KARL HESM'S CONCEPTION OF THE APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

A Dissertation Prepared for the University of Edinburgh

by

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In order to clarify my declaration as to the preparation of my thesis, I present the following statement:-

The content of the thesis is the result of my own efforts with such help from books as is indicated - although perhaps inadequately - by my footnotes, and especially from such books and persons as are indicated in my acknowledgments, together with Rev. J.J. Murry, from whom some relatively unimportant suggestions have been adopted.

The composition of the thesis is essentially my own. However, much of the writing was done with a rapidity that left many mistakes in punctuation and spelling, and even omitted much necessary punctuation. These errors in spelling and punctuation - matters in which I am at best none too proficient - have been for the most part corrected by my wife. When this work was complete I went over the whole again and so did my wife. Afterwards we divided the work of proof reading and correcting the manuscript which my typist returned to me.

The assistances mentioned above I take to be legitimate. However, in order that my work might be presented under no misapprehensions I have considered it wise to call attention to these matters.

"Thomas E. Hill".
The presentation of our subject in the three parts into which it has been divided was the suggestion of Professor W.P. Paterson.

The content of the dissertation has taken shape under the influence of ideas from a multitude of sources, as indicated by the footnotes and the bibliography. The books that have been most useful are: the various editions of Professor Heim's works, Professor Daniel Lamont's "Christ and the World of Thought," Professor John Baillie's "Interpretation of Religion", the two series of "Contemporary British Philosophy", D.S. Robinson's "Anthology of Recent Philosophy", Pfleiderer's "Development of Theology", and Kattenbusch's Die Deutsche Evangelische Theologie seit Schleiermacher. The two collections of philosophical writings have presented an excellent sketch of modern epistemological thought. Professor Lamont's book has been especially helpful in the interpretation of Heim's general theory, and Professor Baillie's book has furnished a splendid historical and interpretative background. The books of Pfleiderer and Kattenbusch, together with a similar book of Grützmacher and Frank, has helped to clarify the historical situation out of which Heim's theology comes. Apart from the above books, the class lectures and personal advice of Professor Lamont and Professor Heim have been a considerable asset.

In the preparation of the manuscript the assistance of my wife has been invaluable. Except for her untiring efforts in reading proof and making numerous corrections in punctuation and spelling the completion of the manuscript within the allotted time would have been impossible. The final typing was done mainly by the North Business College of Fayetteville, North Carolina, U.S.A. All of these contributions are gratefully acknowledged.
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The dissertation which follows these prefatory remarks is a discussion of Karl Heim's conception of the approach (1) to knowledge of God.

The term knowledge is not confined to that which can be logically demonstrated or scientifically verified, but is used to include any kind of awareness of a thing. Knowledge of God is the principal theme. However, inasmuch as Professor Heim regards the examination of the whole knowledge question as essential to a proper view of knowledge of God, and devotes a large part of his attention to a preliminary consideration of that topic, the discussion necessarily moves not infrequently in the field of general epistemology.

Of the various problems involved in an examination of knowledge, attention is directed, in accord with the emphasis of Heim's work, primarily to the problem of structure or form. However, other problems are dealt with as occasion arises.

The first section of the dissertation is a presentation of Heim's views of knowledge. Since only one book of Heim's (excluding a few books of essays and sermons) has been translated into English, a faithful presentation of Heim's views would seem to be of more value than an interpretative analysis of Heim's thought. Thus, while the section in question contains numerous explanatory remarks, it is primarily an endeavor to enable the reader to follow Heim's thought step by step. Interpretation in the light of what other writers have said and critical analysis have been reserved for later sections.

Emphasis is placed throughout upon Heim's present views, since they represent his more mature thought. However, it is scarcely possible to understand the later thought of a writer apart from the process of the development of that writer's thought, nor is it fair to judge a writer entirely by one period of his writings. Accordingly, a discussion of the development of Heim's thought, as well as an effort to determine its constant factors, is included. Moreover, the thought of Heim's earlier books, especially the second edition of Glaube und Denken, is from time to time referred to throughout. Nevertheless, in our presentation of Heim's views, as well as in later sections of

(1) The Word approach might better have been left out since it has a tendency to narrow the discussion unduly. However, inasmuch as the title as it stands has been accepted by the Board of Studies and the Senatus of the University, we have allowed the word to remain, designating by it the way by which men come to know God, and God makes Himself known to men.
the thesis, Heim's present views are our primary concern, references to the earlier forms of his thought being of an introductory and explanatory character.

The second section of the dissertation is an attempt to determine the place of Heim's views concerning knowledge of God in modern thought. Taking as its province the entire field of Occidental thought in the post-Renaissance period, the dissertation by no means undertakes to deal with all of the important writers of the era, but endeavors to show the relation of Heim's thought to such tendencies of the period as have had the significant part in the formulation contemporary thought concerning knowledge of God. Even regarding the living tendencies, the attempt is not made to present an exhaustive study, but rather to call attention to the particular features in which strong influences have been brought to bear upon Heim's thought, and in which striking resemblances influences or differences between the tendency in question and Heim's theory appear.

The third section of the dissertation is an attempt to set forth the chief merits and the major weaknesses of Professor Heim's idea of knowledge of God.

Being a critical investigation of Heim's theory, rather than a systematic discourse upon the problem itself, the analysis does not ask of Heim's theory that it conform to some preconceived system. Rather, beginning with those commonly recognized facts of knowledge, morality, and religion, concerning which every theory of knowledge of God must give an account, and being guided by those basic canons of logic and good taste which are indispensable to any scientific treatise, it attempts to call attention to that in which Heim's theory throws significant light upon the facts involved in, or directly connected with, religious knowledge, and that in which his theory misinterprets or obscures those facts, that in which his theory is true to its own principles, and that in which it is inconsistent with itself.
INTRODUCTION

Such recent publications as Professor Clement Webb's "Religious Thought in England from 1850", W. M. Horton's "Contemporary English Theology", and E. E. Aubrey's "Present Theological Tendencies" have made it abundantly clear that recent theological thought in English speaking countries is turning from an extreme liberalism to a more conservative position. On every hand, often from the most unexpected quarters, a new note is being sounded. However, no satisfactory leadership of the new movement has thus far appeared. The majority of theologians are by no means content with the rigidity of the older Fundamentalism. The European reaction against Liberalism in theology has culminated in the Barthian movement. But the theology of this movement is too obviously one-sided to be taken as more than a corrective of Liberalism. Numerous attempts have been made by British and American theologians to give expression to the newer conservatism. However, most of these efforts seem to be rather hastily assimilated eclectic treatises than mature systematic studies. Although they help to fill the gap, they are no adequate foundation for a type of positive theology that combines the good in Liberalism and Conservatism. On the whole, no satisfactory systematic treatment of the general position toward which recent theology seems to be tending has yet appeared in the English speaking world.

Certainly it would be too much to say that such a satisfactory study is found in the writings of any continental theologian. However, there are adequate reasons for one to expect to find in the writings of Professor Karl Heim significant contributions toward the statement of a prolegomena to a theology that is conservative and yet does not lose sight of the abiding values of liberalism. By natural endowment, early training, and philosophical and theological preparation, Heim has been admirably equipped to make just such a contribution.

Heim has the literary genius and the speculative tendency that has been so abundantly manifest in his native Wurtemburg. He was reared in a conservative church. His university training, however, brought him into intimate contact with that modern classical philosophy from which liberal theology draws its inspiration. In the years since his student days, Heim has followed almost every significant philosophical movement, being particularly impressed by the post war disillusionment and relativism that undermined theological liberalism.

Moreover, while other theologians have been busy working out the dogmatics of a liberal theology, the main stream of Heim's thought has been occupied with an endeavor to present a foundation for a more realistic theology, a theology that allows full play to relativism and yet points out the triumph of faith. For the past twenty five years all of his books, save the volumes
of essays and sermons, have been efforts to this end. How, Heim has asked, can the Christian have certainty?

To the presentation of his central theme Heim has brought a thorough knowledge of medieval philosophy and theology, a keen insight into modern classical philosophy, and a sympathetic reading of contemporary philosophy, as well as a remarkably precise grasp of recent scientific discovery.

Professor Heim's unusual erudition, together with the keenness of his own insights and the brilliancy of his literary style, have established his position as the foremost theologian in Germany today. His following among ministers and theological professors is probably larger than that of any other teacher in Germany. The number of students who attend his lectures was until three years ago, and probably until the present, considerably larger than the number who attended the lectures of any other theological professor.

In the light of the above facts one may expect to find in Professor Heim's thought a significant mature statement of the foundations of religious knowledge, a statement which gives clear recognition to the established gains of liberalism and at the same time preserves those ancient doctrines to which modern relativism has obliged theology to return. It will become clear in the succeeding pages, that although this expectation is not entirely fulfilled, the achievements of Heim's books are among the most significant endeavors in this direction.

Only one of Professor Heim's books (apart from volumes of essays and sermons) has appeared in English. It is high time his systematic thought were becoming known to the English speaking world. Inasmuch as the interpretation of knowledge of God is probably the most significant feature of Heim's analysis of the foundations of religion, it has been deemed expedient to present the following effort to interpret Heim to English speaking readers in terms of that subject.
PART I

A PRESENTATION OF HEIM'S THEORY

Karl Heim's theory of knowledge of God is not the product of a single intense inquiry. Rather, it is the culmination of a continuous chain of inquiries which has found expression in a series of books, most of which are devoted to a single problem. The conclusions at which Heim has arrived from time to time manifest considerable variety. Thus the ideas presented successively in Das Weltbild der Zukunft, the second and third editions of Glaubensgewissheit, and the second edition of Glaube und Denken are so at variance with one another that at least four distinct theories can be traced. However, as a matter of fact, not only is there, as we shall see later, a definite and understandable progress from each of these books to the next, there are also certain elements which remain constant throughout the entire series and a sort of magnetic center about which all of Heim's thought concerning knowledge of God swings.

In order to achieve a just conception of Heim's thought it is necessary before tracing his present ideas in detail to attain a proper grasp of the above mentioned elements of his thought as a whole. Accordingly, we propose to present a brief sketch of those basic tendencies which are so characteristic of Heim that they appear in all of his books, to trace the changing aspects of Heim's thought through their various stages, and to attempt to discover the magnetic center of Heim's thought concerning knowledge of God. Only after this has been accomplished, shall we attempt to present a detailed account of Heim's thought as represented by its present form.

Entering first upon the discussion of the persistent elements in Heim's thought, we divide the subject, for reasons that will appear later, into three sections: A. Heim's general approach to the problem of knowledge of God; B. His idea of knowledge in general; C. His idea of knowledge of God.

I. The Persistent Elements in the Thought of Heim

A. As to General Approach to Subject

(i) The Insistence that It Is Complete Certainty that Is To Be Dealt with in a Theory of Knowledge of God.

That with which a theory of Christian knowledge of God must deal is in Heim's thought complete certainty. Neither scientific probability, insecure hope, isolated feeling, nor imperfect representation will suffice (1). That which is to be described

(1) Heim: Das Weltbild der Zukunft, p.238.
is nothing short of a knowledge that has the same degree of certainty as immediate perception or the axioms of mathematics and logic. Religious certainty may differ in kind from the certainty of mathematics, but it is never less in degree. The conviction that this is the character of religious certainty runs through all of Heim's books(1).

(II) The Insistence upon the Necessity of Dealing with the Entire Knowledge Problem.

Heim's persistent idea of knowledge of God as a complete certainty accounts in part for a second permanent emphasis in his thought; namely, the belief that the true approach to the problem of knowledge of God is one which attacks the entire knowledge problem from a religious point of view.

From the time of his earliest important book(2) in which he attempted to present a new concept of knowledge, Heim has manifested a considerable impatience with all those theories concerning knowledge of God which fail to grapple with the general problem of knowledge as well as the particular problem of knowledge of God(3). Heim believes that it is impossible to show in terms of the accepted idea of knowledge, how certainty of belief in God can be attained(4). He is equally convinced that no theory which places the truths of religion in a special class, distinct from all other knowledge, is tenable(5). Those theories of knowledge which were current until recently provide no adequate place for the value judgments of religion, while attempts to isolate the truths of religion provide no basis for a certainty that applies in practical life.(6)

Thus we find Heim insisting that if the foundation of faith is to be secure, the Christian thinker must start at the beginning and discover a theory of knowledge in general which is capable of giving adequate recognition to the validity of the trust judgments of religion.

"Theory of Knowledge" as well as "Theory of Knowledge of God" must be approached from a religious point of view. True to this conviction, Heim devotes more than half the space in

(2) Heim: Das Weltbild der Zukunft, 1914.
(5) Heim: Das Weltbild der Zukunft, p. 252 ff, and Heim: Glaubensgewissheit, dritte Auflage, p. 50 ff.
(6) Heim: Das Weltbild der Zukunft, p. 235 ff.
his systematic works to the general epistemological problem.

It may indeed be noted that in his more recent books under the title *Glaube und Denken* Heim is not quite so insistent upon the necessity of approaching the entire knowledge problem in independence of secular theories. As the full title of his recent books (Der evangelische Glaube und das Denken der Gegenwart) would indicate, Heim now takes over much from contemporary philosophy. However, he is still quite as insistent as ever that a theory of knowledge of God must be based upon a proper conception of knowledge in general. The lessened emphasis upon independence is a recognition of the fact that the philosophy of recent years is becoming more open to a religious point of view, rather than a withdrawal of the insistence upon the need for a theory of religious knowledge that is religious in its general theory, as well as in its special theological theory. *Glaube und Denken*, in each of its various editions, like Heim's earlier books, devotes about two-thirds of its space to the general epistemological problem.

B. As to Knowledge in General

(I) A Dynamic View of Knowledge

The reason for Heim's belief that a re-examination of the whole knowledge question is necessary for an adequate idea of religious certainty is a deep rooted conviction that what he calls the traditional conception of knowledge is basically incompatible with belief in God.(1) Accordingly, his general analysis of knowledge has been an attempt to break down these traditional conceptions and establish in their place a new dynamic view of knowledge which will accord the claims of faith.

By traditional idea of knowledge Heim means those pre-critical views which prevailed up to the time of Kant and have been to a considerable extent carried over beyond Kant. What he has in mind is the general thought shared, he holds, alike by Realists and Idealists, that the "I" is a sort of a spiritual substance located in a body out upon a world of events which follow a law of cause and effect.(2)

Two lines of argument Heim repeatedly sets forth, in the attempt to overthrow this point of view and to establish in its place his own dynamic view. The first of these is a reference to the antinomies to which the traditional view inevi-

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tably leads, the riddles of Zeno and the antinomies of Kant. (1) If in knowledge a conscious substance is grasping something which has static existence, knowledge is nonsense, for such contradictions as the statement that space is neither limited nor unlimited must be affirmed. But if knowledge is basically a meeting of will with will, the antinomies do not arise, and there is reason to believe that there can be real assurance in mutual trust. Such is Heim's first line of argument. His second is a reference to certain facts, such as the distinctiveness of the now point, which cannot be accounted for in terms of the traditional view. (2) If a conscious subject looks out on a static world, then here and now are no more significant than any other point in the time line; but here and now must be recognized as of special significance. Hence, the old view must be replaced by a new one. Certain additional arguments are emphasized in the more radical criticism of the traditional view in Glaube und Denken, but as they are no part of the persistent elements in the thought of Heim, we reserve the discussion of them for a later section of the dissertation.

The general view of knowledge which Heim undertakes to establish in place of the traditional one against which he contends, may be described in general as a dynamic view. The world is not made up of conscious and unconscious substances, but rather of living wills. (3) Every event is a meeting of wills, and all knowledge is at base volitional. Hence trust judgments, instead of being a kind of second rate knowledge, comprise the surest knowledge that we have. (4) To be sure, reality is constantly objectified as it passes into consciousness, so that trust judgments can be thought to be secondary to observed facts, but basically, knowledge is volitional and trust judgments are supreme.

(II) A Theory of Levels of Knowledge

In his earliest important book, Das Weltbild der Zukunft, 1904, Heim undertook to obliterate distinctions between thought and being, consciousness and reality, and reduced the world to a realm of wills. He soon came to find, however, that, whatever the world might be ultimately, our thought inevitably makes certain distinctions which cannot be ignored. This led Heim to develop a theory of levels of knowledge, which has in some form been present in all of his subsequent books. Heim believes that the world may be confronted on deeper or more superficial levels. He holds that the deeper levels of knowledge consists fundamen-

(1) Cp. Ibid., zweite Auflage, pp. 54-123.
(3) Ibid, p. 179, ff.
tally in intercourse between wills and that the more superficial levels are represented by the observation of objects.

It is unnecessary to present a more detailed account of the theory of levels, since its most recent and highly developed form will be followed with considerable care when we come to speak of Heim's present theory.

C. As to Knowledge of God.

(I) Knowledge of God as Trust in Christ

In view of Heim's general conception of knowledge, it is not surprising to find him saying that knowledge of God is primarily personal trust.

From the time of his earliest publications Heim has rejected the idea that knowledge of God is of the nature of perception or logical deduction. Faith stands over against all such forms of knowledge as a personal trust. (1) Observation and logical reasoning yield neutral or objective truth, but the knowledge of faith is never neutral. (2) Religious knowledge always makes its demands of believers. God is never to be viewed from the standpoint of the spectator; rather, He is the eternal "Thou". Faith, in contrast to all objective knowledge, is the assurance, beyond all perceptive or rational evidence, that another can be depended upon. (3)

The person toward Whom trust must be directed if there is to be knowledge of God is Jesus Christ. In Heim's own account of the development of his thought, in the third edition of Glaube und Leben, Heim speaks of Christ as the great Mountain through which the stream of his thought has repeatedly tried to break. (4) Jesus Christ has always been for Heim of central importance. He has had little sympathy with attempts to attain a syncretistic religion, even though Christ be thought of as the culmination of such a religion. Thus, for example, in a lecture entitled Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte (5) Heim rejects the idea that Christ stands at the top of the pyramid of religion and presses the claim that Christianity stands in an Either-Or relation to other religions. True, Heim seeks from time to time to discover general categories in terms of which to describe religious certainty, but those categories are always intended to represent what Christ is to the believer, (6) and not a certainty that may be attained apart from Christ, as well as in Him.

(2) Ibid., pp. 286, 287, 250, 251.
(3) Heim: Glaubensgewissheit, dritte Auflage, p. 17 ff.
(6) Heim: Glaube und Leben, p. 25.
(II) A Theory of Synthesis of Immediate Certainty and Authority

The trust judgment and, in particular, personal trust in Christ as the surest kind of knowledge is supposed by Heim to transcend the distinction between immediate experiencing and authoritative deliverance. Personal trust in Christ has its roots in a deeper realm where these distinctions do not arise. However, even in Heim's thought, the above mentioned distinctions can never be quite left behind.

The insistence upon the fact of immediate certainty, and the idea that our knowledge of God depends upon the authority of God in Christ are, for Heim, conflicting tendencies that will continue to appear as such as long as the human mind continues to objectify reality. Seeing the necessity of recognizing both sides and the artificiality of placing them in coordinate relation, Heim has repeatedly presented, in some form or other, a theory of synthesis of immediate experiencing and authority. The synthesis itself is always present in his thought; the degree to which the opposition between the two tendencies is recognized, and the peculiar emphasis within the synthesis varies from one book to another. A fuller discussion of this subject will be given presently.

II. The Successive Stages in the Thought of Heim

According to the above sketch the elements in Heim's thought which persist throughout all of the changing forms of his theory are: 1. His general approach to the problem of knowledge of God, an approach which includes a conviction that it is complete certainty which is to be dealt with, and a consequent insistence

(1) Since the terms authority and experiencing will be frequently used in our discussion of Heim's thought, we must pause to furnish an explanation of them that will suffice until we have occasion to discuss them further in our attempt to find the place of Heim in modern thought. In all knowledge there are, roughly speaking, two elements: that which the knower does, and that which inheres in the object, an immediacy and an otherness. Now, it is held by a great many writers that, where knowledge of God is concerned, that which inheres in the known is never discoverable by the knower but must be willingly disclosed to him by God. Nevertheless, if we really know God at all we must apprehend God for ourselves. Hence, by authority we mean a sovereign disclosure of that concerning God which could not have been discovered, and by experiencing, we mean our own apprehension of God. The word experiencing is chosen in preference to the word experience since the former is more distinctly contrasted with the otherness in what is known.
upon attacking the entire knowledge problem; 2. certain features of his idea of knowledge in general, including a dynamic world view, and a theory of levels of knowledge; 3. certain features of his theory of knowledge of God, including an insistence upon the central place of Christ, and a theory of synthesis of inner certainty and authoritative representation. The aspects of Helm's theory which, in contrast to the above, have passed through numerous changes are: 1. the degree to which levels of knowledge are recognized, 2. the measure in which the idea of opposition between experiencing and authority is recognized, and 3. the relative importance assigned to each of the aspects of the synthesis.

In the introduction to the third edition of Glaube und Leben(1) Heim declares that his thought falls into four distinct periods. The following books in the order named, he says, best represent the first three successive stages of his thought: Das Weltbild der Zukunft, (1904), Glaubensgewissheit, zweite Auflage, (1920), and Glaubensgewissheit, dritte Auflage, (1923). Glaube und Denken in its three editions, and Jesus der Herr in its two editions represent the fourth stage of Helm's thought.

Following certain suggestions from Helm's own account of the development of his thought, and certain major ideas from the other books mentioned above, we now undertake to trace briefly the course of Helm's thought illustrating its persistent elements and showing its changing features in their various stages.

The first of the stages in Helm's thought is that represented by his book, Das Weltbild der Zukunft, (Berlin, 1904). During this first stage Heim held that the contrast between consciousness and reality, sensibility and being, could be cast aside, and that world events reduced themselves to relations of Either-Or, which must be continually decided.(2)

In the concluding chapter of Das Weltbild der Zukunft, Heim approached the problem of religious certainty, which he took to be volitional in character, in the light of these convictions. According to the traditional idea of knowledge, he says there are four ways to knowledge: experience, logical conclusion, probability, and religious faith.(3) The possibility is, however, excluded that any of these can account for certain knowledge of God.(4) The logical way does not apply. The probability way is insufficient. Experience leaves one in the lurch.(5) There remains, then, the possibility that there is a special religious way to knowledge, as Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and others have undertaken to point out. But, this way is not a sufficient basis for such

(2) Ibid., p. 26.
(3) Heim: Das Weltbild der Zukunft, p. 253.
(4) Ibid., p. 238.
(5) Ibid., p. 238.
certainty as a Christian has.(1) This way, also, fails in that it leaves to one side everything that is proveable.(2)

One fact, Heim says, remains beyond question, the fact that religious knowledge involves a real certainty claim.(3) Thus one faces a dilemma in that, while there is religious certainty, nevertheless, it is nach den erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen aller Theologen absolut unmöglich -- -- eine solche Gewissheit zu behaupten.(4) Therefore, Entweder jene erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen sind richtig -- -- Oder der Anspruch aus religiöse Gewissheit hat ein Recht.(5) If either is true, the other must be false.(6)

The issue being thus clarified, Heim declares that only an impartial study of the fundamental relations of reality can decide it. Such a study has been attempted in his book, and has, he says, shown reality to be of that volitional character demanded by religious certainty.(7) Thus the certainty claim of religion is said to be ein letzter Überrest der ursprünglichen Gesundheit des Denkens inmitten einer erkenntnistheoretisch erkrankten Weltanschauung.(8)

In this conclusion Heim takes his stand upon the conviction that belief in God is incompatible with the traditional world view in which the "I" is thought to be an isolated point of consciousness and in which events are thought to be casually explained.(9) On the positive side he is equally sure that faith is a decision to stand with the Will of all wills,(10) that religious certainty is in durchgangiger Analogie zu der geheimnisvollen Souveränität, mit der alle übrigen Wirklichkeitentscheidungen aus dem Chaos der Möglichkeiten hervorbrechen wie Blitze aus der dunklen Wolke.(11)

This positive fact means further, Heim indicates, 1. that since scientific investigation has no power either to prove or disprove religious certainty, the latter must be final;(12) 2. that since the idea of isolated consciousness represents only a superficial way of looking at reality, there can be no objection to belief in a Will Who is above all;(13) 3. that there is

(1) Ibid., p. 239.
(2) Ibid., p. 251.
(3) Ibid., p. 252.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid., pp. 252-253.
(8) Ibid., p. 253.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Ibid., p. 260.
(11) Ibid., p. 261.
(12) Ibid., pp. 267-268.
(13) Ibid., pp. 270-271.
no rational or empirical apologetic for belief in Christ, that the decision for Him is a finality; (1) 4. that religious certainty carries in itself the character of the decision of an Umtauschverhälttnisse which appears from the theoretical point of view an antinomy, but from the standpoint of decision, an absolute victory; (2) 5. that it is because of a lack of courage to face the decision that our misguided wills turn for help to static interpretations of faith certainty. (3)

The above sketch is sufficient to illustrate the fact that at the very outset of his systematic work Heim's thought is characterized by several of those elements which we have singled out as the persistent factors in his thought. His demand for complete certainty is apparent throughout. His insistence upon attacking the whole problem of knowledge seems to be the very motive of writing a book on Das Weltbild der Zukunft. He clearly states the theological necessity for a study of the whole problem of knowledge. (4) A dynamic world-view is the central feature of the book, while the account of knowledge of God is abundantly manifest in the thought of certainty as resting on decision. The attempt to place decision beyond the dilemma of the traditional theories of knowledge is an early expression of Heim's characteristic theory of synthesis.

Attention must be called to the indistinctness or even absence of two of what we have called the persistent elements in Heim's thought, namely, a theory of levels, and a Christocentric point of view. The attempt has been made largely to obliterate distinctions in reality, so that a theory of levels could be present only vaguely. Christ is mentioned only casually in connection with the fact of Christian certainty. In these two points Heim's Das Weltbild der Zukunft is an exception to what we have said about the persistent elements in Heim's thought.

However, this fact need not lead to the supposition that the thought of this early book is as far out of line with that of the later books as may at first appear. It must be remembered regarding the theory of levels that, at the time of the writing of Das Weltbild der Zukunft, certain distinctions were not yet sharply drawn which later became clear in Heim's thought. Even in Das Weltbild der Zukunft there is at least a suggestion of a theory of levels of knowledge. (5) Regarding the absence of the Christocentric point of view, it must be borne in mind that knowledge of God is not the theme of this book, so that it is scarcely to be expected that all that is characteristic of Heim's thought upon this subject will come to light.

(1) Ibid., p. 271.
(2) Ibid., pp. 280-281.
(3) Ibid., p. 282.
(4) Ibid., p. 253.
(5) Ibid., pp. 297-298.
Das Weltbild der Zukunft illustrates the characteristic form of Heim's thought, although two of its important features have not yet come to expression.

The changing features of Heim's thought are equally apparent in Das Weltbild der Zukunft: 1. Attention has already been called to the fact that the conception of knowledge in general differs from that presented in Heim's later books. 2. The idea of an element of contradiction involved in the synthesis of knowledge of God has scarcely yet become apparent. 3. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find that the tendency is to emphasize the experiencing side of the synthesis. Decision is supposed to transcend the distinction between authority and immediate certainty, coming from a realm in which the contrast does not arise. Actually, however, the immediacy, rather than the "beyondness", of decisions is most apparent. The impression that I decide predominates over the impression that it is decided in me. We shall presently see how these three features of Heim's thought undergo a striking modification.

B. The Second Stage: Destiny

By the time Heim wrote the book which represents the second stage in his thought, Glaubensgewissheit, zweite Auflage, he had come, partly through his inquiry into medieval and Reformation thought in Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie bis zu Schliererermacher, (a book of which we shall have occasion to speak further) to feel that the grounding of Christian certainty purely upon the decision of an Umtauschverhalten was not sufficient. Such a procedure, of course, brought to expression the impossibility of deciding the question with which Christ confronts us on the basis of pure thought. However, it left undetermined the question: Why is the congregation not shaken in its decision for Christ by the relativistic objection that we perhaps could just as well have decided for Buddha or Mohammed?(1) In the effort to meet this objection Heim reshapes his thought along somewhat more authoritarian lines in the second edition of Glaubensgewissheit.

Here Heim approaches his subject with his characteristic insistence upon complete certainty and upon the need for an analysis of the whole subject of knowledge.(2) He now, however, uses the antinomies and the unexplainable facts of experience not so much to reject the ordinary forms of consciousness as to show that the latter represent only one way of looking at reality.(3) Since the forms of perception and logic introduce a multitude of contradictions, they cannot represent the only relations in which

(1) Heim: Glaube und Leben, p. 27.
(2) Heim: Glaubensgewissheit, zweite Auflage, pp. 1-53.
(3) Ibid., pp. 54-132.
the world stands; nor can they raise any significant objections to belief in God. (1)

Upon the basis of this indication of the possibility of religious certainty Heim attempts to rear an argument for the reality of that kind of certainty. Setting out with a conviction as to the personal character of religious certainty, (2) he further modifies his idea of knowledge in general to accord with what he considers the need of theology. He undertakes to bring to light, under the influence of Spengler, (3) a new category. He finds that the world represented by older conceptions is a world without a center. The now point, however, gives to the world a moving center by fixing the individual's location in space and time and his character as an "I". (4) The fixing of this now point is not to be explained by any of the forms of consciousness. It is rather a destiny which is the opposite of all of the categories. (5)

Every perspective, and so all of reality, can be viewed either from the standpoint of consciousness philosophy as a mere accident, or, from another standpoint, as a higher destiny. (6) What we do in any moment may be viewed either from the standpoint of traditional theories of knowledge and reality as quite indifferent, or, from another standpoint, as a destiny which is beyond the distinction between freedom and compulsion. (7)

To the Christian, Christ is ethical destiny. Christ's commands come to the Christian as a higher necessity which is above freedom and compulsion. (8) Wenn -- unter dem Einfluss Jesu eine Verpflichtung über uns kommt, die jenseits des Gegensatzes von Zwang und Freiwilligkeit steht, so sehen wir daran dass dieser Einfluss aus derselben Richtung kommt, aus der wir alles andere empfangen. (9)

Heim has carried over into the thought of the second edition of Glaubensgewissheit those characteristic features of his thought which appeared in Das Weltbild der Zukunft. He has further introduced in unmistakable fashion those two additional characteristic elements which, as we noted, were only indefinitely present in Das Weltbild der Zukunft; namely, the theory of levels of knowledge and the Christocentric point of view. The theory of levels comes to view in Heim's willingness to recognize the knowledge of perception and logic as one of the ways of looking at reality.

(1) Ibid., p. 132.
(2) Cp. Ibid., p. 133 ff.
(3) Heim: Glaube und Leben.
(4) Heim: Glaubensgewissheit, zweite Auflage, p. 167.
(5) Ibid., p. 179 ff.
(6) Ibid., p. 189.
(7) Ibid., p. 189 ff.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid., p. 189.
The Christocentric point of view comes to expression in the idea of Christ as the content of that category in terms of which our ethical destiny is determined.

Heim no longer hesitates to acknowledge the fact of an antithesis involved in the synthesis of immediacy and authority. His acceptance of such an antithesis comes to expression in his statement of the conflict between destiny and the other categories. The recognition of this basic antithesis leads to an adoption of a more authoritarian idea as the only way to overcome the relativity which remained in the concept of certainty as decision. Thus Heim is no longer satisfied to say that certainty is the decision of an Umtauschverhältnis. Such a decision might seem to be merely human and relative. Hence a decision to place one's life in harmony with God's will is said to be the acceptance of a destiny.

It should be noted that, despite the movement of Heim's thought toward a further recognition of the authoritarian side of knowledge of God, the immediacy side is by no means lost sight of, for destiny is quite as much freedom as it is necessity; and the decision to say yes or no to destiny, as an unexplainable, may be quite as much human as divine.

C. The Third Stage: Non-objectifiability

After publishing the second edition of Glaubensgewissheit, Heim became dissatisfied with the treatment of religious certainty presented there, for the reason that no satisfactory account had been given of the ground of the decision for or against destiny in Christ. He undertook in the third edition of Glaubensgewissheit to present the subject in such a way that this deficiency would be met.

Approaching the task with the same conception of the problem and the method and the same antipathy for the so-called traditional philosophies which appeared in the second edition of Glaubensgewissheit, Heim undertook by his usual arguments (i.e., by pointing out the contradictions and antinomies involved in the world picture presented by the ordinary forms of our perception and logic,(1) and by calling attention to certain distinctions in our perceptive world which could not be accounted for in terms of the forms of perception and logic) to prove the reality of what he called the non-objectifiable. He meant by the non-objectifiable that which can never become the object of sensory experience, but which gives to the "I" its characteristic nature.(2)

Although every "I" shares, he says, in space and time and the categories of logic, it is possible for it so to withdraw

(1) Ibid., dritte Auflage, pp. 83-140.
(2) Ibid., p. 272.
into the Zustand of the non-objectifiable that it can gain a Durchblick into the sense of things and so break down the barriers that divide "I" from "W I". (1) This takes place primarily as we meet Christ in union with Whom we know God and are one with our Christian brethren. In Christ we come to enter into the non-objectifiable where we can know God. The decision for Christ comes to us from the non-objectifiable or, in other language, through grace.

Recognition of an antithesis between immediacy and authority has now become deeper. Not only does our empirical logical way of seeing reality (including our acceptance of the objective fact of Christ) stand over against destiny, it stands over against a diametrically opposite non-objectifiable realm. Thus Heim in a very illuminating passage (2) speaks of religious knowledge in terms of the analogy of a boat chained to the shore, the chain of faith holds fast although the waves of objectification keep it in tension.

Moreover, in the idea that not only is our religious ethical perspective a destiny, but the acceptance of it determined from a realm that transcends the ordinary processes of our minds, or by grace, Heim's theory has moved farther in the direction of an authoritarian emphasis.

However, it should be pointed out that the recognition of an antithesis between immediate experiencing and authority is still largely overshadowed by the idea of their synthesis. The idea of the perspective of non-objectifiability is still offered as a unity of experiencing and authority. There is no such bold affirmation of an unexplainable synthesis of genuine opposites, as Heim's later thought presents.

It should, moreover, be noted that, despite the movement toward an authoritarian view, the emphasis is still upon experiencing. Although Christ is the perspective of non-objectifiability, the idea of dependence upon Him as an authoritative revelation is largely overshadowed by the thought of the new perspective that the believer has in Him. Further, the non-objectifiable, whence comes the decision for Christ, is not only discoverable but participated in by every human "W I". This being true, the tendency is likely to be to interpret the knowledge of God in terms of the immediate decisions of human experience.

D. The Fourth Stage: Revelation

By 1928 Professor Heim had come to feel that the whole conception of a perspective, after the analogy of which the second and third editions of Glaubensgewissheit had undertaken to account for religious certainty, was caught in the web of relati-

(1) Ibid., p. 274.
(2) Ibid., p. 271.
vity. The here-now and the "I" in which one lives are made relative by the consideration that each could be other than it is. However, it is characteristic of Christian certainty that while it has an objective side, it is never relative. (1) What is yet more important, Heim had come to believe that non-objectifiability was like every other distinction of human thought, simply one pole of a relation of dependence. There is no non-objectifiability apart from objectifiability. Hence the non-objectifiable is only a relative conception. The same is true of every other category or conception which emerges in human thought. Even Barth's attempt to magnify the distinction between time and eternity, between this world and the other, represents only relative distinctions.

These considerations brought Heim to a fourth stage in his thought regarding religious certainty. Since every human category is relative, every attempt to find a category in terms of which knowledge of God may be described must be renounced. The antithesis between authority and immediate experiencing must be accepted and incorporated into the theory of knowledge of God in the full recognition that it can never be explained in terms of a higher synthesis. Heim undertakes to evolve a view that meets these requirements in Glaube und Denken and Jesus der Herr.

Examining our knowledge, Heim finds that it comes to being in levels or dimensions which are paradoxically related to one another. The deepest of these levels is that of the meeting of wills. Personal meeting may be either interpretative or uninterpretative. The uninterpretative meeting of wills is a blind struggle or an emotional intoxication, as when a man meets a wild beast, or is overcome by a beautiful scene. The interpretative meeting of wills takes place through a word which, although it belongs both to the objective and the personal dimensions, carries meaning.

However, since every object depends upon another and every dimension of knowledge upon others, our general knowledge is relative and can never reach God Who is beyond all relativity. It would seem that the only alternative would be to fall back upon a pure authority belief. Heim now teaches that Christ is the authoritative Word of God to man and that Christ is only known to man as the Holy Spirit, by his sovereign testimony, reveals Him. However, since certainty involves immediacy, authority alone is not sufficient. Thus, Christ is not only authoritative Word, but experienced reality; the working of the Holy Spirit is not only sovereign testimony, but also inner witness.

Man knows God very much as he knows another through a word. A "Thou" is objectively entirely unknown to me. His word is on one side an objective fact, but on another side a personal interpretation by which the "Thou" reveals himself to me. Even so God reveals himself to us, although it must be remembered that this is

(1) Heim: Glaube und Leben, pp. 28-29.
purely a human analogy for an undefinable fact.

Thus, in the present expression of his thought the theory of levels is more sharply defined in that the various frames of knowledge are now represented as dimensional ways of knowing. Thus, again, while religious knowledge is still trust, authority and immediacy are no longer in any sense brought within a category but accepted as opposites within a paradoxical synthesis. Thus, finally, the emphasis rests even more pointedly upon the authority side, in that only that immediate experiencing which is authoritatively selected enters into knowledge of God.

It should be noted in this connection that the fourth stage of Heim's thought is divided into two periods represented by the first two editions of Glaube und Denken, the third edition of Glaube und Denken, and the two editions of Jesus der Herr, respectively. In general, the second period differs from the first in pressing the authoritarian idea to a greater extreme.

References to precise differences will occur from time to time as we proceed to give a detailed account of Heim's thought in its fourth or present stage.

Summing up what has been said of the development of Heim's thought, we may say that, while persistently manifesting those marked characteristics which have previously been named, it has moved away from a position in which distinctions were reduced to a minimum and authority and experiencing thought to be reducable to a single category, in which experiencing was the dominating factor to a position in which distinct levels of knowledge are clearly defined, and authority and experiencing held over against each other in a paradoxical synthesis, in which authority holds the dominant position.

III The Magnetic Center of Heim's Thought Concerning Knowledge of God

In following the course of the development of Heim's thought we have already had occasion to mention his book Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher. We return now to that book for a further insight into a basic conception which is never presented with such clarity in any of Heim's systematic studies as in the historical monograph to which we refer.

Every theory of knowledge of God is confronted by the difficulty that it must deal with apparently conflicting elements, i.e., the immediacy of experiencing in terms of which alone knowledge of God becomes satisfactory to the individual, and the indirectness of authoritative deliverances in terms of which alone religious knowledge seems to escape subjectivity. One of these elements can apparently not be properly represented except by excluding
the other; yet each demands recognition. Thus, theory of knowledge of God confronts a dilemma. Either it insists upon immediacy of experiencing and so lays itself open to the charge that it has not escaped subjectivity, that it moves only within the circle of consciousness and fails to reach reality; or else it insists upon the authority of its content as given of God, and so is subject to the criticism that its knowledge is not sufficiently direct to be convincing. On the one hand, it may be asked: How can the human consciousness escape its subjective limitations and know God? On the other hand, it may be asked: How can God Who is independent of us make Himself known in the immediacy of our consciousness?

Long before the writing of his more recent books Heim had confronted this dilemma and arrived at certain definite conclusions concerning it. In Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher Heim was dealing with the dilemma as it is presented in medieval philosophy. Medieval philosophy knew nothing of the dynamic world view by means of which Heim had attempted to thrust the dilemma aside. Heim was then obliged to face the difficulty squarely. Accordingly, we find him, in Das Gewissheitsproblem, not only presenting the history of the problem, but quite candidly declaring his own convictions as well.

Believing that the world view out of which the dilemma comes to expression in medieval theology was essentially mistaken, Heim concluded that the only possible solution within such a world view is one which brings the two sides of the dilemma into paradoxical synthesis.

This, it will be recognized, is essentially the same view that Heim adopts in his recent books Glaube und Denken and Jesus der Herr. However, the presentation of the theory of paradoxical synthesis in Das Gewissheitsproblem has a vital significance of its own.

Heim's present books differ from Das Gewissheitsproblem in that in them the attempt is made to present a theory of knowledge of God in the light of a new world view, and in opposition to contemporary objections to Christianity. Accordingly, the theory of paradoxical synthesis which is the real basis of Heim's present theory, is not stated with the same directness in Heim's recent books as in Das Gewissheitsproblem. Thus some account of the theory as presented in the latter book is almost essential to a proper understanding of Heim's present theory.

With this fact in mind, we sketch briefly that magnetic center of Heim's thought about knowledge of God that is found in his theory of paradoxical synthesis in Das Gewissheitsproblem. We shall set forth Heim's idea of the opposing theories that grow out of the dilemma, and then undertake to give a reasonably detailed account of the theory of paradoxical synthesis in which he at-
tempts to draw them together.

A. The Opposing Types of Theory

Heim characterizes the opposing tendencies which issue in the dilemma of religious knowledge as two basic types of theory concerning which the problem is to show the true relation.

According to the first view, we can never get beyond eine letzte Zweiheit, --- den Dualismus zwischen einer erkennenden und wollenden Subjektivität auf der einen Seite und einer ihr gegenüberstehenden Wirklichkeit auf der andern. (1) Subjectivity and objectivity are thought of as parallel lines that never meet. This duality is the important fact in the knowledge question. Once it has been accepted, it can never be escaped, for every attempt to form a higher synthesis of the two elements in knowledge is only a movement of thought within subjectivity and so by no means gets beyond the barrier between subject and object. (2) Even the final ideas and the axioms of logic and mathematics are nothing but an invoking of the possibility of abstraction, which function belongs only to the realm of subjectivity and gives no insight into objective reality.

The only possibility of knowledge in terms of this theory is that ideas which exist in consciousness may be representations or types of realities; but even such representations can never be more than conceptus mentis. This means that, if we are to have knowledge of God, the only possibility is that God be represented to us in some fact within consciousness. We must einem Kontingenten d.h. irgendwie geschichtlich gegebenen konkreten Inhalt als Gott einführen und als gewiss bezeichnen. (3) That is to say, we must accept some relative data as absolute. This is, of course, the acceptance of an authority, for which there is no adequate criterion in experience.

The second basic type of theory, which emphasizes the immediacy of knowledge, Heim describes under the term two line theory. According to this theory, there is a Spare, in welcher die Zweiheit von Subjektivität und Wirklichkeit nicht Vorhanden ist. (4) Subjectivity and reality are not two parallel lines which forever run alongside each other, they are rather Zwei Linien die sich schneiden und dann eine Linie sind. Experiencing is in itself a grasping of reality. The contrast between subjectivity and objectivity is no longer important. Neutrality to the distinction overshadows the distinction itself. The duality in knowledge is considered only a diversification of the basic identity implied in

(1) Heim: Das Gewissheitsproblem in der Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher, p. 45.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid., p. 253.
(4) Ibid., p. 45.
knowledge.

The sphere in which subjectivity and objectivity meet and become one includes two elements. The first of these is the most general of all ideas, or that which is beyond all distinctions, including the distinction between existence and nonexistence, and is itself the source of all distinctions. It is what medieval philosophy called ens. The second element is the axiom of truth or the identifiability of the identifiable, the axiom that alone makes every proof possible. The axioms of mathematics and logic as various formulations of the basic axiom of truth are likewise included in the sphere of the identity of objectivity and subjectivity. (1)

God as the Given in Whom all has its basis may be known in the most general idea and in the axioms of truth, not indirectly or by representation, but directly. He is the Being through Whom all has its reality and the Primary Truth through Whom every truth is true. (2) He is real in a sense beyond the contrast between mens and res existens.

B. The Paradoxical Synthesis of These Types of Theory

The two basic types of theory of knowledge being the fundamentally opposite ways of resolving the dilemma of knowledge, Heim holds that every theory of knowledge must follow one of the four courses that have actually been presented in medieval philosophy: 1. The one line theory may largely thrust the two line theory aside. 2. The two theories may be considered as coordinate. 3. The two line theory may largely exclude the one line theory. 4. The one line and two line types of theory may be held together in a theory which, while abounding in paradoxes, draws the diverse views together in synthesis. The first solution is that of Augustine and Neo-platonism, the second that of Thomas Aquinus, the third that of Nominalism, and the fourth that of the Reformers. Heim has no hesitancy in manifesting his own allegiance to the fourth, or Reformation view. This he does both by casual references, such as when he speaks of a Rückfall into medieval theories, (3) and by systematic comparison of the theories. (4)

This being clear, we may, in the light of our account of the two basic types of theory, proceed to call attention to certain important features of the theory of synthesis which Heim ascribes to the Reformers and adopts as his own.

1. The theory is one of synthesis between the one line and

(2) Ibid, p. 48.
the two line theories. This is perhaps never more clearly ex-
mpressed than in Heim's definition of Luther's idea of sola fides.
Sie ist diejenige Funktion in welcher angesichts des christli-
chen Wertinnalts die Zusammengehörigkeit der beiden Gedankenreihen
zum Ausdruck kommt, deren eine den Indifferenzpunkt der beiden
Seiten der Antinomie zwischen absoluter Setzung un Relationskette
isoliert, während die andere den logischen Widerspruch zwischen
beiden isoliert und sie auf zwei exclusive Sphären verteilt.(1)

2. The theory does not, however, recognize a synthesis of
the basic types of theory all along the line, but finds the union
in one place. It is, for example, by no means acknowledged that
nature or the axioms of mathematics are both authoritative and
self-evident truths. The place of the synthesis is that which
takes place when one is, under the influence of the Holy Spirit,
confronted by the Bible or by Christ who is the Zentralgehalt(2)
of the Bible. The Bible is the indirect representation of the
transcendent God. Yet in believing the Bible one knows God Him-
self. The Bible is an authority, yet it is self-evident. The
Bible is apparently an arbitrarily chosen empirically received
data, but the testimony of the Holy Spirit makes the reception of
it a direct knowledge of God. From one side our acceptance of
the Bible and Christ is assent to indirect representations of
a transcendent God, and the work of the Holy Spirit a sovereign
testimony to an external authority. From another side, our accep-
tance of Christ and the Bible are immediate experiences and the
testimony of the Holy Spirit an internal witness. In the idea
of the identity of the Christ Who in faith is one with the belie-
ver and the Christ of the Bible, and in the idea of the unity of
the self-evidence of the Bible and the sovereign testimony of the
Holy Spirit, the opposing tendencies of theory of knowledge of
God are united.(3)

3. It will, of course, be readily recognized from what has
been said that the theory that Heim adopts as the Reformation
theory is no attempt to resolve the dilemma of knowledge of God.
Rather, it takes the dilemma by the horns. The result is a theo-
ry of paradox. No attempt is made to arrive at a logically com-
plete account. Indeed, such an attempt would really be an obscur-
ing of the claims of the two line theory, which insists upon the
relativity of all human logic.

While Christian certainty is final, it never attempts to show
that all rational creatures must believe. There must always be a
paradox in the idea that the Absolute can be known or that there
can be final certainty through contingent historical occurrences.
Thus, for example, Heim writes of Luther's doctrine of the testi-
mony of the Holy Spirit: --- --- das Geisteszeugnis ist ein dem

(1) Ibid., p. 240.
(2) Ibid., p. 282.
(3) Cp. Ibid., pp. 281, 282.
In connection with the theories of Gerhard and Heidegger, after discovering the necessity of maintaining the idea that the doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit is both an expression of the self-evidence of the Scripture and an idea of an evidence that is added to the self-evidence of the Scripture and an idea of an evidence that is added to the self-evidence of the Scripture, Heim concludes: Nur solange dieser Widerspruch zwischen der weder rational noch authoritativ begründeten Untrennbareit von Sehen und Gewisswerden dem Schriftinhalt gegenüber und der empirischen Trennung von beidem als unaufgelöste Dissonanz festgehalten wird, bleibt der Rückfall in der mittelalterlichen Abwege vermieden.(2) When Heim undertakes to sum up the Reformation theory(3), he declares that it draws together the one line theory and the two line theory bei voller Wahrung des Gegensatzes.(4)

4. The relation between the inner certainty and the authority involved in the acceptance of the Bible, or any portion of it, is described as one of polarity. That is to say, while the two are opposites, the very existence of each depends upon the other.(5) The relation is like that of day and night. While day disappears when night comes, the more emphatically one thinks of night, the more certainly is his thought dependent upon the idea of day. The acceptance of authority does not exclude inner conviction but depends upon it.

Inner experiencing does not drive one from the Scriptures; rather, it brings him to greater dependence upon them. Heim characterizes the relation of the two in Luther’s thought thus: Je ausserlicher, desto innerlicher; je ausschliesslicher wir das bloße transsubjective wort haben (verbum solum habemus), desto tiefer ist die subjective Gewissheit.(6)

5. Despite the fact that the theory of synthesis recognizes authority and involves paradox, it is none the less in full accord with what has been said about Heim’s approach to the subject, a theory of complete certainty. Heim declares that Luther not only uses the idea of axiomatic certainty as an hyperbole; sondern er setzt den axiomatischen Charakter der christlichen Wahrheitsgewissheit überall da infinitiv vorouas.(7) The contents of the Scriptures are as certain to the believer as the content "3 & 2 = 5", die Gewissheit um den Schriftinhalt die Eigenart der Evidenz der

(1) Ibid, p. 259.
(3) Ibid, pp. 381, 382.
(6) Ibid, p. 249.
mathematischen Axiome hat -----(1) The more the highest Wert goes out in a contingent fact (the words of the Bible), the absoluteness of which can only be certain überlogisch, the more the highest Wert has the character of the all inclusive Being, and of axioms to which immediate logical evidence comes. God is both the res singularissimum of two line thought and the ens universalissimum of one line thought.(2)

IV Heim's Present Conception of Knowledge of God

Bearing in mind the foregoing account of Heim's conception of knowledge of God as to 1. its persistent elements, 2. the course of its development, and 3. its magnetic center, we enter upon the more important task of presenting in considerable detail Heim's present ideas of knowledge of God.

In this effort we shall depend principally upon Heim's recent books, the modified third edition of Glaube und Denken and the second edition, Jesus der Herr. We shall, however, have occasion to refer to the second edition of Glaube und Denken in a number of instances in which that edition seems to present a preferable statement of Heim's view, and in certain other instances in which marked differences between the positions adopted in the two periods of the present stage of Heim's thought should be noted. Since Heim's latest book, Jesus der Weltvollender, is primarily a study in eschatology, we shall not need to be especially concerned with it.

None of the above mentioned books deal specifically with the knowledge problem. The second edition of Glaube und Denken attempts to discover what can be said of the foundation of Christian faith in the light of a prevailing Relativism. The third edition of Glaube und Denken is an endeavor to indicate the place of revelation amid an enthusiastic racial Monism. Jesus der Herr is an effort to show what authority Christ has today. However, while Heim is not solely concerned with the knowledge problem in these books, it is evident by the similarity between these books and his earlier writings that the knowledge problem is still the one which preoccupies his mind, and that the change in the statement of the problem is really an effort to meet the particular needs of changing times and not a departure from the questions which have occupied the main stream of his thought ever since the publication of his earliest works.

Heim's later books, as well as his earlier ones, may be regarded as parts of an attempt to give an adequate representation of that which has taken place when a man is conquered by Christ.(3) Hence it is to be expected that, while theory of knowledge is not the sole interest in Heim's later books, a fully developed theory of knowledge of God may be quite readily discerned in them and

(1) Ibid., p. 258.
(2) Ibid., p. 253.
(3) Heim: Glaube und Leben, Introduction.
traced step by step. That such is actually the case will be manifested as we proceed.

A. Heim's General Approach to the Problem

(I) Professor Heim's demand for complete certainty is quite as insistent as ever in his later works. Since his recent books are not avowedly studies in knowledge, he does not indeed state the demand as clearly at the onset. However, his statement of the need for a genuine basis for life and work, (1) his demand for a Wissenschaft vom Letzten, (2) his search for a foundation for thought and deed, and his idea of the immediacy of the knowledge that is given to believers (3) are more than sufficient evidence that Heim still holds that nothing less than complete certainty is a sufficient knowledge of God.

(II) Accordingly, we find Heim continuing to hold that an adequate inquiry concerning knowledge of God demands an analysis of the entire knowledge problem. This demand is evident, in the second edition of Glaube und Denken in Heim's insistence upon the inadequacy of technically defined branches of study, including theology, and in his assertion of the need for a Wissenschaft vom Letzten (4). The most significant and penetrating expression of this emphasis is, however, to be found in Heim's discussion of the question about God. With Grisebach (5) rejecting in one lump all earlier philosophies on the ground that, instead of dealing with present reality, they apply only to the memory realm, Heim affirms that we must begin anew with the realization that every problem ultimately leads to the question about God, and that the question about God calls in question all the foundations of thought and life. Thus Die Religion oder die Frage nach Gott ---- ist ja nicht ein Sondergebiet von metaphysischen Annahmen oder seelischen Erlebnissen, das neben dem profanen Handeln und Erkennen steht. Rather, the religious question comes forth whenever we radikal fragen, that is, when we ask our questions without stopping with some inadequate conclusion. (6) If the questions of our thought really seek an answer in the present, they always involve the question about God, and, in like manner, the question about God calls in question all the foundations of our thought. Thus, no mere technical treatment of the question about God is of any value. All the foundations of knowledge must be examined. (7) Heim's feeling upon this subject may be seen from a practical point of view by the fact that he has taken up more than half of each of the editions of Glaube und Denken with a discussion of relations within the world.

(1) Heim: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, pp. 4, 5.
(2) Ibid, pp. 18, 19.
(3) Heim: Jesus der Herr, pp. 184, 186.
(4) Heim: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, pp. 18, 19.
(5) Ibid; chapter 1.
(6) Ibid, p. 52.
(III) The Divisions of the Subject.

Since Heim continues to deal with the entire knowledge problem his present analysis may, like the earlier ones, for practical purposes be divided into two parts: (1) first, a discussion of knowledge in general; (2) second, a discussion of knowledge of God. By knowledge in general we mean a study of that knowledge which all human beings by virtue of their nature as human beings may possess with reference to any type of object whatever. By analysis of knowledge of God we mean a study of that knowledge which refers in particular to God.

(IV) The Plan of Heim's Latest Books as to Theory of Knowledge of God.

Inasmuch as Heim's two books Glaube und Denken (dritte Auflage) and Jesus der Herr (zweite Auflage) are parts of a connected series, we may, in the light of the above statement of the divisions of Heim's thought, present the general plan of these books with reference to theory of knowledge of God.

Heim first undertakes in the early part of Glaube und Denken a careful examination of the structure of our common knowledge. Then, in the latter part of Glaube und Denken and in the first part of Jesus der Herr he asks whether, on the basis of this analysis, knowledge of God is included within our common knowledge. Having answered that question in the negative, Heim inquires as to what, in the light of the analysis of our common knowledge, can be said of such knowledge as transcends the boundaries of our common knowledge.

We must consider first Heim's analysis of knowledge in general and afterward see to what conclusions he is led concerning knowledge of God.

B. Heim's Idea of Knowledge in General

(I) The Problem

(A) A Structural or Phenomenological Analysis.

It should be noted at the outset that Professor Heim's analysis of our common knowledge is an analysis of the structure of knowledge, not an attempt to decide the issue between Realism


(2) We shall refer to the knowledge that is dealt with in this part of the analysis as our common knowledge, the word common not meaning public in the sense of being, like objects, observable by all but rather in the sense of being possible for all alike. Thus, one's purely subjective experiences, as well as his confronting of persons and things, falls under the term our common knowledge. Heim employs in this connection the term knowledge of the Ich- Du- Es- Welt, but the term our common knowledge is better suited to clarify the knowledge aspect of Heim's thought.
and Idealism. Heim's problem relative to knowledge is not the problem of the reality of the world or of the validity of knowledge, but rather the problem of the structure of knowledge. As Heim puts it, his method is phänomenologisch(1) in the sense that it takes the world as we find it and tries to discover the distinctions which one involuntarily makes in it.

Why does Heim follow this procedure? In the first place, Heim regards structural analysis as logically prior to every attempt to answer the question as to the reality of the world. The issue between Realism and Idealism as to the reality of the world is secondary.

Heim believes that knowledge consists in distinguishing, so that the question as to the reality of the world is to him the question as to whether or not distinctions are in the knower or the thing known. But the question as to whether distinctions are in the knower or the thing known is quite illogical, for one makes a prior distinction in the very act of raising the question. The difference between man and thing, "I" and world, knower and known, implied in the question "Whence distinctions?", is itself a distinction.(2) Indeed one can never separate things distinguished from distinguishing acts, for to speak of a thing distinguished apart from a distinguishing act is to contradict one's self by distinguishing, even while one professes to exclude the act of distinguishing. In like manner, the debate of Realism and Idealism as to the Thing-in-itself is a false issue, for the very thought of a Thing in itself depends on a thinker and so, in claiming to eliminate the thinker, is self-contradictory.(3)

Inasmuch, therefore, as Heim holds that it is an illegitimate formulation of the problem of knowledge to ask whether distinctions are in the knower or in the object, the proper approach to the knowledge problem cannot be to begin with the question as to whether our knowledge is objective or only subjective. Such a procedure seemed to Heim not only to fail to solve the difficulty with which it starts, but so to befog the knowledge situation by naively taking for granted such fundamental distinctions as that between knower and known, that a proper analysis of the distinctions which enter into knowledge becomes practically impossible.

The second reason for Heim's confining himself to structure, or to approaching the problem from a phenomenological point of view is simply that a structural analysis is sufficient to furnish the information that he requires regarding knowledge of God. This is not to say that the problem of the reality of the world has no bearing upon knowledge of God. Heim emphatically declares that the idea that the world is independently real is an attempt to es-

(1) Ibid., dritte Auflage, p. 56.
(2) Ibid., zweite Auflage, pp. 84-85.
(3) Ibid., dritte Auflage, p. 47.
cape from the question about God. (1) However, the analysis of
knowledge in general is only preliminary to the problem of know­
ledge of God. All that it is necessary to show at the outset is
whether knowledge of God is included within our common knowledge
or not and what useful concepts can be gained by an analysis of
our common knowledge.

(B) An Attempt to Disclose Distinctions

It should be noted further that Heim's analysis of our common
knowledge, as a structural analysis, is concerned with the dis­
tinctions involved in our actual knowledge.

In the second edition of Glaube und Denken Heim reasons some­
what as follows: We have, he says, two possibilities over against
reality: (2) 1. We can experience directly, as, for example, when
we gaze into the blue sky or drink cool water. 2. We can distin­
guish and analyse the things which we experience. In neither of
these approaches to reality do we grasp or explain it, nor can we
offer any explanation of the bases upon which the processes rest.
In direct experience we feel reality as a certain impression which
is not further explainable, (3) and even as we distinguish one object
from another we can never in the last analysis tell why we so dis­
tinguish. (4) Thus, for example, when a man says that he sees a red
handkerchief, he can tell much about the handkerchief and name many
of its qualities, but he can never make another person see red or
explain what red is. In like manner, one can distinguish red from
green, but he can never make the distinction for a man who is color
blind, or tell why he himself makes the distinction. (5)

Since all knowing is a process of distinguishing in a manner
which we cannot explain, that which we attempt to grasp in know­
ledge must, of course, lie beyond all distinctions, even beyond
the distinction between nonobjective and objective. (6) Perhaps
the best expression for that which our knowledge seeks to grasp is
the word ens from medieval Latin. Taking this word to refer to
that which is beyond all distinctions, Heim now states that know­
ledge is an attempt to make distinctions and classifications in
the ens. (7) Alle menschlichen Erkenntnisse bis hinauf zu den
verglichenen philosophischen Systembildungen waren nicht anders
als Erkundungsversuche, durch die das des Urseienden zerrlegt wurde. (8)

(1) Ibid., zweite Auflage, p. 83 ff.
(2) Ibid., p. 45.
(3) Ibid., p. 41.
(4) Ibid., p. 46.
(5) Cp. Ibid., dritte Auflage, pp. 78-79.
(6) Ibid., zweite Auflage, p. 47.
(7) Cp. Ibid., p. 49.
(8) Ibid.
In the third edition of *Glaube und Denken* Heim follows a procedure that is not essentially different. However, because certain of his critics had supposed that in the use of the word *ens* or in the idea of the unknown $X$ he had assumed some kind of an existence, Heim eliminates all attempts to characterize that in which distinctions are made, and seeks simply to analyse the basic distinctions which we involuntarily make in the world as we find it.

The problem of the structure of knowledge is for Heim the problem of discovering, without in any way making presuppositions as to their ultimate nature, the distinctions which are present when knowing takes place or the distinctions in the world as we find it.

However, it is not, of course, all distinctions that must be analysed. An attempt to find all distinctions would simply be an attempt to discover all knowledge. Analysis of the structure of knowledge is concerned with a special kind of distinctions.

