DISPUTATIO.
I. Eccii et M. Lutheri Lipsiae habita 1519.

TRANSLATION.
with Critical Introduction and Notes.

THESIS.
submitted to the University of Edinburgh
for the
DEGREE of Ph. D.
by
Rev. ALEXANDER McPHERSON. B.D.

Degree conferred, 26th March, 1931.
In translating the Latin text, which in parts presents considerable difficulty, we have endeavoured to give, so far as possible, the exact equivalent of every word. Only when this has been, through the difficulty of the text, impossible, have we paraphrased the original.

In the Introduction, which begins with a short account of the events leading up to the Disputation, we have thought it best simply to give a summary of the argument of each discussion and add such criticism and notes as the argument suggests.

For the convenience of the examiner the pages of the Translation specially dealt with have been clearly indicated throughout the Summary.
BOOKS
consulted in preparation of Thesis.

Mackinnon -- "Luther and the Reformation".
Scheel -- "Martin Luther".
Hausbrath -- "Luther's Leben".
Köstlin -- "Life of Luther".
Kalkoff -- "Die Entscheidungsjahre der Reformation".
Luther -- "Briefwechsel". Vols. 1. & 2.
Walch -- "Sämtliche Schriften". Vol. 15.
Hefele -- "Conciliengeschichte". Vol. 7.
Lindsay -- "History of Reformation". Vol. 1.
Moeller -- "History of Christian Church".
Kurtz -- "Church History".
Locke -- "The Great Western Schism".
Plumptre -- "The Spirits in Prison".
Bartoli -- "The Primitive Church and the Primacy of Rome".
Hastings -- "Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics".
Clark -- "Saint Augustine".
Thornton -- "Saint Ambrose".
Barmby -- "Gregory the Great".
Schouppe -- "Purgatory".
Graham -- "Purgatory".
Mumford and Thimelby -- "Two Ancient Treatises on Purgatory".

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INTRODUCTION.

An Introduction to the Leipzig Disputation naturally goes back to the day - October 31, 1517 - when Martin Luther nailed his 95 Theses to the door of the Castle Church at Wittenberg. These Theses were a protest against the scandalous traffic in Indulgences which the Roman Curia was then carrying on to fill her empty coffers. In making it, Luther little realised the significance of the step he was taking. Looking back upon it, however, after 400 years, we see that it was one of the great and decisive acts of history. Its date is a red-letter day in the story of the world.

The granting of Indulgences was not a new thing in the history of the Church. Professor MacKinnon tells us how it gradually developed in connection with the penitential system of the Church. In the early Church persons guilty of grave offences were punished by exclusion from the Christian Community till they had rendered satisfaction by submitting to the prescribed penitential discipline. Gradually the practice crept in of rendering this satisfaction in the form of a contribution to some charitable or religious purpose. Then it came to be adopted by many of the clergy as an expedient for raising money, and, later on, for enlisting recruits for the Crusades, who were
assured, in the event of death, of an immediate entrance into heaven. After the Crusades there came the Jubilee Indulgences, in the year 1300, of Boniface VIII, granted to those who visited the Churches of Rome once a day for a period of fifteen or thirty days, and which proved so lucrative to the Roman Curia that subsequent popes reduced the Jubilees from 50 to 33, 25 and even fewer years. The issuing of such Indulgences, the benefits of which were at a later period extended to souls in purgatory, was, of course, supposed to be dependent on confession and contrition, but these conditions were not generally stressed by the Indulgence preachers.¹

Engrossed in world politics, living in splendour such as none of his predecessors ever approached, zealous also to promote the fortunes of his family, Leo X, who had ascended the papal throne some years before Luther's historic act at Wittenberg, naturally found his income inadequate. For the purpose of supplementing it and raising money for the building of St. Peter's Church at Rome, he accordingly proclaimed a general Indulgence. A way to organise this Indulgence in Germany came providentially to hand and to the Pope's undoing.² The Archbishop of Magdeburg, who was also acting bishop at Halberstadt (Albrecht, Prince of Brandenburg and brother of the reigning Elector) had secured

¹. Prof. MacKinnon - "Luther and the Reformation", l. 290-291.
his election to the arch-bishopric of Mayence. The holding of three such offices, however, was forbidden by canon law, and Albrecht could not take over the duties of the second archbishopric without a dispensation from the Pope. This dispensation Leo was unwilling at first to grant. But on pressure being brought to bear on him by the Elector, he finally agreed, on condition that 10,000 ducats were paid over to him, in addition to the customary pallium fees. For this Albrecht had to borrow 31,000 ducats from the house of Fugger at Augsburg; and to enable him to meet his obligations, the Curia suggested that he organise the sale of a Jubilee Indulgence in the provinces under his jurisdiction, one half of the profits to be retained by himself, the other half to go to the Pope. Albrecht, of course, agreed to the suggestion and immediately appointed sub-commissioners, the most notorious, as also the most shameless, of whom was the Leipzig Dominican prior, John Tetzel, to hawk Leo's Indulgences.

Before sending them forth on their unholy errand, the Archbishop issued instructions to his agents. Summarising the principal points of the Papal Bull, they were to emphasise (1) that an Indulgence (the price of which varied according to the social status of the purchaser) secured to confessed penitents "plenary

2. According to Kurtz (Church History II. 233), Tetzel had been sentenced at Innsbruck to be drowned for adultery, but on the intercession of the Elector of Saxony had his sentence commuted to imprisonment for life, and was taken from prison to act as one of Albrecht's sub-commissioners.
IV.

remission of sin, including the punishment due for sin in purgatory; (2) that "it conferred the right to choose a confessor, with the most complete powers to absolve even the gravest sins"; (3) that "it assured to contributors and their dead relatives, now and for ever, participation in the benefit of all the prayers, intercessions, alms, fasts, pilgrimages, masses of the Church militant and all its members, which boon was obtainable even without confession"; (4) that it secured, also without confession and contrition on the part of the contributor, plenary remission of all sins to souls in purgatory.¹.

We have already seen the mercenary motives that underlay the proclamation of this Indulgence. A more scandalous piece of jobbery it would, indeed, be difficult to imagine. Especially scandalous was its application to the souls in purgatory, as if these could have their sufferings alleviated by a contribution on the part of their relatives to the building of St. Peter's - for, of course, the Papal Bull made no mention of the Archbishop and his dealings with the house of Fugger. One wonders how, even in these priest-ridden times, anyone could have been taken in by such nonsense. Nevertheless, the Indulgence preachers seemed to have done a "roaring trade".

Extracts from his sermon show that Tetzel did refer to the necessity of confession and contrition, and

¹. Prof. Mackinnon - "Luther and the Reformation" 1. 292.
distinguished between the remission of guilt and the temporal punishment of sin. He did not, however, make this sufficiently clear to his hearers. What he emphasised was the efficacy of a contribution to the papal money chest. "St. Stephen gave up his body to be stoned, St. Laurence his to be roasted, St. Bartholomew his to a fearful death. Would they not sacrifice a little gift in order to obtain everlasting life"? Then going on to speak of the souls in purgatory, he addressed his hearers thus: "They, your parents and relatives, are crying out to you: We are in the bitterest torments; you could deliver us by giving a small alms, and yet you will not. We have given you birth, nourished you, and left to you our temporal goods; and such is your cruelty that you, who might so easily make us free, leave us here to lie in flames".

Extracts such as these show that, whatever else he possessed, Tetzel had the popular touch. The Archbishop apparently knew what he was doing, when he appointed such a man to help him to wipe out his adverse balance at the house of Fugger.

Leo's Indulgences were eagerly bought by the baser sort and by the ignorant and unreflecting. The better type, however, refused to touch them, and were shocked by the shameless misrepresentation and greed of the commissioners. Men also began to ask why, if the Pope had the power to release departed souls from their sufferings, he did not empty 1.

purgatory out of love. No one, however, dared to protest publicly for fear of Tetzel's biting tongue.

Meanwhile the Indulgence preacher was approaching Wittenberg. Debarred from entering Saxony by the Elector Frederick, who was determined that his country should not be drained of its wealth to aggrandise Rome, he opened his trade at Jüterbock. There, as elsewhere, he did a large business, and not a few crossed the border from Wittenberg to hear him and buy an Indulgence Card. Through some of these Luther had an opportunity of learning at first hand the evil effects of the traffic. They came to him later to confess, and when he refused to grant them absolution, unless they promised amendment, they produced their card and threatened to report him to Tetzel, who was empowered to excommunicate anyone who should dare to criticise or hinder him in the discharge of his office.1

As early as the summer of 1516 Luther had in a sermon warned his people against trusting to Indulgences, and, while expressing himself as not being quite clear in regard to certain important points, plainly showed his aversion to them.2 That aversion was intensified by his discovery in the Confession—al of their baleful effects. But what brought matters to a head was the Archbishop's "Instruction", a copy of which chanced to come into his hand. On reading it, his indignation knew no bounds, and he felt he could no longer keep silence.3 Accordingly

1. Prof. Mackinnon —"Luther and the Reformation" 1. 295.
2. Keestlin — "Life of Luther" 89.
3. Prof. Mackinnon — "Luther and the Reformation" 1. 295.
he nailed his 95 theses to the door of the Castle Church.

These theses were not so much a protest against Indulgences as against their abuse. In publishing them in the manner he did, Luther aimed at a public disputation for the purpose of elucidating the truth, and that for himself as well as others, as he afterwards stated. His main contentions are:

(1). "An Indulgence is and can only be the remission of a merely ecclesiastical penalty; the Church can remit what the Church has imposed; it cannot remit what God has imposed.

(2). An Indulgence can never remit guilt; the Pope himself cannot do such a thing; God has kept that in His own hand.

(3). It cannot remit the divine punishment for sin; that also is in the hands of God alone.

(4). It can have no efficacy for souls in purgatory; penalties imposed by the Church can only refer to the living; death dissolves them; what the Pope can do for souls in purgatory is by prayer, not by jurisdiction or the power of the keys.

(5). The Christian who has true repentance has already received pardon from God altogether apart from an Indulgence, and does not need one; Christ demands this true repentance from everyone.

(6). The Treasury of Merits has never been properly defined, it is hard to say what it is, and it is not properly understood by the people; it cannot be the merits of Christ and of His saints, because these act of themselves and quite apart
from the intervention of the Pope; it can mean nothing more than that the Pope, having the power of the keys, can remit ecclesiastical penalties imposed by the Church; the true Treasure —house of Merits is the Holy Gospel of the grace and glory of God.¹

The disputation which Luther proposed did not take place at the time. Nevertheless his theses created a tremendous sensation. Without his concurrence they were translated into German (Luther wrote his theses in Latin), and circulated through-out the length and breadth of the country, and brought him, as he said, a fame which he did not relish. Not till twenty months had passed did the disputation he desired take place, and then it was at Leipzig, and mainly concerned with a bigger question than that of Indulgences.

The publication of Luther's theses was followed by a series of counter-theses by Tetzel, but whose real author was Conrad Wimpina. Their interest for us lies mainly in this, that he astutely makes the authority of the Pope, on which Luther's theses had significantly, though briefly, touched, the cardinal point at issue. "Christians must be taught", he declared, "that in all that relates to faith and salvation, the judgment of the Pope is absolutely infallible, and that all observances connected with matters of faith on which the Papal see has expressed itself, are equivalent to Christian truths, even if they are not found in Scripture"².

¹Lindsay's History of the Reformation" l. 229.
²Koestlin's "Life of Luther" - p.97.
After Tetzel followed other assailants of Luther's theses, most important of whom was John Eck, professor of theology at the university of Ingolstadt. An attack by Eck was the last thing Luther expected, as Eck had not only cultivated his friendship but also professed sympathy with the new learning. The attack came from his pen under the title of "Obelisks", and, charging Luther with being a heretic and a follower of John Huss, was all the more objectionable, because of the offensive language in which it was couched. When reproached for his breach of friendship, Eck replied in a letter to Carlstadt that he had penned his animadversions at the request of, and to, his bishop, never imagining that they would be published. There is no reason to doubt the truth of his statement. Nevertheless, to write friendly letters to Luther one day and the next to vilify him behind his back, does not prepossess us in favour of the character of Eck.

These, and more particularly the subsequent attacks of his opponents at Rome, led Luther, May 30, 1518, to appeal to the Pope, for whom he still seemed to entertain a sincere regard. He refers to the evil reports that have been circulated against him at Rome, as if he had been trying to belittle the power of the keys, and how he had been branded as a heretic and had had a thousand other ill names hurled at him. His one

1. Walch - Sämtliche Schriften XV. 957.
2. Hausrath - Luther's Leben 1. 196. 
   Prof. Mackinnon - Luther and the Reformation. 11. 32.
source of confidence, however, was an innocent conscience. These attacks, besides, were nothing new; he had suffered from them at home at the hands of men whom he sarcastically refers to as honourable and straightforward people. The reason of all their vilification was that he had dared to raise his voice against the Indulgence preachers, who thought they could say what they liked under the shelter of His Holiness' name, and who, with a disgraceful greed, which could never be satisfied, continued to lead the people captive with their vain consolations, plucking, as Micah says, "their flesh from off their bones", while they themselves wallow in abundance. By using His Holiness' name to allay the uproar they had caused, they had brought the power of the keys and the Pope to be evil spoken of in Germany. His blood boiled within him at beholding all this; accordingly, after raising his voice in protest, he threw down the gauntlet to the learned by issuing his theses for disputation, which he was within his rights in doing, according to the usages of all the universities. Now, what should he do? Retract he cannot. Instead, he is publishing some trifles in explanation of these theses, and likewise sends the same to His Holiness, that he might have the protection of his name and find refuge beneath the shadow of his wings. He significantly reminds the Pope that he can reckon on the protection of others besides His Holiness, namely, the Elector of Saxony, and the whole university of Wittenberg, from which he would have been
expelled had he been the evil person he is represented to be. Therefore he prostrates himself at His Holiness' feet, placing himself and all he has at his disposal. Whatever his verdict may be, even if it be that his life is forfeit, he will recognise the voice of His Holiness to be that of Christ speaking through him.¹

Four months pass and Luther is summoned to appear before the papal legate, Cardinal Cajetan, at Augsburg. Called to retract, he demanded to know wherein he had erred. The Cardinal replied that his views as expressed in his theses were opposed to the Bull Unigenitus of Clement VI., which, he pointed out "explicitly affirmed that Christ by His sufferings had acquired for the Church an infinite treasure, to which the Virgin and the saints had added their quota, and which Christ committed to Peter and his successors as keepers of the keys of heaven to be dispensed by them for the benefit of the faithful."² His teachings was also erroneous, Cajetan continued, in that he maintained that "faith is absolutely necessary to the efficacy of the absolution of sin in the Sacrament of Penance."³ Luther, naturally expecting that he would be permitted to reply, attempted to defend his views, but was informed that all that was permissible to him was to recant. He refused, however, to be denied the right of reply, and the

¹ Briefwechsel. 1. 200.
² and 3. Prof. Mackinnon - Luther and the Reformation. 11. 85.
Cardinal, despite his repeated demands for revocation, was drawn into a heated argument, which was punctuated and ended with the demand to retract. Cajetan was unbending, as a letter of Luther to Spalatin, the Elector's court chaplain, shows:-
"This one thing he kept repeating: Revoke, acknowledge thine error; that is the will of the Pope, be it pleasing unto thee or not."

Luther began to realise that he had nothing to hope for from the Pope. Accordingly, we find him, after his return to Wittenberg, publishing an appeal from the Pope to a General Council. Soon after its appearance a papal decretal was issued on Indulgences, confirming the Bull of Clement VI. It categorically asserted that "the Pope as Peter's successor is invested with the power of the keys. This power includes that of the remission not only of the guilt of sin in the Sacrament of Penance, but of the temporal punishment for actual sins to which the sinner is still liable in accordance with the divine justice. The remission of the temporal punishment is attained by means of Indulgences in virtue of the supernatural merits of Christ and the saints. On this Treasure of Merits the Pope can draw for the benefit of the dead as well as the living, and the remission thereby obtained is valid as far as the specific Indulgence extends.....This doctrine all are bound to teach under pain of excommunication from which only the Pope can absolve."

Things now begin to look threatening for Luther. He had asked for an authoritative statement on Indulgences. Leo complied with his request and threatened him with excommunication unless he revoked. His situation was rendered critical by the appearance on the scene of Charles von Miltitz, as papal Nuntius, bearing in one hand a coveted distinction for the Elector and in the other a demand for the surrender of Luther. But Luther was undismayed. In a letter to Link he had referred to rumours of the approaching arrival of Miltitz, and, after telling him that he is sending him some writings on the transactions at Augsburg, continued: "But much greater things will my pen bring forth. I know not whence these thoughts come to me. In my opinion we are only at the beginning of this business, and the Roman Curia is making a mistake if it thinks it is the end." He adds that he is beginning to think that the Pope is none other than Anti-Christ, of whom Paul speaks.

The result of Miltitz' mission seemed at first, however, to belie Luther's words. Discovering that the Elector had not the slightest intention of surrendering Luther, the Nuntius resolved to try his hand at bringing "the audacious monk" to reason. An interview was arranged, at which, after much fruitless discussion, he secured Luther's promise to observe silence, on condition that his opponents did the same, till his cause

and the charges brought against him were tried before a German bishop.

Such, in brief outline, is the story of Luther from October 31, 1517, up to the events that immediately led to the Leipzig Disputation.

The truce agreed to did not last long. How it came to be broken we will now relate.

During Luther's absence at Heidelberg in April and May, 1518, Carlstadt, his colleague, at the university of Wittenberg, felt himself called upon to reply in a series of theses to the "Obelisks", in which Eck had attacked Luther's 95 theses. This could hardly have been agreeable to Luther who had already replied in a composition called "Asterisks", but which he had contented himself with sending in writing to those who, in like manner, had received Eck's "Obelisks". Hearing of Carlstadt's attack, Eck replied to the Wittenberg theologian in a letter (already partly quoted) in which he excused himself for the tone of his "Obelisks", by stating that they were written for his bishop's eyes alone, and that, if he had thought they would get into the hands of others, he would have written with greater care. He also suggested that Carlstadt should see his opponent, not in himself, but in the men of Frankfurt and in Tetzel. To this Carlstadt replied that he preferred to fight with a lion than with an ass. Thus challenged, Eck sent him a series of

1. Walch - Sämtliche Schriften. XIV. 957.
2. " " " IV. 958.
counter-theses, and demanded a public disputation, proposing the Holy Chair or the Faculty of Paris or Cologne as arbitrators. In October Carstedic forwarded to Eck his theses which dealt with such subjects as penitence, the supreme authority of Scripture, the impotence of the will, the futility of works apart from grace, and declared himself ready for the disputation. When, therefore, Luther set out a few days later for Augsburg, he took with him from Carstedic full authority to settle the conditions with Eck. Given a choice of places, Eck ultimately decided for Leipzig. On December 4, he applied to Duke George of Saxony and the university for permission to hold the disputation. A few days later he published his theses, and, taking the necessary permission for granted, indicated the university as the place where the disputation would be held. The theologians of the university at Leipzig, however, possibly because they felt that Eck's theses revived a controversy which was supposed to be settled by Leo's recent Bull on Indulgences, had no desire to be mixed up in such a disputation. Writing to Luther, Eck says how annoying this was to him. He was glad, however, to inform him that, at his request, the Duke had secured their consent (it was by means of a letter of unheard of coarseness.- Hausrath, Luther's Leben l. 289), and he, therefore, appointed 27th June for the beginning of the disputation.

1. Prof. Mackinnon - "Luther and the Reformation". 11. 130.
2. Haußrath - "Luther's Leben" 1. 286.
fully a month before the letter just quoted, Eck's theses came into his hands, Luther discovered to his amazement that they dealt with points of doctrine, which he himself rather than Carlstadt maintained, regarding penance, purgatory, indulgences, the papal authority to remit sin. Of free-will and grace - the special point at issue between him and Carlstadt - Eck said nothing, and substituted in its place a thesis on the superiority of the Roman Church to other Churches and the supreme power of the Pope: "We deny the contention that the Roman Church was not superior to other Churches before the time of Sylvester (beginning of the fourth century), and, on the contrary, we recognise that he who possessed the seat and the faith of St. Peter was always the successor and the Vicar-General of Christ". This latter thesis (tenth and last of the series) was obviously directed against views which Luther had expressed in his "Resolutions" and subsequent writings, and which Carlstadt would be chary of associating himself with, and most certainly would not defend, seeing that he held his benefice by appointment of the Pope and could be deprived of it by a simple decree of the Curia.

A public disputation on these theses was what Luther had all along been calling for. But he naturally resented the treacherous manner in which he had been treated by Eck. In an open letter to Carlstadt he observed that the man so mindful

1. Prof. Mackinnon - "Luther and the Reformation". 11. 120-121.
2. Hausrath's - "Luther's Leben". 1. 287.
of his word and reliable had let loose on him the frogs or flies which he gave out to be for Carlstadt. Perhaps it was for this that the Holy Spirit had moved the excellent Doctors of the university of Leipzig to refuse to countenance the disputation. Let him be assured that his tricks are perfectly understood, and, if only for the sake of his reputation, be a little more sensible in his stratagems for the future. Meantime, let him gird his sword to his thigh and add to his victories in Lombardy, Bavaria etc. one over Wittenberg, that so he may be able to add to his titles "Saxonica Triumphator". To this, or to another letter not given in Briefwechsel, Eck replied, excusing himself for having virtually challenged Luther, by saying that, since it was he who had disseminated these false and erroneous doctrines in Germany, and Carlstadt was only his seconder, it would be fitting that he appear himself and defend them or disprove the counter-theses, though it would please him better to learn of his rendering obedience to the apostolic Chair and following the teaching of the Fathers of the Church. He also inserted a new thesis (No.13) on free-will and grace against Carlstadt, stating that it had been inadvertently omitted.

That Eck, when he thus challenged Luther, was aware that he had bound himself to silence cannot be proved. It was at any rate the duty of Miltitz to demand that both Carlstadt and Eck

2. Walch - Sämtliche Schriften. XV. 997.
withdraw their challenges. Instead he wrote to the Elector demanding that he impose silence on Luther. This letter was forwarded to Luther who replied:—God was his witness that he was entirely serious in promising silence, and, in spite of the defiant taunts of many of his adversaries, he had held strictly to the agreement. Eck, however, was now seeking the dishonour of the whole university of Wittenberg. Many honourable men, besides, were of opinion that he had been paid to do it. They would close his own mouth and open that of everyone else. His grace would easily understand that the man who would thus attack him was one who otherwise would probably not venture to do so.¹

The Elector declared himself agreeable that Luther take up the challenge. Luther accordingly set about drafting a series of theses, in the last of which, the thirteenth, (in which the main interest of the disputation centred) he stated:—"That the Roman Church is superior to all other Churches is, indeed, proved by the far-fetched decrees promulgated by the Roman pontiffs within the last 400 years. But this ecclesiastical dogma is contrary to the approved histories of the previous 1100 years, the plain teaching of divine Scripture, and the decree of the Council of Nicaea, the most sacred of all the councils."²

¹. Hausrath — "Luther's Leben". 1. 288.
This was a startling statement to make. It went far beyond what any of his friends expected, or, indeed, were prepared at first to accept. They were naturally solicitous for his safety. But for that Luther himself had no fear. To Spalatin, the most fearful of his friends, he writes, that he is not to be anxious, for, unless God had been behind him and his works from the beginning it had been all over with him ere now, if not during the uproar caused by his theses on Indulgences, certainly during his visit to Augsburg. Even now, he is informed, Rome is plotting to get rid of him, not in legal manner, but after the Italian way of poison or the dagger. But when he remembers from what dangers he has already been delivered, he cannot but feel that he has been providentially guarded. Let his friends hold him for mad. The matter will not finish, if it be of God, except, as the disciples did in the case of Christ, all his friends forsake him and the truth is left alone, which saves itself by its own right arm, not by his, nor Spalatin's, nor that of any man. In a word, if he perish, the whole will not go under. The Wittenbergers by the grace of God have already made such progress that they no longer require him. His friends were full of fear. His own and only fear was lest he should prove unworthy to suffer and die for such a cause.

Firmly convinced that God was behind him in the work to which he had put his hand, Luther had no fears. After receiving Eck's theses, he said: "Fiet, ut faciam quae diu cogitavi, ut aliquando libro serio in Romanas lernas invenere!" (I shall do what I have long thought of doing, and penetrate with a serious book into the Roman swamp).\(^1\) In the middle of March he was already zealously occupied in preparing his defence. Following the critical methods of the scholars of the age, he studied the passages in the New Testament adduced in support of the papal claims, as well as those that bore against them. Next he collected the relative passages in the Fathers, together with the decrees of the early Councils, especially that of Nicaea. Then, beginning with the 12th century, he studied the canon law, with which he had not hitherto occupied himself much, regarding the claims of the papacy. The result of his studies, he found, fully confirmed his 13th thesis and proved incontestably that the pretensions of the Pope had no support except in the decretals of the last 400 years.\(^2\) With a view to publication in the event of his not being permitted to reply at Leipzig, he sent his argument in book form to the press. This was "the serious book against the Roman swamp" which, he had told his friends, he was contemplating writing.

1. Werke. 11. 180.
2. Prof. Mackinnon - "Luther and the Reformation". 11. 126
Up till the last moment Luther had no certainty of his being permitted to appear at Leipzig. Duke George of Saxony, while flattered that scholars such as Carlstadt and Eck should select Leipzig for their disputation, had, apparently, an objection to Luther's taking part in it. When the latter, pointing out that he was principally attacked by Eck, applied to him for permission to defend his position personally, he was told that he must first get Eck's consent. But when Luther wrote Eck regarding the matter, his letter was ignored. Twice again he applied to Duke George for permission, but the Duke persisted in his stipulation. When finally Luther appeared at Leipzig, it was under the wing of Carlstadt, whose safe conduct included those whom he might bring with him. 1.

The entrance of the Wittenbergers has been graphically described for us by an eye-witness, Magister Fröschel. The chief person was Carlstadt, who drove in advance alone in a carriage. Then came Luther, accompanied by his friend and colleague, Philip Melanchthon. There followed, with others, the young Duke Barnim of Pomerania, Rector of the University, who brought with him 200 armed students as body-guard to Carlstadt and Luther. Just when the procession had passed through the Grimmel Gate and had reached St. Paul's Churchyard, Carlstadt's carriage broke down, so that the Doctor was thrown in the mud. But Dr. Martin, with Philip Melanchthon drove on.

1. Werke. 11. 250.
and the by-standers, beholding this, said: "He will gain the victory; the other will succumb."  

On the day of their arrival, the Bishop of Merseburg, Chancellor of the University of Leipzig, who from the outset had protested against the disputation, sought to prevent it by affixing to the doors of the Churches, along with the Papal Bull of November 9, 1518, on Indulgences, a mandate forbidding its being held. The Duke, however, had the episcopal prohibition immediately torn down, and sent the person who affixed it to prison. Following upon this, Eck, who, though he had ignored Luther's letter, was burning with desire to measure himself against him, intimated to the Duke that he had no objection to his taking part in the disputation. To the credit of the Duke it must be stated that, though prejudiced against Luther because of the taint of heresy that attached to him, he treated him, once it was decided that he take part in the disputation, with the utmost courtesy, and invited him during his stay at Leipzig three times to his table. So far as the Duke was concerned Luther had no cause to complain. He had reason to do so, however, regarding his treatment by the Leipzig clergy. Not only did they offer him no hospitality; they also refused him access to their pulpits, and even went so far as to stop the celebration of mass on his appearance in

2. Hausrath - " " " " 295.
3. Werke. 11. 251.
4. Prof. Mackinnon - "Luther and the Reformation". 11. 129.
Church. For much of this and other manifestations of hostility Luther had undoubtedly Eck to thank, who had been careful to arrive several days before his antagonist and had utilised the time by exacerbating feeling, already hostile, against him. He had further of Eck's underhand ways before the disputation began. Eck, knowing that not infrequently he owed his victory to audacious and lying statements, refused to allow the notaries who had been granted to Carlstadt and Luther to record the proceedings. Finally, however, he gave in, but insisted that the records be submitted to some theological faculty for judgment. Knowing what such faculties were, Luther strongly objected to this, since he had already appealed from the Pope to a free council. It was only with difficulty that his friends prevailed upon him ultimately to submit. He did so, however, with the reservation that his appeal should stand by law and that the Roman Curia should not have the delivering of the judgment.

Early on the morning of June 27th, the disputation was opened by an address of welcome in the hall of the university, delivered, not by a member of the theological faculty, but by the jurist, Simon Pistorius. After this the company proceeded to the Church of St. Thomas to hear mass, and then to the Pleissenburg (ducal palace), where the youthful Mollaeus, professor of rhetoric, delivered an address, during which "two hour glasses run off", on the right way of disputing.

2. Hausrath- Luther's Leben. l. 298.
3. " " " l. 294.
4. " " " l. 295.
To Mosellanus we are indebted for his interesting sketches, in a letter to Julius von Pflug, of three disputants. Luther is of medium stature and emaciated with care and study that one can almost count his bones. He bears himself, nevertheless, in a brave and manly manner and possesses a clear and melodious voice. His erudition is marvellous and his knowledge of Scripture such that he seems to have it at his fingers' ends. He is also sufficiently acquainted with Greek and Hebrew to test the interpretation of any passage. In conversation he has great wealth of ideas and command of language. In manner he is courteous and kindly, with nothing moody or forbidding about him, and knows how to adapt himself to circumstances. In company he is pleasant, jocose and vivacious, always bright and cheerful in demeanour, however his adversary may press him, so that one must believe that God is with him in his great undertaking. But it is generally admitted that in combating others he is more regardless and biting in speech than becometh a theologian, especially one who is propounding something new. His ability as a disputant was afterwards acknowledged by Eck, who, referring to the Leipzig encounter, quoted Aristotle's remark that when two men dispute together, each of whom has learned the art, there is sure to be a good disputation.

1. Walch sämtliche Schriften. XV. 1422.
2. Köstlin's Life of Luther. 141.
Carlstadt, according to Mosellanus, has the same qualities, but in a lesser degree. He is shorter, besides, in stature, and has a dark-brown, sunburned countenance. His voice, also, is weak and unpleasant, his memory less tenacious and he is more readily moved to anger.

Eck, on the other hand, is tall, broad-chested, and strongly built, with a voice like a town-crier's, harsh rather than distinct, and with nothing pleasant about it. His face, eyes and features suggest a butcher or a soldier rather than a theologian. His memory is prodigious, and, if his intellectual gifts had been equal, he would have been one of nature's masterpieces. He lacks, however, in penetration and acuteness of judgment. He heaps together from Scripture and other sources a mass of unconnected arguments and quotations that have no bearing on the disputation, and thus seeks to impress those who are unable to form a correct judgment. He is full of resource, and, when the argument of his opponent becomes embarrassing, dexterously changes the subject, or, putting the argument in different words, even adopts it as his own and attributes to his opponent the very opposite of what he said. Luther himself, in his last letter to the Pope, characterises his opponent as "the great vainglorious hero, who sparkles and snorts. Inflated with a sense of his importance, he presumes on the papal power, of which he would make use to gain for himself the name of being the supreme theologian in the world."
Such were the antagonists. After the preliminaries, which occupied the whole morning, the theological battle of Leipzig began at 2 p.m. 27th June, 1519, with a disputation, which lasted four days, between Carlstadt and Eck on Free-Will and Grace.

FREE-WILL and GRACE.

Eck maintained the power of free-will - without, however, excluding grace - to produce good works, and quoted in his support Ecclesiasticus (XV. 14-18):- "God at the beginning created man and left him in the hand of his counsel; He gave him also commands and precepts ... Before man is placed life and death, good and evil; what is pleasing unto him shall be given him, since, with great wisdom, God is also strong in power, beholding all things without intermission". The freedom of the will implied here was, he held, not destroyed by the Fall, and quoted Ambrose, Augustine and Bernard in support, though, with these Fathers, he admitted it was injured.

Carlstadt, who maintained the complete impotence of the will and that grace alone is the source of a good work, objected to Eck's appeal to the Fathers. For Bernard writes:- "Man has fallen from being able not to sin into not being able not to sin"; Augustine:- "Man has become captive to the devil, whom he prefers to serve rather than God"; and Ambrose speaks of
free-will apart from grace as being a vague, uncertain thing that can do nothing that is acceptable unto God. (Pages 4-8).

The wordy warfare of texts has now begun. It is not altogether a satisfactory way of carrying on the disputation, for few men are entirely consistent in their utterances; besides, the passages quoted from their works, when torn from their setting by an unscrupulous disputant - and Eck as we have seen was not over-scrupulous - may totally misrepresent their views. Whether thus guilty in the present instance or not, he replied to Carlstadt that he did not quote Ecclesiasticus as supporting the doctrine that free-will has the power to accomplish good works without grace - for that was the damnable heresy of the Pelagians. All he meant to infer from the passage was that the will was not to be regarded as merely passive in a good work, but as rather co-operating with grace. In support of this he quoted Matthew XXV. 20: "Lord, Thou deliveredst unto me five talents; behold, I have gained - - - five talents more". (page 9).

Carlstadt boldly replied that the words of the servant, if he had spoken rightly were really to be understood as meaning: - "It is not I that have gained them, but the grace of God that is with me", just as Paul says: "I laboured more abundantly - - - - - -yet not I, but the grace of God that is with me! (Page 11).

Eck takes exception to the words: "If that servant had spoken rightly" which his opponent had afterwards to admit were indiscreet. (page 12) He might also have taken exception to Carlstadt's interpreting the servant's words, which were Christ's
words, according to the Pauline doctrine of grace; for, while
the Holy Spirit had been working in men's hearts from the
beginning, grace could not operate till after Christ's Resurrection-
ion from the dead and ascension to heaven. Seemingly it did not
occur to him to do so. But he rightly maintained that he was
entitled to argue from Carlstadt's interpretation of the passage
that free-will worked as well as grace. This, he said, followed
inevitably from the little word "mecum" (with me) in the
quotation from St. Paul. (page 12). Carlstadt replied that Eck
shockingly twisted the apostle's words and meaning. He argued
better, however, when he quoted the Baptist:—"A man can receive
nothing except it be given him from heaven", and supported these
words with those of Ambrose:—"Grace so acts — — that she first
prepares the will in him whom she calls, to be the receiver and
servant of her good works". (pages 16-17). Instead of acknowledg­ing this, Eck, he says, attributes a special activity to
free-will in good works and thereby makes her a queen. He will
have nothing to do with such teaching. Good works are entirely
of God and only become ours through being conferred on us by
the divine clemency. (pages 17 and 18).

Eck is compelled to change his ground. He admits that
he has spoken of free-will as a queen. In doing so, however, he
was comparing her with man's lower powers. Compared with grace
and God she is only a servant and handmaid. He agreed with
Augustine who, in speaking of the relation between grace and
free-will, compared it to that between a rider and his horse. While maintaining the freedom of the will, nothing was further from his thoughts than asserting that free-will has a special activity which does not proceed from grace. Every good gift, as St. James says, is from above. He was, therefore, in entire agreement with Ambrose who made the will the receiver of the gifts and the servant of the same. (pages 19-21)

Having got these admissions, Carlstadt thought he had nothing to do but wind up the argument. But Eck artfully contended that the time was up, and that he had not conceded everything. An hour later he continued his argument. Referring to Paul's words:—"Yet not I, but the grace of God that is with me", he pointed out (quoting Bernard) that the apostle, while he might have said "through me", preferred to say "with me", meaning that he was not a servant in the sense of being the instrument, but the associate or helper, as it were, of the Worker by consent. (pages 21-22). This practically contradicted, as Carlstadt pointed out, his former admission. Quoting further from Bernard, Eck held, however, that while man in the performing of a good work is the associate and helper of the Worker by consent, the two, nevertheless, work unitedly in such a manner that what is begun by grace is accomplished by both together, the efforts of the one intermingling with those of the other, and thus form but one cause. (pages 22-23).

In reply Carlstadt ventured to correct Eck's quotation about the rider and his horse, Augustine's words being
being, he stated: "And he puts him on His horse, on the help, that is to say, of the grace of His incarnation; for, as it is written: He hath borne our sins". The similitude, he said, was therefore greater, namely, that free-will bears the relation to grace that a wounded man bears to the beast on which he is borne. (page 24). Eck, however, would not allow that he had quoted Augustine incorrectly, and, giving book and chapter, quoted the exact words:—"I think that free-will may rightly be compared to a beast of burden—therefore, also, hath it been written: I am become as a beast of burden before Thee—and grace to him that sits upon it". (page 28). Whether Carlstadt was quoting another and contradictory passage, or whether his memory failed him, we cannot say, as, unlike Eck, he gave no reference. He admitted, however, that free-will may be regarded as a beast of burden in the sense that it has to be broken in for good works, but maintained that, in order that it (free-will) may be restored to health, grace is also rightly called a beast of burden (the reference being probably to the Samaritan's ass which bore the wounded Jew). (Pages 30-31). We will not question the truth of Carlstadt's conclusion. But what an unnecessary and tedious multiplication of words about a figure of speech which Eck accepted in praise of grace, and which, while differing from that which Carlstadt, correctly or incorrectly, attributed to Augustine, equally supported his doctrine of the all-importance of grace. Unfortunately, there
are only too many similar instances of aimless multiplication of words by both disputants, and we do not wonder that their hearers went to sleep and had to be awakened for dinner.

Replying to Eck's quotation from Bernard about grace and free-will working unitedly in the accomplishment of a good work, Carlstadt pointed out that there immediately follows after it the statement: The whole, indeed, is accomplished by the latter, i.e. free-will, and the whole is accomplished by the former, i.e. grace, but as the whole is in the one, i.e. in free-will, so the whole is accomplished by the other, i.e. grace. The meaning, therefore, is that grace does the good work in free-will. This is clear, he added, from what follows:—"God is the author of salvation; free-will is only capable of receiving it — — — — therefore free-will rather receives good works than effects them; yea, by no means does it do good works". (pages 25-26). Eck, who had quoted only as much from Bernard as suited his purpose, did not attempt to answer these quotations. Instead, he said that Carlstadt, as the respondent, was not entitled to bring them forward, and demanded a categorical answer to the question whether, in the light of what he (Eck) had quoted from Bernard (and others), free-will was to be regarded as entirely passive in a good work. When the question was put to him in this direct manner, Carlstadt, shifting his ground somewhat, admitted that free-will has a certain activity received from grace, adding, however, that he had
never denied this, but only that free-will has a special and natural activity in good works. (Page 30). Eck naturally claimed that Carlstadt had now subscribed to his views, but added (as Carlstadt had previously done in regard to Eck) that he suspected that his antagonist's views, as expressed in his theses and elsewhere, remained unaltered. (Page 31). Carlstadt expressed his amazement that his opponent should make such a statement, and retaliated by pointing out that Eck had assigned a special and natural activity of its own to free-will and then admitted that it had no activity in a good work except what proceeded from grace. (Page 34).

Eck's readiness in reply obviously failed him for the moment. To hide his confusion he interrupted Carlstadt's speech by objecting, which he might have done at any time during the two days the debate had lasted, to his opponent's use of paper and books, and insisted that he rely entirely upon memory. The rulers of the assembly supported Eck, and, on Carlstadt's refusing to fall in with their decision, the meeting broke up in uproar. The disputation, it was thought, had come to an end. On the following day, however, it was resumed, when Carlstadt, having apparently been induced (though later on he again gave Eck cause to make the same objection) to comply, returned to his charge of inconsistency against his opponent. (Pages 34-36).

Eck, whose utterances had not been consistent, replied that, in adding the help of grace, he had given to the will, not a natural, but a supernatural activity. He added, however, in
opposition to Carlstadt, that to have an activity communicated by another is to have that activity as one's own. (page 37).

This latter statement led Carlstadt to ask, with a reference to Eck's quotation from Bernard, how there could be two causes of the same good work, each of which produced the whole. For unless one of the causes, he added, thereby justifying Eck's suspicion that he still held by his published views - contributed to the result merely in a passive manner and the other actively, it was hardly conceivable how the whole work could be entirely produced by either of them. (page 38). The matter was very simple, Eck replied, to anyone who had the slightest knowledge of philosophy. But Carlstadt objected to Eck's introduction of heathenish philosophy into a theological argument, and demanded a straight answer to the question: Is a good work, the whole of it, due to God, or is it not? (page 39). Eck's answer was that his opponent asked what had already been answered, for he could not but know that God in effect produces the whole of a meritorious work - but not entirely. (totum sed non totaliter). (page 40). To such an answer the obvious reply was ridicule. Carlstadt, however, probably wanting to impress the assembly with his knowledge of the scholastic theology, which was partly based on the logic and philosophy of Aristotle, the introduction of which by Eck into the disputation he had objected to, insinuated that his opponent's views did not represent those of the scholastics. He quoted Capreolus and Scotus as holding that
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free-will effects the essence of a good work, which can continue till God infuses His grace. (pages 42 and 45). But Eck nowhere recollected having read such a statement in any scholastic theologian. The gist of it, nevertheless, is found in Scotus (cf. Harnack's History of Dogma VI. 308-309). Accordingly Carlstadt scores.

Carlstadt's reference to the scholastics led Eck to bring forward in their support the dictum of Augustine which, he said, was quoted with approval by them: The beginning of our salvation springs from the compassionate God; to submit to His health-bringing inspiration is in our power; to attain to what, through such submission, we desire, is the gift of God; not to fall away, after having obtained the gift of salvation, is in our power aided by the divine help. Eck held that, in these words, Augustine, while maintaining that salvation is of God, does not exclude the co-operation of the human will, for he says: To submit --- is in our power. (page 44). Carlstadt's reply was that his opponent ought to have looked to what follows, where it is laid down as axiomatic: "If anyone affirms that he can, through natural strength and without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, act in accordance with evangelical teaching, he is deceived by a heretical spirit". (page 48). Carlstadt's quotation from Augustine showed how Eck's was to be interpreted. It was also a reminder to him of his former admission, namely, that nothing was further from his thoughts than asserting that free-will has a special activity which does not proceed from
Parallel with the argument from Augustine there runs one from St. Bernard. But where Augustine made four steps in the assigning to grace and free-will of their respective activities, St. Bernard mentions only three: (1) the beginning is of God; (2) submitting to His inspiration is of the will; (3) grace is of God alone. (Page 44). The conclusion to be drawn, however, is the same, namely that, while emphasising the pre-eminence of grace, free-will must also be recognised as playing a part. Carstadt's refutation of the conclusion is also the same, namely, by further quotation from St. Bernard:—"The words are not mine but the apostle's, who attributes all that comes under the category of good, that is, thinking, willing and performing according to the will that is good, to God and not to his own will." Our comment, also, is the same. (Page 49).

Having displayed his knowledge of the scholastic theology and replied to Eck's quotations from Augustine and Bernard, Carstadt turned to what he should have directed himself at first — his opponent's answer to the question:— Is a good work, the whole of it, of God, or is it not? The obvious answer, we have said, was ridicule; for, while we cannot but have considerable sympathy with Eck's views, the form in which he
expressed them was absurd. But, unlike Luther, Carlstadt did not have the wit for ridicule. He could only say, and he seems to say it very solemnly, that it sounded strange in his ears, that the whole of a good work is produced by God, but not entirely (page 49); and then proceeded to marshall his interminable, although, we must admit, very pertinent quotations:- (1) from Augustine: We therefore will, but God works in us also to will; we therefore act, but God works in us also to act according to his good will; to which Eck's reply was that God naturally works in us to will; for, apart from what is worked by man, He bestows nothing; (2) from the Collect: God of Hosts, whose is everything that is excellent: to which Eck replied that he admitted that every excellent gift is from above; (3) from Cyprian's sixth epistle to the martyrs: Christ was present in his conflict; He raised up, strengthened and inspired the men who fought for Him — — — and always does He conquer in us: to which Eck replied, that the good work, while of God, yet comes about through the co-operation of man, and quoted St. Paul: "For we are fellow labourers with God", which words, he said, maintain the power of free-will; (4) from 2. Chron. XXI.15: Thus saith the Lord, Fear not, nor be afraid of this multitude, for the battle is not yours but God's: to which Eck replied, as also to Carlstadt's quotation (5) from 1. Chron. XXIX.16: "Thine are all things and we have given unto Thee what we have received from Thy hand", that no one is so stupid and ignorant as not to know that everything that is good must be
attributed to God; (6) from Jerome: And that we may know that every good thing we do is of God, He says: "I will give them thoughts and understanding that they may come to know me." But if thoughts and understanding, said Carlstadt, are given by God, where then was there room for all this proud extolling of free-will? From this it may be inferred, he continued, that good works are, all of them, of God. But when his opponent says "not entirely", he lays himself open to the charge of siding at one and the same time with those whose views conflict, the one with the other, i.e. the teachers of the Church and the scholastics. Of course, Carlstadt's logic here is irresistible. But he is not quite so convincing when he congratulates his opponent that he has come round to his opinion that the whole of a good work is produced by God. Eck is also equally unconvincing when he claims that Carlstadt has come round to his opinion. The truth is that each had admitted, or for the most part admitted what the other had brought forward, and then proceeded to argue as if no such admission had ever been made. (pages 49-55).

Before replying to Carlstadt's texts as above, Eck returned to the argument from Augustine and Bernard. Regarding his quotation from the former, in which the Father, he held, while maintaining that salvation is of God, does not rule out the cooperation of the human will, he complained that Carlstadt made no direct reply to his contention, but only sought to invalidate it by other, and, as it seemed to him, opposing
This may not be the correct way of disputing; but in the present instance, where Eck, according to his custom, quoted only what supported his own particular views, Carlstadt was undoubtedly justified in simply replying with an opposing passage from the same author in support of his own. He was also justified in retorting that Eck had made no reply – for what reply Eck made amounted to nothing – to his opposing quotation (p. 57). After thus retorting, he maintained that, when Scripture says we have the power of accomplishing good works, it is to be understood that such power is given by God, and in support of his statement again quoted Augustine. Eck assented to this, but stated, that he had already acknowledged that free-will receives its activity in a good work from God, and added in words equivalent to what he had said on the second day of the disputation, that to have an activity communicated by another is to have that activity as one's own (p. 58). From this he concluded that Augustine made his statements to harmonise with free-will.

Eck next returned to St. Bernard whom he had quoted as supporting the freedom of the will in the 2nd of his statements—"submitting to His inspiration is of the will". Carlstadt had refuted this by further quotation from Bernard, to which Eck made no answer, but maintained that because of consent something is attributed to us. Carlstadt replied that the contrary is the case and further quoted, though not very happily, from Bernard: "Although not of (out of-ex.) us, nevertheless not now without us". The continuation was more direct: "We must be on our guard,
therefore, that when we feel this stirring invisibly within and with us, we do not ascribe it to our will which is weak, but to grace alone". (Page 57). In his reply Eck seemed at first to have come round to his opponent's views. The words he spoke sound as if they proceeded from Carlstadt: "The particle "of" or "from" (ex) points to a certain and, as it were, original and primal source, whence the action or work springs. But since the will cannot impel to good except it has itself been influenced, therefore St. Bernard very rightly denies that the good work proceeds from us. In this he agrees entirely with the apostle, that we do nothing of ourselves, that is of ourselves alone, but through the prevenient grace of God". The continuation, however, is purely Eccian; for, quoting Ambrose, he maintained that, though the righteous are moved by the Spirit of God, this does not necessarily rule out the freedom of the will. (Page 59). Eck, therefore, except that he makes a stronger acknowledgement of the part played by grace, apparently stands where he was. Carlstadt in his reply concedes a measure of co-operation on the part of free-will. "For no one is so ignorant ", he says, "as to deny that those who will do will and those who work do work". He had, however, on the second day of the disputation conceded this, when he admitted that free-will has a certain activity received from grace. He, nevertheless, maintained that, if it be proved that a good work proceeds, the whole of it, from both, that is, that it is effected by God and received by free-will, then obviously such
a work results, the whole of it, entirely from God. He supported
his statement from Augustine's Encheiridion, "- - - - the whole
is given by God, who both prepares the good will of man to be
helped, and, having prepared it, helps it."(page 60).

Eck's answer is quibbling and ridiculous. "The Doctor
says that I have admitted that good works are given by God. I
deny it. Not that I deny that good works are given. My
objection is that he assumes I have made the admission. I
admitted that the power of changing the will for the better is
given by God. But it is another thing to say that the power
of a good work is given, which the Doctor takes for one and the
same thing." The distinction drawn in the latter part of this
statement may have been real to Eck; we can only say that we
are unable to appreciate it. Nor does he talk more to the
point, when, referring to Carlstadt's contention that a good
work is effected by God and received by free-will, he says that
his opponent contradicts what he had already admitted, namely,
that free-will has an activity of its own. For Carlstadt
never made any such admission. He had, it is true, just said
that no one is so ignorant as to deny that those who will do
will, and those who work do work. But he did not mean that it
was to be inferred from this that free-will has an activity of
its own. All he meant was that free-will has, as he had already
admitted, a certain activity received from grace.(pages 62-63).

Referring to Carlstadt's quotation from Augustine:
"The whole is given by God, who both prepares the good will of
of man to be helped, and, having prepared it, helps it", Eck rightly pointed out that Augustine, while he says that the whole of a good work is of God, does not thereby deny the co-operation of free-will, but only asserts the pre-eminence of God and grace; for obviously, if God helps the good will of man, free-will must be allowed to have a certain activity. He is at one, however, with Augustine in the pre-eminence given to grace. For further on he says: "We can do nothing that is pleasing to God except God helps, who gives grace without recompense"; and adds: "The good work that proceeds from grace is, therefore, very rightly called the gift of God and our merit, according to the word of Augustine: When God crowns our merits He crowns His own gifts". (pages 63-64).

The final phase of the disputation is interesting, in part even amusing. After thanking Eck for his admission that good works are the gift of God, Carlstadt gives an unexpected turn to the argument by asking what effect or activity the rod has with which the pedagogue chastises his pupil. Eck, obviously, not too sure of what he may be committing himself to, replies, after a long preamble, to this sapphious - as he calls it - question of Carlstadt, that the rod has an effect or activity in so far as it is directed by the hand of the master himself. Having received this answer, Carlstadt triumphantly hurls at his opponent the words of Isaiah (x.15):"Shall the axe boast itself against him that heweth therewith, or shall the
the saw magnify itself against him by whom it is drawn, or
the rod against him by whom it is lifted up?" The answer, of
course, is "No". Therefore, says Carlstadt, free-will cannot
say that the good work is not entirely of God; for, if it
speaks thus, it boasts itself against the Lord. But Eck dis­
allows the argument. The words of Isaiah do not permit of such
an application, for in the one case the instrument is inanimate,
whereas in the other it is animate, even the soul itself. All
that Carlstadt is permitted to infer from the prophet's words,
he adds, is that we ought not to boast ourselves in our good
works, which, remembering the apostle's exhortation: "Let him
who glories glory in the Lord", none but the most foolish will
deny. Carlstadt replies that, regarding the permissibility of
comparing free-will with the inanimate instruments of the
prophet, he is content to have behind him the authority of
Jerome. Eck may refuse to allow it. Well, it does not matter.
He continues to hold by the opinion that the good work which
free-will, when moved by grace, accomplishes, is the gift of
God. Further, he would like to know which of the teachers of the
Church has anywhere said that a good work is, the whole of it,
of God, but not entirely. Unless he is mistaken, he says, this
is nothing more than a theatrical absurdity of his own creation.
Eck wittily replies that, in asking such a question, Carlstadt
is simply doing what Arius did when he jeeringly asked
Athanasmus where the word Homousia was to be found in Scripture.
The fact is, he sapiently adds, that in theology they labour
under the difficulty that there are more matters in it than names for them. Since Carlstadt clearly understands his position and meaning, there is no sense in catching at words. He wants to say in conclusion that the whole of a good work is of God, but because it does not take place without the co-operation and activity of free-will, he had added, lest he should deny that co-operation, that it is not entirely of God; and that is to put the matter fully and in few words. Therefore, let the Doctor condemn his views and not quarrel about words. (pages 65-68).

With this the disputation ends. So far as the argument is concerned it might have done so on the third day of the debate; for the position of both parties at the close is exactly what it was then. Hausrath awards the palm of victory to Eck. We incline to think, however, that Carlstadt had the best of the argument. The impression he made on his audience was admittedly bad. He lacked the fluency, alertness and especially the memory of Eck. Again and again, apparently, after Eck's objection to his use of paper and books, he required to be prompted by a whispered word from Melancthon, so that his opponent had finally to command: "Tace, Philippe, tua cura negotia!" But so far as the record of the notaries is concerned, he certainly maintained his thesis as well as Eck did his. As also his opponent, he had been forced to change his ground, but

1. Hausrath — "Luther's Leben". l. 297.
he unmistakably scored when, in reply to his question: "Is a good work, the whole of it, due to God or is it not?" he reduced Eck on the third day to the quibbling reply: "Yes, it is, the whole of it, but not entirely". (totum sed non totaliter) With this reply, which, he said, put the matter in few words, Eck wound up the debate. With this reply, however, he practically gave his case away. He began by emphasising the freedom of the will and its power to bring forth meritorious works. He ended by emphasising, while also insisting on the co-operation and activity of the will, the part played by God and grace. Carlstadt, also, as we have shown, somewhat shifted his ground. For, if he did not change the emphasis, as his opponent had done, he nevertheless admitted that the will has a certain activity received from grace. The final positions of the two disputants, therefore, while not exactly the same, do not seem to differ materially. And leaving it at that, we willingly give up what Eck called disputing about troublesome words. We cannot surrender the freedom of the will. A number of teachers, it is true, have in recent times denied its freedom. Their arguments, however, shatter on the moral consciousness of man. The moral law within implies a certain ability to fulfil its behests. This was also recognised by St. Paul, to whom Carlstadt appeals in support of his thesis, in the admission that there were Gentiles who did by nature the things contained in the law (Romans 11. 14). Besides, if there were not such ability,
what purpose could the apostle's multitudinous exhortations have served? The freedom of the will cannot be ruled out. From the Holy Spirit, however, comes every impulse that makes it will the good. From grace, also, comes its most powerful help to perform it. And that is the conclusion of the matter.

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THE PAPACY.

On the morning following the preceding disputation, Luther entered the arena to contend with Eck on the claims of the Papacy. Unlike that on Free-will and Grace, this was a disputation of engrossing interest and vital importance. The thesis (see page XVIII), which Luther was to defend, was one of startling boldness. From a divine, it reduced the Papacy to a purely human institution that owed its sovereign power to the decretals of the last 400 years. No wonder that Luther's friends thought he was going too far and trembled for his safety. But the Reformer stood on firmer ground than they imagined. For himself he had no fear, and, if the supports on which the monarchic claims of the papacy were based should be driven from beneath it, then that was the concern of Eck who had forced this disputation upon him.

Eck began by maintaining that the monarchic constitution of the Church existed by divine right, being formed by Christ—witness His words: The Son can do nothing but what
He seeth the Father do - after the likeness of the Church triumphant. (page 73). Luther rightly replied that these words of Christ referred neither to the Church militant nor triumphant, but to His equality with the Father. He admitted that the Church had a head, but that Head was Christ Himself. If the Pope were the head, then on his death the Church would be without a head till a successor was appointed. (pages 76-77). This argument Eck called commonplace but was unable to refute without more or less giving his case away; for, to his reply that the College of Cardinals assumed the powers of the Pope till they elected another, Luther retorted that at the time when there were no cardinals there could have been no pope. (pages 83 and 90).

Eck had appealed to Scripture in support of his thesis; but more cogently Luther quoted 1. Cor. XV. 25: "For He must reign till He hath put all enemies under His feet", and other similar passages. (page 75). Then, referring to a quotation of Eck's from Cyprian, he says that, if his opponent rests his case on the African Father, they may as well bring their disputation to an immediate end; for the same holy Father never salutes the Roman Pontiff otherwise than as his beloved brother—a form of address which implies equality of rank. This equality is further maintained by Cyprian in the words: "No bishop tyrannically compels his colleagues to obedience since every bishop follows his own judgment regarding the exercise of his freedom and power. (page 78). Moreover the most holy Nicene
Council in its enactments regarding the election and confirmation of bishops says nothing of the primacy of the bishop of Rome. Also, to a quotation from Jerome that "the safety of the Church depends upon the dignity of the Supreme Pontiff, to whom, though not without his having been chosen, a certain authority, exceeding that of all others, must be given", Luther replies that according to Jerome's words the authority of the papacy springs not from divine but from human law; also that Jerome, while willing for the prevention of heresy to grant the Roman Pontiff a certain authority exceeding that of others, maintains that all bishops, whatever their standing, fill one and the same priestly office; and this was likewise the opinion of the African Council, which moreover expressly decreed that the Roman Pope was not to be called a universal pope. Apart from this, he points out, the Greek Church, up to their own time, had not acknowledged the Roman primacy, and yet had not on that account been declared heretical. (pages 79-80).

Eck in reply states that he believes in the headship of Christ as well as his opponent. The fact that Christ is the Head of the Church does not, however, rule out a subordinate head; and that there is such a subordinate head he further proves from St. Bernard: "Let no one belittle the constitution of the Church, for it has its pattern in heaven. For the Son can do nothing but what He seeth the Father do, And as in heaven there are seraphim and cherubim and others up to angels and archangels arranged under one Head, i.e. God, so here under one
one Supreme Pontiff there are primates, bishops, priests etc". The meaning of Bernard plainly is, he says, that as Christ is the Head of the Church triumphant, so the Pope as His vicar is the head of the Church militant. Further, regarding his opponent's statement that no one had declared the Greek Church to be heretical, he quotes Jerome and emphatically maintains that by falling away from the Roman Church it was heretical, as likewise were the Churches of Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria and Bohemia. Because they were not founded on the rock, the gates of hell had prevailed against them. The Roman Church alone, whose head was the successor of the Fisherman upon whom Christ had founded the Church, had preserved the infallible truth of Christ. It mattered not that the African Council had decreed that its pontiff should not be styled a universal bishop. As the vicar of Christ he remained the bishop of the universal Church, which was the more correct designation. (pages 81-88).

To Eck's quotation from St. Bernard Luther was unable to reply, as formerly, by further quoting his opponent's author. He could, therefore, only oppose it. He revered St. Bernard, he said; he did not despise his opinion. Nevertheless, the word of Scripture, when understood aright, must stand above that of all the saints. According to the obvious meaning of that word, therefore, he must oppose the divine right of the papacy. He was willing to grant the Roman Pope, as he could not but grant to Peter, whose successor Eck claimed the Roman Pontiff to be,
the prerogative of honour, but not of power. So far as concerned the latter, the Pope could by no argument drawn from scripture be held to have more than any other bishop. In no way would he acknowledge the foolish decree of Pelagius:—where there is greater dignity there is greater power, and others are under necessity to obey. (pages 90-92).

To Luther's statement that he stood by the word of Scripture, Eck replied by quoting in support of the papal claims Matthew XVI. 18: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." (page 112). On this text the disputation now for some time hinges. Eck's argument takes the form of the familiar syllogism—Peter is the Rock; the Pope is his successor; therefore the Pope exercises his authority by divine right. Further, Christ thus appointed him to rule that the unity of the Church might be preserved. In support of his interpretation of the passage Eck quotes Bernard, Cyprian, Jerome, Chrysostom, Augustine, Ambrose, St. Leo, Anacletus, Marcellus, and Pelagius. (pages 112-114). Luther replies and very truly that the Fathers are self-contradictory in their utterance. He claims, however, that they speak more frequently in his support than in his opponent's. This would seem to be borne out by students of patristic literature. It is doubtful, 1.

1. According to Mgr. Waterworth in his "Commentary by Writers of the First Five Centuries on the Place of St. Peter in the New Testament", over thirty Fathers and writers of the
however, whether Luther maintained his assertion regarding the Fathers quoted by Eck. St. Bernard he had already recognised as being opposed to him. Cyprian he claims (perhaps a little too strongly—see quotation from Cyprian below) to be almost entirely on his side (page 157). Jerome he had already claimed and again claims, though not absolutely convincingly, as supporting him. Chrysostom was strongly in his favour (see quotation below); though he seems according to his reply (p. 82)

first five centuries call Peter the Rock, but many of them qualify their statement in other parts of their works; a greater number call Christ the Rock, although not so as to exclude Peter, as a secondary rock, or foundation, of the Church; others, such as Origen and Jerome say that the Church was built on Peter, but not to the exclusion of the other apostles; and finally, about twenty hold that the Church was founded on the rock of the faith professed by Peter, when he said: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God"—quoted from Bartoli – the Primitive Church and the Primacy of Rome, pp. 50-51.

2. "The Lord saith to Peter:—I say unto thee that thou art Peter, and upon this rock etc. To him, again, after His resurrection, He says:—Feed my sheep. Upon him, being one, He builds His Church; and though He gives to all the apostles an equal power, and says:—As the Father hath sent me, even so I send you; receive ye the Holy Ghost, whosoever sins ye remit etc., yet in order to manifest unity, He has, by His own authority, so placed the source of the same unity as to begin from one. Certainly, the other apostles were what Peter was, endued with an equal fellowship, both of honour and power; but a commencement is made from unity, that the Church may be set before us as one". Cyprian —"de unitate", page 393. Quoted from Bartoli, page 82.

3. According to Waterworth, Jerome held that the Church was built on Peter, but not to the exclusion of the other apostles. (See Bartoli page 51).

4. "What, then, says Christ? —Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona, because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee — — — — and I say to thee that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, that is, on the faith of the confession. (Chrysostom on Matthew XVI.——quoted from Bartoli page 57).
to have forgotten the relative passage. Likewise was Augustine, who, though he had spoken of Peter as the rock on which the Church was founded, afterwards retracted, "It was not said to him: Thou art Petra (a rock) but Petros (a stone); but the Petra was Christ whom Peter confessed (lib. I Retract. xxl. l. pp. 67,68.)" He somewhat weakly adds, however;—"Harum autem duarum sententiarum quae sit probabilior eligat lector". Ambrose also was claimed by Luther (page 121) to be on his side, but he might have substantiated his claim better by quoting from "De Incarnatione", where the Father speaks of Peter's pre-eminence as "a primacy of confession, not of honour, a primacy of faith, not of order"; and adds:—"Faith, therefore, is the foundation of the Church, for, not of the flesh of Peter, but of his faith, was it said that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it". (Bartoli p.56) The remainder of Eck's authorities he summarily dismissed as interested parties or framers of the law (page 166). However, it may be whatever about the Fathers generally, Luther does not prove convincingly that, regarding the interpretation of Matthew XVI, those quoted by his opponent were for the most part in his favour. His exegesis of the passage (p.170), however, is incontrovertible. There is always the possibility, of course, that it did not form part of the original text, for it is absent from the other synoptic Gospels. But taking the passage as it stands, it cannot be interpreted as making Peter the rock on which the Church is founded. This is
clear when we go to the Greek text: "Thou art Peter (Petros) and on this rock (petra) I will build my Church". The two words, though akin, are different in meaning, "Petros" signifying a stone and "petra" a rock. If the words were actually spoken by Christ, those who heard them would at once recognise something of the difference involved. Assuming their authenticity, obviously, Christ, if he meant Peter to be the foundation of the Church, would not have dropped the word "Petros" and employed "petra" in its stead. It is clear, therefore, that the rock (petra) refers to something else.

What is that something else? Ambrose, with most of the Fathers, says that it is Peter's confession of Jesus as the Christ, the Son of the living God. This is the most obvious interpretation, nor do we see that anything can be urged against it, for, in effect, it makes Christ Himself, as proclaimed by all the apostles, to be the foundation of the Church.

Eck's other quotations from Scripture serve him as little as that just considered. From the words: "But he that is greater among you" (Luke xxii. 26), he argues, quoting Richard Armacanus (page 104), that Christ gave the apostles to understand that there was a greater, and says that He indicated who that greater was when He said: "Satan hath desired to have you that he may sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for thee that
thy faith fail not, and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren". (Luke XXII. 31-32). In these words addressed to Peter he says that Christ declared the apostle's superior dignity. The discussion (pages 104, 105, 109, 111, 119, 128) that followed on their interpretation is too insignificant to dwell upon at length. Eck, possibly bases his argument on the fact that in the words addressed to Peter the pronoun "you" is plural, and may be taken as referring to all the apostles, whereas "thou" is singular and must refer to Peter alone. But the point is too trivial to base an argument on it for the primacy of Peter. All that the words mean would seem to be, as Dr. Weir points out, that Christ "foresaw that His apostles would be exposed to great trials, and that all of them would forsake Him, and that He desired that when they returned, Peter, who had so often taken the lead among them, should seek to strengthen his brethren".

The other passage on which Eck rests the primacy of Peter (page 157) is John XXI. 15 ff :- "Feed my sheep". In support of his interpretation of this passage he claims Gregory, Jerome, Ambrose and Chrysostom, and quotes the latter: "Peter was the most eminent of the apostles, the mouth of the apostles and the head of the College; therefore, when his denial was atoned for, Christ committed to him the oversight of the brethren etc". Eck further claims (pages 157-158) that in the

1. Romanism and Protestantism. page 15.
command: "Feed my sheep", Christ fulfilled His promise (Matt. XVI.) to build His Church on Peter. Luther rightly replies that the passage will not bear the construction put upon it. No privilege is conferred, only a command is given by it (p.175). He respects the opinions of the Fathers, nevertheless, he holds by the rule of Augustine (page 194) that the words of all writers are to be judged by divine Scripture, which must count for more than the understanding of the whole human race. Therefore, since the word "feed", according to the ordinary signification and the usage of Scripture, means nothing but to teach, to tend the sheep, in which sense Peter himself used it when he wrote: "The elders, therefore, among you I exhort, who am a fellow elder — tend the flock of God that is among you", his opponent was not entitled to give it the double signification he did, in order to support the Roman primacy. This, and especially the reference to Peter in the passage quoted, where the apostle claims no pre-eminence, was sufficient answer to Eck's argument. But he also points out to his opponent that, if he is to base the primacy on these words of Christ, it becomes a thing of nought, as it is not granted except on the condition of love; and, since it is uncertain who loves Christ, it must also be uncertain who is our shepherd. (pages 176 and 194). Luther's argument, though Eck tried to get round it, is irrefutable; but he allows his logic to carry him a little too far, and in doing so inevitably lays himself open to the charge of Hussite heresy (page 199), which Eck never
lost an opportunity of bringing against him, and to which Luther always stoutly objected. But before this Eck had brought forward the same charge. Luther had reminded him that Peter, even after the sending of the Holy Spirit, had fallen, to the great hurt of the Church (Galatians 11) and was taken to task by Paul. (page 141). Eck replied that even supposing Peter had by his dissimulation committed a deadly sin, he would still have remained the rock and head of the Church, unless Luther wanted to defend the Hussite article, that there is no civil lord, no prelate, no bishop, who is living in deadly sin (page 158). Luther indignantly objected to the insinuation. As strongly as did his opponent he condemned the Hussite article. Somewhat inconsistently, however, he added that it was his opinion, that Peter, had he not been corrected by Paul, ought to have been removed from his prelacy. (page 177).

Regarding the Scriptures which Eck brought forward in support of the primacy of Peter, and, through him, of the Roman Pope, one can never cease to wonder that on such unsubstantial foundation such claims could ever have been made, and still more that the Roman Church still continues to persuade so many millions of their validity. Increasing education, however, and, with it, the power of judging for themselves must ultimately reveal to all the truth.

Along with his refutation of Eck's argument based on the texts just quoted, Luther confronts his antagonist with texts which he is unable to refute.
(1) with (page 142) John XX. 22 f.: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whosoever sins ye remit etc.," in reply to his assertion that the promise in Matthew XVI. was fulfilled by the command: "Feed my sheep". Christ, he points out, addresses himself here, not to Peter alone, but to all the apostles. The Power of the Keys was not given to be the special possession of Peter. All the apostles were put on the same level.

(2) with 1. Cor. 111. 5. (page 180): "What then is Apollos? What is Paul? What is Cephas? etc.," to which Eck replies (page 182) that Luther falsely quotes Cephas with Paul and Apollos, since his name does not occur in the passage, but only at the end of the chapter. That, however, as Luther (pages 195-196) says, is a trifle, since it occurs in the beginning of the first chapter. Paul, he points out, is concerned (page 180) about the schism in the Corinthian Church. Some held by Peter, some by himself, some by Apollos, and some by Christ. The apostle wants to remove the occasion of schism. Let the Corinthians, therefore, he in effect says, acknowledge no head but Christ, which rules out the primacy of Peter and consequently that of the Roman Pope.

(3) with 1. Cor. 111. 11: "Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ". Though following that just quoted from 1. Cor., Luther had some time before (page 121) quoted this text against the Fathers who understood Peter to be the rock. Eck maintained (page 130) that
the word "rock" or "foundation" was also to be applied to the vicar of Christ, to which Luther (page 148) properly replied with ridicule.

(4) with (pages 148, 180, 181) Galatians 11. 6:—"Who were reputed to be somewhat — whatsoever they were, it maketh no matter to me; for God accepteth no man's person", where Paul refers to Peter, James and John, and obviously and most uncompromisingly rules out the primacy of any apostle.

(5) with (page 204) I. Cor. XII. 28:—"God hath set some in the Church, first apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly teachers, then — — — — governments", on which Luther rightly comments that, if the primacy of Peter is of such great importance and so necessary for the divine right, Paul has insufficiently described the Church, in as much as he has left out what is most eminent in it.

(6) with (page 204) Acts 1., where we read that neither Peter nor the entire body of the apostles had power to ordain Matthias nor to give the right of administration, from which Luther argues that the Pope, in conferring the right of administration throughout the whole world, claims for himself more than he finds in his predecessor, the apostle.

(7) with (page 204) Galatians 11. 8:—"He that wrought for Peter unto the apostleship of the circumcision wrought for me also unto the Gentiles", on which, with the verse following:—"They (i.e. James and Cephas and John) gave to me and Barnabas
the right hand of fellowship, that we should go unto the Gentiles and they unto the circumcision", Luther asserts, if he chose to rest his case, neither Eck nor any man would be able to maintain that, by divine right, the apostolate of Peter extended beyond the Jews.

(8) with (page 217) Acts VIII. 14, where we read that the apostles sent Peter, together with John, as if he were a subordinate, and Acts XV. 13 ff where James both confirmed and altered Peter's speech.

With the last of these quotations, which he might easily have many times multiplied, Luther concludes (page 217) by saying that he is willing to concede to Peter the primacy of honour, but not of power. The latter he rightly refuses to allow. The New Testament nowhere speaks of any such primacy. Eck could say nothing in its support, except by forcing a meaning into Christ's words which obviously they refuse to bear.

In further refutation of the papal claims, Luther points out (pages 116-117) that the Church had spread throughout a great part of the world twenty years before that at Rome was founded, as alleged, by Peter. This is evident, he says, from Galatians I. 18 ff, where Paul writes that three years after his conversion he went up to Jerusalem to visit Peter, and again did so fourteen years later. In addition to all these years that Peter spent in Jerusalem there was also the time he was resident at Antioch to be considered. Therefore
it could not be maintained that the Roman Church is the first, and, by divine right, the head. Eck replies, quoting Marcellus, that Peter at the command of the Lord transferred his seat to Rome (page 154). It is true, that, as he (page 158) says, much took place which has not been recorded; but, assuming the primacy of Peter, we would naturally expect to find some reference in the New Testament to his transferring it to Rome. Not only do we find no such reference; we also find it established that Peter, even if he only visited Rome, could not have done so till a very late date, and only for a short time. St. Paul in his epistle to the Romans, which was written about 58 A.D., makes no mention of him. He refers to many by name and sends them greetings, but he does not make the slightest reference to Peter. It is incredible that the apostle could have been thus silent regarding Peter, had he been in Rome at the time. Further, Paul wrote from Rome his letters to the Philippians, to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, during his imprisonment between the years 61 and 63. But neither in these, nor in his two letters to Timothy, which were probably written during his second imprisonment a few years later, is there any mention of Peter in the salutations he addresses to his fellow workers and believers. Again we say it is incredible that the apostle could have been silent regarding Peter, had he been with him at Rome at the time, more especially if he were there as the Bishop of the Church and the foundation of all the Churches. According to tradition, Peter
suffered martyrdom about the same time as Paul. It is impossible, therefore, that he could ever have been at Rome except for a very brief period, during which, also, he certainly did not, as alleged, establish his apostolic Chair. The statement that at the command of the Lord he transferred his primacy to Rome is as fictitious as the primacy itself has been proved to be.

Against the papal claims Luther also points out (p. 79) that the Greek Church had never recognised the Roman primacy, but had not on that account been declared heretical. Eck replies (page 85) that Jerome had held it to be heretical, and rightly so. Luther suggests (page 94) that his opponent should, in accordance with his vaunted moderation, show a little consideration for the thousands of saints that Church had produced. In true Roman spirit, however, Eck (page 101) dooms the millions of Greek Christians, with the exception of a few monks and their adherents who owned the papal rule, to eternal perdition. His utterance is truly bold. It is evident, nevertheless, that Eck does not feel too happy in the position he has been driven to take up, for he adroitly tries (pages 114–115) to change the current of the discussion by insinuating that his opponent, in opposing the papal claims with the case of the Greeks, is a follower of the English heretic Wycliffe and the Bohemian Huss, among whose damnable errors is this: "It is not necessary for salvation to believe that the Roman Church is superior to others". He is, moreover, justified, he says, in making such
a charge, since, according to his poor and feeble judgment, the Doctor's thesis favours the heresy of the Bohemians, who, he understands, are very delighted over it. Luther (p. 116) hotly resents the insinuation. Schism, of whatever sort, he holds in abhorrence. Even if the divine law were on their side, the Bohemians acted wrongly in separating from the Catholic Church, for the supreme law of God is love and unity of spirit. Instead, therefore, of associating his name with the Bohemians, let his opponent consider (page 116) whether he is doing right in branding as heretics, and wanting to hurl from heaven, the thousands of martyrs and saints whom the Greek Church for 1400 years has counted of their number. It seems to him, at any rate, that he is acting in a most shameless manner. Apart from the fact, which he cannot deny, that the Church of Christ was founded and crowned throughout a great part of the world 20 years before that at Rome was born, let him also remember that the Greek Church had never up to their own time accepted the confirmation of its bishops by Rome. If, therefore, there has been a divine right all these years, all the bishops of Alexandria and Constantinople, some of them, such as Gregory Nazianzus and others, the most saintly men, would have to be condemned as heretics.

Luther's argument from the Greek Church was difficult to answer. Somewhat to our surprise, however, he immediately proceeds after dinner to render reply unnecessary. For, returning to the Bohemians, whose schism he had deplored, he
boldly adds (page 123) that there is not the slightest doubt that many of their articles are thoroughly Christian and evangelical and that the universal Church cannot condemn them. His statement is, of course, incontrovertible. But we fail to see the necessity of his making it—in the present connection at any rate. By doing so he played into the hands of his opponent, who from the start had sought to prejudice his case by the charge of Bohemian heresy. Now the assembly has the evidence of its own ears. The effect of Luther's words was electric. According to Froeschel, who was an eye-witness, Duke George, gesticulating, cried with a voice heard all over the hall: "The plague take the fellow." (Walch XV. 1430). Luther's friends were overcome with fear. "There went", writes Hausrath, "something like the smell of the smoke of the stake throughout the hall. For here, in Leipzig, so near the Bohemian frontier, Luther had wind and sun against him. Its university had been founded in opposition to Huss and the Bohemian heretics. Many of the fathers of the noblemen present had fallen in battle against the Bohemians, and defended the doctrine of the Church against their pernicious teaching. To have supported the holy kingdom of the Roman Church—that was the supreme glory of the Saxon nobility and the forefathers of the Duke. What Huss had taught none of these staunch warriors knew; but that he had been an enemy of Germany, a heretic, and the basest scoundrel that ever lived, they knew from childhood's years from their nurses and grandmothers. Luther offended, not only their Catholic sentiments, but also their
national consciousness in reaching out his hand to the Czech. Thus all the passions of those present were stirred up against Luther's bold words. ⁴¹

To speak as he did in such an atmosphere testified, if not to the prudence, most certainly to the courage of Luther. With amazement, we fancy, as great as his delight, did Eck hear his words. Luther immediately proceeded to substantiate them by quoting two of the articles referred to:

1. "There is only one universal Church". (to which the Greek Church had always and still belonged); (2) "It is not necessary for salvation to believe in the supremacy of the Church of Rome". Regarding the latter, he says, (page 124):

"I care not whether it belongs to Wycliffe or John Huss. I know that Basil the Great, Gregory Nanzian., Epiphanius of Cyprus and innumerable other Greek bishops were saved and yet did not hold this article. Further, it is not in the power of the Roman Pontiff or the Inquisitor of heresy to formulate new articles of faith, but only to judge according to those already established. Neither can a true Christian be compelled to believe what goes beyond Holy Writ, which alone is of divine authority, unless a new and tested revelation has supervened. On the contrary, we are forbidden by divine authority to believe except what is proved either by Holy Scripture or by unmistakeable revelation, as Gerson, also, though a more recent

¹. Hausrath - "Luther's Leben". ¹. 304-305.
writer, declares in many passages; and Augustine, one of the older, lays down as a specific canon: — — — Even the canonists themselves, of whom it might be least expected, maintain that the opinion of any private person counts for more than that of Pope, Council and Church, if it is supported by superior authority or convincing argument". Out of reverence (pages 125-126), and for the sake of avoiding schism he was willing to submit and advise others to submit, to the papal authority, if only his opponent recognised that it was of human, not divine, origin, and did not condemn as heretics and assign to eternal perdition the innumerable Greek saints who did not acknowledge it.

Eck is forced to retract somewhat from his wholesale condemnation of the Greek Church (page 127). He does not, after the manner of the giants in the fable, who wanted to hurl Jupiter from heaven, condemn the holy Fathers among the Greeks, who had been canonised (page 135). Regarding the Bohemian schismatics, however, he is adamant (page 126-127). Luther, when he ventured to say that many of their articles were thoroughly Christian and evangelical, does not appear to have realised the full implication of his statement. His opponent, however, enlightens him. In making such a statement he was setting himself up against the Council of Constance — a Council convoked by the practically unanimous voice of Christendom — which had condemned the teaching of Huss. It was, therefore,
specially horrifying (pages 133, 134) to hear him speak of the Bohemian article that it was not necessary for salvation to believe in the supremacy of the Roman Church, as thoroughly Christian and evangelical. Let him bear in mind the argument of Augustine regarding the Holy Scriptures, namely, that, if the slightest falsehood be admitted in them, then the whole becomes suspect. The argument applies with equal force to the Councils. If, as he maintains, the Council of Constance has erred in regard to these two articles, its authority will inevitably be suspected, and especially by the Hussites, regarding other articles (page 134). There is no need to, though he might well, say more. The Council has given its opinion regarding these articles, and that is enough for him. No one can defend them without laying himself open to the charge of heresy. (page 134)

Luther, who in the course of Eck's speech had protested against the insinuation that he was a patron of the Hussites, replies that his opponent, by flinging at him the name of heretic, had acted contrary to their agreement and the will of their patron, Prince George, whereof he begs the rulers of the assembly to take note. He also demands that Eck indicate what were the pernicious articles of the Hussites which he had called most Christian and evangelical, or withdraw his charge. (pages 137-138). Without waiting for Eck to do so, however, he proceeds to adduce a number of Hussite articles, in part additional to those already referred to,
which he holds to be indisputably Christian: (1) there is only one Catholic Church which is the entire company of the predestinated. (2) The Holy Catholic Church is only one as the number of the predestinated is only one. (3) The two natures, divine and human, are one in Christ. These articles, the first two of which are taken almost literally from Augustine, he believes Eck will subscribe to equally with himself. (4). The natural division of human works is that they are either virtuous or vicious. This article, he adds, his opponent had been forced to subscribe to the previous week by his distinguished colleague, Dr. Carlstadt. The charge, therefore, that he is a patron of the Bohemians and a most pestilential heretic, he might with equal justice bring against Eck. Nevertheless, he has rightly called these articles most Christian and evangelical. Out of reverence for the Council of Constance, he would rather believe that they had been inserted by some falsifier of its records than that they had been condemned by the Council. It was by no means certain, however, that they were condemned by the Council, since, speaking of the articles of Huss, the records say that only some are heretical, others being characterised as erroneous, blasphemous, rash, seditious or offensive to pious ears. His opponent, therefore, was not entitled to condemn, collectively, articles which the Council had, perhaps, hardly acknowledged to be rash. Besides, all that had been said against them had
been said against the words of Christ by His contemporaries. Accordingly the article, which says that it is not necessary for salvation to believe in the supremacy of the Roman Church, has yet to be proved heretical. Further, his opponent's argument from Augustine, that, if falsehood or error be admitted in a Council, its whole authority collapses, was inadmissible, for Augustine spoke of Holy Scripture which is the infallible word of God, whereas the Council is a creature of that Word. Therefore, he did an injury to the Word of God by such a comparison, since it has been admitted even by the canonists that a Council may err. Popes and Councils are men; their edicts, therefore, can claim no exemption from the apostolic rule: "Prove all things". (pages 144 - 146).

Luther had protested against Eck's flinging at him the name of heretic. But seeing that Caesar Pflug, as spokesman of the Prince and the nobles of the Council, had that very morning enjoined (pages 149 - 150) that they not only refrain from mutual recrimination, but also avoid meddling rashly with the Church and its Councils, he has now obviously given his opponent the opportunity to retaliate. Eck was not slow to seize the opportunity. Most unwillingly, he says, had he heard the reverend Father set forth, as most Christian and evangelical, further articles that had been condemned by the Council of Constance, and that in spite of the expressed desire of the illustrious Prince, although, out of reverence, he (Luther) alleged that these articles must have been inserted by some
impersonator. (page 160). Eck then proceeds to prove that they could not have been thus inserted. The carefulness with which he does so shows that he was not ignorant of the falsification of patristic texts and synodal decrees that had for centuries been going on to support the papal claims. Had he been so he would simply have dismissed Luther's suggestion with indignation as unworthy of consideration. There is no reason, however, to believe that there was falsification nor did Luther actually say there was.

