CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TO
WAR AND PEACE
PREFACE

Every young author owes more than he is willing to admit to the ideas of his teachers and friends. When I am honest with myself I know that it is they and not I who have shaped this book, and not least when they have expressed disagreement. So it is but an act of reparation to dedicate it to them, above all to my first teacher, Sir Herbert J. C. Grierson, who awakened my interest in the problem of Christianity and Civilisation; to Professor Dorr Diesendorf, whose hospitality made the writing of the central sections a joy; and to Mr F. R. Fogle, the "good companion" of many wanderings on both sides of the Atlantic.

Much of the work on the book has been done in the General Theological Seminary, New York City; to the Dean, the Very Rev. H. E. W. Fosbroke, I am indebted for many kindnesses. I wish also to thank, however briefly, those who have allowed me to discuss with them, to my great profit, some specific historical problems, especially Professor Daniel Lamont and Professor J. H. S. Burleigh; and lastly to thank Professor W. P. Paterson, who has done me the honour of writing a Foreword.

T. S. K. S-C.

Edinburgh, March 1938.
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ABBREVIATIONS


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ABBREVIATIONS


DCD.—Augustine: *De Civitate Dei* (The City of God).

CFM.—Augustine: *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* (Reply to Faustus the Manichee).

LPh.—*Works of Martin Luther*, published at Philadelphia.

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I shall be glad if a testimonial from one of Mr. Scott-Craig's old professors should help to draw attention to an important work on a subject of engrossing interest both in a religious and a political point of view. The testimonial is a very confident and cordial one. He was one of the ablest and keenest of the theological students who have passed through my classes, he followed up his Edinburgh course by study under famous German theologians, and he has entered on a promising academic career in the United States. In this book he provides Christian men and women with the material that will enable them to form an intelligent opinion as to the methods to be advocated in the war which has now been declared against war.

He begins with a scholarly discussion of the relevant sayings of Jesus, proceeds to a full exposition of the epoch-making contributions of Augustine, Luther and Grotius, and supplements these with a most instructive report on the best that has been written since the question was reopened by the horrors of the World War and the institution of the League of Nations. The second merit is his fair-mindedness. He shows much sympathy with the idealism of the Left Wing—the extreme pacifists who urge upon governments as well as upon individuals
the policy of non-resistance to an aggressor. Nor
does he greatly censure the Right Wing, represented
by writers on Christian Ethics who, besides justifying
the war of self-defence, contend that rulers may
righteously take up arms in order to acquire the
territory and the resources that are needed for the
self-realisation of a cribbed and confined people.
He comes out, nevertheless, as a powerful spokes-
man of what may be termed the Christian Centre.
He recognises that Christ left it to His followers to
do much thinking, assisted by their God-given
reason, as to the practical application of His prin-
ciples in the government of a world lying in
wickedness. In the internal life of the nations
the civil power makes use of force, with general
consent, for the maintenance of justice and tran-
quillity. In the international sphere there is the
similar duty of coping in rational fashion with the
cupidity and the pugnacity to which nations as
collective subjects are so strongly disposed. And
he comes to the conclusion, which there is good
ground for endorsing, that at the present juncture
the true Christian policy is to preserve and seek to
perfect the League of Nations, to the end that it
may be able to make justice and humanity the basis
of its resolutions, and have at its disposal the power
that is needed to make law respected and obeyed.

W. P. PATERSON.

EDINBURGH, March 1938.
I. INTRODUCTION

I. THE MEANING OF WAR

Let us conjure up a summer evening in the middle of the eighteenth century. David Hume has left his lodging in the Lawnmarket of Edinburgh to walk down to the Netherbow port. He has just reached the High Kirk of St Giles, and is edging his way past the Luckenbooths which fill the space between the buttresses, when a couple of roughs are thrown out of the tavern opposite. They continue their drunken squabble, oblivious alike of the presence of the great philosopher and of the fact that they are about to barge into a china-booth—till the crashing of the cups and saucers and jugs (not to mention the "flyting" of the china-wife) brings them to their senses. This or some such experience probably lies behind the saying of Hume: "When I see princes and states fighting and quarrelling . . . it always brings to my mind a match of cudgel-playing fought in a China shop."

At the end of the century Kant quoted Hume's dictum with approval as he thought on the probable aftermath of the French revolutionary wars,¹ and added grimly: "Not only will it take a long while to heal the bruises which each has given the other, but also they must afterwards

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pay for all the damage they have caused." Similarly to-day, in Japan, the famous Christian worker and thinker, Toyohiko Kagawa, condemns war as a vulgar squabble. "In the great earthquake a wine-shop on the bank of the Okawa was thrown into the river, and a crowd fleeing from the flames was drowned on the spot. Several days after the fire a mob of drunken idiots were to be seen diving into the river, reeking with the dead bodies, in order to salvage the bottles of sake, hundreds of which were lying at the bottom of the stream. They piled them up and were diving for more, when along came a gang of cleverer sake-thieves who ran away with the whole lot. But think! What are wars and economic conflicts but large scale imitations of this sordid disgrace?" 1

That many national wars do partake of this sordid character is doubtless true; and, indeed, more often than we are usually inclined to admit; for rulers and governments have long known how to pursue aggressive policies under the cloak of altruism or piety. One has but to think how Machiavelli praised the conduct of Ferdinand of Aragon, who "always making religion his pretence, by a kind of devout cruelty destroyed and exterminated the Jews called Marrani . . . . invaded Africa, made his expedition into Italy, and assaulted France." 2 Yet the duplicity or apparent heartlessness of many wars includes a real mitigating factor; for justice is not a static thing. The rights

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of a nation or group are not immutable, but change with its organic growth or decay. A rising people needs more territory and more resources, it can rightly claim to exercise greater authority in the administration of the world’s affairs, and it must inevitably come into conflict with competitors whose established positions it questions. "That war is just which is necessary," wrote Machiavelli \(^1\); and Professor Althaus, writing as a Christian, seems almost to agree with him: "The demand for peace based on justice rather than on an appeal to arms is derived from a doctrinaire opposition of Right to Might. The true rights of nations belonging to a historical process are living rights, rooted in a life-force which has to prove its worth." \(^2\)

Similar sentiments, from a more Nietzschean standpoint, have been uttered by Professor Hauer. War, he argues, is not a struggle between good and evil but a conflict of positive values. Man, as man, possesses certain inalienable rights, such as life and liberty, and for their assertion he is driven to certain necessary lines of conduct. The biological urge in him demands that he develop his powers and capacities; and so with the nation. "Bread and space are the foundation of the life of individual and people alike; they are necessaries for which we must be prepared to employ our energy to the last ounce." \(^3\) In support of his thesis Professor

\(^2\) "Krieg und Christentum" in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Zweite Auflage, Tübingen, 1929).
\(^3\) "Krieg und Frieden als Schicksal" in Kommende Gemeinde, Heft 3-4 (Tübingen, 1929), pp. 81, 82.
Hauer cites the conflict of the emigrant Europeans with the indigenous population of the New World:

The strife between Whites and Indians in North America is an indelible blot on the scutcheon of the white race. But, though it might have been feasible to wage the struggle with less brutality, if there had been more goodwill present, the actual fight for territory was unavoidable. The excess population of the white race needed room to expand; and the Indians would never have surrendered their right, hallowed by the custom of thousands of ages, to roam at will over their hunting-grounds, simply because the white man needed territory for expansion. The Indians knew instinctively that their very existence was bound up with their vast hunting-grounds, and their enforced settlement since then, in one place, has, as a matter of fact, drawn the last drops of real life-blood from their veins. No one can seriously maintain that the methods of the Pilgrim Fathers could have been successfully employed to acquire complete possession of America for the white race. And it was the whole of America, which, as we see to-day, was required. Now that struggle was not a conflict of right and wrong but of right with right. And which was the higher, the right of the Whites to make room for their offspring, or the right of the small nomad population to great hunting-grounds, where to-day dwells a nation of over one hundred million souls, a powerful nation and one ready for even further expansion. What authority would have been willing to decide to whom America ought to belong? ¹

It is extremely illuminating in this connection to

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read utterances of the great German theologians of the early part of the century, at the outbreak and during the course of the Great War: Herrmann and Harnack, Troeltsch and Bousset. There was for instance a public correspondence between a group of English theologians and Harnack in August 1914. They justified the entrance of England into the war on the basis of the defence of Serbia and Belgium; he, on the other hand, affirmed that neither of the latter were quite the innocent parties they appeared, that Britain herself was not disinterested, and that anyhow the struggle was not wholly a European one. Serbia and Belgium were but excuses for Britain's declaration of war. The real cause was the intention of British statesmen to destroy Germany, or so to weaken her that Britain could continue to rule the waves, and extend her sway into the remotest parts of the globe.¹ Very similar was an utterance of Troeltsch in 1915: "England had long been faced with the question, whether to maintain her absolute command of the seas, or to share it by treaty with Germany. The latter course would have involved a fundamental change in England's position in the world. And then at the eleventh hour there opened up the opportunity for a coalition with Russia and France, which would save her by smashing Germany. And so England entered the war. Then the Allies began to fabricate the story

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of a defensive war, a war to save civilisation, a war against militarism . . .” Germany, he went on to say, did not require any such myths; she was fighting a simple defensive war, “in the broad sense of the word asserting her right to live and exist, against a tremendous predominating power; in a finer sense ensuring her indispensable future development.” ¹ England and Germany were both, in fact, fighting for what they believed they ought to possess, the chief place in the sun. There is no need to accept the German analysis of Albion’s perfidy, any more than to accept the English myth of Germany’s sole guilt. “The Englishman speaks of Christ and thinks of cotton,” says the German catchword, but then it is of cotton as a commodity which he sincerely believes he ought to possess or retain at all cost.

Important and serious wars thus arise out of a real sense of injustice, and it is futile to impugn the motives of those who engage in what they believe to be a righteous struggle. That does not mean, however, that there can be perfectly just wars. For thinkers, of course, who hold that might creates right, it is possible to declare that the appeal to unregulated violence may produce a just solution of international problems. Such a view will not here be entertained. Wars may be inevitable, but it is a delusion to imagine that they can be absolutely just. How can there be real justice when each nation sets up to be its own judge? An interna-

¹ E. Troeltsch, “Der Kulturkrieg,” in Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit, Number 27 (Berlin, 1915).
tional court may be an idle dream, but with it stands and falls the idea of international justice and fair dealing.

The most satisfying definitions of war, as we have known it, are those which do not attempt to introduce the element of justice at all; e.g., that of Professor W. P. Paterson: "Any conflict between nations, communities, or large social groups, in which violence is used for the settlement of a quarrel." 1 Dr Dibelius merely obscures the issue when he writes: "War is the settlement of differences between states by military force, as regulated by international law." 2 Such a definition gives the impression that our present international conflicts are somehow the instrument of international justice and law. Whereas all that he can point to are ameliorating customs—such as ceremonious declarations of war or the comparatively humane treatment of prisoners—which have come to be observed as the rules of the game. But they do not legalise or regularise war as such. National war is rather the reckless, or as the case may be, despairing, rejection of legal methods of settling an international dispute, in favour of violence. It is the abandonment of the only methods by which justice might have been secured. As Father Stratmann has rightly put it: "War is a struggle by armed force, organised and carried out according to definite military rules, between

two or more states which are not bound to one another by a legal system." ¹

The initial abandonment, by the appeal to arms, of legal and judicial methods, is paralleled during the course of national wars by an increasing lack of respect for truth. One has but to read Shakespeare's *Henry VI* to realise how the Hundred Years War blackened the character of Joan of Arc. But how much more unscrupulous in intention and widespread in effect is the propaganda of the modern period.² It forms one of the major items in M. Benda's powerful denunciation of the spirit of current literature ³; and it is confessed with extreme honesty, by Adolf Hitler, to be one of the proud weapons of a nation at bay.⁴

The question of the abandonment of truth in war leads naturally to mention of another grave characteristic of war-methods, their inevitable cruelty. Not all types of war are equally terrible and not all are questions of the moment. In the ancient world, war was savage enough, when tribe fought tribe as in the Old Testament battles, or when nation strove with nation as in the Punic Wars. All men who could fight were probably called on and defeat meant extirpation. "*Delenda est Carthago*," said Cato. "Now go and smite Amalek," commanded Samuel, "and utterly destroy all that they have and spare them not; ¹ F. M. Stratmann, *Weltkirche und Weltfriede* (Augsburg, 1924), p. 74.
but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass. To this type of warfare succeeded the conflict of army with army—from the expeditions of Alexander to the campaigns of Napoleon—which at least allowed the civilians, the main body of the people, to remain at home in peace and ignorance. The only people who were killed were those who were paid to take the risk. The struggle might be the comparatively harmless tourney of armoured knights like Bannockburn or Flodden, or the infinitely more devastating activity of mercenaries as in the Thirty Years War, or the conflict of militias raised by conscription like the German and French armies which clashed in 1870. But in any case the horrors of war were confined to the actual battlefield.

And then came the Great War and with it war as we now understand the term, with its abolition of the distinction between combatant and non-combatant, its air-raids, submarine attacks and food-blockades, its poison gases, Big Berthas, barbed wire entanglements and tanks. Despite Professor Raven's strictures on exaggeration of the horrors of war as painted in Beverley Nichols' *Cry Havoc*, his own reminiscences of the last war are only too eloquent witness to the character of scientific warfare. The present localised struggles in Spain and China have hardly had a chance to show recent technical improvements to advantage; what would be in store for us in a new European or

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world war may be gathered from a summary of a report made in 1932 by an international committee of nineteen experts in military science:

The Great Powers dispose of from 1500 to 2000 war aeroplanes apiece, of which perhaps 30 per cent. are bombers. One chemical contributor estimates that a couple of machines, distributing a certain chemical, would suffice to put London out of a war. Let us assume that a belligerent nation decides to employ 300 bombing machines against London. The service experts all admit that the majority of those 300 aeroplanes would get over London, possibly at a great height. They would be sent in waves. The first wave would carry high explosive, including individual bombs weighing a ton apiece. . . . The effect of the first wave would be to drive the entire population underground . . . and disorganise all public services, including food supplies. . . . On the heels of the first wave would arrive the second wave of raiders, dropping incendiary bombs filled with thermite, which burns at 3000 degrees Centigrade, and cannot be put out by any known extinguisher. . . . The final wave of raiders would drop poison gas and vesicant dew. The poison gas, being heavier than air, would penetrate the underground refuges.¹

It is only right to make clear to ourselves what modern warfare entails. Yet as Mr Richards has well reminded us, horror propaganda need not necessarily convince people of the evils of war. "The underlining of horror, indeed, generally

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defeats its own end; for horror induces fear, and fear leads to the very madness which produces the horrors of war.” ¹ Just as the amateur's dabbling in psycho-analysis or the pietist's search for secret sins may lead to a fearful fascination rather than a loathing for the murky deeps of the Unconscious, so the visitor to an “Air-defence Exhibition” is if anything thrilled by his introduction to chemical warfare. Toy shells which exploded realistically when flung into the air and let fall, were being sold in hundreds to gleeful children at a recent exhibition of the kind in Stuttgart. Thus the horrors of war, if they are to be cited as an argument against it, must be brought consciously under a moral head. One must ask “not ‘Can I endure the horrors of war?’ but, ‘Ought I to inflict the horrors of war?’” ²

Or, as it has been put concretely by Professor Heering of Leyden: “If I can resist the murder of my child in no other way than by murdering the child of another, then I shrink from the very thought. . . . If I am unable to defend myself against tormentors by other means than by myself inventing and refining instruments of torture, again I feel myself not at liberty to do so.” ³

When we have admitted the abandonment of justice which the act of going to war necessarily implies, when we have noted the perversion of truth and the excessive cruelty which its conduct entails

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—items which are of themselves sufficient to condemn it in the eyes of decent people—we have yet to answer a final question about the character of war: Does it really achieve anything like the aims with which it starts? Even thinkers like Professor Althaus, who do not utterly renounce national war, hesitate to be confident of its success. Immediately after dismissing pacifism as a doctrinaire opposition of might and right, he concedes: “But whether the results of actual individual wars have always been to bring living righteousness to victory, or whether they do not rather assist the greater evil and brutality, is another question.” ¹ And reviewing even the apparently most successful wars, such as Cromwell’s struggle for civil and religious liberty, the revolt of the Scottish Covenanters, the rebellion of Garibaldi and the American slave war, Mr Richards concludes that they were at best short-cuts and most costly ones to ends that might have been more permanently achieved by other means.² The apparent gains from past wars tell us nothing, however, which can encourage us to believe that modern warfare can profit any of the participants.³ Any future war is practically identical with national suicide. One cannot last long when one spends seven million pounds every day on the conduct of war, as the British people were doing by the end of 1918.

It is perhaps Professor Brunner, among

¹ Althaus, Loc. cit., Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.
theologians at least, who has made the fullest use of
the futility argument to condemn war. He refuses
to pour scorn on the wars of the past but holds that
the wastage of modern warfare creates an entirely
separate problem. The political realist himself
must recognise that modern war defeats its own
ends. "In modern warfare there are no victors,
only vanquished. . . . Even the Machiavelli of the
future will not think in terms of war; he will be
too sagacious to incite his own State to commit
suicide." ¹ A brilliant parable, too, of the self-
stultifying character of present and future warfare
by one who "at times thinks it a childish silliness
even more heart-breaking than its wickedness,"
appears in Mr A. A. Milne's *Peace with Honour.*
Its opening words betray where, consciously or not,
Mr Milne has learned the art of teaching by parable:

There was a certain man who was Owner of a garden
in which he took great happiness. He delighted in it
at all seasons of the year, but most of all he loved it in
early May, for in May came the tulips, flowers which
to him were the chief glory of the garden. All through
the winter he lived for the beauty which was coming
to him in May. All through the long winter he waited
for the first reluctant leaves to show; all through the
first faint days of Spring, as he watched bed and border
slowly begin to take pattern; always he told himself
that in this or that number of weeks the glory would
be consummated, and his garden filled with that
orderly riot of colour which was his great delight.
Then came an intruder; a man who hated gardens;

¹ E. Brunner, *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen* (Tübingen, 1932),
p. 457.
or hated the Owner of the garden; or perhaps just hated all beautiful things. One April afternoon he came into the garden, and walked around the borders, slashing at the heads of the tulips as he went along. And the Owner lay in a chair (for it was a pleasantly warm afternoon) unable to move . . . for recently he had had the misfortune to break his leg . . . and watched him as he walked up and down, destroying all this promise of beauty. And he wondered what he should do. . . . Well, what shall he do . . . ? He is not quite helpless. For on the table by his side (never mind why, but let us say, if you like, that his two little children, playing round a rubbish heap, found it there and brought it to him) lies a live bomb. He has but to take the pin out and jerk the bomb a few yards across the grass, and the work of destruction will be stayed. Stayed, that is, as far as the intruder is concerned. But obviously the bomb itself will carry on the work of destruction over a considerable part of the garden.

And it will blow the intruder to pieces.

And it will blow the owner to pieces.

And it will blow to pieces the owner’s two children, who are pattering behind this exciting visitor.

Does he then throw the bomb?

Remember it is the only thing he can do. It is the only way in which he can stop this unwarrantable outrage, this horrible vandalism, this hideous affront, this . . .

Does he throw the bomb?

Of course not.

Would any man in his senses, aware of the consequences, would any man alive in the world to-day throw the bomb?

Of course not.¹

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Yet the futility argument cannot well stand on its own feet. "An ideal of safety, comfort and prosperity is not one that appeals to the finest characters. . . . No demonstration that war does not 'pay' is in itself a convincing moral argument." ¹ Like the argument against war based upon its cruelty, the futility plea requires a good deal of rethinking. It can at best be used in a subsidiary position. War is wrong because it involves the abandonment of justice and truth, not merely because it is cruel and ineffective.

2. THE MEANING OF PEACE

As hard things have been said about peace as about war. One recalls the famous saying of Count Moltke: "Eternal peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream." And in his last book, Spengler wrote of peace as a skiey, ineffectual vision, to be classed with righteousness, happiness and the other illusions with which men comfort themselves, and concluded even more sombly: "Only few can last out a long war, without going morally to pieces. But none can last out a long peace." ² We must frankly admit that a warless world would have difficulties of its own, much of the kind which Spengler foresees. But we need not despair of finding a solution of them, while the conquest of ignorance, poverty and disease, or the exploration

² O. Spengler, Jahre der Entscheidung (München, 1933), pp. 4, 10.
of desert and mountain, continue to offer unending opportunities for heroism and adventure.

A much more telling criticism of the ideal of peace has been made from the days of Jeremiah, with his denunciation of those who cry "Peace! Peace!" where there is no peace, down to the growing multitude who denounce the Treaty of Versailles as a mockery of a "Peace" treaty. There is a great danger that we identify peace with a certain status quo in which our own wants are satisfied, but in which our neighbour, especially our adversary, remains thwarted. It is easy for the victor to preach peace, not so easy for the vanquished. The whole spirit is well illustrated in a story told of Clemenceau at the Peace Conference in 1919:

The President and the Premiers sat down at the table and were about to proceed to business, when Clemenceau, who was fiddling with his grey silk gloves, said, "One moment, gentlemen. I desire before we go any further to be clear on one very essential point. . . . I have heard something about a permanent peace. There has been a great deal of talk about a peace to end war for ever, and I am interested in that. But I would like to know whether you mean it, the permanent peace." He looked at his colleagues and they nodded approvingly. "So," Clemenceau said, "you really mean it! Well, it is possible . . . but . . . you have counted the costs of such a peace?" The listeners began to grow a little uneasy. "What costs?" "Well," said the realistic Frenchman, "if we give up all future wars, if we want to prevent war, we must give up our empires and all hope of empire. . . . We shall have to tear down our tariff walls and
open the whole world to free trade and traffic. . . .” The President and the Premiers protested. They did not mean that. They expected to keep their cake and eat it, too. No, no, they did not exactly mean that. “Then,” said Clemenceau, sitting up straight and striking the table sharply, “then you don’t mean peace. You mean war. And the time for us French to make war is now, when we’ve got one of our neighbours down; we shall put our foot on him and get ready for the next war.”

Is it then surprising that some have written of peace as the continuation of war by other methods? Such notions of peace are a travesty of the peace ideal, but we must not be blind to their frequent occurrence.

The advocates of a sincere peace imply by the term not merely the absence or abolition of war, but the creation of some way of attaining international justice and righteousness which will be more impartial and effective than trial by battle. They stand for reason, civilisation, legal procedure. They demand that transformation in the relationship of states which has already occurred in internal affairs, the replacement of anarchy by order, the substitution of law for the destructive methods of brute force. There seem to be two possible ways of attaining this end, the foundation of a world-state or the establishment of a federation of national states. The former alternative has been tried and found wanting. Throughout the last two thousand years

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we Europeans have more or less consciously been working for the creation of a state which should embrace the whole of the civilised world. From time to time it has seemed as if that end would be attained; as when the Roman Empire stretched in one realm of law and order from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, from the sources of the Nile to the banks of the Tweed; or when the Medieval Church united Christendom under the joint leadership of the Emperor and the Vicar of Christ. These syntheses were shattered partly at least by material causes; even the Roman roads and the Latin language could not deal with continual pressure from without nor keep control over the emergence of local differences and rivalries. The barbarian tribes smashed the Roman Empire and their descendants smashed the Roman Church. But with the inventions of the nineteenth century, which practically annihilated distance, it seemed almost possible that one of two Teutonic peoples would set up a world-empire, the Anglo-Saxons of Britain and America or the German people. One has but to think of the missionary jingoism of Kipling or the more Utopian hopes of Mr H. G. Wells on the one hand, or of the verse which filled Treitschke with enthusiasm on the other:

When the German has become all German
He will found an empire on this earth
And establish peace for all mankind,

in order to get a sense of the hope that was stirring in men's minds. But it all led only to a world-war
and a peace that was no peace. To-day we recognise that the effort was a mistake. It is not the white man's burden to rule the world, nor the Englishman's nor the German's to dominate all other cultures. The dream of world empire has faded in the light of common day. But it is better so.

There remains the second alternative, a federation of national states bound together in a League, and possessing an international court more effective than the present one. Such a League would have to include all nations; but even more important would be the recognition that membership *ipso facto* involved renouncing absolute national sovereignty. Nations would be no longer judge of their rights and wrongs or free to settle the methods to be employed in administering justice between them. Failure to admit this principle is now generally recognised to have been the rock on which the present League shipwrecked. It is a pertinent criticism of arbitration to ask whether an international court could ever enforce its decisions. Manifestly a nation which returned to war after promising to adopt arbitration as a substitute would be illogical, even perfidious. But the practical question remains, whether an international court would ever have the means of dealing with such a rebellious nation and of compelling it to accept arbitration and the decision which had been pronounced. The only solution is an all-round disbanding of national armies, the concentration of armament manufacture in the hands of the League, and the establishment of an international police force sufficiently strong.
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to compel the government of disputant nations to attend the court and accept the will of the court.¹ Thus the not specifically Christian idea of world peace means the creation of international law, a system of arbitration between states, and appropriate sanctions. It is a constructive alternative to war, the replacement of "trial" by combat by a real judicial system. It is regularised violence in international relations, the counterpart of the civil police force—not a Utopian ideal remote from the real world, or designed to satisfy mere whims and fancies. In that world-order many of our cherished and characteristic institutions may disappear, but it will be one in which the bogey of national war need not be dreaded, and the beginnings of international goodwill and justice will show themselves.

