JOHN CALVIN'S DOCTRINE OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD

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Degree of Ph.D. conferred 27th March, 1930
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INTRODUCTION

This essay is intended to discuss the subject of the Divine Sovereignty. But it does not take this phrase in quite the ordinary significance of the words. It must, of course, discuss Calvin's ideas as to how the hand of God rules the affairs and destinies of men—the doctrine of providence—and as to how all these things have been determined from all eternity by the hand of God—the doctrine of predetermination. Any discussion of the Sovereignty of God, as taught by any Christian theologian, would of necessity include a statement of his attitude to these matters. But, as used in this essay, the phrase is intended to cover not only these theoretical ideas, but the religious attitudes which went with them; to say that Calvin not only says that God rules the world, but to make this personal, experiential—that God rules me, is my Lord, and that I worship him. The subject of this paper is not merely the doctrines which Calvin has expounded as statements of his theories of the nature of God and of his relation to the world, but Calvin's idea that Deum oportebatur.
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coli et adorari.

It is chiefly in this, rather than in the formulation of the several doctrines which have generally been included under the caption of sovereignty, that this paper finds its right to exist; there is very little of originality in the statement or criticism of the doctrinal ideas. But perhaps there is a certain originality in the attempt to correct what seemed a mistake in many interpreters, that they were so eager to say that they do not, and could not, believe in or love such a God as Calvin's, that they forgot that Calvin did both believe in and love his God.

In carrying out this purpose, after a preliminary sketch of the sources of Calvin's thought about these things, the discussion proper begins with a statement of the doctrine of God, sketching Calvin's idea of the nature of God and his relation to the universe, and of the proper relation and attitude of man to God. This is followed by a statement of the doctrines of creation and providence and their religious implications. Then follow two chapters which may seem strangers in this company, discussing our author's idea of the Divine righteousness and the Divine grace.
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It is the position taken in this essay that Calvin never thought of God without his being clothed with these attributes. Then follows a statement of Calvin's doctrine of predestination. After this a statement of Calvin's soteriology and its religious implications is given, the attempt being made always to show how these doctrines reflect the influence of the concept of sovereignty. Then an effort is made to show the influence of this idea in Reformed theology by illustrations from the Reformed creeds. And then, finally, comes a discussion of the relation of Barth's so-called neo-Calvinism to the ideas of Calvin himself.

In this discussion, it has been necessary, at times, to give up the effort to bring the ideas of our author to entire self-consistency, or even to designate one of two attitudes as the prevalent one. The effort has been made, however, to attain as great measure of consistency as possible, and to interpret the author by the general trend of his thought, resisting the temptation to use obiter dicta and remarks made in the course of an apologetic discussion as if they always represented the ruling ideas of the Reformer.
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In the preparation of this essay in its present expanded form, some changes have been made in the material of the first six chapters, which deal with Calvin's doctrine of God; the statement of the doctrine of the Divine sustentation in the chapter on 'Providence' of the world has been changed slightly, material briefly sketched in an appendix to chapter two has been put into the newer chapters, and omitted from its original position, most of the Latin quotations have been put into English, and the chapters on Calvin's soteriology, on the Reformed creeds, and on Barth, have been added.
Calvin felt very sure of the objective validity of his theological opinions; he was very sure that he had merely read what was plainly written in the Scripture and in nature. He felt sure that all who possess the proper spectacles, namely the Divine gift of regeneration, would of necessity read just the same things which he read; all men must, if they were God's people, come to just the same conclusions to which he had come; all regenerate men must believe in just the same majestic conception of God to which he had come. He did not think of himself as teaching one sort of theology, namely, Calvinistic, but as teaching the true theology, the theology which must be believed by all men. He would not have received kindly the insinuation that his views were peculiar, nor would he have considered it anything less than unbelief for us to seek to assign psychological reasons for the origin of his doctrinal ideas.

And yet, it remains a fact that not all Christians have come to just the same sort of doctrinal positions. It is possible to account for this, as Calvin perhaps would, by simply saying that he, and those who accept his ideas, are more fully illuminated by the Spirit of God than these other men.

The standpoint from which modern men find it best to
approach this question, is that, whether true or false, religious ideas, like other ideas, arise in the mind of men under certain definite influences which we can trace and name. We may think that these influences are used by the Spirit of God for the production of these ideas; at any rate, we find it interesting to seek for such reasons for the ideas which are held by our author.

The theological world in which Calvin lived was dominated by Duns Scotus and William of Occam, to a very great extent. And it is one of the commonplaces of the study of Calvin's theological thought, that his doctrine bears a very marked resemblance to that of these mediaeval schoolmen: they, and he, both found the ultimate cause of things in the will of God. And Calvin goes far toward making us believe that he is holding to the Scotist doctrine of an arbitrary, uncaused will of God, when he says that no cause can be higher than the will of God. It is not possible to think that Calvin was absolutely influenced by the prevalent ideas of these great thinkers; undoubtedly he was influenced by them. But, on the other hand, their influence might easily be over-estimated, and doubtless it has been overestimated in some quarters. Calvin's doctrine is not quite the same as theirs; God is not, for Calvin, an arbitrary will. And it is not likely that
this was the determining influence in the formation of
his doctrine of God. For Calvin seems never to have been
able to read these men with approval; he refers to them
and their followers as 'the Sophists'; he never quotes
Scotus or Occam as if he thought of their doctrine as being
in any wise akin to his own. He can see good in Aquinas
and Lombard, but he never seems to feel any doctrinal
kinship to these men. To think that we can trace such
a kinship more accurately than Calvin, is an opinion that
should be adopted only with the greatest of caution.

And the influence of Luther has been greatly
overestimated. Calvin, with devout gratitude acknowledged
Luther as the man who had sent him back to Paul with
eyes opened to the Apostle's doctrine as to salvation.
But Luther did not, as Bauke and other German theologians
seem to think, invent the doctrine of justification by
faith! There is no doctrine in regard to which Calvin
can be said to have been Luther's pupil in quite the
sense in which these scholars use the term.

And this Colossus, grown so great he doth bestride the
world, needs to be cut down to the size of ordinary men
in this matter of the doctrine of God. Luther's 'Deus
absconditus' does find an echo in Calvin's idea of God;
the two men's ideas are, to some degree, alike. But to think
of the Genevan as simply and merely an echo of Luther, simply
an unsophisticated pupil of Luther, who depended upon his master and intended to reproduce his doctrine, but nichtvöllig begriffen hat, and therefore slipped back into mediaevalism! Luther doubtless influenced Calvin's idea of God, but to go as far as many of the German Lutheran theologians, is impossible for any other than a German mind.

Contemporary theological thought, as represented in the decadent scholasticism of the Roman Catholic Church, and in the protestantism of Luther, shows some marked similarities to Calvin's thought about God. And doubtless it influenced him to an appreciable extent. But it is not here that we should seek the influence that determined his thought and gave him what Williston Walker speaks of as 'That profound consciousness of the reality and authority of God which marks all Calvin's thought!.'

Calvin was a humanist. Humanism sent him back to the classic originals, not only to study them, but very much more—the envious despair with which these men looked back upon the classic golden age may have some connection with Calvin's eagerness to conform everything in the life and thought of the church to what he felt compelled to regard as its golden age. It may be that the influence comes more directly into our sphere. Calvin's first published
literary work was a commentary on Seneca's 'De Clementia'. Perhaps we shall be nearest the truth if we assume that his interest in Stoicism was partly the cause, and partly the effect, of his turn of mind. As he studied the literature and the thought of Greece and Rome, he would be drawn to the Stoics as the noblest teachers of their time, and would perhaps adopt some of their ideas. But probably his interest grew from similarity of thought, quite as much as similarity of thought grew from interest. The stern morality of the Stoics, their doctrine of a destiny to which all men must submit, was doubtless in harmony with tendencies already present in his mind; this doctrine of an absolute supernatural power, and the uncompromising demand for the carrying out in life of its principles, doubtless confirmed Calvin's thought, and developed it. But probably it did not determine it. Because Calvin felt no kinship with Scotus, we have been forced to feel that the direct influence of that eminent theologian upon him, was not of the greatest. And as a Christian theologian he seems to have felt that he could not sustain his views about God by an appeal to the Stoics.

There were, however, other thinkers whom he did recognize as his fellows in this matter, and whom he never failed to call to his aid when expounding or defending his doctrine. Calvin believed that his ideas as to the Divine Sovereignty had been taught before him by Augustine, and Paul, and
the writers of the Old Testament—he believed that they had been taught, and well taught. And he always calls them to his aid to explain and prove his doctrine. Calvin believed that he was merely saying over again what Paul and Augustine had already said. Doubtless much of the material that went into his doctrinal construction came from these men.

The material came from them; but why did he choose it from them; and why did he throw it into just the shape he did? He has not merely reproduced Augustine; he has greatly accentuated him. And we should not assume that he merely was stupid and clumsy, and misunderstood his great Latin teacher. Why did he learn from the Bible what other men did not learn? These questions throw us back upon something that goes before his study of the Scripture and of Augustine.

And, in any case, the way in which he uses these authorities would show that not all of his theological individuality is due to them: that high and awful God is just as much in evidence in the first edition of the Institutio as it ever came to be in the later editions. But he does not at all quote Augustine with the frequency which we see later. It is Augustine who taught him predestination, and we see this doctrine come to the fore in the later editions, and simultaneously, the quotations from
Augustine became more frequent. Augustine taught him predestination, but not the idea of the Divine majesty. And the same thing holds, to a less extent, of the Old Testament and of Paul. Paul never became as much a bulwark as Augustine and the Old Testament were; doubtless the latter was the most influential of all the external influences that played upon the life and thought of this man. But it can hardly be thought that even here we have the heart of the matter of his doctrinal peculiarity.

There remains the matter of the peculiar temperament and experience of the man. O. Ritschl has a suggestion which is of interest on this point. He thinks that this homeless Frenchman idealized the king of the land he longed for, and so carried over into religion his feeling for the splendor of his country and his king, and so came to clothe his God with the splendors which, for him, his earthly monarch wore.

There is something very attractive in this attempt to look into the mind of our author. Calvin did indeed make Geneva a refuge for homeless Frenchmen; he did indeed use it as a basis of operations for an evangelistic propaganda which found some of its best results in France.

But did Calvin feel for the King of France the submissive admiration which Ritschl's scheme calls for? He says to the king that he writes the Institutio
in order 'that you may know the nature of that doctrine which is the object of such unbounded rage to those madmen who are disturbing the country with fire and sword'--the part of the king in both the 'rage', and the 'disturbance' was well enough known to Calvin. "We despair not of gaining your favor if you will only once read with calmness and composure this our confession...but, on the contrary, if your ears are so pre-occupied with the whispers of the malevolent as to leave no opportunity for the accused to speak for themselves, and if these outrageous furies, with your connivance, continue to persecute with imprisonments, scourges, tortures, confiscations, and flames, we shall indeed, like sheep destined for the slaughter, be reduced to the greatest extremities. Yet we shall in patience possess our souls, and wait for the mighty hand of the Lord, which will undoubtedly in time appear, and show itself armed for the deliverance of the poor from their affliction, and for the punishment of their despisers, who now exult in such perfect security."

It is not possible that his feeling for the king to whom he spoke so, is the model on which his regard for his God was built.

Let us look again at his mind and heart, however--

Speaking of the Roman Catholic theologians, Calvin says: 'Could these men say such things, if they believed in God?'

This emotional, irrational element may give us the key...
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to the origin of Calvin's doctrine of God's sovereignty. He does not express the reason why such utterances as those of the theologians in question were so thoroughly impossible for men who believed in God; he merely has an instinctive feeling that the two things are utterly incompatible, and he expresses that feeling. Could anything that was learned from others come to have this sort of such instinctive force as this? Does it not seem that this sense of the awful authority and majesty of God, a God whose terrible presence, if believed in, would have made such utterances impossible, must have sprung from roots within him?

And this feeling of Calvin's is not only instinctive, but a little bit childish. This rushing to such grand and sweeping generalizations, stated in such superlative terms, is not the sort of thing which grows up in a man's mind as a result of a life's experience. Is it not very likely that the roots of this are to be sought very early in life? It is a very beautiful and wonderful sort of theology, but we may believe in it devotedly, and yet say that it is of a piece with the childish declaration that 'Whatever my mother says is so, even if it isn't so'. Would we not, if we could have talked to him, have found in Calvin at six years old most of the roots of what later became the Calvinistic idea of God? And if we must think
of theological instruction, isn't it likely that what his beau-
tiful and pious mother taught him in his childhood
is likely to have been quite as important as anything
that he learned from Scotus and Luther?

A. Lang is thinking along this same line, that Calvin's
doctrinal peculiarity springs from internal, not external,
sources, in what he has to say on this subject (Die
Bekehrung Calvin's, pp. 56-57). Calvin felt, Lang says,
that he had sinned against God. He therefore wanted, not
Luther's teaching, but the promises of God, against
whom he had sinned; hence his theology would be
more dominated by the idea of God, than was Luther's.
And he was born with an objectivity of nature which
moved him to trace back his heart-experiences to their
objective ground, in this ground, rather than in the
experience, to find assurance.

It was these inborn tendencies, which, more than
everything else, gave to Calvin that peculiarly pro-
found and powerful sense of the absolute sovereignty
of God.
All of this entire paper has to do with the doctrine of God; it is the special province of this part of it to set forth the ideas which gather immediately about the almighty Divine Person who is the center of Calvin's doctrine of Sovereignty.

After examining the question of God's essential relation to the universe, we shall then inquire whether God be knowable, and what his character is, and then state the religious attitude considered proper toward such a God.

Not all interpreters are agreed as to what Calvin thought about God in his relation to the universe; some have said that he considered this relation to be one of identity; others have said that he was virtually a Deist. Some have said that he thought of God as an unknowable essence, known to us only as an arbitrary and capricious will; others have violently denied this. And all have found, or thought they found, strong reasons for their thought: our author's doctrine of providence, making all things dependent, from moment to moment, upon the presence of God, has been the starting-point for the belief that he is a pantheist. His vigorous sense of the
transcendental majesty of God has lent color to a view exactly opposite, namely, that Calvin was virtually a Deist. And his general conception of the absolute authority of the Divine will, together with certain particular statements, has made some scholars think that his God is very much like that of Duns Scotus.

Dr. Warfield's remarks on this subject of Calvin's alleged pantheism are not based upon his wonted careful research. He says: "The logical process by which the Calvinistic conception of the sovereign will of God as the prima causa rerum—where the very term prima implies the existence and reality of second causes—is transmuted into the pantheizing notion that the will of God is the sole efficient cause operative in the universe; or by which the Calvinistic conception of God as the Sovereign Ruler of the universe whose 'will is the necessity of things' is transmuted into the reduction of God, Hegelian-wise, into pure and naked will—although it has apparently appealed to many—is certainly very obscure. In point of fact, when the Calvinist spoke of God as the prima causa rerum—the phrase is cited from William Ames—he meant by it only that all that takes place takes place in accordance with the Divine will, not that the Divine will is the sole efficient cause in
the universe; and when Calvin quotes approvingly from Augustine—for the words are Augustine's—that 'the will of God is the necessity of things', so little is either he or Augustine making use of the words in a pantheistic sense that he hastens to explain that what he means is only that whatever God has willed will certainly come to pass, although it comes to pass 'in such a manner that the cause and the matter of it are found in the second causes (ut causa et materia in ipsis reperiatur)'.

Dr. Warfield's denial goes a little too far; not the whole point in this business is the existence of those 'second causes', but God's relation to them; of course Calvin would assert their existence; the question is whether he has a right to do so. And he has not nearly so clear a right to do so as Dr. Warfield would have us think. Calvin came very much nearer pantheism than he has admitted. Calvin held (see chapter on Providence) that all natural objects, and men themselves, exist only by the sustaining power of the hand of God, and this in such sense that if the power of the Spirit of God is withdrawn, they vanish away (Commentary on Psa. 164:29, 30).
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It is evident that Dr. Warfield had not read this passage from the Commentary, or he would not have felt free to make quite the bald denial that he did. Calvin's doctrine of providence has indeed so closely associated the power of God with the activity and the very existence of all things as to come close to pantheism; to identify the principle of life in animals with the Spirit of God, to say that God, by a 'secret inspiration' is a part of the existence of physical bodies, is very close to pantheism, and Dr. Warfield, if he knew, should have acknowledged these things.

But these statements of Calvin are to be taken as a part of his doctrine of providence, apologetic statements made to under-gird that doctrine--they did indeed seem to Calvin to be essential to the existence of his doctrine of providence; still we feel bound to say that, though they come into the domain of the doctrine of God, they are not at home there, and should not be allowed to have too much influence in this alien sphere. Calvin, when he was talking about God, never makes the sort of statements that one would expect if he meant really to carry out fully the ideas which are attributed to him. He does not write like a pantheist.
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And so, we are bound to think that it is little less than absurd to say, as Principal Fairbairn is quoted as saying: "Calvin was as pure, though not as consistent a pantheist as Spinoza". Let Calvin himself speak: "I confess that the expression, that nature is God, may be used in a pious sense by a pious mind; but, as it is harsh and inconsistent with strict propriety of speech, nature being rather an order prescribed by God, it is dangerous in matters so momentous, and demanding peculiar caution, to confound the Deity with the inferior course of his works". Calvin was no pantheist.

On the other hand, Dr. Warfield quotes from A.V.G. Allen (Princ. Rev., p. 405, footnote) to the effect that "The God who is thus revealed is a Being outside the framework of the universe, who called the world into existence by the power of his will. Calvin positively rejected the doctrine of the Divine immanence. When he spoke of 'that dog of a Lucretius' he may have had Zwingli in mind. In order to separate more completely between God and man, he interposed ranks of mediators... In some respects the system of Calvin not only repeats but exaggerates the leading ideas of Latin Christianity. In no Latin writer is found
such a determined purpose to reject the immanence of Deity and assert his transcendence and isolation from the world. In his conception of God, as absolute, arbitrary will, he surpasses even Duns Scotus himself. The separation between God and humanity is emphasized as it had never been before, for Calvin insists, dogmatically and formally, upon that which had been, to a large extent, hitherto, an unconscious though controlling sentiment. 

Dr. Warfield tells us that Professor Alien had already represented the Augustinian theology as resting upon the transcendence of deity as its controlling principle, which he (Allen) explains as a 'tacit assumption of Deism.'

And yet, Calvin is no Deist. His position in this matter is so clear that, to anyone who has read the 'Institutio', it can only seem that Professor Allen assigns a new meaning to the term Deism. It is the object of Calvin's whole discussion of the doctrine of providence to say that God is not 'outside the universe' in any sense other than that he is not identical with it; if it be Deism to deny
the identity of God with the universe, then Calvin is properly to be called a Deist; but so are all the other men who can properly be called Christian theologians. And whatever else he is or is not, Calvin is no Deist; he holds a doctrine of providence which describes God as having his hand on every event of life, as ruling every choice of the human will, and as bearing a very close and intimate relation to the very existence of all things. And, too, he holds a doctrine of revelation which is at the very opposite pole from Deism.

There remains the question whether Calvin held a Scotist idea of God; that God, so far as we know him, is a bare and arbitrary will, whose decisions are literally uncaused and ungoverned, purely and absolutely arbitrary. And certainly he allowed himself to say some things which fit best, or seem to fit best, with such an idea of God. He tells us that there can never be anything higher than the will of God; there can be no cause which goes before it, and none should be sought. He says: "They inquire, by what right the Lord is angry with his creatures who had not provoked him by any previous offence; for that to devote to destruction whom he pleases is more like the caprice of a tyrant than the lawful sentence of a judge; that men hay
men have reason, therefore, to expostulate with God, if they are predestinated to eternal death without any demerit of their own, merely by his sovereign will. If such thoughts ever enter the minds of pious men, they will be sufficiently enabled to break their force by this one consideration, how exceedingly presumptuous it is only to inquire into the causes of the Divine will; which is, in fact, and is justly entitled to be, the cause of everything that exists. For if it has any cause, then there must be something antecedent, on which it depends, which it is impious to suppose. For the will of God is the highest rule of justice; so that what God wills must be considered just, for this very reason, because he wills it. When it is inquired, therefore, why the Lord did so, the answer must be, Because he would. But if you go further, and ask why he so determined, you are in search of something greater and higher than the will of God, which can never be found. (3:23:2). It seems as if Calvin has said that God is a mere arbitrary will—it looks as if he has enthroned as his God an almighty caprice, ungoverned, ungovernable, uncaused, and acting without regard to any principles or any persons.

Again, there is a sentence in his discussion of the atonement, which seems even more clearly to show a doctrine of God very like that of Scotus. "Christus non nisi ex Dei
beneplacito quaequam mereri potuit. (2:17:1)"

It is easy enough to see why these statements have been understood to show that Calvin thought of God as an ungoverned, arbitrary will; that at least this is all we know about Him, and perhaps it the very essence of God himself; that at any rate, in Calvin's world, right becomes right simply by the bare fiat of God, and that the sacrifice of Christ, though spoken of in many high-sounding words, as appeasing the wrath of God, and satisfying his justice, though he is spoken of as a substitute and surety for sinners, yet all this really means only that God willed to accept this sacrifice. Righteousness, eternal life, eternal death, atonement, all have no meaning in themselves; all are tossed about according to the caprice of this almighty Tyrant.

It seems so—and many interpreters of Calvin have made this their last word on this subject. But is it so? We soon find that whatever these passages may mean, there are passages which boldly and explicitly deny the very things which we had thought that these statements meant. We hear Calvin say: Nam quum nihil minus Deo conveniat quam abjectam mundi gubernationem fortunae permettere, coecutire ad hominum scelera, ut
impune lasciviant: quisquis exstincto coelestis iudicii metu secure sibi indulget, Deum esse negat. (1:4:2); right and wrong are not changeable, do not originate from his mere arbitrary fiat, and are not so to be set aside; right originates from the nature, not from the will, of God. Again: (1:17:2) Deus sibi ius regendi mundi vindicet.... Non illa quidem absoleta voluntas de qua garriunt sophistae, impio profanoque dissidio separantes eius iustitiam a potentia; sed illa moderatrix rerum pmnium providentia, a qua nihil nisi rectum manat, quamvis nobis absconditae sint rationes. It is impious, then, to exempt the will of God from the control of the principles of right which have their source in the nature of his being. If the passages previously cited, then, teach a Scotist Doctrine of God, they are out of keeping with the nature of God, and are impious.

But do these passages teach such a doctrine? In the first passage (3:23:2), he is speaking not of God at all, but of God's relation to man, and especially of the attitude men ought to take toward God. He is speaking adversus impiorum audaciam, qui Deo palam maledicere non formidant, and the scope and aim of the paragraph is no more than this; he merely says that it is impiety when stulti homines cum Deo
litigant quasi eum teneant suis criminationibus obnoxium. And the purpose of what he says of the absoluteness of the Divine will is merely to lay down the principle that men must render to God a humble and reverent obedience. For in the same paragraph he says Neque tamen commentum ingerimus absolutae potentiae; quod sicuti profanum est, ita merito detestabile nobis esse debet. Non fingimus Deum ex lege, qui sibi lex est; quia (ut ait Plato) lege indigent homines qui cupiditatisbus laborant; Dei autem voluntas non modo ab omni vitio pura, sed summa perfectionis regula, etiam legum omnium lex est. Verum negamus obnoxium esse reddendae rationi; negamus etiam nos idoneos iudices, qui proprio sensu pronuntiemos de hac causa. What was said of the absoluteness of the Divine will was not a theory of the grounds of moral ideals, which many interpreters seek to make it, but a statement as to how men ought to restrain themselves in the presence of God. When he says that the will of God is the highest rule of justice, so that what he says must be considered just for this very reason, because he wills it, he
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means to say, that this is the reason why it is to be considered (by us); to be just, not at all that this is the ultimate ground of it; that we must be so sure of the very thing that some Calvin-scholars deny him to have held, that God always does what we would have to consider right if we understood it— that we must be so sure of this that the very fact that a thing is the will of God is a proof, and a sufficient proof, that it is right; that we shall receive the will of God as the practical rule of what is right.