(C) A Problem of Distinctions between Spheres of Knowing

Professor Heim holds that distinctions are of two types. On the one hand, there are distinctions between contents within a given continuum or sphere of knowledge. On the other hand, there are distinctions between spheres of knowledge. In the second edition of *Glaube und Denken* Heim speaks of distinctions of the first degree, i.e., distinctions between things within the same sphere of distinction, and distinctions of the second degree, i.e., distinctions between spheres of distinctions, the latter he calls dimensional distinctions. (1) In the third edition of *Glaube und Denken* Heim speaks of distinctions of content, and distinctions between realms, each of which is in itself endless and within each of which distinctions may be made according to a particular principle. He also refers in this edition, to distinctions of the second kind, relations of transcendence. However, it is abundantly evident, not only from the character of the classifications but from the further course of Heim's discussion in each of the above mentioned books, that the two classifications are essentially the same. Thus, Heim thinks, on the one hand, of distinctions of the first degree, or distinctions between elements within the same sphere or contents within the same continuum; and, on the other hand, of dimensional distinctions between spheres of knowing or endless continuums which have structural principles, or relations of transcendence. The terms used of each class may be used interchangeably to designate the class in question.

Most of the distinctions which we make are distinctions of content, as, for example, the distinction between trees, houses,

fields, ideas, etc. However, every distinction of content comes to rest within some endless continuum or sphere of knowledge which in turn is a part of our entire *Ich-Du-ss-welt*.

But, if every distinction comes to rest within some sphere of knowledge which is to be distinguished from other spheres of knowledge, the analysis of the structure of knowledge must obviously concern itself primarily with the distinctions between spheres of knowledge, since they are the basis of all distinctions, the fundamental structure without which other distinctions have no meaning. The task which Heim undertakes, therefore, is to bring light to the character of those basic relations in terms of which all of our knowledge comes to rest. (1)

(II) A Preliminary Recognition of Certain Marks Common to All Dimensional Relations

The first result that emerges from Heim's attempt to discover the character of relations of the second degree is a preliminary assertion that all such relations have certain paradoxical marks by which they may be distinguished from relations of content.

In setting forth the common characteristics of distinctions of relations of the second degree, Heim draws argument and illustration primarily from the dimensions of space, which have for this purpose the advantage of simplicity. This, however, must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the characteristics in question are not simply those of relations between endless continuums but those of relations between spheres of knowledge. Although in the third edition of *Glaube und Denken*, which because of its recitiveness and clarity we are following, it is from the character of the dimensions of space as endless continuums that Heim develops his idea of the common marks of dimensional relations; Heim considers even the dimensions of space as spheres of knowledge. Thus, for example, he warns against thinking of dimensions as something that is to be known, rather than something in terms of which knowing takes place. (2) As spheres of knowledge, the dimensions of space differ from other dimensions only in that, being lower in the scale of comprehensiveness, their borders are less likely to be confused.

(1) Heim: *Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage*, Translation. The third edition of *Glaube und Denken* has been translated into English by E. P. Dickie under the title "God Transcendent". However, in order to avoid undue complication in references to the various editions, we shall refer to the English translation of the third edition of *Glaube und Denken* thus: *Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage*, Tr.
(2) Cp. Ibid., pp. 73, 74.
It can only lead to a misunderstanding of Heim's thought to regard the dimensions of space and time as something that exists objectively, to be grasped by an observer. The idea of objective spacial dimensions is utterly foreign to Heim's thought. A dimension of space is a way of seeing things, a sphere of distinction. Thus, for example, when Heim speaks of a two dimensional continuum, he is not thinking of a plain out in the world ready to be observed by anyone. Rather, he is thinking of the way of experiencing which apprehends in terms of surface. In the same way, dimensional relations are not the meeting of objective entities, but, rather, the meeting of experiences that find themselves in a given dimensional form. The fact must never be lost sight of that dimensional relations, whether of a lower or of a higher order, are distinctions between spheres of distinction.

With this explanation in mind we sketch briefly Heim's representation of those characteristic marks of dimensional relations by which such relations are distinguished from relations of content.

When two objects within the same space-time manifold are distinguished, it may be said that they cannot in any of their parts occupy the same situation in space at the same time.(1) Further, when two objects in the same space-time manifold border upon one another, the boundary must be defined as the place where one object ends and the other begins. This may at once be seen to be the case when, for example, buildings adjoin one another, or when one musical tone immediately follows another. But the situation is quite different when dimensions of space are distinguished. Here is not a relation between finite objects, but a relation between manifolds, each of which is in itself endless.(2) But to speak of a relation between limitless entities is to speak a paradox. If, for example, two plains, each in itself endless, border one upon another, it is impossible to define the boundary between them in the way in which the border between two adjoining objects within the same manifold is defined; namely, that where one ends there the other begins. Obviously, since each plain is in itself endless, neither plain can either begin or end, so that neither plain can limit the other. If we are to speak at all of a boundary between endless manifolds, we must speak of that boundary in paradox.

Heim explains this paradox in terms of spheres of knowledge, thus: Suppose(3) that there is a man who perceives the world only in two dimensions, a possibility illustrated by the portrayal of events on the motion picture screen. To such a man space has two directions. There is for him no third possibility. It is an absurdity, as far as he is concerned, to speak of a third dimension of space. But if, perchance, he should become suddenly aware of a third dimension, he would be obliged to state his discovery in a paradox somewhat as follows: "I know that every direction must be either this direction or that, but now it appears that there is a

(1) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, pp. 57, 58.
(2) Ibid., p. 55.
(3) Ibid., pp. 59-60.
direction which is neither this direction nor that."

The same type of paradox may be illustrated at a lower level of knowledge. Suppose(1) that there is a man who knows events only in succession. That this kind of knowledge is thinkable may be seen from that experience which one enjoys when one listens intently with his eyes shut to a fine melody, so that he is aware only of pure succession. If a man's experience were confined to apprehending events in succession, he would have to say that one event must be either before or after another. Simultaneity would be unthinkable. But suppose that our hypothetical character suddenly becomes aware not only of succession in time, but also of arrangement in space, so that simultaneity is thinkable and two events may be differently placed in space without being either before or after it in time. He is now obliged to state his new discovery in terms of paradox, thus: "Whereas I was obliged to say that one event must be either before or after another, I now experience events that are neither before nor after others." He has come upon a distinction between distinctions, as the Unterschied zwischen zwei in sich geschlossenen und in sich unendlichen Manigfaltigkeiten,(2) a distinction which in the language of his former experience must be stated in paradox.

The kind of paradox which is found in the above cases is taken by Heim to be the general mark which characterizes all dimensional relations. As he puts it in the second edition of Glaube und Denken, Das Paradoxon ist der Ausdruck der Grenze die zwei Dimensionen voneinander scheidet.(3)

If dimensional relations are, in general, distinguished from relations of content by the fact that their borders are marked by paradox instead of by the simple rule that where one begins there the other must end, various words applied to the relations will have very different meanings according as they are used of relations of content or of dimensional relations. Heim presents five marks of a dimensional relation by showing the peculiar meanings that must be given to five types of words as they are applied to dimensional relations.

1. If distinctions are of two types, things distinguished will naturally be of two kinds. In 'inhaltliche distinctions, on the one hand, limited parts of a given manifold are related. Thus, for example, one distinguishes between France and Germany, or between a dog and a bone. Things distinguished in this way may be called contents, inasmuch as each is a part of a more inclusive continuum. In dimensional distinctions on the other hand, one distinguishes between continuums each of which is in itself limitless. Such continuums are clearly of an entirely different order from limited contents within a given complete continuum. Thus, for example,

(1) Ibid., pp. 60-62.
(2) Ibid., p. 65.
(3) Ibid., zweite Auflage, p. 68.
two differently directed endless plains are of a different sort altogether from two horses or two houses, or any other pair of limited contents. To that which is distinguished in a dimensional relation Heim gives the name Raum (1), which is literally translated room or space, but the meaning of which is better represented in this connection by the word realm. Thus, Heim declares that a realm is jedes in sich unabschliessbare Kontinuum, innerhalb dessen nach einem in der Structur desselben enthaltenen Ordnungsprinzip eine Mannigfaltigkeit inhaltlicher Unterscheidungen vorgenommen werden kann.(2)

The first characteristic mark of dimensional relations is that the things distinguished are limitless continuums within which distinctions are made according to a principle involved in the structure of the continuum.

2. If the nouns by which things distinguished are designated are different according to the type of distinction in question, there is also a double meaning in two adjectives which are commonly used in speaking of distinctions; namely, the adjectives identical and different.(3) When a distinction is made between two contents which border one upon another, as do two fields, for example, clearly there is an element in which the two are identical; namely, the border between them, and an element in which they differ, namely, the objects distinguished. Thus, in relations between contents which border upon one another, identity refers to boundaries, whereas difference refers to objects exclusive of their borders.

The case is quite otherwise with dimensional relations. Suppose, for example, that one is confronted with two pictures of a cathedral, each taken from a different angle in such a manner that the right-hand edge of one coincides with the left-hand edge of the other. Now suppose the pictures are placed alongside each other on a table. Speaking only in terms of the identity and difference of contents, all that can be said is that the pictures being parts of the plain of the table are identical in their borders and different in their other parts. But speaking in terms of a dimensional relation, they may be said to have an identity and difference

(1) Note: It should be noted in this connection that the word dimension, as Heim uses it to denote a sphere of knowledge or a manifold within which distinctions are made, is identical with the word realm, to this extent that every dimension or sphere of knowledge is a realm, and every realm is at least potentially a sphere of knowledge, although some realms, like the realm of the objective world, are, as will be seen, never represented in human experiences as spheres of knowledge in which we actually live and know. It should be noted, further, that realms, like dimensions, are not to be thought of as objective existences. They may rather be thought of, without presuppositions as to their objectivity, as spheres in which distinctions are made.
(2) Ibid., dritte Auflage, p. 67.
(3) Ibid., Tr., p. 61.
of another sort. Their identity and indifference consists, from this point of view, in that they represent the same object photographed from different angles, or in that different directions apply to the same object. But this statement is a paradox, since direction makes the claim of being infinite, and is therefore, not subject to limitation by the existence of another direction.

The second characteristic of dimensional relations is that the words unity and difference can be used of such relations only in the paradoxical sense that endless directions are said to apply to the same object.

3. Once again, if distinctions are of two different classes, the words whole and part must be used in different senses depending upon the type of distinction to which they are applied.

When the words whole and part are applied to relations of content their meaning is clear. The relation is one of quantity, and, as such, is well understood. For example, when one says that the hand is a part of the body, there is no ambiguity about the meaning of the statement.

But when the words whole and part are applied to dimensional distinctions or distinctions of realms, they no longer refer to limited quantities, so that their meaning is not quite so simple. For example, in the experience of pure succession there can be no distinction between directions. One thing follows upon another. There is no other possibility. But, just so soon as the experience of position alongside is added to the experience of succession, the latter, although it has no limits and seems to be sufficient in itself, is now seen to be a part of a larger realm of experience. Succession, or time consciousness, is now like an infinite line on a plain upon which other limitless lines may lie also. The direction of pure succession is a part of a plain. But, inasmuch as succession is limitless, only in terms of paradox can it be said to be a part of anything.

What is true of the meaning of the words whole and part, or between the experience of succession and of surface in the relation between line and plain, is true of their meaning in every relation between realms or spheres of knowledge, for a realm is defined as that which is in itself endless. Thus, the third characteristic of dimensional relations is that the words whole and part can only be used in the paradoxical sense that one endless continuum is said to be a part of another continuum.

Two important correlaries may be derived from this definition of the words whole and part as applied to dimensional relations. a. It is possible to speak of realms that are more inclusive and realms that are less inclusive. The words whole and part necessarily involve degrees of comprehensiveness. b. It is possible to speak of realms that coordinate one with another, since parts of the
whole are in some sense coordinate one with another. Thus, for example, a plain is more inclusive than a line and lines in a plain are coordinate one with the other.

4. If there are two classes of distinctions, then the concepts of existing alongside and of meeting have different meanings, depending upon the type of relation in question. In distinctions of content, it is possible to express in a formula the meaning of existing alongside or meeting of objects: "Between two contents found together in one space, there is an interval which varies from zero to any optional quantity."(1) For example, the walls of two houses either touch each other, in which case the distance is zero, or they do not touch each other, in which case there is a certain distance between them.

Obviously this rule cannot apply to relationships between coordinate realms, for each realm is endless, so that no realm can either touch another or be separated from it by a certain distance. Yet, everyone will acknowledge that realms such as, for example, two differently directed plains, may exist alongside each other and meet in some way. Since a realm is by definition endless, one is obliged to say that when two realms exist alongside, they must cross each other in such fashion that neither loses its endlessness. This, however, is possible only upon the assumption that in the meeting of two realms there is a common element which belongs fully to both realms without in any sense being divided. Otherwise, as the two continuums, endless in themselves, meet, each would be limited by that element in which it coincides with the other. But, the statement that an element belongs fully to two endless manifolds is paradoxical.

The fourth characteristic of dimensional distinctions may be stated thus: In speaking of existence alongside in connection with dimensional relations, instead of referring to distance ranging between zero and a certain quantity, one is obliged to refer to Schnittlinie or Schnittpunkt, by which is meant that element which, without being divided or striven for, belongs equally to two coordinate realms. Die Begegnung Zwischen zwei koordinierten Raumen innerhalb eines umfassenderen Raums, dem beide untergeordnet sind, ist nur dadurch möglich, das beide ein gemeinsames Element haben in das sie sich nicht teilen und das sie sich auch nicht gegenseitig streitig machen.(2)

5. A final consequence of the fact that distinctions are of two kinds may be seen, when one asks how a person who has hitherto been blind to the existence of a given dimension comes to know of the existence and structure of that dimension. New knowledge of contents is gained through perception or through logical conclusions drawn from perceptions. Clearly, this is not the case where

(1) Ibid, p. 70.
(2) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, p. 77.
awareness of realms or dimensional relations is concerned. One cannot perceive dimensional relations or derive them from reason. One simply knows in terms of them. Think, for example, of a drawing of a transparent cube. The drawing may be seen first as a surface on which squares have been superimposed one upon another. But without any alteration of the lines and apart from logical inference the same figure may be seen as a cube. That is, one may see the drawing either in two or in three dimensions. One does not see either two dimensions or three; rather, he sees the drawing either in two or three dimensions. The words two or three dimensions designate the manner in which we see, not the objects of our perception.

Once again, the manner in which we gain knowledge of contents is often a process of gradual achievement, step by step. When a man learns the streets in a new town, his knowledge comes slowly a step at a time. Knowledge of new realms dawns upon the mind suddenly and completely in such a way that the knower not only recognizes the new realm, but also has the power to see its organizing principle. As soon, for example, as a man becomes aware of three dimensional space, he is aware a priori of the "structural laws governing the contents of an infinite space continuum."(1) The principles of geometry only make explicit what is already inherently grasped.(2)

Thus, the first result of Heim's analysis of our common knowledge is the conclusion that, while knowledge is an organic whole, it nevertheless comes to rest in certain realms or dimensions, the relationship between which may be designated by five paradoxical marks. Each of these realms in which knowing takes place is in itself limitless and so never completely grasped. Each can come into view only a priori.

(III) An Account of the Structure of Particular Dimensional Relations

The second result of Heim's effort to analyse the structure of our knowledge is a characterization of the particular nature of each of those dimensional relations which mark the most important boundaries in our knowledge.

As has already been indicated, the dimensions of succession and extension are lower spheres of knowledge into which one withdraws only by a recognized process; for example, the relation between one two dimensional experience and another is a distinction of a very abstract character; The dimensional relations which have determining significance in the structure of our actual knowledge are those designated by two boundaries: first, the boundary between

(1) Ibid., Tr., p. 75.
(2) Ibid., pp. 75, 76.
the "I" and the "Thou", and, second, the boundary between "I-lyself" (i.e., the "I" as related to the world) and the objective world. (1) The dimensional relations implied are essentially four: "I"-my objective world; you-your objective world; "I" - you; my objective world-your objective world. (2) Since the first two of these relations are alike in kind, the second does not require special consideration. (3) Moreover, since a sketch of the first and third relations will present the essential features of Heim's idea of knowledge of the world, we shall omit any detailed discussion of the fourth relation, calling attention in connection with that relation only to those ideas which are necessary to the argument. Thus, the relations which must be discussed for an understanding of Heim's idea of the structure of knowledge in general are the "I-It" and the "I-Thou" relations.

We must now sketch in some detail Heim's conception of the "I"-my world or "I-It" relation and the "I-Thou" relation which, he holds, belong inseparably to the "I-Thou-It" world, but which may be isolated for analysis. (4) Since Heim's discussion of each of these relations is a rather closely knit argument, we shall confine ourselves at first to a bare presentation of the main stream of the thought, and then undertake a brief reconstructive statement which may bring certain features of the analysis more clearly to light.

(A) Heim's Idea of the "I-It" Relation

Just as it is possible for a man's experiences to be confined to succession or extension, so it is possible for a man's experience to be confined within the dimension of his external world. The philosophical confirmation of such a man's outlook is the doctrine of epistemological realism, in which knowledge is simply and solely the presentation to consciousness of an independently existing world which is quite indifferent to the knower.

However, in the same way in which a man whose thought is limited to succession may become aware of simultaneity, a man who lives only on the plain of relations within his world may suddenly become aware that over against this entire world in an entity which, being no part of his world, is yet in inseparable relation to it. Such a man is aware of the here, the now, or the "I" which can never be really grasped in terms of the relations of his world. He has come into the dimensional level of the "I-It" relation.

The "I-It" relation is the relation in which I stand to inanimate things. It includes my every perception and thought; My world, as such, is only an abstraction from it. It is the relation in which the "I" stands to all that is objectifiable.

(1) Ibid., p. 80.
(2) Ibid., p. 31.
(3) Ibid., p. 82.
(4) Ibid., p. 83.
The relation "I-It" is not a relation between contents within the world. This becomes quite certain just so soon as it is seen that the "I" must be distinguished from all that is objectifiable. That the "I" is, in fact, to be distinguished from all that is objectifiable may be seen from a simple optical fact; namely, that Der sehende Punkt ist selbst nicht mehr sichtbar.(1) I can see an object only when I am separated from it by distance. But I am never separated from myself. Thus, I can never see myself or become an object of perception to myself. Moreover, the impossibility of seeing anything from which the seer cannot be separated is simply the optical expression of a rule which applies to every act of knowledge, the rule that, Ich kann nur erkennen was mir als objekt gegenübertritt. I, as the one who is knowing, can never be an object to myself. I cannot be my body or my thoughts, for these are over against me as objects. Thus, however we take it, it is necessary to distinguish sharply between "I" and "It". The "I-It" relation is no relation within my world.

1. The Paradox of the "I-It" Relation

Is one warranted in going on to assert that the relation "I-It" is a dimensional distinction? Can one say that man---die Grenze zwischen beiden Gegebenheiten nur paradox ausdrucken kann?

Speaking in the terms of the objectifiable world, one is obliged to say of the "I" that it is that which gathers up the successive elements of experience into an experience manifold in which they become simultaneous. Apart from the recognition of such a Kantian Synthesis der tranzentalen Apperzeption, it is impossible to coordinate successive elements. For example, if we leave this synthesis out of consideration, it is impossible to think of two strokes of the clock together, for either they are blended, in which case there is not one stroke, or they are not blended, in which case the two are not thought together. Clearly the synthesis brought about by the "I" is necessary if thought is to have connectivity. But this synthesis is a paradox, for either two things are successive, in which case they cannot be simultaneous, or else they are simultaneous, in which case they cannot be successive. Thus, as the attempt is made to define an "I" from the standpoint of the world, one can only frame the definition in terms of paradox by saying that the "I" is that which gathers into a manifold of simultaneity, elements of experience which are objectively successive. This is the paradox of the "I-It" relation.

2. The Identity of the Relation "I-It" and Becoming-Become

Apart from the pointing out of a paradox in the relation "I-It", Heim's account of this relation involves another striking feature, namely, the contention that the relation

(1) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, p. 110.
"I-It" is essentially the same as the relation Becoming-Become.

As evidence of this identification Heim urges the consideration that it would explain a certain discovery that has now become widely recognized in philosophy under the leadership of such men as Martin Heidegger, Oswald Spengler, Martin Buber, and Eberhard Grisebach. The discovery is that "what presents itself to us in objective form, so that we may have a spectator's view of it, is never the world in the process of becoming, but always what has already become".(1) When one supposes that he is observing an event in process, as, for example, the changing of a tadpole to a frog, or of a caterpillar to a butterfly, he really only observes each stage of the process after it is past, so that what he sees is a secondary becoming, not the primary Becoming which takes place in the hidden Present. One does not see den Übergang in dem das Werden in secondären Sinn selbst erst entsteht.(2)

The impossibility of knowing the present moment or primary Becoming may, of course, be amply illustrated from physics. Thus, in the observation of a star, far from supposing that we actually see the star as it is in the present moment, we know that a considerable time is required for the transmission of light waves from the star to the observer. It is a well known physical fact that in the observation of any physical event, be it near or far, an interval of time is required.

The ground of the impossibility of observing anything in the present is, however, not simply the physical constitution of things, or the imperfection of our sense organs. It has, in fact, never been shown that the external world exists. Thus, all explanations of the nature of our knowledge that depends upon physical facts only beg the question. The explanation of the impossibility of knowing primary Becoming must be sought in the character of the observing process itself, the fact that dass sehende Ich kann sich niehmsns sehen.

If the identity of the relation "I-It" and the relation Becoming-Become is assumed, an explanation of the fact of the impossibility of observing primary Becoming is at hand. It has already been asserted that the "I" cannot see itself. Now, if becoming is the same as the "I", the impossibility of knowing the Present is seen to be rational in the fact that the "I", which is a becoming, cannot know itself.

But, beyond the offering of this simple explanation of the fact that all that is objectifiable is past, there is another reason for identifying the "I" and Becoming. The "I" can, as a non-objectifiable, find no place in the objective world, which is past. The "I"

(1) Ibid., p. 116; Was uns genständlich gegenübertritt, was also in Zuschauerstellung betrachten kann, ist nicht die Welt im Zustand des Werdens, sondern immer erst das Gewordene.
(2) Ibid., p. 120.
must, then, in some way be identified with the Present or the "Not-yet-decided". Thus, upon two grounds one is warranted in assuming that the "I-It" relation is the same as the relation Becoming-Become, or Present-Past: first, such an assumption accords with and gives us an adequate explanation of the recognized but otherwise inexplicable discovery that the events, as we see them, are always in the past or the Already-become; second, the assumption affords a place within the temporal view of things for the "I" which cannot belong to the already decided past.

But, one must guard against misunderstandings: first, it is to be noted that whereas the Present, which may be either in actual becoming or still in the future, is in either case uncertain and undecided; the Past is always definite and fixed. (1) Second, when it is asserted that the "I" is identified with the Present or the Noch-nicht-entscheidensein, it is not meant that the "I" is altogether over against the Past. (2) The "I" belongs quite definitely to Time. Third, when it is said that the "I" is present, it is not implied that the Past is out of relation with the "I" or that the Past is unreal; rather, since the relation "I"-Present--"It"-Past is dimensional, its parts can be separated only by abstraction. The "I" gathers up, and so is related to the elements of the Past. The Past has, for the "I", genau denselben Wirklichkeitswert wie das Unvollendete. (3)

The "I-It" and Present-Past relationships are zwei Seiten derselben Sache. (4) As one thinks of the contrast between two Weltzustände, he speaks of Werden und Gewordensein. But, as one thinks of the manner in which one Zustände is observed by another, he speaks of ich und es.

3. The Paradoxical Marks of the Dimensional Relation "I-It"

In the light of the theory of the identity of the relations "I-It" and Becoming-Become, now, according to Heim, do the characteristics of dimensional relations apply in particular to the relation "I"-Present, "It"-Past; that is to say, what are the five paradoxical marks of the particular relation in question?

a. The factors involved in the relation "I-It" are dimensional in a specific sense. Heim points out in discussing the relation between consciousness worlds, (5) a subject with which it is not necessary to deal fully here, that my consciousness world is a "part realm" of the realm of the Objective world. The world as I know it is not, indeed, an isolated indifferent world, nor is it the Objective world as such. It is, rather, my own peculiar

(1) Ibid., pp. 124-125.
(2) Ibid., pp. 122-124.
(3) Ibid., p. 128.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid., p. 90 ff.
perspective. However, it is none the less a continuum in itself endless, a sphere of knowing in terms of which my observation takes form and into which my knowing may by abstraction withdraw.

The "I", on the other hand, is a nonobjectifiable realm which gathers up the elements of the past into a present experience. Of course this idea is open to the objection that that which is nonobjectifiable cannot be defined, that is to say, the proposition, that one has knowledge of something nonobjectifiable, is a *contradictio in adjecto*. (1)

But, in reality, this objection is not legitimate, for, as has been said, the discovery of a dimension is a priori, so that one may stand in the nonobjectifiable without ever attempting to define its contents. Further, the objection is based on the alternative. Entweder ist etwas gegenständlich, dann kann etwas darüber ausgesagt werden; oder es ist nicht gegenständlich, dann ist es inhaltsleer. (2) But, as soon as one discovers with Fichte that I am over against the objective world, some meaning is already given the dimension of nonobjectifiability, so that the above alternative is broken through and the objection becomes invalid.

It is possible, moreover, to make some positive assertions regarding that which is within the nonobjectifiable realm. While of course we may never objectify the nonobjectifiable, one may indirectly apprehend it. It has been pointed out above that, while I am not to be identified with the past, nevertheless, I am in time as part of time. If this be true, then knowing and willing are parts of the same struggle in time and belong together. They can be separated only by abstraction. (3) While one cannot directly apprehend either the knowing process or the willing process, one can indirectly recognize willing as he becomes aware that impulses are, from some source, constantly thrust into his consciousness: for example, when I, as a poor man, determine to seek bread, I can objectify only the ideas that come before me concerning various ways in which I might get bread, not the will behind them. Nevertheless, I am confident that there is an unseen factor which keeps presenting these ideas to me. (4) I have an indirect apprehension of something nonobjectifiable.

Although legitimate objections may be raised to the supposition that the "I" stands as a nonobjectifiable over against its world, if reality is to be ordered, it must be taken for granted that the "I" is a dimension over against the dimension of its world. (5)

Moreover, in the light of the fact that the "I-It" relation

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(1) Ibid., p. 123.
(2) Ibid., p. 130.
(3) Ibid., p. 132.
(4) Ibid., p. 134.
(5) Ibid., Tr., p. 126.
is essentially the same as the relation Becoming-Become, it must constantly be borne in mind that the "I" is not simply an isolated nonobjectifiable, but a part dimension of a nonobjectifiable dimension. While this dimension is not to be directly apprehended, indirect evidences of its existence abound. One is aware of the reality of a nonobjectifiable, for example, in the idea of energy, the existence of which is never directly apprehended, but, nevertheless, unquestionably real as evidenced by its effects. Again, the subconscious, which can never be localized, manifests itself in dreams, racial memory, and the biological fact of restitution of destroyed members, obliging us to recognize facts that we can never objectify, aspects of a nonobjectifiable realm.

b. The dimensional relation "I-It" or Present-Past involves a paradoxical identity and difference in that each side of the relation bears upon the same fact from a different point of view. At first sight it may appear to be mere speculation to speak of any kind of identity between the "I" and the world. To be sure, if dimensional relations were not distinguished from relations of content, identity between "I" and world would necessarily be impossible. As soon, however, as the fact of dimensional distinctions is admitted, it may be seen that an identity between "I" and my world is at least possible. In the illustration of the photographs of a cathedral, it proved to be a fact that there was a relation of identity between pictures which seemed to have nothing in common except their borders. The identity of the pictures consisted in the fact that two or more continuums were auf dieselbem Inhalt bezogen.

While it is in the nature of the case impossible to demonstrate that the situation is the same when the relation "I-It" is in question, nevertheless, there is sufficient justification for affirming that here also is a case of that identity in which two dimensions are focused upon the same reality, for such a conclusion is the only satisfactory solution of the dilemma before which the "I-It" relation places one. It has already been established that the "Im-Present is no part of the World-Past. This being true, one is obliged to say that either the identity relation "I"-Present--"It"-Past is a dimensional identity of the same type as that presented in the case of photographs of a cathedral, or else the identity and difference of the relation is indefinable and without analogy. The latter is to depart from the criterion of experience world, and to plunge into mere speculation. This we have no right to do unless there is no other alternative. "I" and world are then not only distinct; they have also a dimensional identity and belong inseparably together.

[1] Ibid., p. 133 ff.
c. The "I" as a limitless realm of knowing is paradoxically a part dimension of the nonobjectifiable dimension, which may accordingly be called a "We" realm. In the same way, My world, or the world as I see it, is paradoxically a part dimension of the objective world, or the world seen by all "I's". Of course, it must be borne in mind that neither the "we" realm nor the Objective world can be really apprehended. However, as I stand in conscious relation to my world, I am experiencing, in part, the more inclusive relation "We"-Objective world, the existence of which I may at least surmise.

d. Heim's discussion of the general characteristics of all dimensional relations revealed that, instead of either touching or being separated from each other by a certain distance, as are contents within a realm, dimensions cut across each other in such a paradoxical fashion that the element in which they meet belongs wholly and without division to each.

He declares that the particular element in which the "I" and the "It" or the Present and the Past meet is the so-called Perspektivische Mittlepunkt, or the point of view from which the world is seen. This Perspektivische Mittlepunkt belongs wholly yet without division to both dimensions.

On the one hand, as one thinks of a prospective point of view, in the terms of the world, he sees that it is a point in time and space, a point which is quite capable of being localized and objectified. Thus, it belongs wholly to the "It" realm.

On the other hand, as one thinks of that perspective in the terms of the subjective realm, it is evident that it belongs in its entirety to the nonobjectifiable realm; for, if the Perspektivische Mittlepunkt is the point of view from which the world is seen, it cannot itself be objectified. A little reflection is sufficient to convince one that an "I" does not identify itself entirely with the particular point in time and space which it happens to occupy. Take a simple illustration: A drunken peasant has been taken from the street, where he was sleeping, into the palace of a prince. When he awakens, he supposes that he is in heaven. That means that he supposes that he is in a totally different time and space from that in which he has formerly lived, but soon he begins to think of his wife and his children. It is then evident that his consciousness is continuous and that he had not identified himself entirely with any particular point in time and space. His perspective is beyond any given space.

As a matter of fact, what this man experiences is nothing unique: Das Hineingeworfenwerden von auserhalb in dieses Da, das erleben wir im Grunde jeden Augenblick aufs neue.(1) What happened to the peasant is striking, but it is only an example of what we are constantly experiencing. Every moment we are emerging

(1) Ibid., p. 152.
from a state which we can describe only negatively, and which has no place in the time-line, and finding ourselves transported into a second state to which a definite date in a time-line can be assigned."(1)

e. The relation between "I" and "It" cannot be known by observation or by inference from observation. It is a relation that stands noch dieses die ganzen Objectivität. This relation can only be known as the dimensions of space are known; that is, a priori.(2)

(B) Heim's Idea of the "I-Thou" Relation

If, Heim reasons, the "I" is a part dimension of a "We" or Present dimension, one may reasonably suppose that there must be a relation between the "I" and another "I" in the "We" dimension. Heim maintains that such a relation does exist, and that it is distinct from the relation "I-It", and never to be known in terms of the latter.

The relation "I-You" is not the same as the relation "I-It". In my relation to the world I experience things in the world, I use them, I think them. But I never use or think "Thou" as such; I stand in a relation to a "Thou".(3) Wir können nicht bloss erfahren und gebrauchen, wir können in Beziehung treten.(4) The "I" of the "I-It" relation is the subject of experience. The "I" of the "I-Thou" relation is person or subjectivity without a genitive. One has an experience(5) of an "It"; he enters an experiential relation with a "Thou".

The distinctiveness of the relation "I-Thou" may be indicated by a simple illustration: An educator as a theorist attempts to analyse his pupils, regards them as cases which illustrate certain psychological principles. An educator as a teacher, however, must cease to regard his pupils as cases, that is, he must no longer stand only in an "I-It" relation to them. The more he undertakes to analyse them, the farther he is from actually teaching them. As he observes them, he finds that they are closed to his influence;

(2) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, p. 153.
(3) The term experience is here used in a somewhat narrower sense than that in which we use it in other passages. Here it means the apprehension of that which is peculiarly my own, a part of my world.
(4) Ibid, pp. 155-156.
thence, he must regard them as persons with whom he is in relation, subjects over against himself. He must stand in the relation "I-Thou" to them.

The "I-Thou" relation, being distinct from the "I-It" relation, is, like that relation, a dimensional one in that the "Thou" can, from the standpoint of the "I", be thought of only in terms of paradox. I can only be myself or another. I can never be both; The word "I" is not used in the plural. I can stand only at one place if I am the center point of my world-picture. (1) But, when I regard you as a "You", "I" have given you authority to be the central point of the whole and to treat everything else, myself included, as a "Not-I".(2) The "Thou" can only be paradoxically defined as: ein Nichtich das ein Ich ist. whereas, from the standpoint of the "I" dimension, the "I" is always singular; nevertheless, in the Ich-Du-Es-Welt in which we live, a "Thou" or a second "I" must be recognized. Thus, in the terms of the "I-It" dimension, the fact of a "Thou" can be explained only in terms of the paradox that, whereas I can only be either the one who I am or another, nevertheless, I am compelled to recognize you as an "I".

The peculiar manner in which this paradoxical "I-Thou" relation manifests the marks of dimensional relations is as follows:

1. It has already been shown that the "I" is within the present dimension. Since a "Thou" is recognized as another "I", the "I-Thou" relation is a relation of dimensions within the present dimension. Ich kann dem andern mit dem ich in der zweiten Person spreche, nur in der Ebene der genenwart begegner.(3) Ich und Du are part dimensions(4) within the present dimension.(5)

2. "I" and "Thou" do not have a common border, as do two adjoining fields; rather, there is a dimensional oneness and difference between us in that we both claim, from different points of view, to be the center of the world. Despite the fact that it seems to belong to the nature of the "I" to be only one, both you and I cannot but make simultaneously the claim "to be the one standpoint from which everything else wears the character of a 'Not-I'. The 'I'-place, of which we are disputing the possession, is one; yet we bear on it from two opposite sides."(6) This may be seen in the experience of teaching, already referred to. The teacher cannot look on the pupil only as object. he must admit the "I" existence

(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid, P. 160.
(4) Teilräume, Ibid.
(5) Gegenwordsraums, Ibid.
of the pupil. Teacher and pupil, though separate, are bound in
dimensional oneness by the singleness of the Ichstelle.(1)

3. You and I are not coordinate parts of the "We" dimension
in the same sense in which equal quantities may be part quantities
of a greater quantity; rather, you and I are part dimensions of
the "We" dimension or Present dimension(2) in the paradoxical
way in which an infinite line is a part of an infinite plain. I
am a part dimension of my Ich-Es-Welt in which I, as my nonobjecti­
fiable Self, observe my objectifiable world. In like manner, you
are a part realm of your Ich-Es-Welt.(3)

4. In dimensional relations, realms so schneiden und durchdrin­
gen each other that there is a Begegnungsstelle which has the para­
doxical characteristic that ungeteilt jedem der beiden Raume ange­
hört it. Where, in the "I-Thou" relation, is this Begegnungsstelle?(4)
In the passing over of events from present to past, which is called
Geschen, and of which one side is called Becoming(5) and the other
Become,(6) there is a distinction which cannot be explained. It is
the distinction between doing and suffering. It is a distinction
of which both sides are always present; for, on the one hand, no
matter what one does, his doing is always accompanied by suffering,
while, on the other hand, the very fact of suffering is dependent
upon struggle or doing.(7) The distinction between doing and suffer­
ing is a fundamental one, an Urunterscheidung. It cannot be demons­
strated to any one who does not know it. Every attempt to define
the relation is only to state it in other words.(8)

This Urunterscheidung does not by any means belong to the di­
mentation of objectivity which is a dimension of the Past.(9) Every­
thing in the past dimension has already moved beyond that Übergang
in which the distinction between doing and suffering arises. The
distinction between doing and suffering can never be seen in the
objective world: for example, in the objective world, one can never
tell whether a person has done a thing of his own will or involun­
tarily.

(c) A Restatement of the Thoughts of the Foregoing Sections in
Terms of Levels of Knowledge

In attempting to disclose the idea of the structure of knowl­
edge presented in Heim's idea of the principal distinctions of
knowledge, it has been necessary, in order to show the connectivity

(1) Ibid.
(2) Gegenswartsrealm.
(3) Ibid, p. 162.
(4) Wo liegt zwischen mir und dir diese Begegnungsstelle, Ibid.
(5) Werden.
(6) Gewordensein.
(8) Ibid, p. 163.
(9) Ibid.
of Heim's thought, to present as much of the material as we have
given above in the form in which Heim has presented it, namely,
as an analysis of relations. The essential features of Heim's
idea of knowledge are either expressed or implied in our sketch
of his analysis. However, inasmuch as the immediate purpose of
Heim's study of dimensional relations is to clarify the idea of
transcendence, it is not to be expected that, in a sketch as the
above, Heim's idea of the structure of knowledge as such will stand
out as clearly as possible. Accordingly, we restate the conception
of knowledge implied in Heim's analysis of the principal distinc-
tions of experience in such a way that Heim's conception of the
levels of knowledge themselves, rather than his idea of the rela-
tions between and within them, comes more distinctly to the fore.
For this purpose we shall have occasion to mention, in addition to
the idea of the above sketch, certain ideas from the second edi-
tion of Glaube und Denken, as well as some from sections of the
third edition with which we have not specifically dealt.

Our discussion of Heim's idea of the nature of the problem
of knowledge brought to light the fact that Heim insists that know-
ledge is not a homogeneous whole in which the same principles apply
throughout, that knowledge for Heim comes to rest in various spheres
or dimensions, each of which stands in a distinct relation to the
other dimensions and has its own peculiar structure. This being
true, we are now to ask with reference to Heim's thought, not what
are the principal distinctions within knowledge, but what in the
light of the analysis of the chief distinction of knowledge are the
principal ways or levels of knowledge?

1. The lowest (that is to say, least comprehensive and remotest
from reality) of the levels of knowing is apprehension in terms of
pure succession, as in listening to a simple melody. Beyond this
is perception in terms of succession and simultaneity or surface,
as in looking at a motion picture.

The confining of knowledge within these levels is, however,
only possible by such a severe process of abstraction that the
abstract character of the dimensions is readily recognized. Actu-
ally our knowing is always in at least three dimensions. This leads
to the mention of a third dimensional level.

2. We may call the new level the dimension of knowledge of
the world. It is the way in which I know my world, or the level
at which I distinguish one object from another. At this level, I
am aware of a world of trees, houses, bodies, stars, skies, etc.
The world presented to me in this dimension, like that presented
in every other, seems endless so long as I think only in terms of
it. By abstraction I think of this world as a neutral world of
substantial objects casually determined. Everything in it, even the
one who knows, is an object among objects. An idea of an unknown
knower is paradoxical and incredible at this level. It is incon-
ceivable that anything should be other than object, or that anything
but an objectifiable, should in any way determine anything. Such
is the way in which one who is absorbed in the world itself looks upon his world.

3. However, it is possible to see reality at quite another level, as the knower sees reality in terms of the mutual relationship between knower and known. This level of knowledge may be referred to as the level of self-conscious knowledge. (1) It is impossible for me permanently to isolate my knowledge of the world from myself as a knower. I must see my world in inseparable relationship with myself, as a part of an "I-It" relationship. Without claiming to have created the world, I must see my world as dependent upon myself.

The distinction in Geschen between doing and suffering is the key to the question as to the situation of the meeting of the "I" and the "Thou". The meeting of an "I" and a "Thou" is in the fact that a Werden, which in my "experience-space is active, is, in the experience-space of the other person, passive; and vice versa". (2) I am aware of your action as my suffering, and you are aware of my action as your suffering. (3) Even the solving of the conflict of wills through obedience points indirectly to the fact that the conflict of reciprocal doing and suffering belongs to the meeting of an "I" and a "you", for when two persons get beyond conflict of doing and suffering, we no longer speak of "I" and "Thou". The two are ein Hertz und eine Seele. (4) The meeting of the "I" and the "Thou" is in that situation in which the action of one becomes the suffering of another, and vice versa.

The meeting of "I" and "Thou" in reciprocal doing and suffering is, in general, blind and uninterpretative. There is, however, a special instance in which the meeting of an "I" and a "Thou" in doing and suffering, when taken with the meeting of my world and yours, becomes interpretative. That interpretative meeting is of essential importance.

In discussing the meeting between my object world and your object world (a subject which we have largely omitted), Heim gives partial account of the meeting of these worlds by saying that it occurs at the "place which is lived as the dimensional unity of two consciousness worlds, when, for example, two living bodies look into each other's eyes." (5)

In another passage, to which we have referred, Heim has shown that there is a dimensional unity between the "I" and its objects.

(1) It should be noted that the term self-conscious is used only to point out the quality of knowledge on the "I-It" level, not to indicate that fully developed self-consciousness could never appear at this level.
(2) Erlebnisraum eine Aktion ist, im(K)raum des anderen eine Passion ist und umgekehrt. Ibid., p. 165.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid., p. 166; Acts 4:32.
(5) Ibid., Tr. p. 168.
Taking these two facts together, Heim concludes that the meeting of "I" and "Thou" has, as it were, another side, namely, an objective side in which the worlds of "I" and "Thou" meet. As one views both sides of the meeting of "I" and "Thou", i.e., as personal and objective, a new conception emerges, namely, that of word. It is in word that the meeting of "I" and "Thou" becomes interpretative.

A word is that in which beim Hören oder Lesen der lebendige Akt des Sprechens zum bewusstsein Kommt. The spoken word is the objektive Niederschlag of the conscious meeting of two persons.(1) Two things take place when any one hears a word. 1. There is an objective recognition of a content which belongs to objective space, the sound of the word or the printed letters which represent it. 2. Associated with this is a meeting in the non-objective space of the real Present.(2) It is only when the act of the speaker comes to me that the content through which his meaning is expressed really becomes a word.

Thus, there are two kinds of meeting of persons.(3) There is, first, that general meeting in which the one is vaguely conscious of the other as when, for example, through a musical experience, or the seeing of a statue, I come vaguely to feel the being of another.(4) Over against this, there is the word by which another interprets himself to me. Compared with the latter, the former is only ein ästhetischer Rausch oder ein hinreissender Machteindruck.(5)

4. A "Thou" is never to be known by observation or by conclusion from observation. It would be altogether out of the question to perceive or to prove "that my unbounded Self" yet has a boundary, that a frontier marks me off from you. A "You" can never be experienced.(6) The discovery of the "I-Thou" relation is a priori, and only so.

Since this represents not a new fact learned, but a totally new way of seeing things, the new level has dawned upon me a priori. When once this way of seeing things has dawned upon a man, two things become clear; namely, the abstract character of the world level of knowledge, and the structure of the self-conscious level of knowledge.

The world frame of knowledge is, from the point of view of self-conscious knowledge, seen to be an entirely inadequate way of looking at things, for the reason that it has no place for the knowing "I" or for the distinctive character of the Present moment. It leaves out all account of perspective. Accordingly, it presents to view only the Past or Already become of reality. It recognizes

(1) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, p. 168.
(2) Ibid, p. 169.
(5) Ibid., p. 170.
(6) Experienced means, here, apprehended as a part of my world.
the known world without taking note of the knowing "I" apart from which knowledge is obviously impossible; hence it is only an ab-
straction.

The new level of knowledge into which one comes does not pre-
sent to us a world in which everything is object among objects;
rather, in it, world and "I", knower and known, are bound inseparably
together. Moreover, knower and known are parts of two more compre-
hensive opposites, present and past.

On this new level of knowledge knower and known and Past and
Present are brought into unity in a perspective middle which is an
aspect of the passing over from Present to Past. Thus, for the man
who lives upon this level of knowledge, all reality is centered about,
though not created by, an "I"-here-now point which, from one point
of view, belongs wholly to the realm of the not-yet-decided, and the
nonobjectifiable. On this level of knowledge my world is seen as
experienced in a perspective.

5. There is one fact that remains a complete mystery on the
level of self-conscious knowledge. That is the claim of another
person to be an "I" who looks out upon his world as I look out
upon mine. Such a claim must, even upon the level of self-conscious
knowledge, remain paradoxical, since all that I recognize upon that
level is myself and my world.

However, a man may, and most men do, come to stand upon a new
level of knowledge as the relationship "I-Thou" really comes to
expression. We may call this the level of personal knowledge. A
"Thou" is now just as much an "I" as I am. I recognize that the
other is a world center with rights quite as imperative as my own.
However, not only may the other person be recognized as a "Thou",
all reality may come to take on a volitional aspect, so that every
event which I confront may have something of the character of a
"Thou".

Once a man stands on the dimensional level of the "I-Thou"
relation, a far clearer light is thrown upon the level of self-
conscious knowledge. Even this frame of knowledge is now seen to
be an abstraction from a more comprehensive knowledge situation.
Self-conscious knowledge is seen as an apprehension of the rela-
tionship between myself and my world which leaves out of account
the "Thou" character of reality. To put it in another way, the
level of self-conscious knowledge makes possible the apprehension
of the relations in the passing over of reality from Past to
Present, but is incapable of making distinctions within the Present
itself. Indeed, it now appears that self-consciousness can never
actually arise, or that "I" can never become "I", until a "Thou"
is confronted, for full self-consciousness involves struggling
will.

In the new level of knowledge in which a man stands where he
recognizes another as a "Thou", "I" and "Thou" are seen to be bound together in inseparable, yet paradoxical, relationship. Their meeting finds expression in doing and suffering in such a way that what is the doing of the one is always the suffering of the other.

It will, of course, be readily recognized that doing and suffering cannot be called knowing in the narrow sense of that word; yet doing and suffering are the real essence out of which all knowing comes, for that static reality which can be objectified is only a past which has come forth from a living present, or, to put it another way, what we know as object is only a crystalization of what is, in the present, will. The root of all knowledge is volitional.

None the less, there is a kind of knowing which is more definite and interpretative than doing and suffering in themselves, a kind of knowledge which is at the same time not simply of that secondary static character that belongs to objectification. That knowing is that which takes place when an "I" understands the Word of a "Thou". When you speak to me a part of your world, an idea vocalized in an audible symbol, becomes a part of my world as a sound conveying an idea. However, in that same act, on a deeper level, you are meeting me in the present in such a way that what for you is doing, is for me suffering. But, since I and my world and you and your world belong together, the two levels of the process really belong together; hence in speaking and hearing there is a kind of interpretative knowledge upon the personal level.

6. Since on the level of personalistic knowledge an "I" meets a "Thou", the idea of an Objective world which includes both my world and thy world arises. However, the Objective world does not represent, strictly speaking, one of the dimensions of my knowing, since the only world which stands directly in relation to myself is my own peculiar world. In the same way, since "I" meets "Thou", there arises a concept of a "We" realm or Present realm which is not, as such, strictly a dimension of my knowing. Just as my world is only a part dimension of the objective world, so "I", even in relation to a "Thou", is only a part of the Present dimension. I apprehend in terms of the Objective world only in its part dimension, my world. I apprehend in terms of the Present only in its part dimension, "I". Even in the "I-Thou" relationship, I may not comprehend the Present.

7. Although our present discussion concerns knowledge in general, we must refer here to the relation between knowledge of God and the scheme of dimensions of knowledge.

In the second edition of Glaube und Denken Heim held that one comes into a final dimension which is beyond all the dimensional levels of this world when one comes seriously to raise the question about God. Just as self-conscious knowledge was above all knowledge of the world and personal knowledge was above the knowledge of the
"I-It" relationship, so to ask the question about God was a level of knowledge which was above all knowledge of the world, a dimension of knowledge apart from which all other knowledge was incomplete. (1)

However, following the publication of the second edition of Glaube und Denken certain of Heim's critics, notably Dietrich Bonhoesser, protested against the idea of undertaking to place God within the dimensional scheme. It is doubtful whether Bonhoesser really grasped what Heim meant in this connection. However, in order to avoid misunderstandings, Heim, in the third edition of Glaube und Denken asserted that knowledge of God was really no part of the dimensional scheme, that God broke sheer through all dimensional boundaries. Heim affirmed that, while the relation between God and man was like dimensional relations in several of the marks of dimensions, it was absolutely distinct in the final mark. There was no a priori knowledge of God. Moreover, whereas knowledge within the dimensional scheme must always be incomplete, since the manifolds involved were endless, in God all our questions were brought to rest.

As a matter of fact, when Heim's meaning in asserting that knowledge of God was a final dimension, in distinction from all other dimensions, is recognized, the two conceptions are not so very different. However, this much must be kept in mind, from this point forward, that for Heim knowledge of God does not fall within a continuation of the scheme of the dimensions of this world. Knowledge of God is, rather, something quite distinct. Study of general knowledge may throw light upon it or yield useful forms, but study of knowledge in general can never adequately account for knowledge of God.

In order that Heim's idea of the structure of knowledge may stand out still more clearly, we begin now with the more comprehensive level of knowledge, and restate in reverse order something of what has been said of the character of each level of knowledge and of the relationship between them.

1. God is above all dimensions of knowledge. 2. The nature of the Present and even the character of the Objective world remains obscure to us. 3. In the passing over from Present to Past, the primary distinction between doing and suffering and its expression in Word, reveals a volitional interpretative relationship between wills. This is the highest level of our knowledge. 4. However, when the passing over of Present to Past is narrowed to the compass of an individual perspective, distinctions within the transition itself disappear and only a distinction between a perspective, i.e., a phase of the transition, and past events remains. This is a less comprehensive level of our knowledge. 5. Finally, whenever the fact of perspective is lost sight of, only distinctions between objects remain. This is a still lower level of knowledge. 6. One might go on and say that when awareness of solidity drops out, only a dis-

(1) Ibid, zweite Auflage, p. 341.
tinction between areas remains, and that when awareness of surface drops out, only distinction between succeeding events remains.

(IV) The Dimensions in Polar Relations

A fourth result of Heim's analysis of our knowledge is a conviction that the dimensions of our knowledge are held together in a relation of unalterable mutual dependence.

In the second edition of Glaube und Denken Heim undertakes with considerable care to show the mutual dependence of each of the dimensional relationships. In the third edition of that book he takes for granted at the outset the mutual dependence of all spheres of knowledge and the solidarity of reality, backing the assumption in the whole course of the thought. In Jesus der Herr Heim presents the subject in a fresh light. However, inasmuch as we shall presently have occasion to deal at some length with the idea of polarity, as it is presented in that book, we leave the entire subject with the bare affirmation that Heim insists upon the polarity of all the dimensions of our knowledge.

C. Heim's Idea of Knowledge of God

(I) The Absence of Knowledge of God from Our Common Knowledge

To what conclusion does Heim's investigation of the structure of our common knowledge lead him regarding the question as to whether our common knowledge includes any knowledge of God?

(A) Knowledge of God as a Distinction between God and the World Not Included within Our Common Knowledge

Inasmuch as, for Heim, knowledge is a matter of distinctions, the entire question really hinges upon the question as to whether there is given in our common knowledge any way of distinguishing between God and finite realities. In the third edition of Glaube und Denken, framing the question in this way, Heim declares that the question as to whether we can distinguish between God and other realities is altogether prior to the more strictly epistemological problem as to the reality of God, that the latter problem has no meaning until the former has been decided.

Throughout the book Glaube und Denken Heim represents the relation between dimensions, or frames of knowledge, as relations of transcendence. He has, therefore, he holds, defined with reasonable accuracy certain relations of transcendence within the world. Can we within our common knowledge define the transcendence of God? That is to say, can we distinguish between God and the remainder of reality?

1. God Equally Transcendent over, or to Be Distinguished from, All Dimensions
At the very outset, Helm affirms that God stands, according to the unanimous testimony of those who witness concerning Him, as Creator and Lord, "beyond" the whole of reality. That is to say, God is "equally transcendent" (1) over the world and all its realms. This is, of course, not to take for granted the existence of God, but simply to state the one essential quality which must belong to Him if He is.

2. The Distinction Not to be Found in Spacial Analogies

This being the character of the distinction which separates God from man, as it is represented by those who actually have knowledge of God, the question as to whether knowledge of God falls within our common knowledge depends upon whether or not our common knowledge brings to expression such a distinction.

First of all, it is quite clear that no such distinction can be arrived at from analogies of space.

In attempting to define the transcendence of God, little is accomplished when one takes such words as are ordinarily used to designate a boundary and strengthen them in fancy, as for example, when one says that God is "Wholly Other". In such phrases one is still referring to relationships within the world. (2) The transcendence of God is totally distinct from transcendence relations within the world. The mere strengthening of worldly negation will never give an insight into the meaning of God's transcendence.

3. The Distinction Not within Either of the Basic Processes of Our Knowledge

If such a distinction, as is required for knowledge of God, is expressed within our common knowledge, it is to be discovered by pushing the basic processes of consciousness to their ultimate limits in order to determine whether or not the distinction can be found.

a. The Distinction Not to be Discovered within Our Intellectual Search for a Final Cause

Following the process of consciousness as it looks toward the past, i.e., thought, it is clear that we are compelled to ask the question why. The question is not to be avoided by saying that events are only successive, for the analysis of the structure of

(1) Ibid., dritte Auflage, Tr., p. 187
(2) Ibid., p. 199
knowledge has revealed the volitional character of events, and so obliges us to think of casually connected forces.

Thought is impelled to ask the question why, i.e., why is reality as it is? When the why question is taken seriously, that is, when a cause which is final beyond which there is no other cause is sought, a difficulty appears, namely, that the Gegenstands-welt, which is before us in thought as we look at the world from the standpoint of Gewordensein, is an in sich unabschliessbares Continuum.\(^{(1)}\) This means that it is impossible to reach a cause which is more than one of a chain of causes. One cannot close the circle of causes. Thus, there are only two possibilities open to anyone who seeks to answer the why question. 1. Some element within the chain of causes may be selected, considered final, and called a First Cause, a primum movens. Thus, for example, in the 19th century a primitive gaseous mass was thought to be the beginning of things. It was supposed to have potentially all world energies. This type answer to the why question Heim designates as Idolatry, since it exalts a particular element in the universe. 2. The whole chain of events and causes may be taken to be an unanschlieszbare Unendlichkeit, which creates itself and which is sufficient to itself. Totalität is thought to be source and end. Such a solution to the why question Heim calls Pantheism, since it exalts the whole of things. Human thought is completely bound to these two possible answers. Philosophy and religion in their entire history swing between them. The necessity of this Either-Or for human thought is implied in our being in time and our inability to escape from it.

But, neither of these alternatives implies a distinction between God and the remainder of reality, for when once men are led of God "to inquire concerning God", when the thought dawns upon men that there is a Creator, so that alles, was ist, nicht durch sich selbst ist, sondern geschaffen ist, then evidently this Either-Or of our thought is broken through. A plausible answer to the why question emerges which neither exalts an event in the world, nor looks to the whole series as the source and end of the world. It is the possibility that the world was created by God, that the Source is "both this side of and beyond, above, and below the opposition between our thoughts are obliged to move.\(^{(2)}\) Thus, quite evidently the ultimates to which our common thought leads us is not God. Human thought in itself as it attempts to answer its fundamental question is unable to distinguish between God and the rest of reality.

b. The Distinction Not to Be Discovered in Our Volitional Search for a Final Sanction

Following the process of our consciousness as it turns toward

\(^{(1)}\) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, p. 187.
\(^{(2)}\) Ibid., Tr., p. 195.
the present in will, Heim is led to conclusions similar to those
to which analysis of thought leads him. In the will aspect of our
consciousness we are constantly obliged to ask: Was soll ich wollen?(1)
This question is never to be answered simply by a consideration of
the objective world. The objective world has come to rest. It is
completed decision. Will is fundamentally the living act of decid­
ing. Will does indeed deal with the objective world, but will acti­
vely endeavors to determine what, in the objective world, ought to
remain and what ought to be changed.(2) Thus, the question Was soll
ich wollen? goes behind the objective world to the Zustand in which
becoming takes place. We need an Instanz in the realm of Werden
which gives an authorization in which we can rest satisfied, an
Instanz which gives us that kind of free necessity which has char­
acterized such men as Luther and Paul when they acted quite of
their own wills, and at the same time were sure they could not do
otherwise. We seek to be able to say: Ich handle in voller Freiwil­
ligkeiht, aber im Allerhochsten Auftrag.(3)

Now such a free necessity can never come from myself, for a
command from myself is no real command. It may always be withdrawn
Die Instanz, deren ich bedarf muss also ein nichtgefenstandliches
Ich sein, also ein Du oder ein Wir, das uber mir steht und fur mich
Authoritat wird(4]

But when we inquire whence such an authority can come, we find
that we face just such a Notlage as we encountered in seeking to
find an answer to the question "Why is reality as it is?" Beyond
every situation of which we say that it is perhaps the Instanz which
authorizes our deeds, we must still ask whence its authority comes.
We are in will, as in thought, bound to two possibilities when we
seek an answer to final questions. 1. We can set up some relative
authority as final for us. Thus, for example, a man may say that
the state is his authority, and declare that whatever the state com­
mands he will do. Such a surreptitious attempt to set up an authori­
ity for one's self may be called Idolatry.(5) 2. verabsolutieren
das ganze der unabschliessbaren Reihe. This occurs, when, for ex­
ample, we trust to a sort of inspiration which we feel is contained
in the entire development of nature and the race, or when we suppose
that we live from the realm of Werden of which the Totalitat is the
tragende Kraft.(6) To this attempt to answer the question "What
shall I do?" by an appeal to the universe in its entirety, the name
Pantheism is given.(7)

But obviously, neither of these possibilities reveals a dis­
tinction between God and the world, for God is, by the testimony
of those who know Him, our "Lord" in such a way that while we know
His authority to be absolute, He is in no sense to be identified
with the universe. Our volitional search for an authority reveals

(1) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, p. 192.
(2) Ibid., pp. 192-193.
(3) Ibid., p. 194. (4) Ibid. (5) Ibid., p. 197.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
no distinction between God and the remainder of reality. Hence, neither of the basic processes of consciousness leads us to a distinction between God and the world. Knowledge of God, therefore, cannot fall within our common knowledge.

4. The Distinction of Our Common Knowledge Not Analogous to the Distinction between God and the World

The foregoing argument may seem at first to lead toward the idea that while our common knowledge does not include knowledge of God, it furnishes us with an analogy in terms of which we may readily infer the distinction between God and man. It may be argued that on a level just higher than our common knowledge God stands over against that reality which our common knowledge reveals, in precisely the same type of paradoxical relation in which one dimension stands to another. It has been said that the relation between God and man is marked by paradox; it has likewise been said that dimensional relations are marked by paradox. Heim calls attention to the apparent possibility of putting the whole of the world, the "I-Thou-It", in a parenthesis and declaring that God stands before the parenthesis in paradoxical relation to everything in it, and that all of the conclusions which have been deducted with reference to dimensional relations within the world(1) may now be applied to the relation between God and the whole world.

However, Heim emphatically repudiates this idea. Once an insight has been gained not only into the general character of dimensional relations, but also into their particular characteristics, the impossibility of applying the dimensional idea to the relationship between God and the world appears; for the relation between God and the Weltganzen is quite different from the relations between realms within the world at a crucial point. The two relations differ as to the way in which each is known.

It has been shown that, while we have no direct insight into the contents of realms which are transcendent in the innerweltlichen sense, we are aware a priori of these realms and of their dimensional structures. But when we come to speak of a Creator and Lord, we have no such intuition of the Inhalt der Wirklichkeit, die wir damit meinen. Further, we are given no key to dimensional structure of the Inhalts, der uns hier begegnet.(2) Thought and will, with their questions why and by what authority, come to rest in God. But it is impossible that any questions should come to rest in a dimension, for all dimensions which we know are unabschliessbar. If what is impossible in innerweltlichen dimensions is possible in God, then God is not a dimension. God is not to be known in that a priori manner in which we know dimensions.(3) All our motions within dimensions only lead away from God to Pantheism or Idolatry.(4)

(1) Ibid., p. 204.
(2) Ibid., p. 205.
(3) Ibid., p. 206.
(4) Ibid.
Hence, for Heim not only does our common knowledge fail to
furnish a distinction between God and the remainder of reality,
it does not even furnish an analogy of such a distinction.

5. The Idea of the Distinction between God and the Rest of
Reality a Contradiction of Our Common Knowledge

Heim is not content with denying that the distinction between
God and the rest of reality has place or analogy in our thought, he
goes on to say that the acknowledgement of this distinction would be
in itself a denial of our thought.