Arbitration and international policing do not, however, exhaust the ideal of peace. The liberal Christian has a hope which is all his own. He looks for a day when the Spirit of the God and Father revealed in Christ will enter the hearts of all men. He does not expect that, as long as this world continues, differences, disputes and appeals will not arise. But it is his earnest belief that, when the Gospel has been heard by all peoples, there will be a new attitude to disputes when they do arise, that both sides will seek not only their own rights but be eager for the rights of the other, and willing to seek, and to reinforce, the decision of impartial judges. Finally, there is a powerful

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minority of Christians who believe that non-violence is of the essence of the Gospel, who hold that peace can and ought to be preserved even in a world of injustice, and that such a witness may, by softening the hearts of the oppressors, even produce better and more righteous conditions for the oppressed. They naturally reject the idea of an international police force and army as a betrayal of the primitive Christian emphasis on long-suffering, mercy and love.

Both these groups of Christians—the advocates of an international army on the grounds of Christian hope and the apostles of non-violence—differ from the majority findings of the Churches, which in the past at least have sanctioned national war. It will now be our task to investigate the reasons for this apparent chaos in Christian opinion. I hope to show that there is an underlying order beneath the surface confusion; that there are four main types of Christian position in each of which there has been, and is, a valuable emphasis. The four main types of Christian attitude which we find to-day to war and peace go back to four great theological traditions. Absolute religious pacifism is derived directly from the spirit and principles of the Synoptic Gospels, which are radiant with the vision of God and of His ultimate loving purpose for mankind. Whatever other considerations have weighed with the Church, and must continue to do so, the Gospels remain as the ultimate ideal and as a judgment on all attempts to give due place to the lesser values, attempts which almost invariably result in giving to
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the lesser values an undue prominence. Secondly, there is the great Catholic tradition which goes back to Augustine, and which seeks to reconcile the conflicting demands of the City of God and the Earthly City. Thirdly, we can distinguish what I have called the "Evangelical" tradition, of which Luther is the grand exponent, and which faces up to the grim facts of human sin. Both the Catholic and Evangelical groups have in the past sanctioned national war. But they have done so in the name of justice; and I shall try to show that the doctrine of the Just War may be maintained in an altered form which would to-day better express the mind of the Church in the altered circumstances of our own time—a form which would rule out war as we know it, national war, but allow for military measures taken by an international authority. For this change Catholic theology is to-day better prepared than the contemporary form of the Evangelical position, which is seen at its most characteristic in the German school. The fourth great tradition is the liberal, which seeks sincerely to allow due weight to the Gospels, but is primarily influenced by confidence in the innate powers of the human reason and will which have manifested themselves in so many fields since the Renaissance. The founder of this tradition is Hugo Grotius, in whose system of international law national warfare is really an anachronism. If history has anything to teach us it is surely that these four attitudes are more than likely to continue on into the future. It will be to our profit to understand the specific
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values latent in each of these emphases, and to explore how their exponents may work together more harmoniously for the expression of their common purpose, the deliverance of humanity from moral evil,—and the curse of war.
II. JESUS AND THE ETHIC OF LOVE

I. THE KINGDOM OF GOD

Any estimate of the significance of the teaching of Jesus depends on one's answer to a previous question: What are the most reliable sources for that teaching, and what meaning do they actually convey? It will here be assumed that the Synoptic Gospels are to be preferred to the Gospel of John; but even then one has to pick and choose, and any selection of material thus arrived at is bound to appear arbitrary to the New Testament specialist, be he a "liberal" or an "eschatologist" or a "form-critic." The permanent results of form-criticism have not yet been assessed; but even such a radical book as Bultmann's Jesus still allows us to say not a little about the primitive teaching of Jesus. I adopt, however, in preference, a more eclectic position, such as one will find in E. von Dobschütz, The Eschatology of the Gospels, or W. Manson, Christ's View of the Kingdom of God, whereby we recognise three strands in the Gospels: one, which theologians refer to as non-eschatological, where the idea of the Last Things or the kingdom of God is more or less absent, and where the guiding principle is the Fatherhood of God; a second, where a radical view of the kingdom,
as an imminent divine event, is dominant; and a third, where the eschatology is "realised" and the kingdom regarded as in some sense already present. These I propose to examine in turn, stressing their ethical significance; and we shall find that in this regard the three strands are perhaps not so far apart as has sometimes been imagined.

First, then, the non-eschatological teachings. Almost childlike in its simplicity and gladness is the picture which Jesus draws of God as the gracious, loving Father. In a land of stones and desert he seemed to see only the tiny lilies of the field, the delicate anemones. As he wandered alone in the wilderness he did not indeed fail to notice the birds of prey at their grim work on a caravan which had been overwhelmed in a sand-storm. "Where the body is lying, there the vultures will gather," he said. But he focussed his attention on the reality of that which was good. His thought dwelt on the sparrows, which he could not imagine to falter in flight without calling forth the loving care of the Father. He knew, too, the meanness, the wavering, the stupidity of men; but he never imagined that God punished their shortcomings by manipulating nature to their disadvantage. Whereas it had been the tradition in pious Judaism to see rain and drought as blessing and cursing, as reward and punishment, Jesus, as the sun rose in golden glory over the still waters of the Lake of Galilee, blessed the Father who made His sun to rise not only on the good but on the evil as well. When

1 Lk. xvii. 37.
2 Matt. v. 45.
the early and the latter rain descended in due season he praised the God who was kind both to the just and to the unjust.  

There is nothing in the Gospels to suggest that earnest, persistent endeavour will meet with ultimate failure, that there is an unbridgeable gulf between our ideals and our environment, or that the man of to-day is involved in a system of error and sin inherited from his remote ancestors, a system as terrible as the Karma of Buddhism or the age-old curse that brooded over a family in Greek tragedy. “Ask and you will receive. Seek and you will find. . . . If for all your evil you know to give your children what is good, how much more will your Father give good gifts (or holy spirit) to those who ask him?”  

Jesus starts from the utter certainty of God, of his will and purpose in the world and for the world, a purpose which is stronger than any resistance from nature or human frailty and badness. This is and remains God’s world. However long may be its birth-pangs, however protracted its period of testing and purgation, God’s fatherly goodness will not be thwarted. Yet this very confidence in the loving Fatherhood of God is itself a problem. Even apart from the eschatologically conditioned portions of Jesus’ teaching, his view of ultimate reality was of an optimism which the modern mind finds difficult to share. The doctrine of the beneficent Fatherhood of God is almost too good to be true;  

1 Matt. v. 45.  
2 Matt. vii. 7-11; Lk. xi. 13.  
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from the start Jesus found it easy to hold that goodness and peacefulness might be rewarded, since he was hardly conscious of the struggle for existence.

The major teachings of Jesus are, however, even more optimistically coloured. As we have become more and more conscious since the beginning of the century, Jesus preached not only a gospel of the Fatherhood of God and the consequent brotherhood of men; he preached also a radical eschatology, concerned with the coming of God's kingdom, His final kingdom which would supersede this world, and in which sin and death would be done away and the pure in heart would see their Lord. The Synoptic Apocalypse, or the Matthean parable of the Sheep and the Goats, may show editorial work, but one cannot well excise the scene at Caesarea Philippi, and the promise of Jesus that the Son of Man would come, while some of those present were still alive, "in the glory of his Father with the holy angels." Jesus preached the coming of the kingdom of God as an imminent day of judgment, as the coming of God's new heaven and new earth. It was a determining feature of his thought-world. He used it not merely as a way of capturing the attention of the multitudes, but went up to Jerusalem to allow himself to be killed, persuaded that his life's blood was necessary to seal or to purchase the new covenant and usher in an immediate new age. Now this thought-world is "dead as the moon.

1 Mk. xiii. 2 Matt. xxv. 31-46. 3 Mk. viii. 39-ix. 1.
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We must accept it realistically as simply 'given' and non-rationalisable.”

The optimism of Jesus has become an acute problem for modern theology. Thus Troeltsch felt himself forced to admit that there could be no political ethic "immediately or essentially derived from Christian ideas." And Herrmann and Harnack published a book on social ethics in 1909, which affirmed that "as a result of that frame of mind by which we are united with him, we desire the existence of a national state, with a character and purpose with which Jesus was not acquainted. We will not allow ourselves to be led astray, even if, in this form of human nature, various features are as sharply opposed to the mode of life and standpoint of Jesus as is the dauntless use of arms.”

We may agree at least that it is impossible to build a complete Christian ethic solely on the teaching of Jesus. Yet his doctrine of the Fatherhood of God remains for us the expression of our moments of deepest faith in the ultimate victory of good over evil, of the spirit over circumstance, and in the possibility of establishing a just order in human affairs. And the doctrine of the Kingdom has also an invaluable rôle to play, not indeed for all Christians, but for that triumphant minority who are willing to sacrifice everything for the spirit. For, as we must now consider, there was a third

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2 E. Troeltsch, Politische Ethik und Christentum (Göttingen, 1904), p. 22.
3 Quoted by C. J. Cadoux, The Early Church and the World (Edinburgh, 1925), p. 56.
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strand in his message, what has been called “realised eschatology.” In it the future kingdom becomes already a potent force.

Jesus was not merely foretelling an imminent divine event. “He was essentially a teacher, and his emphasis throughout was ethical rather than eschatological. . . . The Beatitudes describe the type of character, the tone and temper and quality of spirit, which makes for the coming of the Kingdom.”¹ For those who gave themselves to him and his way of love, the new era had already opened. He was not founding the kingdom in the strict sense of the word, but in his fellowship was nevertheless a foretaste of the coming bliss. On his disciples was laid a new command: they shared new powers and privileges. A life of love such as that portrayed in the Sermon on the Mount and lived before their eyes by the Master himself, had become their sumnum bonum, their noblest aspiration. In it they knew themselves already delivered from the weakness, the transitoriness of all past existence. God had come to reign in their hearts. “Come to me, all who are labouring and burdened, and I will refresh you. Take my yoke upon you and learn of me, for I am gentle and humble in heart, and you will find your souls refreshed. . . . The Reign of God is now in your midst. . . . If I cast out daemons by the Spirit of God, then the Reign of God has reached you already.”²

² Matt. xi. 28-29; Lk. xvii. 21; Matt. xii. 28. Cf. C. H. Dodd, Parables of the Kingdom (London, 1935), passim.
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From the time of the Temptation onward, Jesus was aware that his kingdom and those who belonged to it were committed to a different life then and there, from the life which surrounded them. The Evil One had shown him all the kingdoms of the world in a vision, but Jesus was strong enough to reject the offer of them at the price of capitulating to their methods:

The temptation this time is definitely Messianic. Jesus is invited to construe his election by God in terms of a Messiahship founded on earthly rule. The suggestion is powerful, because Messiahship as thus construed not only answered to Jewish expectations but seemed promised in Scripture to Israel’s future king. . . . But as this idea presented itself to the Jews, Jesus discerned in it not an asking of God but a capitulation to methods and aims—militarism, hatred, revolt against Rome—which signified only too clearly a surrender to the evil spirit which disputes God’s government of the world. Therefore he rejects it.¹

The Kings of the Gentiles might “rule” over their people and with the best of intentions, justly taking the title of “Benefactor,” but Jesus and his disciples were conscious that they were among men as servants.² The point has been well made by Dr Dibelius:

When Jesus addresses his disciples in the Sermon on the Mount, he leaves out of sight all the interests, tasks and responsibilities of this earth. God’s children must be like their Father: perfect, holy, utterly loving.

² Lk. xxii. 25.
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What happens to this world does not matter to them. It is destined to perish. Above the collapse of all earthly things gleams the glory of God; and that glory is all that matters. And it matters even now. Jesus nowhere speaks as if the disciples must wait till this world falls to dust before the wonder of wonders, the new world, can appear. What place would there be in that new order, in which the will of God shall be done, for evil and hatred and persecution, what cause for oath-taking, what temptation to rail and hate? No. It is in this earthly world that the spirit of the kingdom of God is to be realised. In the clash of the world and the kingdom, the new life will show its glory.¹

Yet after saying all this, Dr Dibelius goes on to draw precisely the wrong conclusion. He becomes obsessed with the fact that the external kingdom did not appear. He lets all Christians of to-day become citizens of this world, whose primary duty it is to preserve the values of this world, to serve the State and the nation. But it is plain from his own testimony that the Synoptic doctrine of the kingdom supplies a special task for radical disciples of Jesus, in a world which falls short of their ideals. It is theirs to be utterly true to him, at whatever cost.

Let us consider in this connection the famous question put to Jesus while he was teaching as a rabbi in the temple colonnade. "Teacher, we know that you are sincere and fearless; you do not court human favour, you teach the way of God honestly. Is it right to pay taxes to Cæsar or not?" They brought him a denarius, engraved

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with the features of Augustus or Tiberius. By pointing to these he recalled to their minds that money was the property of the sovereign power which minted it. "Give Cæsar what belongs to Cæsar"; he concluded, "give God what belongs to God."¹ Few sentences which passed his lips have had such a formative influence on Christian thinking; its importance is rivalled only by the word to Simon, "on this rock will I build my ἐκκλησία"; and its primitive meaning, like that of the latter word, can be only approximately settled. It is probable that Jesus was simply parrying his opponents, who were trying to wrest a damaging admission from him, and not enunciating a principle.² Or even if he were giving a serious judgment in this particular case, it is by no means certain that we can therefore go on to deduce from it a whole series of duties to Cæsar or the State, including, for example, that of military service.³ But if we suppose that Jesus really was enunciating a principle for the relation of the Christian to the State, we are up against a problem with which the minds of Christians, especially those interested in the eschatological question, must still be concerned. Heim and Brunner refuse to see in the saying any belittling of Cæsar's claims; but is much more probable that a real judgment is being passed on Cæsar, that he and his empire are being silently arraigned as belonging to an order which is about

¹ Mk. xii. 17.
to perish, that they are being assigned to the realm of the unimportant. Jesus is indifferent whether the pious should pay this levy for the last time or not; the essential thing is that they prepare their hearts to meet their King and Judge, that they give God what belongs to God.

The saying is on the one hand a piece of interim-ethic, teaching for that period lying between the old and the new, for the interval which must elapse before the coming of that new external kingdom in which there will be no marrying or giving in marriage, no Caesar or tax-gatherer. But it is also a piece of realised eschatology. Precisely in the interim before the external kingdom arrives, the disciple is already expressing the life of the new era. And so its essential message is one for to-day also. We are still living in that “dreadful interval.” Jesus’ teaching is still vital for a thorough-going disciple who has accepted his values as ultimate and yet must live in a world which has not accepted Jesus and in which the external kingdom has not come. The essence of the teaching addressed to Jews who would also be followers of Jesus, while living under the Roman Empire till it should perish, is still significant for disciples of the twentieth century who live in the political chaos which we know.

The interesting thing about these words of Christ’s is that they were not said to the Romans but to the Jews; and the Jews were a conquered race. Their conquerors were ruling in Jerusalem; just as (in the

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apprehension of the Patriot) Germans will be ruling in London, if we don’t get some more aeroplanes. Now, if we can imagine Christ coming to London at some future time when England has surrendered to Germany, and if we can imagine Mr Winston Churchill asking Him if we ought meekly to pay the indemnity exacted of us, and if Christ replied, “Render unto Hitler the things which are Hitler’s; and unto God the things which are God’s,” we can see that Mr Churchill’s patriotic spirit would not be greatly encouraged. What he would want to be told would be that the secret poison-gas factory at Gleneagles and the undisclosed treaty with Switzerland justified an armed repudiation of the terms of Peace. And he has been told exactly the opposite. For if Christ’s answer is more than an escape from a dilemma, it is saying clearly: “What matter if we are a conquered race, so long as we continue to serve God?”

This is not teaching for the world, which has not accepted Jesus, nor for a Church which requires a basis in civilisation if it is to continue its historic work. It is teaching for the radical disciples of Christ; but it is their very own, their glory and their trial, their confident martyrdom. When the clash comes, the lesser values must for them sink into the background; family, property, culture, nation, race... these are all subordinate to the good of the kingdom of love, which is already God’s kingdom. And if it appears to be conquered by the world, if its members are nailed with their Incarnate Lord to a Cross, it rises triumphant into that transcendent order where God is all in all.

2. THE INADEQUACY OF JUDICIAL VIOLENCE

That the use of legal violence, in the service of good, does not fulfill the ideals of those who wait for the kingdom and seek already to live in it, is sometimes obscured by a misunderstanding of the illustrations which Jesus employs. He told stories in which he spoke of kings and masters who inflict severe penalties on their subjects; and from that has been deduced, for instance by Professor Heim, the right of Christians to employ force and to be content with the results produced by force. Such a conclusion is based on a misapprehension. Jesus taught in parables, not allegories. His stories have usually one point, and the other details are not to be pressed. When, for example, Jesus compares the coming of the Son of Man to that of a thief in the night, no one would dream of concluding that Jesus therefore approved of robbery. How, then, can one press the point when Jesus mentions punishments inflicted by oriental despots and slave-owners? Or if, as in the parable of the Debtor or of the Drunken Steward, the point seems to be precisely that of judgment and violent punishment, it is to be noted that the judge is God himself. The right of punishment which God's holiness may require is not to be carried over into the ordinary conditions of human life, as if society or any human individual had the right to inflict such punishment.

1 Heim, Unpublished Lectures on Social Ethics, 1934-35.
3 Matt. xviii. 21 ff.  
4 Lk. xii. 42 ff.  
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Capital against a non-violent Christ is made by the man in the street and even by Alfred Rosenberg, out of the forceful way in which Jesus, probably anticipating the Last Judgment, cleansed the Temple. Now we cannot be sure of the Johannine tradition that the scourge was of straw, and that it was applied to the animals alone and not to the men. More significant is the fact that the Greek word \( \epsilon\ic\beta\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\nu \) used in Mark xi. 15 of Christ’s handling of the traders is frequently used in the New Testament with no more violent meaning than send out. In any case it is plain that Jesus was not relying on the violence employed to punish or frighten the traders. They scurried away because they knew that a tremendous religious personality, Elijah or Jeremiah or one of the prophets returned to life, had come on the scene and wanted to claim the sacred court for some terrifying, strange purpose, perhaps to usher in the Last Judgment. He spoke of making the whole area a place of prayer; so they went off to a safe distance.

The position of a disciple of Jesus, with regard to judicial violence, is unambiguous to anyone who has grasped the Sermon on the Mount, with its teaching of non-resistance and of love to enemies, especially when it is realised that, in New Testament usage, the word employed for enemy (\( \epsilon\chi\theta\rho\delta\varsigma \)) can cover not only private but public foes, even if the

2 Jn. ii. 15.
usual word for the latter is in other literature πολέμιος.\textsuperscript{1} The passage is not so much an exclusion of violence for the Christian who should find himself in the midst of a hostile, anarchic world. It is far more directed to such as his hearers then were and as we are to-day, people who live in a realm of ordered violence, of justice based on force. The law of an eye for an eye, which he criticises, is not the law of the jungle. It is a limitation set by the community to the blood-feud with its doctrine of a \textit{life} for an \textit{eye} and a \textit{life} for a \textit{tooth}; it is the institution of organised violence in the service of justice. The man who demands the disciple’s shirt, and who is to be offered a coat as well, is one who has employed legal prosecution and constraint to attain his end; but Jesus does not believe that his end is really attained thereby. Between men should exist a positive fellowship, not a delimitation of rights. There must be something added from the disciple’s heart, which will create such a situation. Similarly, the man who forces the disciple to go a mile with him, but with whom the disciple is urged to go two miles, is no Procrustes making exaction on unwary travellers, but some official demanding labour in the service of the State. His methods seem to Jesus inadequate. The disciple will try to ease the situation by doing more than the actual statutory requirement. Thus would Jesus replace law by love.\textsuperscript{2}

There is an important passage (\textit{Matthew} xviii. 17) concerning disputes between Christians. If a

conference between the parties alone, or with a few friends present, has failed, Christ is said to have counselled: “Tell the Church; and if he [the opponent] refuses to listen to the Church, treat him as a pagan or a tax-gatherer.” Principal Curtis has recently made the illuminating suggestion that the last clause does not mean that the adversary should be treated as an outcast, but that the arm of the common law should be invoked, the law which deals alike with Gentiles, tax-gatherers and believers.\(^1\) The exegesis gives us a valuable insight into the Christian mind at the period when \textit{Matthew} was finally edited; but the reference to the “Church,” the organised congregation of believers, betrays the fact that the passage does not go back to the original words of Jesus. Indeed, the whole counsel is just what we would expect when the Christian community had begun its long task of coming to terms with the world of everyday.

More primitive records show Jesus acting in a quite different manner. One day in the crowd round the Master was a man who had been deprived of his inheritance by his brother. “Teacher,” cried the man, “tell my brother to give me my share.” \(^2\) But Jesus would not assume the office of judge and spoke instead of the danger of many possessions.

Or again, in the still more famous episode, preserved in the pericope which has somehow found its way into the \textit{Gospel of John},\(^3\) we see Jesus dealing after

\(^1\) W. A. Curtis in \textit{The Church’s Attitude to Peace and War} (London, 1937), p. 48.
\(^2\) Lk. xii. 13 ff.
\(^3\) Jn. viii. 1-11.
his own fashion with one of the most disruptive of social sins,—breach of marriage. He could have condemned the woman, according to the traditional law, to the penalty of death by stoning. But he chose instead to probe the hearts of her accusers, and to send her away with a new hope and a new loyalty. The judicial system with its code of punishments is no doubt a deterrent and a preventive, but it is not constructive. Jesus, on the other hand, wills that his disciples love to the uttermost in order that they may save and redeem.

Thus while we may hail organised violence as a step forward from chaos, we must remember Jesus' criticism of the whole system, if we are to be in any sense true not only to the letter but the spirit of his teachings. Those at least who belong to the kingdom are bound to go further than the law, to see, in the criminal, one who is still a potential member of the kingdom, one in whom Christ may be formed.

3. THE DUTY OF NON-RESISTANCE

The word "peace" sings its way through the whole of the Gospels. In the story which pious and loving souls wove round the birth of Jesus, the angels announce peace to men through God's good-will. As the Master taught his disciples on the Mount of Beatitudes, he called peacemakers "children of God." And almost the last words he spoke at table, according to the Johannine tradition, were words of peace: "Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you." Yet there are sayings of
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Jesus which might be interpreted to show that at times he approved of violence in self-defence or for the protection of others.

The least relevant of these is the word: "Think not I came to bring peace to the earth, I came not to bring peace but a sword." ¹ This has been applied not only to the relations of individuals but of nations, yet it is perfectly clear from the verse following that the reference is to relations within the family. It envisages a situation tragic enough, and one recurring to-day in the mission-fields of India, where "a man is set against his father, and a daughter against her mother" because the younger generation has forsaken the traditional faith for the Christian religion. With oriental fondness for metaphor, Jesus describes the situation as the bringing of a sword among the disciples; in cold prose it implies that strife, persecution and hatred lie ahead of them. Thus the saying has nothing to do with settling disputes among nations by the sword; and Luke goes out of his way to make clear that it does not involve violence and slaughter even in the family circle, by omitting the sword metaphor which might have been misunderstood. "You think that I am here to make peace on earth? No, I tell you, it is dissension." ² Men will divide over the teaching of Jesus.

The most significant of the sayings which have been used to lend the support of Jesus to the use of the sword by the individual is the difficult word: "Let him who has no sword sell his cloak and buy

¹ Matt. x. 34. ² Lk. xii. 51.
one,"  \(^1\) the last counsel of Jesus before the little company left the safety of the Upper Room for the walk through the dark to the orchard of Gethsemane. Josephus mentions that Galilean pilgrims carried swords for self-defence,\(^2\) and so there is ground for Principal Curtis and Professor Heim to see in the saying Jesus' approval of the pilgrim's ordinary weapon for defence.\(^3\) There were even two swords in the possession of the disciples, though we have no evidence that they were there at the suggestion of Jesus or even with his knowledge. But it is unlikely that Jesus was thinking of the problem of self-defence when he pronounced the word that they should buy swords. The little band was not going into the wilds but a short distance out into the suburbs, into a district dotted with pilgrims' tents. When the swords were produced Jesus said, "Enough"; but two swords were not enough for the defence of them all; he possibly meant, as Goodspeed translates, "Enough of this!" And when one of the disciples actually used the sword to repel the Temple guard Jesus rebuked him and is said to have worked a miracle of healing, restoring the ear which the disciple had cut off one of the soldiers. Plainly, then, Jesus did not mean his counsel to be taken literally; what he did mean is probably past finding out. It is at least possible that he was thinking in pictures. Just as he saw in the anointing by the woman in Bethany a symbolic preparation for his

\(^1\) Lk. xxii. 36.
\(^3\) *Cf.* Heim, *Unpublished Lectures on Social Ethics.*
burial, so he saw an ironic fitness in that he, who had done no wrong nor violence, but who was about to be "classed with criminals," should be surrounded by a band armed with swords, purses and wallets, like robbers prepared to snatch and dispose of their booty. "Have you sallied out to arrest me like a robber?" he asked the Temple guard. "Don't we look like robbers with all these swords and satchels?" he might have added ironically. But however that may be, Jesus had clearly no place for the use of the sword in individual self-defence or for the protection of others. Not only should the individual love his enemies, and turn his own other cheek when struck, he is required to abandon the use of the sword even in defence of a third party.