Having proved that the articles could not have been inserted by an impersonator, Eck goes on to defend the Council's condemnation of them. The first was: "There is only one Holy Catholic Church which is the entire company of the elect". There does not seem to be anything specially heretical about such an article as this. All it appears to do is to distinguish between the visible and the invisible Church — the latter comprising all men of whatever nation, tongue or denomination who profess the name of Christ and seek through

1. Dr Ignaz von Döllinger, Professor of Ecclesiastical History at the university of Munich, after being excommunicated for refusing to accept the decree of the Vatican Council of 1870 declaring the infallibility of the Pope, published, with the collaboration of two of his colleagues, a book entitled "The Pope and the Council" (by Janus) in which he gave a detailed account of falsifications that had been used to make it appear that the authority of the Pope was recognised in the earlier ages of the Church.
communion with Him to conform their lives to His life of perfect obedience. The Roman Church, however, rejected the theory of an invisible Church. Regarding the visible Church it also restricted membership to those who were in communion with the Pope of Rome. Accordingly, in accepting the article that there is only one Holy and Catholic Church, in the Hussite sense, Luther was, Eck says, most heretical, inasmuch as he held that those who were living in deadly sin were no longer in the Church, whereas Christ had likened the kingdom of heaven to ten virgins, of whom five were wise and five were foolish. The gravamen of the charge of heresy, however, lay in the Hussite article deduced from that about the true Church being the company of the elect, namely, that which disputed the claim of anyone to be a civil lord, or prelate, or bishop, who was living in deadly sin. (page 161). Such an article, as Dr. Clinton Locke says, would destroy any religious organisation or civil authority in the world. "If Huss' assertion be true, that a king in mortal sin is no king before God, what security could there be for any ruler? At any moment demagogues might excite the people, saying: The king is leading a sinful life and is therefore no longer the rightful king. A "sinful life" would, of course, be their conclusion as to what was sinful, and it might easily be held by many that smoking, hunting, card-playing were infallible proofs that the king was living in mortal sin." The argument also applies to the prelate, but
in a lesser degree, for the Council that condemned the articles of John Huss deposed John XXIII. from the papal Chair, because of the scandalousness of his life. From his article which identified the Church with the elect, Huss also deduced another, namely, that the validity of the Sacraments depended on the moral character of the priest, which was also obviously pernicious and heretical. It was the former article, however, that Eck specially had in mind when he charged his opponent with the heresy of the Bohemians. Luther does not appear to have realised all that was involved in subscribing to Huss that the elect are the only true Church. In his animadversions on the fall of Peter (page 177), he at any rate emphatically dissociates himself from the further article deduced from this, namely, that no one can be either a civil or a spiritual ruler who is living in deadly sin. He was well aware that an evil prelate was not to be rejected. Somewhat inconsistently, however, as we have already pointed out, he added that it was his opinion that Peter, had he not been corrected by Paul, ought to have been removed from his prelacy.

Passing over the second Hussite article, quoted by Luther as being thoroughly Christian and evangelical, and which was simply a re-statement of the first, Eck proceeds to the third, namely: The two natures, divine and human, are one in Christ. In his objection to this article (page 162) we confess to being unable to see anything except a ridiculous attempt to
involve his opponent in the heresy of Arius. Regarding the fourth article quoted by Luther: "The natural division of human works is that they are either virtuous or vicious" - Eck refuses to acknowledge it as Christian (page 162). Luther correctly replies (page 191) that it was taught by Paul, not to mention Augustine and others. We need not, therefore, discuss it.

Having replied to the Hussite articles quoted by Luther as thoroughly Christian and evangelical, Eck maintains (page 163) that what a Council, legitimately convened, has settled and decreed in matters of faith, must be regarded as indisputable truth. The statement of his opponent, that, because a Council is composed of men, it is therefore liable to err, was ridiculous; for the Council that is legally summoned is guided by the Spirit of God. It is presumptuous, therefore, for anyone to criticise the decrees or findings of such a Council. (page 163).

Eck's repeated charge of heresy, justified from the Roman point of view so far as the Hussite article regarding salvation and the supremacy of the Church of Rome was concerned, had caused much talk and stirred up considerable feeling against Luther. Before replying to his opponent, he, therefore, in order to remove misunderstanding, begged leave to explain his position in German to the citizens present, who did not understand Latin. He had not, he
declared, attacked the primacy of the Roman Church, nor did he desire to withdraw men's allegiance from it. All that he had said was that the primacy did not rest on divine right. Neither, however, did the imperial power in Germany. Nevertheless, men rightly submitted to it. In like manner he recognised it as his duty to render obedience to the papacy. (page 169) In reply to Eck he admitted that the decrees of a council are to be acknowledged, with this reservation, however, that it must always be kept in mind that a Council can err and sometimes has erred, especially in matters not of faith. Further, he maintained that a council has no power to make new articles of faith. Otherwise there would be as many articles as there are human opinions. (page 178). This he would continue to hold till his opponent proved that a council has not erred and cannot err. A Council, he maintained, cannot make a divine right out of that which by its nature is not a divine right. Nothing, therefore, is heretical except what is contrary to the word of God. (pages 191-192).

Eck was obviously unable to refute such a statement. But though argument failed him, words did not. "The reverend Father asks me to prove that a Council cannot err. I know not what he means by this demand, unless it be to bring the laudable and glorious council of Constance into suspicion. But I tell you straight, that, if you believe that a Council lawfully summoned, has erred or can err, you are to me as a
With these words of Eck we conclude our summary and analysis of the disputation. Luther, though no practised disputant as was his opponent, supported his thesis with great ability and power. It is doubtful, however, whether he can be said to have conclusively proved the first part of it, namely, that the supremacy of the Roman Church, or in other words, the sovereign power of the Pope, dated from and depended upon the decrees promulgated by the Roman pontiffs during the preceding 400 years. But, if he failed in this, he convincingly proved, both by his criticism of Eck's proof-texts and by those which he himself brought forward, that the sovereign power of the Pope had not a vestige of authority to rest upon in Scripture. He also proved that though some of the Fathers identified Peter with the "rock" on which Christ said He would build His Church, there was nowhere ascribed in the early Church to his successor, the Bishop of Rome, such supremacy. Cyprian, in spite of his hankering after unity, refused to acknowledge it. Jerome, of whom Eck made so much, stoutly maintained the equality of all bishops; so also did the African Council, as likewise did the greatest of all the Councils — that of Nicaea. But Luther's strongest argument was drawn from the Greek Church, which had never recognised the supremacy of, nor accepted confirmation of its bishops by, the Roman Pope. It was an argument to which Eck was unable to reply except by raising the cry of heresy. Indisputably he
he proved that, in opposing the papal claims with the case of the Greeks, his opponent was guilty of the Hussite heresy, that it is not necessary for salvation to believe in the supremacy of the Roman Church. This, and other Hussite doctrines, which Luther confessed to, brought him, as Eck exultingly pointed out, into conflict with the Council of Constance. Luther, apparently, had not reckoned on this. Boldly, however, he replied that a Council is not infallible; infallible is only the Scripture. This was the most fateful issue of the disputation. Not long ago he had appealed from the Pope to a General Council. Now he refuses to acknowledge the decision or one of the most notable. When next we find him making an appeal it is to the nation, after which there came the final breach with Rome, when he became "a heathen and a publican" to half the civilised world. By the other half, however, he came to be honoured as one of the greatest and most fearless men our race has produced. Nor has the passing of four centuries dimmed his glory. In spite of the modern movement towards reunion, we recognise that from his heroic stand against preposterous papal claims and paralysing papal corruption there have followed blessings unspeakably rich and precious to men.
The question of Purgatory next came up for discussion. To Eck's opening statement Luther replied that he likewise believed in purgatory. There was not, however, a reference to it in Scripture that would stand the test of argument, for 2. Maccabees (I11. 45 f:—It is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead) was not in the canon (page 227). Eck, while admitting that it was not in the Hebrew Canon, maintained on the authority of Augustine that it had been admitted by the Church (page 228). Luther agreed, but added that the Church could give no more authority or weight to the Book than it possessed in itself (page 230).

The opening stages of the debate disclosed further difference of opinion. Quoting 2. Cor. V. 10-11. (We must all be made manifest before the judgment seat of Christ, that each may receive etc.) Eck maintained that souls in purgatory cannot acquire further merit or grace (page 228). His opponent, on the other hand, had presumed to prolong the period for meriting reward and to recompense in heaven merits gained in purgatory. (p229)

Note:— The first two Books of Maccabees were afterwards accepted as canonical by the Council of Trent in 1546. (Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics). The Reformers, however, adhering to the Hebrew Canon, placed them among the Old Testament Apocrypha. Referring to this, Graham in his tract on purgatory quotes an unnamed author:—"Finding that they could not by reason of evasion weaken the force of the text, they impiously threw overboard the Books of Maccabees, like a man who assassinates a hostile witness".
LXXVI.

Luther admitted having done so for the purpose of argument. But he knew nothing of purgatory except that souls suffer there and are to be helped by our works and prayers. He was also prepared to be taught by anyone who could tell him more about it. The words of the apostle, however, quoted by his opponent, conveyed no such information as he desired, for they referred not to purgatory but to heaven and hell (page 230).

Before the possibility of acquiring further merits and grace could be discussed, the Scriptural authority for purgatory had first to be considered. That there was such authority, Eck referred his opponent to the Council of Florence. Apart from 2. Maccabees, there were passages such as the following:—"We went through fire and water, but Thou broughtest us into a refreshing place." (Psalm LXVI. 12); "The Lord said:—Agree with thine adversary——lest thou be cast into prison. Verily, I say unto thee: Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing". (Matt.V.25); "If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss, but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire etc."(l. Cor.111.12-15).

Note:—"Till the Council of Florence (1439) purgatorial doctrine had been an individual opinion, a tradition of the Fathers, a doctrine of the schoolmen, recognised in the common speech of men and in the practices of the Western Church. Now, for the first time, it assumed the character of a dogma of the faith, stamped with the authority of a Council representing both East and West, and claiming to be oecumenical".

These and other passages, he maintained on the authority of Gregory, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, and Bernard, referred to purgatory. If they did not, he was at a loss to understand how Luther, with his desire to rest on the letter of Holy Writ, could believe in purgatory (pages 233-235). But putting this aside, his opponent's doctrine regarding it was unscriptural. Whereas he maintained that merit or grace is increased in purgatory, Ecclesiastes (xl. 3.) writes: "If the tree fall toward the South or toward the North, in the place where the tree falleth, there it shall be"; which, being interpreted, means: "The place, which thou preparst for thyself, thou shalt have hereafter". Because Christ said: "In my Father's house are many mansions", a certain mansion is assigned to the dying, beyond which they are unable to ascend by merits gained in purgatory. (page 235) Passing over other passages, there was also Galatians VI. 7. ff:—"Be not deceived; God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man soweth etc." That the sowing spoken of here refers to this present life, was confirmed by Chrysostom, who, commenting on the passage, quotes John ix. 6:—"I must work the works of Him that sent me while it is day etc!; while Jerome, writing on verse 5, (every man shall bear his own burden) shows how men are helped by their merits acquired here, but when they are called before the judgment-seat at death, neither Noah nor Job nor Daniel can stand for any man. For St. Bernard teaches that a special judgment takes place at the death of every man, which could not be, if he had still the
opportunity of adding to his merits and increasing grace in purgatory. In addition to the Fathers quoted, Augustine also supported the doctrine of purgatory deduced from these texts, when he wrote:—"God has given man only in this life a time to attain to eternal life". (page 286).

Regarding the Council of Florence, Luther replied that a Council cannot make Scriptural what, by its nature, does not belong to Scripture. Psalm Exvil, he said, referred to the persecutions of the saints, "fire and water" being a common figure of speech in Scripture for tribulation. As for Matthew V.25, it was true, as his opponent had stated, that Ambrose had taken prison to stand for purgatory, but Augustine understood it to mean hell, which, he thought, was the better interpretation. But the one interpretation seems to us equally inadmissible as the other, for the words of Christ are obviously to be taken as a simple injunction to those at variance with each other to settle their disputes amicably lest they fall into the clutches of the law. Regarding l. Cor. 111. 12-15, a text which the Roman Church has always emphasised in support of purgatory, expositors, Luther continued, differed widely as to its meaning. As for himself, he was still unable, though he had studied it carefully, to express a definite opinion. He inclined to think, however, that the apostle spoke of the fire of the great conflagration and of the Last Judgment, although he did not rule out Augustine's interpretation, namely, that he spoke of the fire
of persecution by which the faith of mean and their works would be specially tried. (pages 343-345).

But if he refused to acknowledge the Scriptural proofs adduced by his opponent, now, then, could he know that there was a purgatory? It was not necessary to say how he knew this or anything else. The reply seems somewhat weak. From the hurried manner in which he added that his opponent's proof texts tell us nothing of the state of souls in purgatory, Luther would seem to have realised this. Ecclesiastes XI.3. (If the tree fall toward South etc) had been quoted in refutation of the idea that merit or grace is increased in purgatory; but if his opponent's interpretation of the passage were correct, then souls must remain there for ever. Nor did his inference from Christ's words help his argument. He was quite aware that a mansion is assigned to every man after death, but he does not go to that mansion immediately after death, unless Eck understood the mansion in regard to purgatory, in which case he would exclude the dying from heaven. (pages 344-345). Regarding Galatians VI.7. (whatsoever a man soweth etc), this contributed nothing to the argument, for the apostle spoke, not of purgatory but of the Last Judgment. (pages 346). As for Augustine, who had been quoted as limiting the period for attaining eternal life to this life alone, the dictum of the Father, he replied, was quite right, inasmuch as purgatory did not enter into his thought of the future. (pages 346). The quotation from Jerome regarding Galatians VI.5, was, on the other hand, strongly
against his opponent; for if it were true that man is called at death before the judgment-seat, and then neither Noah nor Job nor Daniel can help him, then the Church prays in vain for the dead, and thus purgatory is denied. Jerome, therefore, spoke of the Last Judgment, which takes place after the period spent in purgatory has come to an end. (page 247). It might be true that, as Bernard taught, a particular judgment took place at death. Granting that it was, this did not, however, rule out the possibility of acquiring further merit. But why, we ask, as probably did Luther, should there be two judgments? Where is the necessity? (page 247).

Summing up what he had said, Luther maintained that the Scriptures and the Fathers knew nothing of purgatory, but in their declarations looked to a future in which souls were

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Note:-

This particular judgment continued to be taught by the Roman Church (cf. "Two Ancient Treatises on Purgatory" p.181.- Burns and Oates, Ltd., 1893). It is also taught to-day as shown in following quotation from Graham's Treat on Purgatory (page 10): "There are three states or places after the separation of the soul from the body at death, and into one or other of these the soul of every man must go - Heaven, Hell, or Purgatory. Into which he will enter depends entirely upon the state of his soul. -- A man in mortal sin goes at once to Hell. A man in venial sin, or with some punishment still due to sin, goes to Purgatory. A man without either goes straight to Heaven." But whether these conditions, or what conditions, are found in any single individual at death, the Church, Graham adds, does not pretend infallibly to judge -- that is hidden from man and known to God alone.
were either saved or lost, and that, therefore, all the authorities, quoted as denying the possibility of souls acquiring merit in the life to come, had no bearing on the doctrine of purgatory. Also he had not actually said that souls acquired additional merit in purgatory, but that they received more grace, and, without this increase of grace, sin, which according to St. Gregory was forgiven in purgatory, could not be remitted. Nevertheless, he did not desire to dogmatise, for to God alone was the state of souls in purgatory known. (pages 248-249).

In reply Eck charged Luther with inconsistency in, after agreeing with Augustine and Jerome that merit cannot be added to in purgatory, saying that grace is increased. In his eagerness to score a point he ignored, however, that Luther maintained that purgatory did not enter into the thought of the Fathers any more than it did into that of Scripture, though regarding the Fathers, at least, Luther was certainly wrong. Also it is by no means clear from the disputation that Luther did not at this stage of his development believe in the possibility of acquiring further merit. But apart from this, it does not necessarily follow that, if merit cannot be increased, therefore grace is not increased in purgatory. For what do we understand by grace? Are we not, according to St. Paul, to understand by it the supreme attribute of God, His transcendent love, in virtue of which He bestows out of His fullness what we can never hope to acquire
by our own merits. The inconsistency seems to us to attach rather to Eck, for apart altogether from the disputed increase of grace in the individual soul, there could be no purgatory without an increase of grace. Accordingly, Eck's ridicule of what he calls Luther's petty argument, namely, that venial sin cannot be forgiven without increase of grace, need not be considered. (page 262). Eck also indulged in highly reprehensible language when he said that a venial sin is not offensive to God, which Luther, with other things, was careful to point out. (page 262-263). He scored, however, when, objecting to Luther's following Augustine and interpreting "prison" (Matt. V. 25) as meaning hell, he replied that, according to the words of Christ, such an interpretation was impossible, for in hell there is no paying as there is no redeeming (page 255). Luther was only able to maintain his interpretation by a hair-splitting argument from Jerome. (page 265). He, however, maintained his interpretation of 1. Cor. Ill. 12 ff. at least as well as did Eck his. The passage, he admitted, might be referred to purgatory - though not, he rightly added, in a manner sufficiently convincing to stop the mouth of the contentious. He preferred, however, to understand by the "day of the Lord" "the Last Judgment". If his opponent chose to understand by it a special judgment that took place at death, then let him, as he demanded from himself, give reasons for his interpretation. For our own part, we prefer to follow Luther. (page 265).
To Luther's criticism regarding the quotation from Ecclesiastes (if the tree fall etc.), namely, that, if his opponent's interpretation of it were correct, then souls must remain for ever in purgatory, Eck cordially explained that by "the south" was to be understood "good", and by "the north" "evil", and that what Ecclesiastes meant was that, at death, a man is either good and thus will persevere in goodness (without increase of grace, because of sin forgiven), or he is bad and will continue in wickedness. (Page 257). But Luther, while allowing the interpretation (in part), did not see what reference the passage had to purgatory (page 266).

Regarding Luther's admission that a certain mansion is assigned to the soul at death, Eck had asked how this mansion could be fixed, if there were added more grace, for with increase of grace a higher mansion would have to be assigned. From this it would follow, he added, that the soul that entered purgatory with many venial sins might fare better that that which entered it with few or none. Further, it would be wrong to pray for the dead. It would be better for them to continue in purgatory for further increase of grace; for his opponent had himself written that the soul that is liberated through the intercessions of others is less blessed than if it had suffered sufficiently in purgatory. (Pages 257-258). Regarding the appointed mansion, Luther sufficiently replied that the life of those in purgatory is so ordered that in due course they come to it. The argument that the soul with many venial sins might fare better than that
with few or none, he met with ridicule; for, if it held good, then it would follow that a prostitute might fare better than a virgin. His opponent was not so ignorant as not to know that there were different grades of souls in purgatory, for had he not that very day told them that there were to be found in it saints who excelled in godliness? The remainder of his argument was equally inadmissible. He could not but know that punishment was appointed only for a certain period. It was not permissible, therefore, to argue that it would be wrong to pray for the dead, that they be released from suffering. Let him remember that the apostle desired others to pray for him, even though he knew that his strength would be increased in his weakness. Every believer, therefore, ought to pray for every other believer and help him in his need, notwithstanding that through such need he may merit more and more. (page 265-267).

Luther's answer, however, is not entirely satisfactory, for when he quotes St. Paul as desiring his converts to pray for him, the apostle was in the body and not in purgatory; also it certainly was not that he might be spared suffering; for his words in 1. Thess. V. (v.25) are simply:—"Brethren, pray for us", and in 2. Thess. III. (v.1) their continuation is "that the word of the Lord may run and be glorified etc." Also, it may be right, or it may be wrong to pray for the dead. Personally, we cannot but regret that a custom which prevailed in the Jewish Church without one word of condemnation
from Christ, and also continued in the early Christian Church, as is evidenced by its liturgies, and which must have brought great consolation to those who mourned the loss of dear ones, should, through the Roman doctrine of purgatory, with its monstrous claims and superstitions, have fallen into desuetude. Nevertheless, if Luther held that "a soul that is liberated through the intercession of others is less blessed than if it had itself suffered sufficiently in purgatory," we do not see how he could consistently pray for the dead; nor by his reference to the apostle did he say a word to justify his doing so.

Referring to Eck's rejection of his interpretation of Jerome on Galatians VI. 5, he maintained as before that Jerome, in saying that, when men are called before the judgment-seat at death, neither Noah nor Job nor Daniel can help them, spoke of the Last Judgment. It was, at any rate, impossible to understand him as referring to purgatory, for not only Noah, Job and Daniel, but also the whole Church pray for the dead in purgatory. His opponent, therefore, could not claim Jerome in support of his statement that Galatians VI. 5. ruled out the possibility of souls acquiring further merit and grace in purgatory. (page 268).

In opposition to Luther's 9th thesis (Werke 11. 161) Eck also maintained that souls in purgatory, where at times were
distinguished saints, had assurance of their salvation, and quoted Revelation V. 13:—"They were all singing in heaven, on earth and under the earth (i.e. purgatory)" in support, for those in despair do not sing. (Page 238). Luther admitted that there had been saints in purgatory. He would even go so far as to say that no one is in purgatory except he be a saint. He objected, however, and rightly, to Eck's identifying the phrase "under the earth" with purgatory. If he were in a contentious mood he might with as good reason identify it with hell. Further, his opponent had misrepresented his views. He had never said that souls despair, but only that, since according to the teaching of the Church the punishment of hell and purgatory is the same, they were like to those who despair. To sing to the Lord is not always to rejoice and be glad. On the contrary, the new song is a song of the Cross, i.e. to praise and have God in the heart in the midst of tribulation. (Page 249-250).

In support of his thesis Eck had also quoted the Canon of the mass: "Remember, Lord, thy servants who have gone before — — and sleep the sleep of peace etc; these and all who rest in Christ". But, if they were resting in Christ, how could they be in a state of perturbation and terror such as his opponent represented them to be in? Souls in purgatory were rightly held to rest in peace, if they were waiting in confidence the end of their purification. (Page 238). Luther replied that Eck proved his statement by another of the same sort. In support of his own
views he also quoted the passage which followed Eck's quotation:- "Give them Lord, and all who rest in Christ, the place of refreshing, of light and of peace". This, he held could not be understood as meaning: "Give them to await with confidence the end of their purification", which his opponent had interpreted to be peace. Luther speaks truly, nevertheless, hardly to the point; for according to Eck, as also Roman theologians generally, the purpose of the Church's prayers is not that God will enable souls in purgatory to await with confidence the end of their purification, which confidence they already have, or are supposed to have, but to shorten the duration of their sufferings. Continuing, he said that, according to his judgment they were resting in peace only so far as the body is concerned. For to sleep in peace signifies in Scripture to rest in the grave. Thus his opponent had not proved that they had assurance of salvation. Yea, he, in a manner abolished the pains of purgatory if he gave them peace. (pages 250-251).

Eck did not allow his opponent's statements to go unchallenged.

(1). He contended that "under the earth" (Rev.V.13) could not be understood as meaning hell, for the devils and the damned do not sing, but blaspheme and howl (page 259). That was quite true, Luther replied, but seeing that his opponent had denied that to praise God in tribulation is to sing, he could not, therefore, without contradicting himself, identify it with
purgatory, where souls were in tribulation. But, if Eck was not entitled to identify it with purgatory, neither had he himself specially identified it with hell. Moreover, if Eck took the phrase "under the earth" to stand for purgatory, he would require to designate another place to correspond with "under the sea", which, of course, he could not do. (page 269).

(2). Eck, as indicated above, objected to Luther's making the word "sing" equivalent to carrying the Cross and praising God in tribulation, for in heaven they do not carry the Cross nor praise God in tribulation, for God has wiped away all tears etc. But even if his opponent's interpretation were correct, it would not argue against his views; for, if souls were able to praise God amidst the tribulations of purgatory, they would have an infallible sign of their future bliss. (page 260) Eck here scored through his opponent's blunder. It is true that, as Luther had said, to sing to the Lord is not always to rejoice, that, on the contrary, it is often to praise God in the midst of tribulation. But there was no actual necessity for his saying so. Nor did he extricate himself by replying that he made and proved his statement to refute the opinion of his opponent, that "to sing" is to be understood as referring only to assurance of salvation. (page 270). He would have done much better if, after refusing to admit a text, which obviously has no reference to purgatory, he had also declined to argue on it.

(3). Eck objected to Luther's interpretation of the
words: "They sleep the sleep of peace", as referring only to the body; for, while the canon said: "Remember those who sleep the sleep of peace", it also added: "And all who rest in Christ". It was foolishness, he thought, to distinguish thus between the peace of the body and that of the soul. They must, therefore, follow the better interpretation, namely, that the souls that are to be purified, both sleep in peace and rest in Christ, and consequently know nothing of the disquietude and fear of which his opponent spoke. (page 261) Taken literally, Eck's words imply that souls in purgatory actually sleep, in which case they could certainly know nothing of disquietude and fear, but neither could they have that assurance of salvation, which he maintained they have, unless it were in their dreams. Nor do we see how they could undergo any process of purification. But this, in the light of what follows, could hardly be his meaning. Eck, therefore, spoke loosely, as we often find him doing, without giving thought to the meaning of his words. But Luther did not think it worth while to animadvert on this. He was content, instead, to maintain the distinction he had made, and aptly quoted Revelation xiv.13: "They rest from their labours"; that is, he said, because the soul, being separated from the body, no more struggles in the body with the various trials of life. Among other texts he also quoted Acts vii. 59: "He (Stephen) fell asleep in the Lord", words spoken, he added, without doubt, of bodily death, according to
the figurative language of Scripture. The sleep of peace, therefore, in the Canon of the Mass, referred only to the body. Also, the peace of "assurance of salvation", which his opponent said souls in purgatory possess, had, he maintained, not been proved. In purgatory they were undergoing punishment, and it fell to us to pray that they might be delivered and attain to peace. (page 271.)

In concluding Luther confessed his ignorance of God's dealings with souls in purgatory. He was unable to prove his beliefs, but neither could those who differed from him prove theirs. Very properly, therefore, his conclusion only asserted that neither by scripture nor by argument had it been proved that souls are certain of their salvation, and that grace is not increased in them. It was enough to know that they suffer and that we ought to help them. (page 272).

With the latter statement Eck agreed. He maintained, however, that he had proved his beliefs, though a stubborn and self-opinionated person might not be satisfied with his proof. He continued to hold that grace is not increased in purgatory and that souls have assurance of salvation. (page 276).

With these words the disputation ended. The matter of which it treats is one of supreme interest, for few believe to-day that a man's eternal destiny is fixed by the few years he spends on earth. Most reflecting people believe that the soul will have an opportunity beyond of accomplishing what it has failed to accomplish here, in other words, that further
merit may be acquired and grace increased. It comes as a surprise to learn for the first time, that the Roman Church denies the possibility of this in its teaching on purgatory; and, while wishing to be charitable, we cannot but say that the doctrine of that Church affords some grounds for the charge that it has been formulated for the purpose of aggrandising her priests. Luther, after his attack on Indulgences, naturally came to reconsider the Church's doctrine on purgatory, and it is not surprising that he found himself at variance with it. We incline to think that on the whole he maintained his statement that, apart from 2. Maccabees (xii. 45 f) which he ruled out as uncanonical, there is not a text quoted in support of purgatory that will stand the test of argument. The doctrine rests, not on individual texts, but on the love of God revealed in Christ Jesus. He certainly refuted the argument that further merit cannot be acquired and that grace is not increased in purgatory - at least so far as the texts quoted by Eck are concerned. He also successfully replied to his opponent's thesis that souls in purgatory have assurance of salvation. With good reason did he say (page 263) that Eck dragged forward his authorities by hairs and twisted their meaning. He, himself, brought forward no authorities, for none could count with him, except such as came from the word of God, which in the matter of purgatory, if it were not entirely silent, made no definite and clear statement. It is easy to see what his own opinions were, but he would not, like his opponent, dogmatise. On one thing only would he express
his opponent, dogmatise. Of one thing only would he express himself authoritatively, namely, that souls in purgatory are in great suffering, and it is our duty to help them with our prayers.

INDULGENCES.

The disputation on Purgatory was followed by another on Indulgences. After protesting that it was his intention to avoid contravening the command of the Pope, that no one, under pain of excommunication, should preach or defend certain points regarding Indulgences, and to confine himself to defending what had been approved of as true, Eck proceeded to oppose Luther's 11th thesis, namely: "To say that Indulgences are good for Christians is madness, for they are truly a vice (or the bane) of good works, and are to be opposed because of their abuse etc." (Werke 2. 161). He maintained on the contrary that they are useful to Christians, and that his opponent had spoken foolishly in calling them mad who say so. That they are useful he held to be proved by the fact that the Church for 300 years had thus regarded them, for the Church does not err in matters of faith and the salvation of souls. As Cyprian had written: "God does not permit the greater part of the clergy to err". In support of his statement that the Church believed in the usefulness of Indulgences, he
instanced the Council of Vienna, which approved of the Indulgences granted by Urbanus IV for reverence of the Holy Eucharist, for the Council had added this powerful argument, namely, that the faithful of Christ would by means of them be better prepared to render the Sacrament the reverence and honour that are its due. Next there was the Council of Lyons, which, while limiting the power of the lesser, confirmed that of the higher prelates, to grant Indulgences, which certainly it would not have done, if they were the bane of good works and served no useful purpose. To these was to be added that of Constance, which condemned, amongst other errors, the neglect of Indulgences. Likewise, Gerson, highly esteemed by his opponent, held that Indulgences were not to be despised, but devoutly embraced in the faith, hope and charity of our Lord Jesus Christ, and also maintained that a work that rests upon Indulgences is more profitable and more acceptable to God than another that does not thus rest, although it be otherwise good. Moreover, the granting of Indulgences went back beyond the 300 years during which the Church, through its Councils, had signified its approval of them; for Paschasius 600 years ago and Gregory 900 years ago had granted them, although, according to William Altisiodorensis, there were not lacking those who, even in the lifetime of Gregory, objected to it.

Further, if, as his opponent had said, Indulgences were the vice of good works (i.e. if they indicated a failure
in good works), then we might infer that they are works of satisfaction. But by such a work we do not merit less than we would do if we refused to perform it. If we did, then it would be better to leave it undone.

In support of his thesis he might also refer to the extraordinary unanimity of the whole of Christendom in the Jubilee years celebrated by popes such as Boniface, Clemens VI, Urbanus VI, Nicholas V, Sixtus IV, and also to the fact that, with the general approval of the most Christian kings and princes, the Pope frequently granted plenary Indulgences for Crusades and pilgrimages.

Since therefore, the faith of the Church cannot fail and Christ has promised to be with us even to the end, it could not be admitted that the Church had for so long time erred in this matter to the destruction of souls. Since, also, the decrees of the popes must, according to Gregory, be accepted by all who are in communion with the Church, and the present Pope had decreed that Indulgences are useful for removing the punishment due to the sins of those who, in love, are members of Christ, and that such remission is, as it were, made up for, through the power of the Pope, from the merits of Christ and the saints, he wanted every believer to be firmly persuaded that Indulgences are not the vice of good works, and that he, who says that they are useful, is not mad. (pages 277-280).
In the charge of his opponent that he had spoken foolishly in calling it madness to speak of indulgences as being good for Christians, Luther quoted, or rather paraphrased, Psalms XL. 5 and CXXXVIII. 55, but, whether from the Hebrew or the Vulgate, in a manner that reminds us of the charge he had brought against Eck in the preceding disputation, of dragging forward his authorities by hairs and twisting their meaning. Nevertheless, we cannot but concur in what he added — it is madness to say that indulgences, which are neither enjoined, nor recommended, nor are necessary for salvation, yea, rather, are exemptions from many good works, are to be held as good for Christians. In maintaining this he also characteristically reminded his opponent that "the most wholesome law of God" is only an occasion of stumbling (Romans VII. 11ff.), and that grace alone is of help. How much less then ought indulgences to be considered as beneficial? Somewhat inconsistently, however, he added, mindful possibly of Leo's decree, that he did not deem them harmful or pernicious. (page 281).

His opponent, he maintained, could not base his argument, that indulgences are useful to Christians, on the dictum that the Church does not err in matters of faith and salvation, for, as he had shown, they do not come under that category. Moreover, his quotation from Cyprian was unfortunate, for at the time of the Arian perfidy the greater part of the clergy undoubtedly did err, and that in a most important
article of faith (page 282) - a statement which his opponent was unable to refute. (page 289). He had, however, never denied, he maintained, in replying to his opponent's reference to the Council of Vienna and its approval of the Indulgences granted by Urbanus IV, that Indulgences are useful. He only held that they are not to Christians who live fervently, and, according to their name, love and seek after Christ; for by such, exemption from good works is not desired - rather do they desire that these be laid upon them. (page 282). But the words of Luther's 11th thesis: "Dicere indulgentias esse bonum Christiano est insanire, sunt enim verissime operis boni vitium" (Werke 11. 161) hardly bear out his statement, although, of course, we may regard them as somewhat qualified by the clause that follows: "et improbare indulgentias debet Christianus ob abusum".

In like manner he replied to Eck's appeal to the Council of Lyons. "Pardons" (i.e. Indulgences) were not harmful in themselves. It was only the perverse abuse of them that was harmful, and, except for them, men would rarely do good works (i.e. contribute to the building of St. Peter's etc). There was, therefore, always the danger of a good work being done in a wrong spirit. (page 283).

In like manner he answered the appeal to the Council of Constance and to Gerson. To the former he replied that he had never taught to despise Indulgences, unless contempt were understood in the sense that one can do incomparably better
things with their purchase-money. To the latter that indulgences were not to be despised, provided other things were right. But he did not think that what Gerson said about their being devoutly received in the faith, hope and charity of our Lord Jesus Christ could be entirely pleasing to his opponent, since he held that satisfaction is made even in those who are without grace. (page 284).

The above replies, while by no means lacking in condemnation, hardly go so far as we would have expected from the tone of Luther's thesis and other writings. Obviously he is putting a restraint upon his utterances; and, after Eck's preliminary statement, he could hardly do otherwise, if the disputation was to go on. He, nevertheless, contrives to say more than his opponent could satisfactorily reply to. But he has not yet finished.

Replying to Eck's statement that Indulgences went back to the time of Gregory the Great, he maintained that there was no credible history of the Gregorian Indulgences; and Eck, as his reply shows, was unable to contradict him. But even if they did go so far back, it would not alter the fact - and here Luther speaks without reserve - that Indulgences are nothing but indulgences, that is, the remission of good works, which certainly no one could call good for Christians, no matter how many saints, Councils, or whoever else may have granted or approved of them. Let the Doctor, therefore, dispute, not only
with the names of authorities, but also according to the right and truth of the matter itself. (page 285).

To Eck's argument that, if Indulgences are the vice of (or indicate a failure in) good works, the inference is that they are works of satisfaction, Luther replied as before. Instead of being works of satisfaction, they were the remission of such works. The omission of them did not diminish our merits as his opponent had said. On the contrary, our merits were increased by refusing to purchase them (page 285).

To the argument drawn by Eck from the "extraordinary unanimity" of the faithful in flocking to Rome to obtain the Jubilee Indulgences of Boniface, Clemens VI, Urbanus VI etc., Luther's final reply was (page 303) that the unanimity that would satisfy him was an unanimity that would have urged them to flock to Rome after the matter had been revealed and the truth about Indulgences set forth. That truth, though Luther does not state it, was that these Indulgences, as also those of Leo X, were nothing more nor less than a device to fill the empty coffers of the Pope, and the faithful were too ignorant, superstitious and priest-ridden to see through it.

To Eck's argument that the Church could not have erred in regard to Indulgences, since Christ had promised to be with it to the end, Luther fittingly replied that the whole Church had not erred, for there had always been some who did not approve of them, as was shown by the common proverb:
"Indulgences are pious frauds". His opponent had contended that the decrees of popes must be accepted. "Yes", he replied, "but with judgment, for an eminent authority had written:-The Roman popes are but men and have men for their counsellors and are therefore liable to err." But apart from that there was no decree enjoining the purchase of indulgences, nor had the pronouncement of the present Pope, any more than that of his predecessors, proved that they are profitable and to be accepted because of the merits of Christ. (pages 286-287).

In reply Eck admitted that Luther's statement had been moderate - at anyrate, more so than he had expected. Likewise did Luther at the end of the disputation in regard to Eck's. Public opinion had turned against indulgences and Eck had necessarily to be circumspect in his utterances. It was not his intention, he said, to defend the indiscreet proclamation of indulgences or their abuse. Neither did he regard indulgences as necessary or obligatory. The main point of the dispute between Luther and himself lay in this, that Luther held that indulgences were nothing but the remission of good

1. As a matter of fact Eck had, before taking sides against Luther in the controversy to which the traffic in indulgences gave rise, deplored the evil, religious and moral, effects of the indulgence preaching of Tetzel and his fellow-commissaries and said some very hard things about it.

works. He did not, however, recollect anyone, who had granted or approved of Indulgences, interpreting them thus. Viewed in such a light, Indulgences would undoubtedly be an institution to be condemned, inasmuch as those who purchased them would either not merit the highest bliss, or be sent to purgatory to suffer the penalty they had not paid here. Indulgences were not the remission of good works, but the remission of the temporal punishment that is due and has not been suffered for sin. Thus Leo, the present Pope, understood them, as did also his predecessor, Sixtus IV. Therefore he could not admit that Indulgences are given, as his opponent maintained in his "Resolutions", only to the indolent, or, as he also affirmed in his Sermon to the people, to those who are unwilling to fulfill the penitential canons. (page 287-289).

Luther, in reply, maintained his statement that Indulgences are the remission of good works; for, in remitting the punishment due to sin, they remitted all the works of satisfaction, such as alms-giving, prayers, fastings and vigils etc., which is the third act of the Sacrament of Penance. So long as the purchase of an Indulgence ticket was accepted as an equivalent for these works of satisfaction, Indulgences must necessarily be the remission of good works. The statement, therefore, in his "Resolutions" quoted by Eck, that Indulgences are only for the indolent, was justified. (page 298).
While willing to admit that Indulgences might have a certain usefulness, Luther denied that they were of use to true Christians, that is, to those who, according to their name, loved and sought after Christ. (page 282). But this, Eck replied, was to deal unfairly with the councils who sanctioned them, for, according to their decrees, Indulgences could be granted only to the faithful who had shown contrition and made confession. It was to the wicked that they were useless, because they never obtained them. (page 289). Luther, however, maintained that his opinions did not overturn the judgments of the Councils, for there, many who professed contrition and made confession, but who, nevertheless, were slow to discharge the works of satisfaction required. For such, Indulgences might be supposed to have a certain usefulness (page 289). He might have added that it was by such that they were mainly purchased; also, that while confession was obligatory, the Indulgence preachers did not stress the necessity of contrition, nor adequately explain what it meant. Their concern was not for the salvation of men's souls. What they sought was their money.

In opposition to Luther's thesis Eck had replied that, so far were Indulgences from being a vice (or the bane) of good works, that the purpose of the Councils was to incite men to them (that is, of course, to such works as parting with the money that purchased Indulgences or rendering other services to the Church); further that such works were not tainted because of the purpose for which they were rendered, for,
in granting Indulgences, the remission of sins was assigned to God. (page 291). Luther, however, refused to allow the argument. Such works were vitiated. There were few, he said, who would give without recompense and for the sake of God what they gave for Indulgences. (page 301). His language is stronger than we would let pass to-day, when large sums of money are every year willingly and often at considerable sacrifice contributed to the building of Churches; but probably it was none too strong for the times in which he lived.

To Eck's argument that Indulgences are works of satisfaction Luther had replied that they seemed to him to be nothing but the remission of good works. Eck now (page 293) explains in what sense they are to be regarded as works of satisfaction. It was true, he admitted, that the man, who received them, did not himself make any actual satisfaction. There existed, however, through the super-abundant merits of Christ and the saints and inexhaustible treasury of merits, out of which the Pope, as the vicar of Christ, could draw and thus make satisfaction for him. Such was the monstrous theory "enunciated by Alexander Hales and elaborated by Thomas Aquinas, and officially sanctioned by Clement VI in the jubilee Indulgence Bull of 1343" and by Leo's decretal of 1518.

1. Prof. Mackinnon - "Luther and the Reformation". 1. 285.
Luther was, of course, as well acquainted with the theory and its approval by Leo X as Eck, but ridiculed it. Unwilling, however, needlessly to provoke his opponent, and bring upon himself the threatened sentence of excommunication, he replied, simply but effectively, that possibly they were contending about an ambiguity, namely, that the Doctor called that a making of satisfaction, in which, by the nature of Indulgences, it was impossible that satisfaction could be made, whereas he called a work of satisfaction that which actually rendered satisfaction and did not leave it omitted. (page 302).

Drawing upon the Treasury of Merits referred to, the Pope, Eck argued, by his Indulgences, remitted the punishment but not the guilt of sin. That such a remission took place, he maintained, was clear from Isaiah LX.1:— "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me— -- -- to proclaim liberty (Indulgentiam) to the captives", and from the use of the word "remissionem" instead of "indulgentiam" in Luke IV, where Jesus is reported as applying the passage to Himself. (page 294). Jerome, who translated Isaiah from the original Hebrew and revised the old Latin texts of the Gospels with the aid of Greek codices, apparently regarded the words as synonymous. But this did not help Eck's argument. The passage, as Luther pointed out, contributed nothing to the matter, for Christ, when he said:"This day is this scripture fulfilled in your ears", spoke of the true year
of Jubilee, and not of the remission of punishment, but of the remission of sins, concerning which the whole Scripture deals, whereas the Jubilee of Boniface did not commence till long after. (page 303).

Luther, while willing to accept the decrees of the popes in general, had maintained that there was no decree enjoining the purchase of Indulgences. Eck in his reply (page 295) failed to prove that there was. All that he did was to bring forward the decrees of Sixtus and Leo, which, as his opponent pointed out, did not enjoin the purchase, but only set forth the worth of Indulgences. Not being enjoined, they were, therefore, Luther maintained, unnecessary. (page 304).

In support of his statement that the whole world had not erred in regard to Indulgences, Luther had quoted the proverb: "Indulgences are pious frauds". Eck correctly replied that in a matter of this sort we were not to consider what the man in the street said, but what the good, the learned and the honoured, said, and of these there was a large number, some of whom had been canonised, who, although they disapproved of their abuse, did not condemn Indulgences. (p.296). Luther answered that neither did he condemn them. The Church, nevertheless, did not, by accepting what were only opinions, make truths out of them, which was what the decretal of the Pope, in sanctioning the theory of Hales and Aquinas, attempted to do. He did not condemn the theory. But, to say what he thought, Christ's merits, which, according to Scripture
were grace and truth, could not, even though an angel from heaven were to teach otherwise, be distributed by any man. (pages 304-305). Using the word "merit" in a different sense from Leo's decree, Luther did condemn the theory. Likewise did he, although he declared that he did not, resist the Pope. On the whole he would have done better, if he had stopped with his protest against the Church attempting to make truths out of what were mere opinions. Christ's merits were, without gainsay, superabundant, not only because of what He was, but also because of what He did, and in the latter respect they were even less in the power of the Pope to distribute than in the former.

Eck, who had the last word, added nothing material to the argument. He followed the Chair of Peter and would continue to do so, so long as he who sat upon it did not fall into heresy. It was true that the Pope did not prove the truth of his decisions, but it was enough for him, as the vicar of Christ, to issue them on a faith that could not fail.

Thus ended the disputation on Indulgences. It is by no means of the engrossing interest we expected it to be. Both disputants are, comparatively speaking, moderate in their utterances, Luther, because of the papal Bull, which necessarily restrained his utterance, and Eck, because public opinion had decidedly turned against Indulgences. On the day they began their disputation on the Roman Primacy, Tetzel, despised by those he had sought to delude, and disowned by
those who had employed him, died of vexation of spirit, with none to speak a word of comfort to him but Luther, who wrote, bidding him not to blame himself for what had happened, for "the child (Indulgences) had another father". Referring to the disputation, Luther wrote to Spalatin that "they were almost in agreement". Luther allowed that Indulgences, properly granted, might serve a useful purpose; yea, even that work that rested on them might be more profitable than one that did not, if other things were right. Eck condemned their indiscreet proclamation and said that they must not be relied upon. This represented a considerable measure of agreement.

"If Eck's doctrine had been preached by the Indulgence sellers", wrote Luther, "the name of Martin would to-day have been unknown, and the Indulgence commissaries would have died of hunger, if the people had been taught not to rely on this wretched system. It was indeed a scandalous doctrine that was preached by the Indulgence sellers, one that degraded the very name of religion, for it suggested that the gift of God could be purchased with money and fostered the idea that, when a man had made himself the possessor of an Indulgence, he might continue to sin with impunity. Never in its long and chequered history had the Church of Rome sunk so low. God's patience was at last exhausted, and by the hand of Martin Luther He gave unto her to drink "the cup of the wine of the fierceness

1. Hausrath - "Luther's Leben". 1. 276.
2. Prof. Mackinnon - "Luther and the Reformation". 11. 142.
of His wrath". But not even yet has she parted with Indulgences, nor with the root-error of a Treasury of Merits from which they are dispensed by the Pope. Home, however, no longer sells her Indulgences — those receiving them, we are informed, gratefully drop a contribution, according to their means, into the collection box.

**PENITENCE.**

After Indulgences the subject of Penitence came up for discussion. Eck took up the position that Penitence begins in fear, and in support of this quoted the parable of the Prodigal Son, where Christ shows that the Prodigal was moved to penitence (1) by the greatness of the reward — "they have bread enough and to spare", (2) by the fear of punishment — "I perish with hunger", (3) by a sincere regard for the Father's goodness to which he is thus led — "I will say unto Him: Father, I have sinned etc." Among other passages he also quoted the words of the Baptist: "Oh generation of vipers, who hath warned you to flee etc." He admitted that it would be better if men, who were sunk in the mire of sin, returned to God, without being urged by fear. But they had to take human nature as they found it. Therefore the preachers rightly appealed to the dread of punishment that is instinctive in the heart of man. Augustine approved of this method of preaching,
for no one, he held, comes to love and true grace except through fear. Fear comes first, "but when love begins to take up her abode, fear, which has prepared the dwelling place for her, is driven out. — — Without fear there is no entrance for love. The thread with which one sews is introduced by a bristle; in like manner fear first occupies the mind, because it enters that it may introduce love". Among other Fathers he also referred to Gregory, who, writing on the words:— "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom", had much to say in his support. Penitence, therefore, he maintained, did not begin with love and a desire for righteousness. It would, of course, be more praiseworthy and perfect, if it did. Our weakness, unfortunately, did not permit of this; and, stooping to our weakness, the Lord Jesus and the preachers preached fear, as the step by which we come to a true love of righteousness. (pages 310-314).

In reply Luther said that his opponent had, as it seemed to him, never been further away from the meaning of Scripture, and this was all the more extraordinary, seeing that he held with himself that penitence is more praiseworthy and perfect if it proceed from the love of righteousness than if it proceed from fear. He refused to believe that our weakness ruled out the higher form of repentance. Indeed, if we were to act and expound the Scriptures according to our weakness, we would never repent at all. He might lay it down as a general principle that every good life is regulated by some law. There
must, therefore, be in the case of the penitent a revealing of the law against which he has sinned. But that, in itself, was not enough; for, as Paul had written, "the law entered that the offence might abound". For repentance, it was necessary that a man love the law, and that could only be by the Holy Spirit diffusing love in our hearts. This was Christ's teaching when He said: "No man cometh to me except my Father draw him". Accordingly the law, the recollection of sin and the thought of punishment might terrify the sinner, but could never make a penitent of him. His opponent's exegesis of Christ's parable was, therefore, entirely wrong. The Prodigal's repentance really began in a love of righteousness. For it was when he came to himself that he first recognised the good and realised his own baseness. But this coming to himself did not arise from his weakness or from the fear of punishment. It arose through the appeal of the Father speaking within him and inspiring a love of the paternal home. Another affection, therefore, one entirely different from that which moved him while he lived in sin, had entered into him, namely, the love of the good. Regarding the quotation from John the Baptist he rightly replied: "It is one thing to preach repentance, it is another thing to set about it. The preacher warns, frightens and entices, but nothing comes of it, unless grace moves the will". Not content with refuting his argument drawn from Scripture, Luther also told Eck that he had forgotten the teaching of his great master, Aristotle, who in many well known
passages sought to persuade men that a good work must be
done of free-will and choice, which certainly had more kin-
ship to love than to fear. Further, let him understand that
Christ never compelled sinners to repentance by fear, but
lovingly enticed all whom he called, as, for example,
Zaccheaus, the Magdalene, and the apostles, according to His
words spoken by Jeremiah: "I have loved thee with an everlasting
love; therefore with loving kindness have I drawn thee".
Penitence, therefore, was voluntary, not induced by fear but
by the urge of love. Nor was the quotation from Augustine
about fear going before grace and being driven out on the
entrance of love, he added, (somewhat sophistically), really
contrary to this, for penitence did not begin till the entrance
of love. He approved of the similitude of the bristle and the
thread, if only one did not understand by it that fear
introduced love, which, nevertheless, he took to be the
implication of the Doctors words. As for his quotation from
Proverbs: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" –
it was not to be understood as referring to the fear of
punishment, for such a fear was the beginning, not of wisdom,
but of folly. If a man had love, he certainly was moved to fear
God, that is, as a man fears his father, not as a slave his
master. His opponent must guard, therefore, against confusing
this servile fear with filial fear. It was from the latter
that penitence sprang. It began from fear in love. (pages 314 -
321).
To Luther's contention that a love of the law must precede repentance, inasmuch as, according to Paul, "the law enters that the offence might abound," Eck, not finding it convenient to make a direct answer, replied that, while it was true that through transgression of the law sin abounded, it was also true that by observance of the law merit was increased, and that he, therefore, failed to see why his opponent had introduced Paul. (pages 322-323) Luther replied that his quotation from Paul was very pertinent, for Eck held that penitence begins in fear, and servile fear, according to the apostle, was nothing but sin, and through the strength of the law, increased sin, if grace were lacking. In saying that a love of the law must precede repentance, he did not, therefore, as his opponent had said, forgetful of their weakness, make angels of men, but taught that we are not to make gods out of sinners, so long as they are forgetful of their weakness, by reason of which they can, before grace, do nothing but sin. (page 332).

Regarding the Prodigal, Luther had contended that his repentance began in a love of righteousness inspired by the appeal of the Father speaking in his heart. This, however, Eck replied, did not remove the objection that his "coming to himself" took place through reflection on the punishment, for he had no one to satisfy his hunger even with husks. (page 323). Luther, with undeniable acumen, replied that, unless he had been led to look within and truly repent, he would rather have
died of hunger than have returned; so that the word stood indisputable: "No man cometh unto Me etc. " (pages 332-333). He might, however, have dismissed Eck's reference to the prodigal as not being pertinent, inasmuch as he suffered a present punishment, and his opponent's thesis was that repentance begins in fear of a future punishment.

To Eck's quotation from the Baptist no objection could be taken in this respect, for his words were: "Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?" Luther's criticism was that it is one thing to preach repentance but another thing to set about it; the preacher may warn and frighten, but nothing comes of it unless grace moves the will. But, replied Eck, since the Baptist had put fear into men's hearts, it was a sign that repentance had thereby begun. (page 324). Luther rightly replied that his opponent did not understand Paul nor realise the strength of the law, for grace alone can enable men completely to fulfil its commands. Therefore, even if John taught that fear is the beginning of repentance, it did not follow that repentance (that is, true repentance, which springs from a love of the law) begins in fear. (page 333).

Regarding the teaching of Aristotle, that a good work must be done of free-will and choice, Eck, though surprised that his opponent should quote a teacher whom he would not allow a place in the Schools of Theology, agreed. But it was one thing, he added, to persuade free-will; it was another thing to seek to compel it. (page 324).
This was only a feeble and futile make-shift. For free-will, Luther replied, was never compelled to good nor could it be compelled, but was drawn by grace and thus made truly free. (page 334).

Luther had maintained that Christ never compelled sinners to repentance, and instanced Zaccariaus, the Magdalene and the apostles. Eck replied with Paul, upon whom, as Augustine had written, Christ put constraint, and also with the words of the parable:—"Compel them to come in" (page 324-325). Luther admitted that constraint was laid upon Paul inasmuch as the miraculous entered into his conversion, but objected to his opponent making a rule out of the exception. He might also have pointed out that the conversion of Paul in no way supported his thesis that repentance begins in fear, for Christ spoke not a word of "the wrath to come", but only asked, tenderly and solicitously, "Why persecutest thou Me?" Very truly, however, did he say that Paul could not have undergone a great change of heart unless he had been drawn by grace; and this drawing, as expositors now interpret Acts IX, had been going on long before Christ appeared to him on the road to Damascus. (pages 334).

Penitence, Luther had concluded from Christ's dealings with sinners, was voluntary - not induced by fear but by the urge of love. It sprang, not from servile, but from filial fear. Eck combatted his assertion by again referring to what Augustine had said about servile fear being
driven out by love, and who had also spoken of this fear (servile) as being that to which the Wise Man referred when he said: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom". The fear of judgment, he maintained, was the door through which we enter to turn to God. Among other passages he also quoted in support of his thesis the words of Paul to Timothy: "Those who sin rebuke before all, that others also may fear", and these further words from Augustine: "Servile fear, which is seen when a man through fear of hell restrains himself from sin, is, although insufficient, good and useful, for by it the habit of righteousness is gradually formed! In addition to these there were the words of Christ: "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell". (pages 325-327).

In the above there is much tedious repetition, to which Luther briefly replied by emphasising the word "grace", without which servile fear worketh nothing but wrath. Regarding the exhortation to Timothy "Those who sin rebuke — — that others may fear", he replied that, although his opponent might, if he chose to, refer it to servile fear, he would continue to regard it as speaking of filial fear, till it was proved to be otherwise. The quotation from Augustine he answered by saying that the man, who refrains from sin through fear of hell, does so only in regard to the outward act; inwardly he is all the more strengthened in his hatred of
righteousness; instead of the habit of righteousness there is formed, if grace be lacking, the habit of despair and hatred of God. Luther's answer here hardly commends itself to us. Certainly the fear of hell is an unworthy principle by which to regulate conduct. But it is going too far to say that it increases hatred of righteousness and God. Indeed, there need not necessarily be any such hatred in the man who refrains from sin because of fear. As a regulative principle of life, the fear of hell, while sordid, is also salutary, and more likely to lead to the formation of the habit of righteousness than, as Luther said, to increase hatred of God. Regarding Matthew x 28: "Fear not them which kill the body -- -- but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell", Luther rightly replied that the passage does not inculcate servile, but filial fear, which dreads offending God. (pages 335-336).

After distinguishing between servile and filial fear, Luther had concluded by saying that penitence begins from fear in love. Eck replied that to introduce fear, after emphasising love, was to go backward after the manner of a crab. (page 328). An excellent reply to raise a laugh and cover his discomfort! But equally smart was Luther. Eck had a little before quoted a heathen poet. So now did his opponent. "Love is ever a timid and troubled thing", he replied, partly in jest and partly in earnest, and then wholly in earnest: "As if one did
not know that love is the source and head of every feeling that stirs the heart! For punishment and hell are slavishly feared because life and pleasure are childishly loved. And to drive away this love and fear, the love of God is poured out, that, through it, we may love another life and fear another death, which is separation from God". (page 338).

Eck's final word, which was brief, need not detain us. Nor need we spend much time in summing up the disputation. It is one which the auditors, wearied with more than a fortnight of disputing, might well have been spared. It ministered, however, to Eck's vanity, for he loved to dispute, and, truth to tell, did it well. Regarding penitence there was really no fundamental difference of opinion between him and Luther. For, when he said that penitence begins with fear, he admitted that there is a higher motive. He maintained, however, that the weakness of human nature is such that men are unable to begin with it. With the teachers of his time, as also with Augustine, Eck held too mean a view of human nature. Most certainly it is not the fear of hell that moves men, as a rule, to repentance to-day; for hell, at least the hell of Eck and Luther, they only rarely believe in, and still more rarely is it preached, and never did Christ say a word to suggest that the preacher should make use of it in urging sinners to repentance. In this Luther was absolutely right. Christ appealed, not to the base, but to the noble in man. Luther was equally right in maintaining that penitence
begins in love, love of the law, love of righteousness, love of God. Nor did he detract from this love, when, correcting his opponent's interpretation of the Wise Man's words: "The fear of the Lord etc." he associated with it fear. For filial fear, which he opposed to the servile fear of Eck, is not being afraid of God and the punishment He might inflict for disobedience. It is a holy fear of doing anything which would grieve Him. Therefore, in contradistinction to Eck, Luther said that penitence begins with fear in love. He also rightly emphasised the necessity of grace, if a man was to render loving obedience to God, and gained Eck's assent to this. Nor did he disagree with Eck about fear generally coming before love, but he held that penitence, real penitence, does not begin till the entrance of love. In this he was indisputably right. The fault of Roman theologians lay in this, that they discriminated between contrition and attrition, between real repentance and fear of the consequences of sin. Few who professed penitence, they said, were truly contrite, but though moved only by the fear of hell men might nevertheless receive the benefit of the Sacrament of Penance, which by the infusing of grace changed attrition into contrition, and thus secured them remission of the guilt of sin. Such a doctrine, as Professor Mackinnon writes, "tended to demoralise religion and to make the Sacrament far too much a popular device for escaping hell and ensuring heaven by priestly intervention, without the essentially
religious spirit". This, along with Indulgences, lay at the back of the disputation on penitence, on which at heart Eck did not really seriously differ from Luther.

1. Prof. Mackinnon - "Luther and the Reformation". 1. 87.

ABSOLUTION from GUILT and PUNISHMENT.

The final disputation between Eck and Luther dealt with Absolution from the Guilt and Punishment of Sin. In initiating the disputation, Eck stated that he would deal with the main matter of Luther's 4th and 5th Conclusions, in the course of which he would, however, touch upon other points. The 4th Conclusion runs: "God changes the eternal punishment into a temporal one, namely, that of bearing the Cross, and over this neither the Canons nor priests etc., have any power, although, misled by evil flatterers they may claim to have". (Werke 11. 161). The 5th: "Every priest must absolve a penitent from punishment and guilt, else he is guilty of sin; a higher prelate is equally guilty, if, without very good reason he reserves secret sins, however much the usage of the Church, that is, of flatterers, is against it." (Werke 11. 161).

Regarding the latter Conclusion it must not be forgotten that Luther in his theses and elsewhere maintained that forgiveness is the prerogative of God. Where then, we ask, does the priest
come in? Luther apparently had not yet arrived at the stage when
he could dispense with him. The office of the priest, as the
commissioned servant of God and the Church, was to convey the
divine forgiveness to those who by the sincerity of their
repentance and by their faith had proved themselves fit to
receive it. Luther allowed him, inasmuch as he believed that
God had invested him with it, the power of absolution in a
declaratory sense, and this authoritative declaration of forgive-
ness he still believed, according to his "Resolutions", to be
necessary for the penitent sinner having assurance of salvation.
Cases, however, were not infrequent, where the priest, sometimes
because of refusal to purchase an Indulgence, arbitrarily
refused absolution to a penitent. Hence Luther's 5th Conclusion.

The disputation is difficult to follow, for, unlike the
preceding, it lacks continuity. Eck's opening, however, presents
no difficulty. Against Luther's 4th Conclusion (God changes
the eternal punishment etc.) Eck maintained that, while in the
Sacrament of Penance the guilt is instantly remitted, the
eternal punishment due to sin is changed into one appointed by
the Church. But first he set out to prove that punishment
follows even after forgiveness, (1) from Genesis, where we read
that, though its guilt was remitted, the sin of Adam continued
to be punished in his posterity, (2) by an obscure reference
to 2 Samuel XXIV from which he argues that, though David's
sin was forgiven, it was not left unpunished by God. In further
support he quoted Augustine: "It is not enough that a man reform his life — unless he also make satisfaction unto God for the past through the pain of penance, the signs of humility, the sacrifice of a contrite heart, together with alms-giving etc." His opponent had tried to make it appear that such satisfaction is made only to the Church and is not required by God. He replied (we give only a few of his quotations) with the letter of Cyprian to Fidus: "We have read thy letters in which thou hast reported of a certain priest, Victor, that, before he had done full penance and rendered satisfaction to the Lord against whom he had sinned, his colleague, Therapius, rashly gave him peace". Here he asked Luther to note, the reference was, not to the Church but to God. He maintained, therefore, that, although his opponent had frequently taunted him with twisting the meaning of Scripture, the Fathers had all, so far as he knew, held his view. Besides, what sense would there be in the Church imposing on penitents the heavy burden of penance, unless the Lord and Head of the Church Himself demanded it? In arguing thus, he followed Chrysostom who, nevertheless, opined that in appointing penance it was better to err on the side of mercy than of severity. He continued with a quotation from Gregory: 

"But, because God forgives no sin without punishment, for either we strive after this with tears, or He with judgment, it remains that the heart must strive diligently after its reformation etc". Next he referred to the Canons as not definitely determining the length of penance, but as rather leaving it
to the judgment of the priest, for with God it is not the measure of the time but of the sorrow that counts. He further quoted Augustine: "No one is let off from a more serious punishment that is due, unless he has suffered some punishment, although much less than he deserves, for the fullness of His grace is bestowed by God in such a manner that the severity of His justice is not ignored." Finally he quoted Isodorus: "Although atonement may be made through penance, nevertheless, this must not be without fear, since the satisfaction rendered by the penitent is considered only according to the Divine judgment." Penance, therefore, he concluded, was not enjoined because it rendered satisfaction only to the Church, but also unto God, for with God the punishment, as Augustine had written, lasts longer than the guilt. (pages 341-345).

From the above Eck claimed to have also refuted Luther's 5th Conclusion (every priest must absolve a penitent from punishment and guilt). That this Conclusion was false he further sought to prove by showing from Augustine that the administration of the Sacrament of Penance is of the nature of carrying out a judgment, and that, therefore, just as this administration had been restricted in the case of lower prelates, the appointing of penance must, for the avoiding of confusion, belong to one's own priest or confessor. (pages 346-347).

Dealing with Eck's proof-texts, Luther rightly maintained that the argument from Genesis could not stand; for,
if Adam's sin continued to be punished in his posterity, and if every punishment was to be regarded in the same light, then the punishment with which God visits sin could be remitted by neither priest nor Pope, since no one yet had remitted death and the innumerable ills that followed man's first disobedience. (Pages 347-348).

Neither, continued Luther, could the argument from the punishment of David's sin stand. The fact that the sin, but not its punishment, was removed, was on his side; for he had always maintained that the punishment required by God could be removed neither by the Pope nor by any man. This seems to be in contradiction to the terms of his 5th Conclusion. The contradiction disappears, however, when we remember that Luther, in maintaining the necessity of priestly absolution, attributed the power of absolution to the priest only in a declaratory sense, and that what he was up against, as he states further on, was the claim of the Roman hierarchy to remove the punishments required by God through the power of the keys. Christ did not say to Peter: "What I bind thou shalt loose", but: "Whatsoever thou shalt loose shall be loosed". (Pages 348-349).

Eck had also quoted Augustine: "It is not enough that a man reform his life -- unless he make satisfaction unto God for the past through the pain of penance -- the sacrifice of a contrite heart, with alms-giving etc". Luther naturally replied that he was in entire agreement with the
Father, for, of course, there could be no real reformation without contrition etc. But why then, he pertinently asked, did they boast that such things were remitted by Indulgences? (page 349). If, as he says in his Sermon on Indulgence and Grace, an Indulgence secures the remission of the penitential satisfactions of prayer, fasting, and works of charity, what remained for the penitent to do in pursuit of the Christian life?

Regarding Victor, referred to by Cyprian as having been rashly given peace before he had done full penance and rendered satisfaction unto God, Luther asked Eck to study his author more carefully, and he would find that Victor and others were prematurely given peace that they might go the more readily to the Cross and martyrdom; for these, as Cyprian showed, were the punishments and flagellations which God inflicted upon them for their sins. In the latter part of his statement Cyprian, however, assumed somewhat too much. Luther continued that, though Victor had not yet rendered satisfaction unto God by martyrdom, he nevertheless had in a manner rendered satisfaction, because he had rendered it to the Church (according to Cyprian, however, not completely), to which God desired that men should hearken; for that the Church had a right to inflict punishment was implied in the words of Christ: "Whatsoever thou shalt bind etc". In this manner, Luther admitted, God demanded punishments which the Church might remit, that is, punishments of the Church's appointing. (page 350). But that was very
different from what Eck meant, when he maintained that the eternal punishment due to sin is changed into a temporal one.

Continuing, Luther rightly claimed Gregory to be on his side. His reply also showed that he was, in the main, at one with the Canons. He likewise approved of the words of Augustine: "The fullness of His grace is bestowed by God in such a manner that the severity of His justice is not ignored", as also of those of Isidorus: "The satisfaction rendered by the penitent is considered only according to the divine judgment". The latter quotation was unfortunate for Eck, for the reply was obvious, and Luther did not fail to make it: "Much less, therefore, can the satisfaction to be rendered by the penitent be remitted (i.e. supposing it is the eternal punishment due to sin changed into a temporal one) by human judgment, since the key of power ought not to operate unless there first be the key of knowledge, which understands what and how much to remit". (page 352).

In reply to Eck's refutation of his 5th Conclusion (Every priest must absolve etc.), Luther confined himself to the reservation of offenders for trial by the higher spiritual courts, to which he specially referred in the latter half of his conclusion (A higher prelate is equally guilty if, without very good reason, he reserves secret sins, however much the usage of the Church --- is against it). In opposition to Eck he maintained that such reservations did not help to prevent
offences, for even the grossest sins were laughed at in the higher courts, which sins could be fittingly punished, if the method were followed which the apostles instituted and which was observed till long after the Nicene Council, when it was decreed that every one do penance in his own diocese. On the same matter he also quoted Cyprian, who, in reference to certain offenders who had sinned in Africa and betaken themselves to the Roman Pope, Cornelius, wrote to Cornelius: "Since it is decided by us all, and it is also right and just, that the cause of everyone be heard where his sin was committed, and since every pastor has his appointed portion of the flock — — — it is imperative that those, over whom we are set, do not run about from diocese to diocese — — — but that they plead their cause where both their accusers and the witnesses of their crime are to be found." It would, he maintained, be a much better method of chastising sin, if every priest in his own parish, (for according to the New Testament priest and bishop were one and the same) were to bind and loose the penitent, and this would also be in accordance with the view of St. Paul (1. Cor. V). A priest must, of course, obey the prelate who restricts him (that is, by reserving cases for his own adjudication). Nevertheless, his Conclusion held good, that the prelate sinned grievously, who, without very good reason, reserved secret sins. The Church would not be in its present lamentable state, if every priest were, as his opponent had sneeringly said his Conclusion
would make him, at once bishop, archbishop and pope in his
own parish. (pages 352-355).

In reply Eck tried to discredit Luther because of his
approval of the proverbial saying: "Never do the highest penance;
the best penance, according to his opponent, being a new life.
Holding such views, his conclusion, namely, that the priest is
 guilty of sin, who does not absolve from both punishment and
guilt, was, he said, obvious. Nevertheless, the Fathers at
whom he jeered (Luther had, in reality, only emphasised the many
points on which he agreed with them) as if he alone were able to
interpret the Scriptures, were against him. Their testimony was
clear, that God does not remit sin without punishment; and,
unable to get away from it, his opponent had had recourse to an
extraordinary distinction in punishments, and said that the
punishment, by which God would punish sin, can be remitted by
neither pope nor priest. This, the falsest of all his statements,
annihilated the power of the keys. In doing penance, he maintained,
a man could, through the punishment having been changed, remove
the punishment required by God. Cyprian, Chrysostom etc were all
clear on this. His opponent might say that these authorities
were all on his side, but he must think differently in his
heart. Eck's reply is simply a tiresome rehash of what he had
already said, with an insulting insinuation added. His closing
sentence is significant, for it shows what lay at the back of the
minds of both disputants in framing their theses - if the priest
is guilty of sin who does not absolve from punishment and

Eck speaks as if he almost expected Luther to agree. In the
next sentence he returned to the attack. It did not help his
opponent to say that we have to carry our cross and that this is
the punishment demanded by God, for cross-bearing, as he (Luther)
had learnedly expounded it, was nothing more than the Christian
life. Along with this, he maintained, satisfaction had to be
rendered for the past. (pages 356-358).

Continuing his reply, he said that, though he had made
no reference to "reservations" in his conclusion, he nevertheless
held that in certain cases they served a useful purpose; he did
not approve of them, however, any more than did his opponent,
where the motive in making them was avarice, and punishment
took the form of a money payment—therby unwittingly condemning
Indulgences. (page 359).

Eck, however, was too disputatious to allow a word,
that practically homologated Luther's statement on "reservations!
to be his concluding one. Accordingly, he reverted to his former
argument, and again trotted out the Fathers to prove that God
does not suffer sin to remain unpunished. Tiresomely he
reiterated that, by the works of satisfaction demanded in the
Sacrament of Penance, such as prayer, almsgiving etc., satisfaction is made unto God. But, and here Eck still more clearly than before showed what lay behind his own and his opponent's theses, if satisfaction be thus rendered, why could it not also be rendered through the power of the keys. The Pope, he maintained, as the head of the Church, rendered satisfaction for the punishment due to sin through the Indulgences granted by him from the Treasury of the Church. Leo had, moreover, declared that thus, on pain of excommunication, it be taught and preached. Therefore, if Luther taught or argued to the contrary, he had already come under the ban.

Eck in his reply had been insufferably tedious and not a little insulting. Deservedly Luther makes him smart for it. To the fooleries and absurdities of his opponent, who, like an amusing citharist, kept strumming always on the same chords, he had, he said, already made sufficient reply, and would add nothing to it except this, that the Doctor had not touched the point at issue between them. For the question was not whether God leaves sin unpunished, which his opponent had proved at great length, but whether the Pope remits the punishment which God demands; and concerning this he had proved nothing. It was also significant that he had to-day been silent regarding the Scriptures. His opponent, he grieved to say, penetrated the Scriptures as profoundly as a water-spider does
the water; yea, he seemed to flee from their face as does the devil from the Cross. (page 361).

With this brief but scathing reply the disputation ended — for Eck, in the few words he added, contributed nothing further of consequence to it. Indeed, it would have been better for his reputation as a debater that, pleading the shortness of the time set apart for the disputation, he had added nothing to his first statement, for all that he succeeded in doing was to expose the weakness of his position. He maintained an impossible thesis. Scripture is plainly against it. Also the Fathers quoted by him obviously contribute nothing in its support. They give their support to the Sacrament of Penance, which, although he had doubts of its Scriptural warrant, Luther was still willing to accept. They also regard the satisfaction (3rd part of the Sacrament) rendered by a penitent as rendered not only to the Church but also unto God; and this also did Luther. But nowhere do they, any more than do Eck's Scriptural quotations, say a word to prove that the eternal punishment due to sin is changed into a temporal one appointed by the Church. Eck's thesis is completely refuted, and, in refuting it, Luther may be said to have substantiated his own, namely, that the eternal punishment is changed into that of bearing the Cross, over which neither pope nor priest has any power.
In this disputation Eck had as his opposite his first opponent - Carlstadt. It was preceded by a somewhat lengthy discussion on some points relating to free-will and grace that had not been dealt with in their former encounter. But there was, also, much tedious repetition. The argument, if argument it can be called, is hardly worth summarising or criticising. We will, therefore, proceed to the disputation that followed.

In this disputation Carlstadt sought to refute Eck's 2nd Conclusion: "Although venial sins are a matter of daily occurrence, we nevertheless deny that the just man sins continually in a good work, yea, even when he dies well." This Conclusion, which, unlike most of Eck's, it is difficult not to approve of, Carlstadt declared to be arrogant, impious, blasphemous and heretical, and opposed to it Eccles.VII.20:-

"There is not a just man upon earth that doeth good and sinneth not" - certainly a somewhat sweeping statement, if it is to be taken literally. Eck replied that the Preacher's words could not be opposed to him unless they were falsely interpreted. He admitted that there is not a man who does good but also sins; but since he does good, he does not, therefore, sin all the time. In support of this he quoted, along with a somewhat pointless passage from Augustine, a very pertinent one from Jerome:"It is not that the good sin continually, but only occasionally". He also pointed out, that according to his
opponent's interpretation of Ecclesiastes, St. Laurence would have sinned on the gridiron, St. Andrew and St. Peter on the Cross. But this was contrary to the liturgy of the Church, which, regarding St. Laurence, employed the words of the Psalmist:—

"Thou hast tried me with fire and found no iniquity in me". (pages 380-383).

To Eck's interpretation of Ecclesiastes Carlstadt opposed the dictum of Ambrose, that the Scripture, which speaks generally or universally, ought to be interpreted thus and not restricted by human opinions. Since, therefore, the text quoted spoke of the universality of men — there is not a just man that doeth good and sinneth not — it ought to be understood universally. Regarding the quotation from Jerome, he was not sure that his opponent had given it correctly, but would look it up. Of this, however, he was certain — Jerome unreservedly accepted the passage from Ecclesiastes, and added others from which it is inferred that a man sinneth even when he doeth good, such as Psalm CXIII.2, where David says:— "Enter not into judgment with Thy servant, for in Thy sight shall no man living be justified". If, however, his opponent's interpretation of Ecclesiastes were correct, it would follow that the just man would be able fearlessly to appear before God. But no man, who understood the Scriptures aright, would venture on such a statement. Regarding St. Laurence, etc., he would only say this at present, that, according to Augustine,
the voice of the martyrs is, if not with their mouth, at least with their heart, "All men are liars". This is a plain statement which may be accepted or refuted. It is difficult, however, to understand the sequence of the confusing statement which follows: "Therefore did Christ, when He was about to go forth to death, say: Lord, if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me etc. This failure of resisting nature and of the will in the martyrs — — — He took to Himself, and, as Augustine says, overcame, so that God does not impute this reluctance to die to the holy martyrs, although they had it". Carlstadt's meaning seems to be that the martyrs, like other men, were liars, because, though professing their willingness to die for Christ, they shrank from martyrdom when called to face it. But Christ, foreseeing this shrinking, took it upon Himself and spoke the words: "Father if it be possible etc.", so that, though sin, it might not be imputed to them as such. The argument is ridiculous. We add also that, if shrinking from death was sin (though, according to Carlstadt, not imputed) in the martyrs, it necessarily was also sin in Christ. Equally self-contradictory was Carlstadt, when he replied that the Psalmist's words: "Neither was iniquity found in me", quoted by Eck regarding St. Laurence, were not against him, for this reason, that tribulation, fire and persecution extinguish iniquity; whereas he had just maintained that the martyrs sinned even in the act of giving up their life. He would have done
better simply to have held with Augustine that by iniquity here was to be understood some gross crime. Finally he quoted against Eck Psalm LXXX.(v.3):"O Lord God of Hosts, how long wilt Thou be angry against the prayer of Thy servant?""Since the prayer of the righteous", he said,"a work so often commended by Christ, is under the wrath of Christ, who will dare say that in other good works, or in some of them (in adding the latter clause Carlstadt inadvertently casts doubt upon the text from Eccles, or his own interpretation of it) there are not sins, on account of which God is angry?" (page 363-365).

In reply Eck said that he also followed the dictum of Ambrose, and accepted the words of the Preacher as referring to every just man. He objected, however, to his opponent's applying to the universality of time what only applied to the universality of what Ecclesiastes had stated. In other words, he refused, rightly we think, to believe that the just man sins continually in every good work. To his opponent's statement that Jerome unreservedly accepted Ecclesiastes V1.21, and also added in its support Psalm CXLIII.2:"Enter not into judgment with Thy servant; for in Thy sight shall no man living be justified", Eck, following up his own quotation from Jerome about the just man sinning only occasionally, maintained that nowhere was it to be found in the Father that he sins in every good work, and added in further proof of the statement these words from his(Jerome's) Contra Pelagianos :"He that is cautious and prudent can for a time avoid sin". "A most clear testimony", he said," that the
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just man does not sin continually". His opponent, quoting Jerome, had introduced the Psalmist as shrinking from the judgment of God. The same Jerome, however, had in Contra Jovinianum introduced David thus: "David, the man after God's heart, who did all His will, and who dares to say: Judge me, O Lord, for I have walked in mine integrity". Merely to present this second picture of David was sufficient answer to Carlstadt, if he were to follow his method of arguing. But he believed, though his opponent would not credit him with it, in getting at the inner meaning of Scripture. He pointed out, therefore, that, according to the Fathers, these two passages from the Psalmist were not contradictory. For in the one David thought of the strict righteousness that made a man dread, in the other of the righteousness that was of grace and inspired no fear of judgment. In support of this distinction he rightly claimed the authority of Christ and His apostle, St. Paul. He also fittingly quoted Augustine: "The life of man is not praiseworthy, if it be examined without compassion by Thee. But because Thou art not over-zealous in searching out our faults, we confidently hope that there will be room for pardon with Thee". (pages 386-388).

Carlstadt objected to his opponent's reconciliation of the opposing passages from the Psalmist. He believed, however, that they were capable of reconciliation and
proceeded to show how. To the passage: "Judge me, O. Lord, for I have walked in mine integrity" he added the words of Job:—"If I shall be judged, I know that I shall be found upright" (xiii.18). But by the righteousness of Job, he continued, was to be understood the judgment which, a little before, (verses 15-16) he had passed on himself: "Nevertheless, I will blame my ways before Him and He shall be my Saviour". The English translation from the Hebrew is: "I will maintain (i.e. argue, prove right, according to International Critical Commentary) my ways before Thee". The Vulgate, from which Carlstadt quoted, has the word "arguam", which, in its general meaning, is an exact rendering of the Hebrew. But it has also the meaning "to blame"; and the latter meaning is required here by Carlstadt's argument. This is a meaning, however, which the original will not permit. The whole of the 13th Chapter of Job is against it. For Job maintains the integrity of his life. "He therefore looks to God for salvation, because he is fully convinced that any confession of sin — of the commission of which he is unconscious — would not only fail to obtain God's favour, but would also cause him to forfeit admission into the divine presence, whereinto no hypocrite can obtain entrance". 1. "Misled by the double meaning of the word "arguo", Carlstadt gives a totally erroneous exegesis of the passage. Job, however, while he continued to refuse to admit

that his trials were the result of any special evil-doing on his part, spoke elsewhere in different terms of his uprightness.

In Chapter XLIII. 5-6, we read: "I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth Thee. Wherefore I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes." We may, therefore, consider Carlstadt's argument with these latter words of the patriarch in our mind. By the righteousness of Job, Carlstadt said, was to be understood the judgment which he had passed on himself - "I will blame my ways before Him and He shall be my Saviour." It was according to this judgment, in which he acknowledged and condemned his sin, that Job said he would be found upright when he was judged. The meaning of the Psalmist was the same when he said: "Truth (i.e., confession of sin) springs out of the earth and righteousness looks down from heaven" (Psalm LXXXV.11). Similar were the words of the apostle; "If we judge ourselves, we shall not be judged of the Lord." In this manner did the Psalmist have innocence - his sin was ever before him and he made confession unto God. It was according to this innocence that he desired to be judged in his righteousness. Carlstadt therefore claimed that the passage quoted by Eck (Judge me, O Lord, for I have walked etc) was on his side, for David's righteousness was not without an admixture of sin. Carlstadt's argument is not to be summarily dismissed, for, of course, any serious pronouncement of man must be interpreted in the light of other relative
pronouncements. He proved that David's righteousness was not free from sin. He did not thereby, however, prove that the Psalmist sinned continually even in a good work, which was what he had to do, if he were to controvert Eck's Conclusion. Nor did he do so by claiming that the quotation from Augustine:--"The life of man is not praiseworthy if it be examined without compassion by God" was on his side. (pages 391 - 394).

In reply Eck maintained the correctness of his quotation from Jerome. He added that he recognised the truth of Carlstadt's statement, namely, that the righteousness, whereby the Psalmist desired to be judged, consisted in this, that he had judged himself and his sins. He pointed out, however, that, if in judging himself the Psalmist was righteous, he therefore did not sin in this good work. He also maintained that the passage quoted from Augustine did not support his opponent, for although the Father said that God was not over zealous in searching out our faults, he nowhere said that the just man sinned in a good work. For his own part, he admitted that the just man did sometimes commit venial sin in a good work. There might, for example, arise in one who devoutly preached or celebrated mass or gave alms, or in one who stoutly contended in argument as did the Doctor, a certain elation that was akin to venial sin, but that was entirely different from saying that a man sins continually in every good work. In the few words permitted him for reply Carlstadt
significantly made no attempt to answer the above. (pages 389-401).