It is not so easy to be sure as to how to understand the other Scotist-sounding passage: (2:17:1) Christ could merit nothing except by the good pleasure of God. Very many students have been positive that this is proof conclusive that Calvin held to Scotus’s acceptionation theory of the atonement. And that, on the face of it, is a very bold thing to do, in the face of Calvin’s implied denials, and the position about this matter taken by all those who claimed to follow him closely. But the passage itself probably does not necessarily, or even probably, teach any such thing as the Scotist doctrine. Later Calvinist theologians have taught, at this point, that the thing determined by the will of God is the acceptance of a substitution; Turretin says (Locus 14, Q.10, paragraph xxvii) Gratia
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(spectatur) in acceptatione eius satisfactionis ad nostram iustificationis. Turrettin is almost certainly giving us a mere paraphrase of Calvin's Institutio, at this point; Calvin, four lines before, had said Nihil obstat quomminus gratuita sit hominum iustificatione mera Dei misericordia, et simul interveniat Christi meritem, and we find Turrettin saying, in the very same sentence from which we have just quoted Gratia Dei et Meritum Christi non opponuntur. It seems, therefore, that Turrettin was repeating and interpreting Calvin's statement. Now, there is now doubt that Turrettin meant to say that it was by God's mere good pleasure that a substitute for sinners was allowed, and it seems that he understood Calvin to have said this same thing.

The words may mean what Turrettin has taken them to mean. But probably Calvin meant to say something different from even this; it is more than possible that the thing said to be determined by the will of God is neither the satisfying value of the death of Christ, nor the allowance of a substitution, but the election of Christ
to be the Son of God and Savior of men. This interpretation requires that we understand Calvin to say that a human person was elected to be the Son of God. He says just this thing, not only here, but also in 3:22:1: (quoting from Augustine—though he says the same thing less tersely in his own words) In ipso ecclesiae capite lucidissimum esse gratuítiae electionis speculum,...in nec iuste vivendo factum esse Filium Dei, sed gratis tonto honore donatum finisse. Thus we would understand Calvin, in this sentence supposed to have taught an acceptance doctrine of atonement, to say that Christ could not have merited anything unless he had been elected by the good pleasure of God to his high offices and honors.

At any rate the first interpretation, and the one most common, representing Calvin as saying that the arbitrary fiat of the Divine will gave to the sacrifice of Christ a value and efficacy not intrinsically belonging to it, is so thoroughly out of harmony with all the trend of Calvin's thought that it must seem very improbable. Calvin knew, but rejected and scorned the Scotist conception of God.
Calvin would have us believe, then, that God is not identical with the universe, that he is not totally unconnected with the universe, and that he is not a mere arbitrary and capricious will; what, then, is God? Calvin has spoken very sparingly on this subject. He felt that it was right to reject all these conceptions of the Divine nature which we have been discussing. But when he is asked to state his own theory, he hesitates, and says that God has said very little about this, and that silence becomes the theologian's best: Deus, ut nos in sobrietate contineat, parce de sua essentia disserit. Calvin almost never makes a sentence having God as its subject, and the verb as its predicate. He is not interested in making theoretical statements about God, but in expounding his practical faith in God, as it leads him to worship and serve God. And so his ideas about this remained to the end without systematic exposition, and we must gather together partial statements, and must infer from the implications of what he says, finding the nature of his God indicated in his religious attitudes, as we know the terrible power of a fire from the fear-stricken faces of the spectators shown on the canvas.
What is God? Calvin has said that, in a certain sense, we cannot know: (1:5:1) *Essentia eius quidem incomprehensibilis est, ut sensus omnes humanos procul effugiat eius numen.* (1:13:1) *Quis enim vel parum ingeniosus non intelligit Deum ita nobiscum, ceu nutrices solent cum infantibus quomodo balbutire? Proinde tales loquendi formae non tam ad liquamentum exprimunt, qualis sit Deus, quam eius notitiam tenuitata nostrae accommodant; quod ut fiat, longe infra eius altitudinem descendere necesse est. Or as he says elsewhere: 'We shall never know God as he is, but we shall know him in such measure as it shall please him to manifest himself to us, that is, to wit, according to that which he knoweth to be profitable for our salvation (Hunter, p. 48).'

Many interpreters take him very much in earnest in this; perhaps too much in earnest. Thus, it would seem that not only is it true that we must be wary of discoursing upon the Divine essence, but perhaps we know very little about God at all; perhaps all of what we think of as religious truth is merely a Divinely sanctioned mythology, composed of what God wants us to believe about him, but perhaps not at all in harmony with the actual facts about God as he is.
Thus Dr. Hunter says: *(p. 49)* Occasionally he leaves one with the impression that the God of revelation might turn out to be something quite different from the God of reality. Ultimate inscrutability characterizes both His nature and the purposes and principles of His Providence and government."

This has sometimes been carried so far as to attribute to Calvin sentiments very much like those of Professor Karl Barth, that Gott ist im Himmel, und du auf Erden, and that human knowledge can never reach across this gulf. But this effort, at least, we may say at once, is not likely to commend itself to the majority of scholars. Herrink says: Wenn der Glaube aus der Verzweiflung heraus entstanden sein soll, so kann man sich freilich auf das Calvin'sche 'per mediam desperationem prorumpere convenit' berufen, und doch ist es eine Einsichtigkeit, die nimmermehr ins Reformationszeitalter passt. *(Vom Ringen um das Verständnis Calvins, in Theologische Blätter, March, 1927, p. 74)*

And perhaps the milder forms of this have taken Calvin a little too seriously. Perhaps these statements are echoes of the Deus Absconditus of Luther, or perhaps they represent a passing mood of the author. At any rate, it is
certain that they have been carried too far when they are made to prove him an agnostic who must count himself in with men whom he, if he had known them in real life, would have fought with all his might. Probably all that these statements amount to, is that we had better let philosophy alone, and seek our knowledge of God from the Scriptures.

We can know God. We can know what he has been pleased to tell us as to what he is erga nos; we should seek this knowledge, receive it, and obey it.

Let us notice the way in which this knowledge of God is developed, according to Calvin. He says the Divinitatis sensus is a fundamental endowment of all men; Quendam inesse humani menti, et quidem naturali instinctu, divinitatis sensum, extra controversiam ponimus. This sensus divinitatis is an intelligentia numinis. He is here evidently speaking of the inherent sense of reverence and of awe which stands at the basis of all religion. This feeling, for Calvin himself, always centered upon a single, personal, God; and he felt sure that it must always be so for all men; by this men know him unum esse, et suum esse officem. This feeling, inherent in the nature of man, comes to consciousness and prominence as it finds occasion in the events of life; Calvin
calls this a 'remembering': Cuius (so intelligentiam numinis) memoriam renovans—he evidently seems to have had a hazy and undeveloped conception very much akin to the doctrine of innate ideas against which John Locke found it necessary to contend. Evidently this renovans intelligentiam numinis memoriam is just the calling out of this feeling of awe and reverence, the thing which the Greeks called 'Panik fear'.

This sense of God is ineradicable.

Insculptum mentibus humanis esse divinitatis sensum, qui deleri numquam sit. Even in the minds of the wicked sensum deitatis, quem maxime extinctum cuperent, visere, ac subinde emergere. To lack this is to be a brute: si ab eorum vita semel absit religio, non modo brutis pecudibus nihil excellere, sed multis partibus longe esse misericordes.

There is, too, a natural knowledge of God resting on rational grounds, in addition to this instinctive sensus deitatis; God is plainly revealed in the natural world: Non solum hominum mentibus indidit illud quod dixerimus religionis semen; sed ita patefacit in toto mundi officio, ac se palam offert, ut aperire oculos nequeant quin aspicere eum coegantur. Our talents, and our very existence, are rivuli, which lead us ad fontem.
Calvin waxes eloquent as he tells us of this revelation of God in nature—(1:5:1) The worlds are spectacula invisibilium rerum; Prophetæ coelestibus creaturis idioma attribuit nullis nationibus incognitum; this is so plain that it is evidentiori exstat quam ut praeterire gentis ullius vel obtusissimae considerationem debeat. And the human body, in its beautiful and accurate adjustments, leads us to know God. And not only are these things made evident to the eyes of the scholar, the naturalist, or the philosopher; all men, even the most ignorant, should see God and know him as he is manifested in the natural world.

And now, Calvin goes a step further; he puts together these two approaches to the knowledge of God, and says that they lead us to the same God: (1:5:3) Intus singuli coelestem gratiam, qua vegetamur, indubie sentiunt. We have this feeling of reverence and awe, of which we first were thinking, toward the Maker of the world and of our own bodies.

When we ask what are the things which we learn about God from natural sources, we find that Calvin has not taken the trouble to answer in a formal or complete way. But he tells us in 1:5:3; that from these sources we learn the potentia, bonitas, and scientia Dei.
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And in chapter ten (1:10:2) he tells us that "The mercy, goodness, clemency, justice, judgment, and truth of God shine clearly in both heaven and earth." We get an idea of what he means by some of these terms as we hear him say (C.R., vol. 29, p. 495, paragraph 7) "We ascribe to him omnipotence... he is omnipotent in that all things are held in his hand, by his providence heaven and earth are governed, by his counsel and nod all things are conducted and arranged", and (1:10:2) "Mercy, in which alone consists all our salvation... Judgment, which is exercised daily upon the wicked, and which waits them in even more severe fashion in their eternal death... righteousness, by which the faithful are preserved and graciously cared for... wonderful is his wisdom, which is shown in many ways innumerable, both in the heavens and in the earth". Yet all this has proved insufficient.

Yet all this has proved insufficient, in fact, to lead men to an adequate knowledge of God. Calvin says that these things are plainly to be seen in nature, and that literally all men so in fact experience some sensus deitatis; but this has not brought them to a sufficient knowledge of him. This failure is ascribed, not to any inherited or inheritable depravity of the nature of man, but to the failure to see God and receive him as he has revealed himself in the natural world, and to a direct and intentional revolt from God. Men have
wandered into various vain speculations, all leading away from God; they have invented theories of many diverse sorts; they have made for themselves many false Gods. They have carelessly forgotten and ignored God, and have wandered into vices of all sorts. And so, by the sinful failure to use the mind, and by the sinful misuse of the moral and emotional nature, tandem se tanta errorum congerie implicant, ut scintillas illas quae micas bant ad cerenda Dei demum gloriam suffocet, ac exstinguat malitiae caligo.

This must be called an inconsistency in the system of our author. His system demands that this failure to apprehend the revelation of God be referred chiefly to the fall, as he says (C.R. vol. 29 p. 28): Quicunque ex Adam nascimur, omnes Dei ignorantes sumus et experites, perversi, corrupti, emisque boni inopes. He would justify himself, to some extent, by saying that he has not come to that, yet; the first book deals with God the Creator, and man's original relation to him; very good—then why did our author not confine himself to the discussion of how this revelation would have been apprehended by such a man? The motive, of course, is the desire to give all possible completeness and adequacy to the idea of the objective fulness of the natural revelation of God, in order that he may make all men to be without excuse. They would not be quite so inexcusable, if their failure were due to total depravity.

Thus, this natural sensus divinitatis, and this revelation of God in nature, though objectively adequate, do not lead men to God. And the confused and feeble light which remains is rendered still less useful by the fact that men do not agree about it; it lacks authority.
And so, the light which God has given to men renders men absolutely without excuse, but it does not save them. Hence the necessity for special revelation.

And so God has revealed himself to his people in his word. Whether by visions, or by oracles, or by the messages of men "he engraved upon their hearts a firm certainty of the doctrine, so that they were persuaded and knew that what they taught had come from God". And then, this was written down: "at length, in order that the true doctrine might remain continuous for all ages, those same oracles which he had deposited with the fathers, were written down and became as it were public books". This revelation is for all men, in all ages and climes, under all circumstances.

This revelation is universally valid, but it can be received only by the work of the Spirit of God on the mind: there are sound reasons of a rational sort, tending to prove the truth of the scriptures, but no man receives and believes the Book except a perfect testimonio Spiritus: (1:7:4) "It is necessary, therefore, that the same Spirit, who spake by the mouths of the prophets, should penetrate into our hearts, to convince us that they faithfully delivered the oracles which were divinely intrusted to them.....and this persuasion must be sought from a higher source than human reasons, or judgments, or conjectures--even from the secret testimony of the Spirit". And when men have been so taught, they are sure to receive and take into their hearts,
and understand with their minds this revealed work of God. "Let this remain fixed, that those whom the Spirit inwardly teaches, firmly acquiesce in the Scripture." To men having this Testimonium, the book is perspicuous and self-authenticating: "it is 

God and understand with their minds this revealed work of God. "Let this remain fixed, that those whom the Spirit inwardly teaches, firmly acquiesce in the Scripture." To men having this Testimonium, the book is perspicuous and self-authenticating: "it is 
orbrrtrTov, nor ought it to be subjected to demonstration or reason; that certainty which it ought to have with us it will attain by the secret testimony of the Spirit. For just as old men, or blind people, if you put a beautiful book into their hands, although they know that something is written there, can not read it, yet can they read distinctly when you put spectacles on them; exactly so do we understand the Scriptures only when the Spirit shows us how." And thus the truth of the scripture becomes as evident, in contrast to all error, as light in contrast to darkness, sweet and sour, black and white. 

It is just here, of course, that we are to find the explanation of the remarkable assurance of the man. He was always so dogmatically sure, not because he felt that his reason was superior to that of another man, but merely because he was sure that God had made him a regenerate man, and he believed that in regeneration a man receives, necessarily and universally, the arcanum testimonium.
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Spiritus sanctij that the same almighty God who had made
the earth had spoken in the Scriptures and in his own
heart. He was sure, not of himself so much as of his God.
All other regenerate men read the same Book under the
guidance of the same Spirit; hence all regenerate men must
come to the same conclusion; and any who differ, must
be convinced or silenced. Calvin felt that he could say
that 'he that is of God heareth us'.

And here, just as in the confidence of the Calvinist
as to election and eternal salvation, the high
confidence is born of an absolute dependence upon God.
We should not fail to notice how completely his
whole doctrine of the knowledge of God is a prostration
of himself before God.

The matter which this revelation supplies is
substantially the same as that which is given by the light
of nature, so far as it is dealing with 'God the Creator'.
(C.R. vol 29, p 460, paragraph 7) Deum esse unum aeternae,
infiniiae, spiritualis essentiae pronuntiat. In Chap. 13
of the Institutio, he begins with some statements about
Quod de immensa et spirituali Dei essentia traditur in
Scripturis, but proceeds immediately to handle the subject
in a way that is by no means based upon the Scripture.
The two sources of the knowledge/furnish, not two kinds of knowledge, but are so nearly the same that he preserved no rigid distinction between them.

A few things may be added to what was set down as the contents of Calvin's knowledge of God from nature; a few things which do in fact, whether necessarily or not, come into our hands from his discussion of the knowledge of God from the Scriptures. Deus Spiritualis est, or, as in 1:13:1, as cited above, Spiritualis essentia. In the exposition of this statement, Calvin denies both Deism and pantheism: Spiritualis vero natura quicquam de eo terrenum aut carnale speculari vetat... est incomprehensibilis, terram implet. He had made it evident in what he had said just before, that he is speaking of pantheistic notions of God, when he says terrenum aut carnale.

We may say, further, that God is, to Calvin, a personal God. He never used this expression, but he held to the idea: a spiritual essence, known to be possessed of wisdom, knowledge, a will, reactions of evaluation which are represented to us as affection and anger, and a moral nature.
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When we began on this topic of the knowledge of God, we glanced at some statements of his which were thought by some interpreters to show Calvin as more or less of an agnostic. Let us return to this matter for a moment. We know in part—yes, but we know. We do not, and cannot, know God exhaustively. And we are unwilling to speculate in these regions. But, in the first place, we have all the knowledge that we need for our life; we know, so far as we need to know, what God is erga nos. But, more than this, we shall now feel that it is not accurate to say that Calvin held that we know little or nothing of what God is apud se: we have heard him say to us that God is a spiritual, immense essence; that God acts by the exercise of a conscious will which is guided by intellectual processes which are, in a measure, analogous to our own; that God is a moral Being, whose acts are moral acts. These are statements which reach across the great divide, and describe the nature of the Divine Being apud se. Again, Calvin felt that the Divine virtues, describing, in a practical way, what God is erga nos, is very far from being a divinely sanctioned agglomeration of fairy tales, describing what God would have us think him to be, though not really describing him as he is. These attributes reach across the divide, too, and are qualifications of the Divine nature. It is evident that the attribute of retributive justice is held to be essential to the very nature.
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te the very existence of God, so sure is Calvin that
God, apud se, is that sort of God: Nam quam nihil minus
Deo conveniat, quam abiectam mundi gubernationem fort-
tunae permittam coecutire ad hominum scelera, ut
impune lasciviant: quisquis extincto coelestis
iudicii metu secure sibi indulget, Deum esse negat.
Has any man dared more boldly to assert that he
knows what God is? Truly, Calvin holds that A suis
virtutibus manifestatur Dominus.

Before this Transcendent yet immanent spirit,
thus known as almighty, righteous, gracious, Calvin
prostrates himself in dependence and worship.
We are granted the knowledge of God in order that we
may submit ourselves to him, and worship him. It is
another way of saying this same thing, to say that
God is our sovereign Lord. Dr. Hunter has well said
that Calvin sums up his whole philosophy of life in
the opening questions of his second catechism, where
he says: What is the principal end of human life?
To know God. Why do you say that? Because he has c
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created us and put us into the world to be glorified
in us, and it is right that we should devote our life to
his glory since he is the commencement of it.

Dr. Hunter was very happy in his choice of a
passage to illustrate Calvin's use of this phrase,
'The glory of God' as a summary of his whole
philosophy of our existence. But Dr. Hunter has not
been quite so happy in the interpretation of it:
(p 55) If you probe behind such a doctrine and ask
questions which impeach the justice of God, Calvin
confesses he cannot answer you, but declares his
assurance that it is all for the glory of God, so
making the phrase almost equivalent to the mystery
of the ultimate reason of things. Thus it comes to
imply the reverse of the meaning which it is ordina-
rily given, being used to vindicate providences in
which God does not manifest himself, but hides
himself. Not quite—the glory of God means the
manifestation of God, as God. The manifestation of any
side of the Divine nature as divine, and as
therefore claiming man's worship and submission, is
said to glorify God. This manifestation of Deity may be
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rationally intelligible, or it may be surrounded in the most complete mystery—man may be utterly unable to fathom it, or to see how it is possible; it may be gracious, or it may be terribly severe; it may declare his justice, or it may deny all explanation and demand bare submission—all these things are said to glorify God, because they reveal him as an object deserving and claiming worship. And when it is said that Calvin is sure that these inscrutable providences are for the glory of God, it should be said that very often the phrase is pushing the whole problem into the future, and saying that ultimately all things will glorify God; all things will be seen to have worked for the exhibition of the Divine power, righteousness, and grace, for the manifestation of God as being Divine, and therefore as being the supreme object of all existence. The glory of God, then, means any manifestation of him which declares his absolute exaltation above his creatures and claims their submission.

The glory of God is the supreme end of all creation. *Universa quae in coelo sunt et in terra, in eius gloriam create esse.* All things receive from God their existence, all things are guided and governed
by him, and all this vast created organism exists and is administered with the primary and absolute object of glorifying him, and with a secondary and relative object with respect to his creatures. God is the great fact in Calvin's universe; he dominates everything to such an extent that man and all other creatures shrink into a dwarfed insignificance. But, be it said, in Calvin's world, this man, who thus hangs helpless upon the bounty of this matchless Might, is not held in submission by bare power alone. Calvin thinks not only that God does overshadow all creation with a majesty and might which make man insignificant, but that it is right that this should be so. There is indeed a fierce sternness about it—the very use of the name of God is expected to hush the whole world into submission: Prophetae et apostoli... sacrum nomen Dei proferunt, quo ad obsequium gogantur totum mundum. Fierce and stern and awful it often is, in Calvin's hands, but always he makes us know that he believes that it is right. All creation must bow before the splendid and majestic Might which rules the universe; all moral beings must bow before the Lord of righteousness; every mouth must be stopped before the God of Glory.
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Not only is this submission a matter of right, but Calvin renders it as a tribute of his affection. He, with Otto, has been drawn to this Mysterium Tremendum: (C.R., vol. 29, p. 54) Sane haec nobis una causa satis debuerat, ut Deus in nobis glorificetur. Or (2:3:27) "the faithful fear his displeasure more than punishment". Or: again, almost at the beginning of the Institution, we get a beautiful and lengthy statement of this attitude: (1:2:2) "Knowing him to be his Lord and Father, he concludes that he ought to mark his government in all things, revere his majesty, endeavor to promote his glory, and obey his commands. Perceiving him to be a just Judge, armed with severity for the punishment of crimes, he keeps his tribunal always in view, and is restrained by fear from provoking his wrath. Yet is he not so terrified at the apprehension of his justice, as to wish to evade it, even if escape were possible; but loves him as much in punishing the wicked as in blessing the pious, because he believes it as necessary to his glory to punish the impious and abandoned, as to reward the righteous with eternal life. Besides, he restrains himself from sin, not merely from the dread of vengeance, but because he loves and reveres God as his Father, honors and worships him as his Lord, and, even if there were no hell, would shudder at the thought of offending him. See, then, the nature of genuine religion. It consists in faith, united with a serious fear of God, comprehending a voluntary reverence, and producing legitimate worship agreeable
to the injunctions of the law."

This worshipful life before God is the true way to go through our life on earth, the true way to live life at its highest and best. Only so can men be happy; they were made to find their chief happiness in him: "The ultimate end of a happy life is to be found in the knowledge of God. Thus all are born in that condition, and live so that they know God. But the knowledge of God unless it proceed to this (So. to living in God) is fleeting and evanescent. But it is evident that all have degenerated from the law of their creation, who do not make all their thoughts and actions to this end."

Schultze has written very carefully about the commanding place which Meditatio Vitae Futurae has in Calvin's system. The sum of the matter which he presents fits quite neatly into the conclusions just reached. Meditatio vitae futurae is the ruling idea of Calvin's attitude toward life (it is not so accurate to think of it as dominating Calvin's theological system, as Schultze does). It is the Christian's habitual attitude toward life, and in this respect, Schultze's statement is
a useful and helpful one. For us as theologians, a little more than that is necessary. Calvin looked to the future life for all his highest hopes, and he despised this present life and the body as detriments to the highest good of the soul; true—but let us not forget that bright future the vision of which floats before the eye of our friend is not all white robes and golden streets and painless bodies and tearless eyes; it is a bliss that comes from the hand of God, and the final word in regard to it, which sums up all its glory is that we shall be with him: (3:8:6) Brit sub oculis dies ille quo Dominus in regni sui quietem fideles suos recipiet, abstergat ab eorum oculis omnem lacrymam, stola gloriae at laetitiae ipsos induat, deliciarum suarum inenarrabili suavitate pascet, in suae altitudinis societatem evexit. The meditatio vitae futurae is the negative way of saying the thing that is positively to be expressed by saying we are to think about God and live for him, and we shall at last live with him, and as he lives; it is the negative side of that humble and worshipful dependence upon God which fills all Calvin's thought.
If there be need for further confirmation of this position, that the meditatio vitae futurae is the negative way of designating what is, positively stated, a meditation about God, let us seek it in what Calvin says about hell. Surely we may infer that in this matter his fears for the future are a good index to what his hopes are. And there is no doubt as to what is hell's worst terror: (3:25:12) Quam sit calamitosum alienari ab omni Dei societate; neque id modo, sed maiestatem Dei sentire tibi adversam. The commanding position which the meditatio vitae futurae holds in Calvin's practical ideal, so far from contradicting the positions of this paper, rather confirms them.

This meditatio vitae futurae is the attitude toward the world, of a man whose whole hope is set on God, and who feels that the world veils the face of God.

Calvin's whole thought is dominated by the idea of God; his whole religious life is lived, he feels, before the face of God. In the first edition of the Institutio, when he speaks simply and naively of his religion, we are surprised at the frequency with which one word
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occurs—he uses the word Deus so often that it marks his literary style; but at any rate we are made to know that he feels himself always coram Deo. That vision, he tells us, has amazed and dazzled him (1:2:2), like the view of the noon-day sun; it has crushed him with its consummate righteousness; yet it has drawn him to itself, and wonder of wonders, it has received him in grace, and given him the hope that one day we shall be like Him.
CREATION AND PROVIDENCE.

In the first edition of his *Institutio*, Calvin, says that God made the world for his glory, bound to his service. God made all things: (C.R. vol 29 p 63) Quem (Sc. Beus Pater) et nostrum et omnium omnino rerum quae creatae sunt creatorem agnoscamus. And all these things were made for His glory: (C.R. vol 29 p 27) Universa quae in coelo sunt et in terra, in eius gloriem creatae esse. And all his creation ought to carry out this purpose of its existence: Idque iure illi debere, ut singula pro naturae suae ratione illi serviant, eius imperium intueantur, maiestatem eius suspicient, et parendo velut dominum ac regem agnoscant.