A highly plausible argument to the contrary has recently been presented by Mr W. M. Watt.¹ He seeks to reconcile the killing of enemies with Jesus' teaching about love; and he does succeed, I think, in justifying measures of extreme violence on the part of an individual, in a case of extreme urgency and for the benefit of a third party. If a man could have prevented the assassination of President Lincoln only by shooting the assassin before the latter could have accomplished his murderous intent, his conduct, in view of his service to the American people, would have to be pronounced right,—according, that is, to the standards of moral philosophy. But one can adduce no evidence from the Gospels themselves to

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show that the act is Christian as Christ understood his religion and ethic, that it is an act of pure love. If there is no record of Christ applying his teaching to a situation where a third party is involved in temporal danger, that is scarcely accidental. It is only another instance of his indifference to the things of this world. For to Jesus the continuance of one's own life, or that of one's dearest, or of the life of society, was unimportant. All that mattered was action undefiled by brutality and violence, and a character which would find entrance to God's final and transcendent kingdom.

As we have learned from earliest childhood, there was once a Jew who was going down the steep, desert highway from Jerusalem to the shores of the Dead Sea, and who was attacked and robbed. His fellow-Jews neglected him but he was cared for by a foreigner, a Samaritan. And now arises one of the unanswerable "ifs" of literary history. What would Jesus have made the Samaritan do while the robbers were still at their fell work? There is no evidence for the suggestion that Jesus would have had him wield his traveller's sword. The protection of one life would have seemed to Jesus no excuse at all for taking the life of another, even of a robber. They are right who claim that Jesus renounced "private war"—the use of the sword by the individual. Was he also a pacifist in the wider sense of renouncing public and national war?
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4. THE REJECTION OF WAR

It is of course obvious that the issue of public war was not such a living one in Jesus’ day that he had to make the refusal to bear arms an express condition of discipleship. He could even have contacts with soldiers without at once condemning their profession; he could perhaps find a likeness between obedience to himself and the attitude of the soldiers under the army-captain in Capernaum.¹ But these things mean only that Jesus saw soldiers first of all as persons and not as officials, and that he could see good in military authority and discipline without thereby approving of the ends and methods of militarism as such. Similarly, references to armies in the parables are a weak foundation on which to base the view that Jesus approved of war. The parable of the king counting his army,² or that of the Marriage Feast in which an army is sent to kill those who had murdered the king’s messengers,³ are used by Professor Heim to substantiate a Christian militarism.⁴ But the army is either a literary embellishment which is not part of the real point of the parable, or it refers to the activity of God in His sovereign power. Finally, reference is sometimes made to the “wars preceding the End” in the Synoptic Apocalypse⁵; but it is practically certain that the Apocalypse does not come from Jesus. In any case the wars belong to the framework

¹ Matt. viii. 5 ff. ² Lk. xiv. 31. ³ Matt. xxii. 2 ff. ⁴ Heim, Unpublished Lectures on Social Ethics. ⁵ Mk. xiii. 7.
of crude eschatology, along with the earthquake and the falling stars, which is to be regarded as the husk of Jesus' teaching. Moreover, the disciples inhabiting Judea, as Professor Cadoux points out,¹ are not expected to take part in the wars but to fly to the hills.

But these small points are insignificant beside the very definite stand which Jesus made against military violence and the settling of disputes between peoples by the sword. He did not make the war-issue central to his message but he did not leave it as much out of the picture as some would have us believe. The whole Apocalyptic movement was largely a reaction to a social and political situation, the relation of the Roman Empire to the Jewish nation.² Jesus was born into a ferment of discontent with political subjection and economic inequality. On the one hand was the new and glorious Empire, holding the known world in one community of culture and defending it by military force,—the might of the legions. On the other hand, in Palestine at least, were visionaries and insurrectionists, who spoke of judgment and a new world-order, and who were not unwilling to seize the sword to bring it in. From both Jesus separated himself.

From the days of his wrestle in the wilderness, he knew that for him there was something diabolic in the kingdoms of the world,³ something before which he could not bow down and worship. And

² Cf. S. Mathews, Jesus on Social Institutions (New York, 1928,) p. 11 ff.
³ Vide supra, p. 30.
he may have been only too conscious, when he accepted the title of Christ at Cæsarea Philippi, that above his head stood the magnificent temple to Augustus. He rejected the way of Rome, the way of military conquest, and chose the path of love, even if it should mean a cross.¹

Jesus separated himself also from the party of those who, from the Jewish side, wished to bring in the new world-order by military violence. This has been questioned, in view of the alleged fact that Jesus had a Zealot among the inner circle.² It is, however, impossible to know whether "Zealot" here means a devotee of Jewish militarism or simply a zealot for the observance of the Law, like James the brother of the Lord. But even if the term had political significance, it is unnatural to assume that, under the influence of Jesus, Simon continued an insurrectionist, a Barabbas, and did not give up adherence to the military party when he was admitted to the inner circle of Jesus. The nickname may well have been preserved after his change of heart. The main attitude of Jesus to the Zealots is clear. Not only have we the negative evidence that he did not speak of waging the expected Messianic war,³ we possess also the carefully preserved record of the last week of the public mission of Jesus, in which he said and did things which were at once a severe condemnation of zealotism, and a demonstration that the spirit of Jesus is the antithesis of that behind war. He made it

¹ Vide supra, p. 36.                ² Mk. iii. 19.
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difficult for men to think that he sanctioned military methods, by deliberately contrasting his kingdom with the Davidic kingdom which the Zealots wished to see restored.

He set off from Bethany, down the Mount of Olives, to enter the city of David in state. To his disciples he was already the Messiah or the Messiah-to-be, even if to the crowds he was still the prophet from Nazareth, the returned Elijah, predecessor of the Messiah. At any rate, in his mind, in that of the crowd, and in that of the disciples, there was a definite connection between the entry and the kingdom which was to be. Now Jesus chose to enter the city of David by the very route along which, centuries before, David had returned after quelling the revolt of Absalom. He chose to enter the city royally; yet not like David in the panoply of war but on the common beast of burden, the donkey:

With monstrous head and sickening cry,
And ears like errant wings,
The Devil's walking parody
Of all four-footed things.

And yet the cry went up from the mob, "Blessed be the reign to come, our father David's reign," ¹ "Hosanna to the Son of David." ² May it not have been this very cry which caused Jesus to stop the straggling procession, while he gazed at the city of so many hopes and dreams, the city also of so many sieges and sallies, to "burst into

¹ Mk. xi. 10. ² Matt. xxi. 9.
tears” and exclaim “Would that you too knew even to-day on what your peace depends”—on the abandonment of the policy of rebellion. “But no, it is hidden from you. A time is coming when your enemies will . . . besiege you on every side and raze you . . . to the ground . . . and all because you would not understand when God was visiting you.”¹ (And was not the prophecy bitterly fulfilled in the Jewish War?) Finally, in the days of teaching in the Temple, Jesus seems to have returned to the same theme. “How can the scribes say that the Christ is David’s son?” he asked.² To his mind there could be no compromise between the methods of David and his imitators, and the Christ of God.

If Jesus thus clearly distinguished between the spirit of his kingdom and the military methods alike of Rome and of the zealots, there seems to be no good reason for denying that he totally disapproved of war, of the way of settling public disputes between nations and peoples by the arbitrament of the sword. Unfortunately the remains of his teaching are so scanty that it has been possible to twist his recorded sayings to mean almost the opposite of what he intended them to convey. This has been due largely to the gradual disappearance in the Church of the Apocalyptic God-dominated outlook of the Master, which made the goods of this world seem trivial and the kingdom all that mattered. Once the context of the sayings was misinterpreted their whole significance was destroyed. Yet those, like the Quakers, who, whether understanding the

¹ Lk. xix. 42 ff. ² Mk. xii. 35.
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Apocalyptic origin of the teaching of Jesus or not, are resolved to take it even to-day seriously and literally, are to be accorded all honour. They are the salt and the leaven. In them Jesus would recognise disciples after his own heart; they too have overcome the world—by ignoring the claims of the lesser values. But we have to live in and with the world. It is possible only for a minority to live here and now in accordance with the final purpose of God. The Gospels must be regarded as expressing the ultimate ground and final goal of life rather than as directions for the conduct of Christians as a whole, in the present, either among themselves or in relation to non-Christians. In the teaching of Augustine, Luther and Grotius, we shall see the various ways in which the Church honourably came to terms with the necessities of life in this world.
III. AUGUSTINE AND THE TEMPORAL ORDER

I. THE TWO CITIES

Between the teaching of Jesus and that of Augustine lies the development of nearly four centuries, during which primitive Christianity had been transformed from a prophetic eschatological faith into a sacramental and sacerdotal religion, approximating at least in outward form to the "mysteries" which were its great rivals, and absorbing into its idea of God and man many of the common concepts of Hellenistic culture. But even more important, from our point of view, it had come to terms with history, with the temporal order, or, as the Christian of the ancient period would have termed it, "the world." Not that Augustine shared anything like our modern viewpoint of an astronomic past and a millenial future. He attacks heathen chronology, which would carry the origin of the human race into an indiscernibly distant past: "They are deceived by those highly mendacious documents which profess to give the history of many thousand years, though, reckoning by the sacred writings, we find that not 6000 years have yet passed." \(^1\)

And he goes on to give thanks that "even now the City of God has many thousand citizens who abstain from the act of generation," even though such an attitude, if it became general, would rob the human race of any future at all. Yet he is conscious of a "before" and an "after" which are of importance. For the expected miracle had not taken place. History had not been wound up, and the wheel of time moved on. The vision of the kingdom of God, which dominated the thought of Jesus and the early disciples, could no longer prevent other and secular interests from asserting their place in the field of consciousness. The Church was forced to compromise; and the most important, and in fact the only full and rounded attempt to give expression to that new attitude in the ancient Church is the teaching of Augustine,—above all in his *City of God*. Nor is its importance gone to-day. "One can go the length of saying that the ethic of Augustine provides even to-day a decisive point from which to orient ourselves. There has been much talk of a 'crisis of Augustinianism,' due to the reaction since the eighteenth century against his doctrine of sin and grace. But that crisis is rather one of Paulinism than of Augustinianism. For the soul of Augustinianism lies in his ethic of the supreme good, and his formulation of the problem is still valid for the present day."  

Augustine remains as the type of Christian who seeks to make

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1 DCD, xv. 20.
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a just place for the secular values alongside the supreme value,—the love of God.

The idea of the Kingdom of God as preached by Jesus had of course not entirely faded; it had been preserved in two forms. The Church still looked forward to a winding-up of history, when God would become all in all. The date had merely been postponed. Further, the Church regarded itself as in some sense already the kingdom of God. Augustine himself hovered between attributing the epithet to the ideal Church, the company of the elect known only to God, and to the actual empirical Church 1; but the fact of the identification being made in some form or other is indisputable. "Leaving out of account that kingdom concerning which he shall say in the end, 'Come, ye blessed of my Father, take possession of the kingdom prepared for you,' the Church could not now be called his kingdom or the kingdom of heaven unless his saints were even now reigning with him, though in another and different way. . . . The Church even now is the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of heaven." 2

But Augustine is dominated by two other related conceptions, the City of God and the Earthly City, by the use of which he seeks to achieve, what Jesus did not attempt, the amalgamation of a supreme interest in the things of the other world and a necessary interest in the affairs of this present life.

2 DCD, xx. 9.
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Augustine did not claim originality for his conception, and indeed sought to put forward his doctrine as good scriptural teaching. For the idea of a City of God at least he refers us primarily to the Psalms and their description of the glorified Jerusalem; the origin of the phrase "Earthly City" he does not attempt to explain. But his immediate and unacknowledged source for both ideas appears to have been the Rules of Tychonius the Donatist.

He begins what we may call the overture to his work with a paean:

The glorious City of God is my theme in this work. . . . I have undertaken its defence against those who prefer their own gods to the Founder of this city,—a city surpassing glorious, whether we view it as it still lives by faith in this fleeting course of time, and sojourns as a stranger in the midst of the ungodly, or as it shall dwell in the fixed stability of its eternal seat, which it now with patience waits for; "expecting until righteousness shall return unto judgment," and it obtain, by virtue of its excellence, final victory and perfect peace.

(Perhaps Moffatt's rendering of the quotation from Psalm xciv. 15 brings out the meaning more clearly: until "Goodness shall have justice done to it.") But there is a counter theme to be announced also, much as the Venus music alternates with the Pilgrims' Chorus in the Overture to Tannhäuser. He will tell also of the Earthly City:

I am aware what ability is requisite to persuade the proud how great is the virtue of humility, which

1 DCD, xi. 1. 2 Figgis, Op cit., p. 46. 3 DCD, i. Preface.
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raises us, not by a quite human arrogance, but by a divine grace, above all earthly dignities that totter on this shifting scene. For the King and Founder of this city [City of God] of which we speak, has in Scripture uttered to His people a dictum of the divine law in these words: “God resisteth the proud but giveth grace unto the humble.” But this, which is God’s prerogative, the inflated ambition of a proud spirit also affects, and dearly loves that this be numbered among its attributes, to

“Show pity to the trembling soul,
And crush the sons of pride.” (Æneid, vi. 854).

And therefore, as the plan of this work we have undertaken requires, we must speak also of the earthly city, which, though it be mistress of the nations, is itself ruled by its lust of rule.¹

This introduction which Augustine gives to his work is hardly a fair picture of the book as a whole. This may be partly due to the long period which elapsed between the writing of the first and last sections, but probably even more to the nature of the task which he set himself. For he desired above all to celebrate the City of God, and yet as he went on writing his tone towards the Earthly City became considerably more friendly. From the introduction one would gather that the proud city of this earth was simply a usurper, and that Virgil was a blasphemer to ascribe to it the functions which the Bible declares to be God’s very own. We hear, too, that the Earthly City is evil, a view of govern-

¹ DCD, i. Preface.
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ment common in the ancient Church,—above all in periods of persecution. It is given over to its lust for rule. Yet Augustine can write rather differently of the State:

As to those who seem to do some good that they may receive glory from men, the Lord also says: “Verily, I say unto you, they have received their reward.” So also these despised their own private affairs for the sake of the republic, and for its treasury resisted avarice, consulted for the good of their country with a spirit of freedom, addicted neither to what their laws pronounced to be crime nor to lust. By all these acts, as by the true way, they pressed forward to honours, power and glory; they were honoured among almost all nations; they imposed the laws of their empire upon many nations; and at this day, both in literature and history, they are glorious among almost all nations.¹

Now even though to Augustine “glory” was a selfish thing and in so far short of the highest, yet here at least it appears as a relative good which has its place in the service of the highest good. And later Augustine goes even further. The heavenly city “makes no scruple to obey the laws of the earthly city, whereby the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life are administered.”² Such a passage sets the work of the earthly city in a much more favourable light.

Strictly speaking, Augustine does not use the phrase “City of God” to describe the Church, nor “Earthly City” to describe the State. Not

¹ DCD, v. 15. ² Ibid., xix. 17.
all the baptized, the regenerate, are members of the city celestial, but only those among them who are predestined by God, the elect, the saints who love God. "As long as she is a stranger in the world, the city of God has in her communion, and bound to her by the sacraments, some who shall not eternally dwell in the lot of the saints."  

Similarly, to express the idea of a State, Augustine uses regnum, or imperium, or civitas alone, or occasionally res publica, although the last hardly became a recognised Christian usage until the Middle Ages; by "Earthly City" he denotes rather the number of the predestined to damnation, the reprobate, who love self and not God, what has been called "die irdisch gesinnte Gesellschaft." Both societies appeared before human organisations were formed, the one with the creation of the angels, the other with the fall of Lucifer; but as they appear in the pages of history they approximate more and more to the State and the Church, being typified on the one hand by the Assyrian and Roman Empires and on the other by the Hebrew-Christian religious society. Even though he may hold that God gives earthly kingdoms to both good and bad, and though he declares that the Roman State never corresponded to the ideal of justice, yet there has never been a fairer form of the Earthly City than Rome: "When the kingdoms of the East had been illustrious for

1 DCD, i. 35.  
3 Ibid., p. 8.  
4 DCD, iv. 33.  
5 DCD, xix. 21.
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a long time, it pleased God that there should also arise a Western Empire, which, though later in time should be more illustrious in extent and greatness.” ¹ And if the secular society is thus recognisable above all in the Roman State, the sacred society is exclusively the Church, at least since the coming of Christ; for in discussing the possible admission of the great heathen, Augustine confines himself to the pre-Christian era.² So that in practice Augustine thinks very largely of the Earthly City in terms of the extant Roman Empire, and of the Heavenly—even though in the City of God the identification is not explicitly made—with reference to the empirical Catholic Church. In their inevitable conflicts lies the tension of the Christian ethic.

2. THE NECESSITY OF JUDICIAL VIOLENCE

An excellent illustration of the inescapable conflict of loyalties is seen in Augustine’s discussion of the application of torture to accused persons, the regular practice in the Roman law-court. He admits that in many cases innocent persons die from the effects, or, to escape the continuous anguish, make false confessions on the basis of which they are executed. And then he asks: “If such darkness shrouds social life, will a wise judge take his seat on the bench or no? Beyond question he will.” The needs of the Earthly City, the preservation of human society, demand that he accept office. The brutality and

¹ DCD, v. 13. ² Ibid., xviii. 47.
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injustice which he is forced to commit are less than what would occur if he did not do his duty. He errs through unavoidable ignorance, and after having performed his gruesome task he will have no sense of sin. He will be a guiltless though not a happy man, and if religious he will pray to God: “From my necessities deliver Thou me,”¹ (though one is obliged to reflect that the whole position of Augustine demands that the prayer remain unanswered). In addition, one has only to remember that Augustine was led also to approve of the use of violence in the settlement even of religious controversy, confronting the heretics with the Biblical maxim, “Compel them to come in.” It is then not difficult to see how his idea of the duties of a Christian State would lead him to support the use of force in the solution of international and imperial problems.

3. THE DUTY OF RESISTANCE

For Augustine the dual command of Jesus, to love God and one’s neighbour, is central in the Christian ethic. Since he who loves God loves himself thereby, and since a man is ordered to love his neighbour as himself, it is a primary duty to induce people to love God. A Christian ought in the second place to injure no one in any way whatever, but on the contrary seek to do good to every one he can reach, beginning with those nearest to him.² But Augustine’s idea of the good obliges him

¹ DCD, xix. 6.  
² Ibid., xix. 14.
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to give an interpretation of the teaching of Jesus, about
the use of the sword and on turning the other cheek,
which is poles apart from the intention of the Master.

In his *Reply to Faustus the Manichean* he gives his
view of the meaning of the mysterious injunction
of Jesus, which we have already discussed,\(^1\) that the disciples should provide themselves with
swords. Here is the best evidence that he can
find for countering the rejection by the Manichees
of the God of the Old Testament because he was
a God of war. He admits that the saying conflicts
with the previous other-worldly teachings of Jesus,
when he had sent out the disciples without scrip or
purse, but comments simply: "Does not this show
how, without any inconsistency, precepts, counsels
and permissions may be changed, as different times
require different arrangements."\(^2\) He is more
troubled by the dismay of Jesus when the disciples
start using the swords and by the command to put
them back in their place. He sees that the attitude of
Jesus in the matter of concrete swords is comparable
to his refusal to ask the Father for legions of militant
angels to come to his defence\(^3\); both express his
conviction that the kingdom may be maintained by
love alone.\(^4\) But that was a solution too simple for
Augustine and the mature Church; for to them the
preservation of the goods of this world was a
necessity. Jesus must have meant by his original

\(^1\) *Vide supra*, pp. 40-41.
\(^2\) Augustine, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum (Reply to Faustus the
Manichean)*, xxii. 77; hereafter cited as CFM. Quotations from
\(^3\) *Matt.* xxvi. 53.
\(^4\) CFM, xxii. 76.
command that the disciples were to carry swords but not to use them.1 "Doubtless it was mysterious that the Lord should require them to carry weapons, and forbid the use of them. But it was his part to give the suitable precepts, and it was their part to obey without reserve."2 Augustine suggests also a rather different solution of the enigma. It would have been perfectly in order for the disciples to have used the swords had they been the constituted authorities or possessed their sanction; but in this case they were resisting authority, that of the Temple guards.3 Hence the whole incident leaves open the possibility that Jesus would have allowed them to use the swords for protection and defence against robbers or attackers.

The mind of Augustine was much exercised over the non-resistance teaching of Jesus, and the injunction to turn the other cheek. He was naturally compelled to treat of it in his exposition of Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, in which he lays down the lines of interpretation to which he was to adhere in his later references to the subject, in a passage in the Reply to Faustus and in one of his Letters (cxxxviii) to Marcellinus. He sees that the non-resistance passage cannot be considered simply by itself. It is part of Jesus' general teaching about love; "many have learned to offer the other cheek but do not know how to love him by whom they are struck."4

1 CFM, xxii. 70. 2 Ibid., xxii. 77. 3 Ibid., xxii. 70. 4 Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, according to Matthew i. 58. Quotations from P. Schaff, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (New York, 1903).
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The way of life which Jesus taught was positive, and mere negative non-resistance does not truly represent his spirit; "it is a small matter merely to abstain from injuring, unless you also confer a benefit as far as you can."¹ But in his conception of the nature of the benefit dictated by love, Augustine can hardly be said to agree with Jesus. By adherence to the principle of love we are not "precluded from inflicting such requital as avails for correction, and as compassionate love itself dictates." Two things are, however, required of the man who is to execute the punishment; that he should be one to whom in the natural order of things the power to punish is given; and that his motives should be pure and altruistic, those of a man who "by the greatness of his love, has overcome that hatred wherewith those are wont to be inflamed who wish to avenge themselves." In such a mood a father punishes the child whom he loves, beats him that he may not go on offending. Jesus wishes us to imitate God, God the Father, when he bids us love our enemies; but that Father is like the ideal human father who punishes out of love, and indeed of Him it is written by the prophet "whom the Lord loveth, He correcteth; yea, He scourgeth every son whom He receiveth."² This is rather far from the gospel of Jesus, but it does lay down³ the fundamental position of Augustine,

¹ Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, according to Matthew i. 67.
² Proverbs, 3, 12; rendering of the LXX.
³ Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, i. 63.
that it is the spirit and not the act that is of importance. Love and good intentions can express themselves even through brutal correction.

He returns to the same thought in the *Reply to Faustus*. "What is here required is not a bodily action but an inward disposition." ¹ And he proceeds to give an illustration of how the spirit of love may be preserved even through actions which could not be deemed loving. For polemic purposes he chooses a fable related among the Manichees themselves:

The Apostle Thomas was once at a marriage feast in a country where he was unknown, when one of the servants struck him, and he forthwith by his curse brought a terrible punishment on this man. For when he went out to the fountain to provide water for the guests, a lion fell on him and killed him, and the hand with which he had given a slight blow to the apostle was torn off, in fulfilment of the imprecation, and brought by a dog to the table at which the apostle was reclining. What could be more cruel than this? And yet, if I mistake not, the story goes on to say, that the apostle made up for the cruelty by obtaining for the man the blessing of pardon in the next world; so that, while the people of this strange country learned to fear the apostle as being so dear to God, the man's eternal welfare was secured in exchange for the loss of this mortal life. It matters not whether the story is true or false. At any rate the Manicheans, who regard as genuine and authentic books which the canon of the Church rejects, must allow, as shown in this story, that the virtue of patience, which the Lord

¹ CFM, xxii. 76.

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enjoins when he says: "If anyone smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him thy left also," may be in the inward disposition, though it is not exhibited in bodily action or in words. For when the apostle was struck, instead of turning his other side to the man, or telling him to repeat the blow, he prayed to God to pardon his assailant in the next world, but not to leave the injury unpunished at the time. Inwardly he preserved a kindly feeling, while outwardly he wished the man to be punished as an example.\(^1\)

Such reasoning is the almost inevitable result of the attempt to reconcile the teaching of Jesus with the demands and necessities of life in this world.

The most famous of Augustine's letters to Marcellinus disposes first of all of a too literal interpretation of the words of Jesus. Taken absolutely literally, Jesus talks only about an injury to the right cheek and says nothing about the appropriate conduct when the left cheek is smitten. "'Whoever,' it is said, 'shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also'; but the left cheek is more liable to be smitten, because it is easier for the right hand of the assailant to smite it than the other."\(^2\) The words must have some more general sense, and so Augustine proceeds to give the interpretation which he asserts was general in his day:

The words are commonly understood as if Our Lord had said: If anyone has acted injuriously to thee

\(^1\) CFM, xxii. 79.
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in respect of the higher possessions which thou hast, offer to him also the inferior possessions, lest, being more concerned about revenge than about forbearance, thou shouldst despise eternal things in comparison with earthly things.¹

But of course he prefers his own solution, which we have already described, that the words of Jesus refer to the spirit and not to any loving act on the part of the Christian:

These precepts pertain rather to the inward disposition of the heart than to the actions which are done in the sight of men, requiring us in the inmost heart to cherish patience along with benevolence, but in the outward action to do that which seems most likely to benefit those whose good we ought to seek.²

Jesus himself did not exactly turn the other cheek to the high priest, but at least answered him back. When Paul was smitten he said to the high priest, "God shall smite thee, thou whitest wall."³

Thus throughout his literary career as a Christian apologist, Augustine used all his powers as a thinker and a rhetorician to interpret and overlay the primitive teaching of Jesus on non-resistance and love, in a way which would make it possible for the individual to protect the rights of others in the world of the fifth century. Nor shall we find it different when we come to consider his attitude to the measures which a State must adopt if it is to

¹ Letter cxxxviii, 12. ² Ibid., 13. ³ Acts xxiii. 3-5.
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preserve itself and flourish in this natural order in which we live. To some such approval of necessary violence the mature Christian inevitably comes; but it is unwise to obscure the compromise which has been made by seeking to identify it with the teaching of Jesus. To reconcile the demands of life in this world with the principles of the gospel, involves conscious or unconscious sophistry. With most people, as with Augustine, it is unconscious. They simply refuse to admit, even to themselves, that their values and methods may not have the full approval of him who is the revelation of what life might be, if the supreme values were all that mattered.