Regarding the martyrs, Carlstadt had made the statement that, according to Augustine, these were the words that, if not with their lips at least with their hearts, they spoke in facing death - "All men are liars". Eck replied that, if the words were to be understood of sin, although they had been differently interpreted, he admitted that the martyrs, as also all the saints, were sinners. But he failed to see by what process of ratiocination it could be inferred that they therefore sinned in every good work. Still more illogical was his opponent in quoting the words of Christ, "Father, if it be possible etc." to show how nature and the will resisted each other in martyrdom. For if even Christ shrank from such a death, but could not therefore be charged with sin, much less could His servants, when called to suffer similarly for His sake. This argument, Eck said, was unanswerable. (page 389). Carlstadt, nevertheless, tried to answer it. He maintained that, in replying as he did, his opponent showed that he did not understand whence sins arose in good works. They sprang not from grace, but from the evil that is in man, and which is called the law of the members. According to this law Christ said: "The spirit is willing, but the flesh weak", and St. Paul: "But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind etc". Carlstadt continues with similar quotations and reflections upon them. (page 395). We will only point out that, granting that the law of the members is sin, it is not so without
exception. Sleep may reasonably be regarded as coming under this law; but the man who, with urgent work to accomplish, has to struggle hard to overcome it, yea, even if he succumbs to it, cannot by any stretch of imagination be charged with sin. No more can the martyrs in shrinking from a painful death. Rather must we hold them in all the greater honour because, in spite of their natural shrinking, they braced themselves to suffer and die. Besides, Carlstadt cannot possibly maintain that, because of their shrinking, sin attached to their good works, without also attaching it to Christ's on the Cross. Eck had already answered Carlstadt thus. He now deals with his appeal to Paul. He readily admitted everything his opponent had quoted from the apostle regarding the law of the members. The interpretation of the apostle's words were numerous; but, following Augustine, he held that concupiscence, or the law of the members, which before baptism had been sin, was, after baptism, not sin. This does not specially interest us, but his quotation from James does: "Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed; then when lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sin". In these words of the apostle, he pointed out, the offspring is distinguished from that which bears it, for that which bears is lust or concupiscence, that which is born is sin. But lust doth not bear unless it conceives, and it doth not conceive unless it is enticed, that is, unless it obtains the consent of the will to the committing of sin. With this, he held, and rightly, that he had answered what
what Caristadt had quoted about the conflict between the flesh and the spirit. (page 403). His opponent, however, was not satisfied, and Eck again replied to his objections; but we need not pursue the argument further.

Against Eck's Conclusion Caristadt had also quoted Psalm LXXX.6: "O Lord God of Hosts, how long wilt Thou be angry etc.", and added that, if the prayer of the righteous thus came under the wrath of God, who would dare to say that in other good works of men there were not sins on account of which God is angry? Eck replied that, according to Jerome, God is not angry if we pray for righteousness, but that the man, who prays, fears, because of a bad conscience, that God is angry even at his prayers. He would have done better, however, to have left Jerome out, for, because of its reference to the consciousness of guilt, the quotation partly supported his opponent. More to the point he quoted Cassiodorus, whose interpretation of the passage was, obviously correctly, that the Psalmist held that God was angry because of His delay in delivering His people. But this, Eck said, was quite a different thing from saying that God is angry at the prayers of the righteous, nor could his opponent infer from it that the just man sins even in his prayers. (page 390).

Caristadt replied that Eck had astutely evaded the main point. The charge, however, was unreasonable, inasmuch as Eck had replied to his opponent's quotation and refuted his argument. Caristadt persisted that the righteous man sins even in his best works, and in his support quoted the prayer of the
Church: "In our own righteousness we put no trust", and Isaiah LXIV.6: "All our righteousness is as filthy rags", and also Job lx.20: "If I justify myself mine own mouth shall condemn me; if I declare that I am innocent it shall prove me perverse", and again St. Paul: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, for these are contrary the one to the other". (pages 397-398).

In reply Eck maintained that he had not evaded the point of his opponent's quotation from the Psalmist. Regarding the passage from Job, he said that the patriarch spoke of the strict righteousness (already referred to as contrasting to the righteousness that is of grace) and did so wisely, for no man knows whether he is worthy of love or hate. He spoke just as did Paul, when he said that he knew nothing against himself and yet was not therefore justified. But although Job had spoken according as his opponent had quoted, he had also said: "My heart shall not reproach me so long as I live." (XLVII.6). Regarding Isaiah, he accepted the common interpretation of the prophet's words, namely, that if our righteousness be compared with the divine righteousness, it is unrighteousness, inasmuch as it is imperfect, defective and mutilated, just as the light that is created, if it be compared with the divine light, is darkness; and this, he said, was in accordance with Christ's words: "None is good, save one, that is God". As for the prayer of the Church that we put no trust in our own righteousness, he replied that by such words hope
is not taken away, but only presumption; for when we have
done all, we ought, nevertheless, to acknowledge that we
are unprofitable servants. From none of the Collects, however,
or other writings was it proved that the righteous man sins
continually in his good works, or St. Laurence on the
gridiron. (pages 404-405).

Carlstadt in reply claimed that Eck, in his
interpretation of Isaiah, had approximated to his own views.
He certainly seems to have made a serious admission, one
that raises the question whether he could claim to have made
good his conclusion. Eck thought that he had, in spite even
of the words of Christ quoted by him, and which Carlstadt did
not have the readiness of mind to quote. But, if man's
righteousness be compared with the perfect righteousness of
God, we have no choice but to say that he did not. Carlstadt,
however, nowhere in the disputation said a word to suggest that
the two be compared. Nor can they be compared. The creature and
the Creator live on two entirely different and infinitely
separated planes. There is a perfection possible on earth,
or at least attained to by Christ, but the absolute perfection
of God is beyond our power, even with the revelation of Him
of whom it is written that He was "the express image of His
person," to imagine. The righteousness we have, therefore, to
consider, is not the absolute and, to us, inconceivable and
unattainable righteousness of God, but the righteousness which
is in our power to comprehend, and in some measure attain to,
through His Son. Confining ourselves to this righteousness, Eck certainly did make good his Resolution. Carlstadt with his quotations never really seriously assailed it. His first from Ecclesiastes was, on the surface, formidable. But even had it to be taken according to its surface meaning, which Eck refused to do, the note of cynicism so characteristic of the Preacher, would make us suspect its truth. His last from Isaiah was still more formidable, but, as we have maintained, does not, according to its accepted interpretation, need to be considered. The others were inapposite, for all that Carlstadt proved from them was what needed no proof, namely, that man is weak and erring. Carlstadt assailed an impregnable position. Eck, with whom we have been for the most part at variance in the preceding disputations, here put forward an eminently reasonable thesis and successfully maintained it.
- TRANSLATION. -
TO THE READER

Thou hast here, reader, whoever thou mayest be, the celebrated disputation which we saw and heard at Leipzig, between the distinguished men, John Eck, Andrew Caristadt and Martin Luther. Possibly there are some who do not desire its publication. Others, indeed, may also object to its having been reported; for by general consent both parties are said to have been unanimous that a disputation such as this should in no way become public. But reader, thou need'st not be disturbed by such opinions. For if they had seriously meant that this flood and confusion of words should be kept from the public, they assuredly would not have permitted it to be heard and put on paper in public view by anyone who had a fancy to do so. For, since more than thirty copies were made and sent to different parts of the world, it is quite clear that they wanted all to go before the public, unless perhaps they desired the copies of the stenographers, who had been specially appointed for the purpose, to be subjected to their regulations. Our anxiety has been to present something of use in this to the pious reader. There are in it, certainly, many things which we have hitherto neither known nor sought to know. If these things prosper well, those whom it concerns will see what truth shall come out of them. We certainly hope that they will bring forth not a little regarding liberty, by which we may speak and hear more boldly concerning the things of the Church and Christianity. Although there is much in this multitude of words that is not to the point, we have, nevertheless, no intention of omitting
anything. On the contrary, we desire, in simple faith, to relate everything as it was said and done. Further, although neither ignorant nor unmindful of our power, we cannot magnify nor disparage anything on either side, nor attempt any judgment by which it is the custom to attract or restrain the sympathy of the reader. But we leave everything to the judgment of each and all, which, as we doubt not, will vary; but we also hope that the best may prevail, for the glory of God and the advancement of the Christian faith. Farewell, devout reader, and read devoutly what we in like spirit put before you. This thou wilt do, if thou hast regard to our zeal for the good.

June 27, 1519. 2 o'clock.

Declaration of Dr Carstadt through a respondent at his side.

First we testify, and we desire it everywhere to be known, that we have never wanted to depart by a finger's breadth from the Catholic Church. And if anything of the sort be detected in us, we desire that it be regarded as having slipped from us through human weakness and not of design, and that it now be considered as recanted. Also we do not dictate what shall be the judgment of the learned, nor do we detract from the authority of the public schools. Let everyone preserve his judgment free so long as he does not handle the Scriptures blindly but treats them as a whole. Moreover we pay the Sacred Scriptures this honour, namely, that we want to assert or teach nothing apart from them. In other things, however, which cannot be clearly
taught from these, we give the first place to the teachers of
the Church alone. Nor do we depart from what we testified in
our letter to Dr Eck: "If we do not the most holy Father in
Christ and These things we now testify again in like manner as
before.

Declaration of Dr John Eck.

In the interests of theological honesty I declare that, as I
have undertaken this duty for the glory of God, the honour of
the Church, the salvation of souls and the elucidation of the
truth, it is not my intention to say or teach anything which is
contrary to the Sacred Scriptures or to Holy Mother Church: I
am ready to be set right and corrected by the apostolic chair
and by those to whose judgment we are, according to yesterday's
agreement, to submit this disputation of ours. And this I de-
clare as above.

Conclusion Xi. Free-Will. (Eck).

Illustrious Doctor, since one of the chief points of our
controversy is Proposition XI, where the question is raised,
in what relation free-will stands to a good and meritorious
work, on which depend others preceding and following, I in-
tend to prove that it is in accordance with the Sacred Scrip-
tures, the Holy Fathers and the Christian faith, to say that
free-will, man's power of choice, has an active causality, a
power capable of eliciting and bringing forth meritorious
works, without thereby excluding the grace and special help of God; and to contradict this is plainly to fall into the heresy of the Manichaeans.

And in support of this quote, first, the text from Sacred Scripture, which has already been quoted in the Defence, Concl. 9: "God from the beginning created man and left him in the hand of his counsel; He gave him also commandments and precepts. If thou wilt keep the commandments, they will preserve thee and the faith which it is pleasant to keep. He hath set water and fire before thee; to whatever thou wilt stretch forth thy hand. Before man is life and death, good and evil; what is pleasing unto him shall be given him, since with great wisdom, God is also strong in power, beholding all things without intermission" (Ecclesiasticus XV, 14-18). Here the Wise Man has set before us the power of free-will, and from the words, "if thou wilt", it is clear that he grants and presents the power of choice, or volition as proceeding from free-will. Nor does it avail for the Doctor to say in reply that I have joined the problem and its solution together and made use of a text that is contrary to my meaning, because the Wise Man speaks of man as originally created and the Scripture says; "God made man upright"; if upright, therefore with original grace. That evasion, I say, does not annul the passage quoted. Since, although the Wise Man thinks of man as originally created, nevertheless no one is to imagine that he only after so many centuries addressed Adam with the words, "if thou wilt", but that he directed his words to those still living and who should come after, as the words at the end, "seeing
all things without intermission", indicate. Hence, when St. Jerome in his letter to the Virgin of Demetrias, immediately after the beginning, applies these words of the Wise Man to the men of his time, I add that the views of the holy Fathers make little distinction between the beginning of free-will and its progress, except that at the beginning it was perfect and unimpaired, but in course of time was injured by the stain of sin, according to St. Ambrose (de vocatione gentium), or became halting", according to Augustine (lib. 3 Hypognosticon contra Pelagianos). Bernard (de libero arbitrio, mini columna 8) very clearly bears the same testimony. "Undoubtedly" he says, "Adam continued to maintain the freedom of the will unimpaired after his sin as before it;" and in the following column, "The will endures equally in evil as in good". And St. Jerome states this more clearly in Adversus Pelagianos, where Atticus says to Critobulus: "This is what I said at the beginning—it has been put in our power either to sin or not to sin, and to stretch forth the hand either to good or to evil, that the freedom of the will may be preserved:"

"but this according to the manner and time and state of human society frailty".

Carlstadt's Reply.

The passage from Ecclesiasticus XV speaks of the first man and of the whole human race. For, according to the apostle, "By one man sin entered into the world and into all men". As therefore sin entered by one man, so righteousness would have been communicated to the whole human race, if the first man had re-

† This Book, attributed to Ambrose, is generally supposed to be spurious.
communicated to the whole human race, if the first man had remained in the uprightness in which he was created, and it would have been free to every man to stretch forth his hand to good or evil, as the text says clearly: "God from the beginning created and formed man upright", and then follow the words "and left him in the hand of his counsel". For grace moves and stretches forth the hand, according to the words of Paul, "Those who are the sons of God are moved by the Holy Spirit"; and John says in his canonical epistle, "Everyone who doeth justly is born of God."

In the second place I am astonished that the distinguished Doctor distinguishes times in the Holy Spirit, so far as relates to truth and righteousness, as if the Holy Spirit at one time speaks truth which at another time He overthrows; and I refer (appeal) to former statements.

Regarding his quotation from Bernard, I reply that it is not to the point, since our Conclusion speaks of freedom from sin, while the passage quoted by the Doctor speaks of freedom in volitions; and to prove that it is so, here are the words of Bernard:—"Moreover he has fallen from being able not to sin into not being able not to sin".

The words of Augustine in introducing the quotation: "God from the beginning are: This is the primary grace by which the first man would have been able to stand, if he had wanted to keep the commandments of the Lord. Therefore, having lost this through disobedience, man has, by righteous judgment, become captive to the serpent, that is, the Devil, whom he prefers to serve rather than God; and therefore it hath been written: For by whom a man
hath been overcome, to him likewise he is made over as a slave (2 Peter 11); and again: "Everyone who committeth sin is the servant of sin &."

Regarding Jerome, I say that he was never so ignorant of the Holy Scripture as at any rate to think that fallen man could without grace guard against sin. On the contrary, he puts out all his strength against the Pelagians and proves that good works or merits are not in the power of man.

Regarding Ambrose I reply, for I am also acquainted with his work, that in Book 1, chapter 1, he speaks of free-will apart from grace, or the will itself, is being a vague, uncertain unreliable thing, which can do nothing of itself that is acceptable unto God; just as also the church has sung: "Without Thy Divine will there is nothing in man, that can be called innocent."; that is, the will, apart from the grace of the Holy Spirit, can do nothing that is pleasing and acceptable to God; but whatever it does is noxious.

Eck objects to the answer as being unsatisfactory.

First, if the Wise Man speaks of the first man, and through him, to the whole human race, I have, therefore, what I want, what ever be the nature of free-will in us. So much for the first.

Regarding his second point, namely, that the Holy Spirit does not have different truths for different times, I reply that, so far as precepts, admonitions and commands are concerned, God has given for different times, indeed, conflicting precepts, inasmuch as he appointed circumcision in the ancient Law as being

† This Book, attributed to Ambrose, is generally supposed to be spurious.
necessary, whereas under the dispensation of grace the apostle exclaimed: "If ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing". Such a word as this is an admonition which the Wise Man could not apply to the dead for their profit, just as the command of the Lord: "Go ye to the whole world and preach the Gospel", does not apply to the dead.

In the third place, what the illustrious Doctor next quotes in his defence serves absolutely nothing to the purpose. For I did not quote the words of the Wise Man as supporting the doctrine that free-will has the power to accomplish good without grace—that was the damnable heresy of the Pelagians. For in this, as a Christian, and one who holds firmly to the Christian faith, I at once agree with him; but the matter before us and about which we were arguing was that free-will, that is, our reasoning power, is not to be regarded as being naturally called into action and set in operation only by the aid of grace, that is, that the will does not hold itself merely passive in regard to good and that free-will after sin does not become a mere empty name, but rather co-operates with God with his helping grace. And in support of this we have the text from the Holy Evangel (Matt. XXV. 20), where the servant says: "Lord, Thou delivered'st unto me five talents; behold I have gained beside them five talents more". For if free-will were merely passive in regard to the good, then the servant, in returning thanks to God, would have, by rights, confessed that he had received ten. But because he had received five as a gift from God, and through his own merits and the co-operating grace of God had
gained five more, he openly confesses and without pride that he had gained other five. For also St. Hilary testifies that by these talents are to be understood the merits of the righteous.

Further, I did not bring forward Augustine and Ambrose, as if I understood their testimony in the passages quoted to be that free-will is entirely the cause. I only wanted to show from Bernard, Jerome, Augustine and Ambrose, how unanimous is the opinion of the holy Fathers, that free-will after sin (i.e. the Fall) was not a mere empty name, but remained unshaken, although according to Ambrose, wounded, according to Augustine, halting, and according to Jerome, weakened according to the degree of human frailty. For I also agree that free-will without grace can do nothing that is pleasing and acceptable to God. Thus, then, thinks Eck.

Carlstadt.

To the first statement of the Doctor, namely, that he has what he wants through my reply, I answer in a word: No.

Regarding his second: when the distinguished Doctor quotes certain passages by which he endeavours to prove that the Holy Spirit, or the truth of the Holy Spirit, varies according to the age, as for example, the command regarding circumcision & I answer: It is one thing that there should be differences in remedies appointed for disorders of the body; it is another thing that truth itself should disappear. For there is truth even to-day in the purpose of the circumcision of the Fathers. Therefore this example of conflicting commands is not wisely adduced.
Regarding his third point, I reply that this passage does not prove that man, after receiving grace, has still a special and natural activity distinct from grace. Nor is the passage about the "five talents", though on the surface it appears to support the Doctor, against me. For the words of the servant, if he spoke rightly, are, in their inner meaning, to be understood thus:—It is not I that have gained them but the grace of God that is with me; just as Paul says: "I laboured more abundantly than they all; yet not I, but the grace of God that is with me" (1 Cor. xiv. 10). And thus must similar passages be understood. For what in one place is not expressed, is not, on that account denied. Also what is doubtful must be explained by testimonies that are true and clear. Therefore he does not injure us much in what he has said.

Finally, when he says that free-will is not only a name but also a reality, I answer: He makes the right freedom who Himself is truly free—Christ, our Lord.

To his fourth point I reply that both Augustine and Ambrose say that good merits are entirely God's, and not partly ours, as far as their efficacy is concerned; but become ours through the imparting of grace.

Eck's Reply.

Regarding your first, in which you answer me with the word "No" or "I deny it", I reply that I, too, might answer with a "No"; but that is not enough.

Regarding your second, I reply that your
answer does not weaken my argument; for I did not mean to be understood as saying that a truth becomes a falsehood, but that the admonition given by the Wise Man did not concern the dead, to whom it would have been of no use. On the contrary, I firmly maintain that it is, was and will remain a theological truth which sets forth, how God left man in the hand of his counsel, in regard to good and evil, to death and life.

Regarding your third, I say that this answer does not sound well in my ears — I know not how others may judge of it — which hesitatingly says, "If that servant had spoken rightly", seeing that the Lord commended him and said unto him: "Enter thou into the joy of thy Lord". His (Carlstadt's) erudition admits that the passage quoted by me is, according to its surface meaning, in my favour, but not according to its inner meaning, which he makes to run: "Behold, here are five talents more; it is not I, however, that have gained them, but the grace of God that is with me". Whatever may be the truth of this exposition which turns an affirmative sentence into a negative, I am nevertheless pleased with his statement that the servant whom the Lord praised did not depart from the humility of the apostle. But also this inner meaning serves my purpose. For if it was the grace of God with that servant that gained the increase, then it is easy to see the working of both. This is evident from the little connecting word. For he who disputes with me — does he dispute or not? and he who works with me — does he work or not? Further, St. Jerome has taken the apostle's words in the same sense; for regarding the words "more abundantly" (1Cor. xv.10) he says
that neither had he (Paul) worked in the Gospel without grace, so that he does not ascribe to himself anything contrary to what he had formerly said; nor had grace worked without him, in order that he might preserve the freedom of his will. The distinguished interpreter of Holy Scripture is very clear in his testimony that both grace and the apostle had worked. Therefore free-will was not deprived of its activity.

Regarding his fourth,

June 28, 7 a.m.

Dr. Eck permits Carstadt to answer

Carstadt.

To his first I reply with the adverb "No", and refer the reader to what has been already said. When, however, Dr. Eck makes such a fuss about the passage from Ecclesiast. (XV, 14-18) "If thou wilt keep the commandments they shall preserve thee &", we turn, in reply, to what Augustine has finely said in "De Gratia et libero arbitrio" (c 15), "Through grace" he says, "the will becomes so great that it is able to keep the divine commands which it wills." For to this belongs what is written: If thou willest, thou shalt keep the commands; and c. 16. And therefore the same Augustine says: "He who said: If thou willest thou shalt keep the commands: says in the same book (c 22, v 27): Who will set a watch before my mouth and a firm seal upon my lips, that thereby I fall not and my tongue destroy me not?" If then it be true, what he said, namely: "If thou willest, thou shalt keep the commands" why does he desire that a watch be set before his mouth? And a little farther on Augustine says: "If thou willest,
thou shalt keep the commands. It is certain that we keep the commands, if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of him that we will as much as is necessary, so that by willing we may do. It is certain that we will when we will, but it is He who makes us to will the good, concerning which it is written: "The steps of a (good) man are ordered by the Lord and he delights in His way" (Ps. XXXVII, 23); "Who worketh in us both to will and to do of His good pleasure." (Philp 11. 13.). Let the Doctor then give diligent heed that, since God inspires both to will and to do the good, he do not, by false interpretations of the Scriptures, destroy free-will, and put in the hearts of men who are ignorant and not yet built up in the law of Christ, the swelling of pride instead of theological knowledge. Indeed, I say that Christ has come for no other reason than to snatch free-will from the jaws of the devil, to whom it has been delivered up. For this reason, indisputably, Christ, who knew no sin, became sin that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him, as Paul says in 2 Cor. V (v 21); for free-will can do nothing that is righteous, unless Christ first take upon Him the sins of free-will and bring the same (free-will) over into the kingdom of light; so that Christ alone is good in the good, righteous in the righteous, the sanctification of the sanctified and the redemption of the redeemed, that no one may seek his own glory, as Paul writes he in 1 Cor. I (v.30.), where he says: "But of Him ye are in Christ Jesus who of God is made unto us wisdom and righteousness and sanctification and redemption, that according as it is written: He that
glorieth, let him glory in the Lord. (Jeremiah ix. 23.)". This is the true science of theologians -- to know nothing but the power of Christ and our own weakness; for then our strength is made perfect in weakness, and grace alone is sufficient for us (2 Cor xii. 9). Finally, the passage: If thou wilt hast not the shadow of the sacrament that hath ceased.

To his second point, the variations of truths, I reply that the Doctor is seeking side tracks and is striving to drag me elsewhere, that he may conceal himself and his argument and cover it with subterfuges. For I have often enough said that grace stretches forth the hand of our counsel to good; but he keeps repeating the same words without further texts.

Thirdly, the distinguished Doctor says that he does not like what I said about the servant who answered: "Lord, behold I have gained five talents more;" and that it is offensive to his ears. I reply that I did not express myself clearly, that my answer is offensive to the ears and that such ambiguity is out of place in the matter before us. Nevertheless, I would like the Doctor to give more heed to the persons who speak, and to remember that Augustine (ad Orsium qg) admonishes to consider carefully who it is that speaks in Holy Scripture. But when he makes a noise about my turning an affirmative sentence into a negative, I am not in the least worried, and remit such objections to those who concern themselves with expository niceties and logical trifles. Also when he dwells upon this little word "mecum" (with me) and attributes to free-will an activity of its own which does not proceed
from grace, I answer that it is well known to all who understand St. Paul, how shockingly he twists his words, to give a meaning contrary to that clearly intended to be conveyed by the holy apostle, who rules out every work which does not proceed from grace, when he says: "Not I, but the grace of God that is with me"; that is, it is not I who have a special activity, as the scholastics say, but it is grace which bestows on me every activity, which gives me all my strength, which impels and controls me, for by His grace I am what I am, and His grace has not been in me in vain; that is, whatever I have accomplished, grace has done it all, the grace of God has given me every good work. This he says still more clearly in 2 Cor. IV(v.17) — "We have this treasure in earthen vessels"; that is, we have in the weak vessels of flesh whatever pertains to grace. But let the Doctor ponder that St. Paul calls us vessels of grace, and give heed to what follows (why we have the treasure of Christ in earthen vessels) — that the glory, he says, may be of the power of God and not of us. But what need of further testimony? Why involve ourselves in subterfuges? Why hang suspended in ambiguities? When Scripture clearly ascribes everything that is noble, not to our own power, but that of God. For love alone beareth in us and with us all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things, worketh all things (1 Cor. XIII. 7); that is, grace makes us patient, believing, and active; it makes our ingoing; it also makes our outgoing. To this is to be added what John, the Baptist, humbly and truly said: "A man can receive nothing except it be given him from
heaven" (John III. 27). Nevertheless, my Dr. Eck still wants to work and to ascribe a special activity to free-will in regard to works of grace, when he hears the Forerunner of the Lord confess that a man can receive nothing except it be given him from heaven. But let the doers of good works be gone, when the baptiser of the Lord can receive nothing except it be given him from above. This is what Ambrose (de vocazione omnium gentium) lib. 2, c. 9) finely says:—"For grace herself so acts in all kinds of healing and help, that she first prepares the will in him whom she calls, to be the receiver and servant of her good works". Behold! he says that grace makes the will capable of receiving the gifts of grace and whatsoever belongs to a good work. This is what John said in the words: "A man can receive nothing". Next he (Ambrose) says that grace prepares the will to the service of the gifts of God. But my Dr. Eck makes the will queen when he says that the will has a special activity belonging to herself by which she contributes to good works. By this, I think, the last quotation from Jerome is answered, for the same Jerome (lib. Against the Pelagians, column 12) applies the well-known passage from John, "A man can receive nothing" to the help of God, and weaves together many other similar passages that support my argument.

Regarding his fourth, I am glad to see that the distinguished Doctor anticipates my arguments in which I will strongly and strenuously contend, as I hope and trust in the Lord, that good merits or works are in every part, that is, entirely of God so
far as concerns their efficacy and bestowal, and that they only become ours through being freely conferred on us by the divine clemency. Also I am very pleased that the distinguished Doctor, formerly my opponent, has come round, directly on our first encounter, to my, I should rather say, the Holy Spirit's view, and affirms that free-will, or rather the fallen will, before it has been raised up and restored by grace, can do nothing that is pleasing and acceptable unto God. The fancies of the scholastics concerning what is proper (congruo) may therefore go their way, for the contrition which they assign to a will that has not yet been healed, is of no avail. Begone, also, the father of such opinions, Aristotle, whom, for more than 400 years, having departed from the light and spirit of the Scriptures, they expounded and taught with great harm to souls. Meanwhile my 11th Conclusion, which is really Augustine's (de spirit. et lit. c.3), namely, that free-will before grace avails for nothing but to sin, remains unshaken. Likewise may it be with my 12th, which is from Ambrose (de vocacione omnium gentium, lib. 1. c.2. col. ultima), namely, that the will which is not governed by the divine will, runs all the more quickly to evil, the more eagerly it purposes to act. Perish, also, the teaching of the rabble of theologians, that man, by doing what is in him, can remove the obstacle to grace, for that has been sufficiently refuted in my 13th Conclusion.

Eck Latin text. pages 24–26

My friend, the distinguished Doctor has said —— since we have met for a disputation and not for
the reading of a lecture prepared at home, also that I be not troublesome to my lords, I reply.

To his first, that I am quite satisfied with Augustine's exposition of grace and free-will in chapters 15, 16, and 20, since the holy Father in these passages leaves the rights of free-will unimpaired, to wit, "if thou wilt", and, nevertheless does not pass over what is necessary, namely, the co-operating grace of God, and which so co-operates that the doing of a good work is rightly attributed to God and grace as the principal agents. Therefore it is the duty of a Christian man both to preach grace and at the same time to assert the power of free-will, as Augustine (Book 1, chap. 15 on the Baptism of Infants) has learned-taught, and St. Ambrose has reminded us at the beginning of his "de vocacione omnium gentium". Also Jerome (lib. 2. de baptismo parvulorum) has learned-taught, and he had always been zealous to maintain the omnipotence of God together with free-will. The most honourable Doctor, further, warns me against raising in the hearts of men, who are still ignorant, the swellings of pride with my defence of free-will. He ought not in the slightest degree to suspect this of me; for I defend free-will against the perfidy of the malefice in such a manner that, far beyond them, I put grace as the principal thing against the detestable Pelagians. And when Augustine (Hypognosticon lib. 3), in speaking of the relation between grace and free-will, compares it to that between a rider and his horse, I readily agree with what is there said in praise of grace. Would that God would grant it to us all.
Regarding the end of his principal points, I say that I urge nothing so often except that I would like to maintain the law of liberty, which the Wise Man has expounded, and of which Cyprian makes mention to Pope Cornelius, saying:-"Christ did not rebuke those who went back from Him, but rather turned to His disciples and said: Will ye also go away?" They receive, that is to say, the law by which a man, having been left to his own liberty and set over his own will, seeks for himself death or life. This law, I say, I have wanted, through the reminder of the Wise Man, to be set forth; which reminder certainly is directed to the living, and to those who come after them, but not to those who have been long dead.

Thirdly, the illustrious Doctor, with a lack of moderation, charges me with shockingly twisting the words of the apostle:"Not I, but the grace of God that is with me", and with wanting to attribute to free-will a special activity which does not proceed from grace. I wonder greatly how this could have entered his head, since I only added the words of Jerome to those of the apostle; and I wonder still more that, when he might have had a copy of yesterday's disputation from the notary, he charges me, contrary to our agreement, with asserting that free will has a special activity, which does not proceed from grace; whereas I never even thought of such a thing, and ask that reference be made to the reports of the notaries. What he quoted, however, afterwards, more in attack than reply, about the grace that is given from above---who does not know this? Since even
children know the passage from James (1.17): "Every good gift is given". Therefore I also agree with Ambrose when he makes the will the receiver of the gifts and the servant of the same. But when the illustrious Doctor charges me with wanting to make the will a queen, I admit that I put it thus in my defence (Conclusion 6). When the will is compared with the lower powers which carry out her behests, I maintained, it is true, that she is in the soul as a queen in the kingdom, which also I will yet prove. But when she is compared with grace and God, she is only a servant and handmaid. Finally, when he replies to Jerome by quoting another passage from his (Jerome's) work (contra Pelagian. lib. I col. 12), I would prefer that the Doctor had replied to the words of Jerome quoted by me, which attribute to free-will an activity of its own. For, to produce an instance, is not to answer. On the contrary, one must reply to objections that have been made.

From what Eck had practically admitted in his reply, Carlstadt, here, wanted to conclude (i.e., himself wind up the disputation). But Eck artfully contended that the time was up and that he had not conceded everything to Carlstadt. The matter then was brought before the regents and superiors (rectores et primarios) by whose judgment it was deferred for another hour.

The same day at 3 o'clock, Eck continued his argument.

The word of the servant having been interpreted by that of the apostle, "I laboured more abundantly than they all; yet not I, but the grace of God that was with me", I want to show more
clearly in reply that the apostle here declared that both he and grace had worked in a sense that goes beyond the exposition of Jerome quoted yesterday. For thus does St. Bernard (de gratia et libero arbitrio, mini col. 15) expressly affirm it:— "Therefore Paul, when he had related the many works which God had done through him, sa s; Yet not I but the grace of God which was with me: He might have said "through me", but because it was greater (minus should be majus), he preferred to say "with me", understanding that he was not a servant in the sense of being the instrument, but the associate or helper, as it were, of the worker by consent". There can be nothing clearer than these words: which, alone, ought to convince the opponent, since St. Bernard declares in them that the apostle was not merely a servant but an associate in the work. Moreover, St. Bernard likewise declares very clearly in the same column that grace and free-will together are the one and entire cause of a meritorious work. Following this statement, I do not regard a meritorious work as being accomplished partly by grace and partly by free-will. The words of Bernard are as follows:— "But grace works along with free-will in such manner that, although it anticipates free-will at the beginning, it afterwards joins it—

† Note:— If minus is taken to refer to "potuit dicere per me", the reading is correct; if minus is taken to refer to what follows— "maluit dicere mecum", evidently the minus should be majus.
itself with it, anticipating it undoubtedly in that it directly begins to work of itself, nevertheless in such a manner, that what is begun by grace is accomplished by both together, so that they work unitedly, not separately, both at the same time, not in turns, through all good works." Here the holy Father sets forth not only the causality of free-will but also its mode of action.

Fourthly, the illustrious Doctor wanted to know whether he might expect an answer to the arguments which his Lordship intended bringing forward against me in this matter. To this I answer "Yes". For, for this reason have I undertaken such a long journey (or, perhaps occupied so much time). Regarding his unnecessarily multitudinous quotations, however, let those, who are more skilled than I am, judge, whether also the secular theologians of all ranks during the past four hundred years are to be thus rejected. As if Christ, who promised that he would abide with us to the end of the world, had forsaken His bride. For my own part, I, who am at present dealing with theological matters, will not take upon myself the defence of Aristotle. This, however, I know and declare it for the comfort of philosophers and those who dabble in philosophy - Aristotle has been commended by the greatest and most learned man, whose judgement is so respected and whose praise is so sincere, that they can be rejected by none. To this effect I might easily quote Cicero, Quintilian, Plato and others. But, as I have just said, I am at present dealing with theological matters and will not emphasise philosophy in this place.
To know the Holy Scriptures is not to recite from memory a multitude of texts, but to search out and taste their inner spirit and Christ, our Lord, and to quote passages according to the meaning of the writers. There is, therefore, no sense in the distinguished Doctor making a noise about my coming to the disputation with a pre-meditated lecture. Regarding the passage which the Doctor quotes from Augustine, namely, that Augustine does not abolish the power of free-will, I say that grace makes free-will act; of that I have never had any doubt. Secondly, Ambrose (de vocatone omnium gentium) is clear on this—that free-will receives its power to act from grace. To the other passage from Jerome (advers. Pelag.) I say that Jerome copiously proves the same thing. Regarding Augustine (lib. 3. Hypog.) whose authority he appeals to, that grace bears the same relation to free-will as its rider to a horse, I reply that the Doctor reads Augustine with dull eyes and quotes him in a manner contrary to his meaning. The words of Augustine are as follows:—"And He puts Him on His horse, on the help, that is to say, of the grace of His incarnation; for, as it is written; He hath borne our sins! The similitude, therefore, is greater, namely, that free-will bears the relation to grace that a wounded, infirm man bears to the beast on which he is borne. The quotation from Cyprian does not prove that there is a special activity (or power to act) in free-will. There are, besides, other passages in the same writer, which plainly say that it is Christ
who effects all good works in free-will. When the Doctor admits that free-will has no activity of its own in good works, we accept his statement with all thanks, and wonder that, in the same argument and in the same hour, he contradicts himself in such a glaring manner. There is not lacking a suspicion, however, that in reality he thinks differently, since he quotes passages by which he seeks to prove that free-will has such an activity. I am also pleased with the quotation from James: "Every good gift cometh from above".

To the passage from Bernard where he says that grace undoubtedly anticipates free-will in that it directly begins to work of itself, nevertheless in such a manner, that what is begun by grace is accomplished by both together, so that they work unitedly, not separately, both at the same time, not in turns, through all good works, not partly grace and partly free-will, but both by their inseparable work, accomplishing the whole, there follows the further statement in Bernard: - "The whole, indeed, is accomplished by the latter, that is free-will, and the whole, namely the good work, is accomplished by the former, that is grace, but as the whole is in the one, that is, in free-will, so the whole is accomplished by the other, that is, grace. The meaning therefore, is that grace does the good works in free-will, and thus grace has the activity in good works, but free-will only receives them. This is what Bernard likewise says in the same book (de gratia et libero arbitrio col. 1.): - "This work cannot be effected without the two- the one by whom it is accomplished, and the other to whom or in whom it is accomplished."
Good works, therefore, are rather accomplished in free-will than done by the activity of the will. For Bernard immediately adds: "God is the author of Salvation, free-will is only capable of receiving it". Mark the word "only", which merely concedes. capability of receiving, and denies activity. Bernard continues: "This Salvation can no one give but God, nor receive but free-will! Again: "It follows that free-will rather receives good works than effects them: yea, by no means does it do good works! Bernard mentions three kinds of creatures through whom God works Salvation, namely, through the creature without it, at another time through the creature in spite of it, and at another, through the creature with it. Through the irrational creature He works without it, because it can neither work with understanding nor be conscious that it acts: through demons and wicked persons he sometimes works salvation against their will: but through good men God works with those who both do and desire what He wills. For to those who by their will entirely give themselves up to the work which He by means of them carries out, God imparts. Therefore Paul says: "Yet not I, but the grace of God that is with me!" He might have said "through me", but because it was greater (minus for majus, see preceding note), he preferred to say "with me", making himself not only a servant in the work through being the instrument by which it is accomplished, but also, as it were, the partner of the Worker through consent. The meaning of Bernard is not that free-will has in a good work a certain activity, which neither God nor grace creates, but that the grace of God inspires the will with
the good consent. And therefore he says it is less (see preceding note) to say "through me", because God works through certain creatures without their consent, as for example, when He works through irrational creatures, or through evil men against their will.

E C K.

(Latin text pages 28 to 30)

Although I must confess the poverty of my scholarship which the distinguished Doctor despises, nevertheless, with his kind indulgence, I reply to his statements, so that I appear more learned. For when he quotes Augustine, that grace makes free-will to act, he admits my principal point. For by the very fact that grace makes free-will to act, the work of grace is not in vain; therefore, free-will also accomplishes something. Regarding his second point, neither is the statement of Ambrose entirely favourable to his opinion. For, granted that free-will receives its activity from grace, nevertheless his conclusion, namely, that free-will on that account does not act, is wrong, since not only free-will but also other things receive their activity from God; so that it is indisputable truth to say that, if the first cause cease to act, no secondary cause can act. Fire receives its power to warm from the Creator, but it still continues to give heat. Thirdly, when the esteemed Doctor says that I have read Augustine with dull eyes, I could wish that he were able to see as clearly as I do. But the Doctor assumes that the passage which was not quoted in in his favour: the other, however, which was quoted, he leaves alone. For Augustine says in
"I think that free-will may rightly be compared to a beast of burden—therefore also it hath been written: I am become as a beast of burden before thee—and grace to him who sits upon it! This image Augustine follows up, not with concise words, but very profusely, beyond the letter q. I set this forth, so that neither the most learned Doctor nor anyone else may taunt me with having read only the scholastics, and with being a scholastic, while others are really theologians. When our friend replies to the quotation from Cyprian, that Cyprian has often written that Christ works all good works in us, I am faced with this difficulty, which I have frequently encountered on other occasions, namely, that he gives me quotations to answer rather than answers what I have taken exception to. For I do not deny what Cyprian has taught elsewhere, but I contend that his views regarding the power of free-will in the passage quoted are right.

Fifthly, the most excellent Doctor congratulates himself that I have come around to his view and do not attribute to free-will any activity of its own in a good work. But, if I may be permitted to say so, he has set forth our views in a mutilated form. For I frankly admitted that free-will has no special activity independent of grace, but that grace and free-will together, the one inseparable from the other, carry out the good work, according to the passage from Bernard quoted by me. The illustrious Doctor attempted to reply to this with a long series of passages from Bernard. But because these quotations were more
appropriate to him as an opponent than as the respondent, I still desire to learn whether free-will is entirely passive in regard to a good work, since Bernard affirms that grace and free-will accomplish it together, the one working together with the other. Also I desire to know how Bernard distinguishes between the work begun and the work accomplished; for if free-will is entirely passive, it will be equally so in receiving the impulse as in giving effect to it.

In the seventh place, my friend, the illustrious Doctor, in like manner twists the words of St. Bernard concerning St. Paul. I want to know what Bernard says elsewhere, whether he regards Paul as a partner by consent of co-operating grace, and what else this consent can be, but the working of free-will. And that this is indisputable, I quote the words of Augustine, which do not permit of any fanciful interpretation; from his fourth treatise on the epistle of John, where the holy Father, dealing with the words of that saintly soul: "Everyone who has this hope purifies himself even as He is pure!" says:—"See! how he has not removed free-will, as he has said "purifies himself": Who is it that purifieth but God? But God doth not purify thee, if thou art unwilling. Therefore, because thou dost unite thy will with God's, thou purifiest thyself, thou purifiest thyself not of thyself, but through Him who came that He might dwell in thee. Nevertheless, because thou doest there something by thy will, something, therefore, is attributed unto thee; but it is attributed unto thee that thou mayest say with the Psalmist
(Ps. xxvii. 9): "Be Thou my help, leave me not forsaken!"
If Thou sayest: "Be Thou my help," thou doest something; for if
thou doest nothing, how does He give? Thus writes Augustine.
By these words he shows very clearly that a certain activity is
attributed to us, and by the very fact that God helps us to approve
He energises that we do something. And certainly if Augustine had
not everywhere in his books wanted to defend the principle of the
freedom of the will and its power expressed by the Wise Men, the
most mild Father would not have burst out in such vehement anger
against Julian (lib. 4. C. 8.) as to say that he lied, in as much
as he alleged that Augustine had ruled out the power of free-will.

CARLSTADT.
(Latin text Page 30)

To the first, second, third and sixth arguments I reply that
grace certainly gives action to free-will; nor has this been
denied by me, but only that free-will has a special and natural
activity in good works. With this, I reply to the long speech which
the Doctor has taken from Augustine's fourth treatise on the
Johannine Epistles. For I admit that God is the Helper of free-
will, that is, He gives to free-will strength and action. But
regarding his third point, that free-will is compared to a beast
of burden— this does not help the argument and purpose of the
distinguished Doctor. For free-will, of course, is a beast of
burden, that it may be broken in for the necessary good works of
men, but that it may be restored to health, grace also is rightly
called a beast of burden (the reference is probably to the Samaritan's ass which bore the wounded Jew), as we have shown from the beginning of our argument. To his fourth from Cyprian, I reply that it is the duty of the opponent to ponder and prove his words so that they may be intelligible. The statement of Cyprian, however, is doubtful and never carries the conclusion that free-will has a special and natural activity, as above. Regarding Bernard, the Doctor wants to understand how a good and righteous man is the ally of operating grace. It is sufficient answer to say—because of consent which grace itself inspires in free-will.

E C K.

( Latin text pages 31 and 32 )

Although our friend, the illustrious Doctor, having at last been brought round to our way of thinking, frankly admits that he never denied the activity of free-will communicated by grace, there are, nevertheless, many passages in his writings and many other circumstances that make me suspect that the illustrious Doctor is still of the opinion that free-will has no activity in a good work; firstly, because of his fourteenth Conclusion, where he says: 'Doctor Johannes, not seeing how a good work is entirely of God and the work of God, still reads and accepts the scriptures through the veil of Moses; next because my seventh Conclusion clearly affirms this, namely: He errs who denies that the free-will of man is master of the acts of a man, from this, that it is active in regard to evil, but passive in regard to good; thirdly, because our friend, the reverend Father, Martin Luther, in opposition to
my views, says in his seventh conclusion that he who stammers forth that free-will is master of a man's acts, whether good or bad, shows that he knows neither what faith nor contrition nor free-will is. And the same reverend Father in a printed disputation (Conclusion 13) says that free-will after sin (i.e. the Fall) is merely an empty name; and in Conclusion 14, that free-will after sin is potent for good with a power that has lost its potency; for evil, however, it is truly active. Fourth, because the illustrious Doctor frequently writes in his defence that free-will and choice are passive and effect nothing towards a good work, as is evident from (b. 4. page 2 et c. 2. fac. 1 et f. 1. page 2 et g. 4.) and in many other places, where the illustrious Doctor says that the will only receives and does not act. Nevertheless, if he grants free-will and activity communicated by grace, I am content. If he had allowed this from the beginning of our disputation, namely, that grace and free-will act simultaneously, the one mingling with the other, we would have left off these argumentations or ours.

Also regarding his second point in which he says that St. Augustine (lib. 3. Hypog), who was correctly and with sharp eyes quoted by me, serves nothing to the purpose, it is possible that the illustrious Doctor forgets, as the memory of man is treacherous, to what purpose I quoted Augustine. My purpose was to show that grace and free-will are together the one and complete cause of a meritorious work, but that grace is the principal, free-will occupying a secondary place. This dictum of mine is, without doubt,
and according to general opinion, in harmony with Augustine's symbol which compares grace to the rider, as being the principal, free-will to the horse, as occupying a secondary place.

CARLSTADT.
(Latin text page 32—).

Regarding his first point, since the Doctor infers from my fourteenth Conclusion, that free-will has no activity, I admit the correctness of his inference, so far as natural activity is concerned, but in regard to the activity which grace confers, I say that free-will has an activity. But possibly the Doctor does not want to understand me, nor Bernard, who says that each (i.e. grace and free-will) accomplishes the whole, the one acting inseparably with the other, and who, therefore, does attribute an activity or action to free-will, because the grace of God works in it. In like manner, also, I attribute activity to free-will. For free-will acts because it is acted upon; in like manner also, it runs, because its running is not of the runner. (With the other points he was satisfied and had no desire to contend about the words—beast of burden and rider).

Wednesday, being observed as a holiday, because of the festival of Peter and Paul, was passed over.

Thursday at 3 p.m., the disputation was resumed, the forenoon having been devoted to the eighth celebration of the feast of Corpus Christi.
Dr. Carlstadt, having obtained the place of opponent, rose.

In the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, Amen.

I am amazed that the distinguished Doctor in the exercise of his judgement thinks fit to reject my statements, by saying he is of opinion that the illustrious Doctor thinks that free-will has no - - - - - -.

It seems to me inconsistent that free-will aided by grace - - - - - - - - for the Doctor assigns to free-will a special and natural activity of its own, and then grants that free-will has no activity in a good work excepts what proceeds from grace.

At this point Dr. Eck straightway broke in and interrupted the speech and argument of Dr. Carlstadt so that there arose a confusion of many words, and a little later the seal was affixed at the back of this page.

Eck at this point, probably not too sure of himself interrupted Carlstadt, insisting that he should use neither paper nor books, and hereby commending his own versatile and subtle genius as if he alone by his talents were deserving of praise and victory, said that the Italian manner of disputing was that no books be brought forth in public; that, on the contrary, a man must rely entirely on his memory, and that thus the controversy must be engaged in. Carlstadt frequently protested in a courteous manner but was railed at by Eck before the assembly. The matter was referred to the princes and magistrates. These, having retired consulted together. Their judgement, however, was more productive of
suspicion than indicative of a desire to defend the right. For the majority came to the decision that Carlstadt should not make use of books. All of them afterwards having fallen in with the decision, it was made public by Caesar Pfluck in the following terms:—

"My Gracious Lord and venerable beloved gentlemen, there has arisen between the worthy Doctors Eck and Carlstadt a dispute, to wit, that Dr. Eck has refused to allow Dr. Carlstadt to read his argument from book or paper, and, appealing to the use and wont of other universities and to general custom, has expressed himself to the effect that it is not the custom to argue out of books. Therefore Dr. Eck has by special request permitted Dr. Carlstadt to speak today from his notes. If they do not, however, tomorrow get over their quarrel and straightway finish their disputation as begun, we shall be quite content.

Carlstadt did not submit to the decision of the theologians and finally, his speech having been listened to, they with one accord left their place and with great uproar rushed out of the hall. The cry was heard on every hand that the disputation was now finished. The same evening, however, the following day was intimated announced to Eck, first, because many celebrated people had come together from distant parts, second, lest a matter of such importance should become, so to speak, a jest.
1st July, 1519. 8 a.m.

CARLSTADT.

In the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

The distinguished Father has, it seems to me, made some contradictory and conflicting statements in the cause of the faith. I, therefore, in the first place, ask the Doctor that he explain such inconsistencies. For example there is this inconsistency, namely, that at the beginning of his argument he said that free-will, when aided by grace, has a special and natural activity in a good work. But in the course of his argument he said it had never entered his head, that free-will had any special activity of which grace was not the cause. I ask, therefore, since to have an activity from another is not to have it of oneself, nor to have it as one's own but as another's, how a speech of this sort, which is at variance with itself, is to be harmonised, so that our disputation do not prove to be a waste of breath. (This goes back to 28th June).

ECK.

My friend, the distinguished Doctor, alleges that a few days ago I made conflicting and contradictory statements, inasmuch as at the beginning of the disputation I assigned to free-will a natural and special activity of its own in regard to a good work, and afterwards affirmed that such an idea never entered my head. In reply I say that neither at the beginning nor in the course of the disputation did I ever say that free-will has a natural
activity in regard to a good work, but in opposing the Doctor, I assumed tentatively that free-will has an activity, a power capable of producing and calling forth good works when aided by grace. For confirmation of this I refer to the reports of the notaries. Therefore, in adding the help of grace, I gave to the will not a natural but a supernatural activity communicated by grace, and to this opinion I still adhere. When, therefore, the Doctor seeks to put me in a dilemma by asking whether for the will to have its activity from another is not equivalent to having an activity that is not its own, but belongs to another, and -- that consequently it does not act of itself but through that other, I answer that to have an activity communicated by another is also to have that activity as one's own; and, although the Doctor has brought forward nothing in support of his statement, nevertheless, in confirmation of mine I adduce in this matter the testimony of Jerome to the virgin of Demetrias: "Since God wished to endow His reasoning creatures with the power of free-will and of voluntarily doing the good, He has put into the nature of man the possibility of either and made his own whichever He should choose, so that -- he might naturally be capable of both good and evil, and of bending his will to either. For man could not have the power of voluntarily choosing the good, unless he were likewise able to choose the evil. The most wise Creator desired that we be capable of both". Here Jerome clearly testifies that God has given to man the power of doing either to be his own. In speaking thus he therefore does not differ from the manner in which the holy Fathers have expressed themselves. Nevertheless, I add, although it is hardly necessary
that this working of free-will, which includes an activity of its own, certainly does not exclude the co-operation of another cause. Finally, I admit that free-will has a special activity of its own in regard to a good work, but one such as proceeds from God and grace.

C A R L S T A D T.

(Latin text page 35.)

I next ask the Doctor how there can be two causes of the same good work, each of which produces the whole, as Bernard who has been quoted by the Doctor, says — each, the one working inseparably with the other, produces the whole. For, unless one of the causes co-operates merely in a passive manner and the other actively, it is hardly conceivable how the whole work can be entirely produced by either of them.

E C A.

(Latin text pages 35 and 36.)

Since my friend, the illustrious Doctor, asks, how two causes, namely, grace and free-will, can individually produce the whole, except it be understood that the one is active and the other passive, I answer that the matter is very simple, and, to anyone who has the slightest knowledge of philosophy, obvious, when one considers the manner in which the causes co-operate in the same thing. For I frankly admit that either of these causes produces the whole. The Doctor, however, at the end of his reply used the word "entirely". We do not say "entirely", but follow Bernard who in the same passage says that they act unitedly, not
in turn, but both at the same time. For no one is to fancy that in a combination of many causes, it happens that one cause accomplishes one part, another cause another part, as the Doctor in his reply to my fortieth proposition imagines; for he says: "He (Eck) prepares for himself the whip by which he shall be scourged and has fallen away somewhat from the meaning of Scotus". But it would be altogether too bold, writes Ambrose at the end of his letter, to say that at one part of a good work we require God, but at another part we do not. Although in his thirty-second thesis he argues against me thus: "If a good work is partly in thy power, then, so far as that part is concerned, it counts for something". Therefore, in refutation of this, I have said that it is alien both to philosophy and truth, to imagine that a partial cause produces only a part. And that this is so I prove from the complete subordination of causes. Fire warms, nevertheless St John says that all things were made by God. Therefore this part of our argument can be understood easily and without effort by the man who is instructed in philosophy. This, also, has so far as I recollect been affirmed by St. Bernard regarding free-will.

CARLSTADT.

(Latin text page 36.)

When the Doctor arms himself in a theological disputation with heathenish weapons, he acts according to his custom. In doing so, however, he does not answer my question. I ask, accordingly, in a word:—Is a good work, the whole or it, due to God, or is it not? If he answers the first question in the affirmative, then we are at one: if in the negative, then I repudiate his statement.
Since the illustrious Doctor charges me with defending myself in a theological disputation with heathenish weapons, I answer that were I to do so with weapons that have not been disapproved of, I do not think it ought to be imputed to me as a fault, since I would only be doing what the greatest men of all ages have done, what the Fathers of the Church, yea, what even St. Paul himself have done. Nevertheless, I wonder how he dares at the present time to charge me with such a thing, since I have very carefully avoided the theologians whom he calls scholastics, and that great miracle of nature, Aristotle, and in replying to his two questions have quoted nothing except from Jerome, Bernard and St. John. But when the reverend Doctor asks whether a meritorious work is, the whole of it, due to God, he asks what is already answered; for he cannot but know that God in effect produces the whole of a meritorious work, but not entirely (totaliter), as is clear from Chrysostom (De compunctione cordis). For he says: We may also give these heretics a handle if we say that the apostles and all the saints became wonders, not by their own design and labour, but through the grace of God alone; for they will say: "What hinders all men from being like them? etc.". And St. Bernard agrees above that free-will acts not in part but together and inseparably with grace.

CARLSTADT.

Waiving the contradiction between "entirely" and "not
entirely", which the doctor again brings into his argument, let Jerome speak to us regarding the introduction of Aristotle into a theological disputation. "I am not concerned", he says, "what with what Aristotle teaches, but with what Paul teaches". (lib'1. col. 2. adversus Pelagianos). Further, when the distinguished Doctor admits that a good work is, the whole of it, due to God, I incline rather to prove his statement than disapprove of it. I approve it, therefore, from the prayer which the Roman Church uses every year: "O God, from whom proceedeth everything that is good, grant to thy suppliant people, that through Thine inspiration, we may think on what is right and good". The text is clear, that everything that is good proceedeth from God, and that the Lord Himself, bestoweth and inspireth right thoughts.

E C K.
(Latin text page 87.)

The esteemed Doctor quotes against me St. Jerome (lib. 2. Against the Pelagians) adversus Pelagianos)):- "I am not concerned with what Aristotle but with what Paul says". But I did not take it upon me, although I could, to defend Aristotle in this passage, nor have I made use of Aristotle in the matter. I only said that I might employ such weapons of the heathen as are not condemned, and take gold and silver from the Egyptians as being illegal possessors of them, as Origen applies the words. Therefore, we must, with Jerome, concern ourselves more with Paul than with Aristotle.

Next, the illustrious Doctor assumes that I admitted that a good and meritorious work is, the whole of it, due to God, and
that it is so, he seeks to prove. I beg the Doctor to remember what part he acts in this disputation, and that it is not his duty to confirm my statements but to refute them. The prayer of the Church, however, is not against me, but confirms my statement. For it asserts that what is good is bestowed by God, and puts our help in God, though it does not thereby rule out freewill.

(He also added that all the scholastics were of the same opinion. Likewise Dr. Carlstadt added at the end of this proof that the Doctors of theology, whom he called scholastics, held the same.

CARLSTADT.

Latin text page 38.

The opinion of Capreolus is that free-will accounts for the essence of the act and the Holy Spirit for its manifestation. Scotus, however, makes the distinction that so far as regards the essential principle, (principalitatem entitatis) of a good work, the will is the principal cause, but that so far as regards its merit, it is grace that is the principal cause.

ECK.

(Latin text pages 38-39).

To my statement that the best theologians, whom the reverend Doctor calls scholastics, do not dissent from the Christian opinion that the whole of a good work is due to God, thereby, however, not excluding the co-operation and contribution of free-will, the illustrious Doctor has brought before my notice
two of them,—one, Capreolus, to me not very well known; the other, the subtle
John Scotus, with whom I have been occupied even longer than I desired. Although our disputation does not turn on what this or that teacher holds, but on what we ought to hold and believe as Christian truth, nevertheless, I will defend these excellent men, lest they come to be wrongly understood. The Doctor has not quoted the passage from Capreolus. I have no doubt, however, that Capreolus held the view which his guide—I mean that great light of the Christian Church, the saintly Aquinas—has most lucidly expounded in so many passages, in *Prima li. q.109 maxime artic.6.,
article 6., in q. 24 "On Truth", in masterly book "Against the Heathen" book 3
in q. 24 de Veritate, in eleganti lib. contra gentiles lib. 3., and in other passages, where the saintly Thomas everywhere writes and concedes that free-will has no power to do a good and meritorious work, unless it be supernaturally moved by God and grace, and quotes in the same passages, Jerome and Augustine, with the Scriptural texts referred to by the holy Fathers.

So far as concerns Scotus,—indeed, I should say the whole company of the reputable theologians, who have written handbooks on theological questions—the illustrious Doctor ought to look up the right passage, where the gist of the matter before us is treated, not distinct. 17 primum sed 27 et 8 secundum, and there he will find Thomas, Aegidius, Albertus, Durandus, Gabriel and others, who with complete unanimity assert, after Petrus Longobardus, that free-will left to itself, without any special and supernatural help from God, has, indeed, power in regard to an evil work, but not in regard to a good, inasmuch as the inward inspiration of God preceded every praiseworthy activity of the will.
In addition to this, Bonaventure and others quote the very notable saying of Augustine which I referred to in my defence, as if it were sufficient of itself for every difficult point that might be argued between us. For I said in Proposition 25:—

"Therefore, the famous answer of Augustine is sufficient for all the passages that may be quoted on either side, and without having it in mind, a man may easily run into danger; for it skillfully assigns to each (i.e. grace and free-will) what belongs to it".

The words of Augustine to which I refer are those from 'de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus' (C. 21), and are repeated in his book 'On the Spirit': "The beginning of our salvation springs from the compassionate God; to submit to His health-bringing inspiration is in our power; to attain to what, through such submission, we desire, is the gift of God; not to fall away, after having obtained the gift of salvation, is in our power aided by the divine Help!"

Where St. Bonaventure and others maintain that Augustine made four steps in the assigning to each (i.e. grace and free-will) of what belongs to it, St. Bernard (col. 15) mentions only three; (1) the beginning is of God; (2) submitting or assenting to His inspiration is of the will; (3) grace is of God alone. And of the former of these steps must St. Bernard be understood as speaking when (col. 1) he says: "God is the author of salvation; free-will is only capable of receiving it". For St. Bernard here refers capability, not to the good work, as the Doctor has quoted, but to grace, to the third step of St. Augustine; for he adds:— "There is none to give it except God and to take it except free-will"; by which is to be
understood the salvation of which Bernard speaks. Thus free-will is only capable of receiving it. Therefore the Doctor in his reply regarding this, namely, that I have praised the admirable words of Augustine, attacks me without cause, saying that I do violence to the holy Scriptures and calumniate the holy teachers of the Church; and he wonders at my boldness in quoting Augustine so perversely, while all the time he can nowhere recollect this passage from Augustine. From this it is very clear that the excellent and most spiritually minded theologians, whom he calls scholastics, have rightly emphasised grace in contra-distinction to the Pelagians, and, in doing so, have not withdrawn activity from free-will. I desire, nevertheless, to have it made clear by the illustrious Doctor, how he proves against the scholastics or myself, that free-will is purely passive in regard to a good and meritorious work.

CARLSTADT.
(Latin text page 40).

Regarding the scholastics whom the distinguished Doctor quotes, and alone understands, or rather mis-interprets, the meaning of Scotus and Caprelus is plain; for what free-will effects in a good work they particularly attribute to free-will; indeed, they even say that in certain works free-will effects the essence of the act, which can continue till God infuses His grace. This statement, however, I mean to assail; for free-will, apart from grace and without faith, can accomplish no good work nor even can it be meritorious, either in regard to its essence or its outward manifestation. And that the Doctor may not by his
digressions escape from my hands, before I make plain the meaning of Augustine and Bernard, whose words he quotes and whose meaning he obscures, I ask the Doctor again and beg that he tell me what it is in a good work that acts with grace as a cause. For what the scholastic teach let, likewise, their patron say.

E.C.K.

( Latin text page 40).

I wonder greatly to hear these saintly teachers, Thomas, Bonaventura and others unkindly called merchants by the illustrious Doctor. Nevertheless, seeing that he taunts me, as if I alone understood the scholastic teachers and mis-interpreted them, I say:- Far be from Bocian modesty such arrogant boasting; since I neither understand all, nor do I, alone, know these in whom I am versed; and I am always ready to be taught by those who have greater knowledge. Regarding the exposition and interpretation, however, which the illustrious Doctor puts upon the words of Scotus and the scholastics when they say that free-will is the principal cause of the essence of the act, so that the will, in calling it forth, is able to continue it, till God imparts his grace, I nowhere recollect having read such a statement in any scholastic theologian. On the contrary, they confess that grace is called forth and given on the instant by the most excellent High God, and they deem it indubitable truth, that the grace of the holy Spirit is never tardy in its outpouring. This is, indeed, the truth, even though the illustrious Doctor is so perturbed about the scholastics, that they contend with one another, whether grace, or we might say God Himself, has the principal
activity in a good work, or a minor one, or none at all — concerning which they do not all think alike. Nevertheless, William Occam in his Dubitat. (addito quarto) assigns such an activity to grace; and that, even seven years ago, I held the same opinion, the Doctor might clearly understand from "Chrysopasso praeestin." if he had read it as diligently as he unreasonably despises it. But however that may be, the scholastics are agreed in regard to the activity of grace itself, that free-will has no power to effect a good work, neither so far as its essence nor its outward-manifestation is concerned, unless by the special help of God.

Finally, when the Doctor asks what it is that effects the essence of a good work, he possibly made a slip of the tongue, and meant to ask what it is in the essence of an act that free-will effects. I reply that the question is answered before it is put; for there are not, as in a copper wine, separate constituent elements in the essence of a work, but, as St. Bernard says, God and free-will act together, the one inseparably with the other, in effecting it. Therefore I still demand the illustrious Doctor to prove that free-will is purely passive in regard to a good work, and only receives it. For I am ready vigorously to repel his arguments herein. (Carlstadt then said that these (Thomas, Bonaventure, etc) preached with the gain of souls; therefore, he had called them merchants).

The disputation will be continued at four o'clock.
At four o'clock, the evening before the visitation of Mary.

The distinguished Doctor had defended his thesis today with sorry weapons. These sorry weapons I shall now turn aside.

(1) I will say what is to be thought of the epistle of Jerome to the Virgin of Demetrias. For instance, that distinguished prince of the theologians, our beloved Erasmus, after Augustine, wrote of it thus:—"It is certainly a very learned and eloquent letter, but one whose very style, not to mention anything else, clearly proves that it is not Jerome's." St. Augustine seemed inclined to suppose that it was written by a heretical Pelagian, because there are in it several things which smack of the teaching of the Pelagians. Bede is of opinion that it belongs to the heretic Julian. From this it is easy to conclude what weight attaches to the reply of the distinguished Doctor, when supported by a letter of this sort.

(2) When the distinguished Doctor quoted Augustine's 'de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus' (c. 21):—"Here is the beginning of our salvation", he ought to have looked to what follows a little lower (c. 44), where it is laid down as axiomatic:—"If anyone affirms that he can through natural strength, and without the inspiration of the holy Spirit, act in accordance with evangelical teaching, he is deceived by a heretical spirit". Therefore, to acquiesce either in the inspiration or the teaching is a gift conferred by God. I refer him also to "Retract" (lib. 1. c. 10), where he writes

† Two letters bear the superscription Jerome to Demetrias, the Virgin, 'one the long genuine one, and the other spurious (really by Pelagius) printed in Migne Vol. xiv under Jerome.
"All men, if they will, can fulfil the commands of God". But let not the modern heretical Pelagians imagine that this is in their favour. For it is indeed true that all men can do this, if they will; but the will is prepared by God.

(3), Regarding his quotation from St. Bernard (col.15), I say in refutation of the Doctor's reply, that St. Bernard attributes all the three steps, as the Doctor calls them, to God, and not to free-will. After this manner he writes:— "The words are not mine but the apostle's who attributes all that can come under the category of good, that is, thinking, willing, and performing according to the will that is good, to God and not to his own will! If, therefore, God works these three things in us, i.e., thinking, willing and performing what is good, the first certainly without us, the second with us, i.e., through our consent, which the holy Spirit inspires, as is evident in preceding Col, it follows that the distinguished Doctor is more concerned about maintaining his thesis than the manner in which he does so, more concerned about defending his views than dealing with the faith. For the weapons of the heretics are not to be employed in the things of the faith.

(4). It sounds very strange in my ears that the whole of a good work is produced by God, but not entirely; and that this sounds incongruous to real theologians, I appeal especially to the statement of Augustine in his book "De bono perseverentiae" (c.13), where he says:— "We therefore will, but God works in us also to will. We therefore act, but God works in us also to act according to His good will. (God effects the good work in us)! Again:— "It
"is profitable for us both to believe and speak thus, it is devout and good so that there be humble and submissive confession, that the whole is attributed to God". Note that word "whole". By thinking we believe, by thinking we speak, by thinking we act, whatever it is we do. But in what pertains to the way of piety and the true worship of God, we are not capable of thinking anything, so to speak, of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God. Let him ponder this who ascribes activity to free-will in good works. For our heart and our thoughts are not in our own power. That is what the Church confesses in the Collect: "God of Hosts, whose is everything that is excellent". Good works, therefore, are entirely of God. This is also how Cyprian teaches regarding the petition in the Lord's prayer: "Suffer us not to be led into temptation", and in the sixth Epistle (lib.2) to the Martyrs where he writes:—"Christ was present in his conflict. He raised up, strengthened and inspired the men who fought for Him and proclaimed His name, and always does He conquer in us". Behold! he clearly says that it is Christ who conquers in the martyrs, and, in confirmation of this, he quotes Matthew X. 20: "It is not ye who speak, but the spirit of your Father who speaketh in you". q.d. It is not ye who conquer, but Christ conquers in you. This is also beautifully expressed in 2. Chron. XX. 15:—"Thus saith the Lord, Fear not, nor be afraid of this multitude, for the battle is not yours, but God's". Behold! the Jews fight, nevertheless, Scripture assigns the victory to the Lord. Therefore, likewise in the same passage (following column)
Cyprian says:— "Who is not such an one, that He only regards His servants, but Himself contends, Himself strives in us, and in the struggle of our contest He bestows the crown and is Himself likewise crowned." Rightly, therefore, has David confessed (1. Chron. xxix. 16):—"Thine are all things, and we have given unto Thee what we received from Thy hand"; q.d. — we can give Thee nothing, which we have not received; and we have nothing which Thou hast not given. Therefore, Saint Jerome in his treatise "adversus Pelag" (lib. 1. col. 3. and lib. 2. col. 15) says:— "And that we may know that every good thing we do is of God, He says I will plant them that they can not possibly be rooted up; and I will give them thoughts and understanding that they may come to know me." But if thoughts and understanding are given by God, where then is there room for all this proud extolling of free-will? From this it may be inferred that good works are, all of them, of God. But when the Doctor says "not entirely", he lays himself open to the charge of siding at one and the same time with those whose views conflict the one with the other, i.e., the teachers of the Church and the scholastics. For nowhere among the latter do we find that the whole work is of God, as, again, we nowhere find among the former, unless my memory deceives me, that good works are not entirely of God. I therefore congratulate the distinguished Doctor, who violently attacked my fourteenth Conclusion, that he has today come round to my opinion, or rather that of the Holy Spirit, and says that the whole of a good work is produced by God. (These are the things which, at present, I desire to say; from the Bible however there are other things which I must say).
The illustrious Doctor has, with many words and the reading of many passages from books, assailed the validity of our answers and attempted to destroy our Conclusion. I reply firstly, that, however it may be regarding whatever about the judgement of Erasmus and the venerable Bede (i.e. concerning the letter of Jerome), who conjecture rather than definitely conclude, there is nothing out of place in quoting an author's book (or letter), which is usually quoted as belonging to him. For the Doctor has in like manner employed himself against me, in his defence, with the book "de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus", as I believe, especially since my opinion agrees with the opinion of the Holy Fathers, for example with that of Jerome quoted by me. For thus speaks Augustine in his book "de sententis Prosperi": "It is the nature of men that they can have faith as they can have love. Nevertheless, let the illustrious Doctor, in his condescension, without offence, pardon me when I say that there is another method for disputants to refute each other's answers. For my answer, with its added verification, had to be entirely annihilated, if he wanted to obtain, as he hoped to do, the victory.

(2). Next, the illustrious Doctor, according to his custom, does not reply to my objections, but seeks to invalidate them by other, and as it seems to him, opposing passages. To chapter 21 of Augustine's "de eccles. dog," where Augustine clearly says that it is in our power to acquiesce in inspiration, he answers absolutely nothing but refers me far away (ad forum Julii) to Cap. 44 et 10, where, nevertheless, the passages quoted bring their
answer with them; for, as the Doctor reads, Augustine finds fault with those who think that, without the divine inspiration, and merely by natural power, they can acquiesce in the preaching; which is a thousand leagues away from our meaning. The Doctor added that I should give heed to this side-remark - Augustine does not need an interpreter but a reader. I wonder, therefore, why he himself has interpreted Augustine (lib. "de spiritu") in the manner he has done.

(3) Next, he represents Bernard as not supporting our argument. I wonder very greatly at this, since there is not a man with the breath of life who reads Bernard, but sees that he agrees with us in every point. For Bernard says that at first we do nothing and also are purely passive; although that not at the end, but in the middle, that is, in consent, as he says, God works with us. There has certainly been something attributed to us, according to Augustine's opinion. And I do not accept the interpretation of the most learned Doctor, which, he says, is his own, that consent itself is also inspired. For then there would be no difference between the first, middle and last steps, all of which, according to the opinion of the Doctor, would be completely and entirely effected by God, which would be to overturn the whole of Bernard in this passage.

Regarding his second point the respected Doctor, unless my memory fails me, shamelessly calumniated me before attempting to prove his statement, by saying that I was more concerned about pleading my own cause than that of the faith. And while I expected to see him behave as a party at the Bar, he constituted himself
judge. Nevertheless, let us proceed to refute his statement. The Doctor promises to prove that a good and meritorious work is, the whole of it, entirely of God. A little while ago I desired him to show from the Fathers of the Church that free-will is entirely passive in a good work. I will not say that he seeks to put me off; but this I will say, and it is the sum of the matter, — he shows no desire so far to come into the light. But let us examine his quotations. In quoting Augustine (lib. "de bono persever" c.18.), where he (Augustine) says:— "We will, but in that which we will, the will is prepared by the Lord, who works in us", the Doctor specially emphasises the little word "in us". I don't know, however, that great importance attaches to the word, and especially since this passage can prove nothing except that a good work is, all of it, of God, which also applies to the passages which follow; but that it is entirely of God, there is not a jot or tittle to show. Nevertheless, let the Doctor understand that the first or highest meritorious working is an instantaneous, not a "transient" working (immanentem non transeuntem); therefore, it ought not to seem strange to him that God works in us to will; for apart from what is worked by man He bestows nothing. In like manner, also, regarding the prayer of the Church: "God of Hosts, whose is everything that is excellent" — I admit that every excellent gift is from above etc. Similarly do I speak regarding Cyprian and the passages quoted by him; for I admit that everything that is good is of God; and I say also that it is, all of it, of God, but not entirely, for it also comes about through our co-operation. For we are fellow-labourers with God (1. Cor.III. 9.), and the apostles preached the gospel of
God with God's co-operation. (Mark XVI. 20.) Therefore, all our sufficiency is of God. And, as the apostle says: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" But, as we have already said, while this magnifies the special and supernatural impulse (action) of God in good works, it does not, therefore, do away with the power of free-will. Therefore, I know not to whom the illustrious Doctor intends his song, when he exhorts those, who assign activity to free-will, to get to a better knowledge, because of the passages quoted from Cyprian. Also from 2. Chron. (C.20) he quotes: "Thus saith the Lord: Be not afraid of this multitude etc;" likewise the words of David: "All things are Thine, Lord." As if there were any man so stupid and so ignorant as not to know that everything that is good must be attributed to the Creator of all things! For the Doctor ought to know that, by the general consent of the best theologians, whom he calls scholastics, no creature can do anything, except God, either by a general or special output of His power, makes it to act; so that God does more through the instrumentality of the creature than He could do by Himself alone. For the Doctor has admitted that free-will also has its activity. Therefore, I have not been brought round to his opinion, but he has come round to that of the scholastics, unless, indeed, he proves to me today that free-will is entirely passive.

Nor does it signify that he says he has not read in the scholastics, that a good work is, all of it, of God. Let him at least condescend to continue reading in them and not rob these holy Fathers of the honour that is their due.—Thomas, for example,
in the passages quoted today, Peter Longobardus, the distinguished bishop, in the "Distinction" quoted today etc. Regarding this, the opinion of the scholastics, unless the learned Doctor has stronger arguments to bring forward, remains unshaken, that free-will has of itself no power to effect a good work; nevertheless, this power may, with the help and co-operation of God, be attributed to it, namely that, as St. John says, it purifies itself, and at last becomes worthy to receive according to what it has done in the body, as St. Augustine (Hypognost. lib. 3) interprets the retribution of reward or punishment.

CARLSTADT.

(Latin text pages 46 and 47).

Doctor

The distinguished casts up to me from time to time that I indulge in very long speeches, and is unaware that he does the same thing himself.

(At this point the disputation was, at the intervention of the representatives of the princes, and because of the shortness of the time, suspended from four to six o'clock. Then it was announced by the herald that the disputation would continue till the Lord's Day, one o'clock.).

After the Feast of the visitation of Mary which was on Saturday.

CARLSTADT.

I care nothing that the distinguished Doctor frequently finds fault with my reading from books. On the contrary, my only desire is that this study of mine become known to posterity. Moreover, it is a matter of no concern to me that he obtrudes on
me the rules drawn up for disputants, for these rules and the name of logician are hateful to me. For to dispute in theology is to bring out the meaning of the Scriptures. So much for his first and second.

Thirdly, while the distinguished Doctor replies to the argument taken from "de eccles. dog" (0.44), he makes no reply to the text quoted from Augustine's Retractæ (lib 1). But, that it may be known to all that, when Scripture says we have the power of accomplishing good works, it is to be understood that such power is given by God, let Augustine's l. Retractæ (Cap.22) be read, where he says:—"It is certainly in the power of man to change his will for the better; but such power is nothing except it be given by God".

Fourthly, the Doctor in his reply quoted Bernard who says that consent to the good is not without us, or that the middle step itself is put down to our credit. From this the Doctor, therefore, ventures to infer that the will is only passive in regard to the first, but active in regard to the second, and that, accordingly, the second is, indeed, all of it, of God but not entirely. But the contrary is the case. For Bernard clearly says:—"Although not of (out of -ex) us, nevertheless, not now without us"; and a little lower: "We must be on our guard, therefore, that when we feel this stirring invisibly within and with us, we do not ascribe it to our will which is weak, but to grace alone." Here I ask the Doctor, What does Bernard mean when he says:—"Grace works with us, and the good work is not of us but of grace."
However it may be regarding the answer of the illustrious Doctor, which it is not my purpose at present to refute, I nevertheless refuse to accept this new interpretation brought forward by His Worship (excellentiam), namely, that to dispute in theology is to set forth the truth of holy Scripture, since this sort of disputing is not recognised by Augustine ("contra Faustum," iib. 3, unless my memory fails me). Heretics, he says, love rather to conquer than to argue. There he taunts them with having refused the contest; not for their zeal for theological truth. But when the Doctor objects, firstly, that I have made no reply to the passage from Augustine's Retract. (lib. 1. C.10), which, nevertheless, I answered in dealing with chapter 44 of "de eccles. dog.," I reply that I heard nothing in it specially requiring consideration. This I venture to say—no passage is brought forward from Augustine in which the co-operation of free-will is not at the same time asserted. But when he quotes chapter 22 of the same book, which says that it is certainly in the power of man to change his will for the better, but not unless it is given by God, I indeed acknowledge and have frequently testified that free-will receives its activity in regard to a good work from God; but, if it be given, then free-will has what has been given it, and makes use of the same; only, we must not boast of this, lest the words of the apostle (1. Cor. Iv. 7) be cast up against us:—"What hast thou that thou hast not received?".
But let us rather acknowledge with Jeremiah (X. 23): "O, Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself; it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps". For all this renders unto God the honour that is his due, and does not withdraw from the will its ministering co-operation; so that St. Augustine (lib. 2. de "On the Forgiveness of Sins" peccatorum remissione cap. 16) makes his statements to harmonise with free-will.

Secondly, the learned Doctor thinks that I have not grasped the meaning of St. Bernard because of what follows, namely, that St. Bernard affirms that likewise consent itself does not proceed from us. But the Doctor would certainly not have made this objection if he had followed the teaching of the scholastics. For the particle "of" or "from" (ex) points to a certain, and, as it were, original and primal source, whence the action or work springs. But since the will cannot impel to good, except it has itself been influenced, therefore St. Bernard very rightly denies that the good work proceeds from us. In this he agrees entirely with the apostle, that we do nothing of ourselves, that is, of ourselves alone, but through (The Calling of the Gentiles) the prevenient grace of God. St. Ambrose ( de vocatione gentium) realised and clearly set forth this after the apostolic meaning, namely, that, though the righteous are moved by the spirit of God, this does not therefore rule out the freedom of the will. And with this, I think, the difficulty of the illustrious Doctor is removed so far as it lies between these three: - "in us", which is not enough; "out of us", which we do not touch; "with us", which is in our power.
The first statement of the Doctor is a diversion or subterfuge. The second we will pass over. The third, however, that free-will co-operates, we must discuss in what sense it is to be taken. For no one is so ignorant as to deny that those, who will, do will; and those, who work, do work. But to understand the sense of this - that is the province of theological science. Further, when the Doctor replies that good works are given us, and that we can make use of what is given us, I accept his statement so far as it is true. Regarding Bernard, we will also, for the sake of brevity, pass over the Doctor's interpretation of him. But I am of this confidence in the Lord, that, if it be proved, that a good work proceeds, the whole of it, from both, that is, that it is effected by God and received by free-will, then it will be clear that a good work results, the whole of it, entirely from God. And to maintain the truth of this, I quote the testimony of Augustine in his "Encheiridion" (Cap. 32), where we read:—Moreover, if no Christian will make bold to say, that it is not of the compassion-ate God, but of the will of man, lest he openly contradict the apostle, it must follow, in order that the words, "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy", be rightly understood, that the whole is given by God, who both prepares the good will of man to be helped, and, having prepared it, helps it. For the good will of man precedes many of God's gifts, but not all. Nevertheless, it is itself in those which it does not precede. It presents itself beforehand to him who does
not will that he may will; it follows him who wills, that he may
not will in vain. For why are we admonished to pray for our
enemies, who without doubt are unwilling to live God-fearing lives,
unless God works in them also to will? In like manner why are we
admonished to ask that we may receive, unless that which we will
be granted by Him who makes us to will? From this we conclude that,
as God works in us to will, so also He works in us to do, as for
example, the apostle says:—"Who worketh in us both to will and to
do".

Secondly, we conclude that free-will possesses the whole of
a good work, but 'susceptively,' as one receives some little gift
from another. This, likewise, Augustine ( _lib. 1. Retract. Cap. 23)_
says:—"Each is His, because He Himself prepares the will, and
each is ours because it (the work) does not take place unless we
will it. And therefore, since we cannot will unless we are called,
and when, after we have been called, we will, neither our will
nor our running avails, unless God both give: strength to us as we
run, and lead us whether He calls". From this it is clear how
a good work is ours and how it is God's, and that grace gives to
free-will a strength not its own, by which it works. Therefore,
Cyrillus ( _John. lib. 12. Cap. 56_) says:—"For they were unable to
do what is pleasing to God, unless they were indueed with power
from on high". Therefore, it was said to one of the ancients:—
"The Spirit of the Lord will come upon thee, and thou shalt be
changed into another man". (1 Kings 1.x. 1 Sam. x. 6). Thus
speaks Cyrillus who quotes other texts to this argument. Gregory
also in his ninth Homily on Ezekiel speaks thus:—"But it must
be understood that only our evil deeds are ours; our good deeds, however, are both the Omnipotent God's and ours; for it is He, who beforehand inspires us to will, who continues to help us, lest we should will in vain." And he concludes that by the prevenient grace of the Omnipotent God the gift becomes our merit. From this we see how a good work is both God's and ours. In support of this he also quotes the passage from Ezekiel:— "The Spirit of the Lord entered into me and set me on my feet". This text clearly affirms that the works of God are to be ascribed to the Holy Spirit.

E C K.

(Latin text pages 50 and 51)

The excellent Doctor says that I have admitted that good works are given by God. I deny it. Not that I deny that good works are given, My objection is that he assumes I have made the admission, whereas not a word was spoken to that effect by (my approval of his) quotation from Augustine's first treatise. C. 23. I admitted that the power of changing the will for the better is given by God. But it is another thing to say that the power of the good work is given, and that the good work is given, which the Doctor takes for one and the same thing.

Secondly, the illustrious Doctor tries, in setting forth his views, to prove that a good work is effected by God and received by free-will. I reply that, if the Doctor asserts that free-will is only receptive, he contradicts what he has already admitted, when he confessed that free-will also has an activity of its own. If then, he does not rule out the activity of the will, nobody is so
foolish as to deny that free-will is only receptive in regard to a good work, especially in speaking of its inner working for good. And it is a matter of common knowledge that, as the cause that works to effect and the result frequently harmonize, so also do that power and the material in which it works. But let us examine the passages he quotes.

First, Augustine in his Encheiridion (C.32) is in nothing against us. For we have often insisted that the Holy Fathers, when they say that the whole of a good work is of God, do not thereby deny the co-operation of free-will, but only assert the pre-eminence of God and grace. This is clearly shown by the words quoted from Augustine. For he says:—"God prepares it to be helped and helps it when prepared". Under the name of help he expresses that free-will has an activity, as he declares in his fourth treatise on the Johannine Epistles formerly quoted. "If thou sayest" he writes, "Be Thou my Helper, then thou doest something; for if thou doest nothing, how then does He help?".