As he says this, he has laid down one of the foundation stones of all his theological thought. He does not speak often of creation, but that is just precisely because it is so fundamental that it had become an axiom for him. We get a much clearer statement at the beginning of the first edition of the *Institution* than we ever get later, in his final revision, in which these opening sentences had disappeared. But again, when he goes to the roots of his theological thought in order to teach it to young people, in the second catechism, he rests the authority of God, in words already quoted in the chapter on 'God', on the fact of creation.
CREATION AND PROVIDENCE

This idea is fundamental, not only in Calvin's theological thought, but in his religious and emotional life as well. 'God is the Creator' means to Calvin much more than merely to say that this is the origin of the world; it means 'I am dependent upon that transcendant and majestic Might; he gave me my life, he called into existence all this beautiful world which I enjoy--; I myself and all the world as well, am dependent upon God'. (C.R. vol 29, p 63) Credo in Deum patrem omnipotentem, creatorem coeli et terrae. Qua profitemur nos fiduciam habere omnem in Deo patre fixam.

It is as an expression of this religious attitude to the doctrine of creation that we are able to understand the quaint phrase with which Calvin has headed his chapter on Creation in the last edition of the Institutio: In ipsa etiam mundi et rerum omnium creatione Scripturam certis notis discernere verum Deum a fictitiis. As a statement of theological thought, those words seem very strange: it may be true that the Bible says that the true God is the creator of the world, and that the worship of any other is vain and foolish. But it may be questioned whether any man of the
sixteenth, or of the twentieth, or any other century, would feel that for him it is true that, knowing nothing of God, he is given clear information when he is informed that he is to worship the Creator of the world; God is not 'Clearly distinguished' for the mind of any living man by that statement; as theology it won't do. But as a statement of John Calvin's personal religious feeling, it is not at all so defective. He asked himself 'What is the chief thing that sets God apart in my thinking?' 'Why, it is the fact that I am dependent upon him as my sovereign Lord, that is, he is the Creator'. And if other men will know what they are to worship, let them turn, with me, to this Heavenly King upon whom we are all dependent.'

This religious significance of the idea of creation is evident, also, in Calvin's practical application of it. The right design and tendency of the works of God is that it should first lead us to praise him. It is undoubtedly the will of the Lord that we should be continually employed in this holy meditation, of how the inestimable wisdom, power, justice, and goodness of God are manifested in the formation of the world! Let the readers then know, he says, that they have then truly apprehended by faith what
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is meant by God's being the creator of heaven and earth if they follow this universal rule, not to pass over with ungrateful inattention or oblivion those glorious perfections which God manifests in his creatures, and if they learn to make such an application to themselves as thoroughly to affect their hearts.'

This doctrine has another application: it should not only lead us to praise and worship God, but it should give us ground for secure confidence in him. (1:14:22) ut dum animadvertimus in bonum ac salutem nostram Deum omnia destinassem simul in nobis ipsis, et tantis quae in nos contulit bonis, sentimus ipsius potentiam et gratiam: inde nos ad ipsius fiduciam, invocationem... Amorem excitemus.

Upon the doctrine of creation, then, rested Calvin's rationale of the universe. All that has been said about the 'glory of God' rests upon this as one of its foundations. And we see that this doctrine assumed an important place in his religious life as well, being connected with his mystical sense of dependence upon God, and moving him to praise God, and to trust confidently in him.
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Providence is God's sustaining and governing his creation. It is not by a certain universal motion actuating the whole machine of the world, but a particular providence, sustaining, nourishing, and providing for everything which he has made."

Calvin considered this doctrine of providence the necessary completion of the doctrine of creation. "I confess that God created the world to be its perpetual Governor" (Brief Confess.). Or again: (1:16:1) "To represent God as a Creator only for a moment, who entirely finished all his work at once, were frigid and jejune; and in this it behooved us especially to differ from the heathen, that the presence of the Divine power may appear to us no less in the perpetual state of the world than in its first origin... for, unless we proceed to his providence, we have no correct conception of the meaning of this article 'that God is the Creator'". Providence is a necessary inference from creation: God made the world for ends of his own; these ends can be secured only by the world's affairs' taking a certain course; God will see to it that this is done. Again: God made us; God loves us; God will take care of us. Carnis sensus, ubi Dei
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virtutem se:el in ipsa creat'one sibi proposuit, illie
subsistit......At vero fides altius penet're debet,
nempe ut quem omnium Cre'torem esse idicit, statim
quoque perpetuum moder'torem et conservatorem esse
colligat.

But this connection between the doctrine of
creation and that of providence is not merely a
logical one; these matters hang narrowly together, for
Calvin, in the realm of religious feeling: the doctrine
of providence is the necessary completion of the doctrine
of creation, that the praesentia divinae virtutis
may appear to us, not simply that we should know about it,
but that we should see the face of God. There is a great
deal of highly speculative thinking in this discussion,
yet the chief interest of the author is not in God as
the object of speculation, but of religious worship.
Creation is completed in providence because we get our
sense of dependence upon God, not only from the fact
that he made us, but from the fact that he takes care
of us. See how this religious feeling comes out when
he puts the two ideas together, in the commentary on
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Acts 17:29; "God did not so create the world once that he did afterward depart from his work; but that it standeth by his power, and that the same God is the governor thereof who was the creator. We must well think on this continual comforting and strengthening, that we may remember God every minute! It is religious feeling that prompts him as he says: 'no one seriously believes that the world was made by God, who is not persuaded that he takes care of his own works.'

Providence is the carrying out of the eternal decree of God. (1:16:8) Deum constituimus arbitrum ac moderatorum omnium, ui prosa sapientia, ab ultima aeternitate decrevit, quod facturus esset: et nunc sua potentia, quod decrevit, exsequitur. And hence, 'all creation is so governed by his providence as to be directed to the end appointed by it.' History is but the unfolding, under the hand of God, of this eternal divine purpose; this decree has to do with all events, and the event decreed infallibly comes to pass just as God has willed it. And not only is it all controlled by God, but it is being carried to a predestined end--

One God, one law, one element,
And one far-off, divine event,
To which the whole creation moves.
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And Calvin wishes us to believe in a particular providence. Providence is not 'universal motion', but a 'particular providence'. It is no mere 'general principle of confused motion', as if he should command a river to flow through the channels once made for it, but a power constantly exerted on every distinct and particular movement. God does not 'sit down in idleness, nor continue by a general instinct the order of nature originally appointed by him; he governs heaven and earth by his providence, and regulates all things in such a manner that nothing happens but according to his counsel'.

Providénce governs all the movements of the forces of nature; God moistens the earth with dew or with rain. If the heaven becomes hard as iron, it does so at God's command; the blasting of the crops of corn happens under God's direction. (1:16:5) Certum est non cadere pluviae guttam nisi certo Dei mandato. (1:16:7) Nullum unquam ventum orire vel surgere, nisi speciali Dei iussu. The limb which falls from the tree does so by the hand of God. Even the things which are arranged especially in order that they may be fortuitous, are not so to God: Who does not leave lots to the blindness of fortune? Yet the Lord leaves them not so, but claims the disposal of them himself. He teaches us that
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it is not by any power of their own that the lots are cast into the lap and drawn out; but that the only thing which could be ascribed to chance, he declares to belong to himself. The nature and movement of all the natural world has its source in God, according to Calvin.

All this, of course, is in harmony with the order of nature, and of what we call natural law. (1:16:2) De rebus inimatis sic habendum est....naturaliter singulis indita sit sua proprietas. Even when he makes a false step, and draws a distinction which is out of harmony with his general ideas, he reflects this conception of an order of nature going on in its uninterrupted conformity to natural law: (1:5:7) opera.... quae scilicet praeter ordinarium naturae currsum eveniunt. Things look as if they went on of their own accord: (1:16:4) Verum quidem est singulas remum species arcano naturae moveri. (the natura here is probably the nature of the thing, not a 'secret instinct of nature'). Yet God stands behind all this and governs and sustains it: (1:16:2) Ac de rebus inimatis habendum est, quamvis naturaliter singulis sit sua proprietas, vim tamen suam non exserere, nisi quatenus praesenti manu Dei diriguntur.
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The manner of God's sustaining and governing these natural objects calls for more special examination. We are told that the nature and disposition of natural objects depends upon the momentary presence of the hand of God. That 'secret power of its own nature', sounds as if God were far enough away; but at other times we are told (1:5:5) PIE hoc posse dici, modo a pio animo proficiscatur, naturam esse Deum. This is not meant in any pantheistic sense, but only means to say what he says in the Commentary on Acts 17:29: "I do not doubt that Paul's meaning is that we be after a sort contained in God.... God himself doth separate himself from all creatures by this word Jehovah, that we may know, that in speaking properly he is alone, and that we have our being in him, inasmuch as by his Spirit he keepeth us, life, and upholdeth us. For the power of the Spirit is spread abroad throughout all parts of the world, that it may preserve them in their state; that he may minister unto the heaven and earth that force and vigor which we see, and motion to all living creatures.... God doth, by the wonderful power of his Spirit, preserve those things which he hath made of
nothing." In the course of his comment on Psalm 104:29, he says: "We continue to life so long as he sustains us by his power; but no sooner does he withdraw his life-giving Spirit than we die...

The Psalmist asserts, in the first place, that if God hide his face, they are afraid; and secondly, that if he take away their spirit, they die, and return to their dust; by which words he points out that when God vouchsafes to look upon us, that look gives us life, and that as long as his serene countenance shines, it inspires all the creatures with life....

The prophet describes step by step the destruction of living creatures, upon God's withdrawing from them his secret energy, that from the contrast he may the better commend that continued inspiration, by which all things are maintained in life and vigor. He could have gone farther, and have asserted, that all things, unless upheld in being by God, would return to nothing."

And Calvin goes on, here, to explain that when Vs.30 says: 'Thou sendest forth Thy Spirit, the thing referred to is the same Spirit as in Vs.29; that is, when it says 'Thou shalt take away their spirit', and 'Thou shalt send forth Thy Spirit', the same Spirit of God is referred to in both cases: Calvin identifies the principle of life in
animals with the Spirit of God. He believes, then, not quite that
the existence of the physical universe is unreal, enjoying a sort of ephemeral existence as a sort
of private mythology in the mind of a Divine thinker, but that the universe is dependent upon God for its
existence, and that it has real existence only in a secondary sense. God alone is, and the universe enjoys its secondary, derived existence only by the sustaining power of God. As to the properties of matter, they are real, permanent; and yet one is almost tempted to say that they seem to be merely habitual modes of action of the sole Divine Agent, rather than the necessary properties of material objects.

But, despite this abstract speculation, the properties and modes of action of natural objects remain, for Calvin. The pious man, if he suffer any loss, through negligence or imprudence, will conclude that it happened according to the will of God, but will also impute the blame of it to himself. If anyone be removed by disease whom, while it was his duty to take care of him, he has treated with neglect—though he cannot be ignorant that the person had
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reached those limits which it is impossible to pass, yet he will not make this a plea to extenuate his guilt; but because he has not faithfully performed his duty towards him, will consider him as having perished through his criminal neglect. Second causes, then, are real causes, and natural properties, natural forces are real, permanent, uniform.

The question next arises, how is this Divine providence related to the will of the rational creatures? Calvin tells us that here, too, the sovereignty of the Divine will is absolute: "Nothing can be done or happen without his counsel and providence" (Brief Confession). And (1:16:8) "Whence we assert, that not only the heaven and the earth, and inanimate creatures, but also the deliberations and volitions of men, are so governed by his providence as to be directed to the end appointed by it." There is no absolute freedom for any being except God; he rules everything—all is held in his almighty hand, and ruled by him.

The good angels are absolutely obedient to the will of God. They are so thoroughly subservient to his will that it never occurs to Calvin to say that they are so. They are "ministers of God, appointed to execute his commands." We are told in the Commentary on Psa. 103:20 "That none may think that earthly creatures only are
subject to the Divine commands, the Psalmist chiefly addresses the angels.... the highest end which they propose to themselves is to advance the divine glory. Accordingly, while in one sentence he clothes them with strength, in the immediately following, he describes them as hanging on God’s word, waiting for his orders.... 'Ye who do his Commandment'.

However great the power, as if he said, with which you are endowed, you reckon nothing more honorable than to obey God. And it is not only said that they execute God’s commandments, but to express more distinctly the promptitude of their obedience, it is asserted that they are always ready to perform whatever he commands them. "The whole tendency of the discussion is to make the angels so thoroughly subservient to the divine will that they seem not only to have no will to act contrary to God’s command, but they see themselves absolutely non-personal at times, as when Calvin says: In their ministry, as in a mirror, they give us an imperfect representation of Divinity". They possess power and splendor, but it is
not their own: "The splendor of the Divine majesty is eminently displayed in them." Calvin holds, then, that the angels of heaven are all absolutely subservient to the will of God; they do his will.

And this sovereignty reaches to the lowest depths of hell: (2:4:6) Satan _se_(instrumentum quum sit irae eius) proeius nutu ac imperio hue atque illuc se inflectit ad exsequenda eius iusta iudicia. (1:16:1) E primo capite Iob scimus, Satam se corum Deo sistere ad ex-cipienda iussa, non minus quam angelos... ne quid aggregi possit nisi volente Deo.

And this providence of God is absolutely Sovereign over the affairs and actions of man: Atque hue se pretendit divinae providentiae vis, non modo ut rorum eventus succedant, quomadmodum expedire prosperat: sed ut voluntates quoque hominum eodem tendant. (2:4:6) (2:4:7) Deus, quibus visum facere vult sue providentiae, etiam in rebus externis hominum voluntates lecteores at vero scire, nec ita esse liberam insorum electionem, quin eis libertati Dei arbitrium dominetur. 'The declaration of Solomon concerning the heart of the king, that it is inclined hither and thither according to the Divine will, certainly extends to the whole human race, and is much as though he had said that whatever conceptions we form in our minds, they are directed by the secret inspiration of God. And certainly, if he
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did not operate internally on the human mind there
would be no propriety in asserting that "He causes the
wisdom of the wise to perish, and the understanding of
the prudent to be hid; that "He poureth contempt on
princes, and causeth them to wander in the wilderness
where there is no way"?'.

The theory of our author as to the manner of this
almighty control of the physical universe and the
will of the rational creature, is quite remarkable.
The same power which sustains is the power which governs;
natural objects are sustained in this connection, and
that the way in which they are controlled is this same power
of the Spirit of God, as it sustains, also directs: (1:16:1)
Arcana Dei inspiratione vegetat omnes mundi partes;
in this same connection, Calvin goes on to tell us that
while philosophers go that far, he wants to go much
further, and say that all things are controlled in the
same way. All creatures are sustained by a universal
influence of God, and from it they receive the ability
to perform whatever they do. He quotes, as a text for
this, Psa 104:27--30. The passage from his commentary
dealing with this has been quoted, in which he identi-
ifies the principle of life with the Spirit of God.
We know that Calvin's theory of the sustentation of physical objects is that the Spirit of God is their existence. We are led to think that the way in which God controls and governs these same objects is by this very same presence of His Spirit as a part of the essence of the object. We find, further, that the same expression, 'inspiratio', is applied to God's sustaining and governing of the spirits of rational creatures—this by implication in the last few lines of 1:16:1, and again (1:17:4): consultandi cavendique artes inspiratas hominibus esse a Domino. And the idea seems to be similar in the heading of the first chapter of Book three: Quae de Christo dicta sunt, nobis prodesse arcana operatione Spiritus. The chain is not quite complete; our information on the point is not all that might be desired; but it seems that Calvin's theory of the relation of the providence of God to the spirit of the rational creature is one that associates the Spirit of God in a very intimate way with the spirit of the man; God is immediately present in all things and all actions; all existence, in a very high sense, depends upon him, and all action is done by his power.

By this explanation we are enabled to understand Calvin's violent objection to the use of the word 'permissive' with regard to the Divine providence.
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'God himself, by the most unequivocal testimonies, rejects this subterfuge that evil actions happen only by the permission, and not by the will, of God. He tells us that to speak of God as 'permitting' these things, is to abolish the providence of God, in effect; that this word 'permissive' would give us to understand that God sits by helplessly while men do what they please, and tear up the plans of God's will. We are prepared to understand this position when we remember the ideas just discussed, to the effect that God is immediately present in all that comes to pass, by the secret but essential presence of his Spirit in all things. His whole doctrine of providence is bound up, for him, in this speculation; deprived of it, he feels so thoroughly lost that he says that there can be no such thing as providence. He did not stop to think of whether it might be possible to have a doctrine of providence which did not rest on his scheme. His idea of providence rests on his arcana Dei inspiratio, and the statement that God 'permits' is inconsistent with this, for it says that there are events in which God is not directly active. And therefore Calvin will have none of it: (1:18:1) Tergiversando itaque effugiunt, Dei tantum permissu, non etiam voluntate hoc fieri: ipse
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vero palam se facere pronuntians, effugium repudiat; Quod autem nihil efficient homines nisi Dei arcano nutu, nec quicquam deliberando agitent, nisi quod ipse iam apud se decreverit, et arcana sua directione constituat, innumertos et claris testimoniis probatur.

We are still more sure that the reason for Calvin's objection to the idea of God's permitting evil acts is not an objection to the permitting, in itself, but rather an objection to its undermining his speculative theory of the method of the Divine sustentation and control, when we find that so far is he from objecting to the idea of 'permission', that in fact he practically adopts it. In discussing the influence by which God is said to 'blind', and to 'harden' men, he says: "Since when his light is removed, nothing remains but darkness and blindness; since, when his Spirit is withdrawn, our hearts harden into stones; since, when his direction ceases, they are warped into obliquity; he is therefore said to blind, harden, and incline those those whom he deprives of the power of seeing, obeying, and acting aright." ... The following expressions seem to relate to this: He removeth away the speech of the trusty, and taketh away the understanding of the aged. He taketh away the heart of the chief people of the earth and causeth
and causeth them to wander in a wilderness where there is no way. Again: O Lord, why hast thou made us to err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts from thy fear? .... These passages seem to indicate what God makes men by deserting them. It will require a very subtle caution to preserve any clear distinction between this 'desertion,' and that 'permitting,' against which he so violently made war! And what is more, Calvin has even gone the length, several times, of allowing this very word 'permissum' to creep into the discussion!

It seems at least fairly clear, then, that Calvin held, not only to that very remarkably high doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the providence of God, but that he rested this doctrine on a very remarkably high doctrine of the presence of God in all that takes place.

Calvin tells us what he thinks should be our attitude toward this matter of the providence of God. In the first place, we should take an attitude of humility and faith. Sometimes a suspicion intrudes itself that the revolutions of human affairs are conducted by the blind impetuosities of fortune; or the flesh solicits us to murmur, as though God amused himself.
self with tossing men about like tennis-balls.' We
should wait, not allowing these perplexities to
destroy our faith, and then in the end we shall see
all clear; 'When thick clouds obscure the heavens,
and a violent tempest arises, because a gloomy mist
is before our eyes, and thunder strikes our ears,
and terror stupefies all our faculties, all things
seem to be blended in confusion; yet, during the
whole time the heavens remain in the same quiet
serenity. So it must be concluded, that while the
turbulent state of the world deprives us of our
judgment, God, by the pure light of his own righteous-
ness and wisdom regulates all those commotions in
the most exact order, and directs them to their
proper end.' Therefore, since God claims a power
unknown to us of governing the world, let this be the
law of sobriety and modesty, to acquiesce in his
supreme dominion, to account his will the only rule
of righteousness, and most righteous cause of all
things.....providence governs all things, and from it
originates nothing but what is right, although the
reasons may be concealed from us.'

And we ought to receive comfort from this
doctrine. The Christian will not doubt that the
particular providence of God is watchful for his preservation, never permitting any event which it will not overrule for his advantage and safety. It is necessary and useful to contemplate this special care towards ourselves. For this reason, Christ, after having asserted that not the meanest sparrow falls to the ground without the will of the Father, immediately makes the following application—that the more we exceed the value of sparrows, the greater care we should think of God as exercising over us; and he carries this to such an extent that we may be confident that the hairs of our head are all numbered! What more can we desire for ourselves, if not a single hair can fall from our head but according to his will?

We should also learn from this doctrine that earthly affliction is a heaven-sent chastisement; let us recollect the doctrine of the Law, that every prosperous event proceeds from the benediction of God, and that all adverse ones are his maledictions; and let us tremble at that awful denunciation 'if ye will walk contrary to me, then will I also walk contrary to you!'.

And, Calvin says, we are responsible. As to the future, the eternal decrees of God form no impediment to
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our providing for ourselves, and disposing all our concerns in subservience to his will. The reason of this is manifest. For he who has fixed the limits of our life, has also intrusted us with the care of it; has furnished us with means and supplies for its preservation; has also made us provident of dangers; and, that they may not oppress us unawares, has furnished us with cautions and remedies. Now, it is evident what is our duty. If God has committed to us the preservation of our life, we should preserve it; if he offers supplies, we should use them; if he forewarns us of dangers, we should not rashly run into them; if he furnishes remedies, we should not neglect them. But it will be objected, no danger can hurt, unless it has been ordained that it should hurt us, and then no remedies can avert it. But what if dangers are therefore not fatal, because God has assigned you remedies to repulse and overcome them? Examine whether your reasoning agrees with the order of the Divine providence. You conclude that it is unnecessary to guard against danger, because, if it be not fatal, we shall escape without caution; but on the contrary, the Lord enjoins you to use caution, because he intends it not to be fatal to you. These madmen overlook what is obvious to every observer, that the arts of deliberation and
Caution in men proceed from the inspiration of God, and that they subserve the designs of his providence in the preservation of their own lives; as on the other hand, by neglect and slothfulness, they procure to themselves the evils which he has appointed for them. For how does it happen, that a prudent man, consulting his own welfare, averts from himself impending evils, and a fool is ruined by his inconsiderate temerity, unless folly and prudence are in both cases instruments of the divine dispensation? Therefore it has pleased God to conceal from us all future events, that we may meet them as doubtful contingencies, and not cease to oppose to them the remedies with which we are provided, till they shall have been surmounted, or shall have overcome all our diligence. Calvin wishes to tell us, then, to exert ourselves to the utmost, not thinking that divine providence excludes the use of means; it does not exclude them, but rather uses them.

Our author has not done quite so well, in stating the case for responsibility for past actions. He had a good formula, in the one case, and he might have applied it to the other; but when this matter of responsibility for past actions came into view, the justice of God came more directly into question. This worked on Calvin's feelings so violently that he is prevented from
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using the solution which he had already worked out in
the parallel case. The statements of his opposers, at this
point, would fix the responsibility for evil upon God,
and this inflames Calvin's wrath to white heat. His
principle of the genuine causality of the means,
would have enabled him to fix, at least in some measure, the
blame for evil acts upon men. But he makes no attempt
to go into the theory of the case, but simply appeals
to the human conscience, and to his feeling toward God:
'They are prevented, he says, from exculpating themselves,
by the reproofs of their own consciences! ' 'Will they
implicate God in the same iniquity with themselves, or
cover their depravity with his righteousness?' As a
theoretical proof of man's responsibility, this leaves
much to be desired. But even here, he shows us again the
same devout heart—he dares to answer us with the
emotional revolt of his conscience, and the submission
of his heart, because this seemed to him the inevitable
response of a pious heart to the thought of God and his
righteousness.

The doctrine of the Divine providence, then, is the
completion of the doctrine of creation; providence carries
out the eternal decree of God; it governs and sustains
all things; it rules all rational creatures and all their
actions; it should be received with humble trustfulness,
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and should be the ground of our security, without interfering with our sense of responsibility.

Behind all this, and shining through it all, is this man's sense of God. High and majestic always, gracious and beautifully tender at times, fierce and terrible in his anger against evil, the face of Calvin's God shines behind every line of his discussion of God's creation, sustentation, of his world.