4. THE REDISCOVERY OF THE JUST WAR

Although the importance of Augustine lies in his rehabilitation of the just war, he was too great a mind to be unconscious of the miseries which war entails and the grave danger of a just war degenerating into an unjust one. At times he even seems to praise the attitude of those who submit to conquest and surrender, without a struggle, the values which have made their civilisation worth while:

The vanquished succumb to the victorious, preferring any sort of peace and safety to freedom itself; so that they who choose to die rather than be slaves have been greatly wondered at. For in almost all nations the very voice of nature somehow proclaims, that those who happen to be conquered should choose rather to be subject to their conquerors than to be killed by all
kinds of warlike destruction. This does not take place without the providence of God, in whose power it lies that anyone either subdues or is subdued in war.¹

But his reaction to the evils of war is rather a vacillating one. "What is the evil in war?" he asks. "Is it the death of some who will soon die in any case, that others may live in peaceful subjection? That is mere cowardly dislike, not any religious feeling."² Or again: "But it is added, many Christians were slaughtered, and were put to death in a hideous variety of cruel ways. Well, if this be hard to bear, it is assuredly the common lot of all who are born into this life... That death is not to be judged an evil which is the end of a good life; for death becomes evil only by the retribution which follows it."³ So, too, the suffering undergone by prisoners in captivity is not to be overestimated⁴; after all their real home is in heaven! Even the violation of virgins is no ultimate disaster to them if it takes place without their consent and their will remains pure.⁵ If Augustine holds death and physical distress thus comparatively lightly, it is hardly to be expected that he will greatly stress the loss of property occasioned by war. "They, then, who lost their worldly all in the sack of Rome, if they owned their possessions as they had been taught by the apostle, who himself was poor without but rich within—that is to say, if they used the world as not using it—could say in the words of Job: 'Naked came

¹ DCD, xviii. 2. ² CFM, xxii. 74. ³ DCD, i. 11. ⁴ Ibid., i. 14. ⁵ Ibid., i. 16 and 18.
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I out of my mother's womb and naked shall I return thither; the Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away; as it pleased the Lord, so has it come to pass; blessed be the name of the Lord. . . .'

Nothing could perish on earth save what they would be ashamed to carry away from earth. Our Lord's injunction runs: 'Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth.'”

Yet on the other hand Augustine is not blind to the dreadfulness of war; he laments the destruction of cities and of human life in the Punic Wars; he admits that Æneas was right to grieve over the enemy he had cut down and Marcellus to shed tears over Syracuse “when he recollected, just before he destroyed, its magnificence and meridian glory and thought upon the common lot of all things.”

The soldier is in the same position as the judge, righteous but unhappy; for his task is gruesome. And in a powerful paragraph Augustine presents the issue with a telling combination of logic and feeling:

If I attempted to give an adequate description of these manifold disasters, these stern and lasting necessities, though I am quite unequal to the task, what limit could I set? But, they say, the wise man will wage just wars. As if he would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not wage them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars. For it is the wrongdoing of the opposing party which compels the wise man to wage just wars; and this wrongdoing, even though it gave rise to no war, would

1 DCD, i. 10.  
2 Ibid., iii. 18.  
3 Ibid., iii. 14.
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still be matter of grief to man because it is man's wrongdoing. Let everyone then, who thinks with pain on all these great evils, so horrible, so ruthless, acknowledge that this is misery. And if anyone either endures or thinks of them without mental pain, this is a more miserable plight still, for he thinks himself happy because he has lost human feeling.\(^1\)

Augustine is conscious that the worst evils of war are not really the appalling inhumanity and suffering considered from the point of view of the victims, but from that of the attackers, the rage that may inflame them and communicate itself to the attacked. "The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power and such like."\(^2\) These things ought not to be present in those conducting a just war; but they are certainly often found in those who conduct wars, even wars which appear to be necessary. And Augustine passes judgment on the campaigns of ancient history in a way which makes clear that he had no illusions about war, and did not mean by his defence of the just war simply to whitewash all wars. He condemns the aims and methods of the Assyrian Empire, in which he had the support not only of the Hebrew prophets but of the pagan historian Justinus whom he follows, and quotes with approval as saying: "Ninus, king of the Assyrians, first of all, through new lust of empire, changed the old and, as it were, ancestral custom of nations. He first

\(^1\) DCD, xix. 7. \(^2\) CFM, xxii. 74.

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made war on his neighbours, and wholly subdued as far as to the frontiers of Libya the nations as yet untrained to resist." And he comments: "To make war on your neighbours, and thence to proceed to others, and through mere lust of dominion to crush and subdue people who do you no harm, what else is this to be called than great robbery?" One of the passages which has rightly become one of the most famous in the whole *City of God*, applies the same principle to the campaigns of Alexander; and not Mr H. G. Wells himself could say anything more damaging:

Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robber-bands? For what are robber-bands themselves but little kingdoms? The band itself is made up of men, it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law agreed on. If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases to such a degree that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes possession of cities, and subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a kingdom, because the reality is now manifestly conferred on it, not by the removal of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity. Indeed, that was an apt and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great by a pirate who had been seized. For when that king had asked the man what he meant by keeping hostile possession of the sea, he answered with bold pride, "What thou meanest by seizing the whole earth; but because I do it with a petty ship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who dost it with a great fleet art styled emperor." 

1 DCD, iv. 6.  
2 Ibid., iv. 4.
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His dominion was wonderful but not enduring, and the rule of his successors was if anything worse, for "his generals did not peaceably divide that most ample kingdom among them for a possession, but rather dissipated it, wasting all things by wars." ¹

When Augustine comes to discuss the Roman Empire, he has a hard time balancing good and evil. He is uncertain wherein the real greatness of Rome lies and how it has been achieved. He has to distinguish the Roman State in pagan times and Christian. So that he hardly presents a unified picture of causes and events. Was it, for instance, necessary that the sway of Rome should have been extended over an ever-increasing area? "In this little world of man's body, is it not better to have a moderate stature, and health with it, than to attain the huge dimensions of a giant by unnatural torments, and when you attain it to find no rest, but to be pained the more in proportion to the size of your members?" ² Or to use a different analogy, that between the man of moderate means and the millionaire: "The rich man is anxious with fears, pining with discontent, burning with covetousness, never secure, always uneasy, panting from the perpetual strife of his enemies, adding to his patrimony indeed by these miseries to an immense degree, and by these additions also heaping up most bitter cares. But that other man of moderate wealth is contented with a small and compact estate, most dear to his own family, enjoying the sweetest peace with his kindred neighbours and friends, in piety

¹ DCD, xviii. 42. ² Ibid., iii. 10.
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religious, benignant in mind, healthy in body, in life frugal, in manners chaste, in conscience secure. I know not whether anyone can be such a fool, that he dare hesitate which to prefer.”¹ What reason is there for wishing to

glory in the greatness and extent of the empire, when you cannot point out the happiness of men who are always rolling, with dark fear and cruel lust, in warlike slaughters and in blood, which, whether shed in civil or foreign war, is still human blood; so that their joy may be compared to glass in its fragile splendour, of which one is horribly afraid lest it should be suddenly broken in pieces.²

Had it not been for human wrongdoing which necessitated punitive warfare and accumulated empire to the victors, mankind would have been happy in a federal union of small brotherly states.³ All but the glory of empire might have been achieved by the gradual extension of citizenship to all who were worthy of it.⁴ Even that early struggle, which brought about the unification of the primitive Roman tribes, the Alban war, was largely motived by weariness of the long peace under Numa, by lust of sovereignty. “Why allege to me the mere names and words of ‘glory’ and ‘victory’? Tear off the disguise of wild delusion, and look at the naked deeds; weigh them naked, judge them naked.”⁵

Over against this black picture, rather blacker

¹ DCD, iv. 3. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid., iv. 15. ⁴ Ibid., v. 17. ⁵ Ibid., iii. 14.
than the historical truth, for Augustine could not help being a rhetorician even after he became a Christian, is to be put a whitewashing of Rome which occurs in one of his letters to Marcellinus, a picture equally exaggerated:

The republic of Rome was governed and aggrandised from insignificance and poverty to greatness and opulence by men who, when they suffered wrong would rather pardon than punish the offender. Cicero, addressing Cæsar, the greatest statesman of his time, said in praising his character that he was wont to forget nothing but the wrongs that were done to him.¹

To this corresponds a passage in the *City of God*, where Augustine quotes from Sallust a remark of Cato: "I do not think it was by arms that our ancestors made the republic great from being small," ² though he goes on to point out that such conduct was even then that of a minority, and indeed has a picture of Cæsar praying to Bellona for a new war, which is difficult to bring into accord with the above quoted letter to Marcellinus.

The ultimate position of Augustine as to the aims and methods of the heathen empire is one of qualified approval; its wars were not wholly lustful. "Glory they most ardently loved; for it they wished to live; for it they did not hesitate to die"; and in the process they made their country free and then great.³ And the hardships and sacrifices cheerfully accepted by a long line of heroes, like Camillus, who delivered Rome from

¹ Letter cxxviii, 9. ² DCD, v. 12. ³ Ibid.
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the Gauls, contrast favourably with the efforts made by the redeemed in the name of the celestial city.\(^1\) The Jewish war is the best instance of a necessary triumph of the secular order by military means:

So far as regards human and temporal glory, the lives of these ancient Romans were reckoned sufficiently worthy. Therefore, also, we see in the light of that truth, which, veiled in the Old Testament, is revealed in the New, namely, that is not in view of terrestrial and temporal benefits, which divine providence grants promiscuously to good and evil, that God is to be worshipped, but in view of eternal life, everlasting gifts, and of the society of the heavenly city itself—in the light of this truth we see that the Jews were most righteously given as a trophy to the glory of the Romans; for we see that these Romans, who rested on earthly glory, and sought to obtain it by virtues, such as they were, conquered those who, in their great depravity, slew and rejected the giver of true glory, and of the eternal city.\(^2\)

If we keep in mind the criticisms which Augustine levelled at some of the great campaigns of history, we will be in a better position to understand his doctrine of the just war. His attitude was not simply the surrender of the teaching of Jesus and capitulation to the things of this world; but an honest and thorough-going attempt to find a \textit{via media} between absolute if unpractical idealism and mere opportunism. In two places, one of the later books of the \textit{City of God} and a section of the \textit{Reply to Faustus}, he explains the fundamentals of

\(^1\) DCD, v. 17, 18. \(^2\) Ibid., v. 18.
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the compromise or synthesis which he is attempting to construct.

But the earthly city . . . has its good in this world, and rejoices in it with such joy as such things can afford. But as this is not a good which can discharge its devotees of all distresses, this city is often divided against itself by litigations, wars, quarrels and such victories as are either life-destroying or short-lived. For each part of it that arms against another part of it seeks to triumph over the nations through itself in bondage to vice. . . . But the things which this city desires cannot be justly said to be evil, for it is itself, in its own kind, better than all other human good. For it desires earthly peace for the sake of enjoying earthly goods, and it makes war in order to attain to this peace; since if it has conquered, and there remains no one to resist it, it enjoys a peace which it had not while there were opposing parties who contested for the enjoyment of those things which were too small to satisfy both. This peace is purchased by toilsome wars; it is obtained by what they style a glorious victory. Now, when victory remains with the party which had the juster cause, who hesitates to congratulate the victor, and style it a desirable peace? These things then are good things, and without doubt the gifts of God.¹

There is, in other words, an inevitable conflict bound up with the manifold character of existence as we know it. Society consists of a multitude of individuals clamorous that a whole variety of needs be satisfied. There is not enough to satisfy

¹ DCD, xv. 4. 74
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the needs of all fully and completely. It is thus inevitable that groups of people who are driven by need should at times justly invoke even the sanction of war in order to redress the balance of distribution of this world's goods. It is of course possible for an individual to let himself be martyred for his faith, to yield up the goods of this world and give himself wholly to the spirit; but it is impossible for a nation to martyr itself. Augustine illustrates the question by referring to the case of the Saguntines in the Punic War. "It is reasonably asked whether the Saguntines did right when they chose that their whole state should perish rather than that they should break faith with the Roman republic." 1 From the point of view of the Earthly City at least, they saved their honour at the too great price of safety.

Augustine's tone in the Reply to Faustus is not quite so confident a defence of the just war, but it is still clear enough.

As to the eternal law, which requires the preservation of natural order, and forbids the transgression of it, some actions have an indifferent character, so that men are blamed for presumption if they do them without being called upon, while they are deservedly praised for doing them when required.2

Among such duties is of course that of the righteous war. And Augustine goes on to demand, here foreshadowing what a multitude of later Christian writers were to declare, that not only the causes

1 DCD, xxii. 6. 2 CFM, xxii. 73.
of the war must be just, but that the authority waging it must be the proper one. Not anybody, but the monarch or ruler, has the right to declare war: "The natural order which seeks the peace of mankind, ordains that the monarch should have the power of undertaking war if he thinks it advisable, and that the soldiers should perform their military duties in behalf of peace and safety of the community." But when these conditions are fulfilled, "when war is undertaken in obedience to God, Who would rebuke, or humble, or crush the pride of man, it must be allowed to be a righteous war." ¹ Nor is it fanciful to deduce that Augustine would to-day recognise an international tribunal as the sole proper authority to decide on military measures.

The views of Christian theologians on the subject of the State and of war have often changed under the pressure of circumstances. One has only to think of Luther’s growing militarism due to the Peasants’ War, or on the other hand, the revulsion of theologians, still living, from all kinds of warfare, after they had lived through the World War. Nor was it otherwise with Augustine. The pressure of the barbarian invasions made him apply the theories which he had held somewhat abstractly, and, if anything, to add to their rigour. In his letters we have valuable material to illustrate the conflict which contemporary Christians felt between what seemed to be their “Christian” duty and Lebensnotwendigkeiten. A Christian general, Boniface,

¹ CFM, xxii. 75. Cf. Questions on the Heptateuch, vi. 10.
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wrote Augustine because he was much troubled concerning the gulf between the harsh demands of his calling and the other worldly ideals of Christianity, especially as then exemplified in the ascetic piety of the monastery. But Augustine told him repeatedly to stay where he was; he was as necessary on the battlefield as the monks in their seclusion:

You were then desirous to abandon all the public business in which you were engaged, and to withdraw into sacred retirement, and live like the servants of God who have embraced a monastic life. And what was it prevented you from acting according to those desires? Was it not that you were influenced by considering, on our representation of the matter, how much service the work which then occupied you might render to the churches of Christ if you pursued it with this single aim, that they, protected from all disturbance by barbarian hordes, might live a "quiet and peaceable life," as the apostle says, "in all godliness and honesty." (1 Tim. ii. 2).¹

He reproves Boniface indeed, but only for slackness in the performance of his military duties!

The just war has also, according to Augustine, not only a moral but a religious basis; it is bound up with divine providence and chastisement. It is God who, "through whom He will, removes diseases; who, when the human race is to be corrected and chastised by wars, regulates also the beginnings, progress and ends of these wars." ²

¹ Letter ccxx, 3. ² DCD, vii. 30.
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Even when the obviously wicked are the victors, the defeat of the just may be a punishment for sins committed in some other connection.\(^1\) Augustine does not of course hold the view that God necessarily rewards the just with temporal benefits here and now; but He sometimes at least rewards virtue in this life in order to show that the scales are not weighted against it. "Thus the durations of wars are determined by Him as He may see meet, according to His righteous will, and pleasure, and mercy, to afflict or to console the human race, so that they are sometimes of longer, sometimes of shorter duration." \(^2\) Among wars thus mercifully controlled he mentions a defeat of a Gothic chieftain, a heathen, before the walls of Rome, and the fact that the barbarians who actually took Rome were Christians.\(^3\) Even the pagans had a dim realisation that war was in God’s hands; and though Augustine could see no more meaning in the Nike of Samothrace than did Paul in the Athene of the Parthenon, yet Victory, albeit no goddess, was their imagining of that angel whom the true God sends.\(^4\)

The heroes of the Old Testament waged wars which were naturally, to Augustine, devoid of lustful intention. Moses and Joshua warred by divine command: "by these two wonderful leaders wars were carried on most prosperously and wonderfully" \(^5\); and David subdued nations according to the promise of God.\(^6\) Of course the Old Testament does contain the command, "Thou shalt not kill,"

\(^1\) DCD, xix. 15.  
\(^2\) Ibid., v. 22.  
\(^3\) Ibid., xvi. 43.  
\(^4\) Ibid., iv. 17.  
\(^5\) Ibid., xvi. 43.  
\(^6\) Ibid., xvii. 2.
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and of it Augustine has a careful analysis. It does not prohibit the killing of animals but of men; it rules out suicide. But there are both general and particular exceptions:

He to whom authority is delegated, and who is but the sword in the hand of him who uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he deals. And accordingly, they who have waged wars in obedience to the divine command or in conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, Thou shalt not kill.¹

In addition to this general exception are particular ones, caused by the special inspiration of God, such as the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham and perhaps of his daughter by Jephthah, or the suicide and slaughter dictated to Samson by the Spirit.² In the New Testament one finds soldiers and they are even more necessary in the fifth century than in the first, and so Augustine writes to Boniface:

[monks] occupy indeed a higher place before God, who, abandoning all these secular employments, serve Him with strictest chastity; but "everyone," as the apostle says, "hath his proper gift of God, one after this manner, and another after that" (1 Cor. vii. 7). Some then, in praying for you, fight against your invisible enemies; you, in fighting for them, contend against the barbarians, their visible enemies.³

¹ DCD, i. 21. ² Ibid. ³ Letter CLXXXIX, 5.
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But soldiers are not merely a concession to human frailty; the profession must be justified:

Otherwise John, when the soldiers came to be baptized, asked "What shall we do?", would have replied: "Throw away your arms, give up the service; never strike, or wound, or disable anyone." But knowing that such actions in battle were not murderous but authorised by law, and that the soldiers did not thus avenge themselves, but defend the public safety, he replied, "Do violence to no one, accuse no man falsely, and be content with your wages." ¹

And when Christ, in the famous "Caesar" passage ordered the money to be paid to Caesar, he must have known that tribute money was used for the upkeep of the legions, and so tacitly sanctioned their existence.²

Augustine finds considerable satisfaction in the wars of the Christian era, especially of the Christian empire. He rejoices in rulers "who have put all their trust in Christ, gaining splendid victories over ungodly enemies." ³ But above all he is proud of the ameliorations of warfare which the Christian religion has at least on occasion introduced:

There are histories of numberless wars both before the building of Rome and since its rise and the extension of its dominion; let them be read and let one instance be cited in which, when a city had been taken by foreigners, the victors spared those who were found to have fled for sanctuary to the temples of their gods.⁴

All the spoiling, then, which Rome was exposed to

¹ CEFM, xxii. 74
² Ibid., xxii. 76.
³ Ibid., i. 2.
⁴ DCD, i. 2.
in the recent calamity—all the slaughter, plundering, burning, and misery—was the result of the custom of war. But what was novel was that the savage barbarians showed themselves in so gentle a guise, that the largest churches were chosen and set apart for the purpose of being filled with the people to whom quarter was given. . . . Whoever does not see that this is to be attributed to the name of Christ, and to the Christian temper, is blind.¹

Thus does Augustine give his reluctant yet unflinching support to a just war. Yet his heart is not in warring but in justice and in peace; and to his description of the essence and the prospects of peace we now turn.

He rightly differentiates between different sorts of peace. There are kinds of peace which are no real peace though they may have their own place and value. "As there may be life without pain while there cannot be pain without some kind of life, so there may be peace without war but there cannot be war without some kind of peace, because war supposes the existence of some natures to wage it, and those natures cannot exist without peace of one kind or other."² Such a pseudo-peace robbers have at home or with their comrades; such peace have savage animals who "encompass their own species with a ring of protecting peace."³ The pax Romana was really of the same variety; for the empire was not a State based on peaceful administration of justice between man and man but on a sort of "common agreement" by which each

¹ DCD, i. 7. ² Ibid., xix. 13. ³ Ibid., xix. 12.
tolerated the desires of the other, however immoderate. A true peace on the other hand is what men really ought to aim at, and is in fact the sanction of the just war which seeks to end an intolerable pseudo-peace. And in succinct and powerful phrases Augustine gives his description of the ideal of human relations. "The peace of all things is the tranquillity of order. Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place." A prerequisite of general peace is peace of the body, health, and a degree of bodily comfort; but since man is a rational animal it is even more necessary that each should "enjoy the well-ordered harmony of knowledge and action which . . . constitutes the peace of the rational soul." Man was created with the power of attaining this earthly peace, "health and safety and human fellowship, and all things needful for the preservation and recovery of this peace"; and even yet, after the Fall, his powers are extraordinary:

What wonderful—one might say stupefying—advances has human industry made in the arts of weaving and building, of agriculture and navigation! With what endless variety are designs in pottery, painting, and sculpture produced, and with what skill executed! . . . And for the injury of men, also, how many kind of poisons, weapons, engines of destruction, have been invented, while for the preservation or restoration of health the appliances and remedies are infinite.

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Moreover, under the influence of the Christian redemption “the soul is converted from its own evil and selfish desires, and God possessing it, it possesses itself in peace even in this life.”¹ But this harmony and order in the soul is not at all fully reflected in a redeemed social order.

To demonstrate this thesis, Augustine argues as usual from the individual to the social:

On all hands we experience these slights, suspicions, quarrels, war, all of which are undoubted evils; while on the other hand, peace is a doubtful good because we do not know the heart of our friend, and though we did know to-day, we should be ignorant of what it might be to-morrow.²

If that be so in the inner circle of friends and relations, in the home, how much more true is it of the greater units to which we belong, the city and the world? “In the very great mutability of human affairs such great security is never given to any people that it should not dread invasions hostile to this life.”³ And so Augustine formulates the ruling principle of the relation of the celestial city to the earthly: “So long as it lives like a captive and a stranger in the earthly city, though it has already received the promise of redemption and the gift of the Spirit as the earnest of it, it makes no scruple to obey the laws of the earthly city, whereby the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life are administered.”⁴ Not so much

¹ DCD, xv. 6. ² Ibid., xvii. 13. ³ Ibid., xix. 5. ⁴ Vide supra, p. 55.
human sin and rebellion against God, but the
constitution of the human and the earthly as such,
its real needs and inevitable purposes, condemn it,
while time shall last, to methods which are lower
than the final and absolute will of God. While
above and beyond our human struggle is the divine
realm which those shall finally enter whom God has
called, and where there shall be no more discord or
privation, where order and peace prevail. "The
peace of the celestial city is the perfectly ordered
and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one another
in God." ¹ "Then we shall rest and see, see and
love, love and praise." ²

¹ DCD, xix. 13. ² Ibid., xxii. 30.
IV. LUTHER AND HUMAN SINFULNESS

I. THE TWO KINGDOMS

In as far as it was a specifically religious movement, the Reformation, like the later rise of Pietism and Methodism, was a revival of personal religion. Something entered into the souls of individuals and filled their hearts with joy and peace in believing. Luther was already expressing it before he gave public demonstration of his new faith by nailing up the famous theses. "You say with Israel: 'Peace, peace,' and there is no peace; say rather with Christ: 'Cross, cross,' and there is no cross. For the cross ceases to be a cross as soon as you say joyfully: 'Blessed cross, there is no tree like you.'"¹ These words from a letter of 1516 he simply re-echoes in the ninety-second and ninety-third theses. "He who has had even a faint taste of faith can never write, speak, meditate or hear enough concerning it," he wrote a few years later in the opening paragraph of his Treatise on Christian Liberty.²

² LPh, ii. p. 312.
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Yet this sense of religious blessedness and liberation did not so dominate the consciousness of Luther as to obscure the importance of other factors in the life of his times. He knew that the experience of himself and his associates was that of a comparatively small body of men; over against him stood unbelief and other-belief. The vast majority of the Christian Church itself was given over to anti-Christ, the Bishop of Rome; the Turks were battering at the doors of the empire; the ordinary man, whether nominally Christian or not, was more interested in making profits, and ministering to the pleasures of the flesh, than in listening to the Word. If redemption was real for the few, it was so only in moments of special grace; the dominion of sin continued to be even more real. So that good works, in the form of self-discipline, even if they could not justify one before God with whom faith alone counts, were yet necessary to keep sin in check and the flesh under control. (Indeed, good works were the product of grace in so far as it has begun to take effect on the whole personality.)¹ Luther is thus the classic example of the Christian who seeks to come to terms with the world by treating it as a realm of inescapable sin. He followed very largely in the footsteps of Saint Paul, who called himself the chief of sinners; and his ideas were codified by the legal mind of John Calvin in his famous Institutes of the Christian Religion.