If God is, then He is the Ens Realissimum, the Reality Who
alone is real in Himself, in whom every other existence is grounded,
and to Whom alone other existences are responsible. If the ulti­
mate Reality "remains invisible and inapprehensible" so long as
we are confined to the forms of our experience, and if all of our
attempts to know Him within these forms lead either to Pantheism
or to Idolatry, a final Either-Or comes to light. Either God is
not, and the forms of our thought are sufficient, or God is, and
a judgment is pronounced upon the forms of our knowledge.(1)

The fact of this conflict removes the last trace of the pos­
sibility that man can know God by means of the forms of his own
experience. The transcendence of God may no longer be thought of
as a sphere lying alongside or above this world,(2) or even as a
new direction hitherto unseen.(3) God's transcendence is rather
in uncompromising opposition to our world and all its thought forms.
If God is, our present world is not: if our world is, God is not.
So soon as the thought of God comes to a man, he is faced with
"the necessity of choosing between two alternatives toward which
no neutral attitude is possible".(4) The first alternative is that
he attempt to explain God in terms of Idolatry or Pantheism, think­
ing of God as a primum movens,(5) or as an endless direction, an
Als-Ob.(6) The second alternative is that a man change his whole
way of life, including both thoughts and evaluations, that he learn
to think in terms of the otherwise incomprehensible idea of creation,
and count his own thoughts as "attempts of the creature to escape
his Creator."

That God's existence and our forms of thought are in an uncom­
promising alternative relation is further evidenced by the manner
in which a man changes from the forms of human thought to a recog­
nition of God's existence. The change does not come in terms of
some new category which is added to those which are already present;

(1) Ibid., Tr., p. 211 ff.
(2) Ibid., p. 216.
(3) Ibid., p. 218.
(4) Ibid., p. 215.
(5) Ibid., p. 215.
(6) Ibid., p. 216.
(7) Ibid., p. 217.
rather, it comes when a man with his whole being "seeking the face of God"; (1) learns to say "Thou" to God, Who unlike all existence in the world is always Thou, never "It" nor "He". (2) "As one who awakes from a dream, so we emerge into a new state wherein we stand before God, so that things which were overwhelming when seen from our previous standpoint now seem inconsiderable." (3)

Of course it may be objected that men quite frequently refer to God, as in political speeches or in philosophy, and use the words Transcendent and Supermundane without renouncing human thought and will. But the fact is that the "assumption of a 'World-Originator' may remain in all these instances a purely immanent concern." It may be that men have felt the need of a stopping point and have, after the fashion of the Idolatry of which we have spoken, invented an idea of a Creator. (4) Indeed, even when the word God is used in religion, it does not necessarily really refer to God, for religious concept as well as secular ones may be human concepts. It is perfectly possible for ideas of God to arise out of practical human needs, or out of philosophy, or even out of religion, but if they do not involve a denial of our forms of thought, they are man made and do not really express the idea of God.

For Heim, the distinction between God and reality can never be framed within our common knowledge, either in actuality or by analogy. God's transcendent existence is rather in conflict with all our common knowledge; hence the knowledge of God is not found within our common knowledge. There is no use seeking in terms of common knowledge to prove the existence or the reality of God, for our common knowledge does not even involve the possibility of distinguishing God from the remainder of reality.

(B) Knowledge of God as Apprehension of God, Not Included within Our Common Knowledge

Heim is not content with showing that a distinction between God and the world cannot be framed within our common knowledge. In Jesus der Herr Heim asks whether, altogether apart from the incapacity of our common knowledge to frame the necessary distinction, our common knowledge in any sense involves an apprehension of God. Even if, without being able to define the thought conceptually, the idea of God as the ultimate ground or authority of the universe is accepted, can we come to know God through our common knowledge?

1. The Polarity of All Our Common Knowledge

Heim's answer to this question depends upon his idea of polar-

(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid., p. 219.
(3) Ibid., p. 217.
(4) Ibid., p. 221.
ity or relativity. We have already called attention to the fact that Heim holds that each of the dimensions of knowledge is dependent upon others. We must now give a somewhat more detailed account of Heim's use of the idea of polarity. In the second edition of *Glaube und Denken*, Heim insists upon the polarity of the dimensions and devotes considerable care to the proof of the relativity of all that is known. But it is with the idea of polarity in the more recent book, *Jesus der Herr*, that we are primarily concerned.

Heim sets forth his idea of polarity by a reference to its application to motion. When the distance between two bodies remains constant, whether or not they are moving, they are said to be in a situation of indifference to each other with respect to motion and rest. But, when the distance between bodies begins to change, then their indifference to rest and motion is overcome. It is impossible to think of motion and rest apart from the thought of the situation indifferent to motion and rest; and, in the same way, it is impossible to think of the situation of indifference to motion and rest apart from the thought of motion and rest. Thus, motion and rest, and indifference to motion and rest are mutually dependent. That is to say, they are in polar relation. When the distance between two bodies changes, we say that one body is at rest and that the other is in motion. It is impossible to say that one body moves without saying that the other rests, and vice versa. Motion and rest are, themselves, mutually dependent, and so in polar relation. Thus there are, in the instance of the relation of two bodies, two distinct polar relations which belong together; namely, that between rest and motion, and that between indifference situation, on the one hand, and motion and rest on the other hand. (1)

There is, then, in this case, a double polarity of which the two aspects are: 1. the polarity between motion and rest, 2. the polarity between indifference to motion and rest, and motion and rest. (2)

It should be noted that the polar relation which is presented in this example is not a relation of causality. Motion is in no sense caused by rest, or rest by motion. Nor is there a relation of causality between indifference, and motion and rest. Again, the polarity of these relations is not a logical entity. Motion is neither ground nor consequence of rest, nor vice versa. Polarity is not an expression of causality or of logic. It is rather a relation sui generis. (3)

The principle of double polarity which Heim exemplifies by reference to moving bodies is not, he thinks, confined to one type of relation. It applies, in fact, to every innerweltlichen distinction. The principle may, for example, be seen in the relation between white light and colors, and the relation between opposite colors themselves. A given color exists only as it is in distinction from its opposite. Opposite colors are colors only as over

(1) Ibid., p. 23.
(2) Ibid., p. 22.
(3) Heim: *Jesus der Herr*, p. 23.
against white light, and white light is white only in relation to colors. The same relation may be observed in the relation of notes on the musical scale and a situation indifferent to pitch.

The universality of the principle of polarity becomes more clearly manifest when it is seen that it applies to the very forms of space and time. Present and Past are conditioned by one another so that Present cannot be Present without the thought of a Past, and Past cannot be past without the thought of a Present. But Present and Past can be set over against each other only when both are seen against the background of a situation indifferent to time, a nunc aeternum, such as was spoken of by the medieval mystics. (1) In like manner, no given portion of space can be thought of apart from a bordering space. There is no here apart from a there. But neither can here and there be distinguished except as they are thought of as over against a situation indifferent to here and there.

But what of the Grundformen of our experience? Are they polar or not? This is the crucial question, for if the basic forms of our experience are caught in the web of polarity, then all that we know is polar. This leads back to the third result of Heim's analysis of our common knowledge. Heim has emphatically declared in the second edition of Glaube und Denken that the frames of knowledge are in polar relation. He reaffirms that position in Jesus der Herr.

"I" am "I" only as distinguished from another "I". My world and your world are mutually dependent for their distinct existence. None of these distinctions is possible apart from a situation indifferent to them all, such as has been defined in the thought of the Indian mystics for whom knower, act of knowing, and known are the same. (2)

If, then, contents within the world are after the manner of those which we have mentioned; namely, motion, colors and tones, subject to the law of polarity, and if even the forms of space and time, and even the deepest forms of our experience, the dimensions of knowledge, are subject to the law of polarity, then the conclusion is inescapable that the law of polarity applies to all relations within the world, so that: Es gibt nirgends, weder in der Wirklichkeit noch in unserem Gedanken, etwas, das durch sich selbst ist, was es ist. Alles was, wir wahrnehmen und vorstellen können, ist sowohl in seinem Dasein wie seinem Josein, also in seiner quantitativen und qualitativen Beschaffenheit, dadurch bedingt und bestimmt, das etwas anderes da ist, das ihm als Gegenpol gegenübersteht. (3) Such is the universality of the rule of

(1) Ibid., pp. 28-29.
(2) Ibid., pp. 29-30.
(3) Ibid., p. 30.
polarity over the forms of our thought. None of the forms of our thought escapes polarity.

This being established, Heim undertakes to show that God is beyond polarity.

3. God Beyond Polarity

If God is the ultimate foundation of life and thought, surely He is the answer to our questions as to why reality is as it is, and as to the ultimate authority in life. But polar thought can obviously give no answers to these questions, because every feature of it is strictly relative. Hence God must be completely beyond polarity. (1)

4. A Conflict between God's Existence and the Form of Our Experience

From the two facts that all our thought is polar and that God as the ultimate foundation of life and thought is beyond polarity, Heim proceeds to the conclusion that there is a conflict between the existence of God and our common knowledge. If God is beyond polarity, he is in some sense present in all things; for, if He were not in all things, then there would be something over against Him, so that He, like His creatures, would be under the law of polarity, not beyond it. But our thought forms are unable to apprehend a Sein within all things. There must then be a conflict between God's existence and the forms of our consciousness. This conflict designates a final Either-Or; either God is all in all, or the world is all in all. Such a conflict can be solved only eschatologically, that is, as God does away with our thought forms. (2)

If that conflict implied in the contrast of the polarity of our thought and the Überpolarität of God, between God's existence and our common knowledge, is real, then clearly our common knowledge does not include knowledge of God. It is impossible within our common knowledge um Gott zu wissen, Gott zu fassen und mit ihm in Verbindung zu kommen. (3) This may be clearly seen by bringing to light the alternatives that must be faced.

On the one hand, if the world is all in all, then even though we may know quite clearly what we believe in, we can never get beyond conditionality and, although we may use the word God, everything is conditioned and there is no ultimate foundation of thought and life. On the other hand, if God is all in all, then relativity and polarity are indeed overcome, but we cannot know Him since we are confined to polarity.

If the world is all in all, the word God may still be used as a religious expression for forces within the world. In that case, we should be able to know a god who is identical with these forces.

But religious forces are not God, the ultimate foundation of life. A man need not be disturbed by a god(1) who is only a force within his own thoughts. This kind of a god would, in no sense, be a real foundation for our thought; nor would he have any meaning for our practical life. He would exist for us only as long as our enthusiasm for the force with which we identify him endured.(2)

If, on the other hand, God is all in all, the ultimate foundation of our lives, then we cannot know him, since he is beyond our polar thought. This fact becomes clearer when it is seen that every attempt of human thought to escape polarity must take the form of one or the other of two possibilities, both of which, far from designating any idea of God as the ultimate foundation of life and thought, are confined to polarity. The two possibilities are as follows: 1. We can lay hold upon some reality within the world and set it up as a beginning point, an object of trust, and an answer to the questions, why and by what authority. But in setting up a reality from our world, a reality which we have chosen as an ultimate cause and authority, we are only indulging in a form of idolatry.(3) This holds true of worship of state, or of race, or of any reality of which we think. Such objects of trust can never really bring our questions to rest. They are inescapably bound within the law of polarity, within which God is not included. Every such idol is an object, the very existence of which depends upon some other object, and therefore belongs to polar thought. 2. We may seek a foundation of life, a beginning, an authority, as did the German and Indian mystics, by attempting to get beyond all distinctions of contents, and all distinctions of dimensions and seeking to gain the peace of pure indifference.(4) But, if such a peace is gained, it is by no means an escape from polarity. It is only a retreat from the polarity between distinct objects to the second polarity, that between indifference situation and particular distinctions. The indifference situation is just as really dependent upon distinctions as the distinctions are dependent on the indifference situation. The mystic withdrawing from the polarity of objects of thought is still confined within the second polarity of the indifference situation. Indeed, he never escapes altogether from the polarity of objects. He differs from the common man only in that he is able to remain in flight from simple polarity to second polarity, the indifference situation, for a longer time.(5)

In neither of its two possible ways of attempting to know God does our thought ever escape from polarity. Since God, if He is God, is beyond polarity, it is impossible that our thought should unaided attain knowledge of God. The alternatives bespoken by the law of polarity are final. Either the world is all in all, or God is all in all. If the world is all in all, we may think of the reality of the world, either in its totality or some part of it,

(1) Ibid., p. 46.
(2) Ibid., p. 47.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid., p. 50.
as a god. But such a god, being relative, is not God. If God is beyond polarity, in and through all things, the ultimate foundation of life and thought, our polar thought forms can never apprehend Him.

(C) Our Common Knowledge, a Guilty Situation

Although, for Heim, man's ignorance of God is manifest in his inability to frame a distinction between God and the rest of reality and in his inability to apprehend God, Heim believes that lack of knowledge only receives its fullest expression when its deepest ground is seen as guilt. Accordingly, although Heim's idea of the guilt involved in man's ignorance is not, like his idea of the fact of his ignorance, derived from the structure of man's common knowledge, we must present the former idea in this section.

Heim believes that for a discovery of the deepest ground of our ignorance we cannot stop with an analysis of knowledge of the world but must see what those who stand in the presence of God and under the leadership of Christ say. The reason for this is that the category of answerability, upon which depends the guilt which is the deepest ground of our ignorance, never arises until a man is in the presence of God. Until a man stands before God, laws cannot be more than rules of expediency. A man may be told that he must do thus and so if he wishes to be healthy; but, if he prefers not to be healthy, he need not obey the rule. He may claim that he is in no sense answerable for his conduct with regard to the rule. In the same manner, apart from God, if a man prefers not to be righteous, while he may indeed be punished for his misdeeds, he is answerable to no one.

However, when a man is in the presence of God, under the leadership of Jesus, he is open to the category of answerability, and so able to see how his whole knowledge is under the shadows of guilt.

Jesus taught, Heim says, that there is a satanic power. This power, Heim argues, must be beyond polarity, since only such a power could really struggle against God Who is beyond polarity. But if the satanic power is beyond polarity, the relation of our wills to that power is the same as the relation of our wills to God's will. If that be true, what we do under Satan is done in freedom, and so involves guilt upon our part, for those who obey God are aware that they act in freedom. (1) For those, then, who are in the presence of God and who accept the leadership of Jesus, there can be but one answer to the question as to whether our separation from God is destiny or guilt. Our situation is guilt. We are answerable for it. We live as we do under a satanic power which, in reality, leaves us free. While Satan wills, yet what I do is zugleich ganz und gar mein eigener innerster Wille, für den ich volle Verantwortung trage. (2)

(1) Ibid., p. 108.
(2) Ibid., p. 111.
If this be true, not only are my conscious acts guilty, the very form which the world takes in my knowledge is under the shadow of my guilt. Heim indicates that it would be absurd to say that the world itself is guilty, but that, since analysis of our common knowledge has shown that the idea of a world is an abstraction and that what we call the world is but a phase of an inseparable relation between knower and known, or will and will, one is obliged to say that the shadow of human guilt rests also upon the world. Thus the very form of our world is under guilt. (1)

Further, the guilty rebellion against God involved in my human situation is not only in my own soul, but in allem was lebt. If there is rebellion against God anywhere, it cannot be limited to one Stelle in the world, because the insurrection being against God, goes aufs Ganze. Ein Wille zur Vernichtung Gottes ist Empörung auf der ganzen Linie. Not only my situation but that of my fellows is clearly one which involves genuine guilt. (2) Thus, the deepest ground of our ignorance is that all that we know, even the very form which the world takes for us, is under the shadow of our guilt. Analysis of the world can never reveal this, but when, in the presence of God, under the leadership of Christ, it has come to light, the possibility that knowledge of God is included within our common knowledge is precluded.

(D) The First Step toward a Theory of Paradoxical Synthesis in Which the Emphasis is Placed upon Authority

In tracing the development of Heim's thought, we pointed out that Heim had from the time of his earliest books advocated a theory of synthesis as the only solution of the problem of knowledge of God. We further indicated that the recognition of an antithesis between the two sides and the emphasis upon authority had become more and more distinct, until in Heim's latest books the synthesis was an avowed and irreducible paradox in which the authority idea was prominent. In Heim's idea that knowledge of God is not included within our common knowledge, the first step toward this kind of a theory has been taken.

Obviously, no theory of synthesis of immediacy and authority can acknowledge the idea that knowledge of God falls entirely within our common knowledge, for, if all our knowledge of God came to us by virtue of the constitution of our minds, then the authority principle, i.e., that something is given for which there is no adequate criterion in our experience, is in reality excluded rather than brought into synthesis. Hence Heim's rejection of the idea that knowledge of God falls within our common knowledge may well have a normal place within a theory of synthesis.

(1) Ibid., p. 150.
(2) Ibid., pp. 110-111.
However, the intensity and the setting of Heim's polemic against the adequacy of our common knowledge make it quite clear that it is not simply the synthesis idea that he is eager to defend, but that he is zealous to magnify the antithesis between immediacy and authority and to place the major emphasis upon authority. If it were only a synthesis in which two elements are more or less blended, no vehement repudiation of either side would have been required. It would have been quite enough to have indicated that either factor could yield knowledge of God, provided the fact of the opposite factor within it were not lost sight of.

Heim's exalting of the difference between experiencing and authority seems to tend toward an authoritarian emphasis, for if the difference between God's side and man's side is insisted upon, the emphasis cannot but fall upon the divine side. Further, if Heim were intending to present a theory of balanced synthesis, he would have opposed the idea of the sole sufficiency of authority quite as vigorously as he has opposed the sole sufficiency of immediacy. The fact is, however, that Heim's opposition to an exclusive authority idea is presented in a comparatively few remarks in Heim's latest books, although in the second edition of Glaube und Denken it receives a somewhat fuller discussion in Heim's criticism of Barth.

Heim's rejection of the adequacy of our common knowledge remains a part of a theory of synthesis; but it indicates at the outset a paradoxical and authoritarian emphasis.

(II) The Character of Knowledge of God

(A) The Nature of the Remaining Problem

If knowledge of God is not included within our common knowledge, only two possible ways to knowledge of God remain. Either God has given us a kind of knowledge of Himself which has nothing to do with immediacy of experiencing, or God has given us a knowledge of Himself which is in some paradoxical sense immediate. The former position, apart from its inherent difficulties, excludes all thought of synthesis between authority and experience, and so is quite outside the whole line of Heim's thought. Heim adopts the latter position.

In saying that God gives us an authority through which paradoxically we know Him, the validity of that knowledge is not proven, nor is the nature of the authority or of the immediacy described. But since knowledge of God is not, in Heim's thought, included in our common knowledge, it is impossible either to validate or to describe our knowledge of God in terms of our common knowledge. Hence the only question that remains for Heim is the question as to what, in

(1) Cp. Ibid., p. 184.
(2) Heim: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, p. 407 ff.
the adequate terms of our human knowledge, may be said of the in-
accountable fact of knowledge of God.\(^{(1)}\)

With this, we come to the second of the uses to which Heim
puts his analysis of our common knowledge; namely, the discovery
of structural facts that are helpful in describing knowledge of
God. Having traced Heim's analysis of our common knowledge and his
answer to the question as to whether knowledge of God is included
within that knowledge, we must see what answer Heim gives to the
question as to what, in terms of our common knowledge, can be said
of the unvergleichliche fact that God has spoken.\(^{(2)}\)

(B) The Rejection of Attempts to Find God within Our Common
Knowledge, a General Revelation which Prepares the Way for the Gospel

We have called attention to the fact that Heim believes that
God has revealed Himself in such a way that His revelation gives
us an immediacy. God's revelation is not, however, for Heim, al-
together positive. Preceding all positive revelation is a general
negative revelation which is intended to accomplish such a rejection
of dependence upon our common knowledge as Heim has endeavored to
set forth.

Heim regards the awareness of the unsurpassable barrier which
men meet in their effort to answer all final questions, and which
thwarts all of their attempts to give a final interpretation to
the world as die einzige vorbedingung which must be fulfilled be-
fore they are in a situation to hear the Christusbotschaft.\(^{(3)}\)
As long as one is unaware of his lack of knowledge of God, the mes-
sage of the New Testament is an answer to a question which does not
exist.\(^{(4)}\) We must know that we know not. The man who does not
hunger for the Word can never hear it, however orthodox he may be
regarding the inspiration of the Bible.\(^{(5)}\) Again and again Heim
returns to the thought that recognition of ignorance is the prerequi-
site of knowledge.

The negative preparation, for the Gospel cannot be brought
about by our own efforts. The raising of the question about God,
the breaking down of man-made ideas, is seen by those to whom God
has given an answer to the question, as a working of the Holy Spirit.
The raising of the question, which may indeed lead to atheism or
to faith, may be called a revelatio generalis.\(^{(6)}\) Such a revela-

\(^{(1)}\) Cp. Heim: Jesus der Herr, pp. 170, 171, 182.
\(^{(2)}\) Ibid.
\(^{(3)}\) Ibid., p. 52.
\(^{(4)}\) Ibid.
\(^{(5)}\) Ibid., pp. 181, 182.
\(^{(6)}\) Ibid., p. 52.
tion may come with various experiences of life, for example, through reflection, through tragic events, or through sudden catastrophe. However it comes, it must be present before one is ready to hear the New Testament message.

(6) A Preliminary Account of Knowledge of God as Following the Leadership Of Christ.

Coming now to the positive side of Heim's thought as to what in terms of our common knowledge can be said of our knowledge of God, we find from the outset the idea that God has spoken in a living Word. As a preparation for a more precise idea of knowledge of God, Heim presents the idea of knowledge of God as the following of a living, divinely appointed Leader.

1. The Conviction of the Early Christians That They Knew God through Christ.

It is a historical fact, Heim contends, that the Christians of the first century believed that an answer to the question about God had come to them. This answer was not the exaltation of some element within the world, nor was it mysticism. The early Christians gave up their own search for an answer to the question about God, and accepted Christ as a Leader Whom God had designated for them. To them Christ was everything. They walked in His footsteps. They greeted one another "in Him". Their knowledge and their philosophy, as well as their practical conduct, were under His leadership. In His Lordship was found for them the answer to the question about God.

2. Leadership Distinct from Ideas

Heim analyses this historical fact as follows: Leadership by another is to be sharply distinguished from self-leadership. When one undertakes to be his own leader, he does not necessarily follow his own will. Self-leadership may take many forms. It often appears very much like leadership by another. A man who leads himself may, for example, be led, as was the case with the Stoics, by what he calls the world, which really means the world as he sees it. He may follow and cooperate with the trends of culture and life. He may be led by a certain law. He may set up a life program which is to be his guide. All such ways of life may seem to represent leadership from without, but they are self-leadership, for in each case the one who was being led has chosen the thing which is to lead him, and in so doing has been leading himself. Self-leadership does not exclude the possibility that another person plays a part in the determination of one's conduct. Thus, for example, a man may follow the life program which he has taken over from some outstanding teacher, and still be a self leader in following the program of his teacher, rather than the teacher himself. Self-leader-

(1) Ibid., p. 44 ff.
(2) Ibid., pp. 58-59.
ship may be leadership by anything, whether program or law or principal, that can be made a part of one's self.

This representation of self-leadership enables Heim to describe the boundary that distinguishes real leadership from self-leadership. There is, he says, one thing that cannot be made a part of one's self, namely, a "Thou". Everything in this world except a "Thou" can be made a part of one's self. Leadership by a "Thou" is real leadership and not self-leadership.

3. Christ's Leadership Real Leadership

Christ's leadership is a real leadership, quite distinct from all forms of self-leadership. It is not only in contrast with all kinds of self-guidance, but it excludes them altogether. He who is led by Christ cannot be his own leader, not even to the extent of following a program which he considers to be Christ's own. He who is led by Christ cannot be his own leader, not even to the extent of following a program which he considers to be Christ's own. He who follows Christ must follow Christ alone. The service of Christ bespeaks not an As-Well-As but only an Either-Or. Jesus is the way.

This fact does not have its ground in that when one is led by Christ the deeds required of him are other than the deeds required of one who leads himself. A person who accepts the pattern of life which he believes that he sees in the New Testament may behave in very much the same manner as the man who is really led by Christ. The difference between them is not necessarily in conduct but in motive. The man who only follows what he takes to be the program of the New Testament lives as he does because to live such a life is his program. The man who follows Christ lives as he does for the sake of Christ. The disciples of Christ may be required to do the same things as those who pursue what they consider the normal course of life. At the same time, it may be that Christ will, as indeed he does at times, thrust aside the way that is considered normal. Christ, Himself, stands in the place of law or program for those who are led by Him.

4. Christ's Leadership Exclusive

Leadership by its very nature is exclusive. It is characteristic of leadership that there can be only one leader. This, Jesus

(1) Ibid., p. 58 ff.
(2) Ibid., p. 62.
(3) Ibid., p. 61.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid., p. 63.
Himself has pointed out. (Matt. 6:24) The leadership idea finds its clearest expression in the word Lord. When one studies the word Lord as it is used in the New Testament, he discovers that there are three sources from which it may have been derived. The first of these is the mystery religions in which the word Lord implied that obedience to the command of the gods was required. The second source is the Roman emperor cult. It has been pointed out that Augustus refused the title Lord because, as a title used by slaves, it was unbecoming on the lips of Romans. This means that up to the time of Augustus the word Lord was a title that slaves used of their masters, and so, that it implied the obligation to absolute obedience. The probability is that the use of the word Lord by the New Testament writers was really derived from a third source, namely, the Septuagint, where it is used of Jehovah.(1) Thus, whatever its source, the word connotes full authority.

Now if this be the meaning of the word Lord, if lordship involves the duty of complete obedience, it follows that there can be but one Lord of a man's life. If there be more, then authority is divided. This applies to knowledge and thought as well as to action. It includes even the interpretation of one's Lord. This, too, must be governed by one's Lord. A man cannot take a certain view of the world and form an opinion about his Lord. If a man's Lord is Christ, he cannot interpret Christ in terms of the world's philosophies. Even the authority of the Old Testament is a derived authority if Christ is Lord.

5. Christ's Leadership Present

Closely associated with the exclusiveness of leadership, which is exemplified in the New Testament idea of Lordship, is a further meaning of leadership. Our meeting with a leader must be a meeting in the present. A man is never ruled by the past. The past is in his power. (2) If he is to be led, he must be led by a "Thou" in the living present.

6. Christ's Leadership Different from All Other Leaderships in That it Is Final

To be sure, other leaderships than that of Christ are possible. The Kurios cults of the orient represent a case in point. Indeed, from ancient times to modern, the factor of leadership has been present from time to time in some form or other. This generation is in better position to understand leadership than former ones, for since the war, the supremacy of ideas is broken down and leadership has gained the ascendancy. The past twenty years has witnessed the rapid rise of such men as Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler, who have gotten their hold neither by blood, nor by vote, nor by money, but by themselves.

(1) Ibid., p. 69.
(2) Ibid., p. 65.
In Christ, Who is King of Kings, the category of leadership is fulfilled. Christ's leadership differs from all other leaderships in that Christ's is an authority with respect, not simply to a part of one's nature, but to the whole, not with reference to subordinate questions, but with reference to the ultimate questions of our existence. (1) Whereas other leaderships are only relatively exclusive, and only incompletely present and personal, the New Testament clearly witnesses to a leadership which is completely exclusive and always present. They force upon us an inescapable alternative. Either the witness of the New Testament is altogether illusion, in which case it would not be permitted to be spread abroad; (2) or else the witness of the New Testament is based upon truth, in which case, apart from Jesus, we are building upon sand and Jesus is Lord even of our thought and knowledge. (3)

This brings us to a preliminary insight into the positive side of Heim's present theory of knowledge of God, namely, that a man may know God only by following the living leadership of Jesus Christ, and that everything that is said with regard to the problem must be said only as thought is under the leadership of Christ. We cannot, Heim says, verastreten from the leadership of Christ in discussing the problem of knowledge of God. (4) If we are led, it is only for our leader to say how much we are to be told. We cannot judge his leadership from some criterion which we set up. We have no right to do what theologians so often attempt to do, i.e., zunächst aus fremdem Material einen Tempel bauen, um dann hinterher Christus in einer Nische dieses Tempels als Götterbild auf einen goldenen Thron zu setzen. (5) All of our ideas about the sense of the world and of life must begin, not with the thoughts about the being of God and His creation, but rather with the leadership of Christ. Thought can only nachzeichnen, Was uns durch die Wirklichkeit vorgeben ist. We must begin with the fact that ein Herr gegeben ist. (6)

7. The Ground of the Necessity of Living Leadership

Of course, as soon as the suggestion is made that our knowledge of God depends upon a Leader, the question arises as to why we need a living Leader, as to why knowledge of God, even though it is revealed knowledge, should not be like our knowledge of the objective world, for example, a scheme of definite facts, a system of doctrine.

Heim undertakes to meet this objection with the rather remarkable conception of satanic power, to which we have already referred. This conception, Heim believes, precludes the possibility that we could have received, even through revelation and in faith, a tenable system of ideas about God, and so throws us back upon the acceptance of a living leadership. We must trace Heim's idea of a satanic power in somewhat greater detail.

(1) Ibid., pp. 72-73.
(2) Ibid., p. 74.
(3) Ibid., p. 76.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid., p. 77.
(6) Ibid., p. 78.
Examining the recorded teachings of Jesus, Heim finds that from the beginning to the end of His earthly life, Jesus lived in the thought that He was constantly in conflict with a satanic power. Jesus's baptism was immediately followed by a temptation which evidently involved a real conflict. When the temptation was ended, it is said that Satan departed from Him for a season, a statement which leaves one with the impression that the temptation which the New Testament records is only one of Satan's attempts to divert Jesus from the path of His obedience to God. The passages in the Gospels in which Christ speaks of Satan are numerous. (Cp. Mark 3:27, Luke 13:16, Luke 22:31, John 13:27). In fact, so important a part does the doctrine of Satan play in the teachings of Jesus that, says Heim, one cannot ignore this teaching without rejecting the leadership of Jesus in final problems of life.

Heim interprets Jesus's teaching regarding a satanic power somewhat as follows: 1. The satanic power must be a will. Nothing less than a will could really work against God. 2. This will, which works against God, is more than a human will, for human wills even at their best do not understand God and so could not really work against Him. 3. The satanic power must be beyond polarity, for, since God is beyond polarity, only those who are in some sense beyond polarity can really be in conflict with God.

Heim now undertakes to show that, if Satan is überpolar, faith must affirm both sides of a contradiction which it cannot resolve. a. God is working in all things. This is not to say that God does some things and only permits others. God is actually working in all things, for if there is anything which takes place apart from God, God is not beyond conditionality. From this point of view faith must even say that the devil is God's devil. b. But faith is also obliged to say that there is a real enemy of God. To fail to assert this is to take away the real seriousness of our moral situation and reduce guilt to ignorance. Apart from belief in a real enemy, the struggle of Christ in Gethsemane would have been a Kampf gegen Windmühlen. The acceptance of the reality of the conflict can scarcely be escaped when men unter der Führung Christi in der Gegenwart Gottes verantwortlich zu handeln haben. To be sure, attempts have been made to say that God is responsible for our guilty situation. For example, Schleiermacher taught that good came through evil. But such views take all of the earnestness out of ethics. Their weakness is in that they imply that a man ought to do evil as a means to good. Every reason for moral struggle disappears in such views. There can be no real

(1) Ibid., p. 104.
(2) Ibid., p. 104-105.
(3) Ibid., p. 107.
(4) Ibid., p. 115.
(5) Ibid., p. 111.
(6) Ibid., p. 119.
(7) Ibid., p. 120.
struggle against evil if there is nothing to be struggled against unconditionally. (1) Ethics is in earnest only if God and Satan are unconditionally enemies.

Here, then, is a conclusion to which, while apart from faith it should never have been presented, is inescapable for those who live from faith. It is the conclusion that there are two apparently contradictory points of view to which believers must hold without any attempt to subordinate the one to the other. On the one hand, the believer must say that since God is all in all, every event and every consciousness must be under Him. Even the devil must be Gottes Tehfel. On the other hand, the believer must hold to the idea of the reality of the conflict between God and the satanic will within ourselves. As soon as one undertakes to subordinate either side of this contradiction to the other, he loses something essential to faith. If one denies that God's sovereignty is complete, he denies God's reality. But if one denies the reality of the conflict, he neglects the moral struggle to which we are enjoined. The man of faith standing in the presence of God recognizes both sides of the apparent contradiction, realizing that God alone can dissolve it. (2)

If this be true, then even the knowledge of God which comes through revelation and is received in faith can never be simply a system of ideas. Such a system would involve a destructive self-contradiction. The only possibility of knowledge of God is, therefore, that God reveals Himself in a living Leader upon Whom the believer is at every moment dependent.

(D) A More Precise Account of Knowledge of God

According to what has been said, Heim holds that our common knowledge includes no knowledge of God, that even that knowledge of God which is given by a revelation which breaks through the boundaries of our common knowledge is never a merely content apprehended, and that knowledge of God has its basic roots in a personal relation in the following of a living leader. Heim, however, does not leave the matter thus indefinite. What, according to Heim, is the precise character of that knowledge which has its roots in the following of a Leader?

1. The Approach

a. Method of Procedure

It is particularly important to bear in mind at this point that all that Heim is undertaking to do is to attempt to discover what, in the terms of our common knowledge, can be said of that knowledge of God which breaks through our knowledge. Heim has already emphatically repudiated the idea that man can achieve any ultimate knowledge of anything. An attempt to do so is an effort to escape the relativity within which we are bound. Hence the

(1) Ibid., p. 122; Der letzte Einsatz unseres Willens in Kampf gegen das Böse ist nur möglich, wenn es etwas gibt, das unbedingt zu bekämpfen und zu Überwiden. ist. (2) Ibid., pp. 127-129.
only alternative is to attempt to discover what in the terms of our common knowledge can be said of our knowledge of God. Heim puts the question thus: Wir müssen dabei immer von dem ausgehen, was Sprechen überhaupt heisst, es aber dann von unsern menschlichen Verhältnissen übertragen auf das mit allem menschlichen Beziehungen unvergleichliche Verhältnis zu Gott.(1)

b. The New Testament Witness to the Word of God

In his effort to give a precise statement of the character of knowledge of God, Heim begins with what the New Testament writers have to say upon this subject and then attempts to interpret that to which they witness in terms of the characteristics of that in our common knowledge which most nearly corresponds to it.

Examining the New Testament testimony regarding the fact of knowledge of God, Heim concludes that this testimony is a witness to a Word of God. The New Testament is neither a treatise on morality, nor is it a presentation of a formula for piety.(2) The New Testament is rather der Niederschlag der inneren Erregung, die ein ungläubliches Geschehnis hervorgerufen hat.(3) The disciples of Jesus are not so much concerned with recording a narrative as with witnessing to an event upon which they depend.

The general character of the event to which the disciples witnessed may be indicated by referring to the proclamation: "The Kingdom of God is at hand." Put in another way, the witness of the New Testament writers is that God has spoken, that His Word has become flesh.(4) Apart from the only possibility which our minds could have conceived, namely, that our thought forms be changed,(5) God has opened a way to knowledge of Himself. The apostles liken the manner of God's revealing Himself to us to the way in which, within this polar world; an "I" and a "Thou" meet one another in speech.(6)

c. The Character of Speaking

Since, for Heim, the testimony of the New Testament regarding the character of knowledge of God is that God speaks to us, Heim's attempt to discover what can be said of knowledge of God in the terms of our common knowledge is largely an effort to apply as an analogy what can be discovered about human speaking to the unaccountable fact that God has spoken.(7) Thus, we must present briefly Heim's review of the principal qualities of speech.

(1) Ibid., p. 182.
(2) Ibid., p. 163.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid., p. 168.
(6) Ibid., p. 170.
(7) Ibid., p. 182.
1. A Word is not a being, but an act in which one person bears what another says, and which, as an objective phenomenon, is distinct from all other sounds in that it is heard or grasped. (1)

2. In Word, an "I" and a "Thou" are aware that what for the one is speaking is for the other hearing, in such a way that while the two meet they are, as realms each endless in itself, so distinct that neither understands the being of the other. (2)

3. Speech is only possible when an "I" and a "Thou" as coordinate realms meet in a third more inclusive realm. (3)

4. Speaking, or Word, must come out of and interpret a silent meeting of an "I" and a "You", a struggle of wills. (4)

2. The Account

As Heim undertakes a positive interpretation of the fact that God has spoken, in the light of the four above-mentioned characteristics, the core of his theory is revealed. We must then ask: What, in Heim's thought, can be said of God's speaking in the light of the characteristics of human speech?

a. Evidences of Human Ignorance

First of all, new light is thrown upon the depth of human ignorance. The fact of human ignorance is not only possible but to be expected if God has spoken. If God speaks to us as an "I" speaks to a "Thou", then, in the light of the second characteristic of speech, God may be said to be, like a realm which confronts another in human speech, quite distinct from us. If this be true, then the fact that God has spoken is not only new evidence that knowledge of God is not included within our common knowledge, it is also a clear indication that whatever knowledge comes to us cannot be of the character of a complete apprehension or a fixed system of ideas. (5)

b. Further Expression of the Personalistic Character of Knowledge of God

Attention has already been called to the fact that Heim's preliminary idea of knowledge of God as the following of a Leader is a distinct affirmation of the personal existential character of knowledge of God. This phase of Heim's thought receives more definite expression in Heim's account of Knowledge of God as God's speaking.

Speech, Heim declares, grows out of silent dealing. But silent dealing is always of a volitional character, a silent struggle between wills. Emerging from a silent struggle, speech is always for

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(1) Ibid., p. 171.
(2) Ibid., p. 172.
(3) Ibid., pp. 172-173.
(5) Ibid., pp. 161, 175, 176, 177.
a practical purpose. The speaker demands something of the hearer. Speech is never mere statement of fact. Es gibt kein Wort, in dem es nicht direkt oder indirekt um ganz konkrete praktische Lebensentscheidungen geht.(1) Accordingly, God's Word does not come to us simply as ideas which we accept as final, but rather as Gebot,(2) i.e., both command and promise before which we stand with our whole being. Both the giving and the receiving of the Word are dynamic and personal, never static or indifferent.

c. A Theory of Authority

In tracing the development of Heim's thought we called attention to Heim's conviction that the dynamic personal fact of knowledge of God through God's Word could be stated in the terms of thought only by drawing together diverse and apparently contradictory elements. In Heim's present account of the meaning of the fact that God has spoken, the same conviction is quite evident. The personal knowledge of God in His Word is thought to involve both authority and immediate experiencing in paradoxical synthesis. We note, first, Heim's idea of the authority side of knowledge of God.

That knowledge of God is through the speaking of God points, for Heim, to an interpretation of knowledge of God as authority in several ways. 1. In speech an "I" and a "Thou" stand over against one another. But an "I" and a "Thou" are realms endless in themselves, so that they must always remain distinct. Neither can fully grasp the other. Thus, in the light of the second characteristic of speech, the very fact of that knowledge of God is in speech is an expression of distinctness between God and man.(3) 2. Since it is God Who speaks to us, it is impossible that that which we actually experience should be God Himself, for God is beyond all the polar forms of our experience. Thus, that which we grasp is a content within this world (4) and never a leap of experiencing beyond its own bounds, such a leap being in the nature of the case impossible. To be sure, our apprehension of the content is in part experiencing, just as is our apprehension of every content. However, it will be remembered that Heim holds that even the contents of my world involve an otherness for which experiencing does not account. I do not create my world. In any case, the special significance attached to the content in which God speaks must seem within our experiencing, to be purely arbitrary. 3. Thus, in a third way, the fact that God is known in speech designates authority. God alone chooses that through which He will speak, and God alone makes possible the recognition of that in which He has spoken.(5) Die Abgrenzung dieses Tonbezirks von den umgebenden Klängen und Gerauschen rührt von ihm her. Denn es gehört zum Wesen des Wortes, dass ich das Wort nicht selbst sprechen kann. Der andere muss das lösende Wort sprechen. Er muss der Redende sein.(6)

(1) Ibid., p. 174.  (2) Ibid., p. 196.
(3) Ibid., pp. 182,183.  (4) Ibid., p. 185.
(5) Ibid.  (6) Ibid., p. 177.
For Heim, Knowledge of God is on one side, authoritative. The knower and the known are quite distinct. What is known has neither its origin nor its final criterion in the knower; rather, it is given and authorized by the known, as a content upon which the experiencing of the knower gives him no grip.

It will readily be recognized that this phase of Heim's theory is an expression of what Heim called in Das Gewissheitsproblem the two line theory of knowledge of God. The emphasis is upon the distinctness between knower and known. Such knowledge as comes to us cannot be a direct apprehension of God but must be mediated through a content within the world which God has chosen and pointed out.

d. A Theory of Immediate Experiencing

Alongside the authority idea Heim maintains, though with somewhat diminished zeal, the reality of an immediate experiencing in knowledge of God. Despite the fact that the "I" and the "Thou" which meet in speech are mutually exclusive realms, speech is a meeting of coordinate realms in such a way that they share a certain element without division. The factor of immediacy is evident alike in the element in which the two meet and in the more inclusive realm in which they meet. Thus, Heim points out that in speaking to man God is bestowing upon him an amazing blessing in that He has been willing to come, as it were, upon the same plain with him as unser Bruder. (1) The element in which God and man meet is the Word of God. The Word is shared by God and the believer. Denn wenn Gott redet, ist es Gott, der einen Inhalt unserer Welt von seiner Umgebung absondert und ihn ins Licht der Ewigkeit rückt, und doch findet die Abgrenzung immer zugleich Innerhalb unseres Das-einsraums statt. Denn ein Reden Kommt nur zustande, wenn ein Hörer da ist, der es aufnimmt. (2) The plain upon which God and man meet in speech is, Heim says, according to the testimony of the Bible, the Holy Spirit. (3) As I hear the Word of God in the Holy Spirit, werde ich unter dem Horen des Worts in dieses Sein in Gott zuruckgerufen als in das verlorene Paradies, in dem ich nun wieder Lebensrecht bekomme. (4)

In this connection we must explain that by saying that Heim's theory is one of immediate experiencing we do not mean to say that Heim would for a moment allow that we experience God in the sense in which I experience my world (i.e., apprehend by my own powers as distinctly my own). As a matter of fact, the word experiencing as we have used it, except as otherwise noted, is a larger term which designates that in which events are directly given to us. The term, in this broader usage, does not presuppose or necessarily involve any attempt on our part to master that which

(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid., p. 184.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid., p. 186.
we meet or to make it a part of our world. Thus, for example, while the meeting of another person as a "Thou" who cannot be placed in my world is not *experiencing* in the narrow sense of the word, it may unquestionably be experiencing in the broad sense, in that it involves a meeting in which in the event of the meeting, I stand directly in the presence of the other. It is in this broad sense of the word *experiencing* that Heim's idea of the hearing of the Word of God is an experiencing. When the word *experiencing* is used to call attention to the claim that the apprehension, not the thing apprehended, is my own, it may be used to describe Heim's idea of knowledge of God.

It will be noted that the presentation of the immediacy aspect of Heim's present theory is essentially a statement of what Heim has called the one line theory in *Das Gewissheitsproblem*. In each case the emphasis is upon the immediacy of the relation between knower and known. Experiencing is itself an apprehension of truth. In a single element objectivity and subjectivity meet. Knower and known come upon the same plain.

e. A Theory of Paradoxical Synthesis

It will of course be readily recognized that what has been said of Helm's theory as a theory of authority and what has been said of it as a theory of experiencing cannot be logically reconciled. If God makes Himself known by an apparently arbitrarily chosen content which He Himself points out, then it is difficult to see how knowledge of God can be in any sense an immediate experiencing. In the same way, if the knowledge of God is immediate experiencing, it is difficult to see how it can be authoritative revelation.

The remarkable fact is that Heim, instead of making an effort to explain the difficulty in logical terms, or to show that there is a deeper unity in which the opposition is explained, deliberately affirms that both sides are essential, that each is meaningless apart from the other. He draws the diverse elements into a synthesis in which while the antithesis is fully recognized, each side is demanded by or implied in the other. Such a procedure may seem strange, but for Heim it represents the only true account of knowledge of God as Word of God.

On the one hand, God, Who is wholly distinct from us, and from Whom our guilt separates us, comes in the Holy Spirit upon the same plain with us in such a way that we are called back into the *zustand*, in dem ich schon immer sein solte.(1) On the other hand, the Word which is a content of the world is also that in which God Himself speaks to us, or the point of meeting between God and man.

It now becomes quite plain that, although Heim's present theory of knowledge is somewhat more precise than the theory of paradoxical

(1) Ibid.
synthesis presented in Das Gewissheitsproblem, it is essentially a restatement of that theory. The two line and the one line theories are brought together in synthesis, yet no attempt is made to resolve the apparent contradiction between them.

1. The Authoritarian Emphasis within the Theory of Synthesis

Although Helm's present theory is a restatement of his earlier theory of a paradoxical synthesis of authority and immediate experiencing, the emphasis is now far more upon authority than upon immediacy. This may be seen in three aspects of Helm's treatment of the subject. First, while the care and attention devoted to the importance of recognizing the authoritative side of knowledge of God is very considerable, the treatment of the side of experiencing is confined to relatively few remarks. Second, that the direct apprehension which comes to a man in knowledge of God comes only as a man is in the presence of one particular content. Third, the experiencing in which a man knows God is only an experiencing which is molded by and in some sense identical with the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Fourth, the part of the knower is reduced almost to sheer passivity in the emphasis upon the activity of the known.

g. Helm's Idea of the Precise Character of the Authority in Knowledge of God

Thus far we have shown how Helm's attempt to apply the characteristics of human speech to the fact that God has spoken indicates the depth of our ignorance, the personal existential character of our knowledge of God, and the paradoxical synthesis of authority and immediate experiencing involved in knowledge of God. We have, however, indicated only in a rather general way the character of each side of the synthesis. Accordingly, we must now show more specifically what the authority is of which Helm speaks and in what consists the immediate experiencing to which he refers. We begin with the former question.

Helm's idea of the authority in which God makes Himself known is intimately connected with his idea of the distinction between silence and speech of which we must accordingly treat. (a) Helm contends that one of the corollaries of the fact of speech is that there are two ways of dealing with a person, that one may silently confront another or he may speak to him. If God speaks to us, Helm holds, this must be a way of dealing with us quite distinct from the order of creation. (1) This fact would seem to mean that God in His silent acts makes Himself known to us less distinctly than in His speaking, but nevertheless really, that God is constantly making a positive impress upon us whether we will or no. However, since our common knowledge is in part, at least, God's silent dealing, it is impossible, according to all that Helm has said about our common knowledge, for Helm to draw that conclusion. We find Helm saying

(1) Ibid., p. 174.
that silent dealing is, by comparison with speech, only emotional Rausch. Accordingly, Heim regards God's speech alone as being of vital importance, confines his thought in his latest books largely to the idea of God's speaking, and excludes any considerable discussion of God's silent acts.

Whether or not the above interpretation of Heim's idea of God's silent dealing with us is entirely correct, at least this fact stands out clearly, that Heim insists that a recognition of the distinction between God's silent dealing with us and his speaking with us is necessary for any proper hearing of the word of God.

No one is ready for the Biblical message that God has spoken until he has recognized the fundamental distinction between speaking and silent dealing, for it is only as that distinction is seen that a man is in a position to understand speech, from any source. Men who suppose that the silent struggle between God's will and theirs is sufficient are in no frame of mind to receive God's Word. Those who seek to find the authorization of God's Word in nature are altogether mistaken, for a Word is a sufficient authority. Even those folk who, while they accept orthodox views of the inspiration of the Bible, simply place God's speaking alongside His silent dealing with men, as a parallel channel of revelation, have not grasped what it means that God has spoken. All such persons need to learn that speech comes out of and interprets silence and that silent will without speech is blind and unintelligible. For them, the message of the New Testament is an answer to a question which does not exist.

With this background in mind, we may present Heim's idea of the authoritative side of God's speaking to us under two distinct expressions which have to do respectively with the pointing out of the content in which God has spoken, and the content itself. The pointing out of the content in which God has spoken is through the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Only the Holy Spirit can reveal to us the Inhalt through which God has spoken. Every attempt to make God's choice a part of our mental processes, to assume that we would have arrived at the same conclusions as those to which the Holy Spirit has brought us, is to be rejected. As when a particle of sand cannot be dislodged from an organism, the organism attempts to make the foreign body a part of itself, we insist upon supposing that it is we who speak. For example, Hegel undertakes to show that Christ's death for us could be demonstrated as an inevitable part of the dialectical process of history working out in minds. But, however cleverly such attempts to explain God's Word as a part of our thinking may be wrought out, they are a complete misunderstanding of our human situation. Those who put faith in such speculations are unmindful of that which is prerequisite to the hearing of the Gospel, the realization of our inability to know God. Their explanations are futile movements within those two possibilities to which our unaided thoughts are confined, Idolatry and Pantheism. Attempts to show the relation between Absolutheit and Relativität, or Unendlichkeit and Endlichkeit, cannot inform us about the reality of Jesus.

(1) Ibid., pp. 178-179.  (2) Ibid., pp. 181-182.
(3) Ibid., pp. 189-190.  (4) Ibid., p. 191.
(5) Ibid., p. 192.
The attempt to base the discovery of the content, in which God has spoken, upon feeling, as well as the attempt to base it on that of thought, must be rejected; (1) for if feeling reveals the content of God's speaking, we are no longer under the leadership of Christ in the sense of which the New Testament writers speak. We are really led of Christ only when, for us, all other leaderships have broken down.

The pointing out of that in which God has spoken is, on the authority side, the sovereign testimony of the Holy Spirit which is in no sense dependent upon or a part of the experience of the believer, but God's witness to His Word.

The content through which God has spoken is a "Thou", Christ Jesus the Lord. Those whose eyes the Holy Spirit has opened to the content through which God speaks witness to the fact that God has spoken to them, not through an Es, but through a Du Who meets us, not as an idea in the cold atmosphere of contemplation, but as a Will in the heat of life's struggles. (2) Indeed every other possibility is excluded. For if God speaks through an objectifiable Es, those who hear would be able to represent God's speaking to others in a clear objective manner, as the archeologist flashes pictures of ancient ruins upon the screen. (3) But this is clearly not possible, for many intelligent people fail completely to understand the Word of God.

If God has spoken to us through a Du, we must say that to hear God is not simply to know the historical character of Him Whom God has sent. It is rather to hear His words as personal imperatives, as commands to be obeyed, and promises to be lived by. (4) The imperatives of God demand an answer. In hearing God's Word it is impossible to remain in a neutral position. Either we accept or we reject the leadership of the "Thou" Whom He has chosen.

This fact is abundantly evident in the New Testament. The consistent purpose of the writers of the four Gospels is not so much to give a historical portrait of Jesus as to bring men into personal contact with Jesus Himself, that they might accept His leadership. Jesus's endeavor was not to teach men a particular world view, but to bring them into a personal relationship with Himself. Thus, we are not surprised to find that Jesus persistently rejected the enthusiastic praises of the multitude; He was aware that they had only found something that pleased them. They were attempting to remain neutral, and must therefore be turned away lest they cause His mission to be misunderstood. Jesus ever seeks for men either to accept Him completely or to reject Him.

The insistence upon a distinction between God's speaking and his silent dealing and the idea of the Word as a "Thou" are used in

(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid., p. 195.
(3) Ibid., p. 194.
(4) Ibid., p. 196.
Heim's present thought in support of a tendency, which has characterized thought all along, to confine the idea of the revelation of God within rather narrow limits. If God's speaking is altogether distinct from His silent dealing, then, when it is clear in what God has spoken, none of the remainder of reality can be said to have any positive part in revelation. Thus, once again Heim indicates the exclusiveness of Christ. If speech is altogether distinct from silence, and if Christ is the One Whom the Holy Spirit points out as the Word, then naught else is a positive revelation of God. If God speaks through a "Thou" and the "Thou" is Christ, then there is nothing else through which God speaks.

h. The Precise Character of the Immediate Experiencing in Knowledge of God

Just as the authority side of the synthesis has two aspects, so the immediacy side of the synthesis has two aspects. That in which the content of God's speaking is recognized in our experience is the testimony of the Holy Spirit. While the testimony of the Holy Spirit is, on its authority side, a sovereign testimony, it is, from the other side, our hearing of God's word. Thus, we find Heim saying that the boundary by which the Holy Spirit marks out God's Word from other contents findet --- innerhalb unseres Daseinsraums statt, (1) and that the Holy Spirit makes this boundary sichtbar.

The reception of the content itself is our hearing the Word of God or our acceptance of Christ as Lord. Denn ein Reden kommt nur zustande, wenn ein Horer da ist der es aufnimmt. (2) The immediacy side of our knowledge of God is an apprehension of God which comes to us as under the influence of the Holy Spirit we accept and follow Christ. In hearing the Word we are called into a Sein in Gott. (3)

However, this statement leaves undetermined the vital question as to the relation between that experience in which, guided by the Holy Spirit, we accept Christ, and our common experience. Is the immediacy side of our knowledge of God an illuminated human experience, or is it a different kind of experience altogether? To put the question differently, granted that our experience of God's Word is but one side of a fact which from another side is the sovereign testimony of the Holy Spirit, is that experience a heightening before the Word of God of powers already implied in our common knowledge, or is it a special kind of experience? Is our apprehension of Christ as God's word in terms of perception and conscience, or is it in terms of a sort of a higher category of knowledge?

Heim does not answer the question definitely. However, it seems that what he has said excludes the first alternative.

Heim holds that the forms of our common knowledge are against God and indeed a form of guilt. It would therefore be inconceivable

(1) Ibid., p. 184.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid., p. 186.
to suppose that a further development of these could be the way of our knowing God or that any expression of them could be the human side of what is, from God's side, the testimony of the Holy Spirit. The conclusion that Heim's presupposition excludes the first answer is further implied in what he says of the sovereign testimony of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, he says, reveals the instrument of God's speaking in a manner not comparable to any human category.(1)

However, as to whether Heim actually intends to say that faith is an entirely distinct way of knowing must remain in doubt. In the second edition of *Glaube und Denken* he tended to define it as a function of the whole soul. The fact possibly is that Heim intends to take a position mid-way between the two alternatives suggested, i.e., to say that faith uses elements that find a place within our common knowledge, but is never to be explained in terms either of any one of them or of them all. Certainly this conclusion would be suggested by his vigorous protest against Barth's hyper-authoritarianism, in the second edition of *Glaube und Denken*.(2) That Heim does not actually put the matter thus is perhaps due to a fear of subjectivism as well as to a realization of the inconsistency between such a position and other ideas which he has advanced.

(E) A Defense of the Theory Presented

The theory of knowledge of God which Heim has presented is open to the obvious objections that it involves a synthesis of elements which cannot be rationally united, and that its idea of Christ as the "Thou" of God's Word places a person who lived in the past in a position which can only be filled by a living "Thou".

However, Heim's analysis of our common knowledge is intended to overcome both difficulties. Regarding the first objection, Heim has little to say. But since he has endeavored to show that paradox is involved in those relations in each of the levels of knowledge in which knowledge comes to rest, he evidently intends to imply that the fact of paradox in knowledge of God need present no peculiar difficulty. If even those relations in which "I" meets world and "I" meets "Thou" are paradoxical, why should it be disturbing if the knowledge of God is paradoxical? Indeed it would be strange if it were otherwise.

With regard to the second objection, Heim defends his position by pointing out that his idea is quite in accord with the testimony of the New Testament writers, and by calling attention to certain features of his analysis of knowledge in general which throw light upon the subject. We present the leading features of his thought in this connection.

Everything that the New Testament writers have said is inseparably bound up with their conviction that Christ was present with them. All of their teaching is based upon the belief that the Holy Spirit

(1) Ibid., p. 189.
Who brings us to God in Christ continues the communion between Christ and the believer even after the death of Christ. (1)

This conviction is not to be explained away as the temporal expression of the impression which Jesus made upon His disciples. (2) Rather, with this belief stands or falls the entire message of the early church. The New Testament belief that with the coming of Christ the situation between God and man was radically changed was dependent upon the idea of the present Christ. The New Testament writers had recognized all the while that God had in former times spoken through the prophets. But, if Christ had been to them only another prophet who lived and died, there would have been no essential change. The distinctive point upon which the apostles insist is that the words of the prophets are no longer needed since the Word of God is personified in Christ. Had the writers of the New Testament been recording the facts about a friend of past years, they doubtless would have included a considerably greater number of detailed facts from the earthly life of Christ. But John expressly states that the facts that have been recorded were written that men might believe. The method of the New Testament writers is not that of biographers, but of those who seek to bring men to a living Leader.

Finally, Paul gives rather explicit directions to Christian people with reference to matters concerning which there was no historical word of Jesus. He believed that in giving such teachings he was led by God. To be sure, he says quite clearly that all such teachings must be in harmony with the things which Jesus said during His earthly life, but, nevertheless, the very fact that he set forth such teachings at all is testimony to a belief that Jesus was present with him.

In defending the doctrine of the present Christ, Heim is principally concerned to show that the New Testament clearly teaches such a conception, for he stands firmly upon the conviction that we are dependent, in ultimate questions, upon the New Testament witnessed fact of Christ's leadership. However, Heim undertakes further to defend this doctrine upon the basis of his idea of the structure of the "I-Thou" relationship. His argument is somewhat as follows:

The belief that persons who are not contemporaries cannot meet is always due to failure to distinguish clearly between the "I-Thou" relation and the "I-It" relation. When this distinction is wanting one supposes that a physical communication is necessary to the meeting of an "I" and a "You". But, as a matter of fact, the contact of an "I" and a "You" has nothing to do with bodily nearness and distance. A man may work side by side with another and yet never really come near him. On the other hand, one may be separated by many miles from

(1) Heim refers to John 14; John 16:12-15; 1 Cor. 7:25,40; 2 Cor. 12:8 ff.
(2) Heim: Jesus der Herr, p. 206.
another person and yet in the reading of a letter commune with him. In the meeting of an "I" and a "You" it is not two limited objects that are meeting, rather it is two realms, each of which is itself endless. Further, the meeting of an "I" and a "You" can only take place in a more inclusive realm which cannot be seen. In that this larger realm comprehends my perspective world and yours it cannot be a perspective world. It cannot, then, be a spacial world at all. Thus the meeting of an "I" and a "You" is not spacial but independent of physical distance.(1)

Not only is the contact of an "I" and a "You" independent of spacial nearness and distance, it is likewise independent of temporal nearness and distance. The time stretch in which completed events find their place is an objective continuum which is seen from a perspective point. It is world events as seen from the now point of an "I". But obviously the meeting of two "I's" cannot be comprehended from that standpoint. That more comprehensive realm in which "I" meets "Thou" must therefore be beyond time as well as space.

This fact is often illustrated in experience, for it is well known that a great leader may be far better understood years later than during his lifetime. There are those who enjoy hours with Goethe and Plato. The meeting of an "I" and a "Thou" is not dependent upon contemporaneousness.

This account of the "I-Thou" relation does not, of course, prove that such a Zweisprache as that between Paul and Christ regarding the "thorn" in Paul's flesh is possible, but it does prove that the "I-Thou" relation is not dependent on any objective relations, but is a distinct dimension into which we cannot see and of which we can never say what is or is not possible in it. Thus, one has no right to say that is impossible to stand in a true "Thou" relation with Christ whether it is possible to see Him or not.

If, according to Heim, one is looking for a knowledge of God which is axiomatic or of the character of direct perception, he is doomed to disappointment. But if he is looking for a personal meeting with God he may be gloriously rewarded.

We have pointed out how Heim rejects the notion that our common knowledge contains knowledge of God, in three ways: first, that our common knowledge makes possible no distinction between God and the rest of reality; second, that that knowledge involves no apprehension of God; and, third, that that knowledge is under the shadow of guilt. As we shall undertake to show later, the criticism implied in these suggestions is not entirely escaped by that concept of knowledge of God through revelation which Heim presents. None the less, within certain limits the positive concept of knowledge of God which Heim presents involves a distinction, an apprehension, and a knowing that rises above our guilty situation.

When an "I" and a "Thou" meet, there is a real identity and a real meeting. Thus our knowledge of God is as direct as our knowledge of our fellows. Our questions come to rest as we follow Christ. Again, a word is an intelligible meaning, so that in the Word of God the distinction between God and the world is given. Finally, in Christ the Redeemer and in the Holy Spirit the guilt of our situation is partially overcome, so that in hearing God's Word we are called back, as it were, into something like the Lost Paradise.

At the same time, the limitations of our thought must be kept in mind. The separateness between God and Ourselves remains. We know not as those who examine a map, the meaning of which they can fully grasp, but only as those who follow a guide through a strange city. Our awareness of the distinction between God and the world is not an objective idea that can be recorded and referred to at will; it remains only as we are under the Word. In the same way, our sense of God's presence abides only when we are under the Word. The Leader makes known to us only so much as He thinks we need to know.

The limitations indicated here, the insistence that our knowledge of God is not of that self-evident character that belongs to axioms, and does not involve the sense of being in the presence of objective reality which belongs to our perceptions, but of a personal character, may indeed call out the question as to whether our knowledge of God has as much certainty as our ordinary knowledge. However, Heim's analysis of the common forms of our experience is intended to demonstrate that the forms of our knowledge which are most precise and seem to be most objective are highly abstract, and thus remote from reality, while the highest and deepest of our knowledge is that which is given in personal relationships. Since, then, knowledge of God is always personal, nevertheless, the implication is that it is the highest kind of knowledge.