Further, he quotes the apostle:—"God worketh in us both to will and to do". Unless my memory fails me, the apostle's exact words are:—"Who worketh in us both to do-a-d-te-wi will and to do of His good pleasure." However they may run, I readily agree that God works "in" us to will; but also "with" us, as Bernard says.

Secondly, he quotes the words of St. Augustine (1 Retractations C.28), namely, that a good work is, so to speak, a gift given by God. I reply that we must give heed to the subject matter of which authors are speaking. For Augustine speaks there of faith and love, in regard to which the will is undoubtedly passive. But it is another
thing to speak of a good work. Also, we do not deny what follows, namely, that the will has no power in regard to a good work, unless it be called; for God precedes every good work by giving the impulse to do it. Nor do we deny that God gives the strength; we only say that if He does, then the will will certainly possess it. Therefore, we pray that God may precede our good works by inspiring to them and follow this up with His help.

Regarding Gregory, who in Lib. Moralium so often exalts the freedom of the will, we say the same thing. For we can do nothing that is pleasing to God, except God helps, who gives grace without recompense, otherwise it would not be grace, according to the apostle; and, consequently, the good work that proceeds from it is very rightly called the gift of God and our merit, according to the word of Augustine to Sixtus Presbyter: "When God crowns our merits He only crowns His own gifts".

Regarding Cyrilus and as many others as may be quoted, we have no cause to deny what they say. For men cannot do what is pleasing unto God unless they are in due with a higher strength—witness the exhortation of the Lord Jesus to His apostles that they should remain in the city until they were in due with power from on high. Strength, I say, is an implanted virtue and grace, where the will is only the receiver, but when strength is obtained it is also its nature to work. And concerning this, Scripture speaks in regard to Ezekiel and Saul.

CARLSTADT.

(Latin text page 51).

I thank the Doctor for conceding that good works are the

† Commentary on Job, in 35 Books (known as Magna Moralia) — Gregory's longest and most ambitious literary work.
gift of God and that God crowns His own gifts. When, however, he taunts me with inconsistency, I refer him to what went before and to what followed, and ask what effect the rod or cane has with which the pedagogue chastises the youth in his charge? When that question is answered, we will proceed.

(51 to 52).

The illustrious Doctor asks what effect the rod or cane has with which the pedagogue beats the scholar or a dog. I reply that since, according to his way, every secondary cause may be called instrumental, there must necessarily be different kinds of instruments. For, at one time an instrumental cause exercises its inborn or natural power and strength, at another time a communicated power. Most insignificant, however, is the operation of an instrument, when it acts only as directed, whether by the pressure of a certain force or simply by virtue of its motion. With this preamble, I reply to the somewhat captious question put to me, that the rod has an effect or activity in so far as it is directed by the hand of the master himself. I am ready to hear how this is to be refuted.

(52).

However it may be with the distinction of the distinguished Doctor, Isaiah says that just as instruments that are moved can say nothing to the persons who set them in motion, so neither can man, when moved by the Holy Spirit, arrogate to himself any part of that movement or action. After this manner he writes in Chapter
Chapter 10 (v.15): "Shall the axe boast itself against him that heueth therewith, or shall the saw magnify itself against him by whom it is drawn, or the rod against him by whom it is lifted up?" Therefore also free-will, which is compared with such instruments, cannot say that the good work is not entirely of God; for, if it speak thus, it boasts itself against the Lord.

The illustrious Doctor opposes to my reply Isaiah xi—"Shall the axe boast itself against him who heueth therewith?"—likewise regarding the saw that is drawn and the rod that smites. From this passage it is to be inferred that free-will is unable to say that it does anything; since, if the will should deny that the good work is entirely of God, it would then be boasting itself against the Lord. I reply that these words of the prophet are symbolical, and consequently, according to the teaching of St. Dionysius, (de mystica theologica. C. 4.), do not permit of a general application, but only in regard to one particular point.

The teaching of Isaiah, therefore, is that we ought not to boast ourselves in our good works, and this none but the most foolish will deny, since the apostle exhorts us: "Let him who glories, glory in the Lord". To this end, therefore, the three symbols—the axe, the saw and the rod—are fittingly joined together.

Regarding the nature of the instruments, however, the comparison of the rod and free-will is quite a different matter, inasmuch as the one is an inanimate instrument, but the other an animate one, indeed the soul itself. This distinction I would emphasise, if I
might venture from St. Thomas - quaest. 24. de veritate.

CARLSTADT.

(Latin text page 53.).

What we are to think regarding the comparison of the instruments, I remit to Jerome, and I do so with confidence. In reply, however, I say that the doing of what free-will, when moved by grace, does, is the gift of God and the work of God.

Augustine clearly states this in "de spirit. et lit." (Cap. 2). Besides, it is written in Ezekiel (XXXVI):- "I will cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments and do them!" From this it clearly follows that it is God who makes us to act and work. Next, I would like to hear from the distinguished Doctor, which of the teachers of the Church has anywhere written that a good work is, the whole of it, or God, but not entirely. Unless I am mistaken, it is nothing more than a theatrical absurdity (chimaera histrionica) devised by the Doctor, that he may be irrefutable and not put to confusion.

E.C.K.

(Latin text page 53 to 54.)

Firstly, regarding Augustine's " de spirit. et lit." (Cap 2), there is nothing that I question, neither regarding the statement of Ezekiel that God makes us to do, whatever it be that we do. All the more, then, He makes us to do whatever good we do; for I stated a little while ago that God does more through a secondary cause than when He works alone. This, the distinguished Doctor, if he had read in love, would have understood from the 29th Conclusion
For I know that my prayers are nothing, unless God makes them to be something. But when the Doctor taunts me regarding (what he calls) my theatrical absurdity (or misrepresentation) when I said that the teachers of the Church have declared that a good work is, all of it, of God, but not entirely, he simply does what Arius did when he taunted St. Athanasius, and, before an upright judge, asked the Holy Father where in sacred Scripture the word "homoousia" was to be found. For because of this new coined word the heretics called the Christians Homousians. And Hunericus, King of the Vandals, issued an edict in Africa that all Homousians ought to be put to death by diverse torments. I would like the illustrious Doctor to tell me, since there are none of the faithful but know that God is one in being and three in persons, where the word "person" is to be found in Holy Scripture. In like manner I might speak of the word "Theotokos" in the time of John of Damascus. The fact is that in theology we labour under the difficulty that there are more matters in it than names for them. Therefore, since the fact is undisputed, we contend to no purpose about a name, and disputing about troublesome (pertinacibus) names is to be put aside. Accordingly, since the Doctor has clearly understood my position and meaning, there is no sense in catching at words. I want to say that the whole of a good work is of God, but because it does not take place without the co-operation and activity of free-will, I said, lest I should deny that co-operation, that it is not entirely of God; and that is to put the matter fully and in few words. Therefore, let the
Doctor condemn my views and not quarrel about words.

(The servant of the University then publicly proclaimed that tomorrow at dawn (or the following day at 7 a.m.) the disputation between Dr. Eck and Dr. Martin Luther would be commenced).
In the name of the Lord, Amen. In the year 1519 A.D.
4th July, being the seventh year of the pontificate of our
most Holy Father and Lord in Christ, Leo. X., called to be
Pope by the providence of God, at 7 a.m., after the
disputation on free-will had been continued for several days,
indeed, from 27th June, between the distinguished and honourable
gentlemen, John Eck, Canon of Eichstadt and Chancellor of
Ingolstadt (university) and Andreas Roderphi Bodenstein
Carolostadt, Canon and Archdeacon of Wittenberg, Doctors
of Arts and Theology, was begun in the following manner and in
the presence of ourselves, notaries public, and of the under-
signed witnesses, the disputation between the eminent Doctors,
the aforesaid Dr. John Eck, and Dr. Martin Luther, of the
Augustinian Order of Wittenberg. But because the distinguished
Doctor Martin at the beginning of his disputation referred him-
self to the prior declarations of the aforesaid Doctors, there-
fore the same are taken literally from the preceding disputation
and are inserted at the beginning of this disputation.

Dr. Martin began in the following manner:–

In the name of the Lord, Amen.

The declaration of each of the distinguished gentlemen,
Andrew Carlstadt and John Eck, I make my own and adhere to. I only
add that, out of reverence for the Pope and the Roman Church, I would gladly have let this unnecessary and exceedingly hateful matter drop, had I not been compelled to take it up by Proposition "E" of Dr. John Eck's. I am also sorry that those, whom it specially concerns to be present, are not here. After having time and again, both in private and public, besmirched my character with the charge of heresy, they now remain away, when a judicial enquiry into the matter is about to take place. I speak of the inquisitors of heretical depravity, who, instead of brotherly admonition and teaching, prefer to pursue me with their calumnies.

**D. R. E. C. K.** (Latin text pages 56 & 57)

In thy name, sweet Jesus.

Before descending into the arena, I testify in your presence, my most illustrious lords, nobles, distinguished and most excellent gentlemen, that everything that is to be said and has been said by me is first of all subject to the judgment of the supreme Chair and of him who sits in it, and therefore of whomsoever others, whose office it is to correct the erring and lead them back to a knowledge of the truth. And, inasmuch as the reverend Father in his preface declared, as if justifying himself, that, out of reverence for the Pope, he would willingly have let this matter drop, had he not been compelled by my statement to take it up, I say: Let the reverend Father remember that unless he had himself in his manifesto first denied that, before the time of Sylvester, the Roman Pope was superior to others, it would not have been necessary for me to set down my
my thirteenth statement. Likewise let him remember that in matters transacted before the representative of the apostolic Chair (i.e. at Augsburg), he argued that the pontiff, St. Pelagius had twisted the words of the Gospels; whereas, and more than all, he accepted the words of Christ according to the interpretation of the Holy Fathers. In vain, therefore, does the reverend Father attempt to put on me the responsibility for this disputation, for which he himself more than once gave occasion. But now let us, with the help of God and without further circumlocution, attack his leading principle. Reverend Father, your 13th. conclusion, set forth against mine, admits that the Roman Church is superior to others according to the far-fetched decrees of the Roman Popes issued within the last 400 years. But against these, you say, there are the text of Holy Scripture and the approved histories of 1100 years. To this I reply as follows:

Monarchy and a single authority in the Church of God exist by divine right and were instituted by Christ. Therefore, the text of Holy Scripture or of approved history does not oppose it. For the Church militant, which is as one body, according to the statement of St. Paul, was instituted and formed after the likeness of the Church triumphant, in which there is one sovereignty, with all arranged according to rank up to the One Head, namely God. Therefore, the like order was appointed by Christ on earth, as is seen from John V. (v. 19):—"The Son can do nothing but what He seeth the Father do". Accordingly, he is not of Heaven who refuseth to submit to the Head, just as he is not of Heaven, but of Lucifer, who will not subject himself to God. I can
copiously corroborate all this, especially by that saintly soul, St. Dionysius Areopagita, who in his book "de ecclesiastica hierarchia" says: "For our hierarchy which, with its transmitted orders, was solemnly appointed by God, is like unto the holy hierarchies of Heaven". In like manner writes Gregory Nazianzen in his Apology. "The Church's most sacred rites", he says, "are celebrated after the manner of the celestial image". Through these we are undoubtedly associated on earth with the celestial orders. For what a monstrosity would a Church be if deprived of its head! This, almost all the heretics, as Cyprian indicates to Rogatianus and Puppianus, have laboured to bring about, so that with the head weakened, they might be able with impunity to drive into the minds of men their own errors and poison. And this, with others, was the main reason why the praiseworthy University of Paris condemned Johannes Tornacensis, as denying the primacy of the Roman Church. Such, also was the error of Wicklif, when he said that the Roman Church was not superior to others, according to the law of the Gospels.

When the Doctor argues that there is certainly a universal Head of the Church, he does, indeed, well. And if there is anyone who has privately agreed with Your Highness to defend the contrary, let him step forward. That does not concern me.
Since the reverend Father says he has no concern with the contrary of what I intend to prove, namely, that there is by divine right an absolute rule in the Church militant as in the Church triumphant, I praise him greatly, inasmuch as in this he is at one with St. John in the Apocalypse:- "I saw the Holy City, the new Jerusalem coming down etc.". But to get closer to the matter, we ask: "If the Church militant was not without an absolute rule, I would like to know who else its sovereign could be or ever was, if not the Roman Pope; or what else its supreme seat, if not the Chair of Peter and his successors, according to the words of Cyprian, who in his 3rd. letter to Cornelius, a Roman Pope, against the Novatians who were craftily approaching Rome, says:-"After all they have already done, they now in addition have appointed a pseudo-bishop from among the heretics and dare to proceed even to the seat and principal Church of Peter, whence Sacerdotal unity sprang, carrying letters from Schismatics and abandoned persons, nor think that these were Romans, whose faith was praised by the apostle, and in whom perfidy could find no entrance." In like manner, also, Jerome testifies against the Luciferians. "The safety of the Church", he says," depends upon the dignity of the Supreme Pontiff, to whom, though not without his having been chosen, a certain authority, exceeding that of all others, must be given, else there would be in the Churches as many schisms as priests". And that this Supreme
Pontiff is a Roman, is clear to the same Jerome from his two letters to Pope Damasus, almost every word of which bears on the point. For the sake of brevity, however, we will only point out these:—"I speak with the successor of the fisherman and disciple of Christ; seeking no reward save Christ, I attach myself to your Holiness, that is, to the Chair of Peter; upon this rock, I know, the Church was founded"; and further on:—"Who doth not gather with thee, scattereth." From this any good Christian can easily infer and understand that sacerdotal unity proceeds from the Roman Pope and that his has always been the principal Chair and raised above all others, and that it is the rock, as Jerome says he knows it to be, upon which the Church is founded; or let the reverend Father assign another sovereign to the Church in early times.

Dr. Martin
(Latin text pages 58 to 62).

That there is a supreme authority in the Church militant I at once admit; but I also maintain that its Head is not a man but Christ Himself; and I do so because of the divine testimony (1. Cor. XV.25): "For He must reign till He hath put all enemies under His feet". And a little before:—"Then cometh the end when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God; even to the Father, and when He shall have put down all rule, authority and power". St. Augustine interprets this "On the Trinity" (Book I. last chapter) in "de trinitate" (lib. I. Cap. ult.) concerning the kingdom of Christ in this present age. Thus it is evident that Christ,
that Christ, who is the Head of the Church, will bring us, who are His kingdom through faith to appearance. After this manner He speaks in Matthew XXVIII:— "Lo, I am with you to the end of the world". In like manner Paul (Acts IX. 4) heard a voice from Heaven, saying unto him:— "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?". Here Augustine again says:— "The Head speaks on behalf of His members". Therefore, they are in no way to be listened to, who push Christ out of the Church militant into the Church triumphant, since it (the Church) is a kingdom of faith, that is, we have, though we see Him not, a Head in the Church, according to Psalm CXXII:— "In that place are set thrones of judgment over the house of David". That is to say, there are many thrones, and on them Christ sits alone. The thrones we see, but not the Occupier of them, or the King.

Next—to come to the authorities of the Doctor—when he asserts that there has been appointed by divine law and by Christ one supreme sovereignty in the Church militant, he only declares his own opinion, but proves nothing. For his first quotation from Paul (Ephes. IV. 15), which speaks of Christ as the Head of the Church, is in my favour and against him, since the apostle most certainly speaks there of the Church militant, and calls Christ its Head. There are also against him 1Cor. LII. 5 and I. 13., where the same idea is implied:— "Who is Apollos? Who is Cephas? Who is Paul? Is Christ divided? ". Here manifestly is forbidden any other head than Christ.

The second passage which he quotes (John V):— "The Son
can do nothing but what He seeth the Father do", speaks neither of the Church militant nor triumphant, but, according to the opinion of all the Fathers, of His equality with the Father, namely, that the Father can do nothing but what also the Son can do. I pass over his statement that he is not of Heaven who refuses to be subject to the head, and that he is of Lucifer who will not be subject to God, for as the preceding passages have been unadvisedly quoted, so here his inference is false, inappropriately introduced.

Neither is his third quotation, which is from Dionysius, in any way against us. For we do not deny the Church's hierarchy; our dispute is about the head of the earthly government, not of the hierarchy.

His fourth quotation is from Gregory Nazianzen, namely, that through the holy sacraments we are associated with the celestial orders etc. But any man, skilled in the meaning of words, sees that there is nothing here concerning either government or the head. Next, when he adds that it would be a terrible state of affairs if the Church were without a head, I grant that it would be. But this head the Doctor can make none other than Christ. And this I plainly prove. For if its head, whom they call the Roman Pope, dies, for he is but mortal, then is the Church without a head. If, however, Christ be meanwhile the Head of the Church, till another is elected, then we have a no less terrible state of affairs, for Christ is made to give place to a living Pope and to succeed a dead one.
His firth, which is from Cyprian, who contended against the heretics that, after having weakened the head, they endeavoured with impunity to inculcate their own errors into the minds of men, serves nothing to the purpose. For he speaks not of the Roman head but of any head of whatever episcopate. And if the distinguished Doctor wants to rest his case on the authority of Cyprian, then we may bring our disputation to an end this very hour. For he never salutes Cornelius, the Roman Pope, otherwise than as his most beloved brother. Next, when, in many letters, he describes the election and confirmation of bishops, he proves most indisputably from Holy Writ, that this belongs to the people and two or three neighbouring bishops, as also it is enacted in the most holy Nicene Council. Yea, the same holy martyr, as Augustine quotes him in "de baptismo" (lib. 2. Cap. 3.) speaks thus:—"For no one appoints himself to be a bishop of bishops or by tyrannical terror compels his colleagues to the necessity of obedience, since every bishop follows his own judgment in regard to the exercise of his freedom and power, and, just as he cannot be judged by another, so he himself may not judge another; but we must wait, all of us, for the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ!"

What he says about sacerdotal unity having sprung from St. Peter's Chair at Rome, I willingly agree to, so far as concerns the Western Church. For, as a matter of fact, the Roman Church also sprang from that at Jerusalem, which is the mother of all the Churches. The inference, however, is not correct, that, since from the Roman Church sprang ecclesiastical
unity, therefore she is the head and mistress of all the Churches. Otherwise, he might irresistibly argue that the Jerusalem Church is the head and mistress of all the Churches.

His last quotation, which is from St. Jerome, is wrongly introduced by the distinguished Doctor, even if in every respect the words of Jerome are true, since the aim of the Doctor is to prove that the sovereign power of the Roman Church has been ordained by divine law and by Christ. This meaning the words of Jerome do not bear, for he says:—“To whom, though not without his having been chosen, a certain authority, exceeding that of all others, is given, else there would arise in the Church as many schisms as there are priests”. He says “given”; that is, it may be by the law of men, with all the faithful consenting to it. For I do not deny that, if the faithful of the whole Church agree in regard to the bishop at Rome, Paris, or Magdeburg or elsewhere, that he be the first and supreme bishop, he must, therefore, because of the respect of the faithful of the whole Church thus consenting, be held as the Church’s supreme ruler. But this has never happened nor will happen, since up to our own time the Greek Church has not consented to it, and yet has not on that account been declared heretical. And that this is the view (opinion) of St. Jerome I prove from the letter to Euagrius, where he says:—“A bishop, wherever he may be, whether at Rome, Lugubium, Constantinople, Tarsus, Alexandria or Thessalonica, is of the same standing and fills one and the same priestly office. The power of wealth and the humility of poverty make either more exalted or unpretentious.
Nevertheless, all are the successors of the apostles*. This letter is incorporated in the important decree*, dist. XCLII, C. legimus. Similarly in "Super Epistolam ad Titus": *" The priest (presbyter), therefore, counts for as much as the bishop; and before there were at the instigation of the devil, divisions in religion and it was said among the people: I am of Paul, I of Apollos, I of Cephas; the churches were governed by a general council of presbyters. But after everyone got into the habit of regarding those whom he baptised as his own, it was agreed throughout the world, that one from among the priests be chosen and set over all*. And after quoting passages from Scripture, he says in conclusion: *" As therefore the priests know that, according to the custom of the Church, they must be subject to him who is set over them, so also are the bishops to know that more through such custom than by any actual enactment of God are they raised above the priests*. When therefore the Doctor added that the Roman Pope is regarded by Jerome as supreme when he (Jerome) says: *" I speak with the successor of the fisherman and disciple of Christ, and attach myself to your Holiness, that is, to your Chair; upon this rock, I know, the Church was founded"* he adds nothing to the point. It does not follow - I attach myself to this Church, therefore it is alone supreme; neither does it follow - it is founded on the rock, therefore it alone rests on secure foundation.

To the same effect is the decree of the African Council (dist. XCLX. C. Primae): *" The bishop of the first Chair", it says,* is not to be called the head of the priests or supreme pontiff, or by any such title, but only bishop of the first Chair.
Moreover the Roman Pope is not to be called a universal Pope. If therefore, the supreme sovereignty of the Roman Pope rests on divine law, all this would be heretical; which would be a rash thing to assert. Finally, let us hear our Lord Himself as quoted by Luke (XXII. 24. 26):— "And there was also a strife among them, which of them should be accounted the greatest. But He said unto them: The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them; and they that exercise authority over them are called benefactors. But ye shall not be so; but he that is greatest among you, let him be as the least."

The reverend Father has entered the arena tolerably well prepared, with his matter well arranged, and put together in a little book which he has written and published. Therefore my lords and illustrious noblemen will pardon Eck, who for some considerable time back has been occupied with other matters, if he should not forthwith be able to pile up so elegantly and elaborately such a mass of detail as the reverend Father has just done. For he appears before you to dispute, not to publish a book. But let us examine in order the statements of the reverend Father.

First, he sets out to prove that Christ is the Head of the Church; which surely is unnecessary, since no one would presume to deny this, unless he were anti-Christ. I wonder greatly, however, that he does not reflect, since in the transactions before the legate of the apostolic Chair he indicated that he could
support a certain theological jurist, that there may be several subordinate heads. If there be such heads, the mystical or symbolical head differs, of course, from the natural head. Therefore it will be directly proved that besides Christ, the Head, another head must also be sought for in the Church. Nor does it help him to quote the Apostle (1 Cor. iii. 6. 13):—"Is Christ then divided?". For although Paul there thinks of Peter, St. Jerome (contra Jovinianum — lib. i. mini. column 18) has nevertheless spoken very truly:—"One is chosen (he speaks of Peter) so that, a head having been appointed, the occasion of schism may be removed." Clearly he calls Peter the appointed head of the Church. But let these things rest, and set about refuting his answers to what we have brought forward.

First, when he replies to John v. 19:—For the Son can do nothing but what He seeth the Father do", he says that according to the holy Fathers, the equality of the Father and the Son is here expressed. But let the reverend Father read a little more carefully St. Bernard, who was inaccessible to flattery, in "De consideratione ad Eugenium" (lib. 3.), where, speaking of the constitution of the Church and showing that it was of divine origin, he gives expression to our views (mini column 7):—"Let no one belittle this constitution, because it is on earth; for it has its pattern in Heaven. For the Son can do nothing but what He seeth the Father do, especially since it hath been said to Him in the name of Moses; See that thou make all things according to the pattern which hath been shown thee on the mount. This had he seen who said:
I saw the Holy City. For I hold that this was spoken on account of the similarity; that as there, Seraphim and Cherubim and others up to angels and archangels are arranged under one Head, God, so here also are, under one Supreme Pontiff, the Patriarchs, Primates or Patriarchs, bishops, priests, or abbots and others. Then Bernard adds:—"It is not to be esteemed as a trifle that she likewise has God for her Founder and traces her origin from Heaven". Who now does not perceive that this ecclesiastical hierarchy has, according to Bernard, been appointed by Christ, and that as Christ is the Head in Heaven, so also is the Pope the head of the Church militant, in no wise, however, excluding Christ, whose vicar he acknowledges himself to be. But as to the common argument which he brings forward, namely, that the Church would be without a head on the death of a Pope, unless we were ridiculously to say that Christ gives place to a living Pope and succeeds a dead one — that is an utterly ridiculous argument, and one which, in a matter so serious, and in the presence of so many distinguished men, is scarcely worthy of being brought forward, since at the start I said that the symbolical head differs in certain points agreed upon from the true and natural Head. For Christ, whose kingdom lasts for ever, and whose priestly office is eternal, neither gives place to nor succeeds a Pope, since all power has been given unto Him in Heaven and on earth (Matt. XXVIII), and immediately on the death of a Pope, the College of Cardinals, as on the death of a bishop, the chapter, has and retains the same rights, until a new Pope is elected.
(2). Secondly, I wonder greatly at what the reverend Father says regarding Cyprian, namely, that he speaks of any bishop, not of the Roman Pope; for his words are to be interpreted in the light of the circumstances which suggested them; and Cyprian, in the passages quoted by me, is rebuking those who defected from Cornelius, who certainly was a Roman Pope. Let the reverend Father, therefore, understand that I am not satisfied with mere words, with which we are accustomed to feed sophists. As to the passages he quotes from Cyprian in his support, my opinion is that he will accomplish much more by opposing them. For that Cyprian calls Cornelius brother, and that the apostles were brethren, everybody knows. Nevertheless, Peter, as also his successor, Cornelius, was the head of the apostles, their chief and crown, according to the opinion of St. Dionysius (De divinis nominibus, ca. 3. vel. 7). What has been written of the election, both by the Nicene Council and by Cyprian, neither advances nor retards the argument; and still less ought Augustine (De baptismo parvularum, lib. 2. Cap. 2) to be quoted after Cyprian. For Augustine rebuked the arrogance and boldness of those who, through ambition and pride, pressed themselves forward for prelatic office, and said that they ought not to appoint themselves, nor bring pressure to bear upon others to appoint them, for every prelate ought to wait till he was called, as did Aaron.

Thirdly, with the idea of weakening the force of another statement of Cyprian's, from his third letter to Cornelius, he replies that sacerdotal unity has admittedly sprung in the Western
Church from Rome, but not in the Eastern. The reverend Father, however, ignores the fact, that Cyprian particularly called the Roman Church the Chair of Peter and the principal Church. But the worth of his answer is clear, when one looks into the inner meaning of his words. For the reverend Father understands the rise of sacerdotal unity in a literal manner (more grammatico), namely, in regard to its origin and beginning, whereas Cyprian really wants to set forth the origin of "commission", "subordination", and "influence", so that from Peter alone, as from one head, jurisdiction is derived over all others. Otherwise, will he not be able to have a single priest, not even in Jerusalem.

I pass over the fact that his additional reference to the Western Church does not help him, since St. Jerome at the beginning of his letter, writing from the East, calls the Eastern Church schismatic, a church which tears in pieces the seamless robe of our Lord, which had been woven from above. Foxes (he says) destroy the vineyard of Christ, referring obviously to the lament of the bride in the Song of Solomon (11. 15):—"Take us the little foxes that spoil our vines". Let the reverend father, therefore, I entreat, be silent, and not insult us with his reference to the Greeks and Easterns who, falling away from the Roman Church, have at the same time forsaken the Christian faith. We see then how the inference is to be understood:—"She is the root; therefore she is the mistress". For in using the word "root", we do not speak of the beginning or of time; we mean the root of influence and authority.
Fourthly, the reverend Father tries to slip away from the words of St. Jerome and avoid them. For he allows that the highest honour is given to the Supreme Pontiff, but that only by the appointment of man. But why then does St. Jerome call Damasus the successor of the Fisherman, and want to attach himself to the Chair of Peter, quoting the divine word from Matthew XVI: - "Upon this rock, I know, the Church has been founded". This word, as Bernard reasons, cannot thus be applied to other Churches. And we, alas, to the great harm of Christians, have seen the gates of Hell prevail against the Churches in Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria and also in Bohemia. This, however, the infallible truth of Christ does not suffer in the case of the Church which is founded on the rock. But most true in matters of faith is the statement of Jerome in the same epistle: - "Wheresoever the carcase is, there are the eagles gathered together. An evil race having squandered its patrimony, among you alone has the uncorrupted testimony of the Fathers been entirely preserved".

But this we will clearly prove from the start - the Roman Church owes its pre-eminence, not to human, but to divine law. Nevertheless, it is better to refute what the reverend Father has quoted from St. Jerome in support of his views - first, in regard to the letter to Eugubius, where he says that the bishops of Rome, Eugubium, Constantinople and Reggio had the same standing and filled the same priestly office. This we knew before Theognis was born, (possibly a proverbial saying). Nor is the papacy a superior order to that of the episcopate. For he says also in another place that the apostles were equal; where
nevertheless, he did not withdraw the primacy from Peter. But when the reverend Father so urgently requests me not to seek after subterfuges, which I have never been accustomed to do, he himself, quoting Canon Legimus, sect. 88., brings me to this difficult question (Brocardum), regarding which the canonists and theologians are at variance, namely, whether the episcopate is an order distinguished by characteristics of its own and added to the priesthood. Concerning this I will express no opinion at present, as it is a matter that does not enter here. This, however I say - it seems to me that, saving always a superior judgment, there was no such confusion in the primitive Church, in which the bishop was clearly distinguished from the priest, since the twelve apostles had pre-eminence over the seventy-two disciples. In testimony of this I quote St. Dionysius, who was older than Jerome and ruler of the primitive Church, who (lib. de ecclesiastica hierarchia) places the episcopate among the sacred orders together with the Supreme Hierarch, and shows how he had to be consecrated. According to this, the bishops, I hold, were from the very beginning of the Church raised above the ordinary priesthood.

Fifthly, he quotes the Canon of the African Council (dist. 99.), where the Council makes this prohibition - the Roman ought not to be called a universal bishop, because Christ also (Luke XXII. 24) makes the prohibition:—"The kings of the gentiles etc.". To this I answer: It is true that the proud title of universal bishop was forbidden: not because the Roman Pope at
any time was not held by true Christians as the chief and supreme pontiff, but because the bishop of the Roman Church is not at the same time the actual bishop of any Church, but the supreme; because, otherwise, honour would not be rendered to the lower bishops. But it is not a crime if anyone should call the Roman Pontiff a universal bishop, instead of the chief. More correctly, however, is he styled, not the universal bishop, but the bishop of the universal Church, inasmuch as he is the vicar of Christ.

That the Lord rebukes the ambitious rivalry of the apostles, as a spirit that belongs to men of the world, does not condemn the primacy of the Roman Church. But because St. Gregory I. acted and recognised that he was a prelate of the Catholic Church to the end that he might acknowledge himself to be the servant of servants, we are not therefore to revile and provoke his successors, but rather seek by our prayers to attain from God that they may become such prelates.

By proclamation of the servant of the university the disputation was to be continued at 2 p.m.

At 2 p.m.

D R M A R T I N.

(Latin text pages 67 to 72).

My first answer in which I showed from I. Cor. iii., that Paul forbids the faithful to claim as their own, either Cephas or Paul or Apollos, the distinguished Doctor confutes by saying that, although Paul here mentions Peter, Jerome
nevertheless says quite correctly (contra Jovinianum):—
"One is chosen so that, a head having been appointed, the 
occasion of schism may be removed". Clearly he calls Peter the 
appointed head of the Church. He adds, however; — "But let us 
discard this at present".

My answer is: I cannot allow myself to be turned away 
from a superior authority because of the lesser one quoted. 
And Jerome does not count for so much that, on account of him, 
we should abandon Paul. Paul, therefore, in the passage quoted, 
not only makes mention of Peter, although the Doctor in his 
refutation attempts to minimise it, but with full authority 
forbids that anyone say he is of Peter. Therefore, also, the 
same chapter concludes: - "All things are yours, whether Paul 
or Cephas or life or death; for ye are Christ's and Christ is 
god's." This answer of mine, therefore, still remains un-
refuted, and unless it be more strongly attacked, I will oppose 
it to all past and future arguments of the Doctor. For the word of 
god goes beyond all words of men.

Regarding Jerome, however, I say that I, too, will let 
these matters rest, since the passage, as the Doctor has well 
said, is very ambiguous.

Regarding my second reply - concerning the passage from 
John V. - where we said that Christ is speaking of the equality 
of the Father's power, the Doctor has bidden me read more 
carefully St. Bernard, who, as we have heard, quotes this 
passage on behalf of the Church militant. I answer that I
that I revere St. Bernard and do not despise his opinion. But in controversy one must take the real and proper sense of Scripture, which can stand in debate, and from which the holy Fathers, out of desire to adorn their speech, sometimes deviate, and without sin. Here, however, it is clear from the preceding and following texts, that Christ speaks of his equality with the Father. The text is:—"Therefore the Jews persecuted Jesus because He did these things on the Sabbath. Because of this, the Jews, therefore, sought the more to kill Him, because he not only broke the Sabbath, but also said that God was His Father and thus made Himself equal to God. Jesus therefore answered and said unto them: Verily, Verily, I say unto you; the Son can do nothing of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing". And thus it is clear that Bernard takes this word of Christ in another sense.

To my third argument, a commonplace and ridiculous one, as he said, in which I maintained that the Church has its Head even without a Pope, he replied that it was not worthy of being brought forward in the presence of men of such high standing, and in a matter so serious. My answer is: Let it be commonplace and ridiculous, if only it is irrefutable. And I do not yet see that it has been refuted. For I do not understand, if the Church is not without a head for 3 or 4 months after the death of a pope, provided there are other bishops, how also it is not without a head, if there be no Pope. For what he has said about cardinals who have the right of electing etc., strengthens my argument; since it follows from this, that, at the time when there were no cardinals,
as in that of Jerome, there could have been no Pope.

To my fourth quotation from Cyprian, where I said he (Cyprian) was speaking of any bishop, he replied that it is perfectly clear from the text that he spoke of Cornelius, the Roman Pope, against Novatian. I answer: It does not concern me, nor do I have the letter up by heart. But this I know - Saint Cyprian throughout a series of letters consistently maintains that, whatever be the Church, its head and bishop is appointed by the vote of the people and decision or approval of the neighbouring bishops. Accordingly, if it is spoken, as the Doctor alleges, regarding Cornelius, against the Novatians, it is certain that he spoke only of the head of the Roman Church, not of the universal Church.

Likewise, he disputes the fact that Cyprian always addresses Cornelius as brother, never as lord, as now the bishops are accustomed to do, putting the "relativum" without "correlativo" (i.e. Lord without servant). Against this he says that, according to Dionysius (de divinis nominibus), likewise Peter held the apostles as his brethren and yet was the head and chief of the apostles. I answer: If the distinguished Doctor can prove that ever Peter was ordained one of the apostles, or even one of the seventy disciples, or that he sent one of the same (out to preach), I yield the whole case and own myself beaten. If, however, I shall have proved that not even all the apostles could send forth and ordain one of themselves, I demand that he concede that Peter had no power over the other apostles. From this it follows that
much less has a bishop, who is the successor of Peter, power over the bishops who are the successors of the rest of the apostles. Here, moreover, the text of the Acts (1. 23. ff) is very clear, that the apostle, Matthias, could not be ordained by the entire assembly of the apostles and disciples, but was elected and ordained from Heaven by Christ, as were also all the others. In like manner, also, in chapter xiii, Saul and Barnabas are admitted to the work, after being set apart by the Holy Spirit. It is, therefore, most clearly a mistake to say that Peter has authority over the apostles. This I admit, of course, namely, that Peter was the first in the number (i.e. in the lists) of the apostles, and that he has the prerogative of honour — but not of power. They all were chosen in the same manner and received the same power. In like manner, also, the Roman Pope, I think, ought to have the prerogative of honour, provided saving always that each is of equal power; for we cannot have it as Pelagius infers in his foolish decree: Where there is greater dignity, there is greater power, and others are under necessity to obey.

To my fifth reply, in which I presented the method of the election of a bishop, from Cyprian and the Nicene Council, the distinguished Doctor has replied in language somewhat rhetorical and contemptuous, that it neither helps nor hurts my argument. But my answer is not, on that account, refuted. The decree of the Nicene Council, therefore, still stands; or if it does not stand, and the Council has decreed what is contrary to
divine law, then is it not a Catholic council, but a diabolical cabal. Likewise, when he expressed the opinion, that I ought not to have quoted Augustine, and when he interpreted Cyprian, quoted by Augustine, with his beautiful observation, as meaning that Cyprian was rebuking the ambition and arrogance of those who pushed themselves forward, before, like Aaron, they were called, he did so of pure boldness. For the text is quite clear, that no one, who is already a bishop, ought to constitute himself the bishop of other bishops. My answer, therefore, still holds good.

Regarding my sixth, the distinguished Doctor severely reproves me, because, in the other quotation from Cyprian, I left out the words - the principal Church. Thereafter he ridicules me (naso suspendit) as being a grammarian, (or literalist), because I said that sacerdotal unity had sprung from the chair of Peter. Therefore the new logician, or rather philosopher, interprets this beginning in regard to "commission", "subordination" and "influx". Otherwise, he says, will he not be able to have a single priest, not even in Jerusalem. I answer: Whether I omitted or inserted the word "principal", matters not. For it cannot be called the principal in regard to the Eastern Church, as I have already sufficiently indicated.

Next, I spurn his story about the origin of influence, as easily as he has invented it. Also it is not difficult for me to produce a priest from Jerusalem- to wit, Christ Himself, from whom the Church came forth and had its beginning, according to Isaiah (11. 3.): - " Out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the
and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. Moreover, when he goes on to say that, according to the authority of Jerome, the Eastern Church is schismatic, and has rent the seamless garment of our Lord in pieces, I have not the slightest idea what he means. For he cannot surely say that the whole Eastern Church is and always has been schismatic, just as he cannot deny that the Latin Church has also had at times her schismatics, and nevertheless has remained a Church. Therefore, it is of no use for him to bid me be silent and not spring upon him with the Greek Church, since, having fallen away from the Roman Church they have at the same time become aliens to the faith of Christ. I rather ask Dr. Eck that, in accordance with Eccian moderation, of which he is continually boasting, he be considerate of so many thousands of saints; since the Greek Church has endured up to our own times, and undoubtedly endures to the present day and will endure. For Christ has received, not only the centre of the Roman world, but also the ends of the earth, as His possession and inheritance from the Father. (Psalm 11. 8).

Seventh, he said that my reply, to what he opposed to me from Jerome concerning the Supreme Pontiff, is an evasion; and therefore he added in confirmation of his statement: Why does St. Jerome call Damasus the successor of the Fisherman, and want to attach himself to the Chair of Peter, quoting the divine word (Matthew XVI):— "Upon this rock, I know, the Church is founded; and which, therefore, cannot be appropriated by other Churches. Then he goes on to deplore the fall or error of the Churches of Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria and finally of Bohemia, and states
that, according to the same Jerome, the teaching of the Fathers is preserved intact by the Romans alone. I answer and beg the distinguished Doctor that he will quote the words of the Fathers according to conscience, lest, instead of theologians, we appear to be sophists, for Jerome in the same passage addresses as Supreme Pontiff any bishop when he has been elevated from the number of the other bishops. Therefore, the passage has no special application to the Roman Pontiff. Further, the text from Matthew XVI. does not refer to the Roman Church alone. This the words of Christ clearly show, since He says:—"My Church".

Whatever, therefore, the Church of Christ may be, it is founded upon the rock, and it is not the Roman Church alone. Or, if this word does not apply to the other Churches, then the Roman Church will be the only Church, and consequently not the first. Therefore the unity of the Church does not depend upon the unity of the Roman primacy, but, far better, according to the apostle (Ephes. IV. 5), upon the unity of faith and baptism in the Lord, as also Cyprian in his letters frequently declares. Nor has the teaching of the Fathers remained uncorrupted among the Romans alone, unless perhaps at the time when Jerome wrote. On the contrary, history records that Liberius, the Roman Pope, gave way to the Arians, and Jerome also writes in his "Celebrated Men", that Achatus, bishop of Caesarea, an Arian and pupil of the Arian Eusebius, ordained Felix as Roman Pope at the command of the Emperor Constantine.
In the eighth place, in refuting the words of Jerome, quoted by me, to Euagrius, he says that he himself had long known that all bishops had the same standing and filled the same priestly office, but that the papal office is an order beyond the episcopate. But he has not thereby refuted my answer, since Jerome attributes the superiority or inferiority of bishops, not to divine law, but to custom and the power of wealth. Therefore I still stand by Jerome.

To my ninth he replies that in regard to the Canon Legimus, 92 dist., there does not appear to him to have been any such confusion in the primitive Church, that is, that the bishop was not separated from the priest. I answer: What does that concern me? let him settle it with Jerome and the Canons. Moreover, when he quotes Dionysius as counting the episcopate among the sacred orders, I wonder that he does not also from the same author establish the supremacy of the Roman Church, since it has so much to do with the hierarchy that, without it, the similitude of the Church triumphant cannot stand. Moreover, it was becoming that a teacher, writing on sacred orders, should, having taken up the subject, satisfy us especially in the more important part of it. But Dionysius brings us only as far as the bishop.

In the tenth place, regarding Canon "Prima" 99 dist., when I replied that it was forbidden, that the Roman Bishop be called a universal bishop, he disputed my statement in this wise: it is not that the Roman Bishop is not the chief and supreme,
but that, being specially the bishop of the Roman Church, he may not be the particular bishop of any Church. I answer: As if such a foolish idea could enter into the head of any man, that one person should wish to superintend all the Churches and each individually, so that it should have been necessary to forbid such insanity. Nevertheless, he has put this refutation (of his) aside and given us a weightier one, namely, that he (the Roman Pope) is not to be called the universal bishop, but bishop of the universal Church. Were it not that I am merciful, I would put an end to this argument also. But let the judges and audience form their opinion of it.

Finally, regarding the words of Christ; "But ye shall not be so", he says that Christ found fault with the ambition of His disciples, but not with the chief place or primacy. I answer: This is to beg the question, as if it were already granted that there was such a primacy. In short, the text is clear—Christ has forbidden not only ambition, but also lordship over others.

D R. ECK.

(Latin text pages 72 to 76).

To the defence of the answers given by the reverend Father, I reply,

First, that Paul did not reprove those who said they were of Peter, as if they had been thinking of the primacy of the apostles, but because they were paying regard to particular or individual persons; for the words themselves clearly indicate division and schism. And although he (Luther) rightly esteems
Paul more highly than he does Jerome, nevertheless, it is devoutly to be believed that Jerome understood the meaning of Paul very well in this passage. Nor is the passage ambiguous;—For this reason a head was appointed in the Church — namely, that the occasion of schism might be removed. This ought to be sufficiently clear to the reader who studies the meaning of words (grammatico lectori) — an art which the reverend Father in a certain disputation has declared to be excellent above all other parts of philosophy and the handmaid of theology.

Secondly, no one has denied that Christ (John V) affirmed His equality with the Father, unless Arianus. Nor does Bernard quote the passage in another sense. When, however, the reverend Father expresses himself of the opinion that the holy Fathers quote the sacred Scriptures to adorn their speech, we decline to accept his statement; for such ostentation is not to be thought of concerning them.

In reply to his third point, that, on the death of the Pope, the Church would be without a head, I say that it has never been denied that Christ is the Head of the Church, according also to the Song of Solomon (V. 11) :— "His head is as the most fine gold". Here the gloss is: The head, that is, Christ; the Pope, however, is His vicar. But in consistory the bishop and vicar are reckoned as the same person, so that one may not appeal from the vicar to the bishop. Regarding the cardinals, however, I have already said that now, that is, according to the Church as it is constituted, the election comes to the cardinals, Nicholas, one of the Popes, having ordained it. Nevertheless, I believe that at
the time of Jerome there were cardinals; if not, Jerome would not have been a cardinal-presbyter.

Fourthly, regarding Cyprian, he says that it certainly cannot be that he restricts the words of the holy martyr to the narrow limits of the Roman diocese, since they (the Novatian bishops) came to Rome to the supreme bishop from Numidia, which is a land in Africa across from Atlas, as Ptolemy and Strabo tell us. That Cyprian, however, called Cornelius brother, was, I believe, the opinion of those who collected his works, not the words of Cyprian. For, if we read the letters of the holy bishops, we shall clearly find that at that time these praiseworthy and magnificent forms of address were more common than would be the manner in writing to a Roman Pope, as is apparent from Ambrose, Augustine, Hilary and other Fathers. For they address each other as "most blessed", "most holy" and "most beloved of God" etc.

Regarding the subjoined, he argues that I am seeking after diversions and things that have no bearing on the matter. With his good favour, I would like to say: "Disgraceful is it in a Doctor etc". He demands me to prove that Peter ordained any of the apostles. But this has no bearing on the matter before us. For we are not enquiring who ordained the one or the other, but who received from the Lord Jesus authority over the others. I strongly disapprove, therefore, of his forming any conclusion such as this: Peter could not ordain any of the apostles; neither, therefore, could the successor of Peter ordain the successor of another, or have authority over him. For, although his assumption
is true, the conclusion he draws from it is most obviously false; since the Roman Pope now actually has the power and does ordain other bishops. The means of unravelling the knot, however, lies in this, that the apostolic office, as the foundation of the Church, signifies more than being a bishop. Therefore, Leo X. is a successor of the apostle Peter, but not an apostle.

But when he admits that Peter was indeed the first of the apostles in number (the lists) and prerogative of honour, not, however, of power, that is not enough for me. First, because the evangelists do not begin the lists of the apostles in the same manner, as Chrysostom remarks in regard to Matthew; and see the observation, Matthew X. Further, the distinction he makes regarding power and the prerogative of honour, is clearly contrary to the holy martyr Cyprian, who in the treatise, "De simplicitate praelatorum", against the Novatians, speaking of the cunning of the devil, reproves those who, as the servants of righteousness, make night out of day, destruction out of salvation, despair out of hope, perfidy out of faith. And further on, "And although He gives to all the apostles after His resurrection the like power and says: As the Father hath sent me etc., nevertheless, that He might reveal the unity, He hath, by His own authority, ordained the source of the same unity, so that it should proceed from one. What Peter was, were also without doubt the other apostles; they were endowed with an equal share both of honour and power (this is to be pondered), but the beginning proceeds from unity, so that it may be shown there is only one
Church*. And further on:—"Who does not keep this unity does not keep the law of God, he does not have the faith of the Father and the Son, he has neither life nor salvation". These remarkable and most fitting words of Cyprian make no distinction between the apostles in the prerogative of honour and power.

Fifthly, regarding the election I say as before, that we are not discussing the method of election, but the condition or rather the standing of the person elected. Therefore, the Nicene Council was not a cabal. But they regarded what was done and said as capable of being altered according to the special circumstances of the time, the persons or the place, as we see in many canons.

In the sixth place, regarding the charge of the respected Father, that I have, after the manner of a sophist, invented the distinction of the double origin, we have already heard Cyprian, and he speaks for Eck, who has not sufficient wit to invent new, but only explains, according to his power, the old sayings of the saints. But while he gives me one priest in Christ, he does not understand the meaning of Cyprian and Jerome, since they declare that Peter was appointed the first of the apostles, and that from him proceeds the power of all priests; not indeed that he confers it inwardly, for that is the prerogative of Christ as Head, but that he communicates the ecclesiastical power.

In the seventh place, when he longs that Eck, who holds the Greeks and the Eastern Church for damned, would show more moderation, I reply that the Greeks for a long time have not only been schismatics but arch-heretics, as their errors, so many in
number and persisted in with stubborn obstinacy, show; errors regarding the Holy Spirit, Confession, the interpretation of the three Evangelists, and innumerable other things, although, notwithstanding this, they have frequently rendered a pretended obedience to the Roman Church, as, for example, in the Florentine Council in the times of Eugenius IV. Therefore, if, according to the opinion of many, few Christians among us are to be saved, how much fewer, yea none at all, are saved in Turkey, unless a few monks and their adherents, who hold to the Roman obedience.

In the eighth place, the reverend Father asks that I quote my authors according to conscience, so that there be no uncertainty about their meaning. I would that I could quote them also according to knowledge. But that Jerome acknowledges Damasus as the Supreme Pontiff, no one can have any doubt. Neither does any one doubt that the universal Church is founded on the rock. But that that rock is Peter and his successor I will prove at another time.

Nevertheless, he treats Jerome somewhat flippantly, when he (Jerome) said:—"With you alone is the teaching of the Fathers preserved uncorrupted."

; as if the Roman Popes had not also had their faults! If he refers to the time of Jerome, Liberius and Anastasius preceded him. But I say this, and it ought to be admired by the faithful—no Roman Pope, however evil or erring he may have been, ever in a judicial capacity issued a decree, so far as I remember, that was contrary to
the commands of the Christian faith; although in the act itself they frequently erred, yea, attempted to give such wrong judgments; when, however, they were overtaken by the divine judgment, as in the case of Leo, the Arian, when opposing Hilary, and in that of Anastasius (Can. Anastasius, section 14, perhaps or 16, dist. 19, forte vel 20).

In the ninth place, regarding the Canon Legimus 93, distin., the reverend Father has possibly not understood me! For the idea never entered my head that the papacy was an order above the episcopate, but a high office. But when he says that in this I am at variance with Jerome and the canons, I answer, that I have said what I thought; I prefer here the testimony of Dionysius, as being the older. But when the reverend Father noisily asks why Dionysius has not described the supreme ruler of the Church, yea, why he does not go beyond the episcopate, it is a simple matter for me to answer him. For Dionysius is dealing only in a general way with the sacred orders of the Church. But since I have denied that the papacy is such an order, the episcopate should by general consent hold the supreme place among the orders of the Church.

In the tenth place, when he expresses himself of the opinion that no one is so foolish as he who thinks that any person can be the particular bishop of each individual Church, what have I to complain of, except that the number of fools and of those who seek after singularity is so large. Let the
reverend Father read Alvarus (de planctu ecclesiae),
Johannes de Turre Cremata (summa ecclesiae), William of
Occam (dialog), and he will discover that formerly there
were men who were so foolish.

When, moreover, he thinks to cast doubt on my state-
ment that the Pope is rather the bishop of the Universal
Church than the Universal Bishop, I ought to mention that I
have put it thus on the authority of St. Bernard, and according
(Book 2, On
consideration - to Eugenius)
to the custom of the Popes. For, says Bernard (lib.2 de
conscideration. ad Eugenius ), "Certainly the mark of the
particular bishopric of Peter is etc." Further on also he
writes:- "Since to each of the others the charge of a
particular Church has been intrusted, to thy care has been
committed the one great Church, composed of all the
individual Churches, even the Church universal that covers
the whole earth."

In the eleventh place, the word of Christ (LukeXXIII)
has not been interpreted as if it had been devised by me.
But, not to speak without authority, I quote to him Richardus
Armacanus (lib.7, Cap.3. de quaestionib. Armeniorum), who,
with the authority of St. Leo thus understands the same passage.
And, that this interpretation is true the words indicate:- "But
he that is greater among you etc." Therefore Christ gave it
to be understood that there was a greater. But who that
greater was, He did not at time indicate, but later, when He
spoke to Peter about the devil desiring to have them, and prayed for him that, when he was converted, he should strengthen his brethren; in which words He declared his superior dignity.

Tomorrow at 7 a.m. the disputation will be continued according to the proclamation made in public, as was customary.

Tuesday, 5th July, 7 a.m.

D R. M A R T I N.

(Latin text pages 76 to 79).

The distinguished Doctor, desiring to refute my reply regarding 1. Cor. iii 1 “…Who is Paul? Who is Cephas?” said that here it is not the primacy, but the regard paid to individual persons, that is spoken of; and that this is shown by the word “division.” I reply that the words of Paul appeal to me more than such a forced and fanciful interpretation, which has not a single authority to rest upon; although, nevertheless, he wants to argue from divine law. It is clear, however, that these people were quarrelling about the superiority of persons, which, indeed, the confutation of Paul shows, as, with depreciatory words and comparisons, he urges and says:—“Who is Cephas? Who is Paul? Ministers by whom ye believed. So then he that planteth and he that watereth are one. But neither is he that planteth, nor he that watereth, anything; but God that giveth the increase”. In these words he obviously removes
the person, that is, the occasion of schism. In like manner he also boldly writes to the Galatians (11. 6), when they had been led astray by a claim for the pre-eminence of Peter and other apostles: "Who seemed to be somewhat, whatsoever they were, (that is, how great) it matters not to me; for God accepteth no man's person." It is as if he should say: Whether it be Peter or any other apostle, the first or last - that has nothing to do with the matter. I would, therefore, like the distinguished Doctor to read the Scriptures more correctly, before he thus quote them. It remains, therefore, that this primacy or person has no place in the church, at least by divine right.

I pass over what he said about Jerome having understood the meaning of Paul; likewise his admission regarding John V.; as also his remarks about the "common, petty argument" which, after all, has not been disputed. What he has quoted about the vicar and bishop in council contributes nothing to our discussion. My argument was to the effect:—If the Church is not without a head on the death of the Pope, neither is it without a head when there is no Pope. I pass over, also, what he said about cardinals, because it is known to all when they emerged. Also I say nothing about what he has quoted from Cyprian; for the Doctor spoke out of his own head something about a Numidia beyond Atlas, which is not in the nature of things. (He means that Eck's geography was faulty). Also I will say nothing about Cornelius being addressed as brother by Cyprian, for it...
not been disputed; although he has at the same time told us that they addressed each other with most honourable titles, such as "most blessed", "most holy"; for this, also, I admit. This style of address, however, has not been used in regard to the Roman bishop alone as at the present day. For this he has to prove.

Also, I do not dwell on his statement that it has nothing to do with the matter before us, whether Peter ordained an apostle, for this is the great and invincible argument against Eck, he, therefore, not unadvisedly, is silent in regard to it, lest he stumble over it and be unable to recover himself. Also I admit what he has quoted from the martyr Cyprian regarding the equal honour and power of the apostles, and I accept it as a kindness done me by the Doctor. In like manner I am content that he pass over the election of bishops described by the Nicene Council and Cyprian, for it cannot be confuted. What he repeats, however, concerning the "distinction" in the origin of the priesthood, namely, that what Cyprian had in his mind was the origin of priestly authority, signifies nothing with me, for he speaks merely his own words.

This, however, is to be considered more carefully, namely, that, with great moderation, he dares to call the Greeks arch-heretics, whereas in the entire Church no section has produced more excellent writers than the Greek. For, when he so often insultingly flings at me the name of Bohemian — that and the other slanders he intertwines with it, I hand over to the sophists. They
are too unworthy to speak about in an important theological disputation, much less to be objected to.

Therefore, we will now consider Matthew XVI.:- "Upon this rock etc. ". Regarding this I say that the rock here signifies either power or faith (for I am confident that the Doctor will never be able to keep his promise and prove that the rock signifies the Pope or the successor of Peter). If it signifies power, then the words are superfluous that follow: " I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of Heaven", that is power, unless you are to say that power is given to power. Further, if it means power, this power will belong to all the Churches, for He says: " Upon this rock I will build my Church". - not the Roman Church alone. Or, if it signifies faith (which is the proper interpretation), this likewise is a faith that belongs to all the Churches. Thus it is clear that, however we interpret the word "rock", this pronoun "my" makes the rock a common possession.

Most foolishly, therefore, do the Papal Decrees quote this text in support of the sole primacy (of Rome), seeing that it so strongly maintains the common interest of all in the Rock, and thus agrees with the words of the apostle to the Ephesians:- "One faith, one baptism, one Lord". For there is not, as Jerome writes to Euagrius, one faith of the Roman Church, another of the British, and of the whole world. In like manner, also, there is not another Christ, nor another Rock. Since, then, the same faith, and the same Lord and the same baptism belong to all the Churches, it follows that the same also applies to
everything that attaches to this faith and baptism and to Christ.

Finally, he has, from Richard Armacanus, interpreted Christ's words as referring to ambition, not to greatness or the primacy; for he says that Christ took it for granted that there was among them one that was greater than the others, although He did not indicate which. I answer:—However it may be regarding Armacanus, this most clear text counts for more than the obscure author; for it is written: "There was a strife among them which of them should be accounted the greatest". And Christ's words:—"Which among you will be the greatest", indicate clearly that none was supposed to be the greatest; and, consequently it is clear from the text that He did not wish any to be greater etc. When, moreover, he quotes in his support the passage from Luke:—"I have prayed for thee, Peter, and thou, when thou art converted, strengthen etc.", he speaks, instead, on my behalf, for Christ enjoins Peter, the brother, to strengthen his brethren; he does not, however, confer any supremacy.

D. R. E. K.

(Latin text pages 79 to 82).

What the reverend Father aduces concerning the apostles we have already heard, that I may say it once for all, from Cyprian and Jerome; which also the saint and martyr, Pope Anacletus, affirms (Cap.9 dist.21.) in these words:—"They were all equal in the apostolic office". This no one denies. But this equality in the apostolic office does not rule out the primacy and pre-eminence (of Peter), unless one were impudently to say
that the holy martyr Anacletus contradicts himself in the same decree.

When, however, he puts so great stress on the ordination of the apostles, and seeks from it help, I know that Paul has ingenuously written that, after he went up to Jerusalem, he received nothing from those who seemed to be somewhat. But if this argument is going to tie up Eck so irrevocably, let him use it when he has the opportunity of replying. But when he accepts it as a favour shown to himself that I should quote from Cyprian, that the apostles were endowed with an equal share of honour and power, I am prepared, if he calls it a favour that I should destroy his own arguments, to show him such favours again and again. For the reverend Father made the distinction that Peter was first in the prerogative of honour, but not of power. Cyprian, however, puts them on an equality in both.

What he states regarding Numidia and Mauretania has nothing to do with our discussion; and as I have had for long nothing to do with geographical matters, I cannot remember everything. This I know - Tingitanican and Caesarian Mauretania stretch from Atlas as far as the sea; also Atlas is not put as the limit of Africa, but divides Africa for a great part to many degrees. Let it suffice that those, who came to Cornelius from Numidia, were not of the Roman diocese, and nevertheless approached the first (or supreme) Church. Therefore, the statement of Cyprian still stands irrefutable and unanswered. Regarding "influence" I wonder that he holds as my words what I quoted from
Cyprian (contra Novatianum), to whom also the reverend Father
has made no reply.

Regarding the Greeks, I admit that formerly they were
most Christian and learned, that is, when they called the Roman
Church the first Chair, But when, carried away with pride and
corrupted by envy, they withdrew themselves from their obedience
to the Roman Chair, they fell into terrible errors, and lost
at once the faith and the kingdom. But when he supposes that I
will not fulfil my promise and bases his argument on Matthew XVI,
I wonder that the reverend Father is so hostile to the sophists
and yet so skilfully adopts their methods of reasoning. For,
when he is the respondent, he transfers himself to the side of
the opponent. Therefore, I answer nothing at present, but what
he demands that I prove, I will prove, so that he may not always
have time for deliberation.

Finally, he rejects the obscure teacher Richard
Armacanus and forgets that I said that Richard wrote this with
the authority of St. Leo. Further, he does not prove from the
letter (of the text) what he wants to prove. When a strife broke
out among the disciples, Christ deservedly reproved them. There-
fore the words of Christ are to be taken as meaning that he
checks their quarrelling, but does not rule out the primacy. Like-
wise the reverend Father thinks that the text quoted after this
is in his favour, namely, that Christ spoke of the apostles as
brethren and that therefore he had not made him (Peter) greater.
But if he pondered the words of the text, as he is accustomed to
do on other occasions, he would soon see that Peter is
greater than the others, since he that strengthens is greater
than he that is strengthened. This may be said in reply.
I come next to the main thing which he desired and proceed... to
prove that the primacy of the Roman Church exists by divine right
and the appointment of Christ, so that Peter, with his successors,
was appointed supreme head and ruler of the Church by Christ. In
support of this statement I repeat the argument of Bernard quoted
by me and which has not yet been answered. Likewise I repeat
the words of Cyprian, and, thirdly, I prove it by the words of
Christ. (Matthew XVI):—"Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will
build my Church". There the ordinary interpretation is, that He
specially conferred this power on Peter that he might entice us
to unity; for this reason He appointed him the chief of the
apostles, namely, that the Church might have one supreme vicar
of Christ to whom its various members might have recourse if
it should happen that they were at variance with one another;
for, if there are several heads, the bond of unity is broken.

In like manner has St. Augustine in his epistle "contra
Donatum" interpreted the passage:—"Thou art Peter and on this
rock, that is, Peter, I will build my Church". And although
Augustine elsewhere sometimes expounds the words "on this rock",
as meaning "on Christ", according to the interpretation of the
apostle—"Moreover, that rock was Christ", nevertheless, in his
book "Retracta" he has not repented of his first exposition. In
Book I. Against the Pelagians, my copy column 5:
like manner also speaks Jerome (lib.1. contra Pelagia, mini col.5):
"What have Plato and Peter in common? this — as the former was
the chief of the philosophers so also was the latter the chief of the apostles, upon whom the Church of the Lord was founded as upon an immovable rock, which can be shaken neither by the force of the current nor by any tempest." Similarly also St. Ambrose (Sermo 47) says that Peter was the rock.

With this opinion, also, Chrysostom, at the beginning of the same chapter, agrees. "What then," he writes, "says Peter, the mouth of all the apostles and the head of the entire society?" And further on, "He hath made him to know higher things and appointed him shepherd of the future Church"; and again, "Christ hath put him over the whole world". In like manner also writes the holy martyr, Cyprian, to Pope Cornelius:—"Speaking for all the apostles and answering in the name of the Church, Peter, upon whom the Church had been founded by the Lord, says:—Lord, to whom shall we go?". Therefore, St. Leo (24 q. 1 Cap.) confesses with the saints: "The apostle Peter received from the Lord the primacy of the Church". Thus all the saints (I pass over the more recent such as Bede, Bernard etc.) with one voice confess that Peter received from the Lord the primacy of the whole Church. Also, let us hear what saith the saint and martyr, Pope Anacletus, who did not write the paltry decrees of the past 400 years, but for 1400 years has thundered forth:—"The holy, Roman and apostolic Church received the primacy, not from the apostles, but from our Lord and Saviour Himself, as He said to the apostle, St. Peter: Thou art Peter, and on this rock etc." And further on:—"This apostolic Chair has been appointed, as we have before said, head and centre (caput et
cardo) by the Lord and not by others." These words are quoted from the Canon, Sacrosancta 22 dist.

To the like effect, also, writes Marcellus IV. before Sylvester (Can. Rogamus, 24 q. 1.) to the bishops at Antioch:- "Although the first seat had formerly been at Antioch, it was afterwards transferred to Rome at the command of the Lord". Similarly, also, St. Julian III. (q.d. Can. Dudum) testifies that the Roman Church has the primacy from Christ, and is the head of all the other Churches.

In the same manner also did Pope Pelagius, not 400 years but 900 years ago, following the opinion of twenty-eight other holy Fathers, accept the words of Christ:- "And upon this rock etc." Therefore among the damnable and pernicious errors of John Wycliffe was condemned also this:- It is not necessary for salvation to believe that the Roman Church is supreme over others. Likewise among the pestilential errors of John Huss is also numbered this:- "Peter is not, and never was, the head of the holy Catholic Church". And also this:- "There is not a spark of probability in the statement that there must be one head ruling the Church in spiritual things, which always exists in the Church militant. Also this:- "The papal dignity has arisen from Caesar". and this:- "The Pope's authority and appointment has sprung from Caesar". Thus Boniface VIII. condemning the heresy of the Lugdunenses, issued a decree against their error, that it was not necessary for salvation that every human being be subject to the Roman Pope, which decree we have in the decretal
decretal "Unam Sanctam". Likewise John XXII, condemning the heresy of Marsilius of Padua, has repudiated the statement that the apostle Peter was no more than the head of the Church than any other apostle. Accordingly, through a long series beginning with the early Church, it has always been acknowledged among good Christians, that the Roman Church obtained the primacy from Christ and not by human law or popular consent.

It is my belief that the Bohemians, in their obstinate defence of their errors, are also mixed up with these heresies and defend themselves with such poisoned weapons, as is to be seen in the confession (oblatione) they made in the Council of Basle and in another disputation which took place before the king and the leading men of the kingdom between Ragasius and that minister of iniquity, John Hockenzoma. Therefore, I beg to be excused by the reverend Father if I am hostile to the Bohemians (I speak not of those who are Christian but of their schismatics) as enemies of the Church and that I mention them in the present disputation, seeing that both the Doctor's "Conclusion" and the things that were brought forward yesterday, namely, that the primacy of the Church was set up by the laws of men, for the most part favour, as it seems to my poor and feeble judgment, their errors; and, according to report, they (the Bohemians) delight very much over it. This only do I want to bring forward at present, and I await the reverend Father's opinion of, and answer to, the same.
The distinguished Doctor insinuates that I am favourably disposed to, indeed, a defender of, the sect of the Bohemians. May the Lord have mercy upon him, especially as he does so in an assembly, such as this, composed of so many distinguished men. Never has a schism, of whatever nature, been agreeable to me, and it never will be agreeable. The Bohemians act wrongly in that, of their own authority, they separate themselves from our unity; they do so, even if the divine law were on their side; for the supreme law of God is love and unity of spirit.

Only this have I asked, and I entreat that every Christian will consider in Christian love, whether it would not be the most shameless crime to eject from the Church so many thousands of martyrs and saints, whom for 1400 years the Greek Church has counted of their number, and to want to hurl them out of Heaven where now they reign. For even if all the flatterers of the Roman Pope were mad, they cannot deny that the Church of Christ was founded and crowned throughout a great part of the world, 20 years before the Roman Church was born of Peter, as is most clearly evident from the epistle to the Galatians (1. 18 ff), where Paul writes that, after 3 years, he came to Peter, and then, after 14 years, he again went up to Peter. Adding these years together, they bring us to nearly 18 years after the Ascension of Christ, when Peter, not to mention the years he was settled
in Antioch, was still at Jerusalem. Therefore, it cannot be maintained that the Roman Church is the first, and, by divine right, the head. But here is still a stronger argument - the Greek Church has never, up to our own time, accepted the confirmation of its bishops by Rome. If, accordingly, there had been a divine right, during all this time all the bishops of Alexandria and Constantinople, some of them the most saintly men, such as Gregory Nazianzen and many others, would have been condemned as heretics and Bohemians - a blasphemy such as nothing could be more hateful.

Regarding the arguments of the distinguished Doctor, when he says that the equality of the apostolic office does not prejudice the primacy, and quotes the holy martyr Anacletus (dist. 21. Ca. in Novo test), I answer briefly: - This is one of those most foolish decrees which I impugn, and no one will persuade me that it belongs to the most holy bishop.

Regarding his second point, I have not put special emphasis on the ordination of the apostles, concerning which we will see more in the course of our argument.

Thirdly, what he quotes about Cyprian making the apostles equal in honour and power, because I said that Peter had the priority in honour, I most willingly agree to, and will, if need be, willingly confess to having erred, if only the Doctor holds this as true and says to me: "What then becomes of the primacy?". Nevertheless, I say that the honour of the apostles is equal in regard to others, but among themselves they have rightly given
Peter the first place. For each of the apostles in his office, as each of the bishops in his diocese, has equal honour.

Regarding his taunt that I have not answered Cyprian, I have searched for his letter but have not found it. It has, however, been sufficiently answered in what I have already said, namely, that Cyprian in many letters grants to every Church its own head. Those who came from Numidia do not prove that there is a divine right; they only show that the thing took place, as in like manner Achadius, as a matter of fact, appointed Felix to be Roman Pope, of which we spoke yesterday. Indeed, Epiphanius, bishop of Cyprus, deposed the greater bishop of Constantinople, namely, John Chrysostom, as is to be seen in tripart. history. However a rule has not been established from such a fact. And many other examples.

I wonder greatly that the distinguished Doctor has undertaken to prove a divine right, and up till now has not produced even a single syllable of Scripture in its support, but only the sayings and deeds of the Fathers, which often are at variance with one another.

What he says about the Greeks having formerly been most Christian, and having lost both the faith and the empire by afterwards falling away from their obedience to the Roman Church, is the same as he said yesterday, with the same Eccian assurance, about the gates of Hell having prevailed against them, handling the Scriptures in such a manner that he understands by the prevailing of the gates of Hell against the Church the loss of earthly life and goods. A most beautiful interpretation,
indeed! As if, with the loss of the empire, the faith would not have been able to endure! Thus one might conclude that there were no Christians in Greece because there was no empire. By the same method of reasoning he might also say that the martyrs were overcome by Hell.

He also objects that, from being the respondent, I have become the opponent. I accept the reminder with thanks. Nevertheless I have not done this that I might have time for reflection. For, that I also may boast a little, the Eccian thunderbolts are not such that I must specially deliberate regarding them.

Likewise the manner in which Richard Armacanus, not on his own authority but on that of Leo, treats the word of Christ, does not specially trouble me. Let him prove the matter from the text itself, that is, by divine law, and I will be content.

Regarding his last point where he reasons: "He that strengthens is greater than he that is strengthened"; therefore Peter is the greatest of the apostles"; possibly what he has in his mind is the saying of Aristotle: "The part that acts is superior to that which is acted upon." But I too will argue in good Aristotelian manner: "He that strengthens is possibly greater in himself; but it may easily be that he is less, unless perchance he understands here by "strengthening" (confirmationem) the "sacrament of confirmation", which I do not think. Otherwise it is not uncommon for the superior to be exhorted, comforted and strengthened by the inferior. So much then for his confutation
of my argument.

Coming to the main point, he has proved that Peter is, by
divine right, supreme ruler; and he has done this by quoting the
testimony of Bernard, Cyprian, Jerome, Chrysostom, Augustine,
then by referring to the unanimity of the saints, as also to
many decrees and decretals of various Popes. I answer:—Doctor
Eck purposed to prove by divine law, and now, quite forgetting
that, he falls back on the testimony of the Fathers, which, for
the most part, we have already dealt with, and have seen that,
in many cases, they are self-contradictory, and speak, the
majority of them, much more frequently in my support that in that
of Dr. Eck.

Nevertheless let us examine them in order.

The first, that from Bernard, has already been sufficiently
answered above, and I said that it does not prove but only
seeks to persuade, and, besides, depends upon an unnatural
interpretation of Scripture, as the Doctor himself admits. In
like manner the passage from Cyprian regarding the primacy and
the origin of sacerdotal unity has been sufficiently considered.

Thirdly, he has based his argument upon these words:—
"Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build etc.,”, words
which Augustine has thus interpreted: "Upon this rock, that is,
Peter”, and has not withdrawn the interpretation. I answer:—
What does that concern me? If he will contend against me, let
him first reconcile contradictory statements. For it is certain
that Augustine more frequently interprets the rock as meaning
Christ, and perhaps scarcely once as Peter, and is, therefore, more on my side than against me.

But even if Augustine and all the Fathers understand Peter by the rock, I will oppose them alone with the words of the apostle (that is with the divine law), who writes in 1. Cor. iii. (V.11): "Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ"; and with the words of Peter (1. Peter. 1. 4 ff.), where he calls Christ the living and corner stone and teaches that we are built upon it into a spiritual house. But, if Peter had been the foundation of the Church, the Church had fallen at the voice of a single maid, a doorkeeper. Nevertheless, the gates of Hell have not been able to prevail against it.

It follows, therefore, that the holy Fathers, when they here called Peter the rock, either err as men, or have some other meaning, concerning which I express no opinion. Therefore, I can easily let the word of Ambrose pass, that Peter is the rock, since, indeed, any Christian may be a rock because of Christ, upon whom, as a strong foundation, he is founded, and with whom he is made one.

When, however, Chrysostom calls Peter the pastor of the future Church, and says that he has been set over the whole world, I am quite content, provided that the pastoral office is not understood as extending over the whole Church; for otherwise we might excommunicate the apostle Paul, who has nourished many more Churches than Peter. Also I admit that Peter is first in
honour in the whole world, which also Chrysostom touches upon, when he says that he is the crown of the entire apostolic community. But the crown of the head is only a part of the head (the sentence cannot be translated literally) and not the head itself. Yea, he calls him still more clearly the mouth of the apostles, which also Jerome and Cyprian teach; for, not in his own person alone, but in that of all the apostles and the entire Church, he heard the words:— "To thee I will give the keys etc".

Regarding the decrees, which I have called most foolish things, I say nothing, and especially of that of Anacletus, so much vaunted at this hour, because no good Christian can believe that it belongs to Anacletus, the martyr, who understands Cephas as being head and calls the Roman Church that upon which everything hinges (cardinem).

Finally, since the Bohemians are so hateful to the distinguished Doctor, let him show his memory and talent by writing against them. I wonder greatly that so many enemies and accusers of the Bohemians are found, and yet there is no one who, out of brotherly love, will put himself to the trouble of confuting their errors to the glory of the Roman Church.

(Dr. Martin begged Eck not to fling at him so much abuse and make him out to be a Bohemian, since the Bohemians had always been obnoxious to him, inasmuch as they had destroyed the unity of the Church).

At 2 p.m. the disputation will be continued according to the proclamation of the servant of the University.
At that hour 2 p.m.

DR. MARTIN.

(Latin text pages 86 to 88).

Dr Martin continued in the following manner what he had today begun.

The distinguished Doctor brought forward in conclusion the articles of Wycliffe and John Huss, which were condemned, and Boniface VIII. who condemned them. I answer, as before, that I neither will nor can defend the schism of the Bohemians, but only the Greek Church with its 1400 years of history. Whether the Bohemians hold with it or not, does not concern me. I am certain that neither the Roman Pope nor all his flatterers can hurl from Heaven so great a number of saints, who never owned allegiance to the Roman Pope.

Further, it is also certain that among the articles of John Huss or the Bohemians many are thoroughly Christian and evangelical, which the universal Church cannot condemn, such as this and others similar, namely, that there is only one universal Church. For this, through the agency of Godless flatterers, has been unjustly condemned, since the whole Church prays:—"I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints". This most glorious article of the faith is numbered among the beliefs of John Huss.

Next there is this: It is not necessary for salvation to believe that the Roman Church is the superior of the other Churches. Whether it belongs to Wycliffe or John Huss matters nothing to me. I know that Basil the Great, Gregory Nazianzen,
Epiphanius of Cyprus and innumerable other bishops were saved, and yet they did not hold this article. Also it is not in the power of the Roman Pontiff or the Inquisitor of heresy to formulate new articles of faith, but only to judge according to those already established. Neither can a true Christian be compelled to believe what goes beyond Holy Writ, which alone is of divine authority, unless a new and tested revelation has supervened. On the contrary we are forbidden by divine authority to believe except what is proved either by holy Scripture or by unmistakable revelation, as Gerson, also, though a more recent writer, declares in many passages, and St. Augustine, one of the older, lays down as a specific canon when he writes to St. Jerome: "I have learned to give honour only to those books which are called canonical; my custom in reading others is, however excellent they may be in teaching and piety, to accept as truth nothing which they set forth, except as they are able to convince me from the books of the Canon, or by the reasonableness of their argument".

But even the canonists themselves, of whom it might be least expected, maintain in the Canon Significasti, (de electione et elect. pote.) that the opinion of any private person counts for more than that of Pope, Council and Church, if it is supported by superior authority or convincing argument. Therefore the distinguished Doctor accomplishes nothing, when, setting forth to argue against me from the divine law, he dismisses the same and plies me with quotations from the works of heresy inquisitors.

Accordingly, if the statement of John Huss, that the
papal dignity arose from Caesar, is false, we have also to erase that of Platina, in his Life of Benedict II., where he writes that Constantine IV., Emperor of the Greeks, enacted that the Roman Pope be vicar general of Christ, although he was not thus regarded by the Greek bishops.

Therefore, when the distinguished Doctor presses upon me with the Bohemians, a sect not yet a hundred years old, I also press upon him with the Eastern Church—the better part of the universal Church—which dates back 1400 years. If the former are heretics, because they have not acknowledged the Roman Pope, then I will bring the charge of heresy against the adversary who dares to hold as damned so many saints who have been held in honour throughout the whole Church. With this I likewise answer Boniface VIII, whose character as Pope, and the credence that is to be given to his story, history sufficiently shows.

Accordingly, I conclude and beg that the Doctor will admit that the Roman Popes were men, and not make them gods, especially when they have given judgment in their own cause, and that often not by themselves, but through their most ignorant flatterers, since Gregory, although a Roman Pope, repudiated in many letters the idea of his being primate of the whole world, and in support of his attitude adduced his predecessor, Pelagius, as saying among other things, that the venerable Council of Chalcedon offered this honour of supremacy to the Roman Pope, and yet none ventured to accept it. If therefore, I err, Gregory I. together with his
predecessor errs with me, and they have in a highly reprehensible manner sinned, because they did not accept the proffered primacy.

By these things I maintain to have proved that, from the decrees and the more recent condemnations and approbations of the Roman Church, nothing has been made out against me, since they are all highly suspect and entirely at variance with ancient truth and custom. Nevertheless, out of reverence, and for the avoiding of schism, I most willingly endure and advise that such things be endured, if only we do not condemn, as if by divine law, the multitude of saints to whom I have referred. So much I have wanted to say concerning the articles.

D R. E C K.

(Latin text pages 88 to 94).

The reverend Father, desirous to save his honour, denies that he is a supporter of the Bohemians. I admit that his deeds, if they corresponded with his words, would do him honour. But the latter do not agree with the former, since in an unchristian manner he calls the most pestilential errors of the Hussites thoroughly Christian. Concerning this, however, more later. Nevertheless, I hate the statements he makes that the

that condition — "if the divine law were in their favour"— which the schismatic Bohemians and schismatic Bohemians and Picardians may be accepted if, as if it Picardians might take for granted.

were granted, the divine law is in their favour. I have always praised the most admirable Greeks and holy martyrs. But the reverend Father, little skilled in the culinary art (that is, here, the art of mixing), throws the saints of the Greek Church and its
schismatics and heretics together, so that under colour of the piety of the Fathers he may defend the "perfidy" of the heretics. For he emphasises the 1400 years

( Dr. Martin - I protest before you all that the distinguished Doctor speaks in a shamelessly false manner concerning me. Likewise the distinguished Dr. Eck protests in turn that he will prove what he has said by what has been written and spoken. )
during which, for a long time, the greater part of the Greek Church was heretical and schismatic. There is, however, nothing in common between the light and Belial, between schismatics and the holy martyrs and confessors.

Regarding the Church which was in existence 20 years before that of Rome I shall say, since the reverend Father confronts me with it, that it gives me no concern that the Greek bishops had not been ordained by the Roman Pope, for the village priests of the present day are also not ordained by the Pope. But it would be sheer madness to say that therefore the Pope does not have absolute authority over the village priests.

Concerning the paltry decree of Anacletus I will speak later and likewise defend the other decrees. In regard to Numidia, the reverend Father has said that no rule has been established from it. This is contrary to the opinion of Cyprian, who inveighed against those, as being heretics, who dared to approach the Chair of Peter and the supreme Church from which unity arose. In regard to Epiphanius of Cyprus
deposing John Chrysostom, a higher bishop, from his office, let him himself (Epiphanius), I say, answer for the legality of his act. I hold not with it.

Moreover, in turning his ridicule against me, as a man who does not handle the sacred Scriptures in a becoming manner, and thinks that, because of the loss of temporal things and riches, the gates of Hell prevailed against the Greeks, he imputes to me a thought that never entered my head; for I said that heresies, schisms and errors have prevailed against the Greek Church. Nevertheless, it is true that the loss of the empire followed, to the great shame of Christianity.

Next, when the reverend Father boasts that he speaks from the divine word (Luke XXII), whilst I bring forward an unknown writer, Richard Armacanus, although he is supported by the authority of Leo; I reply that I likewise believe in the Scripture of the Evangel and in the divine law. But the reverend Father replies only on his own intellect and spurns me when I follow the reasoning of the ancients. Undoubtedly both Arius, the heretic, and Athanasius (his opponent) had the divine word—"The Father is greater than I"; but Arius understood it in an erroneous manner, Athanasius, as the Holy Spirit demanded.

Regarding the "strengthening", which he further brought forward, there is nothing in this; since any intelligent man understands that he, who by the power given him from a higher, strengthens others, is thereby greater than those that are strengthened. As for the words "through himself" and "perchance" (per se et per
accidents), I know not what he means. This for his first.

The reverend Father, who would take up my argument in a manner contrary to its main purpose, goes quite beyond the
mark, when, tauntingly, he says that my purpose was to prove that by divine right from the Divine Word that the Roman Church has precedence over others and that nevertheless I had only stumbled upon the sayings of the Fathers and the saints, as if I had wanted to make a pitcher and produced a little pot. May the reverend Father forgive me; but he either will not or is unable to understand my purpose. For that this precedence is in accordance with the sufficient, namely, that so many holy Fathers have maintained it; Divine Word is proved, inasmuch as so many holy Fathers have said that it is so; although, in quoting the testimonies of the holy Fathers, we have not been silent regarding the Divine Word from Matthew XVII. 18:—"Upon this rock etc.".

Regarding Bernard, whose testimony and reasoning cannot be got over, I know not how the reverend Father has forgotten himself and said that I have admitted that Bernard spoke in another sense. This he can by no means make good. For if the true and real meaning of the Scripture is kept, namely the equality of the Father and the Son, then the argument of Bernard proceeds excellently.

Regarding Augustine who, with others, has said that Peter is the rock, he gives it to be understood that he will not let the statement pass, because he (Augustine) contradicts himself. In reply to this I say: How does he dare to think that so holy and learned a Father gives expression to contrary
opinions in the same book, yea, in the same chapter, in the comparison of both opinions (lib. l. retract. cap. 21) ? But how modestly and humbly the reverend Augustinian Father has spoken, let others judge, when he said that he will alone oppose himself to so many holy Fathers. To claim to understand the Holy Scriptures better than the Popes, the Councils, the Doctors, and the Universities in their full vigour, when, also, the Holy Spirit has not deserted His Church - this is the essence of the Bohemian spirit. And it would be extraordinarily strange, if God had concealed the truth to so many saints and martyrs, and waited till the advent of the reverend Father to reveal it. Nor does any quotation from St. Paul help him to carry his point, since the apostle's words are not in the slightest at variance with the Fathers and Doctors. Christ is the Rock, the foundation, the corner-stone, the infallible Head of the Church. Further, that such things are not to be attributed to His vicar, is, since not only we but the holy Fathers testify differently, not to be admitted.

