CARDINAL NEWMAN'S DOCTRINE OF AUTHORITY

IN RELIGION

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March 1, 1931
To the dear memory of

My Mother

with a love that lives
beyond the years
PREFACE

The scope and aim of this essay are indicated in the introductory chapter. I have here to record the large debt of gratitude which I owe to three inspiring teachers: Professors Hugh R. Mackintosh and Daniel Lamont, of New College, the University of Edinburgh; and Professor Walter T. Brown, of Yale University. There are many others to whom my obligation is great; but these three especially, by their encouragement, wise counsel, and untiring help, have made possible the writing of this essay. I wish also to express my thanks to Miss Flora Hamilton, of the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church Staff, who read the manuscript.

Rex Stowers Clements
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTORY

There can be little doubt that one of the most significant questions to-day facing men and women who are interested in religion is the question of authority. All along the line the old authorities are losing their grip; indeed, this loss of the sense of certainty is one of the striking features of contemporary Protestantism. The old unquestioning confidence is gone, never to return; and yet, men feel as keenly as ever before the needs of which the old positive creeds were the expression. In a recent book which is being widely read and quoted, Mr Walter Lippmann writes thus of the condition in which man now finds himself: "There is no theory of the meaning and value of events which he is compelled to accept, but he is none the less compelled to accept the events...... Events are there, and they overpower him. But they do not convince him that they have that dignity which inheres in that which is necessary and in the nature of things"(1). Mr Bertrand Russell accounts for the prevalent cynicism amongst young people as due to the absence of any absolute to which they may give their loyalty. Professor John Dewey writes: "It would be difficult to find in history an epoch so lacking in solid and assured objects of belief, and approved ends of action as the present"(2). This recognition of the breakdown of authority is a note that is repeated over and over again by those competent to comment on the moral and religious condition of our times.

Turning more definitely to the religious field, we read in the general introduction to the "Library of Constructive Theology" that "It may be predicted that the number of people who are content to rest their religion on the authority of the Bible or the Church is steadily diminishing.....". And Professor Dodd tells us in his book on "The Authority of the Bible" that "Apart from the general revolt against authority, modern criticism, by destroying belief in the infallibility of the Bible, has undermined the traditional doctrine of its authority"(1). Father Knox puts the matter in impressive form when he writes: "Protestantism claims to take its guidance immediately from the living Christ. But what is the guidance he gives us, and where are we to find it? That is the question over which Protestantism has always failed to answer the Catholic challenge, over which it finds it increasingly difficult, nowadays, to answer the challenge of its own children"(2).

The Protestant theologian would find little difficulty in making a sound reply to Father Knox. Yet, in her own best religious interests, the Protestant Church must concern herself about answering the Roman Challenge, and she must have something more authoritative to say to her own children than she has been saying in the recent past. If religion is to continue as the unifying force in all of man's activities, if it is to give purpose and direction to all he does, if the secular powers of our age are not to overwhelm and strangle man's natural spiritual aspirations, if loyalty to duty and love are yet to work their saving influences in human hearts, if devotion to God and acceptance of salvation in Christ are to continue to give men the life that is life indeed, then the Church

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(1) C.H. Dodd, "The Authority of The Bible", p.ix.
must regain her note of authority. Or perhaps we should say achieve, rather than regain, a note of authority. For a mere return to the old fundamentalist type of authoritarianism is not to be desired; there is needed a new conception of the true meaning and function of authority. The breakdown of the old authority has been due in large measure to its external character; having no inward personal ground, it was not able to stand when the days of change and discovery came upon us. Out of the chaos that now reigns in the hearts and minds of men, a generation that is confused but wistful looks for the lifting of a standard around which they may rally their highest loyalties, listens for the sound of a voice which in honoring both God's sovereignty and man's freedom will persuade them to follow where it leads. So it has seemed worth while to attempt in this paper an inquiry into certain features of the general problem of authority, and in particular of the problem of authority in religion.

As to Cardinal Newman's connection with the problem of authority in religion, much might be said; no inquiry could be complete without a survey of his position, and few starting-points could be found more rewarding than he furnishes. It must be universally agreed that he was one of the outstanding figures of the nineteenth century, distinguished alike as a compelling preacher, a subtle theologian, and a literary genius of rare power and charm. Relative to his influence on the religious life of England, and so indirectly upon the whole English-speaking world, John Hutton writes: "It would be difficult to name another, who, by the force of his solitary genius and personality, has wrought such a change in the religious life of a country as has been effected by J.H.Newman"(1). It is doubtful whether anyone using the English tongue has ever

exhibited greater facility as a writer than Newman shows,--as one has said, it seemed he could not answer a dinner invitation without adding to literature. It is equally doubtful whether a personality more interesting, contradictory, baffling, and complex, could be found within the limits of the past century. But more than in his unique personality or in his fascination as a writer, our interest lies in the religious problem which he incarnates, "the sacred cause to which his wonderful gifts as man and artist were consecrated", which he reveals to us in all its difficulties and complexities. As Professor Sarolea points out, Newman is, like Pascal, a favorite alike with Catholics and Protestants, with believers and unbelievers; and few thinkers have appeared under so many and varied aspects, and passed through so many changes. He was "a combination of Hamlet and Pascal, anxious and restless, who, like his brother Francis, would have been a free-thinker if he had not become a Catholic, and who tried in vain in Catholicism to find an answer to his doubts and perplexities"(1).

And so it has seemed worth while to examine the development of Newman's views on authority. His up-bringing was evangelical; his university period and the strong years of his early maturity were spent in the Church of England; why, at the age of forty-five, did he secede to Rome? Was it because, like most of the rest of us, he longed for an authority upon which to rest everything, in which all his doubts and perplexities would be reconciled? Whether he ever found that rest, we shall have occasion to doubt. But there is a value, we believe, in tracing the development of his doctrine, in following where he walked, in learning from his disappointments and avoiding his mistakes. We shall

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be thrilled by contact with an intelligence so magnificent; we shall
be amazed that such an intelligence seemed, as Bremond says, to
cherish a passion for bondage.

Our aim in this paper is to examine critically Newman's
position on authority, and to suggest a doctrine that will be more
satisfactory than his is found to be for the times in which we are
now living. We shall seek to trace the genetic development of his
doctrine, from its early days through to its final Roman form. We
shall attempt to show that Newman was, so to say, born a Roman Catholic;
and that, as we read on the first page of his Letters and Correspondence,
perhaps no man who passed through so many changes ever remained more
substantially the same during the revolution of years, circumstances,
and opinions. We shall try to isolate and extract his doctrine of
authority in religion from his writings, depending rather largely
upon the "Apologia". Then we shall criticise this doctrine, compare
it with the doctrine of traditional Protestantism, and offer certain
suggestions that seem helpful in pointing the way to an authority that
compels obedience and at the same time does honor to the free spirit
of man. We shall find that our study will concern itself pretty
largely with the psychological aspects of Newman's life and work; for
it is impossible to understand Newman the theologian without under­
standing Newman the man. To an unusual degree his theology depended
upon and was dictated by his personal characteristics; and, as we have
said, his was a personality of amazing contradictions. We all have
contradictory strains in our make up, and it is our way of resolving
these strains that makes us persons; but in Newman we meet these con­
tradictory tendencies in such number as to render his theology
intelligible only in the light of a knowledge of what kind of man he was. Kant's Critiques can be understood and appreciated in and for themselves, quite independently of any insight into the kind of person who wrote them. It is amusing to read of Kant's personal habits, but a knowledge of these is not necessary to an understanding of his works. His philosophical writings have an objectivity that places them on their own feet; they do not reflect their creator. But not so with Newman. He put himself into everything he wrote, and what he left behind needs to be read against the background of his own personality.

Our position in this paper is in substantial agreement with the thesis of Rawlinson's excellent book on "Authority and Freedom", which is to the effect that "a synthesis is both possible and necessary between authority and freedom, and at the same time between 'Evangelical' and 'Catholic' Christianity...... it is maintained that respect for individual freedom is compatible with recognition of authority as being in a real sense inherent in the revelation of God in history and also in the interpretation of such revelation by corporate experience and tradition",(1).

The paper falls into three parts: first, a biographical section, necessarily rather full, for the reasons indicated above. The two chapters will deal with his family, school and university life, and a brief survey of his life and work in the English Church and in the Church of Rome; and an estimate of Newman, as literary genius, preacher, and theologian. The second part of the paper will contain nine chapters, in which his views on authority will be drawn from his writings; we shall begin with his early views and their genesis, following him through the "Tracts", the Via Media, the "Development of Christian Doctrine", and the use he makes of reason and faith. We shall ask, and try to answer, the question, Why did he join the Roman communion? Finally we shall look at his position

on infallibility, after which we shall summarise our findings. Part three of the paper is an attempt to define the term authority, to criticise Newman's views, and to offer certain constructive suggestions. There are six chapters in this third and final section.

Our inquiry, we feel bound to say, is but elementary and tentative; what follows is offered with hesitation and misgiving. Yet it does represent at least an attempt to think our way into the question, and is, it is hoped, foundational for further efforts of the present writer in the same direction. And, if nothing else has been accomplished, the writer feels that he is a better man for having companioned with that great and sensitive soul, who wrote so superbly, who possessed one of the most lucid intellects of modern times, who was the incarnation of sincerity, yet who was carried far off his course by the cross currents of which he was not conscious.
Chapter 2

BIOGRAPHICAL.

On an early autumn afternoon in 1807, the passer-by might have noticed two little boys at play in the gardens of Bloomsbury Square. The geography of the Square in those days was in many respects different from that which we see to-day; more than a century would pass before the Edison Building shouldered its bulk upward to form the eastern sky line. But the plane trees growing there to-day form a living link with the early years of the past century; and as to-day, so on that far-off afternoon the uncertain sunlight filtering through the leaves of sycamore and locust painted weird patterns on the yellow gravel walks.

The older of the two boys, now six years of age, would be noticed for his distinguished carriage, his fine features, and his wealth of golden-brown hair. His companion, younger, even slighter, more aggressive in his movements, looked out upon the world through big dark eyes set in a pale face that was ringed with black curls. There is a legend that these two lads at times engaged in tests of their skill at wrestling. But the legend may be doubted; they both shrank from games that involved physical exertion and contact. The battles that the future held for them were destined to be fought on the field of ideas, religious and political. The two boys were John Henry Newman and Benjamin Disraeli.
John Henry Newman was born in London on February 21, 1801, the eldest of six children. His father was a member of a London banking firm; and while something of a man of the world, built of coarser fibre than his son, yet he seems to have had a passion for justice and honesty. The third son, Francis William, speaks thus of his father: "As I grew up I began to honor a breadth, serenity, and truthfulness in my father's character...... I saw him in my memory as an unpretending, firm-minded Englishman, who had learned his morality more from Shakespeare than from the Bible" (1). The elder Newman's family appear to have held at one time certain lands in Cambridgeshire; but there is no full and official pedigree extant.

Rather more is known of the family of Newman's mother. Her maiden name was Foudrinier, and her Huguenot family, exiled from France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, spent some thirty years in Holland before settling in England. In the appendix of Ward's monumental "Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman" there is printed a genealogical table of the Foudriniers, with full details of the family from 1658 onward. The most marked influence which Mrs Newman seems to have exerted upon her first-born son was through the evangelical atmosphere in which he was reared.

There has been a good deal of discussion concerning the alleged Jewish ancestry of Newman. Investigation indicates that there is no evidence for believing there was Jewish blood on either side of the family. The suggestion of Jewish origin was first made in the Encyclopedia Britannica; but the writer of the article, when questioned

as to his authority, admits that "there is no evidence for it, except the nose and the name"(1). That the nose is clearly Jewish in type, almost every portrait and photograph of Newman testifies; but this is far from sufficient ground upon which to imply Jewish ancestry.

The entire Newman family was interesting, and in many ways remarkable. Two of the daughters lived to become octogenarians, and both possessed gifts of character and intellect that were above average. The second son, Charles Robert, seems to have been lacking in balance, and to have been a burden upon his family. But Francis William, the youngest of the boys, possessed a brilliance which in some respects overshadowed that of John Henry during their Oxford years. An indication of the independence of mind of the entire family is found in the fact that no one of them followed their celebrated brother into the Church of Rome.

In later life, Newman wrote of his childhood that he was "in no respect a precocious boy". Since he never had any children of his own, we may excuse his failure to realize what a wide difference there was between his own childhood and that of the average boy. One might argue that he was not only precocious, but extraordinarily so when compared with the children of our own times. Few indeed are the boys of to-day who are reading Ovid at the age of nine. Fewer still are those who, like Newman, at that age write poems on Nelson; or "Verses on the Death of a Beggar"; or who compose a mock drama when eleven; or who, when fourteen, compose both words and music for a burlesque opera. Indeed, in the "Apologia" the Cardinal seems to refute his own statement as to his lack of precociousness; he writes, "I made a collection of Scripture texts

in proof of the doctrine "(of the Holy Trinity) "with remarks (I think) of my own upon them, before I was sixteen; and a few months later I drew up a series of texts in support of each verse of the Athanasian Creed. These papers I still have"(1).

Writing in 1852, his sister, Mrs Thomas Mozley, speaks of Newman at the age of eleven as "a very philosophical young gentleman", "very observant and considerate"(2). Throughout his youth, as well as during his later years, books were his constant companions; and he loved to read to the servants from serious works, offering to them his own explanations. He tells us in the "Apologia" that when fourteen he read Paine's "Tracts Against The Old Testament"; "also I read some of Hume's essays, and perhaps that on miracles". In these scattered notes on his childhood, we are able to discern some of the characteristics of the man to be. As we shall see in another connection, his childhood was marked by an extraordinarily vivid imagination; he seemed to live in a world of fancy, apart from common hard events; and the remarkable thing about this is that in his case these childish imaginations and fancies did not fade out with the coming of manhood, but rather grew in strength and fitted themselves permanently into his mature life.

On May 1, 1808, John Henry was sent to a large private school at Ealing. Here he remained for eight years, until he went up to Oxford; he was never at a public school. During his entire period at Ealing, he was very rarely seen to take part in games. His natural inclinations led him to the editing of a magazine rather than to football and cricket. Beyond the garden at Bloomsbury Square and the shrubbery

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(1) Apologia, p. 107.
around his early home at Ham, he had practically no contact with nature, and during the impressionable formative years at Ealing he seems to have taken no interest in natural phenomena. The affairs of the outside world and the intellectual interests of older people made no appeal to him. We have seen that he wrote a poem on Nelson, read Greek and Latin with facility at the age of nine, and was more than ordinarily concerned about the state of his own soul in the early years of his adolescence. But in his autobiographic memoir and in the papers that have come down to us from his youth, we look in vain for any word about that tremendous period bounded by 1808 and 1816; there is nothing of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, nothing of Wellington's Peninsular Campaign, nothing even of Waterloo. This aloofness from the affairs that seemed vital to most persons of that age we shall see exhibited again in the subject matter of the curiously mis-named "Tracts For The Times". So one may conclude that Newman's years at Ealing were years of introversion and loneliness. A boy who went to the bathing pond but never swam could not enjoy great popularity, however brilliant his intellectual gifts.

As we move on to consider his first conversion, it is of interest to notice a record that young Newman made in an early manuscript book, to the effect that when he was fourteen he wished to be virtuous but not religious. On March 8, 1816, his father's bank failed, a circumstance which required young John Henry to remain at school some few weeks longer than had been planned. During this period he came under the influence of one of the Masters, a certain Walter Mayers, who has been described as a pious young clergyman of the Evangelical school. From Mayers, the young Newman received "deep religious impressions, at the time Calvinistic in character", which were to him the beginning of a new life (1). His

(1) "Letters and Correspondence", vol. i, p. 22.
conversion was not accompanied by states of violent feeling, but it
deepened greatly the religious side of his nature. We read in the
"Apologia", "When I was fifteen, (in the autumn of 1816,) a great
change of thought took place in me. I fell under the influence of a
definite creed, and received into my intellect impressions of dogma,
which, through God's mercy, have never been effaced or obscured" (1).
Again he says, "I...believed that the inward conversion of which I
was conscious (and of which I am still more certain than that I have
hands and feet) would last into the next life, and that I was elected
to eternal glory" (2). When he was eighty-four years of age, the
Cardinal found it difficult to realize the identity of the boy before,
and after, the August of 1816. It may be remarked as little short of
amazing that in his account of the conversion experience, the
testimony of conscience is not once mentioned.

It was in June of 1817 that Newman went into residence at
Trinity College, Oxford. His career there can not with fairness be
described as a brilliant success. He had but a meager interest in
sociability, and, as a friend put it, "no grain of conviviality".
Largely as a result of over-work and nervousness, he did poorly in
his B. A. examinations. His books aside, music seems to have been
almost his only interest. He played the violin with more than amateur
skill, and was particularly fond of Beethoven.

But his failure at Trinity was fully atoned for by his gaining
the Oriel Fellowship. The day of his election to this honor, April
11, 1822, he was wont to regard as one of the most memorable days of
his life. In a memorandum of the time he writes, "I am perpetually

(1) "Apologia", p. 107.
(2) Ibid., p. 108.
praying to get into Oriel, and to get the prize for my essay" (1). This gaining of the Oriel Fellowship was one of the significant events, one of the turning points, of his career; the way was now open before him along which would be presented every opportunity for high distinction.

It will be convenient to follow Wilfrid Ward in dividing Newman's career at Oriel into three periods: (a) The period of development under Whately and others; (b) The years of close intimacy with Hurrell Froude, 1826-32; and (c) The Tract Movement, 1832-45.

There can be little doubt that the chief influence in developing the "raw bashful youth" of 1821 into the brilliant John Henry Newman of 1825 was the able and forcible Dr Richard Whately, the leader of the Oriel school of pioneers in liberal theology,—a school by which young Newman was surrounded. "They were neither high church nor low church, but had become a new school.....which was characterized by its spirit of moderation and comprehension". "They called everything into question; they appealed to first principles, and disallowed authority in matters intellectual" (2). It may be remarked here that Newman, if he ever truly belonged, did not long adhere to this school. As an Evangelical he was welcomed; but intercourse with Whately, Pusey, Blanco White, and the others, served to enlarge his horizon and finally to draw him away from Evangelical sympathies. It was after Whately had taught Newman to think for himself that the native tendency of his mind began to come to the fore, and passing out of Whately's influence he gravitated toward

(1) Letters, Vol. i, p. 68.
(2) Ibid., p. 114.
the high ecclesiastical party. In May of 1824 Newman took orders and accepted the curacy of St. Clements', Oxford.

The period of intimacy with Hurrell Froude, beginning in 1828, marks also Newman's appointment as Vicar of St. Mary's, the Cathedral church at Oxford. A serious illness in 1827, and his sister's death in the following year, brought about an important change in his attitude toward religion. He felt that he had been beginning to overvalue the intellectual element. He now turned to the past for guidance; and with fresh significance the thought and teaching of the Church Fathers came to him. To this period too belong those memorable parochial sermons preached at St. Mary's, of which it has been said "they made Oxford feel as if one of the early Fathers had come back to earth". It was at about this time that Newman began an earnest study of the Fathers; and he wrote in a letter, "I am so hungry for Irenaeus and Cyprian (that) I long for the vacation".

During this second period the most powerful personal influence working on Newman was that of Hurrell Froude. Speaking of Froude, Bertram Newman writes: "Froude, brother of the historian, was a young man in a great hurry to medievalise the Church of England" (1). His friends were unanimous in admiring his talents and character, and in the love which they felt for him. We read in the "Apologia": "I knew Froude first in 1826, and was in the closest and most affectionate friendship with him from about 1829 till his death in 1836. He was a man of the highest gifts...... Nor have I here to speak of the gentleness and tenderness of nature, the playfulness, the free elastic force and graceful versatility of mind...... He taught me to look with admiration

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towards the Church of Rome, and in the same degree to dislike the Reformation. He fixed deep in me the idea of devotion to the Blessed Virgin, and he led me gradually to believe in the Real Presence. But there are other estimates of Froude, out of which we select for notice only one. Isaac Taylor, a critic of the Tractarians who was always moderate in his judgments, describes Froude as "the unhappy victim of a singularly malign temperament, and of a pernicious training" (1). It may be well to keep this impression in mind as a sort of antidote to the overbalanced praises heaped upon Froude by those who came under his spell.

A more genial influence was that exercised upon Newman by John Keble, one who "wore with becoming modesty the immense reputation he had won at Oxford", and whose name is surrounded with the halo of genius and sanctity. It was Keble who was regarded by Newman as "the true and primary author of the Tractarian movement". Speaking of Keble's "The Christian Year", which appeared in 1827, Newman writes: "Nor can I pretend to analyse, in my own instance, the effect of religious teaching so deep, so pure, so beautiful. The two main intellectual truths which it brought home to me I had already learned from Butler: the first of these may be called, in a large sense, the Sacramental system, and the other that probability is the guide of life". An acquaintance with Newman's work reveals these two principles as never far removed from the formative centers of his thought.

Newman's quiet life of study and pastoral work was interrupted in December, 1832, when he left England in company with Hurrell Froude

for a Mediterranean voyage. This venture, not common a century ago, and full of the promise of all sorts of interesting and exciting experiences, seems to have made singularly little impression upon Newman, aside from furnishing opportunity for the writing of his contributions to "Lyra Apostolica". He stayed on in Sicily after Froude's return to England, and there experienced a very serious illness, which he regarded as another of the real "turning points" of his life. On his way home, while becalmed in the Straits of Bonifacio, he composed "Lead, Kindly Light". These lines are known and loved by scores of thousands who do not so much as know Newman's name. The day may come when the impress of his tremendous personality will be forgotten, even when his magnificent prose will be no longer read; but "Lead, Kindly Light" will be cherished in countless hearts as long as religion lasts.

So we come to that period in his Oxford career which saw the birth of the so-called Oxford Movement. In the opening years of the nineteenth century, Oxford and Cambridge were purely Church of England corporations; matriculation tests excluded Roman Catholics, as likewise the more numerous and active dissenters. If we fairly consider the ordinary run of divinity professors who a century ago filled chairs of the two universities, it is hardly surprising that students of active minds and truly religious sympathies should have applied to them the words of the Prophet Ezekiel, "There were very many, and lo, they were very dry."

The condition of the Church a hundred years ago merits at least a brief notice. J. A. Froude in his "Letters on The Oxford Counter-
reformation", says that the pre-Tractarian years saw the Church of England in a condition of unexampled healthfulness. Compare with this opinion the fact that only a few years earlier Hannah More and William Wilberforce found in Gloucestershire thirteen adjoining parishes without one resident curate; a whole district in which the only Bible that could be discovered was being used to prop a flower pot; and a village whose fighting vicar, drunk six days a week, was said to appear not seldom on Sundays with a black eye. (1) In 1820 the party on Church Reform published the "Black Book", which pointed out that of twenty-seven bishoprics, eleven were held by members of noble families; fourteen by men who had been connected in some way with royal or noble houses; and of the remaining two, one was filled by a pamphleteer of Pitt's administration, and the other by the favorite of a great city company. (2).

The general run of the clergy were out of touch with the philanthropic and reform movements of the day; they stood apart from and above the toil and strain and the common needs of men; its worse members, to quote Dean Church, were "jobbers and hunters after preferment, pluralists who built fortunes and endowed families out of the Church, or country gentlemen in orders, who rode to hounds and shot and danced and farmed, and often did worse things", (3). The average were kindly, but dull, and often dogmatic and quarrelsome. "The fortunes of a church are not safe in the hands of a clergy, of which a great part take their obligations easily. It was slumbering and sleeping when the visitation of days of change and trouble came upon it,"(4).

(2) Ibid., p. 144.
(3) Dean Church, "The Oxford Movement", p. 10.
(4) Ibid., p. 4, 5.
It was partly against this state of things that the Oxford Movement was a revolt,—against a sterile Protestantism. Canon Lacey is probably right in saying that Protestantism was never more dominant in the Church of England than at the beginning of the Oxford Movement, (1); for certain doctrines are never so secure as when they are unobtrusive. The Protestantism which prevailed at the time had been determined largely by the Wesleyan revival, the industrial revolution, and the lingering effects of Deism; and it was against these three elements of the sterile Protestantism of the day that the revolt which later came to be called the Oxford Movement was directed.

It can never be denied that John Wesley wrought splendid achievements; yet it is equally true that his thought and method, definitely anti-intellectual and in conflict with the temper of the educated classes, bore disastrous fruit a generation after his death. Wesley's attitude toward prophecy and toward signs and portents marked him as remote from the intellectual life of his time. Fifty years after the execution of the last witch put to death in Britain, and thirty years after all legislation against witches had been repealed, Wesley was still proclaiming that with the acknowledgment of witchcraft one's faith in Christianity itself must stand or fall, (2).

The Industrial Revolution gave rise to a middle class whose leaders were non-conformist; thus it weakened the Church of England as a social force. There arose an antagonism between Saxon industry and Norman manners,—an antagonism such as that described by Mr Millbank in "Coningeby"; for the Church was still feudal in structure and in the impressiveness of its splendors, and feudalism no longer went down well

(2) Stewart, op.cit., p. 31, 32.
with those who were doing the nation's work. The men who were building up foreign trade with the attendant adventures and risks that went with that enterprise, inventing and setting up spinning jennys, draining the fen lands round about Lincoln, building canals and bridges and roads, - such men felt in no mood to be ruled in religious matters by a clergy who as a class were largely occupied in preserving game.

Moreover, the Church was sadly lacking in keen thinkers. "The appeal of religion was deliberately intellectualized, so that it might be equally impressive to the faithless and to the faithful", (1). Critics outside the Church were regarded as destroyers, and those within were assumed to be traitors. The "Cambridge Apostles" of 1830, who had the temerity to acquaint themselves with Continental scholarship, were looked upon as a German menace in theology. There is room for speculation in the suggestion made by Dean Stanley, that the development of the English Church would have been very different if Newman had been able to read German. "The talent of the age", wrote Newman, "is against the Church. The Church party is poor in mental endowments. It has not activity, shrewdness, dexterity, eloquence, practical power. On what, then, does it depend? On prejudice and bigotry", (2). Here was a situation which he and his friends heard crying for reform.

The other chief provocative of the Oxford Movement was the reaction towards Romanticism. The eighteenth-century faith in reason was now crumbling; a new enthusiasm for the past arose out of dissatisfaction with the present. The instincts and feelings began

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(1) Stewart, op.cit., p. 40.
to be exalted, as against the god of reason that had been worshipped
but a few years earlier. The Romantic impulse prepared the intellectual
climate for a revival of medievalism; and men were willing to submit
even "to authority, provided it was the kind of authority the remote
past had revered and that eighteenth-century smartness had despised". (1)
The Romantic movement did not belong to any one country; but in England
it found representatives in Scott, Byron, the Lake Poets, the philosophy
of Coleridge, Disraeli's "Sybil" and Carlyle's "Past and Present". The
strange mixture of skepticism and credulity produced by this temper are
seen in the case of Newman himself; it is not easy to realize that the
man who wrote "The Idea of A University" was actually the same who
defended the tale of the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius; or
that he who shivered Charles Kingsley to fragments could exult in the
Blessed Virgin's joy in Paradise when she learned of the decree by Pope
Pius IX of her immaculate conception. It shows a curious union of
mental strength with mental subservience; but we must remember that
Newman was in deadly earnest with a supernaturalism that
was to him thoroughly consistent.

Against the state of affairs sketched in the paragraphs above,
The Oxford Movement was a revolt. Against the compact citadel of Church,
State, and University, insurgent forces had begun to beat, forces that
were being called "liberalism", the tendency of which was to minimize
the dogmatic element in religion. During his early days at Oriel, Newman
was sharply critical of the various religious practices; but he was so
devoted himself that onlookers even described him as a Methodist. But
this phase passed; while in Rome the inevitable spell came upon him, and

(1) Stewart, op.cit., p. 53.
he felt worship to have a reality measurable by the creed. From this time onward, he never concealed his horror of Protestantism. He returned home to attack with all his energy the tendencies of the age, and especially the horrible prospect of a restored Deism.

"Gradually there faded from Newman's mind his old thought of Oxford as a sacred shrine. One by one, the high sanctities of his young imagination became resolved into their constituent parts -- an element of sheer habit and vis inertiae, an element of political caution, an element of social caste..... All that quasi-medieval Oxford environment, all those solemn regulations in the statutes of colleges, all that full-throated profession of faith as creeds were recited and litanies chanted and the gesture of worship everywhere executed -- did it correspond to any conviction within?" (1).

It was by a Cambridge man, Reverend J. H. Rose, that the first concerted resistance against liberalism was made. But Newman and Keble declined Rose's invitation to meet at Hadleigh for the initiation of plans; Newman was opposed to the forming of any kind of association, since it looked to him like conspiracy; and he had little faith in what could be done by committees, knowing full well that their "combined action" must be weak enough to secure the agreement of all members. He and his friends preferred to proceed by way of issuing at frequent intervals short and pungent tracts from the pens of independent writers. Thus it was that in September of 1835 Newman issued the first of the "Tracts for The Times by Members of The University of Oxford". Of the band of able men who set about by this means to revivify the Church,

(1) Stewart, op. cit., p. 108.
Newman soon came to be recognized as the master mind. Not a good manager of the movement he had helped to inaugurate, yet he was its unquestioned leader. He wrote twenty-seven of the ninety Tracts that were published; and his consent, approval, and personal stamp rested like an imprimatur upon every one of the others. Newman's own interests were now becoming almost wholly theological; and the movement whose birth we have just witnessed was insular and ecclesiastical in character. But there is another query that rises inevitably in the mind of the observer: In the two months preceding the publication of the first Tract, the First Factory Act was passed; so also was the Act that abolished slavery under the British Crown. May we not ask, Were not these events and others of a similar nature eminently worth notice in a series of Tracts "for the times"?

Newman continued his work at the University, and his parish duties at St. Mary's and Littlemore. In 1836 he began to edit the "Library of The Fathers"; in the same year he undertook the editorship of "The British Critic", as the organ of the Tractarian party; and his remaining years in the English Church were filled with literary activity. In 1837 he formulated his "Via Media" of Anglican theology against liberalism and Protestantism on the one hand, and Popery on the other. In 1839, while pursuing his systematic reading on the Monophysite Controversy, there came to him for the first time a misgiving as to the validity of the Anglican position. He found himself unable to reconcile his "Via Media" with the story of the Monophysites. This was for Newman a period of terrific stress and doubt. By 1840 he seemed actually to dread Rome. But Oxford became aware only gradually of the change taking
place in him.

In 1841 there appeared the famous Tract 90, which caused intense excitement and wide-spread alarm. The Bishop of Oxford objected to it in a formal message, and we shall remark later upon Newman's very significant attitude to that objection. The Tractarian party was now under a cloud; six doctors were suspended from the University; and the deans of colleges changed the dinner hour, so that their students could not both hear Newman preach and enjoy a dinner in hall. But the effect produced by this official opposition was not what was desired; by 1842 the afternoon congregation at St. Mary's included practically every man of note in the University, and we are told that "one Dean certainly, who had changed the time of his college dinner to prevent others going, constantly went himself". (1)

We now come to a consideration of Newman's conversion to Rome, and his life and work in the Roman Church.

In April of 1842 Newman moved from Oriel to Littlemore, a village about two or three miles to the south of Oxford. In the "Apologia" he writes, "From the end of 1841 I was on my death-bed as regards membership with the Anglican Church". Littlemore was the scene of the death-bed; it has been called a sort of midway house between Oxford and Rome. In 1843 he wrote to a friend that he believed the Roman Catholic Church to be the Church of the Apostles. We are passing here in a rapid and cold-blooded way over years of which every day and hour were filled with torment for one of the most sensitive souls of his generation; torn and distraught, the current of his destiny bore him inevitably toward Rome as to the one haven where his anguished spirit might find rest.

He resigned the vicarage of St. Mary's on September 18, 1845, and on the following Sunday he preached his sermon at Littlemore on "The Parting of Friends". This, says Ward, was "the last public scene of the silent tragedy that was being enacted". From this time onward, he lived in seclusion at Littlemore, where he took three adjoining cottages and followed a life of monastic discipline with a group of younger disciples. His connections with Oxford and with the Tractarian movement were now at an end. We know from the "Apologia" and from his letters something of what he was undergoing in the two following years. It was during this period that the "Essay on The Development of Doctrine" was written. Finally, on October 3, 1845, he resigned his Fellowship at Oriel; on October 7 he wrote to Henry Wilberforce, "Father Dominic the Passionist is passing this way...... He does not know my intention, but I shall ask of him admission into the one true Fold of the Redeemer". On the night of October 8, he made his confession to Father Dominic; and on the following evening, along with two other young men, Newman made profession of faith and received canonical absolution and the Sacrament of Baptism. Thus he left the communion of which he had been the shining light; and thirty years later Disraeli and Gladstone could agree in asserting the Church had not recovered from the effect of the secession.

Plans for the future were gradually formed. The autumn and winter were spent in visiting Catholic colleges, and in extending his acquaintance amongst Catholic leaders. In February he moved to Maryvale; in September of 1846 he went to Milan and thence to Rome, where he encountered many difficulties and failed to find the support he had hoped for.
He returned from Rome on Christmas Eve, 1847. Soon thereafter, an English Oratory of the Order of St. Philip Neri was established at Maryvale, which for most of the remaining years of his life was Newman's home. The King William Street Lectures were delivered in 1850; the infamous Achilli Trial dragged along from 1851 to 1853; the Irish University project occupied his time and strength, and patience, during the years from 1851 to 1858; and through the next four years he was engaged upon various new undertakings, including the editing of certain Roman Catholic magazines. Ward calls the years from 1859 to 1864 "the low-water mark of Newman's life story, ... years of great sadness and despondency", (1). The Achilli Trial had been an enormous burden; the Irish University had realized none of his hopes; infinite toil and much money had been wasted on the translation of the Scriptures, an enterprise begun under flattering patronage but very soon dropped entirely by the higher officials of the Church. "Catholics were proud of his name, but few at the time understood his aims", (2). Being in many quarters distrusted, he ceased to write, and began to devote himself almost exclusively to his school. He felt he had been, to use his own words, "put on the shelf". In an entry made in his journal on January 21, 1863, he speaks of his own stern look, and goes on to say, "it began when I set my face towards Rome; and since I made the great sacrifice, to which God called me, He has rewarded me in a thousand ways,—O how many! but He has marked my course with almost unintermittent humiliation. Few indeed successes has it been His Blessed

(2) Ibid., p. 569.
Will to give me through life", (1). In reading his letters from this period, one is forcibly struck by the constantly reiterated feeling that for him life is rapidly drawing to its close. Let one extract, from a letter to W.G. Ward written in 1857 when Newman was far from old age, stand as typical of scores of a similar tone that could be quoted: "Thank you for your kind inquiry after my health, which, thank God, is excellent but at my time of life and after so long a spell of head work I never should have cause to be surprised, if I had some sudden visitation, -- paralysis", (2).

The beginning of 1864 found him "tilling his garden, saying his prayers, looking after his schoolboys, thinking of approaching death". But this did not last. Kingsley's attack was a trumpet call which brought Newman in full armor from his tent, and there followed that famous battle in which he proved that his sword was keener and his thrust more certain than ever before. It is needless here to say any word about the reception and influence of the "Apologia"; there is universal agreement that it was one of the most significant and influential books of the century, and as a spiritual autobiography it is worthy to take rank with Augustine's "Confessions". After its publication, the tide of popular favor quickly turned from Kingsley to Newman; Protestants in amazing numbers rallied to his support, feeling that Kingsley had made a cruel and unwarranted attack on a meek and harmless priest. A new era in his life now opened; and to him who had seemed almost to long for death as a release, the future held yet twenty-six years of increasing usefulness and influence.

(2) Ibid., facsimile facing p. 420.
The success of the "Apologia" attracted attention at Rome, and brought to Newman from Mgr. Talbot an invitation to preach a series of sermons there. Talbot had proved anything but friendly to Newman in the preceding years, and the now-popular defender of the faith curtly declined the invitation. An instance of his wit, shown so seldom, is furnished in a letter he wrote to Miss Bowles in this connection. The invitation, he says, "was suggested by Manning -- the Pope had nothing to do with it. When Talbot left for England he said, among other things, 'I think of asking Dr Newman to give a set of lectures in my church', and the Pope, of course, said, 'a very good thought', as he would have said if Mgr. Talbot had said, 'I wish to bring your holiness some English razors'". (1)

The following few years saw him occupied with efforts to establish at Oxford a branch house of the Birmingham Oratory; but the scheme was encompassed with immense difficulties, and was finally dropped. While his popularity and power were on the increase in England, it was not so at Rome, as a letter written in 1867 by Mgr. Talbot testifies: "It is perfectly true that a cloud has been hanging over Dr Newman in Rome ever since the Bishop of Newport delated him to Rome for heresy in his article in the 'Rambler' on consulting the laity in matters of faith. None of his writings since have removed that cloud. Every one of them has created a controversy, and the spirit of them has not been approved in Rome..... Dr Newman is the most dangerous man in England.....". (2) Newman was deeply pained by the action of the ecclesiastical authorities in this Oxford matter, and again relinquished

(2) Ibid., p. 147.
all hope of future active work before his death. But his hold on men's minds was established; things were now vastly better with him than in the sad years before the "Apologia"; he engaged in the congenial task of coaching the Edgbaston boys for a performance of Terence's "Phormio", which he had edited; he enjoyed a peaceful summer. Yet the times were stirring, and soon he was drawn into the resounding controversy over Papal Infallibility, a controversy that involved at once religious interests, ethical issues, and practical politics. From his pen during this period came the "Dream of Gerontius"; "An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent", 1870; and in 1875, the "Letter to The Duke of Norfolk", his last work of considerable length.

With the death of Pope Pius IX, Manning's special influence at the Vatican came to an end; Mgr. Talbot, his mind having given way, was living in enforced seclusion; changes were noticeable in the policy of Rome under the new Pope, Leo XIII. The story of Dr Newman's elevation to the rank of Cardinal is an interesting one; suffice it here to notice that he was made a Prince of the Church on May 13, 1879. This signal honor was received in England with tokens of wide-spread rejoicing. He continued to live in the Birmingham Oratory, amidst conditions of severe simplicity. The seclusion forced upon him by age began to surround him in the popular imagination with an atmosphere of mystery and awe. Those who knew him attest that his personal charm increased with the years. He continued to take a keen interest in contemporary events, and, as long as his strength permitted, he kept up his correspondence with old friends. On the night of August 9, 1890, he was taken ill of congestion of the
lungs. He died two days later. On the nineteenth he was buried at Rednal. On the pall was his chosen motto, which had been embroidered on his Cardinal's vestments, "Cor ad cor loquitur". On the memorial stone was engraved the epitaph, written by himself, "Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem".
Chapter 3

AN ESTIMATE OF NEWMAN

Any complete and thorough study of the career and work of Cardinal Newman would quite properly seek the key to his religion in his life and personality. It would bring to the investigation of the man, the equipment and understanding of the psychologist; and in all probability it would be forced, as previous psychological studies of Newman have been forced, to give us a contradictory picture. His mind was too rich and too subtle to be parcelled out and fitted into neat categories; Manning was right when he said, "That man is an enigma". By nature timid, most of his life was marked by an almost crusader-like aggressiveness; sincerity incarnate, still he exhibited a casuistry almost without equal; loving solitude, yet he exerted a charm that drew people to him all his life long. As one learns more and more about Newman, one is more and more impressed with the truth of Professor Sarolea's judgment that "the safest attitude with regard to Newman is to admire without trying to understand".

Newman was clearly of the type that modern psychology speaks of as introvert. From his earliest years he showed his natural taste for solitude and self-examination, and all his life long he gave himself to an almost morbid self-analysis and introspection. His religion absolutely dominated his life, and it was a religion entirely personal and subjective. Himself and his Creator, these are the two things of which he is sure.
It was with reference to a work of Romaine, read about the time of his first conversion, that he writes in the "Apologia": "I believe that it had some influence...in...making me rest in the thought of two and two only supreme and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator", (1). At the age of fifteen he made the vow of celibacy, indeed a strange vow for a Protestant boy of that age; but it influenced his developing manhood, and unquestionably fostered in him an asceticism foreign to the average normal youth. It may be argued that a celibate life is always truncated and lacking in fulness and sympathy; the argument would apply with especial force to young Newman, since the vow was made years before the average future cleric has begun to think definitely of the priesthood. No word of suspicion was ever breathed against the honor and loftiness of his moral life; indeed, the material world scarcely existed for him, and on his features were written the lines of his ascetic habits. In view of his reputation for unsociability, it is interesting to note that his good judgment was respected to such a degree that while at Oxford he was, although himself an abstainer, elected to choose the wines for his college.