What Heim's idea of knowledge of God loses in definiteness and fixity it gains in comprehensiveness. Knowledge of God is, for Heim, the crown and foundation of all knowledge. Apart from it all else falls to the ground.

The determination of the proper procedure in endeavoring to ascertain Heim's place in modern thought as to knowledge of God depends in part upon the particular manner in which Heim has chosen to approach the problem of knowledge of God. Accordingly, without attempting an exhaustive study of the subject, we offer in passing a few introductory remarks upon Heim's place in modern thought as to the method of approach to the problem of knowledge of God.

Out of the complexity of possible approaches we have three broad tendencies. First, there is the tendency to subordinate religious knowledge to other types of knowledge, to explain its claims in terms of concepts derived from other spheres, to allow it no distinctive standing, to force it into the ready made molds of philosophy. This is the method of one side of Hegel's thought and, indeed, of the majority of philosophies in which there is little true appreciation of religious values. Second, there is the tendency to regard religious knowledge and other knowledge as quite distinct. Not only is the knowledge of each considered quite apart from the other, but even the scientific account of each must be confined to its own sphere. This is the method of Ritschl and in some measure of Schleiermacher. Indeed, excluding the theologians of the Hegelian type, it is, broadly speaking, the method of German theology. Finally, there are those who, while clearly recognizing the distinctiveness and self-sufficiency of religious knowledge, insist that an adequate scientific account of religious knowledge must take into account the entire field of knowledge.

In the light of what has already been said of Heim's theory, it scarcely seems necessary to say that his method falls not in the first or second group, but in the third. Heim insists on approaching the entire knowledge problem. It is here, indeed, that Heim's thought diverges most radically from the Ritschlianism that until recently dominated German theology, and from the Barthianism that is so much to the fore today. Karl Barth goes beyond Ritschl in not only saying that religion has nothing to do with metaphysical thought, but tending to ignore the latter altogether. Heim vigorously protests that such a method is totally unfit to meet the needs of the modern man. (1) While there are, as we shall see, marked differences in the conclusions of Heim and Barth, the likenesses are more than the differences. But, in the matter of method, they are almost at opposite poles.

Since Heim has insisted upon the analysis of the entire knowledge problem, and since his theory of knowledge of God is so related to his analysis of knowledge in general that the accuracy of the former depends upon that of the latter; our present discussion must attempt to orient both Heim's theory of knowledge of God and his conception of the structure of knowledge in general which forms its background among modern attempts to solve the knowledge problem. We consider first the theory of knowledge in general.

I. Heim's Theory of Knowledge in General

It must be kept in mind that Heim's analysis of knowledge in general is a study of the structure of knowledge, and has to do at first only indirectly with the problems of the validity of knowledge.

A. Classification of Theories

When the above consideration is kept in mind, the problem of classification of theories is somewhat simplified. However, even so, the varieties of epistemological thought are so complex that whatever principle of classification of schools is attempted is certain to be somewhat arbitrary. We have adopted a classification which comes as near as possible to serving the double purpose of doing justice to the various tendencies and at the same time bringing to light how Heim's thought agrees with, and disagrees with, influences, and is influenced by the various phases of modern thought.

Thus we distinguish the theory that knowledge comes to us in the apprehension of an independent reality, the thought that knowledge comes to us in the unfolding of experience itself, which is reality, and the theory that knowledge comes to us basically as the meeting of spiritual existences. That is to say, we distinguish between Realism, Idealism, and Personalism.

B. Heim's Theory and Realism

A general idea of the nature of the relation between Heim's theory and each of the above types of theory may be gathered from our discussion of certain of Heim's ideas as a theory of levels of general knowledge. However, we must now examine more precisely the relation between Heim's thought and Realism, Idealism, and Personalism.

The interpretation of the way by which we know, which seems at first to come nearest to fulfilling the demands of common sense, is that of Realism.

(I) Realism as a Theory of the Independence of the Known

Realism affirms that knowledge comes to us as the presentation of independent reality, or, as R. B. Perry says, "that some or all known objects owe their being to conditions different from those to which they owe their being known; or that it is possible that objects should be without being known." (1)

The doctrine of the object's independence of the knower is the common denominator of all of the branches of Realism. It is held alike in Representative Realism, Critical Realism, and Neo-Realism. It is primarily the teaching which unites the various types of Realists against their common opponents, the Idealists. With the doctrine of the independence of the object, accordingly, we are primarily concerned. The difference between the kinds of Realism is for our purposes of secondary importance.

(II) Agreement between Heim and the Realists

(A) As to Method

Heim and the Realists are in agreement, in their unwilling-

ness to approach the question of knowledge of the world with any
preconceived ideas as to the satisfactoriness of the results to
be achieved. Heim is one of those (to use the language of Muirhead
concerning the Realists) who seek to "plough their way among the jungle
of facts". (1) It must be kept in mind, however, that this is a
matter of method and not of conclusions. Heim is a Realist in a
sense in which Mensing and Husserl are Realists, namely, in begin­
ing his study from the standpoint of phenomenology. He is never
a Realist in the sense in which Daws Hicks is a Realist, namely, in
accepting the doctrine of the independence of objects. Even the
methodological Realism of Professor Heim applies only to the pro­
cedure of the first half of Heim's analysis, since Heim has in mind
all the while to come later to the undeniable fact that God has
spoken. Moreover, one wonders whether even Heim's preliminary meth­
do­gological Realism is quite as genuine as he protests.

(B) As to the Rejection of Subjectivism

Apart from this methodological agreement with Realism, Heim's
thought is quite in accord with Realism's contention over against
certain forms of Idealism, that knowledge is to be explained entire­
ly from the standpoint of the knower. Even upon the level of obser­
vation, knowledge involves an otherness. There is no worldless "I"
any more than there is an "I"less world. The "I" does not create
its world. On the deeper dynamic level, knowledge arises from a
meeting. However, since the emphasis upon the otherness in know­
l­edge is not, in Heim's thought, derived from Realism but from
Personalism, we need not discuss it further here.

(III). Differences between Heim's Theory and Realism

Heim has less in common with Realism than with any other school
of epistemology. In the introductory chapters of each of the editions
of Glaube und Denken he undertakes a definite refutation of Realism;
in succeeding chapters of each book he consistently maintains a point
of view hostile to Realism. We must now see wherein the differences
between Heim's thought and Realism lie.

(A) As to Point of Departure

The realist, like the Idealist, takes for granted a difference
between knower and known and undertakes to show that the basic dis­
tinctions of knowledge are in the known, rather than in the knower.
This, in Heim's thought, is a begging of a basic question and, ac­
cordingly, a hopeless muddling of the whole knowledge situation.
It is fruitless, Heim contends, to start out with an attempt to dis­
cover whether basic distinctions are in knower or known, since the
distinction between knower and known is itself one of those basic
distinctions which requires the most careful scrutiny. (2)

(1) Muirhead, "Preface to the Second Series of Contemp­
orary British Philosophy."
(2) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, Tr., p. 46.
To put the matter somewhat differently, Realism assumes the concept of a 'Thing-in-itself' and undertakes to show that things in themselves exist and can be known. From Heim's point of view, however, the idea of a 'Thing-in-itself' is precisely what is not to be taken for granted. The very idea of 'Thing-in-itself is "a speculative trespass beyond the limits of our thought."(1) The whole effort of Realism to prove that the 'Thing-in-itself is known as an attempt to answer "a question which we are not in a position even to formulate"."(2)

(B) As to an Ontological Assumption of Realism

Heim contends that the idea of the substantiality of the "I" is a basic postulate of Realism, a postulate with which the whole theory of Realism is bound up. He insists that the Realist consciously or unconsciously makes the "I" an object among objects.(3) Whether or not this postulate really underlies all realistic positions, certainly a large number of Realists would probably be unwilling to acknowledge it. However, quite clearly the idea of the substantiality of the "I" is characteristic of some Realists. Indeed, the idea is put quite brazenly by some Neo-realists.(4) Hence we note the relation between Heim's theory and this position.

Obviously, Heim's theory is in bitter opposition to the idea of the substantiality of the "I". The idea of the dimensional character of the "I-It" relation is a vigorous affirmation that the "I" is not object among objects, or substance among substances, but a dimension over against the whole dimension of objects and substances. Thus we find Heim rigorously ruling out the idea of the substantiality of the "I", declaring that the overcoming of this idea is the first significant revolution in philosophical thought.(5)

(C) As to the Central Doctrine of Realism

By far the most important difference between Heim and the Realists is their dispute regarding the central doctrine of Realism, i.e., the idea that knowledge is essentially a presentation of independent reality.

From first to last Heim's theory is in opposition to the idea that the object is in any sense independent of the knower. Again and again in different ways he reiterates his opposition to this idea of neutral knowledge is an attempt to flee from the Gottesfrage.(6)

(1) Ibid., p. 47.
(2) Ibid., p. 48.
(6) Ibid., zweite Auflage, p. 88 ff.
He insists that the fact of perspective which to the Realist is of minor importance is the very starting point in the knowledge question. (1) He declares that distinction and distinguishing act are never to be separated. (2)

The central difference between Heim's view and the Realist's, however, comes to its sharpest point in Heim's idea of the dimensional character of the "I-It" relation. "I" and "It", knower and known, are, Heim argues, quite inseparable: "Everything objective -- is given but as one pole of a primal relation of which the other pole is a perceiving Ego". (3) There is no "I"-less world, nor is there any worldless "I". (4) It is only in recognition of a paradoxical dimensional identity between "I" and "It" that knowledge is at all possible. "Then between 'Me' and the 'Wholly Other' which confronts me a unity exists. This unity --- must exist as a basis of possibility." (5)

(IV) Heim's Thought and Special Types of Realism

The antithesis between Heim and Realism applies particularly to naive Realism and the Neo-Realism which often closely approximates it. Heim is utterly at variance with those who hold that objects are presented to us just as they are. But, as has been seen, his objections to Realism are not related primarily to the question as to whether objects are presented to us just as they are, but rather to the question as to whether independent objects are presented to us at all.

Since the critical Realism of Santyana and others, which places its essences somewhere between knower and known, and the Representative Realism of Lock and Descartes, which timidly refrains from going beyond the assertion that our ideas are representations of independent objects, include the idea that certain objects are independent of the observer, the antithesis between Heim's theory and Realism applies in general to these forms of Realism as well as to the more thoroughgoing Neo-Realism.

This brings us to the question of the relation between Heim and a certain Realist who has exerted a powerful influence upon Heim's thought. Martin Heidegger, perhaps the foremost philosopher in Germany today, who has in part adopted the phenomenology of Husserl, (6) is not a Realist in the sense in which any one of the groups mentioned above is realistic. However, because of his pre-occupation with the problem of Being and his conception of know-

(1) Ibid., p. 96 ff.
(2) Ibid., p. 77 ff.
(3) Ibid., dritte Auflage, p. 48.
(4) Ibid., zweite Auflage, p. 144 ff.
(5) Ibid., dritte Auflage, p. 144.
Heidegger begins his book Sein und Zeit with an assertion of the need for a fresh study of Being. Such a study, he holds should adopt a phenomenological method, and emphasize the problem of man. Heidegger finds Dasein, or present individual existence, to be the horizon of Being, and declares that Dasein is anxiety which is temporality. Thus temporality is for him the horizon of being.

Heim is quite in agreement with Heidegger's idea that any attempt to describe Being would have to go beyond that preoccupation with consciousness which characterizes idealistic philosophies. Indeed, he finds Heidegger's analysis quite helpful in the effort to exclude the uncritical suggestions in the classical Idealists. Nevertheless, Heim objects very strenuously to Heidegger's theory that Dasein as anxiety or temporality is the manner in which Being exists in the world, or the horizon of Being. This, Heim claims, is only a poetic analogy which reverts again into the dependence upon consciousness and, therefore, cannot stand against Griebbach's proof that what enters consciousness is only a past or secondary representation of present events. Heim adopts Heidegger's criticism of naive Realism and his opposition to Idealism but is unwilling to accept the positive side of Heidegger's own Realism.

(V) Influences Leading to Heim's Rejection of Realism

The major influences which have brought about Heim's opposition to Realism are, according to Heim's testimony, the writings of certain idealistic and personalistic philosophers, together with his own profound conviction that a pronounced Realism is incompatible with belief in God. However, there is another type of thought which probably exercises larger influence upon Heim's theory of knowledge than comes directly to light in Heim's writings.

We speak of the discoveries of modern science, the effect of which upon Realism is not difficult to see. Realism of the naive type has received a death blow. The chief bulwark of such Realism has always been that it allows the common man to maintain his belief in a world made up of things that could be seen, heard, and felt. Now modern science comes forward to tell us that the old substantial world of objects is no longer, that what seems to be solid matter is reducible to energy which in turn is not to be defined conceptually but only presented in mathematical formulations. Thus the stronghold of Realism begins to be undermined. To be sure, Realism of the more refined types, as represented in the Critical Realism of Santyana or in Bertrand Russell's idea of the objectivity of relations, is not perturbed, for it never held that things are ultimately just as they appear. Nevertheless, Realism of the more

(2) Cp. Heim: Ibid., zweite Auflage, p. 27.
(3) Ibid., pp. 28-31.
naive type is permanently crippled. If things as we perceive them are real at all, their reality as solids can only be an aspect of a deeper reality.

Again, all types of Realism have been in some degree undermined, for the knowability of an external world has been called into question. It has in the past been taken for granted in science that there is an external reality which can be measured by a fixed standard of measurement. Even today so eminent a scientist as Max Planck pleads for a recognition of the externality of the world. The success with which science has met in proceeding upon this assumption of an independent world has been taken by Realists of all types as evidence for the externality of the world. However, now science comes forward to call in question all standards of measurements to remind us that all measurements are relative to the velocity of the measurer. Of course a certain stability is reintroduced by regarding the spacial and temporal elements together. But the system of fixed references is broken down. Moreover, if spacial measurements are dependent upon perspective, there is no ground for saying that all our knowledge is not dependent upon perspective. Thus certain philosophers, taking their cue from biology have undertaken to account for all our knowledge as the pursuit of practical ends. The selections of data, the hypotheses, and even the deductions of science are not an apprehension of truth, as such, but biological functions. Thus has science itself begun to show the weakness in the very position for which Realism found a vindication in science, the difficulty involved in the idea of the knowability of an independent reality.

Now, as we have repeatedly tried to show, Heim insists that his epistemology is not based upon anything in the physical world. He does not call in science as a proof of his objections to Realism. Such a procedure would, he sees, be a begging of the question. Nevertheless, unquestionably the tendencies of a modern science have profoundly influenced Professor Heim's rejection of Realism. That he is well acquainted with modern science is abundantly illustrated in his class lectures on science and religion which undoubtedly enter in considerable part into the book which Heim now has in preparation under the title: Der Christliche Gottesglaube und die moderne Naturwissenschaft.

The form taken by Heim's whole approach to the idea of an independent reality as well as frequent illustrations drawn from modern science is evidence of the profound impression made upon him in this connection by such dynamic and relativistic elements in science as those of which we have spoken.

(1) Cp. Max Planck, "Where Is Science Going?"
C. Helm's Theory and Idealism

(I) Idealism as the Theory That Experience Is Self-Sufficient

As has often been pointed out, Idealism has had many forms. Ancient Platonism, Medieval Augustinianism, Eighteenth Century Berkeleyanism, Post Kantian Hegelianism, Bergsonian Intuitionism, and recent Spiritualism have all been at one time or another called by the name Idealism.(1)

It is impossible to adopt a concise definition that includes all forms of Idealism, or even to adopt a definition of modern epistemological Idealism which is broad enough to include all writers who class themselves as Idealists. As Professor Muirhead has pointed out,(2) Idealism and Realism have for some time been drawing closer together, so that some modern writers who call themselves Idealists differ only slightly from others who pass as Realists. Professor Hoernle has undertaken to characterize modern Idealism by saying that modern Idealists share the following teachings: 1. that every kind of object reveals something of the whole of things, 2. that thought thinks in us, 3. that spiritual realms may be recognized. However, although this analysis is exceedingly useful, it will at once be seen that some or all of these tenants could readily be accepted by many modern Realists and Spiritualists. As a matter of fact, modern Idealism has lost much of the characteristic flavor of Idealism through its gradual modifications under the influence of realistic and Personalistic philosophies. Hence, for a characteristic definition of Idealism one must go back to the modern Idealism to a less modified type of Idealism. Since it is mainly in opposition to the tendencies which culminated in German classical Idealism that modern Realism and other protesting philosophies arose, we consider German Classical Idealism as representative of that which is most characteristic in modern idealism. We must therefore see what this Idealism is.

Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, and their followers took over the negative thesis of the subjective Idealists, Berkley and Hume, that nothing can exist except as it is known, and transformed it through their positive idea of the Absolute into the idea that knowing or experiencing is existing. Since experiencing is an aspect of the Absolute, it is an apprehension of reality altogether apart from any reference to externality. The classical German Idealists, like the modern Idealist Wildon Carr(3) believed that reality affirms itself as original activity, and that the

criterion of truth and reality is not from without but from within the subject of experience. The central epistemological doctrine of the classical German Idealists is that knowledge comes to us, not as the presentation of passive independent objects, but as the active unfolding of experience itself, which as an expression of the Absolute is self-sufficient. Experiencing is itself reality.

This German idealistic doctrine of the self-sufficiency of experience is the characteristic feature of Idealism. As we have defined Realism as the doctrine of the independence of the object as over against the knower, we define Idealism as the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of experience as over against so called external objects. In adopting this definition we are aware that not every Idealist would agree. However, if Idealism is to be distinguished from its historical opponents, we feel that some such definition is inevitable.

(II) Agreement between Heim's Thought and Idealism

(A) As to the Inseparability of "I" and World

Since Idealism is a doctrine of the self-sufficiency of experience, whatever standing Idealism gives to the idea of a world, it can never tolerate the idea of a world which is in any sense separate from the "I". Thus, for example, in Fichte, while the Ego posits the non-Ego, a self-subsistent non-Ego independent from an Ego is unthinkable. The world can never stand apart from an Ego. It is always a world in perspective, an experienced world.

We have already seen how this position is characteristic of Heim, how he insists upon the inseparability of "I" and world. With this fact he begins, (1) and to it he continues to hold. (2) Indeed, Heim not only accepts the idea from the Idealists but freely acknowledges them as its discoverers. Thus, for example, in the second edition of Glaube und Denken Heim contends that the undeniable element within Idealism is dass es keinen untersuchenden Gegenstand gibt, ohne dass eine Unterscheidungsfunktion als notwendiger Gegenpol immer mit dabei ist. (3) He holds that against this position the realistic objection that Idealism implies that die Welt sei vom ich geschaffen does not apply. He acclaims the Idealist Fichte as the real discoverer of the fact. (4) Heim sketches with evident approval the teaching of Fichte in this connection. The existence of the "I" may not be isolated from doing; the existence of the "I" is itself in doing, feeling of strength, (Kraftgefühl), striving; longing is the real existence of a man. Being is, then, voluntary self-determination,

(1) Heim: Ibid., dritte Auflage, Tr., p. 33.
(2) Ibid., p. 144.
(3) Heim: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, p. 87.
(4) Ibid., p. 113.
deed, doing. Even the "I think" exists in its reality only through an "I" that itself stands in the process (Vollzug) of doing. The differentiation between the deed (Tun) and the doer of the deed is, then purely an abstract differentiation. There is really no separating doer and deed. (1)

It should be noted here that Heim does not derive his idea of the essential "togetherness" of the "I" and the "world" entirely from Idealists. Thus, for example, Heim declares that Kant has taken the first step in the overcoming of the "I-Myth". The influence of Martin Heidegger upon Heim in this matter (2) is especially important. Pointing out that Fichte in his later writings lost sight of his discovery of the inseparability of the "I" and the "world", Heim finds a striking reaffirmation of the idea in Heidegger. He calls attention to the fact which Heidegger brings to light in section 1, of Sein und Zeit, that Dasein ist In-der Welt-Sein, that "I think" is always "I think something." (3)

Heim's position in this matter is, however, not simply an adoption either of the position of Fichte or of that of Heidegger. It is rather a more radical statement of the nonobjectifiability of the "I". (4)

(B) As to the Character of the "I"

1. Negative: The nonobjectifiability of the "I"

As a doctrine of the self-sufficiency of experience, Idealism insists upon the nonobjectifiability of the "I". Whatever character the Realist may attribute to the "I", the Idealist is obliged to say that the "I" is more than object among objects. Upon this, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling are quite in agreement. For them, the "I" is a subject of experience, an aspect of a transcendental Subject, never a thing among things.

In like manner, since Heim teaches that the "I-It" relationship is distinct from any relationships between objects, (5) his thought involves an insistence upon the nonobjective character of the "I". (6) In this point Heim and the Idealists are in agreement.

Moreover, in this matter, as well as in the matter of the inseparability of "I" and "World", Heim recognizes the influence of Idealism. Writes Heim: Mit der Gewalt eine Vision ging es Fichte...
Heim's insistence upon the nonobjectifiability of the "I", like his idea of the inseparability of the "I" and the world, were developed in the course of his reflection upon epistemological questions(2) under Idealistic influences, before the more recent of the philosophers who have influenced him came to prominence. Thus, for example, both ideas are quite in evidence in several of the earlier books of Heim which we have discussed. However, for the verification and in some degree for the form of his present statement of the idea of the nonobjectifiability of the "I", Heim looks to two writers who can scarcely be called Idealists in the sense in which we have defined the word, namely, Martin Heidegger and Eberhard Grisebach.

In Heidegger Heim finds, as we have indicated, a verification for the doctrine of the inseparability of "I" and world. This, he believes, carries with it the impossibility of the idea that the "I" is an object among objects, for objects can be separated from one another.

In Grisebach Heim finds support for the idea of the nonobjectifiability of the present moment, of which, for Heim, the "I" is an expression.(3) Combining the ideas of these two writers, one of whom shows the nonobjectifiability of the "I" as related to knowing, the other of whom shows the nonobjectifiability of the "I" as a present moment, Heim believes that he has found an adequate verification for his conception of the nonobjectifiability of the "I".

2. Positive: The Synthesizing Character of the "I"

Heim and the Idealists agree not only as to the negative aspect of the character of the "I" (i.e., as to its nonobjectifiability), but also as to the positive character of the "I". Idealists have sometimes implied that the world is created by the "I",(4) although a fair interpretation of the classical German Idealists could scarcely lead to such a conclusion. Nevertheless, every Idealist holds that the "I" actively gathers up the elements of its experience into a consciousness manifold. This, Heim likewise finds to be characteristic of the "I" Heim readily attributes his idea of positive character of the "I" to the idealistic phase of Kant's thought, indicating that the positive nature of the "I" is to be described in terms of what Kant called the Synthesis der transzendentalen Apperzeption.(5)

(1) Ibid., p. 393.
(2) Cp. Ibid., dritte Auflage, Introduction.
(3) Ibid., zweite Auflage, p. 140 ff.
(5) Heim: Ibid., dritte Auflage, p. 115.
From the foregoing account it will be seen that the major points in which there is disagreement between Heim and Realism are points in which Heim not only agrees with Idealism but draws arguments directly from Idealism. Thus Heim's insistence upon the essential togetherness of "I" and world, as well as his rejection of the substantiality of the "I", are supported largely by arguments drawn from Fichte, although, as we have seen, the philosophies of Heidegger and Griesebach also play a part here; and his positive conception of the "I" is taken over from an idealistic phase of Kant's thought that has been accepted by Idealists ever since Kant.

(III) Disagreement between Heim and the Idealists

Although Heim is a stout defender of some of the tenants of Idealism, and although he has far more in common with that school of thought than with Realism, he is no Idealist. We must touch briefly upon the points of disagreement between Heim and Idealism.

(A) As to the Point of Departure

Toward the idealistic conception of the problem to be solved in knowledge, Heim is quite as unsympathetic as toward the realistic conception. The reason for this is that the conception of the problem is essentially the same in Idealism as in Realism. Realism and Idealism represent, as Heim says, a dispute as to whether distinctions are fundamentally in knower or known. However, for Heim, there is a more basic issue, for even the difference between knower and known is a distinction. The primary problem, Heim believes, is not to determine whether distinctions are in knower or known, but to examine the structure of the distinctions themselves.

(B) As to the Relation of the "I" to Time

The doctrine of the eternity of the "I" is quite characteristic of the classical German Idealists. This is, indeed, the main support of the idea of the self-sufficiency of experiencing. Since the "I" participates in the Absolute, it requires nothing outside of the unfolding of its own experiences. As a manifestation of the Absolute, it is a timeless observer over against the stream of time. Thus Fichte declares in a celebrated passage: "I am eternal".

Heim is quite as ready as any Idealist to recognize that the "I" is no mere point in time. A large part of the argument in the various editions of Glaubensgewissheit, as well as his discussion of the distinctiveness of the "I-It" relation, is devoted to this very point. However, the idea that the "I" is timeless or eternal is, in Heim's thought, an unfortunate confusion of the present moment and the eternal present or the nunc aeternum.(1)

(1) Ibid., Zweite Auflage, p. 404.
The "I" can no more be separated from the world than the world from the "I". Thus Heim asserts that when Fichte turned from his earlier affirmation of the temporality of the "I" to assert its eternity, Fichte was really losing sight of his earlier discovery of the nonsubstantiality of the "I" and falling back into an uncritical Realism.(1)

Hence, in Heim's thought, the self-sufficiency of experiencing has no ground upon which to stand. Experiencing is but one pole of an inseparable relation between knower and known, and since neither pole can be present apart from the other, neither can be thought of as a theory in itself. For Heim, the "I" is bound to time and so incapable of a self-sufficient experience.

(c) As to the Significance of the Fact of a "Thou"

The Idealists are not entirely indifferent to the fact of the "Thou" over against the "I", as may be illustrated especially in certain passages in Fichte. However, it is with the experience of the "I" that the Idealist is primarily concerned. Thus, if the "Thou" enters the discussion, it is likely to be only as a part of the world of the "I". A full acknowledgment of the subject-character of a "Thou" is likely to be very disturbing to the Idealist, since, whereas his own experience is said to be self-sufficient, that of another subject would have to be equally self-sufficient; of course, the Idealist can speak of various manifestations of the Absolute, but in doing so he is speaking in a sort of secondary objective manner. The real idea for which he contends is his own participation in the Absolute and the self-sufficiency of his own experience. With this emphasis the thought of a "Thou" who cannot be a part of the world of the thinker, is not readily compatible.

Heim, on the other hand, holds that the distinctive character of the "Thou" as a thinking subject must be recognized. For him the distinctiveness of the "Thou" is not only real but of cardinal importance.

Heim's criticism accords with the satirical remark upon Fichte's theory, to the effect that it might have been well enough for Fichte to declare that everything was a part of his world, but that it would be interesting to know what Madam Fichte would say to that.(2) Thus it is not surprising to find Heim entering upon a

(1) Ibid., p. 113.
(2) It should be noted that Fichte is far more ready to acknowledge the "Thou" than Heim seems to suppose. Cp. J. G. Fichte: "The Vocation of Man", translated by W. Smith, Vol. I, pp. 463-464.
bitter invective against Idealism for its failurs to give due recognition to the evident fact of personal relationships, declaring that such a failure is the condemnation of every consciousness philosophy. (1)

D. Heim's Thought and Personalism

(I) Personalism as a Theory that Knowledge Has Its Roots in the Meeting of Wills

There is a very considerable number of writers, descending from ancient and honorable intellectual ancestry who accept neither the realistic doctrine of the independence of the object nor the classical German idealistic doctrine of the self-sufficiency of experience, but find the meeting of spiritual existencies the way to knowledge.

The Mystics, who trace their roots far back into antiquity both in the East and in the West, insofar as they have a theory of knowledge or allow the possibility of knowledge, find the way to knowledge in a meeting of spiritual existencies. They generally regard the meeting as a fusion. In the French and German Spiritualists, Ravaisson, Lotze, and Fechner, the same tendency finds expression in a theory which, while not having a precise epistemology, excludes the usual theories both of Realism and of Idealism and moves in the direction of a Personalistic view of knowledge. The voluntaristic philosophies of Schaupanhauer, Von Hartmann, and Nietzsche, the vitalistic philosophies of Bergson and Hans Driesch, and the Pragmatism of James give expression in various degrees to the same general tendency. A new trend in which Mysticism's opposition to Realism and Idealism is maintained without detriment to the boundaries between personalities was introduced by Feuerbach. The tendency which Feuerbach originated has been recently carried forward by such writers as Buber and Ebner.

Here, then are several groups of writers who, rejecting both Realism and Idealism, tend to emphasize the importance of the relation between spiritual existencies, as such, in knowledge. If Heim's place in modern thought is to be understood, these writers must be sharply distinguished from those whom we have already considered.

Inasmuch as the writers of whom we are speaking have held a considerable variety of opinion and have not been often grouped in one class, whatever name is given to their type of epistemological thought is likely to be confusing. The words Personalism and Spiritualism, as ordinarily used, designate anti-intellectual-

(1) Heim: Ibid., p. 207.
istic, pluralistic systems rather of ontology than of epistemology. The word Mysticism designates a religious attitude in which boundaries between personalities are largely ignored. The word Pragmatism pertains more to scientific validation than to structure of knowledge, while the word Vitalism is mainly biological in emphasis. Thus, for want of better words, we borrow the word Personalism from ontology, and apply it to the epistemological trend of which we are speaking.

The common teaching which unites mystics, Eighteenth century French Spiritualists, Nineteenth century German Spiritualists, and British, American, and German Personalists and Pragmatists and distinguishes them from Realists and Idealists is that knowledge comes to us first of all through meeting with spiritual existences. However wide may be the divergences of Mystics, Spiritualists, and Personalists, they agree that the basis of knowledge is a meeting of wills. In this teaching they quarrel, although in different ways, both with Realism and Idealism. They have no objection to the Realist's doctrine of the independence of that which is met when one knows; but they deny that the essential fact is, as Realism affirms, an object of knowledge. They do not quarrel with Idealism's claim as to the spirituality of knowing, but their insistence upon the fact of a meeting of spiritual existences in knowledge is a denial of Idealism's thesis of the self-sufficiency of experiencing. They side with Realism against Idealism in holding that a meeting with a reality quite outside of the knower is essential to knowledge. But they agree with Idealism as against Realism in contending for the spirituality of both sides of the knowing process.

(II) Heim's General Agreement with Personalism

Heim's position is quite in accord with that of all branches of Personalism in the conviction that the deepest roots of human knowledge are in the meeting of spiritual existencies. According to all that has been said, the deepest knowledge must, for Heim, always come out of personal meeting. Relations among objects are in the past. The "I-It" relationship is a relation between past and present, but only the "I-Thou" relation is within the present.

(III) Heim's Thought and Special Types of Personalism

Thus far, Heim's agreement with the personalistic idea of knowledge is only general, for since the theories which we have included under the term Personalism are various, the theory suggested by the term is necessarily somewhat general and indefinite. In order to gain a precise understanding of the relation between Heim's thought and that of the personalists, we must consider certain of the particular types of the personalistic theory.

(a) Heim has learned much from the Mystics. They have brought
home to his mind the necessity of immediacy in knowledge, a feature of Heim's thought which, as we have seen, is quite indispensable to his system. However, Heim is completely at variance with the mystical tendency to see in the meeting of spiritual existences a union in which the barriers between personalities are broken down. It is true that in the third editions of Glaubensgewissheit there are some hints of this mystical tendency, but in Heim's later books his emphasis on the dimensionality of the distinction between the "I" and the "Thou" quite excludes all such suggestions. Even a word in which Heim finds the interpretative meeting of personalities is itself, in Heim's thought, an expression of the unsurpassable barrier between persons.(1)

(b) Heim's relation to the German spiritualists, Fechner and Lotze, is somewhat different from his relation to the Mystics. Heim owes his spiritualistic interpretation of the world, perhaps more than to anyone else, to these men. Heim mentions Fechner as having influenced the first period of his thinking. He has taken over Fechner's teaching that the difference between the physical and the psychical is mainly a matter of point of view, the physical being the outward manifestation of realities which are inwardly psychical.(2)

The philosophy of Lotze has exerted a similar influence upon his thought. While Heim does not directly mention Lotze as among the molding factors in his thinking, it is not difficult to trace the thread of Lotze's influence in Heim's idea of the "I-You" relation. Years before Heim's books were published, Lotze undertook to show the spiritual or personal side of all things by showing that action or suffering implies self-recognition.(3) Indeed, Heim's whole conception of the dynamic character of all reality is found in Lotze, for although Lotze does not unequivocally apply his Personalism to nature, nevertheless, he tends strongly to make this inference. Writes a modern historian of Lotze's thought: "Either only minds exist, and the whole world of things is a phenomenon in minds, or things which appear to us as permanent yet selfless points of departure, intersection and termination of action, are beings which share with minds in various degrees the general characteristics of mentality, namely, self-existence".(4) The position is almost identical with that of Heim. Since the writings of Lotze enjoyed wide favor in German thought during Heim's earlier years, one can scarcely escape the inference that they were a molding factor in the writings of Heim, which bear such marked resemblance to them.

(c) The influence of the Mystics and of the German Spiritualists upon Heim has to do in the main with general tendencies.

(1) Heim: Jesus der Herr, p. 174.
(3) Ibid., p. 521.
(4) Ibid., pp. 521, 522.
For the source of the special character of Heim's Personalism we must turn to a group of writers among whom Heim names Martin Buber, Karl Löwith, Eberhard Griesbach, Ferdinand Ebner, and Ludwig Feuerbach. Heim recognizes Feuerbach as the discoverer of the "Thou" relation, Buber as its poetic prophet, Griesbach as a demonstrator of its distinctiveness, and Löwith and Ebner as those who have showed its necessity. Of all the influences which have led Heim to his idea of the "Thou", the most important is that of Martin Buber. Accordingly, we pause to make a few remarks regarding Heim's relation to Buber.

In his little book *Ich und Du*, Martin Buber maintains that living is on several levels, that while one may experience the objective world, it is never possible to experience a "Thou", that one can only enter with his whole being into relation with a "Thou" Buber suggests that the meeting of an "I" and a "Thou" is not in the past but in the present, which is not a part of the space-time scheme as such.

Heim frankly takes over these ideas of Buber and undertakes to systematize them, finding Buber's two great contributions to be: 1. that the "I-Thou" relation is not a relation in the space-time continuum, either quantitative, qualitative, beside, or after, that it is beyond all the disjunctions of the space-time relation; 2. that the "I-Thou" relation is quite distinct from the "I-It" relation.

It would, however, be unfair to Heim to suggest that his entire conception of "I-Thou" dimension is really derived from Buber. Buber has indeed marked out the distinctness of the "I-Thou" relation as over against the "I-It" relation, and set forth most of the essential features of the relation. Heim has applied the conception of dimensionality to the relation and shown how the characteristics of dimensional relations work out with reference to it. Moreover, the whole concept of Word is an advance upon Buber.

(D) In addition to the above named philosophical personalistic tendencies, there is another influence which has had a powerful

(2) Ibid., zweite Auflage, pp. 405, 225.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid., p. 205.
(5) Ibid., dritte Auflage, p. 170.
(6) Ibid., zweite Auflage, pp. 224-226.
(8) Ibid., p. 11.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Ibid., pp. 15, 42.
(12) Ibid., pp. 205, 206.
effect in bringing Heim's thought to its personalistic form. We speak of the tendency in modern science to get away from mechanistic interpretations of physical events.

The science of the first three quarters of the nineteenth century was mechanistic to an extreme degree. The only kind of spiritualistic philosophy that seemed possible was a strict intellectualism in which the mind was bound to a strict logic that corresponded to the rigidly mechanical causation in nature. The voluntarism of Fichte was thrust aside for the intellectualism of Hegel. Such a Personalism as that of Heim could scarcely have emerged. The spiritualism of the day was only a mild protest, a foreshadowing of a new day.

However, with the opening of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, science itself began to change its outlook. One by one the bulwarks of the rigidly mechanical theory were undermined. Exceptions to it were noted in the phenomena of radiation. Solid matter was resolved into moving particles and then into waves. The old fixed standards of measurements had to be abandoned. Space and time were welded into a unified scheme into which the mechanical interpretation would not fit. In the Quantum theory it became evident that physical occurrences reduced themselves ultimately to events which could not be accounted for in a rigid scheme of causality. Observable events could indeed be predicted upon a statistical basis but the movements of individual electrons was quite unpredictable in terms of known laws(1). Heisenberg has now succeeded in establishing the general principle that if the location of an electron is known, its velocity must remain unknown, and that if its velocity is known, its location must remain indefinite.(2)

What has been true of physics has also been true of psychology and biology. The former has turned from a mechanistic associationism to more spiritualistic trends under the leadership of such movements as Freudism and the Gestalt psychology, while the latter is forsaking the mechanical tendencies of Darwin for more vitalistic tendencies as represented in such writers as Hans Driesch.

It should be noted that this about face in science has not led Heim to make the mistake that some religious leaders have made, that of attempting to build an entire spiritualistic structure upon the foundation of the recent findings of science. Heim seems to be amply aware that the findings of recent science, while leaving a gap in the old causal theory, do not necessarily destroy it, that the ultimate determination of the question is philosophical, not scientific. Thus we find Heim repeatedly insisting that his epistemological principles are based on analysis of knowledge and not upon relations of physical phenomena.

(1) Max Planck: "Where Is Science Going?", p. 58.
(2) Ibid., p. 28.
However, that such scientific discoveries as those to which we have called attention have been all the while in the background of Heim's thought, powerful molding factors in his adopting of a personalistic point of view, is quite beyond dispute. Although Heim's is not simply a scientific theory, it is almost inconceivable that such a Personalism as his would have arisen against the scientific background of the mid-nineteenth century. Only in the light of more recent science can such a theory be supported. The philosophers who have been most influential in molding Heim's personalistic thought have drawn their inspiration from modern science. Moreover, Heim has been directly, as well as indirectly, influenced here. Attention has already been called to Heim's excellent knowledge of modern science. Heim not infrequently cites illustrations from science in support of his personalistic interpretation of reality. Thus, for example, after summing up the dynamic view of reality upon which the personalistic epistemology rests, Heim declares that "there is a correspondence between such a view of things and the reduction of solid matter to acts of pure energy--movements of fields of force, 'bundles of waves', and the like--to which we have been led by present day research into the structure of the atom."(1) While modern science by no means accounts for or serves as the sole basis of Heim's Personalism, the background which it affords is well nigh indispensable to such a Personalism as that of Heim.

II. As to Knowledge of God

We have seen that the major schools of thought relative to knowledge in general are Idealism, which finds experience largely self-sufficient; Realism, which begins with that which is known and finds it independent of experience; and Personalism, which attempts to draw these two tendencies together in a dynamic theory. With reference to knowledge of God the situation is similar. However, since it is unquestionably conceivable that knowledge of God is no part of our common knowledge but breaks in upon it, the problem of knowledge of God cannot be regarded as simply a particular aspect of the general knowledge problem. It must be recognized that there are marked differences, as well as likenesses, between the two problems, and so the types of theory will not be quite the same. In theory of knowledge of God there is a point of view which, like Idealism, begins with experiencing and regards this as largely self-sufficient. This type of theory regards reasoning, feeling, volition, and mystical intuition as the important factors in knowledge. Hence, writers of this group tend to hold that knowledge of God has that kind of immediacy that belongs to mathematical axioms, logical deduction, or direct perception, for as long as attention is focused upon experiencing, the idea of an otherness of God is not necessarily encountered. Thus, from the standpoint of the process emphasized, this view may be called a theory of experiencing, and from the standpoint of the character

(1) Heim: Ibid., dritte Auflage, Tr, p. 184.
that it tends to ascribe to knowledge of God, a theory of immediacy. This type of theory does not differ essentially from philosophical Idealism. Thus, for example, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling, as well as numerous writers who may be more strictly termed philosophers fall within this group. However, in order to distinguish the theological aspect of Idealism, we shall refer to writers of the school in question as Liberalists, using the words Liberal and Liberalism hereafter only in this special sense.

Over against the kind of theory which begins with the experiencing aspect of knowledge of God, is a type of theory which, like Idealism, begins with that which is known. However, when, with reference to knowledge of God, attention is focused upon the known, the possibility at once emerges that which is known is in reality beyond the scope of our experiencing. Indeed, it is an historical fact that most writers who in theory of knowledge of God have centered their attention largely upon the idea of God and His self-disclosure to men have held that God Himself is not to be directly apprehended, that our knowledge of God is not an immediate experiencing of God, but an indirect authoritative representation of Him. To be sure, there are numerous notable exceptions including certain modern realistic theories of knowledge of God. In order to simplify our classification of theories, we shall regard the exceptional theories with the Liberal group, with which they share the insistence upon immediacy.

Thus, in theory of knowledge we contrast Liberalism which begins, generally speaking, with experiencing and develops a theory of immediate apprehension, and Authoritarianism which begins with God and His revelation and develops a theory of authoritative representation.

There is a third view which, like Personalism, attempts, whether successfully or not, to draw together the theory which begins with experiencing and emerges with an immediacy emphasis and the theory which begins with the known and emerges with an authority emphasis. We may refer to this theory simply as a theory of Synthesis.

A fourth theory attempts to hold the conflicting views in a relation of coordination.

The major types of theory of knowledge of God being such, our task is first of all to show the relation between Heim's theory and the general tendency of each of these major groups, and then to show somewhat more precisely the position of his theory within the type of theory in which his view falls.

A. Heim's Thought and Liberalism

(1) Historical Background

We consider first those writers who emphasize immediacy of experiencing of God. Of course it is quite impossible to exclude
altogether the idea of authority, for however passive or given in the processes of our minds that which is known may be, the very assertion that something is known implies that in some degree the object of knowledge is distinct from the knower. This is an irrefutable contribution to Realism. However, it is quite possible so to emphasize the immediacy of experience, as, for example, in perceiving nature, or apprehending ideals or values, that the element of distinctiveness is likely to be reduced to a minimum. This, indeed, is just what has taken place with reference to knowledge of God among the group of thinkers whom we have called Liberals.

In the thought of ancient Greece, particularly in that of Plato, the Stoics, and Plotinus, each of whom has profoundly influenced Christian thought, the feeling was very pronounced that man, through the exercise of certain functions of his own existence, can attain immediate knowledge of a God Who in this sense is within his reach. From time to time, especially in the writings of Augustine, Anselm, Bonaventura,(1) and most of the Christian Mystics, this thought was presented in unmistakable terms in medieval thought. However, this thought was in the main pushed into the background in the Middle Ages in favor of the thought that knowledge of God must be given from a transcendent realm. It received a new impetus in the writings of Luther, who, while not forsaking the old authoritarian position, staunchly insisted upon the importance of immediacy of experience. Indeed, so pronounced was Luther's insistence upon immediacy that the authoritarian side of his thought has often been neglected or explained away by Liberal writers. After Luther, the immediacy emphasis was again pushed into the background in Protestant Scholasticism.

From the early days of the Renaissance to the post war reaction against Liberalism,(2) the idea that man's experiencing is really the key to the knowledge of God, has, albeit with interruptions, gained strength.(3) The discoveries of the Renaissance astronomers, Copernicus, Bruno, and Kepler, and the rationalist philosophy of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz had by this time so weakened the belief in the necessity and the infallibility of a revelation from without that the thought of the 17th and 18th centuries could not escape what Professor Webb calls a double-mindedness, being uncertain as to whether to look within the world, or beyond the world, for its religious values.(4) Kant's searching criticisms of the arguments for the existence of a Being Who must make Himself known from outside our world(5) undermined still further the authoritarian belief, so that from the time of Hegel until the recent past Immanentism was decidedly the prevailing tendency in all but the rigidly fundamentalist groups.

(5) Cp. Ibid.
The views of the nature of the experience or psychological processes in which man knows God have varied considerably. The theological followers of Kant, especially Ritschl and locke to man's moral nature as the ground of our knowledge of God.

Hegel held that in rational experience, which he holds is at the same time the process and the substance of knowledge, we have immediate experience of the Absolute. The theological followers of Hegel, such as Biederman, Caird, Green, and Bosanquet, like their master, looked to discoursive reason; Schleiermacher and his theological followers, including Alexander Sweitzer and the Erlanger school, found the vital experience in feeling. Recently, at least two other interpretations of religious experience have come to the fore. These, together with those already mentioned will be dealt with more fully when we come to speak of the precise nature of our knowledge.

It should be noted that Liberalism has never undertaken to get rid altogether of authority. However, in its effort to present a theory of immediate experiencing, it has persistently regarded such authority as must be recognized, as a representation which has either counterpart or criterion in experiencing. This may be seen, for example, in Hegel's interpretation of the incarnation as an "inner necessity of the religious consciousness in its Christian stage",(1) in Schleiermacher's grounding of religious knowledge in the feeling of absolute dependence, as well as in such modern counterparts of this idea as R. J. Campbell's interpretation of Christ in terms of "Immanentism",(2) and Rudolph Otto's attempt to ground knowledge of God in a religious a priori.(3)

(II) A Definition of Liberalism

In the light of the above sketch the type of theory which we have, in our classification of schools, called Liberalism may now be described somewhat as follows: Liberalism is first of all an emphasis on the element of immediate experiencing that tends to regard such experiencing as self-sufficient. However, being unable to get rid entirely of Authority, Liberalism involves as a corollary the principle that whatever authority exists has either counterpart or criterion in experience. Liberalism contends that man knows God immediately in a self-sufficient experience independently of any factor for which immediate experience contains no criterion.

(III) Agreement between Heim and the Liberals

Whatever may be Heim's divergence from this group of writers this much must be made clear at the outset, that Heim recognizes with the Liberals that immediate experience has a real place in any knowledge of God. It should, indeed, be possible to take for

(1) Pfleiderer: "The Development of Theology", p. 79.
granted that any theologian will recognize that knowledge of God is not possible apart from our immediate experience, for there is no knowledge apart from some kind of experiencing. However, inasmuch as two groups of writers with which Heim's name is likely to be linked, i.e., traditional supernaturalists and Barthians, have so minimized this element that it almost disappears in their writings, it is necessary to call attention to Heim's unmistakable recognition of the place of our experiencing in knowledge of God.

We have already pointed out how Heim has in Das Gewissheitsproblem in der Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher expressed his conviction of the indispensability of an immediacy of experiencing in knowledge of God. Authority and experience are seen as two sides of the same fact in that the living Christ is one with the Zentralgehalt of the Scriptures, and in that the Autopistie of the Bible is one with the witness of the Holy Spirit. Essentially the same conviction is abundantly evident throughout Heim's more recent works.

In Heim's dimensional scheme the idea that the meeting of dimensions is not simply one of externality, but also one of sharing, is amply expressed. This is seen in two of the characteristics of dimensional relations, the first of which is dimensional unity and difference. Heim writes: "All spaces, since they are infinite, stand one to another in an exclusive relation of Either-Or. But all spaces, precisely because they are infinite, must make claim to represent the same reality (1). The second dimensional characteristic of which we speak is dimensional meeting. There is, Heim says, always an element which the two dimensions share. There is an element which, from one standpoint, belongs wholly to one dimension and, from another standpoint, belongs wholly to the other. Thus Heim writes: "Between two infinite magnitudes (i.e., dimensions ) there can be contact only when there is an element which belongs in its entirety to each of the spaces and yet does not thereby become two elements, but remains one and the same". (2) Here, then, is immediacy in the basic structure of dimensions.

The immediacy involved in relations between dimensions is, in Heim's thought, representative of an immediacy in the relation between God and man. In the second edition of Glaube und Denken (2) Heim boldly suggested that God is the Final Dimension, although in the third edition of Glaube und Denken he repudiates this suggestion. His change of phraseology is simply intended to discredit the idea of a religious a priori, and by no means nullifies the idea which runs through his books, that the dimensional scheme is in the main, an analogy of the relation between God and man. The implication is, although Heim does not press the point, that just as in every dimensional relation there must be an identity as two

(1) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, Tr., p. 65.
(2) Ibid., p. 71.
dimensions apply to the same reality upon a common element, so man's knowledge of God unmistakably involves immediacy both on the level of silent meeting and on the level of speech. Thus, in the very form of the dimensional scheme, the idea of immediacy in knowledge of God is already implied.

However, the particular manner in which the immediacy idea is presented in connection with knowledge of God appears only when Heim comes to apply the dimensional analogy of the meeting of "I" and "Thou" to the inexpressible fact that God makes Himself known to man.

In terms of this analogy, the idea of immediacy comes to expression in Heim's thought in several ways. First, even God's silent dealing with us has its counterpart in an immediate experience of conscience and thought which, as a negative preparation for the Gospel, culminates in a conviction of our ignorance and need. Again, when God speaks to us, the Word must be heard before it is a Word. Further, God only speaks to us as He comes, so to speak, upon the same plain with us, so that in the testimony of the Holy Spirit we know as though paradise had never been lost.

As we indicated in discussing Professor Heim's theory, there is some uncertainty in Heim's thought as to what experience it is in which knowledge of God becomes immediate. The probability is that Heim means a human experience which under the sovereign testimony of the Holy Spirit is enabled to go beyond itself in such a way that indirect representation becomes experiential apprehension. But whatever the precise nature of the experiencing, it is a genuine human experience in which our apprehension is as immediate as the process of our own minds.

However much Heim may differ from writers of the Liberal school, he has in common with them and in opposition to the Authoritarians at least this, an insistence on the reality of an element of experiencing in knowledge of God. Heim has, in some degree at least, preserved what Professor Clement Webb calls an abiding contribution of Liberalism, namely, an overcoming of the arbitrariness in the traditional view.

(IV) Disagreement between Heim and Liberalism

Heim's thought, while finding a place for the immediacy of experiencing, is in disagreement with Liberalism at two important points.

(A) As to the Idea of the Self-Sufficiency of Experiencing

We have seen how Liberalism tends to hold that all that is essential to knowing is found in the processes of knowing, feeling, and willing, or of some special religious function. Heim agrees,

(1) Heim: Jesus der Herr, p. 184.
(2) Ibid., p. 186.
as we have seen, that experiencing is necessary to knowledge of God; he denies that experiencing alone is sufficient.

Obviously Heim's positive idea of knowledge of God as a synthesis of immediate experiencing and indirect authoritative revelation is opposed to the idea of the sole sufficiency of experiencing. If either factor is sufficient alone, no synthesis is necessary. But apart from this, Heim expresses vigorous opposition to Liberalism's idea of the adequacy of immediate experiencing.

In the first place, knowledge is, for Heim, always rooted in a volitional meeting, and so is from first to last a two sided affair, never exclusively or mainly a function of a knower. Even the object which one observes is a solidification of a will that is other than the knower. Hence, Heim's idea of knowledge in general already suggests a rejection of the sole sufficiency of experiencing in knowledge of God.

In the second place, Heim's relentless effort to show the inadequacy of our common knowledge is to this point. It is true that a denial of the adequacy of our common knowledge is not directly an attack upon the sufficiency of experiencing, for our common knowledge involves an objective side in which objects makes itself known, as well as a subjective side in which knower apprehends. However, when one recalls that Heim's objections to our common knowledge are almost exclusively a demonstration of the inadequacy of the forms of experiencing, it becomes clear that these objections apply directly to the idea of the sufficiency of experiencing.

In the third place, Heim devotes a very considerable section of Jesus der Herr to indicate certain specific facts which undermine theological Idealism, which is precisely what we have reference to in the term Liberalism. We may indicate these facts briefly.

First, it is an undeniable fact that men have doubts not only with reference to certain things about God, but also with reference to God's very existence. Such doubt would be quite impossible if we were in a position to experience God directly, (1) for God is present in all times and in all places. Once again, we would be able to understand and cooperate fully with our neighbors if we were able by our own experiencing to know God, for our neighbors, as well as ourselves, would then be in God. But instead of having full understanding of one another, we are constantly engaged in wars and conflicts. (2)

If we could experience God, we should follow His will in our deeds. But the fact is that we do not even know what we ought to do in most instances, and when we do know what our duty is, our wills are too weak to enable us to accomplish it. (3)

(1) Ibid., pp. 83-84.
(2) Ibid., p. 84.
(3) Ibid., pp. 84-90.
Finally, suffering is a reality. If we knew God and lived for Him there could be no suffering, for suffering arises only from conflict between wills. Thus, the very fact that we suffer is an indication that our wills are not in harmony with God's will and so, that we cannot really experience Him. A special instance of our suffering is our dread of death. If we knew God and lived for Him, how could death bring fear to us? But the fact is that we do fear death and that all human efforts to eliminate our dread of it are nothing but an attempt to get rid of something that is firmly rooted in us.

These facts, Heim contends, as all men must recognize, bring to consciousness dass uns Gott nicht schon durch unsere Existenz erschlossen ist.

(B) As to the Idea that Experiencing Involves Counterpart and Criterion for Revelation and Authority

Heim's theory, being in disagreement with Liberalism's idea of the adequacy of experiencing, is quite as hostile to Liberalism's claim to find counterpart and criterion for revelation in experience.

Heim's conception of the relation between experiencing and authority is, as we have seen, that the two are bound together in a synthesis in which the integrity of each is paradoxically preserved. However, if the ideas in which authority comes to expression can be invented or chosen from among other ideas within an experience which is not under authority, as in Liberalism, authority no longer retains its distinctive character, but is subordinated to, or absorbed in, experience. Hence, we find Heim vigorously opposing the idea that that which is given in authority can be discovered or discriminated by experiencing alone. Thus, for example, Heim objects strenuously to Hegel's attempt to explain the facts of Christ in rationalistic terms and to every attempt of man to make God's Word zum Bestandteil seiner selbst.(1) He insists that God's Word is never to be discerned, or discriminated from other ideas by any purely experiential criterion, whether Machtunterschied, or ästhetischer Unterschied, or any other test of the Schattenwelt der Zeitlichkeit.(2)

(V) Influences Leading to Heim's Rejection of Liberalism

In view of the importance of Heim's rejection of Liberalism, which represents a break with the accepted tradition of nineteenth century German Theology, some account must be given of the influences leading up to it. Probably the most important influences are the conservative reformed views which characterized the church in which Heim grew up, and the severe criticism of Liberalism on

(1) Ibid., pp. 186-187.
(2) Heimi Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, p. 55.
the part of such writers as Kierkegaard and Barth. We shall deal at some length with these influences when we come to consider the Authoritarian school.

Another type of influence has, however, been almost equally potent in Heim's rejection of Liberalism. We speak of the relativistic tendency in modern philosophy and science, and in this connection we may name four groups of writers.

1. In the first place, there are Kant and his interpreters who have influenced Heim both directly and indirectly. Heim enthusiastically accepts Kant's thought that the 'thing-in-itself can never be known, but he insists further that the idea of the Thing-in-itself should be gotton rid of altogether.(1)

2. As this suggests, Heim has come under a group of more radical Relativists, among whom are Avenarius, Mach, (2) and Grisebach. In the latter, Heim finds warrant for rejecting all consciousness philosophies on the ground that consciousness represents events only after they are past.(3)

3. A third group of writers who have a part in Heim's rejection of Liberalism are Pragmatists and Vitalists, such as Nietzsche, Vaihanger, Klages, Bergson, and Driesch. (4) In Nietzsche Heim finds consciousness regarded as only an expression of will in which alone we really live. (5) From Bergson and Driesch Heim has learned to regard intelligence as an instrument of practice rather than of attainment of truth, and the causal theory as a distorted view of things. (6) All of this naturally tends to discredit experiencing as a way to ultimate knowledge.

4. There can be no question as to the fact that Heim has come very significantly under the influence of certain dominant ideas in current scientific theory. His discussion of polarity in Jesus der Herr, for example, makes this abundantly clear. Indeed, if one searches for the real source of Heim's skepticism concerning human experiencing, he will perhaps find it as much as anywhere else in the influence of modern science. The famous Michelson Morley experiment has shown the relativity of all measurements. The Heisenberg principle of uncertainty has demonstrated the questionability of the entire basis of the older physics, and Einstein's general theory of relativity, now firmly established in its major outlines, has made it clear that, whereas everything depends upon perspective, there is no absolute perspective in our universe.

(1) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, p.55.
(3) Heim: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, p. 30 ff.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Cp. Ibid.
These concepts have taken hold in Heim's thought and issued in the rather remarkable chapter entitled Gott oder die Vergweiflung, in the second edition of Glaube und Denken, and the section entitled Der Unbekante Gott in Jesus der Herr.

In concluding this section, we may observe that it is not only modern scientific relativism, as such, that has influenced Heim, but also its expression in literature and theory of history. Thus, for example, in the eighteenth through the twenty-second chapters of the second edition of Glaube und Denken, Heim draws upon a literary relativism to show the hopelessness, from a practical standpoint, of depending upon experiencing alone. Spengler's historical relativism is especially significant. Heim is quite in agreement with Spengler's declaration that "the operations of the systematic philosopher are subject to constant and serious error through his assuming the permanence of his results; he overlooks the fact that every thought lives in a historical setting and is therefore involved in a common mortal destiny." Heim declares that Spengler is one of the discoverers of the idea that we do not observe primary Becoming which is a foundation stone of the idea of the inadequacy of experiencing.

B. Heim's Thought and Authoritarianism

(I) Historical

Inasmuch as it is the anti-Liberalist or Authoritarian side of Heim's thought that represents a break with commonly accepted ideas, we must, in order to present a proper conception as to Heim's place in modern thought, follow certain aspects of the authority emphasis in somewhat of detail.

Arising in the atmosphere of Hellenic Judaism, the authority emphasis has always found a ready acceptance in the Roman Catholic church. Although in the official teachings of St. Thomas authority takes its place alongside reason, popular feeling within the church has long accorded the joint authority of the church and the Bible the right to sit in judgment of reason. Through Duns Scotus and William of Occam the authority idea found secure, though not exclusive, place in the thought of Luther. (1)

After the days of Luther and Calvin, whose influence had been strong enough to make certain that the element of experience was not altogether neglected, the church sought for a more definiteness and objectiveness as to the foundations of its faith. (2) On account of the conflicts that arose from the interaction between Protestant and Catholic doctrine, appeal was made to an unqualified authority. (2) Of the two sides of the thought of the

(2) McGiffert: "Protestant Thought before Kant".
Performers, the church chose the authoritarian side. The Bible became the sole authority in doctrine and practice. "In opposition to the Catholic dependence upon the authority of tradition, it became necessary, in order to guarantee the truth of Lutheran theology, to treat the Bible as an external and objective standard, possessing independent value of its own quite apart from its effect on the mind and heart of the reader."(1) The mystical tendencies in Luther were neglected. Calvin's idea of the testimony of the witnessing of the Holy Spirit was made subordinate to the emphasis upon the original inspiration of the Scriptures. McGiffert writes that the idea of "the testimonium Spiritus Sanctus, as the witness of the Spirit in the heart of the believer, was rejected as dangerously subjective."(2)

Indeed, the Protestant Scholastics were not as a rule satisfied with teaching the Bible as an authority demanding unquestioning assent. They insisted that the Bible must be accepted in all of its parts and to its minutest details. Of this idea McGiffert writes: "Not simply is the Bible as a whole, or the truths which it contains, from God, but every phrase, word, and letter, including even the vowel points of the Hebrew Masoratic text."(3) Hagenbach writes in a similar vein: "But the Protestant theologians of later times frequently manifested such a narrow adherence to the letter of Scripture, that --- they were induced to hazard the boldest assertions."(4) Summing up the thought of the period on the subject of religious authority, Sheldon writes:(5) "It is evident from this review that the claims of criticism were, for the most part, ignored in this period, and that the Scripture was treated almost wholly in the spirit of an unqualified dogmatism."

The ideas advocated by the so-called Protestant Scholastics have persisted with more or less modification in that emphasis in Christian thought known today as Fundamentalism, which is still probably expressive of the feeling of the laity in the larger number of the Protestant churches.(6) Unquestionably many Fundamentalists have a real place in their thought for experiencing. Many Fundamentalist theologians have modified the severity of Protestant Scholasticism, especially by reaffirming, to a certain degree, Calvin's doctrine of the witness of the Holy Spirit, and by allowing a limited place for critical inquiry. However, Fundamentalists remain, on the whole, basically authoritarians. Even the idea of the witness of the Spirit has frequently been viewed

(1) Ibid., p. 146.  
(2) Ibid., p. 143.  
(3) Ibid., p. 146.  
almost entirely from the side of transcendence, so that it often becomes in Fundamentalism another way of affirming the authority of the Bible. Writing of present day Fundamentalism, Wieman says: (1) "It turns to a source of light that lies wholly outside the resources of culture, scientific, artistic, and philosophical, as well as those of common sense, of religious experience, and of anything else which contemporary life might afford." A statement which, if extreme, yet clearly brings to light the general tendency of Fundamentalism.