He has also added the ridiculous argument, recently spread abroad in the speech of the people: If upon Peter, how could the Church have been built upon Peter, who, at the word of an insignificant maid, denied Christ and the Christian faith?

NOTE:- This argument was brought forward by Luther, not in the course of the disputation, but in a sermon preached in the Disputation Hall a few days before, in the presence of and at the request of Duke Barmin, Rector of Wittenberg University. To stop the mouth of the slanderer Luther published the sermon, but to avoid as far as possible giving offence
I hope the reverend Doctor will pardon me; but, since he despises the Aristotelian philosophy, and holds language in high esteem, why, with his lynx eyes, has he not recognised that the word "aedificabo" (I will build) is in the future tense? For, when the bridegroom was present and the children rejoiced, there was no need for a vicar, nor did Christ then give him the power of the keys, but only promised it. It was, therefore, before the giving of the keys and power that Peter was addressed by the doorkeeper (maid), as both Ambrose and, after him, Gregory testify.

To Chrysostom he has replied that Peter was the greatest only in honour; for Paul (as shepherd) had pastured more Churches. As if the reverend Father (Luther) had not preached more than the present Pope, and therefore is to be called a greater shepherd than the Pope! Likewise he is unnecessarily subtle in interpreting the word "head" (vertex), as if Chrysostom did not want to understand by it the primacy. But who can suppose this? since it is a symbol, and "head" (vertex) is taken for the highest point or place in such a metaphorical expression. Thus also he (Peter) is called the mouth of the apostles, since he often spoke for all of the apostles, which also St. Chrysostom dwells upon.

Regarding the decrees he says that they are most

Note contd:—he toned it down in form and content. Thus the sentence Eck referred to does not appear in the text of the sermon. Werke. 2. 241.
foolish decrees. At this I wonder greatly, since he has written in his thesis:—"That the Roman Church is superior to all other Churches is, indeed, proved by the most foolish decrees promulgated by the Roman pontiffs within the last 400 years". I might quote to him, however, much older decrees, before the love of many began to grow cold.

I do not accept his subterfuge in which he denies that this decree is by Anacletus, for thus, unless stamped with their seal, the decrees of all the Councils and Popes might be eluded, and thus the whole judicial faculty be made suspect, as if in its teaching, decisions and judgments etc., it rested on insecure foundations. Thus also the papal rights asserted by these would not be worth a withered bean, unless they were unanimously approved of by the whole of Christendom. Therefore the opinion of the reverend Father is on no conditions to be accepted, since the decrees of all the Popes and Councils are to be found in many places, and, as the human race is bold, men would have been found ere now who would have torn to pieces this ape of Anacletus, parading in a lion's skin. Unless, therefore, he shows that such things are not to be found in the original documents, I will not believe him.

Finally, he said of the Bohemians, certainly not without insult to Christian teachers, that there are more accusers of the Bohemians than men who, out of love and Godly zeal, write against and exhort them, in which they ought to exercise their talent and memory. What use to relate the facts to deaf ears? A Christian, however, ought not to deny
that many with noblest zeal have written against the Bohemians; for example, the Fathers deputed to do so at the Council of Constance; the Doctor who replied to the Bohemians at the Council of Basle; Ragusius; Johannes Capistranus, a man of the most unimpeachable character and doctrine, a priest of the Franciscan order and well known to all the faithful; Nicholas Cusanus, most learned of the Germans, with many others, men such as the reverend Father taunts me with—inquisitors, I pass over. Therefore, there have not been lacking men who gave good counsel to the Bohemians; but they themselves have been lacking, because, wedded to the heresy, they have not followed the good counsel.

Of the Greek saints we have frequently spoken; but it is horrifying, I think, to every follower of Christ, to hear the reverend Father, when, setting himself up against a Council so holy and honourable as that of Constance, a Council that had been convoked by the practically unanimous voice of Christendom, he declares without any sense of shame that certain articles of the Hussites and the Wycliffites are thoroughly Christian and evangelical,

Dr Martin protested at this point, that it was not true that he had spoken against the Council of Constance. Eck, on the other hand, declared that he would prove this from his writings and words. and that the universal Church is unable to condemn them.
shocking does it sound, when we hear the reverend Father say that this article of the Hussites was unjustly condemned, namely, that it is not necessary for salvation to believe that the Roman Church is superior to other Churches. Over such a statement the Bohemians, not without cause, exult, and urge it in their prayers to God, but to the great harm of the Church. If, however, as St. Augustine elsewhere argues, the slightest fault be admitted in regard to the Holy Scriptures, then the whole becomes suspect. Accordingly the condemned Hussites, who have been supported by the reverend Father’s patronage,

Interrupting, Dr. Martin protests that this is a shameless lie.

will without doubt say: If the Council has erred in these two thoroughly Christian articles, then its authority will be regarded by us with suspicion in regard to other articles.

On a matter previously condemned I will not, therefore, waste many words, to do which a Christian might be compelled or led. But I say this: By the authority of a Council or Roman Pope it happens that an opinion cannot be defended without suspicion of heresy, which otherwise might safely be defended without harm to the faith. Of this an example comes to hand; Whether the essence in the Godhead procreates? Richardus (lib. de trinitate) holds that it does and is not in the least to be blamed for doing so. But seeing that the Council has given a decision on the matter, no one now can say, without suspicion of heresy, that the Divine essence
procreates. I hold with the Chapter, "Damnamus" by the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith.

On Augustine, whom he quotes, regarding the recens' of reading the canonical Scriptures, I do not linger, seeing that he (Augustine) does not exclude the decrees of the Councils and the Popes. What opinion my lords, the jurists, have come to in Canon Significasti (de electione), I do not at the moment recollect. But, mindful of their office, as guardians of justice, they will not, I think, consent to the laws of the Popes being overthrown. As for Platina whom he quotes, as if he were greater than the Pope or Augustine or Cyprian, and who in his Life of Benedict 11. relates that Constantine IV. decreed that the primacy belonged to the Roman Church, let the reverend Father read, I beseech him, the comments of the jurists in Canon "Ecclesia S. Mariae" (de constitut), which state how far and in what manner secular statutes are valid in ecclesiastical matters, and he will see in what sense the words of Platina (that I may not say of the Roman Emperor) are to be accepted concerning Churches and heretics.

In the last place, he thinks that I bear hard on the Bohemians and the Greeks. I admit it; but only on their schismatics. For I do not, after the manner of the giants in the fables who wanted to hurl Jupiter from Heaven, condemn the holy Fathers among the Greeks who have been canonised. But then the reverend Father meets us, and rightly, with the case of a Greek who was disobedient and a rebel to the Roman Church, who may have been canonised. Is there anyone in this category and we will
not praise him? In vain, therefore, does he claim to support the papacy (monarchia), not as if it existed by divine right, but by a certain tolerance of the people and consent of the faithful.

This is very evident from Gregory whom he quoted, who rejected the primacy among the faithful, which was offered him. But let the reverend Father get beneath the surface to the inner meaning of the words, and he will discover in the letters the extreme humility of the excellent Father, who would rather by his meekness and humility subdue the pride of the Patriarch in Constantinople than fall himself into the suspicion of being conceited and proud. Therefore, also, he first described himself as the servant of servants. And that this is true, the reverend Father, if he is such a diligent reader of Gregory, would have been able to discover in the letters of the same, (as it is quoted in Decret. canonicis 2. Q. 6. Decreto), where the most humble Father, despising riches and honour, nevertheless mindful of his power, writes: Other bishops besides the Roman were called to the exercise of solicitude, but not to the plenitude of power. No one will doubt here that he is willing to grant to the other bishops a part, to the Roman bishop, however, the plenitude of power, according to the grammatical sense of the words. Therefore, I beg the reverend Father, not continually put down to a desire to flatter, what others or myself have said; for I have not learned, yea, I know not now, to flatter.

To-morrow morning at seven o'clock, the disputatation will be continued.
The disputation took place as above, there being present the honourable gentlemen, Michael Gabler Vueysenburgensis and Nicolaus Meyer Leyphanensis, Laymen from the dioceses Eystettensis and Augustensis, as required witnesses to the above.

Johannes Graumann, Notary, signed the above.

Wednesday 6th July, 7 a.m.

Before beginning, the indefatigable Caesarius Pflugk prefaced by saying that the statements of Dr. Martin would be signed at the close.

DR. MARTIN.
(Latin text pages 95 to 101).

Inasmuch as yesterday the distinguished Doctor assumed the role, not of a party at the Bar but that of judge, and, contrary to the agreement come to and the will of our patron, the most illustrious Prince George, again and again judged and proclaimed that I was a heretic, whereas it was his duty merely to set forth his argument and authorities, and leave it to the judges to decide whether I was a heretic or not; let those whom it concerns see to it whether, in this, public faith has not been broken.

In this matter he first taunts me with having called the most pernicious errors of the Hussites quite Christian. Regarding
this, I testify my innocence. Nor will he ever be able to prove his statement. Also I demand that he indicate these most pernicious articles which I have called quite Christian, or else withdraw his words.

Secondly, he accuses me of having confused the Greek saints with schismatics. What else could he do, seeing that he has nothing else to say? For it is certain that, at the time when Constantinople was last devastated, there were many splendid Christians in Greece, who were afterwards received in Italy. And although he would not bring this forward, still it remains certain that up till at least the Nicene Council, there were sound Christians throughout the whole of the East, who were not subject to the Roman Pope, as the decree of the same Nicene Council most clearly testifies, namely, that which says (lib.10.Ca.3.historia Eccles.):- "And that at Alexandria or in the ancient city of Rome the custom may be preserved, that the former bear the care of the Churches in Egypt, the latter the care of those attached to it". The same Council gives the place of honour, not to the Roman, but to the Jerusalem Church, saying in the same place:- "And that the prerogative of honour, handed down from ancient times, be kept for the bishop at Jerusalem".

But if that is not enough, this nevertheless settles the matter - and the distinguished Doctor is discreetly silent regarding it - namely, that the Church of Christ existed at least 20 years before the Roman Church was born. Therefore his
refutation of my argument is ridiculous, when he says that I confused the saints with the schismatics, since he cannot particularise his schismatics.

Thirdly, in refuting my argument, namely, that the bishops of Greece were not ordained by the Roman Pope, he has said that this is of no consequence, since nowhere are parish priests ordained by the Roman Pope. But who does not see that this was said merely to waste time? since, they are nevertheless ordained by the bishops. Likewise I refer all this back to what was formerly said concerning Jerome's letter to Euphrasius. For the like reason has he also often repeated the story of the Numidians, where it is told of them that, without being called, they came to Rome, and were found fault with for doing so. And will the Doctor out of such a story still attribute to the Roman Pope a divine right? But he also accepts what we read about Epiphanius of Cyprus deposing Johannes Chrysostom, not as a "right", but only as a fact. And thus will he condemn it, since the former acted according to the statutes of the Nicene Council and the declaration of Cyprian regarding the ordination of bishops without the authority of the Roman Pope.

It remains, therefore, incontestable that either the Roman primacy has not been founded on divine right, or that the saints of the entire Eastern Church are eternally damned. I pass over his interpretation of the "prevailing of the gates of Hell" as being the growth of heresy, for it gives me no concern; nevertheless he does not show that the Greeks were heretics;
whereas it is proclaimed even by the laws that the Greeks were not to be considered as heretics. I pass over also his reference to Leo and Armacanus, where he says that he follows the interpretation of the ancients, that is, of the one unique Leo, in taking one number for the other. Likewise I say nothing about "the strengthening of the brethren" which was enjoined on Peter. There has already been enough said, since it proves nothing, and what has been said has not yet been refuted.

Regarding the main matter, he says that he has not been silent regarding the divine right, because he has quoted the passage from Matthew XVI (v.18): "Thou art Peter and on this rock etc.," and followed the interpretation of the Fathers, especially Ambrose and Augustine, who have said that Peter was the rock. He has also ventured to add that Augustine did not retract. After consulting the book, "Retractatio," I find, however, the contrary. For he does retract, and says that Peter is not the rock but that He, whom he confessed, is the Rock. He says the same thing also in the Homily which every priest uses in prayer on the day of Peter and Paul, where he says: "Upon the rock, not upon thee, but upon the Rock which thou hast confessed". I find the same thing also in Ambrose, although he sometimes speaks differently. Besides, there is that golden gloss, as they boast upon the Chapter: "Ita Dominus", which says: "And upon this rock — by this speech I believe that the Lord meant nothing else than the words which Peter addressed to the Lord, when he said: Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God; for upon this
article of faith the Church is founded; therefore, Christ has founded the Church upon Himself.

It does not signify, therefore, that the distinguished Doctor boasts that the words of the Fathers are on his side, since they are found to be much more in my favour. He might, therefore, have spared his tongue and our ears when, with sounding rhetoric, he exclaimed that I wanted to make myself more learned than anyone else, to make it appear that I understood the Scripture better than the Councils, the Universities and the Doctors, better than the Roman Popes; and that it would be extraordinary if the truth, so long concealed, had been revealed to me alone. For this is not to argue but to stir up bad feeling.

Regarding his sneer at my "petty argument" in which I maintained that, on the denial of Peter, the Church, if it had been founded on him, would have collapsed; as also regarding his grammatical reminder that the verb is in the future tense (I will build), as if after the death of Christ the Church had been built upon Peter,—I will say nothing of this, because anyone can easily see what it is worth. Nevertheless, even after the sending of the Holy Spirit, Peter, to the great hurt of the faith, fell. —see Galatians 11, where he is taken to task by Paul, in whom the faith and its confession remained unsullied and entire; whereas in Peter, the faith, though it indeed remained in him, was but a travesty of the truth of the Gospel.

Nevertheless, I maintain that the distinguished Doctor, having supported himself principally upon this passage, now excludes himself from it, so that there is nothing left him of the
divine right. For, if it were only a promise, then we must go to the passage where the promise is fulfilled, which is found in John \( \text{vii.} \) (XX. 22), where He does not say:—"Peter, receive the Holy Spirit"; but speaks in like manner to all: "Receive ye the Holy Spirit, and whose soever sins ye remit etc." I pass over, also, the reference to Chrysostom in which, with the purpose of refuting my statement that Peter was the superior in honour, the Doctor replies that, since Paul preached more than Peter, he will likewise have greater honour, as if I had spoken of the multitude of his labours and not of his priority in rank. I likewise pass over what he said about the head, and his symbolic head, which are mere empty words.

Regarding the decrees, he is amazed that I call them trifling things which have come into existence within the last 400 years. The 400 years I will pass over at present, intending to speak of them later. For there was no need to inform me that 1200 years ago, yea, 400 years ago there were decrees; yea, also, contentions about the primacy. Let the Doctor meanwhile wonder that he understands the passage from Matthew to be a word of promise, not of fulfilment, whereas the decrees themselves rest upon it entirely as a word of fulfilment. It necessarily follows, therefore, that, after the manner of the Doctor, either the Decrees handle the Scriptures improperly or he himself errs.

Again; he is dissatisfied with my refusal to acknowledge the decree of Anacletus as genuine. This, and his amusing remarks about the sealing of decrees, I pass over; for he has not yet replied to the fact (or confuted) that the same
decree declares Cephas to be the head. Ignorance such as this can hardly be attributed to so great a pope, especially at that time when the languages flourished and a great multitude of Jews were at hand. But this also is well known—the Book of Decrees has not yet been approved.

He has also taken me severely to task for having said that the accusers of the Bohemians are more numerous than their instructors. Would God that I had said what is not true. I see, indeed, that much is spoken and written against them, but some-what unhappily, since they are not addressed with a brotherly name, which, let us remember, Paul did not refuse to the Galatians who had fallen into the perfidy of the Jews. I believe that the Bohemians are men who can be won by kindly speech and concessions, but only become more hardened by accusations and taunts of heresy. It is no excuse for us, therefore, to say: One is not to preach to the deaf; since, according to the teaching of Paul, we must be instant, in season and out of season.

Of the Greek saints we have frequently spoken. This, however, must now be dealt with, namely, that, for the purpose of stirring up hatred against me, he has lifted up his voice aloud and said that it is horrible to every Christian believer that I do not shrink from saying, contrary to such a holy and laudable Council as that of Constance, that some of the articles of the Hussites are most Christian and evangelical, which, also, the universal Church cannot condemn. I answer:—Among the articles of the Hussites is also this:—there is only one holy
Catholic Church, which is the entire company of the predestinated. Likewise this: The Holy Catholic Church is only one, as the number of the predestinated is only one. These two articles did not originate with Huss but are almost word for word Augustine's (On John) (super Johannem), and are repeated in "Magister sententiarum" Cap. 4, de sacramento Euchar. A third is: The two natures, divine and human, are one in Christ. These articles, I believe, Dr. John Eck will subscribe to with me. A fourth is: The natural division of human works is that they are either virtuous or vicious; for if a man is vicious and does anything, then he acts viciously; and if he is virtuous and does anything, then he acts virtuously.

This article, as we heard last week, was so triumphantly proclaimed by the distinguished Doctor Carlstadt, that the distinguished Dr. John Eck was compelled to repudiate Scotus and the Scotists, Capreolus and the Thomists, with all the celebrated teachers of his faction, and to subscribe to it.

His outpourings of yesterday that I am a patron of the Bohemians, a most pestilential heretic and such like, I therefore fling back into his own bosom. Here he is of the opinion of John Huss; what he said on his own behalf has also been said for me against his accusations. I add that I rightly said most Christian and evangelical, especially in regard to this article: The two natures, divine and human, are one in Christ. Therefore the Doctor ought to admit that, out of reverence for the Council of Constance, I gave it as my opinion, that these and similar
articles were not condemned by that Council, but were inserted by some impostor. But in addition to this, since the Council itself says that some articles are heretical, some erroneous, some blasphemous, some rash, some seditious, some offensive to pious ears, the distinguished Doctor ought, for the sake of his reputation for prudence, to first reduce each to its own order, and not, contrary to the declaration of the Council, condemn them collectively as heretical, and which (some of them) the Council, perhaps, hardly acknowledged to be rash. For even the purest truth may be stigmatised as rashness, as a stumbling block, sedition, an offence to the ears, as happened to Christ. An article, therefore, is not false, much less heretical, because it is bold or offensive. And thus it is evident that I have been too rashly, and far beyond Eccian moderation, called a heretic; I, a man, whom he could, perhaps, hardly prove to be offensive. Indeed, since it is not incumbent upon him to decide off-hand, which of these articles is erroneous, which heretical, which rash, it is clear as day how unjustly and rashly he has accused me of being a heretic, and with the worst name.

Accordingly, the article, which says that it is not necessary for salvation to believe that the Roman Church is superior to others, is not yet proved to be a heretical article, although it be numbered among the heretical.

Regarding his argument, following the example of Augustine:— "If the slightest falsehood or error be admitted in a Council, the whole authority of that Council collapses", the
comparison is not a happy one, since Augustine speaks of Holy Scripture', which is the infallible word of God, whilst the Council is a creature of that Word. Therefore an injury is done the Word of God by such a comparison, since it is admitted that a Council can err, as Panormitanus points out (Cap. Significasti.). I pass over what has been said about the procreating of the divine essence, since it has nothing to do with our argument.

Regarding Augustine who, with the exception of the Scriptures, bids us read the writings of all with judgment, the distinguished Doctor says that he (Augustine) does not exclude the decrees of the Roman Popes and the Councils. This is his opinion, but it is not supported by proof. But I strengthen my answer with the word of Paul to the Thessalonians (1. 5. verse 21): - "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good". The Roman Pope and Councils are men; therefore they are to be proved and then accepted; they are not to be exempted from the apostolic rule.

Regarding the Chapter "Significasti" quoted by me, he says he does not recollect it, and warns the jurists not to destroy the laws of the popes. In this he seeks to stir up hatred against me. Not hereby, however, are the laws of the popes destroyed, if the divine laws are preferred to them; and since the jurists do prefer these laws, the theologians act most wickedly who in this resist the most excellent jurists.
Of Platina, who was quoted by me, he says that he is not greater than the Roman Pope, Augustine and Cyprian. As if from Cyprian, Augustine or the Pope he had already proved the primacy, whereas he said again and again that he would prove it from the Divine Word; yet he has brought forward nothing but these most foolish decrees and a few misinterpreted quotations from the Fathers. To Platina I grant nothing; but I do grant something to the history, as mother of the truth, which Platina wrote.

What he says about the imperial decrees I pass over.

At last he admits that the Greek saints were not damned, but were only schismatics. This serves nothing to the purpose, for I have never replied on behalf of the Greek schismatics, but on behalf of the saints, especially of the Nicene Council, just as I do not believe that he is thinking of the Latin schismatics, when he speaks of the Roman Church.

Gregory, whom I quoted, is, he says, to be followed according to the inner, not according to the surface, meaning of his words; and thus my reply is sufficiently refuted, for the bare word of Eck is sufficient.

Moreover, when he quoted 2. q. 6. Cap. Decreto, where the same Gregory writes: "Other bishops, besides the Roman, were called to the exercise of solicitude, but not to the plenitude of power," the Doctor ought to have shown that all bishops throughout the world were meant, and not merely those of the Western Church. But if he were to do this incontestably
there would be nothing proved of the divine right. Gregory is a man, and, therefore, the more he contradicts himself in various places, the less he proves. So that I have a greater right to say to the Doctor that he himself should look more to the meaning than to the outward form of the passages he quotes, or first make it to agree with himself.

In the last place, when I quoted against the distinguished Doctor the words of Paul (1. Cor. 111. 11):

"Other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ," he answered that they are also to be applied to the vicar of Christ. Consequently, we must speak thus:

"Other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is the Roman Pope". Therefore we must very obviously either refuse to accept the words of Paul, or hold that they are not to be applied to the vicar of Christ.

Similarly with Galatians 11. 6., where Paul has written:

"Whatsoever they were, it maketh no matter to me, for God accepteth no man's person". Paul here very clearly says that the dignity and reputation of Peter signify nothing, and are not accepted of God. If, however, the primacy springs from divine right, it is certain that Paul here lies; for what is of divine right is certainly accepted by God and matters much. Therefore this passage from Paul forces us to the conclusion that the primacy of any one man, who is a bishop, does not spring from divine right. Consequently the Doctor must retract what he said about the divine right of the papacy, since
he obviously contradicts the apostle. Therefore I say that, unless the distinguished Doctor changes his opinion, which is so obviously at variance with Paul, I will not hold him for a Catholic Christian. This is sufficient regarding my answer to the objections of Dr. John Eck on the 13th Proposition concerning the power and primacy of the Pope. I leave it to the decision of the judges and all who read it.

By command of the nobles the disputation will be continued at 1 p.m.

The following is the preface of the indefatigable Caesar Pflug of which mention was made above.

Regarding the accusations in yesterday's disputation between the distinguished disputants, these, as is clear from the protests made, having arisen, and having been reported for the decision of the presiding gentlemen, on the following day, namely, Wednesday, 6th July, at the beginning of the 7th hour, before the disputation commenced, and in the presence of the Council, Caesar Pflug, acting in the name of the illustrious Prince and the nobles of the Council, by whose decision parties mutually promised to abide in the emergence of such revolts, vigorously exhorted the disputants in regard to their promise and demanded that henceforth they refrain from mutual recrimination and the injuring of each other's good name; further, that
they do not rashly meddle with the Holy Church and its councils, and finish this day their disputa-
tion regarding such matters, lest the disputa-
tion, already more than necessarily protracted,
become still more costly to those who have come from a distance and compel our countrymen to further neglect their pursuits; adding this, that parties, with their adherents, do not attempt anything against the public peace, and, so to speak, their safe conduct.

Signed. Johannes Graumann.
Notary.

1 o'clock p.m. the same day.

DR. ECK.
(Latin text, pages 102 to 111).

When the reverend Father taunts me with having usurped the office of judge, he says nothing to the point. I am a disputant. Nor have I called him a heretic, but his own words have shown that he is friendly disposed to, and a patron of, the heretics and particularly the Bohemians, especially since he dared to say this horrible thing, that certain articles of John Huss, which had been condemned by the holy Council of Constance, were thoroughly Christian and evangelical. But let us rather proceed to the matter itself. Yesterday he brought forward two such articles; today he has added others, concerning which we will speak later on.
But regarding the Greeks, it is a wonder to me with what zeal the reverend Father defends them and asserts that there were also pious men in Constantinople at the time of its destruction, who afterwards came to Rome, and that I must show and name who were the Greek schismatics and heretics. I wonder that the reverend Father in his letter taunts me with being ignorant of history, while he himself here maintains that he does not know what the whole Greek Church knows. Were not Macedonius, Nestorius, Eutyches, Achatius, John of Constantinople, schismatics, and, continuing for a long time in their schism, did they not promise obedience to the Church in the Council of Florence under Eugenius IV., although out of obstinate perfidy they immediately returned to their vomit? Moreover, if the Greeks had not been schismatic and heretical, we would not have the decision concerning the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith against the Greeks. Or possibly the reverend Father is still ignorant that Thomas published a book on the errors of the Greeks.

I add that he has already often quoted that the Greek Church was not subject to the Roman Pope and that Epiphanius of Cyprus deposed St. Chrysostom from his bishopric, which, the reverend Father says, was well done, according to authority of the Nicene Council and Cyprian. He has fallen, however, into the pit which he dug, because St. Chrysostom was deposed through the hatred of the Empress and a heretical Arian put in his place, whom Pope Julius ordered to retire and reinstated St. Chrysostom.
And as effect was not given to this, Pope Julius ordered John Chrysostom to be reinstated, and excommunicated the Emperor. In like manner also he proceeded against other heretical bishops. So that history records that not once but many times the Greeks departed from their obedience to the Roman Church. Let the reverend Father now go and say that the Roman Pope has not exercised authority over the Eastern Church, or justify the deposition of so holy a Father as Chrysostom.

Thirdly, regarding the Nicene Council, which he quoted from Historia Scholastica (lib. 10), if its decree be according to what he has maintained in his "Conclusion", it is well, but it serves nothing to the purpose. For no Council was held, even at that time, to be legally constituted, which was not summoned by command of the Pope. Thus did Leo, Marcellus, Julius, who lived about that time, saintly and not foolish popes, enact. Their enactments may be read in dist. 17. cap. Synodum, and following. Therefore the reverend Father ought to prove that they gave the prerogative of honour to the patriarch at Jerusalem, but not the primacy of the whole Church. The sixth Council, moreover, expressly gives the first Chair to the Roman Church, as is quoted in Dist. XXII. This, also, Pope Leo obtained contrary to the will of the Emperor Michael, and St. Gregory contrary to that of John of Constantinople and the Emperor Mauricius.

Therefore I will at this point also settle it about St. Gregory whom he quotes as having refused the primacy, which is well known to be absolutely false, since he sets such store by
Platina, who thus writes of St. Gregory: "Besides, when John, Bishop of Constantinople, at a Council of the Greeks, appointed himself oecumenical, that is, universal patriarch, and Mauricius admonished Gregory that he should submit to John, that man of strong character and faith replied that the power to bind and loose had been delivered unto Peter and his successors, and not to the bishops of Constantinople, and therefore he should cease to stir up the anger of God against himself.

It is evident from this that Gregory, who undoubtedly was a saintly and humble Father, not only did not reject the primacy, but actually maintained it against the Emperor of Constantinople. Therefore I will not lay it to the charge of so holy a Father, as the reverend Father (Luther) does, that, with not the slightest constancy, he has spoken things that are self-contradictory and conflicting; for if he denied that he was a universal bishop in the sense in which the term was used in our former disputation, he nevertheless obtained (or maintained) the primacy.

Moreover, that this custom had always been observed, yea, even at the time of the Nicene Council, is clear from the ninety-second letter of Augustine and his fellow-bishops to Innocent I., where they say: "Since the Lord of His special grace has set thee on the apostolic Chair and hath thee to our times, which are fraught with great danger to the feeble members of Christ, we pray that thou wilt worthily discharge thy pastoral office". The Pope replies: "Diligently and
fittingly do ye take thought for the highest office of apostolic honour. Of that honour (or office) I say that, apart from the things that are exterior, there rests upon it the care of all the Churches in matters that are difficult to decide; what opinion, for example, is to be held, whilst you follow the ancient rule? What could be more clearly said than that the Pope, at the time of Augustine, carried the care of all the Churches, and that he was not the first to do this, for it was the manner of the ancient rule?

Next, the reverend Father comes with his Hercules, that is, with his argument of the 20 years, during which the Church existed before there was a Church at Rome. I reply: It is true that Christ in the Gospel did not mention the Roman Church, but Peter whom he appointed chief of the apostles. Therefore since Peter, on whom the primacy had been conferred, transferred his seat, at the command of the Lord, from Antioch to Rome, that seat has become, not by the law of man but by the command of God, the first, and has its right from St. Peter, as Marcellus, the holy martyr and Pope, testifies (Ca. Roga. 24. q. 1):— "Although the first seat was at Antioch, it was afterwards transferred at the command of the Lord to Rome! For who is so foolish as to fix the primacy to a place? But this is the opinion of the holy Fathers, that, since by divine law Peter was appointed vicar of Christ, his successors, namely, the Roman Popes, in all places wheresoever they may be, are
likewise the vicars of Christ. The Roman King or Emperor is not, because of his office, continually at Rome. This seems to have been the opinion of Augustine (contra Manichaeos). "It is obvious", he says, "that in debateable matters, the authority of the Catholic Church helps greatly to certitude of faith, which (i.e. the Church), from the securely established Chairs of the apostles down to the present day, is strengthened by a line of bishops who follow one after the other, and by the acquiescence of the people". Therefore in his letters St. Augustine records the names of the Roman Popes. So much, then, in regard to preliminaries.

Now to the main matter.

The reverend Father was to reply to the passages quoted by me; for I said that Peter was by divine law raised above the other apostles (Matthew XVI); I also quoted Jerome, Bernard, Leo and Cyprian, to whom he made no reply, although with his own hand in his own book he admitted that Cyprian was of the opinion that the Church was founded upon Peter, but ventured to add that Cyprian in this was mistaken. To Augustine, however, he endeavoured to reply; for of Cyprian it is indisputable, who in another letter to Cornelius calls the Roman Church the mother and source of all the others.

He charges me with quoting a statement from Augustine which was retracted. The reverend Father, however, cannot darken the judgment of the reader; for so far is he (Augustine) from repenting of his former opinion that he even quotes Ambrose in support of it. But what I quoted at the start Augustine
attests, namely, that by the rock he also understood Christ; and retracting neither opinion, expressing a preference also for neither, he adds: "But, of these two opinions, let the reader choose which is the more credible". Augustine does not venture to decide, and the reverend Father dares to reject one opinion approved of by so many holy Fathers and to accept another at his own will. Therefore, I do not admit that, in the same chapter, Augustine talked conflicting and contradictory things, but only different things. For I accept both opinions—that Christ is the rock, also that Peter was the rock. Therefore I remain with Ambrose, Jerome, Cyprian, Bernard and with the sacred Councils and decrees.

Next, when, to overturn the common opinion, the reverend Father drew an argument from the doorkeeper, I bade him study the words of Christ better, and according to their grammatical meaning; for, by general consent, Christ, in Matthew XVI. (Upon this rock I will build, and I will give thee etc.), only promised Peter something, but did not then give it. But, putting aside his grammar, which, nevertheless, he gave us to understand, is more important in theology than all the other parts of philosophy, he objects: Why then are the decrees founded on this passage (Matthew XVI), and why have I based my argument on the same passage, from which I now withdraw? I answer: Because Christ is the way, the truth and the life, we must, therefore, unhesitatingly believe that He has given to Peter what He promised. Therefore the decrees rightly conclude
from this passage where Jesus promised, although He did not give what He promised till after His resurrection.

But he calmly objects that Christ gave this, not to Peter only, but to all the disciples, when He said: "Receive ye the Holy Spirit etc.". The reverend Father has been unwilling to say when He gave the promised primacy to Peter. For in this the Doctors agree, namely, that Christ at the Last Supper made His disciples priests, by giving them power over His true body, saying: "This do in remembrance of me", (Luke XXII. 19) and then on the day of the Resurrection gave them power over His mystical body, saying: "Receive ye the Holy Spirit". But the primacy and superintendence of the whole Church He committed to Peter in the words: "Tend my sheep" (John XXI. 15 ff). Gregory, Chrysostom, Jerome and all the other Fathers testify to this. For Chrysostom says: Peter was the most eminent of the apostles, the mouth of the apostles and the head of the college; therefore also, when his denial was atoned for, He committed to him the oversight of the brethren. And Homily 80 "de poenitentia":- But on the same night that Peter fell, he rose again, for after that most grievous fall his penitence restored him to his former position and gave him the superintendence of the Church over the whole world. Thus says the gloss (1' Peter V. 2.):- "Feed the flock which is among you, as the Lord committed to Peter alone the care of the whole flock etc.". Therefore Christ then gave what He formerly promised. With this also St. Gregory agrees: "The care of the whole Church and the primacy is
committed unto Peter; witness the words: Feed my sheep". And even if I had not shown when Christ gave this, the truth, nevertheless, could not be denied. And much has taken place which has not been recorded, as Alexander III. beautifully teaches—(Ca. Cum Marthae de celebratione missarum).

But the reverend Father again objects that Peter continued to sin after the sending of the Holy Spirit. And he has somewhat magnified Peter's fault referred to in Galatians 11. Although there had been dissension, first between Peter and Paul, and afterwards between the teachers of the Church, Jerome and Augustine, nevertheless, I cannot be brought to think that any of the apostles fell into any deadly sin after the sending of the Holy Spirit, as such a thing cannot be admitted of those who has been sanctified in the womb. But this goes beyond our purpose. Supposing, however, though I by no means grant it, that St. Peter by his dissimulation committed a deadly sin, he would still have remained the rock and head of the Church, unless the reverend Father wants to defend also this article of the Hussites, which I do not believe:—"There is no civil Lord, no prelate, no bishop who is living in deadly sin"; which would bring the Christian religion into the greatest uncertainty.

Fourthly, I say of the decrees which he calls most foolish:—The enactments of the popes have so very often been received by the Church in matters of faith, and, what is more, formerly the Roman Pope confirmed no bishop unless he sent a written declaration of his faith, in which he professed his
belief in the Gospels, the four Councils, the recognised Synods, and the decrees of the Popes. Therefore, Pope John refused to confirm Cilberecius, bishop of Cologne, because he had not presented this written declaration of faith in perfect order, as we read in Can. Optatum 100. dist.

Regarding his rejection of the decree of Anacletus, we said yesterday with what authority or proof he rejects it. For, since the originals exist, no one yet has said that this decree is not by the holy martyr Anacletus. But Nicolaus Cusanus, the most learned of the Germans, who admits that he has written a concordance of the faith, quotes this of Anacletus from the originals. The reverend Father has also given this colouring to the matter, - that so holy a martyr was not so ignorant as to interpret Cephas as meaning the head. As if for holiness of life so great knowledge were necessary! Nevertheless, let us say this - Cephas is acknowledged to be Syriac, and is also often used by the Hebrews, as signifying Petrus or solidity, as Erasmus after Jerome relates. Let us also add this, namely, that Cusanus, who was well versed in Chaldean and Hebrew, testifies (lib. excitat.) that Petrus also signifies "the head of the house". Therefore Anacletus did not labour under so great ignorance, if he interpreted Cephas as meaning "head". But be that as it may, I do not see under what pretext he can deny the other decrees of the holy martyrs and confessors, such as Clement, Marcellus, Julian,
Pelagius, Agatho, Symmachus, Benedict etc. Therefore I prefer to accept the Fathers and the Holy Council.

But most unwillingly of all I heard the reverend Father, contrary to the command of the illustrious Prince, by which His Highness desired whatever has been decided by the holy Councils to remain undiscussed, persisting in his opinion of yesterday and setting forth four articles of the Hussites which had been condemned, but which he considered to be Catholic and evangelical, therein certainly showing himself an excellent patron of the Bohemians, although, out of reverence for the Council, he alleged that they must have been inserted by some impostor. First of all, the noble and distinguished Doctor, Hieronymus de Croaria, who had the proceedings of the Council printed, saw that they were printed in authentic form, and since the matter was so publicly transacted at Constance, the Hussites would not have so long concealed that certain articles had been surreptitiously inserted. Nor can the reverend Father believe, as he yesterday assumed, that it was a flatterer's trick to support the Roman Pope, seeing that John Hus's was burned in the year XV, Hieronymus, his colleague, in the year XVI, and Martin V. only elected in the year XVII on the very day of Martin. Therefore the holy Fathers, and the men, incapable of flattery, who had been deputed from all the leading nations for this, discussed these articles, and the holy Synod condemned them, repudiated and burned their author. Therefore they must by
Every good Christian be held for condemned and rejected.
Nor is the reverend Father to charge me with wanting to judge
of such articles, for they have already been judged.

It does not help him that the Synod calls certain of the
articles heretical, others rash, seditious, or offensive to
pious ears; since, to whatever category he reduces these articles,
they cannot be called most Christian and evangelical; and,
although we will not take upon us the task of defending the
whole Synod in its condemnation of the articles, we will, never-
theless, say a few things and briefly.

He considers the first article to be Catholic and to
have been formulated by Augustine (Cap. 6. super John
090
I answer: Perhaps the reverend Father interprets the article
too kindly; but because the matter is not subject to the words
but the words to the matter, the judges in the Council were
not stupid. It is true that there is one Holy and Catholic
Church, but that there is only one, as there is one number of
the predestinated in the sense of the Hussites, is most
heretical, since he meant by this that those who were living in
deadly sin, as men who had lost the faith, were no longer in
the Church; whereas the Kingdom of Heaven is likened unto ten
Virgins of whom five were wise and five foolish; and there are
other parables to the same effect. Neither does Augustine
(tract. 26. super John) speak a single word that supports
the Hussites, in commending the Communion of the Eucharist,
Concerning this let the reader judge.
After this manner he speaks of another article: The two natures, divine and human, are one in Christ. On behalf of this he has adduced nothing, unless that it is in accordance with the faith. In Athanasius, however, we read differently: God and man are one in Christ; not the divine and the human.

In another article: "The natural division of human works etc." how extraordinarily does he twist the argument against me, and, as if he were a judge recognised by me, exclaim that his colleague has triumphed over me. Concerning this, all of you, who were present, can bear witness how truly the reverend Father has spoken, and, as previously at Wittenberg he sang a song of triumph before the victory, so now he also sings another, as if the victory were already lost.

But to the matter. This article I never have considered and never will consider to be Christian, and, therefore I have rejected Gregory (Arim. 28 dist. 2.). Nor was it discussed between us whether there can be an indifferent (i.e. neither good nor evil) act, or whether the whole life of unbelievers is sin, and such like questions which have to do with this article.
Therefore, when in palliating the errors of the Hussites, he gives us to understand that the words have sometimes been misunderstood, as happened to Christ our Lord, I ask: What comparison is there between light and Belial? He compares John Huss here with Christ, and yet did not permit me, in respect to the partly admitted affront put upon truth, to compare the holy Councils with the Holy Scriptures, in both of which is certain and infallible truth. For it ought to trouble no Christian that
he says the Councils were men and therefore creatures and thus liable to err. For if they err, as did the Ephesian Council, which was condemned, I believe, by Pope Leo, and as likewise did the Arminian and "Aquisgranensian", then they are not Councils but Cabals. We ought, therefore, rather to hold in firmest belief that whatever the Councils, which have been legitimately convened, have settled and decreed in matters of faith, is most certain and undeniable truth. For thus Christ abides with us to the end of the world, and if two are gathered together in My name etc. It is a foolish objection to make that, because men are in the council, therefore they can sin and err; for, although as men they are frail, we must nevertheless believe that a council which has been legitimately convened is ruled, not by human sense, but by the Spirit of God. Therefore that is sufficiently proved which a Council has proved or decreed, and is not to be further discussed by any self-assertive and captious critic. On the contrary, we must bring into captivity our intellect to the obedience of Christ.

I wonder therefore, that, since he refuses to acknowledge the text of the laws, he quotes the commentator Panormitanus.

Regarding what he finally adduced from the words of the apostle Paul concerning the foundation, I have always taught that all Catholics hold the belief that Christ is the foundation of the Church and that He is also its Head; for He is the Supreme Lord. But, because He appointed Peter to be His
vicar, He also gave him power over the whole Church, as St. Leo (Can. Ita Dominus 19 dist.) testifies. And I wonder greatly that the reverend Father forsakes the text of St. Leo and accepts a gloss that is contrary to the text. For it (see is generally admitted that Christ note), indeed, attributes to Christ that, on His ascension into Heaven, He appointed in His place here another head to whom recourse might be had in doubtful matters and others such as might emerge, so that the Church might not become one vast chaotic Anaxagorean confusion. This belief is held by the whole Church, as is seen in the response (i.e. after a collect) which the Church makes regarding St. Peter:—"Thou art the shepherd of the sheep, the chief of the apostles; to thee hath the Lord delivered all kingdoms of the world". Thus we pray in Church. Yea, St. Francis, who has been by the seal of the "print of the nails" (sigillis stigmatum), taught his brethren and the whole world to be obedient to the Pope, and in his "rule" gave this command. Therefore the Church sings of him: "Francis, a Catholic and entirely apostolic man, hath taught to hold the faith of the Roman Church". Thus have many popes and holy Councils, whom for the sake of brevity I do not quote, decreed. Many declarations of the holy Fathers likewise give forth the same note and approve. All this at the proper time, when I see the treatise of the reverend Father on this matter, I shall not fail to adduce.

Note:—"It" might refer either to the text of St. Leo or to the gloss.
If however, the supreme power of the Roman Pope rests only on human law and is exalted by the consent of the people, whence, then, has the reverend Father the privilege of the mendicant order of friars (mendicitatis)? Whence the monk's cowl? Whence the power of hearing confessions, of preaching, with many other privileges with which they are loaded by the apostolic Chair, although archbishops, bishops and priests frequently speak against them? Nevertheless, as children of obedience, they give ear to the Pope, and, in him, to Christ, so that by patience they attain to eternal life.

This, in brief, I have wanted to add, so far as time permitted, in the present matter of our disputation, and I would have brought forward still more, did not weariness deter me, as likewise the command of the illustrious Prince.

D R. M A R T I N.

(Latin text pages 111 to 112).

I have two things to do: (1) to reply to the refutations of the distinguished Doctor; (2) to oppose him according to our agreement. And as I have been replying for already three days and the time is far gone, so that I cannot deal fully with even one point, I say briefly:

What the reverend Father has brought forward has certainly been put at great length; nevertheless, it serves absolutely nothing to the purpose, since he has been promising now for three days that he would argue against me from the Divine Word, and yet not a single passage from the Divine Word
has been heard, except that from Matthew XVI., and we have
all heard how variously it is interpreted by the holy Fathers,
and that the greater and more sensible part of them hold the
same opinion as I do. He has quoted in support of himself one
solitary passage from Augustine and another from Ambrose; all
the rest were quotations from Anacletus, Marcellus, Pelagius
etc., from those who frame human laws. But Cyprian is almost
entirely on my side - I leave it to the judgment of the
prudent reader. Likewise the most clear text of Jerome "To
Euagrius" and "On Titus". Further, Gregory in his register
almost through six letters, and after him the history and
usage of the Eastern Church. For it does not signify that the
Doctor quoted the schismatic Greeks, Nestor, Macedonius,
Achatius, Eutyches and the others, for they were not the
Eastern Church. I also might characterise the Latin Church by
its Pelagians, Manichaeans, Jovinians, Vigilantians and such
like monstrosities. But far be it from me to call a whole
Church schismatic because of a few bad and schismatic members.

The other points I will not be able to deal with.

I specially reserve, however, the articles of John Huss, which
have been objected to against me, and particularly the last
concerning human works, for pen and paper, and all the others
which I have still to oppose, so that what I am unable to do
now because of the shortness of the time, I will do by
writing. And in this I desire to submit and be obedient to the
commands of the most indulgent patron of the University, the
illustrious Prince. I ask you gentlemen, the appointed notaries, to take note of this and I call the audience to witness.

Transacted as above, there being present at the same time, the honourable Olavus Roters de Osvaberga and Coelestinus Goricius Gorlicenses, clerics of the Diocese Colonienses and Misnenses, they being specially called as witnesses and required by law.

Johannes Graumann, Notary.
appended his signature.

Thursday, 7th July, 7 a.m.

DR. ECK.

(Latin text pages 112 to 113).

The reverend Father yesterday had an hour to reply to our statements; so that we have thus carried out the commands of the illustrious Prince. In replying, he did so, for the most part, with the words "I will pass over this meantime", and said he would answer by pen. Nevertheless, after deliberation, he now purposes to answer more fully. Out of love for the truth and for the sake of its elucidation, I have made no objections to this. But I wonder how the reverend Father dares in the presence of such an assembly to thunder forth that I said I would prove from the Divine Law that there is an absolute rule and primacy in the Church, and yet only quoted the sayings of the Fathers and the decrees of the popes, whereas I quoted to him the Divine Word from Matthew XVI. concerning
the promise of building on the rock, also that Christ specially prayed for the faith of Peter, specially intrusted to him the strengthening of his brethren, and specially laid upon him the command, three times repeated, in the presence of John and James, to feed the sheep. And, that this divine command is to be interpreted thus, I adduced the holy Fathers, popes and martyrs, the unanimity of the Councils and all the Universities. Therefore it is proved from this Divine Word that there is a primacy in the Church, unless the reverend Father puts his own understanding before that of so many holy Fathers, popes and Councils, since the praiseworthy Council of Constance condemned such an article among the pestilential errors of John Huss. Regarding this the reverend Father is silent. Nevertheless, if he wants to bring forward something better, for the elucidation of the truth, which he might have done yesterday according to the command of the illustrious Prince, I am prepared to hear, on this condition, that, while acting the part of respondent he shall not at the end of the matter craftily turn himself into the opponent; but what he shall oppose to the inextinguishable (or incontrovertible, inelubilem) truth, I am prepared to answer and refute. Which I testify herewith.

DR. MARTIN.

(Latin text page 113).

Since it was yesterday decided, in the name of our patron, the most illustrious Prince, that this matter be
finished the same day, and since the distinguished Doctor unnecessarily and in a manner more objectionable than was becoming in this brilliant assembly, took up the greater part of the time, there remained to me for three days reply only a brief hour in which I was expected to answer his extraordinary farrago and at the same time oppose. The illustrious Prince, of his own accord, was then pleased to say that sufficient time be granted me, both to answer and to oppose, for which I thank His Highness most sincerely. To come then to the matter, I want, before continuing the answer begun yesterday, to first dispel the erroneous impression conveyed by the distinguished Doctor this morning, when, according to his somewhat objectionable and persistent custom, he charged me with being guilty of the errors of the Hussites, notwithstanding that I had so often cleared myself of this. Accordingly, I will speak for a little, to begin with, in German, for I understand that I am very wrongly interpreted by the crowd.

He declared that he did not attack the primacy and obedience of the Roman Church, and that such could not, in a Christian manner, be attacked by anyone. He had, however, been led so far as to be compelled to say that this primacy did not exist by divine right; just as the Imperial power among the Germans could not be condemned, although it was not founded on Holy Scripture.
said: It is true that this controversy is, whether the primacy exists by divine right; to reject this, however, is a mark of the Hussite, and an article condemned by the Council of Constance; and it is to be regretted, if the hearts of Christians were so cold, that no one should defend it.

(Thereupon Dr. Martin continued in Latin.)

The distinguished Doctor quotes this passage from Matthew XVI. and contends that here the primacy has been promised. It has been sufficiently shown, however, in what has already been said, that he has scarcely two authors on his side, and that these, in addition, are ambiguous in their statements; whereas the majority, on the other hand, hold that Peter, in the passage referred to, represents all the apostles and believers; which also the context implies, since Christ asked all, and not Peter alone: "But whom say ye that I am?" And then Peter, as the mouth of the apostles according to Chrysostom, and the person of the apostles according to Jerome, Origen, Bede, Augustine and Ambrose, replies for all. Therefore I have said that nothing is proved from this passage concerning the primacy. Moreover the text does not say: "Thou art Peter and upon thee", but "upon this rock!" obviously indicating another rock, from whom Peter was named. But although there are common laws, and

Hence, although the principle is widely recognised, and the Roman Popes themselves testify that the interpretation of
of Scripture counts for more among the Doctors than among themselves, nevertheless, in the deciding of cases it is otherwise.

Regarding this Hussite article I indicated sufficiently yesterday that it has not yet been proved to be heretical. So much Let this go for "good morning".

To return to yesterday's proceedings: When the distinguished Doctor maintained in his second point, that the deposition of Chrysostom was illegal, because it proceeded from the hatred of the Empress, I refuse to accept the inference--; the power set up by the holy Nicene Council to appoint and depose was not illegal, because it happened once to be wrongly used. For in the same history we read that the Roman Pope and martyr, Victor, wanted to excommunicate the bishops in Asia. But these, in turn, as superiors, commanded him to be silent and not disturb the Church of God. (lib. 5. ecclesiasticae historiae). Yea, also Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons in France, put restraint upon the same Roman Pope. There were also at that time in Greece Epiphanius so greatly praised by Jerome, Gregory Nazianzus, Basilius, most Christian men, who, nevertheless, were never under the Roman Pope, but were, according to the enactments of the Nicene Council, ordained by the bishops of the provinces.

The distinguished Doctor quotes that Julian 1. excommunicated the Emperor Arcadius. But this serves nothing
to the purpose; for also Boniface VIII. wanted to remove the
King of the Franks from his throne. What the Roman Popes have
at one time or another attempted, out of human weakness, to
do, does not prove that there is a (divine) right. And it is
no wonder that these holy men were sometimes tempted by ambition,
since likewise the most holy apostles, even in the presence of
Christ, suffered, more than once, from the same failing.

When he says that the prerogative of honour, but not
the primacy, was given to the bishop at Jerusalem, he says well;
but he does not thereby prove that the primacy belongs to the
Roman Pope, at least by divine right.

The distinguished Doctor also says, entirely to my
liking, in the same place that the sixth Synod gave the Roman
Church the primacy, but not the preceding ones. For this is
what I have maintained, namely, that this primacy was given by
the decrees of Synods and human law, by the consent of the
faithful of Christ, which one may not resist. This, also, St.
Gregory in his Register has told us in the following words:-
"Ye know that the venerable Chalcedonian Synod offered the
primacy to this apostolic Chair, and yet none of my predecessors
ever ventured to accept it". Therefore it helps the distinguish-
ed Doctor nothing when he says, that Gregory did not repudiate
the primacy, but maintained it. Let the devout reader read the
letters of Gregory, and he will find that Gregory forbade the
primacy and did not defend the universal bishopric, as we have
sufficiently proved from dist. 99. quoted above.
Concerning the 20 years of the Church before the Roman Church came into existence, he said that the primacy was transferred with Peter to Rome, possibly thinking of the proverb: "Where the Pope is, there is Rome". I answer: "The primacy, which is transferred to Rome, has first to be proved, not the transference which we willingly admit".

He also quotes the words of Augustine against the Manichaens, which, I suppose, are from "de doctrina Christiana" (Lib. 2. C.8), namely, that in debateable matters the authority of the Catholic Church, which, from the Chairs of the apostles, is strengthened by a line of bishops who follow one after the other, and by the acquiescence of the people, helps greatly to certitude of faith. Augustine speaks, however, not of the Roman Church but the universal, and, thus, on my behalf against the Doctor, because he here describes the succession of different apostolic Chairs, one after the other, and the acquiescence of the people, but not the confirmation of other Chairs through one particular Chair.

To come to the matter itself, he says that, regarding the passage from Matthew XVI., "Thou art Peter and on this rock etc", I have not replied to the authors he quoted. I leave it to you, my hearers and readers, to say whether this is true. In his reply he quoted Augustine (Retractiones) as
leaving it to the reader to choose between two interpretations, both equally valid, and saying that, as for himself, he accepted both. I am quite content with this for thus he proves nothing against me.

The second passage is—from the Divine Word quoted by his honour is this:—"Feed my sheep"(John XXI. 15 ff). I am glad that, after three days, a passage is at last heard on which his opinion rests most securely. But let us consider the passage.

In the first place, this passage seems to be understood in a double manner, (1). by the word "to love", which is made to mean "to trust in oneself and regard anything as permissible", and the word "to feed", which is made to mean "be first and rule". And so comes the meaning: —"Peter, if thou lovest me, that is, if thou seekest thine own, and doest whatever is pleasing to thy flatterers, feed my sheep, that is, be first and lord over all!" I do not find this meaning, however, in my Bible. (2). If thou lovest me, that is, if thou deniest thyself, if thou puttest thy life at my disposal, if thou spurnest earthly honour of whatever sort, and lovest none but me, as Augustine excellently expounds the passage, then feed my sheep, that is, teach, preach the word, exhort, pray, be superior by thy good example. For the Greek word here signifies not merely to rule and feed, but to care for lovingly and tenderly and do all things, lest in anything the sheep suffer lack. And this I hold
to be the evangelical meaning of the passage.

Therefore I beg Dr. Eck to pray with me that the Lord Jesus Christ enlighten the minds, not only of the Pope but of all bishops, so that they come to realise that these words have an application to themselves. There is no doubt that the whole world will receive, with open arms and tears of joy, the man who would live his life according to these words. Therefore the distinguished Doctor, if he examine the text carefully, will see that no right or privilege is granted in it, as has been thought, but that only a command is given, and a toil, today beyond human power (*intolerabilis*), imposed, and a duty demanded of him who has already been appointed either to the highest or to a lower place, and is not appointed first. But if he argue that this office cannot be administered unless one first hold the place of power - I let the argument pass; but then this place will have to be based on another word; for here the word commends only the duty.

Therefore the holy Fathers spoke rightly when they said that this passage applies to all. For no one can deny that, if all the sheep have been committed to Peter, he did not feed all of them, as St. Augustine points out and the Book of the Acts clearly shows; and thus he was disobedient to Christ. Nor can it be said that, although he did not feed them himself, nevertheless he did so by others subordinate to him. For suppose we may render the passage in the sense that it was not said to Peter:

"Feed thou, thyself, in thine own person", but "Feed by means of "Feed them by means of another", but "Feed them, thyself"; still this "quae tu" (feed thou) proves that no
nevertheless, it is certain that no other apostle, and least of all Paul, who fed more sheep than Peter, was subordinate to him. Therefore the meaning of the words is to be sought from the entire passage and all the circumstances of the story. Then it is clear that this passage either does not apply to Peter alone, or not to all the sheep.

Thirdly, if the primacy is to be proved from these words, then it is uncertain and a thing of nought, since it is not granted except on the condition of love; for one must not break up the Scripture into different parts, and take them separately, but rather take them together. And therefore, since it is uncertain who loves Christ, it must also be uncertain who is our Shepherd. And if love is not necessary for him, neither will it be necessary for us to acknowledge him as a shepherd. We do better, therefore, to say that this word is a command given to all the prelates of the Church, that, despising riches, honour, even the primacy itself, yea, even life and death, they give themselves for the sheep of Christ. Show us such a man and we will praise him.

I pass over what he has quoted from Chrysostom about the head of the apostolic band, and how the overseership of the whole world was delivered to Peter, because I grant all that has been said about his being chief in honour; but I do not grant that he is sole administrator, at least by divine right. 

Note:—The Latin seems to be incorrect.
Regarding the fall of Peter (Galat. 11), in connection with which the distinguished Doctor would again offensively charge me with the Hussite article, namely, that he can be neither a spiritual nor a civil ruler who is living in deadly sin, if I were to say that, because he had been guilty of a deadly sin, Peter was therefore no prelate, I answer:- This was not done by me and such a method of arguing has no place here. I am well aware that an evil prelate is not to be rejected. Therefore I likewise condemn this Hussite article. But I gave it as my opinion that Peter, when he gave cause of offence in a matter concerning the faith, ought, had he not been corrected by Paul, to have been removed from his prelacy; for a heretical shepherd, or one who dissembles to the danger of the faith, sins grievously. For by this dissimulation of Peter, the faith of Christ, as Paul says, was utterly perishing, and therefore it would have been better, that Peter, unless he had been corrected, should have been held for no priest, not to speak of High Priest. A deadly sin hurts a man in his own person, but heresy hurts the whole community. Therefore I thank the Doctor that I have at last learned from this disputation, that to build upon the rock, means to be subject to the prelate, whether he be good or bad. For I confess that this meaning of the words "build" and "rock" had previously been unknown to me; for he has said:—Even if Peter had fallen into deadly sin, he had still remained the rock, that is, the primate of the Church.

What he says about bishops formerly not being confirmed
unless they submitted a statement of their beliefs, I am content to let pass. But that has nothing to do with the divine right. For I take nothing away from the Pope that is given unto him.

Next, he quoted Nicolaus Cusanus and apologised for that saintly man, Anacletus, saying that there was no need for so great learning in so holy a man. I agree. Nevertheless, it is disgraceful for a pope, whether he be holy or unholy, not to know the Gospels, since he is the shepherd of the flock and the teacher of the Gospels. But since Cephas is interpreted as meaning Peter by John the Evangelist, who writes in his Gospel (1. 42): "Thou art Simon, thou shalt be called Cephas, which is, being interpreted, Peter", since the son of thunder, who knew all the languages, thus thunders forth, the vanity of earthly prattle ought surely to be silent, whether it be out of the mouth of Nicolaus Cusanus, Chaldean or Hebrew. Not that I find fault with the distinguished Docteur, when he says that Peter is equivalent to "the head of the house" in Chaldean, according to his author; Cusanus. But I wonder at the intrepid disputant, who is so bold as to venture into the theological arena, before he has gone so far in his studies of the Gospels, as even to have read the first chapter of St. John's Gospel. Does he not likewise find in his book what Cephas is? I overlook this; nevertheless, let him read the first chapter of 1. Corinthians and he will find it.

Lastly, he says that he will not express an opinion on the articles of the Bohemians, although he never ceases to
attack me in regard to them. I also will be silent concerning them, except to say that I approve of Gregory Ariminensis (dist. XXVIII.), who has been repudiated by the distinguished Doctor. For he is entirely Augustinian and Scriptural, and certainly in opposition to all the scholastics and especially Aristotle; besides he has not yet been confuted by anyone.

I agree with the Doctor that in matters of faith the decrees of the councils are most certainly to be acknowledged, with this reservation only which is always to be kept in mind, namely, that a council can err and sometimes has erred, especially in matters that are not of faith, and that a council does not have the power to make new articles of faith, for then we would end in having as many articles as there are human opinions.

As for his final quotation from St. Francis, that we must obey the Pope, I am at a loss to understand against whom he quotes it. I pass over also his accusations against the mendicant orders - the Doctor cannot even leave this wretched cowl alone. For my own part - I make it clearly known - I wish there were no mendicant orders. Such are the answers I thought to make to the distinguished Doctor's objections to Proposition 13. Therefore it remains, now that they are made, that I also forth set against the distinguished Doctor what objections occur to me.

At this point Dr. Martin, in virtue of his rôle as opponent, meant, according to agreement, as
he said, to proceed to the attack. But Dr. Eck alleged that during the discussion some things had already been said (by Luther) in the role of opponent which he wished first to answer according to his declaration made regarding this. Nevertheless, he permitted the attack of Dr. Martin to proceed.

**DR. MARTIN.**

(Latin text pages 119 to 120).

Against the views of the distinguished Doctor there seems to stand this, which he has somewhat boldly slipped over in his confutation, namely, l. Cor. iii. 5, where Paul, disparaging the personality of all the apostles says:—"What then is Apollos? What is Paul? What is Cephas? Ministers through whom ye believed". Here Paul wants to remove entirely the occasion of quarrelling and schism; he therefore denies that any particular church belongs to any particular apostle, but maintains that all are held in common. Therefore, at the end of Chapter iii. (v. 21. ff) he says:—"All things are yours, whether Cephas, or Apollos, or Paul, and ye are Christ's."

It does not avail to say that they contended, not about who was chief, but about who was to be esteemed most highly, since the text clearly shows that their contention was about the place which the apostles individually held, since some preferred Peter to all, others Paul, others Apollos, while others followed Christ alone. This is confirmed by Galatians i and ii,
where, in a similar quarrel, the Galatians, because of the boasted primacy of Peter, forsook Paul and his teaching as being inferior. Condemning this attitude, he (Paul) shows at considerable length that the eminence of Peter or of any other of the apostles signified nothing, while he states that he had been sent to them, neither by man nor through man, also that he had neither seen Peter nor learned of him, but came by and delivered his entire message apart from him. If, therefore, the authority of Peter had been necessary, and there was a divine right, Paul here would obviously be acting in a godless and blasphemous manner, as he is unwilling it should appear he had been sent even by God through man and absolutely repudiates the authority of Peter. Thirdly, it is still clearer further on when he says: "Those who seemed to be somewhat added nothing to me, and whatsoever they were, it maketh no matter to me, for God accepteth no man's person". Behold, he says here clearly that the standing of Peter and the other apostles make no matter to him. This would be a most impious thing to say, if the standing of Peter rested on divine right. Equally impious would it be to say, "God accepteth the person of no man", since he puts the divine right and whatever pertains to the divine right under the punishment of an eternal curse. Therefore it seems to me that this primacy and dignity, or whatever other name is to be given to the person or standing of Peter, does not rest upon divine right.

Dr. Eck wanted at this point to reply to the repeated objections to his statements. Then at the
command of the lords the disputation was interrupted by the public servant and suspended till 2 p.m.

2 p.m. the same day.

DR. ECK.

(Latin text pages 120 to 126).

The reverend Father brings forward against me three passages from St. Paul, which recently were flourished by the adversaries of the apostolic Chair and elucidated by its defenders. I answer him easily by referring to the evil colouring with which he seeks to cover his teaching and close the mouth and eyes of men. I say, therefore, in the first place, that I did not skip over the passage from the apostle (1 Cor. 11:5), as he charges me with doing, although he falsely quoted Cephas with Paul and Apollos, since the text does not refer to, at the beginning, but only at the end mentions, Cephas, where also the interlinear gloss admits that he is greater than all. Let the reverend Father, therefore, take the sacred Scriptures according to the interpretation of the saints and not that of his own head.

I say, also, that the answer which I gave was thoroughly good and irrefutable, and that the camouflage with which the reverend Father tricks the simple, serves nothing to the purpose.

There is the testimony of Jerome in "Contra Jovinianum" (Book 1, col. 18 mini) where he expressly says that the Church was built
upon Peter. The reverend Father boldly skips over this and says nothing. And beneath:— "That, a head having been appointed, the occasion of schism might be removed". Therefore the apostle Paul, when he wanted to avert contention and schism, did not abolish the primacy of the head, for schism cannot be better removed than by the head. Therefore no word or letter here does anything towards annulling the primacy. Accordingly he made a bad beginning today, in saying that I have quoted perhaps only two Fathers, and these, in addition, ambiguous; whereas I quoted Fathers who speak with clear and unambiguous voice – Augustine, Jerome, Chrysostom, St. Leo, Bernard etc. Moreover, when he praises me for accepting both the opinions of Augustine (lib. l. retract. Cap. 21.), he also tells us that he himself does the same.

Dr. Martin denied that he had done this, unless by a slip of the tongue and without premeditation.

When, in the second place, he quotes Paul ('To the Galatians), as if he (the apostle) had written against Peter with the aim of strengthening the Galatians in the faith, and in the whole transaction was showing that he was the equal of Peter and the others, because he had received nothing from man nor through man, I reply that, if the reverend Father were so diligent an inquirer after truth, as he sets himself forth to be, he would have learned the fundamentals and meaning of Scripture, so that there would be no need for him to say so boastfully, in the
presence of such a distinguished assembly, that he would alone withstand a thousand. The truth of the matter is that, in the apostolic office, all the apostles were equal in dignity of position. The sacred Scriptures and the holy Fathers alike maintain this. Jerome says that Paul would not have taken Peter to task if he had known he was not his equal.

In like manner Anacletus says (Cap. In novo) that the apostles were endowed with equal power. Thus also speak Cyprian and the others. When, therefore, Paul was called to be an apostle by Christ, he frankly said that he had received nothing from man nor through man, and that James and Peter had given him nothing, for this is all to be referred to the apostolic office.

It is different, however, in regard to the power of government and administration, concerning which the holy Fathers are unanimously of the opinion, that the holy Council, in opposition to John Huss, has attributed a primacy, such as we speak of, to Peter. He does not, therefore, use the testimonies of the Holy Scriptures correctly, but applies them, at his own will, in a sense different from that which the Holy Spirit demands. For whereas he gave us to-day his reflections upon Paul's words, namely, "it mattered not to him who they were", these words mean, not what the reverend Father would have them mean, but this — that Peter, John and the others were unlearned and inexperienced men before they walked with the Lord, and that thus God did not regard their person.
He will, however, say, as he is bold enough to do, that this is an Eccian fiction. But let him read Ambrose on the same passage, who does not distort the meaning of Paul, and yet frankly admits that the Church was founded on Peter. Therefore, let him, I beg, say no more, unless he is going to bring forward something weightier. To-day, therefore, when I maintained that it would be a Hussite article to say, that ecclesiastical obedience is not set forth in Holy Scripture, he replied, in brief, that it is not a heretical article. I choose rather to go straight at the reverend Father and say:-

"This is an article which has been condemned, and he himself holds it; therefore he holds an article which has been condemned and repudiated".

Likewise, I ask: If the article is not heretical, is it not, therefore, either daring, or seditious or offensive to pious ears? The Father may choose which he will; whether daring, or seditious or smacking of heresy, or offensive to pious ears - it will be contrary to the institutes of theology.

It is extraordinary with what a peacock-array of colours he adorns the words of Christ (Matthew XVI). He says that Christ asked all the disciples and that Peter answered for them all. But who denies this? He adds, however, from his stock in trade: "Therefore it is said to Peter on his own account and to the other disciples: Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build etc.," : which, as a Lutheran fiction, I do not admit, since it is contrary to the interpretation of the Fathers.
Regarding Chrysostom, it is also extraordinary how he injures the holy Father, as if he had been legally, and according to the decrees of the Nicene Council, deposed. For it has been ascertained from the histories that, after Eusebius of Antioch, whom, with others disobedient to the Roman Pope, I consider a heretic, Christian bishops were expelled, who sought refuge at the supreme Chair, and, at the hands of godless heretics, suffered repulse, down to the time of Theodosius, the Christian Emperor. When, then, schismatics had occupied the Chair for 30 years, St. Gregory Nazianzen accepted the bishopric of Constantinople, not out of ambition, but that another schismatic might not succeed to it.

The saintly Chrysostom, however, whom Epiphanius had unjustly expelled, Arsatius the heretic having been put in his place, returned at the command of the Roman Pope. And it will not do for the reverend Father, then, to calumniate the Roman Pope and the saints who adhered to him, as if "de facto", but not by law, they proceeded against these schismatics. For with empty words he says this, and also that a number of saints, whom the reverend Father highly praises, did not consent to the Pope's action. Therefore, the reverend Father has no cause for accusing these holy Fathers, who lived a thousand years ago, of ambition, from which vice they have been held by the whole Church for so many centuries to be free.

Therefore he deceives and mocks the simple, when he says that Gregory did not want to be called oecumenical and
universal shepherd. For, the other day, he extolled Platina, as one who followed, as he said, the truth of history. Now, however, he repudiates Platina at his own will, which he wants everywhere to be permissible.

He quoted the decree to support his own case. If, however, it is quoted against him, he flings it from him. And when he has the very clear texts of Leo (Cap. Ita Dominus 19. dist.), with others such, against him, then he accepts the gloss, like the wooers of Penelope, if I may be permitted the jest, who, when they could not have the mistress, took up with the maids. It is certain that the holy Popes also styled themselves universal bishops, as, for example, Sixtus, Victor, and as Leo was in the Council of Chalcedon acclaimed:—"Long live the most holy Leo, oecumenical Patriarch"; although, following humility and Christ, the popes refrained from using this title, and called themselves rather the servant of servants, especially that they might not be thought to want to injure the authority of the bishops, as, not so long ago, St. Thomas (lib. de impugnatione fidel) has shown.

Regarding Augustine's letter, he puts you, gentlemen, who are listening to us, to the trouble of reading the words. The words as we heard were that 1100 years ago Innocent said that the custom of old was to consult the Pope in matters which pertained to the faith. Accordingly the reverend Father wanted to transplant this speech against the Manichaean into his own garden, but he will not do so if he reads Augustine's
letter in which is given a list, not of all the bishops, but of the Roman bishops from Peter himself down to his own times.

He says that my answer regarding the 20 years (i.e. before the Roman Church came into existence) has not been proved. The reverend Father is a sharp debater. I have never understood that the respondent ought to prove his answer. I have, on the contrary, always thought that the respondent had to give an answer for his opponent to disprove. His Hercules was weak, if he rides on another's horse (si. alieno Marte nititur).

That he has been so bold as to dare to suggest to you, my illustrious lords and reverend Fathers, that I have not read the 1st. Chapter of John, is, indeed extraordinary rashness, since, as a boy not yet ten, I had read, the prophets excluded, the whole Bible - although I make little of that, as anyone has done as much.

In defending Anacletus, I said that he was by no means foolish in taking Cephas to be equivalent to "caput", that is, the head; not as if I did not know that the Greek word "Kephale" signified in Latin the head, but because in John, whom I had under consideration yesterday, in Augustine and in the ordinary gloss, Cephas is interpreted Peter; but Peter, according to the writer Cusanus, also means the head of the house. The reverend Father made fun of all this. But let the judges who are to be appointed, give their opinion concerning it.

But more extraordinary still is his interpretation of the
passage: "Feed my sheep", which he wraps up in such ambiguity only that he may blind those who see. I am to say nothing of the very ridiculous interpretation, the product of his own ratiocination, which he has brought forward. Instead, I go on to another meaning of the passage, on which he said much, and, not seeking after singularity which is the mother of errors, but following the opinion of the holy Fathers and the holy Mother of the Church, I take the word "feed" in the sense that it has appointed him shepherd and given him the primacy of the universal Church. Thus has Gregory, thus has Chrysostom understood it; thus, also, has Ambrose (Luc. ult.) who was not quoted by me yesterday. Discreetly (pulchre) passing by and saying nothing of these, the reverend Father only quotes Augustine's ideal of what a prelate or shepherd ought to be. I willingly agree to his ideal, and think that every believer should pray that both the Pope and every Prince and prelate should seek the honour of God and the salvation of those under them, and that the best tending of the flock is that by which, as they rule here on earth, they are received up above that they may reign in Heaven. Therefore Augustine here is not against us, but only says such things as enable a prelate to understand what his ordination means.

Nor does it signify that the reverend Father quotes that the sheep were committed to him conditionally; for there is no condition attached in the passage - unless the Father has a different Gospel than I have. But, pointing out what sort of a man
a shepherd ought to be, Christ demands high esteem for and
love towards God from Peter and thus appoints him shepherd of
the whole Church, as sings our Holy Mother Church and as the
reverend Father prays: "Thou head of the Church, shepherd of
the sheep". Accordingly we have it here from the Divine Word,
that a prelate must love God; we have it, likewise, that Peter
was appointed shepherd of the sheep, as St. Gregory, St. Ambrose
and Chrysostom, although he was a Greek, understood it.

Nor does the reverend Doctor's petty argument against
this signify much, namely, that Peter did not feed all the
sheep, since what is done in our name, we ourselves may be said
to have done, as testifies Clemens, (Can. In illis. 80 vel. 81.
section dist.):- "Peter ordained bishops, presbyters and deacons to
propagate the Gospel throughout the whole world". Therefore,
having been sent by the Lord (a principal), as was St. Paul,
he (Paul) did not require to be sent by His vicar. Nevertheless,
Paul went up (to Jerusalem) with Titus (Galatians 11) and
confessed with Peter about the Gospel, and they gave him the
right hand of fellowship.

Further, he fastens on me a gloss that never was
thought of by me, namely, that to build on the rock is
equivalent to being submissive to the Roman Pope. Oh, the
fancies of men! Oh, their extravagance of speech! Such an idea
never entered my head. For Christ builds the Church - not those
who own allegiance to Him; for owning allegiance to Him, they
ought to be submissive to the Church which He has built.
Regarding Gregory Ariminensis, whose views I do not approve of, he says that they are quite agreeable to him. This, however, has no bearing on the matter before us. It is not my intention, therefore, to enter into such side issues. But, as we have received, so will we uphold the article of the Council of Constance as true, and maintain that whosoever contradicts it, errs, and both speaks against the truth and injures the honour of the Council.

DR. MARTIN.

(Latin text pages 126 to 129).

Before coming to the passages which were put forward by me in reply, I shall first briefly run over the distinguished Doctor's jumbled observations on my reply of yesterday and to-day. Among these, as if he had come to the end of his resources, he seeks, in desperation, his last refuge in a single article of the Council of Constance, and, in a most objectionable manner, repeats it again and again, as if it had not already been sufficiently answered by me. Nevertheless, I shall answer it once again.

If the article concerning human works is counted among the condemned, it was, nevertheless, taught by Paul and Augustine, and later was defended by Gregory Ariminensis, and is defended by all the universities down to the present day. I shall not, therefore, allow myself to be disturbed by the distinguished Doctor's most objectionable inculcations of this article, until he has proved that a Council does not and cannot
err, and he has not erred. Since a Council cannot make a
divine law out of that which, by its nature, is not a divine
law, nothing, therefore, is heretical except what is contrary
to the divine law. So much for this article.

When he carps at me, saying that Chrysostom was
legitimately deposed, he has not quite understood me. For I
said clearly today that the power of ordaining and deposing a
bishop was legitimate in Epiphanius Cypr. and Theophilus,
although I did not discuss whether they then exercised such
power wisely or foolishly. It is enough for me that so many
saints, and so many famous and most Catholic men in Greece, who
were not schismatics, had, apart altogether from the sanction of
the Roman Pope, the power of ordaining and deposing bishops.

He also makes a great ado about my having accused the
saints of old of ambition, and pays no heed to my statement
that this frailty attached likewise to the apostles, even when
Christ was with them.

When he now makes so much of Platina against St.
Gregory, it is sufficiently clear to anyone even of moderate under-
standing from my quotation, what he should infer from it. For
I accept from Platina his statements of historical fact and nothing
more. When Platina introduces certain arguments, I repudiate
him, because of the contrary testimony of Gregory.

I pass over at present what has been said about Sixtus
and Victor describing themselves as universal bishops, and also
that Leo was thus acclaimed at the Council of Chalcedon, for
sufficient has been said of this to-day. But this is to be noted, namely, that the succeeding popes followed, as the distinguished Doctor says, the humility of Christ and refrained from using the title. I cannot interpret this otherwise than that, out of humility, they disparaged the divine right, and thus, became lying and disobedient, if there is a divine right, that is, a command that they should be universal bishops.

Repeating Innocent's letter in reply to Augustine, he says that the custom of old was to consult the Roman Pope in matters of faith. He speaks excellently and to my satisfaction, especially in regard to the Latin Church. But what have faith and the primacy to do together here? that is, how does this fit into the present discussion?

He complains also that I demanded proof of his answer regarding the 20 years (i.e. before the Roman Church came into existence). The distinguished Doctor makes a double mistake; (1) in this, that for three and a half days he was the attacker and only at this hour has become the respondent; (2) in that I did not demand him to prove his answer, but this, that the primacy was transferred with Peter.

Also in delivering himself of his views on Cephas, which is interpreted Peter by St. John, he still persists in saying that Peter also means the head of the house, as if, forsooth, John, when he wanted to interpret the Gospel to the Greeks, spoke not in Greek but in Chaldean, lest perchance he should be understood.
He takes the word "Feed" as signifying (Peter's) appointment to be universal bishop, and, in support of this, he quotes Gregory, Ambrose and Chrysostom of whom he was silent yesterday, and of whom I am supposed to have said nothing. Accordingly, I will speak now, if I have been forgetful, and at the same time confront him with the rule of Augustine, namely, that the words of all writers are to be judged by divine Scripture, which must count for more than the understanding of the entire human race; not that I reject the opinion of the most illustrious Fathers; but I follow those who come nearest the Scripture; and, if the Scripture is clear, I will hold by it, in preference to all else. Since, then, it is clear that to "feed", according to the signification of the word and the usage of Scripture, means nothing but to teach, to care for the sheep, as Peter himself understands it, when he writes: "Feed the flock that is among you" (1. Peter, V. 2), one must not give the word a double signification, and unnecessarily give up its plain meaning.

He also objects that I said there is a condition in the word of Christ, "If thou lovest Me"; whereas I think there is not only a condition but also an agreement (a covenant) between Christ and Peter, since the former says: "Lovest thou Me?" and the latter replies: "I love Thee".

I say nothing about logic in which the Doctor is well versed, nor about the conditional conjunction "if", I would like to hear, however, what he has to say to the decretal "de
195.

elect". (C: Significasti), where Pope Paschalis expressly says that there is a condition here, if, at any rate, the authority of the Roman Pope counts for so much as he has hitherto contended, for he says (Luther proceeds to read the decretal from a book).

My argument, that Peter did not feed all, he answers by saying, that what is done in our name, we may be said to have done ourselves. Nevertheless, I do not believe that the Doctor really thinks that thus he has answered my argument, since he cannot say that Paul preached in the name of Peter, for Paul (Romans 1. 1.ff) says, on the contrary, that he is an apostle for the name of Christ; I infer this also from the fact that he (Eck) says, on the authority of Clement, that Peter ordained bishops, presbyters and deacons to preach the Gospel throughout the whole world; yet among these he does not mention Paul.

His statement, however, that he who is sent by the Lord (principali) does not require to be sent by His vicar, seems very much to the purpose. I agree with this, if it be first proved that Peter was His vicar. But if it is proved, then Paul is no less a vicar of Christ than Peter, as it has already been said that he was an apostle in the name of Christ, and consequently there are as many vicars as there are apostles.

Now to the main thing. Regarding the quotation from Paul (1. Cor. 11. 5) he says (1) that Cephas does not occur at the beginning of the passage, but is only brought in at the end, where it is admitted in the gloss that Peter is greater
than all. This is a trifle which may be passed over, since in the beginning of the first chapter (verse 2), at any rate, Cephas occurs.

(2). He can only say that there is not a single word nor a letter in the text that denies the primacy, and thus he holds that he has answered this passage. However, he adds the testimony of Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Bernard, and Leo, who say that Peter is the rock. To this I answer: This second statement serves nothing to the purpose, and it has been already sufficiently debated whether Peter is the rock. Likewise he does not settle this by saying that there is not a word nor a letter that denies the primacy. And even if Jerome introduced a head, that the occasion of schism might be removed, the text, which is clear, strongly opposes him, for it removes the head that the occasion of schism may be removed. For it says:

Who is Paul? Who is Apollos? and will have Christ alone to be the Head by whom all schism is truly removed. And therefore his answer is still unsatisfactory.

Replying to the passage from Galatians (C.11) he indeed admits that the apostles were all equal; which also Jerome and the Canon "In Novo" testify. But when he says that the power of government is one thing and that of administration another, and three will with these words (i.e. power, government and administration) get over such a passage, I am somewhat amazed. Besides, I do not understand what he means by the distinction he draws between government and administration.
Also he tells us that Paul went up with Titus to Peter to consult about the Gospel. It is clear, however, from the context, as also Jerome himself sets forth, that Paul did not do this in order to consult with Peter about the Gospel, which he had been preaching for more than 14 years, boasting also that he had not received it from man, but that he might stop the mouth of false prophets, and convince the Galatians that his Gospel was the same as that which the other apostles preached.

DR. ÊCK.

(Latin text pages 129 to 131).

The reverend Father associates the article of John Huss concerning ecclesiastical obedience with that other article concerning human works. This he does on the authority of Gregory Arimin., who, he says, is defended in all the universities. I reply that so far I have never heard him defended in regard to this at any university - and I have been in many. Moreover, he demands of me that I prove that a Council cannot err. I know not what he means by this demand, unless it be stealthily to bring the laudable and glorious Council of Constance into suspicion. I say to you, reverend Father, straight out, that if you believe that a lawfully summoned Council has erred or can err, you are to me as a heathen and a publican. What a heretic is, I do not at present intend to discuss.

Regarding Chrysostom, he does not hold to have
justified his expulsion, but only to have praised the ordination, appointed by the Nicene Council, of the bishops. I approve of his reverence for St. Chrysostom. The Roman popes, however, have always permitted to different nations different methods of electing bishops. Moreover, it is sufficiently clear from the re-instatement of Gregory Nazianzus and Chrysostom, that the authority of the Roman Pope had intervened, as, indeed, St. Athanasius of Alexandria, St. Paulus, and other bishops of the Eastern Church, who betook themselves to the Roman Pope for re-appointment, testify. The touch of human weakness, also, that he observes in the apostles, we likewise recognise. But seeing that they discharged their duty to the world (public office), we must not, without deliberation and cause, detract from such holy men.

Regarding Platina, he says that he accepts what is authoritative in his history. I also have quoted from Platina none of his arguments, but only his statement of historical fact.

To the letter of Innocent he replies that it contributes nothing to our argument, because it speaks for the Latin Church, but for no other. But as this is only Luther's gloss (comment), supported by no authority or argument, it is set aside with the like ease with which he makes it.

Regarding the 20 years (i.e. before the Roman Church came into existence) he replies that I was the attacker for three days.
I certainly ought to and would have been so, had not the reverend Father with his subtleties frequently turned me into the respondent. For it was not I but he himself who brought up this argument. And certainly Peter did not carry away the same Chair with him to Rome, but he carried the primacy with him there.

Concerning the word "feed", he wants to set aside Gregory, Ambrose and Chrysostom, because a word, whose meaning is clear, is not to be given a double meaning. I answer: Who does not know that the word shepherd is a name which signifies at once an office, an honour and a burden? With the office of prelate he therefore took over at the same time the burden of feeding.