That he was a rather difficult and exacting person, the records of his life abundantly show. His sister wrote of him, "John can be most amiable, most generous. He can win warm love from all his friends: but to become his friend, the essential condition is, that you see everything along his lines, and accept him as your leader", (2). In that painful but valuable little book, written by his brother, Francis W. Newman, we read: "He seemed unable to understand the force of gentleness and modesty. His

(1) "Apologia", p. 108
admirers tell me he was very Christian. My life has been a long sadness that I could never see it in him. His hymns of 1832 breathe contempt, defiance, and self-conceit",(1). Along the same line is the unattributed quotation used by Dr Whyte, from one who lived under the same roof with Newman in his old age and openly accused him of extraordinary implacability toward anyone who either thwarted or disappointed him,(2). A rather amazing sidelight on his attitude toward a question of the day is furnished by a letter written to his brother in 1867 with reference to an attack Manning had been making on the drink traffic; he writes, "As to what you tell me of Archbishop Manning, I have heard that some also of our Irish bishops think that too many drink-shops are licensed. As for me, I do not know whether we have too many or too few,"(3). Was he merely being honest? Did he really not know the situation with regard to public houses? But a moral and spiritual leader of his standing should have known. In any case, we see the difficulty of trying to analyse the characteristics of a priest, occupying the position he then occupied, who could write that he didn't know "whether we had too many or too few".

As a literary genius, Newman stands almost in a class apart. "That Newman ranks with the greatest masters of our language and that his prose exhibits a range of qualities not often found in combination, is generally admitted",(4). Among countless admirers, two such able critics as Dr Alexander Whyte and Rev. Prof. H. R. Mackintosh concur in the opinion that "no other writer in the English language has ever

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(3) F. W. Newman, op. cit., p. 110.
written it quite like Newman",(1) Rare is the writer whose rhetorical devices are so skillfully handled, whose resources are so well-nigh inexhaustible; whether his aim is to persuade, to expound, or to refute, his argument is ordered and his case presented in the most telling way. One seeks in vain to analyse the charm of his style; it baffles description, quite as much as the fragrance of a flower lies beyond our power to describe. It would be difficult to point to a truer appreciation of his charm and power than Mr Birrell gives us: "Dr Newman's style is pellucid, it is animated, it is varied; at times icy cold, it oftener glows with fervent heat; it employs as its obedient and well-trained servant a vast vocabulary, and it does so always with the ease of the educated gentleman, who by a sure instinct ever avoids alike the ugly pedantry of the book-worm, the forbidding accents of the lawyer, and the stiff conceit of the man of scientific theory. Dr Newman's sentences sometimes fall upon the ear like well-considered and final judgments, each word being weighed and counted out with dignity and precision; but at other times the demeanor and language of the judge are hastily abandoned, and, substituted for them, we encounter the impetuous torrent -- the captivating rhetoric, the brilliant imagery, the frequent examples, the repetition of the same idea in different words, of the eager and accomplished advocate addressing men of like passions with himself..... Dr Newman always aims at effect, and never misses it",(2).

He had a broad and sympathetic understanding of the human heart,--though, as we shall see later, he most often considered the heart burdened and in trouble. His appeal was to the imagination, the interest, the attention, rather than to the pure reason. It is in the use of irony and

(1) A. D. Whyte, op. cit., p. 136.
sarcasm that he stands supreme; "his weapons of offense are both numerous and deadly; his sentences stab, his invective destroys".

Kingsley, who knew so well Newman's powers along this line, spoke of his method in controversy as the delivering on you in passing, as with his finger-tip, of a phrase, an epithet, a little barbed arrow. Dr Whyte, in a truly expressive sentence, regards his style as the kind that "sings around you, musical and delicate as a mosquito's wing, and alights on you with feet as fine".

Amongst his poems there are those which convey definite evidence that he possessed the true lyrical gift. But his range is strictly limited, as for example in the "Lyra Apostolica", by the narrow field of his poetical thinking and the exclusive nature of his subjects. Few will be found to deny the true greatness of the "Dream of Gerontius"; it ranks with the best of English poetry, and has been declared worthy of the genius of Dante. His poetry illustrates the qualities characteristic of all his literary work,—clearness of perception, force of character, an imperious and wilful temper, yet always a sweet gentleness and a singleness of heart and purpose. It is the product of a school; but it is a school that is scholarly, aristocratic, stately, refined, fastidious.

The impression that Newman never made any effort to secure exactness and charm in his style, that it was natural, unstudied, unconscious, has gained the credence of certain commentators. But it is well known that as a youth he patterned his writing on the models furnished by Gibbon and Addison, and that Cicero was his great master of style. In a letter written in 1869, Dr Newman says: "It is simply the fact that I have been obliged to take great pains with everything I have written, and I often
write chapters over and over again, besides innumerable corrections
and interlinear additions...... I am as much obliged to correct and
re-write as I was thirty years ago",(l).
We turn now to look at Newman the preacherBremond, whose opinion is always to be respected, tells us
that Newman was as little as could be an orator; he was calm, discreet,
austere; "on no account would he have wished to persuade his audience
by appealing to their passions...... it is impossible not to recognise
the indisputable worth of the man who succeeds.... in profoundly stirring
minds by the power of ideas alone",(2).

It is probably true that

Newman1 s reserved dignity amd cultured distinction held him back from
cries and tears and other cheap artifices of the popular orator; but that
he found his way so surely into the deepest recesses of the human heart
by the pathway of reason alone, that he was unaware of or failed to
practise the higher arts of oratory, there is much room to doubt,

and

this on the basis of his own testimony. Birrell quotes him as saying,
"I do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism11 ; and again, "The
heart is commonly reached not through the reason

but through the

imagination by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts
and events, by history and by description.

Persons influence us, voices

melt us, books subdue, deeds inflame us", (3).

Always graceful, never

clumsy or crude, the sermons that had been written with such consummate
skill were delivered with the subtle and moving power of the superlative
orator,

a term which he understood and illustrated as bringing to the

task of persuasion the whole of his intellect and knowledge.
(1)
(2)
(5)

Bertram Newmafi, op. cit., p. 204-5.
Henri Bremond, "The Mystery of Newman", p. 16J.
Augustine Birrell, "Res Judicatae", p, 142.


It was from the pulpit of St. Mary's at Oxford that Newman first began to exert his tremendous influence; and the sermons written during this period rank well toward the top of all his literary labors. Since we are here concerned with his influence as a preacher, and since that influence was mediated very largely through his unique personality, we shall now devote some space to quoting opinions of a few of his contemporaries. We do this at some risk of giving an undue emphasis to this side of his preaching power; but our interest here is mainly psychological, and it can perhaps best be served by reproducing in so far as we can the effect he produced upon his hearers.

Principal Shairp gives this admirable picture of Newman in the pulpit: "No pomp, no ritualism, nothing but the silver intonations of Newman's magic voice..... The look and bearing of the preacher were as of one who dwelt apart, and who, though he knew his age well, did not live in his age..... What delicacy of style, yet what calm power! how gentle yet how strong! how simple yet how suggestive! how homely yet how refined! how penetrating yet how tender-hearted! And the tone of voice in which all this was spoken sounded to you like a fine strain of unearthly music",(1).

Froude wrote in an article in 1881: "When I entered Oxford John Henry Newman was beginning to be famous. His appearance was striking. He was above the middle height, slight, and spare....... No one who heard his sermons in those days can ever forget them. Taking some Scripture character for a text, Newman spoke to us about ourselves, our temptations, our experiences. His illustrations were inexhaustible. He seemed to be addressing the most secret consciousness of each of us --

as the eyes of a portrait appear to look at every person in a room. He never exaggerated; he was never unreal. A sermon from Newman was a poem, formed on a distinct idea, fascinating by its subtlety, welcome — how welcome! — from its sincerity, interesting from its originality". (1)

And William Lockhart: "To see Newman come into St. Mary's, in his long white surplice, was like nothing one had seen before. He glided in swiftly, like a spirit incarnate. When he reached the lectern, he would drop down on his knees and remain fixed in mental prayer for a few moments, then he rose in the same unearthly way and began the service. His reading of the lessons from the old and new Testaments was a most marvelous expression of the soul.... The effect of Newman's preaching on us young men was to turn our souls inside out.... We never could be again the same men we were before", (2).

Dean Church, with his usual insight and eloquence, speaks thus of the sermons: "Dr Newman's sermons stand by themselves in modern English literature; it might even be said, in English literature generally.... We have learned to look upon Dr Newman as one of those who have left their mark very deep upon the English language.... Such English, graceful with the grace of nerve, flexibility, and power, must always have attracted attention; but his English had also an ethical element which was almost inseparable from its literary characteristics", (3).

Thus we begin to see a little way into the secret of the amazing influence he held over the minds and souls of men. But the story is not yet finished. One who finds himself inclined by natural sympathies toward the position that has been called Evangelical will, after reading

(1) Froude, "Good Words", quoted by Whyte, op. cit., p. 41.
(2) Whyte, op. cit., p. 43.
(3) Whyte, op. cit., p. 39, 40.
these sermons, find himself rather largely in agreement with the criticism leveled against them by Dr Whyte. Perhaps Dr Whyte was too straightforward to grapple with the subtle Newman; yet each reader can himself feel the force and truth of the great Scottish preacher's opinions: "Looked at as pure literature, Newman's St. Mary's sermons are not far from absolute perfection; but..... with all their genius, with all their truly noble and enthralling characteristics, they are not, properly speaking, New Testament preaching at all..... They lack the one essential element of all true preaching -- the message to sinful man concerning the free grace of God..... The more burdened and broken your heart is, and especially with your secret sinfulness, the less will you find in them that which, above all things in heaven or earth, your heart needs...... Newman's preaching -- and I say it with more pain than I can express -- never once touches the true core, the real and innermost essence of the Gospel",(1). Here the minister of Free St. George's, who knew so well the weaknesses and needs of the human heart, has touched upon a point which seems to me one of the fatal weaknesses of Newman's theology, and of his religion.

The chief aim of this essay is to appraise and criticise one element in Newman's theology; in the remaining part of this chapter, we shall notice only certain features and opinions concerning his theology as a whole, such as might properly find a place in a brief account of his life and influence. We shall consider Newman as theologian.

The Abbe Loisy has spoken of Newman as almost the only theologian who can be called great produced by the whole Roman Catholic Church during

the nineteenth century, (1). On the other hand, F.J.A. Hort, himself one of the greatest scholars that has ever graced the English Church, immediately after Newman's death wrote in a letter to his wife: "I suppose there is no distinguished theologian in any church, or of any school, whom I should find it so hard to think of as having contributed anything to the support or advance of Christian truth", (2). Another able critic, Dr Rainy, who was spoken of by Gladstone as "incomparably the greatest Scotsman of his generation", has shown how poorly equipped Newman was for the Kingsley controversy, a task that he set out upon with such utter confidence, (3); how "little ballast he had on board, either of theological learning, or of a disciplined judgment, in such difficult matters". Dr Rainy goes on to say: "It is a fact, and not a creditable one, that, owing largely to the want of training in the English Church, there is very little tuition, and very little literature, fitted to suggest to the minds of her young divines the range of theological responsibilities that may attach to the positions they take up, and the alternatives they embrace. And a certain allowance may be reasonable on that score."

The theological standards inherited by Newman were low; and his brilliance, his fascinating personal charm, and the extraordinary paths that his career followed, led to an overestimation of his power as a theologian. It is evident enough that he shared in the common misconception of his importance; he was on exceedingly good terms with himself; he seemed to regard himself as a heaven-sent messenger who had come to put right once for all men's theological opinions. How one-sided

(3) North British Review, October, 1864.
his theology was, is revealed in his own writings; for him, the New Testament might almost as well not have been written; Paul means to him practically nothing; and on the person and work of Christ, he was strictly limited by the doctrine of the fourth century Fathers. He utterly repudiated and despised the work of Luther and Calvin and all that body of Reformers and Evangelical divines whose lives and works have added glory to the Church of Christ.

So we must not expect to find too much that is solid and substantial in Newman's theology; indeed, it may be that to him the words of Birrell could with some aptness be applied: "The High Church Clergyman of to-day is no Theologian -- he is an Opportunist", (1). We approach Newman, not as a great theologian, but as a suggestive and subtle thinker who incarnates one of the great religious problems, one which is quite as acute to-day as it was in his own time. With the imagination of a mystic, he combined the corrosive intellect of a sceptic; delighting in intellectual difficulties, yet he yearned for certainty, and only a religion that was complex and contradictory could meet the demands of his own complex and contradictory nature. He always stressed dogma; for him, religion was dogma. He would never admit that he had any use for a theology of feeling, for the so-called pectoral theology of Schleiermacher, for example; yet it might be demonstrated that his theology owed more to feeling and less to reason than he was aware, and that he was closer to Schleiermacher than we have been wont to believe.

What a magnificently curious combination he was! And how different everything must have been if he had not had that early

(1) Augustine Birrell, "Res Judicatae", p. 139.
Evangelical upbringing, if he had been made an archdeacon while at St. Mary's, if he had married, if he had been able to read German theology! He sacrificed everything to enter the Roman Catholic Church; and after entering he accepted almost thirty-five years of suppression, persecution, almost disgrace, with a fortitude and resignation that was at least courageous enough never to give public expression to the ranklings in his heart. His critics regarded his type of temper as exotic in the religious atmosphere into which he had come; and his critics were right. How sadly true are these words recently spoken of him: "Among the sacrifices which Newman made in 1845 was the sacrifice of his individuality..... Great indeed is the toll which Roman Catholicism exacts from life. And the toll it takes of genius is greatest of all", (1).

When setting out to criticise a play, or a poem, or a painting, the critic must have in his possession certain tools that are adapted to the work in hand. He must possess certain standards of judgment, of criticism; he must have arrived at a more or less definite philosophy of art, he must know what he is looking for, and he must be able to compare or contrast the piece under consideration with the ideal standard which he holds for work in that particular field. The presuppositions with which he begins his task are all-important,—possibly more important than anything he may find to say about the subject of his criticism. Suppose he is judging a painting; he may approach it with the conviction that no greater painting has ever been done than that represented by Giotto and the new Florentine humanism. Or he may regard sixteenth-century Venetian painting as the high-water mark of the art. Or, conceivably, he may hold that Picasso in his various phases furnishes the standard by which others should be judged. So, whatever the personal preferences of the critic happen to be, the point is that he must have some standard of reference.
It is obvious that a principle of this kind, which applies to all branches of art criticism as well as to the every-day choices of life, must be applied with equal vigor to a study in the field of theology. In setting out to elucidate and evaluate the doctrine of authority that lay behind Newman's thinking and writing, we must know what we are looking for; and when we have found it, we must have at hand a measuring stick by which to judge it. Different investigators would almost certainly employ measuring sticks of different types; and the standard selected will depend upon the critic's race (especially whether he is an Oriental or an Occidental), his age, training, temperament, special interest, and a host of other things. This circumstance must not, however, be allowed to lead us to a relativist view of truth. Truth is one, all of a piece, final, absolute; and the measuring sticks of the Roman Catholic, the Buddhist, and the Presbyterian, if they differ, cannot all be right. What we mean to say is that each critic has his own point of view, and some of these embrace more truth and less error than others.

For example, Newman had his own point of view, his own frame of reference; and it was a very personal and exclusive one. He was never able to look at the truths which he held through the minds of other men; his was almost a narrow-minded, certainly a one-sided, view of things. He would, we feel, have approached nearer to the truth if he had stepped out of himself from time to time, and asked himself how other men thought about and reacted to the positions that he held with such assurance. Another way of putting it would be to say that he did
not see himself in perspective; or to say, he totally lacked a sense of humor, by which we mean the ability to see oneself for what he really is, and in relation to other men and events.

First of all, let it be stated frankly that our position in this essay is Protestant, Evangelical, in the Presbyterian tradition. The standard of reference which we shall use, the yardstick by which we shall measure and appraise Newman’s statements and presuppositions regarding authority in religion, derive from that tradition. We would make it clear, however, that we do not blindly and uncritically accept and hold the Presbyterian tradition as something which we have been taught and which is too sacred to criticise. There are in it elements which seem unsatisfactory; there are in other approaches, including the Roman Catholic, elements that might well be appropriated and welded into the Presbyterian structure. As will appear in the final chapter of this essay, our position is more or less a synthesis of what seems most valuable in the contributions made by the various churches and denominations; and the reason why Presbyterianism holds with us the larger place is because as a system of church polity it appears to be most in line with what we can truly know of the practice of the Apostolic Church, it seems best adapted to meet the needs we are hoping herein to indicate as pressing concerns of the day, and it seems to us to hold the greatest degree of promise for the future.

Our platform, our starting point, may be thus briefly stated: The one thing needful is to find and know God, and the one saving fact is the personal life of Jesus Christ. Here, in our opinion, is the basis on which any worthy doctrine of authority must build.
To be more specific: Our conception of the Church will obviously differ from the view of the Church which Newman held. The Church, as we shall use the term, is a communion or association of professing Christians, occupied with the maintenance, practice, and advancement of the religion of Jesus Christ. It is the visible body of Christ; in the words of the Medieval theologians, "Ubi Christus, ibi ekklesia". It is free from any connection with the State which would dictate or dominate; it is in no sense a political organization. The ministrations of its offices are not reserved to a specially consecrated priesthood whose members are supposed to stand in direct succession from St. Peter, by virtue alone of the imposition of hands; rather, the laying on of hands is a symbol indicating that here is one who is regarded as worthy to follow in the Apostolical succession. Noble, inspiring architecture, glorious music, eloquent preaching, do not make the Church. Its eyes and interests are upon both the things seen and temporal, and the things not seen that are eternal. The function of the Church is to understand and expand Jesus’ experience of God and the world. Its duty and its privilege is to hold up to needy humanity the vision of God’s redeeming love. It must not mistake fastidiousness for saintliness, nor the beauty of form for the beauty of holiness. It must always reflect the spirit and dare the way of Jesus. The Church has authority, and a high authority, but only when and in so far as it is seen truly to represent the mind of Jesus, and so to appeal to the consciences of men.

The Bible has been given to us in order that in the stress of
life and when stilled in prayer we may listen to its words and catch in it the voice of God speaking to our hearts. The Biblical tradition is not a law through the fulfilment of which we obtain salvation; but through the right use of the Biblical tradition we escape the position that would reduce Holy Scripture to a rule of doctrine. The man who comes under the power of the spiritual character of Jesus wins for himself a right appreciation of the Biblical doctrines about the Person of Jesus. A man becomes a Christian, not by declaring as true a set of doctrines that he does not understand or grasp as real, but rather by reflecting and acting upon that which is undeniably real. In short, Christians are not under bondage to law. The Bible exerts authority in the religious life, and a high authority, by introducing us to the marvelously vivid and compelling personal life of Jesus Christ.

Personal Christianity we regard as communion of the soul with the living God through the mediation of the Lord Jesus Christ. It recognizes no other law than the law of sincerity and love. It ascribes to the Sacraments no magical results, but finds their saving effect in the religious apprehension of God's promise as expressed when they are dispensed. It is a vain hope to look for uniformity of doctrine among all Christians, for two main reasons. In the New Testament there is no one doctrine embracing the whole scheme of Christian thought and valid to all eternity. Christian men seek to express in doctrine the reality from which their faith springs and in which it lives; and since different men see differently and do have differing religious experiences, and since they ought to be truthful, they must express themselves

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(1) Herrmann, "Communion with God", p. 3.
differently. "What really unites Christians with one another and
with the witness of the New Testament is not the complete identity
of our thoughts, but the likeness of our ways of thinking, and the
unity of the revelation by which that likeness is caused", (1).

Personal Christianity consists not in a store of knowledge
or a burden of commandments; its essential element can not be given
by one person to another; each individual must experience it for
himself as a gift from above. The solution is not found in mysticism;
for the mystic feels that that which is historical in Christianity is
burdensome, and he seeks to free himself from this burden by sailing
away into those realms where the mystics of all ages, Christian and
non-Christian, have felt at home. The Christian can not thus cut himself
loose from the world in history, in which he has found the revelation
of God to himself. While mysticism is the essential element of Roman
Catholic religion, yet the Christian should, by getting beyond the
legal conception of religion, free himself from the limitations of
mysticism and scholasticism.

The true, final, objective authority in religion is the
Person of Jesus Christ. It is through that Fact that God makes Himself
known to us, with a certainty which no mere doctrine can inspire. God
reveals Himself in many other ways, but chiefly in this, that in the
course of history we encounter Jesus as an undeniable reality. He is
there, and he must be reckoned with. Doctrines about Jesus often afford
a convenient pathway for avoiding His Person; but it is through the Man
Jesus that we are lifted into fellowship with God. It is assumed that
we feel the necessity for unconditional obedience; for "we cannot go

(1) Herrmann, op. cit., p. 13.
back to our first simple indifference to moral demands after our conscience has once been sensible of them",(1).

These sketchy statements will be amplified into a more complete doctrine of authority in Part Three of this paper. Meanwhile, they will serve to guide us along the one trail we shall follow in our inquiry into Newman's religious philosophy. To summarise again: Man's true environment is God, and the one saving fact is the Person of Jesus Christ.

(1) Herrmann, op. cit., p. 63.
Chapter 5

NEWMAN'S VIEWS ON AUTHORITY IN HIS EARLY PERIOD

Cardinal Newman's "Apologia Pro Vita Sua" is regarded by all who know it as one of the most truly remarkable books of the nineteenth century. It is rightly considered the most typical and most important of the writings of its author; it is instinct with his personality, it exhibits his absorption in the drama of his own life, it illustrates his mastery of English style and his superb skill in controversy. It will form the chief ground of our investigation of his doctrine of authority in religion, in its early phase, its development, and its final form. (1) We shall find it necessary to depend almost wholly upon it for the record of his early years. We feel justified in making so large use of the "Apologia", since there is general agreement that in writing it Newman was scrupulously honest. He may have omitted certain things we would like to know; but we may rest assured that what he did write represents the true view of a man whose conscious sincerity can not be questioned. He confines himself, he tells us, "to the charge of Untruthfulness; I will draw out, as far as may be, the history of my mind; I will state the point at which I began, in what external suggestion or accident each opinion had its

(1) The edition of the "Apologia" used in this essay is that printed in 1913 by The Oxford University Press, combining the two versions of 1864 and 1865, with an introduction by Wilfrid Ward.
rise, how far and how they were developed from within, how they grew, were modified, were in collision with each other, and were changed". (1)

In the very opening paragraphs of the early history of his religious opinions, Cardinal Newman gives us certain statements that will be seen to have a direct bearing on his later doctrine of authority. He tells us that he was brought up from a child to take great delight in reading the Bible, and that he had a perfect knowledge of his catechism. In 1820, when he was nineteen, he put on paper some of the more definite recollections of the thoughts and feelings he had as a boy on religious subjects; these were revised in 1823, and from them he sets down two instances which he declares to have had a bearing on his later convictions.

First, "I used to wish the Arabian Tales were true: my imagination ran on unknown influences, on magical powers, and talismans.... I thought life might be a dream, or I an angel, and all this world a deception, my fellow-angels by a playful device concealing themselves from me, and deceiving me with the semblance of a material world", (2). One is reminded of that weird story told by Mark Twain, wherein the one character alone is real and all the rest of creation merely a stage setting put on as a background against which he lives and acts. Each imaginative person perhaps at some time or other amuses himself with these fancies of solipsism; but in most cases they soon vanish in contact with the world of every-day experience.

In the same connection, while reading in 1816 from Dr Watts's "Remnants of Time", he supposed Watts was speaking "of Angels who lived

(1) "Apologia", p. 89, 99, 100.
(2) Ibid., p. 105-6.
in the world, as it were disguised", (1). Too much importance must not be attached to these particular cases; for adults are prone to forget with how vivid a reality the average child invests the stories of fairies and giants that are read to him. The strange thing here is that a boy within a year and a half of Oxford should still have believed the world to be organized on so fantastic a scheme.

But stranger still is the second confession: "I was very superstitious, and for some time previous to my conversion (when I was fifteen) used constantly to cross myself on going into the dark", (2). The source of this practice Newman was unable to recall; but he states definitely that at the time he knew nothing of the Roman Catholic religion further than the name. Nor is it clear from what quarter came another strange influence, that led him in 1811 to draw on the first page of his verse book, between the words "verse" and "book", what he describes as "the figure of a solid cross upright, and next to it, what may indeed be meant for a necklace, but what I cannot make out to be anything else than a set of beads suspended, with a little cross attached", (3). The boy was not yet ten years old; and to explain why these particular objects should have fixed themselves on his mind, why he used to cross himself, and why he so long retained his belief in angels and talismans, it seems necessary to posit, what we are contending in this essay, that he was born with a temperament which was by nature congenial to the Roman Catholic type of religion. During his early years he read some strong books, among them Paine's Tracts, some of Hume's Essays, and selections from Voltaire, written to controvert the Christian faith; but they seem not to have unsettled him, and this perhaps because

(1) "Apologia", p. 106.
(2) Ibid., p. 106.
(3) Ibid., p. 107.
of his inborn habit of believing.

The influences which brought about his conversion in 1816 were Calvinistic in character. In 1864 he thanks God that the influences of a definite creed, and the impressions of dogma which he received at the time of his conversion had never been effaced or obscured; whether creed and dogma really meant as much to him when he was fifteen as he supposed when he was sixty that they had meant, we can not be certain; but it is altogether probable that he is not overstating the case. His belief in the reality of his conversion, of which he was more certain than of his own hands and feet, and which he thought indicated his election to eternal glory, we have already noted. This belief had gradually faded away by the time he reached the age of twenty-one, but it had influenced him "in isolating me from the objects which surrounded me, in confirming me in my mistrust of material phenomena, and making me rest in the thought of two and two only luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator", (1). No longer wholly a solipsist, he is now sure of God as well as himself. But after all, there were other souls beside his own, forming the heritage of which he partook and the environment in which he lived. It was one of Newman's serious weaknesses that he could not get outside himself, and see himself through other men's eyes.

The "Apologia" tells us nothing of the development of its author's ideas during his period at Trinity and the first years at Oriel. But it was probably in 1824 that Dr Hawkins, then Vicar of St. Mary's and afterward provost at Oriel, gave to Newman a copy of Sumner's "Treatise on Apostolical Preaching", from which he learned to give up his remaining Calvinism, and to receive the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration. From Hawkins too he learned

(1) "Apologia", p. 108.
the doctrine of Tradition; "he lays down a proposition, self-evident as soon as stated, to those who have at all examined the structure of Scripture, viz. that the sacred text was never intended to teach doctrine, but only to prove it, and that, if we would learn doctrine, we must have recourse to the formularies of the Church; for instance, to the Catechism, and to the Creeds. He considers, that, after learning from them the doctrines of Christianity, the inquirer must verify them by Scripture. This view, most true in its outline, most fruitful in its consequences, opened upon me a large field of thought", (1).

The study of Butler's "Analogy" was to Newman an epoch in the development of his religious opinions; from it he gained two points which he described as the underlying principles of a great part of his own teaching, viz. the unreality of material phenomena, and the doctrine that probability is the guide of life. The Rev. William James taught him the doctrine of Apostolical Succession. Whately taught him to think and to use his reason; to look upon the Church as a "substantive body or corporation"; and fixed in him "those anti-Erastian views of Church polity, which were one of the most prominent features of the Tractarian movement", (2).

In 1827 Newman was "very strong for that ante-Nicene view of the Trinitarian doctrine, which some writers, both Catholic and non-Catholic, have accused of wearing a sort of Arian exterior..... I had contrasted the two aspects of the Trinitarian doctrine, which are respectively presented by the Athanasian Creed and the Nicene. My criticism was to the effect that some of the verses of the former creed were unnecessarily scientific", (3). "The truth is, I was beginning to prefer intellectual

(1) (2) (3) "Apologia", p. 112-3, 115, 116.
excellence to moral; I was drifting in the direction of the liberalism of the day", (1). One cannot help remarking how dry, formal, and scholastic all this is; how far removed from the real religious interests of every-day men and women, -- of the parishioners of St. Mary's and St. Clement's. Scripture serves no purpose but to prove doctrine; the influence of St. Paul apparently stands just at zero; our Lord's name is mentioned in these pages of the "Apologia" only once, and that in connection with the doctrine of eternal punishment which Newman received from Law's "Serious Call".

A side-light on his attitude to authority in the more general sense is afforded by his opposition to Catholic emancipation. Here he showed his hatred of all that we call progress, -- a fear of change that was almost instinctive in him. He was ready to defend the Kingdom of God from Romanists, Dissenters, and other heretics by the civil power of the State if need be. In the "Apologia" he explains this opposition cleverly, as being based on a simple academical, not at all on an ecclesiastical or practical ground. It is only an example of his vexing insistence on a technical point, a failure to see through the academical aspects of a question to its humanitarian and social implications. He was always the aristocrat, and to him reverence for authority amounted almost to a religion. This inborn aristocratic tendency played a considerable part in making him what he was; for it shut him away from the common people and the thought of his contemporaries, except for the few chosen ones with whom he was on terms of intimacy.

The two intellectual truths which Newman had learned from Butler were recast for him in the creative mind of his new master, John Keble. He understood Keble to say that in matters of religion "it is not merely

(1) "Apologia", p. 116.
probability that makes us certain, but probability as it is put to account by faith and love.... Faith and love are directed toward an Object; it is that Object, received in faith and love, which renders it reasonable to take probability as sufficient for internal conviction. Thus the argument about Probability, in the matter of religion, became an argument from Personality, which in fact is one form of the argument from Authority" (1). Newman completed this argument by considerations of his own, which extend through his University Sermons, and the two essays on Ecclesiastical Miracles and on the Development of Doctrine. The argument is so important that it seems best to reproduce it in his own words: "that absolute certitude which we were able to possess, whether as to truths of natural theology, or as to the fact of a revelation, was the result of an assemblage of concurring and converging probabilities, and that, both according to the constitution of the human mind and the will of its Maker; that certitude was a habit of mind, that certainty was a quality of propositions; that probabilities which did not reach to logical certainty, might create a mental certitude; that the certitude thus created might equal in measure and strength the certitude which was created by the strictest scientific demonstration; and that to have such certitude might in given cases and to given individuals be a plain duty, though not to others in other circumstances:--

"Moreover that as there were probabilities which sufficed to create certitude, so there were other probabilities which were legitimately adapted to create opinion; that it might be quite as much a matter of duty in given cases and to given persons to have about a fact an opinion of a definite strength and consistency, as in the case of greater or more

(1) "Apologia", p. 121.
numerous probabilities it was a duty to have a certitude; that accordingly
we are bound to be more or less sure, on a sort of (as it were) graduated
scale of assent, viz. according as the probabilities attaching to a
professed fact were brought home to us, and, as the case might be, a
religious conjecture, or at least, a tolerance of such belief, or opinion,
or conjecture in others; that on the other hand, as it was a duty to have
a belief, of more or less strong texture, in given cases, so in other
cases it was a duty not to believe, not to opine, not to conjecture, not
even to tolerate the notion that a professed fact was true, inasmuch as
it would be credulity or superstition, or some other moral fault, to do
so. This was the region of Private Judgment in religion; that is, of a
Private Judgment not formed arbitrarily and according to one's fancy or
liking, but conscientiously, and under a sense of duty", (1). This
argument, which may be said to leave something desired in the way of
lucidity, will be considered at a later point in the essay; it is intro-
duced here as belonging to this point in Newman's development and as
showing the position reached by him in seeking for religion a
basis of authority.

Soon he began to swing away from the influence of Liberalism; and
gradually his early devotion to the Fathers returned. He set to work in
1830 on a History of the Council of Nicea; the work appeared in 1833 as
"The Arians of The Fourth Century". Up to this time Newman had gone on the
principle that the Church was the body to which Christians must cling, both
for the statement of creed and the exposition of rites and their significance;
the Scriptures he regarded only as containing the body of facts which the
Church used as her authority for the creed and worship that she enjoined.

(1) "Apologia", p. 122-3.
He utterly rejected the Protestant principle of the supremacy of the Scriptures; he violently disliked the Reformation, and under Proude's influence looked with admiration toward the Church of Rome. Now, in the "Arians", he gave full expression to his confident belief that dogma is the backbone of religion,—a principle that he always afterward maintained with consistency and energy. "From the age of fifteen", he writes in the Apologia, "dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion; I know no other religion; I cannot enter into the idea of any other religion; religion as a mere sentiment is to me a dream and a mockery. As well can there be filial love without the fact of a Father, as devotion without the fact of a Supreme Being. What I held in 1816 I held in 1833, and I hold in 1864. Please God I shall hold it to the end." Few sentences in the whole range of his writing bear more directly than this upon his conception of authority in religion.

Already in 1830 he considered that "Antiquity was the true exponent of the doctrine of Christianity and the basis of the Church of England"; and the course of reading in preparation for his book on the "Arians" was adapted to develop this view. In this, his first theological book, and a thoroughly careful and scholarly piece of work, Newman defends dogma to the point of losing sight of the real core and meaning of revelation; for, as an able critic has pointed out, "Dogma is essential to safeguard and display revelation, but dogma is not itself revelation",(1). With this book the first section of the development of Newman's doctrine may be said to be completed. But there are two incidents which, while not bearing a direct relation to his views on authority in religion, yet are so illuminating as to the place he assigned to authority in secular and

political life, that they must not be overlooked. His brother, Francis W. Newman, tells us of the painful domestic scene, amounting almost to a quarrel, that took place between John Henry and his father at the time when the coronation of George IV was approaching. The King wished to discard his wife, Princess Caroline, by an odious accusation; the ministry had given notice of prosecution, and the trial was only just begun. The elder Newman held that Princess Caroline, treated brutally by the King and virtually driven into exile, deserved great pity rather than further insult and punishment. But John Henry, then nineteen, vehemently asserted against his father that the fact of the ministry ordering the trial ought to be sufficient to bias everyone against the Queen. Francis Newman observes that his father's argument was more Christian than his brother's, (1).

The second case we take from the "Apologia": "While I was engaged in writing my work upon the Arians, great events were happening at home and abroad, which brought out into form and passionate expression the various beliefs which had so gradually been winning their way into my mind. Shortly before, there had been a Revolution in France; the Bourbons had been dismissed; and I believed that it was unchristian for nations to cast off their governors, and, much more, sovereigns who had the divine right of inheritance". The quotation itself reveals more than pages of comment; one asks in astonishment how it could be unchristian for a people to expel a king who had broken his coronation oath and who was known to be aiming at despotism. "But John did not seem to know that a king who claimed allegiance must himself be loyal and truthful, so that duty and right may go hand in hand", (2).

Now comes the Mediterranean voyage, and the writing of the "Lyra

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(2) Ibid., p. 6.
Apostolica". It was about this time that Newman began to have his "fierce thoughts against the Liberals"; and, as illustration, he tells us in the "Apologia" that he would not even look at the tricolor on a French vessel at Algiers, and that on his way home, forced to stop a day in Paris, he kept indoors the whole time and all he saw of that beautiful city was from the diligence. Does this not give us a broad hint as to the type of his temperament?

But we turn to discover what the verses in the "Lyra Apostolica" reveal as to his views on authority in religion. There are in the collection one-hundred-seventy-nine short poems, and they have been ranked high by many critics, especially by Mr. R. H. Hutton. The poems were published anonymously in 1858, but Newman's contributions are marked by the Greek letter delta. Poem number 103, under the title "Idolatry and Dissent", indicates the direction his thought was taking, and presages the course he is to follow. The poem is addressed to Protestants, who are called "poor wanderers", "all wranglers and all wrong". Following one's private judgment is identified with following the "blind idol" of one's "own weak will"; the writer here definitely scorns the search for truth, denies to the searcher the right to seek evidence while forming his judgment, confuses the whim of fancy with the reasoned and reasonable religious position of a rational being, and sees only harm and danger in the varying interpretations that honest individuals put upon the same religious truths. Against this danger of private judgment, Christ has granted "prophets of his Creed", and sacred hands have "safe conveyed" this faith once delivered to the saints "from age to age". So a call is issued: "Wanderers! come home!"; for Christ's Church has always kept faith, has not lost one grain of holy truth, and soon shall lift herself from the dust and reign as in
her youth. Obviously reference is made to no other Church than the Catholic; yet even at this time Newman was stoutly affirming his hatred of the Roman system. In a contemporary letter, he writes: "As to the Roman Catholic system, I have ever detested it so much that I cannot detest it more by seeing it". And in his last letter from Rome, he writes, "Oh that Rome was not Rome! But I seem to see as clear as day that union with her is impossible".

It was the Catholicism of the Church, as distinct from the Roman system, that appealed to him. In a poem called "The Good Samaritan" he exclaims, "O that thy creed were sound! for thou doth soothe the heart, Thou Church of Rome". The poem entitled "Persecution" reveals much as to his feeling toward the Catholic system:

"Say, who is he, in deserts seen;  
Or at the twilight hour?  
Of garb austere, and dauntless mien,  
Measured in speech, in purpose keen,  
Calm, as in heaven he had been,  
Yet blithe when perils lower.

My Holy Mother made reply,  
"Dear Child, it is my Priest.  
The world has cast me forth, and I Dwell with wild earth and gusty sky;  
He bears to men my mandates high,  
And works my sage behest.

Another day, dear child, and thou Shalt join his sacred band.  
Ah! well I deem, thou shrinkest now From urgent rule and severing vow;  
Gay hopes flit round, and light thy brow:--  
Time hath a taming hand".

Hutton, we feel, would scarcely regard this particular poem as an "exquisite piece of work, shining with the softest and the whitest poetic lustre." Our first reaction is one of amazement that Newman could write of the priesthood,

(1) Mozley, "Letters and Correspondence", vol. i, p. 378.  
(2) Ward, "Life", vol. i, p. 54.
in Italy of all places, as the "sacred band" which he would one day join. But a more serious criticism is that the sentiments expressed in this poem bear no likeness to Christianity, as we understand it. A new Deity, called "Holy Mother", is set up, whose mandates are carried out on earth by priests who are to tame and rule the hearts and minds of men. One would look with slight success for anything in the words or example of Christ, or anywhere in the New Testament, that could be construed as lending support to such a doctrine as the poet is preaching.

In another poem, called "Schism", we read:

"O rail not at our brethren of the North,
Albeit Samaria finds her likeness there;
A self-formed priesthood, and the Church cast forth
To the chill mountain air.

What though their fathers sinned, and lost the grace
Which seals the Holy Apostolic line?....." etc.

Dr Whyte interpreted Samaria to stand for Scotland, and the Presbyterian reformers and theologians to be the self-formed priesthood; but it seems to me that Newman may mean by "brethren of the North" not only the Scottish people but all heirs of the Protestant Reformation, German as well as British. However, of greater significance is his remark about the "sin" that led to the loss of grace that makes effective the Holy Apostolic Succession. Here he insinuates the impotent and grace-forsaken condition of the Protestant clergy, implies that Protestant theologians can feed only on the crumbs that fall from the table at Rome, and declares his own belief in the necessity of the Apostolical Succession.

We can at this distance see in these lines, what was not seen for some years after they were written, that Newman was drifting steadily toward Rome. It was an unconscious drifting; he still hated Rome, even as he hated Evangelicalism; but his destiny was turning both his mind and his
footsteps toward the "Holy Mother". Manning said the common bond between the various poems composing the "Lyra" was lack of truth; in arrogant and war-like tone there is felt also a lamentable lack of love. But what we see most clearly in his poems, as in so many of his sermons, is his Homeward progress, "his onward footprints, soft as the falling snow; his swift, noiseless, delicate, and refined footprints", leading him into the very bosom of the system that was so hateful to him.
Chapter 6

TRACTS FOR THE TIMES

The circumstances attending the writing and publishing of the Tracts For The Times are too well known to require extended notice here. Of the ninety Tracts published, most of them anonymously, evidence has been collected from one source or another to indicate that Newman was the author of some twenty-nine of them, including numbers 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 19, 20, 21, 31, 33, 34, 38, 41, 45, 47, 71, 73, 74, 75, 79, 82, 83, 85, 88, and the famous and troublesome 90. From these writings we shall attempt to elucidate the development and position of Newman's mind between the years 1833 and 1840 with reference to his theory of the Church and authority in religion.

Tract 1, under the heading "Thoughts on the Ministerial Commission, respectfully addressed to the Clergy", was the definite and tangible inauguration of the Tractarian movement. It was a stirring call to oppose liberalism, a vigorous appeal to join in helping the Bishops to "stand the brunt of the battle" then waging against the Church. But it was made clear that in rallying to the support of the Bishops, the ordinary clergy would in no way "encroach upon the rights of the SUCCESSORS OF THE APOSTLES" or touch their "sword and crosier". This high view of the Apostolical Succession, and the place it held in Newman's thinking about the Church and her clergy, is developed further in the assertion that Christ cannot be so
hard a Master as to bid His vicars oppose the world and yet give them no credentials for so doing. "There are some who rest their divine mission on their own unsupported assertion; others, who rest it upon their popularity; others, on their success; and others who rest it upon their temporal distinctions. This last case has, perhaps, been too much our own; I fear we have neglected the real ground on which our authority is built,-- OUR APOSTOLICAL DESCENT". There is a succinct statement of his view of the authority of the Church of England clergyman. His authority rests not on the basis of his own good life, his own religious experience, his full communion with God, his conformity to the mind of Christ, his living example of the lives of the saints of all ages; but rather on the fact of an external act, the laying on of hands, through which "the grace of ordination is contained". "The Lord Jesus Christ gave his spirit to His Apostles; they in turn laid their hands on those who should succeed them; and these again on others; and so the sacred gift has been handed down to our present Bishops, who have appointed us as their assistants, and in some sense representatives". Further, "we must necessarily consider none to be really ordained who have not thus been ordained". So we have presented to us the closed-corporation view of the Church of England clergy, as we would expect. But what is surprising is the view of the Church it reflects,—the recognition in an external, material, mechanical act of doubtful historical continuity, of the necessary and only channel of grace by which a man is made a priest. Beginning with these premises, with these views of the Church and her clergy, a man's feet are on the slippery slope that leads logically to Rome.