Luther sometimes bases his ethic on the distinction

¹ LPh, ii. pp. 328 ff.
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between the saved and the depraved states of the individual:

A Christian is composed of two kinds of persons, namely, a believing and a spiritual person, and a civil or temporal person. The believing or spiritual person ought to endure and suffer all things; it neither eats, nor drinks, nor engenders children, nor has share or part in temporal doings or matters. But the temporal and civil person is subject to the temporal rights and laws, and tied to obedience; it must maintain and defend itself, and what belongs to it, as the laws command.¹

Or again he may begin a treatise like that *Whether Soldiers, too, can be Saved,* with a distinction between personal and official morality; but he does not follow it out. He does not go on to write of the distinction between the conduct of the redeemed “person” and the necessarily harsher code of the official, but on that between a good official and a bad official.² Nor does Luther make the distinction between personal and official morality the basis of his work, *Secular Authority,* and wisely so, for a social ethic which starts by dividing the individual tends to merge the “person” more and more in the “official.” So that Troeltsch goes a little too far in making the distinction between personal and official conduct on the part of the individual the basis of Luther’s social teaching.³

¹ W. Hazlitt, *The Table-Talk of Martin Luther* (London, 1890), p. 335. Hereafter cited as *Table-Talk.*
² LPh, v. p. 34.
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More pervasive and more satisfactory are the distinctions of a more social character which Luther draws between two realms which confront each other in our experience, the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the World, to which we belong alternately as complete individuals. The contrast was already in his mind when he wrote the Treatise of Christian Liberty:

Christ, like his forerunner John, not only said, “Repent ye,” but added the word of faith, saying, “The kingdom of heaven is at hand!” And we are not to preach only one of these words but both. . . . A man does not live for himself alone in this mortal body, so as to work for it alone, but he lives also for all men on earth, nay, rather, he lives only for others and not for himself. . . . We may be sons of God, each caring for and working for the other, bearing one another’s burdens, and so fulfilling the law of Christ. Lo, this is a truly Christian life, here faith is truly effectual through love; that is, it issues in works of the freest service cheerfully and lovingly done, with which a man willingly serves another without hope of reward, and for himself is satisfied with the fullness and wealth of his faith. ¹

He is fully persuaded of the reality of the kingdom of God; but at least once there comes to the surface the thought that there are other kingdoms, based not on love, but on greed and oppression. But “although tyrants do violence or injustice in making their demands, yet will do no harm, so long as they demand nothing contrary to God.” ²

¹ LPh, ii. pp. 334-336. ² Ibid., ii. p. 341.
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When Luther came to compose the *Secular Authority* three years later, his mind had been much clarified by bitter experience, even before the Peasants' War. He saw the kingdoms of the world in their grim reality; yet he tried to keep alive also his original enthusiasm for a kingdom of God:

We must divide all the children of Adam into two classes; the first belong to the kingdom of God, the second to the kingdom of the world. Those belonging to the kingdom of God are all true believers in Christ and are subject to Christ. For Christ is the King and Lord in the kingdom of God, as the second *Psalm* and all the Scriptures say. For this reason he came into the world that he might begin God's kingdom and establish it in the world. Therefore he says before Pilate, "My kingdom is not of this world, but whoever is of the truth hears my voice," and continually in the gospel he refers to the kingdom of God and says, "Amend your ways, the kingdom of God is at hand." Likewise, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness." He also calls the gospel a gospel of the kingdom, for the reason that it teaches, governs and contains God's kingdom. Now observe, these people need no secular sword. And if all the world were composed of real Christians, that is, true believers, no prince, king, lord, sword, or law would be needed. For what were the use of them, since Christians have in their hearts the Holy Spirit, who instructs them and causes them to wrong no one, to love everyone, willingly to suffer injustice and even death from every one. Where every wrong is suffered and every right done, no quarrel, strife, trial, judge, penalty, law or sword is needed.1

1 LPh, iii. p. 234; cf. iv. p. 265.
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Jesus' teaching condemning an eye for an eye has been falsely held by the Catholic Church to apply only to the perfect,—the monks. It applies to all Christians, and involves at least that they shall not go to law with each other, use the secular sword among themselves.¹ Jesus specifically separated a divine kingdom from the realm of Cæsar, which he would not have done had the two spheres not been distinct.² The kingdom of Christ has a peacefulness utterly other than the kingdom of David, so that David could not be a type of Christ, while Solomon, the peaceful, a "Frederick," could.³

But he begins to stress more and more the fact that the specifically Christian realm is inadequate to meet the demands of the whole of reality as we know it. Not that with Augustine and Thomas Aquinas he sees social institutions involved in the very nature of our psychophysical being, even before the Fall. Government in any form we know is determined by human sinfulness. True, the Christian, who is redeemed, will express a new spiritual life, his love, in dealing with our tangled human problems, but it will be a passive and not a creative love, a suffering and penitential compassion which operates within the forms of violence, coercion and punishment, the only forms which can influence the unrepentant and the unbelieving. And side by side with the Christian order will exist the world, in all its brutality, secularism, and sin; to it the "Christian" must also belong and

¹ LPh, iii. pp. 233, 238.  
² Ibid., iii. p. 256.  
³ Ibid., iii. p. 238.
temporarily lay aside his specific Christian aspirations.

It might appear at first sight that Jesus was ignorant of the demands and necessities of politics:

When Pilate asked him, "Art thou the king of the Jews?" "Yea," said Christ, "I am; but not such a king as the emperor is, for then would my servants and armies fight and strive to deliver and defend me; but I am a king sent to preach the gospel, and give record of the truth which I must speak." "What!" said Pilate, "art thou such a king... then surely thou canst be no prejudice to me?" Doubtless, Pilate took our Saviour Christ to be a simple, honest, ignorant man, one perchance come out of the wilderness, a simple fellow, a hermit, who knew or understood nothing of the world or of government.  

But it was not so, according to Luther. Jesus recognised the existence of a secular and punitive state. If in the Table-Talk Luther comments on "Give unto Cæsar" that it is a sharp syllogism which neither prohibits nor affirms the State, in his notes on the eighty-second Psalm he declares that the rulers established in the Book of Genesis are reaffirmed in the Cæsar passage in the Gospels. And of course it is Saint Paul, the interpreter of Christ, who makes explicit what is latent in the Gospels. "We have the clear, definite statement of Saint Paul in Romans xiii, where he says, "The powers that be are ordained of God"; and again, "The power does not bear the sword in vain, but is the minister of God for thy good, an avenger unto

1 Table-Talk, p. 10.  
2 Ibid., p. 25.  
3 LPh, iv. p. 294.
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him that doeth "evil." ¹ The descriptions, however, which Luther gives of the State, its origin and functions, are so inconsistent that one is forced to the conclusion that, due to the pressure of circumstances, there was considerable confusion in his own mind.

He is at least clear that over against the kingdom of God in human relations exists, and must exist, the kingdom of the World:

All who are not Christians belong to the kingdom of the world and are under the law. Since few believe and still fewer live a Christian life, do not resist evil, and themselves do no evil, God has provided for non-Christians a different government outside the Christian estate and God's kingdom, and has subjected them to the sword, so that, even though they would do so, they cannot practise their wickedness, and that, if they do, they may not do it without fear nor in peace and prosperity. Even so a wild, savage beast is fastened with chains and bands, so that it cannot bite and tear as is its wont. . . . First fill the world with real Christians before ruling it in a Christian and evangelical manner. This you will never accomplish; for the world and the masses are and always will be un-Christian, although they are all baptized and are nominally Christian. . . . These two kingdoms must be sharply distinguished and both be permitted to remain; the one to produce piety, the other to bring about external peace and prevent evil deeds; neither is sufficient in the world without the other.²

There must be people whose concern is not with spiritual ideals but with keeping the roads open

¹ LPh, iii. pp. 244-245. ² Ibid., iii. pp. 236-237.
and uninfested with robbers,\(^1\) and who will deal concretely with the knaveries of bakers who use false weights.\(^2\) The worldly kingdom involves the acceptance of human inequality and bondage, some will be free and others imprisoned, some lords and some subjects.\(^3\) The great thing is simply that it keeps human society going at all. Luther does of course not need to go the length of saying that it would be better if rulers and those in authority were not Christians at all\(^4\); but in the carrying out of their duties they temporarily lay aside their Christian impulses.

When he comes to discuss the theological justification of the kingdom of the world he propounds rather contradictory theses. Sometimes he thinks of that realm as specifically Satan's: "He that best governs the world, as most worthy of it, is Satan, by his lieutenant the pope."\(^5\) At other times it is the human realm over against the divine: "Christ had neither money nor riches nor earthly kingdom, for he gave the same to kings and princes, but he reserved one thing peculiarly to himself which no human creature or angel could do, to conquer sin and death . . ."\(^6\) Even more paradoxically he often speaks of the kingdom of the World as a religious realm over against the specifically Christian realm. "It is not princely to be a Christian and therefore few princes can be Christians, as they say, 'A prince is a rare bird in heaven.' Now even if they are not

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\(^1\) LPh, iv. p. 23.  
\(^2\) LPh, iv. p. 240.  
\(^3\) Table-Talk, p. 41.  
\(^4\) Ibid., v. p. 84.  
\(^5\) Ibid., p. 88.
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Christians, nevertheless they ought to do what is right and good according to God’s outward ordinance; He will have this of them.” 1 But that outward ordinance of God, which constitutes a divine realm outside the specifically Christian, is one which deals with sin. This we will see in more detail when we examine Luther’s treatment of legal punishment as an expression of the will of God. Meanwhile it is sufficient to note that he confidently affirms the necessity of the continued existence of the sinful kingdom of the world. Not only in view of the abundance of justifying grace for the individual soul, but in the light of secular necessity, we may listen to his pithy word: *Pecca fortiter.*

2. THE USE OF LEGAL PENALTIES

It was the chief aim of Luther’s treatise *Secular Authority* firmly to establish the place of secular law and the necessity of violent judicial penalties; and he afterwards looked back with pride on the success with which he had done so, a success which he considered greater than that of any previous writer on the subject from a theological point of view. According to Luther the penal law can be traced back to the grim dawn of history; for if Cain was in such terror of being killed for the crime of murdering Abel, then he must have had it from Adam that it was law for murderers to be slain. And throughout history that penal law has been repeatedly affirmed; God re-established it after

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1 LPh, v. p. 60.
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the Flood in unmistakable terms when he said "Whoso sheds man's blood, his blood shall be shed again by man"; afterwards it was confirmed by the Mosaic law of a life for a life. Even the Christian revelation is not out of accord with penal law, though Luther has to do some strange exegesis to prove his point. Christ's word to Peter in the garden, "He that taketh the sword shall perish by the sword" was plainly a pacifist injunction; but Luther interprets it as a command to use the sword in order that the guilty shall perish as they ought.1 (This of course he applied also to the practical case of the Peasants' War; they had taken the sword, therefore by the sword ought they to perish.2) And when, in the Johannine record, Christ says to Pilate, "My kingdom is not of this world," and adds, to show the contrast, "If my kingdom were of this world then would my servants fight," Luther comments: "There you see that before God and the world it is right for servants to fight for their lords," 3 and so support authority.

Like Augustine, Luther felt that no sense of sin ought to attach itself to the carrying out of judicial penalties. There is no reason for an executioner to ask the pardon of a condemned malefactor as though he were doing him some wrong. When the magistrate punishes, God himself punishes. It is He who is the plunger, driving the fish into the net 4; "the hand that wields this sword and slays with it is no more man's hand but God's; and it

1 LPh, iii. pp. 231-232. 2 Ibid., iv. p. 226. 3 Ibid., iv. p. 277. 4 Table-Talk, pp. 308-309.
is not man, but God, who hangs, tortures, beheads, slays and fights.” ¹

A Christian does not have recourse to the sword of justice in his own case, since without a miracle he would be likely to do so out of self-interest and not from the pure motive of seeing evil punished. ² He supports penal justice for the sake of others: “My own possessions, my honour, my injury, I must not regard, nor grow angry because of them; but God’s honour and commandment we must protect, and injury and injustice to our neighbour we must prevent.” ³

These sentiments Luther seeks to bring into accord with the teaching of Jesus. “Christ does not say, ‘Thou shalt not serve the State or be subject to it,’ but, ‘Thou shalt not resist evil.’” ⁴ It is not for the individual to punish wrongdoers but the duly constituted magistracy. That is why God approved of the judicial violence exhibited by Samuel, Joshua or David; nor is the Old Testament out of date “for they had the same spirit and faith in Christ as we.” ⁵ And if Christ did condemn worldly princes who exercised lordship, he condemned them in so far as they were selfish and did not seek the profit, honour and salvation of others. ⁶ By thus introducing the altruistic motive of the punishment of sin and the protection of the innocent from the wrongdoing of sinners, Luther believed that he had justified the use of the utmost judicial violence, even in the light of the teaching of Jesus.

¹ LPh, v. p. 36. ² Ibid., iii. p. 249. ³ Ibid., i. p. 274. ⁴ Ibid., iii. p. 240. ⁵ Ibid., iii. p. 242. ⁶ Ibid., iii. p. 263.
3. AGAINST INSURRECTION

The problem of private war, of armed resistance to the emperor by individuals and groups of individuals, was forced on Luther's attention both by the religious and the social situation, by the religious revolt of which he was the leader and by the condition of the peasants who looked to him for counsel. His attitude to armed resistance was somewhat modified during the course of events, but his fundamental principles remained for the most part unaltered.

As early as 1522 he was writing: "Insurrection is an unprofitable method of procedure, and never results in the desired reformation. For insurrection is devoid of reason and hurts the innocent more than the guilty. Hence insurrection is never right, no matter how good the cause may be in whose interest it is made." ¹ And when the grounds for insurrection became more and more social rather than religious, Luther judged the question of rebellion in the light of his fundamental categories of the two kingdoms and declared with all his power against the right of insurrection.

This matter is great and perilous, concerning as it does both the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world (for if this rebellion were to proceed and get the upper hand, both kingdoms would be destroyed and there would be neither worldly government nor Word of God, but it would result in the permanent destruction of all Germany). . . . ²

¹ LPb, iii. p. 211. ² Ibid., iv. p. 220.
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It is wrong for the individual or groups of individuals to resist evil; that must be left for the authorities, for Cæsar, to deal with. Therefore when the Peasants’ War broke out in all its virulence, Luther wrote the tract which has done so much to discredit his social teaching, the bitter tirade “Against the robbing and murdering Hordes of Peasants.” With that ruthless logic which is so characteristic of the German people, intensified in his own case by the inhuman clarity of the pure religious genius, which tends to see everything in terms of absolutes, he summoned the authorities in the name of God to do their duty. To neglect to punish the rebels would be to neglect the divine command and would allow wickedness to flourish unashamed. “Here is no time for sleeping, no place for patience or mercy. It is the time of the sword, not the day of grace.” ¹ “Therefore, dear lords, . . . stab, smite, slay, whoever can. If you die in doing it, well for you! A more blessed death can never be yours, for you die in obeying the divine Word and Commandment in Romans xiii, and in loving service of your neighbour, whom you are rescuing from the bonds of hell and of the devil.” ² And he composed another tract, partly at least to comfort those who had fought on the lords’ side in the war and to still any of their remaining doubts, “Whether Soldiers, too, can be Saved.” With the tragic injustice thus done to the peasants, we are not, however, immediately concerned. Our main interest is in Luther’s attitude to the use of force

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for the settlement of social problems in a Christian state, and it is clear that he disapproved of the violence exercised by the peasants not so much because it was violence but because they were not the right persons to use it. They were rebels.

But the issue of resistance to authority was to come up in an even more acute form, in the religious struggle for a reformation of the Church. In 1521 Luther wrote:

You see what Hutten wants. I would not have the Gospel defended by violence and murder. In that sense I wrote to him. By the Word the world was conquered; by the Word the Church was preserved; by the Word she will be restored. Antichrist, as he began without violence, will be crushed without violence, by the Word.¹

But by the end of the same decade the Lutheran movement had ceased to be a national affair; Luther's attitude to the peasants had made him the leader of an aristocratic party, for whose support he had to pay by acquiescing in some of their methods. They were quite ready to fight for their religion; they were more than ready, true to the medieval tradition, to regard the emperor simply as first among equals, and resist him by force if his demands ran counter to their desires. Luther opposed indeed the formation of the Schmalkaldic League, an alliance of Protestant princes for the protection of the new religion. But gradually he gave way. How strange sounds the following passage in his

¹ Quoted, LPh, iii. p. 204.
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Table-Talk after the utterances of his earlier days; whether on the use of force to obtain religious rights or on the question of civil rebellion:

The question whether without offending God or our conscience, we may defend ourselves against the emperor, if he should seek to subjugate us, is rather one for lawyers than for divines. If the emperor proceed to war upon us, he intends either to destroy our preaching, and our religion, or to invade and confound public policy and economy, that is to say, the temporal government and administration. In either case, 'tis no longer as emperor of the Romans, legally elected, we are to regard him, but as a tyrant; 'tis therefore futile to ask whether we may combat for the upright, pure doctrine, and for religion; 'tis for us a law and a duty to combat for wife, for children, servants, and subjects; we are bound to defend them against maleficent power.¹

(As has been pointed out,² the same arguments would have justified the peasants in their resistance to oppression; but of his inconsistency Luther was apparently unaware.) But even after his acceptance of the legal argument of his friends and allies, he still found no fundamental theological basis for his change of attitude. Theologically considered, rebellion is wrong; the Kingdom of God cannot be promoted by violence.³

¹ Table-Talk, pp. 333-334.
³ Cf. Ibid.
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4. WAR AS A CORRECTIVE OF SIN

Luther, as we have seen, started by believing that religion could not be preserved by the sword; and though he was driven by circumstances to give a sort of quasi-approval of armed resistance by the Protestants within the Empire, he never worked out any thorough-going justification of his changed attitude. And when he deals with religious war on an international scale, he remains completely true to his original conviction. In his treatise On War against the Turk, he makes plain in what the duty of a Christian as such consists. He is to be first on the spot with his army; but it is an army of the spirit, which attacks not Turks in the flesh but the Devil himself with the weapons of preaching, repentance and prayer. 1 We are to remember that Christ before Pilate confessed that his kingdom was not of this world, and that in the garden he bade Peter put up his sword and said, “He that taketh the sword shall perish by the sword.” 2 (How different from Luther’s use of these texts on other occasions!) 3 Such is the duty of the Christian when his religious community is attacked by a heathen nation; though, as we shall see, the duty of the emperor and the citizen when the lives and property of the community are endangered, is very different. 4

Just as Augustine wrote movingly about the evils

1 L.Ph, v. pp. 89-90.  
2 Ibid., v. p. 84.  
3 Vide supra, p. 95, and infra, p. 106.  
4 Vide infra, p. 109.
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of secular war and approved the just war simply in order to avoid greater evils, so Luther, whose utterances seem so often militaristic in character, was utterly opposed to all sordid types of warfare and could write tellingly about the evils of national conflicts for secular ends. "War is one of the greatest plagues that can afflict humanity. It destroys religion, it destroys States, it destroys families. Any scourge, in fact, is preferable to it."¹ He was fond, too, of quoting an old Roman proverb, "War is like fishing with a golden net; the loss risked is always greater than the catch can be."² In The Magnificat Translated and Explained he has a passage on the futility and injustice of many wars:

Defence of subjects should not be accompanied by still greater harm; that would be but to leap from the frying-pan into the fire. It is a poor defence to expose a whole city to danger for the sake of one person, or to risk the entire country for a single village or castle, unless God should have enjoined this by a special command, as He did of old time. If a robber knight robs a citizen of his property, and you, my lord, lead your army against him to punish this injustice, and in doing so lay waste the whole land, who will have wrought the greater harm, the knight or the lord? David winked at many things when he was unable to punish without bringing harm upon others. All rulers must do the same. On the other hand, a citizen must undergo a certain measure of suffering for the sake of the community, and not demand that all other men undergo for his sake the greater injury.

¹ Table-Talk, p. 332. ² E.g., LPh, i. p. 265; iv. p. 304.

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Christ did not desire the tares to be gathered up, lest the wheat also be rooted up with them. If men went to war on every provocation and passed by no insult, we should never be at peace and have naught but destruction besides. Therefore, right or wrong is never a sufficient cause indiscriminately to punish or make war. It is a sufficient cause to punish within bounds and without destroying another. The lord or ruler must ever look to what will profit the whole mass of his subjects rather than any one portion.¹

And similarly in the Secular Authority he wrote:

He is a poor Christian indeed who for the sake of a single castle would make an armed camp of the whole land. . . . For what have the many women and children done that they should be made widows and orphans in order that you may avenge yourself on an idle tongue or a wicked hand which has injured you?²

He has even a touch of ultra-modern disgust with the “horrors” of war:

Cannons and firearms are cruel and damnable machines. I believe them to have been the direct suggestion of the Devil. Against the flying ball no valour avails; the soldier is dead ere he sees the means of his destruction. If Adam had seen in a vision the horrible instruments his children were to invent, he would have died of grief.³

But his aversion from war is conditioned more, as we would expect, by supra-human than human considerations:

Is it not true that money, property, body, wife, child, friends and the like, are good things created

¹ LPh, iii. p. 175. ² Ibid., iii. p. 268. ³ Table-Talk, pp. 331-332.
and given by God Himself? . . . "Did I know that
Thou wouldst rather have them remain in my possession
than in that of others, I would serve Thy will by taking
them back at risk of life and property. But now,
since I know neither, and see that for the present thou
sufferest them to be taken from me, I commit the case
to Thee. I will await what I am to do, and be ready
to have them or to do without them." That, mark
you, is a right soul, and one that fears God.¹

Luther naturally then denounced wars of pure
aggression. "He who starts war is wrong," ² he
wrote in the tract Whether Soldiers, too, can be
Saved. And he did not hesitate to point to
contemporary examples of what he judged were
evil and aggressive wars; as when he passed
judgment on the battle of Pavia, which just pre­
ceded his treatise, and on the war which led to the
sack of Rome:

If the king of France had not begun the war against
the Emperor Charles, he would not have been so
shamefully defeated and captured; and now that the
Venetians and Italians are setting themselves against
the emperor, and starting trouble, God grant that it
may be they who must first stop it and let the word
be true; "God scattereth those who desire war," for
even though the emperor is my enemy, I do not love
wrong.³

And he wrote fervently of the blessings of peace,
both within the nation and between peoples:

It is from peace that we have our bodies and lives,
wives and children, houses and homes, nay, all our

¹ LPh, iii. pp. 171-172. ² Ibid., v. p. 56. ³ Ibid., v. p. 58.
members—hands, feet, eyes—and all our health and liberty, and within these walls of peace we sit secure.

"Where peace is, there is half a heaven"... Christ himself, in *Matthew* v, compares peace to heaven, and says, "The peaceful shall be called children of God." ¹

But unfortunately "God's children do not belong in the world, and just as little does peace belong there." ² And so Luther finds himself forced to reckon with the wars which have the divine approval.

Among them are to be counted of course the Old Testament wars which were directly commanded by God. The heroes who waged them stood in the fear of the Lord and fought not for the sake of worldly goods but simply at the divine command. Such were Abraham and Moses, Joshua and the Judges, David and the Kings.³ And John the Baptist is cited on two important occasions as sanctioning warfare:

When the soldiers asked him what they should do, he answered: "Do injustice or violence to no one, and be content with your wages" (*Luke* iii. 14). If the sword were not divinely appointed he should have commanded them to cease being soldiers, since he was to perfect the people and direct them in a proper Christian way.⁴

In confirmation of this, we have the greatest preacher and teacher next to Christ, namely John the Baptist, who, when the soldiers came to him and asked what they should do, did not condemn their occupation and

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did not bid them desist from it, but rather confirmed it and said, "Be content with your wages and do no one violence or wrong." Thus he praised the profession of arms, and, at the same time, forbade the abuse of it.¹

True it is that Christ did not bear arms; but there were other necessary offices and professions with which he had nothing to do; he confined himself to his special vocation to conquer sin and death and to establish a realm of spiritual love in the community of believers in their private relations with each other:

You ask, Why did not Christ and the apostles bear the sword? Tell me, Why did he not also take a wife or become a cobbler or a tailor? . . . Christ fulfilled his own office and vocation, but thereby did not reject any other. It was not meet that he should bear the sword, for he was to bear only that office by which his kingdom is governed and which properly serves his kingdom. . . . This office, which he exercised then and still exercises, always bestows God's Word and Spirit; and in this office the apostles and all spiritual rulers must needs follow him.²

And though Luther, as we have seen, used the word of Christ to Pilate as the basis of the Christian's preference of martyrdom to employing force to obtain religious rights,³ he used it also to defend secular warfare:

Thus Christ, when he stood before Pilate, admitted that war was not wrong when he said, "Were I king

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of this world, then would my servants fight that I should not be handed over to the Jews.”

Just wars are those which are carried out with the same aims as civil penalties:

If the sword is a wrong thing when used for fighting, it would be a wrong thing when used for punishing evil-doers and keeping the peace; in a word, everything it does would have to be wrong. For what is just war, except the punishment of evil-doers and the maintenance of peace?