Regarding the condition, I do not accept what has been adduced by the reverend Father, because Christ Himself, since He always abides by the latter, did not attach any condition to the feeding. For thus the Hussite error would be confirmed, namely, that he, who is not living in (Christian) love, cannot be a bishop, a prelate or a shepherd.

Regarding the chapter "Significasti, de elect.", I know that Gerson and other teachers are still debating whether a Council is above the Pope. But, seeing that the words of the decretal have not been quoted, I can say nothing, but only conjecture, and will not bind myself to the statement that Paschal accepted the condition regarding quality( or state i.e. of love).
Regarding Paul, who did not acknowledge the primacy of Peter, but was an apostle of Christ (we are all of Christ I hope), it is nevertheless to be noted that he nowhere takes the primacy of government away from Peter, but that, when near death, he, as we read in the letter on the "Passing of the apostles", bade farewell to Peter as the head of the Church. I am not certain whether the letter was by Dionysius or not.

He has also called Paul a vicar of Christ, but not a universal vicar. For also in the Apocalypse (XXI. 14) twelve foundations of the Church are named; but, nevertheless, other foundation, that is, principal foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Christ.

Of the second he has said that it does not bear on the matter, whether Peter was the rock, whereas it is the sum and substance of our disputation. Nevertheless, he made no reply to the answer given by me the day before, to which I referred, since it is clear "according to the letter", that Paul condemned contentions. But I know not by what method of reasoning the reverend Father thinks that Paul rejected the primacy in order that schism might be removed. He has perhaps never been in a country where there was no Prince. If he had, he would have experienced the contrary, namely, that many dissensions, contentions and strife arise, where there is no prince and head, to judge and settle causes.

Also, he is amazed that, with so few words, to wit, apostolate and government, I should think to refute so great a
testimony. Principles (elements) are very small in size, but very great in power. If the reverend Father had paid attention to these two little words, apostolate and government, the supreme head and the secondary, he would before now have been able to reconcile the passages of Scripture and of the Holy Fathers which seem to him to be at variance with one another. But having neglected these, he must now follow strange and impossible teaching.

The debate was adjourned by public edict till the following day at 7 a.m.

Friday, 6th July. 7 a.m.

DR. MARTIN.

(Latin text pages 132 to 134).

To the passages I quoted from Paul ( ... Corinthians and Galatians) the distinguished Doctor has, according to his custom, made no reply, except to reiterate what he had already said about the Council of Constance and the Hussites. The passages are not, however, thereby refuted. For, as I have said, the much more holy and celebrated Nicene Council teaches differently. Therefore, the more he falls back on his Council, the more will I on mine; and I say, as I said yesterday, that, however often a Council may be quoted, you do not thereby prove the divine right, with which alone we are concerned here. Therefore a Council contributes nothing to our present purpose.

In the second place, in order that he might rather
avoid than confute the passages, he has brought forward this
distinction between apostolate and government, regarding which,
since it is invented by the will of man, and is found neither
in the Holy Scriptures, nor in the Fathers who interpret them,
I object that it should be brought forward against me, especially
since the apostolate is not, as he and his followers think,
a name of honour, but the name of an office, as is clear from
St. Paul's epistle to the Romans (1. 5) and elsewhere, where
he says he received grace and apostleship, to be obedient to
the faith. For an apostle is a messenger of the Word, and the
apostolate is an office of the Word, and thus in holy writ the
apostolate and administration are practically one and the same
thing. He must then by administration understand forensic
(or public) disputes about temporal or ecclesiastical things
which do not properly come under the administration of an
apostle. I indeed confess that, if liberty to invent is to be
permitted in this manner, I also will invent and make out that
St. John is a chancellor and another apostle something else.
But all this has nothing to do with "divine right". The principles
principles, therefore, which he boasted as being small in size
(but great in power), disappear. And I wonder greatly that the
distinguished Doctor thus shrinks from Holy Writ and flees its
face, and turns aside to those subterfuges invented by men.

Therefore the passage from Corinthians still remains
untouched, namely, that in which, for the purpose of putting an
end to schism, Paul removes the person of Peter, Paul, Apollos etc.
and leaves only Christ, there being left to them only the ministry of the Word, which is the true apostolate and administration of the Church. It is to no purpose that he thought to answer this most weighty passage with his foolish simile about a country without a head being exposed to many schisms and dangers; for there can be no Church without a head, when there are many bishops without a pope.

It is just as we see it working out in leagues (of nations), where the states are all the better governed, the less they have a common head. For we have the evidence of our eyes that France, Spain, Hungary, and innumerable countries in the world are without a common head; nevertheless, they do not collide the one with the other, but each country is content with its own king. If now in these temporal kingdoms, which are in a continual state of flux, because of the different minds and customs of men, and which have no common head, neither in Heaven nor on earth, peace and harmony abide, much more can this be in spiritual and unchanging things, where we have one faith, one love, one rule of conduct, and, in addition, a common head in Heaven, according to the words of the apostle — one faith, one Lord (Ephesians IV. 5). If, therefore, there were ten, yea if there were a thousand popes, there would not on that account be schisms.

Therefore I ask the Doctor that he deign to give a better answer to the quotation from Paul, as also to that from Galatians (vi. 6): — "God accepteth no man's person";
for there Paul rejects whatever in Peter and the apostles is pretentious at all personal, or, as one calls it, imposing (qualification). Neither of these passages has yet been touched, much less answered.

To this I add, in order to end the disputation, that Paul, in describing the body of the Church (1 Cor. XII. 28), enumerated first apostles, second prophets, third teachers and lastly governments, which the Doctor calls administrations. If therefore the primacy of Peter is of so great importance and so necessary for the divine right, Paul has insufficiently described the Church, inasmuch as he has left out what is most eminent in it.

Moreover, there remains the fact that neither Peter nor the entire body of the apostles had power to ordain Matthias, nor to give him the right of administration (Acts 1). Therefore the Roman Pope, in conferring the right of administration throughout the whole world, claims for himself more than he finds in his predecessor, the apostle.

In like manner do I think regarding the ordination of Paul and Barnabas (Acts XII), whom the Holy Spirit, not Peter, nor the Church, set apart. Not without reason, therefore, does he glory that he received nothing from the great apostles; yea, in writing to the Corinthians, he says that in nothing did he come behind the other apostles (11 Cor. XII. 11).

But this passage, where he writes to the Galatians, ties Peter up still more tightly, namely: "He that wrought
for Peter unto the apostleship of the circumcision, wrought for me also unto the Gentiles"; and further on: "They gave to me and Barnabas the right hand of fellowship, that we should go unto the Gentiles and they unto the circumcision. Only they would that we should remember the poor". (Galat. 11.8ff). If I chose to rest my case on this passage, the Doctor would not be able, nor would any man, to maintain that, by divine right, the apostolate of Peter extended beyond the Jews; and, therefore, all the passages on which he bases his argument, such as "Feed my sheep", "Thou art Peter etc", apply only within the limits of his apostolate, as Christ clearly (John X. 16) distinguishes between the sheep of the Gentiles and those of Israel, saying: "Other sheep have I which are not of this fold".

Finally, a word on what the Doctor touched upon yesterday - Revelation XXI. 14. There, the new Jerusalem is described as having twelve foundations, apart from the chief foundation - Christ. But no distinction is made here between the twelve foundations, such as certainly would have been made, if the primacy of Peter were to be reckoned as so important. Similar is it with many of the similitudes of Scripture, as, for example, the twelve oxen on the sea of brass (3. Reg. 7), the twelve lions on Solomon's throne, the twelve stones of Jordan, and such like, in all of which the entire equality of all the apostles is represented, nor can any distinction be proved by divine law.
Let this suffice, then, for the Conclusion which I, up till this day, believe to be absolutely true, yea, which I certainly know, I do not say hope, can never be overturned. Therefore I ask the distinguished Doctor, since he has still quoted no passage from the Divine Law for his view, that he at least, clearly and without circumlocution, refute some (of mine); otherwise, I will not hold him for a theologian who judges aright of the Scriptures; and I leave, yea, I refer it to the judgment, not of envy, nor of the crowd, but of the judges to be appointed and of every reflecting reader and fair-minded hearer.

DR ECK.

(Latin text pages 134 to 139).

I know not what the reverend Father means, when from the beginning of his speech he continues saying that I have answered nothing, and, nevertheless, in its continuation seeks to overturn the most weighty and irrefutable answers, which I made yesterday. Whether this is consistent let himself judge.

Next, he says that he will not be bound by the authority of the Council of Constance. But let him examine, let the judges examine with what right he takes up this attitude. I do not reject the Nicene Council in the matters of faith. In regard to usages, however, such as the ordination of bishops - these can be altered according to the circumstances of time and place.

He demands of me that I prove to him the divine right. Although I have frequently done so, my "Conclusion", however,
does not contain such proof, but merely my denial of the statement of the reverend Father in his manifesto (resolutorio) that the Roman Church previous to Sylvester was not the superior of the others. Nevertheless I maintain that the primacy of the Roman Pope is of divine right, according to the passages quoted by me.

Next, with the purpose of refuting my reply, he says that the distinction which I make is invented by the will of man. As if it were not permissible to make such a distinction in theology, just as Arius did in ridiculing Athanasius; for, too tenacious of the letter, he said that the son was a "creature" (or created being), because of the words: "The Father is greater than I" (John Xlv. 28). But Athanasius refuted this by making the distinction thus: "The Father is greater than I, according to my humanity, but not according to my divinity". But, because Arius did not recognise the distinctions in Holy Writ, he did not accept this, and so remained obstinately in error. Therefore, also, here, since those who elucidate Holy Scripture shall have eternal life, we must, by comparing various passages of Scripture, lest it be admitted that the Bible is a self-contradictory book, have recourse to this method of making distinctions, so that he who clings too closely to the letter be not destroyed, but rather by the spirit be quickened. And because Peter is frequently set above the others in holy Scripture, but frequently also regarded as merely their equal, it is necessary, for the reconciling of such contradiction, to make such distinctions as are
as are conformable to Scripture.

Jerome and Cyprian, whom I have quoted, assent to this. For while admitting the equality of the apostles, they grant the primacy to Peter, which they could not do, except by making distinctions. I am content that the apostolate be called an office, provided that he also call it an honour. For, as I said, there are those names, both of honour and responsibility, as the apostle indicates to the Romans (I. 16): "How shall they preach, except they be sent?"

Regarding administration I again agree with the reverend Father that administration in temporal matters is a much lower thing than administration in spiritual matters. Let us pray the most Blessed God that our bishops recognise this and do not administer spiritual things through their deputies and temporal things by themselves. I have, therefore, spoken of the administration of government in spiritual things as an exercise of power, nor does the reverend Father hinder me in what he says about thus being able to make of John a chancellor, and of Mark a keeper of the seals etc., since, as Augustine says, philosophers use words freely, but we must speak according to a certain rule, and must, therefore, speak such things as are founded on Scripture, as, for example, the first part of the apostolate consists in the equality of the apostles, the second or government, in the primacy of Peter. Therefore, I admit that the passage from Paul is very weighty, but it is not against me in a single syllable.
The reverend Father has contemned my simile about schism in a country where there is no ruler, seeing that at the present day this is the situation in the kingdoms of Spain, France, England and Hungary, which are without a head (i.e. a common head), and, nevertheless, live in peace and harmony with one another. I wonder how the reverend Father—as has already forgotten so many massacres, wars and battles, which he cannot but have heard of. I will not speak of the endless quarrels and perpetual enmity between the French and the English, nor of the inveterate enmity between the French and the Spaniards, who so often have waged war, with very great effusion of the blood of Christians, over the kingdom of Naples; and would God that there were at last an enduring and permanent peace! One faith, one Lord, Christ, I acknowledge with the apostle but I revere the Roman Pope as the vicar of Christ. My former answer, therefore, remains unrefuted and irrefutable, at least according to my poor judgment. Of this, however, let the Doctors judge.

Further, the reverend Father said that I have not touched on the words of Paul:— "God accepteth the person of no man", and much less answered them. Perhaps it escaped (obaudibit) him that I quoted the meaning of the same words both from Ambrose and Jerome. John and Peter were uneducated men and not versed in the law. Paul, on the other hand, was a learned man and had advanced beyond many of his
contemporaries, as he testifies of himself. (Galatians 1.14). Therefore, Paul did not want to estimate Peter and John and ask what sort of men they were, because God accepteth no man's person. For He hath chosen both the fisherman and the learned scribe. The primacy, however, is not thereby overthrown; but the accepting of the person of a man is not to be imputed to God, even if He choose one in preference to the other, as Peter confessed regarding Cornelius (Acts x. 34): "Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons".

Let us now come to the passages quoted by the reverend Father. He quotes 1. Cor. 12, 28, where the apostle, describing the spiritual body, enumerates, first apostles, then prophets and teachers and finally government. I say that the apostle has indeed described it beautifully, but has neither denied nor admitted the primacy. But the argument is inadmissible, namely: Paul here does not refer to this primacy, therefore there is no primacy in the Church; first, because even children know that you cannot from one passage argue that a thing does not exist, and second, because what is not expressed in Holy Writ in one place, ought, according to Augustine's (On Christian Doctrine) teaching (lib. de doct. Christiana), to be accepted from another, as (in the matter before us) we have done.

We reply in like manner to Revelation xxi. I admit that there are twelve foundations and that these are also typified by the twelve oxen, the twelve lions and the twelve stones of Jordan. In these it is indicated that the
number of the apostles is twelve; but the primacy is not therefore denied. Moreover, I quoted this passage, because it is necessary to show that the passages of Holy Scripture agree with one another; and since the apostle has laid one foundation, namely, Christ and no one can lay another, we must not on that account deny that Peter is also a foundation of the Church, since also St. John himself laid twelve foundations; so that unless you accept the distinction of one foundation of all the foundations, that is, the principal foundation, and of the subordinate or secondary foundation, you will not be able to bring Paul and John into harmony with each other.

Secondly, he quoted that Peter could not ordain Matthias, likewise that the Holy Spirit set apart Paul and Barnabas. I answer: Since the apostles were bishops, I do not recollect having read in Holy Writ that Christ ordained them to be bishops, although at the Last Supper He first ordained them to be priests. Therefore I may assign this likewise to Peter, namely, that he ordained them to be bishops. Nevertheless, since I admit that the apostolic office is conferred by God alone, it is not strange that they asked for divine help; for they cast lots, not after the ordinary manner, since, as St. Dionysius testifies, the lot was a visible manifestation of the Holy Spirit. Therefore this passage is in favour of the primacy of Peter, since he there discharged the office of the primacy conferred on him: "In those days Peter rising up in
midst of the brethren etc. " Likewise is it in the matter of Saghira and Ananias, as also in the justification of the apostles that they were not filled with new wine, and in the answer and defence before the Council of the Jews (Acts 1-5) and in other things written in the Acts of the apostles where he exercised the authority of his high office. Therefore I hold that Matthias was made an apostle of the Lord but was ordained to be a bishop by St. Peter. In like manner I admitted a little while ago that Paul received his apostleship from God, and I also confess that he was more abundant in his labours than the others.

But let us come to the third passage which, among the others quoted by the reverend Father, seems to be more to the point:— "He that wrought effectually in Peter" (Gal.11. 8). And I say that Paul here did not proclaim the divine right but referred to it as an actuality, since Peter, also, in the Acts of the apostles was commanded to instruct the heathen Cornelius in the faith and ruled over the heathen in Antioch, where he had his seat, and likewise at Rome, where finally he received the crown of martyrdom from the heathen Nero, and taught them together with the Jews who had been converted to the faith and were still to be converted. From this it is clear that Paul relates what had taken place. I pass over the fact that Paul was not thinking of the office of government or of the primacy, but of the discharging of the apostolic office, according to which the apostles had different countries allotted...
them. In this Peter was on an equality with the other apostles, according to Anacletus (Can. In Novo), according to Jerome (Contra Jovinianum et super epistola ad Galatas), according to Cyprian (Epistola 9. ad Cornelium papam lib. 4.). Therefore the Holy Writ is likewise to be understood according to its purpose, so that we must give heed when it speaks of the office of the apostolate and when of the government of power or authority.

It does not matter that the reverend Father continues to say that I have adduced no divine law for the primacy, and that I have not answered the passages quoted by him, for I might say the same of him. Nevertheless, none of the Fathers has understood the passages quoted by the reverend Father as denying the primacy of Peter over others, to which effect he quoted them; while, on the other hand, the holy Fathers have, for the most part, understood the passages quoted by me as dealing with the primacy of Peter. Therefore, if in this Conclusion (or argument), I have at any time spoken somewhat sharply and harshly against the reverend Father, I would not like you to think that it has been against him personally; but the matter under discussion seemed to me so important and urgent, that, at times, somewhat sharp words had to be used. In the remaining arguments you will always find that sobriety of speech which is characteristic of Eck.

Therefore I will now finish this argument by stating that I consider that Peter received the primacy of the whole
Church from Christ. (1) by the promise made to him (Matt. XVI) according to the interpretation of Jerome, Cyprian, Augustine and others, (2) from the name by which he was first called (Matt. X), according to the gloss there, (3) from the paying of the tribute money (Matt. XVII) where alone he was put on an equality with Christ, according to Augustine and Ambrose, (4) from the fact that Christ prayed for his faith that it might not fail, and commanded him to strengthen his brethren (Luke XXII), according to Chrysostom and St. Leo, (5) because he was appointed shepherd of the sheep of Christ (John XXI), according to Chrysostom and Gregory, (6) because Christ says to him "Follow Me", that is to say, not only after the manner of His martyrdom but also in His office as a ruler, according to Theophilus, (7) because he alone was bidden come to Christ on the sea (Matt. XIV), so that thus the whole world, represented by the sea, might be subject to him, according to Bernard (de consideratione ad Eugenium). Also from other passages already quoted I hold that this "Conclusion" which has been approved of by so many Holy Fathers and just recently by the Council of Constance, is true. Nevertheless, I do not wish to trust to my own wisdom, and am ready to bring my reason captive, both in these and other things to that of the judges to be appointed by the apostolic Chair, and of other wise and pious men.

To God alone be the glory, Eck.

The disputation will be continued at 2 p.m.
We are compelled to add an appendix, because the distinguished Doctor, in answering my objections, has at the same time brought forward much new matter against me, to which I must reply. And, although I would have liked to pass it over, nevertheless, as I want to make my views thoroughly clear to the judges to be appointed, I reply in a few words.

First, he has stated that, before the election of Matthias, Peter made a speech, exhorting the apostles etc. But I do not think that the primacy of Peter will appear to be proved even to the Doctor himself by this, namely, that Peter preached, since he himself at a previous sitting made me the answer: "The apostolate is one thing; the administration of government is another". He did not therefore speak correctly when he said that, in preaching, Peter exercised the power of government, for then likewise Stephen would be primate and pope, since he also preached and did many wonderful works among the people.

As to his idea that the apostle Matthias was ordained by Peter to be a bishop, let him believe it who will; I will not believe it except he prove it. Likewise it may be said that Peter exercised his office as primate in striking Ananias and Sapphira down dead, but it cannot be proved. For he also raised the dead, which likewise the other apostles did. Neither is his defence of the apostles, that they were not drunken, as they
appeared to be, a sign of his primacy, since, as I have said, the distinguished Doctor has all along marked off the primacy from all other works and administrations which Peter had in common with others. Also I agree with what he said about Peter walking on the sea and Bernard making the sea to stand for the world, but that has nothing to do with the primacy, since we also ought to tread the world under foot.

I willingly pass over what he said about the faith that should not fail, which was promised to Peter by Christ's prayer; for I admit that the faith of Peter never failed, although he himself fell from the faith. For, as Augustine says, the thief confessed the faith of Peter, when Peter denied it. The faith of Peter is one thing, his primacy is quite another.

Likewise I admit what he says about Peter being put on an equality with Christ in giving the tribute money for Christ and for himself; but this does not argue for his primacy; yea, rather does it argue against it. For soon after, as Jerome also interprets the passage, the other disciples were offended, because they supposed that Peter might be the greater, and they began to dispute among themselves which of them was the greatest. Then Christ, having called a little child, rebuked their ambition; and thus what follows the text argues more strongly against the primacy than what precedes it does in its favour.

The words from the last chapter of John (C.XXI), and addressed to Peter alone, namely, "Follow Me", are, he says,
according to the interpretation of Theophilus, to be understood as referring, not only to the manner of his martyrdom but also to his rank as a ruler. But I deny the correctness of Theophilus' interpretation, partly because Augustine seems to bring out the meaning better when he makes it: "Follow Me in suffering temporal evil"; partly also because, if Augustine had not thus spoken, the text of the Gospel itself shows the meaning clearly; for it runs: "There went abroad the saying among the brethren that that disciple should not die; for they had heard Christ say: If I will that he tarry (till I come) what is that to thee? Follow thou Me". Therefore it is clear as day that this following is to be understood as referring to the nature of his martyrdom and death.

Therefore I beg the Doctor to refrain from quoting fresh texts, and especially such as do not help the argument, since I also might quote the passage from Acts VIII (v. 14), where the apostles sent Peter, together with John, as if he were a subordinate, and Acts XV. (v. 13 ff) where James both confirmed and altered Peter's speech. I do not wish, however, to quote these and similar passages, since I conceded to Peter, some time ago, the primacy of honour, and only denied him the primacy of power over the other apostles. For this is that "person", yea, indeed, the primacy of honour, which God doth not regard, as I quoted above, — not the person of the fisherman or of poverty (i.e. of education — see pages 209 and 210) as Ambrose, according to the Doctor's quotation, set forth. For
Jerome interprets Paul better by dwelling on the nobility of his character, which the false prophets among the Galatians sought to belittle by the high esteem in which Peter was held among them. I am quite willing, therefore, that the Doctor confirm his statement by the testimonies of Jerome, Ambrose, Bernard, and Leo, especially in regard to the passage: "Thou art Peter", although my view, as I have already said, is more strongly supported by the same, and by superior testimonies which speak more to the purpose. This, also, I submit to the decision of the judges, as above.

DR. ECK.

(Latin text pages 141 to 142).

The reverend Father re-opens what to-day was finished. He flings back at me, what I added at the end of my argument as secondary and emblematical, as if it were of cardinal importance, and has been so solicitous in making it appear thus, that he does not know whether he has become the opponent or the respondent. Let me briefly reply.

I have never been so foolish as to think or speak thus, "Peter preached; therefore he was supreme (among the apostles)! Next, he condemns my "credulity" regarding Matthias, but does not refute my argument. Matthias and the other apostles were bishops, and they were not ordained by Christ; neither did they ordain themselves; therefore they could only have been ordained by Peter, whom Christ appointed to be universal shepherd by His words, "Feed my sheep". Therefore he must either hold my
opinion or reply to it.

Regarding Peter's defence (of the apostles on the charge of being drunken) he imputes to me what never was in my thoughts. It never entered my head to distinguish between the primacy and the administrative works of the other apostles. On the contrary, I quoted to him St. Gregory, that also other bishops were called to share in solicitude, but not to the plenitude of power.

In regard to what Bernard has said about Peter walking on the sea, he says that it does not help the argument for the primacy. I wonder how he can speak thus, if he be a reader of Bernard. For Bernard expressly wanted to prove from this the primacy of Eugenius over the others, and that the whole world should be subject to him, not in the manner it is subject to other bishops and apostles.

Regarding the tribute money, he wants to prove the opposite from what follows – namely, that Christ rebuked the murmuring of the apostles. This, nevertheless, he has not done. I, however, take the words of Holy Scripture, not according to my own interpretation, but according to that of the holy Fathers; for St. Ambrose wanted to show from this that Peter was to be greater than the others; which, also, Augustine in "quaest. evangeliorum" most clearly testifies. Therefore, let us not follow our own interpretation, but that of the Holy Fathers.

Regarding the endurance of (Peter's) faith, he says nothing, except to quote the words of Augustine, namely, that
the faith, which Peter denied, the thief preserved on the cross. I, also, will pass over these words. Let the reverend Father, however, know that St. Cyprian wanted to conclude from the words of Christ that no heresies had arisen at Rome as in other Churches, according to my statement, the other day, that there had been in the Roman Chair 212 popes, and that before their departure (to Avignon) none had, through any decree they had issued or judgment they had delivered, erred in the faith.

Regarding Theophilus whom he respects at his own will, without the support of any testimony or argument, I wonder that a man, who is so hostile to the sophists, thus despises the Fathers of the Church. He has, indeed, quoted Augustine, who is, however, not opposed to Theophilus, that Christ spoke of the manner of His martyrdom. Let him show, however, where Augustine refuses the rank of ruler, since in the same work (tract. 124) he confesses that Peter, as the first apostle, had also more abundant grace. Also in letter 162 he says that, in the Roman Church, the supremacy of the apostolic Chair has always prevailed. Therefore let him not ask me not to defend my Conclusion, which I regard as true.

He reminds us that Peter was sent to Samaria, and infers from this that the primacy had been taken from him. But we know that a person may send himself, as in the case of the Son of God, who was sent by the Father and by Himself. This has not been brought forward for the first time, but was answered long ago by Alpharus, Johannes de Turre Cremata and others.
Also, if, out of regard for his rank and age, Peter yielded to James in the Council at Jerusalem, this does not deprive him of the primacy. That he may appear, however, to grant something, the reverend Father assigns to Peter the primacy of honour, as if, perhaps, the apostle were greedy of honour; whereas he has heard from me, that, according to Cyprian, Jerome and Anacletus, the apostles were equal in honour. Accordingly the reverend Father assigns to Peter the primacy of honour, which the Holy Fathers deny him. On the other hand, he refuses Peter the primacy of authority, which the unanimous verdict of the holy Fathers and the Council of Constance accord him.

Accordingly, let him desist, I entreat, from boasting, when confronted with such holy Fathers and such a famous Council, that he is supported by higher authorities, for I have already frequently shown that the passages quoted by him do not deny the primacy, according to the opinion of any of the holy Fathers. Therefore, let him rather, with the Greeks, lately become wise, as is said of the Trojans, understand at last that the Roman Pope, as the true vicar of Christ, occupies the chief place in the world, as the Greeks themselves, emperor, patriarch and nobles, have admitted, in making their submission to the Roman Church, 22nd. Novemb. 1439; and thus, there is peace in our time. All this, as above, I submit to the judgment of those whom it concerns and will concern. To God alone be the glory. Eck.
I agree with practically everything the distinguished Doctor has said, especially with the words of Augustine, that the supremacy of the apostolic Chair has always prevailed in the Roman Church, if he had only added one word, namely, the supremacy of power over all bishops. And I believe that Bernard twists the passage about Peter walking on the sea, since what follows clearly attributes such walking to faith and not to the primacy, as Christ said, when Peter was about to sink; "Oh thou of little faith, wherefore did'st thou doubt?" (Matt. XIX. 3) And when he desires me to believe with him that the other apostles were ordained to be bishops by the apostle Peter, I am little inclined to comply, since all were equally bishops with Peter as the text quoted by Peter concerning Judas shows: "And his bishopric let another take". (Acts. 1. 20; Psalm CIX. 8.) So much for this.

The Doctor suggests that, according to the passage from the Psalm: "And his bishopric let another take", Judas was also a bishop. I answer that bishopric, there, is used for the apostolate and not for the episcopal office. For, according to the majority, it is doubtful whether Judas was even a priest. This, however, does not signify. Nevertheless, when he had
taken his morsel, Judas went out. Therefore, when at the Supper Christ ordained the disciples to be priests, Judas was not consecrated as a bishop. I submit this to the decision of the judges, as I did the rest.

The disputation was thereupon resumed and the question of PURGATORY (9th thesis) taken up.

DR. ECK.

as opponent, begins. (Latin text page 143 –144).

Not only among the theologists (or dabbler in theology-theologiiastas) but also in the Holy Scripture and the Fathers, it is held that this present life is a state and time wherein we qualify for reward and punishment. Therefore the souls in also purgatory are unable to become more deserving and thus cannot receive further grace. I prove this from Jeremiah XXV. 14:

"I will recompense them according to their deeds and according to the works of their own hands". In like manner, also, speaks Paul: "We must all be made manifest before the judgment-seat of Christ, that each may receive the things done in the body, according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad. Knowing, therefore, the terror of the Lord we persuade men! (2. Cor. V. 10,11). And to come down to later times, I add Jerome's interpretation of the apostle in this passage: "The apostles meaning is", he says, "so long as we wander from the
Lord in the world, let us, by good behaviour, insure that we shall find favour with Him in the future; not that we mean, as do some, that, after we have departed from the body, we can there accomplish anything or deserve any reward. The same, also, is acknowledged by the ordinary gloss: "In vain, therefore, does a man, after he has departed from the body, hope for anything which he has neglected to procure here." In like manner, also, has Ambrose interpreted it. The deeds done in the body, he says, alone can claim reward elsewhere.

From this it is clear that, since grace is increased according to merit, and souls in purgatory can, according to what has been alleged, do nothing that will add to their merit, grace also cannot be increased in them. St. Augustine very clearly assents to this in his Encheiridion (Cap. 109 and 110) and repeats the same words notably in quaest. 2. de octo Dulcitii quaest, after many others. "Therefore", he says, "all merit, by which one's state after this life may be alleviated or made worse, is acquired here. For let no one think that after death he can receive credit with God for what he has neglected here". Therefore there is an end after death of all meritorious work, and, consequently of further corresponding grace.

DR. MARTIN.

(Latin texts page 144).

The distinguished Doctor has brought forward against me two passages from divine Scripture and four from the holy Fathers. The first is from Jeremiah, where God says: "I will
recompense them according to their deeds". I wonder somewhat that the distinguished Doctor thinks that these and similar passages argue against me, since in my manifesto (resolutorio) I quoted many more of the same kind, and showed that they were not in the slightest against me, or were just as much against purgatory. For since the entire Scripture has absolutely nothing to say about either Purgatory, but speaks everywhere of Heaven or Hell, I maintain to have replied to all the passages with this one answer, namely, that they serve nothing to the purpose, and, consequently, also, all the interpretations of the Fathers, if they do not expressly make mention of purgatory. For we must believe that, if they deal with Holy Scripture, they must also follow the sense of the Scripture. Therefore one will have to prove by other arguments and quotations that the state of souls is unchangeable and that they do not grow in love.

DR. ECK.

(Latin text pages 144 to 145).

The reverend Father says that in his manifesto he has quoted and expounded many passages. We have seen them. We have also seen that his exposition does not affect the text, and this we will now prove. We also refuse to accept his statement that nothing is said in Holy Scripture of purgatory. This statement might be agreeable to the Greeks and Picardians, but it is contrary to Christian belief, as he rightly recollects in his manifesto. But let us examine his solitary answer
in which he says that the passages quoted by me serve nothing to the purpose, and see how fitly he has replied. The apostle says: - "Everyone will receive according to the deeds done in the body"; the Father says that a man will receive also according to the deeds done in purgatory. Augustine says: "All merit is acquired here"; the Father, on the other hand, says that also in purgatory is merit acquired. Jerome says: "After we have departed from the body, we can earn nothing further from God"; the Father contradicts this and says that, after we have departed from the body, we still continue to acquire merit. Similarly also regarding Ambrose. Let your illustrious Lordships, Excellencies and Worships now judge, whether the passages quoted by me, which (he says) are directly contrary to the words of the Fathers, serve nothing to the purpose. I beg, therefore, that he answer correctly, or show how they serve nothing to the purpose, and that he do not wonder that I also mean to quote to him many authorities, so that it may be made manifest that we are dealing here not with dabblers in theology but with real theologians.

DR. MARTIN.

(Latin text pages 145 to 146).

I, who firmly believe, indeed, I may say, know that there is a purgatory, am not difficult to persuade that mention is made of it in Scripture, as for example in Matthew (xii.32) quoted by Gregory in Dialog.: "It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in that which is to come", giving us thereby to understand that certain sins are forgiven in purgatory.
I admit, also, the passage from 2. Maccabees (xii.46f) :
"It is a holy and comforting thought, to pray for the dead". But I maintain that in the whole of Scripture there is not a reference to purgatory that will stand the test of argument and convince; for the Book of Maccabees is not in the Canon, and, while it may be authoritative for believers, it counts for nothing with the obstinate. Also the passage quoted by Gregory is very easily got over, namely, that sin is forgiven neither here nor in the world to come — that is, never. Therefore I do not wish the suspicion to attach to me that I countenance the Bohemians and the Greeks. So much to begin with.

To the reply of the Doctor I will make no other answer than that which I have already made. For, since he repeats what he said before, I also will make the same answer. For I said that in the Holy Scriptures nothing is said about purgatory; therefore neither can the Scriptures, nor the expositions of the same, be adapted to the doctrine of purgatory. For after death the recompense is either good to the good or evil to the bad. They are mid-way between (neither good nor bad) who are in purgatory; concerning these the passages mentioned do not speak, and to these is given in recompense neither good nor evil. And thus purgatory is dealt with by none of these quotations.

DR. ECK.

(Latin text page 146).

The Doctor defends himself by saying that he believes
and knows there is a purgatory. I readily accept his statement and knew as much before. But when he denies that Purgatory is proved in Holy Scripture, I reject his denial as false and Grecian, and abide by my statement, although neither that, nor other much greater things, can be proved against the bold and obstinate, as was made clear in the case of Arius and others. But if, because it cannot be proved against the obstinate, one is therefore to say that purgatory is not to be found in Scripture - that, I say, is entirely fallacious and contrary to our religion.

He says that the Books of the Maccabees are authoritative for believers but are not in the Canon. This, also, I say is false; for, although they did not find a place in the Hebrew Canon, the Church, nevertheless, has admitted them into the Canon, as the Father of the Father (Luther), Augustine, testifies in his book "de civitate dei", and inasmuch as St. Ipho inserted in his decree the statute by which the Church admitted these books into the Canon.

The reverend Father chooses to abide by his opinion that the passages quoted by me have no bearing on the matter. They are, nevertheless, in direct opposition to him. He says, first, that these passages have regard only to Heaven and Hell. This does not help him, however; because they expressly speak of a state in which men lay up for themselves reward or punishment and define this state as being terminated by death. The reverend Father, on the other hand,
though supported by no teacher, presumes to prolong to souls, that have departed from the body, the period for meriting reward, and to recompense in Heaven the merits gained in purgatory; whereas the words of the apostle proclaim that only those works are rewarded which a man has done in the body. Accordingly, having pondered the statements in his manifesto, I am unable to accept them, inasmuch as they are insufficient, as when I first pointed out these contradictions.

D R. M A R T I N.

(Latin text pages 146 to 147).

(1). When the distinguished Doctor says that we are not to deny that a thing is in Scripture because the obstinate cannot be convinced of it, he speaks excellently and most truly. I speak, however, of those obstinate people who can transfix us with our own word and sword. For it is clear that the Book of Maccabees belongs to the Old Testament. When, therefore, St. Jerome details the Hebrew Canon, and definitely states that the Canonical books alone are of value in argument, and in this his opinion is everywhere accepted, then we will be easily pierced with our own weapon, unless we are still able to persuade believers.

(2). When he says that the Book of the Maccabees has been admitted into the Canon, he disputes about an ambiguous word; otherwise we would soon be in agreement. I am aware that the Church admits this Book, and have said so. The Church,
however, can give the Book no more authority or weight than it possesses in itself, just as it approves and rejects the writings of other Fathers, but does not, therefore, give its authority to all that is said in these, or add to their value. I will say no more, therefore, about this ambiguity arising from a double Canon.

(3). He says that the passages quoted by me expressly speak of the state wherein one acquires merit, and that this state is terminated by death. I answer, as before, that they make no mention of purgatory, but only of Heaven and Hell. Therefore at death a man can earn nothing in regard to Hell, nor at death can he earn anything in regard to Heaven, and thus the time for acquiring merit is ended for both; otherwise purgatory would be clearly proved from the same passages.

(4). He says that, without the support of any teacher, I prolong the period for acquiring merit, and also assert that merit acquired in purgatory will be rewarded. I admit it; I have done it, too, for the purpose of argument, and to hear something better than I have hitherto known. For I know nothing of purgatory, except that souls suffer there and are to be helped by our works and prayers. I am humbly prepared to be taught, however, if anyone can tell me more about it. The words of the apostle quoted against me, namely, that only works done in the body are rewarded, have been accepted by the Doctor as referring to purgatory. I have already said that they cannot be thus accepted, but only in regard to Heaven and Hell. If this
relation be observed, it is obvious that they are not in opposition to me; otherwise they will be a proof of purgatory.

The disputation will be continued to-morrow at 7 o'clock.

Saturday, 9th July, 7 a.m.

DR. ECK.

(Latin text pages 148 to 161).

The Father says that the passages quoted are not understood as speaking of purgatory. I am quite agreeable to this in so far that, because they confine the opportunity of acquiring merit to this life alone, they therefore exclude it from purgatory. Next it is certain that Augustine in his Encheiridion also speaks of Purgatory, since he proves in the same manual that the state of the souls there is alleviated by the help of the living. Also Jerome inveighs against those who think that souls, that have been stripped of the body, still acquire merit; nevertheless, he maintains that there is a purgatory. (Esa. ult. 66. v.24).

When he says, however, as if he had no great faith in it, that his conclusion is a disputation, I wonder greatly, since he has been dragging it about now for more than a year, and given it the imposing title of "a disputation against new and old errors", and also asserts that the views of the more recent theologians have no appearance of truth even to a fool
and contemptuously calls these theologians mere dabblers in theology. Also, I decline to admit his conjecture about the word "Canon" being used in a double sense, since Augustine in "De civitate dei" (lib. 18) could not, especially in the adversative part of the sentence, have used the word in a double sense, when he said: "It was not in the Canon of the Hebrews but in that of the Church". Next it is certain that, when several Gospels had been written, four only were, by the authority of the Church, admitted into the Canon; and that the Books of the Maccabees were in like manner admitted, the prologue testifies. They were, however, put by the Church among the histories of the sacred volumes. - But to the point.

He bases his argument on this - that purgatory is not mentioned in the Sacred Scriptures. The decree of the Council of Florence, which, also, the Greeks, when they had given up their errors, accepted, is however against his statement. Likewise are many passages of Holy Scripture; for example: "We went through fire and water, but Thou broughtest us out into a refreshing place" (Psalm LXXI. 12); "From prison and from chains He goeth forth to reign" (Eccles. IV. 14); "The Lord said: Agree with thine adversary,. . . . . lest thou be cast into prison. Verily, I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out hence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing" (Matt. V. 25). By prison He there understands the place of purgatory, out of which a man is not delivered, until he has made full satisfaction, according to the interpretation
of St. Ambrose of the corresponding passage in Luke. The argument, however, of Gregory which St. Bernard (serm. 66. super Canticis) quotes, is strong, namely, that Christ indicates that certain sins are forgiven in the future world.

But most clear is the text, I. Cor. iii. 12-15: "If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss, but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire. And the day of the Lord shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire; and the fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is, whether hay, stubble etc." Here, says St. Ambrose, the apostle speaks of purgatory. The interlinear gloss bears the same testimony as also does the ordinary gloss. St. Jerome (lib. 2. contra Jovinianum), likewise St. Gregory (de purgatorio), and St. Bernard (super Canticis) are of the same opinion. And lest anyone fling at me Augustine, who in his Encheiridion (Cap. forte 67) says that these words may also be understood of the fire of this present world, let him read the Father more fully in the same work, also "quaest. 2. de octo Dulcitii quaestio", and he will find that Augustine also understands these words of the apostle, which are most clear, as referring to purgatory.

Therefore, not only in the Books of the Maccabees, which certainly ought to suffice for the Church, but also in other passages of Scripture, the doctrine of purgatory is taught, unless Gregory, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome and Bernard are of the number of uninstructed theologians. If it were not
thus taught, I know not how the reverend Father can confess that he knows there is a purgatory, since his desire is so great to rest on the letter of Holy Writ, and since the testimony of Scripture is most clearly in favour of the modern theologians. On the other hand, he cannot produce a single passage from Scripture where it is asserted that merit or grace is increased in those who are to be purified. On the contrary, the Wise Man (Eccles. Xl. 3) says:—" And if the tree fall toward the South or toward the North, in the place where the tree falleth, there it shall be"; that is, according to the ordinary gloss: "The place which thou here preparest for thyself, thou shalt have hereafter". Because Christ says: "In my Father's house are many mansions", a certain mansion is assigned to the dying man, beyond which he is unable by merits gained in purgatory to ascend. In like manner Damascenus (lib. 2. Cap. 4) testifies: "But one ought to know that what the Fall was to the Angels, death is to men"; and he made this statement in regard to the limits of the period wherein one can acquire merit. Likewise also the Wise Man (Eccles. lx. 10): "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might etc", since in this sense that devout and worthy minister of the Church, Johannes Capistranus, quoted the words. Thus also teaches the apostle (Galatians Vl. 7 ff): "Be not deceived, God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap. For he that soweth to the flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption etc; let us not be weary in well-doing..... as we have, therefore, opportunity, let us do good
unto all men". The gloss is: What a man soweth, that is through labour in this present life. It is not, therefore, in purgatory that merits are sown, but in this present life. Chrysostom confirms this from John 1:6: "I must work the works of Him that sent me, while it is day; the night cometh when no man can work". The day, says Chrysostom, is this present life. Therefore Augustine exhorts us to work while we have life, lest we be overtaken by the night. As witness, likewise may be added St. Ambrose, who maintains that the apostle speaks of the time granted us in this present life, that we may walk uprightly. Therefore, the excellent Psalmist says (Psalm ClIV. 23): "Man goeth forth unto work and to his labour until the evening".

Finally, apart from those quoted above, the passage from Augustine, where he also refers to purgatory, that from "De fide ad Petrum" (Cap.3.) is clear: "God has given man only in this life a time to attain unto eternal life". Jerome, also, writing on Galatians VI. 5: "Every man shall bear his own burden", shows how men are helped by their merits acquired in this life, but when they are called before the judgment-seat, which takes place at death, neither Job, nor Noah, nor Daniel can stand for anyone, but every man will bear his own burden. For also St. Bernard beautifully teaches that a special judgment takes place at the death of every man, which could not be, if he had still an opportunity of adding to his merits in purgatory and increasing grace, because, as God speaks
through the prophet Zechariah, He will make grace equal to grace, that is, He will bestow the grace of glory according to the grace of faith. And even if these testimonies were not so clear - and their meaning is very clear - this alone ought to restrain the reverend Father in his purpose, namely, that, as a theologian, he wants, without theological foundation (basis), and without authority to constitute himself a judge or the assessor of a judge, to prolong to departing souls the period for acquiring merit. Therefore in this particular the conclusion seems to be that souls in purgatory suffer considerably and are purged of their sins, but do not acquire more grace.

Regarding the second point of importance - his denial that souls in purgatory are sure of salvation - I think that here again he is without Scriptural authority. At any rate, I quote at present in support of my belief that they have assurance of salvation, Revelation V. (v. 1. ff):— "I saw on the right hand of Him that sat on the throne etc. .... and no one neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor under the earth, was found worthy to open the book". In Hell, of course, there could be no one worthy to open the book; and therefore he speaks of purgatory, in which also are at times holy men, resplendent with miracles, as St. Gregory (dialog. 4) testifies of St. Paschasius; and history asserts the same of St. Severinus, bishop of Cologne, although by birth he was a Swabian. Also beneath: " And they were all singing in Heaven, on earth and
under the earth". Those, however, who are almost despairing of salvation, do not sing. Therefore, since the sacred writer (anima) tells us that there is a song there, he assures us that the souls are sure of salvation.

Besides in the Canon of the Mass where we pray for the dead in purgatory, we speak thus: "Remember, Lord, thy servants who have gone before us with the standard of faith, and sleep the sleep of peace etc., these and all who rest in Christ" etc. If, therefore, according to the most holy Canon of the Mass, souls are resting in Christ, how can they be in such a state of perturbation, and terror, as are those in despair, as the reverend Father in his manifesto (Concl. 14 to 20) gives us to understand? For I do not see how the souls that are to be purified, and are living in a state of perturbation, trembling, terror and, as it were, despair, all of which indicate the greatest possible disquietude, can be said to sleep the sleep of peace, since all this is directly opposed to such peace. But they are rightly regarded by true Christians to rest in peace, if, in confidence they wait for the end of their purification. This is what, for the most part, moved me, and moves me again to-day to dissent from the reverend Father. Nevertheless, I am ready to submit to the judgment and instruction of others.
With many quotations, grouped under three heads, the distinguished Doctor has sought to maintain against me (1) that the Canon of Scripture includes the Books of the Maccabees, (2) that the doctrine of purgatory is proved from other passages of Scripture, (3) that souls in purgatory are sure of their salvation.

Regarding the first two, I reply that there is no dispute between me and his lordship. There was no necessity, therefore, for his assembling such an array of quotations in support of a doctrine which I maintain perhaps more strongly than himself, since I have declared that I know there is a purgatory. The question, however, is whether it can be proved that souls in purgatory acquire merit and increase in grace. But let us go over his statements in turn.

First, he said that by the passages quoted yesterday I had proved that merit is acquired only in this life, that I had, therefore, excluded the possibility of this in the future life, by which he understands purgatory, and consequently makes the passages apply to purgatory. I, however, grant it of the future life, either in Heaven or Hell. He also quoted the Encheiridion where Augustine speaks of purgatory, and Jerome, who rebukes those who assert that souls, which have been stripped of the body, acquire merit. I admit both. He also
reproves me for having said that I was making this matter the subject of a disputation, and, as if I had no faith in it, that I had given it the imposing title of "a disputation against new and old errors", and had asserted that the views of the more recent theologians had no appearance of truth even to a fool, and that I had contemptuously called these mere dabblers in theology. I say again, however, as I said yesterday, that I still know nothing of the doings of souls and of purgatory, and that I call it wrong for people to venture to make assertions about things of which they know nothing, and give out, as indisputable articles of faith, opinions of the Fathers, such as St. Thomas, Bonaventura and such like, which they themselves (i.e. the Fathers) did not entirely maintain. These I call mere dabblers in theology, not theologians. Opinions are to be dealt with in the schools; the words and works of God are to be preached to the people. Psalm xix. 2: "The heavens declare the glory of God and the works of His hand". I do not, therefore, condemn the opinions of the excellent Fathers, but I resist those smiths, who out of the opinions of men forge us articles of faith. This does not become a good theologian.

Regarding my statement, in opposition to Augustine (lib. 18 cap. 36.), that the word Canon is used in a double sense, my authority is St. Jerome; also Eusebius, who in his history of the Church records the opinions of the ancients. Therefore such double sense still stands; for Augustine says
one thing, Jerome, with the more ancient writers, another of the Canon, and consequently no certainty is possible in argument based on such dissension. Whether the Prologue of Jerome numbers the Books of the Maccabees among the divine Writings, I do not recollect. I pass over what he said about the four gospels being admitted by the authority of the Church. For this will be another matter.

Next, he says that it is contrary to the Council of Florence to teach that purgatory finds no place in Scripture. I answer that a Council cannot make Scriptural what, by its nature, does not belong to Scripture, just as the Church could not have made Gospels, even if it had approved of them.

Accordingly let us look at the authorities (or proof texts). First, there is Psalm LXVI. 12: "We went through fire and water". I reply, that this does not support the doctrine of purgatory, for the words refer to the persecutions of the saints, just as in many other passages, for example: "Thou hast tried me with fire" (Psalm XVII. 3); likewise, "Try my reins and my heart" (Psalm XXVI. 2); also: "For a season, if need be, ye are in heaviness through manifold temptations, that the trial of your faith be much more precious than of gold which is tried by fire" (1. Peter 1. 6.f). and, in brief, it is a common figure of speech in Scripture that by "fire and water" understands tribulations.

They cling too much, therefore, to the letter and the syllable, which the distinguished Doctor charges me with doing, who take
fire to stand for purgatory.

Likewise, also, is it with the passage from Ecclesiastes about the man who goeth forth from prison and from chains to reign. Very obviously the text speaks of the variety of this conflicting world, inasmuch as, by a reversal of fortune, he, who is a servant, sometimes becomes king, and he, who is a king, becomes a servant. If, by these and similar passages, we are to contend against those who deny purgatory, we shall only bring ourselves and the Church into ridicule with our enemies; although, for my own part, I very readily admit all these and similar passages.

Similar, also, is the passage from Matthew V. (verse 25): "Agree with thine adversary lest he deliver thee to the tormentor", where, he says, Ambrose takes "prison" to stand for the place of purgatory. I am willing to let this pass. But, because other Fathers have interpreted it differently, especially Augustine, who understands it to refer to Hell, and as meaning that the soul that is there will never get out of it, the passage is of doubtful authority, so that, while it may suffice for believers, it is unconvincing to the adversary, to say nothing of the fact that the context does not even permit of its being understood as referring to purgatory, for it speaks of the adversary who agrees, and the adversary who continues at variance, and maintains that he who continues at variance sins culpably, and against the command of Christ; and this pertains not to purgatory but to Hell.
He says that Gregory's argument with which Bernard agrees, namely, that God forgives certain sins in the future world, is strong. I answer: Yes, to those who already believe, but not to unbelieving adversaries.

Next, he says that the text: "He himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire" (1. Cor.111.5), is very clear, and that Ambrose and Jerome, the ordinary gloss and the interlinear, likewise Gregory and Bernard, understand the apostle to speak of purgatory, although Augustine somewhere says that the words may be understood of the fire of this present world. I reply that so far is this text from being clear, that to-day I confess, after having examined it carefully, I am still unable, seeing that expositors interpret it so differently, to understand what Paul really means, although, for my own part, I am willing to let it refer to purgatory. But, since the apostle very clearly says that every man's work shall be tried by fire, and that in this fire the day of the Lord will be revealed, which shall manifest every man's work, and these are clear words— he seems, according to my poor judgment, to speak of the fire of the great conflagration and of the Last Judgment, or, as Augustine, who takes the words metaphorically, thinks, of the fire of temporal persecution, by which the faith, and the teaching of the faith, with everything built on these, are specially tried.

So far, then, nothing that will stand in
argument has been proved from Scripture concerning purgatory. I do not on that account consider the holy Fathers to be un instructed theologians (or dabblers in theology), for I believe with them in purgatory; nor have they given out their opinions and ignorant (suppositions) concerning the state of souls as articles of faith as do the dabblers in theology.

The Doctor wonders how I can know there is a purgatory, and not have a single passage of Scripture in support of my belief; for he is of opinion, as he tells us, that these most clear testimonies from Scripture are in support of the modern theologians (i.e. uninstructed theologians). I answer: It is not necessary to say how I know there is a purgatory, or anything else. Besides, these most clear passages are adduced in support of the doctrine of purgatory, but they tell us nothing of the state of souls in purgatory.

Regarding the passage from Ecclesiastes (XI.3): "In whatever place the tree falls, whether toward the south, or toward the north, there it shall be", which, according to the ordinary gloss, signifies: "The place, which thou hast prepared for thyself here thou shalt have hereafter", - I am at a loss to understand by what mental process it is quoted as bearing on the matter before us; for, if, by the place prepared and to be occupied hereafter, he understands purgatory, then one must remain for ever in purgatory. If, however, he understands by "what thou hast prepared here" what merit thou hast acquired here, then
he is not interpreting the text from Ecclesiastes XI, which does not speak of merit but of the death of man.

I pass over his reference to Christ's words: "In my Father's house are many mansions", and his inference that a certain mansion is assigned to the dying person, beyond which he is unable to ascend, for this is all in my support. I am quite aware that to every man a mansion is assigned after death; but he does not go to that mansion immediately after death, unless the Doctor understands the mansion in regard to purgatory, and thus he would exclude the dying from the eternal kingdom.

To his quotation from Damascenus: - "What the Fall was to the angels, death is to men", I reply: If, therefore, they fall after death into purgatory, it follows that they will undergo eternal purification, or one must interpret Damascenus, as also everything preceding, in regard to the two last mansions, namely, that of the damned and that of the blessed, and not of purgatory.

Likewise in regard to Eccles. lx.10 :- "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might, for there is no device nor understanding in the grave (regions beneath) whither thou goest". If he understands this of purgatory, then again purgatory becomes hell. Therefore the passage has no reference to purgatory.

Johannes Capistranus I willingly allow, but in a sense beyond our controversy.

He further says that the words of the apostle:"What
a man soweth in the flesh, that shall he reap" (Galat. VI. 7),
are against us, as also those of our Lord:- "The night
cometh when no man can work" (John Ix. 4), which Ambrose
interprets of the life of this present time when we acquire
merit. It is clear, that they contribute nothing to our
argument. For the apostle does not speak of purgatory but of
the Last Judgment. And, with all due respect to Chrysostom,
Christ understands by "the night" unbelief, as is clear from
the following verse:- "As long as I am in the world I am
the light of the world", meaning thereby that without faith in
Christ no one can work well. Nevertheless I let Chrysostom's
words pass, for he looks to the Last Judgment.

Regarding the passage from Psalm CIV. (v. 23): "Man
goeth forth unto his work until the evening", it may be applied
in a figurative sense to the life and death of a man; but
in its natural meaning, which alone counts in argument, it
speaks of the admirable ordering of God in thus appointing
that in the morning man goeth forth until the evening of the
natural day to his work. And Augustine (de fide ad Petrum,
Cap. 3) is rightly of the opinion that the time for acquiring
eternal life is given to men only in this life; for as I have
said, they look always to the future life, but not to
purgatory.

He also says that Jerome, writing on Galatians
VI. 5.:- "Every man shall bear his own burden", rightly shows
that men are helped by their merits (acquired) in this life,
but when they are called before the Judgment-seat, which takes place at death, neither Job, nor Noah, nor Daniel can stand for any man. I reply that this exceedingly strong testimony is against the distinguished Doctor, because, if it is true that man is called at death before the Judgment-seat, and then neither Job nor Noah nor Daniel can help him, then the Church prays in vain for the dead. And thus purgatory is denied. Therefore Jerome speaks of the Last Judgment, which takes place after the period spent in purgatory has come to an end.

He also quotes Bernard that a special judgment is held at the death of a man, and that this could not take place, if he had still an opportunity of acquiring merit. I answer: "However it may be regarding whatever about this special judgment, his Conclusion does not hold."

I say nothing of the quotation from Zechariah (14.7): "He will make grace equal to grace", because it is interpreted in a good figurative sense, but not according to its real meaning.

At the end of this section he says: Even if these testimonies were not so clear, this ought, nevertheless, to as a theologian restrain me, that thus, without authority and at my own will, since I am neither a judge nor the assessor of a judge, I would prolong to departing souls the period for acquiring merit. In like manner I retort on the Doctor that, whereas he himself is neither a judge nor the assessor of a judge, he
nevertheless, of his own will and without authority, assigns a certain state to souls, and I object especially since he will not have this to be a matter of mere opinion (which I would willingly let pass), but of certain knowledge.

The disputation is to be continued at 2pm.

2. p.m. of the same day.

D R. M A R T I N.

(Latin text pages 156 to 158).

Dr. Martin continues as follows:—Because the distinguished Doctor does not seem to have quite understood my views, I will set them forth, so far as I can, more clearly. They are that the Scriptures and the holy Fathers of old, in their declarations, look to a future life in which, without any thought of purgatory, souls are either saved or damned. Therefore all those authorities which deny the possibility of a state in which merit may be acquired after this life, have no bearing on the doctrine of purgatory. Where this still remains unrealised, a man practically denies that there is a purgatory, just as there was no thought of it in the minds of the Scripture-writers and the holy Fathers. All the passages quoted, therefore, will continue to stand as truth, namely, that the time for acquiring merit is before death. Next, I do not speak of the merits of souls in purgatory as if they (the souls) accomplished anything.
but that they receive more grace. For it is known to all
that sin, even a venial one, is not forgiven, unless grace be
increased and that St. Gregory (dialog.4) writes that sins
are forgiven in purgatory and that "dist.25 cap. Qualis" is
quoted. Nevertheless, I make this statement only as an
opinion, yea, as speaking in ignorance. To God alone is, I
believe, the state of souls in purgatory known.

To his third point, namely, the knowledge of souls
of their salvation, in support of which he quoted, first,
Revelation V. 3. :- "No one in heaven, nor on earth, nor
under the earth was found worthy to open the book", under-
standing by "under the earth" purgatory, in which, also, he
says, holy men, such as Paschasius and Severinus at times have
been:-

I reply that this gloss has no authority; there-
fore it may be repudiated as lightly as it is introduced. I
admit, indeed, that there have been saints in purgatory. I go
further and say that no one is in purgatory except he be a
saint. One might, therefore, in a contentious spirit say that
"under the earth" is the same as hell, or whatever else you
like, so that neither devils, men nor angels could open the
book, as it is said that the three ranks of beings (trina
rerum machina) worship God, and in the writings of the apostle,
that those in heaven, and those on earth, and those in hell
bend the knee; since also the devils tremble. Yea, as the
phrase is used in the same book (Revelation) "under the earth"
signifies also the dead, as in another chapter (xx. 13) St.
John writes: "Earth and Hades delivered up their dead".

Also, when he proceeds to quote the words: "They were all singing in heaven and on earth and under the earth" and adds that the despairing cannot sing, I answer: I have never said that souls despair; but only that, since according to the teaching of the Church the punishment of hell and purgatory is the same, they were like to those who despair, just as we also read that some in this life have been tempted to despair, as in many passages in the Psalms: - "Turn not Thy face from me, lest I become like them that go down into the pit" (xxvii.9, xxviii.1). Therefore, to sing to the Lord is not always to rejoice and be glad; on the contrary, the new song is a song of the Cross; that is, to praise and have God in the heart in the midst of tribulation, yea, in death itself.

Under his third head he also quotes the Canon of the Mass, where, in praying for the dead, we say: "They sleep the sleep of peace and rest in Christ". He does not see, however, he tells us, how they can be said to sleep the sleep of peace, if they are in such perturbation, trembling and disquietude. Therefore he interprets this sleep of peace by saying that they await with confidence the end of their purification. I answer that this interpretation does not satisfy me, and that he proves one thing by another of the same nature. For, that they are in a state of disquietude, is proved by what follows in the Canon: "Give them, Lord, and all who rest in Christ, the place
of refreshing, of light and of peace", and by the petition which we all offer up in prayer: "Give them, Lord, eternal rest"; likewise: "Give them peace." This cannot be understood as meaning: "Give them to await with confidence the end of their purification", which the Doctor has interpreted to be peace. More correctly, therefore, according to my judgment, they rest in peace, only so far as the body is concerned. For to sleep in peace signifies, in the sacred Scriptures, to rest in the grave. And thus it is evident that the distinguished Doctor has not proved that they are sure of their salvation; yea, he abolishes, in a certain manner, the pains of purgatory, if he gives them peace.

DR. ECK.

(Latin text pages 158 to 163).

Because the time at our disposal is limited, seeing that we must finish this matter today, and since I cannot refute replies that have no bearing on the matter, and at the same time touch upon other points of purgatory, I mean to bring forward only a few, from which it will be easily seen that the reverend Father has avoided the main point of the matter, and run after secondary ones. When, therefore, I quoted, in the first place, Augustine, that all merit is acquired here, and that no one may hope after death to acquire credit with God, for what he has neglected here, when also I quoted Jerome to the same effect, he says that he agrees with both. But what extraordinary perverseness is it, after agreeing with Augustine that all merit
is acquired here, to say that grace is increased in souls even in purgatory.

Nor in the present matter does it avail him to say that the passages quoted do not speak of purgatory, for St. Augustine has said the same thing (as they do, i.e. that all merit is acquired here) in treating of the souls in purgatory, both in his Encheiridion and in his book "de cura pro mortuis agenda cap. 1." For after death we can effect nothing that will help us; we can only receive what we have done. For Augustine found himself in the dilemma - how our intercessions (suffragia) could help the dead, when they were not acquiring merit. He had recourse to this, namely, that they had already earned in life what helped them after death. To no purpose, therefore, has he (Luther) sought to instruct me concerning his meaning which I have understood quite well. Also his petty argument, that venial sins cannot be forgiven without increase of grace, has no weight with a Christian. Let the reverend Father prove this. For it is supported by no authority; on the contrary, it is false. For since, because of God's compassion, a venial sin is not offensive to God, there is no need of additional grace in order that it may be blotted out; it is enough if one suffer sufficiently for it.

Secondly, he defends his error. Because, however, I do not see a single letter quoted by the Father on behalf of his new doctrine, it must therefore be deservedly regarded as suspect, since the opinion of the more recent theologians
rests upon so many passages from holy Scripture and the
Fathers. And he does not make excuse for this by charging some
with making the opinions of Thomas or Scotus into articles of
faith, concerning which I know nothing. For I have not quoted
Thomas or Scotus, but the greatest lights of the Church together
with the Holy Scripture. Let him see, then, what sort of men
he accuses of being dabblers in theology.

Thirdly, he replies to Augustine regarding the
Books of the Maccabees by opposing to him the stronger
(testimony of) Jerome. But Jerome nowhere denies that the Books
of the Maccabees are recognised by the Church as being in the
Canon of the Bible; on the contrary, he constantly asserts
in his Prologue that they were given a place among the historical
books of the Sacred Volume. Therefore he (Luther) ought not
to put them on a level with the little works of the holy Fathers
in "Can. Sancta Romf (15 dist.)

When I opposed to him the Florentine Council, he
replied that a Council cannot make a thing belong to Scripture
which does not find a place in it. This indeed is true; but
what are we to think of him, when, with such rashness, he so
calumniates such an honourable Council as to insinuate that it
has decreed such a preposterous thing? But since there were in
the same Council some very learned men, I prefer to believe the
Council which was guided by the Holy Spirit, rather than Dr.
Luther; not that a Council can make anything belong to Scripture
which does not; but I believe that a Council has the sense and
meaning of Scripture when it decrees that that belongs to Scripture which is found in Scripture.

His excuse (or defence) is valueless that an interpretation can always be found, and that thus the text quoted has no weight in argument against the obstinate; for this would be the loophole of all heretics who are always able to bring forward some fanciful interpretation, by which they contend that the Catholic truths find no expression in Holy Writ. Thus even to this day the heresy of the perfidious Arius would endure, so that Homousia cannot be so clearly proved from the Sacred Writings but that the obstinate would evade it by some subterfuge or other.

Likewise we know quite well that the Church cannot make Gospels. Nevertheless, it was through the instrumentality of the Church that the Gospels of Nicodemus, Bartholomew, Thomas and others were repudiated, and we believe with unshakeable faith in four. In accepting these Gospels we must rest on the judgment of the Church. Likewise is it in regard to the understanding and interpreting of the Holy Scriptures.

Further, in accepting (i.e. in order to answer) the passages quoted by me at the beginning, he said there was no necessity for quoting them, since he himself also believed in purgatory. He did not mention, however, that out of all these passages, which limit the time for acquiring merit to this present life, he wanted to extricate himself, for purgatory (he says) cannot be proved from the Sacred Scriptures. This
dictum of his had, necessarily, to be refuted by me, lest the Picardians and other schismatics, who do not know, as does the Father, that there is a purgatory, should seize it for their support. We will consider only a few of these passages and dismiss the others.

He refuses to accept the word "prison" (Matt. V. 25) as meaning purgatory, because Augustine, as I am well aware, also understands by it "hell". I add to what the Father has told us, that Chrysostom understands by it, this present life. But the opinion of Ambrose, who by "prison" understands purgatory, is better, or at least not to be ridiculed. The words of Christ show this — "He will have to pay the last farthing". But in hell there is no paying, as there is no redeeming. Nor can the mistaken gloss of Ambrose, namely, that he who is to be thrust into prison has committed a deadly sin, move us to reject his interpretation, since men are punished in purgatory both for venial and for deadly sins, even though they repent of them. This we learn from the Book of the Maccabees, where the writer says: "It is a holy and comforting thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from their sins". For those, who had been killed, and for whom Judas Maccabaeus offered sacrifices, had committed deadly sin in appropriating the idols as their spoil, although they were supposed to have repented when they were cut down, according to the ordinary gloss on the passage, and the words of the Psalm (LXXVIII. 34): "When He slew them, then they sought Him".
Fourthly, when I quoted that most clear passage from the apostle Paul (1. Cor. iii. 12 ff) which Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, Gregory, Bernard, Isidorus, as also the ordinary gloss, understand of the fire of purgatory, the reverend Father confessed that he did not have the true meaning of this passage. Having repudiated so many Fathers, he therefore brought forward a new interpretation, namely, that the apostle spoke of the fire of the last conflagration, because he mentioned the day of the Lord, and said that the fire would try every man's work. I, who have always heard that one ought specially to believe the ancient Fathers, highly approve of the opinion of the holy Fathers, and do not accept this new interpretation and the words of Luther, except he prove it from Holy Scripture. Nor does what he dwells upon in this connection, which also the holy Fathers have no doubt read, help. For, although the day of the Last Judgment is specially called the day of the Lord, as also Bernard recalls, nevertheless, at the death of any man, when judgment takes place, that day may be called the day of the Lord, and there is no need for him to adopt so precise and sophistical an interpretation, as is the manner of the sophists, and take the word "everyone" in the widest sense. On the contrary, let him take it as applying to those who have built; stubble, wood, hay, just as also Augustine restricts the distribution in John 1.(v.9): "Which lighteth every man that cometh into the world". Therefore the apostle's word remains irrefutable, that those who build on wood, hay, stubble are saved, nevertheless, through
purgatorial fire, that thus no evil remain unpunished.

To the passage from Ecclesiastes about the fall of the tree he replies: "If it refers to purgatory, the conclusion is that the soul remains forever in purgatory". I answer that the gloss judges quite correctly that by "tree" is to be understood man, as likewise Ezekiel (XIII. 6) designates the reasoning creature — "Every tree of paradise etc"; and that by the "fall" is to be understood death. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that the soul remains forever in purgatory. On the contrary; by the "south", as Jerome beautifully interprets the passage, is to be understood "good", by the "north", on the other hand, "evil and condemnation". Accordingly the Wise Man did not mean these places, but a state, that is to say, that at his fall (or death) a man is either good and thus will persevere (in goodness) without increase of grace because of sin having been blotted out, or he is bad and will continue in wickedness.

Regarding the mansions (John XIV. 2), he said that immediately after death a certain mansion is assigned to the soul. But how can this mansion be fixed, if there be added more grace? For with the increase of grace there will, necessarily, follow a higher mansion. It would also follow that he, who entered purgatory with many venial sins, might fare better than he who entered it with few, or than he who died with none; for the increase of grace would grow according to the cancelling of many venial sins. Further, it would be wicked and reprehensible to pray for the dead, and it would be better for them if they
continued in the pains of purgatory for further increase of grace, as the reverend Father has somewhere written that the soul, that is liberated through the intercessions of others, is less blessed than if it had itself suffered sufficiently in purgatory. But this is not only contrary to the sacred word:—
"Holy, therefore, and comforting is the thought etc."; it is also contrary to the observance and devotion of the whole Church, which we ought to show to the dead, as St. Augustine beautifully sets forth in his book "de cura pro mortuis agenda", and in his Encheiridion.

Further, he replied to the quotation from Damascenus, that he (Damascenus) was not speaking of purgatory; for, if he were, then souls would remain for ever in purgatory. I also am of opinion that neither Damascenus nor the other authorities speak of purgatory, for otherwise they would be unfavourable to me and favourable to the Father. But since they speak of the present life, to which they limit the period for acquiring merit or laying up condemnation, the time for acquiring merit cannot be extended beyond the limit appointed, namely, death. Therefore I accept no other interpretation, than that which the author himself means, who, in the passage quoted, speaks of the limit of the period for acquiring merit.

In like manner also can I speak of others, and no one can rebuke me, as the reverend Father is to be rebuked, when I say on the authority of the holy Fathers and Sacred Scripture, that I shall finish my course and my opportunity for acquiring
merit when I die. He, however, without the slightest support from Holy Scripture, and contrary to the teaching of Augustine and Jerome, extends and prolongs the opportunity to them; although it suits his modesty to say that this, his opinion, is merely a conjecture; but then he ought not to call the opinion, that is opposed to him, an error.

Regarding the quotation from Jerome, that neither Noah, nor Job, nor Daniel can stand for any one after death, he has tried to turn it against me, because Jerome (he says) here speaks of the Last Judgment; which, however, he does not prove from the text. For not only at the Last Judgment, but also immediately after death, every man will bear his own burden.

Finally, he, proceeding to another point, replies to the passage from Revelation (V.3.ff), that by "under the earth" is to be understood "hell". But, then, what follows about the song cannot stand, for the devils and the damned do not sing, but blaspheme and howl. Therefore by "under the earth" is necessarily, purgatory, and not hell, to be understood. Although I do not deny that in Holy Writ mention is also made of the devils in hell, as for example by the apostle, when he speaks of those in heaven and those on earth and those in hell (bending the knee). But this is nothing to the purpose.

Moreover, he has added to the word "sing" this gloss, namely, that it is equivalent to carrying the cross and praising God in tribulation. I spurn the Father's fanciful interpretation of the passages as lightly as he brings it forward. Yea, the
words of John do not permit of such an interpretation; for he says: "They were singing in heaven, not on earth. But in heaven they do not carry the cross; neither do they praise in tribulation, for God has wiped away all tears from the eyes of the saints, and there is now no more pain etc.

But even if his interpretation were allowed to pass as being correct, though it is, nevertheless, contrary to the letter, still it would not settle the matter; for, praising God in tribulation after death (i.e. in purgatory), they would have the surest sign of their future bliss, since, in contrast to them, the "damned", their hatred of God having risen to the highest degree, would break forth in perpetual blasphemy against the Creator. Therefore, the souls that are to be purified sing with full assurance of their salvation, and praise God in expectation of the end of their purification.

When I quoted the Canon of the Mass, where it is asserted that they sleep the sleep of peace, he did not admit my conclusion, namely, that if they sleep the sleep of peace, then they are confident of their salvation, and are not in trembling, terror, and fear, and, so to speak, despair. He gave two reasons for not doing so: (1) because there follows the prayer: - "Grant them a place of refreshing, light and peace"; (2) this further prayer frequently repeated: "Lord, give them eternal rest", and, "Give them peace". Therefore, he offered another interpretation, namely, that the sleep of peace refers only to the body. I am not satisfied, however, either with his
Objection nor with his new interpretation, which has neither plausibility nor reason. For the Canon says: "Remember those who sleep the sleep of peace", and beneath "and all who rest in Christ". It does not say: "Who rest in the grave". Further, what does it matter to the soul whether the body has peace or not, whether it be tossed about on the sea, or torn by beasts, as St. Augustine testifies. And what man admits that a lifeless and powerless body sleeps in peace? Therefore, while he objects to the distinctions that are made by the modern theologians, he nevertheless conspicuously distinguishes here between the peace of the body and the peace of the soul.

Therefore, we must follow the better interpretation, namely, that the souls that are to be purified both sleep in peace and rest in Christ. Such rest and peace, however, exclude disquiet of soul, terror and, so to speak, despair; since souls are in the highest state of disquietude, that are agitated by such perturbation of mind as to be, so to speak, in despair.

To what he has represented as being not so important (non impendio), we reply that we pray and supplicate God that he give them peace - not the peace which they already have, namely, assurance of salvation, but eternal peace; for there is a peace, as Bernard says, both from guilt and from misery. May God, then, give the souls in purgatory peace from the penalties of sin, as He has given them grace against sin.

Therefore it still remains certain and irrefutable truth that souls in purgatory do not despair of salvation.
To my statements the distinguished Doctor replies from Augustine, who says that all merit is acquired here; also, when dealing with purgatory, that we receive after death only what we have worked for. My answer is brief:—"Then either there is no purgatory, or purgatory is simply what a man receives for his past life." It is therefore evident that Augustine is not to be understood as speaking of purgatory. For souls have not ordered their life in the past that they may receive purgatory. Although this passage is also in my support, namely, that the merit, by which they deserve to be helped, they have earned here. But I confess that I cannot understand how souls are helped in purgatory, and how they are liberated, without some gift of grace, by the mere removal of punishment. Let him understand it, who can.

Next, he says, it is not true that venial sins are not forgiven without increase of grace.

When, therefore, the Doctor maintains that venial sins can be forgiven without increase of grace, I refuse to allow his statement until he prove it. Indeed, it is contrary to the clear words of Scripture (Romans VII.14. ff and Galat. V.17), where the apostle writes: "I am sold under sin; who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" He answers: "The grace of God through Jesus Christ." But it is certain that the apostle was not living in deadly sin. The rest I leave to a future disputa-
tion between Dr. Andrew and Dr. John Eck. This also is
also-is erroneous, namely, that venial sin is not offensive to God, since everything that is impure is displeasing unto God, and He rejects him who breaks the least (commandment) (Matt. V. 18 ff.). And the Doctor has not proved it is enough that they only suffer sufficiently.

Secondly, he accuses me of not having quoted a single letter in support of my opinion, whereas he himself has quoted in support of that of the more recent theologians so many passages from Scripture and from the Fathers. I answer: The more he multiplies his quotations the more I hold his opinion as suspect, for, as I have already sufficiently shown, he has dragged them forward by hairs and twisted their meaning (obtorto collo.). He sins less who hesitates in his opinions than he who tries to confirm his questionable opinions by God's Word.

He also says that he does not know who they are who have made articles of faith out of mere opinions of Thomas and others; for he has quoted the lights of the Church together with Holy Writ. He therefore admonishes me to give heed to whom I call dabblers in theology. I have already said today and I say it again: I admit that opinions are but opinions, and I hold no man at fault for this; but to twist a passage of Scripture so as to give it a meaning contrary to its sense for the purpose of supporting what are mere opinions, and to obstinately persist in doing so—this, I say, is the office of your false theologians.

Regarding his other point, the Canon of Scripture, where, supporting his argument on the authority of Jerome and the
Council of Florence, he prefers to believe the Council which was guided by the Holy Spirit, rather than me, I return him thanks. For he has a devout mind; I have also never desired that anyone believe in me. But I answer briefly: Let him first reconcile with himself Jerome, who in Prolog. Gal. clearly numbers the Books of the Maccabees and several others among the Apocrypha. By doing this he makes the Books of the Maccabees dear and pleasing unto me, but in contentious matters easily discarded. I have to-day already said enough of the Council; yea, as the Doctor himself says: "A Council does not err; moreover if it errs, it is not a Council". And, that I may speak according to my own ideas, I believe that a Council and the Church never err in matters that pertain to the faith; in other matters, however, they are not necessarily free from liability to err.

But when he exclaims that this is the refuge of heretics, by resorting to which they are able to refute or accept whatever interpretations of authorities they please, I answer:- Why have not St. Augustine, Jerome and other most successful vanquishers of the heretics complained of this? But instead they have put aside ambiguous passages and sought to contend only with those that are clear and unmistakeable in their meaning. Let us do the same regarding the souls in purgatory.

But to the main point and the authorities.

Regarding the interpretation of the passages he has said that Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose, Bernard, Gregory, Isidorus, together with the ordinary gloss, are repudiated by me. He has said this in accordance with Eccian moderation, or rather offensiveness,
for he has shown himself too eager to stir up ill-will against me. I have said it already today, and I say it again that they are not despised by me.

Regarding his refusal, however, to accept my interpretation - that is a matter of indifference to me. Let him first prove his own, since the text is clear regarding the day of the Lord and regarding the fire in which the day of the Lord will be revealed. This, indeed, may be referred to purgatory, as I have said; and thus I have not repudiated the Doctor's opinion, namely, that there is a purgatory. Nevertheless, the mouth of the contentious (or obstinate) cannot be stopped by such an interpretation.

Likewise I have not ridiculed the opinion of Ambrose regarding the word "prison" (Matt.V.25). But when the Doctor goes on to say that the words of Christ indicate that we are to pay till the last farthing, and therefore it is not to be understood as meaning hell, I answer that this has been sufficiently refuted by St. Jerome, who (adversus Helvidium) correctly interprets the word "till" in a manner that does not require it to mean what Ambrose and the Doctor understand by it here; for thus also it is written (of Joseph) in Matthew 1. (v.26): "He knew her not till she had borne her son"; and nevertheless it does not follow that he knew her after His birth. In like manner it does not follow here that he shall come out after payment, but that he has to pay and shall not come out.
Moreover, when he argues that the man, who continues at variance with his enemy, has not committed a deadly sin, and that also deadly sins, if repented of, as also venial sins, are removed in purgatory, I reply that the text does not speak of deadly sins that have been repented of; for a deadly sin repented of is no longer a deadly sin, and a penitent man is no longer at variance with his enemy. Christ, therefore, speaks of a man who is at variance with his enemy and obstinately remains so.

I pass over the passage from Ecclesiastes about the fall of the tree, where he quotes Jerome as understanding by the "south" the state of the good, and by the "north" the state of the wicked. I allow both interpretations; but this has nothing to do with purgatory.

Regarding the certain mansion in St. John, he argues thus: How can it be certain (or fixed) if there be an increase of grace, and if to him who receives such increase a higher mansion is due? But one might argue in like manner of any believer after baptism to whom from all eternity a certain mansion is set apart or prepared.

Next, the life of those in purgatory is so ordered that thus they come to the appointed mansion. Also from the human argument is no conclusion to be drawn such as would make it follow that he who enters purgatory with many venial sins would fare better than he who entered it with few (i.e. because grace would be increased in him). If this argument holds good, then
it is to be feared that a prostitute would be in a better state than a virgin. As if there were not different grades of souls in purgatory! since he himself to-day has told us there are saints in purgatory who excel others in godliness.

Next he quotes the argument of Sylvester that it would be for the advantage of souls to continue in the pains (of purgatory), for thus also would it be profitable to the martyrs to die and to suffer till the day of judgment. As if the Docotr did not know that punishment is appointed to souls for a certain period! For it is not a reprehensible thing to pray for the dead, just as it was not reprehensible in the apostle to pray for himself and desire others to pray for him, while, nevertheless, his strength would be increased in his weakness. Therefore every believer ought to pray for every need of every other believer, and help him, notwithstanding that through such need he may merit more and more.

By this, also, I claim to have answered the objection that I spoke contrary to the observance and piety of the Church, when I said that a soul that is liberated through the intercession of others is less blessed, than if it had itself sufficiently suffered in purgatory. This he drew as a corollary from my words, when I gave it as my opinion, that souls are to be helped, however much more perfect the nature of their merit might be by satisfying in every manner the divine justice.

I pass over Damascenus and his limitation of the period for acquiring merit, and refer you to what I have already said.
Likewise, he objects against me that, without adducing any authority in my support, I prolong the period for acquiring merit, whereas he, in limiting that period, has a multitude of authorities behind him. I answer that he also, as I have already shown, has none in his support, except what he has violently torn from their context.

Also, thinking to trip me in my speech, he says that I have called my opinion merely a conjecture, and that I have therefore no right to call one that is opposed to it an error. I answer as before:—I not only call my opinion a conjecture but also ignorance; likewise I have not called the conjecture that is opposed to it an error; I have called only this an error, namely, that a conjecture should be given forth as absolute truth.

Next he says that the passage from Jerome regarding Noah, Job and Daniel, does not apply only to the Last Judgment, and that I cannot prove from the text that it does. I will leave this to the judgment of a wiser man, for the text expressly says that neither Noah, nor Daniel, nor Job can help a man with their prayers, once he has been dragged before the judgment-seat, which takes place at death. This certainly is to be understood of the Last Judgment; at any rate it is not to be understood of purgatory, because Noah, Job and Daniel, and the whole Church pray for the dead in purgatory.

Regarding the quotation from the Apocalypse he rightly says that the devils under the earth do not sing, but blaspheme etc.
As the disputation had already lasted two hours, and the time was up, Dr. Martin proposed to put the rest in writing for the notaries, and first to show it to Dr. Eck. Accordingly he put forward the following through his notary.

I am well aware that the devils in hell do not praise but blaspheme; but it does not therefore follow that by "under the earth" we are to understand purgatory, in which souls sing. First, because they are in tribulation and suffering punishment, and God has not yet wiped away all tears from their eyes. The Doctor, however, denies that to praise God in tribulation is to sing. Therefore he contradicts himself in bringing praise into purgatory under the earth, and, at the same time, punishment, in which they do not praise. But I also deny that souls therefore sing because they have an un-mistakeable sign of their salvation. For this unmistakeable sign was to be proved. Next I did not say that by "under the earth" is to be understood only hell, but also whatever else is under the earth, in all which praise abounds to God, for all things are full of the glory and praise of God, who is to be praised in all His works. Moreover, the Doctor must not only understand by "under the earth" purgatory, but also a fourth place by "under the sea", since in the same chapter (Revelation V) we also have the words: "Under the sea and all that is therein". More correctly, therefore, we believe that in this four-fold classification all creatures are to be
I have said that to praise God in tribulation is to sing; and I prove that this is not, as the Doctor asserts, a fancy of my own creation; for in Romans V.3. we read: "We glory in tribulations also"; and in Psalm XLII.8 : "In the daytime the Lord has commanded (or promised) His loving kindness, and in the night (i.e. in tribulation) His song"; and in James V.13. : "Is anyone sad, let him pray with a quiet mind and sing psalms"; also in Psalm XXXIV.1 : "I will bless the Lord at all times". The Psalmist says: "at all times"; that is, also in time of adversity. On the other hand, the man is censured of whom it is written in Psalm XLIX.19. : "He will acknowledge (i.e. praise) Thee, when Thou dost good unto him". I confess, however, that I have not said this concerning the damned under the earth, but to refute the opinion of the Doctor, who maintains that "to sing" is to be understood as referring only to assurance of salvation in purgatory.