And in all this discussion, God is portrayed as the absolute Lord of creation. All things are of God, in Calvin's world, and all things belong to God, and ought to obey him, and ultimately all things do serve his purposes. All the way through Calvin's discussion of this doctrine we see his interest to accentuate the Divine majesty; it is a very sublime and wonderful God, this Creator of all things and men. And he is absolutely sovereign—there is no qualification, no external check, no limit to the absoluteness of the power of God. God is the absolute Lord of all things. And it is in this interest that Calvin so ruthlessly lords it over the human race, and sets
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men in the dust before God; he will have it that God must be, and is, all in all. In the comment on Daniel 4:35, we see how Calvin strikes down all human pretensions either to pride or power, only in order that he may exalt the power of God. After Nebuchadnezzar praises God, because his power is eternal, he adds by way of contrast, 'all the dwellers of the earth are considered as nothing.' We see, then, how suitably these clauses agree together; for God is an eternal King, and men are as nothing in comparison with him. For if anything be attributed to men as springing from themselves, it so far detracts from the supreme power and empire of God. It follows, then, that God does not entirely receive his rights, until all mortals are reduced to nothing. For although men make themselves of very great importance, yet Nebuchadnezzar here pronounces himself by the Spirit's instinct, to be of no value before God... In God we are anything he pleases, in ourselves we are nothing." In it all he exalts God, praises God, adores God. His whole doctrine of providence is a doctrine of soli Deo gloria.

We should notice, too, that this majestic light is no mere intellectual idea; God is, to Calvin, no great Unknowable. Calvin expects us to find God and to
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know him and commune with him, as he is to be known in his works of creation and providence; Calvin expects the doctrine of creation and providence, as he has laid it before us, to move us to worship and praise a God whom we see plainly revealed in nature; he desires that the presence of the Divine Power may appear to us in these things.

And, too, Calvin derived comfort from the very feature of his doctrine which has made it so disquieting and hateful to so many men of his generation and of ours; this very absoluteness of God, which has made so many to turn back in dismay or anger from his doctrine, was a source of comfort to him. He felt that in this lay his chief security: we have dared to believe that God loves us; we are even sure of that; but what can God do for us? Are there things which affect my life, and might ruin it, which are beyond his control? Calvin felt sure in answering this question with a decided negative, and therefore he felt secure. And so, he would say with praise and love in his heart that God is the absolute Lord of all things.
An important aspect of the thought of Calvin about his sovereign heavenly Lord, is his doctrine of the Divine righteousness. For it is this thought that controls, moulds, and enforces, the idea of God's mighty and majestic rule over his creatures.

Calvin says that God is righteous. (C.R. vol. 29 p. 27) "ipse infinitam instititam esse". And he meant what he said, despite what some expounders of his doctrine seem to think. It has seemed to some students of Calvin that because he asserted some doctrines which seemed to them wrong, and did not succeed in showing that these acts of God were right, that he has no right to say, at the same time, that God does these things, and yet that he is perfectly righteous. And these students have therefore concluded that Calvin doesn't mean by righteousness just what other men do.

What Calvin has done, of course, is sometimes to assert that God does these things, and that they are righteous, asserting that God is a perfectly righteous person, and so he must do right; we know that he has done right, even if we cannot understand his acts. He also says that the relation between God and a creature is not the same as that between man and man, and that hence the nature of the duty required is not the same. God owns him absolutely.
And the man has sinned. And then, finally, as an ad hominem argument he used the idea that it is impious to deny the justice of God because of his greatness, his majesty, and his claims upon us.

But Calvin held that God is righteous. And that righteousness for God means just what it means for us, namely, conformity to the moral law, that moral law being the same for God and for men, though of course demanding different things in accordance with different circumstances and relations. Righteousness in God is not some strange and arbitrary thing, based upon an almighty and universally inscrutable will: God can be known, if not known fully: we know in part, but we know. And the righteousness of God is comparable to our moral ideal, and is, in the main, so far comprehensible that it is right for us to try to understand God—Quid enim hic aliud dici videtur, quam Deo esse potentiam quae impediri mequeat, quominus prout libitum fuerit quidvis aget? Verum longe secus est: quae enim potentior afferri ratio potest, quam dum iubemur cogitare quis sit Deus? Quomodo enim ullam iniquitatem admittet, qui iudex est orbis? When he says that we are to remember who God is, he means, of course, not that God is an arbitrary power who can deny any explanation, but that we know that God is righteous. And when he says the judge of the world will do right, the standpoint taken is that the righteousness is not arbitrary, but one
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which fits the moral nature of the universe, and the moral ideals of men.

And this righteousness, the law of God for himself and for men, arises from and is defined by, the moral nature of God. God, in giving the law to men, simply revealed to them the righteousness of his own nature--the law "shows" and "displays" the righteousness of God. It is no external law, binding God with an obnoxious rule, it is an expression of his own nature. Righteousness inheres in God -- that's where it started, and that's where it is defined -- it arises from the nature of God. To the same extent, we should notice the phrase "legem Dei aeternam" (C.R. vol. 29, p.43). Nor does this mean that it is to be resolved into a mere whim of God, or into a way of saying what God wants, or feels is of benefit. It is true that God wants it, and that it is beneficial, but the distinction between right and wrong is independent of these matters -- a thing is right, for God, as for us, not because it is beneficial, but because it is right. And this not only accounts for the origin and definition of righteousness: it shows the intimate relation between the will of God and the law of right. The will of God, as of men, is character going into action -- he does what he does because he is what he is. God's character is at all times completely righteous: everything in God is righteous. Ad Dei naturam
proprie pertinet iustitiam facere -- iustitiam naturaliter amat". (3:23:4) Hence all his acts are righteous, and we may speak of the will of God and righteousness as synonyms, and even prefer the former, as being more personal and religious, without its losing the moral quality inherent in the idea of rightness. That seemingly arbitrary "will of God" of which we hear so often, is to be thought of only in this way.

God is righteous. And he made his universe with that moral distinction woven into its very nature. Man was made in the image of God, to be like Him, so that he would find his highest happiness in righteousness -- this not only as an essential, but as the most important part of a man's life and character. Further, God demanded that man should live so: promising rewards to righteousness and threatening punishments to unrighteousness; this because righteousness is the most important thing in the universe: failure to do right is to violate the nature of self, of the universe, and of God, and (in a sense) to demand that they, in self-protection, should retaliate.

Here also, we find explained Calvin's thought of providence having what might be called favorites: those who are the children of God, righteous, are the important element in the universe -- all material things are of no importance by comparison: and the providence which Calvin saw in the slaughter of hundreds for the benefit of David, is
cut from the same cloth -- the fate of wicked men is tossed about with the same impersonal unconcern -- it is the righteous who count.

This idea of the Divine righteousness has its directly negative aspect. If we may say "naturaliter amat iustitiam"(3:23:4), we must also say "aversetur iniustitiam". Unrighteousness demands punishment. And sin is, in fact, punished to some extent in this present life, and punished by eternal punishment in hell. In just one paragraph Calvin tells us of his idea of hell -- its chief punishment, be it noted, is alienation from God - "quam sit calamitosum et alienari ab omni Dei societate"(3:25), and also, it punishes men by the hostility of the Divine majesty.

Just here, for some, moral ideas disappear, for it is notable, that in this paragraph Calvin begins by saying that he is speaking of the "Divine vengeance upon the reprobate," and the whole tone of the paragraph is rather in that vein: so that upon a cursory reading the student is sure to feel that the zeal of a Divine wrath is the only thing that is present in Calvin's consciousness, and that this Divine wrath is perhaps more than a little bit arbitrary, and that Calvin is fierce because he feels that he is fighting the cause of his favorite doctrine, reprobation by the arbitrary will of God.

Let us look more closely. Is it an arbitrary God, whom Calvin thus describes? NO - it is not. Expressed here
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is only the mysterium tremendum -- there is only that shrinking before the Divine majesty, the power of the Divine will. But implied is something more. The "reprobate" are the "wicked", and only the wicked -- the two designations are used synonymously here -- and the Divine wrath is no arbitrary thing, but an expression of the law of right and wrong: this wrath is not a merely terrible but inscrutable destruction of men arbitrarily selected to glorify God by showing his terrible power; it is a wrath against sin; it is the reverse side of the Divine righteousness. Calvin's idea, summed up in his statement: "peccatoribus, donec a reatu soluti fugrint, semper incumbit ira Dei et maledictio, qui ut est iustus iudex, non sinit impune Legem suam violari quin ad vindictam armatus sit" (2:16:1)

This negative side of the Divine righteousness is to be seen also in the doctrine of the atonement. It is the reaction of God against human sin that makes the atonement necessary. It is, because of the reaction of God's righteousness against sin, that the sinner "necesse habeat eius placandi modum ac rationem expetere quod satisfactionem exigit". It is because "perpetuum et irreconciliabile dissiduum est inter iustitiam et iordinatem" (2:16:3) that the righteous God is angry and must "litari", "persolveve quod alii debebant".

The attempt is sometimes made to divorce this negative aspect of the Divine righteousness from the positive
side of it. But after all, this "barbarous" and "in-human" doctrine is essential to the retention of the positive side. It is this "perpetual and irreconcilable opposition between righteousness and inquity", which is just the most characteristic thing about Calvin's ideal of righteousness, and it is this which gives it its sublimity and its practical power. It is a fair question whether the very modern gentlemen, who enjoy themselves at Calvin's expense, have quite understood him, or felt the power of his great ideal. That Genevan banker, who as he was being executed for immorality praised God that the law of God was so impartially executed in Geneva, had gotten Calvin's ideal.

Calvin, then, holds that God is righteous, and that this righteousness is to be defined as a conformity to a unique and independent moral distinction which finds its source in the nature of God: that this righteousness qualifies the Divine nature through and through and governs all the acts of God: that it is a part of the character of creation and that all the creatures are bound by duty to God, as well as to themselves, to live in accordance with this Divinely-given character.

This doctrine of righteousness is of supreme importance to a right conception of Calvin's idea of the Divine sovereignty. This is the driving force of
of it, to a considerable extent, and this is the apologetic for it.

This is the apologetic. God's will is absolute. He does what he will. We can never find a higher reason for things being as they are, than just the fact that God wills it so. And so, as far as man is concerned, Calvin says ad hominem, that man is entitled to no explanation — man is God's creature — the will of God is absolute. But, when we come to ask what is this will of God we find that it is "the supreme law of righteousness" — that it reflects and displays the righteousness of the Divine nature, and we are to feel sure of this, even when we cannot understand: God acts according to his will among men and angels — "the profane call this the sport of fortune --- but the moderation of God's providence is most just, although incomprehensible".

And Calvin was perfectly honest in using this as an explanation to himself and to other men, of the difficult things about the works of the sovereign power of God. For he always held fast to the faith that the righteousness of God is never violated by the acts of the Divine will: God's will expresses God's character, and God's character is righteous.

And this idea of Divine righteousness is the great power behind Calvin's idea of the Divine sovereignty (his doctrine of righteousness). There is the element of mystic
incomprehensible and irrational mysterium tremendum before whose awful majesty men cringe in terror yet are drawn with a strange fascination. This thing of course is a tremendously powerful element in Calvin's worship of the almighty King. But not only so: we worship God, and serve God, chiefly because we ought to serve him. And we owe that worship chiefly not to the mysterium tremendum, nor chiefly to the creator - God, but to the righteous God: thus not as a tribute to his righteousness, but because in him inheres that moral law which is our character -- we bow to him because he is righteousness: because the righteousness which is our oughtness is one with, and springs from, the will and the righteous nature of God, and that oughtness demands that it (the oughtness) be obeyed, and that if personalized, it receive worship. God is the sovereign Lord of Calvin's heart and life chiefly because in him the law of righteousness becomes personal: the will of God is to be obeyed and submitted to (chiefly) because it expresses this oughtness, this righteousness.
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Calvin's idea of the Divine righteousness was a very high and beautiful, if at the same time a terrible one. But alone, it must lead to despair; no man dare present himself fearless before that throne. His purity makes all things appear polluted; His righteousness even the angels are unable to bear; he acquits not the guilty; and his vengeance, when it is once kindled, penetrates even to the abyss of hell. Sinful man must tremble before such a God. And the terror is increased because not only is it a fact that God condemns men, but it is right that he should do so -- not only do men go to hell, but with shame they must say that they belong there. The fierce white light of this Divine righteousness dazzles and overpowers the sinner with its matchless splendor, but it offers him no hope but condemnation.

And Calvin always held that God is that sort of a God. God is righteous -- that means he conforms all his actions to the moral law, and enforces that moral law on all his creatures, and condemns all sin. Calvin always held to this: yet at the same time, he held that God is merciful, loving, that he calls these sinners to himself and receives them and treats them as his children; that he is gracious. Calvin's idea of the grace of God is that while remaining righteous in that fierce and awful sense, God is yet a loving Father.
God is reconciled to sinful man by his Son Jesus Christ. Men were alienated from God by sin, heirs of wrath, obnoxious to eternal death. (It is notable that Calvin shrinks from the direct statement that God actually hated the persons whom he later receives, though he had just before used this phrase in a hypothetical statement, and it seems called for here). But Christ interposed as an intercessor; he has taken upon himself and suffered the punishment which by the righteous judgment of God impended over all sinners. Is this a favor wrung by the pitying Savior from the unrelenting Judge? By no means: God who is the perfection of righteousness cannot love iniquity, which he beholds in us all, but he yet discovers something that his goodness may love in us. Since there is a perpetual and irreconcilable opposition between righteousness and iniquity, he cannot receive us as long as we remain sinners; therefore, to remove all occasion of enmity, and to reconcile us completely to himself, he abolishes all our guilt by the expiation of Christ. The love of God the Father therefore precedes our reconciliation in Christ; or rather it is because he first loves, that he afterwards reconciles us to himself.

Calvin reiterates this contrast again and again.

We are led to see what the scripture shows us
of the attitude of God to sinners: God is righteous, and therefore hates sin; God is merciful and loves his creatures. God was our enemy; but he has manifested his love to us by the gift of his only begotten Son. He did not begin to love us when we were reconciled to him by the death of his Son, but he loved us before the creation of the world. Wherefore, in a wonderful and Divine manner, he both hated and loved us at the same time. God, at the same time that he loved us, was nevertheless angry with us.

This is the grace of God, that he ought to hate and punish sin, and does so; yet he loves sinners and receives them. If we are to understand how Calvin felt about this we must feel with him the awful splendor of the Divine righteousness, and the vile heinousness of sin -- then, and then only can we catch the profound feeling of the condescension of God, which there is in this word grace, as he says: "Sic mera et gratuita nostri dilectione excitatur ad nos in gratiam recipiendos".

All of this comes out very strongly when we come to the matter of justification by faith. The justification of men is gratuitous, coming "ex mera misericordia" -- not from any merit of men. He fights against the idea of any merit on the side of men. The righteousness of the saints consists not in the perfection
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of their virtues, but in the forgiveness of their sins. Justification consists not in the infusion of the essence of God in Christ. Nor is it a moral change by which we become righteous in character. It is the remission of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ.

And this justification is not obtained because it is in any way deserved. We do not earn it, and it is not attained by our goodness, nor by anything that we do. It is obtained by faith alone. And this faith is not thought of as earning or meriting justification; it is only the formal cause, a condition sine qua non, but no more.

The favors of salvation are obtained by men upon terms such that there can be no thought of any merit in the recipient. He becomes a child of God indeed, and may surely and confidently trust in God's favor; indeed, no man is truly a believer unless he be firmly persuaded that God is a propitious and benevolent Father to him, and promise himself everything from his goodness. But even here men must say "not unto us, but unto Thy name give glory" -- they must remember that all of this is totally undeserved.

In this trembling and fearful dependence upon the grace of God we see Calvin's religion at its heart. Trembling, fearful, knowing that God is righteous and he a hell-deserving sinner, he yet comes to God with a trustful and
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affectionate confidence that enables him to call God his loving Father. In this humble adoration of the undeserved favor of his sovereign Lord we see Calvin in his true thought about the absolute God.
PREDESTINATION.

Calvin believed that God confers special favors upon particular individuals; that God's method of conferring many of his favors is to select, or 'elect', certain people to especial privilege. This is a principle which we see exemplified in the whole life of creation; it is an especial favor of God that we are men, and not oxen or asses; it was in God's power to create us dogs, but he actually made us in the image of himself. And the fact that we are such, and not oxen, is not due to our worthiness of it, but to the special and undeserved favor of God. We see this principle superlatively exemplified in the person of Christ: (3:22:1) In ipso ecclesiae capite lucidissimum esse gratuitae electionis speculum... non iuste vivendo factum esse filium Dei, sed gratis tanto honore donatum.

We see this principle exemplified, also, in the history of God's dealing with the human race in former ages; the family of Abraham were selected as the special objects of God's favor. Then, of this same race of Abraham God rejected some, and by nourishing others in the church, proved that he retained them among his children.
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The most important example of this principle, however, is the selection of individuals as predestinate unto eternal life. (§ 31:7) Num dum dimidia ex parte exposita est gratuita electio donec ad singulas personas ventum fuerit. This praedestinatio is the aeternum Dei decretum quo apud se constitutum habuit, quid de unoquoque homine fieri vellet. We see evidence of this decree, and would be forced to believe in it, even if we were not directly told of its existence; for the covenant of life is not equally preached to all, and among those to whom it is preached it does not always find the same reception. This diversity in the preaching and reception of the Gospel shows us the Divine favor to some particular men. And evidently this is but the carrying out a Divine decree, the eternal purpose of the all-knowing, all-ruling God. And so we believe that all men are not created with a similar destiny; but eternal life is foreordained for some, and eternal damnation for others. Every man, therefore, being created for one or the other of these ends, we say that he is predestinated either to life or to death.

This decree, which fixes the way of life and the eternal destiny of all men and angels, is an eternal
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purpose of the sovereign will of God. It is literally
eternal; it had no beginning. It has ever been present
before his eyes. This decree, moreover, extends to all the
world, all the creation, and fixes all the events of
life, and their eternal destiny. And it is no mere
foreknowledge of what will happen, caused by
some other force; it is no foreknowledge, it is a
purpose, God's intention to effect the carrying out
of what is decreed. It is independent; uncaused by
anything foreseen in the creatures, or in the external
world. And it decides the eternal destiny of all the
creatures of God.

Calvin has not succeeded in being just exactly
and precisely consistent in his statement that
predestination is uncaused by anything in men. For in
the midst of this discussion there occurs the account
of how Ishmael and Esau fell from the adoption,
because the condition annexed was, that they should
faithfully keep the covenant of God. Doubtless he could
have explained this in a way which would harmonize with
his system; but he did not. And 'Divinum iudicium' is
used as a synonym for 'Praedestinatio', where it seems
to imply that the 'iudicium' is a condemnation for
sin. But, in general, it may be said that he has succeeded
in being consistent, and in teaching that his 'Praedestina-
tatio'
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tinatio is not caused by anything in men, but is made solely by the will of God, having regard to nothing in men. He says that the elect believe and live righteous lives, and thus, and thus only, are saved; they would not be saved people if they did not do these things. The reprobate will be condemned in the day of judgment on the charge of evil living. But these things do not influence God in the choice of the one to life, and the other to death. Predestination, he says, is not of works.

All creation thus hangs mutely dependent upon the will of God. The whole destiny of creation has been settled from all eternity by the decisions of the will of God.

This decree of predestination, as it terminates on the persons selected for salvation, is called election. Now, this election is, according to Calvin, not direct and immediate. Just as we can possess the fatherly favor of God only through Christ, so is it here— even this unmerited favor of election to life is given 'in Christ'. The elect are elect only as they are members of Christ: (3:22:1) Quoniam in universo semine Adae nihil electione sua dignum reperiebat celestis Pater, in Christum suum oculos convertisse, ut tanquam ex eius corpore membra eligaret, quos in vitae consortium sumpturus erat.

It is not only
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It is not only true that the elect were not chosen because of anything in themselves, but they were not 'mere elected in the character of men at all; they were elected in the character of members of the body of Christ; God did not look at the race of men, but at Christ.

And the elect are 'chosen unto holiness'; chosen in order that, being lifted from their state of sin, they might be holy. This was the only way in which men could get to be so, and it is in fact the root of all virtue whether in the earthly or the heavenly existence: (6:22:1) Quiquâd virtutis in hominibus apparat, electionis esse effectum. (3:22:3) Quae in ipsis futura erat sanctitas, ab electione habuisse exordium.

These two last two considerations are important; for they show us that, even here, where he seemed to have made his God least moral, there was a somewhat different Divine Being before the eye of Calvin, from the one of whom we hear on the pages of some of his interpreters; God, even here, is not merely an arbitrary almighty will; he is a moral Person. It may be that to hold the idea which he held, of a God who predestinates men to eternal death, would, for many men, make it impossible to think of God as righteous. At any rate, however, it was not so
for Calvin. God predestinates men to eternal life, how? In Christ. Men are elect as having an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the Righteous, as members of Christ. Men are elect, with what purpose? and what result? Holiness. Absolute and awful as is Calvin's God, he is also righteous.

This decree of election is carried out by the Divine call, electorum vocatio. God calls all men in the Gospel invitation; this is a stream from the same source as election, but it is not the thing meant here. What is meant is that God's Spirit comes to a man and calls him, bringing him to faith and life in Christ. In this 'calling', (3:24:1) Deus effidaciter suos electos docet, ut ad fidem adducat; and also avertet cor lapideum et dat cor carneum; that is, this 'calling' convinces and enlightens the mind, and makes holy the emotional and moral nature. The result is that the elect 'come to God', that is, they believe in him, trust in his mercy, and obey him.

This Divine vocatio, Calvin carefully tells us, comes only to the elect. God may act upon the hearts of heathen, and other non-elect persons, to produce understanding and some measure of moral life (though we are
told that all true and acceptable piety is the result of election, and is found only in the elect. This 'effectual teaching', this vocatio, is given only to the elect. All of the elect are called, and no others are called. And this call is, by reason of its nature as the act of the almighty Spirit of God, always effective; all of the 'called' will be found to have 'answered'; all those who have 'learned', 'come'.

Calvin does not believe in the idea of a growth in holiness which begins at birth; he wants a conversion, and a conversion which confesses a sinful life and turns definitely away from it. He denies the existence of a semen electionis sown in the heart from birth. He believes that all men are sinners before they receive the Divine vocatio, and that this, and this only, can bring them to God. It seems implied, too, though not directly stated, that the effectiveness of the call is not gradual; it seems to be thought of as practically instantaneous in its effect; a man is, at any given time, said to be either 'alive', or 'dead'.

It will be of use to us to glance, for a moment, at his idea of how the elect know that they are elect. His statements about this matter are a rather strange combination. His thought was breaking a new trail, away from that of Luther, but his experience seems to have forced him into a path very close to that of Luther.
His theory is that assurance of election is an inference from its results in the life of the person in question. Unable to pry into the counsels of God, we look at our own lives and infer that if we see any good in them, it is from God, and is a sign of election: (3:24:3) Electionem quoad nos a posteriori confirm ri. (3:24:4) Optimum tenebimus ordinem si in quaerenda electionis nostrae certitudine, in iis signis posterioribibus, quae sunt certae eius testimonianes, haereamus.

It is just possible that these two quotations do not mean quite as much as they might seem to mean; for both of them are taken from paragraphs which deal with other subjects. Paragraph three, from which the first quotation is taken, deals with the error of saying that the validity of election depends upon the consent and belief of man; in the course of this discussion Calvin says that these fruits of election are to us confirmation of our knowledge of our election, though they are not confirmation of the fact. He might have meant to say only that these fruits of election are a confirmation of election, not the confirmation of it, to us. And paragraph four, from which the second quotation is taken, deals with the folly and danger of seeking to know our election by trying to inquire into the secret counsels of God. It is possible that, when he, in process of this discussion, he says that
we should draw our assurance from the 'subsequent signs', not even here is he making a statement which he would repeat, if it were set beside what he says in the next paragraphs, and his attention were called to the fact that the basis of assurance spoken of is not the same in paragraphs three and four as in five and six. To think this is to relieve Calvin of a suspicion of inconsistency at this point; and of course it is possible that he might make the first statement which has been quoted, and even the second, and yet, practically and normally, set the Christian's assurance on altogether different grounds. Obiter dicta are never to be pushed too far. This is possible--but it is not likely. Later Reformed theology, at any rate, has not thought so. No--Calvin, the theologian of the objective God, has here expressed his mind; here is an objective basis for assurance, not vacillating and wavering as do my emotions--here, he might have said, I know the love of my God, for I can see the fruits of it.

And then, he has another thing to say on this subject. Assurance is to be sought in the experience of communion with Christ. The children of God (3:24:5):

Non in ipsis eos dicitur elegisse, sed in Christo suo...
Quodsi in eo sumus electi, non in nobis ipsis referiemus...
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electionis nostrae certitudinem, ac né in Deo quidem Patre; sibi illum abaque Filio imaginamur. Christus ergo spectulum est, in quo electionem nostram contemplari convenit. What does this mean? Just how are we to find our assurance in Christ? The answer is: satis perspicuum firmumque testimonium habemus, nos in libro vitae scriptos esse, si cum Christo communicamus. Our knowing that we have conscious communion with Christ as members of his mystical body shows us that we are in him, and are elect. Quum enim sit, cuius corpore inserere destinavit Pater quos ab aeterno voluit esse suos, ut pro filiis habeat quotquot inter eius membra recognoscit.