And Luther gives an illustration, which has become justly famous, of what he means:

A good physician, when a disease is so bad and so great that he has to cut off a hand, foot, ear, eye, or let it decay, does so, in order to save the body. Looked at from the point of view of the member that he cuts off, he seems a cruel and merciless man; but looked at from the point of view of the body, which he intends to save, it turns out that he is a fine and true man, and does a work that is good and Christian as far as it goes. In the same way, when I think of the office of soldier, how it punishes the wicked, slays the unjust, and creates so much misery, it seems an un-Christian work and entirely contrary to Christian love; but if I think how it protects the good and keeps and preserves house and home, wife and child, property and honour and peace, then it appears how precious and godly this work is, and I observe that it cuts off a leg or a hand, so that the whole body may not perish. For if the sword were not on guard to preserve peace,

1 LPh, v. p. 37.  
2 Ibid., v. p. 38.
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everything in the world must go to ruin because of lack of peace. Therefore such a war is only a little, brief lack of peace that prevents an everlasting and immeasurable lack of peace, a small misfortune that prevents a great misfortune.\textsuperscript{1}

It might seem to some that even in the sixteenth century the cure was worse than the disease, but Luther was confident that this was not always the case, and, though he made reservations as to the methods of war, fire and slaughter seemed to him not only wise but profitable for the sake of those to whom injustice was being done:

If your opponent is your equal, your inferior, or of a foreign government, you should first offer him justice and peace, as Moses taught the Children of Israel. If he is unwilling, then use your best strategy and defend yourself by force against force, as Moses well describes it all in \textit{Deuteronomy} xx. In doing this you must not consider your interests and how you may remain lord, but your subjects, to whom you owe help and protection, that all may be done in love. For since your entire land is in peril, you must make the venture, so that with God’s help all may not be lost; and if you cannot prevent some from becoming widows and orphans, as a consequence of this, you must nevertheless prevent it that all go to ruin and there be nothing left but widows and orphans.

In this matter subjects are in duty bound to follow and risk life and property for the cause. For in such a case one must risk his property and himself for the sake of the other. And in such a war it is a Christian act and an act of love confidently to kill, rob, and pillage

\textsuperscript{1} LPh, v. pp. 35-36.
the enemy, and to do everything that can injure him, until one has conquered him, according to the methods of war. Only, one must beware of sin, not violate wives and virgins, and when victory comes, offer mercy and peace to those who surrender and humble themselves.¹

It is interesting and valuable that Luther gives once again a contemporary instance of the application of his theory. We have seen how he warned Christians against trying to secure their religion by offering armed resistance to the Turk.² He now uses the Turkish menace as an instance of what will be a just secular war on the part of the German Empire:

The second man whose place it is to fight against the Turk is Emperor Charles, or whoever is emperor; for the Turk attacks his subjects and his empire, and it is his duty, as a regular ruler appointed by God, to defend his own.³

The emperor and those who follow him must not think that they are fighting to defend religion; that is banned; nor must they go out for mere gain; their duty is simply to defend and protect what they have, what is rightly theirs, against a secular menace. But that duty is inescapable.

Luther tries to face up to the difficulty that a prince may try to mislead his people into believing that a war is just when in reality it is a war of aggression. If it is clear that such is the case, then one must obey God rather than man and refuse to

follow him. But if a subject has simply doubts as to the justice of the war into which his ruler commands him to go, he has not sufficient grounds for refusal to bear arms:

How is it when subjects do not know whether the prince is in the right or not? I answer: As long as they cannot know nor find out by any possible means, they may obey without peril to their souls. . . . For whichever side is defeated, whether it be in the right or in the wrong, must accept it as a punishment from God; but whichever side wars and wins in such ignorance, must regard their battle as though one fell from the roof and killed another, and leave the matter to God.

On another occasion Luther gave a somewhat more curious defence of his position. The apostle teaches us in 1 Corinthians xiii that love believeth all things; hence one ought to believe one's lord. It might have been thought that the same principle might bear on appreciation of the motives of one's opponents.

As far as possible Luther rested his case for war on the plea of justice and the punishment of sinful rulers and peoples. He did not raise the question whether a nation could be a fair judge of its own case. But with his profound religious sensitiveness he realised that the world of justice could easily become a godless affair, and he sought to emphasise the moment of grace and dependence upon God in the execution of justice by war:

Even though you are sure and certain that you are not beginning it, but are forced into war, nevertheless

1 LPh, iii. p. 270; cf. v. p. 68.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., v. p. 68.
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you must fear God, and have Him before your eyes and not march out saying, "Yes, I am forced into it, I have good cause for war." If you depend on that and plunge in headlong, that, too, is not the thing to do.¹

One ought to go into battle in humility and with a song of God’s grace in one’s heart:

"Dear Lord, Thou seest that I have to go to war, though I would be glad not to; I do not build, however, on the justice of my cause, but on Thy grace and mercy; for I know that if I were to rely on my just cause and be confident because of it, Thou shouldst rightly let me fall as one whose fall was just, because I relied upon my right and not upon Thy sheer grace and kindness." ²

Thus out of his consciousness of human sinfulness is born Luther’s deepest thinking both about God and about life. In this world, war is unavoidable, for men are sinners; in justice men and nations have to be punished. Yet he who executes justice is himself a sinner; it is only as he relies on the grace and favour of that God in whose hands he is that he can administer the office to which he is called.

¹ LPh, v. p. 61. ² Ibid.
V. GROTIIUS AND THE COMING OF REASON

I. THE REIGN OF LAW

ALTHOUGH Hugo Grotius is known to posterity almost as much for his theological as for his legal writings, he belongs fundamentally to the modern world rather than to the body of traditional Church thought. His rectoral theory of the Atonement, for example, which is his specific contribution to theology, is based on an analogy taken from the legal world of his day and superimposed on the Biblical data; and the same tendency becomes even more obvious in his writings on ethical subjects. He represents the coming of Reason and the liberal spirit into the interpretation of human life.

The sense of an impending kingdom of righteousness and love, in which God will be all in all, which vibrates through the Gospels; the contrast between an earthly city and a heavenly, to both of which we belong but to the latter of which we owe supreme allegiance, which is the leading conception of Augustine; the conflict between the kingdom of the world, a realm of sin, and the divine order of grace and charity, which dominates the profound religious consciousness of Luther—these have almost
disappeared from the mind of Grotius. As Troeltsch has put it in extreme form:

The contrast between Calvin's phrase "Stat [in the Being of God] pro ratione voluntas," and the doctrine of Grotius, that the Law of Reason would still be valid even if—per impossibile—there were no God, throws a lurid light upon the great gulf which separates these two worlds. In taking this stand, Grotius's position, like that of Leibnitz, was close to the Catholic theory of Natural Law than to the Calvinist or even to the Lutheran theories. But in reality this is a new world. When Society is constructed on a rational basis, and individualism is based on the equality and freedom of the reason of individuals, then the spirit of Calvinism has disappeared, and we are faced with the fact that the rationalistic ideas of Stoicism have been set free from their fusion with Christian thought...and that this has given rise to a specifically modern individualistic habit of mind.¹

But Grotius did not make, either intentionally or unintentionally, a complete break with the Christian past. He quotes Jesus and Augustine and Thomas Aquinas freely and is not uninfluenced by the body of canon law; to a Catholic writer, like Father Regout, his work appears but an appendix to scholastic thought.² Certainly Grotius is less conscious of his ecclesiastical heritage than of the pagan past and the secular present; he rests on the heathen historians and philosophers—Livy, Cicero, Plato—even more than on the Bible and the Fathers, thus

reflecting the classical Renaissance; and he is continuously aware of the absolute monarchies around him, the system of great powers which had replaced the imperial and feudal society of the Middle Ages.

Dr Figgis was of the opinion that the system of Grotius preserves the best of the past and assimilates the valuable elements of the present:

The unity of humanity which has been taught in some way from the time of the Stoics and impressed as an ideal on every generation from the time of Augustine to the Renaissance, prevented the final and deliberate outward recognition of the view that States have no duties to one another and that the international polity is a fortuitous concourse of atoms. It was the conditions compacted of ancient ideas of human society and the immutable authority of the law natural, coupled with the modern facts of State independence and self-sufficiency and religious differences, that made International Law, in the form which it took, possible, i.e., it made it truly international and in the form of its expression really law.¹

But one must also admit that the past and the present are in conflict in the thought of Grotius. They work harmoniously for a while, so that Grotius, by his strong belief in the power of human intelligence and in the links of justice and expediency which bind the nations together, is the honoured father of international co-operation and the reign of law. But they are also in conflict, for Grotius

¹ J. N. Figgis, Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius (Cambridge, 1923), p. 190.
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rehabilitates national warfare within the system of international justice, which is an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. In effect the necessities of contemporary politics tend to overcome his cosmopolitan rationalism, whether Stoic or modern. More obvious of course is the conflict between his viewpoint and the teaching of Jesus, though he seeks to minimise it. But he is too honest and too great a thinker to cloud his mind for the sake of preserving religious harmony. It is his supreme service to be one of the founders of that liberal Christian movement, which, though recognising the sublimity of the ideals of Christ, is content for the present to relax some of their absoluteness in order that humanity may not pass them by as wholly impracticable.

Regarding the pacifistic attitude of his great fellow-countryman, Erasmus, as a necessary but exaggerated protest against violence,¹ and convinced by his legal career of the importance of law and order, Grotius in exile set himself to compose a systematic account of the place of private and public war and the right of defence and punishment in human society. International rather than civic justice was the theme in his mind:

The municipal law of Rome and of other states has been treated by many, who have undertaken to elucidate it by means of commentaries or to reduce it to a convenient digest. That body of law, however, which is

concerned with the mutual relations among states or rulers of states, whether derived from nature, or established by divine ordinances, or having its origin in custom and tacit agreement, few have touched upon. Up to the present time no one has treated it in a comprehensive and systematic manner; yet the welfare of mankind demands that this task be accomplished.  

But as the work grew in his hands he found that he had to say a good deal about civic justice as well. For both conditions within and between states are to be regulated in the light of law,—natural, human and, if possible, divine.

The law of nature permits of two sorts of proof: the primary sort is *a priori*, the secondary *a posteriori*:

I have made it my concern to refer the proofs of things touching the law of nature to certain fundamental conceptions which are beyond question, so that no one can deny them without doing violence to himself. For the principles of that law, if only you pay strict heed to them, are in themselves manifest and clear, almost as evident as are those things which we perceive by the external senses; and the senses do not err if the organs of perception are properly formed and if the other conditions requisite to perception are present.  

To the evidence of *a priori* reason must be added also the proof of a secondary nature afforded by reflection *a posteriori* on this historical process in the writing of philosophers, historians and poets. The unity of their testimony points back to a

1 DBJ, p. 9.  
2 Ibid., p. 23.
universal cause, to a true conclusion from the principles of nature.¹

"The Law of nature is a dictate of right reason which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity." ²

What relation then does the moral law have to God? In the light of the above principles we can say of an act that it is "either forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature,—God." ³ But though the traits in man that give rise to natural law have been implanted by God,⁴ that law "would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him." ⁵ Acts covered by the natural law are in themselves either obligatory or not permissible, and therefore are enjoined or forbidden by God; they are to be contrasted with acts covered by the specifically divine law, which is decreed by the arbitrary will of God who makes things unlawful simply by forbidding them and lawful and obligatory by His command.⁶ And just as the morality of the natural law is intrinsic and not conferred by God, so it cannot be altered by Him. Measureless indeed in some undefined sense the power of God may be, but even God cannot make two and two add up to more than four, and even God cannot make that which is evil according to the natural law be anything but evil. He may

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command murder or theft as the absolute lord of life and property; but that does not make such conduct right.¹

Natural law has here plainly nothing to do with certain modern meanings which we might easily attach to the word. It has nothing to do with the immutable laws of the physical universe, which have sometimes been considered to be analogous to the working of the moral law in man. Grotius would not cry of duty as did Wordsworth:

Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong
And the most ancient heavens, through Thee, are fresh and strong;
nor sing with Arnold:

"Ah, once more," I cried, "ye stars, ye waters,
On my heart your mighty charm renew;
Still, still let me, as I gaze upon you,
Feel my soul becoming vast like you!"

Nor is natural law the law of the animal as such, the law of the jungle. Man may be an animal, but he is one of a superior kind. "Among the traits characteristic of man is an impelling desire for society, that is, for the social life—not of any and every sort, but peaceful, and organised according to the measure of his intelligence, with those of his own kind."² Natural law flows from that which is distinctively human in man, his intelligence and his consequent recognition of, and respect for, intelligence in his fellows. "Whatever is clearly at variance with such judgment is understood to be contrary to the law of nature, that is, to the nature


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of man.” ¹ It is important, and prevents confusion, to remember that natural law is to Grotius the truly human law; for he later, as we shall see, refers to custom and the positive institutional law whether civil or international as “human law.”

Rather interestingly Grotius makes social respect for the rights of others historically prior to self-discipline and rational self-control. It is the former which is the original significance of Law; the latter is a derived meaning.² Allied of course to the power of discrimination and control in the individual is the rational allotment “to each man or to each social group, of those things which are properly theirs.”³ But to include this in the proper domain of natural law was too much for an aristocrat and lawyer like Grotius. Law is not constructive. “Its essence lies in leaving to another that which belongs to him or in fulfilling our obligations to him.”⁴ The law of nature and reason is taken up, that is, with justice, Grotius assumes that justice more or less prevails in human relations, that society will be justly organised if everybody has what has always normally belonged to him. Like a good lawyer and conservative, he admires above all “expletive justice,” of which he gives an illuminating example:

When Cyrus had given to the smaller boy a smaller tunic although it belonged to another, and on the other hand given a larger tunic to the larger boy, his teacher thus instructed him: that would have been a proper course to pursue in case a referee had been appointed

to decide what would be suitable for each; but when
the question to be settled was, to which boy the tunic
belonged, then only one point was to be considered,
which boy was more justly entitled to it—whether the
object should belong to him who had violently taken
it away, or to him who had made it or purchased it.¹

But justice and law involve at least abstaining from
that which is another's and restoring what belongs
to him, fulfilling promises, making good any loss
to another inflicted through our fault, and last
but not least inflicting penalties upon all men
according to their deserts.² "It is not unfair that
each suffer to the full extent of the evil he has
committed." ³

This natural law of justice, because it is the law
of our true human nature, ought to be followed in
spite of all ulterior consequences.⁴ But fortunately
justice is also expedient; honesty is the best policy.
"The Author of nature willed that as individuals
we should be weak, and should lack things needed
in order to live properly, to the end that we might
be the more constrained to cultivate the social
life." ⁵

From natural law based upon reason, Grotius
passes to consider another great realm of law in
human affairs, that which he rather misleadingly
calls "human law," since natural law is also human.
This realm of law is derived from unbroken custom,
which in its turn rests on common consent, an act
not of the intelligence but of the will. "Whatever

⁴ Ibid., p. 16. ⁵ Ibid., p. 15.
cannot be deduced from certain principles by a sure process of reasoning, and yet is clearly observed everywhere, must have its origin in the free will of man.” ¹ Human law, in the terminology of Grotius, is volitional, not rational.

It has three spheres. There is municipal or civic law proper, which is the creation of the State, an association of free men joined together for the enjoyment of their common rights. It regulates the internal affairs of the State as a whole. Secondly, we find a sphere of law narrower in scope and origin than municipal law, subject to the State but not directly created by it, e.g., the commands of a father or a master. Lastly, there is a law which is broader than these, which receives its sanction from the free consent of all or of many nations, and controls relations between them.³

Just as the laws of each State have in view the advantage of that State, so by mutual consent it has become possible that certain laws should originate as between all States, or a great many States; and it is apparent that the laws thus originating had in view the advantage, not of particular States but of the great society of States. And this is what is called the law of nations . . .³

To-day we would call it rather international law.

Grotius is not unmindful of the attitude of a Machiavelli that there is no such thing as international justice or international law. But he seeks to demonstrate the falsity of Machiavellian

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doctrine. He believes in the reality of justice; but even apart from that he is convinced that the view of Machiavelli does not fit the facts. It is not true that even the absolutist States of modern Europe are self-contained and self-sufficing. Respect for international law is forced on men not by the voice of conscience simply but by circumstances themselves, by the canons of expediency:

There is no State so powerful that it may not sometime need the help of others outside itself, either for purposes of trade, or even to ward off the forces of many foreign nations united against it. In consequence we see that even the most powerful peoples and sovereigns seek alliances, which are quite devoid of significance according to the point of view of those who confine law within the boundaries of States. Most true is the saying, that all things are uncertain the moment men depart from law.¹

There remains but one sphere of law yet to be considered. We have seen what Grotius means by natural and by human law, namely the system of law deduced from rational principles by human intelligence—which as God-given has a divine authority—and that built up by decisions of the free human will. We have now to consider the specific law of God.

Divine law, like human law as defined by Grotius, is volitional in character. Here applies what "Anaxarchus rather vaguely expressed, that God

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does not will a thing because it is lawful, but that a thing is lawful, that is obligatory, because God willed it."¹ This law rooted in the arbitrary will of God has been thrice promulgated, at the Creation, after the Flood, and through Christ.² So Grotius first of all announces; but it becomes clear as he goes on that the fundamental law of God is in the Old Testament, and in the New only as far as it is in harmony with the Old and extends rather than contradicts Old Testament principles. In the revelation before Christ we get the commands of God which are obligatory; in Christ we receive recommendations concerning what is permissible if we want to be perfect. He regards as mistaken the view that, after the coming of the New Testament, the Old Testament was no longer of use. We believe the contrary . . . because the character of the New Testament is such that in its teachings respecting the moral virtues it enjoins the same as the Old Testament or even enjoins greater precepts. In this way we see that the early Christian writers used the witnesses of the Old Testament. . . .

The New Testament I use in order to explain—and this cannot be learned from any other source—what is permissible to Christians. . . . I have not omitted to note the things that are recommended to us rather than enjoined, that we may know that, while the turning aside from what has been enjoined is wrong and involves the risk of punishment, a striving for the highest excellence implies a noble purpose and will not fail of its reward.³

¹ Op. cit., p. 45. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid., p. 27.
To neglect the commands of the Old Testament is deadly, but to neglect the precepts of the New is venial.

These rather upsetting conclusions of Grotius about the ethics of the Bible receive much illumination from the attempt which he makes to relate the ethics of Scripture to those of natural law. His reluctance to taking the New Testament as the sole guide in ethics is manifestly motivated by his respect for natural law, which seems so much more practical than the visionary counsels of Christ. The ethic of the New Testament, the exalted spiritual life which is permitted to Christians, he distinguishes—as Catholic theologians had done—from the law of nature, “considering it as certain that in that most holy law a greater degree of perfection is enjoined upon us than the law of nature, alone and by itself, would require.” ¹ The ethical law of the New Testament is therefore shelved because it is irrelevant to the problems of everyday and of the common man. But even the Old Testament is not accepted as identical with the law of nature and as universally binding. It contains not only a republication of the law of nature but much else besides, special non-rational commands of God for particular occasions which it would be rash and mistaken to seek to obey now. (Such injunctions were divine permissions, not perpetual ordinances.²)

There are some who urge that the Old Testament sets forth the law of nature; without doubt they are in error, for many of its rules come from the free-will

¹ Op. cit., p. 27. ² Ibid., p. 49.
of God. And yet it is never in conflict with the true law of nature . . . provided we carefully distinguish between the law of God, which God sometimes executes through men, and the law of men in their relations with one another.¹

Plainly it is left for reason to decide whether a command of God in the Old Testament is in conformity with natural law or not, and it can do so only by reference to material outside the Biblical revelation. So that the final authority for the ethics of a Christian is his reason and free-will, and the content of the natural and human law. Mankind has come into its own.

This we see clearly when Grotius discusses the nature of the State. Its origin is a human necessity, though one approved by God, and not a divine ordinance.² Its function is to be deduced from human reason and human experience. The State, for example, limits human freedom; it takes away from men in general the right of resisting injury on their own account; but therein they concur, for it is in the interest of all.³ The State even appears at times to take from men the right of exercising their private judgment as to what is the right course to pursue in civic or international affairs. The State is of course not to be obeyed if it commands anything contrary to the law of nature or of God.⁴ But even if the individual may dissent from the action of the State,⁵ which is a very hypothetical case, since the State is the creation of the

¹ Op. cit., p. 27. ² Ibid., p. 149. ³ Ibid., p. 139. ⁴ Ibid., p. 138. ⁵ Vide infra, p. 133.
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group to which he belongs, Grotius leaves but little room for any still small voice of God. The natural and human law are in effect above the divine law. Nor, in the interpretation of Grotius, would Jesus apparently disagree. For by “rendering unto Cæsar” he meant “that his followers owed to sovereign powers an obedience, joined if need be with long-suffering, not less in degree, if not even greater, than that which the Jews owed to the Jewish kings.”

2. THE VALUE OF A PENAL SYSTEM

Grotius saw plainly the necessity of violent penalties as a deduction of reason, a command of God, and a permission of Christ. “If the right to inflict capital punishment and to defend citizens by arms against brigands and robbers should be taken away, there would follow a riot of crimes and a deluge, so to speak, of evils, since even now, with regularly constituted courts in operation, the force of evil is with difficulty restrained.” Punishment is not so much corrective as exemplary— with which we may compare his theory of the Atonement. It is not punishment but vengeance which is condemned by nature and gospel alike, and if Christ had meant to abolish capital punishment he ought to have been more explicit, since that would have been such a revolutionary step. He does indeed seem to disapprove of processes of

1 DJB, p. 141.  
2 Ibid., p. 66.  
3 Ibid., p. 475.  
4 Ibid., p. 478.  
5 Ibid., p. 71.
law; but Grotius notes, with a somewhat perverse literalism, that Jesus condemns lawsuits with reference to small things like clothes, just as he condemns resistance to small injuries like a slap on the cheek. But the defence, by legal process, of "the means of subsistence" is quite another thing. Grotius is of the opinion that Christians should not, however, seek out opportunities to become themselves criminal judges, yet he thinks that someone has to undertake the task of inflicting harsh penalties. Such a solution is most unsatisfactory. The franker acceptance of the unpleasant situation by Augustine is really preferable; or even the curious compromise of Luther by which Christians might not use the law for themselves but ought courageously to do so for the sake of others.

3. THE ISSUE OF PRIVATE WAR

Grotius takes up the question of the use of militant measures by the individual first from the point of view of the law of nature. Cicero, he remarks, has shown in his treatise On Ends that, according to the first principles of nature, every animal is impelled to have regard for its own safety; and man, as far as he is an animal, is subject to the same urge. But a human being is an animal with a difference; he possesses reason; and that factor modifies his use of force for his own benefit; "moral

1 DJB, p. 72.  
2 Ibid., p. 74.  
3 Ibid., p. 72.  
4 Ibid., p. 456.
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goodness becomes the paramount object.”¹ But right reason and consideration for society do not prohibit the use of all force by the individual, merely “that use of force which is in conflict with society, that is, which attempts to take away the rights of another. For society has in view the object that, through community of resource and effort, each individual be safeguarded in the possession of what belongs to him.”²

There are three main instances where the law of nature permits retaliation; in defence of life, of chastity and of property. “The right of self-defence . . . has its origin directly, and chiefly, in the fact that nature commits to each his own protection, not in the injustice or crime of the aggressor.”³ So, even in a case where the assailant is blameless, rendered irresponsible, by madness or sleeplessness, the right of self-defence is not taken away. “It is a disputed question whether innocent persons can be cut down or trampled upon, when, by getting in the way, they hinder the defence or flight by which alone death can be averted.”⁴ But those who dispute the right argue more from the evangelical law of love than from the law of nature. Militant measures in defence of life are permissible, however, only when danger is immediate and certain, not when it is merely assumed. “Those who accept fear of any sort as justifying anticipatory slaying are themselves greatly deceived, and deceive others.”⁵ Even the suspicion of a plot or an ambuscade is not an excuse for such a measure,

¹ DJB, p. 51. ² Ibid., p. 53. ³ Ibid., p. 172. ⁴ Ibid., p. 173. ⁵ Ibid.
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at least if it is not altogether certain that the danger cannot be otherwise averted.¹

The defence of chastity is in the highest degree justifiable, for not only the opinion of men but the law of God puts chastity on a plane with life.² By the law of nature it is also permissible to kill in defence of property. “If we have in view expletive justice only, I shall not deny that in order to preserve property a robber can even be killed, in case of necessity.”³ But the commands of God in the Old Testament and the institutional Roman law modify that position: “The Hebraic law, then, as well as the Roman, enjoins upon citizens what regard for others suggests, that they should not kill a man merely because he is stealing property, but that such an act of violence becomes permissible only in case the person who has sought to safeguard his property has himself been exposed to danger.”⁴ For the most part, of course, the right of judging and punishing has been transferred from the individual to the State under human law in its municipal sphere:

Although public tribunals are the creation not of nature but of man, it is, nevertheless, much more consistent with moral standards, and more conducive to the peace of individuals, that a matter be judicially investigated by one who has no personal interest in it, than that individuals, too often having only their own interests in view, should seek by their own hands to obtain that which they consider right.⁵

¹ DJB, pp. 174-175. ² Ibid., p. 175. ³ Ibid., p. 179. ⁴ Ibid., p. 181. ⁵ Ibid., p. 91.
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But in circumstances where judicial procedure is not available, the original natural law of retaliation remains in force.1 This admission prepares us for Grotius' acquiescence in national war; for as yet there exists no proper international court to try the disputes of nations.