Regarding the Canon of the Mass, he is not satisfied with my statement that "to sleep in peace" refers to the body, because the Canon says "those resting in Christ", not "those resting in the grave"."Moreover," he says: what does it matter matter to the soul whether the body is tossed in the sea or in the air, and is not at rest?" Likewise he adds: " who would say that a lifeless body sleeps in peace?" I answer: All this subtlety amounts to nothing, for those who rest in the grave, or whose bodies are anywhere being tossed about, nevertheless.
rest in Christ, — that is, according to the Revelation of St. John (C.14. v.13): "They rest from their labours", that is, because the soul, being separated from the body, no more struggles in the body with the various trials of life. Moreover, how will he deny that Christ's body slept in peace in the sepulchre and rested in God, since Scripture in so many places thus speaks of Him and the Church sings: "I will both lay me down in peace and sleep" (Psalm lV.9) and "My flesh also shall rest in hope" (Psalm XVI. 9). Likewise Revelation XIV.13.: "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord"; as also Acts VII. (v.59) of Stephen: "He fell asleep in the Lord", which without doubt is spoken, according to the figurative language of Scripture, of bodily death. If, according to Eck, a lifeless body does not sleep, yet let him grant, I beseech, that it sleeps in God who will awaken it, and in the Scripture which testifies to this.

Finally, he says we are to pray for their peace, not that which they already have, but that which falleth to the purified, that is, peace from the misery of their punishment. I answer: This is to beg the question; for the peace of assurance which (he assumes) they have, has not yet been proved. Consequently they are still undergoing punishment, and we are to pray that they may be delivered from this and attain to peace.

I have thought it right to say all this in order to show that I know nothing of what God does in purgatory, and
that they are too bold, who, impatient of such ignorance, choose rather to form conjectures than to admit their ignorance. My own beliefs I am unable to prove, but neither can they prove theirs. My "Conclusion", therefore, very properly asserts only this, namely, that neither by Scripture nor by argument has it been proved that souls, at least all souls, are certain of their salvation, and that grace is not increased in them. Let it suffice that we know they suffer and that we ought to help them. The rest must be left to God.

These matters were transacted in the presence of the honourable Johannes Teuber Weysmann and Bartholomæus Schaller Ernfriedsdorfensis, Bambergensis et Misnensis dioecesis, specially required and called as lay witnesses to the above statements. 10th July, at or about the hour of noon, in the usual place of disputation.

11th July, 7 a.m.

D R. E C K.

(Latin text pages 169 to 171)

Dr. Eck presented the following written reply:-

The answer of the reverend Doctor seems to me insufficient, especially in that he says that Augustine does not speak of purgatory, whereas he particularly deals with this same matter. Nor is it to be denied that the souls of the departed are helped by the piety of their relatives who are still alive,
when the sacrifice of the Mediator is offered on their behalf, or alms are given in Church. These things, however, help only those, who, while they were alive, deserved that they should afterwards be of help to them. For there is a manner of life that is neither so good as not to require such things after death, nor so bad as not to be helped by them after death. Therefore all merit by which a man's state may be alleviated or aggravated after this life is acquired here. Go then, Luther, and say that Augustine here did not speak of purgatory.

Next, he does not prove that for the removal of venial sins an increase of grace is required. I admit that an increase of grace sometimes removes venial sin, but it is also removed by a sufficiency of suffering (satispassione). Therefore the apostle quoted from Romans VII. (v.14.ff.) does not speak of venial sin; and even if he did speak of it, he would not exclude sufficient suffering. But of his acquiescence I say nothing at present, as it does not come under the matter before us. I admit that venial sin is offensive to God, but not in a manner that rules out forgivenness, for it does not make a man hated of God nor does it make him the enemy of God, which, besides, would be incompatible with grace. Therefore souls do have venial sins in purgatory, without, however, enmity towards God (or the enmity of God).

He prates about my having dragged my authorities by hairs and twisted their meaning to support my argument. But may I perish, if, in the whole disputation, he has quoted even a
single passage so pertinent to the matter, as I have done here. But let the judges judge of this; not Luther.

He angrily asks why also Augustine and Jerome have not discussed this hiding-place of the heretics of which I have spoken. Good God! As if Augustine did not everywhere cry out against the Pelagians, and Cyprian and Ambrose against the Arians and Novatians, that they interpreted the sacred Scriptures according to their own pleasure!

He demands that I prove my opinion, when he is, nevertheless, unable to prove his own. Mine, however, which I have proved, I leave to the judgment of the judges.

Regarding the word "till", the argument of Jerome to Helvidius is different, because it is proved from other passages of Scripture that Mary always remained a virgin. Therefore "till" in this passage does not mean till the final reckoning (consumationem), which, indeed, it cannot do here.

Regarding my arguments, I do not intend, for the sake of brevity, to delay over them. When, however, he said that I had made it clear from his words, that the souls which are liberated by the intercessions of the living, are less blessed, he does me an injustice; for neither do I deal in idle fancies. For it will be found in the elucidation of my remarks, that Paschalidis did not wish his rewards to be diminished, and that therefore he preferred to be burned. But I let this pass and leave it to the judges.
Further, I do not deny that anyone in tribulation may praise God; but it cannot be understood thus here, since He (the Spirit) says that they sing in heaven, when God has wiped away all their tears. From this it will be clear to the reader how he perverts my meaning. Therefore the souls in purgatory sing unto God, according to John; and I ask him to explain why they are uncertain of glory. Therefore he most falsely pretends that I contradict myself. Accordingly I do not deny that the good glory in tribulation and sing, but I did deny the gloss which he devised, namely, that to sing is equivalent to praising God in tribulation, for then the angels and the saints in heaven would not be singing unto God.

Next he seeks to defend this most obvious error, namely, that souls sleep the sleep of peace so far as their body etc., inasmuch as the soul that is separated from the body is free from the various trials that attach to existence in the body. But see his artfulness; for, whereas in answering he referred to the body which rests in the grave, he now transfers to the rest of the soul from the trials of bodily existence. But listen, dear friend! is this to rest from labour, namely, to suffer trials no longer in the body, nevertheless, to suffer incomparably greater trials without the body, that is, in the soul? What does it help, if I have rest from fever and am tortured by gravel?

Regarding the rest of Christ - that is another matter;
for in it He waited for the resurrection, without seeing corruption. Blessed therefore are they who die in the Lord. But who will regard the body as blessed, except the soul return again to the body? Thus, also, is it in regard to St. Stephen, who fell asleep in the Lord.

Next he says that I am beginning the question when I say: "They are in peace, and nevertheless, we pray for their peace". But because it is ridiculous that the peace, which they already have, refers to the body, it follows that there is in the soul assurance of its salvation.

When he says that he cannot prove his own beliefs, he speaks, I think, most truly. Others, however, do prove their beliefs, although a stubborn and self-opinionated person might not be satisfied even with conclusive proof, but continue to cry out that it is no proof, as did Gregory Arimin, and Petrus Aliacensis against Aristotle's "Rationes de primo motore" (7 and 8 Physicorum). Therefore I conclude with the common belief that grace is not increased in purgatory and that souls have assurance of salvation.

On 11th July, 2 o'clock.

The disputation on INDULGENCES begins.

D R. ECK.

(Latin text pages 171 to 173).

First of all, before entering on this disputation on
Indulgences, I protest that it is not my mind or intention to contravene, in my contribution to it, the commands of the Pope, in which, in the decree beginning "Cum postquam", he enjoins that no one shall preach or defend what contradicts certain points regarding Indulgences, under pain of excommunication; but that it is rather my intention to defend the truths approved in the same decree. With this preface I proceed to the 11th Conclusion which is to be opposed.

To say that Indulgences are useful to Christians is to say what is true and pious; for Indulgences are not a vice (or the bane) of good works; therefore it does not seem to me to have been well said, that they, who affirm this (i.e. that Indulgences are useful) are mad. That Indulgences are helpful to Christians is proved by this, namely, that the Church does not err in matters of faith and concern the salvation of souls. Yea, as St. Cyprian says, God does not permit the greater part of the clergy to err. Now, for 300 years, Indulgences have been regarded by General Councils and by the entire body of clergy as useful for and pious in Christians. This was evident in the Council of Vienna, when the Indulgences granted by Urbanus IV. for reverence of the Holy Eucharist were approved. For the Council added this powerful argument, namely, that the faithful of Christ might be better prepared to render to the Sacrament the reverence and honour that are its due.

In like manner did Innocent III. in the General
Council where he issued the most useful decree "Omnis Utriusque", which was received by the whole Church, deal also with the Indulgences of the Hospitallers, saying: "We enjoin on you for the remission of sins, that, of the good gifts (or properties) conferred on you, ye render them kindly and loving help, so that by your aid their lack may be supplied, and ye, by these and other good deeds which the Lord shall inspire you to do, may attain to eternal joy".

Likewise in the same Council the power of the lesser prelates to grant Indulgences was limited and this was afterwards approved by the Council of Lyons. But if Indulgences were a vice of good works and of no use to Christians, what would have been the good of limiting in the case of the lesser prelates the power to grant what is the bane of good works, and conferring it on those of the highest rank?

To this there is to be added that the honourable Council of Constance, which condemned, among other errors, the neglect of Indulgences, granted Indulgences to all who attended the Council and fasted on Saturday (feria sexta); which would have been to taint and spoil the good works of so many and great Fathers. And Gerson, whom the reverend Father calls an excellent theologian, inasmuch as he was devoted to truth and honour, gave it as his opinion, that the granting of Indulgences was not to be lightly esteemed or despised, but devoutly embraced in the faith, hope and charity of our Lord Jesus Christ, who gave to men this power
of the keys of the Church. For, he says, it is certain that a work, that rests upon such Indulgences, is more profitable and more acceptable unto God, than another that does not thus rest, although it be otherwise good. Thus Gerson.

Such also was the opinion of other holy and eminent men at the time that Indulgences were granted; and these were also granted by St. Gregory 900 years ago, and by Paschasius 600 years ago. Therefore the authority of such a Father alone ought to incline every Christian to believe that Indulgences are helpful to Christians, although I am aware that William Altisiodorensis relates that there were not lacking those who, even in the lifetime of St. Gregory, opposed the same holy Father in regard to Indulgences.

Further, this is to be added: If Indulgences are detrimental to a vice of good works (or indicate a failure in good works), then, in my opinion, we may infer that they are works of satisfaction. But by a work of satisfaction we do not merit less than we would do if it were not a work of satisfaction. Otherwise it would be better that we did no works of satisfaction, lest in such a state we should diminish our merits. But as we sow in blessings, so also shall we reap in blessings. Nevertheless, I will hear what the reverend Father has to say. To this may be added the extraordinary unanimity of the whole of Christendom in the Jubilee years celebrated by popes such as Boniface, Clemens VI., Urbanus VI., Nicholas V., who was a most upright and learned pope, Sixtus IV.; also
that, with the general approval of the most Christian kings 
and princes, the Pope frequently granted plenary Indulgences 
for crusades and pilgrimages.

Since, therefore, the faith of the Church is unfailing, 
for which faith Christ prayed (Luke xxiii.) that it might not fail, and promised (Matthew xxviii. 20) that He would be with us always, even till the end of the world, it is not to be admitted that the Church has erred for so long time to the destruction of souls; and because the decrees of the Popes must be accepted by all who are in communion with the Holy Church, as Gregory says in "Can. Praeceptis" (12th section.), as also in "Can. Omnia decretalia" (25. quaest.1) and in many other similar passages (concordantibus), and because the present Pope has decreed, on pain of excommunication, that indulgences are useful for removing the punishment due to the sins of those who in love are members of Christ, and that such remission is, as it were, made up for from the merits of Christ and the saints through the power of the Pope, I want every Christian believer to be firmly persuaded that Indulgences are not a vice of good works, and that he, who says that Indulgences are useful, is not mad, which would be nothing else than saying that all the clergy of the Church have now for so long time been mad.
The distinguished Doctor assails my 11th Conclusion with twelve arguments. But before I reply to these, I must first explain what I said about its being madness to hold that Indulgences are good to the Christian and that they are a vice of good works. I say, therefore, that, when the Prophet (Psalm XL. 85) makes bold to call false (teaching) a mad thing, and regards (Psalm CXIX. 85) as the discourse of the godless the doctrines of men, which are not evil in themselves, except that they cause among the foolish an evil confidence against the justice of God, how much more is it madness to say that Indulgences, which are neither enjoined nor recommended, nor are necessary for salvation, yea, rather are exemptions from many good works, are to be held as good for Christians, since everything that is good for us and necessary for salvation is comprehended in the precepts and counsels (of the Gospels). Yea, I say further: Since, according to the testimony of Ezechiel and the apostle Paul (Romans VII. 11. ff), the most wholesome law of God is not beneficial to man, but on the contrary an occasion of stumbling, and grace alone is helpful to a Christian, how much less ought Indulgences, which cannot in the least be compared with the goodness (or power) of grace, not to mention that of any law, since they are nothing and a spoiler—or indicate a lack of good works—to be considered as beneficial? Not, however, that I deem them harmful or pernicious, as we will show.
When, therefore, the distinguished Doctor says, first, that the Church does not err in matters of faith, or in what concerns the salvation of souls, he speaks rightly; but such are not Indulgences, as we have already said.

Moreover, when Cyprian says that God does not permit the greater part of the clergy to err, let him (Eck) look to what he said. It is certain that, at the time of the Arian perfidy, the greater part both of the most eloquent bishops and the most learned men did err in a most important article of faith, and to such a degree, that almost no Catholic bishop could remain in his Chair.

When he says that in the General Councils, and for a period of 300 years, Indulgences were regarded as useful for, and pious in, Christians, and approved of by the Council of Vienne, and that Urbanus IV. bestowed them for the purpose of awakening reverence for the Holy Eucharist among believers, I answer that I never denied that Indulgences are useful, but they are not to those who are Christians, that is, to those who live fervently, and, according to their name, love and seek after Christ; for by such exemption from good works is not desired; rather do they desire that these be laid upon them. Also I say that in such matters we must have regard to the personality neither of Council nor of Pope, but to what they say, especially since such an error as this about Indulgences, inasmuch as they are not a matter of necessity, is not dangerous, if everything else be right, that is, if men know
that they are not necessary, and do not depend upon them.

(2). Concerning the General Council and Innocent III., who, regarding the ordering of the institutions of the Hospitallers, enjoined that, for the remission of sins, they render kindly help etc., I say that to this hour I do not understand the words of the Pope, since the remission of sins seems to me an entirely different matter from Indulgences; and if they are the same (co-ordinated), I reply as above.

(3). Regarding the Council of Lyons, in which, he says, the limitation of the power of the lesser prelates to grant Indulgences was approved, I am in entire agreement with the Doctor. But to what follows, namely, that if they were useless, it would not have been necessary to restrict in the case of the lesser prelates the power of conferring what is the bane of good works, I answer that Indulgences were called by me the bane or vice of good works because the Doctor attacked me in regard to the 42nd Conclusion in my Resolutions, where I said: Not that Pardons are in themselves wrong and harmful, but that the perverse abuse of them is harmful, since men would not do such a work (i.e. the giving of alms etc) except for the Pardons. For thus the Pardon becomes the end of such a work, and it is very evident that men would rarely contribute unless Indulgences were promised. Therefore there is at least always the danger here of a good work being done in a wrong spirit.
(4). He has quoted the praiseworthy Council of Constance, which condemned, among other errors, the neglect of Indulgences. I answer: I have never despised these, or taught that they are to be despised, unless contempt be understood in the sense that one can do incomparably better things with the money with which Indulgences are purchased, yea, even than are the Indulgences themselves. Therefore this preference for the better does not mean contempt of the lower, just as to prefer gold does not mean to despise wood or hay, although it is more valuable.

(5). When he quotes Gerson, that the granting of Indulgences is not to be despised, I add: Yes, in its own way; or, as he himself has said, if everything else is right (ceteris paribus). And I do not think that this statement can be entirely pleasing to the Doctor, namely, that Indulgences are to be received in faith, hope and charity, since he holds that satisfaction is fulfilled and discharged even in those who are without grace. I might also admit that, if everything else was right, the work that rests on Indulgences is more profitable than another which does not, if only these other things come properly under comparison; just as I do not deny that a single "Pater Noster" or a layman may be better than all the canonical prayers of a priest.

(6). He states that Gregory, 900 years ago, and Paschasius, 600 years ago, had already granted Indulgences, although, according to the account of William Altisiosorensis,
there were some who opposed St. Gregory, I answer that I have so far come across no credible history of the Gregorian Indulgences. But however that may be, it does not therefore follow, that Indulgences are anything else than Indulgences, that is, the remission of good works, which, certainly, no one can call good for Christians, no matter how many saints, Councils, or whoever else may have granted or approved of, them. Let the Doctor, therefore, proceed against me, not only with the names of authorities, but also according to the right and truth of the matter itself.

(7). He supposes that Indulgences are a vice of good works, (or indicate a failure of good works) because they are works of satisfaction. I say, however, that they are not works of satisfaction, but a remission of satisfaction, and are not to be regarded as works of satisfaction. According to this argument, therefore, they are wrongly compared with works of satisfaction. As if our merits were diminished, if Indulgences were left out! Rather is the opposite of this the truth, namely, that our merits are increased when Indulgences are left out.

(8). He says that the Jubilee year of Boniface VIII, Clemens VI, Urbanus VI, Nicolaus V, Sixtus IV etc., was unanimously accepted by the faithful. I answer: Who knows whether it was thus unanimously accepted? Nor is Boniface held in such esteem, that anything he did must straightway be regarded as good, especially in a matter such as this that is neither good
nor necessary for salvation. For he has also perpetrated other monstrosities, which have furnished a bad example in necessary things.

(9). To his statement that the Roman Popes, with the approval of the most Christian kings and princes, granted Indulgences for pilgrimages etc., I answer as before, that it is not to be wondered at, that God despises such things, and permits to be done or happen what has no connection with salvation. Nevertheless, in these things He watches over us, that He may teach us what is profitable, as the apostle (Titus iii. 8) says, that is, His precepts and counsels.

(10). He argues that the faith of the Church is unfailing, and that Christ is continually with us; therefore it is impossible that during such a long time the Church could have erred to the destruction of souls. I answer: The whole Church has not erred; and even supposing She should err in such trifling matters (I speak always of Christians), there would be no danger, provided the faith remained uninjured. That there should be diversity of opinion, and error, in temporal matters does not destroy the Church. He contends that the decrees of the Roman Popes are to be accepted. I answer: Without doubt they are to be accepted, yet with judgment, as it stands in dist. 19. Cap. Anastasius: "For the Roman Popes were men, and had men for their counsellors; consequently they could err". Further, there is no decree that enjoins that Indulgences are to be bought, nor up till the present day is
there anything which plainly declares the worth of Indulgences.

Finally, concerning the enactment of the present Pope, namely, that Indulgences are profitable and accepted because of the merits of Christ and the saints, I answer: He does not satisfactorily express, nor does he prove even in a single syllable what he says. Of this I have written at length in my "Acta Augustensia". It does not, therefore, follow that all the clergy of the Church have for such a long time been mad, since there were always those who did not approve of Indulgences, and who, at least in private, spoke against them, as the common proverb testifies:—Indulgences are pious frauds.

D R. E C K.

(Latin text pages 177 to 182).

I have followed the reverend Father's statement, which in many points is milder and more moderate than the words of his "Conclusion" would have led me to expect, or his other writings seemed to signify. It is not my intention to defend the indiscreet proclamation of Indulgences or their abuse, but the truth, and to maintain the great good they may accomplish, when granted in a sensible manner. And that I may be brief, I am not to discuss the defence of his "Conclusion". Since he assumes, however, that Indulgences are not enjoined and are not necessary, we admit it. But in all this it seems, according to my poor judgment, that the trouble in our disagreement lies mainly in this, that the reverend Father holds that
Indulgences are nothing but the remission of good works. I do not recollect having come across this interpretation in the case of anyone who granted or who approved of Indulgences. For, viewed in this light, Indulgences would certainly be hurtful, dangerous, and an institution to be condemned; since thus the Councils and the Popes would be giving exemptions from good works, so that in such a case a man would either not merit the highest bliss, which is against the salvation of souls, or, being deceived by the remission of good works, men would be sent to purgatory that there they might suffer the penalty that had not been paid here, which certainly is highly reprehensible. Therefore all who grant or sanction Indulgences are unanimous that Indulgences are not the remission of good works, but the remission of the temporal punishment that is due and has not been suffered for sin that has been repented of. Thus Leo, the present Pope, expressly says in the aforesaid decree what Pope Sixtus IV. most clearly did before him at the time of his Jubilee.

Therefore I cannot admit what the reverend Father says in his "Resolutions" (see note) that Indulgences are given only to the indolent, or, as he also affirms in his sermon to the people, to those who are unwilling to fulfill the penitential canons (or the procedure prescribed for penitents). And yet he says in the same Resolutions that the penitential canons have been prescribed for the indolent, because otherwise earnest men would make their whole life

Note: An amplification of 95 theses, and sent to Pope.
an act of penitence. Therefore Indulgences would be a most unholy institution, if they were exemptions from good works.

In his reply he said, first, that Indulgences have nothing to do with the salvation of souls, since in this the matter of supreme importance assuredly is, whether they promote or hinder this salvation. It also concerns our faith, whether the Pope, as the vicar of Christ, can, through the merits of Christ and the saints, remit and abolish, when the sinner has made amends, the penalties that attach to sin.

Regarding my quotation from Cyprian, he raises the question, which also occurred to myself in reading Cyprian, whether, although I do not know it for certain, the greater part of the clergy had been infected in other places as in Greece.

Next, in reply to the Councils, he says that Indulgences are not good for a Christian, that is, to one who follows Christ in faith and love. This certainly deals unfairly (destruit) with the words of the Councils and the granting of Indulgences, because they are only granted to the faithful of Christ who have shown contrition and made confession after the customary manner. Therefore, according to common teaching and belief, it is only to the wicked that Indulgences are not good, for they do not obtain them; but to the pious and to those who are truly Christians, they are good.

I do not agree with the reverend Father when he here
applies the saying of Seneca: "One is not to consider who it is that speaks, but what he says"; for in matters of faith we must specially consider who it is that speaks, and a Council that has been regularly assembled must be given heed to by every Christian.

He says it is not a serious matter even if one errs in regard to Indulgences. To me, however, it does seem a serious matter, since the errors, which at first led to detractive of your brethren of the mendicant orders, were deemed to be dangerous.

Regarding the enactment of Innocent in a General Council, he says that he does not understand how it is to be interpreted, and whether Indulgences are to be regarded as the remission of sins. I say, as I always have done, that I will not admit that such an important and properly constituted Council could have erred, since it was not forsaken by the Holy Spirit, and that the remission of sins is to be understood in regard to their punishment. For the word sin is not always used of the fault, but also of the punishment due to the fault, as in the Maccabees: "That they may be delivered from sins", which cannot be understood of deadly sin, but of the punishment attaching to it. And if Indulgences are said to be granted that those who obtain them may be delivered from punishment and guilt, no one is to think that Indulgences remit the guilt, but that the Pope grants that men be absolved from guilt through the Sacrament of Penance by the appointed commissaries.
and then obtain Indulgences, that is, the remission of the punishment.

He has defended his statement that Indulgences are a vice of good works, by saying that he himself was also of the opinion that, if everything else was right, a good work with Indulgences was better than one without them; but it so often happened that men bought the Indulgences that they might not do the good works without them.

The two hours having expired, the remainder of the disputation was put off till two o'clock in the afternoon, at which hour he continued as follows:—

Although much might be adduced in support of this, for example, the fact that neighbours come together for sacrifice and offering because of mutual friendship more than from respect to the dead, nevertheless it seems to me that, with all due respect to a superior judgment, this is not a vice of good works. First, for this reason, that the holy council desired by means of Indulgences to incite men to good works. Second, because, although they may do and present such works in order to obtain Indulgences, nevertheless their works are not tainted because of this purpose, for such a purpose is not out of harmony with the final purpose, namely, that the remission of sins is fittingly assigned to God; for otherwise, if we were to separate the first purpose from the final one, there would be very few or no good works.
Regarding the neglect of Indulgences condemned by the Council of Constance, the reverend Father says that he has not despised them. I frankly confess that if he had always used the moderation he has shown to-day, one would possibly, as a matter of conscience and without judgment, let his interpretation pass. Nevertheless, his written speech in the language of the people presents another interpretation to the laity. This, however, does not concern me.

He has replied to Gerson by admitting what he says; nevertheless, he is of opinion that Gerson, who holds that Indulgences are useful if they are accepted in faith, hope and charity, is against me. Since on another occasion I maintained that satisfaction can be made in the case of a deadly sin, I reply by saying that the most Christian Chancellor is of this opinion, namely, that anyone can make satisfaction in regard to an enjoined act of penance in deadly sin; otherwise those who hear confessions would act most foolishly in imposing a wearisome (du rantem) act of penance. But whether anyone in deadly sin obtains Indulgences is nothing to the purpose. The reason of distinctions is obvious, for Indulgences are not usually granted except to the contrite, who have made confession. Therefore it is no wonder if sinners do not participate in them. For Indulgences are valid only for what they profess to be valid, (valent quantum sonant).

The reverend Father has added that, if everything else
be right, the "Pater Noster" of a layman is worth as much as the Canonical prayers of a priest. I do not admit this.

Regarding St. Gregory he says that he has not yet seen any trustworthy account (of his Indulgences). But such a constant tradition, as St. Augustine says (lib. de trin.) of Alexandria, does not permit of such a thing (i.e. of Gregory having granted Indulgences) being denied. Moreover he denies that Indulgences are works of satisfaction. On the contrary, he says that they are only remissions from good works. In this all-important matter I think we are at variance with each other and that the main point of our controversy hinges on this. But I have already stated that Indulgences are not exemptions from good works, as the reverend Father thinks, but the remission of the penalty that is due to sin. Therefore a truly Christian man, who receives Indulgences, does not do less but more good works, than if he had not obtained Indulgences. Moreover, I understand Indulgences to be works of satisfaction, as Pope Sixtus IV., Clement VI, and the present Pope declare them to be; not as if he who receives Indulgences makes satisfaction, but because no evil remains unpunished and no sin unavenged (Can. Sicut primi de poenit. dist. 1). So when a man renders no equivalent for the punishment of sin, the vicar of Christ, as the steward of His treasury, himself, out of the treasure entrusted to him through the all-sufficient merit of Christ, renders this equivalent and makes satisfaction for him.
Therefore I conceded in my previous statements that Indulgences do not in themselves wipe out the guilt but the such punishment. And that a remission takes place through Indulgences, and not the remission of good works, is clear from Isaiah:-

"The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the meek, He hath sent me to heal the broken-hearted, to proclaim liberty (indulgentiam) to the captives and the opening of the prison to them that are bound etc." Christ, who quoted these very words as applying to Himself, used for the word Indulgence that of "remission".

In like manner, speaks Theophilus, as St. Thomas quotes him:- "Formerly were all souls held by hell, till He came, who preached remission (forgiveness) to the captives!

Next the reverend Father contends that merits are increased when Indulgences are given up. I do not see this, since, as I have said, those who do not purchase or who give up Indulgences, sometimes prefer to spend the money that would have bought them in feasting rather than in increasing their merits. I admit that at times some may do a work of greater merit with that money than if they were to purchase Indulgences. But out of such individual cases we are not to establish a rule.

Regarding the celebration of Jubilee years, he will not admit that this took place with the approval of the faithful, and holds that the fact that the life of Boniface VIII was suspect may render his Jubilee likewise suspect. I say, however,
that the approval of the people is sufficiently great, since on the Jubilee year the faithful of Christ crowded together from the whole of Christendom. How one otherwise can prove the approval of the faithful I do not see.

Regarding my statement that, with the approval of the princes, the Pope granted Indulgences to those going on pilgrimages or taking part in the Crusades, he replies that it does not particularly matter, if they erred in a matter of no consequence. As if it were nothing to deceive the faithful of Christ, and to make use of the unanimous approval of Christian princes and kings for such a deception!

Next, he says that there is no express and clear decree regarding Indulgences. I oppose to him the declaration of Sixtus and the recent declaration of the present Pope, in which the latter says that the Roman Church, which the other Churches are expected to honour as a mother, has handed down the tradition that the Roman Pope, the successor of Peter who carries the keys, and the vicar of Christ on earth, has received the power of the keys to open, by removing from his faithful in Christ the hindrances, namely, of guilt and the punishment that are due to actual sin; the guilt by the Sacrament of Penance, but the temporal punishment, which by divine justice is due to actual sin, by an ecclesiastical Indulgence; and that he can on reasonable grounds grant to the same faithful of Christ, who are members of Christ in love, either in this life or in purgatory, Indulgences out of the super-abundance of the merits of Christ and the saints; and through the granting of an
Indulgence by apostolic authority, both to the living and the dead, he can dispense the treasure of the merits of Christ and the saints. In this, with what follows, he clearly shows that Indulgences are not exemptions from good works, but the remission of the punishment of sin, which takes place through the compensating merits of Christ.

And when I argued that the Church during so many years had not erred, he answered that the whole Church had not erred, because there had always been some to whom the matter was suspect, and hence the proverb: Indulgences are pious deceptions of the faithful. To this I answer: When the reasonableness of any matter is to be got at, we must not listen to what the ordinary man may say, but to what the good, the learned, the honoured and the noblest say. For there were very many most upright and highly honoured men throughout the whole of Christendom during these 300 years, some of whom also were registered in the calendar of the saints, who nevertheless did not condemn Indulgences, although they disapproved of their abuse, as they did of the abuse of all things. Thomas is a saint; such also are Bonaventura, Albertus Carmelita, Bernhardinus and other great men: Ales, Gerson, Capistranus etc., who, nevertheless, did not condemn the granting of Indulgences. Therefore it does not signify that John Wycliffe and Ulrick Kalteisen in England, Master John of Wesalia, who nevertheless retracted at Mayence, and the Bohemians disapproved of the granting of Indulgences.

Therefore we will conclude that Indulgences,
when discreetly granted to the honour of God and the exaltation of the faithful, are not unprofitable to the faithful and devout of Christ, who do not presume upon them but receive them in humility and gratitude, and guard against and repel their abuse; that we must rather render thanks to God for such a gift than proudly despise it, and in doing so ever remember that the best Indulgence is true contrition for sin. Nevertheless, if the views set forth today are really the mind of the reverend Father, I would have preferred that he had expressed them clearly and not given cause to the simple to think otherwise. For there is no one among all his hearers who would have gathered the meaning given to-day from his 11th Conclusion: "To say that Indulgences are good for a Christian is madness, for they are truly the bane of good works". But so far as concerns myself, I am quite content with his interpretation.

D R. M A R T I N.

(Latin text pages 182 to 186).

Objecting to my statements, the distinguished Doctor maintains, first, that Indulgences are not the remission of good works, and that he has come across no one who has said that they are; that, if they were, it would follow that they are truly dangerous, harmful and to be condemned; also that, by the unanimous consent of those who grant and those who approve of them, they are rather remissions from the punishment that is due to sin. I answer: I wonder greatly what these words of the Doctor mean; for, by the punishment due to sin, everyone certainly understands all
the works of satisfaction, which is the third act of penance. To these necessarily belong also good works, almsgiving, prayers, fastings, vigils and such like. Regarding this there is the unmistakeable text (lib.5. Cap.: Cum ex eo), where the Pope says, that by indiscreetly granted Indulgences the satisfaction of penance is weakened; and therefore almost all bulls of Indulgences contain this clause: "We exempt from the enjoined acts of penance".

But, granted that only the punishment and not the works were remitted, then I say it is worse that the punishment be remitted rather than the works, since the life that is suffering and painful accomplishes more and is more profitable than that which is merely active, according to the apostle (2. Cor. xii. 10):—"When I am weak, then am I strong". For the work is purer that God works alone and in which we suffer than that in which we co-operate with Him, as we read in Deuteronomy xxxiii.39:—"I wound and I heal; I kill and I make alive". Therefore, according to the views of the distinguished Doctor, more incongruities follow from Indulgences than according to my views; and I know not whether I do not speak most truly.

Secondly, he cannot harmonise my statements that Indulgences are granted only to the indolent, and that the penitential canons are likewise imposed only on the indolent. To this I reply that I do not recollect saying that the penitential canons are imposed only on the indolent; but if I did, my meaning is that the eager and ardent (but repentant) sinners do more than
the canons demand.

Thirdly, although he admits that Indulgences are not necessary to salvation, nevertheless, it is advantageous, he says, to know whether they promote salvation or not. I answer: It is not necessary to know this, but only if they are hurtful to salvation; for there is no need to know what is not necessary to salvation.

Likewise in regard to the importance of knowing whether the Pope can forgive through the merits of Christ, I know not whether it is of importance. Concerning the merits of Christ we will speak later.

Next, he says that my opinion overturns the judgments of the Councils and condemns the granting of Indulgences, which, according to common usage, grant to the contrite who have made confession (such blessing). I answer: My opinion does not therefore overturn the judgments of the Councils, because there are those who are contrite and make confession, who nevertheless are slow to discharge the works of satisfaction and whom the Scriptures call infirm; and for the sake of these Indulgences are not to be condemned.

He objects, also, to my making use of the saying of Seneca: "One is not to consider who it is that speaks, but what he says", because in matters of faith we must also consider who it is that speaks. I answer: This is beside the point, because the matter of Indulgences is not a matter of faith. In short, we must in matters of faith specially consider, not who it is
that speaks, but what he says, for we are not to have respect of persons, as Christ expressly warns us (Matt. VII. 15 and XXIV. 5):—"Beware of false prophets which come to you etc."; also, "Many shall come in My name, saying I am Christ"; and (John x. 27): "My sheep hear My voice". Therefore, also, we are not rashly to give credence to the Pope, that the rule of John the Apostle may be obeyed (1. John IV. 1): "Beloved, try the spirits, whether they are of God".

Next, he says, there is danger in the error of Indulgences, since the error of those who at first disparaged the Mendicant Orders was held to be dangerous. Whatever about the disparagers of these Orders, the error in Indulgences is not thereby proved to be dangerous, and what the Mendicant Orders and the priests of the Church held to be an error, does not directly become an error. To this I add, when he says that a Council does not err, because it is ruled by the Holy Spirit —"Yes, in the things in which it is ruled by the Holy Spirit, that is, in matters of faith". And, that I may say it once for all, I did not say that a Council erred in granting Indulgences, but that it may err.

I pass over what he says about understanding by remission of sins the remission of their punishment, because the word sin is often taken for punishment, as in 2. Maccabees. XII. 46. I do not often find that the word sin is used for punishment, unless perhaps where it is written of Christ that He bore our sins. I
would not venture, however, to say, that this is to be understood entirely of punishment. But this is beside the point.

Meaning to refute my statement that "pardons" are the vice (or bane) of good works, he says that there is a subordination of ends in works, and that, if the pardons are attributed to God, they do not therefore vitiate the work. I answer: Produce an example in proof. For I said to-day that they are few who would give without recompense and for the sake of God what they give for Indulgences. By their fruits, therefore, ye shall know them. Yea, if they were to hear that they could do anything better than buy Indulgences, it is probable that none of them would buy Indulgences.

Regarding the neglect of Indulgences, he says that if I had spoken with this moderation, my declaration would have been allowed to pass, but my speech in German indicated another meaning to the laity. I answer: Let the distinguished Doctor read the same speech more carefully and he will find that I said in plain words that Indulgences were not to be despised, but were to be left free; no one was to be frightened away from, just as no one was to be urged to buy them; obviously they were a comfort to the indolent. Therefore it is through no fault of mine, if they do not understand this declaration and tolerably moderate view.

I pass over what he says in regard to Gerson: "It is a different thing to make satisfaction in sin and to buy Indulgences in sin, because in the latter, the manner of granting, which permits Indulgences only to those who have confessed and are
penitent, stand in the way". In this also, he says Johannes Gerson is at one with him. My answer is that I leave this as something that goes beyond my power of understanding; for really I do not understand how a sinner can make satisfaction in sin and also not have the liberty not to make satisfaction, since more seems to be required for the accomplishing of a work than for leaving it undone.

Concerning Gregory, although his history cannot be accepted, he nevertheless says that tradition does not permit of its being denied. I answer: No one rashly gives credence to tradition. And there I leave it.

Finally I return to what he said about Indulgences being works of satisfaction and not the remission of good works but of punishment. Possibly we are contending over an ambiguity, namely, that the Doctor calls that a making of satisfaction, in which, by the nature of Indulgences, it is permitted that no satisfaction take place, and this remission of satisfaction is taken for the making of it. I, however, call that a work of satisfaction which actually renders satisfaction and does not leave it omitted.

He also quoted the passage from Isaiah (LXI. 1), where Christ (Luke IV. 18), reading from Isaiah says: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He hath anointed me to preach deliverance (indulgentiam) to the captives", and where (instead of indulgentiam) He used the word "remissiorem". To this he added Theophilus who, interpreting the passage, says
that souls were held captive etc., till the coming of Him who
should preach redemption to the captives. That this passage
carributed nothing to the matter, the words themselves and the
context make clear, because Christ Himself in the same place says:
"This day is this Scripture fulfilled in your ears," also because
he speaks of the true year of Jubilee, that is, of the fullness
of the time, of the crown of the year of grace, and not of the
remission of punishment, but of the remission of sins, concerning
which the whole of Scripture deals; whereas the Jubilee of Boniface
did not commence till long after this. Moreover he denies that
merits would be increased by having nothing to do with "pardons!"
This I pass over, for my statement (i.e. that they would be
increased) is not refuted because sometimes men would spend in
feasting the money that would have purchased them.

Concerning the Jubilees that were celebrated he says
that the approval of the people is sufficiently shown by the
fact that so many of the faithful flocked from every part of the
world, (Italy and Rome excepted) to obtain Indulgences, and he
does not see how one is otherwise to prove the unanimity of the
people. I answer: The unanimity of the faithful that would
satisfy me is an unanimity which would urge the faithful to
flock together, after the matter had been revealed and the truth
about Indulgences set forth. But now they flock together,
without knowing wherefore or why, the greater part believing that
they are doing a necessary and meritorious thing.

Next, regarding pilgrimages and the Crusades, the
distinguished Doctor thinks that it is not a small matter, if so many of the faithful, especially important personages, were deceived. I answer: It is not a matter of great consequence, since also St. Jerome says of the blood of Zacharias the prophet, (Matthew xxiii. 35): We do not condemn an error which sprang from devotion to the faith. Therefore is this error also without hurt to the soul, although the money goes for nothing (citra lucrum pecuniae) which they pay for the honour of the Church to the rulers of the Church.

When I said that there is no decree regarding Indulgences, he brought forward that of Sixtus and the latest of Leo's, in which the value of Indulgences is set forth, I answer: This is another matter. I said that there is no decree which enjoins to buy Indulgences; therefore they are not necessary.

Finally, regarding the proverb which I quoted, that Indulgences are a pious deception of the faithful, meaning to prove by it that the whole Church had not erred, he replies that we are not to give heed to what the man in the street may say, but to what good and upright men think of them, adding that some even of those whose names are inscribed in the calendar of the saints did not condemn Indulgences. I answer: Neither do I. Nevertheless, I add that the Church, when it accepts opinions, does not thereby make truths out of them. Therefore I reply to the declaration of Leo X, as I replied in the Acta (Augustana), that one cannot prove by mere words, especially of men, that
Indulgences are taken from the treasury of Christ, and cancel the punishment which divine justice demands, although I do not therefore condemn the opinion. But, to say what I think, since Christ's merits, whether they are received as helps, or in any other manner or name, are nevertheless His own merits, they do not undergo a metamorphosis because of any use or appropriation of them by others. But if they are the merits of Christ, then they are also grace and truth, according to the Psalmist (XXV.10):- "All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth"; and John (1.14 ff):- "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ"; and in the same passage:- "We beheld Him full of grace and truth". Therefore, although an angel from heaven were to teach otherwise, I would not believe that it is in the power of any man to give grace and truth, that is, to distribute the merits of Christ. Nevertheless, I do not resist the Pope. But I stand by my written declaration.

D R. E C K.

(Latin text pages 187 to 189).

I have said that the matter in dispute between us consists mainly in this — whether Indulgences are remission of good works or of the punishment of sin. Following the latter interpretation, I have maintained that the teachers of the Church and the Roman popes, who have so far written on Indulgences, are on my side. The reverend Father, however, very learnedly and acutely refutes this, because to remit the punishment of sin would be equivalent to remitting the works of satisfaction, among which are good works, which would be contrary to the
decree of Innocent (Can. Cum ex eo), concerning penance and remission - "That the satisfaction rendered in penance be not weakened". I answer: The labours of satisfaction are certainly remitted, but not therefore good works; for, although prayer and fasting etc. are satisfactions, they are nevertheless good works, although we do not make satisfaction by them. There is also to be added that satisfaction is made, not only by the labours of good works but also of sufficient suffering (satispassionis). Therefore many hold that the person who has made confession ought not to be compelled to take upon himself the work of rendering satisfaction, according to the common saying: "It is better that a Father-Confessor send the person who has made confession to purgatory with little penance than to hell with great". And it is not strange if the Pope restricted plenary Indulgences to evade the penitential works of satisfaction, if they were granted indiscriminately by the prelates. Therefore the clause of the Bull deals with enjoined penances, that is, penances which according to divine justice ought to be enjoined, as the teachers of the Church, who write upon Indulgences, interpret it.

Further, when he argues that it is worse to remit the punishments than the works, I do not agree, because the punishments are of use in so far that by means of them a man is taught to do good and therefore his strength is made perfect in weakness. But let the judges decide on this. And because to err in Indulgences would be dangerous to souls, as I have to-day
quoted, therefore the Church does not err, if she will let only the indolent, who are contrite, receive them. Certainly we are not to go with them to the Carthusians.

In matters of faith, he says, we are chiefly to give heed to what is said. I, however, regard the authority of the person who speaks as being most important in theology, because we are enjoined to give ear to those who sit in the Chair of Moses. Therefore we must give heed to who it is that speaks, so that, according to the word of the apostle, we bring our intellect into captivity to the obedience of the faith. For this reason have councils been held, namely, that by their authority errors might be exterminated.

Of the Mendicant Orders I say nothing.

When, however, he says that a council does not err in those things in which it is led by the Holy Spirit, I answer, following the opinion of the ancient Fathers, that we must always assume that a council is led by the Holy Spirit, so long as the contrary is not evident, namely, that it has been irregularly or illegally assembled.

But the reverend Father continues to take a firm stand on what he calls the bane of good works, namely, that for the sake of Indulgences men give money which they otherwise would not give. As if this were the bane of good works! I would like to ask the reverend Father, if he with his brethren were to make an annual remembrance (anniversarium) of a certain
prince or noble with thirty masses, a remembrance which he would not otherwise make, because in making it good presents are given, whether this would be the ruin of good works? (Martin hesitates. Eck: And thus all flesh, in the cowl as well as out of it, shall not be saved.)

Concerning Indulgences, which he does not despise, let those, who have read his sermon in German, judge.

Further, the reverend Father has become my interpreter and says that possibly I mean that Indulgences are works of satisfaction in the sense, namely, that because of them (or by reason of their nature) one is not held to make satisfaction. That is not my meaning. It is that a man ought also to make satisfaction of his own for sins of which he has repented and that through Indulgences he make satisfaction by another; for the Pope gives him out of the treasury of the Church that whereby he may pay; so that thus, according to the common teaching of the Fathers, sin, even in Indulgences, does not remain unpunished, except that also a man cannot make satisfaction of his own unless the merits of Christ be added.

Concerning the approval or unanimity of the faithful, I do not believe that anyone is so foolish as to think that the Indulgences granted in the Jubilee years were things it was necessary to obtain. And if he thinks that the journey to Rome was meritorious in itself, he does not err in doing so; for it remains incontestable that the work, by which anyone obtains
Indulgences, is meritorious, and yet there is no merit in the Indulgences themselves.

Finally, I do no violence to the words of Sixtus, and the present Pope, because I follow the Chair of Peter and the views of him who sits upon it, so long as he does not fall into heresy, which God forbid. I know that he does not prove but issues decisions, and I deem him to be the vicar of Christ in issuing decisions on a faith that cannot fail. Nevertheless I leave all this to the judgment of those whom it concerns and am prepared to expunge any errors that may be shown me.

Dr. Martin added: Likewise do I.

Tomorrow at 7 a.m. the disputation will be continued between the same Doctors and will deal with PENITENCE.

Tuesday, 11th July, 7 a.m.

DR. ECK.

(Latin text pages 189 to 191).

Against the conclusion of the reverend Father and a part of his sermon on Penitence, I intend to prove in defence of the pious preaching friars that true penitence also begins in the fear of punishment, and that it is a good preparation when we begin to consider and reflect etc.

First, because the Lord Jesus observed this manner of
preaching as did also His fore-runner, St. John. For the Prodigal Son (Luke XV) represents the type of the penitent, according to Augustine (de quaest. evang.), Ambrose (lib. 2. de poenitent. cap. 3), Chrysostom, Jerome and others; but Christ sets him before us thus: "And when he came to himself, he said: How many hired servants of my Father's have bread enough and to spare, and I perish with hunger! I will arise and go to my father, and will say unto him: Father, I have sinned against heaven and in thy sight etc". Describing here the course of the penitent, Christ shows that he is first moved to penitence by the greatness of the reward - "they have bread enough and to spare", next by the fear of punishment - "I perish with hunger". Carried on by these steps, he comes to meditate on true penitence - "I will say unto him: Father, I have sinned etc". And as Basilius makes clear: There are here three stages in penitence - the hope of reward, the fear of punishment, and a sincere regard for the Father's goodness. And thus he, who had been an enemy, first becomes a servant, before he becomes a friend of God.

In like manner John begins with fear: "Oh generation or brood of vipers! Who hath warned you to flee etc?"

In like manner also it is represented throughout the whole of the Old Testament, that, through fear of punishment, men are led to obey the commandments. Thus we find it everywhere in the Books of the Law, the Histories and the Prophets. To quote only one passage, Psalm LXXXIX. 31. ff.: "But if his children
forsake my law, and walk not in my judgments, if they break my statutes and keep not my commandments, then I will visit their transgression with the rod and their iniquity with stripes; and what further belongs to this. Therefore the preachers who hitherto have followed Holy Scripture, have followed a good method of preparing for penitence, by dwelling on the heinousness of sin and on eternal punishment.

There is further the argument of Dionysius, namely, that God so rules all things that He leads the lower to the higher through the middle. Therefore, since the sinner is in the lower, inasmuch as he is not worth the bread he eats, he must, if he will rise to the higher things of grace, do so by means of fear.

It would, indeed, be a fine perfection (bene esset perfectionis), if a man, who is sunk in the mire of sin, were able to rise, so that he should lay hold of grace, by merely contemplating the love of God and by regard for righteousness. But show us such a man and we will praise him.

Likewise St. Augustine approves of the method of preaching of our time, and clearly shows that no one comes to love and true grace except through preceding fear - not the fear of a son but that of a slave. This is Augustine's witness (tract. 9. Super Joh.): Let fear, therefore, come first; for the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. But when love begins to take up her abode, fear, which has prepared the dwelling place for her, is driven out. For the more the former grows, the more the latter
dwindles, and the more the former takes possession, the more
fear is driven out; the greater love becomes, the less becomes
fear, and the less love becomes, the greater becomes fear. But
if there be no fear, then there is no entrance for love (he
makes a comparison), just as we see that the thread with which
one sews is introduced by a bristle; the bristle enters first,
but not till it is out does the thread follow; in like manner
fear first occupies the mind, because it enters that it may
introduce love. He quotes the passage from Psalm XXX. (v. 12):-
"Thou hast turned for me my mourning into joy". And further on
is given the opinion according to Scripture: "For who is
without fear cannot be justified". It is necessary, therefore,
that fear first enter, that by its entrance there may come love.
Fear is the medicine, love is health. From this it is clear that
penitence is medicinal, and fear is the medicine, according to
Augustine, and love does not enter except through fear. Therefore
they preach well who say that penitence begins in fear.

I do not agree when the reverend Father at the begin-
ning of his manifesto repeats the word of the reverend Father
Staupitz, as if it were sent down from heaven, that penitence
begins in love and regard. For St. Ambrose, as a good physician
of souls, expressly opposes this in the letter to Studius: "Where
punishment is appointed there ought to be repentance for sins;
where forgiveness is granted there is grace; penitence precedes,
grace follows. There is, therefore, neither penitence without
grace, nor grace without penitence. For penitence must first
condemn the sin so that grace may remove it. Chrysostom likewise testifies to this throughout his book "De cordis compunction" and in Homily 80 (de poenitentia) and sermon 29.

Likewise also Isidorus, (lib.2. de summo bono, Ca.12):-

"Compunction of heart is humility of mind with tears, arising from the remembrance of sin and fear of punishment"; and throughout his book "De contritione cordis" and in "Speculum peccatorum" Augustine deals with nothing else; yea he exhorts the sinner who would repent, to reflect on the three abysses, namely, his own sins, punishment and the judgment of God.

Likewise St. Bernard in "Super Canticus" (Ser.16) and in many other places, Gregory in "Morales" (lib.2.et 5), likewise in "Super Job" (Ca. 29), also in "Super Ezech." (lib.2), where (Homily 19) he says: "It is written: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. It is undoubtedly certain that one rises from fear to the Lord, but does not go back from wisdom to fear. The Prophet, therefore, speaks from heavenly things to the lower; he begins rather with wisdom and descends to fear. But we, who rise from the earthly to the heavenly, number the same steps in ascending, in order that from fear we may arrive at wisdom! Likewise (lib.1, super Ezechiel) he says: "There are two wings, namely, fear and penitence, which are said to cover bodies, that is, sins".

From all this I would, therefore, have it concluded that in regard to one point, namely, fear, the preachers of our own and former times have preached well.
penitence begins in fear; and that they strive in their sermons to sow the fear of God among the people in order that thus the seed of the devil may be uprooted, according to the words of Origen (lib. 3. super Job): "The fear of punishment and of judgment is good; which fear the devil must first expel, before he can sow the seed of sin". From this, then, it follows that penitence does not begin with love and a desire for righteousness; although I admit that, if it were to begin with this, it would be more praiseworthy and perfect than beginning with the fear of punishment. But our weakness does not permit of this, and, stooping to this weakness, the Lord Jesus and the preachers preach fear, as the step by which we may attain to a true love of righteousness.

D R. M A R T I N.

(Latin text pages 191 to 195).

To tear different passages from different places, with no regard to their connection or agreement, is not the way to understand and interpret aright the divine Scriptures. On the contrary, it is the commonest way (Canon) to err in the Holy Scriptures. The theologian, therefore, if he would not err, ought to set the entire Scriptures before him and compare conflicting passages, and, just as in the case of the two Cherubim which stood opposite each other, find their diversity harmonised in the midst of the mercy seat (propitioriis); for otherwise the face of each Cherub, that hither directs the eye, is diverted from the mercy seat, that is, from the true
Therefore the distinguished Doctor has never seemed to me to be further away from the Holy Scriptures than he is to-day, and all the more so because he admits in his argument that penitence is more praiseworthy and perfect, if it proceeds from the love of righteousness, as I hold it to do, than if it proceeds from the fear of punishment. As if we must not strive to bring forth praiseworthy fruits, and, as St. John says, fruits, worthy of repentance. For I absolutely refuse to accept what he says about our weakness preventing us from setting about repentance out of a love of righteousness. If we are to act and expound the Scripture according to our weakness, then we will never repent, but will become worse every day. Therefore, before replying to his objections, I will first explain myself.

Every good life must be regulated by some law; therefore the law is the beginning or source of penitence and of every good work. Accordingly there must first of all be in the penitent either a revelation or suggestion of the law against which he has acted and according to which he ought to act. But if the law has been revealed or recalled to memory, then there follows directly, if grace be wanting, an increase of sin. For the will naturally hates the law, according to the clear testimony of Paul to the Romans and the Galatians:

"The law entered that the offence might abound" (Rom. V. 20);
"The law was added because of transgressions" (Galat. I. 19).
Therefore St. Augustine (de spir. et lit. C. 3) says: "For
free-will before grace avails for nothing except to sin" — not for penitence, as the Doctor says (for that is Pelagianism). Augustine continues: "And when it begins to be clear what has to be done, it is not loved, nor undertaken, nor well lived, unless the Holy Spirit diffuse love in our hearts." Here Augustine says very clearly that the law of God cannot be loved, unless the grace of the Spirit has been received. But if the law is not loved, its opposite, sin, is not hated. Therefore penitence is impossible till a man loves the law. This is what the apostle means (Romans IV. 15): "The law worketh wrath", that is, it makes sin manifest, but it does not give grace to hate sin. Therefore hatred of the law and the love of sin remain, however much a man may be shaken through chidings from without or within with servile fear. For although he refrain from the work of sin, nevertheless, he cannot refrain from the love of sin. This also is Christ's teaching in St. John's Gospel (VI. 44), where He says: "No man can come to Me except My Father draw him". I admit, therefore, that the law, the recollection of sin and the thought of punishment may terrify the sinner, but they never make a penitent of him.

Replying, therefore, to his first objection, namely, that in which he holds that the Prodigal Son (Luke XV) began to repent through recollecting the greatness of the reward, saying: "They have bread enough and to spare", I say that this Prodigal Son really began from a love of righteousness; for he first recognised the good when he came to himself, and from this recognition of the good he understood his own baseness. But this
"coming to himself" did not arise from his weakness, or from the fear of punishment, as the Doctor himself says that the fear of punishment came to him only after reflecting on the great reward. Therefore it did not begin from fear of punishment. It arose through the appeal of the Father speaking within him and inspiring a love of the paternal home, till he says:—"How many hired servants of my Father's etc.

For, since he had formerly lived in sin, he neither recognised the good nor loved it, nor did he hate sin, although, nevertheless, he could not be ignorant of it. Therefore, another affection was necessary, namely, the love of the good.

Further, he quoted John the Baptist (Luke 11:7):— "Who hath warned you to flee etc.?" to show that he began with fear. I answer: It is one thing to preach repentance, it is another thing to set about repentance; it is one thing to preach good works, it is another to begin to do them. The preacher warns, frightens, and entices, but nothing comes of it, unless grace moves the will.

In like manner do I reply to his quotation from Psalm LXXXIX (v.33): "I will visit their transgression with the rod". The sinner may be beaten, but unless grace co-operates, it avails not, as Jeremiah (V.3) writes: "Thou hast stricken them, but they have not grieved"; and Isaiah (1.6.): "From the sole of the foot even unto the head, there is no soundness in it. Why should I strike you any more?" — because it was of no avail.
And I wonder greatly that the distinguished Doctor forgets that light of nature, Aristotle, and ventures to teach that the beginning of any virtue springs from the urge of fear, seeing that Aristotle in so many well known passages (Lib. 3. Ethic) seeks to persuade that a good work must be done of free-will and choice. But the will certainly is either love or the sister of love. Therefore, also, it is said that a good work must be done voluntarily. I add, also, that Christ never compelled sinners to repentance by fear, but lovingly enticed all that He called, as for example, Zacchaeus, the Magdalene, the apostles, and indeed all. Just as also He says in Jeremiah (XXXI. 3.): "I have loved thee with an everlasting love; therefore with loving kindness have I drawn thee".

I say, therefore, that the fear of the Lord is indeed necessary, but it must be filial fear; for without love it is impossible to endure the conversion, in which the sinner is terrified, crushed and humiliated, according to 1. Kings 2. (1. Sam. v. 6.): "The Lord bringeth down to hell and He bringeth back again". I believe, however, that the opinion of even the distinguished Doctor himself and of all the scholastics is with me, and contends against his objections, since all are agreed that contrition must take place in love, if it is to be a good and meritorious repentance. Thus I reasonably understand penitence to take place through the urge and command of love, that thus it may be a voluntary, joyful and loving penitence. Accordingly, although John upbraids and frightens the Jews, it does not therefore follow that men also begin to repent through
terror. Or, if they do begin through terror, then are they hypocrites rather than true penitents, unless grace be added.

The Doctor has added the argument that God so rules all things that He leads the lower through the middle to the higher. Applying this to fear, he means us to understand that sin is the lower, fear the middle and love the higher. This I pass over but I do not accept it.

He says also that it would be truly perfection if a man were able to rise, so that he should lay hold of grace, by the mere contemplation of God and by regard for righteousness; and adds: Show us such a man and we will praise him. I answer: Neither by fear nor by love can a man rise so that he lay hold of grace, but grace precedes and inspires to this pure contemplation of God and love of righteousness.

To Augustine, who teaches that fear goes before grace, and that on the entrance of love fear is driven out, I reply:- If he is rightly understood, then I admit it; that is, I admit that penitence is not yet begun, since fear precedes grace. But with the entrance of love penitence is begun, that is, the love of righteousness and hatred of sin. If, however, love does not enter, then fear brings forth nothing but more sin. Therefore the similitude of the bristle and the thread is approved of by me, if only one does not understand by it that fear introduces love, which, nevertheless, I take to be the implication of the Doctor's words, namely, that unless the bristle goes out the thread does not enter, that is, unless fear, which hinders true repentance, is driven out through the
the entrance of love, a man can never truly repent.

Ambrose, quoted in his letter to Studius as saying that penitence comes first and grace follows etc., likewise Isidorus in his "de summo bono" etc., also the three abysses which we are to reflect on, namely, sin, punishment and judgment, also Bernard in "Super Canticis", Gregory in "Morales", and other Fathers who teach that we must rise from fear to wisdom and penitence, and begin with fear—these I willingly admit but do not understand as being opposed to the apostle Paul in his teaching on the law and the fear of the law. I say, also, that if a man has love, he is moved to fear God and thus penitence is begun from fear in love; for otherwise it would stand unchallenged that fear thinks only of punishment and does nothing that is good, but hates the law.

The distinguished Doctor, therefore, does not prove that penitence does not begin in the love of righteousness, however good the fear of punishment may be to begin with. For not from the fear of punishment but from the fear of God must a man repent, since in the former case he is a slave and shall not abide in the Father's home, but in the latter he is a son and heir. Therefore I do not admit that the verse from Proverbs (1. 7): "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom", is to be understood of the fear of punishment, which before the coming of grace tortures a man to no purpose, since the Wise Man expressly says: "The fear of the Lord", and not the fear of punishment. The fear of punishment is rather the beginning
of folly. Let the distinguished Doctor, therefore, give heed that he do not confuse this servile fear with filial fear and lose the meaning of Scripture and the Fathers.

DR. ECK

(Latin text pages 195 to 200).

The reverend Father seeks with plausible words to get away from such clear and unmistakeable passages from Scripture and the Holy Fathers. And that he may persuade you to his views, he has dared to say that I am far away from a true understanding of the Sacred Scriptures, and here seeks to divert you from their meaning with his Cherubim that look upon each other. But let those judge, whose duty it is, which of us has the better understanding of the Sacred Scriptures. Nevertheless—to ignore his very irrelevant answers—he brings forward again and again two things, of which, according to the common way, he made no mention in his sermon, and which no preacher, so far as I recollect, has denied, namely, that this fear, also, in so far as it disposes to true repentance, is preceded by (and proceeds from) the divine inspiration. For it is indubitable in regard to Christians that, contrary to the perfidy of Pelagius, we have the beginning of our salvation from God's working in us through His Spirit. There was no necessity, therefore, to bring forward this, or, because of it, to find fault with the method of preaching.

In one thing, nevertheless, he seems to me through his equivocation to err, namely, that he understands this grace,
by which God beforehand moves the hearts of men, to be love, since there is another gift of God which He grants of His grace, and by this St. Augustine's words (de spir. et lit.) against the godless Pelagians are explained.

Secondly, he says that fear accomplishes nothing unless there be added to it love. But which of the scholastics or preachers, all of whom follow the apostle Paul's views regarding love (ep. ad Corinth), ever denied this?

Further, since I said that the repentance is more praiseworthy which starts from love, he argues that we must therefore act according to the word of John: "Bring forth, therefore, fruits meet for repentance" (Matt. 11:8). For, if it were to go according to our weakness, we would never repent aright. I answer that we may also bring forth fruits meet for repentance, even if we have begun in fear and come to love.

And I wonder that the reverend Father wants to make us angels and to forget our weakness, since St. Gregory has expressly said (lib. 2. super Ezechiel) that the prophet descended from wisdom to fear, but we, who rise by the same steps, come from fear to love, as much else is pardoned to our weakness.

Desiring to make his meaning clear, he shows how love of the law must precede penitence, because through the law sin abounds (Rom. V. 20, and Galat. 11:19) etc. I answer:—

(Against Faustus, book 22)

It is true, as St. Augustine (contra Faustum lib. 22) testifies, that a sin in act or word against the law would not be sin, if there
were no law to prohibit it, but as through transgression of the law sin abounds, so by observance of the law is merit increased. Therefore such secondary matters or diversions contribute nothing at all to the purpose, and after dinner we will show that the replies which he has made are contrary to the meaning of Holy Scripture.

At 2 p.m. the disputation will be continued.

At 2 o'clock, accordingly, of the same day
Dr. Eck continued his reply this day begun.

The reverend Father has replied to the quotation from the Prodigal Son that, according to the words, "when he came to himself," the love of righteousness had previously entered into him; for he thought of his father's house. But this does not remove the objection, that his "coming to himself," took place through reflection on the punishment, since he had no one who would satisfy his hunger with husks. For, so long as his money lasted, he never came to himself, but only when he suffered from hunger. Further, St. Augustine says that his words were the words of a man who was meditating repentance, and had not yet performed it. But if he had come to himself through love of righteousness, he would forthwith, contrary to Augustine's opinion, have begun repentance. Therefore his (Luther's) reply contributes nothing to the purpose, and obviously is contrary to Basilius.

To John (the Baptist) he replies that it is one thing to begin (repentance) and another thing to preach it; also that
preachers frighten men, but do not make repentant by the tortures of punishment. Again his reply amounts to nothing; for, if John preached, he certainly intended that there should be fruits to his preaching, and, since he put fear into their hearts, it is a sign that penitence had thereby begun. This, also, our preachers preach, but how the people begin God alone knows.

Further, he attributes the beginning of repentance to grace. But our preachers and teachers have never denied that God moves first by His Spirit.

Moreover, although he will not allow Aristotle a place in the schools of theology, he nevertheless ventures to quote him against me. But I answer that it is the constant teaching of the heathen that, when a man does not advance beyond the fear of punishment, he can bring no virtue to perfection; for we read:

"The wicked hate to sin through fear of punishment, The good through love of virtue".

and the work, that is good, must not be done through compulsion, but voluntarily. But it is one thing to persuade free-will; it is another to seek to compel it. I admit that Christ called the apostles, Zacchaeus and the Magdalene, with kindly words. But, that He sometimes called with words that were stern, the story of Paul shows us, of whom Augustine (23. quaest. 4. Can. Quis nos) says: "Upon whom Christ put constraint, whom He compelled". And in the Gospel of the Call at the Last Supper he says: "Compel them to come in". In like
manner and at considerable length writes St. Gregory in his Homily. Let the reverend Father, therefore, I beseech, say no more about the call being made only with kindly words.

Next, he thinks that filial fear alone is necessary for the penitent. I wonder greatly that, since he has to-day exhorted me to a true understanding of the Scriptures, he has not first improved himself therein. For St. Augustine in the passage quoted to-day on John also speaks of the servile fear which love drives out, and says that the Wise Man is speaking of this when he says: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Prov. 1. 7). Likewise it is of this servile fear that Cassiodorus speaks on Psalm CIII. 10: "The fear of the Lord etc". The fear of judgment is the door through which we enter to turn to God; and it is the gloss of Cassiodorus. Likewise the gloss on the words of the apostle to the Romans (VIII. 15): "For ye have not received the Spirit of bondage again unto fear", says that this servile fear is good and of God. In like manner Paul testifies that it is good in I. Timothy (v. 20): "Them that sin rebuke before all, that others also may fear". Similarly Augustine, writing on the Psalms, says, and Longobardus quotes him in lib. 3: "The servile fear is seen when a man through fear of hell restrains himself from sin, in which he fears the Judge and punishment". And further on: "The fear is good and useful, although insufficient, by which the habit of righteousness is gradually formed". Bede also expounds it thus: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning
Therefore he must seek out another defence and give another answer, since the one he has given does not agree with the Fathers. But, if he will not stand by the declarations of the saints, he will have the Holy Scriptures against him. For, while the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, love, nevertheless, drives fear out; but the filial fear, according to David, abideth forever. Therefore it is one fear by which wisdom enters; it is another which abides with increasing wisdom. Therefore, when the reverend Father denies that fear introduces love, he clearly contradicts Augustine, who, in the passage quoted, says all this, namely, that servile fear is the beginning of wisdom and that it is in turn driven out by love. The mellifluous Bernard subscribes to the opinion of Augustine, in Ser.52. Super Canticis, which for the sake of brevity I do not quote. I add, however, this, that love does not drive out fear as if the one were incompatible with the other; but gradually, as grace increases, the servile fear decreases, till finally, when grace has grown strong, it disappears entirely.

Nor does what the reverend Father gravely told us to-day signify, namely, that the fear of the Lord, and not the fear of punishment is the beginning of wisdom, since the fear of punishment and the fear begotten of reverence are both the fear of the Lord, and both are from the Lord. Only the mediums through which fear manifests itself are different,
as Bede and others quoted by Longobardus, in addition to the passages already quoted from Augustine, testify. And, if we had nothing else, it is sufficiently clear from the words of Christ (Matt.X.28): "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear Him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell". For if the servile fear were anything to be condemned, as the reverend Father says, why does Christ call us to it? And that Augustine and others thus understand it (i.e. as a thing to which Christ has called us), I leave those whom it concerns to judge.

Moreover, he says that the scholastics all agree that repentance is of no use, unless it take place in love. This is indeed true, but according to Augustine men do not come to love except through fear. Fear is the medicine; love is health. Therefore all know well that, unless love be added, such fear is not enough. For this reason they put it on the way, but not as the goal.

He passes over the argument taken from St. Dionysius. The reverend Father, however, does not indicate, since sin is the lower and love the higher, what is the medium by which we attain from sin to love. And, indeed, he can give no other than that which Basilius, Bede, Augustine, Bernard and others have given, namely, fear.

Next he assumes that grace precedes fear and love. If by this he means the grace of the divine movement by which
God beforehand breathe into us His Spirit, I agree with him. But if he speaks of the grace of love, I do not agree with him; because the beginning of the former, which is rightly called wisdom in Scripture, is the fear of the Lord, although such fear is profitless without love.

Further, when he says that he admits Ambrose, Gregory and other teachers, but not contrarily to what the apostle says on the fear of the law, his statement is mystifying beyond words. Let him say clearly whether the holy Fathers quoted by me are against the views of the apostle or not. If they are against the views of the apostle, then let him prove it. But I cannot possibly think that they are, since they were well versed in the sacred Scriptures, and full of the Holy Spirit and understood the apostle Paul as well as we do. But if they are not against the views of Paul, then let him stand by their opinion and not reject the preachers who taught the manner of contrition and repentance aforementioned, and let him not rule out for sinful men such servile fear, which is a useful, and, in a manner, necessary medium (i.e. between sin and love).

It does not help him that he thinks that, when one has love, the mind is moved to fear, for that would be to go backwards after the manner of the crab, and is against the opinion of St. Gregory (lib.2. homilia 19. Super Ezechielem). It is, or course, undisputed, that a man rises from fear to wisdom, but not that he returns from wisdom to fear. Fear, accordingly, has pain (i.e. future punishment before it), but, as love
increases, this diminishes, till at last it entirely disappears.

I pass over, through lack of time, other things in the same Sermon, which, nevertheless, would have been thoroughly discussed, had not to-day been fixed for the finishing of this matter; for example, the individual confession of sinners (sigillata confessione peccatorum in specie) referred to by Chrysostom (Super Caput. 12. Matt.); this also, that the scholastics inculcate three things in repentance, namely, contrition, confession and satisfaction which Chrysostom taught before them ("Serm. 29. de poenitentia"); also the double manner of confessing (i.e. to the priest and to God) both great sins and small, with other matters, all of which one might deal with and examine at length. But now, that the foundation has been laid, I commit the entire sermon, together with what I have adduced on my own side, to the judgment of the Judges who are to be appointed.

D R. M A R T I N.

(Latin text pages 200 to 205)

I expected that the distinguished Doctor would refute my answers, especially those which, as being fundamental, I quoted from Paul on the law, which, before love, works nothing but wrath and increases sin - I say nothing about its preparing for grace - just as likewise servile fear, which proceedeth from the law, worketh wrath and increaseth sin. He, however, boldly skips over this and treats us to the same old song, and seeks to persuade us that it is not camouflage, but the pith and kernel of Scripture. I will take up his points individually.
First, he says that it was not necessary to inform him that the beginning of our salvation springs from the inspiration of God, since he also understands fear as being given to prepare for this (timorem disponentem). I answer: This is obviously entirely erroneous, according to the word of Paul who says it is impossible that the law be fulfilled; on the contrary, sin is increased, unless the Holy Spirit shed forth love in our hearts (Rom. VIII. 3 ff). This passage, which is so clear, he ought to have refuted, as also the words of St. Augustine (Cap. 3. de spir et lit.): "Although we now know how we ought to live, nevertheless we do not begin, we do not live rightly, unless grace be given". Let him, therefore, be gone with his servile fear, which worketh nothing but hatred of the law and of God, and is wrongly spoken of as preparing the way for grace.

He also contrives to find a double meaning in the word "grace" - one is love, the other is the gift by which we are first stirred. Let such a distinction disappear. It serves nothing to the purpose. It is besides a trifling with the words of Paul. For the text of the apostle is very clear, that, unless grace and love make us to love the law, the law works nothing but wrath. This gift, however, by which we are first stirred, will not love the law. It is only the love of the Spirit that does that.

Thirdly, he grants that fear without love is profitless, and says that no one has denied this. I answer: Why, then, do they teach profitless forms of repentance, and oppose...
me when I teach the profitable one? I say nothing of such
having been completely repudiated in so many works of Augustine;
for, if Augustine had not done so, nevertheless Paul has
thundered against it, when he argues that all works before love
are sin and things to be condemned, and do not prepare
(indisponentia) for grace. And with these words can we reply to
practically all he has objected against us. According to his
custom he arranges the texts of the divine Scriptures so that
they harmonise with the dictums of the Fathers, yea, he turns
and twists them to suit his own interpretation of the Fathers,
when they ought rather to be marshalled against the dictums of
the Fathers and the latter judged by the texts of Scripture.

Fourthly, he does not agree with my argument, that
we ought to make the more commendable penance, but says that we
can also bring forth fruits meet for repentance, if we begin
with fear. Following Augustine, my comment on this is: "If we
add sin to sin, then, since, as has frequently been said,
whatever takes place before the will has been healed by grace,
is the fruit of a corrupt tree, we cannot bring forth good
fruit. Therefore we can never come to love through servile fear.

Fifthly, the Doctor follows Gregory (Super
Ezechielem) who, as he (Gregory) says, descends from wisdom
to fear, whereas we rise from fear to love. I answer that St.
Gregory does not necessarily exclude love and has not excluded
penitence from incipient fear, as the Doctor understands; just
as all servile fear is not excluded from love, especially in
this life, since the office of love is to expel servile fear, and that throughout the whole life, and to introduce filial fear in its place.

Sixthly, he replies to the passages from Paul, namely, that the law was added because of transgression and increaseth the offence, that this serves nothing to the purpose, and that I have sought after diversions. In saying so, he quotes Augustine (contra Faustum. lib.2): "Sin consists in what is spoken or done against the law of God". I know not what the Doctor is driving at. We are not disputing here about what sin consists of; therefore our time is lost with superfluous words. The matter we are considering is this, that, according to the authority of Paul, servile fear can be nothing but sin, and that through the strength of the law it increaseth sin, if grace be lacking. And therefore the passages from Paul are not diversions, but thunderbolts that shatter and pulverise the Doctor's opinions. I do not, therefore, forgetful of their weakness, make angels of men, but teach that we are not to make gods out of sinners, so long as they are forgetful of their weakness, by reason of which they can, before grace, do nothing but sin.

He says that the conversion of the Prodigal Son took place through reflecting on the punishment. I deny this. To the fact put forward in proof of his statement, namely, that he had no one who would satisfy his hunger with husks, I say: Unless he had been led to look within, and had come to himself, he
would rather have died of hunger than have returned; that the word may stand indisputable: "No man cometh unto Me, except My Father draw Him". (John VI. 44).

Regarding his quotation from Augustine that the Prodigal's words were the words of a man who was meditating repentance but had not yet performed it, I should think that this helps my argument, since to meditate repentance, especially from the bottom of one's heart, is certainly to begin repentance. Therefore the words "but had not yet performed it" must be understood of the completion and outward manifestation of his repentance (de perfectione ad extra).

In like manner may Basilius be answered.

Regarding the word of John the Baptist, he says it is a feeble answer to say that it is one thing to preach repentance and another thing to begin it. I answer: With due respect to the reverend Doctor, he does not seem to understand Paul nor to recognize the strength of the law. For the law indeed teaches what is holy, just and good, but grace alone begins, does and completes these things. Therefore, even if John taught that fear is the beginning of repentance, it does not follow that repentance begins in fear; just as if I were to urge to any good work by terrors and threats, the good work does not therefore spring from terrors and threats, but from love.

He is angry when I remind him of Aristotle being in the theological schools, although I do not acknowledge him.
In my opinion he is too insignificant to have a standing there, for he has been a corrupter of the scholastics. I wanted, however, to strengthen my argument, by showing that those, who hold that repentance begins in fear and not from free-will, are stultifying Aristotle whose dictums they hold as sacrosanct. For I ignore the distinction that has been made between compelling and influencing free-will. For it is not true that free-will is ever compelled to good, or even can be compelled. Moreover, were it compelled, it would be pulled in the opposite direction, and so would hate the pressure brought to bear on it. By grace alone is it drawn, that is, made truly free, as Augustine teaches (Contra Julianum lib. 2.).

I said that Christ called the apostles and the Magdalene by gently drawing them. He opposes to this that Paul was called in sterner manner and bidden be a bondman in the Gospel, so that he should compel others to enter. First, I wonder greatly that, since we are accustomed to quote the case of Paul in defence of grace, those who say that this is miraculous and not to be made a rule, escape us. The distinguished Doctor, however, does not regard it as if it were miraculous, but makes it the rule. But I let this pass. I say, however, that Paul could not have undergone a real change of heart, unless he had been drawn by grace, as St. Augustine (Contra epistolas Pelagianorum) teaches that the grace of God makes those, who are unwilling and resist, to be willing and obedient. And thus is answered what is implied in the Gospel, that the bondman can compel with the word, but
unless the Lord hiss (or whistle), nothing follows. (See Isaiah VII. 18).

To the passage from Augustine who understands servile fear in the words of Solomon: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom", and to the gloss on Psalm CXXI: "The fear of judgment is the door through which we enter to turn to God"; I answer: Yes, if grace be present; but servile fear without grace (for Augustine does not exclude it) worketh only wrath. For Augustine must not contend, and as a matter of fact does not contend with Paul, who condemns everything that is outside of grace. The gloss on Romans VIII. 15: "Ye have not received the spirit of bondage unto fear", which says that servile fear is good; I would rather reject, as it is clearly contrary to the text. For the apostle says: "Ye have not received the spirit of bondage unto fear", and thus condemns it. Or I say that the gloss does not interpret the text.

The passage from the apostle's first letter to Timothy (V. 20): "Rebuke before all that others also may fear" has been interpreted by the Doctor as referring to servile fear. He is at liberty to do so. I, however, will continue to regard it as speaking of filial fear till he prove it to be otherwise. Regarding the words of Augustine, as quoted by the Master (Longobardus), lib. 3.: "Servile fear is seen, when a man through fear of hell restrains himself from sin, in which he fears the Judge and punishment etc." I say that he restrains himself from the outward act only, but inwardly he is all the more strengthened in
his hatred of righteousness which threatens him with hell. And further on there are the words: "The fear is good and useful, although insufficient, by which the habit of righteousness is gradually formed". This, in my opinion, is, if grace be excluded, the habit of despair and of hatred of God. If, however, grace be included, I allow the words to pass.

It is not, therefore, necessary that I give another answer, unless the Distinguished Doctor first prove that the holy Fathers speak of servile fear without grace, or that love has nothing to do with the expulsion of servile fear. Therefore, what he consequently quoted about the expulsion of fear and the beginning of wisdom, and how love gradually expels fear through the growth of grace is sufficiently understood from what has gone before.

There still remains the important passage, Matt. X.28, which in his opinion is sufficient in itself to settle the matter: "Fear not them which kill the body, but rather fear Him etc". Therefore the servile fear, to which Christ calls us, is not to be condemned. I answer firstly: If the Doctor will have it thus, then it is contradicted by what went before, where servile fear is spoken of as being insufficient; therefore it is also absurd to say that Christ has taught us what is insufficient. I say, nevertheless, that servile fear is not inculcated here, since also filial fear dreads offending God and being separated from Him. And even if the passage speaks of purely servile fear, grace is not to be understood as being excluded; on the contrary,
it is to be understood as being included, since, according to the apostle and Augustine, every command and teaching is a letter which requires the Spirit.

He also admits that the scholastics rightly say that contrition without love availeth nothing; but he has not refuted them. Their own word and testimony, therefore, stand against them, unless he denies that contrition in love is that which springs and grows from love.

I rather like the word of Augustine that fear is a medicine, love is health; that is to say fear in yet imperfect love, and perfect love.

He says that I have passed over the argument from Dionysius, concerning the lower, the middle and the higher, and have not indicated what is the middle between sin - the lower, and love - the higher. I confess that I willingly passed over it because I thought it would be quite evident to the Doctor himself that this argument serves nothing to the purpose. For Dionysius speaks of the lower, middle and higher ranks (or classifications). But I refuse to acknowledge a middle between sin and grace, as also does Christ, since He says: "He that is not with Me is against Me"; and again: "Either make the tree good, or make the tree corrupt". But I believe that also the Doctor himself is of the opinion that grace and sin are with the scholastics diametrically opposed to each other.

The Doctor will not allow my statement that grace
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precedes love and fear, unless I were speaking of the first stirring of grace. I answer: I hold with the apostle and Augustine that, unless the law be loved, (which is the work of love and not of the first stirring), a man does not live rightly. Therefore God is neither feared nor honoured rightly.

Finally, he sets before me the choice of two conclusions (cornutum syllogismum):—Either Ambrose, Gregory and others are against the words of the apostle, or they are not. If they are, then I must prove it; if they are not, I must stand by their views. I answer and pass between the horns of his dilemma: They are not against the words of the apostle, and I stand by their opinion; not, however, the Eccian understanding, or rather misunderstanding, of it. For they do not exclude love from fear, whether servile or filial.

The Doctor says that I go, like a crab, after the back, because I said: When one has love, the mind is moved to fear. Whether like a scorpion, or, according to him, a crab, I am amazed at what he says, since also the heathen poet has said: "Love is ever a timid and troubled thing". As if one did not know that love is the source and head of every feeling that stirs the heart! For punishment and hell are slavishly feared because life and pleasure are childishly loved. And to drive away this love and fear, the love of God is poured out, that, through it, we may love another life and fear another death, which is separation from God.

The Doctor has passed over the other points referred
to in my Sermon, as also the discussion of it as a whole. I say: in brief; He has pen and paper; let him boldly attack it; and we will see whether he will have refuted my Sermon or held himself up to ridicule. This I leave to the judgment of those who are to be appointed to decide between us.

**D R. E C K.**

*(Latin text 205)*

I am unable through lack of time to reply to what the reverend Father has adduced. Nevertheless, I call the judges to witness that I have passed over nothing, and that it was never the opinion of the preachers and teachers that the law is fulfilled without love and that none of them have taught a profitless repentance, but how one may come by servile fear to a profitable one. I also draw the attention of the judges to the fact that, with a profusion of fine-sounding words, he has departed from the answer given today,(Dr. Martin interrupted saying he had not done so) in which he said that the Wise Man but now admits that he speaks of servile fear, speaks of filial fear without, however, excluding grace; which interpretation neither the text nor the holy Fathers permit. For by wisdom he understands love, and thus there would be a beginning before the beginning. Also Augustine throughout does not trouble himself how servile fear with love is the beginning of love, but how servile fear first occupies the mind, and first enters it and thus introduces love. This, also, is the opinion of Gregory who repudiates the backward, crab-like movement, regarding which the reverend Father, instead of
Gregory's crab, drags in the scorpion: "Love is ever a timid and troubled thing". All the teachers, therefore, whom I have quoted to-day, hold that servile fear is the beginning of love, according to the interpretation already frequently given, and which preachers are accustomed to give of it; regarding which I appeal to the judges.

On account of the feast of St. Margaret, the same Doctors will dispute to-morrow at 2 o'clock on the subject of ABSOLUTION from the PUNISHMENT and GUILT of SIN by any ORDINARY PRIEST.

Wednesday, 13th July, at 2 p.m.

DR. ECK.

(Latin text pages 205 to 209).

Regarding your 4th and 5th "Conclusions", reverend Father; because the time appointed us is too short, we shall deal, although we will touch upon other points incidentally, with the main matter, namely, that any priest may absolve from punishment and guilt, contrary to the common practice of the whole Church, and also with this, that in your Sermon in the vernacular and in your Conclusion you say that it cannot be proved from any passage of Scripture that divine justice demands any punishment or satisfaction from the sinner. And I stand firmly by this, that in the Sacramental absolution the guilt is instantly remitted, but
but the eternal punishment due to sin is commuted into a
temporal one. This is clear from the teaching of Holy Scripture
and from the usage of the holy Fathers. To be brief, Ambrose
has expressly taught this (Super Lucam), Jerome (lib. 1. contra
Jovinianus) (Question 1— On eight Questions of Dulcitius)
Jovinianum), Augustine (quaest. 1. de octo Dulcitii—question-
itus); and Ambrose (Luc. 5) pertinently testifies that the
punishment of sin is abolished through satisfaction.