Now, it is of course possible that Calvin could have presented this communion with Christ as a thing so be objectified and used as the basis of an inference, thus: 'This must have God for its author, and therefore it must be that I am elect'. He might have done so; but in fact he did nothing of the sort. The assurance based on communion with Christ, and that spoken of in the following paragraph, based on conscious reception
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of Christ as he is offered, are cut from a cloth altogether
different from that theological inference which is
presented in the third and fourth paragraphs; these
grounds of assurance are more akin to the Lutheran
'Heilsgewissheit'. Calvin of course seeks to preserve
his objective, rational, point of view by saying that
it is to Christ, and not to ourselves, that we are to
look. But it remains that the ground of certainty was
a subjective mystical apprehension of Christ. We must
not forget this when we try to see how Calvin thought
about God. There is that great majestic Might, Maker
of all worlds, doing his will among the armies of heaven
and among the dwellers of the earth, matchless,
irresistible, marvelous, awful, dwelling in light
unapproachable. We know Him by an inference. But
God is also knowable, and is known. We have communion
with the Divine, and we find him delight to show his
power in acts of love, to manifest his righteousness
even in acts of grace. At other points of his theolo-
gical system, Calvin adjusted these two concepts more
accurately to one another. But the very fact of the
discrepancy should call our attention to the fact
that, reconcilable or not, the King of glory is, for
Calvin, the King of love.

And it may be well to stop here to say that this
is true of all of the discussion of predestination.
All interpreters of Calvin have seen written in bold letters the absoluteness of the predestinating power of God. What might escape notice is the fact that in all this, Calvin is telling us of a God who is, for him at any rate, not only a God of power and majesty, but of love and grace. He is not seeking to crush the hearts of men, even though some may feel that he would do this; he is contending for the glory of the grace of God; he wants men to think of election as 'not of works' in order to make himself, and all other men, give to God alone the credit for having saved him and them. Most interpreters seem to forget that these pages which seem so harsh to many modern readers, seemed to the man who wrote them a sort of long-extended 'Te Deum'.

Those not included in the number of the elect are the "reprobi", predestinate to eternal death. The decree of God by which he predestinates them to death is not a mere preterition; it is not that they are merely passed by, left in their sin and misery. They are conditi ad mortem. Aliis vita, aliis damnatio aeterna praeordinatur; the foreordination of the reprobate to death is just as active a thing as the election of the children of God, at least in so far that they both can be covered by the same verb! There is a positive decree of God consigning the reprobate individually to hell: (3:22 11)
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in hunc finem excitentur reprobì, ut Dei gloria per illos illustraretur.

And it may be well to repeat, in this connection, what has already been said of the decree of predestination in general, namely, that reprobation is not based upon works; it is based simply upon the will of God. Even, unpolluted by any crime, is accounted an object of hatred. Ergo si non possimus rationem assignare, cur suos misericordia dignetur, nisi quoniam ita illi placet: neque etiam in aliis reprobatis alius habebimus quam eiusmod voluntatem.

This decree of reprobation is carried out by God's depriving the reprobate of the means of life (3:24:12): Quos ergo in vitae contuméliaìam et mortis exitium creavit, ut irae suae forent, et severitatis exempla, eos, ut in finem suum perveniant, nunc audiendi verbi facultate privat: nunc eius praedicatione magis excaecat, et obstupefacit.

Calvin says that in doing this God acts righteously; his apologia is a very interesting one: it says again and again that man is not entitled to any explanation from God; man should simply believe that God is righteous--God does not owe man an explanation, and he could not understand it if it were given. The pivotal idea here is the greatness and exaltedness of God.
PREDESTINATION

We are interested to notice that in the course of his attempt to defend the doctrine of reprobation, Calvin is forced to modify it; he is not able to maintain quite the high position which he had taken; reprobation becomes somewhat more of a predestination, a leaving to what was the natural desert of the sinner. And predestination without regard to works has been replaced by a predestination which is based upon the evil of the sinner's heart and life: (8:23:3)

Deum natura sua aestimare. Qualiter peccato vitati sumus omnes, non possimus non esse Deo odiosi, idque non tyrannica saevitia, sed aequissimae iustitiae ratione. God has merely left men to what they were already in, and this they deserved by what they were. This is somewhat different from the doctrine that Esau was hated before he had a chance to be evil, and without regard to the fact that he later would live an evil life (8:23:11).

Calvin did this, because, as always, he must describe God as not only great and powerful, but as righteous. Some students will always feel that he failed in this effort. But we must at any rate recognize that Calvin was making the effort to describe God as absolutely almighty, and yet absolutely perfectly righteous, and that he believed that he had succeeded.
PREDESTINATION

We shall close our discussion of this doctrine with Calvin's words: (3:21:1) "Huius principii (sc. Praedestinationis) ignorantia quantum ex gloria Dei imminuat, quantum verae humilitati detrahat...
Numquam liquido, ut decet persuasi erimus, salutem nostram ex fonte gratiae misericordiae Dei fluere donec innotuerit nobis aeterna eius electio."
FREE WILL

Having sketched Calvin's doctrine of Divine Sovereignty in relation to his ideas about God, we now turn to see how his anthropological and soteriological ideas were influenced by this frequent doctrine. We shall, here, expect to find less traces of this doctrine, but shall expect that if it be indeed the commanding conception which it has thus far seemed to be, it must be in evidence here also.

All of Calvin's anthropological ideas may conveniently be grouped together in a single phase of the discussion, which we shall somewhat loosely call 'Free Will'.

It will be of use for us first to glance at the terms which Calvin employs in describing and analyzing the human spirit. The soul has two faculties, the understanding and the will. The former is thought of as performing all the functions which we assign to the intellect: perception, memory, and reason. And since the powers of the mind vary greatly in the dealing with different classes of subjects, we may here notice that its relation to earthly matters is quite different from its power in relation to spiritual things.

Feeling receives less explicit recognition than we should expect. But Calvin did not entirely forget that it exists; the failure to recognize it is more
FORMAL THAN REAL. THE OBJECTIVITY OF HIS MIND, AND HIS PASSION FOR KNOWLEDGE AND THOUGHT, DID INDEED MAKE HIM PAY IT LESS ATTENTION THAN IT DESERVES, HOWEVER. BUT UNCONSCIOUSLY, HE HAS GIVEN IT A PLACE, DESPITE HIS CONTEMPT FOR IT IN SADOLET.

FEELING, AS WELL AS INTELLECT, IS THE FUNCTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING. IT IS NOT EMOTION, BUT "REASON," WHICH IS SAID TO "ASCEND EVEN TO GOD AND ETERNAL FELICITY." (WE ARE SURE THAT HE DOES NOT REFER TO SPECULATION ABOUT GOD AND HEAVEN, NOR TO ANY Sort OF MIRACULOUS TRANSLATION, FROM HIS USE OF SIMILAR TERMS WITH REGARD TO THE LORD'S SUPPER. IT IS NOT AN IDEA, BUT A FEELING, OF WHICH HE IS SPEAKING). SO FAR AS FEELING HAS A PLACE IN HIS PSYCHOLOGY, IT IS INCLUDED IN THE UNDERSTANDING; CALVIN WAS INTERESTED CHIEFLY IN IDEAS; HE EXPECTED THEM NECESSARILY TO PRODUCE RESULTS WHICH WE KNOW ARE IN FACT MEDIATED BY FEELING; WE SHALL THEREFORE NEED TO REMEMBER THAT THE TERM 'UNDERSTANDING' MAY MEAN FEELING.

THE TERM 'WILL' IS USED OF THE POWER OF CHOICE, WHICH, WAYS CALVIN, ALWAYS Follows THE UNDERSTANDING. THE TERM 'HEART' IS A SYNONYM FOR 'WILL'.

And, finally, when 'free will' is used, it means
FREE WILL

not only that the will is free from any external co-ercion, but also that it is free from any bias to evil, and is able to choose the good. On the other hand, free will does not necessarily imply necessity to the good.

Man, at his creation, was free; conspicuous for the light of the mind, which enabled him to discern good from evil by the light of reason to discover what ought to be pursued or avoided—"the principal or governing part". And, too, his affections were all turned heavenward; all his inclinations were toward the good. And his will was really 'free'; "In his integrity man was endowed with free will, by which, if he had chosen, he might have obtained eternal life". This free rectitude, however, was by no means necessitated to the good; sometimes we are led to suspect that Calvin thought of the mind of the first man as a "tabula rasa", and always we feel that he has not come to any definite conclusions as to the real relations of the powers with which he tells us that the soul is endowed; he has no clear idea of how or why the man was inclined toward the good. In fact, many of those who since his day
FREE WILL

have been glad to call him their master in theology would have been forced to call their great teacher an Arminian at this point. Turrettin and Hodge do not tell us about a will which is "flexible to either side, not endowed with constancy", as Calvin has done. If those words had been quoted from any book other than the Institutio, it would be said that they did not come from a Calvinistic source!

Man did not preserve this free rectitude; he fell. Calvin's account of this is an excellent example of what Bauke calls Calvin's dialectic skill; he combines several statements as to the source and nature of Adam's transgression into a single account, although the statements would have not been thought at all harmonious by their original propounders. Disobedience, discontent, unbelief, and pride all fit together to make a more or less unified account of the nature of the first sin; but clearness and consistency suffer under such treatment. It seems, however, that the root of the matter was unbelief, and the decisive point was revolt against the authority of God.
FREE WILL

When we come to examine the effects of this fall upon the first sinner, we notice a change of viewpoint in our author; he had told us about the powers of the original man in a way which seemed to indicate that the bent to good, and all the rest meant that these things were resident in Adam, as qualities having their ground in his spiritual nature. But now, when it comes to the point at which we must be told that these qualities have been lost, the explanation rests upon the assumption that all these things were merely effects of the presence of God in his life: "Adam's spiritual life consisted of a union to his Maker." And Adam's defection from the prescribed obedience was punished by the destruction of this union: "an alienation from him was the death of the soul." Not only so, but Calvin again shifts back again to the idea of inherent qualities: "The Divine image in him was obliterated, and he was punished with the loss of wisdom, strength, sagacity, truth, and righteousness." Calvin's explanation doesn't seem exactly convincing; in one case, the qualities are independent, and are to be lost only by a positive act.
FREE WILL

of God, in the other, they are dependent, and disappear when the hand of God is withdrawn.

In any case, however it is to be explained, this means that Adam was ruined. And we are told that this ruin was transmitted to his posterity, and appears in all succeeding generations. As an apologetic statement of this doctrine, Calvin prefaced the Biblical proof of it with the statement that all nature suffers, and suffers as a result of the sin of man. It is therefore to be presumed that the children of the sinner will also suffer. And this is, in fact, the case: "Every descendant, therefore, from the impure source, is born infected with the contagion of sin... For who can bring an clean thing out of an unclean? Not one." And if we have any remaining suspicions as to the truth of this doctrine, they are to be laid to rest by the exposition of the Pauline texts: "As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned", and "As in Adam all die".

As a result of the transmission of this depravity all men are tainted with "original sin". This is a hereditary pravity and corruption of our nature,
diffused through all parts of the soul, first rendering us obnoxious to the Divine wrath, and then producing in us those works which the Scripture calls the works of the flesh". This definition makes us immediately want to know whether all men are the objects of the Divine wrath directly because of Adam's sin, independent of any moral faults of their own.

Calvin is conscious of the difficulty which this question raises. He wants to say that it is simply a curse from God upon the whole race, coming as a direct result of the failure of their representative. He wants to say this, but doesn't quite dare to do so. And so, his statements are not very clear: at one time it seems as if the condemnation of men is to based on their own sins. When it is said that the sin of Adam renders us obnoxious to the Divine judgment, it is not to be understood as if we, though innocent, were undeservedly loaded with the guilt of his sin."

We expect him next to solve this difficulty by showing how this is true; instead of this, in the very next sentence, what had just been said is flatly contradicted; he says that we die because he sinned: "Because we are all subject to a curse, in consequence of his transgression, he is therefore said to have
FREE WILL

involved us in guilt". It had not occurred to our author that a curse is only another name, in this connection, for a Divine sentence of condemnation, and that the statement, as it stands, puts the sentence upon us for the sin of Adam.

As to how this depravity is transmitted, Calvin refuses to allow himself to be involved with the question of how souls come into existence. It is written all over his discussion, that his system is best satisfied by believing that the soul is derived from that of the parents; and sometimes he speaks as if he thought this. But generally he keeps himself neutral in this matter, and he made one statement which tells us what he thought: "The cause of contagion is not in the substance of the body or of the soul; but because it was ordained by God that the gifts which he had conferred on the first man should by him be preserved or lost both for himself and for his posterity". God gave these endowments of mind and will to the race; they lost them, in the person of their representative, if we will insist on having a theory of the matter; The chief point of concern, however, is that man's condition is not his original one, and that this change is due to the
We next inquire into the present state of the matter, seeking to know just what are the abilities left to man since the fall; and we are told that the whole truth about this may be summed up in the words of Augustine: "The natural talents in man have been corrupted by sin, but of the supernatural he has been wholly deprived." The natural talents in man have been corrupted by sin—the ability to think remains; men have made great progress in jurisprudence, in philosophy, and in the arts; all this being enjoyed as a special gift from the Spirit of God to the fallen and ruined man. We feel bound to call the attention of the author, however, to the fact that he has not quite fulfilled the promise with which he began; one searches the pages of his works in vain, for an attempt to show how these endowments and abilities in fallen man differ from those of man at his creation; Calvin is a poor psychologist, and he has made no real attempt to handle this matter. He has not shown that the abilities of man are corrupted or ruined; he shows us that man's intellect is weak; he should, however, have tried to show us that he once
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was strong, and could now be so if he had not fallen. The whole picture is one of finitude and weakness, but hardly one of ruin, as Calvin has drawn it.

In spiritual things we are said to be as blind as moles. The natural man shows almost literally no capacity for knowing God, for knowing the Divine mercy, or for knowing the Divine Law. "The Lord afforded them some slight sense of his Divinity, that they might not be able to plead ignorance as an excuse for their impiety", but they knew nothing in a way that was really worth while; the natural man is like a "man traveling across a field by night, who sees the intermittent flashes of lightning extending for a moment far and wide, but with so evanescent a light, that he is by no means assisted on his journey, but is re-absorbed in darkness before he can advance a step."

The emotional state of fallen man is indicated by our author, even though he has no formal recognition of feeling. "All the affections relating to the happy life of the soul are extinguished... such are faith, love to God, charity towards our neighbors, and an attachment to holiness and righteousness." The feelings of the unfallen man have been lost; man is now unable
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to feel toward God or man or toward right as he once
could have done.

And the state of the will in fallen man leaves
much to be desired: man is no longer "free" -- by this he
means that he no longer can desire good. The desire
for eternal felicity which we find in the breasts
of men is not really a desire for (moral) good, any
more than is the tendency towards perfection which
we see in metals and stones. Fallen man is not free,
cannot want (moral) good, is held in bondage, a sinner
by nature, held under the yoke.

Calvin has said, then, that man, as we know him, has
less of intellectual power than he might have had,
has almost no perception of spiritual truth, is emo-
tionally estranged from God and right, and cannot
will the good. It must be said that his statements
have not been clear, and that Calvin's handling of
these matters shows us the weak side of the great
master; the superlative intellectual powers of
Calvin are here seen at their worst; this is the
poorest piece of all his theological work.
FREE WILL

If we had any doubt as to why our author contends so vehemently against the idea of the freedom of the will, we cannot fail to see the reason, as we hear him say to Charles V: "as to the doctrine of free will, as preached before Luther and the other Reformers appeared, what effect could it have but to fill men with an overweening opinion of their own virtue, swelling them out with vanity, and leaving no room for the grace of the Holy Spirit?". Here, as in all the rest of his theological work, he is chiefly condemned to make himself, and all men, bow before God and praise Him.
THE PLAN OF SALVATION

God decreed from eternity to save men. God did not begin to love men after he had been propitiated by the sacrifice of Christ; the purpose to redeem, and the love that prompted it, are eternal. "Our reconciliation by the death of Christ must not be understood as if he reconciled us to God in order that God might begin to love those whom he had before hated, but we are reconciled to him who already loved us."

At this point we shall be asked whether Calvin took supra-, or infra-lapsarian ground; whether he held that, in the purpose of God, predestination precedes creation and the fall, or follows them; the one view making God to create some men in order that they might be damned. It is still sometimes asserted that Calvin was a clear supra-lapsarian. And the reading of certain passages in Allen's translation of the Institutio would lead one to think so. But Allen has made Calvin so. Allen reads in 3:21:5: "Every man, therefore, being created for one or the other of these ends, we say that he is predestinated either to life or to death." This sounds as if our author were supra-lapsarian; but the Latin is by no means so; Allen made Calvin to
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teach a supra-lapsarianism which is not in the original Latin at all. And the Consensus Genevensis, written by Calvin, explicitly states the opposite view: "Quod ex damnata Adae sobole Deus quos visum est eligit, quos vult reprobat". The question had not been raised and argued with the fulness with which it was later handled, but this seems to express our author's mind on the subject, and make him an infra-lapsarian.

In carrying out his purpose of salvation, it was necessary that God should provide redemption for men, should tell them about it, and should enable them to accept it.

Salvation is provided by God in the gift of his Son, who by his life, death, resurrection, and ascension, but especially by his death, saves from the guilt of sin, and the punishment due to it, to a forgiveness which insures an eternal life of glory in the presence of God (2:16:19). There is no trace of the more developed and more logical scheme of later Calvinistic theology, to the effect that there is an "active" and a "passive" righteousness of Christ, the latter bearing the penalty due to sin, the former earning the rewards due to righteousness by a perfect obedience. Reconciliation is "by the blood of Christ".
THE PLAN OF SALVATION

"That blood is a complete satisfaction for us".
The whole discussion moves in a simpler style
than that of Calvin's successors; the technical
terms of the scholastic period have not been invented,
and there is no feeling of need for them. Calvin is
willing, however, to say that "Christ suffered in his
soul the dreadful torments of a person condemned
and irrevocably lost."

All this is undergone by Christ as "a substitute
and surety for transgressors."

And in all this whole matter of the providing
of salvation, we see behind each particular doctrine,
the dominating ground-principle which we have so
often noted before: Calvin's awed reverence for his
sovereign Lord. And it is the same Lord of whom we
had heard before: he is absolute and almighty; salvation
comes about as a result of an eternal purpose of God;
and his decree fixed before all eternity the destiny
of all creatures. And this salvation, as before remar-
ked, is provided in a way such as to satisfy the
justice of the righteous God at the same time that it
offers forgiveness to sinners. And in all this Calvin
catched another note, too--this almighty purpose, so
terrible, so majestically righteous, is for Calvin, a
purpose of love.
THE PLAN OF SALVATION

When we come to deal with Calvin's doctrine of salvation, we find that Calvin's awe and submission before his God is equally in evidence. God has spoken in his word, "to make himself known to salvation," to give a saving knowledge of himself. This revelation has been committed to writing, and transmitted to succeeding generations. And the revelation of God was complete long ago; there was an age of inspiration; but that is long ago past. And, finally, this Book always speaks with the authority of God.

Some interpreters would go further, and say that Calvin holds that the Scripture is always infallibly true; that there are in it no conflicts either with known facts, or with known moral truths, nor with other statements of Scripture. Others stoutly deny this, and maintain that Calvin is the father of the modern idea that the Bible contains the Word of God, and that later protestant scholasticism has misunderstood and misinterpreted his author, when it has associated him with itself in its own worship of the letter of the sacred text. Of course all modern theologians recognize that a distinction can be made between the belief that Scripture is absolutely infallible in all its statements, and the other belief that the Bible is
THE PLAN OF SALVATION

authoritative in matters of faith, when it has been relieved of its conflicts with itself and with other known facts. All modern men at least say that they know this difference. Calvin did not. And so his theoretical statement is always that the book is infallible in all particulars, and is to be so received and obeyed; for any man to fail to do so, is to disobey God. We are bound to think, however, that his chief interest is not theoretical, but practical; he is not so zealous for this theory of inspiration as he would have been if it had been an end in itself. He is not so zealous for it as many of his followers have been. His chief interest is that men, all men, everywhere, should join with him in bowing in submissive and reverent obedience before God. He thinks that they will do this only when told that the Book is infallible; and so he tells himself and the world that this is so.

The starting-point for the idea that he did not hold this theory of infallibility is the fact that when Calvin comes to interpret the Bible in detail, he admits that it is not always perfectly at one with itself. He seems unconsciously that this is to modify his theory; his attitude is somewhat like that of Dr. Charles Hodge, who, after repudiating the idea of errors in the Bible, says: "No sane man would deny that the Parthenon was built of marble, even if here and there a speck of sandstone should be detected in its structure. No less unreasonable is it to deny the inspiration
THE PLAN OF SALVATION

of such a book as the Bible, because one sacred writer says that on a given occasion twenty-four thousand, and another says that twenty-three thousand, men were slain. Surely a Christian may be allowed to tread such objections under his feet. Both the great master, and his nineteenth-century pupil who followed him so closely, have in fact given up their theory in its absoluteness.

And yet, there is a higher unity; for Calvin has been true to the principle which was his chief concern. Always and everywhere Calvin says that the Bible speaks for God, and that men must obey it; the Bible is a personal revelation, experiential, in the sense that it not only came from the experience of men who were in contact with God, but that it brings men into contact with God always. Principal Lindsay is thinking somewhat along this line when he says: "Saving faith was for the reformers a personal trust in a personal Savior who had manifested in his life and work the fatherly mercy of God. This... made them see that the word of God was a personal and not a dogmatic revelation; that the real meaning in it was that God was there behind every word of it. It is trust, obedience, submission, worship of this sort that is the chief concern of Calvin in all he says about the infallibility of Scripture. But we must not forget to say that Principal Lindsay's statement, however valid it may be for the Reformers in general, should be
somewhat qualified when we are speaking of Calvin in particular. For it is not true of him that the Bible is always to him a personal and not a dogmatic revelation; it is to Calvin sometimes one, sometimes the other, sometimes both. Or perhaps we shall do better to say that Calvin's God is a personal Redeemer, known personally to him, and that at the same time he is a God who has spoken, making certain definite statements, which he says to all men, and which are to be received in the same way by all men. Certainly this is a dogmatic revelation; Principal Lindsay would have made it impossible for Calvin to hold other men to the doctrine of predestination as he so rigorously did.

But the caveat is worthy of our attention, nevertheless; we must not forget that though the Bible is a book of dogmatics for Calvin, it is always a book in which we should apprehend the presence of God; the doctrines and commands are always to be taken from the Book; and they are always and everywhere the same. But it is not the Book that commands, it is God who speaks from the Book. Never should it have been said of this fierce image-breaker that he worshipped a book, or anything else other than God. He found in the Book the word of God—the Book brought him to the face of God, and his zeal for the Book is only another facet of his zeal for the honor of his sovereign Lord, the King of Kings.
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This fact, that God is always present in the Book, serves to explain for us not only the looseness of Calvin's statements as to the veracity of the Scripture; it helps us to see why this prince of exegetes is so thoroughly lacking in historical sense, when dealing with the Bible. For Calvin, all those who were inspired seem to have possessed a knowledge that proceeded from God; this, in the sense that all of their statements must be interpreted as if they were meant to contain all that God would ever say. And so, The Old Testament may contain, does contain, most of what is in the New Testament! If we say that this makes Abraham a stranger to ordinary men, this is the Lord's doing, and it is marvelous in our eyes! And so, the Scripture becomes a much stronger book than most of us find it in fact to be. Calvin could tell us about Augustine and Anselm as if they were real men; he always settles a question as to the ideas taught by the Fathers by reproducing their life and times—shows himself a first-rate historical critic, in such matters. But the fact that he believed that God had spoken to Abraham and David, makes him come very near to asserting that Abraham and David knew all that God knows; the truth of the New Testament was known to God; we may expect that the men who were
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the instruments of God in the giving of his revelation should know most of what is to be said. It seems as if the Psalms are a perfectly valid source of proof-texts for Pauline theology.