There is another side of his view of the Church presented to us in Tract 1,—that of the Church's dependence on the State. "Should the
Government and Country so far forget their God as to cast off the Church, to deprive it of its temporal honors and substance, on what will you rest your claim of respect and attention which you make upon your flocks? Hitherto you have been upheld by your birth, your education, your wealth, your connexions; should these secular advantages cease, on what must Christ's Ministers depend?..... We know how miserable is the state of religious bodies not supported by the State....." Like many another portion of the Tracts, this language sets on edge the teeth of every Evangelical Christian. We are tempted to turn aside and criticise the doctrine Newman is here expressing; but our aim is only to call attention to the views he was holding about the church, and the lines quoted speak for themselves.

Tract 2 further develops his views on the Church. As to the active and zealous interference of the clergy in matters of this world, he says, "No one contends that His Ministers ought to use the weapons of a carnal warfare,—but surely to protest, to warn, to threaten, to excommunicate, are not such weapons". The object of this Tract is to center attention on that article of belief, "The One Catholic and Apostolic Church". And as to what is meant by this tenet, Newman declares that "the only true and satisfactory meaning is that which our Divines have taken, that there is on earth an existing Society, Apostolic as founded by the Apostles, Catholic because it spreads its branches in every place; i.e., the Church Visible with its Bishops, Priests, and Deacons". And he quotes with approval the words of Bishop Pearson: "There is none other name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved but the name of Jesus; and that name is no otherwise given under heaven than in the Church". The first part of this statement is true, always and everywhere; to the second
part we cannot yield our assent.

The two opening sentences of Tract 3, being entitled "Thoughts on Alterations in The Liturgy", read as follows: "Attempts are making to get the Liturgy altered. My dear Brethren, I beseech you, consider with me whether you ought not to resist the alteration of even one jot or tittle of it". The Tract proceeds to display Newman's hatred of change or progress, which was an element so fundamental in his make-up. But it was an element based not on mere stubbornness or obscurantism, but rather on a fear of what limits alteration might reach if once it were admitted in principle. With his view of the Church, and his impression of the enormous function of dogma in Christianity, it followed with perfect consistency that he should object to making changes, to unsettling minds, to institute a practice designed to remedy certain non-essentials which might in the long run undermine the very essentials on which he considered the Church to rest.

Tracts 6, 7, and 8, all brief, treat respectively "The Present Obligation of Primitive Practice", "The Episcopal Church Apostolical", and "The Gospel a Law of Liberty". The marked contrast between the form and condition of the Christian Church in primitive and in present times is pointed out; the likeness, he says, is only theoretical and idle. After reviewing the fortunes of the Mosaic Law, Newman turns to "reflect upon our Savior's conduct"; and he goes on with the startling statement, "He set about to fulfil the Law in its strictness, just as if he had lived in the generation next to Moses...... He received and He obeyed". To quote this opinion seems adequate refutation of it; most persons familiar with the Gospel records are convinced that Christ was anything but a legalist. However, what we are concerned to note here is that Newman thought that
in his argument for antiquity he had good authority in the practice and
counsel of the Lord Jesus; and we must respect his honesty and sincerity.

Tracts 7 and 8 are arguments for the Apostolical character of the
Episcopal Church. They reiterate the scheme of succession by which the
Apostles appointed others to carry on their offices; the Apostolical
Succession is "a fact", and "every link in the chain is known, from St.
Peter to our present Metropolitans". The only true and approved form
of a ministerial order is found in "a class of persons set apart from
others for religious offices". It is admitted that the ecclesiastical
system which Newman was upholding is only faintly traced in Scripture,
but this he explains by the fact that the Gospel is a Law of Liberty, and
is addressed "to those who love God, and wish to please Him". "Many
duties are intimated to us by example, not by precept — many are implied
merely — others can only be inferred from a comparison of passages....." etc.
The objection which may be raised here, "that if God had intended the form
of Church Government to be of great consequence, He would have worded His
will in this matter more clearly in Scripture", Newman dismisses as
irrelevant. There remains one passage that reveals rather clearly Newman's
position on the Church and Ministry,— a passage of the kind that used to
infuriate Dr Whyte: "It is not merely because Episcopacy as a better or more
scriptural form than Presbyterianism, (true as this may be in itself,) that
Episcopalian ministers are right and Presbyterians are wrong; but because the
Presbyterian ministers have assumed a power, which was never intrusted
to them."

In Tract 11, on "The Visible Church", we read, "The Sacraments are
evidently in the hands of the Church Visible; and these, we know, are
generally necessary to salvation, as the Catechism says. This is an
undeniable fact, as true as that souls will be saved, that a visible Church must exist as a means toward that end. The Sacraments are in the hands of the Clergy; this few will deny, or that their efficacy is independent of the personal character of the administrator. In every age the Bishops have been the stewards spoken of in Luke XII:42-46,(1); and the undeniable Papal misuse of the gift only goes to prove that "bad men may nevertheless be the channels of grace to God's household".

Tract 15 seeks to prove that the Apostolical Commission of the English clergy is valid independently of the Church of Rome and was not given up when communion with Rome ceased; that the English Church did not revolt from those who in Reformation days had true authority by right of succession from the Apostles; and that the people of England, in casting off the Pope committed no schism, so that her orders maintain a direct unbroken connection with the first bishops of the Christian Church. The argument is not convincing, but it illustrates certain of the principles on which Newman was proceeding, and it shows us too how large were the leaps of faith he could make while he thought he was being rigidly logical. Two further points in this Tract need to be noticed. First, is the definite statement concerning obedience to the Pope: "Now there is not a word in Scripture about our duty to obey the Pope...." There follows a cogent analysis, in short compass, of the way in which the Bishop of Rome arrived at his present position of supremacy. A second point to remark is this: "Luther and his associates upheld in the main the true doctrine". The tract was written in 1857; Newman still spoke of the English communion as Protestant. But we know from the Apologia that the material used in the

(1) "Who then is that faithful and wise steward, whom his lord shall make ruler over his household....." etc.
composition of this tract was not altogether his own; and Froude, disgusted with the whole Tract, accused him of "economy" in publishing it.

Tract 20 is a continuation of Tract 11, the third of a series of letters to a friend on "The Visible Church", and contains some very direct statements as to Newman's feeling about Popery. He writes, "I will not say that the question is not whether it will lead to Popery, but whether it is in the Bible; because it would bring the Bible and Popery into one sentence, and seem to imply the possibility of a 'communion' between 'light and darkness'. No; it is the very enmity I feel against the Papistical corruptions, which leads me.....". "How comes it that a system, so unscriptural as the Popish, makes converts? because it has in it an element of truth and comfort amid its falsehoods". "A sigh arises in the thoughtful mind, to think that we should be separate from them; Cum talis sis, utinam noster esses! -- But, alas, AN UNION IS IMPOSSIBLE. Their communion is infected with heterodoxy; we are bound to flee it, as a pestilence..... Popery must be destroyed; it cannot be reformed". Thus Newman wrote on December 24, 1833.

Tracts 21, 31, and 33 have no bearing on our present inquiry. Tract 34, on "Rites and Customs of the Church", is thus summarised by its author: "---- rites and ordinances, far from being unnecessary, are in their nature capable of impressing our memories and imaginations with the great revealed verities; far from being superstitious, are expressly sanctioned in Scripture as to their principle, and delivered to the Church in their form by tradition." It seems to us possible here to discern an indication of the direction in which Newman is moving.

Tracts 38 and 41, on the "Via Media", will be considered under that general heading in the next chapter.
In Tract 71, Newman writes upon the "Controversy with The Romanists". His object is "to consider seriously, the one question, with which we are likely to be attacked, why, in matter of fact, we remain separate from Rome". The position of the Church of England, he declares, is a defensive one; attending to her own affairs, she is assailed and encroached upon by the Church of Rome, and so she must defend herself. In the foreground of the controversy are put certain practical grievances, viz: the denial of the cup to the laity; the necessity of the priest's intention to the validity of the Sacraments; the necessity of confession; the unwarranted anathemas of the Roman Church; the doctrine of purgatory; the invocation of Saints; and the worship of images. To adduce no further examples, it may be said that this Tract is a powerful polemic against the Roman Catholic Church, and illustrates the degree of antagonism and distrust which Newman's reason, at least, felt against the Roman system.

There are still certain other Tracts from Newman's active pen: 72, "On The Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Religion"; 74, "Testimony of Writers in The Later English Church to The Doctrine of The Apostolical Succession"; 75, "On The Roman Breviary", etc. But they add little to what we have already learned concerning the views he held on the two subjects now engaging our attention.

Before attempting a summary of the evidence furnished by the Tracts we have been considering, it may be well to recall some of Newman's own impressions of what he and his co-workers were trying to do through the medium of these popular publications. "We were upholding that primitive Christianity which was delivered for all time by the early teachers of the Church. That ancient religion......must be restored. It would be in fact a second Reformation: a better Reformation, for it would be a return not
to the sixteenth century, but to the seventeenth", (1). "I despised every rival system of doctrine.....; I had a thorough contempt for the evangelical", (2). He states for us the position he took up, and the propositions about which he felt so confident: a) first was the principle of dogma; "my battle was with liberalism; by liberalism I meant the antidogmatic principle and its developments". b) Secondly, he was "confident in the truth of a certain definite religious teaching, based upon this foundation of dogma; viz. that there was a visible Church, with sacraments and rites which are the channels of invisible grace". c) "But now as to the third point on which I stood in 1833, and which I have utterly renounced and trampled upon since,—my then view of the Church of Rome;—I will speak about it as exactly as I can". There follow several paragraphs on the development and change of his feeling toward Rome, which we must admire as wholly and earnestly sincere.

The tone of the Tracts led Anglicans on all sides to believe that the Tractarians were on the way to becoming Catholics without being aware of their peril. In 1837 Newman published his "Prophetic Office of the Church", of which one of the chief aims was to show that to confuse Anglicanism and Romanism is impossible; "the spirit of the volume is.... very fierce", he says in the Apologia, (3). The larger aim of the book was "to offer helps towards the formation of a recognized Anglican theology".

Having passed in review Newman's contributions to the "Tracts for The Times" in the chronological order of their appearance, we are able to discern what positions were maintained from first to last, and what underwent modification and change with the passing of time. The memorable thesis

(1) Apologia, p. 145.
(2) Ibid., p. 146.
(3) Ibid., p. 164.
on the interpretation of the Thirty Nine Articles which formed his Tract 90 has not yet been discussed; but the Tracts we have already considered led up logically and inevitably to the position expressed in number 90; and before turning to it we shall attempt to summarise "the slow and painful result of fifteen years of internal struggle" through which he was led to the views therein expressed.

He began with a whole-hearted confidence in Anglicanism, and with the deep-rooted conviction that the Pope was Anti-Christ. Throughout the Tracts he maintains his confidence in the one and his certainty with regard to the other; but we can see clearly how, step by step, he draws nearer to that system which at first he hated. He consistently opposes liberalism, and indeed change of any kind; the Scriptures were for him the basis of authority, and there was no thought of questioning them from the historico-critical point of view. Apostolical Succession was the ground on which the clergy could claim obedience. Again and again there was brought in a distinctly sacerdotal tone, although it may be questioned whether Newman himself was strongly inclined to sacerdotalism. He believed in a visible Church, whose control of the Sacraments gave to her an absolute authority in ministering to the religious life of her communicants. The principle that probability is the guide of life was employed to an extent that seems unwarranted; the Tractarians acted on assumptions that lacked certainty. As Hutton puts it, they lived "more like a colony of immigrants amongst a people of different language and customs, than like a band of patriots who were reviving the old glories of their native country",(1). Finally, Newman was led to see the conformity between the Primitive Church and Roman Catholicism; and not only that this Primitive Christian Church, in which was the source of

(1) R. H. Hutton, op. cit., p. 55.
all truth, bore witness not in favor of the Anglican but of the Roman Church, but that the whole of history seemed to be on the side of Rome. So he was driven to attempt to restore the Roman Catholic principle within the Anglican Church. This meant the elimination of the liberal and rationalistic principles of Protestantism, and the substitution of Roman beliefs and practices. And there followed insuperable difficulties. Seeking to strengthen the Anglican foundations, he found that these were crumbling away. When he attempted to define the principles on which the Anglican Church rested, it was revealed to him that these principles just did not exist. In trying to prove the identity of the National Church with the Universal Church, it became clear that the English Church, having been disowned by Romans, Greeks, and Non-Conformists, was only local and insular, a pathetic compromise. So came Tract 90. Once having accepted the view of the Church expressed in the first of the Tracts, Newman is carried steadily Romeward; and still we hear, faintly but surely, those "onward footsteps, soft as the falling snow; his swift, noiseless, delicate, and refined footsteps."

The tracts had been accorded sincere attention from all quarters; the appearance of each succeeding tract had been looked for with eagerness, and they were read carefully by men in widely diverse stations of life. But Tract 90 was received in a storm of universal indignation. It proved to be the swan song of the tractarian movement as such, although it had not intended to take that role. But when Newman saw how hostile was the public's reaction to it, when he felt that public confidence in him was now lost, he realized that his place in the movement was at an end.

Tract 90 was published in 1839, under the title, "Remarks on Certain Passages in The Thirty Nine Articles". Its object, to use the language of
its introduction, was to point out: "that there are real difficulties
to a Catholic Christian in the Ecclesiastical position of our Church at
this day, no one can deny; but the statements of the Articles are not in
the number.... Our present scope is merely to show that, while our
Prayer Book is acknowledged on all hands to be of Catholic origin, our
Articles also, the offspring of an uncatholic age, are, through GOD'S
good providence, to say the least, not uncatholic, and may be subscribed
by those who aim at being Catholic in heart and doctrine". There follow
comments on fourteen of the doctrines; from these we shall abstract such
statements as seem to add to our understanding of Newman's doctrines of
the Church and of authority in religion.

Articles VI and XX, on Holy Scripture and the Authority of the
Church, are seen to set forth three things,—that the Church "expounds and
enforces the faith"; that it "derives the faith wholly from Scripture";
and that its office is "to educe an harmonious interpretation of Scripture".
The weakness of this is that it does not make clear what the criteria are
by which the Church interprets Scripture; nor does it point out whether her
interpretations of Scripture are invariably right. On Article IX, on
Justification by Faith only, Newman observes, "An assent to the doctrine
that Faith alone justifies, does not at all preclude the doctrine of Works
justifying also". Section Three, on Articles XII and XIII, has no
bearing on our inquiry.

Section Four, "The Visible Church", on Article XIX, is of extreme
importance. Here Newman sets out what had by this time come to be his
views on the Church. He quotes some twenty-three definitions, ranging from
St. Clement of Alexandria down to Pope Pius II, every one of them, except a
few of the very earliest, Roman Catholic. These definitions are offered
as "illustrations of the phraseology of the Article", and it is argued
that "they plainly show that it is not laying down any logical definition what a church is, but is describing, and, as it were, pointing to the Catholic Church diffused throughout the world; which, being but one, cannot be mistaken, and requires no other account of it beyond this single and majestic one". And further, "the coetus fidelium spoken of in the Article is not a definition, which kirk, or connexion, or other communion may be made to fall under, but the enunciation of a fact".

Section Five holds that General Councils may err unless it is promised as a matter of express supernatural privilege that they shall not err; and this promise does exist when they are called both "according to the commandment and will of Princes and in the name of CHRIST". Thus Newman establishes for himself the validity of the Ecumenical Councils. The long section on images and relics, while not voicing approval of the Roman doctrines and practices, yet does so interpret Article XXII as to make loyalty to it not inconsistent with the beliefs and practices of Roman Christians. He does the same with the Sacraments, in Section Seven; with this difference, that he points out the lack of harmony between Article XXV and the Catechism as to the true character of the Sacraments. As to the "shocking doctrine" held by Romans with regard to transubstantiation, he finds "great offense" in it.

It is not easy at this distance to understand the storm and scandal raised by this famous Tract; for a fair observer will grant that both logic and history seem to be on Newman's side. Logic, because starting with the first principles he had adopted, and working through the other eighty-nine Tracts, we are bound to arrive where he did in Tract 90; history, because once admit the same principles, and the Roman interpretation is wholly
justified by the course of historical development. But Tract 90 was just what was needed to bring the Bishops thundering against the Papacy.

Of particular importance is the attitude which Newman took up in regard to the action of his ecclesiastical superiors toward the Tracts, and toward number 90 especially. In the Apologia, we are told that the first threatenings of a crisis came in 1838, when his own Bishop made "some slight animadversions, and they were animadversions, on the Tracts for The Times". And we notice with interest the course Newman took: "At once I offered to stop them". The grounds for this position he amplified in a pamphlet addressed to the Bishop the following year, after the blow against the Tracts had actually fallen; here we read, "I wrote to the Archdeacon on the subject, submitting the Tracts entirely to your Lordship's disposal...... I said, 'A Bishop's lightest word ex cathedra is heavy. His judgment on a book cannot be light'...... And I offered to withdraw any of the Tracts over which I had control...... I afterwards wrote to your Lordship to this effect, that 'I trusted I might say sincerely that I should feel a more lively pleasure in knowing that I was submitting myself to your Lordship's expressed judgment in a matter of this kind, than I could have even in the widest circulation of the volumes in question'...... if ever you determined it, I was bound to obey".

In these lines Newman enunciates once more his view on the authority of the Church. The Bishop's word was law; his judgment must be obeyed; his opinion must be accepted without hesitation or question. This followed from the conception of the Church as a visible organization with a life of its own, with Bishops who were the true heirs of the Apostles and who delegated their authority to the lesser clergy. When a Bishop spoke there
was only one thing for his subordinates to do, and that was to obey with promptness and docility. In this view, the question of individuality simply does not arise; a clergyman is regarded no longer as an independent thinking being, but as a part of an organization, one of the smaller wheels that move in certain definite ways in response to the movement of the levers in the central power-house. From the point of view of mechanical efficiency, this system is ideal.

Nor did the question of conscience arise. Whatever Newman himself felt as to his justification for publishing Tract 90, he gives no indication of believing that as against the Bishop's objection he had a right as a free man to support it, and a duty as a follower of truth to defend it. It seems not to have occurred to him that no man on earth, whatever his claims to Apostolical Succession, has any right of dominion over the minds of other men who are thinking truly and following the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the name of Christ. Of course it wouldn't have occurred to him; it couldn't, since his view of the Church was what it was. It is a facile and untrue theory which holds that all of Newman's later acceptance of dogma and external authority date from his act of submission to Rome in 1845. "It is not submission to authority that makes a dogmatist; it is rather the temperamental dogmatist alone who can submit to authority",(1). Newman had in him no native skepticism, no passionate straining eagerness to think for himself, to assert the dignity of his own free manhood, and then to stand against all comers for what his conscience knew was right. We are not accusing him of cowardice or lack of moral courage; far from it; he was always a fighter, a born controversialist. But the native tendency of his mind was so strongly set in the direction of receiving dogma and accepting the authoritative dictates of those placed over him.

(1) Stewart, op. cit., p. 100.
in the ecclesiastical system, that he became warped; and, in this particular case, so tamely submissive as to be a little less than admirable. If he really believed in his Tract 90, he should have supported it and fought for it against all the Bishops in the Kingdom, whatever the results. To him of course these suggestions would sound rankly heretical; but the difference is that I am writing from the Protestant point of view, and Newman was no longer a Protestant. The charge of dishonesty was brought against him because, it was said, while maintaining his position in the Church of England he had accepted the full-orbed system of Roman doctrine; some even went so far as to accuse him of having joined the Roman communion secretly. Such charges are unfair and untrue; we can, however, charge him with a lack of clear-sightedness, and a failure to see to what port he was irrevocably steering his course. But he was not dishonest; he was not consciously and deliberately a Roman Catholic. Yet we do maintain that he was no longer a Protestant; and as proof of the contention, we submit this one instance of his attitude toward the Bishop's action on Tract 90.

No longer a Protestant, not yet a Roman Catholic; but there was the Via Media.
Chapter 7

THE VIA MEDIA

Newman's doctrine of the "Via Media" is found in his book on the "Prophetic Office of The Church", and in a collection of his letters and pamphlets written between 1830 and 1845. As we have already observed, the lectures on the "Prophetic Office" sought to determine the relations of the Roman and Anglican systems to each other, and also to establish a theology upon the Anglican idea and Anglican authorities. He was, he tells us in the Apologia, for years without any satisfactory basis for his religious profession, "in a state of moral sickness, neither able to acquiesce in Anglicanism, nor able to go to Rome". So he set about to select, sort, distribute, catalogue, and harmonise the vast stores of primitive doctrine, original principles of the Gospel and the Church, Catholic truth and individual opinion, which were the Anglican inheritances. The name "Via Media" indicated merely a receding from extremes; he would show it to be one, intelligible, and consistent. He admitted in the introduction to the book that as an integral system the Via Media had scarcely had any existence except on paper; yet he held no doubt as to the three fundamental points on which it was based: 1) dogma; 2) the sacramental system; and 3) opposition to the Church of Rome. However, he found it no easy thing to pilot himself and his party along that middle course which he wished to regard as the true ground of true theology; there is
an extremely conscientious, almost morbid, eagerness to clear up the theological position of the Anglican party, though it yielded no very satisfactory result.

So in the remarkable and fascinating "Lectures on The Prophetic Office of The Church", which later became "The Via Media", Newman carries through a characteristic and subtle effort to set out the true view as to the use and abuse of private judgment, the authority of the Church, and the authority of antiquity. It was because he felt sure that both Romanism and Protestantism were wrong that he undertook the gallant enterprise of building his own theology upon the Via Media. That his enterprise failed, he acknowledged in a letter to Wilberforce: "As time went on and I read the Fathers more attentively, the Via Media became less and less satisfactory", (1).

From his "Via Media" we shall select two aspects of the question Newman is facing: his theory of the Church, and of the use and abuse of private judgment.

In the Introduction he offers a definition of religion; he writes, "The essence of religion is the submission of the reason and the heart to a positive system, the acquiescence in doctrines which cannot be proved or explained. A realized system is pre-supposed as the primary essential, from the nature of the case." Every person who has thought of the matter at all realizes how difficult it is to define a term so large as the term religion. Yet Newman's definition is certainly to be ranked as a highly unsatisfactory one. No wonder he spent years in turmoil and vexation of spirit, when we recall that this is what he understood by the essence of religion. It is not that the definition is wholly wrong; it

does contain a portion of truth, and so is all the more misleading. He
condemns theorizing on religious subjects as the undue use of the reason;
and what men claim as their right and privilege to choose and settle their
religious needs for themselves, he argues should yield place to the
acceptance of what the wise, the good, and the many of former times have
made over to their posterity. Life is not long enough to prove everything
that may be made the subject of proof; "and, though inquiry is left partly
open to try our earnestness, yet it is in great measure, and in the most
important points, superseded by Revelation,--which discloses things which
reason could not reach, saves us the labor of using it when it might avail,
and sanctions thereby the principle of dispensing with it in other cases".
The channel through which Revelation is mediated to modern-time Christians
is the Bible, which Newman considers as the only standard of appeal in
doctrinal inquiries. The written word of God must be accepted "as the
supreme and sole arbiter" of the differences between Protestants. But the
Bible is not so written as to force its meaning upon the reader; steering
his course between an absolute trust in the authority of the Roman Church
and the ultra-Protestant principle of individual judgment, Newman asserts
that the way of the Via Media is for Christians to begin with the habit of
obedience to those who have "natural authority" over them, and to cultivate
a teachable temper before essaying to criticize.

This authority is found, of course, in the Church. Not in the
Protestant Church, which does not claim it; and not in the Roman Church,
which although Apostolical yet has added a burdensome weight of tradition.
Rather in a Church system which is earlier than the Roman, which goes
directly back to the primitive days of Christianity. The Thirty Nine
Articles should not be changed, but added to, "add protests against the erastianism and latitudinarianism which have encrusted them". Such doctrines as appear wanting are the doctrines of the Church Catholic, with roots in the primitive Church; or are doctrines which, though having not the sanction of a place in the Articles, Liturgy, or Creeds, yet are believed by and ought to be believed by all, such, for example, as the inspiration of Holy Scripture. The Via Media is willing to meet both Protestant and Roman opponents; it will take the test either of Scripture or of Antiquity. Roman tradition lacks authority in that it is the tradition of men, is not continuous, stops short of the Apostles, and in its beginning is wrapped in obscurity. The relation of Romanism towards true Catholicity is marked by the misdirection and abuse, not the absence, of right principle. Rome retains the principle of true Catholicism perverted; popular Protestantism is wanting in the principle.

Antiquity has a high authority in religious questions, he writes. Whatever doctrines the primitive ages unanimously attest, whether by consent of the Fathers, or by Councils, or by the events of history, or in whatever way, is received as coming from the Apostles. The Council of Constance furnishes a memorable instance of Rome's disregard for antiquity, in the case of the decree by which it formally debarred the laity from participation in the cup in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. And this leads presently to Newman's own views on the Sacraments.

The poet and believer within him became all but indistinguishable in their adherence to ideal realities. He seemed to believe whatever was to him beautiful to believe; as if to say, "It is too beautiful not to be true". Thus he idealized the Church of the Fathers and of the Middle Ages. And as
the years went on, filling out the fourth decade of the century and opening the fifth, he began to ask himself which Church the Fathers would be found in if by some miracle they could come back to life. Clearly he saw that the Roman Church was as much unlike the Church of the New Testament as the English Church was; and yet, through the centuries it had preserved the two characteristics of devotion and self-sacrifice. There is a danger of placing too large an emphasis upon the rational and logical forces that were working in Newman during this period; let us remember that he was a poet, and that to a rare degree he lived a life of the practice of the presence of God. His environment was always one of holiness. Dean Church has explained Newman better in two lines than some of us could do in volumes: "But what won his heart and enthusiasm was one thing; what justified itself to his intellect was another", (1).

It seems fitting to place his view of the Sacraments in the former category. He had stoutly denied the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, which teaches that the wafer becomes the actual carnal body of Christ; but he had always held a very high view of the Sacraments, as being necessary to salvation and in the sole and jealously-guarded possession of the Church. His adult belief in angels, for example, made it easy for him to believe in the Real Presence in a sense rather more than spiritual. He longed for certainty, definiteness; he must believe in the Real Presence, yet a purely spiritual belief is likely to be vague and unsatisfactory to one of so vivid an imagination. Again we are brought up against the question of first principles; starting where he did, the transfer to the position that finds satisfaction in the Roman Mass was easy and inevitable. As Professor Sarolea points out, the misfortune of the Anglican Church was

(1) Dean Church, "Occasional Papers", ii, p. 475.
that it accepted the same premises and principles as the Roman Catholic, but did not follow them up to their logical conclusions. "Our only escape from Newman is to deny his premises",(1). And we do deny his premises. We cannot here enter into a full discussion of the sacraments; suffice it to observe that the acceptance of the miracle of the Mass requires a strangely flexible metaphysics. If one is prepared to believe that under certain environmental circumstances, through the utterance over the wafer and wine by a properly ordained priest of the words "Hoc est corpus meum", the wafer and wine are changed into the actual body and blood of Christ, then he must hold a conception of the nature of matter that is at one neither with scientific opinion nor with every-day experience. The Roman Catholic is satisfied that a miracle takes place. But there still remains the old problem of what happens if a mouse should eat a portion of the consecrated Host,—will the mouse have eaten the body of Christ? And the blood too, since the Council of Constance teaches that "the entire Body and Blood of Christ is truly contained as well under the bread as under the wine"? There is the problem too, old but pertinent, of cannibalism. Such are but a few of the difficulties that face one who starts with these premises that are so coarse, carnal, and irreverent, and such poles away from the heart and spirit of Christ. Finally, it may be asked, if for the sake of those with no spiritual imagination the words of Jesus in the institution must be interpreted with crass literalness, why should not the same interpretation be placed upon his words, "I am the way, the truth, and the life"; or, "I am the door"?

We turn now to the two chapters on private judgment. Here we are on a subject that Newman handles extremely well; moreover, we are on ground which is for the most part congenial to our own way of theological thinking.

We shall look first at his view on the abuse of private judgment.

He makes a strong attack on the notion that every Christian has a right to make up his mind for himself what he is to believe, on the basis of personal and private study of the Scriptures. There are those, he says, who consider private judgment rather as the necessary duty than as the privilege of the Christian; but the notion is too preposterous, and he gives his attention only to what is called the right of Private Judgment,—that is, not that all must, but that all may, search the Scriptures, and determine or prove their Creed from them. To carry the definition a bit further; it is not the duty of all Christians, nor the right of all who are qualified, so much as the duty of all who are qualified. But there are certain qualifications; there are obstacles that stand in the way of the exercise of Private Judgment, whether it be called a right or a duty. Inability to read is obviously such an obstacle; two further impediments, less obvious but quite as serious, are inaccuracy of mind, and prejudice.

Whereas every Christian is bound to have as accurate notions as he can have, many a man is capable of receiving more accurate and complete notions than he can gather for himself from the Bible. "It is one thing to apprehend the Catholic doctrines; quite another to ascertain how and where they are implied in Scripture". Through inaccurate use, private judgment may become a weapon which destroys error by the sacrifice of truth; for example, men who reject the doctrine of transubstantiation because they do not find it in Scripture may go on to reject also the divinity of the Holy Ghost because He is nowhere plainly called God. Prepossessions have a large influence in the interpretations which men put upon the Scriptures; most men are hindered from forming their own views by the external bias.
which they receive from education and other causes. In other words, a man
will find pretty much what he is looking for; and he will not find that
against which he holds a prejudice. For instance, "Do this in remembrance
of me", is understood as a command; but, "Ye also ought to wash one
another's feet", is not a command; and, "Search the Scriptures" is an
argument for Scripture being the rule of faith; but "hold the Traditions"
is no argument in favor of Tradition. So popular Protestantism, abusing
private judgment, interprets Scripture in a spirit of caprice. Thus the
two disqualifications, inaccuracy of mind and prejudice, must discourage
those who are humble and cautious from relying on their own unassisted
powers in interpreting Scripture. For Scripture was never intended to
teach doctrine to the many, but only to prove doctrine to those who were
already instructed in it. Amazing as this last statement may seem to us,
yet it was one to which Newman held tenaciously and upon which a large
part of his theological system was founded.

We turn with somewhat more interest to the chapter on the use of
private judgment. The theory of private judgment, he says, is maintained
in theory by the Protestantism of the day as a sort of sacred possession
or palladium; while Rome takes the opposite extreme and maintains that
nothing is absolutely left to individual judgment,- that is, there is no
subject in religious faith and conduct on which the Church may not pronounce
a decision, such as to supersede the private judgment and compel the assent
of every one of her communicants. The English Church takes a middle course
between these two. But this middle path cannot be so easily mastered by the
mind as either of the two extreme theories; because, first, it is a mean and
has in consequence a complex nature; next, it partakes of that indeterminateness
which is to a certain extent a characteristic of English theology; finally, because it has never been realized in visible fulness in any religious community, and thereby brought home to the mind through the senses.

"The means which are given us to form our judgment by, exclusively of such as are supernatural, which do not enter into consideration here, are various, partly internal, partly external. The internal means of judging are common sense, natural perception of right and wrong, the sympathy of the affections, exercises of the imagination, reason, and the like. The external are such as Scripture, the existing Church, Tradition, Catholicity, Learning, Antiquity, and the National Faith......... it is pleasanter to walk without doubt and without shade, than to have to choose what is best and safest. The Roman Catholic would simplify matters by removing Reason, Scripture, and Antiquity, and depending mainly upon Church Authority; the Calvinist relies on Reason, Scripture, and Criticism, to the disparagement of the Moral Sense, the Church, Tradition, and Antiquity; the Latitudinarian relies on Reason, with Scripture in subordination; the Mystic on the imagination and the affections, or what is commonly called the heart; the Politician takes the National Faith as sufficient, and cares for little else; the man of the world acts by common sense, which is the oracle of the indifferent; the popular Religionist considers the authorized version of Scripture to be all in all. But the true Catholic Christian is he who takes what God has given him, be it greater or less, does not despise the lesser because he has received the greater, yet puts it not before the greater, but uses all duly and to God's glory",(1).

There follows a series of remarks or propositions, offered in

(1) Via Media, i, p. 131, 133.
illustration of the theory of private judgment taught by the Via Media theology: 1) Scripture, Antiquity, and Catholicity cannot really contradict each other.

2) When the moral sense or the reason of the individual seems to be on one side, and Scripture on the other, we must follow Scripture, except in the case Scripture should anywhere contain contradictions in terms, or prescribe undeniable crimes, which it never does.

3) When the sense of Scripture, as interpreted by the reason of the individual, is contrary to the sense given by Catholic Antiquity, we ought to side with the latter.

4) When Antiquity runs counter to the present Church in important matters, we must follow Antiquity; when in unimportant matters, we must follow the present Church.

5) When the present Church speaks contrary to our private notions, and Antiquity is silent, or its decisions unknown to us, it is pious to sacrifice our own opinion to that of the Church.

6) If, in spite of our efforts to agree with the Church, we still differ from it, Antiquity being silent, we must avoid causing any disturbance, recollecting that the Church, and not the individual, "has authorities in controversies of faith". (1)

These, then, are the grounds upon which Newman builds his Via Media doctrine of private judgment. It remains now to consider the doctrine in practice. The popular opinion that no one has an enlightened faith who has not discussed the grounds of it and made up his mind for himself, is declared rightly to apply only to infidels and sceptics. For everyone must begin the religious life by faith, not by controversy; he must take for

(1) Via Media, i, p. 135.
granted many things that he cannot prove for himself; and even if what he is taught contains an admixture of error, this is in the long run better than to believe nothing until full proof is established. "If he would possess a reverent mind, he must begin by obeying; if he would cherish a generous and devoted temper, he must begin by venturing something on uncertain information." The Christian will study Scripture and Antiquity, as well as the doctrine of his own Church; and he may perhaps, in some points of detail, differ from its teaching; but, even if eventually he differ, he will not therefore put himself forward, wrangle, protest, or separate himself from it. Against the commonly accepted doctrine of the day Newman would maintain, "not the Roman doctrine of Infallibility, which even if true, would be of application only to a portion of mankind, for few comparatively hear of Rome,--but generally that, under whatever system a man finds himself, he is bound to accept it as if infallible, and to act upon it in a confiding spirit, till he finds a better, or in course of time has cause to suspect it",(l).

Scripture reading in England has, he says, been the cause of schism; but this is because the Church is deprived of the power of excommunicating, which, in the revealed scheme, is given as a check upon private judgment. If only the Clergy would think alike, and then would formally express their faith in similar terms, there is no doubt at all that the laity would think alike too. The Church may, without claiming infallibility, claim the confidence and obedience of her members. Minor differences may be allowed, without disagreement on fundamentals. "If there is schism among us, it is not that Scripture speaks variously, but that the Church of the day speaks not at all; not that private judgment is

(1) Via Media, i, p. 138.
rebellious, but that the Church's judgment is withheld" ,(1). He concludes his argument with the statement of the conviction that in the rule of private judgment as it has been outlined, there would be found quite as adequate a certainty as the doctrine of Infallibility can give.

So we see that in defining the Via Media, Newman got rather well along in articulating his doctrine of the Church and of Authority. He was at this time one of the best known and most highly respected men at Oxford; and between 1833 and 1843 he exerted an enormous influence through his efforts to determine the true attitude of the new party. He admitted frankly enough that there were conscientious and sensible men who did not at all approve of the attempt he was making, on the ground that the views he was putting forward would, under the circumstances, lead to Rome; he failed to see how prophetical the vision of these conscientious and sensible men was.

In summary: Newman held deep in his heart as an article of personal conviction that to interpret Scripture and to administer the Sacraments ordained by our Lord, an organized and visible Church was necessary; but that the Church of Rome was non-Scriptural and non-primitive in her doctrines of purgatory and invocation of the Saints, and that as a result of relying upon her own infallibility she had sanctioned beliefs and practices which could not be traced back to the Apostles. He knew that his position was genuinely plausible; before blaming him for advocating it, we must remember that every one of his Anglican predecessors had held it, even if advancing it less energetically,-- and we must admit too that every controversialist be held liable to the same sort of blame. In defining the function of private judgment, he asserts that its proper use must begin

(1) Via Media, i, p. 143.
with a willingness to obey those who hold natural authority. Investigation
should be conducted half-unconsciously, without pride or confusion, but
with an impersonal eagerness to get at the truth and to give up one's own
liberty to an experienced and honest guide. Reverence and humility are,
in his view, the proper conditions for the right exercise of private
judgment. While we do not accept certain of his premises and the
conclusions that must inevitably follow from them, yet with his position
as outlined in this chapter we confess ourselves in substantial
agreement.
Chapter 8

"DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE"

There are two ways of regarding Newman's essay on the "Development of Christian Doctrine". It may be considered as the last of his Anglican writings, or the first of his Roman Catholic works. It was partly the one, partly the other; written while he was still professedly an Anglican, it was not published until after he had joined the Roman Communion. Indeed, he seceded to Rome before the book was completed, and it was published in an unfinished state. Written during the years when he was weighing in agony of mind the competing claims of the two churches that appealed so strongly to different and yet similar elements in his make-up, when he was so certainly drifting to Rome without fully realizing just what was happening, coming just at the parting of the ways, this book is of enormous significance in helping us to understand the course of his thinking during these distressing experiences. He regarded it as his best book. And it cost him more toil and strain than any of his others, not excepting the Apologia; the strain was perhaps less intense than that which attended the writing of the Apologia, but it extended over a much longer period. A letter written in June of 1845 tells how the infinite care expended on the book wore him out mentally and
physically; and the result of this tension was visible to his friends and comrades. Father Stanton has said that for hours together Newman would remain standing at his high desk, writing and re-writing, growing paler and thinner, until at the completion of his task it appeared that the sun shone through his almost transparent face.

The writing of the Development essay, like so much else in Newman's life, was inevitable. He had held fast to the Via Media as long as he could; but his line of thought was running out in the only way possible for it to run; he was driven irresistibly forward from one point to another. The note of Antiquity, which in the Via Media gave to the Church its authority, now began to yield place to the note of Catholicism as a surer ground. In 1839 there came doubts as to the validity of the Anglican succession; and in the years that followed this doubt deepened until he was convinced of the power of the Roman argument. In his mind the Catholicity of Rome began to overshadow the Apostolicity of Anglicanism; antiquity was no longer the touchstone; the Church was, must be, one; quod semper quod ubique quod ab omnibus; and that Church must be the Roman. Sacramental grace must belong to an order not only visible and external but also exclusive; and where Catholicism in the Roman form exists, Anglicanism has no footing. Along these lines his mind was moving, moving on to the logical consequence of the principles he had enunciated in Tract 90. Two of these principles took on a fresh and deeper meaning: Anglican doctrine must not be at variance with the authoritative teaching of the one old true Church, and wherever this one true Church exists in the direct line of descent Anglicanism and Protestantism have no right to interfere. Upon these two rocks the Via
Media broke; and out of the wreckage arose the towering structure of the essay on Development.

It is in many ways an unusual book; in at least one respect it is a very remarkable piece of work. Remembering that it was written many years before the scientific conception of biological evolution had been given to the world by Darwin and Wallace, we concur with Hutton's opinion when he says, "Newman's genius is not simply, as has been often asserted, a special gift for the vindication of authority in religion". His discussion of the true tests of development is marked by the "keenest penetration into one of the most characteristic conceptions of modern science", (1).

If the book can be said to have a single aim, it was to justify as legitimate developments what were regarded as Roman corruptions and additions to the primitive creed. But its philosophy went deeper than the theological questions of the day; it applied the great principle of development as a test of truth in religion. The changes, the historical development, in the Roman Catholic system are but the response of a living social body to changing conditions, and, far from being corruptions, are but the new answers given to the new questions that are bound to arise. Christianity has many aspects, and these change with the changing times; as circumstances alter, old principles appear under new forms. Christianity changes with the forms "in order to remain the same. In a higher world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change and to be perfect is to have changed often". Thus it is that, in spite of changes of outward form and polity, he justifies the claim of the Roman Catholic Church to be semper eadem. What he was doing was seeking a principle which would vindicate his long devotion to antiquity, and at the same time correlate
that primitive type of Christianity with the necessary processes of
growth which Scott had years earlier taught him as essential to life.
Let us see how he approaches his task, and then inquire more precisely
what bearing this work has on his view of authority in religion.