As we have already remarked, the main line of progressive thought in Protestantism since the days of Hegel and Schleiermacher has moved in the direction of an emphasis upon experience. Upon this tide of Liberalism, Fundamentalism with its uncritical attitude toward the Bible and its virtual ignoring of modern science and philosophy has made comparatively little impression. However, another type of Authoritarianism, which was initiated by the original genius of Kierkegaard, has now taken a firm hold in Christian thought and is bringing strikingly to light certain values in the authoritarian type of theory. The new authoritarian movement uses the tools of reason and morality to attack the self-assurance which these functions manifest. It relies not so much upon the authority of the Bible itself as upon God's authority in the Bible. It avoids the dilemma in which modern criticism of the Bible places Fundamentalism by emptying the authority idea of nearly all precise content and pointing out the demand for obedience to God.

Because of their profound influence upon Professor Heim's thought, we must consider specifically two writers of this group, Søren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth.

Kierkegaard's contribution to the authoritarian type of thought is primarily a negative one, namely, a vigorous protest against every effort to attain knowledge of God by way of man's own experience. As Kierkegaard lived in a day in which the prevailing philosophy was an easy and cold Hegelianism, in which it was thought that the way to knowledge of God was through an unfolding of abstract logical principles, his revolt was directed primarily against intellectualism. Its polemic, however, is likewise a condemnation of every attempt to attain knowledge of God by relying solely upon experiencing. Kierkegaard denied that we arrive at knowledge of God by moving rationally through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and insisted that the divine synthesis always manifests itself to us as a paradox. (2)

Kierkegaard finds that existential thinking, not abstract logic, is the way to truth. Men must begin to take that attitude in which one finds himself when confronted by a decision upon

(1) Ibid.
(2) Cp. E. E. Aubrey, on Kierkegaard, in "Present Theological Tendencies".
which his whole future depends. (1) The impersonal attitude of the scientist must give way to the intensely personal attitude of a man who is facing death. Only in a "moment of decision" (2) in which a man's whole being and destiny is involved may a man confront God. (3) Abstract thought is but a hollow shell which must give place to existential thinking.

Kierkegaard compares the intellectualists of his day to the spectators at a play who say to themselves: "How delightful --- to sit as in one's private theatre and watch the drama of universal history being played." (4) This, for Kierkegaard, is an impossible attitude: "We must quit our comfortable box and take the part that is assigned to us on the stage." (5) The only truth worth having is existential truth, "truth as it is known to --- a personal self, with a dignity and responsibility all its own." (6)

No kind of merely human thought leads to God. Mankind as a synthesis of eternity and temporality (7) is universally (8) under the sickness to death of despair. (9)

There is no escape for man himself from the impossible situation in which he finds himself. Whether the sickness involved in man's need for finality and his inability to attain it is recognized or not, it is fatal to all his systems.

God's morality is quite distinct from every moral system which can rear. Thus, for example, in "Fear and Trembling". Kierkegaard points out that God's command to Abraham with reference to offering up his son was contrary to all rational ethics. It was God's way, not man's. Likewise, the mystical way and the dependence upon feeling are inadequate. (10) Faith is God's gift, (11) not man's attainment.

Kierkegaard's devastating criticism of the idea of the adequacy of experiencing applies not only to Hegelianism's effort to arrive at knowledge of the Absolute, but also to the more traditional rationalistic efforts to prove the divinity of Christ from the effects of his life in history. In his "Preparation for a Christian Life" Kierkegaard writes: "Can we prove from history that Christ

(1) Cp. W. Brock, on "Existing" in "Contemporary German Philosophy", p. 82 ff.
(2) Aubrey: Ibid., p. 67.
(3) Ibid.
(4) E. L. Allen: "Kierkegaard, His Life and Thought", p. 152.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid., p. 155.
(7) Sören Kierkegaard; Die Krankheit zum Tode, Translated by H. Gottsched, p. 11 ff.
(8) Ibid., p. 19 ff.
(9) Ibid., p. 10.
(10) Aubrey: Ibid., p. 72.
(11) Ibid., p. 73.
was God? Let me first ask another question: Is there any more absurd contradiction thinkable than wishing to prove that a certain person is God? - - - To prove something is to render it reasonable and real. - - - One can prove only that it is at variance with all reason. - - - One will find it impossible in the conclusion suddenly to arrive at the new category 'God'; that is, one cannot make the consequence, or consequences, of a man's life suddenly prove at a certain point in the argument that this man was God. - - - What has been said, mind you, providing one will take the time to understand it, is sufficient to make a logical mind stop drawing any inferences from the consequences of Christ's life: that therefore He was God."(1) Kierkegaard eschews every attempt to find a basis for knowledge of God in human experience, whether by an effort of reason to reach the Absolute directly, or by a rational attempt to establish a source of authority.

The thought movement which was begun in Kierkegaard is receiving today a powerful expression among a group of writers of whom the most significant is Karl Barth.

In all essential respects, the negative side of Barth's thought is almost precisely like that of Kierkegaard. Like Kierkegaard, Barth and his followers repudiate every form of rationalism and insist that all true thought must be existential. Consider, for example, the following in which Brunner closely follows Barth: "If you do not so seek, namely, personally and passionately, you do not seek at all."(2) "To find the center of existence, the center of your own being has to be active, with the periphery of your being you can find only the surface of reality."(3) Like Kierkegaard, Barth rejects the idea that the human experience is able to attain knowledge of God. Whereas Kierkegaard, who lived in an age of Hegelianism, centered his attack on the sufficiency of human intellect, Barth, who lives in a time when Liberalism emphasizes other forms of human experience, directs his polemic against the sufficiency of human experience itself. Thus, where Kierkegaard had insisted that God confronts our intellect as paradox, Barth insists that God confronts our entire existence as paradox.(4)

Consider the following passages from Barth's "Epistle to the Romans": "We know that God is He Whom we do not know, and that our ignorance is precisely the problem and source of our knowledge."(5) "All knowledge is uncertain, except our ignorance and God's knowledge."(6)

(3) Ibid.
(4) Aubrey; Ibid., p. 85.
(5) Karl Barth: "The Epistle to the Romans". p. 45.
(6) Ibid., p. 361.
Earth has adopted Kierkegaard's method of driving men to despair in order that they might believe. "May their peace be their disquiet, and their disquiet their peace! This is the beginning, theme, and end of the 'Epistle to the Romans'."(1)

Barth's advance beyond Kierkegaard is primarily on the positive side. Defining knowledge as "that confirmation of human acquaintance with an object whereby its trueness becomes a determining factor in the existence of the man who knows",(2) Barth evidently takes his point of departure from the object rather than from experiencing. Knowledge is not first of all something that the knower does but something that is done to him. Approaching knowledge of God in the same way, Barth begins with God and holds that man knows God only in God's self-manifestation or Word. Experience plays a part in knowledge of God, but the part that it plays is that of being determined by truth, rather than determining truth. "By experience of the Word of God---we understand the determination of their (men's) existence as men, by the Word of God."

Barth is indeed ready to acknowledge that "experience of the Word of God, of course, takes place always in an act of human self-determination."(3) However, Barth hastens to withdraw practically all significance from this statement by saying that the act of human self-determination is, as this act, neither the experience of the Word of God nor a kind of cooperation with the Word of God, nor a small share in a greater whole, nor even another side. Barth is quite emphatic in rejecting the view that "what viewed from the one side is grace is from the other side---freedom, and vice versa." The Holy Spirit indeed witnesses in us, but His witness is never to be identified with our experiencing.

Having begun with the idea that God as known, not man as knower, is all important in knowledge of God, Barth contends that knowledge of God is not only dependent upon a divine self-manifestation which is quite beyond anything in our experiencing, as such, but that this knowledge is conditioned upon historically recorded words or upon the Bible. This comes to light clearly in Barth's resolving of the idea of the Word of God into the following: 1. the Word of God as preached, which in its highest expression is "man's language about God, in which and through which God Himself speaks about Himself",(4) 2. the written Word of God, which is a record of past revelation and a promise of future revelation,(5) 3. the revealed Word of God, which is God's primary self-manifestation to prophets and apostles and to all those who hear His Word.

In the third of the above forms of the Word of God it might appear that Barth is speaking of a kind of revelation which is in-

(1) Karl Barth: "Epistle to the Romans", p. 32.
(3) Ibid., p. 227.
(4) Ibid., p. 106.
(5) Ibid., pp. 124, 125.
dependent of any historical content. However, when one bears in mind Barth's idea of the relation between the three forms of the Word of God, it becomes clear that for practical purposes Barth has in mind nothing of the sort. The three forms of the Word of God are three forms, not three Words. They are to be viewed as one. True, a man can never hear the Word of God through the Bible, apart from a primary revelation, but primary revelation comes to him as God makes the Bible a revelation to Him. "Revelation is the form which establishes the other two. But it, itself, never meets us anywhere in abstract form; of it precisely our knowledge is only indirect, arising out of Scripture or in proclamation."(1) Summarizing his idea of the relationship between the forms of the Word of God, Barth writes:

"The revealed Word of God we know only from the Scripture adopted by Church proclamation, or from Church proclamation based on Scripture.

"The written Word of God we know only through the revelation which makes proclamation possible, or through the proclamation made possible by revelation.

"The proclaimed Word of God we know only by knowing the revelation attested through Scripture, or by knowing the Scripture which attests revelation."(2)

Thus, evidently the three forms of the Word of God are so related that the idea of primary revelation, instead of announcing an immediate knowledge of God, is for us always associated with record and proclamation. Barth is no Protestant Scholastic. He rejects the idea of verbal inspiration, but, in the idea that our knowledge of God is entirely dependent upon a divine self-manifestation which comes to us in indirect representation, he is a thoroughgoing authoritarian.

(II) Definition of Authoritarianism

With this historical sketch before us, we may undertake to frame a somewhat more precise statement than that given in our classification of theories. We have noted that Authoritarianism begins with the objective side of knowing and presents a theory in which knowledge depends upon divine authority, indirectly manifested, rather than upon human experiencing. According to what has been said above, we may now say that authoritarianism is the view that indirect representation is the indispensable factor in that knowledge and that representation is recognized only by God's authority. Attention has indeed been called to the fact that Authoritarianism, both in its older and its more recent forms, has given an important place to the doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit. However, in the theories mentioned, this testimony is thought to be an authoritative witness outside, not within, the believer. Even acceptance of divine truth under the testimony of

(1) Ibid. p. 136.
(2) Ibid.
the Holy Spirit tends to mean, for Authoritarians, a reception of a content the significance of which does not appear in experience.

(III) Agreement between Heim's Thought and Authoritarianism

Heim's theory is more in agreement than in disagreement with Authoritarianism. Heim's theory is quite authoritarian in that it finds the primary factor in our knowledge of God to be God's self-manifestation. Denn es gehört ja eben zum Wesen des Wortes, dass ich das Wort nicht selbst sprechen kann. Das andere muss das lösende Wort sprechen. Er muss der Redende sein.(1) God's self-disclosure is all important for Heim. Heim is quite insistent, as his entire exposition of the inadequacy of the forms of our experiencing shows, that our experiencing cannot in itself attain knowledge of God. Indeed, he would be as ready as Barth to declare that man is forbidden "to ascribe to himself, wholly or in part, the possibility of --- (an experience of the Word of God) or even to equate dialectically, with a possibility proper to himself, the divine possibility which is realized in such an experience.(2)

Heim's theory is quite in accord with Authoritarianism in holding that God's self-manifestation comes to us in indirect representation. Heim contends that the very fact of a Word is an expression of a barrier between knower and known.(3) Any attempt to know God apart from Christ, the Leader, Whom God has appointed, is an impossible attempt to spring over one's shadow. The idea that our knowledge of God is independent of indirect representations is contrary to the most important facts of life.(4)

Finally, Heim's theory is quite in accord with Authoritarianism in the precise contention that experiencing furnishes no counterpart or criterion for revelation. In Heim's thought the only criterion for God's Word is a testimony of the Holy Spirit, or to look at the matter in another way, an experiencing which being under God's Word and Spirit is no longer solely experiencing. Enough has already been said upon this point in connection with Heim's disagreement with Liberalism to exclude the necessity of further discussion.

(IV) Authoritarian Influences upon Heim

Each of the two major types of protestant Authoritarianism, as well as that of late medieval Catholicism, has had its influence upon Heim. It is, however, primarily of the Fundamentalist tradition and of the Kierkegaard-Barth traditions that we must speak.

(A) Heim was reared in a church in which Fundamentalist doctrines have long been popularly held. Heim inherited from his early teachers a high conception of the transcendence of God and so of the necessity of revelation. It was probably this, as much as the critical tendencies of his own mind, that led him in his

(1) Heim: Jesus der Herr, p. 177.
(2) Barth: Ibid., p. 237.
earlier works to reject the claim of experiencing to be the real source of knowledge of God.

The dependence upon the authority of scripture which characterized Fundamentalism runs all through Helm's books. Although it has long since in his thinking assumed a critical form, been counterbalanced by that recognition of experience of which we have spoken and considerably modified in his most recent book, it is still a real part of his thought. Thus we find Helm contending in the second edition of Glaube und Leben that, in which we know God is primarily Christ and in the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments,(1) and that it is a mistake to undertake to get along without particular words, since commands may be bound up with words.(2)

Thus Helm has drawn from Fundamentalism not only a tendency towards a high conception of the transcendence of God which leads him to reject Liberalism, but also an idea of a revelation which refers specifically to the Bible.

(B) There can be no question about the fact that the negative side of Helm's Authoritarianism in recent years draws its inspiration primarily from the Kierkegaard-Barth tradition.

It seems hardly necessary to say that Helm is in hearty accord with all that Kierkegaard and Barth have to say about the impossibility of knowing God purely by human experience. Helm sees Kierkegaard as the real discoverer in thought of the boundary between God and man,(3) and declares that Barth has again discovered there is no direct way from our world to God either through Denken, Handlung or Erleben. Writing of this aspect of Barth's theology, Helm declares: Jede Kritik dieser Theologie macht sich lächerlich, die sich bemüht, über den tiefen Spalt, der hier zwischen Gott und Mensch aufgerissen ist, hinterher wieder Schneebrücken zu bauen.---(4)

Moreover, Helm agrees that knowledge of God is never solely experiencing, even though it be a divinely given experiencing. Helm repeatedly acknowledges his indebtedness to both Kierkegaard and Barth, referring especially to the latter as the chief influence in the present formulation of his thought.(5)

Helm's representation of the dilemma between Idolatry and Pantheism into which both our practical experiences and our theoretical judgments bring us, is essentially an interpretation of the paradoxes which Kierkegaard and Barth, as well as Kant and Zeno have perceived in the forms of human experience. These paradoxes are to Helm, as well as to Kierkegaard and Barth, a denial of the adequacy of the forms of experiencing.

(1) Helm: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, p. 363.
(2) Ibid., p. 415.
(3) Ibid., p. 406.
(4) Ibid., p. 410.
On the positive side, Heim accepts the Barthian view that God speaks through His Word, which is, from one standpoint, a representation within time and space. He adopts the Barthian idea that the word only really becomes God's Word in the light of God's present revelation and under the testimony of the Holy Spirit. These ideas were, indeed, to some extent present in Heim's earlier thought, especially in Das Gewissheitsproblem. However, there can be no doubt that Heim's present emphatic presentation of them is taken over in very considerable part from Karl Barth. Barth's writings have had, as Heim indeed acknowledges, a determining influence upon all of Heim's latest books.

(V) Disagreement between Heim's Theory and Authoritarianism

(A) In General

Heim's agreement with Authoritarianism is such that his conception of the experiencing and immediacy of knowledge of God are in constant danger of being overshadowed by the authoritarian side of his thought. However, Heim has retained a sufficient emphasis upon the reality of the experiencing and immediacy of knowledge of God to set his thought in opposition to the Authoritarianism of which we have been speaking. While Heim accepts the idea of an indirect representation made known by authority and not by anything in experience as such, he continues, as we have seen, to place over against this the necessity of an experience and immediacy side of knowledge that is genuine. Knowledge of God, for Heim, must involve an immediacy made possible by a genuine of experiencing. Over against Authoritarianism's idea of the primacy of God's self-manifestation Heim places Liberalism's idea of the reality of experiencing; over against the idea of the indirectness of the Word, the idea of apprehension; over against the impossibility of a criterion, the necessity of a criterion.(2)

(B) With Reference to Special Forms of Authoritarianism

In view of the close relation between Heim's thought and certain types of Authoritarianism, we must point out the special differences between Heim's thought and Authoritarianism that arise out of the peculiar character of those forms of Authoritarianism. We indicate briefly the particular nature of the differences, first,

(1) Ibid., also Introduction to Heim: Glaubensgewissheit, dritte Auflage.
(2) Note: This, of course, raises the question as to how Heim, in disregard for logic, continues to maintain such affinities with the opposing tendencies of Liberalism and Authoritarianism. However, since this is a critical question which relates to every theory of the type which we have called Synthetic, we must reserve discussion of this point until we come to our critical discussion of Heim's theory as a theory of Synthesis.
between Heim's thought and Fundamentalism, and second, between Heim's thought and the Kierkegaard-Barth tradition.

1. Fundamentalism

The difference between Heim and Fundamentalism has to do primarily with an emphasis upon the record of revelation found in the Bible. Fundamentalism tends to find revelation in the Bible itself, whereas Heim believes that revelation is only complete when the words of the Bible grip the individual. The Fundamentalist is likely to feel that Heim underestimates the Bible, while Heim believes that Fundamentalism exalts the authority of the Bible to such an extent as to lose sight of the experiencing and immediacy side of knowledge of God. Heim sees the fault of Fundamentalism in insisting upon the original inspiration of the Bible at the expense of that which is wrought in the believer through the Bible, (1) and in its tendency to find knowledge of God in the Bible as a whole, rather than in that which comes as an answer to the hungering and thirsting soul. (2)

2. The Kierkegaard-Barth Tradition

The particular difference between Heim's thought and the Kierkegaard-Barth tradition, of which Barth is the most important contemporary representative, is of an entirely different sort from that between the former and Fundamentalism. The difference between Heim and Fundamentalism has to do with an emphasis upon the representation of God that seems to exclude experience. The difference between Barth and Heim has to do with the emphasis upon the authority by which the Bible becomes the Word of God, which tends to underestimate experience. Barth's criticism of Heim in this connection would be that Heim so far acknowledges experiencing, as such, as an aspect of the apprehension of the Word of God that he falls back into Cartesianism. Heim's criticism of Barth is that Barth so augments the abstract authority of God that he reduces the experiencing side of knowledge to a meaningless shell and so renders impossible the very idea of God (3) and robs the idea of the Word of God of its practical import.

We must, however, state the difference more precisely. Heim in one passage indicates that the real divergence of his thought from Barth's is that Barth's thought abstracts from the practical situation out of which theology must come, while his thought has its basis in this situation. This is, obviously, not primarily an epistemological distinction. However, it is suggestive of an epistemological difference between a real recognition of the significance of experiencing in knowledge of God and a failure to recognize that experiencing. This is the root of the difference, that while both writers renounce human experience, as such, Heim assigns a role of real significance to a genuine experiencing element in knowledge of God where Barth does not. It is the significance of experience in knowledge of God, rather than its existence, that Barth's Authoritarianism calls in question.

(1) Heim: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, p. 414.
(2) Heim: Jesus der Herr, pp. 181, 182.
(3) Heim: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, p. 422; Ibid., dritte Auflage, Tr., p. 28 ff.
In order to bring the difference into a clear light we con­trast the ideas of Barth and Heim as to the experience of the Word of God.

Barth declares that there is indeed an experience of the Word of God, (1) if man has knowledge of the Word of God at all, for "man exists in experiences." Indeed, our experience of the Word of God is, for Barth, in a certain sense a self-determination. (2) However, so eager is Barth to show God's authority that he declares that fundamentally the experience of God's Word is being determined by God's Word and that it is never in view of our self-determination that an experience is an experience of God's Word. Barth goes on to reject the Augustinian view that the relation between God's determination of us and our self-determination is that "what viewed from the one side is grace is from the other side -- freedom, and vice versa." Writes Barth; "our self-determination -- cannot, as Pelagius wished, take the place of it (determination of God) or, as the Semi-Pelagians wished, cooperate with it, or, as Augustine wished, be secretly identical with it." (3) For Barth, the experience of the Word of God is a determination by the Word of God, which experience consists in an acknowledgment. Every attempt, Barth holds, to make the apprehension of the Word of God essentially a real experiencing, though it be a capacity given of God, is to be rejected. (4) Thus in a number of ways Barth has reduced the element of experiencing to an empty shell, a sort of an echo, a passivity which can scarcely have much real significance.

Now, if certain of the statements of the closing chapters of the third edition of Glaube und Denken and Jesus der Herr be regarded in isolation from the rest of the content of those books and from Heim's earlier books, his position could be construed as being not essentially different from that of Barth. Indeed, the difference is not so wide as is sometimes supposed. However, when the books in question are considered as a whole and in the light of Heim's earlier books, it becomes clear that Heim attaches significance to experiencing altogether beyond that which Barth assigns it. When it is kept in mind that Heim's rejection of our common knowledge despite the confusion which, as we shall see, it involves, is intended as a rejection of human experiencing and that Heim's interpretation of the Word of God involves a dimensional meeting, there can scarcely be any doubt that Heim assigns a real significance to experiencing.

Numbers of illustrations of the contrast of which we are speak­ing may be called to mind. First, Barth says that our experience of the Word of God is that of being determined by the Word of God. Heim disagrees. The experience of the Word of God is rather a meeting of man's will with God's, that may issue in rebellion as

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(2) Ibid., p. 227.
(3) Ibid., p. 228.
(4) Ibid., p. 239 ff.
well as in faith. From the very outset of his theory Heim has too great an appreciation for the volitional reality of experiencing to allow this idea. Whatever being determined is involved is for Heim a voluntary self-surrender. In this connection we may note that Heim indicated that Barth is unwarranted with beginning with an idea of God, since this is in itself problematical and impossible apart from an appreciation of the structure of experiencing.(1) To begin, as does Barth, with the determination of known by known is for Heim absurd, since the very idea of the knower is in part dependent upon experiencing.

Second, whereas Barth teaches that the experience of the Word of God is an acknowledgment, Heim holds that it involves an effort toward a higher kind of life. Acknowledgment is experiencing at a minimum where the object is all important. For Heim, a Word is always a demand for practical efforts,(2) and its hearing is a moral struggle, as well as an acknowledgment.

Third, the difference between the ideas of Barth and Heim as to the reality of the experiencing side of knowledge of God comes more strikingly to expression in their respective ideas of assurance. To the question as to how we can be sure that our faith is not vain, that there is a genuine possibility of knowing the Word of God, Barth answers: "Assurance is affirming; it is thus assurance in expecting it (the word), an expectation which rests upon its previous presence, upon the promise grasped, we might even at this stage say, which rests upon baptism received and believed in--but expectation."(3) Barth goes on to say: "It is more human, i.e., more unsure than all other human assurances, just because it is the assurance of expectation---Yet an assurance which with calm and confidence may be set over against that assurance, anchored in human consciousness, of the directly or indirectly Cartesian thesis as to the knowability of the Word of God."(4)

In protest against this idea of assurance Heim urges the idea that the final ground of assurance is nothing other than the testimony of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the believer, a testimony which is both divine grace and human experience.(5)

In criticising Barth's conception at this point, Heim is, on the whole, scarcely fair to Barth. However, in the closing sentences of his criticism, Heim comes to the heart of the difference between his position and that of Barth. He indicates that Barth's reason for not giving the Calvinistic answer which he gives to the problem of assurance is that Barth fears lest he be drawn back into Cartesianism or Pietism. He then declares that Barth sees only two possibilities: either certainty rests

(1) Heim: Ibid., dritte Auflage, Tr. p. 29.
(2) Heim: Jesus der Herr, p. 184.
(4) Ibid., p. 259.
upon sacramental Kundgebung, die mit ihrem Befehl und ihrer Segnung von aussen an den Menschen herantritt; or certainty lies in Erlebnis oder der Autopistie des Selbsbewusstseins. Or to put it more generally, either that upon which my certainty rests liegt --- jenseits von mir; ich werde von aussen angesprochen; meine Funktion besteht darin, dass ich nur nach sage, was mir vorgesagt ist. (1) Dann allein kann ich mich darauf verlassen. Or else it lies in mir; dann gehört es in das Gebiet des Erlebens und des Cartesianischen Selbstbewussetseins, es ist also mit diesem zusammen in Frage gestellt. This general alternative is indeed characteristic of Barth's thought, either certainty is from without and trustworthy, or from within and questionable. Heim holds that the alternative is a false one, that the question might well be put so if belief in God were universal and the question were only whether a man were saved. But, he says, when the question is as to whether faith itself is valid, the alternative is inadequate. The only possibility for certainty, he declares, is that Ein und dasselbs Erfahrungs element Muss in zwei entgegengesetz­ten Dimensionen stehen. (2)

Fourth, this leads us to another expression of the difference between Barth and Heim, namely, as to the idea of the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Barth declares that the Holy Spirit speaks "on our behalf, yet not only to us but in us." However, in the light of what has already been said of Barth's idea of experiencing, (3) clearly the speaking in us can scarcely be said to be a genuine experiencing of ours. Indeed Barth declares: "We can only note what His yea is to the Word of God, this yea of His we can only repeat after Him." (4)

Heim's position is in contrast. Heim holds that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is indeed a sovereign witness, but at the same time that it is in a sense identical with our experiencing. (5) Thus, in Jesus der Herr the Holy Spirit is said to be the Medium in which God meets us. His testimony is in our realm, for a word unheard is an empty shell. (6) Again Heim speaks of the Holy Spirit as Dieses Medium, auf Grund dessen der Schnittpunkt zwischen der göttlichen und kreatürlichen Sphäre zustande kommt.

A final expression of the difference between Heim and Barth as to the significance of experience is seen in their respective estimates of the idea that experience may be seen as one side of knowledge of God. As we have seen, Barth expressly rejects the idea that what is seen from one side as grace is from another experience.

(1) Heim: Ibid., p. 420.
(2) Ibid., p. 421.
(5) Cp. our discussion of Das Gewissheitsproblem in der Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher.
(6) Heim: Jesus der Herr, p. 164.
Heim, on the other hand, holds that it is precisely the case that what seen from one side is grace is from the other side experience. (1) He does not, indeed, suppose for a moment that it would be in any sense possible to account for knowledge of God only from the side of experience, or that there is ever a knowledge of God which is solely experience. However, when the two sides are held together, one can see the matter in precisely this light. It is indeed his feeling that unless knowledge of God can be seen as genuine experiencing, it is by no means real knowledge.

C. The Theory of Coordination

(I) Definition

Liberalism begins with experiencing and develops a theory in which knowledge of God possesses the kind of immediacy that belongs to axiomatic inferences. Authoritarianism begins with the knower and holds that since God is transcendent, knowledge of Him must come through an indirect representation which is acknowledged upon divine authority. The theory of coordination holds that it is possible to begin at either end, and so develop both kinds of theory. Experiencing and revelation are parallel sources of knowledge of God.

This position, it must be noted, is not the affirmation that God may be known both in nature and in the Bible. Such a claim could be made from either of the two standpoints of which we have already spoken, as well as from that to which we are now referring, for our knowledge both of nature and the Bible can be thought of either as God's ways of revelation or as the fruit of human experience. Experience need not confine itself to nature nor revelation to the Bible. The view which we are now presenting is that, on the one hand, there is much that we can know about God purely through our own experience, but that there is, on the other hand, a knowledge which God reveals to us by His sovereign act, especially in the Bible.

(II) History

This view, of course, finds its classical expression in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, who held that the "truth that there is a God" may be ascertained by reason, but that the truth that God is Trinity is above reason and is given by revelation. (2)

Among the Reformers this idea finds some sanction in Luther and Calvin, especially in the latter. However, as we shall see, it is in both overshadowed by quite a different conception. Melan-

(1) Cp. Ibid.
thon and Zwingli were more decidedly friendly to this conception.

Soon after the Reformation the idea of parallel sources was largely swallowed up in that Protestant Scholasticism of which we have already spoken. The idea of coordinate sources reappeared in the eighteenth century as a defense against Naturalism. Leibnitz, Lock, Barkley, and Reid, setting out from different points undertook to achieve knowledge of God from rational experience. At the same time, each of them accepted also the revelation which is given in the Bible. The Deists and their opponents were quite agreed that there are two sources of knowledge. They differed only as to the relative importance of the two. The theory of parallel sources was largely discarded after Kant's searching criticism of the classical proofs for the existence of God and Schleiermacher's demonstration of the independence of religion, although tendencies toward such a theory have from time to time appeared in some phases of the theories of certain writers, such as DeWett and Ritschl, whose essential views are of a different order.

The theory has now in a modified form been vigorously reasserted in the writings of the Neo-Thomists. Since the opening of the last quarter of the 19th century, when in 1879 Pope Leo XIII issued an encyclical ordering the study of the philosophy of St. Thomas,(1) a group of Catholic Theologians has voiced a considerable protest against the anti-intellectualism of the day,(2) and expressed anew the idea of parallel sources. Rejecting the Kantian idea of the unknowability of the Thing in itself, the Neo-Thomists take reality itself to be the province of science. Without overlooking the importance of the a priori assumptions, they seek a religious faith which is based upon reasoning from the facts of the natural world.(3) At the same time, these writers hold that there is a revelation which is a "completion of the natural"(4) in that it manifests ultimate ends which are inaccessible to reason.(5) Reason, for the Neo-Thomist, leads up to the idea of the necessity of an ultimate Being, but it is only as that Being manifests Himself to us that we begin to know His character.(6)

The theory of coordinate sources is implied in the writings of certain Protestant writers who are especially interested in uniting divergent groups within the church. This seems to be illustrated in the point of view presented, for example, in William Temple's "Nature, Man and God."(7)

(2) Aubrey: Ibid., p. 133.
(3) Ibid., p. 140.
(4) Ibid., p. 141.
(5) Ibid., p. 142.
(6) Ibid.
Since the Coordinate theory as a sort of eclectic effort to combine the opposite tendencies of Authoritarianism and Liberalism is scarcely a distinct theory which may be stated in its own terms, we need remark only in the briefest way as to the relation between Heim's theory and this view.

(III) Agreement between Heim's Thought and the Theory of Coordination

It is perfectly evident that Heim holds in common with the writers who find reason and revelation, experience and authority, to be parallel sources of knowledge of God, that both sources must be genuinely recognized in any proper theory of knowledge of God.

We have seen how Heim holds to opposing tendencies of Liberalism and Authoritarianism, how with the Authoritarians he holds that knowledge of God is through indirect authoritative representation, and how with the Liberals he holds that experiencing has a significant part in knowledge of God.

(IV) Disagreement between Heim's Thought and the Theory of Coordination

We have seen how Heim has recognized an antithesis between experiencing and revelation which precludes any other relation between them than that of paradox. This in itself would exclude altogether the idea of a relation of coordination between experiencing and revelation. However, when we consider further Heim's insistence upon the genuine synthetic character to the relation in question, his idea that it is precisely through the indirect representation that the experiencing takes place, it is perfectly plain that the theory of coordination is foreign to his thought. Heim presents a theory which either establishes a paradoxical synthesis or is paradoxical nonsense. It is in no case a theory of coordinate sources.

D. The Theory of Synthesis

(I) Definition

Liberalism holds that knowledge of God is immediately given and verified in experience. Authoritarianism holds that knowledge is given in an indirect representation for which the criterion is beyond experience. The coordinate theory undertakes to show that there is knowledge of both kinds. The theory of synthesis undertakes to combine the first two theories by saying that precisely through the indirect representation of God given in the Bible, Christ, Beauty, Goodness, Nature, or some other content, a knowledge equal to axiomatic certainty is possible, and that the criterion for revelation is, at the same time, beyond and in experience.
(II) History

This type of theory has been presented in various ways from time to time throughout the history of the church. Even the types of writers whom we have mentioned share in some degree in this theory, for it is impossible to exclude either authority or experiencing altogether, or to regard them as entirely distinct. Even the writers in whom the synthesis idea is relatively prominent are likely to emphasize one side or the other of the synthesis. Hence, it is difficult to distinguish this theory sharply from others.

However, inasmuch as in the types of writers already discussed the emphasis is so predominantly upon one factor or another or upon the coordination between the two that the synthesis idea is largely overshadowed, we have classified such writers according to their emphases, and reserved for discussion in this section those thinkers in whose work the idea of a synthesis of revelation and reason retains a vital significance.

(A) Although there were strong suggestions of the thought of experience and revelation as two sides of the same fact in the early church, especially in the writings of Augustine, the idea can scarcely be said to have fairly come to light in the thought of the church until the Reformation.

In view of the vital influence of the Reformers upon Heim's thought, we must dwell at some length upon their idea of knowledge of God. The primary purpose of the theological writings of Luther and Calvin was neither to present an exact system of philosophy not to develop a scientific theology. It was rather to help the Christians who were cutting loose from their moorings in the Catholic church to find a Scripturally based expression of their faith. This being true, it is scarcely to be expected that the views of knowledge found in their writings will be altogether concise or comprehensive. Their investigations do not propose to cover the whole field of knowledge, nor are they intended to represent a concise epistemological judgment. Although it is possible to trace a theory of knowledge of God in their writings, theory of knowledge is always subordinate to the idea of salvation. Bearing this in mind, we may present briefly the synthesis idea as suggested in Luther and Calvin.

For Luther and Calvin knowledge of God was through God's Word; yet it was immediate. Its criterion was both in experience and beyond experience. The very fact that opposite emphases, as Protestant Scholasticism and the theology of Schleiermacher, could look for support from Luther, and that both modern Liberalism and Barthianism should claim to be the true heirs of the Reformation, should be sufficient evidence for the two sidedness in the Reformer's thought. No effort, however persistent, to ignore or to ex-
plain away either side of the Reformer's thought, or to place the two sides in parallel relation, can ever do justice to the Reformers or explain the perplexing fact that opposite schools claim to be the true interpreters of the Reformation.

The fact suggested by the claim of opposing schools to be founded upon the thought of the Reformers may be somewhat more precisely represented by reference to the Reformers themselves. To begin with, there can be no question of the fact that, to the Reformers, sufficient knowledge of God is only by the Word of God as recorded in the Bible. That is to say, knowledge of God is by an indirect representation which God has given to man.

The Reformers often speak of the revelation of God in Christ through the Bible as so complete in itself that experience, as such, seems to be excluded. A few illustrations will suffice to make this clear. In his "Discourse concerning Christian Liberty", which Luther considered the best expression of his own doctrine, Luther writes: "And to cast everything aside, even speculation, meditations, and whatever things can be performed by the exertions of the soul itself, are of no profit. One thing, and one alone, is necessary for life, justification, and Christian liberty; and that is the most holy Word of God, the Gospel of Christ". (1)

With somewhat less clarity, but with similar emphasis, we hear from his "Table Talk": "The Holy Scriptures surpass in efficacioussness all the arts and all the sciences of the philosophers and jurists; these, though good and necessary for life here below, are vain and of no effect as to what concerns life eternal." (2) —- "Can he who understands not God's word, understand God's works?" (3)

Calvin is yet more emphatic. In fact, he addresses himself in at least two chapters of the "Institutes" to specifically asserting the insufficiency of human reason and the necessity of the revelation in Christ through the Scriptures. The first of these is entitled: "The Guidance and Teaching of the Scripture Necessary to Lead to the Knowledge of God the Creator." Here Calvin teaches that "no man can have the least knowledge of true and sound doctrine without having been a disciple of Scripture." (4) Calvin concludes the chapter thus: "For, since the human mind is unable, through its imbecility, to attain any knowledge of God without the assistance of His sacred word, all mankind, as they sought God without the word, must necessarily have been wandering in vanity and error." (5) The second chapter, devoted to a similar discussion, is entitled "The Fanaticism which Discards the Scripture,

(2) Hazlitt: "The Table Talk of Martin Luther", p. 4.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Calvin: "Institutes".
(5) Ibid.
under the Pretence of Resorting to Immediate Revelations, Subversive of Every Principle of Piety." Calvin specifically rejects all efforts, even on the part of Christians, to attain knowledge of God apart from Scripture, and so implies that those who depend on experience alone are in effect rejecting revelation.

In the chapter entitled "Redemption for Lost Man to Be Sought in Christ", Calvin puts the matter thus: "Since the fall of the first man, no knowledge of God, without the Mediator, has been available.

However, if the Reformers insisted that knowledge of God is only through the Word, knowledge of God was also for them (although they were less emphatic about this) a genuine experiencing through which, despite the indirectness of the recorded Word, knowledge of God equal to axiomatic certainty was given. God, even in giving a Word, has given experiential certainty. Thus, Professor H. R. Mackintosh writes of the Reformer's view of the Bible: "The Reformer's conception --- rises directly out of religious experience. In its pages they found a redeeming God entering into personal touch with men; the Bible is no mere collection of truths, but God's converse with His people."(1)

For Luther, the idea of the experience of faith through the Word is of such vital importance that it scarcely requires mention. But even Calvin gave a place of genuine importance to the experiencing and immediacy side.

As the Reformers insisted that knowledge of God through God's Word was both authority and experiencing, they also held that the criterion of knowledge of God was both within and beyond experiencing.

Asked how a man knows the Word of God, the Reformers invariably answer that it is through the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Consider, for example, the following which Lindsay(2) quotes from Calvin's "Institutes": "Let it be considered, then, as an undeniable truth that they who have been inwardly taught of the Spirit feel an entire acquiescence in the Scripture, and that it is self-authenticated, carrying with it its own evidence, and ought not to be made the subject of demonstration and arguments from reason; but that it obtains the credit which it deserves with us by the testimony of the Spirit."; or the following from Calvin's "Institutes": "For the Lord hath established a kind of mutual connection between the certainty of His Word and of His Spirit; so that our minds are filled with a solid reverence for the word, when by the light of the Spirit we are enabled therein to behold the Divine Countenance; and, on the other hand, without the least fear of mistake, we gladly receive the Spirit, when we recognize Him in His image, that is, in the Word."(3)

(2) Lindsay: "History of the Reformation".
(3) Calvin: "Institutes", p. 95.
When we inquire what the testimony of the Holy Spirit is, they reply that it is both an experiencing and a sovereign witness. Here, for example, are typical passages from Luther and Calvin. Luther declares: "We do not separate the Holy Ghost from faith; neither do we teach that he is against faith; for He is certainty itself in the world, that makes us sure and certain of the Word."(1)

Or again, "It is necessary, therefore, that the same Spirit, who spake by the mouths of the prophets, should penetrate into our hearts, to convince us that they faithfully delivered the oracles which were divinely intrusted to them."(2)

This witness of the Holy Spirit is complete and final authority from the transcendent God. Calvin writes of the sovereignty of the testimony of the Holy Spirit: "For though it (the Word) conciliate our reverence by its internal majesty, it never seriously affects us till it is confirmed by the Spirit in our hearts. Therefore, being illuminated by Him, we now believe the divine original of the Scripture, not from our own judgment or that of others, but we esteem the certainty, that we have received it from God's own mouth by the ministry of men, to be superior to that of any human judgment, and equal to that of an intuitive perception of God Himself in it."(3) But Calvin, as even the closing words of the above passage indicate, is equally convinced that the testimony of the Holy Spirit has the sound directness of experiencing. Consider the following with reference to Calvin's idea of the criterion of knowledge of God: "But, with regard to the question as to how we shall be persuaded of its divine original, unless we have recourse to the decree of the Church, this is just as if anyone should inquire, How shall we learn to distinguish light from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter? For the Scripture exhibits as clear evidence of its truth as white and black things do of their colour, or sweet and bitter, things of their taste."(4)

Undoubtedly, the Reformers' view belongs to the type of view in which there is a synthesis between authoritative representation and immediate experiencing. However, attention must be called to the fact that, for the Reformers, the emphasis in both aspects of the synthesis is still somewhat decidedly upon the authoritarian side. They are very emphatic about the Bible's being a representation of God, but they are not quite as emphatic in asserting that the apprehension of the Word of God is a genuine experience. Again, they are quite insistent in affirming the transcendence of the testimony of the Holy Spirit but, although they indicate clearly that this testimony is in some sense experiencing, by their tendency in actual practice to accept the Bible as a whole as God's Word and by

(1) Luther's "Table Talk", p. 106.
(2) Ibid., p. 79.
(3) Ibid., p. 80.
their idea of verbal inspiration, they seem to have departed somewhat from their willingness to allow experiencing as a criterion for the discovery of God's Word. Thus, for example, Professor H. R. Mackintosh writes of a well known fact regarding the Reformers: "It ought to be said frankly that Luther often clings to the older notion of a verbally inspired Bible. --- The same is true of Calvin.(1)"

With this sketch of the Reformers' view before us, we may indicate somewhat more briefly the character of certain other expressions of the theory of synthesis.

(B) As the thought of a synthesis has been more or less carried on in the two opposing traditions of which we have spoken (i.e., Fundamentalism and Liberalism), the tendency has been, in the one group, to neglect the authority side and, in the other, the experience side. The Fundamentalist tradition in adhering in a measure to the Reformation doctrine of the witness of the Holy Spirit has never quite lost sight of the Reformation synthesis, although it has tended to let the idea of the authority of Scripture push the experience idea to one side. The Liberal tradition has likewise not entirely lost sight of the synthesis, although Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, and in somewhat less degree their followers, have by their respective emphases upon morality, feeling, and intellect strongly tended to push aside the authority element in favor of the experience side of the synthesis.

(C) In Albrecht Ritschl the theory of synthesis finds a modern exponent. Ritschl regarded matters pertaining to the prolegomena to theology as of second rate importance,(2) so that it is scarcely surprising that his theory contains a good deal of confusion as well as a shifting of position in the various editions of his works. However, the suggestions which he made in this connection have been decidedly more influential than those of any other writer since Schleiermacher.

Two suggestions are outstanding in Ritschl's idea of religious knowledge. First, his idea of religious truth as consisting in value-judgments and, second, his opposition to mysticism and his attendant idea of the historical Christ as a source and norm of value-judgments.

Ritschl broke with the intellectualist tendencies that more or less dominated the theological thought of his day and revived the Kantian idea that man's moral nature is the key to religious knowledge. Metaphysical argument could never arrive at adequate conclusions concerning religious matters, nor were religious truths to be phrased in the language of metaphysics. "Religion", he writes, "is occupied with judgments of value Werthurteile". "In

all religion", he contends, "by the help of the sublime spiritual power which man adores, the solution is attempted of the contradiction in which man finds himself placed as a part of the natural world and as a spiritual personality with its claim to sovereignty over nature -- religion (arises) as a belief in superior spiritual powers by whose help the deficiencies in man's own power are supplied."(1)

Along with this idea of value-judgments, Ritschl presents the thought that the Christ, through the discovery of those who witnessed concerning him, has the effect of giving us courage to make those value-judgments concerning God which our moral nature requires. Furthermore, Christ as the "Perfect Revealer of God"(2) is the norm and the standard for all our value-judgments. Every mystical way to God is to be repudiated. Men come to God only through Christ.

(D) What is presented with some confusion, or only hinted at, in Ritschl becomes clear in the writings of his greatest pupil, William Herrmann. Beginning with the same concept of religion as that of his teacher,(3) Herrman develops a system which brings the relation between Christ and morality into clearer light. Herrmann takes as his point of departure man's(4) sense of his inability to attain his highest moral ideals, and then inquires as to what man can postulate regarding Reality upon the basis of the unsatisfied moral longings of his soul. When a man begins to ask whether there is not a Reality in which the goodness of which we fail resides, he is on the way to religion.(5)

Certainty, however, comes to the longing soul only as he meets the historical Christ. "We see it only when it pleases God to reveal His Son in us, and this can happen to us only when, with minds intent on exercising our moral judgment and satisfying our religious need, we come in contact with the Biblical tradition regarding Jesus Christ."(6)

Herrmann(7) repudiates every form of mysticism, both non-Christian and Christian, the former on the ground that it leaves Christ out of account, and the latter on the ground that it tends to neglect the Christ of history. Frankly facing the historical difficulty involved in his position,(8) Herrmann holds that even

(1) Quoted in Phleiderer: "Development of Theology", p. 184.
(2) Ibid., p. 190.
(4) Cp. Baillie: "The Interpretation of Religion".
(5) Ibid., on Herrmann.
(7) Ibid., Translation.
when we exclude all of those elements of Christ's life which may be reasonably doubted, we still have grounds for acceptance of the major facts of Christ's life.(1) However, it must never be supposed that the historical facts, as such can bring us to certainty. Herrmann readily recognizes the relativity and uncertainty of all historical facts. Thus Christ's confronting us is not a matter of pure history, rather it is the impress that Christ's life makes upon our individual lives as it redeems our characters and "takes hold of our manhood". (2)

In his "Communion with God" Herrmann writes: "Jesus becomes a real power to us when He reveals His inner life to us; a power which we recognize as the best thing our life contains. This experience of the reality of Jesus comes as we feel His power first in the lives of those whom He has touched. But all the same it must be our own faith."(3)

For Herrmann, therefore, Christian certainty is dependent upon two facts which are intimately bound up together. We quote a classic passage from Herrmann's "Communion with God". "The Christian's consciousness that God communes with him rests on two objective facts, the first of which is the historical fact of the Person of Jesus. We have grasped this fact as an element in our own sphere, and we have felt its power. —— The second objective ground of the Christian's consciousness that God communes with him is that we hear within ourselves the demand of the moral law."

On the one hand, there are placed within us all, moral demands which require fulfillment. On the other hand, there is in Christ that which enables us to meet these demands. These two are bound together in a most intimate relation for, on the one hand, our moral impulses enable us to find Christ and give us assurance in moral victory after we have met Him and, on the other hand, meeting Him is the only way in which victory can come to us.

Thus for Ritschl and Herrmann, as for the Reformers, knowledge of God is a synthesis of authoritative representation and immediate experiencing. Knowledge of God for them depends upon an objective historical representation. But that representation can only be adequately apprehended in the value-judgments and moral victories of experiencing. In the same way, the criterion of knowledge of God is experiencing as our own faith, but is at the same time beyond experiencing in that it is a divine imperative.

It is, however, clear that, whereas Luther and Calvin had placed the stronger emphasis upon the authority side of the synthesis, Ritschl and Herrmann place the stronger emphasis upon the experience side. Thus, for example, whereas the Reformers insisted

(1) W. Herrmann: Ibid., p. 71.
(2) Moore: Ibid.
(3) Herrmann: Ibid., p. 71 ff.
that Christ and the Bible were essential as God's revelation, Ritschl and Herrmann were more concerned to show that Christ is God's revelation because we meet God in Christ. Again, whereas in the Reformers' doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit as the way by which we recognize the Word of God the thought of transcendent witnessing is to the fore, this thought is in Ritschl and Herrmann somewhat overshadowed by the idea of moral experiencing.

As Grutzmacher points out, the followers of Ritschl may be divided into three classes: first, those who develop both sides of Ritschl's theology; second, those who develop the rational side of Ritschl's thought, or the left wing Ritschlians; third, those who develop the historical side of Ritschl's thought, or the right wing Ritschlians. Of the first group we have Herrmann as an example. As representatives of the second and third groups, we shall consider Ernst Troeltsch and Martin Kähler, respectively.

(E) Martin Kähler, who considered himself a Biblical theologian(1), was, like Ritschl, primarily interested, not in the problem of religious knowledge, but in the problem of justification. Kähler felt that it is insufficient to begin either with the religious consciousness or with the Christian consciousness. We must, rather, start with the witness of the Apostles which we are to receive in faith, so that the experiences of the Apostles may be ours.(2) Nevertheless, it is a mistake to undertake to distinguish between the Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith. Indeed, even in the New Testament these two are inseparably bound together.

(F) Unlike Ritschl, Herrmann, and Kähler, Troeltsch(3) is unwilling to assume that historical Christianity is either the starting point or the norm of religious knowledge. Rather, he begins with the psychological facts furnished in the history of religions,(4) and undertakes a rational interpretation of these facts in terms of a discriminating religious a priori which so places a man in communication with the Fundamental Ground of All Being that to doubt reason is to doubt one's own being.

(G) Numerous theological writers, both in the past and in the present, besides the ones whom we have mentioned, have maintained the thought of religious knowledge as a synthesis of revelation and reason. We are, however, obliged to limit our discussion to the

(1) F. Kattenbusch: Die Deutsche Evangelische Theologie seit Scheiermacher, pp. 55,57.
(2) Ibid.
(3) In making the religious a priori final, Troeltsch has led the left wing of the Ritschlianism to such an extreme emphasis that logically this group should be placed among the Liberals, although because of its historical connection we have mentioned it here.
(4) Grutzmacher: Ibid., p. 373.
above who seemed, in general, to be of the greatest historical significance.

(III) General Agreement between Heim's Thought and the Theory of Synthesis

From what has been said of the relation of Heim to other views concerning revelation and experience, it should have been already perfectly clear that Heim's theory belongs essentially to the type of theory now under discussion. His agreement with Liberalism's demand for immediate experiencing and Authoritarianism's insistence upon revelation when taken with his refusal to accept the coordinate theory of knowledge of God, shuts him up to a view in which authoritative representation and immediate experiencing stand in a relation of paradoxical synthesis. As we have already tried to show, Heim's positive conception of knowledge of God is precisely such a theory. Heim holds that through the representation of God in the Word of God immediate experiential knowledge is given and that the criterion for the discovery of the Word of God is both within and beyond experience.

(IV) Relation between Heim's Theory and Precise Expressions of the Theory of Synthesis

(A) It is a significant fact that, although during a considerable period of Karl Heim's life Ernst Troeltsch was by far the most influential theological writer in Germany, there seems to be almost no evidence at all of any positive influence of Troeltsch upon Heim. Almost the only references of Heim to Troeltsch are his rejection of the latter's pyramid theory of religions, and a few scattered references in which he renounces various ideas of Troeltsch. About all that Heim seems to have gained from Troeltsch is a certain support for the speculative tendency involved in his attempt to interpret Christian certainty. But even here Troeltsch's rationalism is that of a religious a priori which links us with the Ground of Being, while Heim's is an avowedly relative effort to interpret that which is altogether above reason. Emphasizing the experience side of knowledge to the almost total exclusion of the authoritarian element, Troeltsch's system must inevitably appear to a thinker of Heim's type as what he elsewhere calls an unwarranted attempt to spring over one's shadow.

(B) Martin Käler was, as Franz Spemann's little book Karl Heim und die Theologie seiner Zeit suggests, not only a teacher of Heim, but probably the most influential of his teachers. Käler's influence upon Heim has evidently involved far more than the practical evangelistic and missionary emphasis of which Spemann speaks.(1)

(1) Spemann: Karl Heim
There can be little doubt that Käler's pronounced reliance upon the Bible and upon the historical fact of Christ has made a lasting impression upon Heim and perhaps has quite as much a part in the authoritarian side of his thought as the influence of the Barthians. Further, Käler's conception of a faith-witness which is taken into our lives can be clearly traced, especially in Heim's book *Jesus der Herr*.

(C) Although references to Herrmann are rather infrequent in Heim's work, it is impossible to avoid the surmise that Heim has been deeply influenced by Herrmann who was the leader of German theological thought during the earlier and more formative period of Heim's thought. There are, moreover, too many striking points of resemblance between Heim and Herrmann to allow the idea that the resemblance is incidental. Consider, for example, the following: Heim's interest in religion is primarily a practical one. So is Herrmann's. Heim is searching for a foundation for moral living; so is Herrmann. Herrmann believed that the only answer must come through Christ, so does Heim. Heim's conception of Christ begins with the impress that Christ makes upon the believer, Herrmann's does also. Each regards the reception of Christ as entirely personal, incommunicable, and incapable of rational explanation. Each rejects mysticism as an attempt to get along without Christ. To be sure, any one of the above elements in Heim's thought could have been derived from other writers, but taken together they form a strong link between Herrmann and Heim.

It is quite evident that much of that in which Heim's thought is an advance over the ideas of the Reformers has been learned from the Ritschl-Herrmann tradition. The interpretation of the hearing of God's Word in terms of actual moral demands, the idea of man's moral nature as both a force driving him in despairing hope toward Christ, and as one expression of certainty in Christ, are taken to a considerable extent directly or indirectly from Herrmann. Despite the fact that Heim has little to say of Herrmann, one can scarcely over-estimate the influence of the latter upon the former.

(D) However, for the major influence in the development of Heim's theory of synthesis and for the view which his most closely resembles, we must look neither to Herrmann nor to right wing Ritschlianism, but to the Reformers. Attention has already been called in our discussion of *Das Gewissheitsproblem* to the evidence found in that book of Heim's profound study of, and hearty agreement with, the Reformers. Evidence of the influence of the Reformers runs all the way through Heim's books.

Perhaps Heim's peculiar agreement with and dependence upon the thought of the Reformers' type of theory of synthesis can best be brought to light by reference to four special points of similarity. In the first place, Heim's thought and the Reformers' thought emphasized authority rather than experience. We have already indicated that, whereas modern expressions of the theory of synthesis
tend to emphasize the experience side of the synthesis, the Reformers emphasize the authority side. Despite the modern heralding of the Liberal tendencies in the Reformers, there can be little doubt that the authority emphasis is still the stronger in their writings than the experience emphasis. The Bible and Christ are not for them the Word of God primarily in that we meet God in Christ and the Bible, but rather in that God has given them. The recognition of revelation is indeed for the Reformers a moral experience in which even intellectual questions come to rest but such an adequate moral experience can for them be only the work of the Holy Spirit. These are, as we have showed in an earlier section, essentially the emphases of Heim. Both the Reformers and Heim hold to a theory of Synthesis. Both agree that of the two aspects of knowledge of God authority is by far the most important.

In the second place, like the Reformers, Heim does not attempt a complete reconciliation of the apparent contradiction between the idea of a synthesis between an indirect representation and immediate experience. We have seen how Ritschl and Herrmann have undertaken to find in moral judgments a category in which the oneness of an objective and a subjective side can be explained. It is equally clear from what has been said that the Reformers, while perhaps only partially recognizing the contradiction, made little or no effort to explain it away. At one time they speak as though experience is ultimate, at another as though authority is final. Their doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit is an expression, not an explanation or removal, of the difficulty. In the early years of his writing Heim tried, like Herrmann, to find a category in which the apparent contradiction is overcome. However, he has, as we have indicated long since, given up the attempt and with the Reformers boldly affirms the contradiction, finding with them that the testimony of the Holy Spirit, rather than some explanatory category of which we are able to point out both a divine and a human side, is the final ground of our certainty. Heim, like the Reformers, offers no explanation of the paradoxical idea that in his thought the criterion for the discovery of God's Word both is and is not in experience.

In the third place, Heim and the Reformers agree that the synthesis is complete. With regard to the immediacy of the synthesis, modern forms of the synthesis theory seem to be somewhat hesitant to go all the way. Thus Ritschl and Herrmann, while exalting the experience element, are very severe in their rejection of mysticism. Knowledge of God consists in value-judgments before Christ. Thus, there remains a certain indirectness in our knowledge of God. Heim, however, agrees with the Reformers in his willingness to recognize that, although our knowledge is through Word, it is direct. He is not a mystic, but he adopts with reservation the mystical side of Luther's thought. He quotes with approval Luther's statement, Wer ihm glaubt der ihm hat. He reiterates Clavin's idea that through the testimony of the Holy Spirit we know God.
In a passage to which we have frequently referred, (1) Heim makes it quite clear that he is by no means satisfied with the Ritschlian rejection of mysticism and his conviction that as the Holy Spirit brings the Word to our hearts we are in the presence of God.

In the fourth place, Heim agrees with the Reformers in giving a place of central importance in his writing to certain terms employed in the ancient creeds of the church.

We have seen that, whereas more recent forms of the synthesis theory are framed in the terms of modern philosophy, the Reformers spoke in the terms of the ancient creeds of the church. While clearly Heim employs the terms of modern philosophy in the explanation and defense of his theory, the essence of his theory is stated in the terms of the creeds as a theology of the Word of God and of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, Heim's effort to interpret his theory is simply an effort to show what the idea of the Word of God and the idea of the testimony of the Holy Spirit imply.

While Heim has, under the influence of modern forms of the theory of synthesis, learned to present the idea of a synthesis of authoritative representation and immediate experience in a way which is more meaningful in modern thought than the writings of the Reformers, his theory of synthesis is essentially a reaffirmation of the Reformation theory. The writings of the Reformers more than any modern expression of the theory of synthesis has been the molding factor in Heim's thought. Heim's theory is in closer agreement with the Reformation theory itself than with any modern theory.

E. Heim's Thought and the Various Points of View As to the Precise Character of Authority and Experience within the Synthesis

When it has become quite clear that Heim's theory belongs neither to the Liberal nor to the Authoritarian type of theory, but to the type of theory in which an effort is made to bring these diverse tendencies into synthesis, two important questions arise. Since Heim's theory has both an authority side and an experience side, it must be asked: What is the relation of Heim's theory to other theories, first, with regard to the precise idea of the authority by which God is known and, second, as to the precise idea of the experience in which revelation is apprehended? Although strictly speaking, we are attempting to locate Heim's thought, more precisely than hitherto, among theories of synthesis, the purpose of our inquiry can best be accomplished not by confining the study strictly to ideas of authority and experience presented in those theories which may be considered definitely theories of synthesis, but by comparing Heim's idea of authority and experience with the various conceptions in terms of which these subjects have been presented.

(1) Heim: Jesus der Herr, p. 86.
(I) As to the Precise Character of Authority

When we ask where has God revealed Himself, and in what consists the authority by which He makes Himself known, the number of answers that may be given is multiple. We have chosen four types which seem to represent the major possibilities. God's authority may be vested in the church, nature, ideals, or the Word.

(A) Nature

1. Those who hold that God has revealed Himself primarily in nature may be divided into two distinct classes. First, there are those who believe that God has so manifested His glory in the created universe that reason can proceed to the idea God. This view the Reformers accepted along with other thinkers of their times. They never questioned the idea that God had manifested Himself in nature to a sufficient extent to enable any reasonable man to know of His existence. Consider, for example, the following passages from Calvin: "God hath given to all some apprehension of His existence, the memory of which He frequently and insensibly renews; so that men universally know that there is a God, and that He is their Maker. ---"(1) "But on all His works, He hath inscribed His glory in characters so clear, unequivocal, and striking that the most illiterate and stupid cannot exculpate themselves by the plea of ignorance."(2)

However, neither Luther nor Calvin believe that this knowledge is sufficient. Calvin begins his chapter on "This Knowledge Extinguished or Corrupted, Partly by Ignorance, Partly by Wickedness" as follows: While experience testifies that the seeds of religion are sown by God in every heart, we scarcely find one man in a hundred who cherishes what he has received, and not one in whom they grow to maturity."(3) Again Calvin writes: "Some people grow vain in their own superstitions, while others revolt from God with intentional wickedness; but all degenerate from true knowledge of Him."(4) Again, "So also, while the government of human actions proves a providence too plainly to admit of a denial, men derive no more advantage from it than if they believed all things to be agitated forwards and backwards by the uncertain caprice of fortune; so great is our propensity to vanity and error."(5) Thus, for the Reformers, while the knowledge of God given in nature is real, it is only of a secondary significance.

The belief that God has so manifested Himself in nature that men can reason from nature to God was in general the view of the

(2) Ibid., p. 58.
(3) Ibid., p. 54.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid., p. 67.
18th century European Rationalists, as well as of the English apologists and deists of that period. It is also interesting to note that this is the type of natural theology which appears in two modern writers who are otherwise very far apart, namely, Emil Brunner and F. R. Tennant. (1)

The rise of modern naturalism, however, has led to the development of quite a different kind of natural theology. It is now widely held by a number of writers that God does not simply write His glory upon the heavens so that we can reason to His existence, but that His character is so expressed in nature that in the intercourse of the whole man with nature, which includes both subhuman and human nature, we perceive God at work. This view finds a more or less pronounced expression, for example, in such American Naturalists as Henry N. Wieman who begins with the idea that God is that upon which human life is most dependent, and holds that knowledge of God is an immediate experience obtainable only through the tested methods of observation and reason. (2) This modern theological naturalism is suggested by the conclusion of Professor Norman Kemp Smith's essay entitled "Is Divine Existence Credible?" (3), and appears in the writings of Professor Adolph Schlatter. (4)

2. With the first form of natural theology Heim has no sympathy. The theory is, for him, a false and mechanical intellectualism which reduces existence to a static order instead of grasping its dynamic momentary existence. Nature, as reason apprehends it, points to Pantheism or Idolatry, never to God.

Heim agrees in two points with the second type of natural theology; First, Heim accepts the repudiation of the static conception of nature and of a logically formulated causal argument presented in this theory. Second, Heim is willing to agree that upon the volitional level we actually meet with God as God deals with us in His silent acts. However, Heim takes exception to the claim of the second type of natural theology, that the meeting between God and man in nature yields knowledge of God. The volitional attempt to apprehend God and man, as well as the endeavor to reason to Him, ends in Pantheism and Idolatry. God leads us to Himself through His silent acts only by bringing us to a despair which is a preparation for God's Word. Positive knowledge is, for Heim, not disclosed in nature.