Scripture also comes readily to hand; for the sin
of Adam, though the guilt is remitted, is punished in the whole
of his posterity. Therefore, although the guilt is taken away,
the punishment still remains. Augustine touches on this argument
Treatise 124 (On Matthew) in tract. 124 (Super Matt.) and in gloss on 2. Kings (Sam.) 12.
Likewise there is the passage concerning David in 2. Kings XXIV.
10 (i.e. 2. Sam. XXIV. 10) where we read that "David repented
and his heart smote him"; "I have sinned", he said, "greatly in
that I have done; and now I beseech Thee, O Lord, take away the
iniquity of Thy servant". Now, the sin is not taken away so far
as the guilt is concerned, because, as the prophet says: "The
soul that sinneth, it shall die". It remains, therefore, that
the sin, so far as the punishment is concerned, is taken away.
Thus the Prophet Nathan saith to David: The Lord hath taken away
thy sin. Here the gloss is: God blots out thy sin, but does not
leave it unavenged. For either the man who is penitent punishes
it in himself, or God in vengeance punishes it—in the man. (Note:—
The whole passage is obscure.).

And, to come to the holy Fathers, from whom the
usage and practice of the Church, though principally from the apostles themselves, is derived, we find, first, that no sin remains unpunished, and that the punishment is ordered according to its guilt. Augustine touches on these arguments and Gratianus sets them forth (Can. Sicuti primi de poenitentia, distinctione 1.). For God would not permit evil to happen, unless, by His righteous ordering, He were to make it go forth as something better in the world. Therefore Augustine (lib. de poenitentiae medicina) says: It is not enough that a man reform his life and depart from his evil ways, unless he also make satisfaction unto God for the past through the pain of penance, through the sighs of humility, through the sacrifice of a contrite heart, with almsgiving etc. For it is not said that we are only to refrain from evil; concerning the past he also says: Pray the Lord that He forgive thee etc.

But the reverend Father, according to my view, tries to make it appear in his manifesto and elsewhere that such satisfaction is made to the Church, but that God does not require such punishment, and that what He requires man may not take away.

I reply to this, firstly, with what Augustine says in his Encheiridion (Cap. 71), in speaking of the Lord's prayer: "This prayer certainly wipes out the least of our daily sins; it wipes out also those from which the believer, whose life has been godlessly lived but penitently changed into something better, departs". From this it is clear that the Lord's Prayer wipes out both venial and deadly sins, not in respect to their guilt but
in respect to their punishment, because it has been changed through penitence. This change of Augustine's cannot be understood except as a change of eternal punishment into temporal.

I do not quote those who lived within the last 400 years, such as Wilhelmus Parisiensis and Wilhelmus Altisiod, who fully confirm this. Likewise there is Cyprian who in his letter to Fidus speaks thus: We have read thy letters, dear brother, in which thou hast reported of a certain priest (presbytero), Victor, that before he had done full penance and rendered satisfaction to the Lord God, against whom he had sinned, his colleague, Therapius, rashly and precipitately gave him peace. Here St. Cyprian does not say that Victor had not rendered satisfaction unto the Church, but that he had not rendered it unto the Lord God.

The same Cyprian writes to Cornelius, the Pope, concerning the heretics: "They endeavour with devilish malice to accomplish their work, that the divine mercy heal not the wounded in the Church. They spoil the penance of the wretched with lies and deceit, by telling them that it does not appease the wrath of God." The holy martyr here very plainly reproves the heretics, who think that the penance enjoined by the Church does not make satisfaction unto God.

The reverend Father has frequently and shamelessly taunted me with not dealing rightly with the meaning of the holy Scriptures. Let the appointed judges decide today, which of us judges the more correctly regarding the faith and the interpretation of the holy Scriptures. Nevertheless, all, so far as I know, who have handled the Holy Scriptures, have held this view. For to
what purpose would the Church impose on penitents such a heavy work, if the Lord and Head of the Church did not demand it? I have touched upon this argument in my Observations; nevertheless, it is not mine, but Chrysostom's, as Gratianus quotes it (26. quaest. 7. Can. Alligant.):-The man, on whom thou dost impose the heavy burden of penance, either rejects the penance, or, not being able to endure it, he is offended, so that he sins further. In short, although we err in imposing a moderate penance, is it not better that we give answer on account of mercy than on account of severity? For, where the master of the house is bountiful, his steward must not be niggardly. If God be indulgent, why should the priest be severe? This on behalf of the Father—Confessors.

Likewise he says in Homily 31, "super epistola ad Hebraeos": "Sin is diminished by confession". But it is not diminished so far as concerns its guilt, for it would be impious, as Jerome says, to look to God for half forgiveness; therefore it is diminished so far as concerns its punishment.

I add Gregory, 4. moral. 49, where, after much else, he speaks thus: But, because God forgives no sin without punishment, for either we strive after this with tears or He with judgment, it remains that the heart must strive diligently after its reformation etc.

This is also the opinion of Jerome, as his words are quoted in "Can. Mensuram de poenitent". (dist. 1.): The Canons, therefore, do not definitely determine the length of the penance
for any particular sin, so that they should say how it is to be amended, but they rather leave it to the judgment and discretion of the priest; because with God it is not so much the measure of the time, as of the sorrow, that counts.

He also quotes Augustine in Can. Nullus: No one is let off from a more serious punishment that is due, unless he has suffered some punishment, although much less than he deserves; for the fullness of his grace is bestowed by God in such manner that the severity of His justice is not ignored. Here the distinguished Doctor Carlstadt has Augustine, who was quoted in my defence, but whose views it is not our purpose at present to pursue further.

Finally, we may add Isidorus (lib. 2. de summo hono, Cap. 13): Although atonement may be made for sin through penance, nevertheless this must not be without fear, since the satisfaction rendered by the penitent is considered only according to the divine judgment and not the human. Therefore penance is not enjoined because it renders satisfaction only to the Church, but also because it renders satisfaction unto God. For also with God the punishment lasts longer (productior est) than the guilt, as Augustine testifies (tract. 124. super Johannem).

From all this, which is held as indisputable truth, the refutation of the reverend Father's 5th Conclusion is very manifest, in which he says, that any priest must absolve from both punishment and guilt, and thus any village priest would be,
in his parish, bishop, archbishop and pope. That this is most obviously false, and contrary to the usage of the whole Church and not merely that of the flatterers (of the Pope), I prove (1) from what has been said, namely, that, while through sacerdotal absolution the guilt is cancelled, the punishment nevertheless remains, although changed; (2) because the sacrament of penance is judicial, as St. Augustine (Ca. forte 2. de poen. medic.) describes the manner of such judgment. Its administration, also, is of the nature of carrying out a judgment, otherwise there would be Anaxagorean chaos and absolute confusion in the Church of God.

And since the administration extends to two matters comprised in this Sacrament — for both the penitent sinner and the sins themselves are the matters concerned in penance — and no one denies that, for the prevention of confusion, the administration is restricted in the case of the lower prelates so far as concerns the sinners, therefore the appointing (of penance) belongs to one's own priest (or confessor); and, because the sentence pronounced by him who is not one's own judge is null and void, he therefore does nothing, who grants absolution to one who is not under him.

Also in regard to the sins may administration in like manner be restricted, and to the prevention of offences. Moreover that also one of those under him cannot grant plenary absolution, is clear from this, that such a power, unless it is founded on authority, ought not to be granted against the opinion
of the whole Church, whose practice ought to be for a Christian the rule. But in the above it was shown by dignitaries of the Church (per majores clericos) such as Cyprian, Chrysostom and Augustine, that the debt of punishment still remains after the guilt. Let the reverend Father, therefore, acknowledge the authority of the Holy Fathers and conform to the custom of the whole Church; else let him prove from the Sacred Scriptures, the Councils or the holy Fathers, why he should not do so.

At the end Dr. Eck said that, if it seemed necessary to himself, he would claim the right to reply, after the reply of Dr. Martin.

**D R. M A R T I N.**

(Latin text pages 309 to 314).

I leave the Doctor to have the last word, since he wishes it. The distinguished Doctor, however, argues against my Conclusion, and, wanting to prove that punishment is required by God, he quotes:–

(1). Genesis iii., where the sin of Adam, even when the guilt has been pardoned, is punished in his posterity. Punishment, therefore, he maintains, remains, although the guilt has gone. I want to bind the Doctor to this example, so that he may not reply, except either to confirm or give up his opinion. If this punishment is required for sin, and if we are to regard every punishment, as he argues, in the same light, then I hold that the punishment cannot be remitted by the Pope or by any priest, since
no one yet has remitted death, the innumerable pains, diseases
and such like miseries, all of which have been inflicted because
of the first sin. And thus the proof-text of the Doctor is in
favour of my Conclusion and against himself.

(2). That the sin, but not the punishment, was removed
from David is also on my side, as I have likewise often said in
my Sermon in the vernacular: - Because there was a punishment
which God required, therefore no one could take it away. If the
Doctor has not understood me, then let him read more carefully;
for I said and do now say, that God does not require any punish-
ment such as the Pope or man can release from.

(3). He quotes the gloss: God blots out the sin, but
does not leave it unavenged. But this is not against me. For
He avenges it either through the man himself by filling him
with remorse (contemendo), or through the correction or
discipline of the Church, or through Himself in judgment. And the
first and last of these punishments are in the power of no one,
as the apostle (1. Cor. XI. 31 f) says: "If we would judge our-
selves, we should not be judged of the Lord; but when we are
judged of the Lord, we are chastened, that we should not be
condemned with the world". Here it is clear how God requires and
how He does not require punishment.

(4) He adduces Augustine quoted by Gratianus, that
God would not permit evil to happen, unless by His righteous
ordering He were to make it go forth as something better. I am
amazed that the distinguished Doctor binds these and such like
passages thus together, since no one denies them or holds the contrary. For my quarrel is only with their boast that, by the power of the keys, the punishments required by divine justice are removed. For I do not consider this to be true; nor can it be proved. For Christ did not say to Peter: "What I bind thou shalt loose", but "Whatsoever thou shalt loose, shall be loosed". (Matt. XVI. 19).

"On the Medicine of Penitence"

(5). He quotes from "De poenitentiae medicina": "It is not enough that a man reform his life, unless he also make satisfaction unto God for the past through the pain of penance, through the signs of humility, through the sacrifice of a contrite heart". But all this I have always maintained and insisted on. Why then do they boast that such things are remitted through Indulgences, if it is not enough that a man reform his life and divine justice requires such satisfactions? To no purpose, therefore, does the Doctor glory that it is not only said:-- "Refrain from evil; but also: "Pray the Lord that He forgive the past". Thus it is clear that so far no Scripture has been quoted against me, although I might quote much stronger passages on my own behalf.

Next, he quotes from Augustine's Encheiridion:-- "This prayer (the Lord's prayer) certainly wipes out the least of our daily sins; it also wipes out those from which the believer, whose life has been godlessly lived, but penitently changed into something better, departs! But this is just what I said, namely, that after conversion the sinner is held to the
the Cross and sufferings of life, which God sends, and from which no man can loose. This passage also is therefore on my side.

He does not quote those who lived within the last 400 years. I am pleased that he does not do so.

Regarding Cyprian in his letter to Fidus, in which he (Cyprian) condemns Therapius for rashly giving peace to Victor, before he had done full penance and rendered satisfaction unto the Lord, he (Eck) says: Take note, that it was not to the Church, but to the Lord, that he (Cyprian) says, Victor did not make satisfaction. I answer: Let the Doctor read and study Cyprian carefully and he will find that those, to whom peace was given, were given it prematurely, that they might more readily to the Cross and martyrdom. In many letters he shows that these were the punishments and flagellations which God inflicted upon them for their sins. Therefore Victor had not yet in this manner rendered satisfaction unto God, and yet he did render satisfaction, because he rendered satisfaction to the Church which God wants us to hearken to. For it is implied in the words of Christ, "Whatsoever thou shalt bind", that the Church ought to inflict punishment. And in this manner I may admit that God demands punishments which the Church may remit, because He has made a covenant with her.

Regarding the other passage from Cyprian, namely, that addressed to Cornelius, where he writes that the heretics
prevent sinners from rendering satisfaction unto God whose anger they have kindled against them, - although Cyprian here does not speak of men who are penitent, but of heretics, who, as if they were upright and had done well, excused and defended themselves in their sins, I reply, nevertheless, as to the preceding.

Next he asks: Why should the Church want to burden penitents if the Lord does not demand it? and then quotes a long passage from "Ca. Alligant." I pass over all this and say that the Church has been commanded to judge and chastise sinners, and that if she does not do this, God will inexorably do it, according to the words of Paul quoted above (1. Cor. XI. 31 f), and thus it cannot be loosed.

Likewise regarding Hœmily 31 (Super Hebraeos) - sin is lessened through confession. From this the Doctor thus concludes: It is not lessened so far as its guilt is concerned, for it would be impious to look to God for only half a pardon; therefore it is lessened in regard to its punishment. I admit all this, according to what has already been said.

Regarding the quotation from Gregory (4. Mor.):"For either we strive after this with tears, or God with judgment", I say that scarcely anything more apt could be quoted on my behalf. Likewise regarding the words of Jerome quoted in Can. Mansuram, although I have doubts about their being Jerome's, I agree entirely that the canons do not definitely determine(i.e. the length of penance) and that therefore it is left to the
discretion of the priest. I also add: Much more is it to be left to the will of God, who alone searcheth the heart, and who judgeth neither ignorantly nor unjustly.

I am also pleased to hear the words of Augustine in Cap. Nullus: The fullness of His grace is bestowed by God in such a manner that the severity of His justice is not ignored. They can stand both for the Doctor and for myself.

Isidorus, whom he also quotes, is not an author of any weight in these matters. Nevertheless, I approve of his statement that the satisfaction rendered by the penitent is considered only according to the divine judgment and not the human. Therefore much less can it be remitted by human judgment, since the key of power ought not to operate unless there first be the key of knowledge, which understands what and how much to remit.

He quotes from Augustine that, with God, the punishment continues longer than the guilt. I grant this, always remembering, however, the words of the apostle in Rom.VII.18:- "I know that in me (i.e. in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing"; the meaning of which is that punishment and sin end together.

So much for the first Conclusion. Against the second he says it is most obviously false and contrary to the usage of the whole Church, that any priest ought to absolve the penitent from both punishment and guilt. And he proves this (1) from words, that is, out of nothing; (2) by the argument that the Sacrament of Penance is something judicial and that its administration is of the nature of carrying out a judgment. Its administration is, moreover, restricted in the case of the
lower prelates, both in regard to sinners and in regard to their sins, first for the avoiding of confusion, secondly for the prevention of offences. Otherwise, any village priest would become a bishop, archbishop and pope.

My answer is two-fold; first, that to this day I do not know whether the restriction of such administration has brought about what it was alleged it would, namely, the prevention of offences and the removal of confusion. Rather is it certain that quite the contrary has been the case. For even the grossest sins are laughed at in the higher courts (i.e. of the prelates), which sins could be fittingly punished, in the parishes concerned, if the method were followed, which the apostles instituted and the holy Fathers observed till after the Nicene Council, when it was decreed and long after observed, that dioceses be not intermingled, and that everyone do penance in his own diocese. Concerning this there is extant, with others, the very remarkable letter of Cyprian to Cornelius, the Roman Pope (letter 111.): "For since it is decided by us all, and it is also right and just, that the cause of everyone be heard where his sin was committed, and since every pastor has his appointed portion of the flock, which he is to rule and lead as he shall render account of his doings unto the Lord, it is imperative that those, over whom we are set, do not run about (from diocese to diocese), nor by their crafty and upsetting effrontery destroy the bishops' coherent unity, but that they plead their cause where
both their accusers and the witnesses of their crime are to be found. For he speaks of those who had sinned in Africa, and had betaken themselves to the Roman Pope, Cornelius. And thus the custom of the primitive Church, in regard to the binding and loosing of sinners, is clear.

Moreover, since, as the apostle (Acts. xx. 17 and 28) shows, bishop and priest (presbyter) are one and the same, and (Titus 1. 5) every city ought by divine right to have its own bishop, it would be a much better method of chastising sin, if every priest in his own parish were to bind and loose the penitent. The apostle has given an example of this in 1. Cor. 5., where, being present among the Corinthians in the spirit, he handed the fornicator over to Satan, and rebuked them because they had not themselves done this.

But by what law, or to what advantage to the Church, this usage, prescribed by the Divine Word and so long strictly observed, has been abolished, let others show. I indeed cannot deny, for we see it before our eyes, that thus it has come about, thus it has become the rule, that both the erring persons and their sins are reserved (for a higher spiritual court) and that to a single soul often six or seven pastors, under and above, are appointed. But whether it ought to be thus, or whether there is any advantage in it, I express no opinion. I know that a subordinate must obey the superior who restricts and torments him, although not by any divine law. The superior, nevertheless, as my Conclusion says, sins grievously, if, without very good reason,
he reserves secret sins. Yea, I doubt if any, and, so far as I can understand, I give it, without boldness, as my opinion, that no secret sin ought to or can be reserved; and I will be glad to hear proof to the contrary.

Further, I say that the Church would not (to-day) be going to ruin, if the parish priest were at once, bishop, archbishop and pope; and these were joined together, as Cyprian says, in one coherent unity, and as was the custom of the early Church.

Therefore I do not concern myself particularly about the article concerning these reservations having been condemned at the Council of Constance. I know that this reservation was examined and condemned in the early Church and in the teaching of the apostles. And now also, as the most lamentable experience of the Church teaches, its condemnation would be most helpful and salutary for the restraining of sin and the removal of the hateful confusion of all the bishoprics which we behold to-day. But, why it was changed at its time, I pass over. I find it (the usage) mutable; I leave it mutable. This I leave to the decision of the judges.

DR. ECK.

(Latin text pages 214 to 217).

The reverend Father from the start somewhat exultingly belittles my quotations, as if what was most opposed to him stood least in his way. For in his Sermon in the vernacular he...
maintained that eternal punishment is not commuted into a temporal one, and opposes the general opinion, as if it could not be proved that, apart from Cross-bearing, God demands any satisfaction. And in his Latin sermon he praises.

Dr. Eck only began to speak about 4 p.m., and being cut off, he resumed his address at the beginning of the disputation on the following day, to wit –

The teaching of the scholastics, the proverb (dictum vulgarium), which says of penance: "Never do the highest penance". The best penance, according to his gloss, is a new life. He and his champion add this argument:— "If the godless person turn from his evil etc.". If he attributes it to a new punishment, how then is it said that He does not remember? and thus his conclusion is obvious, which clearly says that the priest is guilty of sin, who does not absolve from guilt and punishment. I have opposed this error with the testimonies of the Fathers at which he thought to jeer, and, by doing so, to captivate his hearers, as if he alone were able to interpret Holy Scripture.

Therefore I appropriately quoted Augustine against him; "It is not enough that a man reform his life and depart from his evil ways". From this it is very obvious that the teaching quoted from his Sermon is false, because a new life is
not the best penance, since, according to Augustine, this is not enough. And this teaching is also strongly condemned by St. Ambrose (lib. 2. de poeniten. Cap. 5): "The apostles taught penance according to the command (magisterium) of Christ". And further on: For he, who does penance, must not only wipe out his sin with tears, but also cover it over and hide it with better works. The words of the Holy Father are very clear - we must cover our sins over with better works, if we would do penance.

But since the authorities were so clear, that God does not remit sin unpunished, he has recourse to an extraordinary distinction in punishments, although his custom is to condemn the scholastics because of the distinctions they make, and says that the punishment, by which God would punish sin, can be taken away neither by man nor by Pope. This is the falsest of all his statements and annihilates the power of the keys. For, in doing penance, a man can, through the punishment having been changed, certainly remove that punishment, according to the apostle quoted by the reverend Father (1. Cor. XI.):- "If we judged ourselves, we should not be judged by the Lord". Therefore if we render satisfaction for such punishment, God will not exact another from us for our sins. Otherwise, if God were to punish what we have punished, then, contrary to the prophet (apostle), He would punish the same sin twice.

Besides, the words of Cyprian, Chrysostom, Gregory
and Jerome were clear, that the punishment imposed by the priest as a satisfaction is the punishment which we are due to God; and thus Victor, because he had not fulfilled the imposed penance, is said by Cyprian to have failed in rendering satisfaction to God. Theodorus also bears the same testimony in his book on repentance, (or confession), which Bede follows almost word for word; although, possibly, neither of these authors, nor Isidorus, are sufficient for him.

Therefore, although he may say with his mouth that all the authorities are on his side, nevertheless, he must think differently in his heart; since these authorities overthrow his teaching and Conclusion. For if the priest is guilty of sin, who does not absolve from punishment and guilt, then the bishops must have been guilty of sin in not absolving Victor from punishment and guilt, and all the priests throughout Christendom would likewise be guilty, who do not grant absolution apart from Indulgences.

Nor does it help him, that we have to carry our Cross and that God demands this punishment; for such cross-bearing is nothing else than the Christian life, as the reverend Father learnedly expounds it; but along with this, we must render satisfaction for the past and pray to God for it.

Regarding the reservation of cases my "Conclusion" says nothing. Nevertheless, I hold that moderate reservations are useful, which has also been the experience of prelates in
in monasteries. I frankly confess that I have the desire of Berson, who, at the Council of Constance, raised his voice for the abolishing of the immoderate reservation of cases, and that this reservation is specially displeasing to me, as it is also to the reverend Father, when avarice attaches to it, that is, when punishment takes the form of a money payment.

He says that the Church would not be going to ruin, were the priest in his parish likewise bishop and pope. But it certainly seems to me that if the beautiful hierarchy and government of the Church were thus to go to pieces, the Church itself would likewise collapse.

But I want to keep to the main point, that sin does not remain unpunished, according to Augustine, Gregory etc. Therefore satisfaction is rightly called the third part of penance. And Augustine has fully proved in his Encheiridion that through the Lord's prayer we render satisfaction for evil deeds. And, as the reverend Father truly said yesterday, God has made a covenant with the Church:—If the Church does not do it, then God does it. Therefore I hold with the scholastics and preachers, that either we must make satisfaction, or God will demand it. But if we render satisfaction by our prayers or good works, why then could not this take place through the addition of the power of the keys, which God has not without reason bestowed on His bride, the Church. And since, according to the opinion of Gregory (Cap. Decoreto. 2. q. 6.), other bishops
have been called to share in the responsibility but the Pope has complete (or absolute) to the fullness of power, he renders satisfaction through the indulgences granted by him for the punishment that is due for sin, and this satisfaction or payment is made from the treasury of the Church, as, after Sixtus, the present Pope has declared, enjoining that, on pain of excommunication, it be thus taught, held and preached. Therefore if the reverend Father teaches, preaches or argues to the contrary, he has already come under the ban. I am pleased, however, that, besides the key of power, he yesterday also admitted the key of discernment or knowledge; since, nevertheless, he denies in opposition to the scholastics many kinds of keys (Conclus. 7. Resolutor.)

I have specially wanted to add this, so that future judges may understand more clearly where we differ on this point; for if the reverend Father stands by the opinion of the Doctors quoted by me, he will be in opposition neither to the scholastics, the preachers nor myself. Therefore if he desires to do so, he will also be able to express his view more clearly, for the information of the judges.

DR. MARTIN.

(Latin text page 217.)

DR. Martin, not having gone up to the desk, rose from the place where he usually sat and replied:

To the fooleries and absurdities of the Doctor I made
sufficient reply yesterday; for, like an amusing cithara player who keeps strumming on the same chords, he continues repeating the same things.

Further, he has not touched the point at issue between us. For the question is not whether God leaves sin unpunished, which he has proved at great length, but whether the Pope or the Church may remit the punishments which God demands. Concerning this he has proved nothing; but I leave it to the decision of the judges and all our hearers.

Thirdly, he has been silent to-day regarding the Holy Scriptures. Therefore I keep to his proof-text of yesterday, Genesis iii., from which he proved that punishment is required by God, which punishment the passage shows to be irremissible. I grieve to say that the Doctor penetrates the Scriptures as profoundly as a water-spider does the water; yea, he seems to flee from their face as does the devil from the Cross. Therefore, with all due respect to the Fathers, I prefer the authority of Scripture. And this I commend to future judges.

DR. E C K.

(Latin text pages 217 to 218)

Contrary to the dignity that becometh a theological disputation, the impatient monk has eked out his argument with scurrilous remarks. Let upright men judge of this. Whether I have correctly quoted Scripture against him, the judges will decide. But that this was the point at issue between us, is clear.
from the 4th Conclusion, namely, that in remitting the guilt, God remits the punishment etc. This was the matter about which we argued, and because he prefers the authority of the Sacred Scriptures to the Fathers, as if he, like another oracle of Apollo, alone had the meaning of the Scriptures, more than the holy Fathers, and apparently quotes the passage cited by me yesterday, I reply with the following two statements:

(1) That I quoted it to the end that one might see, that, though the godless man turn from his evil ways, God still remembers (his sin), not however, so far as its guilt, but its punishment, is concerned; which supports the teaching of the scholastics and the preachers.

(2) When the reverend Father turns such a passage against me, and says that the punishment imposed by God for Adam's sin is irremissible, either by Pope or man, I admit that what he says is true, because it is a punishment which follows not only the person but also (human) nature. It is not strange, therefore, that such a punishment cannot be remitted by man. But it is not thereby proved that the personal punishment that is due for sin cannot be remitted by priest or pope. But in these matters I appeal to the judges, and am prepared to change my views, if they should have anything different and better to teach me.
Before entering upon the second stage of our disputation, the "Conclusions" which the Doctor read out at the beginning of our contest, must be submitted, so that the judges elected today may understand that the Doctor has brought forward foreign and irrelevant matter and has invalidated no conclusion (of mine), and may therefore judge that my Conclusions are unassailable and are according to the principles of the faith. They are these: Freewill before grace, which the Holy Spirit imparts, availeth nothing except to sin. That is the 11th. The 12th is:- Yea, our will, which is not ruled by the divine will, runs more quickly to sin, the more eagerly it turns to action. And the 14th: Since Master John (i.e. Eck) does not see how a good work is entirely of God and the work of God etc... In this latter Conclusion the monstrous statement is not made, which the Doctor loves so dearly — "the whole of it, but not entirely". There remains to be discussed the 13th Conclusion, namely, that the Doctor, according to his own rule and that of his fellow disputers, can do what in him lies, that is, remove the barrier and hindrance to grace etc... I will defend and prove that "to do what in one lies" is to sin, to do evil, to displease
God, to lie, to boast etc. I would have our judges reminded that I have therefore read the passages from the books of the saints, so that they may understand that, unless they make a pronouncement according to these, their judgment will be against the teachers of the Church.

**E C K.**

(Latin text page 220).

Eck believes that the judges have likewise read the teachers of the Church, but have interpreted them differently from Dr. Carlstadt. For I also have quoted them. It remains, therefore, that they declare which of us has spoken the more correctly.

**C A R L S T A D T.**

(Latin text page 220).

The judges, I have no doubt, will understand that Dr. Eck's interpretation is contrary to the meaning of the teachers of the Church.

The afternoon of the 5th week-day.

**E C K.**

(Latin text pages 220 to 223.)

Since on the first day of our disputation we got so far, that the illustrious Doctor admitted that free-will also has an activity in a good work, although it must first
be moved by God and grace, in which opinion he agrees with all the scholastic theologians, as has already been dealt with and declared, it is necessary to defend these and myself, both in the other conclusions which have somewhat boastfully stated, and, firstly, in the 13th., namely, "Dr. John according to the rule (or opinion) of his fellow-disputers, can do etc., "This Conclusion, as it is put, is either false, or it puts a false meaning on the scholastics, as if in the declaration "He can do what in him lies", they were opposed to Ezekiel and Ambrose. Against this I argue thus: Free-will, when it does as much as in it lies, can sin and lie etc; but, when it does what in it lies, aided by grace, it can do good, acquire merit, avoid sin, according to Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers. If, therefore, the scholastics speak thus, the illustrious Doctor puts a false meaning on them, or has not understood them rightly.

I prove "the less" by the oft quoted passage from St. Augustin:-

The beginning of our salvation is of the inspiration of God; that we may yield to His wholesome (healing) Spirit is in our power. We do what in us lies, only when we do what is in our power. Chrysostom subscribes to this in "Super Epistolam ad Hebraeos" (Cap. 7.): Thou seest that we must first purify ourselves and then God will purify us. There St. Chrysostom clearly maintains that we must first do what in us lies, and then God will purify us. He expresses himself to the same effect in Homily 84 (super Matthaeum): Therefore I earnestly beg and
and entreat you not to attribute all to God and think ye have
only to yawn and sleep; and again also:—If ye be vigilant,
not to imagine that anything ye do is accomplished by your own
efforts. For God will not have us slothful and idle. He
desires us to do what in us lies in regard to a good work.
Bernard has given the same testimony clearly in "de gratia
et libero arbitrio". where he attributes to free-will the power
to consent, and says that it is a means whereby we may obtain
merit. Then only is anyone said to do what in him is, or what
lies in his power. And consent lies in the power of free-will
itself. Besides, that everyone may know how irrelevantly the
Doctor has drawn me to discuss free-will, I have put down in
my observations against the revered Father Martin, that the
will is master of its own acts. Therefore he has taken occasion
and in a most irrelevant manner wandered into a discussion
of free-will and predestination. But without rebuke, at least,
such as is merited, I prove that I rightly said that the will
is master from Gregory Nysen. in "de libero arbitrio", where
he represents man as doing and accomplishing, because he would
resolve in vain, if he were not master of his actions, and
argues thus: Whatever we are exhorted to, that is in our power;
we are exhorted to good works, therefore good works are in our
power. We see, therefore, again, that, in doing what in him lies,
a man can do good; never, however, excluding the help of grace.
And therefore he concludes (C.3) that we are the master of our
actions. In like manner St. Bernard (de libero arbitrio—Col XI)
says that free-will ought to endeavour to rule the body as
Wisdom rules the world, and control the senses so powerfully that it does not permit sin to get the upper hand. Thus speaks St. Augustine (C.8. L.1. de libero arbitrio) - "let reason rule over the impulses of the soul". Because, therefore, following the opinion of the holy Fathers, I said that the will is master of its actions, and, in defence of this statement, explained myself by saying that it is master in regard to lower acts, but a servant in regard to Christ who rules in it, he nevertheless, out of a malicious desire to cast aspersions on me, continues to charge me with the perfidy of Pelagius, which I have always held in abhorrence.

But he here represents the opinion (maximam) of the disputers as being contrary to Ezekiel, since I clearly expressed myself in Chrysopassus (centuria 4. numero 3) that free-will does not straightway remove the obstacle to grace, but only prepares the way (dispositive), and that this preparation is equivalent to yielding to the salutary inspiration. If he had not read in a carping spirit, he would have found (centuria 3. numero 60) that, to do good in oneself, the divine impulse must always precede, as is there expressly said concerning Ezekiel, whom he represents as being opposed to us. It is clear that he is in agreement with us when he writes: "Take away our stony heart and give us a heart of flesh"; because, as I have already said, the good will is prepared by the Lord who goes before, and grace makes the will to act rightly; nevertheless the acquiescence or consent of the will is required. And that is to do what in one lies.
Therefore God says: "Make you a new heart". Therefore we reason with Origen (lib. 3. C. l. de principiis): In the course of our life labour and pains must be expended by us and industry applied; and further on:- For if no labour be demanded, the commandments would certainly seem to be superfluous. In vain, also would Paul reprove certain for having fallen away from the truth, and praise others for having stood by the truth of the faith.

Next Dr. Andrew finds fault in Conclusion 15 with our vigils and works, because in Chrysopassus I have dealt much with predestination and nevertheless deny that the passages quoted regarding predestination apply to works that are to be rewarded. There is verily great truth in the saying: It is easier to indulge in carping criticism than to understand. For, although I am well aware, how little of the suppliant there is in me, yet I have always been ready, as I am to-day, to be corrected and taught by those whose learning is greater than my own, that thus I may dispel the clouds of ignorance. Nevertheless, you can easily see how ignorantly he attacks my statement, since in Proposition 18 I reproved Dr. Andrew, saying that, when I maintained that the will was master of its acts, he drew this with hairs into the matter of predestination. Further, I said in Proposition 18:— I do not intend here to defend either side, because the matter of predestination is irrelevant and beyond the scope of our disputation. Since, then, I said that predestination (whether, that is to say, it
concerns us) is irrelevant to the matter and to our disputation, he has drawn a fine meaning out of this and dares to charge me with saying that the passages concerning predestination cannot apply to works that are to be rewarded. Similar is the calumny in Proposition 16, where he says I have read Bernard (as meaning):—Do away with free-will, then nothing is blessed; and he adds:—He reads what he will and adds much that is false, and shows with what judgment he has perused the teachers of the Church, and makes himself to all who are devoted to them a perverter to be held in suspicion. In all sincerity I pray the Most Wise and High God that He never strike my understanding with such blindness that I should falsify anything in the holy Fathers; which, I believe, no one so far has charged me with doing. And, let the Doctor say what he will, I have read as I continue to read, what St. Bernard has written, according to the best codices. These, also, let the Doctor read, so that he may not distort, since he is very inexperienced in reading the Fathers of the Church, as he shows in his introduction to the "On the Justification of the Wicked" pamphlet, "de justificatione impii". Therefore, out of brotherly love, we ought rather to help and exhort each other to the most sacred study of theology, than wound and exasperate one another with such taunts and stinging words and ridicule. So much in defence of the scholastics and my words.

CARLSTADT.

(Latin text pages 223 to 226).

In the name of Christ, Amen. Although many of the
arguments brought forward by the Doctor may be refuted by the fact that the scholastics, in regard to doing what in us lies, are at variance with the teachers of the Church, nevertheless, let us look at the Doctor's statements one after another and briefly.

Regarding the first, in which he says I have attributed an activity to free-will, I admit that I have done so, but, as I have shown in the preceding, it is an activity that is of grace, that does not belong to oneself but springs from God.

Regarding the second, in which he charges me with having put a false interpretation on the scholastics, I reply that I am falsely charged with this, and that the distinguished Doctor in the 38th Conclusion of his second manifesto has clearly described what is meant by doing what in one lies. His words are:—Since to do what in us lies, is, according to the opinion of the most approved theologians, to remove the obstacle and hindrance to grace, I will not allow that he who does what in him lies, does what is displeasing to God etc. From this it clearly follows that the hindrance to grace is removed by ourselves; otherwise, he would have said that to do what is of grace, is to remove the hindrance to grace. And regarding this opinion, namely, that grace removes evil merits and the will to do evil and the hindrance to grace, none of the teachers of the Church have any doubt; but we are not said, according to the same teachers, to do what in us lies, when we work by grace. For Augustine (de vera innocentia C. 150) says:—To live and act after ourselves is to do evil. His words are:—When a man
lives according to himself, and not according to God, he is like to the devil; for even an angel must live, not according to the angel, but according to God, that he may continue in the truth. Behold, the text is clear - He who lives according to himself is like unto the devil and is a liar. This, also, says Augustine (C.7. de facere, quod in se) regarding the articles falsely assigned to him. Thus also he speaks in "de vera innocentia" (Cap.136):- Whatever good we have, we have of our Creator; but if that be in us, which we ourselves have done, then will we be condemned; but if that which God has done, then will we be crowned. From this it follows that God awards condemnation to the man who does what in him lies; but on him, who does what is of God He bestows a crown. And if that was the meaning of the Doctor, then he ought to have added what Augustine was not ashamed to add, and I would acknowledge my gratitude to his lordship, if he should thus think and speak with me. The same Augustine says (de vera innocentia C.322):- No one has anything of his own except sin and falsehood; but if a man has anything of truth and righteousness, he has it from the source which is Christ. But what we have of God, the Giver, depends on the power of God and not on our own ability. This, Augustine has clearly set forth in "de peccatorum meritis" (lib.2 Cap.5). But the scholastics say that "doing what in one lies" precedes the inpouring of grace. If, however, anyone says that grace alone removes the hindrance to grace, he is not to be contradicted but accepted. With this I reply to his third and fourth points.
Regarding Chrysostom I say that he is to be read with caution; yea, if he expresses himself as being of the opinion, that the beginning of purification is in us before grace, we must hold, not with him, but with St. Augustine, who through the examination of heretics has become more trustworthy. Yea the distinguished Doctor has himself ranked Augustine as the first of the theologians.

To his sixth point regarding consent, which Bernard attributes to free-will, I reply that the same Bernard expressly says that such consent is also of God, as likewise the effort. With this, also, may we reply to the ninth, although the words of Bernard are good, but not to the point.

In the seventh place, when the distinguished Doctor says that I have drawn him to this matter of free-will, when he only maintained that the will was master of its own acts, I answer that I have nothing to do with his conclusions; but if his lordship is aggrieved, he can reply in writing at his earliest convenience.

In the eighth place, when Gregory Nyssenus represents man as doing and accomplishing, I am unaware that his authority is so great that I must submit to it, even if he were of another opinion. For, indeed, I know nothing about him. Nevertheless, I have said in the preceding that free-will does the act, that is, it acts, if it has previously received the divine action.

In the tenth place, I reply to Augustine on free-will, that the same Augustine has expressed himself clearly in later
books, as for example, "de peccatorum meritis" (lib. 2), where he says that free-will, even if renewed by grace, has no power over the members of the body, except that it does not give the members up to the sin that is in man. Thus also in lib. retractationum.

In the eleventh place, when the distinguished Doctor says that in his Chrysopassus - I know not in what "Centuria" - he has stated that free-will does not principally remove the obstacle and impediment to grace, but grace itself. I desire to be instructed by the Doctor what it is to remove principally or to remove the entire obstacle. I say that this, which is principally or first of all of grace, is not to be attributed to us but to God, as is clear from the words of Augustine quoted from his book "de vera innocentia".

In the twelfth place, the Doctor has said that the divine impulse goes before the preparation for grace. I am afraid that, if this divine impulse is distinguished from the grace, which makes the godless upright, the distinguished Doctor is justifying with scholastic devices the mantle, with which the Pelagians, who come to us in sheep's clothing but inwardly are ravening wolves, cover themselves.

In the thirteenth place, I am quite pleased when he says that Ezekiel is not against him, if what he says be true. I would, indeed, that we were united in the truth; but in his conclusion which he quotes, he does not say that this is of grace, namely the removing of the obstacle to grace. If, then,
this be his meaning, he adds his gloss, and either destroys or confirms his argument. I willingly speak with the distinguished Doctor according to the Scripture, which says:-

"And I will take away, saith the Lord, the stony heart out of your flesh". He does not say: "Ye shall take away", but "I will take away" (Ezeek. XXXVI. 26). Nor does it matter that he quotes the same Ezechiel from another place, where we are bidden put away our stony hearts. For, when the Scriptures exhort, warn, command and direct us, they show what we ought to ask and what we ought to entreat to be given us. Therefore we pray: Thy will be done; that is: Do in us what Thou justly demandest; make us submissive to Thy warnings and precepts.

In the fourteenth place, I let what he quotes from Origen pass, and reply as to Chrysostom. For Origen in his book "Peri Archon", seems to attribute many things to our will, which Augustine refuses.

In the fifteenth place, when the distinguished Doctor says that I have found fault with his labours and vigils, because I have denied that the passages quoted by him regarding works have to do with predestination etc., I answer that this has nothing to do with our present purpose, which is restricted by certain well-marked lines, according to the agreement we came to at the start. To the saying which he quoted: "It is easier to indulge in carping criticism than to understand", I reply: It is a common ailment, for which possibly the distinguished Doctor may likewise be in need of medicine and
help, and I trust he may not actually have it. For he says that I have attacked him in an ignorant manner. The accusation, however, is still under judgment.

Regarding all the other points which have not been answered in what I have said, I refer the reader to the Apologia of the distinguished Doctor and my own. Finally, I do not worry about his recalling to me my little book, "de Justificatione impii", for he does this, not for instruction, but probably only to waste time.

E C K.

(Latin text pages 226 to 228).

I believe that the best of the scholastics are not at variance with the holy Fathers. When he opposes to me Conclusion 38, he does not remember how I began this disputation. For in regard to evil the will can do what in it lies, and this power it has in a marked degree of itself, as also Augustine says. It is another thing, however, to do what in it lies, in regard to good; and concerning this I have said in the conclusion, that either is in our power - both good and evil, Eccles. XV. (Sir. XV. v. 14 ff.). Nevertheless, evil is more in our power, because we cannot do the good without the help of God. And therefore Augustine (C.150 de vera innocentia) does not speak simply of living after ourselves, but adds "and not after God". Therefore we must take the meaning of the words from the matter of which they are spoken. Accordingly,
when we spoke of merits, he ought to have understood the
Conclusion about doing what in one lies in regard to good. It
was thus we quoted Augustine and the Doctor has made no reply
to the passage.

Regarding Chrysostom, you see here his (Carlstadt's)
views, and in what honour he holds not only the scholastics but
also the Fathers of the Church. Chrysostom, he says, must be
read with caution; (Gregory) Nyssenus, he says, is to be denied,
and he cannot bend his neck to him—perhaps because he is of
the stiff-necked type. Nevertheless, Chrysostom does not contra-
dict Augustine, who teaches the same (de perfectione justitiae).

There, undoubtedly, he prays for this. And when he prefers
Augustine to Chrysostom, because he was exercised with heretics,
I oppose to him Jerome (contra Pelagianos), who attributed to us
the beginning of a good work; to God, however, its accomplish-
ment; and that in the same book in which he refutes the
Pelagians. For what can he say against Jerome, the hammerer
of the heretics, who is much clearer than Chrysostom? And
Bernard (de gratia et libero arbitrio) speaks to the same
effect as Chrysostom, concerning the keeping of the commandments.
From Bernard he has quoted that such consent is of God. I admit
it, but only in part.

Regarding the Conclusions he bids me reply to them
in writing. I am now disputing with the purpose that there
should be an end of these abusive writings, as is clear from
the defence and the letters written to the most illustrious
Prince and the university.

Regarding Augustine (*de libero arbitrio*), he does not answer him, but only says that he (Augustine) has set forth his views in his book *"de peccatorum meritis"*; whereas Augustine, after the same book (*de peccatorum meritis*), also wrote his *"Retractiones"*, but did not withdraw the words which I quoted. Therefore he (Carlstadt) ought to have replied to them.

Next, he wants to be instructed what it is to remove "principally" the obstacle. I have said that he who does not know what is principal and what accessory, what is less than principal and only directive or preparative, knows little indeed. The principal in actions is that which directs or gives activity to something else, or contributes to the efficacy of an ulterior cause. Therefore grace removes sin principally and effectually in the third degree, as taught by Augustine, free-will, however, in the second degree, according to Augustine, by acquiescing and preparing the way for its removal. When he praises me for now thinking with the teachers of the Church, it seems to me that I have always done this in Chrysopassus. But I ought to have added the gloss. I answer: If he had read our defence in Christian (theologica) love, he would have found the gloss with the text (*Conclus. 23 adnot. 2*). For I freely confess that no really meritorious act can ever take place without the special help of the divine grace and compassion. When he says he is afraid that, if the preceding preparation is not the grace
that justifies, I am strutting in the dress of the Pelagians, he has brought forth nothing in support of this. I defend myself therefore by only saying that I am a poor little sheep and know nothing of wolves. Nevertheless I believe that it is the opinion of Augustine, that the beginning of salvation is grace and the impulse of grace which maketh righteous; first in the third degree laid down by Augustine, where the grace, which is true love, is given; so that the first grace precedes, the second co-operates. Regarding Ezechiel I have always said, and the scholastics admit, that all good works are attributed to God — "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" Nevertheless, the co-operation of free-will is not therefore to be removed from the help of grace. Regarding Origen, it is true that in his book "de principiis" he has set down some erroneous things; therefore St. Jerome has sifted the same books; nevertheless he has left the passage, quoted as Catholic, intact. Therefore, illustrious Doctor, you will see that my opinion has always been that free-will has power of itself for evil, but has no power of itself for good, unless it be helped, stirred, drawn and impelled by grace. Therefore we have never been at variance with one another regarding the dignity (or importance) of grace, in opposition to the abandoned Pelagians. And with this I claim to have clearly set forth my views, and at the same time defended the scholastics in the matter of the obstacle (or hindrance).
CARLS TADT.

(Latin text pages 228 to 239).

Regarding his first point, namely, the views of the scholastics, I refer the reader to the discussions (or questions) which dealt with the activity of free-will and with imperfect and true repentance (de attritione et contritione).

Regarding his second and fourteenth, I am pleased that the last word of the Doctor was, that free-will has no power of itself for good, unless it be stirred and drawn and impelled by grace. It is a beautiful and true word, for which praise be unto God. That the preceding preparation or inclination is also of the grace that justifies, likewise pleases me. I would like, nevertheless, that we do away with this name, and use in its stead a word by which the Holy Spirit speaks to us in Scripture.

I am also pleased with his 3rd point, namely, that, to do what in one lies, without any regard to God (i.e. to God's help) is nothing else than to do evil.

To Jerome I reply, as in the preceding disputation, that he himself quotes the passage from the apostle (Phil.2.): - "It is God who worketh in us both to will and to do"; to will, however, is first, and the beginning of good works, so that the teachers of the Church say that God works this in us apart from ourselves.

Regarding Bernard, when he is represented as saying that
consent is partly of free-will, I reply that he is incorrectly quoted; for he says that the entire consent is of God and entirely in free-will.

To his 12th, namely, that, to remove the obstacle principally, is to attribute activity to free-will, I answer that there is no special inconsistency in such manner of speech, if the usage of Scripture be recognised. Regarding the rest, you will yourselves best determine.

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Friday, 15th July, 7 a.m.

Subject of Disputation:-

THAT the RIGHTEOUS SIN in GOOD WORKS.

CARLSTADT.

(Latin text page 239.)

In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.

The second Conclusion of the distinguished Doctor, which is arrogant, impious, blasphemous and heretical, seeing that it is manifestly contrary to Scripture and the prayers of the Church, I will attack and demolish with uncompromising sword; not with craft, not with falsely quoted authorities, nor with deceiving boldness, nor sarcastic loquacity, as is the manner of the distinguished Doctor.

Against his 2nd Conclusion which begins: Although venial sins are a matter of daily occurrence, we nevertheless
deny that the just man sins continually in a good work, yea, even when he dies well: I oppose the passage from Eccles. VII. (v. 21) where we read: There is not a just man upon earth that doeth good and sinneth not. The text is clear, that he who doeth good, likewise sins. The Conclusion of the Doctor, is, however, contrary to this passage, and therefore heretical. Let the Doctor, therefore, reply.

E C K.

(Latin text pages: 229 to 230).

In Thy name, sweet Jesus, Amen.

Against my most Christian Conclusion the daring Father, forgetful of theological decorum, and relying on his own understanding, has quoted a solitary passage from Ecclesiastes VII., to which, he says, my Conclusion is opposed. I answer:— My Conclusion is so based on truth, that he, who contends against it, cannot but be suspected of falsehood. And the text quoted is not against my Conclusion, unless it be falsely interpreted. Therefore I admit there is not a man who does good but also sins; but since he does good, he does not, therefore, sin all the time. I find this nowhere, either in the Sacred Writings or in the holy Fathers. And, that my interpretation gives the sense and meaning of the passage, I quote St. Jerome (lib. I. contra Jovianum col. 4):— "It is not that the good sin continually but only occasionally". In support of this Jerome also writes in the same place, that man,
as constituted in this life, is subject to his passions. And
the interlinear gloss quotes as a concordant passage: "For
all men have sinned and come short of the glory of God".
Therefore the Wise Man means that the man who does good also
sins at times. And that this is the true and Catholic meaning
of Scripture, and not that which Dr. Andrew in his rash way
draws from it, I quote to him Augustine, (lib. 2. de peccatorum
of Sins, chap. 20) who treads on his neck. From this (book)
we see that, although there might have been one in this life,
who so excelled in virtue that he attained to such a plenitude
of righteousness as to have no sin, it is, nevertheless, not
to be doubted, that he was formerly a sinner, from being which
he was converted to this new life. Therefore the unanimous
view of Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers is that no one,
who does good, is so righteous, but that he may sin, or has
sinned, at times. He would then say in a most godless and
blasphemous manner that St. Laurence sinned on the gridiron,
St. Andrew and St. Peter on the cross; when, nevertheless,
concerning St. Laurence the Church sings the Psalm (XVII. 3):-
"Thou hast tried me with fire and found no iniquity in me".
Therefore let Dr. Andrew cease from his shameless scurrility,
and, as becometh a serious theologian, seek the truth with
honourable contention of words, that he may find it.
As the Doctor admits that there is not a man who does good, but also sins, but adds that, since he does good, he does not therefore sin all the time, I oppose to him, regarding the same passage, the words of Ambrose (de poenitentia), that the Scripture, which speaks generally or universally ought to be interpreted generally or universally and not restricted by human opinions. But the text quoted (Eccles. VII.) speaks in a general or universal manner, without any limitation or restriction — "There is not a just man that doeth good and sinneth not". It does not say "Since"; it does not say "afterwards"; but simply "that doeth good and sinneth not". It ought, therefore, to be understood generally of anyone that doeth good. Nor does his quotation from Augustine stand in my way, for, regarding the meaning of Augustine, I refer the judges to the preceding and following chapters in "de peccatorum meritis" (lib. 2.); likewise to the last chapter of "de spiritu et littera"; also to the book "de perfectione justitiae"; from which they will easily see that the distinguished Doctor either falsely understands or falsely quotes Augustine.

Regarding Jerome, I will look up the passage referred to, and see if it has been correctly quoted. This I know — Jerome in his book "adversus Pelagianos" unreservedly accepts this passage and adds to it several others, from which it is
inferred that a man sinneth even when he doeth good. For he makes use of the passage from David (Psalm CXLIII.2) where we read: "And enter not into judgment with Thy servant; for in Thy sight shall no man living be justified"; or as the Hebrew has it: "Make me not to come into judgment"; for the word "Dophot" is according to some Hebrews (or Hebraists) a transitive verb of the second or third order (conjugation); that is, make me not to come into judgment, for in Thy sight shall no man living be justified". Behold! The text is clear - David, who has the testimony or reputation of holiness, does not wish to come to divine judgment, because no man living is justified before it. But if the gloss of the Doctor were right, it would follow that the just man could go without hesitation or fear to the judgment of God, and would, to wit, when he did a good work and sinned not. But the exceeding boldness of such a speech, namely, that the upright should desire to present themselves before God to be judged, is clear to all who understand the Sacred Writings.

Next, the Doctor's inferences, regarding St. Laurence, Andrew and Peter, will be answered, when we deal with the death of the saints. This, nevertheless, I add, and it is the voice of the martyrs, as Augustine says: "All men are liars" (Psalm CXVI.11). This is the voice of the holy martyrs, sent forth, if not with their mouth, at least with their heart. Therefore did Christ, when He was about to go forth to death, say: "Lord, if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me; nevertheless, not
as I will, but as Thou wilt*. This failure of resisting nature and of the will in the martyrs who were about to die for Christ, He took to Himself, and, as Augustine says, overcame, so that God does not impute their reluctance to die to the holy martyrs, although they had it. Nor are the words of the Psalmist: "Neither was iniquity found in me", against me, because tribulation, fire and persecution extinguish iniquity. Nevertheless iniquity may also be taken for some gross crime, as Augustine says, writing on Psalm CXVIII. And, if anyone wants to, he can thus reply to the words of the Psalmist.

Further, that the righteous really sin in good works, together with, and at the same time, and in the same act in which they do righteously, is clear from the words of Asaph (Psalm LXXX.5): "Oh Lord God of Hosts, how long wilt Thou be angry against the prayer of Thy servant?" Behold! the servant of the Lord, who is upright, says that God is angry at his prayer. But, since the prayer of the righteous - a work so powerful and holy, and so often commended by Christ - is under the divine wrath, who will dare say that in other good works, or in some of them, there are not sins on account of which God is angry? Nor is it against me that, in the Hebrew, it runs:- How long wilt Thou fume (oschonta)? Since it is a figure of speech, and the smoke of God, in the Hebrew, signifies His anger, as the Septuagint has rendered Eccles. VII. Likewise Cassianus (de velle bonum et agere malum) has quoted this in
regard to some former passage, I forget which.

E C K.

(Latin text pages 232 to 235).

After hearing my answer, Dr. Andrew betook himself to mendicancy (mendicimonium), that is, to the rule of the universal—just as philosophers, when they are at a loss, go back to the first cause—and quoted Ambrose (de poenitentia), that Holy Scripture, when it speaks universally, (or generally) is to be understood thus. I answer: It is true and I accept the words of the Preacher universally and that he speaks of every just man. But when he wants to apply to the universality of time what only applies to the universality of what Ecclesiastes had stated, he is a sophist, and does not understand the meaning of Scripture and its manner of speaking. He has referred the judges to the book "On Man's Perfection in Righteousness" "On the Merits of sinners" justitiae" and to "de meritis peccatorum" (lib.2.). May I die, if, either in these books or in all the works of Augustine, it is anywhere to be found, that the righteous sin continually in every good work. When he says that I have quoted Augustine falsely, he does me an injury, since neither he nor any other can, in this disputation, show me any passage, which I cannot point out in the originals. And thus he has not replied to Augustine, but sent us on a fool's errand. (remisit ad forum Julii).

Further, after taking time to go over Jerome again, he
quotes another passage from Jerome (contra Pelagianos), which brings in other quotations, even from David himself, who, though a saint, shrank from judgment, according to Psalm CIIII., (v. 3): "Enter not into judgment with Thy servant"; and from these, he says, it is to be inferred that the just man sins in every good work. I reply that Jerome never thought, and nowhere is it to be found in him, that the just man sins in every good work; and such an inference is wrongly drawn from his words. To prove the truth of this, I quote Jerome in the same book "Contra Pelagianos" (lib. 2), where he says: "He that is cautious and prudent can for a time avoid sin". A most clear testimony that the just man does not sin continually, since he can for a time avoid sin! And when with fine sounding words he introduces the Psalmist as shrinking from the judgment of God, let the new interpreter of holy Scripture behold the same Jerome introducing the saintly David in "Contra Jovinianum" (lib. 2.) where he speaks of him thus - "David, the chosen one, the man after the Lord's heart, who did all His will, and who dares to say: Judge me, O Lord, for I have walked in mine integrity". Behold! this David desires to be judged according to his integrity. Therefore, if I were to remain by the Doctor's manner of answering, namely, by giving an example, the matter would now be finished. But we must bring out the meaning of Scripture, which the Holy Spirit demands, and not rest upon the surface, or literal, meaning of the words, after the Jewish manner under a Christian covering, as he
falsely charges me with doing (Conclus. 1.). Therefore I say that, according to the opinion of the holy fathers, these two passages from the Psalmist are not contradictory. For in the one he desires to be called to judgment according to a righteousness that is of grace (pian), of which the apostle (2. Timothy IV. 8.) speaks:— "Henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give me at that day". And regarding this righteousness of grace the householder (Matthew XX. 4) speaks:— "Go ye also into my vineyard, and whatsoever is right I will give you"; and Colossians I. 12:— "He hath made us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints". Behold! this is the righteousness of grace, according to which the righteous cry to the Lord: "Judge me, oh Lord".

There is, however, another, a strict righteousness, according to which David, although upright, did not want to be called to judgment, because, according to it, no living man is justified in His sight. And thus Augustine (9. Confess. Cap. ult.) says:— "And the life of men is not praiseworthy, if it be examined without compassion by Thee." But because Thou art not over zealous in searching out our faults, we confidently hope that there will be room for pardon with Thee". Therefore the passages quoted do not help Dr. Andrew, and he will show me no teacher of the Church or the Schools, who has ever understood it thus, unless it be the ecclesiastical teacher of Wittenberg.

Regarding the saints, he refers to the point when he will deal with their death and departure. Nevertheless, he says
that all martyrs cry to God: "All men are liars". I do not recollect that the martyrs ever said this in their martyrdom. Nevertheless, it contributes nothing to the purpose, whatever way we understand the words: "All men are liars", whether of vanity and transiency, as St. Jerome very beautifully interprets them, or, as is more in harmony with St. Augustine, of sin. I say that all the martyrs, all the saints were sinners. But by what reasoning can we infer: "Therefore they have sinned in every good work". Regarding the Psalmist's words: "No iniquity is found in me", he said that iniquity is sometimes to be understood of a great crime.

Regarding Christ who prayed to the Father: "Father, if it be possible etc.," he has shown how nature and the will resist each other; but in doing so he has put into our hands a sword by which his argument shall be destroyed. For I reason that it is false that the saints sin because of a natural shrinking from death, and that, because of such shrinking, their love is diminished, so that they must suffer the pains of purgatory. And from this fact and passage in the life of Christ the argument is unanswerable, that the upright man who fears death, and whose will is only half prepared for it, does not on that account sin. His love is thereby not diminished, and there arises in him no dread which has reference to the pains of purgatory, as might be proved at length. But I go on to his next.

Finally, he thinks fit to quote, and with very pompous
words, the clear text of Psalm LXXX.(v.5): "O Lord God of Hosts, how long wilt Thou be angry at the prayer of Thy servant?" I would that Dr. Andrew did not, according to the Counsel of the wise, rely on his own wisdom, but that he would take the words of Holy Scripture in the sense which the Holy Spirit demands, and which the holy Fathers have taught, and whom not to believe, as Boetius says, is folly. Therefore St. Jerome in this passage is expressly against the interpretation of Dr. Andrew, in that he holds that God is not angry, if we pray for righteousness, but that the man, who prays, fears, because of a bad conscience, that God is angry even at his prayer. But if he wants a more literal interpretation, let him take Cassiodorus, who says that in this Psalm he prayed, as formerly, for the promise of the Saviour:—"Send forth Thy power and come; show us Thy face etc." He says, however, that He is angry, because He delays. He has not, therefore, said that God is angry at the prayer of the righteous man, because he sins even in his good works, but because He delays to grant his request; and it is the manner of those who are angry to put off what they ought to give. For this reason, he says that God is angry at his prayer, and not in the sense of Dr. Andrew.

CARLSTADT.

(Latin text pages 235 to 238).

Since the distinguished declaimer has, by his digressions, encroached on my time, so that I cannot get to authorities more important and weighty, I will not, because of the pressure of time, refute his slanders. I will only touch briefly upon his futile
answers and refute them. And, first, he says that I took refuge in the rule of the universal etc. I answer that I did not adopt the words of Aristotle or of a philosopher, but the rule of Ambrose; and I admit the applicability of the rule regarding the persons who do good, which also the Doctor has admitted; he says nothing, however, of the rule in regard to works, although the text speaks both of persons and works; but he passes over the works and speaks only of persons.

(2). He says: May I die, if the teachers do not think thus. I reply that he speaks thus that by hook or by crook (per fas et nefas) he may bring the minds of his hearers to his way of thinking; and I refer him to the passages already quoted.

(3). Regarding Jerome, when he taunts me with taking time for reflection, I answer that it would not be unreasonable, if, in a matter so important—and so necessary for salvation, I presented myself well prepared; for here we do not seek to display the retentiveness of our memory or the sharpness of our wit; we seek the truth.

(4) Regarding the words of the Psalmist: "Enter not into judgment etc.," he tells us that Jerome says a man is able to avoid sin for a time. I again refer the judges to the books of Jerome against the Pelagians, where they will find what sins Jerome speaks of, and how by grace we can be freed from sins or avoid transgressions, because love covers our sins.

(5). He quotes Jerome (Contra Jovin.) and the testimony of the Psalm: "Judge me, O. Lord, for I have walked in mine
integrity", and noisily maintains that this passage decides the matter. First, I will confirm his opinion, but not to his liking. And to begin with, I am amazed that the Doctor has swallowed so many of the rules of disputators, and yet has forgotten his own, and, only presenting examples, answers nothing that has been brought forward.

But I add to the first passage the words of Job(XXXI.18):

"If I shall be judged, I know that I shall be found upright".

Here Job expressly says that he shall be found upright, when he is judged. I would, however, that the Doctor understood the innocence of David and the uprightness of Job; then he would correctly interpret the passage, and in my favour:— Judge me, O Lord, according to the innocence of Job. For the righteousness of Job is the judgment of which he said a little before:— "Nevertheless I will blame my ways before Him and He shall be my Saviour." (See note). For no hypocrite shall come before Him.

According to this argument by which Job judges, acknowledges and condemns his sin, he desires to be judged and will be found upright when he is judged. David speaks to the same effect: Truth

Note:— The English translation from the Hebrew is "But I will maintain my ways before Him." The general meaning of the word "arguam" used in the Vulgate is the same. But it has also the meaning of "to blame, censure", which Carlstadt's argument seems to require here.
Truth springs out of the earth, and righteousness looks down from heaven. When truth, that is, confession of sin springs up in man, then the righteousness, which makes men upright, looks down from heaven. Similar are the words of the apostle: "If we judge ourselves, we shall not be judged of the Lord"; and those of John in his Canonical epistle: "If we confess our sins, God is just and will forgive us our sins". Therefore when a man judges his sins, the Merciful God, who justifieth, forgiveth his transgressions. Thus also did David have innocence — because his sin was ever before him and because he confessed his sins to God. And according to this innocence he desired to be judged in his righteousness. But what is the righteousness he means? Let the Psalmist answer us: "The Lord will not forsake His people till righteousness return to judgment"; that is, so long as the people of God submit their righteousness to right judgment, they will not forsake, on the contrary, they will confidently seek to be judged by the Lord. Therefore the passage quoted by the Doctor, namely, that David desires to be judged according to his righteousness, according to the innocence in which he has walked, is on my side. In accordance with this he says (Psalm CIX.26):— "I have declared my ways and Thou did' st save me". Therefore David's righteousness contains sin.

(6). Regarding his quotation from 2. Timothy (C. 1V):— "There is laid up for me a crown of righteousness"; and from the parable: "Go ye also into my vineyard", and the passage:— "He hath made us meet etc." I reply that the Doctor has quoted
these passages in order to make a digression. For we are not inquiring how good works are rewarded. The main point of our discussion is this - how are there sins in good works? If anyone, however, wants to get to the mind of Augustine, let him read his "de gratia et libero arbitrio" (Cap.16), where he says that God crowns His gifts.

(7) When the Doctor invents a new kind of righteousness, according to which, he says, David did not want to be judged, I refer the judges, for the sake of brevity, to Augustine's "de perfect. justit." where he makes sufficient distinctions; Regarding Augustine's Confessions (C. finali), where he says: "If Thou search out sins without mercy", this passage from Augustine is against him, and is a sword of Goliath, because it expressly says that there are sins in (good) works, and because of this he confidently hopes in the mercy of God; as also Christ says: "They that be whole need not a physician, but they that are sick; I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners".

(8) He says that I cannot point to a teacher of the Church who ever understood it in the manner I do, unless it be the teacher of Wittenberg. I would like to answer the Doctor at length, if I did not spare the university of Ingolstadt. But that my understanding of it is confirmed, I refer to the passages quoted (Eccius:et Soluta), and add what Augustine wrote to Jerome about the words of James.

(9) When he says he does not recollect that the
martyrs said: "All men are liars", I reply that this is a
proof that he has not diligently read Augustine on PsalmCXVI.

(10). When he says that, in maintaining that the
resistance of nature and the will is sin, I have produced a
sword with which he will cut off my head, he shows sufficiently
that he does not understand whence sins arise in good works.
For they do not spring from grace, but from the evil that is
in man, and which is called the law of the members. According
to this law Christ says: "The spirit is willing but the
flesh weak"; and Paul (Rom.VII.23): " But I see another law
in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing
me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members".
Because of this law, says Paul, he is led captive whether
he would not; and a little above: " For I know that in me
(that is, in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing; for to will is
present with me; but how to perform that which is good I
know not; for the good that I would I do not". Behold, Paul
expressly says that he wills the good, that he wants to keep
the commandments of God, that he desires to die for Christ,
as Augustine expounds it, but how to perform he knows not,
because there is a resistance of the will, which opposes the
will to good. From this it is clear that the saints, when they
will the good, nevertheless do the evil; that is, they feel
evil desires in their nature, and these desires will not dis-
appear, so long as this mortal clothes us. But when death is
swallowed up in victory, then there will be the will to good,
without any evil desire, then it will be possible to will and perform what now we know not, nor hath any saint known, how to perform, except Christ and His Mother.

(11). In replying to the passage: "How long wilt Thou be angry etc.," he opposes to me Jerome who says that it is the consciousness of guilt that makes us be afraid of God. But the passage is in our support, because the consciousness of guilt presupposes transgression, otherwise it would be a false consciousness. But let the Doctor and the elected judges see how Augustine interprets this verse: "How long wilt Thou be angry etc.?" and they will soon understand it. Further, I cannot but admire how astutely the Doctor here evades the main point. I, too, have wanted to know the reason and the distinction, why, since prayer is so blessed and so holy and good and so eminently commended by Christ, God nevertheless is angry at the prayer of the righteous. Why will we deny sin in such works? But that the Doctor may understand that I follow the authority of the Church, I quote to him the prayer of the Church, which says: "In our own righteousness we put no trust". Therefore, this mistrust is born of evil, of sin. The words of the Church are: "Since we put no trust in our own righteousness".

The same day at 2 o'clock, Carlstadt continues the disputation.

For according to Augustine (Contra Julian, Book 4, chap.3), what is good cannot be displeasing to the good. If therefore the works of any saint are entirely without sin, one can reasonably have
confidence in them. But that this is false, is clear from other prayers of the Church, which run: "Thou, O God, who seest that we trust in no work of our own"; and elsewhere: "That we sin continually". Therefore the members of the Holy Church sin continually, even when they do good. otherwise it would be false what is here said - "We sin continually". And, that we trust in no work of our own - this is what Isaiah (C.LXIV.5.) has said: "And all our righteousness are as filthy rags". Here the text is clear, that all our righteousness, that is, all our works, are as the rag of a menstruating woman. Therefore they are unclean. Also he markedly says, "all our righteousness", so that he excludes no righteous act. Cassianus beautifully explains this of willing the good and doing the evil. This is also what Job says: - "If I wash myself with snow water, and make my hands never so clean, yet shalt Thou plunge me in filth. (Job.IX.30 f). Augustine reads: "Nevertheless hast Thou plunged me in filth", that is, that all our works are plunged in filth. But what else can we understand here by filth, if it be not our sins, our shortcomings? Therefore Job rightly says in the same Chapter: (IX.20):- "If I justify myself, mine own mouth shall condemn me. If I declare that I am innocent, it shall prove me perverse".

Behold! Job, the saint, the upright and patient man, to whose holiness God bare witness, says: "If I justify myself, mine own mouth shall condemn me". Therefore a little further on he says: "I am afraid of all my works, for I know that Thou would'st not spare me if I sinned". What has the upright man to fear in good
works, if there be in them no sins? Therefore Paul (Gal. V. 17) says:- "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, for these are contrary the one to the other". Augustine in his book, Hypognosticon, writes:- "There is perpetual and unceasing conflict between the flesh and the spirit, as the Wise Man says (Sir. XL. 1):- "A heavy yoke, over all the sons of Adam from the day of their coming forth (i.e. birth) till that of their return to the mother of all". The text is clear, that the spirit continually striveth against the flesh, and as often as the spirit effects good, the flesh resists to such a degree that, under this struggle, the spirit necessarily is weakened and stained, as Augustine shows (Contra Julian lib. 3. C. 6. et de verbis apostoli. Serm. 3. a.c.d. et Serm. 11.). When, therefore, the righteous man seeks to do good works, he cannot perform what he ought and desires to do, as the apostle clearly shows, "so that ye do not what ye would". Therefore the righteous sin in not doing what they ought and what they would. I ask the judges to judge according to the passages we have quoted, and deign to look closely into the meaning of the authors cited.

E C K.

(Latin text pages 240 to 244).

That I be not a weariness to the Doctors and to my hearers, I am not to add further matter; I will only reply.

In his reply the illustrious Doctor has defended his rule of the universal, which is from Ambrose, as I have long recognised and known. He would like, however, to extend it to all works; and
this extension in regard to works, which is found in none of the sacred teachers, I refuse to admit, since their affirmations about works are limited; their negations, however, are more sweeping. Otherwise, the positive commands would always be obligatory, which would be to the mind of the indolent peasants, who love to observe the Sabbath. He has excused himself by saying that it is good he came prepared and collected. I have not found fault with this, for it becometh a prudent man; but the right sort of combatant takes counsel also in the arena.

Regarding Augustine he has appealed to the judges; but he has not produced a single word from Augustine. Therefore I also pass over this. Jerome, who was most carefully quoted by me, he also refers to the judges. They will find that I have thus quoted him.

Finally, when I quoted two passages from David, which outwardly contradicted each other, the illustrious Doctor, with the intention of showing that the literal (grammaticus) meaning was not sufficient for the understanding of Scripture (I pass over his joke, i.e. about my swallowing all the rules stretched the threads of disputators), extended his argument (fimbrias) by explaining at length and in a manner uncalled for, what was the nature of the righteousness of David, on account of which he desired to enter into judgment before the Lord; which righteousness consisted in this, that he judged himself and his sins, according to his quotations concerning the righteous-
ness of Job and David—"my sin is ever before me", and "thus truth springs from the earth". I answer that, although this explanation is true in itself, all the scholastics and preachers have likewise taught for the past 400 years that, when sinful man exercises righteousness in himself through penitence, God forgives the sin. Therefore the scholastics and preachers have with one voice maintained that penitence is a part of vindicated righteousness.

Secondly, I say, that from the whole of his explanation, there follows still more against his argument, since he admits that David in judging himself, as likewise others who judge themselves, was righteous, and consequently did not sin in this good work; for otherwise he would not have dared, because of the sin that accompanies this judgment, to pray that God should enter into judgment with him.

Thirdly, because the Doctor thinks that the passages quoted make for himself, notwithstanding that in the whole declaration, in one part of which David seeks to be judged according to his declared righteousness, nevertheless, still trembling before the strict righteousness of God, said: "In Thy sight shall no flesh living be justified"; he (Carlstadt) here applies his rule of the universal. I will not, however, delay longer over this.

Next, when I had spoken of a double righteousness which I proved from Holy Scriptures, he referred me, because he refused to admit the scholastics, to Augustine (de perfect.
justit.); Likewise I quoted the most clear passage in Confess. 9, where he (Augustine) speaks of the righteousness that is of grace and compassion. And in truth Augustine there does not support the illustrious Doctor. Augustine indeed admits that God does not inquire closely into our sins, but nowhere does he say that the righteous sin in a good work, although I freely admit that the righteous man does sometimes commit venial sin in a good and meritorious work; that, for example, in one who devoutly celebrates mass or preaches, or gives alms, or stoutly contends in disputation, as does the Doctor, there arises a certain elation of mind that is of the nature of venial sin. And in this I have never contradicted the Doctor. For thus testifies St. Gregory (1. Moralium) — our good works are polluted by the slightest stain of defilement. And William of Paris, that great bishop and originator (inceptor), as the chronicle of the begging hermit brothers testifies, says that the Egyptian bugs and flies fall on the ointment of prayer and the sacrifice of a broken heart.

Further, the illustrious Doctor says that I have digressed from the sin that attaches to good works to a consideration of how good works ought to be crowned. I say, with all due respect to the Doctor, that such was not my intention; but when he referred to righteousness, I showed from Holy Scripture that there is a double righteousness, and that merits are rewarded according to the righteousness of grace (piam justitiam).
Therefore Chapter XVI. of Augustine's "de gratia et libero arbitrio" is not applicable here. Further, when I said that I had not read in the stories of the martyrs, that they exclaimed in their martyrdom that all men are liars, he opposed to me Augustine, who was not a martyr but only a confessor. Augustine, he says, tells us that the martyrs spoke thus. I add to what he says, that every man ought to acknowledge the prophetic truth, that all men are liars, and that, if he will not believe the prophet, he will some day discover it to his hurt. He says that in Psalm LXXX. I have boldly ignored the force of his quotation, that God is angry at the prayer which is so commended by Christ; much more (a fortiori), therefore, at other good works. I answer that it was at the particular prayer for the sending of the Saviour, and that it is not true that God was really angry (in se irasci), for He is free from such passions, but that He only held Himself for one that was angry, and that this was the special reason why He so long delayed. Next, when I said that no teacher of the Church or scholastic had given this meaning (or held the view) that the righteous sin in every good work, except the scholastics of Wittenberg, the Doctor was indignant and added threats, which, because they are incompatible with his "safe-conduct", I refer to my lords, and I also now make clear that by these scholastics of Wittenberg I meant Dr. Andreas Bodenstein de Custis, and the Father, Martin Luther. Further, as to his quotation regarding the law
of the members, and his appeal to the apostle, I answer that I readily admit everything he has quoted from the apostle, and, for the sake of brevity, I pass over the different interpretations of this chapter by Origen, Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose, Damascenus and St. Paulinus. Nevertheless I now accept the later view of Augustine, who at one time followed that of Paulinus, and say that concupiscence, the law of the members, which before baptism was sin, is, nevertheless, after baptism not sin. After Augustine in his "De nuptiis et concupiscencia" (lib. 1), and especially his "Contra Julianum" (lib. 6), I say, in short, that concupiscence as a weakness and sickly state of health, the law of the members, the law of the flesh, is not sin, either deadly or venial, and that after baptism it is not original sin, even although, as the interlinear gloss in the passage referred to does, sin is interpreted as concupiscence, that is, as ... Augustine interprets it (Contra Julian. lib. 6. Cap. 5), because it (concupiscence) springs from sin and is a punishment of sin, and adds in support the words: "Every man is tempted when he is drawn away by his own lust and enticed; then when lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sin". In these words the offspring is certainly distinguished from that which bears it, for that which bears is lust or concupiscence, that which is born is sin. But lust does not bear unless it conceives and it does not conceive unless it entices, that is, unless it obtains the consent of the will to the committing of sin. And with this I hold that I have answered what he quoted about the conflict between the flesh and the
spirit, which we all experience. But this is beside the point.

Next he quotes Job. (C.9) who does not venture to justify himself. I answer that Job here speaks of the strict righteousness, and as a wise man, because no one knows whether he is worthy of love or hate. He speaks just as did Paul, who knew nothing against himself, and yet, as he says, was not thereby justified. Therefore the righteous do well in being afraid of all their works. As Job, and St. Gregory say: It is the nature of pious souls to acknowledge guilt where there is none (that is, to be seen). But let him take this morsel from Job (C.37): "My heart shall not reproach me so long as I live". How has he here justified himself? Next, I was afraid lest he should omit the passage from Isaiah, that all our righteousness are as one that departeth, or, as the other text has it, as the rag of a menstruating woman. I might give him the interpretation of Jerome, our greatest interpreter of the Bible, who says that the prophet speaks here of the comparison between the righteousness of the law and the righteousness of the Gospel. However, I will give him only the common interpretation, that it is true that, if our righteousness be compared with the divine righteousness, it is unrighteousness, because it is imperfect, defective and mutilated, just as the light that is created, if it be compared with the divine light, is darkness. And that this is true, is clear from Luke XVIII. 19:—"None is good, save one, that is God". Thus argues Augustine (de perfectione justitiae), and Chrysostom and others agree. For whatever is compared with the Greater
is not good; yea, compared with Him, it is as if it were not. Therefore what is said in one passage of goodness or of what is good, I accept in another of righteousness. And this in conclusion:—When he reminds me of the prayers of the Church, that we put no trust in our own works, and, according to another Collect, that we rely on none of our acts, I reply with my readings of today, that by such words hope is not taken away, but presumption is done away with, for when we have done all, we ought, nevertheless, to acknowledge that we are unprofitable servants. Thus the Church continually recognises that her children sin; therefore she prays for them. But from none of the collects or other writings is it proved that the righteous man continually sins in every good work, nor St. Laurence on the gridiron.

For the rest, if either through a slip of the tongue, or ignorance, or human weakness anything unadvisable has been said or done by me, I beg the most illustrious princes, the most excellent and distinguished gentlemen, the most venerable and honoured Fathers, the nobles and teachers, that in this they grant me forgiveness; and I pray the same, as judges, that they take nothing as done by me out of an evil spirit; and I am ready to be taught, and corrected, if in anything I have not reached the true meaning and sense of the Scriptures. To God alone be the glory. Amen.

C A R L S T A D T.
(Latin text page 244).

To begin with, I like the distinguished Doctor's
protestation; for I also make the same protestation and express the same desire. But since the time is short and I cannot reply to everything he has said, I will only touch upon those points in which, it seems, my friend, the distinguished Doctor, has drawn to my view. There is, for example, the reply which he made to the words of Isaiah: "All our righteousness etc." in which the distinguished Doctor said that all our righteousness, if it be compared to the divine righteousness, is darkness and unrighteousness. This meets with my approval; and it follows from this, that the righteous man, when he acts righteously, always acts unrighteously, if his righteousness be compared with the divine righteousness. Praise be to God!

But when he says that, according to the prayers of the Church, hope is not taken away from good works, but presumption, I would readily agree with him, if the Church said: "We, who do not presume on good works"; but since it says: "We have no confidence", it seems that hope likewise is taken away.

Finally, I beg the Doctor to tell me whether Paul had been baptised or not, when he wrote the epistle to the Romans. If he was baptised, then he does wrong to call concupiscence sin after baptism, since he says: "Now, then, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me". It is therefore an apostolic testimony, that the apostle after baptism called the desire that was in his flesh sin. Therefore no one is to be found fault with, if he follows or imitates the apostolic manner of speaking. Regarding his other points,
I am not permitted, since it is contrary to the will of my lords, to state my objections. This, therefore, must be my last word.

\[ \text{E C K.} \]

(Latin text pages 244 to 245).

Passing over two points, since they have always been unquestioned with the scholastics, I answer briefly, and under three heads, to what he desires to know from me regarding Paul.

(1). That Origen, Jerome and Isidorus (lib.2. de summo bono) hold that the apostle speaks of the habit of sinning which he had under the law and which kept urging him to evil.

(2). That Origen considers it probable, and St. Paulinus testifies to Severus, that the apostle spoke not for himself, but in the person of the feeble; and this also for a while was the opinion of Augustine (lib.6. Contra Jul. C.11).

(3). I say: Granted that my sin is here to be understood desire, nevertheless sin is taken for the punishment of sin. As from Augustine (lib.6. Contra Julian. C.5) it is most clear, and we in the above have said, that sin sometimes is to be understood as the punishment of sin, as, for example, when we pray for the dead that they may be loosed from sin, as John Picus, Count of Mirandola, learnedly teaches (Conclus. 11. Apologia.). Therefore desire after baptism is called sin, just as the writing of anyone is called his hand. Therefore if you call desire sin in the manner just described, I readily
agree. But if by sin you mean guilt and blame, then I will resist you with hands and feet. Nevertheless I add as a corollary:— We ought not always to follow the manner of speaking even of the holy Fathers; since, although it is well known that Mary was called the mother of Christ, nevertheless the Council decreed according to the times that she be called, not the mother of Christ, but the mother of God. This, with the above, I submit to my superiors, and am ready to be corrected.

Carlstadt:— I make the same submission.

Transacted in the year of our Lord and in the year of the pontificate, day and month as above, in the spacious dining hall of the Castle of Leipzig, diocese of Merseburg, in public before the most illustrious, and the illustrious princes and lords, Prince George and John his son, Dukes of Saxony, Landgraves of Thuringia, Counts of Misna, and Berninus Stetinensis, Duke of the Pomeranians, Cassubiorans and the Slavs, and Prince of Ruha, also George, Prince of Anhald, Count of Aschania and Lord of Bernaburgia; likewise before the illustrious Counsellors of the aforesaid most illustrious Prince George, Duke of Saxony etc., who represented the Prince when absent; moreover before the august, distinguished and venerable gentlemen and lords, the rector, masters and teachers of the whole university, as likewise before many most learned men of other schools, and finally before a large concourse of studious youths; and in addition to such an assembly of hearers, before
the most honourable gentlemen, Johannes Teuber Weysman and
Bartholomaeus Schaller Ernfriedsdorffensis, laymen of the
dioeceses Bambergensis and Misnensis, especially required and
called as witnesses to the above.

Finis.

And I, Franciscus Richter, public clerk in the diocese of
Misna, notary by the holy imperial authority and scribe
of the aforesaid illustrious university of Leipzig, declare
that, together with the above mentioned witnesses, I was from
beginning to end uninterruptedly present at the above disputa-
tions, objections, answers, protestations, and at all else
reported above, and transacted and completed, as hath been
stated, before such a distinguished gathering, and that I saw and
heard these things thus transacted, and that together with my
colleague or fellow-notary, who makes his declaration below, I
closely followed the whole of the above disputation and the
series of other speeches as delivered by the disputators, and
carefully took the same down in shorthand; and this present
public record containing the above-mentioned disputation and
transactions, written because of the exigencies of our business
by the hand of another, and faithfully, in one hundred and
fifty sheets of paper within and two of parchment without, I,
thereafter, together with the same colleague, prepared, sub-
scribed and published, and reduced to this public form; and,
called, requested, and lawfully required to bear evidence to
to the credibility and clear testimony of each and all of the matters set forth, I have corroborated, signed and confirmed the same with my usual and customary mark, name and surname, together with the seal of the most illustrious Prince, our sovereign Lord, George, Duke of Saxony, Landgrave of Thuringia, Marquis of Misna, above named, and also with the addition of the seals of the distinguished rector of the aforesaid university of Leipzig. Also I bear witness regarding any corrections to be found in the matters set forth, that the same have been made by myself and my colleague, whose declaration appears below.

And I, Johannes Graumann, public clerk in the diocese of Herbipolis, notary by the holy, apostolic and imperial authority, declare that etc. ————————————————————————
— as above.

Finis.

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