The characteristic feature of the work is the setting out of
several tests by which a true development is distinguished from a
corruption. These seven tests are: 1) Preservation of type, as the
child in the man, suggested by the analogy of physical growth.
2) Continuity of principles; e.g., the Newtonian theory of gravitation
is based on certain axioms; some languages are in principle more elastic
than others. 3) Power of assimilation; e.g., a plant or animal grows
by taking into itself and assimilating into its own substance materials
from outside itself. 4) Logical sequence; not to be understood as
rationalism and contrasted with faith; "the holy Apostles would without
words know all the truths concerning the high doctrines of theology,
which controversialists after them have piously and charitably reduced
to formulae and developed through argument". 5) Anticipation of its
future; specimens of advanced teaching often occur early, as e.g.,
Athanasius is elected Bishop by his playfellows. 6) Conservative action
upon its past; true development is an addition which illustrates and
corroborates, does not obscure or correct, the body of thought from which
it proceeds. 7) Chronic vigour; duration is the final test of development;
corruption is distinguished from decay by its energetic action, from
development by its transitory character.

These seven tests are drawn out and illustrated with subtlety and
power; if their premises were sound and their logic true, they would sweep
away almost in entirety the objections which this paper will raise against
the claims of the Roman Catholic Church in respect of authority in religion. But having stated them, we shall leave them at this point, and turn to those parts of the essay which bear more directly on our line of inquiry.

It was the study of the history of the Church that drove Newman to the formulation of his theory of development; and in that study he found no outcome except the necessity for adherence to the whole Roman system. "To be deep in history" he writes, "is to cease to be a Protestant". So he establishes the supremacy of the Church which had by now become his spiritual home, on the records of its eighteen centuries; there was and had always been but one true Church, developing through these centuries, but still always true to the original genius imparted by the Apostles. The voice of that Church was the voice of authority; there was no other authority. In three singularly vivid pictures, which served as the inspiration of his life in after years, Newman identifies the Church now in communion with Rome as the Church of the early centuries; he draws historical parallels between the nineteenth century Roman Church and the Church in the Apostolic period, in the Nicene period, and in the fifth and sixth centuries. These three pictures are excellent examples of his rhetorical power; let us quote from one of them, allowing it to stand as representative of the other two. Concerning the Nicene period and its modern parallel, he writes: "On the whole, then, we have reason to say, that if there be a form of Christianity at this day distinguished for its careful organization, and its consequent power; if it is spread over the world; if it is conspicuous for zealous maintenance of its own creed; if it is intolerant of what it considers error; if it is engaged in ceaseless war with all other bodies called Christian; if it, and it alone, is called "Catholic"
by the world, nay by those very bodies, and it makes much of the title; if it names them heretics, and warns them of coming woe, and calls on them one by one, to come over to itself, overlooking every other tie; and if they, on the other hand, call it seducer, harlot, apostate, Antichrist, devil; if, however much they differ with one another, they consider it their common enemy; if they strive to unite together against it, and cannot; if they are but local; if they continually subdivide, and it remains one; if they fall one after another, and make way for new sects, and it remains the same; such a religious communion is not unlike historical Christianity, as it comes before us at the Nicene Era" (l).

So he convinced himself that Catholicity is a truer note of the Church than mere Antiquity. In his review of the Church in the Apostolic Age, he makes the suspicion and distrust with which early Christianity was regarded an almost necessary accompaniment of modern Christianity; so that the better Roman Catholics are treated, the less conspicuous in our day this note will be. But, as Hutton suggests, in a world which humbles itself before such Roman Catholic apostles and martyrs as Father Damien, this note can hardly be called conspicuous in spite of Newman’s emphasis upon it. Again, in the paragraph quoted above and in the whole of his review of the Church in the Nicene period, he overlooks the lessening of the conflict between the Church of Rome and those Christians outside her fold. During the past few years there has been a virtual alliance against skepticism made between these two branches of Christendom, and to-day that alliance is facing their common enemy, secularism. This new spirit, more pronounced now than in Newman’s day, is vastly more significant than the blasts of denouncement which the Churches used to hurl at each other. In his review of the Church in the fifth and sixth centuries, he speaks of rife heresies,

(l) "Development of Doctrine", p. 272-3.
negligent bishops, disorders and fears,—and makes this condition bear witness to the authentic claim of Rome. One is reminded of the judgment of that monk in the Lutheran period who became converted on a visit to Rome, because when he saw the Church so powerful and yet so corrupt, he concluded it must be divinely sustained.

In the lectures on the Prophetic Office of the Church, while working toward a definition of the Via Media, Newman had written, "There are what may be called minor points, which we may hold to be true without imposing them as necessary;" "there are greater truths and lesser truths, points which it is necessary and points which it is pious to believe". The reader will at once observe that, this being so, how are the minor points to be distinguished from the major, what are the criteria by which we judge which truths are greater and which less? In the chapter on An Infallible Developing Authority, Newman faces and sets about to answer this question. The tests for ascertaining the correctness of development, which we have been reviewing, he says are insufficient for the guidance of individuals in the case of so large and complicated a problem as Christianity; "they are of a scientific and controversial, not of a practical, character, and are instruments rather than warrants of right decisions". Our inquiry, like his, is first of all practical; and so we come to this chapter on authority as representing what is for us the most significant portion of the book.

The conclusion at which he arrives is that, since there has been true development of doctrine and practice in the Divine Scheme, so also in that scheme there has been appointed an external authority to decide upon that doctrine and practice, thereby separating them from the mass of mere
human speculation, extravagance, corruption, and error, out of which they grow. This he calls the doctrine of the infallibility of the Church; and by infallibility he means the power of deciding whether this, that, and a third, and any number of theological or ethical statements are true. He then attempts to prove that along with revelation there must be given an external authority which authenticates this revelation and forces its acceptance upon the mind. A revelation may occur without evidence that it is revelation; but Christianity is not of this nature: its revelation comes to men as a revelation, as a whole, objectively, and with a profession of infallibility. He regards as untenable the view that belief in the infallibility of the Church must rest on moral evidence and not on demonstration, since nothing is more absurd than a probable infallibility or a certainty resting on a doubt. "All allow the Apostles were infallible...... when we say that a person is infallible, we mean no more than that what he says is always true, always to be believed, always to be done". To the idea of such a peremptory authority as he supposes, the objection that it lessens the task of personal inquiry is lightly dismissed by the somewhat non sequitur statement that "to suppose that the doctrine of a permanent authority in matters of faith interferes with our free will and responsibility is, as before, to forget that there were infallible teachers in the first age, and heretics and schismatics in the ages subsequent"; and he adds the weak supposition that "there may have been at once a supreme authority from first to last, and a moral judgment from first to last". Some may argue, he says, that the analogy of nature tells against the continuation of an authority once given; but he holds that this would deny revelation itself, "for an innovation upon the physical order of the world is by the very force of the terms inconsistent
with its ordinary course". What exactly he means by revelation it is not easy to determine; but this last statement adds some light, and it further shows his view of nature as a closed system in which unpredictable events do not occur,—a view that has been shattered by the work of the modern scientist. Again, he speaks of revelation thus: "Revelation has introduced a new law of divine governance over and above those laws which appear in the natural course of the world". But he adduces no proof for the position which he holds; he says in effect, If a revelation has been given then there must also have been given an infallible authority; and he assumes his contention proved. He seems to regard revelation as a single simple fixed act, not as a continuing process; and he seems to overlook what has been called revelation in the Old Testament. One of the most difficult things he says in speaking of the Creator is that "He gave the Creed once for all in the beginning, yet blesses its growth still, and provides for its increase". But no less surprising is cautioning us to bear in mind that the "essence of all religion is authority and obedience". As we have said, the defining of the essence of religion is an exceedingly difficult task; but some of us believe we know certain things that it is not: and one of these is, obedience to an external authority.

Newman now comes to a definition of revelation; it "consists in the manifestation of the Invisible Divine Power, or in the substitution of the voice of a Lawgiver for the voice of conscience". The two halves of this statement are as different as darkness and light; for if the Invisible Divine Power through His revelation silences the voice of conscience, then God can not be what Jesus taught us to believe Him to be. To Newman, revelation must have external backing; it must be buttressed from the outside; never self-authenticating, it must be guaranteed by something
outside itself, by an external authority. We differ from him at this point; for us, there is no revelation apart from the men who receive it; it must come through the lives of men, or the human mind, or history, or nature, and it must occur in the plane of history. In the process of its being received it verifies itself. Here we are touching upon a point of tremendous importance, too large to be fully discussed in this place; but it will not do to dismiss lightly Newman's view of external, as it were impersonal, revelation; for it is near to the center of the determining forces of his whole attitude toward religion.

Contrasting natural and revealed religion, he writes, "What conscience is in the system of nature, such is the voice of Scripture, or of the Church, or of the Holy See, as we may determine it, in the system of Revelation." Such a distinction, we feel, is not well chosen; conscience does not exist in the system of nature as such, but is found only in man; and in man is combined both the natural and the supernatural. At the risk of a brevity that may lead to misunderstanding, we would venture to suggest that religion is at once natural and revealed and supernatural. The rigid contrast between religion as "natural" and religion as "revealed" is now in large measure obsolete, and has been rendered so chiefly by the idea of evolution and by the study of comparative religions. He continues, "A revelation is not given, if there be no authority to decide what it is that is given". But C. C. J. Webb points out, following Bishop Butler, that Reason is the only possible judge of revelation, and that the view which regards reason and revelation as independent sources of religious truth has been found unsatisfactory. Rawlinson puts it thus: "Whatever is of spiritual truth or value in any form of human religion whatsoever comes from God, and
is a product of Revelation". This definition makes the necessary distinction between religious revelation and mere discovery or secular knowledge, and expresses the point of view of this paper.

The need for an external authority, a sort of flying buttress for revelation, Newman saw in Peter's question to his Divine Master and Lord, "To whom shall we go?" Earlier he writes, "We feel a need, and she (the Church) alone of all things under heaven supplies it". It is easy and natural to ask Peter's question; most persons do feel the need; some ardently crave an authority on which to lean; and the matter is immensely simplified if they can accept an external authority. But to cite Peter's question can be designed to impress only those unfamiliar with the context in which it occurs. It proves nothing that the question was asked; but Newman's argument would have had a weight which it seriously lacks if he could have quoted the Master's reply.

In conclusion: the attempt to justify infallibility by the doctrine of the theory of development is futile and self-destructive; for the notion of the infallibility of the Church and the supposed infallible voice speaking her orders is itself a product of development, and so cannot be final. In a later chapter we shall have occasion to notice how weak the ground is under the notion of an infallible guide, and how late the idea of infallibility came into the Church. An essential point that Newman seems to overlook is that in a genuine development of ideas the new truth not only modifies the old but may also abrogate it and take its place. New interpretations of old experiences require that the old forms of expression be cast off; even when religiously preserved, they often become mere forms of words. Mellone has summarized a strong argument

(1) Rawlinson, "Authority and Freedom", p. 115.
against Newman's position thus: "The development of Christian doctrine cannot claim to be specially rational; there is nothing in its nature to prevent errors, fictions, or even degrading superstitions from becoming an integral part of it", (1). So the theory of the development of doctrine, even though its author regarded it as his best work, really seems to rest on a foundation of sand; it does give us the clearest statement so far of his view of authority in religion, -- but it is a view which we find distinctly unsatisfactory.

Chapter 9

WHY DID NEWMAN JOIN THE ROMAN COMMUNION?

In the midst of an inquiry that is chiefly theological, we must now turn to a question that is largely psychological in character,—the question, What were the factors working in Newman that led him out of the Church of England into the Roman Church? It is a question which few of his biographers have faced; but now, at the parting of the ways, at the point where he has worked himself to a position which renders longer separation from Rome impossible, we can not do otherwise than seek adequate reasons for his sacrifice of position, reputation, influence, and sacred affections in order to enter into a religious alliance that could be looked upon only with horror by the vast majority of his compatriots. This problem of his conversion is the central and dominant question in a large number that are all of surpassing interest. For him it was not merely a theoretic crisis in his religious life; it was a desperately practical and serious matter, and on it hinged not only his own salvation but also his whole notion of the scope and character of authority. The spiritual crisis is not his alone; it is one that we face too, and the struggles and questionings that vexed his soul are being re-enacted in the souls of other thousands to-day. The solutions that he found for his difficulties must be examined and appraised; if worthy, let us apply them to our own individual needs; if unworthy, they must be rejected and an earnest search made for a higher and better way.
There are two common ways of answering the question as to why Newman went into the Church of Rome. One is to say that he simply sold out to a system of superstition and fear; that he grew weary of thinking and decided to hand over his spiritual affairs to a company that has for centuries been specializing in handling just that sort of thing. Unable to bear the burden of freedom, he surrendered the light of reason and conscience and went into bondage to an external authority. Such is the reply usually made by Protestants and free-thinkers. But the Roman Catholic attributes the conversion to the visitation of Divine Grace; Newman was led to find the truth that he was seeking in the bosom of the true Church of Apostolical Catholicism. In each of these explanations there is a large element of truth, but they do not carry us all the way. His conversion was more than anything else a psychological matter; and the position of this paper, following the suggestion of Professor Sarolea and Dr John Hutton, is that Newman was converted because he had been born a Roman Catholic, because there was a pre-established harmony between his type of mind and heart and the Roman Catholic system. The student of the psychology of religion to-day sees in religion, not so much an intellectual and dogmatic problem, as a psychological phenomenon. This is not to find the explanation of religious phenomena in any such absurd origin as Freud attributes to it; nor is it to dispose of religion as mere wishful thinking; nor does it follow any of the other short cuts, that are either too easy, or explain too much. But it does recognize the fact that the spiritual conditions, needs, and desires which dogma, ethical judgments, and rites and symbols meet, do vary according to race, climate, and other factors of
the environment, and very largely according to the temperament of the
individual. There are temperaments which seem to be born to Buddhism,
or Mohammedanism, or Christianity; and among Christians, there are
religious natures which seem naturally to be Roman Catholic or Protestant,
or even Agnostic. It is worth remarking that as a rule Teutonic peoples
are not receptive to Catholicism, while Protestantism makes little
progress in Latin countries. It is useless to close our eyes to the
fact that in Asia Christianity has had a terrifically uphill fight to
win its comparatively few converts. In the United States of America,
the negro Christians are found almost entirely in the Baptist and
Methodist churches; very few of them become Episcopalians or Roman
Catholics. Harnack explains the Greek schism along the same psychological
lines, holding that the Greek Church is not Christianity permeated with
Hellenism but Hellenism permeated with Christianity. Indeed, Roman
Catholicism itself varies with the temperaments and tastes of its various
groups of adherents; in England it tends toward intellectualism, in Spain
and Portugal it is decidedly more materialistic.

We have already noticed certain of Newman's boyhood habits,—his
implicit belief and acceptance of early teaching, his belief in angels, his
superstitiousness, his practice of crossing himself before going into the
dark. His conversion came as the result of the gradual, inevitable
development of these characteristics; there was about it nothing of external
catastrophe or sudden crisis. In becoming a Catholic he did not need to
change his nature; his soul was, from the beginning, of a type in conformity
with Roman Catholicism. His own personality, so complex and contradictory,
could not rest in a religion which was less of a theological synthesis and
political system than Roman Catholicism is. This, then, we regard as one of the chiefest reasons why Newman left the Church of England; he was born a Roman Catholic.

In our study of his theological writings up to 1845, we have seen that he was steadily and surely moving toward Rome. An acquaintance with his Anglican sermons reveals the same tendency. A man may hold certain philosophical and theological views, as it were in a part of his mind, without allowing them to influence the whole of his conduct and thinking; his sermons are more likely to reveal the real inner condition,—especially in the case of one like Newman to whom to preach was to confess. And for the man who wrote the Anglican sermons there is only one course open, the course Newman took; he must, to use the strong words of John Hutton, "abandon his own inherent right as a man to think, shrink from the splendid perils of responsibility, and thus fall a victim to the fascination of a church which makes the prostration of reason the first condition of communion with her, and her unrelenting terms of peace". (1)

A second reason for his change of faith was his innate conservatism, his hatred of change. There are those who maintain that he was by nature a sceptic, and that only by a determined and continued effort did he keep from falling into infidelity; only by the deliberate exercise of the will to believe, was he able to maintain his status as a Christian believer. Indeed, Huxley wrote in the "Nineteenth Century" for June, 1889, that if he were called upon to compile a primer of infidelity he would make a selection from certain of Newman's own works. However this may be, Newman surely never wrote with the intention of undermining belief; and Huxley would perhaps have been nearer the truth if he had seen in Newman, not a tendency

to unbelief, but a rigorously honest apprehension of the difficulty of answering with definite finality the great questions that concern God, the soul, free will, and the external world.

What we do see more clearly than his scepticism is his opposition to change, his hatred of "liberalism". His life-long study was the consideration of ways in which the difficulties that beset Christian theology should be met; he began this study by reading Paine and David Hume, and the strange thing is that he seems never to have been led by these writers to entertain the slightest doubt as to the certainty of the Christian revelation. Acquainted with the various strong points of the sceptic's position, yet he never himself passed through a period of religious unsettlement and uncertainty,—for the reason that he was endowed with an inborn tendency to believe.

The whole Tractarian movement was a protest against the "Liberalism" that he saw threatening the establishment. His theology was rooted in the past, and his face and mind were turned to the early centuries. He could not conceive of religion apart from dogma; as he often said, for him religion was dogma. But he opposed change not alone in religion. One hundred years ago to-day was a stirring time, not only in religion but in politics as well. Reform was in the air. But with his instinctive hatred of progress, Newman opposed the Bill for the Emancipation of Catholics. He mistrusted science, which was then beginning to undermine widely-held opinions relating to the facts of nature and the origin of man. New Testament scholarship was revising men's opinions of the genesis and development of the canon and text of Scripture; but he opposed historical criticism as a pernicious German disease. Faith was to him, above all else, a surrender to authority. He hated the Reformers,
and declared that the spirit of lawlessness came in with the Reformation. And as the years went on, after his conversion, he saw nothing hopeful in the achievements of the Victorian age; he saw no occasion to praise God for the rise of hospitals and asylums, for the abolition of slavery, for prison reform, for efforts toward the betterment of social conditions among all classes of people, or for the spread of Christ's gospel in foreign lands. Rather, he saw in the intellectual and social movements of the time only a manifestation of man's sinful pride.

It is not surprising that Newman did not find himself at home in a church that was dominantly Protestant. For Protestantism faces the future. Basing itself on dogma, yet it does not, it cannot, make dogma the whole of religion. It recognizes man's responsibility to his fellow man as well as to God; and, among other ways, it seeks to make effective the Kingdom of God by a growing sensitiveness to social injustices. It believes in progress; it is dynamic rather than static. And Newman did not like it; his soul was attuned to a different rhythm.

A third cause contributing to his conversion is furnished by the first principles which he began to adopt early in his career as an Anglican clergyman,—premises which largely grew out of the two inborn tendencies that we have just examined. First principles are always shifty matters; they spring up out of the soil of one's environment and attach themselves to the mind in subtle and unconscious ways. They are for the most part accidental, like the shape of one's nose; and they are changed with little less difficulty. The large element of futility in nearly all religious controversy is traceable to the fact that supporters of opposite views often begin on first principles that are miles apart.

One of Newman's first principles was that dogma is the essence
of religion, a statement we have already noted several times. Another was that the true note of the Church was Apostolicity. This certainty became less certain after 1841, and he gradually replaced it by the note of Catholicity. But Catholicity embraced and developed the principle of Apostolicity, so that it was not really a change of principle. We have seen too that Newman regarded the Church as visible, and her priests in control of the channels through which alone sacramental grace could flow to the believer. On the more personal side, he organized his own life on a high level of asceticism.

But merely to accept these principles was not enough. They were built deep into the foundation of his character, they did motivate and inform the whole of his religious life. To a mind as keen and inquiring as his own, to accept an opinion meant to carry it to its conclusion; he must inquire whether these principles were best exemplified in the Anglican Church. As we have seen, the only period of Church history with which he was thoroughly acquainted was the Nicene era; his passionate devotion was to the Fathers of the fourth century. Comparing Anglicanism with Romanism, and considering each of the first principles on which his theology was built, he saw every advantage to lie with Rome. He left the Anglican Church not out of whim or caprice; it was for him a desperately serious business, and during his last years at Littlemore the one question he asked over and over again was, "What shall I do to be saved?" All his life a solitary man, this was the most solitary period of all; he was acting quite apart from any desire to serve as an example that others should follow; it was a matter just between himself and his Creator. No other course was open to him but to take his way into the Church that he had convinced himself was the true fold of Christ. In any survey of the reasons
why Newman left the Church of England, the result of following his first
principles to their logical conclusion must be accorded an
important place. And even after he was inside the Roman fold, and saw
and understood how it worked, and was repressed and snubbed and dis-
illusioned, it seems never to have occurred to him to revise the first
principles that led him to a conclusion so amazing as that which
drew him away from Anglicanism.

In his passage from Anglicanism to Roman Catholicism, there was
no essential change in his views of the nature of authority in religion.
His early reverence for external authority now only found a wider scope
and a more definite voice. In the painful little book to which we have
already referred, his brother, F. W. Newman, writes: "Later, I have
thought that zeal for authority, as in itself sacred, was the main
tendency perverting his common sense". While a school boy at Ealing,
John Henry had started a weekly newspaper called "The Spy", and founded
an order into which he initiated several boys, among them his brother
Charles. It was an order with degrees marked by ribbons of different
colors, with John Henry as Grand Master. Some thirty years later, after
the conversion to Rome, Charles wrote or said to Francis Newman, that it
was "just the thing to be expected from that Ealing affair, for John
evidently coveted to be a Grand Master of some Order; but authority for
such a post could be got only from Rome". Post facto judgments are easy
to make; even so, the incident has its value.

The average Anglo-Catholic to-day will explain Newman's conversion
as a move to rid himself of the burden of uncertainty and doubt that
attended his thinking on the question of authority in religion; a yearning
to be at rest, as a tired child comes at evening time to the arms of his
mother. We must insist that there is no slightest ground for suspecting his honesty, his exact obedience to what seemed to him to be the will of God. As someone has said, he lived under a light that would be intolerable to the majority of very good men; it was his habit to be quite alone with God; he lived altogether for God. But the question may fairly be asked, What was his conception of God? Without adducing extended proof at this point, it seems to us that his religion was founded not upon that faith in God to which Christ invites us, but rather on a certain suspicion of God, a fear of what he might do to us if he chose. His sermons, models of simplicity and high seriousness, yet sin against the whole truth. For while he knows the human heart to a "weird and shaking depth", there are regions in it that he either does not know or will not trust. He knows the soul in confusion and defeat; he does not know it when God has lifted it up and made it glad. His preaching does not uplift; he does not give to his hearers the benefit of the doubt; his words tend rather to humiliation, and that leads to despair. But this is only a reflection of the inner processes of his own life; and the preaching that made men insecure, confused, at a loss, came out of a heart and mind ready to go over in despair to an external visible authority. His power, one has said, finds its hold in a certain element of terror in the human soul; and while this may be to a degree natural enough, we maintain that it is not Christian. Christ puts an end to man's ancient fears, and fills the heart with hope and love; He reveals God in His true character, not as a heartless judge, nor yet as an indulgent grandmother, but as the Father of truth and love. It is this conception of God that Newman seemed not at all to know. In the Apologia he tells us how shifty are the grounds upon which his belief
in God rests apart from the authority of some abiding institution; and he gives us a sentence which is perhaps more startling than we are prepared for: "If I looked into a mirror and did not see my face, I would have the same sort of feeling that comes upon me when I look into this living world and see no reflection of its Creator". In the human heart, in the unfolding of the world's history, he sees no evidence of God, no steadfast ground for faith; for him, faith is not personal and incommunicable, but apprehended by sight, having material embodiment; hence his need of a visible Church as witness and support of his belief. He awakened in himself doubts and misgivings where the normal man would imagine everything secure. "One by one he put out the kindly lights, the little genialities and courtesies which even the uncouth world permits itself to show us". He would not permit himself to rest his own faith in anything within his own moral or emotional experience, in any feeling or mood or purpose. Then, when he was crying for something to believe, something to end the strife of doubt and misery, he heard the call of the Infallible Church, which would release him from the anxiety of thinking; and he was ready, not in faith but in despair, to cast himself into her arms.

It would be folly, and worse, to minimise the claims of the great Church to which Newman transferred his loyalties. It is a system which seems to us wrong, in which we could never find peace; yet a study of the kind on which we are engaged should teach us to look at the questions that confront us with other men's eyes as well as with our own, should remind us that we differ from other men quite as much as they differ from ourselves. We should see how hateful is the spirit of bigotry in any branch of the Church of Christ, and in contrast, how
beautiful is an open mind and a humble heart. So it cannot be denied that Rome exerts a marvelous attraction upon minds constituted as Newman's was; she is so sure of herself, alone in the world claiming infallibility; her political organisation developed to a degree of perfection equaled by no other institution in the whole world; her wealth and power amazing in their ramifications; her architecture, music, and liturgy so magnificent; the daily mass, drama and miracle, impressing the soul with a tremendous awe; her ideals of asceticism and celibacy, though so often travestied, yet in aim how noble! All of these things appealed to Newman; but it was the note of authority that drew him irresistibly.

Another reason working towards Newman's conversion was his disappointment over the rejection by the Anglican Church at large of his Via Media. How strong his feeling was against Rome in the eight years following the beginning of the Tractarian movement is made abundantly clear by several of his Tracts and by various of his other writings. In 1833 in the Lyra Apostolica he had called Rome a "lost Church". In his book on the Arians in the same year, he spoke of "the Papal Apostasy". In Tract 20, he wrote: "Their communion is infested with heresy; we are bound to flee it as a pestilence. They have established a lie in the place of God's truth, and, by their claim of immutability in doctrine, cannot undo the sin they have committed". In 1834 he wrote: "In the corrupt Papal system we have the very cruelty, and craft, and ambition of the republic....." In Tract 38 he uses of certain doctrines of the Church of Rome the epithets "unscriptural", "profane", "impious", "bold", "unwarranted", "blasphemous", "gross", "untruthful", "vulgar".
"monstrous", and "cruel". In his lectures on the "Prophetic Office of The Church", he set out in greater detail than elsewhere what he regarded as the difficulties standing in the way of communion with Rome.

So it was through the Via Media that he sought to oppose both modernism and Rome. But he was destined to disappointment. As early as 1837, he received his first shock as to the tenability of the Via Media: he was impressed by the similarity between the Monophysites of the fifth century, who denied the human nature in Christ and leaned on the Emperor, and the Anglicans of his own day who had so little of doctrinal strength and depended on the state for their sustaining power. Then in 1838 Bishop Bagot of Oxford offered what was in the nature of a slight censure of the Tracts. Newman was really at the head of a movement of which he was not the master. As he tells us in the Apologia, his wrist was always weak; and it soon became evident to him that the reins were broken in his hand. More and more it was borne in upon him that while Protestantism and Romanism were real religions, the Via Media existed only on paper.

Then came the storm over Tract 90. In this attack, he recognized "much of real religious feeling, much of honest and true principle, much of straightforward ignorant common-sense"; and he recognized too that his leadership at Oxford was gone forever. He was profoundly affected to see his efforts falling on barren ground; he had attributed to the clergy of his church functions as channels of Divine Grace much higher than any other party granted them, and now these very principles were disowned by the ecclesiastical leaders themselves. The Bishops' charges in general dealt severely with the Tracts; among other things, it was said "Already
are the foundations of apostasy laid; if we once admit another Gospel, Antichrist is at the door"; "-----the foundations of our Protestant Church are undermined by men who dwell within her walls, and those who sit in the Reformers' seat are traducing the Reformation"; "Our glory is in jeopardy"; "Why all this tenderness for the very center and core of corruption?"; "Tractarianism is the masterpiece of Satan"; etc.,(1). As Hutton remarks, this was just the evidence necessary to convince Newman that the Anglican Church rejected the teaching of the Tracts. Extremely sensitive and always proud, he was hurt at the loss of his position of leadership and the rejection of the principle that was so dear to him. If the Via Media had met with approval, if he could have introduced into Anglicanism his ideas of Catholic doctrine while at the same time leaving out the Roman system, undoubtedly he would have remained in the Church of England. It was only after the repudiation of his leadership that he turned wistful eyes toward Rome; and even then, five long and weary years passed before the final step was taken.

This brings us to a sixth reason for his conversion,—his pride and sensitiveness. Quite free from selfishness and petty vanity, Newman was intensely proud; and this led in two ways toward Rome. He felt the superior claims of the Roman Church, and he could not bear to be on the wrong side; he felt that Rome looked upon Anglicanism with something of contempt, and such an attitude by so powerful a Church was too much for him. Always the aristocrat, he could not be comfortable on the side of the less powerful or less honored. Further, an excessive self-conscious­ness was one of his weak points; he was, as we have said, decidedly introvert, and his religion was too introspective to allow him to lose the thought of himself in work for his fellow men or for a great cause.

(1) "Lectures on Anglican Difficulties", p. 92-3.
It was the question of his own salvation that so confused and agitated him. At Littlemore his motto was, "Je mourrai seul". From the time of resigning his living in 1843, he was himself unsettled and he had no hope of settling others. "My own soul" he says, "was my first concern, and it seemed an absurdity to my reason to be converted in partnership".

So he waited, as quietly and patiently as he could, for a "sign", for something in the nature of a supernatural coincidence. This was in line with the precedents set in the New Testament, and also it was needful for his type of temperament; something external working on him was needed to convert his intellectual convictions into full certitude. So his delay of the two years between 1843 and 1845 is in part explained by his inability to say "I know"; his "strong view" in favor of Rome remained where it was; he could say only "I think". The Apologia helps us but little here, for what he says on this point in the first edition is almost sure to be altered in the second. He was slow, hesitant, cautious, because he felt people should not make so important a decision under "exciting, tumultuous conviction". He had a terrible fear of a "judicial delusion". Keble pointed out in a letter to him the temptation of wishing to be at rest, a temptation that Newman recognized all too well; but now that Keble mentioned it, it caused Newman even deeper distrust of his own feelings. The risk to his soul of moving, and the still greater risk of remaining where he was, became his all-absorbing thought. His correspondence with Keble and with his sister show clearly how concerned he was over what his friends would think and say. The months passed, and he still waited for a sign. "Conviction" he had, but he could not act upon it, could not "make up his mind". But finally he "assented to the proposition made" to him; and one of the most sensitive
souls that ever lost its way in the labyrinth of doubt at last found its haven of refuge.

It seems relevant here to speak briefly of Newman's life in the Roman Church, in respect of the peace, happiness, and satisfaction he found there. Our position in this paper is that Newman's theology in general, and particularly his views on authority, underwent no deeply grounded change incident to his conversion from Anglicanism to Romanism. Concerning his general feeling after the change, he writes in the Apologia: "I have had no variations to record, and have had no anxiety of heart whatever. I have been in perfect peace and contentment; I have never had one doubt. I was not conscious to myself, on my conversion, of any change, intellectual or moral, wrought in my mind...... it was like coming into port after a rough sea; and my happiness on that score remains to this day". This is frank, open, and honest; and since it is written of his religious opinions only, it is undeniably true and supports our thesis. But that Dr Newman found lasting peace and contentment in the Roman Church is seriously to be doubted. Ward's two large volumes convince the reader that Newman's experience of Roman Catholicism from the inside was a continuing disillusionment. Ever ready to submit to the authority of the Church, yet he had no delusions as to the motives that inspired that authority in practice, and the character of the men who pulled the wires to which it responded. As Dean Rashdall observes, "..... he thought it his duty weekly to submit, and to give up serious writing or teaching, lest a word should escape his lips which, reported to an ignorant and quite unspiritual Italian prelate at the other end of Europe by a malicious informer in a garbled extract badly translated,
should bring down upon him the dreaded 'censure'!" (1). He suffered intensely from the treatment he received at the hands of Rome; for he could not make himself entirely at home there, he could not give up altogether his habits of thinking and criticising, he could not stoop to the petty intrigues that were necessary to gain favor and power.

Moreover, he was regarded with suspicion and mistrust; and as we learn from Ward and from Newman's own journal, he suffered personal effacement and personal chagrin. And to be snubbed and ill-treated was especially hard to bear by a nature that was excessively sensitive and craved sympathy and appreciation.

(1) Hastings Rashdall, "Ideas and Ideals", p. 127.
Any inquiry into Newman’s doctrine of authority in religion must take account of what he considered the proper functions of the reason in determining what should be believed, and also the meaning he gives to the concept of faith and the use to which he puts faith in the religious life. These separate but cognate inquiries will lead to a consideration of his views on miracle.

We are dealing with Newman primarily as a theologian; the contributions of his long and fruitful life were almost wholly in the field of theology. It would probably be agreed by most who are in a position to form an opinion that theology and philosophy are not far apart as disciplines of the mind, and that a good theologian will also be something of a philosopher. But Newman was not a philosopher; his mind was of a type that tended to speculate and theorise; but that he did not regard himself as a philosopher seems indicated in the Apologia when he makes a distinction between the philosopher and the theologian. He writes, "There are of course intellectual habits which theology does not tend to form, as for instance the experimental, and again the philosophical". It may be suggested that he is here making a rather too sweeping distinction, and accepting a premise which is not adequately
founded. It may be maintained that the theologian should form the philosophical habit of mind. Ritschl and many of his followers endeavored to bar the door against the intrusion of philosophy into the domain of theology, and to base doctrine wholly upon historical revelation. But the attempt has not been wholly successful, because it involves a false isolation of religion from the wider world of knowledge. It is in the interest of theology itself that we should try to show that religious doctrine can be harmoniously related to human experience and knowledge in its wholeness. But let us see what Newman does on the basis of the assumption he has made.

The Apologia affords valuable evidence in point, not so much in its bearing upon his conversion as upon the character of his thinking and his manner of arriving at conclusions. Of himself in 1845 he writes that in response to Bowden's question he "could not respond. My reason was, 'I have no certainty on the matter myself'. To say 'I think' is to tease and distress, not to persuade". Again he writes, "Certitude of course is a point, but doubt is a progress; I was not near certitude yet. Certitude is a reflex action; it is to know that one knows". But it may be suggested that an honest man who says "I know" is certain, and even if wrong is still certain, i.e., wrongly certain. It seems a strange play upon words by one who was so careful a thinker and writer to hinge so much upon the distinction between saying "I know" and "I know that I know". Instead of pointing out the danger of jumping at conclusions and saying "I know" when one really means "I think" or "I believe" or "I guess", Newman offers as the rather mischievous test of certainty the ability to say "I know that I know". If one knows, then he has reached what for him is certainty; it is no use to carry the process on
indefinitely by declaring that he knows that he knows that he knows.....

Certitude in religious inquiry, he tells us, is obtained by our own action; we are to begin by believing, and conviction will follow. Then "God cooperates with us in our acting and thereby bestows on us a certitude which rises higher than the logical force of our conclusions". Indeed, it is God who wills us so to act, and in this way: that "in religious inquiry we should arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities". Newman can scarcely mean that we arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities and also that God bestows certitude upon us. But we should not press the point, for he was writing under stress, about an experience that had taken place twenty years before, and which could never in any case be described accurately and fully.

But there is another direction in which Newman offers real light on the method of his own reasoning processes. It is patently obvious that there are many different aspects under which phenomena may be observed. Ten men, spaced a mile apart, may take ten photographs of Vesuvius; the photographs will all be different, but all will be aspects of Vesuvius. It is well known too that even in higher mathematics methods and solutions tend to become personal, and intuition frequently takes the place of careful reasoning. Newman makes much of the point that the value of reasons depends largely on the individual; and this principium individuationis he calls the illative sense. He pointed out the importance which he saw in the intervention of personality in the logical processes; for the illative sense decides according to the experience of each individual thinker, and that experience varies not only with every class of men but also with the individual, as the
arguments which once appeared decisive cease to be convincing. So it is by its nature that the illative sense must decide on probabilities; but the certainties which it supplies, while subjective, are no less certain than convictions founded, e.g., on mathematical demonstration. The certainty based on probability is different, but it is not less; it may be the stronger because intimate and personal. In the Apologia he tells us, "Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt, as I understand the subject", (1).

Regarding the articles of the Roman faith which are not in the Anglican Creed, Newman says, "I made a profession of them upon my reception with the greatest ease, and I have the same ease in believing them now". For example, he did not believe the doctrine of Transubstantiation until he became a Roman Catholic; but he had no difficulty in believing it "as soon as I believed that the Catholic Roman Church was the oracle of God, and that she had declared this doctrine to be part of the original revelation". Again it is a matter basically of first principles: believe that the Roman Church is the oracle of God, and quite naturally all else becomes easy. He says that the doctrine is difficult, nay impossible, to imagine, but not difficult to believe; here is made clear his willingness to accept the ipse dixit of an external authority in matters of belief. And the only logical ground he offers for believing this is that he isn't sure it can't be so: "Why should not it be? What's to hinder it? What do I know about substance or matter? just as much as the greatest philosophers, and that is nothing at all". What Newman needed to know was not more about substance and matter, but more about the spirit of Jesus and His abhorrence of magical carnal external rites.

(1) Apologia, p.332.
Passing to the doctrine of the Trinity, he says that while his abstract notion of three is incompatible with his idea of one, yet he has no means of proving that there is not a sense in which one and three can be predicated of the incommunicable God. It is not a question of having reasons for his belief; rather, he freely believes what the Church tells him to and feels secure when he can see no reason why it can not be so. Any mind except one thus predisposed by nature to the habit of believing, would seek sounder reasons on which to base its religious faith. Augustine believed in the Trinity not because the church told him he must, but because it seemed reasonable to him on the analogy of the lover, the thing loved, and love. Others have been helped to see the reasonableness of the doctrine by the somewhat cruder analogies of one man being in the three relationships of son, father, and brother; or a rose, exemplifying life, its essential rosiness, and fragrance. Newman’s mind needed no such aids; it was enough to believe what the authority of the Church told him he must believe.

The danger that he saw attending the functioning of man’s reason can be shown in a few quotations. "I know that even the unaided reason, when correctly exercised, leads to a belief in God, in the immortality of the soul, and in a future retribution; but I am considering it actually and historically; and in this point of view I do not think I am wrong in saying that its tendency is towards a simple unbelief in matters of religion". Pointing out that outside the Catholic Church things are tending to atheism, he says, "lovers of their country and of their race, religious men, external to the Catholic Church, have attempted various expedients to arrest fierce wilful human nature on its onward
course, and to bring it into subjection". What a dark picture of the world Newman carried in his mind is shown to us in the following long quotation: "To consider the world in its length and breadth, its various history, the many races of men, their starts, their fortunes, their mutual alienations, their conflicts; and then their ways, habits, governments, forms of worship; their enterprises, their aimless courses, their random achievements and acquirements, the impotent conclusion of long standing facts, the tokens so faint and broken of a superintending design, the blind evolution of what turns out to be great powers or truths, the progress of things, as if from unreasoning elements, not toward final causes, the greatness and littleness of man, his far-reaching aims, his short duration, the curtain hung over his futurity, the disappointments of life, the defeat of good, the success of evil, physical pain, mental anguish, the prevalence and intensity of sin, the pervading idolatries, the corruptions, the dreary hopeless irreligion, that condition of the whole race, so fearfully yet exactly described in the Apostle's words, 'having no hope and without God in the world',--all this is a vision to dizzy and appal; and inflicts upon the mind the sense of a profound mystery, which is absolutely beyond human solution. What shall be said to this heart-piercing, reason-bewildering fact? I can only answer, that either there is no Creator, or this living society of men is in a true sense discarded from his presence". This is superb writing; but the impression it creates is false, because only partly true. It is not to be wondered at, that, seeing only the dark depressing hopeless side of the human scene, Newman was driven as if in desperation to a Church that claimed infallibility and possessed the power to curb "fierce wilful
human nature on its onward course". We believe the paragraph quoted above betrays a very meagre faith in God's omnipotence and sovereignty; it is neither shallow optimism to say that if the world is in the condition pictured, then it is so only because God wills it. We vigorously dissent, however, from the view Newman has presented; it is a picture of things as they might have been if God had not revealed Himself in His Son, but it is a condition of affairs which Jesus Christ forever destroyed. Yet it is on the view that things are as he paints them that Newman posits his belief that God "should think fit to introduce a power into the world, invested with the prerogative of infallibility in religious matters". Thus he is led to speak of the Church's infallibility as a provision "adapted by the mercy of the Creator, to preserve religion in the world, and to restrain that freedom of thought" which he rather grudgingly admits is a great gift. The Bible, he says, "cannot make a stand against the wild living intellect of man". But the infallible Church is a power happily adapted "for smiting hard and throwing back the immense energy of aggressive, capricious, untrustworthy intellect."

Again he says, "Few minds in earnest can remain at ease without some sort of rational grounds for their religious belief; to reconcile theory and fact is almost an instinct of mind" (What Newman means by 'fact' we shall see presently). Yet he adduces no valid reasons for accepting the beliefs that Rome requires her adherents to hold; if he has "rational grounds" he keeps them to himself. As an example, he devotes a paragraph of some thirty lines to the acceptance of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception; he repeats seven times over in that one
paragraph the fact that he and other Catholics "have no difficulty in receiving it", but he offers no reason as to why he does receive it except that it harmonizes with the circle of dogmatic truths into which it had been received.