At this point we must pause to call attention to the marked contrast as to natural theology between the view of Heim and that of the Reformers whom he otherwise follows closely. The Reform-

(3) It is by no means implied that this is the only aspect of Professor Smith's conception of knowledge of God.
(4) See Aubrey: "Present Theological Tendencies", p. 75.
mers, as we have indicated, had a relatively high regard for God's revelation of Himself in nature. Although like most of their contemporaries they rejected the then modern Coperican theory(1), they were quite convinced that nature offered evidence for the existence of God and would have considered the idea that our ideas of the external world are a conflict with God strange indeed. In adopting the latter conception, Heim goes altogether beyond the Reformers, following Kierkegaard and Barth in a point of view fraught with grave difficulties.

(B) Ideals

1. A number of modern writers hold that God has manifested Himself primarily in ideals which are independent of us. This view is not entirely distinct from the one just mentioned, since almost every idealistic theory sees nature as in some degree the embodiment of ideals. However, the emphasis in idealistic theories is upon ideals themselves, rather than upon their manifestation in nature. The idealistic theory of the content of revelation is that the ideals, primarily Truth, Goodness, and Beauty are the manifestation of God.

Like the Naturalists, the Idealists are essentially of two distinct types with respect to the question before us. First, there are the rationalistic Idealists who hold that God has revealed Himself in ideals or values in such a way that we can reason from ideals to the idea of God. Our ideas and ideals can be real only if God supports them. Thus we may argue from the reality of our ideals or values to the reality of God Who supports them. W. R. Sorley's book, "Moral Values and the Idea of God," is perhaps the best presentation of this approach.

Writers of a second Idealist group hold that the ideals are somehow identical with God, so that in apprehending ideals we actually apprehend God. God is so manifested in the values which we cherish and around which our lives are molded that in them God Himself meets us. This was the authoritarian side of the thought of the great German Idealists, as well as of the recent school of British Idealism, of which Bernard Bosanquet is most representative. It is likewise essentially the view of the American philosopher Josiah Royce.

2. Once again, Heim's sympathy is with the more natural and vital view than with the somewhat artificial view which requires rational inference. While he strongly rejects any suggestion that Ideals so manifest God that we really have knowledge of Him, he, nevertheless, is quite ready to concede that God through ideals, as well as through nature, is constantly making His silent working felt in our lives.

(C) The Church

It is officially held in the Roman Catholic Church and to a limited degree among Anglo-Catholics that the church is an agent of God's authority, one of the two fundamental instruments of His revelation. Needless to say, Heim has no sympathy with this point of view. His thought is farther from it than from any other. It scarcely receives his consideration except in a historical way in Das Gewissheitsproblem. In this respect Heim is really a "Protestant".

(D) The Word of God and the Testimony of the Holy Spirit

A fourth view is that authority in which God makes Himself known is, in the language of the Reformers, the Word of God and the witness of the Holy Spirit. Neither nature, nor ideals, nor the church is an adequate revelation of God. Rather, God makes Himself known in a way which is closely akin to what we call speech. The Word of God is the authoritative representation of God, and the testimony of the Holy Spirit is, from the divine side at least, a sovereign testimony of God.

In the light of all that has been said regarding Heim's theory, there can be no doubt that it belongs to this general type. Hence, our problem in the present connection is to show precisely the place of Heim's thought among the various forms of this type of theory. To this end we distinguish three forms of the theory: the extreme fundamentalist form, the Barthian form, and the Reformation form.

a. Extreme Fundamentalists have carried forward the Jewish and medieval Christian conception of the plenary verbal inspiration of the Scriptures in their conviction that the content of revelation is a book which, although its revealing quality is most intense in its record of the life and teachings of Jesus, Christ is throughout an inerrant representation of God. In this type of theory the testimony of the Holy Spirit is thought to apply to the entire Bible.

As we shall presently see, Heim holds in common with this type of theory that even the words of the Bible have a certain vital significance in knowledge of God. This, he says, is the kernel of truth in the theory of plenary verbal inspiration, that God in the Holy Spirit speaks to us not only the ideas but from time to time in the very words of the Bible.

Nevertheless, the idea of verbal inspiration strictly construed, the theory of an infallible book, is quite plainly incompatible with Heim's Personalistic idea of the Word of God. Indeed, Heim clearly repudiates this theory by affirming the reality of a distinction between revelation and the words of the apostles,(1)

(1) Heim: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, p. 414.
by rejecting the **materielle Biblizismus** which makes every word of the Bible binding for us, (1) and by insisting that the Word of God is not an **Es** but a **Du**, and by declaring that even the Old Testament is dependent upon the authorization of Christ.

b. Karl Barth and his school go far beyond the Reformers in affirming their distinction between revelation and the words of the prophets and apostles. For Barth, revelation is primarily expressed in the formula "God giving sein Wesen" (2), which means practically "the Person of Jesus Christ." (3) However, Barth distinguishes two other forms of the Word of God, namely, the Word recorded, and the Word proclaimed. In the second and third forms of the Word of God the primary revelation is present with us, although not in its purity.

Heim had insisted that the Fundamentalists made the Word of God so fixed and definite that they placed it within the power of man and lost sight of the living authority of God. He insists that Barth has made the Word of God so remote and indefinite that he has allowed man to do as he pleases and has lost sight of the practical demands of God. Whereas Barth holds that primary revelation must in the nature of the case be beyond our apprehension, and revelation as we grasp it confused and indefinite, Heim holds that God is all the while bringing to bear upon us definite commands and promises. Whereas Barth holds that we receive in the Bible and in preaching a somewhat distorted and mingled form of the Word of God, Heim believes that through the Bible, under the Holy Spirit, we may receive the very command of Christ, God's Word, for our present situation. Thus Heim criticises Barth severely, though somewhat unjustly, declaring that the latter in abstracting from the practical life situation is, in reality, evading the Word of God. Compare, for example, the following from Barth's *Prolegomena*: Die Offenbarung das Zeugnis der Schrift erzeugt und in der Schrift für sich selber redet, das macht die Schrift zum Worte Gottes ohne dass diese darum Aufhörtene schlicht historisch Wort der Propheten und Apostel zu sein, teilhaftig der Relativität der Zweideutigkeit, der Ferne, die allem Historischen eigen sind: (4)

The import of the Barthian view may at this point be stated by saying that, for Barth, God's revelation is Jesus Christ in Whom in the Bible and biblical preaching we come under the authority of God, but apparently not in such a way that we can say that this or that precisely is indeed God's Word.

Essentially the same view is held by other members of the Barthian group. Brunner is relatively more concerned about Christ

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(1) Ibid.
(2) Barth: *Prolegomena*, p. 36.
(3) Ibid., p. 134.
(4) Barth: *Prolegomena*, p. 45.
as the Word of God. Gogarten lays a greater emphasis upon the need for decision in which Christ as the Word of God at every moment confronts us. (1) Paul Tillich defines the Word of God as *Jede Wirklichkeit, durch die hindurch das Unbedingte in unsere Gegenwartigkeit mit unbegünter Machtigkeit hereinbricht*, (2) and like Gogarten stresses the element of answerability with which God's Word confronts us, (3) as for example, in the following: *Die religiose Personlechkeit ist dasjenige Sein, das seiner selbest in bezug auf das unbidingte Sein machtig ist*. (4) Despite individual differences, each of these views emphasizes the reality of authority without showing how a definite understanding of what God requires of us in any given moment is possible.

The difference between Heim’s theory and the Barthian theory relates, like the difference between Heim’s theory and the theory of verbal inspiration and innerrancy of Scripture, to the problem as to the degree of definiteness in the Word of God.

c. Despite the claim of Barth to be a disciple of the Reformation his theory has swung far beyond the Reformation view in the severity of its distinctiveness between revelation as such and revelation apprehended. We must place the view of the Reformers as to the content of revelation somewhere between the fundamentalist theory of a verbally inspired inerrant Scripture and the Barthian view of an indefinite authority.

The conception of the Reformers is somewhat indefinite. It is, indeed, this very indefiniteness of theirs which gives both Fundamentalism and Barthianism some claim to be the modern representative of the Reformation. The Reformers’ distinction between revelation and the Bible is in line with the Barthian emphasis, while their tendency to continue to use the Bible as a verbally correct text-book is in line with the fundamentalist point of view.

Perhaps the nearest we can come to a precise statement of the Reformation idea of the character of revelation is somewhat as follows: God has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ Who lives and is the center and fulfillment of the Bible, and when the Bible is illuminated for us by the Holy Spirit we stand under the direct living command of God in Christ.

Although Heim goes considerably beyond the Reformers in the precision of his statement, it is essentially the above view of the content of revelation which he has adopted. His entire discussion of the Leadership of Christ is to the effect that Christ leads us in definite situations, (5) and his concept of Christ as the Word of God involves a distinct effort to show how Christ brings

(5) Heim: *Jesus der Herr*, p. 54 ff.
his precise commands before us today. (1) In the second edition of Glaube und Denken, where Heim is concerned to show the place of the Bible, Heim insists that in reading in the Bible what Jesus did and taught we meet with Christ in the present and are under His Ichsagen, moreover, that God speaks to us. (2) Heim declares: Durch das innere Zeugnis des Heiligen Geistes wird mir, während ich die fleischlichen Worte der Propheten und Apostel lese und höre, eine eiserne Bindung aufgelegt. Sie können für mich zu einem Befehl werden, der in dieser Stunde mich persönlich gerichtet ist. (3)

The point which marks Heim's particular advance over the Reformers' theory is his interpretation of the idea of the living Word of God in terms of modern personalistic philosophy. The thought that an analogy of Christ's speaking to us from the past, yet as our contemporary, is found in the very character of the relations between persons, is an idea which could scarcely be clearly expressed until recent personalistic thought had furnished the tools. (II) As to the Precise Character of the Experience Side

The various types of experience in which knowledge of God has been thought to come to rest have been numerous. Meland and Wieman, (4) for example, examining the tendencies in America, where the views of the rest of the world are likely to be represented, find, along with their own, at least twelve distinct groups, each holding a different conception of the type of experience in our knowledge of God and each group containing within itself marked differences of opinion. In order not to make our discussion too tedious, we undertake to sum up under four heads the various points of view to which the relation of Heim's thought is to be shown.

(A) Intellect

1. The Emphasis

We consider first the idea that our knowledge of God comes primarily through thought. The idea that thought unfolds the knowledge of God, having been presented in Plato and further developed in Anselm and Bonaventura, finds its chief exponent in modern times in Hegel. Although at times Hegel showed a marked leaning toward a recognition of feeling as of the essence of religion, (5) his theory is, essentially, one in which religious knowledge depends primarily upon intellect. The Absolute may, in Hegel's thought, be known as we discern the inseparability of the distinctions which we make and their higher unity. (6) Religion is only a symbolical

(1) Ibid., p. 187 ff.
(2) Heim: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, pp. 363, 364.
(3) Heim: Ibid., p. 415.
representation of the higher truth into which intellect brings the thinker.

The theological followers of Hegel have departed somewhat from the extremes of Hegel's emphasis upon intellect. Biederman holds that ideal Being is given to us only in sensuous Being, and that both are included in the whole of reality. Intellect is essential to final knowledge but it is inadequate alone. Weisse's thought represents a modification of Hegel by the assignment of a more important role to the idea of creation. Rothe has a place for the idea of a religious consciousness which includes intellect but is not solely intellectual.

Caird and Green have a better appreciation than has Hegel for the distinctive values of religion. The more recent English Idealistic school of Bradley and Bosanquet tones down the Hegelian intellectualism by their respective ideas of feeling and culture. The American Idealist, Josiah Royce, sets individuality, the essence of which is purpose, over against the Absolute, to which thought leads. However, for each of these writers, as for Hegel, the essence of that in which we apprehend God is intellect.

However, it is not simply writers of the Liberal group, such as Hegel and his disciples, who have placed intellect in a position of priority in the apprehension of God. This emphasis has long been characteristic of perhaps the majority of the thinkers whom we have called Authoritarians. Such writers have not, of course, for a moment been ready to acknowledge that intellect can apprehend God. However, when it has been granted that God's revelation is primary, most Authoritarians seem to agree that revelation takes hold first of all in the intellect. Thus, for the medieval church, faith was essentially assent. Thus again, for the modern Fundamentalist the reception of the Scriptures and even the beliefs upon which faith is thought to depend are, from the human side, acceptance upon the basis of rational evidence. Thus, even Karl Barth deplores the modern depreciation of intellect and makes knowledge of God on the experience side to be an acknowledgment.

2. Agreement between Heim's Thought and the Intellectualist Emphasis

It should be clear from the outset that whatever agreements or disagreements are noted between Heim's thought and the intellectualistic emphasis must be regarded in the light of the fact that Heim's theory has no place either for the Hegelian exaltation of reason to a position of finality, nor for Authoritarianism's reduction of reason to the status of a sort of an echo of revelation. With this in

mind, we may point out certain significant points of agreement be­
tween Heim's thought and the intellectualistic emphasis.

Heim holds in common with the Hegelians the conviction that
intellect must have its place in any satisfying religious certainty. He
has from his earliest books onward insisted that the Christian's
knowledge of God must be continuous with the rest of his experience,
that it must satisfy the demands of intellect as well as of feeling
and will. Repeatedly Heim criticises the attempt of Schleiermacher
and Ritschl simply to ignore the claims of intellect by confining
religious judgments to other fields of experience. This he regards
as a solution that is by no means fitted to satisfy the practical
demands of life. (1) Only a knowledge in which the claims of int­
ellect have been met has practical value. Thus Heim says: Die
Erkenntnis mit ihrer Frage nach der Weltursache zur Ruhe kommt,
wenn wir den Schöpfer gefunden haben ——. (2) Whatever may be Heim's
conception of the value of intellect, Heim is equally as sure as
the Hegelians that the questions of intellect must be satisfied in
knowledge of God.

3. Disagreement between Heim's Thought and Intellectualism

Although Heim's theory is in agreement with Intellectualists
that knowledge of God is never something which simply ignores
intellect, it repudiates altogether the idea that the experience
side of knowledge of God is, in the main, rational apprehension.
Knowing God is for Heim not looking at a map, but following a
Leader. It is not grasping a content or receiving evidence, but
hearing a practical life demand. Heim's theory of knowledge, both
in its general phase and in its theological phase, is personalistic
rather than intellectualistic. Always for Heim the question what
is, is less important than the question Was soll ich tun.

(B) Feeling

1. The Emphasis

Over against those writers for whom intellect is the primary
factor in the experience side of faith are those who hold that
knowledge must come preeminently through feeling.

Arising in Oriental mysticism and being carried forward through
the Middle Ages in Christian mysticism, the emphasis upon feeling
received some stimulus from Luther, was renewed in German Pietism,
and received classical expression in the writings of Schleiermacher
and Schelling.

As a Romanticist reacting against the rationalism of his day,
Schleiermacher defined religion as distinctively feeling, and, more
definitely, as a feeling of absolute dependence in which the "anti­
thesis of relative freedom and dependence vanishes." (3)

(1) Cp. Final chapter of Heim's Das Weltbild der Zukunft.
(2) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, p. 205.
(3) Pfleiderer: Ibid., p. 105.
Schleiermacher undertook to show that religion had its own peculiar character and that it was, accordingly, largely independent of intellect.

The emphasis upon feeling was expressed from a less distinctly religious point of view by Schelling. Although the idea of absolute dependence was scarcely in the mind of Schelling, he held that as the Ego goes beyond itself and returns to itself in creative activity and appreciation, it becomes aware of an Absolute which is neither ego nor non-ego.(1)

The theological followers of Schleiermacher departed from the extreme immanentism of their master but retained his emphasis upon feeling as the center of the experience side of knowledge of God. Thus, although C. H. Nietzsche and Alexander Sweitzer have a far more significant place in their thought for intellect than has Schleiermacher, feeling is for them still the point where religion takes hold.(2)

In recent years the emphasis upon feeling has found exponents in various quarters. The Erlanger School, which sees the consciousness of the Christian that he is born again as the foundation of knowledge of God,(3) has in such writers as Franke placed feeling to the fore. The American school of psychology of religion, which received its impetus from William James's "Varieties of Religious Experience", although it represents an emphasis upon feeling, is not consciously a philosophy of religion. The views of Edward Scribner Ames are typical of this point of view. Again modern Mystics, such as Leuba and Rufus Jones,(4) find feeling to be the point at which the mystic meets God.

2. Agreement between Heim's Thought and the Feeling Emphasis

Professor Heim shares with the writers of this group the conviction that the experience foundation of religious certainty is not of the character of rational proof, that religion is neither a symbolic representation of truths that can best be intellectually apprehended, nor yet a process of logical deduction. Like many other writers who differ from Schleiermacher, Heim has taken full advantage of the latter's insight as to the distinctiveness of the religious consciousness, an insight regarding which Protestant theology is permanently indebted to Schleiermacher.

3. Disagreement between Heim's Thought and the Feeling Emphasis

Although Heim's thought is indebted to the line of thought to which Schleiermacher gave powerful impetus, it is by no means an

(4) Cp. R. Jones: "Pathways to the Reality of God".
interpretation of religious knowledge in terms of feeling. Heim's agreement with Schleiermacher is mainly on the negative side. Faith, is for Heim, not intellectual apprehension; but neither is it feeling. As a matter of fact, the emotional aspect of religious faith receives little—perhaps too little—recognition in Heim's thought. Now and again there is a passage(1) in which there is a suggestion of an appreciation of this aspect of religion, but such passages are exceptional. Repeatedly in his earlier works Heim takes considerable care to show that such an identification of religion with feeling as one finds in Schleiermacher renders religious knowledge incapable of coping with our practical life situation.(2)

(C) The Religious A Priori

A third type of theory finds the experience side of knowledge of God in religious intuition or rational insights of a special character. Writes Professor J. B. Baillie concerning this type of theory: "The fundamental affirmations of the religious consciousness are, according to this view, ultimate truths of reason which are intuitively apprehended and immediately evident." This theory is of ancient origin, having been clearly expressed in the Stoic philosophy.(3) Its chief modern exponents are Ernst Troeltsch and Rudolph Otto.(4)

Without entering into a detailed discussion of this theory we may simply indicate that it is foreign to Heim's thought. The very idea of a religious a priori, Heim feels, implies a religious capacity in man which is incompatible with the whole idea of the contradiction between God and human experience. It is quite possible to say that a man has thoughts, feelings, and will without implying that his experiencing is in itself a capacity for knowing God, but a religious intuition can scarcely be anything else than a certain native capacity to apprehend God in some way. Thus we find Heim specifically opposing the idea of the religious a priori, declaring: "This Reality is not accessible to us --- a priori. Every movement we can execute to find Him within the spaces accessible to us carries us further away from God, either in the direction of Idolatry or in that of Pantheism."(5)

(D) Personal Response

There are a number of writers who have thought of the experience side of knowledge of God not as either intellect, feeling, or religious a priori, but as a personal response somewhat analogous to the

(2) Cp. the closing chapter of Heim's Das Weltbild der Zukunft and the opening chapters of each of the editions of Glaubensgewissheit.
(3) Baillie: "Interpretation of Religion", p. 234.
(4) Ibid., pp. 236 ff., 246 ff.
(5) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, Tr., p. 211.
response of one person to another. As contrasted with intellectualistic Idealism, personalistic theories have, while attempting to keep in mind the idea of a total response, tended to emphasize volitional and moral aspects of human existence. Accordingly, we may say quite generally of the theory which we have in mind that it contends that knowledge of God takes hold in the personal, striving, aspiring life of a man.

l. The Theory

It is important that we distinguish certain particular forms of this theory.

a. The moralist side of this theory finds classical expression in the theory of Immanuel Kant. For Kant, the most impressive and undeniable fact in the universe was the inescapable sense of obligation that lives within the heart of every man. This obligation is categorical; its demands are final. The finality of the categorical imperative leads us to infer directly the existence of a God who will bring the world order into conformity with moral demands in such a way that goodness may be accompanied by happiness.

b. The narrowness and formality of this concept is overcome in the more comprehensive views of Lotze and Eucken, who tend to find the apprehension of God in moral values somewhat more direct.

c. The theory presented by Kant and Lotze is essentially a Liberal theory. It is a theory of immediacy of experiencing which reckons in the main without the concept of revelation. The essential views of Kant and Lotze are brought within the framework of a theory in which revelation is distinctly recognized in the writings of Ritschl and Herrmann. Religious knowledge for them was of a personal conviction of the reality of those values which men most cherish, nourished and strengthened by confronting the Person of Jesus Christ in history. Personal response is for Ritschl and Herrmann not mainly internal reaction but response to God in Christ.

d. The theory of personal response is expressed within a theory which gives a far greater significance to the idea of revelation than do Ritschl and Herrmann in the writings of the Reformers. Since the Reformers were, of course, unacquainted with many of the issues raised by modern philosophy and psychology, and further, since they were, as has been noted, somewhat more concerned with revelation than with experience, it is not easy to discover their precise conception of the experience aspect of knowledge of God. However, certain facts are discernable. In the first place, although the experience side of knowledge of God is genuine experience, it is, nevertheless, never to be thought of in isolation from divine authority. Upon this point Ritschl and Herrmann tend to waver at times, writing occasionally as though the objective facts of a Christian certainty were only judgments of hope and as though our experience were quite our own. For the Reformers the experience side of faith is always a personal response to God. True experiences
can be God-inspired but even that takes place only as we stand in
the presence of God's Word and under His sovereign Spirit. In
this matter Barth is a true interpreter of the Reformation. It is
in this chiefly that the Reformers' views are most distinct from
the views of Ritschl and Herrmann.

In the second place, Christian knowledge of God, embracing the
whole man, includes an awareness of personal obligation. This comes
to expression in Calvin's concept of revelation as Law and in Luther's
concept of works as an evidence of faith. However, it must be said
that, although Calvin's sense of the reality of the Law of God is
powerful, it is always in danger of being overshadowed by his idea
of knowledge as rational conclusion, and that while Luther never
loses sight of the necessity of a right life, he tends to find assur-
ance, first of all, in a mystical awareness of justification in
Christ.

Kant, Ritschl, and Herrmann go much farther than the Reformers
in emphasizing the moral element in religious assurance. Thus, for
example, we find Herrmann in his "Communion with God" criticising
Luther's idea that works are an evidence of faith, and insisting
that faith verily up to a certain point consists in good works,
that believing is the will and the courage to live aright.(1)

In the third place, the experience side of knowledge of God
is, for the Reformers, dependence upon the promises of God. It is
the assurance that God Who has spoken will carry out that which He
has said.

2. Relation between Heim's Theory and the Personalistic Theory

There can be no doubt as to Heim's general agreement with the
personalistic theory. From the beginning to the end of each of his
recent books it has been clear that he regarded the experience of
certainty as a personal existential response in which the dynamic
volitional aspect of personality, rather than what he considers the
secondary static intellectual phase of personality, was to the fore.

This general agreement being established, our question is to
discover the relation between each of the types of what we have
called the personalistic theory and Heim's thought.

Heim's theory has in common with the Kantian view the conviction
of the finality of moral compulsion and of the blessedness that must
accompany a true response to the right. Indeed, Heim acknowledges
the tremendous contribution of Kant in the recognition of the former
idea. However, the Kantian thought that the concepts of obligation
and of happiness can be linked in an argument for the existence of
God is quite incompatible with Heim's idea of the limitations of
human experience as well as with his positive conception of faith.

(1) Herrmann: "Communion with God"
Heim does not ignore the connection but he refuses to recognize in it a basis for a rational argument. In the same way, while Heim's thought does not oppose the idea suggested in Lotze, Ritschl, Herrmann, and others of the conservation of value, he refuses to find a basis of proof in this idea. Heim's thought is also in accord with Herrmann's in that it sees faith as a purpose to do good in the assurance that all will be well, but refuses to find in the obligation to do good an adequate foundation for assurance. In each case faith is for Heim far more distinctly than for the above named writers a standing before God. In this his thought is at one with that of the Reformers.

Heim's thought accords with the Reformers' idea that the experience of faith is always an experience before God. Faith is a standing before God. For Heim, as for the Reformers, the experience side of faith is never anything in itself. However, Heim differs from the Reformers in that he is unequivocally opposed to the tendency that we have noted in Calvin's writings, to allow intellectual conviction to overshadow awareness of obligation, and the tendency to allow mystical preoccupation to stand before practical response.

The relation between Heim's idea of the experience side of knowledge of God and that of the two types of personalistic theories of which we have spoken may be briefly put thus. When we consider the framework in which experience is set, Heim's theory belongs with the Reformation theory. Experiencing is in itself quite hopelessly inadequate. Even the sense of obligation never arises except in the presence of God. If faith is standing before God; hence the idea of obedience to God's Law and dependence upon His Promise are a better account of the experiencing side of knowledge of God than are the ideas of moral goodness or of belief in the conservation of value. However, when we consider the phase of experience stressed, Heim follows Kant, Ritschl, and Herrmann, rather than the Reformers. Thus Heim says of our meeting with Christ, so heisst das ganz selbstverständlich, dass ich mit meiner ganzen Kraft versuche, mit dem, was diese Stude meines Lebens ausfüllt, in seiner Nachfolge aktiv in alle Weltverhältnisse einzugreifen. If it is not self-evident dass ich mit meiner ganzen Kraft versuche, so hat keine wirkliche Begegnung mit ihm stattgefunden. In faith the whole man is before God, but personal response means dass ich in die Bewegung hineingezogen bin, die dieser Person sebst ausführt, dass ich aufgefordert bin, ihr Gefolgshaft zu leiten und in ihre Fusstapfen zu treten.

In concluding this discussion of Heim's place in modern thought we undertake to gather up into a few concise statements the gist of what has been said and in the light of this to suggest in a

(2) Heim: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, p. 364.
(3) Ibid.
general way the character of the comparatively original contribu­
tions which Heim has brought to the wealth of the modern literature
of the problem of knowledge of God.

1. Insisting upon the necessity of attacking the entire know­
ledge problem, Heim adopts with modifications tenants of Realism
and Idealism avoiding the extreme statements of each. He joins
hands with the Personalists in restating the relation between ob­
jectivity and subjectivity in terms of a dynamic view of knowledge
which he holds to represent a deeper level of experience than per­
ception or logical reasoning. Approaching the particular problem
of knowledge of God with this concept in mind Heim's thought is in	ension between Authoritarianism and Liberalism, the extreme forms
of each of which is rejected. Heim undertakes with the Reformers
to restate the relation between authority and experience in a
theory of personalistic synthesis in which authority is apprehended
in an experience which being genuine must yet from moment to moment
remain under an authority of God.

Regarding the character of the authority by which God reveals
Himself, Heim agrees with modern naturalistic and idealistic schools
in holding that the universe, including nature, is constantly making
its impress upon our minds, but differs with them in holding that
this impress is unintelligible.

Regarding the character of the experiencing side of knowledge
of God, Heim's thought follows Hegel in seeking a satisfaction for
intellectual queries, but adopts Schleiermacher's opposition to
an intellectualistic interpretation of religion. It repudiates
the notion of a religious a priori and finds the real experience of
faith in a response of the whole person. Heim holds with the Re­
formers that this response is not a self-incited inner reaction,
but a personal response, which the Holy Spirit makes possible, to
God's Word and testimony. But Heim believes with Kant and the Rit­
schlians that the response is first of all moral, not, as the Refor­
mers at times tended to say, intellectual or emotional.

To put the whole matter in one statement, we may say that Heim's
thought is essentially a restatement of the Reformation view on the
broader basis of a modern personalistic philosophy and in the light
of a wealth of suggestions from scientific, philosophical, and
theological sources.

2. What, in the light of the foregoing analysis, are Heim's
contributions to the literature of the problem of knowledge of God.
We ask the question without for the present raising the question as
to the tenability of Heim's views.

a. Our discussion of the place in modern thought of Heim's
conception of the structure of knowledge has revealed that there is
not much that is strikingly new in the general epistemological ideas
of Heim. The presentation of a theory of knowledge of God which in­
cludes a careful analysis of knowledge in general is something that
is comparatively new in recent German theology. Not since the days of the ascendancy of Hegelianism has there appeared in Germany such a thoroughgoing attempt to grapple from a theological standpoint with the entire knowledge problem. Schleiermacher largely ignored the problem of knowledge of the world. The same is true of Ritschl and of the Barthians. Heim's thought as evidenced both in its idea of the necessity of approaching the whole knowledge problem and its actual presentation of a general theory of the structure of knowledge is a departure from the usual approach among German theologians.

The first contribution of Heim is that he has furnished German theology with a Christian view of knowledge of God which, instead of simply ignoring or leaving to the philosophers the question about knowledge of the world, involves a comprehensive view of knowledge from a Christian standpoint.

b. We have shown at sufficient length the tendencies which have influenced Heim's thought regarding each of the levels of knowledge. It has become clear that there is comparatively little originality in Heim's thought concerning any one of the levels. He freely credits others with the discovery, in thought, of each of the levels. However, although there is little that is new either in Heim's idea that knowledge is in levels or in his idea of any particular level of knowledge, the idea of dimensional levels of knowledge is comparatively new. The theory of levels of knowledge is itself almost as old as philosophy. It was implied in Plato's ascending scale of ideas as well as in Plotinus's stages in the ascent to the experience of the One. It found expression in Hegel's idea of the steps in the proceeding of dialectic to the thought of the Absolute. In recent philosophy it has become somewhat more sharply defined. Professor A. S. Pringle Pattison has shown that each level has its own laws, and Professor Lloyd Morgan has shown its relation to current scientific theories. So widespread is the idea today that Professor Muirhead could call it one of the common characteristics of modern Idealism.

It was scarcely to be expected that any such theory should develop until modern science had broken down the rigidity of the old conception of dimensions and brought into view the possibility of other dimensions beyond the commonly recognized dimensions. Since the appearance of a new dimensional idea in science there have appeared several philosophies which might be termed dimensional. However, none of these theories is similar to that of Heim either in epistemological emphasis or recognition of the distinctive value of religious truth.

Thus, for example, Professor Alexander in his "Space, Time, and Diety" has presented a theory of levels which might well be called

(2) Cp. Professor John Baillie's Essay in "Contemporary American Theology".
dimensional but, inasmuch as he has made space and time the very stuff out of which the universe is made, the source from which arises even the quality of Divinity and Deity itself, his system is scarcely basically religious. Whether Heim's idea is fundamentally sound or not, the thought of levels of knowledge worked out along dimensional lines is one which Christian thought could well afford to canvass, and for the working out of which it is indebted to Professor Heim.

c. We have seen that whereas the school of Ritschl is in a sense a reaffirmation of the Reformation theory of synthesis its emphasis tends to be upon experience. Heim's third contribution is a reaffirmation of the Reformers' theory of synthesis in a way which takes into consideration the thought of the intervening years, without minimizing emphases which the Reformers considered essential. It must be perfectly clear from what has been said that Heim's system is no slavish restatement of what the Reformers have said, but a real interpretation in the light of a wide acquaintance with modern thought. But it should be equally clear that Heim is essentially true to the thought of the Reformers. Of course this phase of Heim's thought does not represent something entirely new; but it represents a reaffirmation of a neglected view from a new standpoint.
PART III
CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Having now presented Heim's theory of knowledge of God, and studied its relation to other modern theories, we must subject Heim's theory to a critical examination, asking to what extent Heim's theory of knowledge of God is tenable. Since the problem of knowledge of God is complex, this central question involves a great many subordinate questions. In order that our analysis may not be unduly scattered, we focus attention on a few vital questions.

In concluding our discussion concerning Heim's place in modern thought, we called attention to three outstanding contributions of Heim to modern thought: (1) the presentation of a theological theory of knowledge which attacks the entire knowledge problem, (2) a dimensional theory of knowledge, (3) a reaffirmation of the Reformation theory of synthesis of knowledge of God. Our mention of these contributions simply called attention to the historical fact that such contributions to modern thought had been made without attempting to make any assertions as to their soundness.

As we come now to attempt a critical analysis of Heim's thought, our study will naturally take as its point of departure those features of Heim's thought named above, for a critical analysis in order to have point must concern itself primarily with that which is more or less distinctive in the writer in question. This leads us to three critical problems which grow out of the above features of Heim's thought, in the order named: First, we ask, how successful has Heim been in disclosing a sound general theory of knowledge that is in essential harmony with our fundamental religious certainties? We inquire, second, to what extent is Heim justified in fitting his epistemological conclusions into a dimensional mold? Finally, we ask, to what extent is Heim's special theory of knowledge of God sound?

It must be understood that the three above named problems are not distinct studies. Basically the analysis is one as the theory is one. Thus Heim's dimensional theory is Heim's theory of knowledge in general, so that the second and third questions overlap. Again, Heim's general theory of knowledge is intended to be a necessary preparation for his theory of knowledge of God, so that the third question is intimately related to the second. Nevertheless, the issues involved in the three questions are sufficiently distinct that the merits and weaknesses of Heim's thought can scarcely be brought to light without regarding the questions separately. Thus, altogether apart from the question of the soundness of the dimensional theory, Heim holds certain ideas of the structure of knowledge which do not stand or fall with the dimensional theory. And again, Heim's precise theory of knowledge of God has certain merits and faults of its own, apart from Heim's general theory or his dimensional scheme.
I. As to the Tenability and Religious Appreciation of Heim's General Theory

The first of Heim's contributions to modern thought is the presentation of a theory of knowledge of God which is preceded by a thorough investigation of the entire field of knowledge. When one begins to inquire as to the worth of this alleged contribution, he must ask: To what extent is Heim successful in disclosing a general theory of knowledge which is in harmony with our deepest religious convictions? This in turn brings to light a number of subordinate questions of which three are outstanding. First, it may be asked whether or not the attempt to develop a general theory of knowledge as a background for a theory of religious knowledge is justifiable. Second, it must be asked whether the theory is epistemologically tenable. Finally, it must be inquired whether the theory is really in harmony with our deepest religious convictions.

A. As to the Approach

As we have already indicated, it has not been customary in German theology in recent years to precede the study of knowledge of God by a thoroughgoing investigation of the entire epistemological problem. Thus Brunner and Barth speak slightingly of Heim's procedure in so doing and Friedrich Traub in a critical analysis of Heim's theory(1) considers it unwise to attempt to unite a particular theory of knowledge with faith, and declares that every theory of knowledge which is not in itself false may be united with the Wahrheitsgehalt of faith. Adolph Schlatter, in a round table discussion in 1933, went so far as to answer the present writer's inquiry as to the former's opinion of Professor Heim by saying that the whole attempt to find an epistemological basis for faith is really an expression of doubt. Other writers, especially such Realists as Professor Alexander and a number of scientists(2) whose field of endeavor is near the border line between science and philosophy, tend to disparage epistemological investigations altogether on the ground that they tend to obscure more vital issues.

(1) One can readily understand the impatience of such philosophically minded scientists as Max Planck(3), or such system building philosophers as Samuel Alexander, with a militant epistemology which attempts to dictate to experimental science and to metaphysics as to what its methods should be. Clearly in the present imperfect state of science and philosophy, each discipline must be allowed to carry out its investigation without undue interference from others, in whatever way it finds to be productive of the best results. However,

(2) Cp. the Introductory chapters of Alexander's "Space, Time, and Diety".
(3) Max Planck: "Where is Science Going?", Chapter 2.
this is no warrant for a condemnation of epistemology as such. Altogether apart from any attempt to mold the course of scientific investigations, epistemology serves at least two essential functions. In the first place, it supplies some kind of an answer to certain questions that necessarily arise in the human mind. If our questions as to the character of our knowledge have any meaning, it is not in the interest of truth to rule out that branch of inquiry which attempts to answer them. But more than this, epistemological inquiries, whatever their failure to bring to light generally acceptable positive conclusions, reveal the strict limitations within which science works, and so provide an understanding of the setting of science. In performing such a service, epistemology has checked philosophically minded scientists and scientifically minded philosophers who, in their elation over the practical achievements of science, have from time to time been tempted to proceed to philosophical conclusions which, if established, would preclude the possibility of real religion. Certainly Heim makes no bolder claim for his own epistemological investigations than is warranted by the above considerations. Objections to Heim's procedure on the ground that it is a too ambitious epistemology do not hold.

(II) The Objection to Heim's procedure as an attempt to attach a general theory of knowledge to the experience of faith has somewhat more weight.

Unquestionably, it is a mistake to attempt to tie the validity of faith so thoroughly to any theory of knowledge that the former is conditioned by the latter and stands or falls with it. The dire consequences of such a procedure are illustrated in the case of the dogma of the Roman Catholic Church. However, it is one thing to bind the validity of faith inexorably to a certain epistemology and seal the union in official decrees. It is quite another thing to attempt to state what faith requires in general theory of knowledge. The first procedure is to be rejected by every thoughtful Christian because it unwarrantedly makes faith dependent upon an intellectual process, and because it attempts to substitute artificial decree for free inquiry. The second procedure has a distinct value and is in some degree inevitable for every thoughtful religious person.

It is clearly the second method, not the first, which Heim adopts. Certainly Heim is attempting to present no official theory. Further, he makes no claim that faith stands or falls with his theory. He writes even of his theological views: So erwies sich jedes letzte Wort, in das wir Christus fassen wollten, immer wieder als ein bloss vorletztes, in dem noch ein tieferes Geheimnis verborgen lag. (1)

(III) However, regardless of the legitimacy of the approaching the entire problem from a religious point of view, there are two dangers involved in this procedure which Heim has not entirely escaped.

(1) Heim: Glaube und Leben, p. 35.
(III) However, regardless of the legitimacy of approaching the entire problem from a religious point of view, there are two dangers involved in this procedure which Heim has not entirely escaped.

(A) In order to bring these dangers, as well as the special value involved in the procedure in question, to light we mention again our classification of approaches. We saw that one may approach the problem of knowledge of God by interpreting religious knowledge in the terms of general philosophy, by regarding religious knowledge and speculative knowledge as entirely distinct, by approaching the entire knowledge problem as well as the problem of religious knowledge in the light of the special insights of religion. Within the third of these approaches, the analysis of knowledge in general may be put to two uses. First, it may be used to present a background in terms of which the relation of our religious knowledge to our ordinary knowledge may be shown. Second, it may be used as an effort to discover in our common knowledge concepts in terms of which the independently valid fact of knowledge of God is to be described.

We hold that insofar as Heim's approach puts general knowledge to the first use, it is sound, but that when it moves into the second it is tempted to form analogies that will not hold. Religion does not need, as Heim is sometimes tempted to suppose, to turn for the discovery of basic concepts in terms of which it is to be described, to general epistemology. Religion is sui generis and quite capable of developing its own scientific concepts, as Professor J.B. Baillie has so clearly shown in his "Interpretative Religion". Rather than that religion should borrow its concepts, it may better, as an expression of man's deepest most comprehensive knowledge, suggest its own best concepts to philosophy. The real reason that the general epistemological question has importance to the religious man is not that he seeks a general terminology but that he needs a means of meeting criticism. Various kinds of knowledge are constantly pressing for attention and attempting through various epistemologies to establish their own finality. The religious man needs an understanding of them from his own point of view.

When it is kept in mind that the study of general theory of knowledge is to be used by the theologian to set forth the relation between religious faith and other kinds of knowledge, and not to develop the concepts to be used in describing faith, a theological investigation of the whole field of knowledge has a legitimate place. We would not, therefore, criticize Heim for entering the field of general epistemology, but for the use to which he puts his investigation of it.

(B) The second danger involved in such an approach as that of Heim is a tendency to bias general epistemology from a religious
A religious point of view may justly demand recognition in general epistemology, an epistemology written for an avowedly theological purpose may avoid a bias that calls its results in question only by the exercise of extreme care. Actually, Heim seems not entirely to have escaped this danger. But since this is principally a matter of the development of the theory, rather than of the method, we leave it for the present without further remark.

B. The General Theory

From these remarks as to Heim's method, we turn to the question raised by Heim's presentation of a theory of religious knowledge which attacks the entire knowledge problem. We ask now: To what extent is Heim's general theory of knowledge tenable? Assuming that Heim is right in entering the sphere of general epistemology, how successful is his analysis?

The essential features of Heim's general theory are, according to what has already been said, four: 1. a denial that the known is independent of the knower, and an insistence upon the inescapability of the knowing "I"; 2. an assertion that the relation "I-It" is the same as the relation Becoming-Become; 3. a rejection of the idea of the self-sufficiency of experiencing and an insistence upon an otherness in knowledge; 4. a conviction that knowledge is at its deepest level personal meeting, which finds interpretative expression in a word. We may now consider these features of Heim's thought in the order named.

(I) The Denial of the Independent Object and the Inescapability of the "I"

Heim's idea of the inseparability of "I" and "It" involves the idea that an objective and a subjective side of every act of knowledge must be recognized.

(A) The Soundness of Heim's Contention That Independent Existence Not To Be Asserted of Objects

Is Heim's rejection of Realism's claim that independent objects are presented to the knower, in favor of the idealistic doctrine that objects as such never exist save as known justifiable? Clearly the decision of the issue as to the independence of the "I" depends upon the meaning ascribed to the word independence. Independence does not simply mean that the object is not created by the "I", for many writers who deny the independence of the object also reject creationism as does Heim.\(^{(1)}\) Further, the independence of the object does not mean simply that being known does not change the object. The idea of the independence, which Heim is concerned to deny, is the idea that the independent object is thinkable at all. The prob-

\(^{(1)}\) Heim: Glaube und Denken, Zweite Auflage, p. 84 ff.
lem does not, then, necessarily involve the question as to whether being known creates the object or whether knowing changes the object. The real issue is as to whether the actual existence of objects even remotely like the presentations of our sensory experience can be asserted.

The question being such, has Heim sufficiently disclosed weaknesses in the foundations of realistic thinking to warrant a rejection of the realistic idea of the independence of the object?

The arguments by which Heim has attacked the realistic doctrine in question are somewhat as follows: First, Heim has insisted that there is no distinction apart from a distinguishing act, and that, since every object represents a distinction of one kind of another, every object is dependent upon a knower. Again, Heim has pointed out that the idea of a Thing-in-itself which is involved in the idea of the independence of the object is an illegitimate concept, the very idea being a product of that knowing process which it endeavors to escape. Finally, Heim has indicated that, whereas if the object existed independently of the knower, the knower ought like other existences to be knowable, the knower actually never becomes known as object.

Over against these arguments the realistic idea of the independence of the object rests essentially upon the foundation of the following ideas: 1. that this view of knowing involves fewer complexities than any other; 2. that it accounts more adequately than any other view for the feeling which accompanies all knowing, that one knows something; 3. that it is more in accord with the claims of common sense than any other view.

Do the idealistic considerations which Heim advances adequately counteract the advantage gained by the apparently greater simplicity of the realistic idea that all reality is essentially independent of the knower?

It cannot be denied that it is much simpler to assume that things are as they are, irrespective of our knowing them, than to be vexed with the problem as to how they come to be such and such things to us. If a simpler explanation is allowable, it must be accepted in preference to a more complex one in philosophy as well as in science.

It may be indicated to begin with that no one of the forms of Realism has been more than moderately successful in its use of the argument from simplicity. There is a type of Realism most closely akin to naive Realism, which, while recognizing the fact of the "I", does not regard it as worthy of any special consideration. This is the type of Realism represented in the Introductory chapters of Professor Samuel Alexander's "Space, Time, and Diety". It is also the point of view from which Professor Friedrich Traub criticises
Heim. (1) Traub acknowledges that the "I" is present in knowing, but insists that the object is none the less independent. This type of Realism purchases simplicity at the price of ignoring what is undeniably one of the major problems of knowledge, namely, the problem of the knowing "I".

There is a bolder type of Realism, like that of Mr. Russell and Mr. Holt, which reduces the factors involved in knowing to a single objective type, not indeed ignoring the problem of the knower, but rather attempting to explain him as "The sum total of all the appearance presented at a place where there is a brain." (2) However, the concept of the objectivity of relations upon which this theory depends, introduces new complexities which may prove quite as serious a barrier to simplicity, as the idea of a knowing "I". Finally, the Critical Realists do not propose to use any argument from simplicity, but admittedly increase the number of entities to be dealt with by introducing essences between knower and known.

However, whatever the successes or failures of Realists in stating an argument from simplicity, appeal to the simplicity of the realistic scheme of things can not establish a bold idea of the independence of the object in face of such idealistic considerations as Heim has presented. It is indeed for this very reason that the dispute between Realism and Idealism is still unsettled, and is likely to continue so. The very presentation of the thought which plays so large a part in Heim's theory, that every discrimination, even the idea of a Thing-in-itself, depends upon an act of discrimination, is fatal to every attempt to establish a Realism of the more naive type. The only possible way in which idealistic implications of the idea of the inseparability of discrimination and discriminating act may be met from a realistic point of view is by the theory of Russell and others, that all relations, like ideas and things, are objective. However, such a view falsifies the testimony of experience, for we are inevitably compelled to assume that certain judgments, not to speak of decisions and emotions, are the products of a process which is quite our own and of an entirely different order from external reality. But even if the possibility of the theory of the externality of relations be admitted, it is in the nature of the case impossible to establish the actuality of that theory as over against the alternate theory that discriminations are our own acts.

Again, the awareness of the reality of that which is not to be known objectively, namely, the knowing "I", must always prove a barrier to the establishment of the thesis that what is known is independent of the knowing mind. Here is an exception which destroys the simplicity of the realistic idea. If the knower cannot be known objectively, it is impossible to show that his nature is not such as

(1) F. Traub, Erkenntnis theoretischer Fraze Zur Karl Heim's Glaube und Denken, p. 68.
(2) Cp. C.E.M. Jcola on Russell in "Introductions to Modern Philosophy".
colors the whole of knowledge. Of course the Realist can, as in
the case of Russell and Holt, affirm that the knower is nothing
but a certain pattern of objects. But if this be true, all know-
ledge, including the theory in question, is but a meaningless
arrangement of objects which ought not to be called knowledge at
all. The idea that all reality is independent of knowing must
always be reckoned with as a possible world view, but every attempt
to establish such a view as final is ruled out from the beginning
by the fact that the view that the knowing "I" is altogether out-
side objectivity always remains an equally possible view. Further,
whereas no standpoint beyond the knowing "I" from which the issue
between these two possibilities may be objectively determined is
attainable to those by whom the idea of nonobjectivity of the "I"
is intuitively grasped, the idea of the independence of all reality
must always seem nonsense.

The second foundation of the Realist's idea that objects can
be said to exist independently of the knower is stronger than the
first because it is based upon a positive fact of experience. It
is perfectly clear that knowledge always claims to be knowledge of
something. Knowledge as such is only a formal phrase. Where there
is knowing, there is an object of knowledge. This much our common
experience repeatedly testifies. This is a part of the given of
experience. Realists are fond of calling attention to this fact.
Thus, for example, G. Dawes Hicks(1) maintains that examination of
the act of knowing qua act reveals that the essential character of
the act is discriminating and not construction,(2) that while the
content of a mental act may be possessed and retained, it always
has a nucleus of content apprehended(3). Many Realists go much
farther and make the sense of a something in knowledge an important
factor in the attempt to establish the independence of the object.
Is the fact in question, despite the idealistic considerations
advanced by Heim, an adequate basis for an idea of the independence
of the object of knowledge?

Certainly it is legitimate to interpret our sense of a something
in knowing as indicating that that which we know is not of the
making of our own minds. However, when on the basis of the same
fact an attempt is made to show that the object exists quite inde-
pendently of knowing, the implication of the fact is pressed beyond
legitimate bounds. It is quite possible and reasonable in face of
the fact in question to hold, as does Professor Heim as well as
perhaps the majority of modern Idealists, that while what is known
is by no means created by the knower, any given object of knowledge,

(1) G. Dawes Hicks: "From Idealism to Realism", in "Contemporary
(2) Ibid., p. 120.
(3) Ibid., p. 125.
as such an object, is quite dependent upon the knower.

However this may be, it is certain that it is impossible in face of the idealistic arguments to which Heim has called attention to establish the idea of the independence of the object on the basis of an awareness in knowledge of a something. It can never be shown that our knowing does not depend, as Heim says, upon acts of discrimination, for how could the standpoint required for such a proof, namely, a standpoint outside the knowing process, be gained? Further, Heim's objection to the idea of a Thing-in-itself(1) is quite fatal to any attempt to establish the independence of the object on the basis of the sense of a something in knowing. The assertion that the something which is apprehended in knowing is independent is clearly an illegitimate judgment, for the very idea of the independence of the something is a discrimination of the knower.

The awareness of a something in knowledge certainly indicates that the knowing process is not complete in itself, but it gives us no warrant for predicating existence to that which stands over against the process itself.

The foundation upon which the persistence of the idea of the independence of the object has really depended is not a philosophical defense but the appeal of the idea to common sense. As C.E.M. Joad has aptly remarked, Realism is the theory of knowledge of the man in the street.(2)

The analogies that most readily occur to the average man in connection with knowing are that of looking out of a window or of turning a searchlight upon objects. Thus the Realist may argue convincingly that the object is there whether it is known or not.

The effort to show that Realism is common sense is not, of course, like the other two foundations of Realism of which we have spoken, an attempted philosophical proof, but an effort to reinforce philosophical arguments by appeal to common opinion. Unquestionably the common opinions of men must be given due consideration in every philosophical discussion. However, for two reasons this appeal is no warrant for asserting the independent existence of the object of knowledge in face of the arguments advanced by Heim. First, it is questionable whether the idea of the independence of the object is really common sense. Second, the common sense in question in this instance seems to be more a reflection of a past philosophy than an inherent demand of human experience.

If the Realist were allowed to state the issue for the ordinary man and to inquire of him whether or not he thought that things existed independently of his knowing, then he would probably reply that he thought that things did exist independently of his knowing.

(1) Heim: Glaube und Denken, dritte Auflage, Tr., p. 47.
However, the above is manifestly an unfair statement of the issue; it is not primarily the assertion of the independent existence of the object that the common man is interested in. The idea of existence involves philosophical complexities beyond the scope of the thought of the man in the street. What common opinion is interested in is the preservation of the assurance that in knowing he is confronting something that can be met with at least moderate success in terms of the impressions that are given him. When the question is whether objects exist independently, the common man surmises that a flat denial would jeopardize objectivity, and so he answers in the negative. But, objectivity does not depend upon the assertion of independent existence. Objectivity can readily be preserved, as in Heim's system, without making illegitimate assertions about the ultimate character of that which is known.

Further, there are other elements in knowledge which the common man is quite as eager to preserve as the element of objectivity. Thus, he is quite unwilling to surrender the idea that his own perceptions and thoughts are of a distinctive character and his own most intimate possession. He would be loath to part with the belief that he is in such a real communication with his objects as makes knowledge possible. However, a virtual denial of both is implied in the theory of the independence of the object. In such a theory there is no essential difference between objects known and objects unknown. Further, as Josiah Royce has indicated, real independence implies such a difference in kind between knower and known as renders real communication impossible. Thus, it is easily conceivable that, if the Idealist were allowed to state the issue in his way, the common man might readily be persuaded to accept the Idealistic hypothesis, as in Bishop Barkley's "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous". Thus, for example, if the Idealist asks the common man, "Do you have any part in your knowledge?", the answer would unquestionably be an affirmative. Common opinion insists upon both an experiencing and an otherness in knowing, and it is for this reason that the quarrel between Idealism and Realism is perennial.

This brings us to the second weakness of the attempt to assert the independence of the object on the basis of common sense. When the contention that the common man is at the present time somewhat more inclined toward Realism than toward Idealism is allowed, little of positive significance is proved.

The term common sense is a somewhat deceptive one. It does not, as is often supposed, represent a certain body of opinion to which the very structure of reality impells us. Rather, it generally represents the opinions that are commonly held in any particular period of the intellectual development of the race. These opinions, however, are only in part representative of those ideas toward which

reality constantly leads us. In considerable part they are representative of philosophical systems of past eras which have often been impressed upon the public mind in somewhat artificial ways. The common sense of today, may, accordingly, represent in considerable part the reflection of the philosophical and scientific opinion of the past ages. Thus, for example, the theory of psychological hedonism is still the conception of the popular mind, whereas scientific psychology has long since gone beyond it.

As a matter of fact, the current common sense idea of knowledge is in considerable part an inheritance from centuries of thought under the domination of Aristotle, and accordingly, represents less an inherent tenant of the human mind than a turn of thought impressed on the common mind by centuries of an artificial philosophy.

Primitive man believed in a world, but he did not think of objects as existing independently of his perception. His return to familiar objects which were not seen on his excursions was not the pursuit of a philosophical opinion at all, but a way of satisfying his desires, a friendly way of confronting the world. Centuries of Aristotelianism developed an intellectual conviction of the independent existence of objects. But Lock, Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and a host of others have urged the importance of the role of the knower, and modern science has destroyed the idea of a world of solid objects. It is accordingly quite conceivable that the ordinary man of the future, when the ideas of modern Idealists and Physicists have permeated the common mind, may, like the primitive man, be quite as much impressed with the part of the knower as with the part of the known in knowledge. True, scientific thought may then have moved into an entirely new phase, but it will have become clearer than ever that the use of the testimony of common sense in the attempt to establish an epistemological point of view must be exceedingly discriminating.

In any case, even a slight acquaintance with the history of philosophy may serve as a warning which will prevent one from allowing the present realistic tendency of common opinion to outweigh those conclusive contributions of Idealism to which we have called attention. Idealism has by no means established its own central doctrine, but those idealistic arguments of which Heim makes use are more than adequate to offset Realism's questionable appeal to common sense for support of the contention for the independent existence of the objects of knowledge.

We may now conclude that the idealistic considerations which Heim advances in opposition to the doctrine of the independence of the object are quite adequate to eliminate the possibility of ever establishing the theses of the independence of the objects. Not one of the foundations of this position maintains the force of a demonstration in face of the considerations to which Heim calls attention. "I" and objective world do indeed belong so inseparably together that any attempt to speak independently of
the object is doomed to logical failure.

(B) Implications Derived from Denial of Independence, Extreme

We have agreed with Heim's contention that it is impossible to show that objects exist independently. This contention brings to light the important fact that the known never can be said to be anything apart from a knower. However, the rejection of independence and the establishment of the place of the knower is no warrant, as Heim seems tempted to suggest, for the idea that that phase of our knowledge in which objects are to the fore, our perceptions of trees, valleys, mountains, our scientific observations, and our intellectual ideas are relatively meaningless abstractions.

It is quite true, as Heim holds, that when we are absorbed in objects, we are not confronting reality at its deepest level. But this must not be taken to suggest, as Heim's language often implies, that when our concern with objects is relatively great, we are not dealing with reality at all. Reality is rich and varied and has other aspects than those which we may regard as its deepest aspects. When a man feels the cool taste of water, he is quite as genuinely confronted with reality as when he discovers the electronic structure of atoms of hydrogen and oxygen. In the same way, a man is as genuinely, though not as deeply, confronted by the Rhine falls when he only looks at it as when he, with Fichte, places his soul in converse with it. Heim recognizes the fact of levels of knowledge but often underestimates the value of the lower levels.

It has, indeed, been one of the most valuable contributions of modern Realism to show that that kind of knowledge which comes to us in our ordinary workaday impressions has a value quite its own. Thus, for example, G. E. Moore has laid hold on an important truth when he argues in his "Defence of Common Sense"(1) that it is more reasonable to say that things are just such objects as are given to us than to attempt to show that they are something else. That the whole world of objects, sun, moon, stars, lakes, plains, houses, tools, bodies, etc. is in some real sense more or less as it appears to us, is a conviction that the human mind is loath to surrender. Although knowledge in its phase of objectification be not final, or deepest, or provable, it must be considered genuine in its own way.

(II) The Idea of the Oneness on the Relation "I-It" and the Relation Becoming-Having Become

Closely allied with Heim's rejection of the independence of the object and his conception of the inseparability of "I" and "It" is his theory of the oneness of the relation "I-It" and the relation Becoming-Having Become.

(1) G. E. Moore: "A Defense of Common Sense", in "Contemporary British Philosophy".

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(A) An Important Fact Brought to Light

The thought world has long been willing to accept the idea that there is a certain connection between the passage of time and our perception of physical objects. This connection has, until recently, been supposed to have its explanation in the physical constitution of things. However, there can scarcely be any doubt that the connection represents a fact of first-hand importance for the understanding of the structure of knowledge itself. The strange elusiveness of the present moment is of the same character as the elusiveness of the "I", and our inability to apprehend the "I" is experienced as precisely an incapacity to lay hold of the present.

Whether it is possible to go so far as Heim does in identifying the relations "I-It" and Becoming-Become must remain for the present questionable, but this much is certain, that the remarkable affinity between these relations is an important fact which epistemology has too much neglected in the past. Heim's theory is, in the point in question, certainly more than an empty speculation.

(B) Certain Objections Unwarranted

Heim's theory of the identity of "I-It" and Becoming-Become has been subjected to a number of unjust criticisms. W. Thimme objects that, whereas the word Past is a formal word, the idea of the identity of relations is impossible, save as the word is used at one time of Past events and at another of the formal Past. Unquestionably Thimme is mistaken in assuming that the real meaning of Past is the formal meaning. Language depends upon usage and by this test the Past may equally well designate a formal time stretch or past events. Frequently we speak of the Past with a clear reference to events that have already taken place. But does Heim illegitimately shift from one meaning to the other? From the standpoint of a philosophy which allows in Newtonian fashion for the existence of a formal independent time stretch, Heim is indeed open to the criticism that he changed the meaning of his terms without warrant. But, when one recalls that Heim's whole argument for the identity of "I-It" and Present-Past is based upon a frank adoption of that modern idea of time which excludes the notion of an independent formal time stretch and makes time vary with the perspective, the objection loses its meaning. Every reference to Past, whether it emphasizes events or not is, from this point of view, a Past of events. However, whatever ambiguity in the use of the term Past in the second edition of Glaube und Denken is removed in the third edition where Heim substitutes the words Becoming and Having become for the words Present and Past.

F. Traub argues that if Present and "I" are one, as Heim asserts, the "I" would really create its world—an idea which Heim elsewhere repudiates. In consideration of Heim's conviction that the Past, or world, is continually coming to rest out of the Present,
the criticism seems at first to be just, but it overlooks a very important fact which is implied in the second edition of Glaube und Denken and made perfectly clear in the third edition, namely, that while the "I" is present, the Present is by no means exhausted in any individual "I". That Present out of which my world comes involves not a lone will but a struggle of wills, so that even my apprehension of that world which I call my own is at a deeper level in every case a meeting with a "Thou" on whom I depend for my very existence.

A third unwarranted criticism is that of Traub that the "I" would be both in the time stretch and not in it. Of course this objection is quite valid so long as the time stretch is thought of as an objective independent reality. However, to assume this is to beg the very question at issue. If the possibility that the time stretch grows out of the living present is at all granted, then it is quite obvious that the now point not only can but must be within the time stretch from an objective point of view, and beyond it from an existential point of view. All such criticisms as the above represent a misunderstanding of the theory in question rather than a basic difficulty in it.

(C) The Theory Open to Certain Objections

However, the theory as Heim presents it is open to certain criticisms which cannot be overlooked.

The foundations of the theory are not so sure nor so true to the facts as Heim seems to suppose. To begin with, the Bergsonian view of time is not so firmly established that it can be taken as a settled conclusion of modern philosophy. More important, the argument upon which Heim depends for the establishment of the theory of the identity of "I-It" and Becoming Become is scarcely adequate. Heim has, it will be recalled, based his proof of this identity largely upon its alleged explanation of the impossibility of knowing present events. Without undertaking to discuss this argument in detail, it may be remarked that the identity of "I-It" and Becoming-become can never be proved by the assertion that such identity explains a fact hitherto unknown about both relations. The idea of the movement of the sun around the earth would explain the apparent rising and setting of the sun but this does not prove the discredited idea that the sun moves around the earth. There are indeed a number of remarkable parallels between consciousness and time which build up an increasing probability of an identity between "I-It" and Becoming-Become, but it is as yet scarcely possible to dogmatize upon this point.

The real difficulty in Heim's theory is, however, not in the foundations of the idea of the identity of the relations but in his interpretation of it. In the first place, the Future is left quite blank. Despite the fact that both Traub and Thimme criticized this deficiency in Heim's second edition of Glaube und Denken, Heim proceeds deliberately in the third edition of Glaube und Denken to make the idea of the complete tracklessness of the Future even more
emphatic. There can be no mistake as to his intention.

We can readily understand that Heim's denial of the possibility of knowledge of the Future is in part an insistence that the Future is never to be marked out after the pattern of the Past. However, it is not necessary in order to safeguard this idea to declare that the future is utterly trackless. In adapting the latter position, Heim disregards evident facts of experience. He presses to an absurd extreme the principle that succession in nature does not mean necessary law, and by so doing rules out those probabilities of experience which must enter as determining factors in conduct as well as scientific procedure. His idea injects unnecessary difficulties into the idea of Providence, which is a part of genuine religious experience.