Of course we cannot fail to feel that this is a very faulty sort of exegesis. But let us remember the reason why this master of interpreters failed to come at the exact sense of so much of the Scripture: the reason for this is partly dogmatic, as a matter of course—the Book is all one Book, and all of it teaches the same doctrinal system. But the concept behind this is not dogmatic; it is that same mystical feeling of the presence of God. It is the presence of God that makes it all one doctrinal system. It is because all of the Book speaks in divers parts and in divers manners from the same sacred mouth that it is known to be uniform. It is not a fault of the reasoning intellect that made Calvin forget history; it is his bended knees, which make him unable to deal with Moses with the same accuracy which he displays in dealing with the Fathers.
God's way of telling men about his salvation is what Calvin calls 'the secret operation of the Spirit'. In dealing with this, we notice that the objectivity of his mind has made him pay less attention to the subjective operations and effects of religion than other religious teachers have done. And yet, our author has not entirely failed to give us some idea of the operation of the Christian life in the soul of man. In the first edition of the Institutio we are briefly told of the operation of the Spirit of God in bringing men into a saving knowledge of Christ; and in the last edition he deals with this matter in a separate chapter, and touches upon it several times in another.

When dealing with the doctrine of election, Calvin is a rigid 'Calvinist': "God effectually teaches the elect". "If we inquire whom he calls, and for what reason, the answer is, those whom he had elected". And, moreover, "nothing is requisite to it but the free mercy of God". This secret operation of the Spirit is given to all the elect, is the most characteristic result of election, is the means by which the elect are known, and is given to none other than the elect. And all of those who are called, 'come'; to be 'taught of God' is sure to mean that one will 'learn'.

But it should also be said that Calvin did not always draw the line so tightly. He was always sure, however,
THE SECRET OPERATION OF THE SPIRIT

that this operation of the Spirit of God is necessary
go the existence of Christian life in the hearts
of men. Without this operation man does not, and
cannot, know God. And all the affections of his
heart are alienated from God. And he cannot with his will
embrace God's offer of mercy, nor can he will to do
right. Always Calvin is sure that man is lost and can
never save himself; always he is sure that the Spirit of
God must come to a man to save him: In the first
Institution it is by the Spirit that God wins us to
himself, justifies, and sanctifies us, leads us to
eternal life. In the last Institution, it is "by the
secret energy of the Spirit that we are introduced to
the enjoyment of Christ and all his benefits".
The Spirit is "the seed and root of a heavenly life
within us". All the features of Christian life within
the soul are dependent upon the Spirit of God for
their beginning and sustentation, in a way exactly
analogous to the sustentation of the existence of
physical bodies and of animal life (see Chapter of
Providence).

Always Calvin is sure of the general fact of
our dependence upon the Spirit of God; but in detail,
he is by no means always so ruthlessly consistent
THE SECRET OPERATION OF THE SPIRIT

about the relation of the human will to the Divine election and call, as he had been in discussing election. Calvin is so far from ruthless consistency that many later Calvinists would have to call him Arminian: "till our minds are fixed on the Spirit, Christ remains of no value to the soul." The use of "If any man thirst, let him come to me and drink" in John 3:1:2 is such as to blunt those very distinctions which our author had been at such pains to sharpen. And as before, we find that his interest was not in the theory for its own sake, but for its religious value; he is not caring a great deal for the theory, in itself; he merely wanted to force himself to bow his knee to God, and then to make all men join in that worship; controversy made him greatly sharpen his distinctions; they were not naturally so fierce.

This secret operation of the Spirit takes effect on the intellect, the feelings, and the will. It works on the mind, "enlightening us into the faith of his gospel." "Such is the propensity of our minds to error that they can never adhere to Divine truth; such is
THE SECRET OPERATION OF THE SPIRIT

Dullness that we can never discern the light of it. Therefore nothing is effected by the Divine word without his Spirit and his illumination...the mind must be illuminated by the Holy Spirit". The method of this illumination is that "the mind is enlightened to understand the truth of God"; but this is not to be taken as if it implied the imparting of new truth, nor is it the imparting, by superconscious revelation, of truth already revealed to other persons. This illumination is a quickening of the powers of the mind so that a man is enabled to receive, by ordinary intellectual processes, the truth of God revealed in nature and written in the Scriptures. Of this illumination it should be said, too, that it is no mere cold understanding of bare facts; this is all that Calvin says; but there is a glow about certain words on this subject which makes us think that this has been no cold matter; and there is an assurance, a violent, dogmatic positiveness about his assertion of the truth of things learned in this school of the Spirit, such as to make us sure that a part of the perception of this Divine revelation is a persuasion of its truth and its compelling moral force, growing out of its harmony with the conscience, its capacity for making him feel "consciously superior, happy, and right", its harmony
THE SECRET OPERATION OF THE SPIRIT

with the deepest intuitions and aspirations of the human spirit.

And yet, our author is no kinsman of the Ahabaptists. He will have nothing to do with their frenzied "revelations," and endeavors to expose their errors. And he never says anything which would suggest that he thought that the Spirit of God spoke to men in his day in any such way as to give them any new or personal revelation; he will none of this dream-revelation, this ecstatic frenzy which sets aside the Scripture to make way for what Calvin holds is but the Wilful imagination of sinful men. The Spirit of God acts behind consciousness, giving to men an ability to perceive the truth of God; and they are taught to ascribe this ability to the Spirit: but he never invades the consciousness of men since the days of revelation. The Spirit of God, says Calvin serves us as spectacles do the aged, to make possible the reading of truth already written down.

But this life-giving touch of the Divine Spirit not only affects the emotions in these secondary ways, through the truth, but it has more direct effects as well. The devastating power of sin has destroyed...
THE SECRET OPERATION OF THE SPIRIT

the affections which pertain to the happy life of
the soul; men do not love God and righteousness. The
Spirit of God deals with this condition by touching
the springs of the affections, making men love God, giv­
ing them new purposes toward the good, "strengthening
and establishing their hearts", as Calvin says.
"He consumes the vices of concupiscence, and inflames
our hearts with the pursuit of piety and the love of
God".

And the Spirit also deals with the wills of sinners,
to make them saints: "By the breath of his power he in­
spires us with Divine life, so that we are not now ac­
tuated from ourselves, but directed by his agency and
influence; so that if there be any good in us, it is the
fruit of his grace, whereas our characters without him
are darkness of mind and perverseness of heart". The
perverse will is removed by the regenerating power of
the Holy Spirit, and the man is actuated toward God.

And this power of the Spirit of God remains in
the life of man. It is the "root of a heavenly life
within us", constantly fostering the Divine life
within us, by affecting the intellect, the feelings,
and the will. Not very fully nor explicitly has Calvin
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dealt with the idea of growth; it is implied, perhaps, in many figures of speech; a "root" should grow, all "living" things grow; but we search almost in vain for any direct attempt to deal fully with the idea of growth in the Christian life. Calvin, so completely a knowledge of God, that it is intellectual states that he is chiefly interested. So far as his theory goes, he has no idea of what we mean by personality, and so he makes no direct and explicit effort to deal with the growth of a personality in any given direction. But in the last edition of the Instituție, dealing with Repentance, he says in the course of an apologetic discussion, just the thing for which we are looking: "This restoration is not accomplished in a single moment, or day, or year; but by continual, and sometimes even tardy, advances, the Lord destroys the carnal corruptions of his chosen, purifies them from all pollution, and consecrates them as temples to himself, renewing all their senses to real purity, that they may employ all their whole life in the exercise of repentance, and know that this warfare will be terminated only by death."

We are surprised to discover that Calvin has not
used this doctrine of the operation of the Spirit as a support for his doctrine of the sure salvation of the people of God. He is absolutely sure that the elect will be saved, and he wants them all to be sure; tells them, in fact, that assurance is of the essence for strengthening this faith of saving faith. He could have well used this matter which we have just been reviewing: men are saved by faith, and faith is produced and maintained by the Spirit. This operation of the Spirit, being given as a consequence of election, is always constant and everlastingly abiding. But our author never takes the final step of saying that when we know that we have the Spirit's operation, we know we are elect and will be saved.

The connection of the matter of this chapter with the doctrine of Divine sovereignty is obvious: the Christ is represented as receiving his life from God, and as being dependent upon God for the maintaining of it. And wherever the power of God is in evidence, there we see that it produces righteousness. And God has been so gracious as to send his Spirit to dwell in the hearts of sinful men. In this chapter we see a righteusly almighty God, moreover, a gracious God; and before Him Calvin bends the knee in reverent
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yet confidently trustful worship.
In dealing with Calvin's doctrine of faith, we shall consider, in succession, its object, its nature, and its origin. The object of faith, our author tells us, is the mercy of God. God is the important fact with regard to all the great things that concern men; the great fact in Calvin's world. And God is the important fact in this matter of salvation (for Calvin's thought about faith is, from beginning to end, what Schleiermacher would call teleological; Calvin is always thinking of faith as leading to salvation). "In the Divine benevolence, which is affirmed to be the object of faith, we apprehend the possession of salvation and everlasting life to be obtained".

The object of faith is the mercy of God. But men cannot find out God for themselves, with the means supplied to them by nature. "The revelation of God, through which he makes his glory known in the creatures, gives sufficient light so far as we consider the revelation itself; but when we consider our blindness, it is not sufficient". Men are blind, and so they cannot receive this revelation of God in nature, objectively so thoroughly adequate, but ineffective because the subjective conditions for the reception of it are wanting. Then, having said this much, Calvin forbids
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all attempts to obtain a knowledge of God and his mercy, by any natural means; he says that if we try to find God in this way "We wander in error", and in depending upon such natural light "faith ceases to be faith, and vanishes, fading out into delusions". (We come here again upon the inconsistency noted before, that Calvin says, with one breath, that natural revelation is adequate, and only our stubbornness prevents its reception, and in the next breath he says that we must not try to know God in this way.)

Man, then, is not equipped to find out God for himself. There must be 'special' revelation, in order that man may know God in a way that is really profitable, and in order that he may be saved. "Without the word, all our conceptions of Divine grace are unprofitable and transient...There can be no faith without the illumination of the word of God". "The word is as necessary to faith as the living root of the tree is to the fruit; because, according to David, none can trust in God but those who know his name. But this knowledge proceeds not from every man's imagination, but from the testimony
which God himself gives of his own goodness".

Faith rests upon the word of God. But not everything that we know about God, and not even every part of the revealed knowledge of God, is to be taken as the basis of faith. For faith, in Calvin's parlance, always means a saving faith, which leads the believer to the fatherly goodness of God, and to an eternal life of glory with him. And so "Although faith admits the veracity of God in all things, whether he command or prohibit, whether he promise or threaten; though it obediently receives his injunctions, carefully observes his prohibitions, and attends his threatenings—yet with the promise it properly begins, on that it stands, and in that it ends. For it seeks in God for life, which is found not in precepts nor in denunciations of punishments, but in the promise of mercy.... Therefore if we wish our faith not to waver, we must support it with the promise of salvation, which is voluntarily and freely offered by the Lord". "When we assert, therefore, that faith rests on the gratuitous promise, we deny not that believers embrace and revere every part of the
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Divine word, but we point out the promise of mercy as the peculiar object of faith.

And, furthermore, we must particularize still further: "We include all the promises in Christ". All faith, as a trust in the Divine mercy, must know something of Christ; in Old Testament times the people of God knew Christ, and received their promises of mercy through Christ; of the least-informed of them it is correct to say that "it is certain that they had imbibed principles which afforded them some knowledge of Christ". All of the Scriptural revelation is mediated through Christ. And thus, to say that faith seeks to know God only from his word, and that it has its basis only in the promises contained in that word, is to say that faith clings to Christ as the only worth-while revelation of the mercy of God. And thus Calvin informs us that Christ is the only proper object of faith: "For the one Christ has in himself all the blessings and all the other features of eternal life contained in himself; and these he offers to us through the gospel, and we receive them through faith....two things are to be noted here: First, that Christ is the one object
of faith; therefore the minds of men wander in errors when they decline from him. And so it is no wonder if the whole Papist theology is an abortive chaos and a horrible labyrinth, because, having neglected Christ, it wanders in vain and windy speculations. And too it is to be noted that after faith has embraced Christ, this alone is sufficient to salvation.

We ought to notice at this point that although Calvin speaks of faith in Christ, and says that all the promises are contained in Christ, he does not mean by this at all what, for example, Luther meant. When Luther spoke of faith in Christ and of faith in him, when Paul spoke of Christ and of faith in him, he meant that Christ, in and of himself considered, is the important element in the salvation. There is present in both of these writers' minds, too, the idea that Christ reveals the fatherly love of God, but the idea of primary importance is not that Christ reveals or represents, but that he is. It must be said that Calvin feels this trust in Christ's saving power also; he begins his chapter on faith in the last Institutio with a series of propositions in which this element comes plainly to the light. And one cannot read any of Calvin's utterances on the
subject of the atonement without seeing that he trusts in Jesus as not only a Revealer, but as a Redeemer:
"Our heavenly Father has been pleased to relieve us by Christ the Redeemer". When we hear Calvin say "No one can condemn us while Christ intercedes for us", we are assured that he does in fact think of Jesus as something more than a spokesman for someone else. This is profoundly true in Calvin's heart; his religion recognizes Christ as Redeemer. But one can hardly feel that this idea received its due from our author when he is speaking on the subject of faith. We must feel that the gratuitous promise of God is the object of faith, and that Calvin thinks he has spoken exhaustively when he has said this. "Faith is a knowledge of the Divine benevolence toward us". It is founded, indeed, on the truth of the gratuitous promise in Christ. But the phrase "in Christ" probably means merely that Christ is the medium through which it is brought to us and certified to our minds (note that it is the "truth" of the promise—the problem uppermost when we speak of Christ is how to know, not how can we be forgiven). We see this as we hear our author say: "For since God dwelleth in the light which no man can approach unto, there is need for
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the interposition of Christ as the medium of access to him...because no man cometh unto the Father but by him; he alone knows the Father, and reveals him to believers." Calvin thinks he has followed Luther; he tells us in the first Institutio that Christ is the only object of faith; but as in the last quotation above, he confuses the idea of the need of human ignorance with the need of human sin. He thinks he has followed Luther; but he has not done so; Luther could never have written a complete description of faith, as Calvin did in the Genevan Catechism, without putting the name of Christ into it.

But let us recognize the positive side of all this: as Scheibe said, the prominent thought in Calvin's mind is that he has sinned against God; it is that majestic Face that dominates all Calvin's thought about sin. It is as feeling an estrangement from God, that Calvin rises to make his confession. And so, too, it is God who dominates the picture when he comes to think of faith; as always, it is God as the dominant fact in Calvin's religion: "Quid enim melius atque aptius fidei convenit, quam agnoscere nos omni virtute nudos ut a Deo vestiamur".
We next turn to examine the psychologic nature of faith. And we must begin by noticing the side of Calvin's statements about this: Calvin had grown up, and all his contemporaries had been nurtured under a doctrine that faith, for the common man, consisted in being willing to submit to the doctrine of the church. A man could believe a doctrine the statement of which he had never heard, simply by saying that he believed the doctrine of the church; this is "fides informata"; he adds love, and it becomes "Fides formata".

Calvin's fiery polemic against these ideas takes as its text the statement that faith consists not in ignorance, but in knowledge: "Is this faith, to understand nothing, but obediently to submit our understanding to the church? Faith consists not in ignorance, but in knowledge....For we do not obtain salvation by our promptitude to embrace as truth whatever the church may have prescribed, or by our transferring to her the province of inquiry and of knowledge." "Faith consists in a knowledge of God and of Christ, not in reverence for the church." This false doctrine of the Roman Catholics, says Calvin, has involved ignorant and credulous folk in a labyrinth which has so confused them that they embrace as oracular anything which is imposed upon them,
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however monstrous, if it only have the sanction of the church. This inconsiderate credulity, though it be the certain precipice of ruin, is, nevertheless, excused by them on the plea that it credits nothing definitively, but with this condition annexed, 'If such be the doctrine of the church.' Thus they pretend that truth is held in error, light in darkness, and true knowledge in ignorance. Always it aroused Calvin's contempt and anger to have it said that faith is a mere docile and submissive reverence and love for the church. Faith should bring men to God, by enabling them to know God and his truth and to embrace and receive his mercy. Faith is to know God, to know something of what God is, and to know the will of God; all this, in however simple and rudimentary a fashion it may be known, being yet known definitely, in such a way that it could be stated in definite propositions. A man who believes is a man who can say: There is a God, almighty, righteous, omniscient. He is merciful, and has promised to receive all who trust in him. And the believer has a sure knowledge of these definite facts. The believer is a man who has a definite, sure, knowledge of definite facts.
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And the believer is a man who knows that the blessings of salvation, offered by the mercy of God, are his. This proposition, too, has a polemic force: the Roman doctrine was that men can never be assured of their salvation except by special revelation; the Reformers, in line with their effort to make religion personal, contended that faith must be sure; sure not only of the objective facts, but of the subjective appropriation of them; a believer must know that he has been saved by the mercy of God. "No man is truly a believer, unless he be firmly persuaded that God is a propitious and benevolent Father to him, and promise himself every thing from his goodness; unless he depend on the promises of the Divine benevolence to him, and feel an undoubted expectation of salvation..... No man has a good hope of the Lord, who does not glory with confidence in being an heir of the kingdom of heaven. He is no believer, I say, who does not rely on the security of his salvation, and confidently triumph over the devil and death". Faith necessarily includes assurance of salvation.
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Calvin is ready to admit, however, that there might be some remnants of fear lurking in the Christian believer's heart. "We live in the flesh, though we seek to live in heaven. The pious heart, therefore, perceived a division in itself, being partly affected with delight, through a knowledge of the Divine goodness, and partly distressed with sorrow, through a sense of its own calamity; partly relying on the promise of the gospel, partly trembling at the evidence of its own iniquity". "We are never so happy during this present life as to be cured of all diffidence". This is a very helpful and useful thing for the believer, says Calvin. For it keeps him humble, keeps him ever in that trembling and earnest zeal that works with fear and trembling, keeps us ever mindful of that state of despair which is the dark undertone of faith. And our author feels that this is not inconsistent with the sure confidence of which he spoke. Perhaps he does not achieve the perfect consistency that is desirable, on this point; probably we must say that he has been forced to admit that faith is not always so absolutely sure and confident
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a thing as we had been led to suppose. But he does make good his main contention, that genuine faith knows God, believes confidently in him, and still hopes on despite some doubts.

And, too, faith has in it the element of trust. "Faith is a sure and efficacious trust, not merely a bare intellectual notion". We were led to expect this statement by what we have already noticed as to the object of faith: if faith were exactly equivalent to bare knowledge, one thing which could be known about God would be as much a proper object of faith as another. But we are told that this is by no means true; true faith begins with the evangelical promise of the mercy of God. This, of necessity, implies that faith is no mere intellectual persuasion; the faith which rests upon nothing but the evangelical promise, must be a trust in God.

And when we remember that faith is an assured knowledge, we are prepared for the statement that faith leads to, or perhaps is, a calm and peaceful rest. For the believer is promising himself all the
blessing, favor, and love of God; and he is sure of these things; and so he is at rest. "Trust is a sure, confident security in God, on the basis of the recognition of his nature." The principal hinge on which faith turns is this—that we must not consider the promises of mercy as being true only to others and not to ourselves, but rather make them our own by embracing them in our hearts. Hence arises that 'fiducia' which the apostle calls peace (Rom. 5:1), unless anyone would rather make peace the effect of 'fiducia'. This peace is so very intimately bound up with trust and assurance that Calvin cannot quite decide whether they were names which gave a different emphasis in describing the same thing; he can't tell whether they were separate for the apostle Paul, nor can he decide as to his own heart, so intimately are they bound up together. And so we have the elements present in the heart, Calvin does not care about the arrangement of the ideas!

This peace, or rest, is described as "a security which makes the conscience calm and serene before the Divine tribunal, and without which it must necessarily be harassed and torn almost asunder with
Calvin has added another element to the composition of faith; at least he tells us that he has added it. But we cannot fail to notice that this element of love came in only in order that he might be able to answer his opponents, the Roman Catholics. Calvin tells us that so far from believing in the addition of love to faith, in order to "fides formata", he believes that there can be no faith without love. And when he is on this tack, he is quite extreme: "With the heart man believes unto righteousness". "The assent which we give to the Divine word is from the heart rather than from the head, and from the affections rather than the understanding". We are bound to remember that except when he is in this polemic humor, faith was chiefly an intellectual matter, and that these things were said on no other occasion than when he is seeking to refute the Romanists.

We must note, also, that the object of faith, whether considered as knowledge, trust, or love, is altogether unseen. Faith reaches into the unseen, the world of infinities, lifts up its feeble hands seeking to lay tumultuous trepidation". 
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hold upon the infinite God; it seeks to look steadily and discerningly into the light unapproachable. Calvin says that we do not know God; God is inaccessible, unapproachable, and faith, so far as it exists at all, is a knowledge of God!

Many modern interpreters of Calvin would have us think that this 'agnosticism' of Calvin is much more thorough-going than we find it in fact to be. In their hands, Calvin's faith becomes either a subjective notion, its knowledge of God being suspected even by the believer himself of being only a private mythology; or, with the Barthians, faith is simply a standing empty, ignorant and despairing before the Great Unknowable, depending indeed upon Him, but not knowing Him.

This is altogether to misunderstand Calvin. He did indeed say all that has been used as a basis for these ideas; but these statements are merely his corrections of his own dogmatic positiveness, merely his admissions that he doesn't know the Almighty unto perfection. One should not seek to make Calvin too much like either Kant or Barth.

He says that faith is knowledge. "But by this we intend not such a comprehension as men commonly have of these..."
have of those things which fall under the notice of their senses. For it is so superior that the human mind must transcend itself on order to attain it. The mind does not "comprehend" what it "apprehends". "What our minds apprehend by faith is absolutely infinite, and this kind of knowledge far exceeds all understanding". And the knowledge of faith is incomplete because "those things which we know by faith are at a distance from us and beyond our sight". Calvin would say with Paul "We know in part", but if anyone had misunderstood this and made him seem a Barthian, he would have repeated the words, adding an emphasis like that of the last address of Dr. James McCosh, in the chapel at Princeton: "We know in part, but we know?.

The origin of faith is from God. The Holy Spirit begets faith. The word ought to be sufficient to produce faith, but dullness of our minds and the perverseness of our hearts prevents: "Such is our propensity to error, that our mind can never adhere to Divine truth; such is our dullness that we can never discern the light of it, Therefore nothing is effected by the
"Nor is it enough for the mind to be illuminated by the Holy Spirit, unless the heart also be strengthened and supported by his power... Faith, therefore, is a singular gift of God in two respects; both as the mind is enlightened to understand the truth of God, and as the heart is established in it".

In conclusion, let it be said that one should not fail to notice how the idea of God stands behind all that has been said by our author on this matter of Christian faith. This it is which made him come so near forgetting Jesus Christ in his rapt gaze into the face of God; this it is which makes Calvin the sinner so fear God, makes him say that to doubt that God is his merciful Father, is to despair; this it is which makes him think of God as the great hope and the great boon of his life; this is what prompts him to say that the sum of the benefits conferred upon the Christian is "that God will never leave us". It is his feeling of the reality.
and the nearness of the gracious heavenly King that gives to Calvin's chapter on faith in the last Institutio a beautifully childlike dependence so much like the twenty-third Psalm or the Lord's Prayer.
Repentance, in Calvin's view, is not only a close concomitant of faith, but it is the result of it. He wishes us to believe, in the first place, that repentance follows faith. This is established by several Biblical arguments, more ingenious than convincing, and by the statement that "no man can truly devote himself to repentance, unless he knows himself to be of God, that is, except he has previously received his grace" (which leads to faith). Another argument for this position is that the proper work of the Spirit is to lead us to faith in Christ; and "no rectitude" (and no repentance) "can be found but where that Spirit reigns". And so, no man will ever reverence God but he who confides in his being propitious to him. This priority of faith, however, is not to be taken as if there were a definite time between faith and repentance; "we dream not of any space of time which faith employs in producing repentance". Repentance follows faith immediately, being produced by it.

We are informed that the conscious motive to repentance is the fear of God. And when Calvin says 'fear', he means to include the
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idea of an actually trembling anxiety, of terror at the threat of the most terrible punishment; "wherefore the scripture, when it exhorts to repentance, frequently introduces the mention of the judgment; as in Jeremiah: 'Lest my fury come forth like fire, and burn that none can quench it, because of the evil of your doings'. Or again: 'Sometimes God is declared to be a judge, in order that sinners may consider that worse calamities await them, unless they speedily repent'. The fear of God, from which we are told that repentance springs, has in it a terror, a shrinking from actual calamity.