For Newman, the bridge between reason and faith is the illative sense that we have already noticed. Faith is not produced by processes of reasoning; it is rather a state of soul, a "disposition to give our assent to religious truth on credit". If logic could lead to faith, then faith would be the monopoly of the most intellectual among men; but it is a fact of experience that the most robust faith is found among the common people. Pascal's aphorism is applicable, "Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait pas"; and Pascal's God is the "Dieu des simples et des ignorants, non des philosophes et des savants". Indeed, Newman accepted this truth when he adopted as his motto the words of Saint Ambrose, "Non in dialectica placuit Deo salvum facere mundum".

He regards faith as independent of ratiocination; in a letter written at the time of his conversion, we read "May I have only one tenth part as much faith as I have intellectual conviction where the truth lies!...... Perhaps faith and reason are incompatible in one person, or nearly so". But this does not imply faith and ratiocination to carry on a war within the mind; the conclusions of our intellectual experience must not be contradicted by the facts of our religious experience. We have no business with a religion that is irrational, nor with a religion that is merely rational; for when reason has done all it can do, there are left vast areas of reality that have not been touched at all. Here comes in faith; and with it, a sense of adventure, imagination, beauty, and love.
For Lutheranism, faith is the beginning and end of all religion; it is quite independent of works and observances, it is the gift of grace. For Newman, faith is partly the result of our own efforts and struggles; it is a gift of grace, but in order to deserve it we must co-operate with the Divine Will by prayer, fasting, good works, and the other external acts of religion. Faith, while independent of ratiocination, is not antagonistic to it; for ratiocination, properly exercised, fixes its own limits, and so leaves to the religious life its own proper field. Further, he holds, it is by the use of the reason that we are given the probabilities upon which our faith is based, probabilities which faith converts into certainties; so it is the reason which keeps faith from degenerating into blind superstition.

Different men use the same words, such as reason, faith, conscience; but they give to these words widely varying meanings. One of the prime difficulties in any discussion is, as we have constantly been insisting, the agreement on first principles; and if, when starting from different premises, we arrive at the same practical conclusions, it only proves that logic has little to do with the process. Newman's faith, we have seen, purports to base itself upon reason; and what he calls the illative sense is the bridge across the chasm that is supposed to exist between faith and reason. But it is readily seen that to Newman faith meant something rather different from what it means to the modern theologian. Faith has been well defined in these words: "like every form of knowledge, faith is a response to a reality which evokes, invites, and rewards acquaintance. The revealed fact is not man-made or poetically contrived; it is given or presented or found to be inescapably there...... and the task of faith is to discern and receive and proclaim the
redemptive meaning which these facts contain for the sinful,(1).

That Newman allowed faith to go beyond this and to lower itself to what was perilously near to superstition, is revealed by his attitude to miracles, to which we shall turn at a later point. But the big and shocking failing in his view on faith is its lack of harmony with the faith of the New Testament. The faith that glows and soars in the words of Jesus, in Paul's letters, in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews, seems to have had no influence whatever in shaping his views. One is not merely surprised; one finds it impossible to understand how a clergyman, a fellow of Oriel, a theologian with Newman's qualifications, could so completely ignore the witness of the New Testament as he succeeds in doing in connection with what he has to say on faith.

As commentaries on the uses to which he put faith, let us look briefly at, first, his acceptance of the Church's view that faith and works are separable; and secondly, his attitude toward what we may call ecclesiastical miracles.

In Lecture VIII of "Anglican Difficulties", 1850, we read that "the Roman Church regards it better for sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions on it to die of starvation in extremest agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say should be lost, but should commit one single venial sin, should tell one wilful untruth, or should steal one poor farthing without excuse". In the same lecture: "Take a mere beggar woman, lazy, ragged, and filthy, and not over-scrupulous of truth -- (I do not say she has arrived at perfection) -- but if she is chaste, sober, and cheerful, and goes to her religious duties (and I am not

supposing at all an impossible case), he will, in the eyes of the Church, have a prospect of heaven quite closed and refused to the State's pattern-man, the just, the upright, the generous, the honorable, the conscientious, if he be all this, not from a supernatural power (I do not determine whether this is likely to be the fact, but I am contrasting views and principles)—not from a supernatural power, but from mere natural virtue. Whatever Newman is trying to get at in these passages is not altogether clear, but we quote them to indicate that he is aiming to exalt the magical powers and absolute authority of his Church; and one is sympathetic with poor blunt Kingsley when he says that in so doing he "has committed himself unconsciously to a statement which strikes at the root of all morality".

Let us look at one more sample of the argument characteristic of this period, found in Lecture IX, the title of which is "The Religious Character of Catholic Countries no Prejudice to The Sanctity of The Church". By religious character, he details the tendency to profanity, blasphemy, imposture, stealing, and lying; but these types of behavior he argues do not prejudice the sanctity of the Church, because the Church considers that "faith and works are separable", and those who commit these wrong acts yet have faith "caused directly by a supernatural influence from above". He further illustrates the separableness of faith and works thus: a man "may be gifted with a simple, undoubting, cloudless, belief that Christ is in the Blessed Sacrament, and yet commit the sacrilege of breaking open the tabernacle, and carrying off the consecrated particles for the sake of the precious vessel containing them". It is scarcely necessary to add comment to these quotations. Newman is going on premises that do seem to strike at the root of morality and ethics; and when a man
gets to the point where he can believe the sort of thing that has just been quoted, then he will have little difficulty in believing pretty nearly anything presented to him.

In the projected series of "Lives of The Saints", the first few of which Newman edited, one fairly amazing work is "The Life of Saint Walburga". The preface is signed with Newman's initials. Kingsley objected strongly to this work; Newman replied in the Apologia that the stories were treated as myths and legends, but he goes on to say that he has no intention of implying that miracles did not illustrate the life of Saint Walburga. The author had pointed out in the "Life" that Saint Walburga had become one of the Saints called Elaeophori, or Olive Trees in The Courts of God; "these are they from whose bones a holy oil distils. That oil of charity and gentle mercy which graced them while alive, and fed in them the flame of universal love at their death, still permeates their bodily remains"; then he describes how the oil fell, in drops, sometimes the size of a hazel-nut, sometimes of a pea, into the silver bowl beneath the stone slab. In his preface Newman asks the question whether such miracles are to be accepted as matters of fact, and answers by saying that "in this day, and under our present circumstances, we can only reply, that there is no reason why they should not be. They are the kind of facts proper to ecclesiastical history, just as instances of sagacity or daring, personal prowess, or crime, are the facts proper to secular history". Then, in the Apologia, on page 407, speaking of the "verisimilitude, the miraculousness, and the fact of this medicinal oil", he writes: "there is nothing extravagant in this report of the relics having a supernatural virtue...... For instance, a man was restored to
life by touching the relics of the Prophet Eliseus...... And again in
the case of a pool: 'An Angel went down at a certain season into the
pool, and troubled the water; whosoever then first, after the troubling
of the water, stepped in, was made whole of whatsoever diseases he had' ....
As to Saint Walburga, I made one exception, the fact of the medicinal oil,
since for that miracle there was distinct and successive testimony. And
then I went on to give a chain of witnesses........ I can tell him more
about it now; the oil still flows; I have had some of it in my possession;
it is medicinal still ......". In his "Lectures on The Present Position of
Catholics in England", 1851, Newman writes that he "firmly believes that
portions of the true cross are at Rome and elsewhere, that the crib of
Bethlehem is at Rome", etc.; and that he thinks it "impossible to
withstand the evidence which is brought for the liquefaction of the
blood of Saint Januarius, at Naples, and for the motion of the eyes of
the pictures of the Madonna in the Roman States".

A word may be added about his Maryolatry. Dean Rashdall says
that the devotion to the Virgin in which Newman indulged was of a kind
condemned by sober Catholics of perfect orthodoxy. During the Achilli
trial, he wrote to a nun, "I went on saying to the last moment, 'I will
not believe it, till I see it, that Our Lady and Saint Philip will suffer
it' ...... Mary is taking the best way, depend upon it, for our victory".
A few days later he wrote to Sister Imelda, "I am not certain that I
shall not be obliged even yet to confess that your Madonna has got
me off", (1). Rashdall remarks, "A man who had only God to trust to
would be in a poor way, one would conclude. And Mary, it appears,

interferes with the administration of justice only when she has been flattered",(1).

These instances are given, not for their curious interest, but as prefatory to the question, How far should a man who makes such uses of reason, faith, and belief, be followed in the matter of arriving at an adequate, reasonable, and compelling authority in religion?

(1) Rashdall, "Ideas and Ideals", p. 123.
Chapter 11

NEWMAN AND INFALLIBILITY

We have said that in temperament and type of mind Newman was born a Roman Catholic; and it has appeared in the preceding chapters that when he set his steps Homeward by accepting the premises which Rome requires her adherents to hold, and when he followed these premises to their logical and irresistible conclusion, then he had left Anglicanism entirely behind and was a thorough Roman Catholic. Such was not wholly the case. Newman never ceased to be an Englishman. And the shabby and humiliating treatment meted out to him as a Roman Catholic has a basis, we believe, in his attitude on the question of infallibility. For at this point, Newman was never a good Romanist. It is almost traditional amongst writers on Newman to set down Rome's distrust and ill treatment as due to the jealousy and conniving power of Manning. Undoubtedly that was a factor, and a large one; but it doesn't furnish an adequate explanation. There was beside this the deep-seated suspicion with which Newman was always regarded, the feeling that he had never become a thoroughly dyed-in-the-wool convert to Rome;
and the plans which as a Catholic he formed and into which he threw all his energies were allowed to fizzle out and come to nought both through lack of support and through genuine though cleverly concealed opposition, mainly because Rome did not trust him. She made large use of his name; she was proud of her conquest of so brilliant an intellect, so powerful a writer, so influential an Oxford leader. But she felt, as he himself must have felt, that he was never fully at home in her communion.

His experience was not unlike that of the Marquess of Bute, who received at the hands of the Roman Church a quite similar type of discouragement and opposition. The Marquess of Bute case is one to which library reference can not be made; the facts concerning it have not been committed to the ineradicable record of cold type. But there are many now living in Scotland who remember that the Marquess of Bute was a celebrated convert to Roman Catholicism, and that about a generation ago he set on foot plans to establish a college at Saint Andrews for the training of Roman Catholics. It was his contention that Roman Catholic priests should receive their college and theological training while maintaining contact with the kind of people amongst whom their ministry would be spent. He was against the segregation of Roman clerics during their academic careers, and devised a scheme which seemed to him would promote greater all-around effectiveness in the work of the Catholic clergy in Scotland. In theory, at least, much may be said in favor of his plan; but it was gently discouraged, and finally came to nothing. At first the attitude of the Roman hierarchical authorities was one of friendly interest; but the Marquess began to find more and more obstacles in his path, and it finally developed that Rome was herself offering the
opposition, in shrewdly-concealed guise. She may have simply mistrusted the Marquess. Or it may be one of her principles to keep her own colleges separated from possible pollution from contact with college people not of her own faith. This latter seems to have been the case when, on the offer of the Protestant authorities, she refused to share the privileges of Trinity College, Dublin, and set up Maynooth College by and for herself.

We have said that Newman never could forget he was an Englishman. He could not entirely leave off thinking; he could not utterly abase his reason before an external authority; he could not deny wholly the rights of a free man, which were in his heritage. And this inability to prostrate himself before an infallible Pope and an indestructible Church was reflected in his utterances in one way or another, most notably in what he wrote on the question of infallibility. The subject of infallibility is one which can not possibly be treated fully in a paper of this length; but we must, by way of introduction, canvass hurriedly its scope and aims. We can do no better than quote from Dean Curtis: "At the heart of such universal questions as What shall I believe? Whom shall I trust? Whom shall I obey? Where shall I find certitude? What is the foundation of faith? What is truth? there lies a principle of faith in the existence of a source and channel of infallible knowledge...... Usually, it may be said, it is a practical or working infallibility that men agree to recognize; but just in proportion as that infallibility is challenged and placed in need of vindication it is apt to be invested in a robe of mystery, and advanced to a dignity which it is fondly hoped will make it absolute and above
question. The word 'infallible' is late Latin in origin; but the idea, both religious and political, which it conveys is as ancient as authority in Church and State. As a negative virtue or perfection it is practically equivalent to 'inerrancy' or 'indefectibility', the root notions of 'stumbling', 'straying', and 'failing' representing obvious and kindred defects in a guide to truth. As a positive virtue or perfection it has for its counterpart 'reliability', 'trustworthiness', or 'trueness'......" It is further developed that infallibility is a universal idea; it exists in degrees and qualified forms; its wide range extends to external nature, human nature, human society, reason, conscience, the state and political systems, and religion. "Each of the Churches and every type of Christian has a seat of authority, simple or complex, accessible or remote, to which it habitually refers its doctrinal and practical difficulties...... Broadly speaking, infallibility has been sought by Christian faith in a direction either external or internal to the individual",(1). Among the applications of the principle in the field of religion, we meet with the ideas of infallibility of the Holy Scripture; of creeds and confessions; of the universal Church, with its particular representatives such as the Episcopate or General Councils; of the consent of Christendom; of the Pope; of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit; and of the Christian conscience.

It is assumed that the doctrine of infallibility held and taught to-day by the Roman Catholic Church is sufficiently well known to require no explication here. In setting out Newman's relation to the doctrine, we shall be concerned with the position of his mind only after the Apologia, i.e. from 1864 onward; we shall seek his attitude to the general

(1) Curtis, article "Infallibility", in Hasting Enc. Relig. and Ethics.
concept of infallibility in religion, and to the formulation and pro-
mulgation of the doctrine by the General Council of 1870. Ward tells
us that Newman "was credited — by those who did not appreciate his
true motive — with a want of hearty loyalty, with a deficiency in the
believing spirit. He was opposing zealous champions of the Pope, and
(so such hostile critics urged) was thereby showing his own want of
zeal. He was supposed to be making common cause with writers like
Sir John Acton, who might fairly be urged to be wanting in devotion
to the Holy See, and deficient in respect for the great theologians
of the Church. For him in these circumstances to criticise directly
the imprudent champions of the Papacy was a delicate and invidious task...
Newman therefore seized the occasion which Kingsley had supplied to
him for giving a sketch of the rationale, nature, and limitations of
the Church's infallibility and an analysis of the normal action of her
authority"(1). It was on the point of the limitations of the Church's
infallibility that he differed from the more thorough-going Roman
apologists, and which gained for him suspicion and mistrust, and caused
the long delay in his proper recognition by Rome. W.G.Ward and Veuillot
appealed to the Infallible Authority of Church and Pope for guidance
in theological matters to the almost complete exclusion of the exercise
of the intellect; they overlooked the contribution of individual thinkers;
Ward especially took the stand that Papal instructions and encyclicals
should be given the lead, and should be followed with unquestioning
obedience by the individual Roman. Newman, on the other hand, appealed
to history and to the actual development of the doctrine in the Church,

first analysing and defining the scope of Infallibility as possessed by the Church in matters of faith and morals.

The Church's infallibility he regards as "a provision, adapted by the mercy of the Creator to preserve religion in the world, and to restrain that freedom of thought, which of course in itself is one of the greatest of our natural gifts, and to rescue it from its own suicidal excesses"(1). We have seen earlier that one of his premises was that the world is in an almost hopelessly depraved condition, so bad that the Creator thought fit to interpose and set up on earth an institution for teaching men in matters of religion and leading them to salvation; our view of the sovereignty of God and the progressive realization of his kingdom prevents our accepting this premise; but it was real to Newman, and from it he went on to the reasonableness of expecting that the revelation which God vouchsafed would be embodied in an infallible institution, an institution that must be infallible, -- in short, in the historic Roman Catholic Church. But the acceptance of the authority of this infallible Church he holds to be not necessarily incompatible with the manly exercise of the individual Catholic's reason; he appeals to the facts of history to prove that private judgment has not been destroyed but has played an important part among Catholic theologians, and that infallibility does not supersede reason but is designed only to curb its excesses. Even heterodox thinkers, such as Origen and Tertullian, have played important parts in the making of Roman theology. Rome's primary function is here negative rather than positive; it is not to initiate in matters of

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(1) Apologia, p. 337.
religious thought, but to guard the original deposit and check
incautious development. "Every exercise of infallibility is brought
out into act by an intense and varied operation of the Reason, from
within and without, and provokes again a re-action of Reason against
it; and, as a civil polity the State exists and endures by means of
the rivalry and collision, the encroachments and defeats of its
constituent parts, so in like manner Catholic Christendom is no
simple exhibition of religious absolutism, but presents a continuous
picture of authority and private judgment alternately advancing and
retarding as the ebb and flow of the tide;-- it is a vast assemblage
of human beings with wilful intellects and wild passions, brought
together into one by the beauty and majesty of a Superhuman Power --
into what may be called a large reformatory or training-school, not
as if into a hospital or into a prison, not in order to be sent to
bed, not to be buried alive, but (if I may change my metaphor)
brought together as if into some moral factory, for the melting, re-
fining, and moulding, by an incessant noisy process, of the raw material
of human nature, so excellent, so dangerous, so capable of divine
purposes",(1). "The Catholic Church claims, not only to judge infall-
ibly on religious questions, but to animadvert on opinions in secular
matters which bear upon religion, on matters of philosophy, of science,
of literature, of history, and it demands our submission to her claims",(2).
"It is to the Pope in Ecumenical Council that we look, as to the normal
seat of infallibility",(3). "The simple question is whether authority
has so acted upon the reason of individuals, that they can have no

(1) Apologia, p. 344.
(2) Ibid., p. 348-9.
(3) Ibid., p. 347.
opinion of their own, and have but an alternative of abased super-
station or secret rebellion of heart; and I think the whole history
of theology puts an absolute negative upon such an assumption"(1).
Here one may reasonably ask whether Newman was fairly and properly
interpreting the facts of history. We know that he was not a good
historian, and was able cleverly and subtly to use history to prove
the point at hand; but we are seeking only to elucidate his own
position, without inquiring into the actual historical record of the
Roman Catholic Church on the matter now under our eyes.

He continues his argument by declaring that "it is individ-
uals and not the Holy See, who have taken the initiative, and given
the lead to the Catholic mind in theological inquiry. Indeed, it is
one of the reproaches urged against the Church of Rome, that it has
originated nothing, and has only served as a sort of remora or break
in the development of doctrine...... Authority in its most imposing
exhibition, grave bishops, laden with the traditions and rivalries of
particular nations or places, have been guided in their decisions by
the commanding genius of individuals, sometimes young and of inferior
rank. Not that uninspired intellect over ruled the superhuman gift
which was committed to the Council, which would be a self-contradictory
assertion, but that in that process of inquiry and deliberation, which
ended in an infallible enunciation, individual reason was paramount"(2).
Small wonder that when her most illustrious convert wrote in this tone
nineteen years after his conversion, Rome looked at him with chary eyes.

During the Middle Ages, in the palmy days of the theological

(1) Apologia, p. 355.
(2) Ibid., p. 356.
schools, the strongest examples are found of the free discussion and
the active exercise of the individual intellect in the forming of
Roman Catholic theology, he says. Any interference on the part of
authority such as would stifle the exercise of real thought he holds
to be abnormal and temporary. On the whole Rome has been slow to
interfere, and interference has been so limited that the matter has
usually been threshed out by discussion, and authority has merely
added its sanction to decisions already reached by reason. In an
impressive passage which, among other things, teaches the lesson of
patience in a time of trial, Newman points out that in the long run
the interferences of Rome have mainly been wise, and the opponents of
the infallible Church mainly wrong.

Before going on to discuss Newman's relations with Rome in
regard to the formal enunciation of the doctrine of Infallibility, it
seems not out of place to insert here an entry made in his journal on
October 30, 1867, which throws light on his feelings toward Rome at that
time: "A.B. and others have been too much for me. They have too deeply
impressed the minds of authorities at Rome against me to let the truth
about me have fair play while I live; and when one ceases to hope one
ceases to fear. They have done their worst -- and, as Almighty God in
1864 cleared up my conduct in the sight of Protestants at the end of
twenty years, so as regards my Catholic course, at length, after I am
gone hence, 'Deus viderit!'..... Confidence in any superiors whatever
never can blossom again within me. I shall never feel easy with them.
I shall, I feel, always think they will be taking some advantage of me,--
that at length their way will lie across mine, and that my efforts will
be displeasing to them. I shall ever be suspicious that they or theirs have secret unkind thoughts of me, and that they deal with me with some arrière pensée". Sad words are these to come from so sincere and holy a man, who felt that the Church of his adoption had dismissed him to a "dishonored ease". It was in this mood that he took up his opposition to the formulation of the doctrine of infallibility,—not to a doctrine, but to the doctrine which was proposed. The story of the calling of the General Council, its work at Rome, and Newman's attitude before, during, and after, is a long and interesting one; we can notice only those few of its features that bear directly on Newman's own views on infallibility.

Pope Pius IX was a bitter enemy of liberalism, and a champion of so-called reform. The determined group of neo-Ultramontanes, led by M. Louis Veuillot, the editor of the "Univers", were united on a policy of extreme centralization, and they urged that the Infallibility of the Pontiff should be made an article of faith. Veuillot wrote in a pamphlet, "We all know certainly only one thing, that is that no man knows anything except the Man with whom God is forever, the Man who carries the thought of God. We must...unswervingly follow his inspired directions", (l). W.G. Ward in the "Dublin Review" was carrying on an equally enthusiastic campaign. This position was strenuously opposed by men like Newman, Montalembert, Dupanloup, and Dollinger; and Newman was dreadfully distressed by the articles in the "Univers" and "Dublin Review". He agreed that the Pope's definitions of faith were infallible; but while it was one thing loyally to follow the lead of Pius IX, it was

quite another thing to ascribe infallibility to the Pope's public utterances which were not concerned with faith and morals. "His whole sympathy was ever with obedience and loyalty. But he could not shut his eyes to the terrible revenges which time would bring on an attempt to identify the Catholic faith with views which ignored the patent facts of history, including the human defects of Popes themselves, visible at times even in their official pronouncements. He could not forget such Popes as Liberius and Honorius", (1). He was anxious to emphasise two points in connection with the painful task he had assumed in opposing the movement toward infallibility: first, the degree of freedom which a Catholic could claim for his own internal belief,—he might differ from the accepted view in cases where there were urgent reasons for so differing; and second, that each Papal utterance should be interpreted in its doctrinal effect not by the private judgment of the reader, but by the gradual sifting of theological experts.

In a letter to Pusey, March 1867, he writes of the Pope's infallibility: "A man will find it a religious duty to believe it or may safely disbelieve it, in proportion as he thinks it probable or improbable that the Church might or will define it, or does hold it, and that it is the doctrine of the Apostles.... She can never simply act upon it, (being undefined, as it is) and I believe never has;..... On the whole then I hold it; but I should account it no sin if, on the grounds of reason, I doubted it", (2). W.G. Ward was trying to give to the letters of the reigning Pope such authority as instantly to oblige internal belief;

Newman protested against Ward's contention that Catholics were obliged to

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(2) Ibid., p. 221.
hold this view, and summed up his protest, "Say if you like 'I think this is the true interpretation', but do not impose it on others as obligatory, if grave theologians think differently",(1). In June, 1868, he wrote in a letter: "I hold the Pope's Infallibility, not as a dogma, but as a theological opinion; that is, not as a certainty, but as a probability...... Anyhow, the doctrine of Papal Infallibility must be fenced round and limited by conditions......",(2).

His line of action in 1869 and 1870 in connection with the Vatican Council has often been construed to show a deficiency in whole-hearted loyalty to the Roman See; but he acted only from a stern sense of duty; he revered Pope Pius IX; and it was in the belief that he was defending Catholic theology that he carried on the "cause of the immemorial constitution of the Church against the innovations of advocates of a new absolutism". In January, 1870, he wrote a letter to Bishop Ullathorne in which he spoke of the advocates of the new doctrine as "an aggressive and insolent faction". In March of the same year, he wrote to the Bishop of Kerry: "If it be God's will that some definition in favor of the Pope's infallibility is passed, I then should at once submit -- but up to that very moment I shall pray most heartily and earnestly against it".

In April, 1870, he wrote to Dr Whitby at Rome: "The tradition of Ireland, the tradition of England, is not on the side of Papal Infallibility...... Archbishop Manning tells...that...the definition certainly will be carried; and, moreover, that it has long been intended! Long intended, and yet kept secret?.... Am I bound to take my view of

(2) Ibid., p. 236.
expedience from what is thought expedient at Rome?", (1) Small wonder that the Cardinal's hat was tossed to him only when it was thought he was too old longer to be dangerous.

At the General Congregation meeting on July 13, 1870, at which the definition of Papal Infallibility was informally passed, eighty-eight bishops voted "non placet", and sixty-two voted "placet juxta modum"; and then these bishops withdrew and went home. On July 18 the definition was formally passed. Newman accepted it at once, but felt it had two seriously evil consequences. One was increased centralisation. The other objection is contained in a letter of April, 1872: "The two main instruments of infidelity just now are physical science and history; physical science is used against Scripture, and history against dogma; the Vatican Council by its decrees about the inspiration of Scripture and the Infallibility of the Pope has simply thrown down the gauntlet to the science and historical research of the day". For months after the Council, he busied himself explaining the definition to those who consulted him, striving to show its reasonableness and to distinguish it from the excesses advocated in its name by its extreme promoters. His position was that the newly defined dogma had its roots in the past; the infallibility now ascribed to the ex cathedra utterances of Pius IX had belonged also to St. Peter and to St. Gregory the Great; he wrote in May, 1871, "The dogma has been acted on by the Holy See for centuries -- the only difference is that now it is actually recognised".

The Gladstone controversy afforded Newman a brilliant opportunity to champion the new definition against the assault of the theologically--

minded statesman. In a widely-circulated pamphlet on "The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing upon Civil Obedience", Gladstone gave a doubtful answer to the question whether Roman Catholics could be loyal subjects of both the Pope and the Queen. Newman's attention was arrested, and he undertook to answer the attack; his reply was contained in the book called "Letter to The Duke of Norfolk on the Occasion of Mr Gladstone's Recent Expostulation". A full analysis of the letter is impossible here; we must be content with a few extracts, which will illustrate and support our line of argument, but which, taken out of their context, are likely to give a not altogether fair picture of Newman's position. Let us keep in mind that he received and supported the definition, and considered that he was stoutly defending a vicious attack upon his Church, which as a good Catholic he felt himself bound to do. Gladstone magnified the political implications of the doctrine; Newman minimised them; but what we are after is the indication this letter gives as to his true view of infallibility.

The Church, he says, is faithful to antiquity; the definition maintains fidelity to the ancient Christian system. To believe in the Church is to believe in the Pope; "we must either give up the belief in the Church as a divine institution altogether, or we must recognise it in that communion of which the Pope is the head. With him alone and round about him are found the claims, the prerogatives, and duties which we identify with the kingdom set up by Christ". But he does not defend the policies and acts of particular Popes; "I am far from saying that Popes are never in the wrong, and are never to be resisted". As the
vicar of God upon earth, the Pope has sovereignty, "and all his acts are sure to be such as are in keeping with the position of one who is thus supremely exalted." And yet, strangely enough, the Pope actually has but little power; "so little does the Pope come into this whole system of moral theology by which (as by our conscience) our lives are regulated, that the weight of his hand upon us, as private men, is absolutely unappreciable". Cardinal Turrecremata is quoted by Newman as saying, "were the Pope to command anything against Holy Scripture, or the articles of faith, or the truth of the Sacraments, or the commands of the natural or divine law, he ought not to be obeyed". Newman continues, "if either the Pope or the Queen demanded of me an 'Absolute Obedience', he or she would be transgressing the laws of human nature and human society. I give an absolute obedience to neither...... and if, after all, I could not take their view of the matter, then I must rule myself by my own judgment and my own conscience. ......Here, of course, it will be objected to me, that I am, after all, having recourse to the Protestant doctrine of Private Judgment; not so; it is the Protestant doctrine that Private Judgment is our ordinary guide in religious matters, but I use it, in the case in question, in very extraordinary and rare, nay, impossible emergencies". "It seems, then, that there are extreme cases in which Conscience may come into collision with the word of the Pope, and is to be followed in spite of that word". To put this proposition on a broader basis, he then proceeds, beginning with the Creator and His creature, to draw out the "prerogatives and the supreme authority of Conscience". (We shall have
occasion later to look at this exposition in greater detail). "Did the Pope speak against Conscience in the true sense of the word, he would commit a suicidal act..... On the law of conscience and its sacredness are founded both his authority in theory and his power in fact".

In the chapter of the Letter which deals with "Conscience", Newman uses language which we may suppose was not wholly approvable by Roman Catholic authorities, and which it is doubtful is the point of view of most Roman Catholics, whether lay or theologically trained. He says, "A Pope is not infallible in his laws, nor in his commands, nor in his acts of state, nor in his administration, nor in his public policy...... Was St.Peter infallible on that occasion at Antioch when St.Paul withstood him? was St.Victor infallible when he separated from his communion the Asiatic Churches? or Liberius when in like manner he excommunicated Athanasius? And, to come to later times, was Gregory XIII, when he had a medal struck in honor of the Bartholomew massacre? or Paul IV in his conduct toward Elizabeth? or Sextus V when he blessed the Armada? or Urban VIII when he persecuted Galileo? No Catholic ever pretends that these Popes were infallible in these acts. Since then infallibility alone could block the exercise of conscience, and the Pope is not infallible in that subject-matter in which conscience is of supreme authority, no dead-lock, such as is implied in the objection which I am answering, can take place between conscience and the Pope".

Then, at the close of this chapter, are found the celebrated words, "I add one remark. Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts, (which indeed does not seem quite the thing) I shall drink,--
to the Pope if you please, -- still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards”.

The Vatican definition, the Encyclical Bull called "Pastor Aeternus", declares that the Pope has the same infallibility which the Church has. And to determine what is the infallibility of the Church, Newman turns to consider "what is the characteristic of Christianity, considered as a revelation of God's will", and writes thus: "Our Divine Master might have communicated to us heavenly truths without telling us that they came from Him, as it is commonly thought He has done in the case of heathen nations; but He willed the Gospel to be a revelation acknowledged and authenticated, to be public, fixed, and permanent; and accordingly, as Catholics hold, He framed a Society of men to be its home, its instrument, and its guaranty. The rulers of that Association are the legal trustees, so to say, of the sacred truths which he spoke to the Apostles by word of mouth". Of course we, as Protestants, do not accept this view of revelation, nor do we believe that our Divine Master appointed a Society of men with rulers who would be as legal trustees of His Gospel; our reading of the New Testament does not permit us to interpret His message and His early Church in this way. Nor can we agree with Newman when, with lamentably weak backing for his argument, he claims that the Revelation is safeguarded by an authoritative, permanent tradition of teaching as shown when St. Paul calls the Church "the pillar and ground of truth". It just does not follow. And furthermore, there is something incongruous in Newman appealing to St. Paul for his proof texts. In short, and in conclusion, from our point of view his argument that the Church must be infallible
as being the Divinely appointed trustee for protecting, preserving, and declaring the Revelation, carries no weight; and chiefly for the reason that we understand Revelation, the Church, and the life and purpose of Jesus Christ to be quite other than Newman conceived them to be.
Chapter 12

SUMMARY: HIS DOCTRINE OF AUTHORITY

It is our contention that Newman's doctrine of authority in religion, while it did undergo certain developments with the passing of the years, yet never underwent any radical change. As a Roman Catholic his position on authority was what it had been as an Anglican, with the difference that in the later period it was fuller, more mature, and based in a Church which claimed infallibility. In order to draw together the strands of the discussion we have been following, it may be helpful at this point to summarize the doctrine we have found emerging from his own writings. We shall find some twelve elements entering into what we may call his view of the scope and function of religious authority.

1). All his life long he believed passionately in God. To Newman, He was a God of fear and terror, able to crush mankind if He should so choose; and so in Newman's mind the ideas of God's Fatherhood and Love were made to suffer, while his justice and power were exalted. Newman seems to have been surprisingly little affected by the conception of God which Jesus taught and exhibited. He lived in and for God in a peculiarly complete way; the two things which alone were luminously
clear to him were the existence of God and of himself. In a strangely thorough way, he seemed able to forget that other souls did exist by the millions round about him, souls just as real and important in God's sight as his own; he never managed to see himself in relation to other men of his generation and to the thought of his time. His aristocratic aloofness prevented a sympathy and close touch with the common people of the sort to whom Jesus ministered. One might fairly ask whether the God Newman believed in was the same God that Jesus revealed.

2). **Probability** he held to be the guide of life. Men can not be certain of their religious beliefs with a mathematical certitude; but the convergence of probabilities yields a certainty which is no less to be believed than those propositions which are demonstrated with mathematical exactness. Any one belief is like a cable made up of various strands of wire, no one of which is able to bear the whole weight put upon the finished article, but which taken together form a unity that is wholly reliable. This really makes each man for himself the determiner of his beliefs; but, unable to rest upon itself, this type of subjective certainty is seen to require the support of the greatest possible number of other persons, which in the end amounts to an external authority.

3). **Revelation** is external, final, fixed, supported and buttressed by the authority of the Church. It is static, not progressive; miracles serve to prove the original revelation, and are not regarded as belonging to the evolving process of revelation. Revelation was made necessary because of the wretched condition into which mankind had gotten; God saw that drastic measures were necessary, so he sent a revelation that was in itself complete but not self-evidencing, and at
the same time He set up on earth a Church to guard and promote this revelation. For if there be no authority to decide what has been given, then no revelation has been given, says Newman; but the Church of the Apostles is that authority.

4). The Church must therefore be infallible. It is inconceivable to think God would send a Divine Revelation to work man's salvation, and not put that Revelation into the hands of an institution that is beyond the possibility of error. A Church based on anything less than a commission from God is not able to claim infallibility. The Church is Catholic, the representative on earth of the Kingdom founded by Christ. At its head is the Pope, Christ's vicegerent on earth, who is likewise infallible, but in a limited degree. But his ex cathedra pronouncements upon faith and morals carry an authority from which there can be no appeal, since he speaks as the successor of Peter, as God's representative.

5). The true notes of the true Church are its antiquity and its catholicity. Newman was deeply concerned with the Church Fathers of the Fourth Century, and made a life-long study of the Church of that period, with the result that his views of what the Church should be was largely conditioned by what in that era it was. Here again we are struck by the lack of influence of the New Testament teaching on the formation of his views on the Church. Doctrine, he held, was subject to development; the present dogmas of the Church are the results of a natural evolutionary development of the deposit originally committed to the Apostles. Newman made no distinction between religion and the intellectual expression of religion; for him, religion was dogma,
developed, and crystallized into the doctrines of the Church of Rome.

6). The Church must be visible. It must be a tangible institution, with an organization that assures its continuity and guarantees its trustee-ship over the original deposit of faith. So it must have a visible head, the Pope; and subordinates, who have power to carry out its will, the Bishops; and still other subordinates, who minister to the moral and spiritual needs of the masses, the lesser clergy. The Sacraments are generally necessary to salvation; these Sacraments are solely within the power of the Church to give or withhold, and their effectiveness is entirely independent of the character of the officiating clergyman.

7). The real ground on which the authority of the clergyman is built is his Apostolical descent. The Lord Jesus Christ gave His spirit to the Apostles; they in turn laid their hands on those who should succeed them; these again on others; and so the gift has been handed down, in unbroken line, from Christ to the latest ordained priest serving in the Church. The grace of the Sacrament of ordination is contained in the laying on of hands, and is possessed only by the Bishops of the Roman Church, who are the true representatives of Christ and His Apostles.

8). The Scriptures are to be used to prove doctrine, not to teach it. The doctrines of the Church have been defined by the Church Fathers; and what they teach can be verified and supported by Scripture. But the Church does not go to Scripture for its doctrines. Scripture does, however, hold a large authority in the teaching of the Church,
since nothing contrary to the corpus of sacred writings may ever be taught. Newman lived before the modern historico-critical approach to the Bible had gotten itself established in England; his acceptance of the Bible was whole-hearted and free from any critical doubts. But as an authority, the Scriptures stand second to the Church; the Bible has authority only because the Church invests it with authority.

9) There is no essential connection between religion and morality. Since the essence of religion is dogma, and quite free from any connection with the moral behavior of the religious man, it will follow that the Christian will take his directions from the institution that holds in its hands the keeping and teaching of that dogma. The individual will not rely upon his own interpretations of Scripture, but will obey the Church. Theoretically, he must not obey his priest if the priest requires him to do an act that is immoral or contrary to Scripture or Church law; but the layman has no right to judge of the immorality of an action. The low standards of morality in Roman Catholic countries he held to be no prejudice to the Church, for by attending to religious duties and avoiding what the Church defines as sin, the individual will have a good store of grace in heaven. As the old saying goes, he will be straight God-ward, even if a little twisty man-ward. Here is a difficult matter; it makes of religion a sort of gas-meter affair, and it recognises a type of celestial book-keeping which does not evoke the sympathy of the person who believes there is a close relation between moral conduct and favor with God.
10). Newman tries to hold to the principle of Private Judgment; he declares that men must decide for themselves on questions that are involved and difficult, even though this means disobeying the commands of the Church. But he hastens to add that he is supposing an impossible case; and in practice he would, like all other Roman clergymen, demand unquestioning obedience to the Church. Of conscience, Newman held a very lofty view; he regarded it as the voice of God in the nature and heart of man, the internal witness of both the existence and the law of God, the aboriginal vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a priest in its blessings. It is never lawful to go against one's conscience; in extreme cases, where it comes into collision with the word of the Pope, conscience and not the Pope must be followed. Yet in the same chapter he writes: "conscience cannot come into direct collision with the Church's or the Pope's infallibility". The distinction seems to be, that when an individual comes into conflict with the Church or the Pope, he is exercising, not conscience, but its miserable counterfeit, self will. Conscience truly so-called will always be found to be in agreement with the Pope and the Church; what is not thus in agreement is not conscience. In this way the term is limited by definition, so that it becomes something different from what we generally understand by conscience.

11). The doctrines and practices of the one true and infallible Church may be difficult to understand; but they are not difficult to believe. Once accept the view that the Church is truly the trustee of Revelation and the representative of Christ's Apostolical society, and
her teachings and requirements will be accepted without hesitation. One must begin by believing, and certitude will follow. The interests of religion and the soul's salvation cannot be achieved by approaching with a spirit of doubt. Newman recommended what was to himself a natural attitude; he began by believing implicitly in whatever authorities had sway over him, and in maintaining loyalty to those authorities. The theory of the right of Private Judgment, of which he occasionally spoke and which he seemed to uphold, was in practical life interpreted in the light of this principle of loyalty to authority. Private Judgment was to be used only on rare occasions; the abasement of reason before authority was the every-day practice expected of the Christian.

12). Newman had an active distrust of the human reason in its relation to the religious life. He disliked paper logic. He saw truly that it is the concrete being as a whole that reaches decisions, and that "Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum". As well say the quicksilver in the barometer changes the weather, as say his religious opinions were determined by logic. Faith accords with reason in the abstract, not in particular cases; man has faith in the Word of life, because he believes in the human messenger and in the likelihood of the message. Faith is the reasoning of a religious mind, or of what is called in Scripture a renewed heart, acting upon presumptions rather than evidence, speculating and venturing on the future without being sure of it. One wills to believe what the Church teaches must be believed; and one is secure in pointing out that the opposite of his belief cannot be proved. Miracles are accepted as proofs of revelation; there is no reason why miracles should be confined
to the Apostolic Age, why they should not occur in modern times.

This, then, in brief compass, is what we have found Newman to believe and teach on the subject of authority in religion. For him, authority was religion. In one of the appendices of the Apologia he tells us what he means by the term authority; he writes: "Conscience is an authority; the Bible is an authority; such is the Church; such is antiquity; such are the words of the wise; such are hereditary lessons; such are ethical truths; such are historical memories; such are legal saws and state maxims; such are proverbs; such are sentiments, presages, prepossessions". If we were to try to express in one sentence what his doctrine of authority was, we would say that his first stage was that what he 'ought' to believe was whatever is taught by Scripture; next, it was the teaching of the chain of Anglican divines; and finally, his test of what he ought to believe was what the voice of the Roman Church imposed upon him. It now remains to ask, What influence has the view of authority which he held and taught had upon religious thinking? What are the results that have followed from his ideas of the scope and character of authority in religion?

First of all, he was the founder, the real father, and the guiding spirit of the Oxford Movement. In 1833 his opinions on authority were different from those held by the majority of Anglican clergymen, but the opinions which he held and taught during the succeeding seven years have since been built solidly into the Church of England. "After one hundred years of advocacy, discussion, and abuse, the impulse imparted by the Oxford Movement is still quick and powerful..... The Anglo-Catholics have practically captured the machine of the establishment."
Most of the Theological Colleges are in their hands.... Four Bishops out of the forty-three are still definitely hostile. Of the other thirty-nine, a few are disquieted",(1). "Last August, immediately after the rejection of the Revised Book by the House of Commons for the second time, five Episcopal Sees, two of them Primatial, fell vacant. All five were filled by the ministry of the day by out and out Revisionists. Loaded dice can only fall in one way",(2).