The position of Grotius on individual defence by violence is well in accord with what he called natural and human law, and even with the will of God expressed in the Old Testament. The fundamental difficulty is the question of the will of God as expressed in the New Covenant. "In the case of the volitional divine law in its more perfect form, that is, the law of the Gospel, a greater difficulty presents itself. I do not doubt that God, Who has over our lives a more absolute right than we ourselves, might have required of us so great a degree of forbearance that, as individuals, when confronted with danger, it would be our duty to allow ourselves to be killed rather than to kill. But did God purpose to bind us in so extreme a fashion? That is the point which we are to investigate." 2

Grotius manages to find support for the view that God did not intend to lay such stringent commands upon men, in his interpretation of isolated sayings. Christ's allowing the disciples to have two swords in their possession must have meant that he approved of the pilgrim's customary method of defence.3 If Christ said to Peter to put up his sword, it was because he did not want to be defended, or because Peter had revenge in his heart, or because resistance

1 DJB, p. 92. 2 Ibid., p. 93. 3 Ibid., p. 94, and supra, p. 41.
involved attacking the properly constituted authori-
ties.\textsuperscript{1} The saying that he who takes the sword shall
perish by the sword is probably a prophecy of the
punishment which the Romans would exact from
the blood-guilty Jews.\textsuperscript{a} Nor is the sacrificial love
of Christ on the Cross to be made into a binding
principle:

As for the example of Christ, when we are told that
he died for his enemies, the rejoinder may be made
that all the acts of Christ exemplify virtue in fullest
measure, that it is praiseworthy to imitate them, so
far as possible, and that such imitation will not fail of
its reward; nevertheless not all his acts are of such a
character that they proceed from a law, or themselves
establish a law. For in dying for his enemies and for
the ungodly, Christ acted not in obedience to any law,
but in accordance with a special promise and covenant,
as it were, made with the Father; if he should thus
die the Father promised to him not only supreme glory
but a people that should endure for ever. That in other
respects this act is as it were unique, to which scarcely
any parallel can be found, Paul shows.\textsuperscript{a} (Romans v. 7.)

But Grotius was not really satisfied with this position,
and further on in his great work he admitted that
the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount was incom-
patible with measures such as he was proposing.
At least with regard to the defence of property by
killing, he is clear as to the duty of the true follower
of Jesus:

For if Christ bids that a tunic and a cloak be given
up . . . rather than that recourse be had to a lawsuit—
\textsuperscript{1} DJB, p. 95. \textsuperscript{8} Ibid., p. 96.
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a contest without bloodshed—how much more . . . that things also of greater value be relinquished rather than that a man, the image of God, sprung from the same blood with ourselves, should be killed.¹

What then, he asks, are we to make of the fact that almost all jurists and theologians now teach that we have a right to kill a man in defence of our property? And rightly he answers: "In this matter, undoubtedly, as in many others, discipline has become relaxed with time, and little by little the interpretation of the law of the Gospel has begun to be adjusted to the customs of the age." ² One wonders if, in his heart of hearts, he did not really hold that among the "other matters" where a compromise had been effected, was that of defence of life by means of "private war." For that, and not the sayings of Christ which might sanction killing, is the real reason for the gulf between the ethics of the Church and those of its Founder.

If individuals have the ultimate right of armed defence, what of groups within the State? As a general rule rebellion is not permitted. Since the coming of municipal law, the application of natural law has changed. "As civil society was instituted in order to maintain public tranquillity, the State forthwith acquires over us and over our possessions a greater right, to the extent necessary to accomplish this end. The State therefore in the interest of public peace and order, can limit that common right of resistance." ³ Without such restraint the

¹ DJB, p. 182. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid., p. 139.
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State would be simply a "non-social horde." ¹ With such a position the volitional divine law agrees, for Hebraic law condemned to death anyone who disobeyed the consecrated ruler (Joshua i. 18).² Christ said, "Render unto Cæsar," and Peter, "Honour the King." ³ But rebellion becomes a right in cases of unavoidable necessity, such as atrocious cruelty.⁴ The provocation does not have to be extreme where the ruler does not possess the whole sovereign power. Rebellion is justified against the chief authority of a free people who transgresses the law,⁵ and also against a king, who, possessing only part of the sovereign power, seeks to possess himself of the part that does not belong to him.⁶ But as in the case of individual resistance, such group resistance is not in accord with the professions of a radical follower of Jesus. He must be prepared to lose his life rather than rebel, but "he who thus loses his life is declared by Christ truly to have gained it." ⁷

4. NATIONAL WAR AND ARBITRATION

It will be most convenient to discuss the justification of public war in the thought of Grotius in the reverse order from that in which we have considered the problem of private war, to deal first, that is, with the arguments drawn from the volitional divine law and from human law, reserving to the end what

¹ DJB, p. 139. ² Ibid., p. 140. ³ Ibid., p. 141, 143. ⁴ Ibid., p. 150. ⁵ Ibid., p. 156. ⁶ Ibid., p. 158. ⁷ Ibid., p. 156.
is the crux of the whole matter—the bearing of natural law on the subject.

As far as the Old Testament is concerned, Grotius finds no trouble. For there he discovers, as did Luther, not only individual wars by the special command of God, but perpetual laws laid down, in Deuteronomy xx, for the carrying on of warfare. The New Testament is more of a problem, but the traditional references are made to Romans xiii, and to the teaching of John the Baptist, whose gospel is practically that of Jesus. The teachings of Jesus himself, though they may have been pacifist, were probably counsels rather than commands, and his principle of love towards enemies has to be interpreted in the light of conditions as we know them. "In accordance with the law of a well-ordered love, the good of an innocent person should receive consideration before the good of one who is guilty, and the public good before that of the individual. Now it is in the love of innocent men that . . . just wars have their origin." Such considerations would, however, have seemed simply prudential to Jesus, who declared that the whole had no need of a physician but they who were sick, who announced that he came expressly to seek and to save the lost. Not only the letter but the spirit of the teaching of Jesus has been modified by Grotius. Secular considerations, the preservation of this-worldly values, have outweighed purely religious and other-worldly motives. But if Grotius—and with him

1 Vide supra, p. 108.  2 DJB, p. 55.  3 Ibid., p. 64.
4 Ibid., p. 65.  5 Ibid., p. 83.  6 Ibid., p. 75.
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of course the liberal movement as a whole—cannot make final appeal to the words of Jesus, they can at least find support in the deliverances of the Church. "There is no lack of writers, and very early writers, too, who hold the opinion that . . . war . . . may be lawfully resorted to by Christians."¹ Yet, though religion does not renounce military measures for secular ends, religion itself cannot as a rule be preserved or furthered by the sword. Grotius admires the spirit of the early Christian martyrs² and declares that the heathen cannot be truly converted at the point of the sword.³ Though he relaxes even this position and affirms that a just war may be waged against those who treat Christians with cruelty for the sake of their religion alone.

What, in the second place, is the bearing of human law on the problem of national war? "That wars . . . are not condemned by the volitional law of nations, histories, and the laws and customs of all peoples fully teach us."⁴ International law has rather busied itself with defining the due formalities according to which national war should be waged.⁵

And now, thirdly, but most importantly, what has natural law to say to us? It is there that we learn what justice is, and with justice Grotius is primarily concerned. "In giving our treatise the title The Law of War, we mean first of all . . . to inquire whether any war can be just, and then,

¹ DJB, p. 84. ² Ibid., p. 153. ³ Ibid., p. 516. ⁴ Ibid., p. 517. ⁵ Ibid., p. 57. ⁶ Ibid.
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what is just in war. For law in our use of the term here means nothing else than what is just, and that, too, rather in a negative than in an affirmative sense, that being lawful which is not unjust.”¹ Cicero had defined war as an actual contest, a contending by force, but following Philo, Grotius sees that an armed peace is a kind of war, and defines war rather as “the condition of those contending by force, viewed simply as such.”² He thus intentionally omits the conception of justice from his definition of war: “I do not include justice in my definition because that very question forms part of our investigation, whether there can be a just war, and what kind of a war is just.”³

Certain types of national warfare are clearly unjust, and according to Grotius aggressive wars come under that head. As a good lawyer he is interested in the preservation of the status quo and holds that it represents at least a form of justice. Thus desire for richer land is ruled out as a just cause for war: “The desire to change abode, in order that by abandoning swamps and wildernesses a more fruitful soil may be acquired, does not afford a just cause for war.”⁴ He excludes also the desire to rule others on the pretext that it is for their good: “For even if something is advantageous for anyone, the right is not forthwith conferred upon me to impose this upon him by force.”⁵ Similarly, with the wish for universal empire: “For as a ship may attain to such a size that it cannot

¹ DJB, p. 34. ² Ibid., p. 33. ³ Ibid., p. 34. ⁴ Ibid., p. 550. ⁵ Ibid., p. 551.

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be steered, so also the number of inhabitants and the distance between places may be so great as not to tolerate a single government.” Grotius rather confuses two issues in all these instances. For it may be right for a nation to demand richer territory and a wider dominion in view of its expanding population and cultural superiority, while it can still be wrong to seek to achieve these ends by the method of national war.

Grotius also condemns wars which, while not aggressive, are futile or cause more harm than good. He cites as a typical case one where a nation, to preserve its liberty, risks a war which will end in its annihilation. It were better to continue to live, even in servitude, than fight and be destroyed. “Life, to be sure, which affords the basis for all temporal and the occasion for eternal blessings, is of greater value than liberty.” In some cases it may well be doubtful whether it is right or worth while to fight; in these cases one ought to favour a non-military solution. If a war is just in the eyes of the authorities but there are some whom they are unable to convince that they ought to take part in the struggle, such people ought not to be forced into military service. It is enough if they pay extra taxes.

The truly just war is the defensive. “No other just cause for undertaking war can there be excepting injury received.” A nation has the same right as an individual to protect life and property. But

1 DJB, p. 552.  
2 Ibid., p. 573.  
3 Ibid., p. 560.  
4 Ibid., p. 594.  
5 Ibid., p. 170.  
6 Vide supra, p. 127.
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in addition a nation has the right which the individual does not possess, to forestall an act of violence which threatens it from a distance.¹ Finally, since there is no law court to judge between nations, each is itself judge and can have the right of inflicting punishment on an offending people.² Such just wars can, of course, be undertaken not only in one’s own defence, but to come to the assistance of allies, friends and kindred peoples.³

War must have a just cause. It must also be waged by the proper authority. In order that a war may be formal, it is requisite that “on both sides it be waged under the authority of the one who holds the sovereign power in the State.”⁴ It must also be waged in a proper manner. This forbids the use of poisons, but allows the telling of falsehoods to the enemy, plunder and pillage, and the slaughter of women and children.⁵ Grotius believes that such activities can be undertaken “within the bounds of law and good faith,” with the same scrupulousness as a judicial process.⁶

The sections of the Law of War and Peace which deal with the concrete question of the just war are hardly the most significant of the book as a whole. If that were all that Grotius had to contribute to the solution of the problem of national warfare, then Catholic writers would be correct in treating him as an appendix to scholastic thought. For the description of the just war as defensive, the necessity of its being waged by the sovereign

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authority, and the imposition of certain mitigations of the brutalities of warfare—had all been worked out previously by Roman theologians. Grotius himself mentions having read Franciscus de Victoria among others.¹ And his statement of the doctrine does little to improve upon theirs. The distinction between aggressive and defensive wars is a poor one from a moral point of view; for it may be wrong to defend what you have possessed long but unrighteously, and it may be right to make valiant efforts to secure resources which actually belong to others but for which you have developed a greater need. Further, Grotius acquiesces in the traditional idea of individual States being sovereign and able to act as impartial judges of their own case in a dispute.

The achievement of Grotius, as he himself recognised, was in his elaboration of the idea of law, within and between national States. Contrasting his work with that of the Roman theologians, he saw clearly what differentiated his work from theirs. "All of these... have said next to nothing upon a most fertile subject; most of them have done their work without system, and in such a way as to intermingle and utterly confuse what belongs to the law of nature, to divine law, to the law of nations, to civil law, and to the body of law which is found in the canons."² It was this basis of the ideas of law and justice in human affairs which Grotius investigated and relaid. He applied it successfully to the condition of affairs within the

¹ DJB, p. 22. ² Ibid.
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State and to the question of private war; he saw that for the most part individual self-defence is outmoded and has been replaced by State action. When he looked out on the world of his day he saw signs of the same sort of thing occurring between nations, for they were not autonomous but inter-dependent. They required to be further bound by a legal system. But as such did not then exist, he had to fall back on national war as the final arbiter, and attempted to define it so that the ends of justice might be served. But it was an impossible task.

Grotius suggests two good ways by which justice might be attained without nations having to resort to trial by battle: conference and arbitration. And in an almost pathetic footnote he adds that the latter is "a way very often scorned by the more powerful... It is a worthy way, however, which lovers of justice and peace should pursue." ¹ But the essential flaw in the international structure is the lack of a "common judicial authority." ² It is that which prevents the ideals of Grotius on international law from coming to fruition; and it will always be so unless we take energetic steps to remedy the situation.

¹ DJB, p. 561. ² Ibid.
VI. CONCLUSION

I. CURRENT CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES

There is no single attitude to the State and the problems of war and peace which can to-day be called "the Christian attitude." The river of Truth may be one, as Clement of Alexandria believed, but the "streams which flow into it from every side" so colour and alter it that the original purity and unity can hardly be recognised. The Churches and their theologians have to-day, as in the past, not one attitude but several, for they hold widely differing ideas as to the goods they ought to pursue, which ought to dominate the rest, and what means are justified in the pursuit of them. They operate with different standards of value. So that we must first determine the ruling principles which guide the minds of writers representing the main Christian attitudes. I hope thereby to show also the importance for the present and the future of those figures who are the main subject of this book. For the deliverances of modern theology repeat, often consciously, the positions of the past. It is true to-day, and will be true to-morrow, that the absolute Christian pacifist will rely on the teaching of Jesus, the catholic reformulate Augustine, the "evangelical" remould Luther, and the liberal restate Grotius.
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(a) Synopticism

Firstly, we have to bear in mind a type of Christian attitude which is not greatly concerned with what the state of society or the deliverances of philosophy and science may be, but which is directly inspired by what it believes to be original Christianity, "synopticism," the religion of the first three Gospels, the "Christianity of Christ" as A. B. Bruce called it. Ever and again in the history of the Church there have been those who sought to revive a direct imitatio Christi—Peter Waldo, St Francis, the Mennonites and the Quakers. But the modern representatives of the School, though unconcerned with the findings of science in other fields, start from a historical Jesus revealed by the critical tools of liberalism. What the actual synoptic teachings are we have seen in some detail; here we are concerned simply with certain modern evaluations of them.

Thus Dr C. J. Cadoux, in his *Early Church and the World*, was writing mainly a historical study, yet it is clear where his sympathies lie and what drove him to write his book, the sense that the Church ought to return to the teachings of the Master. He faces up to the eschatological interpretation of the Gospels but finds it exaggerated. "The broad features of the Kingdom and the laws governing its growth seem to be very largely independent of its catastrophic coming." ¹ Jesus founded the Church, that is, he promoted

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the unification of his followers in a powerful, permanent, and growing society, separate from the outside world, invincible in its conflict with evil, pervaded with a spirit of brotherly concord, aided by his own spiritual presence, and apparently controlled by apostolic leaders invested with large, if obscurely indicated, powers. 1

The movement so founded rejected violence, but had its own method of overcoming evil, that of love, a method which would make coercion and war ultimately unnecessary. Confronted with the change which came over the attitude of the Church to political necessities, its gradual approbation of violence and war, Dr Cadoux is obliged to conclude, that the Christian community betrayed its Lord:

The ethic to which Jesus trusted when he preferred to die rather than declare a Messianic war, was indeed an ethic which demanded a willingness to fail and to suffer martyrdom in an indefinite number of particular cases, in the sure and certain hope that, the cause being God’s, it must ultimately win all along the line.

... Theodore Beza had well grasped the secret of the Church’s vitality when he said to the catholicising King of Navarre, the secret ally of the persecuting Duke of Guise, “Sire, it belongs in truth to the Church of God, in the name of which I speak, to receive blows and not to give them; but it will please you to remember that it is an anvil that has worn out many hammers.” 2

Very similar is the conclusion of the Dutchman, Professor G. J. Heering, who entitles his work significantly The Fall of Christianity. The historical

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Jesus was a Messiah of peace who commanded us to love our enemies to the uttermost; and up to the time of Constantine his followers, with some exceptions, lived out his teaching. But then came the turning-point, typified by the decision of the Council of Arles in A.D. 314, that “they who throw away their weapons in time of peace shall be excommunicated.” “This radical change in the Christian faith, in so vital a matter as war, we cannot regard as other than a disastrous fall, a fall into a condition which primitive Christianity would not have hesitated to call a condition of sin.”¹ That fallen condition has ever since clouded the vision and the conduct of all but a few exceptional Christians. Coercion may be inevitable, but war is not²; to-day it is necessary that we return to the Gospels and ask of them what the highest good may be, and we shall find that it is not love of country but the kingdom of God. Even the proposal of an international army is incompatible with the Christian religion.³ “This fallen Christianity of ours is in bitter need of hearing the A B C of Christian morality again and yet again.”⁴ The Christian must return to the way of absolute love, and face clear-eyed the prospect that such an ethic may lead to a Cross.

The fullest and most satisfying study of the teaching of Jesus on war and peace which has yet appeared, The New Testament Basis of Pacifism, by Professor G. H. C. Macgregor, is a plea also

² Ibid., p. 209.  
³ Ibid., p. 230.  
⁴ Ibid., p. 241.
for a return to the Gospels as the source of the Christian ethic. Dr Macgregor does not claim to be writing "a book on the practical issues involved in the problem of Peace and War." He wishes first and foremost to find out what, as a matter of fact, Jesus taught. Now, although he finds a place in the ethic of Jesus for a discriminating use of force (which he thinks might be deduced from the cleansing of the Temple), his attention is chiefly directed to showing the discrepancy between war methods and the teaching of Jesus. Warfare as we know it to-day is a use of force which cannot be reconciled with the redemptive love which Jesus illustrated supremely on the Cross, and "there is no word of Jesus more often repeated in the Gospels than that in which he bids [his disciples] follow him along the road of the Cross." The Church cannot expect obedience to the way of Christ from an unbelieving world, but her own duty is plain, to be true to him. The compromise of Augustine and Luther was a betrayal of the Christian ideal. A Christian nation must be willing to face national martyrdom rather than betray her Lord by taking part in national war. Even if the creation of an armed "International Police Force" would be a step forward from the present chaos, the Christian is bound by his higher loyalty to refuse to serve in it.

There is thus to-day an important section of the

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2 Ibid., p. 106.  
3 Ibid., pp. 144-145.  
4 Ibid., p. 103-104.  
5 Ibid., p. 102.  
6 Ibid., pp. 127 ff.  
7 Ibid., p. 146.  
8 Ibid., p. 18.
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Christian Church which, seeing clearly the implications of the teaching of Jesus, is heroically prepared to be utterly true to them. Nor is it blind to the fact that others within the Church may sincerely hold different views. "One has a certain sympathy with the man who refuses to water down the challenge of the Gospels, but has come to the conclusion... that for the time being, and in a world such as this, we must rest content with the second-best." ¹

(b) Catholicism

The teaching of the Roman Catholic Church is, next to liberal theology, the most courageous and successful attempt that has yet been made on the part of Christian theologians to unite the Hellenic and Hebrew traditions, to combine natural and revealed theology. It seeks to do justice at once to the temporal and the eternal, to the witness of Christian experience and to the more this-worldly teachings of Aristotle and Cicero. But when that Church has stated its mind in reflected terms, as above all in the Summa of St Thomas Aquinas, the decisions reached tend to become binding. So that books written by modern Catholics take more or less the form of recapitulations, or restatements of previous syntheses. Just as the authors of the Jewish Apocalypses hide behind the mantle of Enoch or Abraham, so the Catholic writer on ethics shields himself behind the pronouncements of some Father or Doctor of the Church, when not

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Thomas then Augustine or Bellarmine or Suarez. This can be very irritating in its traditionalism, especially in a discussion of the problem of war. "Converts like Mr Chesterton seem quite unable to realise that the age of the rapier and the blunderbuss has passed away and that modern conflicts are not waged after the pattern of the Napoleon of Notting Hill." ¹ It leads to a certain cavalier treatment of issues which are worthy of more serious attention. Thus in a standard introduction to Catholic sociology, the question of war is dismissed with a reference to the general attitude in the Biblical and Church tradition. "War, the condition of struggle by bloodshed between States, has never been fundamentally rejected by the Christian tradition or by the Church. In the Old Testament, God himself is declared to have ordered war; the Gospel contains no command for soldiers to lay down their arms; and the Popes have summoned to arms in time of dire need, to rescue Christian culture from the Turks." ² The Catholic solution of modern problems is thus practically determined by what the great heathens, the great figures of the Scriptures and the great men of the Church have said in the past.

But the substance of teaching thus amassed is no mean or negligible quantity. It is based on a broad view of man and of human life. Natural theology is the presupposition of revealed theology;

² O. Schilling, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie (München, 1928), ii. p. 656.
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and so the goods of this world, and its evils also, are not beyond control by that reason with which we have been endowed. Post-Reformation Catholicism is at this point a restatement of Thomism, which in its turn depends on Augustine. It stresses the validity of reason over-against the late mediaeval nominalists who saw in natural law only the divine caprice, the Biblicists who base everything on the Bible and have an over-accentuated doctrine of human depravity, and the sects who, since the days of Wyclif, have imagined that the Christian ethic is simply the evangelical law of love. There is in the nature of things a natural law, set there by the Creator and not completely destroyed by sin nor superseded by the realm of grace in Christ.¹

It is discoverable by reason; though, in its necessary consequences at least, it is also to be found in the Decalogue. What is its content? All natural moral commands can be reduced to, and deduced from, one ultimate general principle. Just as in the realm of mental philosophy every principle follows from the statement "everything exists or does not exist," so in the realm of moral philosophy all ethical commands can be derived from the final principle "the good is to be done and evil is to be left undone." The "good" is the expression of our native tendencies, which are three. In common with even inanimate objects we have a natural tendency to self-preservation. Like all organic creatures we have, second, a tendency to preserve

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the species. Finally, we have, in common with all spiritual beings, a tendency to follow our reason, which includes honouring God and doing to others as we would that they should do to us. But the realisation of the "good" is a complicated business, and in the social sphere not one to be left to the discretion or indiscretion of the individual. There must be a central delegated authority, the State, equipped with the power to put its measures through. Thus the use of force is a result not of sin but of the complexity of our physico-spiritual existence. And its use is not to be regulated on principles derived solely from a special revelation.

The natural law of seeking the good applies of course also to the relations of States to each other. Here again the use of force cannot be dispensed with:

The moral sanction of war is based on the nature of the State as a perfect society. If the State is permitted to defend its citizens against disturbers of the peace at home, it must also have the right to defend them with the force of arms against attack from without—if there is no other way of doing so. For the repulse of internal and external enemies is necessary for the preservation of the State. It is one of the demands of the natural law, which it were impossible to imagine that the Gospel could annul, and which is in harmony with its caritas and the consequent peace. The righteous war is not, as extreme pacifists hold, the opposite of, but rather the means to, a true peace. While an unjust war is the contrary of a good peace and leads to a bad peace, so a just war is the opposite of a bad peace and is a means to a good peace, like the operation performed
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by a surgeon, which attacks disease in the interests of health.¹

We are thus introduced to what has been since the days of Augustine one of the most important theories in Catholic natural theology, the doctrine of the righteous war. It forms the main theme of discussion in two important treatments of the war issue in recent Catholic theology, Vanderpol’s *La Doctrine scolastique du Droit de Guerre* and Stratmann’s *Weltkirche und Weltfriede.*

The first type of just war is the defensive. It has been the official teaching of the Church since its adoption of Thomas, who at this point relies almost wholly on Augustine,² that it is justifiable to counter an attack with force. The second type of just war is the punitive, undertaken for the restoration of justice. Only when a war is waged with good intent, for a just cause, and by the proper authority, can it be justified in natural theology. Some later teachers like Bellarmine and Suarez have added the condition that the war must also be carried out in a just manner, without unnecessary violence and damage.³ Stratmann proceeds to show that modern warfare can hardly be said to conform to these standards. Is it possible clearly to distinguish between attacker and attacked or to ascertain national guilt? Is it just if the parties interested in the case are their own judges? Is it feasible

² Cf. *Summa Theologica*, ii. 2, Question 40.
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to avoid unthinkable horrors in the conduct of war? The conditions set up by the scholastic theologians for a just war are so stringent as to make modern national wars an impossibility, and so he cries "Back to Augustine and Thomas." ¹ Other is the standpoint of Vanderpol. He hopes indeed by the restatement of scholastic doctrine to make a real contribution to peace; but he thinks it still possible for individual governments to settle for themselves the rights and wrongs of a dispute, though he does admit that an international tribunal would be more just and the true culmination of scholastic doctrine.² He agrees that such a court would have to be provided with a police force or army for the carrying out of its decisions in case the parties refused to accept its decisions. Stratmann is of course very much more in favour of an international court and army. It would be according to him the Archimedean point from which one could unhinge the whole world of national war.³

So far natural theology. But has revelation perhaps the decisive word to say in the question of the abolition of war and its supersession by a system of international justice? Vanderpol contents himself with ascertaining that war was from time to time ordered by God in the Old Testament, that the teaching of Jesus was not really anti-militaristic, that the Early Church pacifists were either heretics or objectors merely to the paganism involved in

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military service, and that St Augustine and St Thomas agree in this interpretation of the content of revelation. He permits himself a more or less piecemeal historical treatment and does not tackle the question from a systematic theological point of view. Stratmann also gives a historical treatment of the problem, but reaches rather different conclusions. The Old Testament is to him not a timeless norm for conduct but a particular law for a particular people in a state of crisis; if Jesus in no sense did away the right and duty of defence he certainly understood thereby something different from modern war; the Early Church pacifists were not indeed in line with official statements of the Church but may well have represented its general spirit more truly. But, being a Catholic, Stratmann could not remain true to his communion and not mention that the great Fathers had held other views than his on the purport of revealed teaching. He conveniently deals with their views on the just war as part of natural theology. Conveniently but strangely also the bearing of the specifically Christian doctrines of the Creation and the Redemption is treated in the section on natural theology. But the treatment is interesting. Even if, he writes, the struggle for existence be part of God's creative method, there is no proof that war is a necessary form of that struggle. On the other hand, if that struggle be regarded as the inevitable product of

3 Ibid., pp. 70 ff.

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sin, there is reason to suppose that forms of sin, as distinct from a general state of sinfulness, are eradicable. Moreover, the Catholic Church has always believed not only in the salvation of the individual soul but in the redemption of the world. Thus, except—and admittedly the exception is large—for the attitude of certain great Church Fathers and their interpretation of the Bible, there is no dogmatic objection to the idea of a legal settlement of international differences and the elimination of national war.