But this fear is more than mere terror; "Conversion commences with a dread and hatred of sin" and "the apostle makes Godly sorrow the cause of repentance". "He calls it Godly sorrow when we not only dread punishment, but hate and abhor sin itself, because it is displeasing to God". "The faithful fear his displeasure more than punishment". "Even though there were no hell, we should dread his displeasure more than death".

These two elements were bound together in the actual feeling of Calvin; he shows them both to us,
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dwelling side-by-side in his heart as he says: "all iniquity is an abomination to the Lord....they will not escape his vengeance, who provoke his wrath against them by the wickedness of their lives"— Calvin shrinks from sin because it offends God, and because he fears punishment. And these two motives, intertwined together, are the conscious reason why a sinner repents.

Calvin objected vigorously to two definitions of repentance which were current in protestant circles in his day: Melancthon's Loci had defined repentance as a mortification of the flesh and a vivification of the Spirit, the former being defined as genuine sorrow, the latter as the assurance of faith; other Lutherans (neither they, nor Melancthon are named, nor their books cited directly, by Calvin) had distinguished between what they called legal and evangelical repentance, defining the former as that which springs from the Divine wrath, the latter as springing from trust in God. Calvin refuses to accept either of these definitions; both of them leave out of the Christian's thought the fear of the punishment of God. Calvin will have it that this must be the motive from which true
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repentance springs, and that it must be held before
the eyes of the Christian all through his life.

Repentance is a conversion of the life to God,
says Calvin. This, in opposition to the Roman
Catholic doctrine of contrition, confession,
satisfaction, and absolution. The objection to this
system is not its shallowness, in and for itself
considered, but the way in which it dishonors God.
It has set a mere man in the place of God, exercising
the authority of God—"for who can forgive sins, but
God only?". And it has taught sinners to look to a
man and to trust in him, instead of God; it has taught
sinners to be ashamed before a man, instead of God!
"As though we humble not a man with sufficient degree
of shame, when we summon him to the supreme tribunal of
heaven, to the cognizance of God! It is a won-
derful advantage, indeed, if we cease to sin through
a shame of one man, but are never ashamed of having
God for a witness of our evil conscience!"

"'Rend your hearts and not your garments', for it
is God and not man, with whom we have to do. Weeping,
penances, and the telling of beads, may be all very
well in the presence of a priest, but we are dealing
with God, and none of these external things are of
avail. Repentance must be a conversion of life.
"We have taught the sinner to look not on his com-
punction or his tears, but to fix both his eyes
solely on God".

And it must be a thorough reformation; no mere correctness of outward conduct is of any avail. Repentance must be a change of the attitude of the soul itself; there is ever burning in Calvin's heart the fire called into life by that vision of perfection which was floating before his eyes when he so passionately had said: "Let the children of God know that all sin is mortal". Or again: "We deem it to be sin, whenever a man feels any evil desires contrary to the Divine law; and we also assert the depravity itself to be sin, which makes these desires in our minds". Repentance must be as thorough-going as this very high moral ideal.

The transformation prescribed is a "mortification of the flesh and a vivification of the spirit". Let it be said, at the outset, that these terms do not mean quite all that they suggest to some philosophic ears; so far as his theory is concerned, Calvin must be completely exonerated of having represented it that the flesh is evil in itself. One must remember that Calvin believed that man's present condition is not his original one; that all our author's thought on moral questions is shot through with the idea of a fall of the race from
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a primaeval blissful innocence. The flesh, itself, as it came from the hand of God, did not seem to Calvin an evil thing. But, on the other hand, it must be admitted that the practical result is almost what Martin Schultze has made it, a constant sighing for delivery from the flesh; the present fact for Calvin is that the flesh is evil; Calvin is Puritanical in much the way in which he has been represented, for example, by B. Bess. It must be conceded that Bess is right when he says that Calvin set himself against the currents of life as it is. There remains, of course, the question whether Bess is correct in thinking that the currents of life as it is are the normal ways of life, and the best ways possible for the world.

At any rate, Calvin makes himself sufficiently clear when he says: "We by no means condemn those desires which God has implanted so deeply in the nature of man that they cannot be destroyed without destroying humanity itself; they are sinful, not because they are natural, but because they are corrupted".

Repentance is a mortification of the flesh. The natural appetites of men have been so corrupted by sin that they lead men away from God; the body,
originally made holy, has become the seat of sinful desires. Repentance is to stifle these desires with all the power of the human will, and to give oneself up to the power of the Divine Spirit, who can put them to death, i.e. remove them. And in the same ways we are to carry out the other branch of repentance, the vivification of the spirit; we are to set our wills with a firm resolution in the way of righteousness, and give ourselves up to the power of the Holy Spirit, in order that we may lead a righteous life. Calvin says in the first edition of the Institutio: "The life of a Christian man is a constant striving and straining for the mortification of the flesh to the moment of its complete downfall... He has made most progress who has learned to be most displeased with himself; not to remain stuck fast in this mire and not make further progress, but to hasten and yearn for God".

"Both these branches of repentance are the effects of our participation of Christ. For if we truly partake of his death, our old man is crucified by its power, and the body of sin expires, so that the corruption of our former nature loses all its former vigor. If we are partakers of his resurrection, we are raised to a newness of life by it." We wonder, as we read those words, whether they refer to con-
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sicious effects, a transformation by the emotional power of the death and resurrection of Christ, or to a theologico-mystical concept, that beneath consciousness the man is transformed by the power of God. Probably the best answer is that, both of these ideas are present, blended in an indefinite and hazy fashion: consciously believers are moved to flee from sin as they see in the cross of Christ a revelation of the heinousness and the terrible results of sin, and of the love of God; consciously believers are inspired by the pulsating joy of the resurrection to strive to copy the beautiful life of the risen Lord: and, too, unconsciously, believers are made less responsive to sin, and made alive to righteousness, by the conquest of the powers of evil which takes place in the death and resurrection of Christ, all Christians receiving this as a sort of contagion, by reason of the oneness of Christ with his people.

And repentance is to be the constant attitude of the people of God; other men may think that they have done with repentance, but our author tells us that for all true Christians this is a life-long task: "it is necessary for us, if we desire to abide
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in Christ, to strive for this repentance, to devote our whole lives to it, and to pursue it to the last".

Or again: "The life of the Christian is perpetually employed in the mortification of the flesh, till it is utterly destroyed, and the Spirit of God obtains the sole empire within us. Wherefore I think that he has made a very considerable proficiency, who has learned to be exceedingly displeased with himself; not that he should remain in this distress, and advance no further, but rather hasten and aspire towards God, in order that being ingrafted into the death and life of Christ, he may make repentance the object of his constant meditation and pursuit".

"When God offers remission of sins, he requires repentance of the sinner". How shall we adjust this statement to the justification, held by Calvin, that sinners are justified by faith alone? We are told in the Genevan Catechism that God requires repentance and good works of us, but that we cannot from this conclude that God will justify the Christian on the ground of his works, or that we owe to these things our possession of the love of God, which means eternal life for us. But, in the other
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hand, to be impenitent is to be unforgiven; repentance is essential to salvation: for no man can accept Christ without the "secret operation of his Spirit", and the Spirit of God always prompts to righteousness; for a man not to feel moved to repentance and good works is a sign that he has not the Spirit of God in his heart, is not justified, is not saved. "It is not possible to divide faith and good works from one another so that a man should believe in order to justification without doing good works; for to believe on Christ means to receive him as he comes to us; and he promises not only redemption from death and reconciliation with the Father, but also the grace of the Holy Spirit, who re-creates us to a new life. These must necessarily be bound together; or we divide Christ". We cannot feel that this, however, is quite as adequate an answer as it would have been for him to tell us why God has made personal righteousness incumbent upon the justified sinner; Calvin did not answer this question.

In Calvin's discussion of this doctrine of repentance we are made to see again the elements
have which/appeared again and again as Calvin's thought about God: we notice the fear of the Lord God Almighty, we see the same moral force in God and in his preacher, and we see the same filial trust in the goodness of God, which we have seen so often before, as we hear Calvin tell us, in the Genevan Catechism, "Repentance is a displeasure, yes, a hate for sin, springing from the fear of God, which leads us to righteousness, which lead us to self-denial and the putting to death of the flesh, so that we give ourselves over to the leading of the Spirit of God and regulate all our life according to the will of God".
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD IN THE REFORMED CREEDS.

All Christians believe in God; and all Christians have the idea of God as one of the principal forces in the background of their religious thought and life. But the prominence of this idea varies in different individuals, and there are typical variations shown by particular types of religious thought. It is this that we mean when we say that Calvinistic theology is peculiarly a Theocentric type of thought; that the idea of God dominates the thought of Calvin and of his followers to a degree not true of other men. Not that other men do not believe in God, but that Calvin can say, in this matter, "I more". And as we have used the term 'the sovereignty of God' in this paper as a designation not of the disputed 'five points'; so here, as we seek to trace this idea in the Reformed creeds, we shall be seeking not illustrations of these several doctrines, but of the thing which we believe stands behind them, the idea of which Professor Williston Walker is thinking when he says (Life of Calvin, p. 138): 'In the first edition of the Institutes there is already
in evidence that profound consciousness of the reality and authority of God which marks all Calvin's thought. And this was true of all the Calvinists, as well as of the master; Professor Schaff is perhaps right when he says that "The dogma of predestination consolidated the Calvinistic creed, as the dogma of consubstantiation consolidated the Lutheran creed"; true it may be, but that does not go deep enough; the true mark of Calvinism should be sought in the profound sense of God which marks the thought of all these men; predestination and perseverance were the chief controversial topics, but the heart of Calvinism should be sought in that profound consciousness of the reality and authority of God, and in the sense of dependence upon Him.

And so, we are looking, not for phrases which teach the doctrinal peculiarities of Calvinism; we might think a creed Calvinistic even if it explicitly stated no one of the 'Five Points'; we are seeking statements which show this sense of the majesty and authority of God, and of man's humble, loving trust in Him.
We need not be told that the Second Helvetic Confession is not completely under the direct influence of Calvin; for its careful direction "De Sepultura Fidelium" is not quite in Calvin's style; Calvin forbade funeral services. And we must have been forced to the same conclusion when we hear Bullinger quoting Calvin's thought about God's creation in almost exactly Calvin's words, yet neglecting what Calvin considered an opportunity to say that it was done to the glory of God: "omnia autem quae condidit Deus, erant ut Scriptura ait, valde bona, et ad utilitatem usumque hominis condita". But the mark of the hand of Calvin is evidently to be seen in the treatment given to other matters: to be sure, the mere statement of the doctrine of predestination would not necessarily mean a Calvinistic influence; but Bullinger adopts Calvin's spirit and Calvin's very phrasing: "Let Christ therefore be the mirror in which we contemplate our predestination". And it is Calvin's combination of submission and confident trust when we are reminded, in this connection, of the words of Jesus, that 'None of these little ones should perish'; Bullinger had learned from Calvin to make this doctrine
teach him to depend on the Fatherly love of God as consolation in life and hope in death.

And the absoluteness of Calvin's God is to be seen in Bullinger's treatment of providence.

"Dei hujus sapientis aeterni et omnipotentis providentiae credimus cuncta in coelo et in terra et in creaturis omnibus conservari et germinari". And of the Epicureans, who deny the immediate rule of God, Bullinger has learned to say 'Dammamus' with all the vigor of Calvin's wrathful zeal for the honor of God.

And the idea of man's duty as springing from the will of God is clearly in evidence in the chapter on the Law: "We teach that the will of God is expounded to us by the law of God, telling us what He commands and forbids, what is good and righteous and what is evil and unrighteous".

With the Heidelberg Catechism, we come to a more definitely Calvinistic document.
If we are to see Luther's influence in the fact that it begins: "My only comfort in life and death is that I, with body and soul, both in life and in death, am not my own, but belong to my faithful Savior, Jesus Christ, who with His precious blood has fully satisfied for all my sins, and redeemed me from all the power of the devil"; we notice immediately the hand of Calvin as it continues: "and so preserves me that without the will of my Father in heaven not a hair can fall from my head; yea, that all things must work together for my salvation." And we know that we are on Reformed ground when we read that "Christ, with His true body, is now in heaven, and is to be there worshipped."

And this creed shows, graciously and beautifully, the central Calvinistic idea in which we are especially interested: doubtless we shall not be reading-in ideas, if we see a Calvinistic sense of the majesty of God in the emphasis which is placed upon creation "out of nothing"; this, especially, when we notice how, in true Calvinistic style, providence is immediately attached to creation: "God" (having created) "still upholds heaven and earth." And this providence is one with
regard to which "none can stay His hand or say unto Him, what dost Thou?". "The almighty and everywhere-present power of God, whereby, as it were by his hand, he still upholdeth heaven and earth, with all his creatures, and so governs them that herbs and grass, rain and drought, health and sickness, meat and drink, fruitful and barren years, riches and poverty, yea, all things, come not by chance, but by his fatherly hand". And the phrase quoted above, "Christ with his true body is now in heaven, and is to be there worshipped", is an example of the same exalted idea of God; the Lutherans had sought to sustain their doctrine of consubstantiation by claiming ubiquity for the human body of the exalted Christ; it was not merely controversial spirit that made the Calvinists so violently repudiate this—they had learned from Calvin to think of God as the high and lofty One that inhabits eternity, infinitely exalted above the creature; and the idea of conferring Divine attributes upon a creature was a degradation of this high and majestic idea of God. And it is this same dominance of the idea of God which explains how, in later Calvinists, as in Calvin
himself, faith is defined without being directly related to Christ. It is God who dominates the picture, even to the verge of excluding Christ; "Faith is not only a certain knowledge whereby I hold for truth all that God has revealed to us in his holy word, but also a hearty trust which the Holy Ghost works in me by the gospel, that not only to others, but to me also, forgiveness of sins, everlasting righteousness, and salvation are freely given by God, merely by grace, only for the sake of Christ's merits". This is better than Calvin had done, but it has still left it a faith in God, and not immediately a faith in Christ. And here, as in the case of the master, it is merely that Ursinus and Olevianus have the defects of their qualities; they have given us a defective definition of faith because of this overmastering sense of God.

Unusually clear is the expression of the Calvinistic sense of God's righteousness and punitive justice. "God is terribly displeased with our inborn as well as our actual sins, and will punish them in just judgment in time and in eternity". "God is indeed merciful, but he is likewise just; wherefore his justice requires that sin, which is committed
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against the most high majesty of God, be also punished with extreme, that is, with everlasting, punishment both of body and soul. "Since, then, by the righteous judgment of God we deserve temporal and eternal punishment, what is required that we may escape this punishment and be again received into the favor of God? God wills that his justice be satisfied; therefore we must make full satisfaction to the same, either by ourselves or by another". And this strong moral feeling is to be seen, also, in the position given to the ten commandments. Luther had put this first in his catechism—a "schoolmaster to lead us to Christ"; Calvin departed from this order, and taught that the law is binding on Christians, somewhat more clearly and emphatically than Luther had done; but here we have it wrought in bold lines into the very structure of the Catechism: the three parts of the Catechism are "Of man's misery", "Of man's redemption", and "Of thankfulness"—this latter consists almost entirely of an exposition of the law of God, the Ten Commandments; the "thankfulness" of the redeemed Christian man should consist in the observance of the law of God.
The Belgic Confession is thoroughly Calvinistic. And in it, as always, we find that same sense of the exalted majesty of God, of man's dependence upon Him, and of man's duty toward Him. "We believe that the Father created of nothing the heaven, the earth, and all the creatures, as it seemed good to Him, giving unto every creature its being, shape, form, and several offices to serve its Creator." We believe that the same God, after he had created all things, did not forsake them, or give them up to fortune or chance, but that He rules and governs them, according to his holy will, so that nothing happeneth in this world without his appointment. And as to what he doth, surpassing human understanding, we will not curiously inquire into it further than our capacity will admit of, but with the greatest humility and reverence adore the righteous judgments of God which are hid from us, contenting ourselves that we are disciples of Christ, to learn only those things which he has revealed in his word, without transgressing those limits. "This doctrine affords us unspeakable consolation,
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since by it we are taught that nothing can befall us by chance, but only by the direction of our most gracious heavenly Father, who watches over us with a paternal care, keeping all creatures so under his power that not a hair of our head (for they are all numbered) can fall to the ground without the will of our Father, in whom we entirely trust; being persuaded that he so restrains the devil and all our enemies that, without his will and permission, they cannot hurt us".

Calvin's words, as well as his spirit, are to be seen in the statement about the fall of man: "For the commandment of life, which he had received, he transgressed, and by his sin he separated himself from God, who was his true life". The abject submission of the statement about election is remarkable: "We believe that the posterity of Adam, being fallen into perdition and ruin by the sin of our first parents, God did then manifest himself such as he is, that is to say, merciful and just: merciful, since he delivers and preserves from this perdition all whom he,
in his eternal and unchangeable counsel, hath of mere goodness elected in Christ Jesus our Lord, without any respect of their works; just, in leaving others in the fall and perdition wherein they have involved themselves”.

We notice again the same zeal for the Divine majesty as we find the same anti-Lutheran horror of the admixture of the human and Divine in the person of Jesus Christ; the incarnation, nor yet the exaltation, of the Lord Jesus Christ must never be thought of as a deification mere humanity. Then, there are not two Sons of God, nor two persons, but two natures united in one person; yet each nature retains its own distinct properties. As then the Divine hath always remained uncreated, without beginning of days nor end of life, filling heaven and earth, so also hath the human nature not lost its properties, but remained a creature, having beginning of days, being finite, and retaining all the properties of a real body. And though he hath by his resurrection given immortality to the same,
nevertheless he hath not changed the reality of his human nature; forasmuch as our salvation and resurrection depend on the reality of his body".

The sense of right, and of punitive justice, is powerfully in evidence in this Symbolum in the statement of the doctrine of the Atonement: "We believe that God, who is perfectly just, sent his Son to assume that nature in which the disobedience was committed, to make satisfaction for the same, and to bear the punishment of sin by his most bitter passion and death. God therefore manifested his justice against his Son when he laid our iniquities upon him, and poured forth his mercy and goodness upon us, who were guilty and worthy of damnation, out of pure and perfect love, giving his Son unto death for us, and raising him for our justification, that we through him might obtain immortality and life eternal". Again: "He hath presented himself in our behalf before the Father, to appease his wrath by his full satisfaction, by offering himself on the tree of the cross, and pouring out his precious blood to purge away our sins".
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No man needs doubt where the Scotch learned theology, if he reads the Scotch Confessions. The 'Confession' of 1560, though not intended as a full statement of faith, but only as an anti-Roman polemic, shows the same vivid sense of God's reality, his majesty, and his immediate presence, which we have been finding in the other Reformed Symbols. "We therefoir, willing, to take away all suspicion of hypocrisie, and of double dealing with God and his Kirk, protest, and call the SEARCHER OF ALL HEARTES for witness, that our mindis and heartis do fullilie agree with this our confession, promeis, aith, and subscription; sa that we ar not mivit with ony warldlie respect, but ar perswadit onlie in our conscience, through the knowledge and love of Godis trew religion prented in our heartis be the Holie Spreit, as we sal answer to him in the day when the secreits of heartis sal be disclosed'.

The fuller statement of 1560 is full of Calvinistic expressions. The sovereign might and majesty of God are clearly in evidence: "Be whom we confesse and belieue all thingis in hevin and eirth, aswel visible as Invisible, to have been created, to be reteined in their being, and to be ruled an guyded be his inscrutable
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Providence, to sik and, as his Eternall Wisdome, Gudnes, and Justice hes appoynted them, to the manifestation of his awin glorie".

The belief in the penal justine of God, and the sense of the authority of the law of this terribly righteous God are to be seen very strikingly displayed in this Symbol: "That our Lord Jesus offered himself a voluntary Sacrifice unto his Father for us, that he suffered the contradiction of sinners, that he was wounded and plagued for our transgressions, that he being the cleane innocent Lambe of God, was damned in the presence of an earthlie Judge, that we suld be absolved befoir the tribunal of our God. That hee suffered not onylye the cruell death of the crosse quhilk was accursed be the sentence of God; but also that he suffered for a season the wrath of his Father, quhilk sinners had deserved...... We avow that he suffered to make full satisfaction for the sinnes of the people". The humbly submissive penitence, the passionate earnestness, which this produced in religious life, comes to expression as we hear
that "The sonnes of God, as before wes said, dois fact against sinne; dois sob and murne, when they perceive themselves tempted in iniquity, and gif they fal, they rise againe with earnest and unfained repentance; and thir things they do not be their awin power, bot be the power of the Lord Jesus, without whom they were able to do nothing".

Elizabeth succeeded in her effort to eliminate Calvinism from the Articles of the English Church. Predestination indeed remains, but there is wanting in the statement of it that passionate adoration, that submissive dependence, which characterize pure Calvinism; the Thirty-nine Articles do not crush men into the dust in that humble dependence upon God; Elizabeth wished to make a broad and inoffensive creed, and moreover, a not too religious creed. Her efforts were crowned with success.

She could not, however, eliminate the Calvinistic ideas which were running, with increasing power, in the heads and hearts of her subjects. The remarkable
feature of the religious life of England in her reign was the growing power of the Puritan party, dominated as it was by a Calvinistic sense of God, which found expression in a determination to set all things in accord with his word, and to make all of life Godly. It was of a piece with all this that we should hear that passionately polemic appendix was attached to the 'Thirty-nine Articles', to express the Calvinistic feeling of the people, which shows the influence of Calvin's doctrine of Divine Sovereignty as it says: "The moving or efficient cause of predestination unto life is not the foresight of faith, or perseverance, or of good works, or of any thing that is in the person predestinated, but only the good will and pleasure of God". And this idea of God's absoluteness is not left, even in this short and violent polemic, untempered by the other side of the matter, that God is righteous and man responsible; "Those who are not predestinated to salvation shall be necessarily damned for their sins".

And not only in the polemic "Lambeth Articles", 
but also in the longer and fuller statement known as the "Irish Articles", do we find evidence of Calvinistic ideas in the English church of that time. In this Symbol the Calvinistic doctrine of the sovereignty of God is plainly declared: "God did, by his unchangeable counsel, ordain whatsoever in time comes to pass...... By the same counsel God hath predestinated some unto life, and reprobated some unto death". This all-controlling purpose of God is ruled and guided by nothing outside Himself; He acts in accord with the principles of mercy and justice, the principal purpose and end of His action being the glory of His Name: "For all things being ordained for the manifestation of His glory, and His glory being made to appear both in the works of His mercy and His justice, it seemed good unto His heavenly wisdom to choose out a certain number towards whom He would extend His undeserved mercy, leaving the rest of mankind to be spectacles of His justice".

In this Symbol, too, Calvin's emphasis upon the doctrine of creation, with the implication that it is from this that we are to infer much of His exaltation with reference to men, is reproduced: "In the beginning of time, when no creature had any being,
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God, by His word alone, in the space of six days, created all things; and afterward, by His providence, doth continue, propagate, and order them according to His own will.

Though the law of God does not occupy in this Symbol the prominent place which it does in other Calvinistic creeds, this is a formal rather than an actual difference. Calvin's ideas are mirrored quite accurately: God is a moral Being, and has laid it upon His moral creatures that they must be righteous like Himself. He has expressed His character in the commandments of Holy Scripture. "The works which God would have His people walk in are such as He hath commanded in Holy Scripture"; this moral principle imbedded in the nature of God is not set aside; the Divine law is not relaxed in the forgiveness of the sinner, for it is fully satisfied by Christ; it is not relaxed after the sinner has been forgiven, for it is still binding, with all its old authority, upon the redeemed children of God; it is the "Justice of God", which demands the "ransom"; and "it pleased our heavenly Father of His infinite mercy, without any desert of ours, to provide for us the most precious merits of His own Son, whereby our ransom
might be fully paid, the law fulfilled, and His justice fully satisfied. And this law remains in effect for the Christian: "No Christian man whatsoever is freed from the obedience of the commandments which are called Moral".

Of all the Calvinistic Symbols, the most powerfully controversial is the "Canons of the Synod of Dort". It was made as a defence of the separate doctrines which are generally thought of under the caption of 'the divine sovereignty'; the disputed, peculiar doctrines of Calvin are thrown into prominence and stated polemically. In this discussion we have sought to go behind these particular doctrines to the general thoughts about God, and the attendant emotional attitudes, and have designated this as the "sovereignty of God". It will be surprising, however, if we do not find these general ideas, and these emotional attitudes, in this Symbol; the salient points must indicate the thoughts which lie at the center: in the defence of the Calvinistic doctrines of the Atonement, predestination, depravity, regeneration,
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and the perseverance of the saints, one would be bound to use the idea of the absoluteness of God, one would be bound to make some of the feeling of the majesty of God.