What Newman taught in "The Prophetic Office of The Church" is what Bishop Gore was teaching twenty years ago in "The Church and The Ministry". In his latest book, "The Philosophy of The Good Life", (November, 1930), Bishop Gore reminds the reader time and again of Newman, especially in the rather unusual type of his thinking. As one has expressed it, he seems constantly to be slipping off the main road into the bog; but like Newman, Gore regards as very precious those very ideas which seem to us lacking in soundness.

The Anglo-Catholics follow Newman's lead in discarding the Reformer's appeal to the Bible alone. Like him, they maintain that the Bible is not, and was never intended to be, the one standard of authority in disputes over faith and order. And like him, they regard the Lutheran and Calvinistic view of private judgment to be the great error of the Reformation, and they demand a return to the earlier reliance on tradition. The distinctive Anglo-Catholic beliefs have been defined as follows: (a) Jesus Christ founded not merely a faith, but a living and witness-bearing institution, with assurance that it would be guided into all truth; (b) He enjoined symbolic worship by Sacraments as the channel

of covenanted grace; (c) it is thus contrary to His will and a source of manifold error for men to depend either on individual illumination and reasoning, or on isolated scrutiny of the Bible, rather than on the continuous witness of the Church reaching back to those who companied with the Lord,(1). It will be seen at once how directly these views are traceable to Newman. His greatest influence flowed from his teaching during the Anglican period; for after 1845 his views were on the whole the views of Rome, and what he said and wrote was kept within the limits imposed by tradition. Yet his influence in securing broad-minded treatment for Catholics in England was immense; and the number of Anglicans who followed him into the Roman Church was enormous.

Someone has said that, whether for good or ill, no man before or since ever lit at Oxford such a torch as Newman lit there.

PART THREE

Chapter 13

AUTHORITY DEFINED

The word 'authority' is derived from the Latin word 'auctoritas', which in translation is equivalent to the Greek 'exousia'. It implies authorship or origination; auctoritas is the power or influence exerted by an auctor or author, by creatively adding to the sum total of human knowledge or experience, or by increasing or enriching the welfare or nobility of human life. From this has come the common use of the word authority to denote any kind of power or influence by which control over the mental or physical acts of others is exercised. When a person possesses 'exousia', he must have gotten it either from within himself or from the actual source in which it resides. In Hellenistic Greek, 'exousia' in a religious context denoted the combination of supernatural power with supernatural authority to teach, and in this sense it is used in the Synoptic description of the teaching of Jesus: "en gar didaskon.... os exousian echen". A modern dictionary definition of the word authority regards it as "legitimate power to command or act, power, weight, influence derived from character, testimony, credibility,
standard of reference, an expert, entitled to speak with authority". Authority is of several kinds; it is met in almost every field of activity and phase of life, under one aspect or another; and in the sphere of religion we shall have to consider a number of quite different elements entering into what the Greeks understood by their term 'exousia'.

The concept of authority includes the idea of coerciveness of a certain type. It is the right of control; but this control does not lie in mere force or power. It is the right to demand obedience; it is that which has the right to be obeyed. The man on the street holds the popular view that authority means the power to enforce obedience; but such a power is not a necessary attribute of authority. The coercive force which authority possesses is not external or physical. It is primarily a spiritual matter; the power of authority over the human mind and the human conscience lies in its derivation from reality, from what is true and what is right. We are compelled to believe what is true and do what is right, not by some force applied from outside ourselves, but because as self-conscious men striving for the highest possible degree of self-realization we see clearly that if we do not follow the lead of truth and the laws of the moral conscience, we are led into error and disloyalty. Authority and obedience are correlative terms; when we speak of one, we imply the other. There is nothing necessarily unspiritual about obedience; the harsh antithesis often drawn between authority and spirit is not valid. "The authority of the Church is a spiritual authority; and the personal inspiration which has been contrasted with it speaks through the conscience with an authority
no less categorical"(1). In the spiritual realm, authority is that which says the last word; from its judgments there is no appeal; it is absolute and final.

It is usual to contrast authority with reason; a man is said to accept a belief on authority when he adopts an opinion without himself going through the processes of reasoning which might lead him independently to that opinion, and which he accepts on the ground of its being presented to him by someone or some institution he thinks more competent than himself. But this notion of authority is rather ambiguous, since authority cannot be at once external and coercive. It is coercive only when it is truly internal; an external authority can refer only to the historical or psychological causes of belief or action, and not to its whole ground; and the power which compels belief belongs to the whole ground on which belief is based, rather than to the causes alone. From its very nature as spiritual, authority can not be impressed from the outside; it can get at and into men and influence their belief and action only through the use of their own minds. Antecedents or causes which produce a belief, and the grounds or reasons which sustain and justify that belief, should be distinguished; they are by no means identical. In ordinary life we often believe a statement because we have been taught it, or because our friends believe it, or because everyone in our community believes it; but these causes are not the whole ground of the belief. Our belief, for example, that a certain man is guilty of burglary may have as its cause the fact that he was convicted of the crime in a court of law; but the real ground of our belief is the more or less unconscious judgment we make upon the body of evidence brought

(1) Dean Inge, "Authority and The Life of The Spirit", in The Modern Churchman, Sept.-Nov., 1929.
against him, and the honesty and competence of those trying the case. Thus, "the cause of a belief or action may be spoken of as external, but belief or action which rests solely upon such a cause lacks any ground to sustain it, and consequently falls short of the nature of a belief or action; it is a bare abstraction. A mere external authority is, then, left hanging in the air; it is a cause severed from a ground. We may derive our opinions from this 'authority', but it is never the whole ground of these opinions, because the ground of any such opinion always contains some independent judgment about that 'authority'",(1).

We speak of the authority of the Roman Catholic Church when that Church proclaims that salvation depends upon holding the particular beliefs which she teaches. But this is not authority in the true sense; it is more akin to a proclamation of martial law, with criticism forbidden and dissent punished. Theoretically conscience is, as Newman pointed out, held to be supreme; but in all practical cases disobedience to the Church is a serious offense. This is to externalise and materialise authority, and to forget its true function as a spiritual influence. A further point, and one of primary importance, must be recognised in connection with any institution that claims to be infallible: an infallible authority assumes not only absolute goodness and wisdom on the part of the Church that imparts it, but an equal absoluteness in the wisdom and goodness of each person who receives that authority.

To be true to its real nature, all authority should be propadeutic. As Sabatier suggests, it should, like the good teacher, make itself superfluous. An external authority which is as necessary and as peremptory in its commands to-day as it was sixteen centuries ago is

not authority at all in the true sense.

We are insisting upon the moral and spiritual nature of authority, and that the presence or absence of force or power is irrelevant to the notion. It follows from this that the authority assigned to institutions or to persons or to the individual conscience is a derivative authority, and depends upon the values declared or represented by them. We ascribe supreme authority to God; but not because of His almighty power; rather, because He represents supreme value or highest good.

Professor Sorley points out two conditions which the claimant to authority must satisfy: a) He must have superior insight into values, and b) he must not, in the exercise of his authority, unduly restrict the values that come from free inquiry and experiment. The former of these conditions can never be more than a matter of probability, although this probability may be strong enough to satisfy all practical purposes. The latter is a question of degree, but it must admit of research and experiment so conducted as to secure further values in a universe where many values are still latent and where values are still being created. It can be shown that the Gospel of Jesus Christ stands both these tests.

Authority in any field does not stand by itself, isolated; it cannot exist, as it were, in a vacuum. Its relations with the whole scope of the field in which it happens to be met are intimate and far-reaching. In the sphere of religion, the question of authority is always and everywhere pertinent. The Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford recently pointed out in his Inaugural Address that "for the vast majority, everywhere and always, religious belief, whether true or false, rests upon authority", and "the most extreme traditionalism and the most extreme modernism are accepted on authority in exactly the same way". (1)

(1) H.L. Goudge, "The Methods of Theology".
It is merely asserting a fact about human nature to say that what appeals as authority to one type of mind will not be authoritative for every other type; and hence much of the difficulty that is encountered in seeking to define an authority that will be accepted as binding by all at the same time that it is expressed in terms which appeal to all.

No attempt at a definition of authority would be complete without reference to Bishop Butler's celebrated sentence on conscience: "Had it strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world".

These, then, are the lines along which we shall expect authority to manifest itself. To carry our definition still further and to make it more explicit, we shall consider in the following chapter the relation and function of authority in certain of the more important fields of every-day experience.
FIELDS WHERE AUTHORITY IS MET

A. Asked what authority in essence is, where it resides, and what its true functions are, the average man would undoubtedly find his mind turning toward certain manifestations of the powers of the State. For with its army and navy, its police systems, and its various other agencies for enforcing its mandates, the civil government stands to the average citizen as the symbol of authoritative rule. But we repeat here what was said in the last chapter: authority is not synonymous with force or power. The authority of the civil state must at times be enforced by an appeal to force; but its essence is not found there. There are times when force must be used to control some, else anarchy would be in a fair way to injure all. But even in such cases authority appeals to external means of force only when internal authority,—that is, intelligent unselfish self-direction,—has become inoperative. The authority of an army officer, which may be taken as a type case of so-called external authority, depends finally for its effectiveness upon the morale of the troops, on their confidence in their commander, and their sympathy with him and his objectives.

It is necessary that we have some conception of what we mean by
the state before we can get very far in an inquiry as to the function of authority therein. The state is not an obvious fact; the literature of political thinking contains dozens of different conceptions of what the state is, and many of these definitions are in direct conflict. Thus it is said that the state is a piece of territory; or a collection of persons; or persons organised for secular purposes; or, more commonly, the state is regarded as the political machinery of government in a community; or it "is concerned with those social relations which express themselves by means of government", (1). While each of these definitions carries a certain amount of truth, they are rejected by Professor Oakeshott in favor of one which regards the state as "the totality in an actual community which satisfies the whole mind of the individuals who comprise it", in which government and law, economic, religious, intellectual, and every other activity and aspect of social life find their explanation, and for the perfection of which they all exist. Thus the state is not the government, but the social whole which the government implies and requires for its explanation. With the state understood in this way, it follows that the authority of the state rests not in government and law. Authority is that from which there is no appeal, it is not responsible to anything else, it is inescapable, and complete in itself. Montaigne says, "there is nothing so much, nor so grossly, nor so ordinarily faulty as the laws". So then to embody in government and law the authority of the state, is a legal fiction and not a fact.

Another common conception of authority in the state is expressed in terms of consent. "The supreme power remains with the people", says

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Locke; the authority which is behind government lies in the will of the majority of the people. This view was widespread in seventeenth century England and eighteenth century France, and is at the basis of the constitutional government of the United States of America. The late William Jennings Bryan, following the line of reasoning which regards the opinion of one man as being quite as good as the reasoned conclusions of another, argued that if a majority of the American people voted that evolution is not true and should not be taught, then it is not true and must not be taught. Possibly this is what pure democracy, when carried to its absurd conclusion, must inevitably come to; but it makes truth appear a relative matter, and it definitely puts reason on the side-track.

Without further argument, we come to a definition of authority in the state, which, if not wholly satisfactory, at any rate has less faults than some of the others: "The authority of the state is not mere government or law, nor is it founded upon a contract or any other form of the consent of the people, but resides solely in the completeness of the satisfaction which the state itself affords to the needs of concrete persons. Apart from its completeness, the state has no authority, for that only is authoritative, in the full sense, which is complete", (1).

The exercise of this type of authority may be illustrated in a homely way by the police officer on point duty. He is there to represent all and for the good of all, and his authority is satisfactory and acceptable in so far as he is seen to think of all and for all. We refer for our direction to him, and we agree to the decisions he makes; we obey

him, not because of his brawn or his brains, but because he is our servant. His authority is not so external as it may at first seem, for if we are intelligent and co-operative, we regard him as the captain of the traffic game. If we cheat or disobey, we are not playing the game; we are true neither to our fellow players, nor to ourselves.

B. Society. The relation of the authority of the rational and moral consciousness of the individual to the society in which he lives furnishes a long list of heroic conflicts, for it has been the individual in obedience to the demands of his conscience who has revolted against the static consciousness of his social group and has demanded a revision of its standards. The number of real initiators, the number of men who have brought something really new into the world, is small indeed; and those who have been strikingly original have as a rule had to fight against the contrary strain of their social group. Athanasius contra mundum is a phrase symbolic of what is always going on in human history. And whether the man who plows the lone furrow is a genius or a fool, his own generation usually never knows.

The environmental group with which man is day by day concerned is not the body politic, or state; it is rather the social body, or the community in which he lives and works. And the authority which this community exerts upon him is the precipitated experience of that society. This may be stated in a simple way by saying that social experience is social authority. But there is a further influence, that of social opinion, — a feeling, generated as it were electrically, that this past experience should and must be followed. The rules of society are as a general thing informal and unformulated; they take the shape of custom
and tradition, mode and fashion. The sanctions of these informal rules are also informal; yet these sanctions enforce the authority of tradition and custom with inescapable exactitude.

The problem of conflict between the authority of the social group and of the individual conscience is one that is frequently met. It is perhaps best judged in a solemn solitude by the individual and personal experience of values. Men in every age have staked their reputation and their life on a conviction of personal experience of conscience; but for most people it is wisest to take counsel with the general experience of the society in which they have membership. The individual conscience must be granted the right to strike off by itself, but as a rule the cumulative experience of the race offers correctives to the sometimes poorly balanced struggles for originality.

Societies grow through co-operative effort; the individual is necessary to society, and society is necessary to the individual. In all primitive society the individual counts heavily, and a man must make a definite contribution to society in order to prove his right to share the advantages offered by the social group. They are in error who point with longing to the free and easy life of the savage, and imagine that in primitive tribes each person may do as he pleases. A limit is placed upon individualism when we realise that the individual never exists in isolation. Alexander Selkirk on his desert island could well say, "I am monarch of all I survey, my right there is none to dispute". But if he had been really and completely alone, there would have been no suggestion in his mind about the question of his competency. However ignorant and foolish the person marooned on a desert island may
be, he has to be his own authority. Yet, even so, he has stored in
memory a good bit of authoritative information and tradition that was
transmitted to him in pre-shipwreck days. And as soon as another
individual appears on that island, then there is a social situation
and the problem of authority arises. The individual, merely qua
individual, is in all but a theoretical sense an anomaly.

Authority as it applies in social relationships is often
keenly felt in family associations. Considering the family as the
fundamental social unit, the home is seen to stand at the very center
of the problem. It is generally held that the young people of the
present generation have thrown off to a startling degree the regard which
former generations had for the home and for parental authority. But this
is a condition that seems to be perennial; inscriptions have recently
been unearthed, which were written three thousand years ago, and even
at that time were bewailing the lack of respect shown by young people
toward their elders. Increase Mather, preaching in New England two
centuries ago, deplored the fact that the boys and girls of his time were
"hankering after new and loose ways". Yet it is undeniably true that
there is to-day an alarming disregard for the normal and reasonable
restraints of home life. Something has definitely gone wrong with the
parent's exercise of authority over the child. And here again we see
authoritative to be a spiritual matter, for a parental authority that carries
an appeal to force into the years of a child's adolescence is likely to
destroy itself. With parents, as with teachers and all others who seek
to influence conduct so as to enhance living, authority is based not upon
mere age or position, but upon their wider experience and deeper insight,
and upon the sincerity and self-attesting wisdom of their suggestions,
directions, requests, and appeals. Intelligent sincerity appealing to sincerity and common-sense possesses a type of authority that commands by virtue of throwing the decision upon the party to whom appeal is made. It is then no longer an external authority.

The wide-spread discussion over the presence of the word "obey" in the marriage service is sufficient evidence that the problem of authority extends to the relations between husband and wife. We merely indicate the problem; discussion of it must be left to those who feel competent.

Let us notice one further conflict in the realm of social relationships that involves the question of authority, here again merely pointing out the problem without attempting a solution. Everyone is familiar with the usual distinction between "labor" and "capital," the one representing the great class of workers who have nothing to sell but the labor of their hands, and the other representing the organised industrial machine which buys this labor and uses it to transform raw materials into goods that can be sold at a profit. We believe it can be shown that the so-called labor problem is a revolt, not against capital as such, but against a third party which may be called management. It is this third party that holds authority, in its right to hire and fire; and it is to this authority that labor objects, on the ground that it is exercised in an arbitrary way.

C. Science. To say that we are living in an age that is dominated by the scientific outlook is merely to repeat a truism that nobody would trouble to deny. Most persons have a large and sublimely uncritical faith in whatever is said in the name of science; even the casual opinions which an Edison or an Einstein may express about art or morals or God, are accepted
by the many as law. We therefore ask the question, What is the authority of the scientist? Where in science does authority rest? Why do I believe what the scientist tells me, when I am so often unwilling to take seriously the moral precepts of the clergyman?

Science is a social product; its achievements have been wrought by the co-operative efforts of many minds, each laborer working in his own plot in the large field of inquiry, but each more or less dependent upon the findings of the other laborers. Clifford used to argue that no one had any right to believe what he had not seen or proved for himself. Such a doctrine of agnosticism is barren enough in the ordinary affairs of life, but its absurdity is seen with especial clarity in the field of science. No one man, starting at the beginning and working by his own unaided efforts, could in a lifetime get beyond the elementary discoveries which to-day make up the tools of the scientist, if he be required to see and prove every step for himself. Twenty years ago every physicist was a born and bred Newtonian; now, all are on the way to becoming Sinsteinians. Our authority in the field of physics has changed; the rank and file of scientific workers follow the opinions of the well qualified experts who have devoted their trained intelligences to the questions at issue; indirectly, we all believe that the authority in which we are trusting is the authority of reason.

Now it may seem at first sight that the type of authority which holds sway in science is very nearly akin to the authority claimed by the Roman Catholic Church,—i.e., that it is an authority of experts. But there are decisive differences. The authority of the Church of Rome
is based on her claim of possession of the true revelation and the grant of infallibility; there is about her claim an arbitrariness which makes it unacceptable to many people, and not binding upon them. But the authority of the scientific expert is conditioned by his co-operation with the laws imposed by nature; he must be rigorously bound by the laws of gravitation, innumerable thermal laws, the natural properties of the particular medium with which he works, whether glass or rubber or hydrogen or gamma rays. The authority thus imposed by the natural physical world is inescapable, and it is verifiable by all. Man's reason has questioned nature, recognised the claims she presents, and validated her order as real, verifiable, and authoritative. Science claims authority on the basis of discovery, which is as yet far from complete, and which can be shared by all who have a mind to follow the necessary steps; Rome bases her claim on a revelation entrusted to her alone, which was full and complete when given, and which must be accepted in toto without question. As a matter of fact, the authority of science is much more nearly akin to the authority which the Protestant theologian claims for the Christian Church.

Science has authority over us, we have said, because of our faith in experts. We believe that if we had the time, skill, and facilities, we could arrive at the same conclusions which the scientist has reached; we could verify his findings. In other words, the scientist has in his scientific discoveries something which is not peculiar to himself; he has passed beyond opinion and reached certain fragments of truth; he has gone beyond the merely subjective, and laid hold on what is objectively true. Our trust in the scientist and the validity of his
results rests also upon our faith in the dependableness of nature. We
cannot here discuss the view, now almost universally held, that there are
no absolutely rigid laws of nature, but only statistical averages; for all
practical purposes these averages amount to laws, and we are confident that
under similar conditions nature would behave for us as she does for the
expert scientist. For example, the doctor of medicine is an expert. When
we are ill we ask to be treated by a man who has had thorough and adequate
training, and who has made the experiments necessary to develop in him a
certain skill in curing disease. Back of our confidence in the doctor is
our assurance that what he does to us and prescribes for us are exactly the
things we ourselves would do and prescribe if we had the opportunities to
give ourselves to the same studies that have been so important in his life
of training. The case is similar with the navigating officer of an ocean
vessel; he trusts in the Nautical Almanac without himself making all the
calculations necessary to determine his position and course. He trusts the
Almanac because he believes that the calculations which have been made by
a number of experts are trustworthy, and because the tables have been found
reliable in the past; in other words, because of faith based on experience.

We may push our question a step further and ask, How does the expert
know? The answer is that in the last analysis he must come down to and
rely upon his own experience; all that he can tell us is based upon
experience, and that experience is and must be his own. Eddington says
that a scientist can push his inquiries back and back until he can go no
further, and there he finds the shadow of himself. There are here certain points
that cannot be resolved easily or merely wished away. For example, on what
authority do we accept the belief that the earth rotates on its axis?
No man has ever actually seen the earth's axis; no one has ever really seen the earth rotate; we can't stand off watch it. It will be objected that this is attempting to quibble over a perfectly obvious fact; but the point is that the fact is not obvious, and the evidence possessed by the average man in support of his belief in the rotation of the earth is extremely slight. But we believe because of our faith in scientists, in their superior skill and knowledge, in their love of truth, in their honesty, and in what must be their own personal experience and testimony. Here is a close parallel to the reasons why we believe in the validity of religious experience.

D. Art. Authority in art is less rigid in its requirements than authority in the state, or in society, or in science. The latitude of permissible conduct in artistic effort seems to be wide enough to take in pretty nearly every person who has the impulse to self-expression, and among some of the moderns it has been thought that really significant results could be obtained without the usual devotion to a long and hard discipline. But to those to whom art is something more than an opportunity to be different, it must submit to an authority; and that authority is found in its relation to reality. The great artists have always believed they were in touch with and making true representations of reality; with heightened sensibility and superior insight, they have been able to see and give expression to aspects of reality that escape the casual observer. It may be argued, as Ducasse so ably argues, that art and beauty have no relation to each other, that art is purely subjective self-expression, and that no standards of criticism claiming objective worth can ever be set up. But
his position, while suggestive, is not satisfactory and is not
accepted by this paper. Aside from tradition and individual taste,
there are canons of artistic creation which must be observed if the
way of beauty is to lead into touch with reality. As in science, so
in art experimentation must be freely permitted; and these experiments
may yield fruitful results, provided they are not made merely at
random; "it is not enough to use the brush boldly, and then try which
way up the picture will look worst".

To express oneself in art, it is necessary first to have a self
to express; and a self includes ideas, as well as impulses. The richer
in worth art is, the more profoundly it will portray aspects of emotion
and thought. The best art must satisfy the body that creates, the mind
that understands, and the spirit that illuminates; and the supreme artistic
worth of a Doric temple is due to its being the fulfilment of these three
demands. It is essentially the architecture of intellectual sanity. It was
built by and for men who understood what freedom means and what it implies.
Even though the field of beauty seems to be one in which agreement is most
difficult to obtain, yet there are elements of permanent and authoritative
value that discerning critics in all ages recognise. In the preface to
his "Poems", Professor Santayana reminds us what these elements are: "To
say that what was good once is good no longer is to give too much
importance to chronology. Aesthetic fashions may change, losing as much
beauty at one end as they gain at the other, but innate taste continues
to recognise its affinities, however remote, and need never change", (p.x-xi).
America's foremost church architect expresses the same thought in different
words: "Art, if it is worthy the name, is primarily the manifestation of
beauty of some sort, and this beauty is not, as some curiously hold to-day,
a variable and a personal reaction or idiosyncracy. Neither personal tastes nor changing fashion can make the parabolic curve of a Doric capital or a Gothic moulding other than beautiful, or a cubist sculpture or a post-impressionist still-life or an art nouveau apartment house other than ugly"(1).

E. Morals. The great social problems of the present day are very largely moral in character; and, as Dean Inge has pointed out, they are problems for the new morality, not for the old. Earnest thinkers in great numbers are to-day abandoning Christianity and the Christian morality; and the reason is that so many members of the Christian body have been remaining proudly immobile in a rapidly changing world. This condition indicates that a static tradition has no message for the times in which we are living. The attendant danger of this state of affairs lies in the revolt against all authority in morals, the throwing off of all restraint, the repudiation of the voice of internal authority as well as that which is considered external.

In considering the question of the place and ground of authority with reference to morals, three points of view are distinguishable and must be reckoned with; each has had respectable support, and in each there resides a large portion of truth. a) One position sees the basis of moral authority to rest in law, particularly in the laws of the state we live in, as representing what society has found to be most useful and is determined to force upon her members. This view has a parallel in the field of religion, being represented there by the belief that authority in religion rests in an institution and a set of definite rules and laws; the Old Testament corollary is the early Hebrew legalistic religion. b) The second position is utilitarian; authority in morals is founded upon social desires.

(1) Ralph Adams Cram, in Webber's "Church Symbolism", p.ii.
and needs; the greatest good for the greatest number is the end sought. The religious parallel is the man who pays little attention to ritual but devotes himself to what he considers the good life; he is the modern representative of the Old Testament Wise Man. c) A third view lays emphasis on individualism, and makes morality a matter of conscience. This was the line taken by the great Hebrew Prophets, and is one of the chief notes of Protestantism. Here, then, we have three different grounds of authority in morals, paralleled by three cognate types of authority in religion. For our present purpose, we shall discuss only the third type of moral authority, since it represents the line along which the strongest attack is to-day being waged against morality of any kind.

Hegel taught that the individual must accept the established customs, traditions, and institutions of his time as the final authority binding upon him. But a more widely accepted view in our day is that each person, while a member of society and as an intelligent being bound to respect the accumulated wisdom of the past, nevertheless has the inalienable right of revolting against whatever in custom or tradition he regards as unjust, immoral, or unreasonable. Often this attitude is carried too far, and is interpreted as though the rule of action in morals were, "Think as you like, do as you like, admire as you like; or, if you so prefer, don't think or act or admire at all". Manifestly, this is not the way to man's self-realization; it amounts to a denial of that which distinguishes man from the lower orders of animals.

Roughly speaking, there are three kinds of individualism. One finds morality to be quite independent of religion and philosophy, maintaining that, like art, it must be experienced and felt. This amounts almost to
finding the only authority in morals to reside in individual caprice; its danger is that it leads to an extreme form of subjectivism, which leaves nothing objective and binding in the moral consciousness.

A second type of individualism regards man as a creature of will, to whom the satisfaction of appetite and impulse is natural and right. This position has grown quite naturally out of the study of biology as a dynamic process, following upon the earlier study of static physics; man is seen to be drawn on by his own impulses and urges working from inside, rather than pushed along from behind by an external, fixed, and determined scheme. As the embodiment of will, man is the creature of his desires; his instincts are fundamental, and his aim and purpose in life is to satisfy these desires. But man finds society telling him that there are certain things he must not do; and, being a creature of instinct, he asks society who made it a judge over him. His position is strengthened by the work of the Freudian psychologists, who tell him that all restrictions and repressions of the natural libido are wrong and harmful. Here, then, is an ethics of will; it posits no kind of restraint, it knows no obedience to discipline or control; it puts authority in the individual as a biological organism. It is individualism in the extreme, and illustrates the limits to which this principle can run when given free rein in the field of morals.

Mr and Mrs Bertrand Russell are among the most vocal of the exponents of this type of individualism; on both sides of the Atlantic they have a fairly large following, collected from the class of young people who are keen to have the thrills of life without its responsibilities. Mr and Mrs Russell present a positive menace and a real danger to decent
society, and the shallowness and inadequacy of the position which they advocate can be indicated briefly by the following considerations: 1) It exalts the animal instincts, whereas man is essentially a creature of reason, and the governing of the animal instincts has been one of the big steps forward on the way to human civilization. 2) Its chief, if somewhat disguised, aim is freedom of sexual relations; exalting what it is pleased to call the creative impulse, yet the last thing it really wants is to create. 3) It must logically be made to apply to all the instincts, to acquisition, pugnaciousness, hunger, as well as sex. 4) There is a practical contradiction amongst the instincts, and in daily life a balance must be reached through reasoned choice. 5) This theory does not challenge authority, but denies all authority. 6) It is purely materialistic, with no spiritual element in it, whereas we maintain that authority is a spiritual matter. 7) There is a unity to life, and while men want satisfaction for their instincts, more than this they want satisfaction for themselves. 8) This theory fails to account for the achievement of civilization, for the things that are essentially human, and for either truth or goodness.

The third type of individualism in morals is what we may call the right of private judgment. The man who bases his action upon this principle purports to be guided not by impulse but by reason. The right of private judgment is deep-seated in Protestantism; it demands for every individual the right of thinking for himself and coming to his own conclusions. Reason holds the place of authority, and to exercise the reason is to rise above external and arbitrary authority. But the expression 'private judgment' is really a contradiction in terms; for when we arrive at truth, whether in science, morals, religion, or in any other
field, it is no longer private, but universal. Ideas live only in persons, and in order to have validity these ideas must be re-thought and lived by persons. The insane man has an abundance of ideas, but they are not true ideas. The right to truth is conditioned upon our thinking right opinions.

F. Religion. The question of the place of authority in religion is not limited to Christianity, but is found in all religions, and is seen to center pretty definitely around the priesthood and the sacred writings. For the purpose of this paper, however, we shall limit our discussion to authority in the Christian religion. Authority in religion is usually taken to mean something external to ourselves, infallible, which we must accept without questioning because we are incapable of questioning. The Christian world is divided roughly into two groups, the Roman Catholic and the Protestant; and it is usual to regard the Roman Church as imposing an external authority, while Protestantism relies upon something more internal in its nature. A moment of reflection convinces us that this familiar antithesis between external and internal authority is not very useful, unless we disregard the spatial connotations of the terms. There is no essential difference between the state of mind that accepts the authority of the Church, and that which accepts the authority of individual inspiration. That inner light which is felt to be the presence of the Holy Spirit in the soul, speaks with an authority as absolute as any so-called external authority can possibly be.

The one religious institution in which authority has become crystallized is the Church of Rome. We shall have occasion to see in the next chapter that her claims to infallibility may be questioned. The
dictatorial tones in which she communicates her authoritative utterances, the prestige of the tradition to which she appeals, the signs and wonders employed to corroborate them all fail to be convincing; her warnings and threats savor more of a military campaign than of a religious authority.

The other great branch of the Christian Church, born out of revolt against the abuses of Rome, soon found itself in need of an authority to which appeal could be made. Thus the Scriptures were set up as the final authority for Protestantism. But, like other collections of literary documents, this corpus of sacred writings has been found to be not exempt from errors due to the human infirmities of compilers and scribes. So against this authoritarian approach to religion there has been a reaction so violent that it has carried people back not only to a middle position where certain religious authorities of a rational type are held to exist, but back even to the position which says that no authority exists at all. Where the standard of education is high and where there is thorough grounding in the principles of religion, this latter position presents fewer evils than abject submission to the claims of an infallible Church or an infallible Book. But the danger attaching to this revolt against all authority is the danger that always follows extreme individualism; it is a dangerous thing to cast off all moorings before making sure that there are adequate resources on board; and a compass and rudder are more to be desired than an anchor.
The various references made earlier in this paper as to the doctrine of authority held and taught by the Church of Rome makes it unnecessary to go into detail here regarding that doctrine. We need but remind ourselves that the Church claims to be one, holy, catholic, and Apostolic, and therefore infallible. In "The Faith of Our Fathers", a book which styles itself a "plain exposition and vindication of the Church founded by our Lord Jesus Christ", Cardinal Gibbons declares that the Roman Church has "authority from God to teach regarding faith and morals; and in her teaching she is preserved from error by the special guidance of the Holy Ghost". The founding of the Church and the commission to it of infallible authority is recorded in St. Matthew's Gospel, the sixteenth chapter and eighteenth verse, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church. And the gates of hell shall not prevail against it". This reference to the gates of hell is interpreted by Cardinal Gibbons as a solemn promise by Christ that no error shall ever invade his church. The infallibility and supreme power of the pope is traced to the nineteenth verse of the same chapter: "And I will give to thee the keys to the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven". Cardinal Gibbons declares that
the New Testament establishes no doctrine at all unless it satisfies
every candid reader that Our Lord gave plenipotentiary powers to Peter
to govern the whole Church. Whatever privileges were conferred upon
Peter have been inherited through the centuries by the Bishops of Rome,
as successors to the Prince of Apostles. The supremacy of the Pope, his
authority as absolute head of the Church, is clearly proved by: 1) The
great number of appeals made to Rome by inferior courts; 2) the Church
Fathers with one voice pay homage to the Bishop of Rome; 3) Ecumenical
Councils furnish eloquent vindication of the claim for papal supremacy;
4) every nation converted to Christianity has received the light of
faith from Rome. So much for the arguments as stated by Cardinal Gibbons.

LaGrange is one of the most authoritative Roman Catholic commentators
on the Gospel of St. Matthew. Let us notice only this one quotation, from
the preface to his commentary: "Matthieu est le revelateur d'une doctrine
essentiellement interieur, et le foundateur de l'institution chretienne,
establie sur le fondement de Pierre, suquel sont associees les apotres".

Likewise in the Catholic Encyclopedia we read that the proof of
Christ's having constituted Peter the head of the Church is found in the
two Petrine texts already cited. In virtue of Christ's commission, Peter
stands in a relation of authority to the Church, and is the principle of
stability, unity, and increase. In all countries, keys are the symbol of
authority; and in conferring them, Christ makes Peter his vicegerent,
supreme over the Church, to govern in His place. Legislative and judicial
authority are granted in the fullest measure. The universal testimony of
Roman Catholic theologians maintains that the Roman Catholic doctrine of
authority is based upon: 1) Christ's establishment of His Church upon the
Apostle Peter; 2) His granting of the keys to Peter; 3) the primacy of the
Bishop of Rome; 4) Apostolical succession; 5) the inerrancy of the Church and the infallibility of the Pope; and, 6) the duty of all persons to accept the doctrines and submit to the rule of the Church.

Let us now proceed to examine the grounds upon which these claims are made.

The vital texts upon which the Papacy rests its claims are so few in number that one would expect them long ago to have been evaluated by every historian interested in the Christian Church. But actually the very scarcity of material tends to increase the difficulty that faces the historian, and almost every text in point is still the object of controversy. The first problem is to make sure of the genuineness of the texts; the methods used and the remarkable results achieved in the field of recent Biblical textual criticism are too well known to require comment here. But the establishment of a text does not finish the historian's work; for the influence of documents may depend "less upon their real origin than upon the way in which they coincide with the general outlook and demand of the subsequent age in which they are mainly used". (1) Here we are confronted by one of the solidest grounds supporting the Papacy; for few traditions are more firmly fixed than those which buttress the Petrine claims. However, the question is not solved by the strength of a tradition, nor by the fact that certain documents have been accepted for centuries; for the Catholic scholar is bound to regard the tradition as more reliable than the Protestant scholar is willing to do, because one is pre-disposed to accept, and the other, if not to reject, at least to judge on the basis of well documented evidence.

(1) Shotwell and Loomis, "The See of Peter", p. xx.
Such an inquiry as we are now engaged upon, if it be complete, must then raise two problems. There is the question of the authenticity of the texts, which can be answered only by the expert working in the field of New Testament criticism. For our purpose we accept the authorised Catholic Douay version of the New Testament, since to the Christians of the early centuries the Latin Vulgate was authentic, and to the Roman Catholic historian the texts of this version underlie the Roman Catholic structure. The second problem involves the influence of these texts as they have actually been handed down, and presents an interesting and almost limitless field of investigation. We must, however, be content with looking at only a few of the more salient considerations that arise in this connection.

It may be said that in a general way the Christian Scriptures and the Christian Church took shape and grew up together as complementary developments. The apostolic and sub-apostolic ages were not dominated and regulated by a closely organised hierarchy; it was a time of inspiration, of intense free spirituality; traditions and functions were not yet fixed. Evangelists, "driven by the spirit" like Paul, were still extending the Gospel; those who spoke with tongues were still likely to interrupt services, even in the presence of Bishops, as we are told in the "Didache"; inspiration was still producing such writings as the "Shepherd of Hermas", "The Ascension of Isaiah", and various other visions, parables, and teachings. By the middle of the second century, the process of the formation of our New Testament was well advanced; and the Muratorian Fragment, dating from 170-190 A.D., contains a list of accepted books. By this time the Church had come under episcopal control. But it is rather embarrassing to the Roman Catholic claims that the first definite statement
we have to the effect that Peter and Paul founded the Roman Church is made by Dionysius of Corinth, about 170 A.D., and that the earliest lists of the early Bishops of Rome date from about the same period and do not quite agree with each other. The century between 70 A.D. and 170 A.D. was one of turmoil and persecution for Christians, one in which legends of saints and martyrs were springing up; and yet as far as precise documentary evidence goes, the century is almost a blank. It is the one century for which, more than any other, we could wish for completer historical knowledge.

We now turn to those texts which were employed to buttress the structure of a papal monarchy.

1. The Gospel of Mark. This earliest of the gospels is our prime source for the life of Peter during his discipleship, being based partly upon Peter's own recollections, according to a tradition dating from the first half of the second century, (1). Modern scholarship dates Mark's gospel about 75 A.D.; the place of its writing was probably Rome. We should expect that in this gospel, if anywhere, would be found some account of Peter's own ideas about his primacy. But it is a significant fact that none of the vital texts upon which the Petrine claim rests are taken from Mark's gospel. This fact takes on additional weight when we consider that the majority of competent scholars place its origin in Rome, and its date only a few years after Peter's death; surely if Peter had had any idea of his own primacy, if he had regarded himself as the first Bishop of Rome and Christ's vicar on earth, or if there had been any early tradition to that effect, it would be reflected in the pages of Mark's gospel.

Mark's story about Peter begins with "the call", specific references to Simon being limited to ten verses scattered through the first chapter. The commission of "the twelve" comes next, with a brief reference to the changing of Simon's name to Peter, an incident of no special significance, being paralleled by the changing of the names of James and John. The assignment of their mission and the bestowal of the gift of miracle is upon all the twelve; Peter receives no special distinction. The incident of Peter's confession receives slight treatment. Next follows, in Chapters 9 and 10, the question of precedence. Throughout the Gospel there are references to the group of more intimate disciples, Peter, James, and John; they were with Jesus at the raising of Jairus's daughter; they were chosen to witness the Transfiguration; this little group are with Him in Gethsemane. But the first incident of the painful controversy over the rank the disciples were to hold in the new kingdom occurs at Peter's own house in Capernaum, chapter 9, verses 32-34 (33-35 in the King James Version). Jesus not only refused to encourage their ambitions to power, but He plainly rebuked them, "If any man desire to be first, he shall be the last of all and the minister of all". But this one rebuke did not settle the question of precedence. "It came up again and again, showing that among the disciples themselves there was still rivalry for honor in the kingdom which they believed Jesus about to establish. Mark records these incidents to show apparently that Jesus himself singled out no one for leadership and forbade his disciples to concern themselves over which one of their number should head them. The replies of Jesus are as insistent as their inquiries",(1). In chapter 10, verse 31, He says to them, "But many that are first shall be last: and the last first". In

response to the request for special recognition for James and John,
He calls all the disciples together and tells them, "whosoever shall be greater, shall be your minister: and whosoever shall be first among you, shall be the servant of all. For the Son of man also is not come to be ministered unto; but to minister and to give his life a redemption for many". Mark records in chapter 14 Peter's denial of Christ; but Peter plays no further part in this gospel, except for one reference by the young man at the tomb, 16:7.

Thus we see that the most solidly established of the gospels is "singularly lacking in the assertion of claims to special authorization for Peter",(1). Whatever the true explanation, we have the text before us.

2. The Gospel of Matthew. This is a composite work, and much more complex than the gospel we have just been looking at. It was compiled some few years later than Mark, in either Palestine or Syria; and the fact that its narrative of the acts of Jesus is taken almost bodily from Mark's gospel points to the acceptance of Mark's account as authoritative. The absence of any other tradition to rival the Petrine Mark is of utmost significance. In addition to the gospel of Mark, Matthew draws a good deal of its material from the so-called "Q" source, which appears itself to have been made up of two parts,— the one a Greek narrative and the other a collection of Aramaic "Logia". The remaining additions cannot be traced back beyond the gospel itself, i.e., the closing years of the century. From the complex and tangled problem that Matthew offers, it is significant and sufficient for us to notice

(1) Shotwell and Loomis, op. cit., p. 17.
that practically seven-eighths of the material is taken from Mark and from "c"; and that it is among the remaining portion, the "extra" texts, that we find those upon which the Petrine claims are based. The historical basis for the Petrine texts in Matthew is decidedly less sound than the position given to them by tradition would lead us to expect.

Foskes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake in a recent authoritative book suggest that the Matthean tradition belongs to Antioch. "At first sight Rome seems natural; but this is due to the impression made by later controversy. There is no trace in the second century that Rome claimed supremacy because of its connection with Peter, nor is there evidence of the special use of Matthew in Rome...... The hypothesis may therefore be ventured that 'Tu es Petrus' represented originally not Roman but Antiochene thought, and reflects the struggle between Jerusalem and Antioch for supremacy",(1). From the first, Peter was associated with the Gentile Church at Antioch, and according to ancient tradition he was Bishop at Antioch before he went to Rome. It is reasonable to suppose that, since Jerusalem had the sacred sites connected with Jesus' ministry and death and could lend its great prestige to any doctrines emanating from it, that at Antioch the story of Peter's relation with his Master would be so told as to bring out into better perspective the career and work of the Bishop of Antioch as it was locally understood. It was, by the way, a story in which Peter's own part was not always conspicuously praiseworthy.