Equally as mistaken as Heim's rejection of the idea of Future is the suggestion which he tends to make, that because our objective knowledge of events is a knowledge of what is past, it therefore does not reveal to us the real character of events. Now it is quite certain that the confinement of our knowledge to the past renders impossible the proof that we know events. Indeed, it may well be that events themselves are quite different from our past representations of them. However, it is equally possible that the events themselves are almost or even precisely like their past representations. It is not necessary to assume that events are totally altered in passing over into the Past. Certainly the fact that the validity of our objective knowledge cannot be proved is no warrant for the suggestion that such knowledge is false. Rather, it is reasonable to assume, as we have already indicated, until sufficient evidence is forthcoming to necessitate the abandonment of this position, that such knowledge is genuine and within its own sphere essentially sound.

Thus, concerning Heim's idea of the identity of the relations "I-It" and Becoming-Become, we conclude that Heim's theory calls attention to certain epistemological facts of vital importance, although its foundations are not as yet by any means firmly established. Its major weaknesses are not in the idea itself but in certain implications which Heim is inclined to find in it. The idea of the unknowability of the Future is pressed beyond reasonable bounds. Knowledge of the Past is unnecessarily discredited. Here, as in the matter of the inseparability of "I" and "It", the difficulty is not the idea itself, but a tendency to found upon it a low estimate of the worth of the knowledge of perception and logic. Perception and logic are not the highest ways of apprehending reality, but they have within their own spheres a value which Heim fails sufficiently to appreciate.

(III) Heim's Rejection of the Self-Sufficiency of Experiencing and Recognition of an Otherness in Experience

We have now to consider the value of Heim's thought in relation to Idealism. We have seen how in a number of ways Heim opposes the notion that experiencing is sufficient in itself or that it
participates adequately in absolute knowing, and clearly recognizes that experiencing always confronts an otherness which sets limits to it. Thus, on the level of observation the "I" meets an "It". On a higher level the "I" is dependent upon, and limited by, a "Thou". Further, the present of the "I", instead of being the nunc aeternum, is but a present moment which from an objective point of view is in the time line.

(A) Heim's Idea Essentially Sound

Now it is quite unnecessary to labor the point that there is a certain otherness which experience must confront. This fact has never been entirely lost sight of, but today it is more to the fore than at any time in the modern era. The belief of Hegel, that the sovereign thought of the eternal "I" is in itself the unfolding of ultimate reality, is no longer widespread.

Not only have realists and pragmatists shown its weaknesses, the Idealists themselves have modified it. However, much modern Idealists may cling on to Hegel's idea that thought and being are identical, they are by no means of the opinion that such an approach to absolute and eternal truth as the great German Idealists believed in is possible. F. H. Bradley sees too much contradiction in the world of "appearances" to warrant such a view. The Neo-Idealists Croce and Gentile see the manifestations of Absolute Spirit as constantly changing, so that there is no eternal knowledge, and even Bosonquet and Wildon Carr are far less optimistic in their claims for knowledge than was Hegel. Once again, the modern Idealist is ready to recognize the dependence of thought upon the empirical sciences than was Hegel. He is not so thoroughly convinced that thought can realize the truth. Finally, many Idealists, as J. E. Creighton(1) and J. B. Baillie(2) have been ready to acknowledge the limits indicated for the knowing "I" by the existence of "Thou's". Almost no Idealist would, today, accept Hegel's confidence in thought itself as an adequate participation in the Absolute. Accordingly, we conclude without further discussion that Heim is quite right in insisting upon a certain otherness in knowledge.

(B) Extreme Suggestions Associated with Heim's Idea

However, when this has been said, it must be indicated that Heim carries his opposition to Idealism to an unwarranted extreme. To begin with, while Heim is perfectly right in rejecting the claim that it is possible to show that the process of knowing itself gives an insight into reality, this does not warrant him in suggesting that knowing reveals nothing of ultimate reality. It is indeed true, as Heim declares, that the "I" is not the nunc aeternum, but this does not mean that the "I" has no part in the nunc aeternum.

(1) Phil. Review, Vol. XXIII, pp. 283-292, in Robinson's "Anthology of Recent Philosophy".
The conception of the "I" as an adequate participation in eternity is not acceptable, but a satisfactory conception of the "I" must allow for a fuller recognition of the value of the knowing process than is indicated by Heim. Again, while it is quite true that the "I" is dependent upon a "Thou", this must not be taken to mean that the "I" is in no sense independent. Certainly it is an undeniable psychological fact that self-consciousness never arises apart from contact with other personalities. It is further true that personality deteriorates when it is altogether deprived of human contacts. However, to deny that there is a certain kind of contemplation in which self-consciousness launches out as it were, upon its own is an evident mistake. Like a child brought to birth and nurtured by others, but at last coming to its own, the "I" enters from time to time upon its own adventures in at least a relative independence.

Indeed, we may assert that unless experiencing has a certain reality in itself, it is difficult to see how it can enter effectively into a knowledge relation. Certain it is that parts of the knowing process--such, for example, as the formation of scientific hypothesis--purport to be thought's own work. Again, certain volitions seem to be quite our own. If such intimate experiences are disallowed, what is to be accepted?

In conclusion, we say that Heim is quite right in asserting that there is an otherness in knowledge. We agree that there is no "I" without an "It" and no "I" without a "Thou", but we refuse to interpret this to mean that the "I" is in actuality constantly bound hand and foot by its dependence upon the "Thou". Again we assert with Heim that the "I" belongs to time but we refuse to acknowledge that this indicates that the "I" has no significant part in eternity. Our quarrel is, here, as in the other questions, discussed, not with Heim's basic thesis but with the extreme interpretation that he is inclined to place upon it. Heim's mistake is not in denying the self-sufficiency of experiencing. His error is rather in failing to appreciate sufficiently that while that knowledge which comes to us as the soul withdraws into itself is neither final nor the highest kind of knowledge, it may none the less be genuine knowledge.

(IV) Heim's Adoption of a Personalistic Theory

The outstanding feature of the positive side of Heim's general epistemology is his bold acceptance of a personalistic point of view. Heim feels that as long as knowledge is thought of as static, the tension between Idealism and Realism must endure. On the one hand, the object is not independent, yet, on the other hand, the "I" is always confronted by an otherness. The apparent conflict is largely resolved when a dynamic view of knowledge is adopted. In such a view knowing is no longer tabulated results of a fixed order, but a phase of the intercourse between will and will. Knowledge is at its deepest level a meeting of personalities which becomes interpretative in Word.
(A) Certain Criticisms Unwarranted

In addition to the numerous objections that have been raised to the personalistic theory in general, a number of formidable criticisms have been launched against Heim's theory in particular. It is our conviction that not one of them does serious injury to the real heart of the theory. Let us consider a few. W. Thimme(1) objects that, if the personalistic theory is to hold, nature should be not simply, as Heim says, duartig, but really Du. However, the distinction between a real "Thou" and that which is on the way to becoming a "Thou" or of "Thou" character is one which we encounter every day, as for example, in our relationship with a new born babe or a dog, neither of which is ready to enter into a full "Thou" relationship. There is no reason why there should not be degrees of personality.

F. Traub(2) points out that the contradiction between the "I" and the "Thou" is not settled by the analogy of space. We agree. However, Heim's position is by no means dependent upon the analogy of spaces. The idea of differently directed plains converging upon a single line is illustration rather than proof.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer(3) offers two objections: first, that the theory is based upon an uncritical ontology which assumes an ens indistinctum and, second, that it is a mistake to suppose that the "Thou" is another "I". The first objection is eliminated by Heim's exclusion of ontological assumptions in the third edition of Glaube und Denken. The second seems to be a bit of unwarranted pedantry that contradicts an obvious fact of experience.

(B) The Theory Essentially Sound

It is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake to argue the case for Personalism in detail or even to attempt to answer all the major objections to it. However, we may indicate that there are good reasons for believing that the philosophy of the future will be of a decidedly personalistic flavor.

To begin with, philosophy has already moved considerably in the direction of Personalism. Such writers as Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Bergson, and James have adopted a rather thoroughgoing Personalism. Still more significant is the fact that the above mentioned philosophers have wielded an influence in modern philosophy beyond their numbers. Very few writers, even of pronounced idealistic or realistic views, have been unaffected by their work. Further, the

(2) F. Traub: Erkenntniskritische Fragen zu Heims 'Glaube und Denken', in Zeitschrift fur Systematische Theologie 10, 1933.
personalistic philosophy accords with the view that primitive people and children, unaffected by centuries of Aristotelianism, are likely to take. Finally, many modern scientific writers have been led in a number of different ways toward the conclusion that the minute events upon which our universe depends are basically indeterminate and apparently of somewhat the same quality as well. (1)

(C) Weakness in Heim's Personalism

Without any attempt to argue the case in detail, we have ventured the assertion that Heim is quite right in the general direction of his Personalism. However, when this has been said, we must point out that Heim's effort to apply his personalistic theory to all knowledge, while quite rational, is subject to certain limitations. It is a mistake to insist that all reality can be definitely accounted for along personalistic lines. Experiencing and experienced can never be successfully isolated either from each other or from volitional effort. However, this must not be allowed to obscure the fact that one's absorption in the process of experiencing sometimes becomes so pronounced, or his preoccupation with objects so decided, that it is quite impossible to trace the precise connection of the processes in question with personal volitional endeavor. The attempt to cram those kinds of knowledge in which either side has become decidedly prominent into a personalistic synthesis is, to say the least, artificial. Thus, for example, while it is easy to see how the eager reading of a Luther discourse is a meeting of wills, it is more difficult to show that the perusing of an essay on chemistry is entirely of that character. While all knowledge may be basically personal, derived from a living present, it is certainly not possible to demonstrate the personal root of all knowledge. The generalization that all knowledge is of this character is still somewhat speculative.

However, altogether apart from the impossibility of definitely reducing every element in knowing to a personal meeting, the theory that all knowledge is basically personal involves the grave danger—not always avoided by Heim—of underestimating the real worth of that knowledge that comes to us in ways other than personal. Unless a personalistic theory is carefully surrounded with safeguards, it is likely to attempt to absorb less vital ways of knowing and thereby to lose sight not only of many things inherently valuable, but also of the very basis upon which the theory itself, as a conception of the structure of knowledge, stands. We have already seen how Heim has failed to preserve sufficiently the sense of the distinctive values in knowledge of various kinds. His Personalism, like other aspects of his theory, has attached to it certain rather extreme implications.

We may now summarize what has been said of Heim's general epistemological ideas. Are Heim's convictions as to the general

(1) Cnp. Sir James Jeans: "This Mysterious Universe" or Sir Arthur Addington: "The Nature of the Physical World".
structure of knowledge essentially sound? In the light of what
has now been said, the question may be, with certain qualifications,
answered in the affirmative. Heim is right in denying the legiti­
macy of asserting the existence of independent objects, or the self-
sufficiency of knowing; in insisting on an experiencing and an
otherness in knowledge; in pointing out a relation between knowing
and the temporal process; in finding personal meeting to be the
root of knowledge. However, in connection with each of these ideas,
Heim is mistaken in tending to draw certain skeptical conclusions
which underestimate the special value attached to each of the various
aspects of the knowing process.

C. Harmony between Heim's General Theory and the Fact of
Knowledge of God

We pointed out in discussing Heim's place in modern thought
that one of Heim's major contributions was his attempt to present
a general theory of the structure of knowledge which would be in
harmony with the fact of knowledge of God. We have now seen that
such an attempt has a legitimate though perhaps somewhat less
significant place than Heim supposes. We have shown, further, that
at least the main features of Heim's idea of the structure of
knowledge are sound. We have now to ask whether the conception
of knowledge which we have been discussing is really in essential
harmony with religious knowledge.

Without undertaking an elaborate discussion of the point, it
is relatively easy to see that the answer is, in general, affirmative,
Heim has relegated sensory experience and rational attempt to dis­
cover God, to a lower order of knowing. The highest and deepest
form of knowledge Heim has found in personal relationship, which is
precisely the way by which those religious persons who have known
God have been given such knowledge. Heim has found the crown of
all knowledge in personal speech, which again is the way in which
God has been known in the highest religions. Again, in viewing
personal knowledge as a meeting, rather than as purely a giving or
solely a receiving, Heim's general thought of knowledge is quite in
harmony with what religious persons testify concerning their know­
ledge of God. In short, Heim has developed a conception of know­
ledge which is fitted as admirably as possible to bring to light
the superior quality of religious knowledge. If anything, Heim's
thought is too much in harmony with the facts, so much so that it
encounters the suspicion that it has allowed religious convictions
artificially to mold scientific inquiry. Heim's general theory is
in essential accord with the facts concerning knowledge of God.

However, when Heim comes to his special study of knowledge of
God, his thought takes a rather peculiar turn. Although with
reference to structure his thought follows the suggestions involved
in his general theory, with reference to the validity problem his
thought diverges sharply. Had he said that our human knowledge
might involve a partial inadequate knowledge of God, this would
have been in harmony with what he had said in general about knowledge. But instead, he develops a relativity theory and a theory of conflict between our common knowledge and knowledge of God, which, as Traub(1) aptly remarks, is not necessarily involved in his general concept of knowledge and which is unwarranted in its extreme form. In so doing, Heim has been to a considerable extent blind to the harmony between his own general theory and the essential facts relative to knowledge of God. In this, he has in part vitiated the otherwise valuable contribution involved in his showing the structural relation between the knowledge of God and the knowledge of men and things.

II. The Dimensional Scheme Justifiable in the Main

Having now examined the major epistemological features of Heim's general theory of the structure of knowledge, we turn to the characteristic dimensional scheme into which Heim fits his conclusions. We must ask: To what extent is Heim right in fitting his conclusions as to the structure of knowledge into such a dimensional scheme as he presents? This question seems to involve four questions: First, are the assumptions upon which Heim's dimensional idea proceeds sound? Second, has Heim given a just account of the ordinary dimensions of space? Third, has Heim adequate warrant for extending the dimensional scheme? Fourth, is the scheme of higher dimensions which Heim develops actually continuous with the scheme of the recognized dimensions? Or is the dimensional idea really applicable to the higher knowledge relations to which Heim applies it? We shall consider these questions in order.

A. It is a well recognized fact that every system of thought consciously or unconsciously proceeds upon a foundation of accepted axioms. The body of assumed matter is greater in some instances, less in others, but never altogether eliminated. Inasmuch as their own assumptions are not always recognized by creative thinkers, it is perhaps easier for dangerous flaws to creep into an otherwise excellent system here than elsewhere. Are the presuppositions of Heim's dimensional system sound?

Detrich Bonhoesser(2) brings forward in this connection the objection that Heim's dimensional system is based from first to last upon the uncritical assumption that there actually is an ens indistinctum in which distinctions can be made. Die Dimensionen sind auf einen General nenner gebracht, der unkritisch im hintergrund gelassen allein den Entwurf der Dimensionen ermöglicht und den Begriff der Dimension zusammenhält. (3) Bonhoesser opposed this procedure saying that, from the standpoint of critical philosophy, one may not assume the independent reality of anything because the very idea of the thing must be based upon a distinction of a finite mind; and further, that if the idea of the ens were a reality, then Unzweitelhaft muss also auch der Gottesgedanke auf diesem hintergrund...

(1) Traub: Ibid., p. 76.
(2) Bonhoesser: Ibid., p. 443.
(3) Ibid.
erscheinen.

If Bonhoesser's representation of Heim's assumption is correct, he has, of course, revealed a side of Heim's thought that it would be difficult to defend, for the presupposing of the existence of a reality beyond distinctions would not only be philosophically unwarranted, but it would be a contradiction of what Heim says about the possibility of the human mind's attaining knowledge of God. The fact is, however, that Diem has not properly understood Heim's thought. Diem's objection(1) is formulated with reference to the passage in the second edition of Glaube und Denken in which Heim presents the idea of the ens. This passage is, however, merely incidental and not essential to the thought of the second edition of Glaube und Denken. Heim was by no means affirming the existence of an undifferentiated reality. Such an assumption would be foreign to the whole spirit of his book and a misunderstanding of the idea of ens indistinctum. The idea of the ens presupposes nothing as to whether or not it represents an existing reality. The ens in Heim's thought has nothing to do with existence or non existence, reality or unreality. It is a mistake to suppose that Heim's mention of the ens involves the assumption of the existence of an undistinguished reality.

It is true that apart from Heim's discussion of the ens it might be said that his whole system presupposed the existence of an undistinguished reality, if the dimensions were said to represent the ways in which we apprehend an existing reality. But quite the contrary of this is the case. The dimensions are simply the ways in which our thought comes to rest. It may not be justly charged that the construction of a dimensional system presupposes the existence of any kind of a reality any more than it could be said that arithmetic presupposes the existence of things to be numbered.

When Heim came to write the third edition of Glaube und Denken, recognizing that the second edition was open to the sort of misunderstanding which is found in Bonhoesser's(2) objection, he not only excluded the passage about the ens but placed his definite rejection of the idea of the Thing-in-itself beyond dispute, and began his analysis from a purely "phenomenological" point of view, in which all assumptions as to the reality or unreality of the world were repudiated. Whatever question there may be concerning Heim's basic assumptions in the second edition of Glaube und Denken, it is quite clear that the third edition is altogether free from any illegitimate assumption as to the existence of an undifferentiated reality.

In beginning with the phenomenological method, Heim has reduced the presuppositions of his system to a minimum. He has excluded from the early part of his analysis not only assumptions as to the reality of the world but even the questions "whether the world of experience in which we are set is an ultimate reality or a world of appearance";(3)

(1) Heim: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, p. 47 ff.
(3) Ibid., Tr., pp. 48-49.
and whether "Space and Time are forms of intuition valid only for the perceiving subject, or --- forms of Being belonging to the real world as it is in itself."(1) Beginning with experience as he finds it, and attempting to discover its basic distinctions, Heim has refused to assume at the outset that these forms belong to the real world, reserving the question as to their reality until they have been clearly defined.(2) Neither the second nor the third editions of Glaube und Denken is dependent upon such uncritical assumptions as Bonhoeffer suggests.

While even the method of the third edition of Glaube und Denken is not able to get rid of presuppositions altogether, it approaches as nearly to their complete elimination as it is possible to do without forsaking those basic logical principles apart from which thought collapses altogether.

B. Heim's Definition of the Dimensions of Space

Having seen that Heim's dimensional scheme does not rest upon unwarranted assumptions, we must now ask whether it is true to the real character of the spacial scheme of dimensions. To be sure, Heim has repeatedly emphasized the idea that the dimensions of space are but special illustrations of the dimensional principle, while other dimensions are more important. Nevertheless, since the dimensions of space have until recently held a monopoly upon the word dimension, and since it is the dimensions of space to which Heim looks both for the word dimension and for the preliminary statement of the characteristics of dimensions, his scheme must involve a right understanding of the spacial dimensions if it is to be properly a dimensional scheme.

Without undertaking to reexamine in detail Heim's account of the character of the dimensions of space, we may note that Heim finds that dimensions are, from an epistemological point of view, realms of knowledge such that 1. each higher number of dimensions represents a more comprehensive way of looking at reality, 2. the boundary between dimensions has certain paradoxical marks, and 3. a new dimension comes to light only a priori. Of course, the possibility must be reckoned with that the dimensions are not forms of our knowing at all, that they represent an arbitrary hypothesis which explains some of the facts of knowing and leaves others quite unaccountable, that the paradoxes of the dimensional system are the signal for its abandonment rather than a clue to its extension. However, it is difficult to see how the spacial order could possibly be conceived apart from a dimensional scheme. The system of dimensions is invariably acceptable so soon as it is understood. The hypothesis that space is given us any other way than dimensionally would introduce more difficulties than it would eliminate. It must be taken for granted, until prohibitive objections are forthcoming, that the spacial order is grasped dimensionally.

Once this is acknowledged, the first two of the above propo-

(1) Ibid., p. 46.
(2) Ibid., p. 46.
sitions setting forth Heim's idea of the dimensions of space are so obvious that it is scarcely necessary to discuss them. Clearly, a man who sees the world in two dimensions has a more comprehensive view than the man who sees it in one, and the man who lives in three dimensional space than the man who lives in two dimensional space. Further, it is quite clear that the idea of above would present to a man who saw only in terms of a horizontal plain a number of paradoxical characteristics. Even such a writer as Hermann Diem, who in other matters takes issue with Heim's dimensional scheme, says of Heim's theory:

(1) Was Heim über die Beziehungen der Dimensionen zueinander sagt, ist richtig, wenn diese Beziehungen Attribute eines wirklich vorhandenen dimensionalen Verhältnisses sind.

However, when we come to the third proposition, the situation is somewhat different. The statement that dimensions are known not step by step by perception and logic, but as a whole a priori, is not quite so obvious. Hermann Diem (2) objects to Heim's idea of dimensional knowledge on several grounds. He says that it is possible to demonstrate the existence of a new dimension to one who is prepared, or else the dimension is meaningless. Further, he says that Heim never shows how he comes to know the dimensions, whereas in the time of the wirklich Systematiker the categories were thought to be demonstrable. He insists that if a man comes simply to stand in a dimension, his dimensional knowledge is a priori.

With regard to the last point, we may simply remark that it is quite in accord with the position of the third editions of Glaube und Denken where dimensional knowledge is specifically said to be a priori. (3)

The first objection claims the possibility of a demonstration, but really makes the demonstration dependent upon a kind of knowledge which may readily be interpreted as a standing in the dimension already. It is no objection to Heim's interpretation of the dimensions to insist that a man hitherto unable to define a certain dimension can be brought to understand such a definition, for the point upon which Heim insists is that the very understanding of the dimension is conditioned by a previous standing in it. Heim is willing to acknowledge that demonstration can clarify dimensions, and insists only that demonstration cannot introduce a dimension to one previously blind to it.

With reference to the second objection, namely, that the categories were demonstrable, Heim's answer that every demonstration of the categories must employ the categories and so moves in a circle, is quite conclusive. (4) Neither category, nor dimension, nor anything else that purports to be a basic form of thought is demonstrable. Should Heim undertake to show how precisely he comes to have knowledge of the dimensions, he would deny the very principle

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(1) Diem: Ibid., p. 486.
(2) Ibid.
(4) Ibid.
for which he is contending. If the dimensions are frames of knowledge at all, they are apprehended a priori.

When this has been said, it should be noted that it is never possible actually to exemplify the sudden a priori of a new dimension from experiences. Heim declares that if a man perceived only in one direction and then suddenly became aware of the possibility of another, he could only state his new experience in terms of his old one by means of paradox. The same thing, he says, holds true of a man who perceives in two dimensions and suddenly becomes aware of a third. Heim's argument is convincing and would be quite complete if such men as those of whom he speaks could be produced. The fact is, however, that there are no such men. All of us know in at least three dimensions. In proof of the thinkability of one and two dimensional experience, respectively, Heim suggests the cases of listening to a melody and of seeing a cinema. But in listening to music we never lose altogether the sense of being in space, and obviously we interpret the two dimensions of the cinema screen in terms of three dimensional experience. Thus it must be kept in mind that, although Heim's account of the manner of dimensional knowing is convincing, it must of necessity remain somewhat speculative.

Regarding the question as to the accuracy of Heim's account of the dimensions of space, we affirm that what Heim has to say positively is quite true. At the same time, there are certain facts about the dimensions of space, such, for example, as their geometrical and algebraic relations, of which Heim makes little or no use. What significance these omitted characteristics of the spacial dimensions have for the question of the validity of Heim's dimensional scheme we shall presently see. But, in any case, it is quite clear that Heim's account of the dimensions of space is sound, as far as it goes.

C. The Extension of the Dimensional Idea

If Heim's grasp of the dimensional idea is, as far as it goes, sound, has Heim any right to extend the principle to over those relations to which he applies the idea?

Until recent years it has been taken quite for granted that the dimensional idea was something that applied strictly to space. However, with the coming of the relativity theory and its interpretation in terms of four dimensional reality, and with the demonstration in non-Euclidean geometry of the possibility of a multiplicity of dimensions, the reasons for confining the dimensional idea to the dimensions of space are removed.

Even such a writer as Herrmann Diem, whose objections to Heim's dimensional idea we have already noted, declares concerning his objection to Heim's theory: Dabei ist nicht entscheidend, dass die Beziehung der Koordinaten anschaulich gemacht werden kann. Diese kann auch durch eine algebraische Funktion dargestellt werden.
wie beim vier dimensionalem Raum der nichteuklidischen Geometrie und der Relativitätstheorie. (1) Heim has every right, from a mathematical point of view, to extend the dimensional idea beyond space, provided he shows that the added relations are truly dimensional. There no longer remains any mathematical or lexicographical reason why the dimensional idea should not be extended indefinitely.

However, altogether apart from the problem of the lexicographical and mathematical legitimacy of Heim's extension of the dimensional idea, this procedure must withstand serious objection from another point of view. A principle now accepted by a large number of modern writers is that each level of experience ought to be interpreted in its own terms. (2) Does Heim's dimensional scheme violate this principle by attempting to apply spacial concept to the various forms of knowing? It is from this point of view that Friedrich Traub (3) and H. P. Van Dusen (4) criticise Heim's dimensional scheme. As we are presently to show more fully, Heim's dimensional scheme is no crude application of spacial ideas to spiritual facts. It is, rather, as Heim says, an attempt to bring "the structural laws of the 'boundaries between spheres of knowing' under a general formula." (5) It is Heim's contention that the formula belongs quite as distinctively to the "I-It" relation or to the "I-Thou" relation as to the relation between differently directed plains. While it is probably true, as Professor Van Dusen remarks, that Heim is tempted occasionally to discover strained parallels between the spiritual and special relations, it would be a grossly unfair caricature of Heim's thought to say that it had crammed the knowing process into a spacial mold.

D. The Continuity of Heim's System

This brings us to the heart of our present inquiry, namely, the question: Are the higher relations to which Heim has applied the dimensional idea truly parts of a scale of dimensions of which the dimensions of space form the lower part?

(1) The Characteristics Ascribed to Spacial Dimensions Applicable to Higher Dimensions

In order to answer this question, we must first ask whether the marks which Heim has found characteristic of the dimensions of space really apply to the higher dimensions of which Heim writes. Are the boundaries of the "I-It" and the "I-Thou" relations marked by these characteristics which belong to Heim's account of the essential features of the dimensions of space, namely, that dimensions are such that each new dimension comes to light only a priori. 

(1) Diem: Glaube und Denken bei Karl Heim, in Die Christliche Welt, p. 485.
(2) See J. Baillie: Articles in "Contemporary British Philosophy" and "Contemporary American Theology".
(3) Traub: Ibid.
(4) H. P. Van Dusen: "Review of God Transcendent" in "Christendom". (Winter, 1938)
that each higher dimension yields a more comprehensive view of reality, and that dimensional boundaries are marked by four paradoxical marks in addition to the mark of non-sensory and non-logical a priori knowing.

(A) Increasing Comprehensiveness

If our conclusions regarding the correctness of Heim's general ideas of the structure of knowledge be acceptable, it is already clear that the dimensions which Heim adds to the recognized dimensions yield a successively more comprehensive and deeper knowledge. We have insisted that the reality of a knowing "I" over against the known must be recognized. If that be so, that knowledge which recognizes both "It" and "I" is a more comprehensive way of looking at reality than that knowledge which, abstracting from the "I", is absorbed only in the object. Again, if it be true that reality is basically personalistic, then the knowledge which recognizes a "Thou" is more comprehensive than one which is blind to this side of reality.

It must, however, be remarked that there is at least one element in which the scheme of increasing comprehensiveness seems to break down. Heim regards the "I-Thou" relation as a dynamic form which is characteristic of reality in process of becoming. However, this relation comes to its highest and deepest expression in Word apart from which all else is astetischer Rausch. (1) Now, when he is asked what a Word is, the reply is that Word is the meeting in which an "I" confronts "Thou" as "my consciousness world" meets "your consciousness world" in an intelligible symbol. Thus that "I-Thou" relation which is supposed to be the highest and deepest apprehension of reality, instead of including the relations below it, as three dimensional relations include the relations between their respective plane surfaces, is obliged to look back to a spacial form of a less comprehensive dimensional relation for its completion. However, this fact does not undermine the basic structure of the dimensional scheme. It remains in essential harmony with the idea of increasing comprehensiveness. At the same time, the discrepancy in question is sufficient to call attention to the fact that the dimensional idea is not a perfect representation of the facts of knowing, but rather another insufficient though excellent attempt to describe the elusive fact of knowing.

(B) Paradox

With reference to the thought that Heim's higher dimensional relations are marked by paradox, ponderable objections have been raised. Herrmann Diem declares that is is not true dass eine neue Dimension entsteht, sobald eine Fragestellung auftritt, die den innerhalb der bisherigen Dimensionen möglichen Fragestellungen inkoordinable ist. (2)

(1) Ibid., p. 170.
(2) Diem: Ibid., p. 485.
The truth is, he says, that when to the former Koordinaten-

system a new coordinate comes which cannot be fitted in, the new
coordinate, instead of constituting a new dimension, remains as
Inkoordinables.(1) However, this objection misses the real point
of Heim's contention. Heim has not undertaken to show that a new
dimension dawns upon the mind without being brought within a
system of coordination; rather, his contention is that when a new
dimension comes to light, while demanding a new more comprehensive
system, it remains uncoordinated in the old system. To attempt to
deny that insights do dawn upon the mind which are incoordinable
within previous ways of thinking is to deny plain facts of experience.
To deny, specifically, that to a thought abstractly confined to
objectivity the dawning of the idea of an "I-It" relationship is
a paradox, is untrue to facts which are being frequently experienced.

If what we have said concerning the structure of knowledge is at
all true, the "I" when discovered stands quite as much in paradoxical
relation to the distinctions of the world as the idea of surface
to a purely linear experience; and the "Thou" is quite as strange,
yet necessary, to the "I" and its world as depth is to an experience
confined to surface. Moreover, in the case of the higher Dimensions
the paradox is more directly experiencable than in the case of the
lower dimensions for whereas we do not actually perceive in less than
three dimensions, experience is now and then abstracted to the narrow
limits of pure objectification, or self-conscious knowledge. Thus,
when a man completely absorbed in watching events around him suddenly
becomes aware that it is he who is thinking, he may be shocked with
the awareness of how utterly distinct this "I" is from all that he
sees. Or again, when a man reflecting upon the wonder of the relation
between himself and the world, like Fichte at the falls of the Rhine,
suddenly becomes aware of the presence of another person looking
at him, he will be startled by the sense of the strangeness of the
presence of this new kind of being which has forced its way into
relationship with himself and shattered the sole sovereignty of the
"I-It" relationship.

It is not necessary to examine the two dimensional relationships
with which we are here concerned with reference to each of the
paradoxical works of a dimension, we may simply remark that, once
it is clear that the boundaries of these dimensions are marked by
paradox, the special characteristics follow largely as a matter of

course. They are, rather, a clarification of the nature of the para­
dox, than additional characteristics.

(C) A Priori Discovery

If the knowledge of an "I" over against one's world and the
reality of a "Thou" over against one's self is not a priori, whence,
it may be asked, is such knowledge? Since the days of David Hume
the attempt either to discover the "I" and the "Thou" by empirical

(1) Ibid.
methods or to demonstrate their existence logically has been a futile attempt which has seldom found ponderable expression. Yet the facts of "I" and "Thou" are a part of that obvious given world with which philosophy must begin. The inability of Heim to show whence his knowledge of dimensions, which Diem(1) thinks of as a weakness in Heim's thought, is in reality an added evidence of the a priori character of the dimensions. Modern philosophy has showed an increasing tendency to recognize that the kind of knowledge represented in scientific investigation and that given in personal relationships are of two distinct orders, so that one is never to be interpreted in terms of the other. If this be true, the passing from the one to the other can never be by building up a system of experiences or ideas in the one which will make it possible to rise to the other, but only by coming to stand in the new relation.

Proof of the a priori character of the discovery of the "I" and of the "Thou" is, in the nature of the case, impossible. However, whoever undertakes to deny it is confronted with difficulties far more grave than those involved in it. The sheer want of any clue in the types of knowing from which these realities are abstracted, as to how the "I" and the "Thou" have been discovered, is in itself the strongest evidence that their discovery is in fact a priori.

(II) A Lack of Correspondence between the Dimensions of Space and the Higher Dimensions

(A) The Spacial and Mathematical Qualities of the Dimensions of Space Applicable Only to These Dimensions

If it is true that Heim's higher dimensional boundaries manifest the characteristics which Heim rightly has found in the dimensions of space, it is equally true that the higher dimensions do not correspond in every respect with the dimensions of space. It has already been indicated that the dimensions of space involve geometrical and algebraic relationships of which Heim makes little or no use. Obviously, these relations as belonging to dimensions of the space-time manifold, as such, do not apply to such relationships as the "I-It" or the "I-Thou" relationships.

(B) Certain Qualities Peculiar to the Higher Dimensions

The higher dimensions have certain characteristics of their own which are not even suggested in the lower dimension. Thus, for example, the "I-It" and the "I-Thou" relationships are boundaries between kinds of consciousness that are quite distinct from space consciousness. Again there are features of their structure such, for example, as the special character of the idea of Word which have no counterpart in the relationship between spacial relations.

(1) Ibid.
(C) Essential Continuity

How shall we interpret the fact that there is not a complete correspondence between the dimensions of space and the higher dimensions? Herrmann Diem urges this lack of correspondence as evidence that Heim is guilty of a fallacy of the order: der Eisbar ist weiss; diese Katze ist weiss also ist diese Katze ein Eisbar. (1)

As a matter of fact, want of complete correspondence does not necessarily involve a real difficulty. Relations can be of the same order without manifesting identical marks. Indeed, if they were completely alike, they would be representations of the same relation. The dimensions of space have certain characteristics as dimensions of space and, granted that there are higher dimensions, it would be absurd to demand that they manifest those characteristics which belong peculiarly to space.

The real problem--apart from which Diem's objection is a begging of the question--is as to whether or not essential marks of the higher dimensional relations correspond with essential qualities of the dimensional relations of space in a manner not shared by other relations. It has already been made clear that certain essential qualities of the spacial dimensional relations are clearly manifest in Heim's higher relations.

Of course the question remains as to whether the dimensional marks are shared by other relations. In answer to this question, Diem urges that paradox is found within dimensions as well as at dimensional boundaries. That is unquestionably true. Paradoxes are found throughout reality. However, apart from the fact that most real paradoxes will be found at base to be rooted on one or another of the relations which Heim has termed dimensional, Heim does not hold that a relation is dimensional simply because it manifests paradox, but demands of every relation claiming to be dimensional that it manifest all the marks of a dimensional relation. (2) Thus, for example, although the relation between God and man seems to manifest paradoxical marks of a dimensional relation, but not a priori knowledge, Heim emphatically denies that the relation is dimensional. (3)

When Heim's thought that a dimension is indicated by the presence of all the marks of a dimension is clear, the definition is more than sufficiently definite to confine itself to those relations of which Heim has spoken. Accordingly, the lack of complete correspondence between the spacial dimensions and the "I-It" and the "I-Thou" relations is not to be taken as evidence that a logical error is involved in saying that the latter are dimensional. Rather, it is in the main simply an expression of the fact that some dimensions are higher and some lower. Heim has never intended to say that the "I-It" and the "I-Thou" relationships were spacial

(1) Ibid., p. 484.
(2) Heim: Ibid., p. 234.
(3) Ibid., p. 209 ff.
dimensional relationships. Rather, he insists that the essential characteristics of the term dimensional represent a general formula which applies to all the major structural relationships of knowledge. The lack of correspondence between the dimensions of space and the higher dimensions does not seriously interfere with the essential continuity of the dimensional scheme.

(D) Exceptions

At the same time, it must be noted that numerous points in which there is a lack of correspondence between the higher and the lower dimensions are not to be explained simply as characteristics of particular dimensions. Consider, for example, the idea of Word already referred to. To attempt to reduce such a fact to a strict dimensional order yields highly artificial results. Such a fact, in reality, brings to light that the dimensional system, despite its essential soundness, is by no means a complete account, and must always be regarded as somewhat speculative and tentative.

All in all, the dimensional system has the distinct advantage of having brought into understandable connection the basic frames in which spacial and temporal reality are apprehended and the higher reaches of our knowledge, while at the same time adequately preserving the distinctness between the various levels of knowledge. It is a legitimate and valuable though still somewhat speculative suggestion. Heim is reasonably warranted in fitting his conclusions as to the structure of knowledge into a dimensional framework.

III. Heim's Idea of Knowledge of God

Having considered the major critical problems that arise in connection with two important phases of Heim's contribution, we now come to the essential feature of our analysis, namely, a study of Heim's special theory of knowledge of God. The two contributions which have already been studied are, as we have showed, significant as prolegomina to the idea of knowledge of God. However, as we have indicated, Heim's theory of knowledge of God is itself somewhat more distinct from his general conception of the structure of knowledge than he seems to realize. In any case, the former is sufficiently distinct from the latter to be profitably regarded separately for critical purposes.

According to our presentation of Heim's theory, Heim's special theory of knowledge of God is a personalistic synthesis of experiencing and authority, a synthesis which takes place under God's revelation in Christ on a higher level than our common knowledge, a synthesis in which authority tends to overshadow experience. Speaking more precisely, we may note six major characteristics of the theory. 1. Knowledge of God is not thought to be contained within our common knowledge, since that knowledge is relative and in conflict with God. 2. Knowledge of God is thought to be a synthesis of experience and authority. 3. The authority element tends to be rather decidedly more prominent. 4. The synthesis is of the nature of a personal meeting. 5. The authority through which knowledge of God is given is Jesus Christ and the sovereign testimony of the
Gathering the last four characteristics into the one question as to the precise character of the synthesis of knowledge of God, we may distinguish three major critical questions with reference to Heim's special theory of knowledge of God. 1. Is Heim's idea of the relativity of human knowledge and of the conflict between our knowledge and God sound? 2. Is Heim's idea that knowledge of God is a synthesis on a level higher than our common knowledge of experiencing and authority sound? 3. Is Heim's particular characterization of the synthesis of knowledge of God correct?

A. As to the Relativity and Perversity of Our Common Knowledge

The thought that our common knowledge is relative and rebellious, and therefore far short of that finality which must belong to knowledge of God, plays, as we have seen, a considerable part in Heim's thought, forming an important link between his general theory and his special theory of knowledge of God. The thought is, as we have seen, presented in a number of ways. In the second edition of Glaube und Denken Heim holds that all facts and responsibilities grasped in terms of our common knowledge could be other than they are. In the third edition of Glaube und Denken Heim attempts to prove that all human efforts to answer the questions why and what shall I do end in Pantheism or Idolatry. In Jesus der Herr Heim tries to establish the polarity of all human knowledge. In both these last, Heim presents the idea of a final conflict between God's existence and our thought. However, the ideas that especially concern us are two; first, that our common knowledge, or all the knowledge which we attain by our human faculties, falls short of knowledge of God, because it is confined within a circle of relativity; second, that all our knowledge falls short of finality and is sinful, because it is in conflict with God in such a way that if God is, knowledge is to be denied; and if our knowledge is sound, then God is not.

(I) The Relativity of Our Common Knowledge

(A) A Sound Emphasis Involved

The Liberal theology, which until recent years held possession of the larger area of the theological field, tended to insist more and more upon the ability of man by his own powers to apprehend God. Hegelianism thought to find God through intellect, Ritschlianism through moral values, and the Psychology of Religion group through religious experience. However, a certain weakness which has recently, especially since the World War, rather discredited this type of thought, has always been present in Liberalism. Liberalism loses sight of something of essential religious importance.
We assert that Heim is performing a valuable service to theology and to the church when he joins hands with Karl Barth and his followers in powerfully calling the attention of the theological world once again to the fact that human thought, feeling, and will cannot in themselves discover God.

The contention that man by his own powers finds God fails to do justice to the blindness and weakness that is still ours when we have done all that we can. Moreover, it leaves us suspecting that what we have is but our own shadow. Indeed, what value would a knowledge have in which we only have a part? Surely such knowledge between friends would be worth little. Man dependent upon himself becomes proud. The idea of God is pushed more and more into the background until, as in some American psychologies of religion, it disappears. Moreover, the idea of a human capacity for absolute truth is philosophically untenable. Much of the skeptical criticism of Hume has never been successfully answered. Even Kant allows us no theoretical knowledge of the Ultimate. Modern Relativism leaves a philosophy of the bold type of Hegelianism no ground upon which to stand. All that we know is cast in the molds of space-time and seen only from our own perspective. We can never be sure that we have got at the heart of things. It is simply not true that man can by his own powers compass heaven and earth. Thus far, Heim is quite right.

(B) An Unfortunate Extreme

With the statement that Heim is right in undertaking to show that our efforts cannot in themselves find God, our agreement with Heim's idea of the relativity of our common knowledge ends. From this point on, Heim's thought involves a serious misunderstanding of our human situation.

Heim is quite right in the assertion that human knowledge, apart from God's revelation, is relative and helpless in ultimate problems. But the fact which Heim misses is that human knowledge is never entirely without a divine help which is constantly presenting through the world about us sights, sounds, thoughts, ideals, and friendships which help us toward God, and quicken our faculties for an apprehension of divine truth. However, this divine help may be rejected by our sinfulness, it is never entirely wanting, and its presence changes the whole aspect of our human situation. It is one thing to declare that human knowledge, as such, is relative and without a knowledge of God. It is quite another thing to suggest that our actual knowledge is so limited. Heim is right in principle; human experience in abstraction from revelation yields no knowledge of God. But Heim is mistaken in the application of his principle, for it is only the abstraction purely human knowledge and not, as Heim seems to believe, our actual knowledge that is devoid of knowledge of God.
In the second edition of *Glaube und Denken* Heim held that the distinction between our common knowledge and the knowledge of God which God gives was of a dimensional character, so that the former could be separated from the latter only by abstraction. Thus, we find Heim insisting, as against Realism, that either God is all our knowledge, or He does not enter our knowledge at all. Thus Heim is able with reasonable success to meet the criticism of Steinmann, that he destroys the validity of knowledge in order to prove revelation, by calling attention to the fact that he has not demonstrated the invalidity of our actual knowledge, but only shown what knowledge would be reduced to if revelation were withdrawn. Keeping in mind the abstractness of the distinction between revealed knowledge and our common knowledge, Heim was able to point out the limitations of our human knowledge, as such, without necessarily implying that our actual knowledge is totally devoid of knowledge of God. Revelation could be said to be, in some sense, present all the way down the scale. However, in the third edition of *Glaube und Denken* and in *Jesus der Herr* Heim's zeal for the maintenance of the divine authority carries him so far that the idea of the vast difference between human knowledge and divine revelation overshadows the idea of the dimensional continuity between them. The abstractness of the distinction between pure revelation and pure human knowledge is to a considerable extent lost sight of. The continuity between our common knowledge and God is entirely broken. All our efforts lead away from God. God no longer has a connection with the dimensional scheme. Only when the believer is confronted by Christ Whom God has given and pointed out, is there a positive revelation at all. While God is beyond polarity, all our actual experiences are under polarity. Only in Christ, through the testimony of the Holy Spirit, do we meet God.

Of course Heim's idea of a negative revelation as a form of knowledge not directly connected with Christ, places Heim's thought in a somewhat closer accord with the facts of our experience than it would otherwise be. However, this suggestion is far from removing the difficulties, for if the basis of intellect is not something more than negation, and if the imperative of duty is something more than an impulse that leads us to despair, there is still no room for a positive revelation in our common experience.

It is not against the idea of the weakness of pure human knowledge, but against this unwillingness to believe that our actual knowledge apart from Christ contains any divine element, that we protest. The difficulty in Heim's thought is that it suffers from a fallacy which he himself often points out, namely, that of confusing between an "abstraction" and a *Sonderung*. Whatever abstract distinction may be legitimately drawn between knowledge that is purely human and knowledge under revelation, knowledge actually exists only in conjunction with some kind of a positive revelation. It is precisely this that Heim has lost sight of when he writes as though his demonstration of the relativity of pure human knowledge...
were also a demonstration of the relativity of our actual knowledge.

In opposition to Heim, we urge that, although pure human knowledge is devoid of knowledge of God, and although our actual knowledge is far more limited than most Liberals recognize, our common knowledge is yet shot through with enough of revelation to assure for its content considerably more value than Heim will allow. In support of our protest we urge four considerations:

1. The arguments in terms of which Heim rejects the ultimate validity of our common knowledge do not apply to that in our knowledge which is touched by revelation. Thus Heim may hold that all could be other than it is, but if certain of our workaday convictions be under God, even in moderate degree, they are to be seen as necessary. Again it may be urged that all our thought and morality leads to Pantheism or Idolatry, but if our thought be even indirectly touched by the Creator this would certainly not be the case. Again it may be urged that all that we think and do is under polarity, but certainly if God guides us even in a small measure to this extent, our thought is no longer under polarity.

2. We may now with all assurance urge that it is precisely the case that our thoughts and deeds are always in some degree under the revelation of God. If God is God, we cannot believe that He has left us entirely to go our own way. Moreover, the testimony of religions is almost unanimously to the effect that God is somehow in men's best thoughts and deeds. Even significant discoveries in science have often been attributed to inspiration. The foundation of our logic is in some sense in God. God is our Creator and Sustainer and thus, in some sense, the Author of our thought. There is an element of God's self-disclosure in all the forms of our thought. The distinction between our thought and God's revelation is a real one, but it is always an abstract one. We may indeed go a step farther—though this is no essential part of the present argument—and suggest that in our intellectual functions, which are always an integral part of our total experience, there is given enough of revelation to enable at least some individuals to attain a certain recognition of the existence of God. We would not assert that such knowledge is a necessary intellectual conclusion which may be demonstrated to every man, or that it is based entirely upon intellectual premises. However, we find it impossible to believe that the traditional arguments for the existence of God, as they are restated to accord with modern science, are utterly devoid of meaning.

When the moral consciousness is under consideration, the inadequacy of the view that our common knowledge contains no element of revelation is even more apparent than when intellect is under consideration. Whatever may be said of the abstract distinction between revelation and our knowledge with reference to intellect, the impossibility of separating these two is even more apparent.
with reference to the moral consciousness. The process of abstraction, although it must always be recognized as abstraction, is native to the intellect, so that it is possible up to a certain point to hold phases of the intellect apart, and to speak of a pure human logic as though it could exist alone. However, the moral consciousness knows no abstractions, so that any distinction between divine imperative and human conscience is, whatever its value, imposed upon morality from without by the intellect. The abstract character of the distinction between that which is purely human and that which is given from above ought, then, to be clear.

Purely human moral aspiration, as distinguished by the intellect, can never find an ultimate sanction, but our actual moral experiences are all the while, whether they will or no, confronted by an ultimate moral sanction. Conscience may, indeed, be hopelessly confused, but nevertheless in conscience we stand before God. It is this that gives the inescapable sense of obligation to moral demands that makes duty's imperative final. In order to avoid identifying the imperative with a written law, Kant tended to make the imperative a purely human experience, thereby placing it within the sphere of the relativity of all human experience. But when the imperative is seen as also a divine command, it becomes genuine knowledge of God which, although inadequate in itself, is none the less real, for as human experience is met by divine imperative, God is in some degree known. The exclusion of all positive revelation from our actual experiences represents a sadly inadequate view of our moral consciousness.

3. If it were necessary to renounce all other knowledge in order to hold on to that which is under God's revelation in Christ, the sacrifice would be worth while. However, we are confronted with no such alternative. Heim seems to suppose that if any final knowledge is recognized in ordinary experience, the human mind will desist from its search after the highest knowledge in Christ. It is this fear that led Heim to unwarranted extremes in his rejection of Realism and Idealism in general theory of knowledge, and it is this fear which now leads him to unwarranted extremes in his rejection of Liberalism in theology. However, the recognition of a valid human knowledge does not cause the mind to desist from a search after a higher knowledge. It is quite possible to recognize that our actual experiences contain some element of positive revelation and some knowledge of God, without for a moment suggesting that either mind or heart is satisfied. Thus, for example, Calvin, whom Heim follows in most respects, while freely allowing, as we have shown, that God in a measure makes Himself known in the world, at the same time makes quite plain the utter satisfactoriness of such revelation. Indeed, the church has always held some such position. Heim advances no good reason why the revelation in our common experience must now be said to be only negative. Men can have a certain kind of knowledge and still hunger after the highest knowledge. Indeed, it would seem that positive, though inadequate, revelation in that which is seen in the main as our common experience
would tend to lead men toward, rather than away from, Christ. It is certainly a mistake to suppose that ordinary knowledge must be condemned if the highest knowledge is to appear.

4. Finally, we urge that the total rejection of ordinary knowledge is not only not necessary to the attainment of the highest knowledge, but detrimental to it. If in our common knowledge there is no revelation and so no validity, not only are many intellectual, moral, and aesthetic experiences which have a decided religious value excluded but it is difficult to see how we shall recognize Christ when He is presented to us. Of course, it may rightly be said that God gives us the required insight. But God has given at least a part of the capacity all along. It would be a rather incredible idea that Christ Who is in part, at least, apprehended by the same sensory methods as ordinary facts is really apprehended in a way which has nothing in common with our ordinary experience.

How, in view of the account of our ordinary experience as hopelessly relative, can knowledge of God be possible even under revelation in Christ? It has long been recognized that John Locke's tabula rasa theory of mind was hopelessly inadequate. Impressions do not come upon the mind even of an infant as writing upon a clean tablet. Rather, our knowledge comes to us through, and in considerable part in terms of, that which we already have. This being true, it is quite incredible that the mature knowledge of God that is given in Christ should suddenly dawn upon minds which were previously in possession of no positive knowledge of God. Such a view is too much like the assumption that a child who has been raised in the wilderness will suddenly begin reading with great relish the "Critique of Pure Reason".

No theory of religious knowledge can be psychologically sound which fails to recognize the positive revelational element which is in much of our ordinary experience and to which religions, and especially Christianity, have always borne their testimony. Our experience under the personal Christ cannot be an utterly new experience which has been in no sense foreshadowed. Rather, it is the crown and completion of an experience which has always been in some degree under revelation. It is the only experience in which knowledge of God that is at all adequate is given. It is not the only experience in which any knowledge of God is given. To say that it is so is to call in question the possibility that any knowledge of God is given in it.

Heim's representation of the limitation of our experience apart from the revelation in Christ brings to light the undeniable fact of relativity and inadequacy of human experience, but its extreme statement overlooks that revelation in our common knowledge apart from which it is difficult to see how knowledge of God could be given.
(II) A Conflict between God and Our Common Knowledge

As we have seen, Heim's treatment of the incapacity of human knowing as over against God involves not only the idea of relativity, but also the idea of a thoroughgoing conflict between all the forms of our knowledge and God's existence.

(A) A Sound Emphasis Involved

In virtually denying the reality of sin and emphasizing the idea of divine immanence at the expense of the idea of the divine transcendence, Liberalism has in considerable measure weakened both the faith of the congregation and the theology of the church. As we said of Heim's emphasis upon the relativity of human knowledge, we may now say of his idea of conflict, that it involves a valuable and sound emphasis. In joining hands with Barth and others in calling the attention of Christian thought again to the fact that our knowledge is not only limited but in a measure perverse, Heim is presenting something of basic importance.

Whatever may be said of the old doctrine of original sin, or of a connection between our sin and that of the first man, this much is beyond dispute, that there is in us all, as Professor Kemp Smith puts it, a "root of evil" which keeps cropping out often in the most unexpected places and discoloring not only our deeds but also our thoughts. Moreover, the recognition of the fact of a sort of a rebellion against God in all purely human knowledge is essential to a proper humility before God, a sound recognition of the distinction between God's transcendence and our finiteness, and between God's holiness and our impurity. Thus far, Heim is quite right.

(B) An Unfortunate Extreme

Heim's contention seems to be that an unmitigated conflict against God is present not only in our human experience as such, but in all our common knowledge, i.e., in all that we do and say except as we are under the revelation of God in Christ. Perhaps an extreme idea of the relativity of all our knowledge is excusable, but when Heim contends that all our knowledge is in Either-Or Conflict with God the connection with reality seems to be lost. We must express a protest along the same lines as those suggested in connection with the former idea, but even more severe.

1. The contention that all our knowledge is in unmitigated Either-Or conflict with God overlooks the fact that all knowledge worth considering involves some element of revelation. (Enough has now been said to this point.) But, if our knowledge contains some element of revelation, it is indeed presumptive to hold that its conflict is of unmitigated Either-Or character.
2. The thought that all human knowledge involves unmitigated conflict implies that all our culture is to be interpreted as rebellion against God. However, an idea that demands that all that humanity has built up, all its literature, art, music, ideals, and philosophy, is to be put down as against God must necessarily come under suspicion. The possible harmony between a right use of all this and a pure worship of God has been too clearly seen in the years of Liberalism's influence to be easily thrust aside. W. M. Horton commenting on a recent book of Heim,(1) aptly puts it from a distinctly American point of view: "For an American wholly to abandon Liberalism --- would be to affirm that the very existence of our nation is an affront to Almighty God. --- I, for one, cannot do that. I recognize that we have sinned, and need to repent, but I cannot believe America has no value or mission in God's sight, and deserves simply to be obliterated."(2)

3. Human consciousness, even in its more distinctly religious phases, is aware of no such conflict as that of which Heim speaks. Men are indeed aware of sin as a kind of separation from, and conflict against, God. The search for atonement is a part of every religion. However, men have not come to feel that the conflict is an unmitigated Either-Or. Quite to the contrary, the religious consciousness is expressive of a striving toward God which, though mistaken and mingled with irreligion, is hardly completely hostile to God.

If such a conflict as that of which Heim speaks were a reality, we should certainly find that the Christian, having been brought to God in Christ, will testify that his former knowledge involved such a conflict. However, while Christians testify both to a sinfulness and, indeed, to a continuing sin, only in exceedingly rare instances do they declare that their past knowledge was in Either-Or conflict with God. Almost never do Christians say that all of their experiences which cannot be definitely related to the revelation of God in Christ are a rebellion.

4. But not only does the extreme form of Heim's view fail to find adequate support in the testimony of human consciousness or even of religious consciousness, it is by no means necessary for the maintenance of the ideas which it is intended to support.

Heim seems to feel that the contrasts between divine transcendence and human finiteness, and between divine holiness and human sinfulness, were essential to the idea of revelation. In this, Heim is quite right, for if God is only immanent, revelation is ultimately reduced to self-realization, and if man is not sinful, he needs no revelation. However, it is one thing to see the contrast between God and man, it is quite another thing to magnify that contrast to an unabating conflict. The former insight is indeed necessary to any proper account of revelation, the latter theory is not necessary at all to such an account.

(2) W. M. Horton, "Contemporary English Theology", pp. 174-175.
a. It is not necessary in order to maintain the idea of the
transcendence of God to declare that our thought is denied by, or
in conflict with, the transcendence of God.

Throughout the early Christian centuries the church held to
an idea of a genuine transcendence and a real authority without
at the same time denying human thought forms. In the Bible we
are told that God's ways are "higher than our ways" and that
"no man hath seen God at any time". The medieval theologians
keep reminding us that God is, beyond all that we can say of Him.
But in neither case is there the teaching that our thought is to
be denied if God exists. In the third edition of Glaube und Denken
Heim holds that the Copernican discovery requires a new analysis
of the idea of transcendence.

But, Renaissance discovery did not, as Heim seems to suppose,
suddenly render the thought of conflict necessary to the idea of
transcendence. However much the popular idea of transcendence
may have been associated with the medieval cosmology, it is certainly
a misrepresentation of medieval theology to suggest that its idea
of transcendence was dependent upon the concept of a limited uni­

verse. Medieval theologians did not think of transcendence as
simply spacial. It must not be denied that the Copernican discovery
injected certain new difficulties into the problem, especially with
reference to its popular presentation. But the idea of transcen­
dence had received an expression that was relatively independent of
any particular theory of spacial universe long before Copernicus.

Many medieval thinkers say quite as clearly as does Professor
Heim that God's transcendence is a transcendence directly over all
aspects of the universe so that there would have been quite as much
reason for affirming a conflict in the light of their idea of a
limited universe as in the light of our idea of an unlimited one.
But, the medieval thinkers found it unnecessary to take this step.
The idea of transcendence, upon which their thought of an authorita­
tive revelation depended, required only a recognition of the limita­
tion of our thought, not a denial of it.

Since the discoveries which have set forth the idea of an un­
limited universe, ideas of transcendence have been modified in
emphasis, but not changed in essence. Almost never has it been
demanded by those who recognize transcendence that human thought
be denied. Even Kant does not do more than reduce human thought to
a phenomenological level while allowing that moral consciousness
can postulate that which is beyond phenomena. It is indeed too
much to suppose that the entire world of thought, insofar as it
recognizes transcendence, has simply carried forward a naive pre-
Copernican conception in utter blindness of its impossibility.

There have, indeed, been many who with Professor Heim have agreed
that transcendence and human thought forms are irreconcilable alter­
natives, but they have generally cut the Gordian knot by denying
transcendence, as has, for example, Benito Croce. It is difficult to see how Professor Heim can on his own premises avoid either following the example of Professor Croce or repudiating his own system entirely as sinful human thought.

The church has both in medieval times and in modern times, especially within recent years, held that transcendence and immanence must be held together, not indeed in logically explainable fashion, but in some kind of a compatible relation. No adequate reason has been shown why such a thought must now be utterly rejected.

While Heim has, in his third edition of Glaube und Denken, done a fine thing in reemphasizing the idea of transcendence by presenting the idea with an even greater clarity than Karl Barth, he has undoubtedly gone much farther than necessary, insisting beyond practically every other modern thinker who accepts the idea of transcendence (excluding the extreme Barthians) upon the contradiction between God's transcendence and our thought. Such an extreme doctrine as that of Professor Heim is in no sense necessary to a proper recognition of revelation.\(^1\)

b. Is the idea of an unabating Either-Or conflict necessary even to conception of the contrast between divine holiness and human sin?

There can be no question about the fact that the contrast in question does imply some kind of conflict. Descriptions of sin as finiteness or as an evolutionary drag take all the meaning out of sin. Sin, if it has any meaning, implies a perverted will which is in some degree in conflict against God. There is considerably more reason for introducing the idea of conflict in connection with the contrast in question than in connection with the contrast between God's transcendence and our finiteness.

Having acknowledged the essential emphasis in Heim's idea of a conflict in general, we now express our agreement with much that Heim says of sin. Sin is indeed the deepest root of our ignorance. If we were pure, it is impossible to see any ultimate reason why we should be unable to know God. In this sense there is indeed a real conflict against God in our knowledge. It is because of a conflict in our wills, not simply because of our finiteness, that we are unable to know God. In this, Heim is in accord with Luther and Calvin and, indeed, with the more generally accepted tradition of the church. Further, the idea of the reality of a satanic power is

\(^1\) It might appear at first sight that in insisting upon the idea of Either-Or rebellion in our common knowledge, Heim is joining hands with Calvin in exalting the sovereignty of God. However, even a casual acquaintance with Calvin's writings reveals that even he held no such extreme idea as that presented in Heim's conception of an Either-Or conflict between God and our knowledge. Our knowledge, for Calvin, involves sufficient knowledge to leave every man without excuse.
thoroughly in accord with the teachings of Jesus. Finally, there is no mistaking the fact that faith must affirm the apparent contradictions that God is all in all and yet that sin is real. No solution of the problem of sin has proved satisfactory and none gives any promise of doing so. Absolutist solutions break upon reality of the fact of evil, and Pluralist solutions involve an unsatisfactory doctrine of God. The difficulty may as well be frankly acknowledged.

None the less, the idea that an Either-Or conflict must be recognized if sin be real is untrue. It is one thing to acknowledge the reality of sin; it is another thing to accentuate it. Heim does both. The fact that there is a satanic power does not necessarily imply that this power is completely beyond polarity. Certainly the New Testament does not indicate such an idea, and if the idea be put forward, as in Heim's thought, to explain how we can be free under Satan's influence, it creates a vastly greater difficulty than it resolves, for whereas we have analogies both of personal and impersonal influences which leave us free, the thought that there is more than one reality which is beyond relativity so far violates all rules of logic that it makes nonsense of thought. Heim ought to be satisfied to recognize the fact of evil without augmenting it to the status of a sort of a second absolute.

Our sin is indeed a conflict against God. But conflict is not absolute denial. Indeed if one's sin be altogether isolated from God's influence in our lives, it might indeed be a denial. However, as we have repeatedly insisted, the complete separation of our lives from God is an abstraction which cannot be ignored. Further, that sin which is in us is not, as Heim would have us think, a powerful nonrelative struggle against God, but only the pitiful rebellion of the creature against His Creator. It is the fool who hath said in his heart, "There is no God". However wise the genuine atheist may be, he is in this not one who acts according to a supernatural cleverness, but a fool. The satan of Heim's thought is too much like that of Milton's "Paradise Lost".