And in fact we do find that there are some very striking examples of the doctrinal ideas which we have seen in Calvin himself, and which we have been tracing through the Reformed creeds. God is absolute: "And as God is most wise, unchangeable, omniscient, and omnipotent, so the election made by Him can neither be interrupted nor changed, recalled nor annulled; neither can the elect be cast away, nor their number diminished". "Election is the unchangeable purpose of God, whereby, before the foundation of the world, he hath, out of mere grace, according to the sovereign good pleasure of his will, chosen...". "The good pleasure of God is the sole cause of this gracious election".

The Divine righteousness, with its reverse side, penal justice, finds vigorous expression: "God is not only supremely merciful, but also supremely just. And his justice requires (as he
hath revealed himself in his holy word) that our sins committed against his majesty should be punished, not only with temporal, but with eternal punishments, both in body and soul; which we cannot escape, unless satisfaction be made to the justice of God". "As all men have sinned in Adam, lie under the curse, and are obnoxious to eternal death, God would have none done no injustice by leaving them all to perish, and delivering them over to condemnation on account of sin".

The loving filial relation of the children of God to their heavenly Father finds expression, alongside these expressions of the absolute authority of God: "According to this gracious he graciously softens the hearts of the elect, however obstinate, and inclines them to believe. . . . . That decree is to pious souls a source of unspeakable consolation".

The last of these Calvinistic Symbols in point of time is the first in influence, the Westminster Confession. And the ideas which we have been tracing
through the other Reformed creeds are even more fully and accurately reproduced here than in the other creeds which we have been studying; though farther removed in time, this Symbol is closer in thought than the others, to the master who taught them all.

We are told very plainly of the absoluteness of God: "He is most absolute, working all things according to the counsel of his own immutable and most righteous will, for his own glory."

There is an "infinite distance between us and God". "He is the alone foundation of all being, of whom, through whom, and to whom are all things. .... nothing is to him contingent or uncertain".

The same concept of God as an absolutely almighty Spirit is seen in the statement as to the Divine decree: "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass". The doctrine of providence is, as always, connected with creation, because the idea which both suggested most prominently was that God is the First Cause of all things, the Eternal, in contrast to the finite creatures: "God, the great Creator of
all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence, according to his infallible foreknowledge and the free and immutable counsel of his own will, to the praise of the glory of his wisdom, power, goodness, and mercy". And God is the determining factor in even so intimate and private a matter as the choice of salvation: "This effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled...".

The Calvinistic idea of the Divine righteousness, with its negative aspect, the Divine wrath, is powerfully expressed in the Confession: "Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God and the curse of the law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries spiritual, temporal, eternal". The statement of the doctrine of the
Atonement shows this same idea of penal justice:
"The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which he through the eternal Spirit once offered up unto God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father, and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven..."
"Christ, by his obedience and death, did fully discharge the debt of all those that are thus justified, and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to his Father's justice on their behalf". "Justification is of free grace, that both the exact justice and rich grace of God might be glorified in the justification of sinners".

And the Westminster fathers, when they came to provide for the actual religious instruction of the people, gave a very remarkable proof of this idea of a righteousness in God which demanded a righteousness from his people; they expounded the ten commandments with a detail and a puritan sternness which no other doctrinal book approaches. And in the Confession itself they were at pains to inform us that "The moral law doth forever bind all, as well justified persons as others, to the obedience thereof; and that not only in respect of
the matter contained in it, but also in respect of
the authority of God the Creator who gave it.
Neither doth Christ in the gospel any way
dissolve, but much strengthen, this obligation.

And the attitude of man to God must be in keeping
with the humility of his estate as a creature in
the presence of this great God: "To him is due from
angels and men, and every other creature, whatsoever
worship, service, or obedience, he is pleased to
require of them." And as with Calvin himself, this
attitude of worship is considered well summed-up
in the phrase 'the glory of God'; predestination
of men to eternal life or death is said to be done
"for the manifestation of his glory"—men must
submit to the power of the absolute God, and the
manifestation of God as God is the manifestation
of his glory and calls for submission and worship
from all men. Or again, God is "glorified" by the
manifestation of his "exact justice" in the payment
of a full satisfaction for sin—men must worship
the God of righteousness. Or again, God is "glorified"
by the manifestation of "his rich grace" in the
providing of salvation for sinners—men are con-
strained to worship the God of grace. We may say
that this attitude of awed, reverent dependence,
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united with confident filial affection, is well expressed when we are told that the ideal condition for the human race is that of Eden: "They were happy in their communion with God", or when the Shorter Catechism tells us that "Man’s chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy him forever".

In all these Reformed creeds we have seen the heart of Calvinism preserved; looking for the soul of Calvinism in a reverence and trust towards God, we have found the peculiar Calvinistic emphasis in these things present in all these creeds. Perhaps we may be allowed to say that the soul of Calvinism is so thoroughly independent of the 'Five Points' that we can agree with the statement of an American Methodist Scholar, as he says that even the Wesleys, who could pray "Help me to hate that horrible decree" (predestination) were Calvinists, believing in a very majestically exalted God, and holding a very peculiarly stern morality; not consistent Calvinists, but Calvinists, nevertheless.

Perhaps it may not be altogether fanciful for us to think it significant that just as Ritschel's theology, which puts Christ into so prominent a place, should have sprung from Lutheran roots, so
It is not accidental that Schleiermacher's statement of religion in terms of the feeling of "absolute dependence" should have come from a
Reformed theology.

It is the peculiar glory of the Reformed theology that it has always given to its idea of God a majestic splendor in the mind, and a moralizing power in the life, which no other theology has ever equally had. Of course Otto objects to this, and says that Luther's idea of God is quite as grand as that of Calvin. In this opinion Otto has not a great deal of company, however; and one is bound to think it remarkable that Otto has found it so often necessary to go to Calvin for the phrases in which to clothe these 'Lutheran' ideas. Most men will feel that 'that profound consciousness of the reality and authority of God' truly may be spoken of as 'marking all Calvin's thought'--that these things are peculiarly Calvinistic. And it must seem that from all the Reformed creeds we may draw the conclusion that for their framers, even more than for other men, the words of Aquinas are true: "Theologia a Deo docetur, deum docet, ad Deum jacit".
Earl Barth is the most spectacular figure among German theologians of the present day. He was a Swiss pastor, but he found it impossible to preach under the theological systems in which he had been trained; he therefore broke loose from all these and is making for himself and his followers a system altogether different from any of these. His is a theology of protest; he says that he wishes rather to protest against abuses than to affirm; he wishes rather to shake theology out of its self-content than to teach a finished system. But though its critical remarks may seem sounder and better-grounded than its constructive efforts, it must be said that the theology of Barth does readily lend itself to the idea that it is a system; there is a highly-developed system of ideas, closely knit together, expressed in a peculiar set of terms, and clinging very closely to a consistent use of these terms and ideas, the whole being taught with an assurance worthy of Calvin or Luther.

It is interesting to notice, in passing, that this theologian who so violently decries the attitude expressed in "nicht Lehre, Leben", came to his present theological position, not from theoretical, but from practical, considerations; this theology based on so desperate a hatred of
pragmatism, crying for truth at all costs, arose out of the despair of a preacher's heart and life, and not from the dissatisfaction of his mind.

Barth's system is different from what is being taught by other theologians of the present day; it quite violently attacks modern theology. But Barth will have it that what he is teaching is by no means a new thing under the sun; he wishes it to be said that he is merely reviving in modern dress the theology of the Reformation. Barth wishes to be considered a Calvinist, and his opponents (whose name seems to be legion!) are willing to let this stand as a fair statement of the case.

It is this proposition, however, which we wish to investigate: we want to know just how far it may with truth be said that Barth is a Calvinist, and just how far he has reproduced, in particular, those ideas of the Divine sovereignty which we have been discussing. For the purposes of this inquiry we shall set forth the main outlines of Barth's theology, and then seek to come to a conclusion as to how closely these ideas follow those of Calvin.
BARTH AND CALVIN

The central idea is a contrast; the awful difference between the finite and the Infinite, between the relative and the Absolute, between the changing and the Eternal, between time and Eternity, is the central idea with Barth.

"If I have a system it consists in what Kierkegaard called 'the unending qualitative difference' between time and Eternity, in its negative and positive significance constantly held before the eye. 'God is in heaven and thou upon earth'; the relation of this God to this man, the relation of this man to this God, is for me the theme of the Bible and the sum of philosophy in one". The great chasm between what is "this-side" and what is "yonder-side" the great divide, is the greatest idea in Barth's system.

On this side the great divide is the world which we know; bound down, conditioned by space and time, yet full of a constant impulse to live. But it is all hopeless, helpless, bound to fail and fade away; its very desire for this sort of life is the sign of its finitude, is its condemnation to death. This world is thus hopeless
and helpless because it is out of harmony with what is beyond the divide; it is hopeless because it is "creaturely". This line of thought, uncontradicted, would lead us away from any moral ideas; man is alienated from God merely as being less than God. And this is the line along which Barth proceeds most of the time; but he can play a different tune from this same instrument: man is alienated from God because of sin. The race is alienated from God because of the fall; the fall, however, understood not as a particular historical event, but as 'a timeless, before-all-time defection, a transcendental disposition of history'. (Here, as often, we feel moved to repeat Barth's expression, "let him understand who can!").

The race of men is alien from the God who dwells beyond the great divide, in the light unapproachable. All that lies beyond that barrier is to us unknowable; the best description of that world and of the God who rules in it is to say "altogether other"; the most certain and accurate thing which we can say about God is that He is altogether different from this world of ours, and
absolutely different from any thought of ours, unknown and unknowable, describable only in negatives. Yet this "otherness" does not mean that there is no relation between this world and the God of that world; that majestically inscrutable Might is the Creator of this world (We should notice, however, that Barth does not use this word to point to a definite historical fact of the past, but to express the idea of the dependence of our world upon God). Although we know that that world is altogether alien to ours and to all that we know, yet it stands in relation to us and to our world; related, yet unrelated—the tangent touches the circle, yet never becomes, even for a second, a part of the curve; the tangent touches, says Barth, yet does not touch. And that world beyond the divide is the boundary of this world, setting its limit, determining its end. And finally, one must remember that the "otherness" of that world is the salvation of this; if that world were similar to this world it could be no better, and could not help this world; the "otherness" which makes it unknowable is the quality which makes it able to save this world. It is "otherness", superiority, which makes that world alien, and it is that same
superiority which enables it to save this world.

Notable is Barth's attitude to man's attempts to reach across the great divide; ecclesiasticism, all religions, the religious impulse as such, are all abominable, an accursed thing. Religion is the attempt of men to reach across the divide; it is the attempt of man to know God, the unknowable. Religion pieces together little bits of supposed knowledge of God and teaches men to be content with themselves and their world, worshipping this so-called knowledge as their God. And so religion's attempt to know God can best be characterized by the exposition of the 'myth' of the tree of knowledge—"ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil"; man is attempting to possess the things which belong to God. Psychologically viewed, religion, basing its knowledge of God upon experience, must be thought of as a worship of that experience, which means, of course, the worship of self. The church is included in the general condemnation; for the church exists because it claims to reach across the divide and bring God to men and men to God. This it can never do, for
the church is of this world, altogether of this world, belonging to the same order of things as the religious experience upon which it is based. "What is built in this aeon, be it ever so phenomenal, both quantitatively and qualitatively, is never the kingdom of God, but the Tower of Babel". And earth is very careful to tell us that he does not mean that there is a "remnant", a holy band within the mass of the idolaters; all churches, all sects, of every sort, are attempts of men to reach across the divide and bring the Infinite into human life; and as such they are vain and empty, idle and hopeless, and because they deny the "yonder-side", they insult the Almighty.

Religion and the church are hopeless, in themselves. But religion may serve for the salvation of its devotees, if men will only realize that "the characteristic thing about religion is that it claims to grasp something which it never reaches", then a man, as he reaches across the boundary to grasp the world of the infinities, touches the electric-charged boundary, and realizes his finitude; and the church may serve, in similar fashion, to make men see the failure of all that is human, and so sharpen the sense of the Divine.
All the efforts, which starting from this side, seek to bridge the gulf, must necessarily end in failure. And if they make men content with themselves, they deepen and make permanent the gloom and the doom which rest upon men. If there is to be any knowledge of God, it must come from the other side of the gulf; if man is to know God, God must reveal Himself. And this is what God has done; He has revealed Himself to man. The Bible may, in general, be said to be the record of this revelation. And the Bible should be thought of and dealt with as a book of revelation; we should seek not only to see the psychological attitudes of the Apostle Paul; we should seek to see the Bible not only as a fact in the literary history of the First Century, but we should seek to think of it as speaking for God to all times and ages; we should break through the wall that divides the First Century from the Twentieth; we should seek to make ourselves and all men realize that the Bible is not merely a human document, belonging in the museum of First Century antiquities, but that it is a Divine book, embodying a Divine revelation.
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Barth is careful to explain that he is not reviving the orthodox theory of an infallible Bible; there is unprofitable matter in the Bible, and there are books other than the Bible which bring to us the Word. But what he wants us to catch from the Bible is its "hint at the miracle of the Un-and Super-historical, its pure transcendental view, its absolute "yonder-side" tendency."

We should cease to be content to know that there were certain attitudes, certain feelings, which represent the religion of the apostles; we must seek to know, not that Paul believed this or that, but that it is, or is not, the truth. Theology must cease to play with attitudes, and seek to know the truth as it is given by God; it can no longer leave the categories 'true' and 'untrue' to philosophy; theology must deal in truth, not in attitudes, it must be real theology, the truth about God.

But we must remember that we have been told that God is the Unknowable, the Altogether Other, so different from us and our world that if we knew the truth about Him we could not put it into our speech, or think it with our present categories.
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And so, the expression of the truth of God is a very difficult matter; in fact, we can speak truly about God only in paradoxical, contradictory, ways, so that one statement contradicts and eliminates the other; that is, in a "dialectic-speech-form", knowing that we can abide neither with the thesis, nor the antithesis, since both will be removed by the synthesis. We dare not try to content ourselves with a single statement, however cleverly-phrased it may be; "direct, unambiguous speech is the worst perversion of the truth".

The Bible is the record of a revelation of God; what, then, is the content of this revelation? The answer is Christ. But we must make a distinction between the earthly Jesus and the heavenly Christ; and we must say with Paul that though we have fixed our thoughts on Christ after the flesh, all our interest is now to be centered upon the 'mythical' Christ of Paul. "The so-called historical Jesus, who moves over the plain of history and psychology, is, like all else historical and psychological, corruptible; it is never the Divine and Eternal". We are to think of Christ the Crucified and the Risen. But
the crucifixion is not to be thought of in this connection as a merely historical event; it is a communication of God to man; a Word, and indeed the last word, of God with regard to man, God's fundamental 'negation', the Divine judgment upon all human possibilities. Doubtless it is a little hard for us to be sure that we have understood our author at this point; perhaps we shall best get at what he is saying if we put it that the cross means the dying, in idea, of all that is human, the demonstration of the Divine 'NO' upon all that is human, upon all that is this-side the great divide.

Likewise, we are assured that the resurrection (that is, the resurrection of which we are to think) is not, and cannot be, an historical event. The resurrection is not that event which took place outside the gate of Jerusalem in the year 30; the resurrection of which we are to think is the Divine event which stands behind this, the outbreak of the Divine 'YES', the affirmation that there is a possibility for man other than death and despair.
And this is the gospel; the revelation of the fact that all men, and all their life, lie under the Divine 'NO'; and that all men who realize their creatureliness, depending upon the Divine, come under the Divine 'YES'. "If a man, not from a religious height, but direct from the sinful and suffering world, not with the mask of an especial piety, but in his naked neutral brokenness; himself become a problem; pressed to the wall, forced to the brink of the Abyss—if a man from all this dares to make the leap into the uncertain, the bottomless, into the empty air, and there hanging suspended over the abyss, is grasped by the hand of God, then the man believes".

We dwell in a world which must pass away and die; it can never be improved, or changed, so as to grow gradually better and at last blossom out into the glories of the kingdom of God. This world, and all that is human, creaturely, must pass away. And the Kingdom of God will come at last, bursting with all its full-orbed splendor upon this world of sorrow and darkness and death. But we are cautioned not to think of this, either, as being exactly an historical event; to do so would be
to reduce it to the level of this world; we must remember that the tangent never becomes a part of the curve of the circle. Indeed, we are sometimes addressed in language which would seem almost to mean that the parousia had been reduced to a nebulous phantasm.

When we ask for a statement about ethics, we are told that the same "yonder-side" tendency must rule here. Any ethical theory which is based upon this world, or uses it as material, is bound to fail. Kant fails because his "free man" is only a theory, a dream-person, who does not exist in real life. Ritschl built his kingdom of God from and in this world; and, in the end, it must fail; the individual man, or the whole of Christendom, cannot be the adequate means to the kingdom; God, and God alone, can supply this. And so the chief thing to keep in mind about ethical theory and practice is that it is to be an interims-ethic; we live "between the times", and we wait for a Kingdom of God to be brought to us from beyond the Divide.

Is this Calvinism? Certainly it is very much like the doctrinal ideas of the Genevan Reformer, in several of its chief ideas. And yet there are marked differences, in detail. We notice, in the
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first place, that the idea of God tends, in Barth's hands, to become quite indefinite. God is merely a Great Unknown, dwelling in that "other" world. And the most significant thing that we can say about Him is just this, that he is outside our world. And so, very often, the idea of God tends to become a mere equivalent for that world. And the idea of God tends, too, to become indefinite when, in the discussion of the wrath of God, this phrase drifts more and more into an equivalent for the law of nature. The Divine 'NO' tends to become less and less an arrangement made by a personal God, still less a punishment upon individuals, and becomes a religious way of saying that all that lives in this physical world must die; the wrath of God has become the theologian's way of designating what the scientist calls natural law.

That this is different from Calvin's personal God needs no statement; the Institutio is filled with a polemic against the "Epicureans", whose ideas were very much like this.

And, too, Barth's God is a far-off and unknown God. God and man are totally incommensurable, dwelling in worlds so different that man can
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never understand God at all, in this world. This, like so much else of Barth's, is like Calvin; and yet it has carried the matter so far as to be altogether different from him, in the end. Calvin says that God, in revealing Himself to us, lisps to us, as mothers do to their children, because man is not able to comprehend the infinite God. But this, from Calvin, is mere theoretical concession, and means no more than to say that we cannot know God exhaustively. Calvin's general attitude is, that God speaks to us in that direct fashion which Barth says is the worst foe of the truth; Calvin based his remarkably dogmatic assurance on the fact that he believed that this revelation was so plainly legible that all Christians should know God, and find Him to be in all essentials like the idea of God held by Calvin himself. Calvin knows; Barth is in desperate earnest when he tells us that we do not know, and never can know.

And we should notice, at this point, that Calvin's theory is that the Bible is an infallible Book. Barth believes that the Bible is
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authoritative, and is of authority whether it fit with the theologian's experience or not; but the Bible is not infallible: "The only Bibliicism which one can prove against me is that I think the Bible is a good Book, and it would be worthwhile for a man to take its thought at least as seriously as his own".

We find this fact that God is for Barth far-off and unknown to be further illustrated in the doctrine of faith. Faith, according to Barth, disavows all supposed knowledge of God as a worship of oneself, and casts itself upon Him, the Unknown and Unknowable. To see just how far this is from Calvin, one has only to read Calvin's violently polemic treatment of ideas of the Romanists which were very much like this, in §2: "Faith is a certain knowledge of the Divine benevolence."

And Barth's idea of predestination belongs just alongside his doctrine of faith; Calvin knew his God, and believed that God had known John Calvin as an individual, from all eternity, and that God had loved him that long ago. Barth's idea of predestination
is by no means so individual a matter as that; election is to be seen in the sweep of history, but there is no trace of Calvin's idea of election in the thought of Barth. And we must believe that this is not because Barth is less willing to ask himself and all other men to bow before God as Calvin does, but because Barth knows his God so much less than Calvin knows his.

And Barth's polemic against religious experience is a working-out of this same general idea of the unknowableness of God. All religious experience is a false representation of the Divine, and whenever men begin to worship their ideas of God, they are really worshipping themselves. Calvin's ideas are altogether different; he does indeed despise Sadolet's display of feeling for its own sake, but his own life, and all his theological work are shot through with the sense of the reality and nearness of God. Ritschl could use Calvin's Institutio as his text-book in dogmatics; it would not have been so easy
for him to have used Barth's Commentary on Romans in that way! Calvin's books taught men to pray; but "God is in heaven and thou upon earth"--is it taking too great a liberty when one adds the rest of the verse "therefore let thy words be few"?

And finally, we see this agnosticism of Barth in his ethic. Both Calvin and Barth inculcate an attitude of life which looks always to the future; Barth says that we live "between the times", and Calvin tells us that the Christian's daily thought must be a "meditation of the future life". But in this present life John Calvin knows what is his duty; he inculcates no idle gazing into heaven--he shows himself the great preacher of the law of God as the rule of the Christian's daily life. Barth, on the other hand, is not very much concerned with these matters; we can never accomplish very much; we are to wait upon God.

And Barth leaves us with the impression that God is, for him, a less thoroughly moral
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Person than He is for Calvin. For Barth, the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against man’s failure to worship. (He renders “Unrighteousness” by “Insubordination”—sin is a violation of God’s command, but the idea of a moral law of inherent right is omitted from his thought.) Calvin feels that all unrighteousness is impiety, and that all impiety is unrighteous, but he would have given us a very emphatic statement that there are many other ways of being unrighteous than by being blasphemous and irreverent. This failure of Barth to do justice to the idea of right is especially noticeable in the fact that the wrath of God descends upon the heads of men not always or generally because of sin, but because he is a creature. Almost never do we find Barth shrinking away from God because of sin, as man’s own act, man’s distance from God is due not to his sin, nor even (in general) to the fall, but to the finitude, creaturality, the “this-side-ness”, of man. And so, the salvation offered by the gospel according to Barth is a condescension of God to the frail creature. It need hardly be said that for Calvin, man, made in the image of God, is alienated from Him by sin, and is brought
back to God by a salvation which has at its heart the forgiveness of sins.

Is Barth a Calvinist? That word has always meant that the theologian to whom it was applied followed his great teacher more closely than any other of the masters have been followed; the Church honored the names of Paul and Augustine and departed widely from their doctrine; the followers of Luther or of Ritschl did not by any means reproduce the ideas of their teachers as the Calvinists did those of Calvin. To be a Calvinist has always meant that a man reproduced the ideas of the Genevan Reformer with an accuracy and a detailed fulness unparalleled in the history of theology. And so we are bound to feel that Barth is not a Calvinist in the same sense in which this may be said of Turrettin or Hodge or Warfield. We miss, in Barth the definite, personal, clear, idea of God which we see in Calvin; we miss Calvin's knowable, lovable God, the God of intimate religious fellowship; we miss Calvin's teaching of the law of God; we miss Calvin's idea of Predestination;
and above all, we miss Calvin's idea of the Divine righteousness. But we find in Barth the same idea of the majesty of God, and the same effort to make himself bow before God. Barth is not an old-fashioned Calvinist; but he seems to feel a commission to 'cry aloud and spare not' in the insistence that theology must seek for truth and that it must seek to make believers bow down in humble adoration before God. To say these things with the peculiar emphasis of Barth is to be much nearer to Calvin's religion than is most of our present-day world.

God is, for Calvin, an almighty Sovereign. In the first part of our discussion of Calvin's doctrine, we discovered that God, personal, knowable, is the absolute Lord of men; that He is righteous and demands righteousness of men; and that He is gracious in a way that preserves completely the 'fear' of the Almighty King, without making impossible the most confident filial trust; and we found that Calvin's theological work abounds in evidence of the fact that he did in fact accord to God, at all times, that loving, warm-
hearted, confident devotion.

As we have glanced at Calvin's anthropological and soteriological ideas, we have found that the same majestic Face is ever before our author, as he shows us the eternal plan of God, and shows us how God is the all-determining factor in all the execution of this plan; and as he shows us how in all the conscious reactions of men to God, there must be recognition of God as the Almighty Lord, the God of righteousness, the King of Grace.

And, finally, we have found the Reformed creeds reproducing these ideas with a fulness, and a word-for-word closeness, which is almost without parallel in theological literature in the relations of teacher and followers. And we have seen Karl Barth differing in many essential details from our author, yet profoundly influenced by him, and reproducing the great concept of a God who is absolutely exalted, transcendent to all creation.
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