The account of "the call" is taken almost verbatim from Mark. But in listing the Twelve there is this difference: Matthew places Peter first, and mentions the fact that he is first, 10:2. Shotwell and Loomis

tell us that "it is the view of Catholic theologians that this is a formal statement of Peter's primacy, one of the most definite in the New Testament, a recognition by Matthew of what was then positively accepted fact", (1). That it is a view with practically no foundation in historical fact, requires no further demonstration.

Mark records Peter's confession as a simple fact; but in Matthew it becomes entirely different. Here it is made the basis for the selection by Jesus of Peter as the foundation of His Church, and so it "gives rise to the strongest text in the arsenal of the Roman See in subsequent ages". This eighteenth verse of the sixteenth chapter is open to three varying interpretations. Some of the Fathers held that it is Peter's confession, "thou art Christ, the son of the living God" -- which was the real corner-stone of the Church. There is a considerable number of Papal utterances to this effect. When Luther insisted upon this interpretation, Eck, who was the papal champion, said that no one denied it, (2). But the orthodox Catholic view has been the literal one, that the rock was Peter, Kepha in both cases. A third view was advanced by Protestant theologians, who maintained that Jesus was referring to Himself as the rock and not to Peter at all.

This central text does not stand entirely by itself. In chapter 18 there is a similar charge, but here given to all the disciples, and indicating the apostolical succession of all the apostles without special primacy for any one. This text strengthens the case for the episcopacy, but weakens the Roman claim for Petrine supremacy.


(1) Shotwell and Loomis, op. cit., p. 21,22.
(2) "De Primatu Petri contra Lutherum", chap. xiii.
Mark and the "Q" source, but adds different extra matter and employs a different kind of editorial treatment. It was apparently written about the time of the completion of Matthew's gospel. The place of its origin is a difficult question, and beyond the scope of the present inquiry. The book of Acts is a continuation of Luke's gospel, and they should be read together. But confining ourselves to the Gospel, we find but few references; and these require little comment.

There is "the call" told differently from Mark's simple story; in a similar way Luke treats the appointment of the Twelve, and of the Seventy, applying to the Seventy whole sections of the "Q" text which Matthew applies to the Twelve. There follows Peter's confession, as it is in Mark. The question of precedence arises, and brings in the text promising the twelve thrones. In chapter 22 there is added a new charge to Peter alone, which may be regarded as giving Peter an advantage over "the brethren"; verses 31 and 32, "And the Lord said: Simon, Simon, behold, Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren." At the close of the gospel it is recorded that after the resurrection Jesus appeared specially to Simon, 24:33-34.

4. The Gospel of John. No subject in the whole range of New Testament presents a more puzzling problem than the question of the authorship of the fourth gospel. But for our purpose it is sufficient to accept two points upon which there is substantial agreement,—that it was written at Ephesus, sometime about 105 to 110 A.D. This gospel concentrates upon Jesus' teaching and miracles; it has little to say about Peter.
The scene of Peter's call is transferred from the Sea of Galilee to the Jordan; and the changing of his name from Simon to Peter is recorded in the same incident, 1:42. The confession by Peter that Jesus was the Christ, which in Matthew is the basis for the granting of the keys, is entirely lacking in John's gospel. After the resurrection, Christ grants power to all the disciples together; 20:22-23, "he breathed on them; and he said to them: Receive ye the Holy Ghost: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained. Here again the argument favors apostolical succession; but it tells quite as strongly against the Petrine supremacy.

But in the last chapter of the fourth gospel the trend is decidedly different from that of the preceding twenty chapters. Here Peter is exalted, in both figurative and direct language; it is Peter alone who pulls in the miraculous draught of fishes, and who is singled out by Jesus with the reiterated "Feed my lambs". In this pastoral charge Peter "is invested by Jesus with the insignia and office of chief under-shepherd of the flock of God..... There remains nothing that the most exacting friend of 'Catholic' apostolicity could demand in the way of tribute to its great representative",(1). However, the case for the Roman claim loses most of this support by the fact that this last chapter is regarded by most scholars as an appendix, written by a different hand than that which wrote the main body of the gospel. The narrative naturally closes at the end of the twentieth chapter. The opening words of chapter twenty-one, in which the Sea of Galilee is spoken of as "the sea of Tiberias", shows that it was added by a later hand after the second name had come to be applied to the Sea. In the body of the gospel Peter is

treated as of secondary importance even among the disciples; this final chapter has been added to give a Petrine close to a gospel which had exalted John and had come out of a center of Pauline Christianity.

5. Acts and Epistles. It has been suggested that the book of the Acts of the Apostles admits of division into two parts: Chapters 1 to 7, "The Acts of Peter", and chapters 8 to 28, "The Acts of Paul". In these opening chapters, Peter is the leading personality. He takes the initiative in electing a successor to Judas, he speaks at Pentecost, it is his shadow that has virtue in it, it is he who rejects Simon Magus, and to him is revealed the great fact that Christianity is to be opened to the Gentiles. Then, in chapter 13, Peter drops out of the narrative of Acts, and Paul assumes the center of the stage. Competent scholarship regards the Pauline section to be considerably superior in historical accuracy and sureness of touch, than the earlier chapters; and, while this is the point of view adopted by this paper, fairness requires that it be admitted this interpretation is open to attack. That Peter drops out of sight in Acts is not proof that he dropped out of the work of the Church. It is largely a matter of emphasis.

In a few passages in Galatians and Second Corinthians, Paul gives his clear and emphatic conception of the relationship existing amongst the apostles. He writes, in Galatians 1:18, "Then after three years I (Paul) went to Jerusalem to see Peter; and I tarried with him fifteen days". But he acknowledges no pretensions on Peter's part to a position higher than his own. The second chapter of the Galatian letter records how Paul "withstood him (Peter) to the face, because he was to be blamed". In second Corinthians, 11:5, we read, "For I suppose that I (Paul) have
done nothing less than the great apostles'.

These, then, are the texts upon which Rome bases three of her six claims to authority,—i.e., the establishment of the Church upon Peter, the granting of the keys to Peter, and Apostolical Succession. Our examination of these texts leaves us convinced that the Scriptural warrant for such a hierarchy as Rome has become is so slender as to be virtually negligible. The Roman Church could never have grown out of the meager New Testament warrant for it; the Roman Papal Monarchy is rather only a natural political growth, and as such is the most powerful political organisation in the world. The Scriptures are used to prove the Roman doctrine and to validate the Roman organisation, as Newman pointed out. But we are here caught in a vicious circle; for Rome really holds the Scriptures to have validity only because she gives them validity. Rome declares the Scriptures to be of divine origin, and then points to them in proof of her own claims of power. Examination of the New Testament records from an unbiased point of view reveals the great weight of inescapable evidence against the fact or intention of Christ to set up on earth a Church organisation with Peter at its head. Peter was a leader among the disciples; there need be no denying his power and influence. But taken as a whole, the New Testament fails completely to support the claims to authority which Rome so confidently asserts.

So it becomes clear that it is the Tradition behind Rome which is really far more important in establishing her claims than the New Testament texts are. This tradition is especially strong in regard to Peter's having been in Rome, and his founding of the Church there; and, while there seems nothing improbable in the tradition and belief of Catholic writers in Peter's early labors in Rome, yet, even though he worked there and
suffered martyrdom there, that is not to say that he founded the Church or was its first "bishop". The rise of the episcopate is hidden beyond the hope of recovery in the dark clouds of uncertainty; we can never find the true answers to the questions we would ask. But if we limit ourselves to the texts, we do not know for certain that Peter was ever in Rome, or if he was there, we do not know for how long nor what he did. Not until 252 A.D. is the See of Rome spoken of as the See of Peter, by Cyprian of Carthage; not until 354 A.D. is Peter definitely called the first Bishop of Rome, and even this evidence in the Liberian Catalogue is inadmissible since it grants him a bishopric there lasting for twenty-five years, which can not be reconciled with the earlier texts.

If we were to follow where the interest of this present inquiry beckons, we should soon find ourselves on shoreless seas. We should need to consider the legend accepted as historical; then the apocryphal tradition; then the rise of the Bishopric of Rome, with its growing claims of Power; the rise of the Papacy under Gregory,—but we must confine ourselves, and briefly, to the acceptance of the tradition in the early centuries.

The earliest reference is that of Clement of Rome, who in the fifth chapter of his famous letter written to the Corinthians in 96 A.D. makes a reference to the deaths of Peter and Paul; but the reference is utterly vague, nothing is said of the place or manner of their deaths, and more is made of the life and sufferings of Paul than of Peter. Ignatius of Antioch, in a letter to the Romans circa 116 A.D., devotes three short sentences to a comparison of his own admonitions with the commandments of Peter and Paul. Papias of Hierapolis, circa 120 A.D., is quoted by Clement of Alexandria,
who indicates that Papias regarded Peter as having been in Rome.

Dionysius of Corinth, circa 170 A.D., in a letter to the Romans, "makes the earliest statement we possess to the effect that Peter and Paul actually founded the Roman Church", (1). Irenaeus of Asia and Gaul, between 130 and 200 A.D., was among the first to employ the Roman traditions of Peter and Paul; his writings had an enormous effect upon the rise of the Papal office. From the whole of the first two centuries, these are all the references we have in support of the tradition that Peter the preacher was in Rome.

That Peter suffered martyrdom in Rome is first mentioned by one Caius of Rome, circa 199-217 A.D. This is also referred to by Tertullian, between 160 and 235 A.D.; by Origen, 185-254 A.D.; by Porphyry of Tyre, 230-300 A.D.; by Peter of Alexandria, circa 311 A.D.; and by Lactantius of Africa, circa 310 A.D. It is not profitable to examine these references; it is enough to notice the lateness of the dates. But the tradition that Peter founded the Roman episcopate must rest on evidence even more questionable, as being later. Eusebius, 265-339 A.D., seems certainly to regard Peter as head or leader of the Roman community, but nowhere calls him formally by the title of Bishop. The Liber Pontificalis, put together in the sixth or seventh century, draws upon a source called the Liberian Catalogue, dating from 354 A.D., which makes explicit assertion that Peter founded both the Roman Church and the Roman See and was its first Bishop. Damasus, bishop of Rome from 366 to 384 A.D., testifies to the presence of the bodies of Peter and Paul in the crypt "ad catacumbas". Optatus, bishop of Mileve circa 370 A.D., makes a statement more sweeping than any we have encountered thus far; "Not only" he says,

(1) Shotwell and Loomis, "The See of Peter", p. 75.
was Peter head of the Apostles, and the first Bishop of Rome, but his
Bishopric at Rome was the first to be established anywhere in the Church.
It was the original episcopate. The claim, however, was excessive, even
for that credulous age", (1). With Jerome, 335-420 A.D., the tradition
assumed its final shape.

These citations represent fairly and accurately all the proof
that can be drawn from the early Fathers in support of the tradition that
Peter preached at Rome, founded the Roman episcopate, and there suffered
martyrdom. The evidence is surprisingly scanty. But when the Roman
Catholic apologist is confronted with the inadequacy of this first channel
of revelation,—the Word of God written,—he at once turns to the second
channel,—the Word of God unwritten, or oral tradition. And it becomes
apparent that this oral tradition renders vastly greater service in
buttressing Roman claims than can be granted to the New Testament records.

In refutation of the claims made for tradition by Rome, we shall,
in the interest of brevity, make use of a few sentences from a book by one
whose sound scholarship and fairness of judgment leave no room for further
discussion after he has spoken. W.P. Paterson writes: "It is certain that
there was an oral tradition touching the life and doctrine of Jesus by
which the Church lived for a generation before it possessed the first of
our canonical Gospels. It is certain that this tradition must originally
have been wider in its scope than our written record...... But...much is
still wanting to make good the position that there was an oral tradition
descending from Christ and His Apostles which sanctioned the specific
features of the Roman Catholic system of doctrine, worship, and government...

In default of Scriptural testimony, universal acceptance is regarded as

(1) Shotwell and Loomis, op. cit., p. 111.
sufficient evidence of a divine tradition, but this is not forthcoming in the case of the doctrines and practices which Rome is most anxiously concerned to substantiate...... It is not surprising that Protestants are sceptical as to an unwritten tradition which is said to have conveyed from Christ and His Apostles practically the whole system of Roman Catholic dogma, worship, and discipline"(1). It may be argued, as Newman argued, that the Roman Catholic system is the result of development; but this does not convince us that the various lines of development have all been drawn from Christ and His first followers, or even from Christian sources.

Turning to the inerrancy of the Church and the infallibility of the Pope, we can see quite easily how naturally such a doctrine grew up. But "in reality the theory comes into conflict with the fact that no ecclesiastical organ has given evidence of being invested with infallibility in its handling of doctrines. At different times reliance has been placed upon different organs as the seat of infallibility, and it is difficult to defend either on the ground of its constitution or the results of its work"(2). The Biblical evidence, as we have seen, would never by itself have suggested the theory of Papal infallibility. But even so, if papal decrees had always been in accordance with the truth and consistent with one another, if the fruit of the Roman Catholic system had only been more wholesome and inspiring, we might more easily share with our Roman Catholic brethren the judgment that it is a true doctrine. Our purpose is not popular and controversial; it is enough merely to say that the record of the glaring errors and inconsistencies of the Papacy are too

(2) Ibid., p. 44.
well known to students of Church history to require elaboration here. The names of Honorius I and Sixtus V suffice to stand as types. The shocking and lecherous immoralities of the papal court under Alexander VI are too foul and painful to recount in this place; the memory of such unspeakable vileness should fill with shame not only the Roman Catholic but also every person who shares in the Christian tradition. The moral decline that prevailed in the Church in the thirteenth century is lamented in the despairing cries of Roger Bacon, Adam Marsh, Grosseteste, Thomas of Celano, Bonaventura, Vincent of Beauvais, and many others. Cardinal Gasquet's ludicrous efforts to whitewash the morals of the monasteries is aptly described by Dr Barry, "To manipulate ancient writings, to edit history in one's favor, did not appear criminal....", (1). One need look no further than the works of Professor Coulton for an exposition of the true condition of affairs in the medieval Church; especially useful are his "Medieval Studies" and "Five Centuries of Religion". Coulton is a distinguished historian, a scholar of the first rank, with an enormous reputation to lose; but Roman Catholic apologists consistently refuse to meet him in debate or to answer him in writing.

In conclusion, we see that the Roman Catholic doctrine of authority has very little to recommend it to the modern thoughtful man. Admitting its tremendous appeal to a certain type of mind, and that not necessarily the untrained mind, and admiring many of its features, yet as a whole we must reject it unconditionally. As an interpretation and living example of the religion founded by Jesus Christ, the Roman Catholic system fails

(1) Barry, "The Papal Monarchy", p. 133.
utterly. But in practice, "Roman Catholics have better reasons for believing in their religion as a whole than are supplied in the figment of an oral tradition and of an infallible Pope", (1). The only effective attack which can be made upon this unacceptable doctrine of authority is that which opposes to it a purer and stronger conception of the same Divine Founder and Gospel in a more satisfactory setting.

(1) W.P. Paterson, op. cit., p. 56.
Chapter 16

THE PROTESTANT THEORY EXAMINED AND CRITICISED

The persistent problem of authority in religion is raised in all its complexity in the history of Protestant theology. It is one of the glories of Protestantism that it does allow freedom of thought and insists upon the right of private judgment in the interpretation of the doctrines upon which Christianity is founded. But this very freedom proves to be the occasion for an unfortunate lack of agreement on what really are the true doctrines of Protestantism and the authentic Protestant attitude toward the question of authority. At this point Rome has the advantage in holding to what is, outwardly at least, a uniform and unquestioned doctrine, and in teaching that doctrine the world over in unity and with commanding assurance. Protestantism lacks this definiteness and unity in its view of authority. However, it is not enough to say merely that Rome holds an external doctrine, while the Protestant doctrine is internal and personal; or that Rome places authority in an infallible Church and Pope, while Protestantism trusts it to private judgment. For, as Professor Paterson points out, every branch of the visible church acts upon an assumption which is separated only by degree from the Roman Catholic doctrine of infallibility. "It is
the firm conviction of every Church which is a living and believing Church, that it is in possession of truth which is eternal and unchangeable, and that even if theoretically it be capable of erring it has, as a matter of fact, been preserved from essential error\(^{(1)}\).

One of the less creditable features of Protestantism is its tendency to schism. In its earliest years it split into the Lutheran and Reformed divisions; later on the Anglican branch asserted the independence of its own point of view and broke off connections with the other Reformed members; there have been other divisions and sub-divisions almost beyond counting. So when the word "Protestant" is used, it unfortunately does not mean a type of Christianity that is recognisable as having been everywhere consistent with itself during the past four centuries. We shall consider, first, what we choose to call the older or original Protestantism; and then modern Protestantism, as it has emphasised evangelicalism, the High Church point of view, liberalism, the inner light, and reason.

1. The separation of the Reformed Church from the Lutheran was, if not caused by, at least confirmed by a difference in attitude toward religious authority. The Lutheran branch of the Church, the parent stem of the Reformation Churches, was content to retain elements of tradition so long as they did not actually conflict with the teachings of Scripture; whereas the Reformed group held that express Scriptural warrant was required to justify anything which entered into their doctrines of belief, worship, and government. The older, conservative Protestant doctrine of authority is expressed in the formula, "The Bible, the whole

\(^{(1)}\) W.P. Paterson, op. cit., p. 56.
Bible, and nothing but the Bible, is the religion of the Protestants". While proclaiming the Scriptures to be the supreme standard, yet the authority which the Reformers practically acknowledged "was not that of the whole Bible, but the authority of the Bible as a whole interpreted from its centre...... The use to which the liberty (won by revolt against the Roman system) was put was, not to repudiate the notion of authority in religion altogether, but to transfer the allegiance from an ecclesiastical authority that was distrusted to a Scriptural authority that was believed to rest on a solid basis",(1). It was the substitution for the authority claimed by Rome of an authority equally definite and, so to speak, external. Rome held to Scripture and tradition; the special feature of Protestantism was that the sole channel for the transmission of revelation is the written Word of God, a perfect instrument, requiring no buttressing by tradition and no interpretation by a Church claiming infallibility.

Protestantism held that Scripture is not only a complete record of revelation, but that it also possesses an exclusiveness which is in contrast to the limited authority allowed to it in the Roman system. No Church has a right to claim inerrancy for its doctrines on the ground of inherent infallibility; yet the organised Christian Church must define doctrines and judge controversies of faith, and must require its members to respect its decisions. To Calvin it seemed necessary to build into the Church a system of discipline "so searching and effective as to ensure that the weak and erring would be adequately tutored, governed, and restrained"; but this ideal was not persistently held to, and later Protestantism has developed a large measure of liberty. The Scripture

(1) W.P.Paterson, op. cit., p. 57-8.
on which the Protestant Church proceeded to build was held to come
direct from God, and the basis of authority in that Scripture was the
authority of God. This led to the view of the absolute inerrancy of
Scripture, on points of history and geography, as well as doctrine and
ethics; a mechanical type of verbal inspiration it was, in which the
Holy Spirit employed the inspired writer as a mere penman. "That
Calvin looked upon Scripture as a statute book of doctrine and morality,
and that he held the mechanical and plenary theory of inspiration, is
antecedently probable from his intellectual constitution and legal
training, and this is strongly supported by the terms in which he
usually touches the subject", (1).

Let us look now at some of the views of Scripture as held by
Luther, and expressed in the Westminster Confession. In Appendix E of
Professor Paterson's "Rule of Faith", we read: "The presuppositions of
Luther's theological thinking was that the Bible is the Word of God,
given by revelation of the Holy Spirit, and that it alone transmits and
proves the truths of revelation". There follow certain quotations from
various of Luther's works which bear upon his doctrine of Scripture,
taken from Köstlin's "Luther's Theologie". "I will not waste a word in
arguing with one who does not consider that the Scriptures are the Word
of God: we ought not to dispute with a man who thus rejects first
principles". "Even though an angel from heaven and all the world
should preach against it, we ought to believe, for the reason that it is
God's Word, and that we have an inward feeling that it is the truth".
"Christus Dominus et rex Scripturae". "In this all sound sacred books

(1) W.P. Paterson, op. cit., p. 65.
agree that they preach Christ and occupy themselves with Christ".
"In comparison with these (the Pauline Epistles) the Epistle of James
is a right strawny epistle, for it has nothing of the evangelical
manner". Professor Paterson comments thus on the place Luther accorded
to reason: "The powers of reason were estimated by Luther in strict
consistency with a doctrine of original sin and total depravity; and
while he recognized reason as paying some homage to God and duty, he
regarded it as incompetent to handle the things of religion apart from
the experience of regeneration, as strongly disposed to unbelief, and
as the tool by which Satan had wrought much mischief in theology", (1).

It is doubtful whether a more powerful or more noble treatment of
the topic of Holy Scripture has ever been written than that which is
found in the Westminster Confession. Here, however, we look in vain
for any elaborated and rigid theory of the nature and range of the
inspiration of the Scriptures,—a circumstance which may be due to
an unwillingness on the part of the framers to include it as an article of
faith, or due to the fact that since divine authorship was assumed it
was natural that inerrancy should follow. We quote certain pertinent
sentences: "Although the light of nature, and the works of creation and
providence, do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, as
to leave men inexcusable; yet they are not sufficient to give that
knowledge of God, and of His will, which is necessary unto salvation:
therefore, it pleased the Lord, at sundry times, and in divers manners,
to reveal Himself, and to declare His will unto His Church; and after-
wards, for the better preserving and propagating of the truth, and for

the more sure establishment and comfort of the Church against the corruption of the flesh, and the malice of Satan and of the world, to commit the same wholly unto writing; which maketh the Holy Scripture to be most necessary; those former ways of God's revealing His will unto His people being now ceased". "The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself), the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received, because it is the Word of God". "The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself; and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any Scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it must be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly".

In criticising this older Protestant position, there are several points to be mentioned briefly. First it may be said that the principles on which the Reformers started out were incomparably superior to the Roman doctrines and approached very much more closely to what, on the basis of the New Testament records, we have reason to suppose the religion of Jesus really was. But the high authority of the free spirit could not be maintained; the reformers, with that characteristic weakness of human nature, fell back upon an authority differing in degree but little from the authority claimed by Rome. While professing to reproduce objectively the whole content of Scripture, the early Protestant theology actually only edited it in the light of an assured central content. Particular portions of Scripture were elevated to a high authority such as was not allowed to every part of its message; and this was done with an arbitrariness which destroys the claim to objectivity. The kind of unity
which Calvin found in the Scriptures was based on a dogmatic assumption which the scholarship of the past century dispelled. Protestant theology is now agreed that any such theory of mechanical inspiration and consequent inerrancy as the Reformers considered necessary to hold, can not be supported. The true test of inspiration is the power to inspire; on that basis it is still found that the Bible is the unique gift of God, of lofty dignity, and a trustworthy "source of our knowledge of the Christian revelation, and as the sovereign means of grace". But it is not serving the best interests of Christianity to maintain in the face of present-day knowledge that every word of Scripture was divinely dictated and that all is perfect and without error.

The Westminster Confession argues that the authority of Scripture depends not on man or on a Church, but on God. We agree absolutely with this; but at the same time, we must recognise that it presents an exceedingly difficult problem. For, just how is authority mediated from God to man? How does it "get at" men, and authenticate itself to him? The Confession further states that the former ways of God's revealing His will have now ceased; this seems an arbitrary assumption. What basis have the Anglicans for limiting revelation to the first five centuries, and the early Reformers for limiting it to the period of the composition of the Scriptures? One feels that God has not given up interest in and control of His world; the need for revelation is as great to-day as it ever was; may we not suppose that the fact of revelation is as real?

2. The Church of England has associated itself with the Lutheran position on the retention of traditional elements. It has conserved a
great deal that is traditional rather than Scriptural, and its theologians not only lay great stress on the authority of the Ecumenical Councils, but also "they find no form of dogmatic proof so congenial as that which is built up out of the testimonies of the Fathers". (1) It was in following this emphasis that Newman was led into the studies that finally drew him to Rome. There is something to be said for the High Church dependence on the ancient and undivided Church as "the authorized interpreter of the deposit of revealed truth"; but our position on this point has been made clear earlier in this paper.

3. The Reformed branch of the Protestant Church separated itself from Lutheranism largely because of the feeling that the Lutherans were retaining too much of Roman Catholic idolatry, and were failing to appreciate the grace and freedom of the gospel. Since the time of the separation, the Reformed church has contained within its borders shades of theological opinion and attitudes toward authority ranging all the way from the old orthodoxy to an almost nihilistic rationalism. It has been said that the ruling principle of the theology of the Reformed church is a lively conception of the sovereignty of God, and that this principle regards the world and all life as the carrying out in time of His divine plan. This leads to predestination, and, as many would maintain, a virtual denial of free will to the individual. But the criticism carries little weight. Clearly, the problem of free will and determinism is a vexing one; the best thought thus far brought to bear upon it has been unable to find a solution. The fact is that God is sovereign and man is free; Paul saw this with wide open eyes, but he

(1) W.P. Paterson, op. cit., p. 11.
was wiser than to attempt to resolve the antinomy.

A second criticism often brought against the doctrine of predestination is seen likewise to have little force behind it, namely, the objection that a recognition of the absolute sovereignty of God diminishes man's responsibility, encourages him to fold his hands and await the inevitable outcome of things. But an appeal to history reveals the fact that when Calvinistic thought has been dominant there has been, as Froude states, an "unusual manifestation of moral vision, enthusiasm, and strenuousness"; to quote Dr Dykes, it put iron into the blood. On the other hand, ethical results have not been especially impressive during those periods which have emphasized the self-sufficiency of man as over against God. So we leave our consideration of the early Reformed Protestantism in substantial agreement with its view of the sovereign power of God and its bearing on authority.

4. The rise of Rationalism, and of the use of reason in relation to authority in religion, marks an important epoch in the history of religious thought,—in the opinion of Troeltsch, more important even than the sixteenth century Reformation. For Rationalism "broke in principle with the supernatural scheme of thought, and asserted its title to rule over an ever-extending realm of knowledge without any obligation to render homage, and to pay tribute, to a divine authority",(1). The claim thus made in the second half of the seventeenth century, and repeated continuously since, was valid with respect to those portions of new discovery in the fields of history and science for which Christianity has no "message that bears the stamp of revelation"; but

(1) W.P. Paterson, op. cit., p. 315.
the rationalism that challenges the presuppositions common to Roman Catholicism and Protestantism goes further and affirms that the unaided reason is the exclusive authority and the sole source and norm in matters of religion.

The elevation of reason to a supreme place of authority in religion was an inevitable development. For it is true that religious truth is apprehended only by the activity of the mind, and when the intensity of religious experience following the Reformation cooled, it was felt by many that the witness of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the believer was merely a rational judgment expressed in pious terms. Moreover, when the human mind was freed from the fetters with which the Church of Rome had bound it, the natural result was for it to take a rather overweening pride in its own strength. But the tendency has been to go too far, to grant too large a place to the authority of the unaided reason, and to confuse revelation with mere discovery. Religion should be rational; a religion that is irrational has no place in to-day's world. But it is a mistake to suppose that the exercise of the reason alone can lead into the depths of religious experience, or can explain that experience after it has been felt. Professor Montague's book on "The Ways of Knowing" teaches the lesson that we cannot get into full touch with reality by following any one method to the exclusion of all others; and in the sphere of religion, as in the realm of personal relationships, this is especially true. Religion is primarily a personal relationship between the individual soul and God; and as such it cannot be reduced to literal scientific terms. There are various illustrations that may be offered roughly to indicate what we mean. For example, a
diamond is defined in precise language as "native carbon crystallized in the isometric system, usually in the form of tetrahedrons"; but the diamond which a woman wears on her left hand really means more, really is much more than that. Analysed scientifically, Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is resolved into sound waves of varying intensity and frequency; but its true essence, what the symphony really is, is not apprehended by such a procedure. The friendship that I feel for my companion grows and glows only upon the basis of the spiritual adventure that I make; its success can not be proved by hard reason on a priori grounds. In short, while reason must be granted free play in examining the first principles and the developmental elements that enter into a doctrine of authority in religion, yet to the reason alone complete and final authority can never be granted.

5. The sovereign authority to which Protestantism gave full recognition was declared to be the Scriptures, but was in reality the Holy Spirit. The Prophets had been inspired by the Holy Ghost, and the New Testament doctrine was derived both directly from Christ and from the Spirit whom He promised would be with and lead the disciples. So failure to acknowledge the power and efficacy of the Holy Spirit was to fail in correctly understanding the principle of knowledge which Protestantism held. This position is expressed by Hans Denck, quoted by Rufus Jones: "The Holy Scriptures I esteem above human treasures, but not so highly as the Word of God, which is living, powerful, and eternal, and pure from the elements of this world, since it is God Himself, Spirit and not letter, written without pen and paper, so that it can never be blotted out".(1).

(1) Rufus Jones, "Mystical Religion", p. 386.
The school of the Free Spirit, or the Inner Light, in theology ranges all the way from theological liberalism to complete freedom of individual thought, and includes various types of mysticism. Professor Paterson limits it to those who, "believing that special revelation is a mode of divine activity, have held that throughout the Christian dispensation private revelations of a supernatural kind have continued to be given to men, and that the communications thus made take their place alongside of the Scriptures as authoritative Word of God", (1).

Exemplified first by the Anabaptists, this principle of the Inner Light was later affirmed by the Quakers, still later by the Swedenborgians and other more modern sects, and has certain affinities with present-day schools of subjective theology.

This type of religious authority stands at the opposite pole from the Roman Catholic doctrine. It sets the voice of the Spirit as it speaks in the heart of man, far above dogma, even above Scripture; it exalts the individual, and, although it might deny this, it does rank private judgment above every other criterion of authority. Thus it is the very antithesis of Romanism. Newman had too little respect for the average man, he trusted too little in the individual to admit into his doctrine anything approaching the tenets of this school of the Inner Light. As we have seen, he argued that the court of final appeal rested with the individual reason and conscience; but he knew better. He knew that in all practical cases the Church of Rome required her adherents to obey her dictates without reference to their private opinions. It was here that Newman gave evidence of being a not too good Romanist.

His own position was a sort of half-way-house between the strict

(1) W.P. Paterson, op. cit., p. 79.
authoritarianism of Rome and the principle of private judgment. He
gave the appearance of wishing to run with the fox and with the hounds.
If only he had had a firmer faith in his fellow men, a larger trust
in God, and less craving for external buttresses, his attitude on the
illumination of the Inner Light coupled with his lofty conception of the
primacy of conscience, would have furnished a doctrine of authority
which all the world must have respected.

It will not be wise to accord to the principle of private judgment
or to the voice of the Inner Light too large a place in our attitude
toward the question of authority in religion. The Inner Light has been
regarded as the distinctive note of mysticism, and as such it has often
mistaken the operations of merely human faculties for divine manifestations.
An excellent treatment of the history of this confusion of the true with
the false is found in President Cutten’s “Speaking With Tongues”. There
attaches also the danger that so often accompanies mysticism in those of
its subjective phases which are marked by a denial of the real world
and of evil, and which spreads its wings and soars off into the realms
of amazing fancy. This type of individualism is not reliable; it requires
an anchor in something objective, in the collective historical experience
of the race, and in what the long list of men who have been qualified
through their own religious experience and through the faculties of trained
minds have regarded as Christian revelation. After all, the average man’s
opinions on religion are not just as good as every other man’s; for they
may not be so true. The school of the Inner Light is right in regarding
the Voice of the Holy Spirit to be the Voice of God, and to be the final
and absolute authority in religion. The difficulty lies in recognising
that Voice when it speaks, and in distinguishing it from the fancies and imaginings of the individual. It is scarcely likely that the illumination granted day by day to ordinary individuals on the affairs of common life possesses a validity superior to Scripture. There is in the world to-day a large and growing body of earnest Christians, followers of Mr Frank Buchman, calling themselves the First Century Christian Fellowship, who seem to refer to God nearly all the judgments that need to be made in every-day living, the trivial as well as the important; and few enterprises are undertaken without first seeking God's guidance, which is always given in unmistakable terms. While the true Christian should and will live in constant communion with God, it seems to be stretching the point rather far to ask Him about every detail of life, and to suppose that He speaks to us definite and detailed answers. He has endowed us with minds, such as they are; and it may be said without irreverence that He expects us to use them. There is more in the Oxford Group Movement to interest the psychologist than there is for the theologian.

In concluding our review of the Protestant doctrine of authority, we see that as a doctrine it is much less definite than that taught by Rome. It is to-day, so to speak, less authoritative. In its early stages it fell into the same error that characterises the Roman position,—i.e., it set up an external arbitrary authority. This external authority imposed by Scripture has been outgrown; it does not appeal to the modern mind and temper. Protestantism requires to have something to say on authority in religion that willrecommend and authenticate itself to the age in which we are now living; the truth is now exactly what it was in the past and always will be, but the modes of its expression must change with
changing times, and newly discovered portions of truth must modify 
the implications of older truths. The second general characteristic 
of the Protestant doctrine, which we call private judgment, likewise 
has its rich advantages and its dangers and limitations. When it runs 
into individualistic expressions of opinion interpreted as the Voice 
of the Holy Spirit, it is in danger of passing over into mere caprice. 
The sovereign right of the individual judgment must never be surrendered; 
herein lies the great strength, as well as the weakness, of the 
Protestant position. It must seek and submit itself to an adequate 
and trustworthy control if it would avoid the pitfalls of 
extreme subjectivism.
Having looked at both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant doctrines of authority, and having seen earlier in our inquiry that Newman's doctrine was neither completely the one nor the other, we now turn to examine his doctrine in some detail and to discover in it what elements there are of strength as well as of weakness. Our purpose in examining and criticising the Roman Catholic doctrine was in large measure a criticism of Newman's position, to the degree in which he accepted the Roman doctrine; for, since he was a priest and a Cardinal of the Roman Church that doctrine was, formally at least, his own. It will be expected that we shall, after having rejected the Roman Catholic doctrine, suggest some form of the Protestant attitude toward authority as better qualified to claim allegiance. But our examination of orthodox and liberal Protestantism reveals to us that something is still wanting in its views on the scope and nature of authority in religion. So the two preceding chapters have both been in criticism, more or less directly, of Newman's position. In the present chapter we shall direct our attention more specifically to his own
views, looking first at his general conception of Christianity, and
secondly at the twelve elements entering into his doctrine of authority.

It is impossible to say very much to the point about Newman's
views on authority in religion without being led into a consideration
of his whole thought about Christianity. He was most uncritical in his
acceptance of first principles; having accepted them, he felt no
obligation to examine them, and he followed obediently wherever they
led. It is not on any one nor on a few particular points that we can
pin him down; it is his scheme of religion as a whole that strikes us
as mistaken and impossible. Carried along by his exquisite prose and
his subtle logic, we yield to him on one point and then on another;
until, when we break the spell of his fascination and look around us,
we see how far we have been carried from the shores of reality, and we
feel compelled to condemn his whole system of Christian thinking. Few
men have ever employed more subtlety than he did; few have juggled words
with more telling effect; few have been so clever in twisting ideas
about to fit preconceived opinions. Dogma, he declared, was the essence
of religion; but it has been truly said there never was a clearer case
of a man's dogma growing out of his religion, instead of his dogma
producing his religion.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Newman's religion is what
we may call its lack of contact with reality. He was led on by hints;
he never studied any side of a question except his own; he built up the
system of his religion in the closed circle of his own circumscribed
interests, a circle into which the influence of the world's progress
and the nobility and the hunger of mankind were not allowed to enter. Dr John Oman suggests that Newman "follows a kind of aesthetic intuition, and builds up a scheme which draws him on by its completeness; and he never seems to experience the need of falling back on the question whether it has actuality behind it or not", (1). He was a Romanticist, seeking first of all perfection for his work of art; everything that rendered his scheme more complete from the aesthetic point of view, he readily assimilated; the rest he passed by as if it did not exist. Thus it was that he came to regard the Church of Rome as a finished work of art, "one great, perfect, completed whole, wherein everything down to the late determined immaculate conception of the Virgin is right in its context and requisite in its place", (2). Clearly enough, then, one may expect to find his doctrine of authority unsatisfactory in proportion as his attitude to Christianity seems warped.

1. The first element we noticed in the doctrine which in Chapter 12 we ascribed to Newman, was his certainty of two and only two beings in the universe, himself and his Creator. This was to him a spiritual experience more certain than his own certainty that he had hands and feet. He approaches the mystic in this absolute certainty of the luminous self-evidence of God; and there is no reason to doubt the deep and honest sincerity that was behind his assertion. In every religion the fundamental question is the idea of God; that Newman lived in a communion with God closer than is given most men to achieve, seems certain enough. But the surprising thing is that one who had such a genuine and

(2) Ibid., p. 265.
unquestionable spiritual experience of God should feel the need of the infallibility of an external authority in the form of a visible guaranteeing Church. Surely if God spoke to Newman in the intimate and unmistakable way he has given us to understand that He did speak, there could be no need for an external buttress; such a witness must be self-authenticating and final. Newman seems never to have thought of God as Father; he never achieved the relation to Him that shines through every word Jesus speaks of God. He saw only the dark and fearful side of relationship to the Divine; the impression that his sermons make is invariably one of insecurity, and confusion, and fear. His appeal is for men to leave the sad condition in which they find themselves placed, and hand over the affairs of their souls in a kind of slavish panic to a self-contained external authority. Fundamentally, Newman lacked faith; he had nothing of the kind of faith that Jesus and Paul lived by. Often as it has been denied, it seems to the present writer that he did live just on the ragged edge of skepticism. We should not deny what he tells us about his certainty of God; but for myself, I can not see that it made much difference to his religion. It might have been better if he had been less sure, if he then could have exercised a loftier faith. His view that the world had gotten into such a desperately evil state that God was forced to send a revelation and an institution in which are vested the guarantees of that revelation, does little honor to God. For if God is God, why should He have allowed things on the earth to have come to such a pass? Was it because, as in "The Green Pastures", He had not been down here for eight or nine hundred years? And if He seeks to redeem man from his ignorance and excess by external mechanical means,
why does He not step in boldly and either eliminate evil or restrict the use of men's reason to a point where he must submit to the one true Church? Newman must have known better; he must have known that "God is spirit"; and one would look in vain upon the pages of the New Testament to find there such a conception of God as Newman held. His was certainly not the God of Jesus and Paul. And so we find that this fundamental element in his doctrine of authority and his theory of religion is anything but satisfactory.

2. Butler's thesis that probability is the guide of life was accepted by Newman and made a basic part of his theological system. To Butler, the guide thus furnished by probability was intended not to satisfy our curiosity, but only to afford us practical guidance, (1), and as such there can be little doubt of its practical value. We do act on probabilities, even in questions of greatest importance; and even in trivial matters we can not have full and exact and mathematical certainty before making our choice on the one side or other. But Newman's great fault in this connection was that he juggled the facts, and adjusted them to fit his theory. The main lines of his theological position were determined by influences so slight as to be almost accidental; his attitude toward Scripture was fixed in its final form when he once heard it stated that the sacred text was intended only to prove doctrine and not to teach it; while walking around Christ Church meadow he learned the doctrine of Apostolical Succession; so it was from Butler, quoted at second hand, that he found justification for his type of argument, even though his method was different from Butler's. Keble maintained that

probabilities in religion are raised to certainties by faith and love; but Newman could not wholly accept this, since it led in a direction away from the definite authority of a visible Church. His sermons abound in such phrases as "Why should we not believe..."; "Scripture seems to show us..."; "Who knows whether...", etc., all introducing fantastic probabilities. Coupled with his doctrine of development, this principle of probability could in his hands be used to prove the soundness of Rome, or, for that matter, of any other system he had been interested in defending.

3. In the anarchical situation which resulted from the human race being in opposition to the purposes of its Creator, Newman expected that God must interfere. And, since the Roman Church must be accounted for as an agency more divine than its political growth would indicate, it seemed to him that the best way for God to interfere was to set up an institution which would do battle with man's fierce passion and all-dissolving intellect. This institution is, of course, the Church; and the revelation which it represents is once-for-all, final, and external. The ideas of God and of revelation can never be far separated; we see here how necessary it is to understand Newman's conception of God before we can know what he means by revelation. We see too how this external mechanized view of revelation runs counter to what the Scriptures reveal of God's purpose and method. To see in the pages of the Holy Word a God who only holds a cruel whip over cringing humanity, and to see nothing spiritual except what is brought in from the outside and certified by the certificate held by the Roman Catholic Church, is indeed a "melancholy absence of faith". It is, as John Oman says, "to deny the power of truth
to fight its own battle, to expect no effect from God's spirit striving with man's\textsuperscript{1}, (1). It is to treat men as children, a thing which the Roman Church has always done. It is to distrust man's freedom, reason, and independence, a thing which has always been one of her characteristics. It is to have such a weak faith and such a materialistic attitude toward religion as will be satisfied only with a visible external support and guarantee of revelation, a thing which points to the fundamental difference between the very idea of religion as held by the Roman Catholic and the Protestant.