There is of course a gulf between Catholic theory and practice which cannot be completely passed over. The Popes since Leo XIII in the closing decades of last century have in theory placed themselves on the side of the anti-war movement. Benedict XV during the Great War made important pronouncements in favour of arbitration and disarmament. But many of the Catholic clergy remain intensely nationalistic both in France and Germany; and the alliance between Mussolini and the Pope is more politic than Christian. But at least there is little in the essential nature of Catholicism to prevent it from being at one with the best modern thought on arbitration and international justice.

Alone among Catholic writers on the subject of

2 Ibid., p. 240.
3 Cf. J. B. Sägmüller, Der apostolische Stuhl und der Wiederaufbau des Völkerrechts und Völkerfriedens (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1919), passim, and K. Rieder, Päpstliche Enzykliken und ihre Stellung zu Politik (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1923), passim.
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peace stands Father Stratmann with his conception of a special task for Christians. Yet his conception is no un-Catholic one but a deduction from the very nature of a Catholic Christianity which stresses its revelational as distinct from its rationalistic side. For those who are Christians and who want to hear the specific Christian answer to the question of peace, Stratmann has one fundamental question: "Is Christ the one right way, the sole truth, the only life worth living, and is it the calling of all mankind to form his mystical body?" If so, then it is significant for certain members of the human race to live utterly Christian lives on this earth, for they have the hope that their witness will not be in vain. It is not enough for Christians to be members of a sacramental cult organisation, valuable as that is. He even speaks warmly of those who do not belong to it, the "body" of the Church, yet follow Jesus in spirit and so belong to the "soul" of the Church. His ideal is that men should belong both to the body and to the soul of the Church, be filled with the spirit of Jesus all the more because they enjoy his sacramental grace. He condemns strongly that type of churchiness which attends to worship but neglects morals, personal or social. Missing a church service is not to be thought worse than a fit of bad temper. If all men are potential members of Christ's body, then service to them is service to him. A hungry, naked, imprisoned brother is the hungry, naked, imprisoned Christ. These considerations are all-important for the Christian

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in determining his attitude to military action. Is it enough that he should see justice done by force? Or is there something further demanded of him because of membership in the Church and his incorporation into the mystical body of Christ? Yes; for in that case there are no enemies save the enemies of Christ. Bread and butter, blood and soil drop into the background. The thing that matters is loyalty to Jesus. The real enemies to be overcome are the enemies of his spirit. “And these enemies of Christ we treat both outwardly and inwardly as Christ treated them,” 1 without rage in our hearts and without weapons in our hands, but with an infinite love which is willing to suffer all things if only they may be brought into the same divine fellowship, a love which is willing to go to a Cross. It would be an evil day for the Church if such a spirit were not to be maintained by at least a minority of its members; even if it would be as disastrous for civilisation if the Church as a whole were to lose that concern for the preservation of secular values (even by methods less than the highest) which it has shown since the days of Augustine.

(c) Evangelicalism

Evangelical thought is sometimes clouded by “Biblicism,” a literalist fundamentalism, which regards the question of peace and war as settled because there are certain writers in the Old Testament who regard Yahweh as a God of battles,

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pronounce Jael in God's name blessed among women, or commend Jehu for extirpating the dynasty of Ahab. Yet all but the most fundamentalist theologians admit that, even if it is the same God who reveals Himself everywhere in the Bible, not all of the authors had the same grasp of His will and purpose, that there is a depth and breadth of revelation in Deutero-Isaiah's vision of the suffering Israel, of Micah's hopes of a peaceful world, which was absent from earlier teachers like Moses and Samuel. By evangelical Christianity is to be understood rather that view which takes the Bible as the sole authority for faith and morals, using the Biblical story of the Creation and Fall of Man and the salvation of his soul (as treated in Genesis and the Letters of Paul) as the presupposition of the gospel of Christ, the good news of the loving Fatherhood of God and the coming of His kingdom (as that is preserved for us in the Synoptic Gospels). In this view we are not to judge the Old Testament or the apostolic interpretation of the meaning of life by the light of the words and acts of Christ, but to take them as equally normative for Christian faith and conduct. Nor are we permitted to seek to unite the Biblical witness with the testimony of natural revelation. Such a view was, in the main, that of the Protestant reformers, and to-day is best represented by the "dialectic" theologians of Germany, who have returned with enthusiasm to the study of Luther and Calvin.

Although not strictly of the inner "dialectic" circle, since he is conscious of a sort of negative
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revelation in nature, Professor Heim shares their devotion to evangelical religion and the teaching of Luther. According to him the world was created good and in the beginning strife and destruction were absent. Yet it is patent that a struggle for existence is now being waged not only between men but throughout nature. Heim quotes a verse of Schiller’s:

O peaceful world of plants!
In thy consummate stillness
I hear footsteps divine;
Out of thy quiet mirror
Shines the image of God.

The verse reminds English readers of Wordsworth’s joy in the peaceful processes of nature, of how he hymned the daisy and the daffodil, the violet and the lesser celandine, finding a gracious and loving presence in the midst:

The Being that is in the clouds and air,
That is in the green leaves among the groves,
Maintains a deep and reverential care
For the unoffending creatures whom he loves.

But just as Aldous Huxley has reminded us that Wordsworth’s picture of nature might have been far different had he lived in a tropical jungle, in the stifling darkness and among the malevolently tangled rattans, so Heim stresses the brutality of the struggle for existence. He catalogues the plants provided with spike, barb, and sting. He speaks of acacias which harbour a type of poisonous ant as a protection against attack by a species of black ant.
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He describes the warfare waged by fungus, mildew and heather, the conflict of moor and forest. Even at its most innocent, in the world of plants, organic nature is a life-and-death struggle.¹

Now this whole process is the result of a primal Fall, of which we have the record in Genesis and Romans, when man shook himself off from the Eternal, from God.² That act affected not only the succeeding generations of men but the whole of nature. In the Cross of Christ, God has indeed spoken a word which is strong enough to still our fears at the approach of death, to assure us that the eternal relationship will be restored to those who accept the promise of restoration made in Christ and rest in his completed work.³ Jesus is truly the long promised Son of Man, and the Sermon on the Mount portrays the character of his kingdom, but the new world of God has not really broken in. Human reason is still impotent. The body with its passions and its inevitable decay is still there. The era of the kingdoms ruled over by beasts of prey, as in the visions of the Book of Daniel, is not yet over. The period of force, violence and destruction between men and nations is to continue, though within the Church itself no such methods may be employed. For the faith one can only suffer, but for national safety and honour one must

² Heim, Die Weltanschauung der Bibel, p. 42.
³ Ibid., p. 64.
follow where the State wills to lead. Only in the "last days" does Micah promise that it will be feasible to beat our swords into ploughshares, when God will intervene and recreate all nature, and when, in Isaiah's phrase "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb and the leopard lie down with the kid." Meanwhile man is impotent and grace unavailing to transform human life as we know it. ¹

Claiming to reiterate the principles of the Reformation over against Catholic doctrine, Professor Brunner holds that it is impossible and dangerous to assign a large place to reason in the foundation of the Christian ethic. ² Reason must be subservient to the revealed will of God. Since it is morally "fallen" it must derive its principles from the Bible, though since it is not "formally" degenerate it is still able to apply those norms. And the whole Bible is the source of moral guidance, the Old Testament perhaps even more so than the New, where God speaks as Creator and Judge rather than as Redeemer. For ethics is concerned with "the preservation of life within the realm of sin and not with winning man for the realm of redemption." ³ It is of course the will and purpose of God to establish a kingdom of fellowship among men, and this would have been brought to pass within the bounds of the Creator's loving ordinances for the family, economic life and the community of nations, had not man torn himself

¹ Heim, Unpublished Lectures on Social Ethics, 1934-1935.
² E. Brunner, Natur und Gnade (Tübingen, 1934), p. 44.
³ E. Brunner, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen (Tübingen, 1932), p. 255.
loose from his central relationship to God. But since that time these ordinances exist only as conditioned by sin. This is especially true of the State, which exists to control the sin of believers and unbelievers alike, by force and violence. Men are "justified," brought into forgiven fellowship with God, when in faith they hear Christ speaking to them from the Cross, of his atoning work; but they remain sinners. They require to be treated as objects, not as persons; they must be regulated by violence, not by love. So there can never be a Christian State, guided by the Golden Rule, the principles of the Sermon on the Mount. Within and without, the State must continue to be erected on force. "There will be struggle between the peoples as long as men remain sinners, that is, till the resurrection of the dead. And the battle will be fought out till the end of time with the utmost brutality." We must indeed root out modern war which is futile and does not attain the ends for which that struggle is designed, but it will be succeeded by some kind of international conflict which will better achieve its purpose.

An extreme but very characteristic instance of the Biblicism of modern German theology is to be found in a brochure by a former student of Heim's, Professor Althaus of Erlangen. The ordinances of human life—marriage, the State, etc.—are recognised by reason, but discovered only by faith to be the

1 E. Brunner, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, pp. 194, 320.
2 Ibid., pp. 431, 447.
3 Ibid., p. 451.
4 Ibid., p. 458.
5 Vide supra, p. 13.
CONCLUSION

creation of God,¹ and we encounter them only as defaced by sin. Thus:

In the organisation of men into races and peoples we recognise the creative profusion of God, who in this case once again sets up individualised life. But this organisation is at the same time separation. There is an antipathy which separates races and peoples; and it is a feeling which cannot be suppressed by conscious effort in the name of love to humanity or the brotherhood of all mankind. That is the truth behind the story of the Tower of Babel; it is human guilt which causes misunderstanding between peoples! Love to one’s nation and fatherland appears on the surface to be imprinted with the pure nobility of a gift of God, a divine purpose. And yet it is inevitably bound up with antipathy, anger and hatred . . . is characterised by original sin, by the primal curse. All politics are conditioned by the Fall.²

True, Jesus has come and preached the kingdom of God, which is to overcome sin and death. In it the ordinances, especially as modified by the Fall, will cease to apply. Jesus has conquered Satan and the demons, and announces forgiveness. But, though this victory is at bottom won, it has not yet become an open reality. Death has been conquered, but men still die. The ordinances continue to apply in this world of sin and death, and will remain in force till the Last Judgment. Even should war be done away there is no hope of reconciliation and co-operation between the

¹ P. Althaus, *Die Theologie der Ordnungen* (Gütersloh, 1934) p. 7.
peoples of mankind; the struggle will be carried on in all bitterness, suspicion and distrust.

However much these theologians may differ among themselves, it is at least clear that they are at one with Luther in stressing the Bible as, for Christians, the paramount source of information on moral problems and above all its doctrine of the depravity of human nature. As long as this world lasts we cannot escape from sin, injustice, and international strife. Once, of course, their premises are granted, their conclusion follows naturally and logically. If sin is as deeply ingrained as they teach that it is, then it is indeed unlikely that even God himself could repair the damage. But have they rightly interpreted the Christian Gospel. Are *Genesis* and *Romans* the necessary presupposition to an understanding of Jesus? And is there no light to be thrown on human nature and the problem of international relations by science and natural theology, by the unbiased study of the nature of war and peace as human problems? These are the questions which the "liberal" Christian at least is bound to raise.

(d) *Liberalism*

Many Christians are actuated by ideals which are not primarily derived from Church or Bible or Gospel but from the liberal culture of modern times, which descends from the Renaissance and the *Aufklärung*. The anti-war movements of the last hundred years have obtained their ideology largely from that optimistic view of man which
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came with the rebirth of literature and art in the sixteenth, of science in the seventeenth, and of political and social institutions in the late eighteenth century. They are inspired by the faith that, just as man has conquered distance and diminished disease, has measured the stars, has enshrined his longings in immortal forms of beauty, so he will eventually be able to transform and humanise international relationships. Grotius, Rousseau and Kant were the progenitors of the movement, President Wilson’s dreams after the World War the latest descendants of importance.

One of the best recent examples of an amalgam of liberal and Christian thought is to be found in Miss Boeckel’s *The Turn Toward Peace*. It is not written from a theological standpoint but it does urge a point of view for which the co-operation of the Churches is urged and expected. The attitude of the author is determined by her analysis of modern social conditions. Peace is prepared for by the achievements of modern industry and modern science. “The prosperity of millions of the everyday men and women of the United States is dependent on both the products and the purchases of peoples in other parts of the world, and it is therefore only as others prosper that we can prosper.” Modern inventions, again, “represent the combined efforts and co-operation of scientists from age to age and from many countries. Modern civilisation is as dependent upon exchange of knowledge as upon

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exchange of materials." ¹ In various fields, moreover, organised international effort is already achieving wonders and the range of its effectiveness may be increased: "To-day the Universal Postal Union is to all intents and purposes a small section of an international government, for, although its rulings are subject to ratification by the legislative bodies of the nations, no nation can afford to rebel and cut its citizens off from the advantages of the service which it provides."² Similarly, the development of the method of nation-wide justice to supersede civil chaos, points to the inevitability of a system of international law such as Grotius wrote of:

The Supreme Court was accepted by the people of the United States, in spite of the risks involved, because they recognised the pressing economic and political necessity for a stable and orderly government. A similar necessity confronts the nations of the world to-day, making the acceptance of the World Court equally imperative . . .³

Lastly, the causes of war are either such as intelligent organisation can mitigate, like economic rivalry, or such as better education can remove, like race prejudice, which is acquired and not inborn.⁴

But optimistic liberalism is not confined to the young and vigorous continent of America. The late Canon Sheppard welcomed Bertrand Russell's book, Which Way to Peace?—the plea of an agnostic liberal for an eventual international government

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and police force—as “a great contribution to the cause of peace.” And Mr Leyton Richards, though not omitting motives derived from the Gospels, is very often inspired by liberal ideas current in Great Britain. He believes in the possibility of creating in the economic world “an order of life upon a co-operative basis governed by intelligent planning,” a necessary preliminary to which is the abolition of war. The United States of America and the British Commonwealth of Nations are present examples of the substitution of Federalism for Nationalism. To avoid international complications men need primarily to get to know each other better:

The most important feature of the League is not the constitutional procedure by which it carries on its work at Geneva, but the fact that—in the lobbies and precincts of the Assembly Hall and on hotel terraces—the official representatives of more than fifty nations rub shoulders, offer each other cigarettes, sip coffee together, laugh at the same jests, respond to the same human appeal.

And he naturally argues from civil police to an international army as a goal which civilised society may well reach, though Christians—by which he means radical disciples of Jesus—could not take part in the activities of such an organisation.

Such viewpoints depend on the assumption that the universe is essentially rational and man essentially good. They are dominated by the idea of progress,

2 Ibid., p. 96.
and are manifestly related to the spirit which pro-
duced the independent republics of France and
America. It is not surprising that Miss Boeckel
dedicated her book: "To the memory of my
Father, Albert Brewer, because, like his ancestor
who signed the Declaration of Independence at the
age of seventy-six, he possessed such courage and
readiness for the future as are needed in the world
to-day." But though deriving its view of the
universe and society from modern conditions and
modern thought, the liberal school in the tradition
of Grotius can and does ally itself with the Churches
and with an interpretation of the teaching of Christ,
the view of Christianity which stresses the Father-
hood of God and the brotherhood of man.

2. TOWARDS A CHRISTIAN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The study of past and present Christian thought
on the subject of war and peace helps one, if not
to an immediately satisfying solution of the problem,
at least to an understanding of the issues involved
and an appreciation of opposing points of view. This
diversity of opinion is discovered not to be the result
of muddled thinking but to represent certain well-
defined traditions not only of ethical but of theo-
logical thought. To one or other of these types,
or to some combination of them, we all belong,
though we naturally choose one position in
preference to another. I have myself been led
from initial sympathy with absolute pacifism based
on the spirit of the Gospels, to an increasing respect
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for a more mediating position, above all as expounded by the liberal school of thought. Most of the position which I hold will have become fairly obvious from the introduction and from the criticisms which I have made of the various thinkers which have come under review. Here I wish simply to arrange my conclusions.

When one has lived in Central Europe for any length of time, one comes away in a state of tension, with the feeling that war is likely to break out at any moment, that civilisation is cracking, and that all that matters is the relation of the individual soul to God. But that apocalyptic mood passes as one moves north through Great Britain, and disappears as soon as one has crossed the Atlantic. Even if war, a devastating war, is about to engulf the world, the important question which we have to ask ourselves is not what we will do when it happens, whether we will join in and perish fighting for what is precious to us and to our country, or whether we will stay out as far as possible and by martyrdom witness to a higher mode of existence. Whichever course we choose, we will be caught up in the struggle, and when it is over we will be back fundamentally where we are now, in a world of injustice and desirous of seeing justice done. So that the fundamental question which we must put to ourselves is: How can international justice be secured? The normal condition of human life is not a choice between God or Devil, war or peace at any price. It is a three-cornered affair in which love and hate and
justice, God and anti-God and also the world, are of account.

That, too, is why we cannot separate the problem of modern war from that of war in general. It is not of the first importance that chemical warfare is to-day of so terrible a nature that if widely employed it would be suicidal for civilisation and utterly repugnant to the Christian conscience. Even if men are sensible and good enough to abrogate it, we are still left with the much deeper problem of how followers of Christ can reconcile themselves to the use of violence and coercion at all, the only methods which have approved themselves on a wide scale against the bully and the enemy of society.

One cannot but have the deepest respect for those who take literally the words and example of Jesus, who relinquish the world and the rights of themselves and their fellows, and seek only the kingdom of God. They have made the values of Jesus the chief, the only concern of life, and they are prepared to follow him in martyrdom for them. All who call themselves Christians must learn from them at least not to become so absorbed in this world that nothing else counts. It may not be possible for all to follow exactly in the footsteps of the historic Jesus, but we would all sit at his feet and catch something of the Christ-spirit, and so work that that spirit may leaven the life of the whole world. The organised Church has not in the past made enough room for the absolute Christian pacifist. To Augustine he was a heretic
CONCLUSION

and a Manichee, to Luther a Schwärmer or fanatic; Grotius wanted him to pay excess taxes. Catholic, Protestant and Liberal have regarded him as dangerous and un-Christian in any practical sense of the term. But that is a mistaken point of view: for without the witness of the Christian pacifist the testimony of the Church and the life of the world would be impoverished. Something of infinite value to humanity, the unshakeable demonstration of the inner and other world would be lost. We need to recognise varieties of Christian experience, and to accept the validity of that which bases itself on the religion of the Synoptic Gospels, and as part of its expression of the love of God rejects not only modern war but force and violence as a means of implementing international law.

At almost the opposite pole from the "synoptic" Christian is the "evangelical." He is fully conscious that the Christian is in the world and cannot escape from it. But it is a sinful world which has him in its toils. The words "progress" and "reform" are anathema to him; the world is getting worse and worse until the Judgment Day, and we are heading for the final Armageddon. The redeemed will be saved in their souls but in their bodies they are part of this world and condemned to partake of its sin and warfare. They cannot hope to create a spiritual oasis where the principles of the Sermon on the Mount will flourish; synopticism is illusion; and it is not even Christian, for the evangel of Christ is not to be found simply in
the Gospels but in all the writings which he inspired in the Old and New Testaments. If “evangelical” Christianity is thus far removed from “synopticism” it is no less so from the thought of the liberal school. For between those who deny and those who affirm the right of reason to a place in the formation of a Christian philosophy of life, between the pessimistic and the optimistic view of man, it is difficult to find common ground. The evangelical admits that the Christian is partly at least of this world; but he will not concede that it is basically a good world. But the liberal rises to the thought of a good “beyond” only because he has first found a good “here.” Yet the conception of Luther that our sinful nature demands the existence of a judicial system reinforced by sanctions, might, if extended into the international sphere, open the way to co-operation between evangelical and liberal Christians in the building of a righteous international order.

Catholic Christianity has, on the other hand, considerable areas of thought in common with liberalism. That seems at first sight strange when one thinks of the Index, and of the obscurantism and rigidity which have so unfortunately characterised the Roman communion since the Council of Trent and even more since the Vatican Council. Nevertheless the Roman Church is leavened with the spirit of liberalism. It found Abelard too much for it, but Saint Thomas has been called, not without justification, “the prince of mediæval modernists,” and his teaching is to-day normative
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in that communion. This kinship with modernism comes from the distinction in Catholic thought between natural and revealed theology, and from its insistence on nature as well as grace, on justice and coercion as well as love. The fundamental insight of St Augustine, that the Earthly City must continue in time alongside the City of God, was perpetuated in the system of St Thomas Aquinas and is still dominant in Roman theology to-day. These are points at which the liberal can make real contact. He rejoices naturally that the Renaissance and the Reformation freed him from the tyranny of the priest, but following Grotius, he looks back sympathetically at the older communion and refashions many of the ideas which it brought to birth.

In the specific problem of war and peace, he is indebted to the Roman Church for its rediscovery of the just war. The modern liberal would not go as far as Grotius and join with Catholic theology in affirming the justice of war waged on a national basis; the determination of justice in a dispute between nations must be in the hands of a supranational court. It alone can determine a just cause and put the award in the hands of a competent authority. But then the use of violence and the taking of life even on a wide scale would be justifiable; such a "war" is just. And for the formulation of the solution liberalism owes a great debt to the Church of Rome.

But liberalism is not a mere child of Catholicism. The liberal appeals to natural theology, but not
CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TO WAR AND PEACE

so much to the ideas of Aristotle and Cicero as to what science and history, what human experience as a whole, can tell us of the nature of the world and of man. He listens with an open mind to the conclusions of physicists and biologists, historians and economists. He learns that the universe is infinitely old and incredibly vast, that human nature is the product of a long selective process, and that the conduct of life depends on the understanding and control of physiological and economic mechanisms. Life is a curious mixed affair, and progress is accompanied by many set-backs. But though pugnacity is something instinctive to man, it is not uncontrollable, nor is it the only drive which he possesses. Altruism is already deep in his being, and so is rational planning of his existence. Thus war is not finally inevitable; its form may be changed. As private war in the form of the blood-feud has been eliminated within national states, so national war may be eradicated from the society of nations and make way for the reign of law and a police-army.

But the liberal Christian appeals also, as did Catholicism, to revealed theology, though by that again he means something rather different. The liberal does not give unquestioned allegiance to Holy Writ, even to the Gospels, and still less to the decisions of the Ecumenical Councils. Revealed truth is to him not so much a body of accurate information as a vehicle of the spirit, the witness of faith and love and supreme devotion. He knows that there are things which he cannot weigh in a
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measure, or tie down to concepts. The beauty of art and poetry and music, as well as goodness and the things of God, escape laboratory investigation or even the efforts of discursive reason. The Gospels may seem to leave reason and the world out of account altogether, but one may find there a life which kindles life and light and love in the beholder. It may be difficult, almost impossible, to bring it into full union with the life and thought of everyday; but it is as real; at times even more real. And so the liberal at his best depends very definitely on that light on the nature of ultimate Reality which shines from the pages of the Bible and above all of the Gospels. His faith in God, whom he there sees as the loving Father and the great Deliverer, at work in the time-process, creatively moulding events to express a spiritual purpose, bringing triumph even out of the supreme agony of the Cross,—that faith inspires him as nothing else can with the hope that justice and righteousness shall at length prevail and peace be brought into the dwellings of men. But first justice and then peace.

We cannot hope for a united Christian front to the problem of war; but we can work for a closer co-operation among Christian groups which have so many fundamental principles in common. Perhaps it is even more important that we should co-operate more effectively with those outside the Visible Church, who share that liberal philosophy from which the Church itself has learned to profit. But however black the international situation may
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be, and however disunited the Church may show itself, the liberal Christian is not wholly despondent. He believes that his principles are in accordance with ultimate Reality, and that, if not now then in coming generations, and as the fruit of much patient labour, those principles will be realised in the conduct of disputes between the nations of the world. And as an immediate task, as the essential means of establishing international law, he will work for a truly international court and an effective international police-army.
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