We may conclude that since neither of those contrasts upon which the concept of revelation depends necessarily involves a final Either-Or conflict, it is beside the mark to suppose that the idea of revelation is dependent upon such a conflict. The idea of conflict in our experience is, then, like the idea of the complete lack of revelation in our experiences, supported neither by the facts of consciousness nor by the requirements of the idea of revelation.

5. The most serious difficulty involved in Heim's extreme idea of an Either-Or conflict in our common knowledge is that, in depreciating our ordinary knowledge, it calls in question the very knowledge which it is intended to exalt, namely, the knowledge of God in Christ. If our knowledge is in final conflict, how, indeed, is the conflict ever to be overcome?
Heim deliberately affirms that each side of the conflict is altogether beyond relativity, each is Überpolar so that all possibility that there is any higher standpoint in which the paradox might ever be overcome disappears. Since this is the case, we are obliged to say that his conflict is no paradox which is simply beyond us, it is rather a conflict of absolutes. We are therefore obliged to say that the nature of paradox gives us no help in understanding how knowledge of God could ever be attained when there exists in our ordinary experiences such a conflict against God as that of which Heim speaks. Of course Heim undertakes to show that God overcomes the conflict through His Word. Certainly, if religion means anything, God does indeed break through the perversity of our thought in a revelation that astonishes and lifts us. But when this consideration is urged in answer to the objection that Heim's idea of an Either-Or conflict between God and man involves a virtual denial of knowledge of God, it only puts the difficulty in Heim's idea in a new form.

While the divine sovereignty and initiative in salvation is always to be acknowledged, there is another point to be insisted upon. Christians have always testified to their freedom in Christ to the fact that their belief in God in Christ was, from one point of view, their own volition. They have been aware that, while God drew them to Himself and transformed their wills, He did not compel them against their wills and annihilate their wills. While religion and, in particular, Christianity, has insisted upon the new life in God and spoken in a figure of the death of the old, it has, nevertheless, been unwilling to say that in conversion personality is annihilated and will crushed. Now, as we have seen, Heim himself is quite ready to acknowledge the element of freedom in conversion. But can Heim, in the light of his extreme idea of the conflict of our experience, logically find a place for freedom in man's relation to God? If our experiences are a thoroughgoing Either-Or conflict, they can only be changed by a compulsion from which freedom is completely excluded. Conversion would have to mean not transformation, but destruction. The continuity of personality would be completely broken.

At this point Heim may, of course, have recourse to the familiar Calvinistic idea that the relation between freedom and necessity or between Predestination and Freedom of the will is a mystery beyond human understanding. This is, indeed, the answer to which every attempt to give a logically complete account of the relation between God and man must come. However, it is one thing to renounce the claim to rational completeness in the account of the relation between God and man. It is quite another thing to ride rough shod, as Heim tends to do in this instance, over all logic and to press one's interpretation of the relation to such extremes that the possibility of even a paradoxical synthesis becomes remote. The former procedure is right and necessary, the latter is insupportable.
B. As to the Synthetic Character of Knowledge of God

We have seen how Helm holds that our common knowledge involves no knowledge of God, and that knowledge of God is a synthesis on a higher level of experiencing and authority. Just as within the realm of our common knowledge, experiencing and the self-manifestation of the object meet in a personalistic synthesis, so on a higher plain, namely, as God makes Himself known in Christ, the divine self-manifestation meets an enriched and enlarged human experience in a synthesis.

Is Heim right in holding that knowledge of God is a synthesis? It is already clear from what has been said regarding the element of revelation in our ordinary knowledge that we are convinced that Heim is mistaken in placing knowledge of God upon a level which has no real continuity with other knowledge. We shall later have occasion to deal with a number of questions as to the precise character of Heim's idea of synthesis. For the present, however, we confine ourselves to the bare question: Is Heim right in contending that knowledge of God is a synthesis of authority and experience? That is to say, does knowledge of God really consist in a drawing together of an otherness and an experiencing?

(I) Objections Considered

(A) Self-Contradiction

Extreme Liberals and extreme Authoritarians agree in repudiating the theory of synthesis. Thus, for example, many writers, such as those of the left wing of American Liberalism, hold that our knowledge of God is simply our own best experiences, that any effort to combine with this conception the idea of a revelation is an attempt to carry over into present day thought a concept that belongs really to the past; and Karl Barth seems to hold that any theological affirmations that are based on experience are a sort of an affront to the sacredness of revelation which permits no second. (1)

In each case the objection to the theory of synthesis is not simply the contention that the theory fails to agree with the extreme position adopted, but the feeling that the theory of synthesis involves an element of self-contradiction. From the point of view of extreme Liberalism or extreme Authoritarianism Heim's attempt to bring experience and authority to a synthesis appears as an impossible eclecticism which involves itself hopelessly in an attempt to combine contradictories. Thus, for example, we find Herrmann-Diem writing of the second edition of Heim's Glaube und Denken: Von da an ringen in Heim's Theologie zwei Tendenzen, die sich gegenseitig ausschliessen. Die eine Tendenz geht dahin, einfach Zeugnis abzulegen von dem Inhalt der biblischen Botschaft, wobei die vorausgehende philosophische Einleitung diese Botschaft, weder begründen noch beglaubigen soll, sondern nur rein negative.

(1) Cp. Aubrey's account of Karl Barth's Nein in "Present Theological Tendencies".
die intellektuellen Einwände gegen die Möglichkeit des Glaubens beseitigen will. Die andere Tendenz geht in entgegengesetzter Richtung. Sie will mit allgemein philosophischen Mitteln aus dem Selbstverständnis des natürlichen Menschen heraus diese nicht nur die Notwendigkeit der radikalen Frage zeigen, sondern zugleich auch auf die Christliche Botschaft als die einzige mögliche Antwort hinweisen, wenigstens indirekt, weil der Weg der Verzweiflung, der als die andere Möglichkeit immer offen gelassen wird, keine Antwort ist. (1)

That there is, in fact, a certain element of at least apparent contradiction, experience and revelation as ways of knowing God is beyond question. Each makes exclusive claims; each seems, if allowed at all, to be sufficient in itself. Thus far, we agree with extreme Liberals and extreme Authoritarians. Is Heim therefore mistaken in regarding knowledge of God as a synthesis of experience and authority?

It must be pointed out at the outset that the contradictories involved within Heim's synthesis of knowledge of God are presented in quite a different relation from the contradictories involved in his idea of Either-Or conflict between God and man's knowledge. In the latter case, Heim pressed his interpretation of the conflict to its utmost logical limits. But in the former case, Heim seems to be attempting honestly to indicate what happens when a man comes under Christ. This being true, the charge of self-contradiction has not the same force in the latter case as in the former. With this in mind, we may proceed to discuss the objection.

Whatever else may be said, at least this is clear, that Heim is quite well aware of the element of apparent contradiction in his theory. He is by no means guilty, as Diem would suggest, of slipping inadvertently into a way of thinking that is self-contradictory. We have seen how in his Das Gewissheitsproblem Heim has made it quite plain that he recognized the conflict involved in his theory, purposely accepting the paradox as an integral and vital part of his system. This being true, one must at least pause before undertaking to interpret the apparent contradiction in Heim's thought as a blunder that vitiates the whole theory; for it is not so lightly to be assumed that so keen a writer as Professor Heim has deliberately incorporated into his system a difficulty that is obviously fatal.

More than this, Heim is by no means alone in adopting the idea that knowledge of God is a synthesis. The synthesis idea has had a place in the thought of the church ever since the days of Paul, finding expression in Augustine, and especially in Luther and Calvin. It has never been entirely lost sight of, and is today perhaps more widely and more clearly recognized than ever before, particularly in Great Britain. (2) Whatever contradiction is involved in the synthesis theory is by no means a contradiction that has to all minds

(1) Diem: Ibid., p. 482.
implied a denial of the theory in question. If Heim's theory of synthesis is to be rejected as involving a contradiction, then the theory of Augustine and of the Reformers must also be regarded as issuing in absurdity, for the element of synthesis is of the essence of their thought. Moreover, the intelligence of many reputable modern writers must in such a case be called in question, for the theory of synthesis has been deliberately adopted by many such writers.

These considerations, altogether apart from independent analysis of the situation, are adequate to lead us to suspect that the apparent contradiction involved in Heim's theory of synthesis is not to be interpreted as a fatal error in his system, but rather as a representation of certain facts that belong inherently to the nature of religious knowledge.

That this precisely is the case is quite evident when the character of faith is understood. For the man of faith, knowing God is both a divine self-disclosure and an intimate personal experience. If the former be wanting, what comes to him is relative and unavailing; if the latter be wanting, what comes to him is arbitrary and unconvincing. Similar conclusions are reached when the facts are couched in theological terms. As Brunner says, God can only be known through God. Yet, at the same time, God can only be known through man's experience. However much the idea of synthesis may involve contradiction, synthesis is of the essence of religious knowledge.

Of course at this point it may be objected that the conflict involved in the synthesis of religious knowledge is simply an evidence that religious knowledge is invalid. However, the fact of religious knowledge is too well established in history and too much more secure in the minds of religious persons than all other kinds of knowledge to be called in question by an apparent conflict that logical thought finds itself unable completely to resolve.

Logical thought is only one type of knowing, the peculiar sphere of which is the ordering of concepts. It is limited to the business of assuring order and clarity among the concepts which are furnished it. It has no means of passing judgment upon matters which cannot be reduced to clear concepts. Life is full of realities which from the standpoint of logical thought seem to present conflicting tendencies.

Logical thought cannot adequately cope with the fact of knowing, for the reason that knowing is a process that cannot be completely reduced to logical thought. While logical thought is constantly busy eliminating errors in current epistemologies, it can furnish no satisfactory account of facts of knowing which appear from its standpoint to be contradictory. Were this not the case, the quarrel between Realism and Idealism would long ago have been settled. There is always an otherness and an experiencing in knowing, which logic cannot reduce to harmony. Thus, if it be required
that all knowledge be subject to a logical explanation, a large part of reality, including the process of knowing itself, must be ruled out. Such a procedure is of course unreasonable and itself the worst possible self-contradiction. Large areas of reality defy strict logical definition at least for the present, perhaps for always.

If it be true that logical thought can give no adequate account of many facts, including the fact of knowing, and that many primary verities even appear to logical thought to involve contradictions, certainly it is not to be expected that the knowledge which is the most intensely personal of all kinds of knowledge should be objected to because it does not reduce itself to logic or because it involves, from the standpoint of logical thought, apparent contradictions. The apparent contradiction in Heim's theory of synthesis is no evidence that religion as it is represented in Heim's theory of synthesis is to be rejected.

It is indeed one of the peculiar merits of Professor Heim's work that he has shown through analysis of our common knowledge how little it is to be expected that knowledge of God will be free, in terms of logical thought, from apparent contradictions. Heim has shown that if we try to explain that self-conscious knowledge which recognizes the perspective terms of a knowledge that is confined to objects, we are faced with contradictions, so that we must say that, whereas all known things must be objects, the perspective is both an object and not an object. In the same manner, Heim has shown that if from the standpoint of self-conscious knowledge we attempt to explain our knowledge of a "Thou", we are again faced with a contradiction, for we must say that the "Thou" is both a part of my world and not a part of it. Every level of knowledge appears to involve contradictions when judged in terms of a lesser level. Of course in each instance the contradiction disappears so soon as one gains a higher dimensional level from which to view the relation in question. But since no one ever gains a standpoint completely beyond relativity, our knowledge of God must always appear as a paradox.

We conclude that insofar as Heim's theory is simply a theory of synthesis of authority and experience, its apparent contradiction is to be explained neither as an inaccurate account of religion nor as a demonstration that such knowledge is invalid, but rather as a representation of the superlogical character of religious insight.

(B) Narrowness

A second objection to the theory of synthesis is that it unwarrantedly limits knowledge of God to a single way. Such a criticism, for example, seems to be suggested in what Professor Walter Horton says in his "Contemporary British Theology" regarding Heim. Horton declares, on the one hand, that he believes with Heim that faith culminates in personal allegiance in Christ, and, on the
other hand, that he cannot believe that American culture does not stand for something real.\(^{(1)}\)

The objection of which we are speaking arises from time to time from distinct standpoints. From the standpoint of the theory that revelation and experience are parallel sources, there is not a single synthesis, but two distinct ways of knowledge of God, experience and revelation. From such a standpoint Heim's theory would seem to be an undue narrowing of the field.

This is an old view and has, we have noted, been thoroughly canvassed. However, it isolates religion from ethics and thought in a way that is alien to the genius of Christianity. It leads to absurd conclusions as, for example, the idea sometimes represented in medieval thought, that a thing can be true in philosophy and not in theology, and vice versa. We therefore deem it unnecessary to attempt further to show that it fails to overthrow the theory of synthesis.

From another standpoint, it is held that knowledge of God comes not in a single way but in several ways. The error of theologies of the past is in this view thought to be an unwillingness to recognize more than one way to knowledge of God. Thus, for example, Professor William Adams Brown in his "Pathways to Certainty" discusses four ways of knowledge of God. From this point of view, the confining of knowledge of God to a synthesis is too narrow. But such views present only an apparent opposition to the theory of synthesis for, on the one hand, such views are generally willing to allow that each of its ways involves some kind of a synthesis and, on the other hand, the theory of synthesis, as such, does not necessarily confine itself to a single expression.

We therefore conclude that the thought that the idea of synthesis unduly narrows the field is no real objection. The criticism of Professor Horton brings to light, as we shall see, a real difficulty. However, its force is not in opposition to the idea of synthesis, as such, but in its criticism of a particular understanding of synthesis of knowledge of God.

(II) The Soundness of the Synthesis Theory

Neither of the principal objections that are urged against Heim's theory of synthesis is successful in refuting the theory as a synthesis. Of course this is not the place to undertake a positive argument for the theory. However, if the above objections do not hold, there is scarcely room for reasonable doubt that both the general character of the epistemological problem and the particular character of the problem of religious certainty imply some kind of a synthesis of otherness and experience of self-disclosure and apprehension. Insofar as theories of knowledge have neglected either of these facts, they have not only neglected important elements in the claims of knowledge, but failed to show how valid knowledge is possible.

Realism may never be pushed so far that the experience of the observer drops out, else there is no knowing, and so no knowledge. On the other hand, Idealism may never be carried to such lengths that the object is entirely lost sight of, else there is nothing known and when nothing is known, knowledge ceases to be. What is true of knowledge of objects is yet more obviously true of knowledge of persons, for such knowledge is clearly a matter of giving and taking in which the self-disclosure of the one and the hearing of the other is essential.

If self-disclosure and apprehension are required by the character of knowledge in general, the corresponding factors of revelation and experience are yet more pointedly demanded by the character of knowledge of God. Every genuine Christian experience is a testimony to a revelation of God. Christians feel in some measure with Paul that the Gospel came to them "through revelation of Jesus Christ". But at the same time, Christians are equally sure that God's revelation has taken its roots in their lives. As Paul puts it, "I know Whom I have believed". They are not content, on the one hand, with an experience that is purely subjective nor, on the other hand, with a revelation that is purely abstract. "The Spirit Himself beareth witness with our spirits that we are the children of God".

However mistaken Heim may be about the relative importance of the parts of the synthesis or about its precise character, he is scarcely mistaken in holding that, if there is valid knowledge of God, there is a synthesis of revelation and experience.

Heim is quite right, on the one hand, over against those of the Liberal school who, like Hegel, so reduce the idea of revelation to experience that they have no place for the idea of a sovereign self-disclosure of God, and, on the other hand, as over against those of the authoritarian group who, like Barth, are so absorbed in the thought of the divine Word that they almost fail to recognize any place for experience.

C. As to the Precise Character of the Synthesis

We have now found reason, while rejecting the extreme expression of Heim's idea that our common knowledge is completely relative and in conflict with God, to accept Heim's idea that purely human knowledge is indeed relative and perverse, that all our knowledge is in some measure relative and perverse, and that knowledge of God is indeed a higher synthesis, though not as distinct from our common knowledge as Heim supposes. We must now examine in somewhat more of detail the character of that synthesis in which Heim finds knowledge of God to consist. According to our preliminary statement as to the outstanding features of Heim's theory, four questions must be asked in this connection. 1. Is Heim's personalistic interpretation of the synthesis sound? 2. Is Heim's conception of the relation between the elements within the synthesis true?

(1) Gal. 1:12.
(2) 2.Tim. 1:12.
(3) Rom. 8:16.
3. Does Heim's account of the precise character of revelation do justice to the facts? 4. Is Heim's account of the experience side of knowledge of God true to the facts?

(I) Heim's Personalistic Interpretation of the Synthesis

As our presentation of Heim's thought and our attempt to find the place of Heim in modern thought have revealed, Heim's interpretation of the synthesis of knowledge of God, as well as his idea of the general structure of knowledge, is personalistic. In showing Heim's place in modern thought, we distinguished a number of theories as to the precise nature of revelation and several conceptions of the precise nature of experience. In each case we showed that Heim's thought agreed in general with those theories which found knowledge of God to be of a personal character. Is Heim right in this?

We have already seen that there are adequate reasons for holding that the highest and deepest kind of knowledge comes through a personal meeting. Those same reasons apply indirectly to the interpretation of knowledge of God, for it is scarcely to be expected that when we come to consider this subject the entire structure of knowledge should change its aspect. It is indeed reasonable to suppose that knowledge of God will differ from ordinary knowledge with respect to its ultimate validity, but it is certainly not reasonable to think that when God is known, our minds are departing from the highest and deepest kind of knowing.

However, in addition to the grounds upon which the personalistic interpretation of knowledge in general rests, there are other adequate reasons for regarding knowledge of God as the expression of a personal relation. That, despite the inability of philosophy to develop any satisfactory intellectual demonstration of the existence of God, religious people remain steadfastly convinced that they know God is in itself a clear indication that the revelation of God is primarily neither logical principles nor a mechanical proof, and that the experiences in which we know God are not primarily of the intellectual kind. Moreover, philosophers are coming increasingly to recognize that if there is any knowledge of God, it must be of a personal and religious kind.

As Professor Pringle Pattison has pointed out in his Guifford Lectures, the communion of religion is reduced to absurdity in a thoroughgoing Absolutist philosophy. Professor Clement Webb has from another standpoint demonstrated the need in all religion for personal Divinity. If there is a God, He is to be known with our whole being and not with so incomplete an aspect of our nature as pure intellect. Current philosophy is increasingly testifying to this fact.

When we turn from philosophy to the testimony of religion itself, the evidence is even more convincing. Every advanced religion with the possible exception of philosophical forms of Buddhism
and Hinduism, which are more nearly philosophies than religions, is an expression of a relation which is felt to be of a volitional character. The knowledge involved is not primarily intellectual but distinctively religious. Particularly is this true of the Christian religion. In Christianity nature is not thought of as a finished external manifestation of God's wisdom, but a vital declaration of His glory. God's fullest revelation is thought to be His Word—and a word is always personal. The experience of faith is no logical conclusion but the whole soul's obedience and trust.

Without further discussion, we accept Heim's idea of the personal character of our knowledge of God, and accordingly, hold that both as to his idea of revelation and as to his idea of the experience of faith he has done wisely in excluding all those theories in which this aspect of knowledge of God was minimized.

(II) As to the Relation between the Two Sides of the Synthesis

It is one thing to develop a theory of a synthesis between authority and experience. It is quite another thing to gain a true sense of the relation between the two elements involved. It is indeed about this second question that a large part of the controversy in the theological world has centered.

Heim's refusal to recognize any final validity in our common knowledge would naturally lead us to suspect that in the higher synthesis of knowledge of God a relatively small role would be assigned to experience, for if our common knowledge is to be rejected because the forms of its experiencing are sinful, it is scarcely to be expected that experiencing will play a very large part in knowledge of God. Such a relativism as Heim develops is, when presented by a theologian, usually a preparation for an authoritarian emphasis. That Heim has actually exalted authority and given a rather small place to experience within his idea of the synthesis of knowledge of God we have seen in our presentation of Heim's theory.

To be sure, Heim does not even in his latest book lose sight altogether of the experience element in our knowledge under Christ. Indeed it is, as we have shown, one of the virtues of his thought that distinct recognition is given to the experience side of all knowledge of God. Heim tells us that the Holy Spirit Who distinguishes God's Word from His silent working is as a plane upon which lines meet. The Holy Spirit is as a more inclusive Raum in which God, having in speaking become a "Thou", meets a human "Thou". Heim declares, moreover, that while the Abgrenzung, through which God's Word is distinguished, is from the divine side a Licht der Ewigkeit, it is from the human side a distinction that comes to rest in our Daseinsraum.(1)

(1) Heim: Jesus der Herr, p. 184.
However, despite this clear recognition of the place of experience in knowledge of God, the role assigned to experience within the synthesis is relatively small in Heim's thought. Heim declares that that in which we recognize Christ is gezogen in einer Weise, die der ganzen zeitlichkeit entgegengesetz ist, so that it has nothing to do with any innerweltlichen Unterscheidung—die jedermann sichtbar wäre." It is neither Machtunterschied nor Ästhetischer Unterschied, but is sovereign over all human standards.(1)

One is not to judge or recognize Christ either by dialectical principle(2) or by inner feeling,(3)

(A) A Sound Emphasis

Unquestionably, this polemic of Heim's calls attention to a fact of basic importance. It is indeed God Who speaks; Man listens. Every attempt to present the synthesis of knowledge of God as a sort of a "half and half" relation in which God's authority and man's experiencing are evenly balanced is a failure to recognize the true meaning of revelation, and a fatal binding of religious certainty to our human weakness. Heim is quite right in seeking to escape that anthropocentric theology that makes something in man, either intellect as in Hegel, feeling as in Schleiermacher, a moral consciousness as in Ritschl, or a priori as in Otto, the ultimate test of religious knowledge. With this motive we are in sympathy. We acknowledge that whatever else may be said of our recognition of the Word of God, it is first of all the sovereign witness of the Holy Spirit. The apprehension of Christ is by no means grounded in something that belongs fully to human nature, but rather in something which must come from God to man.

(B) Unfortunate Extremes

When it is clearly seen that the experience in which Christ is recognized is only the human side of that which is from another side the witness of the Holy Spirit, and when it is further acknowledged that the experience in question arises only through the sovereign act of the Holy Spirit, we consider that it is a mistaken and even dangerous zeal which tends to make experience passive, and insists that that in which we recognize the Word of God has little to do with our ordinary kind of experiences.

Here are two unfortunate extremes in Heim which endanger the sound principle to which we have called attention above. The first extreme is the tendency to make the experiencing involved in knowledge of God mainly passive and so to fall short of an adequate recognition of the element of genuine meeting in such knowledge. This tendency obscures that necessity for honest thought and moral aspiration which can never be eliminated from religious appeals, least of all from the preaching of the Gospel. Man has his part actively to perform, and when this is lost sight of, religious intelligence and morality are in danger of being engulfed in obscurantism and laxness. Of course the objection to an uncompromising

(1) Ibid., p. 185.
(2) Ibid., p. 198.
(3) Ibid., p. 192.
recognition of the reality of experiencing in knowledge of God is the fear of subjectivism in epistemology and self-determination in morality. But certainly, that we as active, thinking, feeling, willing persons, meet the revelation of the Almighty does not mean that we are attempting to master Him.

The second phase of the mistake involved in Heim's minimizing the place of experience in the synthesis of knowledge of God is that Heim fails to appreciate the fact that the ordinary kind of experiencing enters into our knowledge of God. The Holy Spirit indeed takes hold of our experiencies and uses them. However, it is in considerable part precisely our best intellectual and aesthetic and moral judgments which the Holy Spirit uses to lead us to a recognition of the Word. Is not the effort to eliminate these experiences a reintroduction of that arbitrariness which Liberalism strove valiantly to overcome? However, since this difficulty belongs primarily to a question which we shall later discuss, we leave it for the present with the above remarks.

A truer account than Heim's of the relation between the authority and experience aspects of knowledge of God would involve a recognition that God always takes the initiative, that God has made us, that He sustains us at every moment that God never leaves Himself without a witness, that in Christ God broke into history in an unaccountable way, that God alone can reveal Christ to us. At the same time, such an account would have a place for an experiencing that is more active than that of which Professor Heim speaks, an experiencing in which those intellects and wills which God has given are searching and striving as well as trusting, an experiencing in which the ordinary forms of our experiencing are still recognizable.

Before passing, however, from our brief examination of Heim's emphasis within his synthesis, we remark that while the most recent books of Heim give a formal expression to the extremes to which we have been objecting, these extremes are not altogether characteristic of Heim. We have been careful to show that much more moderate positions are to be found in Heim's earlier books. Moreover, although the meagre formal statements in Heim's recent books as to the experiencing side indicate the extremes of which we have been speaking, the general structure of the theory presented indicates a more moderate view. Thus, in all lower levels of knowledge, knowing is a real meeting. Especially is this true of the "I-Thou" relation which is the type of our relation to God.

(III) The Special Character of the Authority in Which God Is Known

Heim's idea of the revelational side of the synthesis of knowledge of God is in general somewhat as follows: God is, in silence, constantly confronting our wills through our consciences and through the world in which He has placed us. This silent working of God
affords us no real knowledge of God, but reaches its culmination in the general revelation in which we recognize our utter helplessness. God goes beyond silent working and speaks only in Christ, Whom the Holy Spirit points out to us. It may indeed be that God has in times past spoken through others, but God speaks to us only through the "Thou" Christ, Whose Leadership permits no second. Even the Bible carries God's meaning only by the authorization of Christ.

(A) A Sound Emphasis

Unquestionably Heim is urging a message which the modern world sorely needs. Worship of the so-called "order of creation" of blood or race or laboring class or economic stability is fatal to man's best aspirations. External nature does not disclose to us the deepest meaning of reality; none of the multitude of religious teachers of the ages adequately points us the way to God. Jesus Christ is indeed the highest and only sufficient revelation of God and of the way of life. The modern man who turns away from Jesus for aught else only proves that the truth is not in him. It is now even as John wrote of Jesus long ago: "Everyone that is of the truth heareth My voice."(1) Christ is the touchstone upon which everything purporting to be a revelation is to be measured.

It is equally true that we know Christ only as God is present with us or as the Holy Spirit testifies to us. Our knowledge of God begins with God both as to the self-disclosure of God in history upon which such knowledge depends, and as to the impress of such knowledge upon our lives. Thus far Professor Heim is right and helpful.

(B) Unfortunate Extremes

It is perfectly evident that Professor Heim is not satisfied to say that Christ is the highest and only adequate revelation of God. He goes far beyond this in insisting that, for the modern man at any rate, the Word of God is only in Christ. This emphasis comes to expression in what Heim has to say of the exclusiveness of the leadership, of the distinction between speech and silence, of the "Thou" character of the Word of God and of the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Neither nature nor ideals nor non-Christian religions are any more than means of showing us the hopeless inadequacy of all else save Christ. Even the Old Testament is a revelation only in so far as it receives the definite sanction of Christ.

When our agreement with the essential fact in Heim's thought of the unique place of Christ has been expressed, and when it is clear that the meaning of Christ may be broader than often supposed we find it necessary to protest against Heim's uncompromising unwillingness to acknowledge the presence of God's Word anywhere else

(1) John 18:37.
save in Christ. We cannot agree that in all else save the Christ Whom we meet in history and in religious experience is silence:

1. The considerations upon which Heim bases his idea that in Christ alone is the Word of God do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that such is the case.

a. The background of Heim's idea of the exclusiveness of Christ is the idea of the distinction between silence and speech. Professor Heim holds that all that takes place in the world is in the deepest sense an expression of will. In particular, when two persons confront one another there is always a silent struggle of wills. One purposes something for the other and strives to achieve in him some practical end. But such a struggle of wills is always blind and unintelligible until one person attempts to interpret the meaning of his will to the other through a Word. Thus heim writes: "On the one side is the Word which, while making no appeal to the eye, supplies the meaning; on the other side a multitude of impressive forms in which the existence of the other may make itself felt, whether it be an outburst of praying with tongues, or an air on the violin, or a marble statute, or a magnificent religious ceremony. If the Word is not there as the decisive place from which the light of meaning streams over everything, 'the true Light, which lighteneth every man coming into the world' (John 1:9), then everything else, however powerful it may be in itself, is no more than an aesthetic intoxication or subjugation by the sheer immensity of a spectacle."(1) But if Word is quite distinct from all other personal meeting, then whatever is the Word of God is set apart from all other contents of the world.

Now there can be no doubt that Heim's distinction between silent action and speaking is a perfectly legitimate one. The relationship in which two strangers confront each other in the wilderness, each afraid of and at the same time desiring to be acquainted with the other is quite different from the relation between two friends who greet one another in a common tongue. The uncomfortable feeling that something is moving nearby is displaced by a different order of experience when someone breaks the silence either in friendly greeting or in angry challenge. Indeed we may go a step farther and say that Heim is right in saying that when the "word of meaning" is absent there is only emotional intoxication and struggle of blind wills.

What we would question, however, is the idea that the "word of meaning" is ever entirely absent from any self-disclosure or any manifestation of will. The distinction between silence and speaking is not, as Heim's position would indicate, one of discreet functions, but one of expressions of will which are present in varying degrees in every experience of knowing.

Consider the relations between human wills. When one person speaks out of his heart, or writes an intimate letter to another,

(1) Heim: Glaube und Denken, zweite Auflage, Tr., p.171.
the "word of meaning" is certainly there. However, it would be somewhat odd to say that the "word of meaning" is not also in the notes of a violin, or in a great painting or statue. Does not the meaning of a painter, sculptor, or composer often come to us far more really in his artistic expressions than in his spoken or written words. There is such a thing as an aesthetic meaning as well as an artistic intoxication (Rausch). Further, our sense of obligation to another person, the influences that others have upon us, and similar facts have a real meaning in them. Even when one is only vaguely aware of a moving presence, he has some sense, though an indefinite one, of the meaning of the will which causes the movements, else there would be no recognition of the movement. We may not be able to determine precisely what the other intends, but in the very fact that we are aware of a compulsion is implied something of meaning. In short, we may say that from our most interpretative experiences to our blindest feelings meaning is always present, even though in diminishing degree as we move from the former type of experiences to the latter.

When it has been seen that the distinction between silence and "word of meaning" is from a philosophical point of view an abstract distinction, so that the word of meaning is never entirely wanting from any expression of will, the distinction between word and silence no longer presupposes that the Word of God is something which can be sharply separated from all of creation.

b. The second ground of Heim's idea that the Word is present only in Christ is the contention that leadership is exclusive. The line of thought is that Christ, the Word, is our Leader, and that since leadership is exclusive we are not to look elsewhere for God's self-disclosure.

Of course leadership may be defined as one likes, but leadership as we find it will scarcely support the inference which Heim derives from it. It is indeed true that a real leader commands complete obedience. Two facts, however, must be remembered. First, the leader does not demand that his followers exclude those other influences from within and from without which are in keeping with the spirit of the leadership. As the Apostle puts it, "All things are yours—and ye are Christ's."(1) Second, the leader does not ignore, but is in fact in considerable degree dependent upon ideas and programs. Leadership is above programs and ideals and platforms, but it is by no means independent of them. Rather, it is expressed through them.

When these two facts are considered, all argument for the supposition that the Word of God is only in Christ that might be sought in the idea of the exclusiveness of leadership disappears. The idea of the leadership seems rather to suggest that the Word is present in many facts which we encounter even outside of recog-

(1) 1 Corinthians 3:21,23.
nized relation to Christ. A German peasant through some proclamation catches the idea of some phase of the German nationalist movement. He is in some degree a disciple of the movement whether he knows and follows der Fuhrer Hitler or not. In like manner, when an earnest man of whatever creed lives in genuine regard for God as he knows Him and for his fellows, it is certainly conceivable that he may be under the Word of God even though he has never heard the name of Christ or become distinctly aware of His leadership. Such an interpretation seems certainly to be involved in the saying of Jesus that "He that is not against us is on our part". (1)

c. The third ground of Heim's idea that the Word is present only in Christ is Heim's idea that the Word is a "Thou". Heim has undertaken to show that a "Thou" is only one and never plural. In his discussion of the character of the Word of God he contends that the Word is a "Thou". Thus if one concedes, as most Christians will concede, that Christ is the Word of God, it must be acknowledged that Christ is the only Word of God.

Now unquestionably God's Word is supremely the "Thou", Christ Jesus. The words which John ascribes to Jesus are indeed true of Him: "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." Moreover, it is not simply in an understanding of Christ's ideals and programs but in confronting Himself that we know God. The more we are drawn toward Christ Himself the more we are drawn toward God. Christ is, as we have said, the test of all that purports to be revelation.

There are, indeed, reasons for going beyond the acknowledgments above and saying that wherever we meet the Word of God we are in some sense under the leadership of Christ or confronted by the "Thou" of Christ. Christians are aware that the eternal Word of God is so abundantly in Christ that they may say with John that "the Word became flesh". (2) It may indeed be that the identity between the eternal Word and the human Jesus is such that not only do we meet in Jesus the highest expression in the Word, but also that we never meet the Word without in some sense meeting Jesus. All Christians acknowledge that the same Word of God which they find in beauty and conscience is supremely manifest in Christ. Many Christians so fully find in Christ the revelation of God that they cannot believe that anything through which they are led toward God, whether a beautiful scene, a lovely life, or a noble impulse, is not in some sense a manifestation of Christ. They are not satisfied with saying that that which is in Christ is in other revelations. They must go on to say that other revelations, not visibly connected with Christ, are in fact an expression of Christ. Certain it is that it is quite impossible to remove any revelations very far from Him Who is the culmination of them all.

(1) Mark 9:40.
(2) John 1:14.
But, evidently it is no such enlarged conception of the Word in Christ which Heim has in mind when he insists that only in Christ is the Word of God given to us. Heim's real intention is evidently the idea that only as we are definitely confronted by the Christ of history and of distinctly Christian experience do we know anything of the Word of God.

When all possible acknowledgements of the true emphasis in Heim's idea that the Word of God is a "Thou" have been made, the conclusion that the Word of God is only in Christ does not follow. In the first place, as we have noted concerning the idea of leadership, it is artificial to attempt to isolate a "Thou" from what he does and says. To attempt to isolate a "Thou" from what He does and says, to attempt to separate Christ from His ideals and programs is scarcely a justifiable procedure. Thus to say that the Word is only in the "Thou", as such, is an unwarranted statement.

In the second place, as we have already indicated, the distinction between speech and silent acting is not nearly so sharp as Heim would indicate. Thus the fact that one can say this "Thou", Christ Jesus, is the Word of God is by no means a proof that all else may be excluded.

In the third place, even if we overlook the above facts, there is a serious error in Heim's idea that the Word is only a "Thou", which grows out of Heim's mistaken attempt to discover the means of describing religious knowledge in general epistemology. Let us suppose that Heim's general account of Word is quite correct. It is at the outset a questionable procedure to attempt to fit any religious idea into a mold worked out by a general philosophical study. Religion is its own best guide. Thus, when the attempt is made to apply Heim's analysis of Word to the fact that God has spoken, absurdities emerge. Heim applies the idea of the exclusiveness of the Word, to religious knowledge and the results seem sane enough. But when an attempt is made to apply other characteristics, the impossibility of the attempt to fit the religious facts into general epistemological molds appears.

In one passage Heim calls attention to the fact that in speaking God has humbled Himself and come on our plain as a "Thou" to speak to us. A little later we are told that God, instead of speaking to us through words which have an "It" character, has spoken to us through His Word, Who is a "Thou". But, Heim has contended that a "Thou" is always singular, not plural. He has showed that a symbol from the past or objective world becomes a Word when an "I" meets a "Thou" and my world meets your world, in such a way that the symbol becomes an interpretative experience. In terms of such a theory the idea that a "Thou" is a Word can only be nonsense. There is here, against all meaning, a plurality of "Thou's" in a single meeting. Again, a "Thou" has become a symbol or precipitate through which a personal meeting takes place.
But where in Heim's system or anywhere else does it make sense for a "Thou" to precipitate itself in a "Thou"?

The impossibility of defining God's speaking in terms of such an analysis of ordinary words as Heim's is then quite evident. The truth is that while Christ is indeed a "Thou", and while God's revelation in Christ is in a real sense analogous to human speech, the concept of Word has its own enlarged meaning when it is used to define God's speaking. Word has not now the narrow meaning of a content which differs sharply from all others in that it bears meaning from one to another. A word in this sense must always be an objective symbol which carries meaning, never a "Thou". When the concept Word is used to describe God's speaking it must indeed be broadened and deepened to include more than one kind of reality, a "Thou" as well as an "It". But surely this broadening and deepening of the concept does not exclude what already belonged to it.

Moreover, in God's order of faith the sharp boundaries between person and person, the exclusiveness of the "Thou", are, as even Heim acknowledges,(1) softened. In such an order one may indeed meet the Word in other persons who are under Christ, or indeed in those who have heard only lesser disclosures of the Word. When the meaning that must be ascribed to Word when the term is used in the phrase the Word of God is seen, all reason for undertaking to confine its use to narrow limits disappears. Its supreme and only adequate expression and its test may be and as we hold is, in the "Thou" of Christ. But its lesser expressions are widespread in the earth, in persons, in ideals, in loveliness, and in goodness everywhere.

d. The fourth ground for Heim's idea that the Word is only in Christ is his contention that God, the Holy Spirit, not man, points out the Word. The thought is that since the Holy Spirit testifies to the Word in Christ, Christ's revelation is exclusive.

Heim argues rightly that that in which God has spoken is distinguished from other contents not by any human category, but by God, Himself. The Holy Spirit manifests the revelation of God. Further, every Christian will acknowledge that it is Christ primarily to Whom the Holy Spirit witnesses.

The difficulty is that the conclusion that the Word in Christ must be exclusive does not follow. Certainly the actual testimony of the Spirit does not lead men only to Christ. The doctrine of the witness of the Holy Spirit instead of proving the exclusiveness of the Word in Christ is indeed an indication that God may speak elsewhere, for God being free may speak by His Spirit when and where He will. This does not mean that the Holy Spirit makes

(1) Heim: Jesus der Herr, p. 166.
Christ unimportant. The Holy Spirit witnesses preeminently to Christ. It may indeed be that everything which the Holy Spirit designates as God's Word implies some kind of a "Thou" relationship with Christ, but at the same time it is a plain fact that God's speaking is often other than a recognized meeting with Christ.

Thus each of the major lines of thought which enters into Heim's idea that Christ is the only Word of God, while supporting the idea of the supremacy and sole adequacy of Christ, by no means indicates, as Heim implies, that there is no Word of God save in Christ. Rather, each is, when properly interpreted, a suggestion that there is a Word of God which, while culminating in Christ, also finds expression elsewhere.

2. Apart from the fact that Heim's supposition of the exclusiveness of the leadership of Christ is not supported by the considerations upon which he bases it, there are certain positive facts which indicate rather conclusively that God's Word is manifested elsewhere than in Christ. Among these we name the religious necessity of the doctrine of creation, the religious need for a preliminary revelation, the testimony of religions, and the character of the consciousness of Christ.

a. If any religion is to continue to prove in any way satisfactory, it must involve the idea that its deity is in some sense a creator of its adherents and their environment. Thus nearly all religions have in some degree held this belief. Christianity has always been particularly insistent that God is the Creator. If the Word of God were only in Christ, we would be obliged to say that the Word of God is in no sense in the world. However, this position is incredible if God is the Creator. It would therefore seem that we are obliged either to accept a sort of a Marcionite belief that God is not the Creator, or else to reject Heim's idea, acknowledging that God's Word is expressed elsewhere than in Christ.

b. Again the psychological requirements of religious knowledge point to manifestations of God's Word in which no definite relationship to Christ is involved. If the Old Testament(1) and, in a lesser degree, other religious phenomena did not in a meaningful way point us toward God, it is difficult to see how we would be able to recognize Christ as the highest revelation of God.

c. Once again, the testimony alike of Christianity and other religions has always made room for a Word of God which in its lower forms, at least involves no distinct relationship to Christ.

Note: Heim recognizes that the Old Testament is a revelation for people who lived in earlier times and, by Christ's authority for us also. But if the Old Testament is not in its own right a revelation to us also, how are we to recognize Christ as the highest revelation, or indeed as a revelation at all?
Obviously this is true of non-Christian religions which not only in Greece, whence came in part at least the very concept of the Word, but everywhere have claimed to be an expression of some kind of a divine manifestation. We would point out that even on Christian principles this testimony of other religions cannot be disregarded. The Christian religion has at its very core the principle of love. It would be a fundamental departure from that principle to declare that that in which another finds assurance contains no positive merit. Christian love is not very different from Josiah Royce's principle of loyalty to loyalty. It is foreign to its genius to hold that there is no meaning at all in the phenomena of other religions. Further, the Christian's acceptance of God's speaking in Christ is on Heim's own principles an internal witness, which as such is able only to say what is God's word for the individual believer and not to legislate for others as to where God has spoken. While there are grounds for the assurance that the highest revelation is in Christ, the claims of non-Christians that they have received a revelation of God may be quite as real as the parallel claims of Christians.

When we come to consider the testimony of Christianity itself, we find that while its teachers have not always given the adequate recognition implied in its basic principles to other religions, it has been constant in its own insistence upon the reality of a revelation of wider scope than Professor Heim will allow. In this connection we may very aptly quote from Professor Webb's recent lectures, "Religious Thought in England from 1850": "Very early in the history of the Christian religion the Church had refused to follow Marcion in seeing in Christ's advent a sudden invasion from without of a world whose maker and lord was other than the Father whom Christ came to reveal. But the full working out of the principle involved in this refusal was inevitably delayed until with the advance of historical knowledge in the nineteenth century, Christianity could be envisaged as a culmination of a universal process --".(1) The Christian consciousness has always found through the Scriptures of the Old Testament a revelation of God. From the days of Marcion to the days of Ritschl and Barth, the church has steadfastly refused to permit any reduction of the Old Testament to a place of relatively minor importance. It has insisted that God speaks in the words of Isaiah and Hosea, though less completely and perfectly, yet as really as through the words of Christ.

d. We come finally to a fact that bears still more conclusive testimony to the reality of the Word elsewhere than in Christ, namely, the fact that Christ's own consciousness took shape from a human standpoint in terms of certain historically traceable religious ideas. Christ's religious consciousness grows on its human side in large part out of the Old Testament. To be sure, we quite agree with Heim that the most important fact about Christ is Himself. No amount of explaining can fathom Him. The young man in Ian Maclaren's story who burned his manuscript with its learned words about a Semitic heritage in order to speak a "good word for Jesus" was quite right. However, it is none the less a fact which cannot

be fairly ignored, that Jesus's consciousness was molded in a Bible atmosphere and that many of his most characteristic expressions are a deepening of what was already in the Old Testament. It seems strangely arbitrary, therefore, to declare that the revelation in the Old Testament is completely dependent for its authority upon Christ. If the Scriptures contained revelation for Christ, how can they contain less for us? We joyfully acknowledge that Christ is the Lord of the Scriptures, that "they are they which testify of Him",(1) but we find it out of keeping with the facts to declare that they involve no real revelation of their own.

Moreover, a multitude of influences other than the Bible entered into the formation of that late Jewish literature and attitude, which together with the canonical Scriptures, was the atmosphere in which Jesus grew to manhood. There is indeed abundant evidence that many religious influences went into the making of the Old Testament itself. Therefore, just as it is arbitrary to declare that the Old Testament involves no distinctive speaking of God, it is in like manner arbitrary to suppose that the speaking of God is excluded from other religions and from a multitude of facts not specifically considered to be religious, and to declare that revelation suddenly begins, as far as we are concerned, with Jesus Christ.

IV. The Experience Side of Knowledge of God

We have already seen how Heim has underestimated the place of experience in knowledge of God. Hence we are concerned here only with the structural character of the experience side of knowledge of God.

We recall briefly the main features of Heim's thought in this connection. Our ordinary experiencing at its best leads us only to despair which is the human counterpart of God's silent dealing with us. Only as we come under God's revelation in Christ in whole soul obedience do we know God. In this our own discriminating and volition has but little part. The recognition of the Word of God comes about only as the testimony of the Holy Spirit becomes the inner witnessing of the Holy Spirit with and in our spirits.

(A) Sound Emphasis

We unhesitatingly acknowledge the soundness of certain features of this conception. Knowledge of God is indeed never simply an intellectual conviction. It is rather a part of a whole soul obedience to God's Word. Again, obedience to Christ is only Possible under the regenerating inspiring power of God.

Unfortunate Interpretations

Despite our conviction of the essential soundness of the above features of Heim's analysis of the structure of the experience side of knowledge of God, we are obliged to point out two extremes in interpretations which are in some degree the counterpart in Heim's idea of the experience side of knowledge of the weakness which we have pointed out in his idea of the authority side of knowledge of God.

1. Alongside Heim's endeavor to confine revelation to Christ is an attempt to confine the experience of faith to that which comes to a man under Christ. Heim's thought labors from first to last under a profound mistrust of all the forms of human experiencing. Thus we find Heim in Das Weltbild der Zukunft building his system upon the thesis that we must choose between our ordinary way of thinking and the way of faith. In later works the same thought is maintained, and the idea of the sinfulness of our thought forms made more emphatic. In the second edition of Glaube und Denken Heim insists that the very form of our world is sinful. In the third edition of that work, Heim explains that the reason for this is that the world is never to be completely isolated from the "I", which is another way of saying that the sinfulness of our world is accounted for by the fact that our way of experiencing is involved in our guilt. All our experiencing can lead nowhere but to a nihilism or, if it is fortunate enough to be guided of God, to a despair which is the only gateway to faith. This profound mistrust of all human experiencing is expressed not only in Heim's theoretical works but as well in his practical lectures and essays. Thus, for example, in an essay entitled Krieg und Gewissen, he holds that man is of necessity bent upon destroying man, and again in an address upon the church situation delivered in Tübingen in the summer of 1933 he condones the Bismarckian policies on the ground of the sinfulness of the world. This utter mistrust of all human experiencing is deeply ingrained in all that Heim writes and says.

Of course we cannot undertake in this place to enter any detail of the discussion of the whole question of human depravity. However, we call attention to a few considerations in opposition to Heim's idea that all experience save that directly under Christ is to be excluded from knowledge of God.

a. What we have said in opposition to Heim's idea of the Either-Or conflict of human knowledge against God, and what we have said in opposition to Heim's endeavor to limit positive revelation to Christ is, if true, evidence of the illegitimacy of undertaking to limit the experience side of knowledge of God to that which takes place as we are directly under Christ.

b. It is not true that all that is involved in our experiencing has in it the seeds of despair, nor is it a fact that a man must

actually pass through despair to come to Christ. The first proposition is supported by those experiences of beauty, of truth, and especially of goodness which bless our lives and which we find it impossible to repudiate altogether. The second proposition is supported by the simple observation that many good Christian people have indeed passed from the relative innocence of childhood into the joyful experience of communion with Christ without any intervening period of despair.

Cf course Heim's answer to the objection to which we are referring would be, as in the case of his answer to a similar objection of Steinman,(1) that his theory is an account of the structure of knowledge of God and not a description of experiences. However, this answer only partly meets the issue. Whereas any account of structure which gets very far away from the distinctions which experience itself makes is, to say the least, dangerous, there is in actuality no purely human experiencing. The very existence of experiencing is dependent at every moment upon God, so that experiencing is never entirely devoid of divine influence or entirely full of the seeds of despair. As for the contention that despair is necessary to faith, it is impossible to set up for this idea even a claim that it is a purely structural concept.

2. The second difficulty in Heim's idea of the precise character of the experience in which we apprehend revelation is his apparent belief that in our actual apprehension of Christ the ordinary kind of experiencing has little part.

In the first two editions of Glaube und Denken Heim is content with the positive assertion that we are quite dependent upon the testimony of the Holy Spirit. However, in Jesus der Herr, although Heim's meaning is uncertain, he seems at times to proceed to a negative contention which is by no means to be inferred from the fact of our dependence upon the Holy Spirit, namely, that our actual thoughts, feelings, and volitions have little to do with our recognition of the Word of God. Thus Heim declares that our following of Christ is distinct from our approval of Christ's program or His moral life, that the distinction between God's word is neither Machtunterschied nor ästhetischer Unterschied, that it does not consist in the contrast between Heldentum and Alltaglichkeit or between genealen Personlichkeiten und unbedeutenden Menschen, that the divine choice setzt sich souverän über alle diese irdischen Größenmaßstäbe und Größenunterschiede hinweg.(2) Heim declares, moreover, that whenever one undertakes to show from any general principle when or where God has spoken, he has lost sight of the character of our situation as sinners. The speaker, he declares, is allein der Aktive und Gebende der Hörende aber nur das passive und empfangende Gesäss.((2) Heim: Jesus der Herr, p. 185.

(2) Ibid., p. 188.
Eternity, or relativity and Absoluteness, have any value for our recognition of Christ. (1)

Now we quite readily acknowledge that it is only when God enables us to know Christ as the Word that we know Him. Human experiencing alone is inadequate. Only as our experiencing is taken up into the witnessing of the Holy Spirit or as the Spirit witnesses in us do we apprehend God in Christ.

However, this does not mean that the experiencing in question is not continuous with the ordinary kind of experiencing.

Against Heim's apparent inference in this connection we urge the following: a. The tendency to exclude our active experiences is rather surprising in a writer who finds knowledge of God to come to being in a "Thou", or leadership relation, in which the whole soul of the believer meets the Word of God. It is difficult to see how the whole soul can be involved except the experience in question be continuous with our ordinary experiences, indeed except the very distinctions, feelings, and aspirations which are commonly ours be far more involved than Heim is willing to allow.

b. Our acceptance of Christ is not something quite apart from our reaction to Christ's moral superiority. It is quite true that we do not evolve a complete moral ideal and then accept Christ because He seems to fit into our ideal. Such a view would be artificial to an absurd degree. However, it is true, to an extent which Heim fails to realize, that it is in His moral superiority that Christ Himself takes hold upon us. Thus, that in which we know Christ, while not being a purely human moral distinction, is a distinction which involves the same kind of moral consciousness which is present, though in lesser degree, in our ordinary experiences.

c. It is indeed true that, if our ordinary experiences remained completely and solely our own, they would have no part in a recognition of Christ. However, it is not only conceivable but undoubtedly true that our ordinary experiences are always in some degree under the influence of the Holy Spirit. Just as every content of our ordinary knowledge contains something of the revelation of God, so every act of experiencing is in some measure under the guidance of God. The fundamental fact that experience is never altogether isolated from God is evident even in Heim's own basic principles, for all life is, in his thought, a continuing creation. When it is kept in mind that our ordinary experiencing is at least in some degree an experiencing under God, the major reason for the effort to exclude our ordinary experiencing is set aside.

d. Heim's idea, if pressed to its logical conclusion, really implies an exclusion of experience from knowledge of God, and so a rejection of the idea of synthesis which Heim has tried to establish. If Christ is not in any sense to be recognized through

(1) Ibid., p. 192.
our ordinary experiences, He is not really recognized in us at all.
To say that God in us recognizes Himself is no adequate answer, for
while our experience under God's direction is still our own, God's
recognition of Himself is not ours. Accordingly an exclusion of
our ordinary experience would be a denial that we can know God
at all.

The exclusion of our ordinary experience introduces a
dangerous element of arbitrariness into religion. If our knowledge
of God is something quite apart from our ordinary experiences, it
may become possible to say that almost anything is God's revelation.
Only when it is clearly recognized that although our experience
must be under God if we are to recognize His revelation such a recog-
nition is in terms of the best in our experience, can this danger
be avoided. Heim is guilty in the third edition of Glaube und
Denken of that of which he accused Barth in the second edition,
namely, of so divorcing revelation from life as to tend to make
men free from it. In trying to escape the extreme Immanentism of
the theology of the past century and a half, Heim has gone so far
that he has, by minimizing the importance of actual experiences,
tended to reintroduce that very note of "sheer arbitrariness" which,
as Professor Clement Webb notes, it was the peculiar contribution
of Immanentism to overcome.(1) We agree in general with Professor
Horton who writes: "We may agree with Heim that Christian faith in
Christ culminates in a personal trust in Christ which is something
more than a rational assurance of the truth of his ideas --- but ---
cannot believe that it is a sin --- to reserve our loyalty for a
God Who, in all His ineffable mystery, yet shows Himself to us as
light and not darkness, encouraging us in the pursuit of truth and
justice."

In bringing to a conclusion our critical analysis of Heim's
theory, we may make brief reference to one problem which, although
it does not fall strictly within the scope of our subject, should
not be altogether ignored, namely, the question as to whether Heim
adequately shows the final validity of knowledge of God.

H. P. Van Dusen in his review of the translation of the third
edition of Glaube und Denken urges that Heim has never really faced
the problem of the validity of knowledge of God. Writes Van Dusen:
"But perhaps the most fatal weakness of the whole position is the
excessive subjectivism which has characterized all thinkers of Heim's
school. By begging the fundamental epistemological issue—whether
our 'knowledge' be of genuine reality or only of the world as we
experience it—the discussion is set in a phenomenalistic and so
partial perspective. It may be said never fully to escape the 'ego-
centric predicament'."(2)

(2) Van Dusen: Ibid., p. 134.
It is difficult to understand how so eminent a scholar as Professor Van Dusen could have so seriously misunderstood Heim's effort. Evidently he has not read the second edition of Glaube und Denken where Heim earnestly grapples with the problem of relativism, setting the reality of God over against all our knowledge, or Jesus der Herr in which Heim so valiantly endeavors to show how a knowledge that goes beyond the polarity of our thought forms is possible. Indeed, it seems even doubtful whether Van Dusen has read the translation of the third edition of Glaube und Denken with a great deal of care. While Heim begins in the third edition of Glaube und Denken with phenomenological analysis of the forms of experience, that structural analysis is only preliminary to Heim's effort in the same book to show the meaning of that which is real beyond all forms of experience, and that effort is a preparation for the attempt in Jesus der Herr to show how knowledge of such a reality is possible.

But, when it is perfectly clear that Heim has grappled with the problem, we have still to ask whether he is able to give an affirmative answer. Is Heim able to say that we have valid knowledge of God or is his system in spite of his own wishes, essentially agnostic?

If the extremely skeptical features of Heim's thought to which we have taken exception were the whole of Heim's thought, Heim's system could certainly not be a positive answer. The extreme form of Heim's rejection of Realism and Idealism, his refusal to acknowledge that our ordinary experience has any place in knowledge of God, his claim that ordinary experience is in Either-Or conflict with God, and his minimizing of the experience side of the knowledge that comes through revelation in Christ, all tend strongly to call in question the possibility of valid knowledge of God.

However, the above mentioned features of Heim's thought are by no means the vital ones. As we have been careful throughout to show, the objectionable extreme features of Heim's thought are implications and conclusions built upon the main structure of his thought. Almost every criticism deals with a suggestion which, as we have shown, is added to an essentially sound distinction or proposition. Thus, for example, the idea of the limitation of our ordinary experience is an addition to the idea of the limitation of pure experience, and not the fundamental thought in question. In the same way, the idea that nature contains no word of meaning is a misapplication of the abstract distinction between silence and speech, and not an essential confusion of distinctions.

There is a more positive and vital part of Heim's thought which is more important than its skeptical side. It may be summed up as follows: Knowledge is in levels of various depths and realities. The deepest knowledge is always personal. Although pure human knowing, even on its personal level, cannot apprehend God, and although
When God deals with us in silence we cannot apprehend Him, when God manifests Himself in His Word (the "Thou", Christ Jesus, our Leader) and points out His Word to us in the witness of the Holy Spirit, then in humble obedience we hear God speaking to us.

When it is seen that the extreme skeptical side of Heim's thought is secondary, the answer to the question whether or not Heim has found a positive answer to the question as to the validity of knowledge of God depends entirely upon what is meant by validity of knowledge in this case.

If, on the one hand, showing the validity of knowledge means demonstrating the objective existence of the object of knowledge, Heim certainly fails to show the validity of knowledge of God. Indeed Heim makes no pretense of establishing such a demonstration. He repeatedly insists that God is not a divine Object. Every attempt to know him by an "observer Attitude" must fail. Thus from the standpoint of realistic theologies like that of Adolph Schlatter, Heim's system seems to be fundamentally skeptical.

Once again, if the validating of knowledge of God means an elucidation of its coherence, Heim fails to show the final validity of knowledge of God. Heim repeatedly disavows any claim to logical demonstration. Neither apart from revelation nor in the light of revelation can even the existence of God be established by logic. Again Heim rejects every attempt to establish knowledge of God upon the basis of arguments drawn from morality, feeling, or religion. He finds all these completely inadequate. From the standpoint, therefore, of rationalistic theologies Heim's system must seem to fall short of showing the validity of knowledge of God.

We hold, however, that final validation of knowledge of God is of quite a different order from that suggested in the above ways. It matters not how clearly we as human beings think that we may have proved that God is real or how necessary we may see the existence of God to be, objections can always be raised to our proofs. We are creatures of relativity, so that however much our thoughts may suggest they can never finally prove. Final validation in the sense of proof is, in the nature of the case, impossible.

The final validation of religious knowledge rests in that knowledge itself. All that can be done to elucidate the validity that is already there is to set forth conceptually the meaning of religious knowledge, to show that it is on a plain of at least equal standing with the best of our non-religious knowledge, and so not to be called in question by that knowledge.

If this be validating knowledge of God, then Heim has succeeded in showing the final validity of knowledge of God. Unquestionably Heim has tried to show what it means to know God in His Word. Further, it has been one of the outstanding virtues of Heim's system to show that the certainty of faith is the highest kind of knowledge. He has shown that neither observation nor dialectic science and philosophy could refute the knowledge of God, since the personal knowledge
of faith is knowledge at a deeper level. He has shown how God can meet us in His Word through the Holy Spirit, and how relativity may thus be transcended. He has shown how the knowledge of God is the foundation apart from which other knowledge is invalid.

We are now in a position to summarize our critical analysis of Heim's thought. The distinctive features of Heim's thought are:

1. its attempt to present a general theory of knowledge which is in accord with the essential facts of religious knowledge,
2. its interpretation of knowledge in terms of a dimensional structure,
3. its reaffirmation of the Reformation idea of knowledge of God as a personalistic synthesis of authority and experiencing.

With regard to the first of these we found that the attempt to frame a general epistemology from a religious standpoint is sound insofar as it is an attempt to answer the questions which the human mind raises as to the relative value of religious knowledge and knowledge of other types, although the attempt is mistaken insofar as it is an effort to discover in general epistemology the terminology for the description of religious concepts, or a biasing of general epistemology from a religious standpoint. We found, further, that Heim's general account of the structure of knowledge as a theory of levels, the highest level being personal meeting, to be sound, although it involved an inadequate recognition of the importance of those kinds of knowing in which either the object or the "I" is in the foreground. Finally we say that although Heim's general theory is in essential harmony with the facts of religious knowledge, the value of this is in part vitiated by the fact that Heim is inclined to make too sharp a break between the two.

With regard to Heim's fitting his ideas of the structure of knowledge into a dimensional scheme we found the procedure essentially sound, but noted that it was somewhat speculative and imperfect, and that it tempted Heim at times to artificial parallels.

With regard to Heim's special theory of knowledge of God we found that the skeptical distrust of everything human, which was expressed in Heim's extreme repudiation of Idealism and Realism, comes to a more striking and still less warranted expression in Heim's extreme idea of the relativity and perversity of our common knowledge, in his minimizing of the experiencing involved in our knowledge of God, in his unwillingness to recognize other manifestations of the Word of God than Christ, and in his tendency to exclude our actual experiences from such knowledge. However, despite these extreme tendencies, we found Heim's thought essentially sound in its recognition of the limitation of human thought, in its idea that knowledge of God is a synthesis of authority and experience in which God has the place of primary importance, and in its insistence that in Christ alone, as made known by the Holy Spirit, is adequate knowledge of God.
We began our study of Karl Heim's conception of the approach to knowledge of God by pointing out certain reasons for expecting Heim's thought to be an excellent formulation of the tendency in modern thought to reaffirm the essential importance of revelation without losing sight of the contributions of Liberalism. We have now seen that this expectation is partly, though not entirely, fulfilled in the writings of Heim.

We are grateful to Professor Heim for an analysis of knowledge which brings to light the superior quality of religious knowledge, and for calling into the service of religious philosophy one of the most fruitful concepts of modern science. We are grateful to Heim for joining hands with Barth in the effort to bring men's minds back to a consciousness of the sovereignty of God, and especially for his reaffirmation, over against the Barthians, of the Reformation theory of synthesis of personal knowledge of God. We regret that certain extreme emphases should have detracted from the acceptability of Heim's system, but we trust that his future publications will correct some of the extremes and present in a fairer light the unquestionably vital contributions of his thought. That such a modification of Heim's thought may reasonably be expected is indeed indicated in some degree in his latest book Jesus der Weltvollender and more pointedly in his recent article entitled "The Present Situation of Theology in Germany" in the "Expository Times".
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