4. It followed naturally that Newman should hold the Church to be infallible and the Pope inerrant. He argued against the definition of Papal infallibility by the Vatican Council of 1870, as we have seen; but after it was passed he supported it and declared it was only a formal statement of the principle on which the Church had always worked. We need spend but little time in stating our objection to the doctrine of Church and Papal infallibility. We have already seen that it grew up quite naturally and inevitably, and is explainable on purely human and political terms; we have examined the texts on which it rests, and we find no warrant in Scripture for such an organisation as it has become. Newman would say that the Church of his adoption is the result of the process of development; we answer, then it is a disgracefully false development. No more striking contrast can be imagined than that which is presented by the Roman Catholic Church in its present condition, and that little band of simple men whose hearts were on fire as they rallied round the standard of the Living Christ. When a Roman Catholic Archbishop arrived recently at the Cathedral in Boston, Mass., arrayed in

gorgeous vestments, driven in an elegant motor-car, and marched majestically up the canopied and carpeted approach to the Cathedral door, a workman passing by at the time gave pointed expression to the contrast when he was heard to remark, "And Jesus Christ walked in His bare feet!" So far has Rome departed from the form, the faith, even the religion, of Jesus. It is a denial of His example and teaching to argue that He intended His revelation to be the exclusive property of any kind of politically-minded organisation; it is doubly a denial to conceive it vested in such a Church as the Roman Church has actually become. For it is a Church which seems to be half heaven and half hell. There can be no denial of the lofty piety and the true faith that fills so many of its members; its service to art and music is more than worthy of high praise; we must admire its practical psychology, its deep insight into the human heart; but we deplore its chicanery, its politics, its materialism. Our judgment must be that by its fruits it shall be known. Newman seemed able to disregard the dark features of the Church's past, or, if he saw them, he did not allow them to effect his uncritical loyalty. If the Church had been infallible through the centuries, it would be less difficult to resist her claims to-day; but the pages of history reveal all too clearly how fallible she has been, how little of true religious spirit has informed her judgments, how unspeakably vile many of her supreme pontiffs have been. Charitably-minded persons seek to excuse the conduct of popes and priests on the ground that it was perfectly natural in the time and social environment in which they were living; this is an attitude which we can not share. To maintain that the Church has been infallible and the Popes infallible is only to use
the words in a sense which deprives them of their ordinary meaning. It is to say that what they have done and said is true and right because they have done and said it. When a papal decree conflicts with conscience, of course conscience is to be obeyed; but it it’the Church which decides what conscience is, and the Pope is quite able to bring conscience into line with his pronouncement. If a papal decree is found to conflict with some earlier papal judgment, it is the Church which has the power to decide that one or the other was not delivered ex cathedra, or that in one case His Holiness may have been speaking as an individual and not as the Head of the Church. What a convenient doctrine this is one can easily judge for himself. "The historical inquiry is closed by appeal to the infallible Church". But Newman could see no objection to this theory which makes the Church infallible and then tests that infallibility by the Church's own judgments.

5. Among the notes of the Church, Newman gave large place to antiquity, catholicity, and development. As for antiquity, his fault was that he did not go back far enough; it was the writings of the third and fourth century Fathers that came like music to his inward ear, giving support to the ideas he had already formed. In Chapter 15, supra, we saw how large a part tradition had played by the beginning of the third century, and we know that numberless elements had by that time been absorbed into the Christian Church from unlikely sources. We can only wish that Newman had carried his antiquity back to the New Testament records, back to the Christianity of Jesus and Paul. To base one's Christian theology so largely on the writings of the Fathers is to make what seems to us a selection of authorities which is indefensibly arbitrary;
to ignore as consistently as Newman does the teachings of Jesus and Paul is to stop short in one's progress backward to real antiquity. It was while defending his Via Media that the doctrine of Catholicity grew in importance for Newman. We agree with him that Catholicity should be a note of the Christian Church; but to our mind, "Catholic" does not mean "Roman". He has no good ground for speaking of "the feelings of awe, mystery, tenderness, reverence, devotedness", as "feelings which may especially be called Catholic". Besides, the Roman Church is not truly Catholic; for it embraces within its communion a comparatively small percentage of the world's peoples, and there are temperaments and whole races to which, accommodate itself as it will, it can not appeal. The true Catholic, as Dr Whyte has said, is "the well-read, the open-minded, the hospitable-hearted, the spiritually-exercised Evangelical, as he is called. He is of no sect. He is of no school. He is of no occasion. He comes of no movement. He belongs to all sects, and all sects belong to him", (1). With Catholicity thus interpreted, Newman had no acquaintance.

We have already considered in some detail his theory of development. He felt, with Döllinger, Möhler, and others, that it was an anachronism to carry back every element of the Roman Catholic system to the Apostolic Age; and so he set out to defend its doctrines as a legitimate development of the original deposits. Lack of space clearly makes impossible here a full refutation of Newman's scheme of doctrinal development; we shall look, and briefly, at only one phase of the question. That the Roman Catholic system is a development, that it has worked out thoroughly and consistently its first principles, can not be

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denied; but we must ask, Do the principles which underlie its various
lines of development all alike derive from Christian sources?
Professor Paterson points out that "it is a difficult task to show
that the doctrines which have been elaborated to form the Roman Catholic
scheme of salvation, including its developed sacramental theory are an
explication of the original teaching of Christ and of the Apostles.
They represent the implications of, and the deductions from, a mediaeval
conception of Christianity which has been modified by the intrusion of
elements that are alien to the original genius of the Christian religion.
They fail to satisfy Newman's first test of a true development -- viz.
the preservation of type or idea",(1).

6. The Roman system is complete and well-developed; full orbed,
it satisfies the Newman type of mind. Lacking in true religious faith,
temperamentally given to belief in the miraculous, clinging to opinions
that were no less than superstitions, he needed a visible Church in
which to believe, a Church which held in her own hands the efficacy of
the sacraments. He regarded the Church as a perfected system, in much the
same kind of way that Hegel regarded his intellectual formula as a
summing up of the Eternal. But the immediate perfection of the Roman
system, while satisfying Newman, yet is "only a narrow interpretation
of God's ways, for, if the whole world is a sacrament of things spiritual,
the sacraments of the Church must be great symbols laden with a world of
meaning, but to narrow the sacramental efficacy of all material creation
down to the wonder-working of a material substance debases and does not
glorify the idea. Nor is the highest way to place the sacramental idea
in a material world at all, for its ultimate symbol is man not nature,

and the fundamental error is the denial of that liberty upon which that sacramental importance of humanity depends. Moreover what is the worth of God's loving patience and all the infinite device of his providence, if infallibility goes by office, and the end of all our search is not the light of the souls that love truth and the liberty of the souls that obey it, but the reception at the hands of another of a body of doctrine, and the performance at the direction of another of a body of ritual? (1). It seems unnecessary to add any comment to Dr Oman's words.

7. A large proportion of Newman's share of the "Tracts for The Times" was given to arguing for the Apostolical descent of the Church of England ministry. Later in his career he regarded the clergy of the Church of Rome as the only true descendants of the Apostles. In both cases, he believed in an almost magical efficacy to the laying on of hands. The belief that their clergy are the spiritual descendants of an unbroken line stretching all the way back to Peter and His Master, is a source of great comfort to many people. But it has a purely sentimental basis. Aside from the fact that there is no proof whatever that the leaders of the early Church imposed hands upon their successors, and the fact that we can not be certain about the organisation of the Church in the first two centuries of our era, we would further take the position that an external mechanical type of succession is no part of God's plan for the realisation of His Kingdom. The analogy of the storage battery from which the current flows in unbroken line to the clergy of to-day, a figure often used to illustrate the theory of Apostolical succession, is too crude and unspiritual to receive serious consideration. What the

claim for Apostolical succession amounts to is in many cases but little removed from ecclesiastical snobbery. What does matter is that the ministry of the Church should succeed Christ and His Apostles as His true ministers in all ages in respect of a burning zeal for the advancement of the Kingdom which Christ ushered in, and of lofty self-consecration to the ideals which He set forth. To separate the office of the priest and the man who fills it is suicidal; to argue that it is not improper for Pat Murphy to be drunk on Saturday night and then for Father Murphy to celebrate Mass on Sunday morning, on the basis that when he is before the altar he is no longer an individual with human weaknesses but a priest of God, is subversive of the very morality for which the Church must stand. "Be ye clean, that bear the vessels of the Lord".

8. Among the many amazing things that Newman believed, one that seems especially strange to us is his belief that Scripture was intended only to prove doctrine, and that the true source of doctrine were the formularies of the Church. We may ask, Had the Church formulated a doctrinal system which Paul in his letters was trying to prove? It seems pretty difficult to point to anything like proof that the Church had worked out her doctrine before the Scriptures were written, and that they were written merely to prove what was held and taught by the Church. Here is another example of Newman’s habit of seizing upon a point and never afterward examining it to ask if it be really true; if it fitted in with his pre-conceived notions, then for him it was law. It is an example too of the characteristic Roman method of arguing in a circle,—the Scriptures prove the doctrines of the Church, and the Church gives to the Scriptures what validity they have. The great pity is that Newman did not give himself to a proper study of the New Testament; for the Evangelical Church
needed and still needs the genius, the scholarship, and the rare and splendid talents which he possessed so abundantly, "to commend the Gospel message to men of taste", as John Foster said. But one can not escape the sad conviction that Newman was never whole-heartedly converted and surrendered up to Jesus Christ as the Redeemer of sinful men. Not once is the name of Jesus found in the impressive record of his conversion. He never escaped from the strictly limited doctrine of the Fathers on the person and work of Christ. As Dr Whyte pointed out, Newman persistently put forward works where Paul put faith; merit where Paul put grace; doubt and fear where Paul put love and hope and full assurance. The essentially Christian elements in his theology were seriously truncated because of the use he made and the attitude he held toward the Scriptures.

9. Again, the Christianity of his system suffered because of his insistence that dogma is the essence of religion. To us, it seems the perversion of religion, of Christianity in particular, to make the dogmatic element paramount, almost to the exclusion of all else. It is narrow; it is arbitrary; it is not the way of Jesus and of Paul. True, dogma is important; and the Protestant Churches are often in danger of underestimating its value. One often hears it said, "It doesn't matter what a man believes, so long as he lives the good life". But it does matter what a man believes; every man has his creed, of one sort or another, and his life is shaped largely by that creed, whether or not he be conscious of the shaping; and it is the business of theology to look to the soundness and truth of the creeds of Christianity. But to make Christianity merely a matter of dogma is to be still under bondage to law. That dogma
is not the essence of religion in the practical affairs of the religious
life seems to be indicated by the following circumstance: The Roman
Catholic and the Greek Catholic Churches hold almost the same dogma,
what differences that existed between them having been pretty well
settled and smoothed away by the Council of Florence. Yet in practical
affairs the eastern and the western Churches are separated by a wide
gulf. On the other hand, some of the Protestant sects profess dogmas
that differ violently, while in every-day religious affairs they bear
striking resemblances to each other. Without minimising too greatly
the significance to Christianity of dogma, yet we must disagree entirely
with Newman when he holds that dogma is the essence of religion. This
was not the way of the Master.

10. Hand in hand with his insistence upon dogma as the essence
of religion went Newman's distrust of private judgment. It was one of
his oft-repeated beliefs that there is no logical halting-ground between
atheism and infallibility; either one must accept the authority of the
visible Church, or he must slip into complete denial. Against this
position we maintain that atheism and infallibility are not opposites, but
rather that both appeal to the type of mind that must rely upon a
materialistic proof and that finds it difficult or impossible to recognise
the validity of personal religious experience. It is this experience, and
not the voice of the Church that claims infallibility, that is the real
antithesis of atheism. He was ever fearful of the harm that might be done
by pride of intellect; and the assertion of the right of the individual to
think for himself and to arrive at independent judgments he regarded as
the work of intellectual pride. Here we must agree with Newman; for, as
John Oman has well said, "to spread our peacock-feathers over our eyes is the surest way of shutting out the heavens". But this is not the final word; for it is equally true that "pride of intellect is only rightly escaped by the humility which is not the resolve to abandon the intellect God has given us, but the resolve to use it as He guides us". (1) Newman held out for the right of the individual to use his private judgment in certain extraordinary cases, but not in the Protestant sense of the use of private judgment. In reality, about the only function he found for it was to decide to accept the authority of Rome. It was as if one should say, "I am free to make my own choices; I have the right to exercise my private judgment; therefore, I decide to put my spiritual affairs wholly into the hands of the Roman Church, and I freely choose to surrender my will to hers".

We cannot go all the way with Newman in his depreciation of private judgment; we cannot, with him, place implicit trust in the Church as the infallible interpreter of divine truth. The history of religion warns us to be wary of ecclesiastical councils; one commentator writes, "Belief in the infallibility of councils can hardly be held by one who has studied their history, and who knows anything of their violence and party spirit, and of the bad arguments on the strength of which many of their infallible conclusions were arrived at". (2) In the Old Testament it is the great individual who is also the holy man through whom religious progress and enlightenment comes. The life of Christ offers strong reason for distrusting the official collective body. The individual contributions of Peter and of Paul were the great factors that entered into the make-up of the Apostolic Age.

(1) John Oman, op. cit., p. 268.
(2) Salmon, "The Infallibility of The Church", p. 286.
11. A further point in Newman's doctrine of authority is that the Christian must begin by believing; he must not withhold his assent to the beliefs and teachings of the Church until such time as they are all clearly proved, but by willing to do he shall know the doctrine. Here again we feel that Newman is very near to a large truth; no friendship, no marriage, no business, no religion can be begun and successfully carried on without the exercise of an ample faith. But the point at issue is to determine where that faith begins. Newman would have us believe what a normal reason can not approve, or, rather, he would have us hold our reason in abeyance while we engage upon those Roman Catholic practices which are calculated to produce true religion. Our position is that the reason should be followed as far as it will take us, and then a leap made into the unknown beyond, into the region of faith. Faith was for Newman, as we saw in an earlier chapter, something distinctly different from the faith of the New Testament; rather than a continuation of the journey from the point where reason confesses her inability to guide further, it was for him a denial of reason at the outset and a sort of self-hypnotism by the continued repetition of religious "duties". His distrust of the human reason amounted almost to a panic; he was genuinely afraid of where the exercise of his own reason might lead him. Rationalism and Romanticism had both sought the short-cut to freedom, the one by asserting the right of the individual reason, the other by seeking the system in which the greatest degree of contentment could be found; with Newman, we reject these two methods. But he regarded men as incapable of gaining freedom and using it rightly; he must be led by the hand, like a child, if he would find the right road. Here
we must part company with him, for we feel that his position bears
testimony to his nearness to unbelief.

12. Over and over again Newman stressed the sovereign right of conscience; as we have seen, he held that the believer must follow the dictates of his own conscience, even though in so doing he be brought into conflict with Papal decrees. But he hastens to add that he is supposing an impossible case, for the conscience can never run counter to the will of the Pontiff. What this comes to is that man does not have the right to determine what his own conscience is and requires; one's conscience is really determined by what the Pope wills. If I find myself in disagreement with His Holiness, then it is not my conscience that I am following, but the wretched dictates of private judgment or the proud urges of self-will. To put it crudely in another way, the Pope has power to change and twist conscience into what he wishes it to be. There is little doubt that Newman held a high view of the dignity and authority of the human individual conscience; but the necessity of conforming to the Roman system required that he tone in his beliefs, and this was for him not a difficult adjustment. He was probably never consciously dishonest; but he was over-subtle, and his mental attitude "makes something less than the impression of a whole-hearted regard for the truth". When he says that he never used an argument which he saw clearly to be unsound, he comes dangerously near to trifling with the truth. In his hands, conscience was a flexible instrument; it never got in his way.

And so we conclude that Newman's doctrine of authority in religion, his view of the seat of authority, his beliefs concerning what is right
and worthy of devotion, are not acceptable. His religion was not essentially Christian, for it rested not upon the revelation of God the Father which Jesus Christ brought into the world, but upon his own fearful and terrifying analysis of man. It was un-Christian in that it built upon the syncretistic Cahtolicism of the fourth century while practically ignoring the religion of Jesus and Paul. It was un-Christian in its lack of true humility, in its assumption of superiority, in its lack of a faith that at once grips upon the realities of life and soars into the very heavens. It was un-Christian in its emphasis upon the mechanical materialistic doctrine of an infallible Pope and Church. It was lacking in true Catholicity by reason of its exclusiveness, and the contempt it held for Luther who had preached against the abuses of the Roman system more rigorously than any other man since Paul; but then, Luther was only the "leader of a school", and not a "Father". Newman's very temperament determined that his doctrine should be faulty; for he regarded himself as a heaven-sent messenger whose task on earth was to teach all men concerning the truth of religion. It may be said even that Newman sought neither true freedom nor true faith; that he hindered the real progress of the Kingdom of God, revived the spirit of bigotry, acquiesced in man's bondage to superstition, encouraged the Church to look backward instead of forward; and that he made "men curb unduly within themselves that daring of the soul which has been the good providence of the world", (1). He never felt, with William James, that there is that within us which is prepared to take a risk. What a pity he could not abandon the premise which so long tormented him and which is false and contrary to God's way everywhere, that the true Church

must be found only in a visible and material sense! What a pity he could not see that it is vastly grander and truer to reality to regard Christianity not as a definite body of doctrine guarded by an infallible group of men, but as a "new power of vitality which enters the world, partakes of its evil, and again rejects it, at times by violent commotion"! What a pity that this poor old man, whom we so greatly admire and to whom we owe so much, never realised that the "fruits which the tree of knowledge refuses to yield grow on the tree of life".
Chapter 18

CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT

It is usually a much easier thing to criticise an established position than to offer in its place a wholly satisfactory substitute. Our purpose in this chapter is to put forward certain considerations toward a doctrine of authority in religion which will avoid some of the more obvious failings of the Roman Catholic and Protestant doctrines and will do justice to the God-given freedom of man's inquiring spirit. Of the difficulties that lie in the way of furnishing such a doctrine, no one can be more conscious than the writer; we shall feel the work we set out to do has been accomplished if we succeed in merely indicating the lines along which a valid authority in religion can be reached. It would be unwarranted presumption to expect to do more; for the quest is a ceaseless one, and the final word will not be spoken until we know fully, even as we are also fully known.

1. We shall first call attention to what we said in an earlier chapter about the spiritual nature of authority. Our position is that there is no such thing as an external authority in religion. A Church
may claim to be infallible, and may force its doctrines and discipline upon its adherents; but where coercion is resorted to, there is not the exercise of real authority. Even in the state, even in the army, true authority is a spiritual matter; it works in men, not by way of compulsion, but through their acceptance into their minds of its superior claims and its right to be obeyed. This can perhaps be made clear by a story told to the writer by a Lieutenant-Colonel of the United States Army, who was during the World War Chief Morale Officer for the American Expeditionary Forces. A few summers ago this officer was in command of an encampment of soldiers. One night he sensed that something was wrong in the camp; he felt that trouble was brewing. Hastily dressing himself, he picked his way through the darkness to the spot where the noise was coming from, and there he found a small group of men gathered about their ring-leader, who was a corporal; they were making plans for some kind of boyish escapade, perhaps not serious in itself, and yet serious enough as a breach of military discipline. They were, of course, taken aback to see their regimental commander walk into their midst. His action was significant. He did not speak a word. He simply walked over to the ring-leader, and played his electric torch for a few seconds upon the chevrons on the corporal's sleeve. Then he turned, and went silently back to his headquarters. Before he had taken many paces, the corporal had ordered the men back to their tents; the threatened outbreak was checked. And it had been done, not by harsh threatenings from the Lieutenant-Colonel in whom authority was embodied; but by turning the thought of the corporal in upon his own authority. There in the darkness a circle of light resting upon the chevrons on his sleeve reminded him that trust had been
placed in him, and he was now betraying that trust. It was an
effective substitution of inner self-control for external restraint.

The exercise of authority in religion is not different from the
exercise of authority in any other sphere. Authority, wherever found,
must recommend itself as a spiritual force to the mind of the individual.
Obedience to the laws of the state, of the Church, of the human conscience,
are in this all alike. In his dialogue called "Crito", Plato exhibits
Socrates as the good citizen, who, having been unjustly condemned to
death, is nevertheless willing to give up his life in obedience to the
laws of the state. The days of Socrates are drawing to a close. His
aged friend Crito comes to him, and urges his assent to a plan of escape
which has been arranged by his friends. But Socrates is afraid that
Crito is pressing upon him the judgment of the many, whereas he has all
his life long followed the dictates of reason only; and now, even though
he happens to be in trouble, he can not repudiate the principles on which
he has built his life. He recognises that he has been unjustly condemned
by the decree of the state, but he refuses to flinch and run. In every
line of the dialogue there breathes the fine lofty spirit of Greek
individualism; Socrates is the final judge of what his action will be.
Yet it is not a selfish subjectivism; there is a higher loyalty, his
loyalty to the state and to his own selfhood. The principles on which he
has lived can not be repudiated merely because his external circumstances
are altered. In one of his noblest figures of speech, Plato pictures
the laws as coming and talking with Socrates; and as a result of this
imagined conversation, Socrates says to Crito substantially these words:
"I have lived in Athens for seventy years. By living here thus, I made an
agreement with the laws of Athens to live by their provisions. I
need not have stayed here; I could have gone elsewhere if I had so
chosen. But having lived here under the laws, I must abide by their
current enforcement, at whatever cost to myself. Escape will not make
me holier or happier or juster, in this life or in the life to come. I
depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil. This, dear Crito,
is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of
the flute in the ears of the mystic. Leave me, then, Crito, to fulfil the
will of God, and to follow where He leads". It is along such lines as these
stories illustrate that we shall expect to find what we can accept as
a valid authority.

2. The right of private judgment is deep-seated in Protestantism.
It demands for every individual the right to think for himself. The well-
disciplined reason has a large voice in determining what authority shall be
accepted and followed, and to exercise the reason is to rise above external
and arbitrary authority. Individualism is always a protesting, and it has
great positive value when it is directed against false and abusive views of
authority. However, a limit is placed upon individualism by the condition
that the individual never exists apart from society; nevertheless, the
individual counts heavily in society, and it is to the individual and not
to courts and councils that the world owes most of its progress. At the
center of the individualistic position is the belief that nothing is too
sacred to investigate, and that there are no barriers to thought other
than thought itself. Here is at once the strength and the weakness of
Protestantism. While maintaining the right of each person to think for
himself and to express his own individuality in accepting only what his
properly exercised reason permits him to accept, we must also seek to guard it from running out into mere subjectivism and caprice. We shall have to make room for the objective and binding element in the moral consciousness. We must strive to strike a balance between the true sovereignty of the individual, and a recognition of the fact that every person is not fully qualified to decide for himself on all questions without reference to what others have thought and learned. It is false to say that the only thing we know is our own experience; this is merely our opinion, whereas to arrive at the truth is to see things from a universal point of view. In an earlier chapter we noticed Hegel’s teaching that the individual must accept the established customs, traditions, and institutions of his time as the final authority. But this is a view with which we cannot agree; for each person, while bound to respect the accumulated wisdom of past generations and the teachings of those who have gained the right to speak, nevertheless has the inalienable right of revolting against whatever in custom or tradition is regarded by mature reflection as unjust, unmoral, or unreasonable.

The two general theories of authority in religion, the Roman Catholic and the Protestant, correspond to two general tendencies in human nature. The one view is conservative, tenacious of tradition, distrustful of the individual; the other is liberal, living in the present, full of faith in the average man and his future. Our final doctrine shall draw elements from both; but on the matter of individualism our position is decidedly with the Protestant tradition. C.W.Emmet explains in Streeter’s "Reality" why so many millions are satisfied in denying their
right to private judgment by accepting an external, material, institutional authority in religion: "In our weakness we crave something definite on which to lean, something which may tell us without possibility of error what we are to do, what we are to believe". But this is the attitude of children; grown men may and should in all humility stretch the pinions of their own reason and exercise the gifts which God has given them. The courageous and pioneering souls of every age find submission to the demands of an external authority to be intolerable. The insistence of Protestantism on the right of private judgment is just the insistence made by Christianity; for, to continue with Emmet's quotation, "..... the message of Christianity is that by losing our lives we find them. It tells us to live dangerously, and to take risks".

And there are risks that must be taken. Life is a training-ground for the building of character, and not merely a fearful place through which men must be led as children through a dark forest. It is man's glory that he is free; free to make his own choices, free to sin if he choose that rather than the higher way. And this gift of freedom carries with it the responsibilities that inevitably accompany privilege; if God has decreed that with the passing of centuries we should have reached a stage where we have minds developed to think for ourselves, then it is a cowardly misuse of His gift if we abandon our search for the truth and hand over our spiritual affairs to a Church or a book or a body of men. The individual may often be wrong; the Church and society may be right, they usually are; and we agree with Newman when he says we cannot cut
loose entirely from the past. Yet to fetter man's freedom and
shackle his spirit by compelling conformity to an external authority
which he cannot accept for his own is to deny the way of Jesus and
the effective working of the Holy Spirit.

In George Bernard Shaw's "Saint Joan" there is a scene where
the parish priests have been talking with Joan of Arc. She had been
acting strangely, behaving in a way that could be called at least un-
conventional; and the priests are urging her to return home, forget
her visions, be a good girl, and they as the representatives of the
Mother Church will stand by her and look after her. It is the age-old
contrast of the priest and the prophet, the conservative and the pioneer.
They are putting forth the claims of traditionalism against the stirrings
of her individualism. Their's is a comforting doctrine, but it does not
appeal to Joan. To their tame counsel she replies magnificently, "But I
hear the voices!" Joan was right. Those who hear the voices must be
permitted to follow where they lead. We must grant to the individual
his freedom to strike off on new paths, to depart from tradition, to
plow the lone furrow. The grandest pages of history are those on which
are spread the records of the pioneers, the men and women who sought a
better way. Many of them have gotten lost, have had to suffer for their
daring; but it is something to have helped humanity onward toward its
goal, rather than abjectly to have followed a leader who has only
questionable qualifications to lead. For, as John Oman says, "man
advances not so much by great visions of his journey from mountain
peaks of thought, as by earnestly trying all ways and finding, by coming
to the end of them, that he is away from the great highway of true progress"(1).

3. We have now reached the point where our discussion must be drawn to a conclusion, and some suggestions toward a doctrine of authority in religion offered. Thus far we have been considering Newman's views on authority; we have criticised the traditional Roman and Protestant attitudes; now we must point out where, in our opinion, an adequate and compelling doctrine of authority can be found. We have rejected the Roman Catholic doctrine because of its conflict with the facts of history, its lack of harmony with the religion of Jesus, and its failure to do honor to the mind and spirit of man. We have found the voice of society to be not always acceptable, for the voice of the people is by no means inevitably the voice of God. Nor can we accept without qualification the authority of the individual; for, cut off from society, the individual is not up to much. Having rejected so much, what remains that has abiding worth?

The search for authority is in the last analysis a search for reality, for spiritual reality. The Christian consciousness is the historical corporate consciousness of Christian believers, the continuing witness of the Christian Church. It is a social product, not limited to the individual and his particular experiences, yet subject to continual check and control in the effort to get beyond opinion and reach truth. It is older than the Bible, for it is that which produced the Bible. It is Christ extended in the body of his followers. The quest for certainty, our search for authority in religion, is a quest for that reality which will show us that religion can never be a matter of indifference. Religion will not permit a man to rest content, once it has really touched his conscience; it is compelling; it is all of life or none. When we find this authority, this reality, it takes possession of us and exerts its
away in us; it exerts an authority that is not external and foreign, but exercised through the mind and conscience by nature, man, Scripture, the Holy Spirit, Christ, and God. When we conform to it, we find our life; by submitting to it, we win our freedom. So we come to this: The quest for authority in religion is nothing other than the quest for God. Not until we find Him do we find an adequate authority. Yet we can never see God, as Moses sought to do; we can not place our hands on Him; we can not confine Him by definition to a box of words, for to define Him is to limit Him. We can never chart God, can never make Him particular; for anything we can explain and understand can not be God. But we are approaching the language of the mystic, with his negative attributes; we must turn now to a positive approach, and ask where and how God is apprehended.

In a large sense, we may say God is apprehended through His revelation of Himself to us; and all we can know of Him, all He is and means to us, is by revelation. So revelation is an inclusive term, holding within itself the accents of God's voice as He speaks to us through His Son, the Holy Spirit, Scripture, the Christian Church, and conscience. Our doctrine of authority must draw elements from each of these five means of revelation. First, however, we shall look at the idea of revelation in general. In his recent book, "Pathways to Certainty", Professor William Adams Brown tells us there are four ways of testing a belief, ways that have been in use from the earliest times and are still in use to-day. These four ways are called, for convenience, the way of Authority, the way of Reasoning, the way of Intuition, and the way of Experiment; and the nature of the belief to be tested determines
which methods should be used, and what relative weight should be given to each.

The way of authority, which we understand in its wider sense as the right to control, is more often thought of in the narrower sense of a standard imposed from without. As such it is the easiest and most used pathway to certainty in religion. But there is widespread revolt against this way, due to the unjustified claims that have been made for it both by Roman Catholics and Protestants. "The way out of the difficulty is not to reject authority as a pathway to certainty but to define more clearly just what authority is fitted to do for us", (1). The age of childhood is the age of authority, when external conditions and restraints must be imposed; adolescence is the age of example and imitation; in maturity, men are expected to have gained the power of self-direction.

It is during their mature years that men come into possession of the second way, the approach through reason. Familiar examples of this are afforded by the old arguments that used to be put forward to prove the being of God. The validity of these arguments is being challenged to-day, on the ground that such a God as they postulate cannot be demonstrated, and that there is a large body of evidence which seems to deny the power or goodness of such a God. It is pointed out in reply that, as we have said, God can never be seen, touched, demonstrated with scientific certainty; but there are in the universe qualities which make it reasonable to believe in such a good God. And secondly, while evil seems inconsistent with the plan of a God who is both all-powerful and good, Christian faith sees it as necessary in the process of discipline which has as its aim

(1) Wm. Adams Brown, "Pathways to Certainty", p. 82.
the building of character.

The way of intuition, by which is meant the sudden insights that come from time to time to assure men of immediate contact with a worthy reality, is a third way to certainty. Professor Brown tells us that "it is in response to such insights that all the great loyalties are born, whether their object be a person or a cause", (1). Those who isolate this experience from the rest of life and make it their sole ground for belief in God, removing Him from all contact with both the world of sense and of thought, represent the extreme of mysticism. There are others who discover God's presence in specific objects which we call sacraments; of these it has been said that their function is to serve as a meeting place for the intuitions.

The fourth way, the way of experiment, may be called the practice of the presence of God, or the achievement of right religious adjustment. It is active, and continuing; in it we participate in a test which is still going on. Our belief in God needs to be tested by experiment because the world is still in the making; and we win our certainty of God's reality by practising his presence in our every-day lives, through "the life of prayer as consummated in the life of love".

It may be asked whether there is not a fifth way to certainty, more direct and dependable than the four we have mentioned, namely, the broad highway of divine revelation. We have thus far been discussing only human methods, in which there is the possibility of mistake; it is divine certainty for which we are searching. The question is a pertinent one, but it may be answered that "God's revelation when it comes will be found not outside the four ways already distinguished but inside.......
Revelation is not to be thought of as a fifth way of reaching certainty.... rather it is our way of expressing our conviction that in each of the four ways God is speaking to us....",(1). Even in the case of miracle, where the contrast between revelation and our ordinary ways of knowing is marked, all the four ways of knowing must be called upon to contribute to our certainty; we cannot accept miracle on the basis of authority alone.

As Professor Mackintosh points out, the Bible does not encourage us to think of revelation as taking place by the sudden and cataclysmic granting of mere information or bare doctrines. "It rather bids us conceive of God as unveiling His character and purpose through objective events and historical personalities, which faith is taught to interpret as luminous with transcendent meaning and predictive of yet greater Divine manifestations in the future",(2). Revelation, instead of being merely an abstract noun, must be remembered to stand for the most "concrete and personal object with which we can have to do", that is, God as He makes Himself known savingly to man. The term is difficult of definition, but it may be taken to mean "such a disclosure of God as in any degree meets and satisfies the religious need",(3). Finally we come to the real point, which is the "Christian claim that a perfect and final revelation of God.... has been imparted through and in Jesus Christ... Our faith stands upon the entire fact of Christ; but the fact of Christ is truncated if we stop short at the cross and leave the Resurrection out..... There can be no repealing of that great word: 'He that hath seen me hath seen the Father' ",(4).

(1) W.A.Brown, op. cit., p. 78-9.
(3) Ibid., p. 81.
(4) Ibid., p. 82-3.
It is, then, through God's revelation of Himself that we can know Him and come into communion with Him. It may be that our understanding of Revelation can be made clearer by an illustration, crude rather than subtle, but in a general way expressive of our use of the term. It is as with a telephone conversation. One person must take the initiative, but there can be no conversation unless the person at the other end wills to take off the receiver, listen, and respond. The initiative is with God; but those to whom He would reveal Himself must co-operate through right religious adjustment. Our approach to God, directly or through Christ, the Bible, the Church, conscience, or the divine agency of the Holy Spirit, is conditioned by and dependent upon His own redeeming revelation of Himself to men. The one thing needful is to know God; we can know Him only through the divine initiative. In seeking authority in religion we seek God; and we find Him in His revelation of Himself to us.

4. It may be well at this point to remind ourselves just what we are trying to do in this chapter. Our position is that the final, complete, and only authority is God, whom we know through His revelation to us. Of the many mediums of revelation, there are four of major importance, out of the elements of which man must build his authority in religion; these are, Jesus Christ, the Bible, the Church, and conscience. And it is through the agency of the Holy Spirit that these four authorities are fused into one and given sovereignty in the hearts and minds of men. So, in the sections that follow, we shall consider the place of these five components.

a) Among the significant facts of history, the fact of Jesus
Christ stands out like a mountain peak. It is a circumstance to be reckoned with that "this man holds, and has always held, the central place in the supreme religion of the world". Whatever may be said by those who question the validity of Christian views of God and Jesus, the solid fact remains that we are living in the kind of a world that did actually produce Jesus Christ. He is here; He can not be ignored; men are required to take up an attitude toward Him of one kind or another. The comprehensive content of His self-consciousness may be summarized, as Professor Mackintosh suggests, by its two main aspects, namely, that He definitely regarded Himself as the Messiah, the Deliverer sent by God; and that He claimed to stand in a unique position of Sonship to God.

God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself; and we have here an authority which is inescapable. Jesus was seen to be thinking right thoughts; His message authenticates itself to each heart and mind that will receive it; it bears upon itself the authority of its grounding in reality. He was in complete harmony with God and with His world environment; to use a modern phrase, He was a completely integrated personality; He was normal, whole, the perfect Man as well as God in human form; and as such He exerts a religious authority of a real and compelling kind. The intellectual quality of His message speaks to the minds of men; its quality of love that knows no satisfaction until it has poured out the complete sacrifice, speaks with an equal authority to their hearts. No man can lie in the face of Christ; he may deny Him, he may hide away from Him, but still there will come to his ears with "deliberate speed, majestic instancy" the sound of those feet "that follow, follow after". As it has been strikingly put, "No man is ever safe from the day when Jesus Christ may look at him and
make him ashamed". This is the authority of Christ, that He is of God, that He is universal, that He speaks to both mind and heart in terms that cannot be denied.

b) The attitude of thoughtful people toward the Bible has undergone a tremendous change during the past century. To the minds of some, its authority has been lessened by the new understanding that has followed upon archaeological research, textual criticism, and the new outlook ushered in by modern science. It is felt by the fundamentalist that if any slightest doubt be cast upon the absolute literal accuracy of the first chapters of Genesis, it must follow that the whole of Scripture is invalidated. Such an attitude is unfortunate. It is trite now-a-days to say that the Old Testament was not intended to teach geology and astronomy, no thoroughly religious person feels that he must base his faith upon the literal interpretation of any humanly written document. It seems more reasonable to regard the Bible in the light in which it was intended to be taken, as the record of the spiritual development of a race chosen by God for their unique religious interests and insights. This view also marvelously enhances the wonder of the Book. The authority of the Bible is not lessened, but rather increased, when it is taken not as a fixed and final set of external rules, but rather as the true and glorious account of man's spiritual pilgrimage, dictated truly by God speaking through His chosen great souls. Nor does this mean that it is merely on a level with other great literature; it is superior; it is unique; it has an authority above everything else ever written; for in it the Voice of God is continually heard, and through it runs the scarlet thread of man's sin and his final redemption on the
Cross of Jesus Christ. The Bible exerts a powerful authority, not upon men, but in men, from the moment they put themselves under its spell. Its authority is not external, like a law that is forced upon men; rather, it works within the heart and mind, speaking the accents of undeniable truth. There is much wisdom in the remark that it is one thing to take the Bible literally, but quite another thing to take it seriously. When we take it seriously, it brings us face to face with God; and there we find the only authority that can take possession of our whole lives.

c) The Protestant denominations have erred grievously in their emphasis on doctrinal differences and their minimisation of the place the Church holds in the religious life. While Rome has placed too much stress on tradition, Protestants have all but ignored it,—and this has been their own loss. The continuing witness of Christian believers through nineteen centuries can not but speak with accents of authority to the modern Christian; he should rejoice in his glorious succession to that great line of Saints through the ages, illustrious and obscure, in whose hearts the flame of zealous piety burned. One feels this continuity while worshiping in a great cathedral. One feels that human nature does not change from age to age, and that the real authority of the Church is independent of science, of creed, of institution. We might say of it what has been said of the Divine Comedy: "The increase of knowledge, the loss of belief in doctrines that were fundamental in Dante's creed, the changes in the order of society, the new thoughts of the world, have not lessened the moral import of the poem...."

As we have already made clear, we can not accept the Roman Catholic type of Church organisation. The Church must, however, have
organisation and form, and this can be subsumed under the three heads of belief, worship, and government. In the matter of belief, a wide latitude must be allowed to the individual; let each man be persuaded in his own mind, and not forced to give verbal assent to a creed which his intellect can not accept. This is not to overlook the value of creeds; they represent the accumulated experience of serious religious minds; they stand for spiritual truths which men have thought eminently worth preserving. They are sign-posts along the way. It is when they become crystallised and are not allowed to accommodate themselves to changing times that they become stumbling blocks to the ongoing of God's Kingdom. Jesus was an experimenter; He broke away from the codes and creeds of His people, and in consequence was crucified. But, as Dr Fosdick has said, He experimented with new possibilities in goodness, not with fresh styles in badness. In the matter of worship, there is need for less latitude. For the sake of the benefits that come from corporate worship, each person should be willing to forego certain elements in the service that he likes, and join in certain other usages which he may not wholly approve. Only thus can we have a real Church; the worshiper should be able to practice a little give-and-take. We may not entirely agree with every clause in a statute law, yet we obey the law as a whole; so in worship, we can without any compromise of sincerity accommodate our own opinions to the programs of our Church leaders. The modern tendency toward an increase in ritualism and enrichment of the Church worship service is excellent, provided it does not go so far as to mistake the beauty of form for the beauty of holiness. As for the government of the Church, a middle path should be sought between the autocracy of Rome and the democracy of the Baptist and Congregational
bodies. This combination of representative government combined with an authoritative central governing body seems most satisfactorily met in the Presbyterian type of polity. It is built on the plan of the Apostolic Church; it is wholly representative; and ideally, it secures rule by those most competent to govern. Far from perfect though it may be, yet it seems the best system of Church government yet devised to secure the loyal adherence of thoughtful Christians and to speak with authority to them. Incidentally, it would be an interesting study to trace the influence which the Presbyterian Church polity had in shaping the government of the United States of America; the writer believes it would be found that that influence was very large.

d) Cardinal Newman sought to save for conscience a place of high authority in his system. But we have seen what his use and understanding of the term was; conscience was not the voice of God speaking in the heart and mind of the individual, but rather was what the Pope chose to make it. The authority Newman gave to conscience was purely verbal. Our view is rather that the individual human conscience must have the final word in determining questions of authority in religion, with this important provision, that the conscience must be trained, and must be listened to in the attitude of prayer. An untrained conscience is not a safe guide; its mandates are likely to be the dictates of mere caprice. Every person does not have, merely by reason of the fact that he is an individual, the inalienable right to judge for himself and do as he pleases. Evil days are sure to come when every man does "that which was right in his own eyes", (Judges,17:6); for every man's mind and heart are not always trained to use the freedom which we grant should be his. It requires effort on the
part of the individual; he must earn his right to be governed by his own conscience. Until men pass beyond the ways of childhood, they must allow other and more capable persons to make their judgments for them; at this point there is some justification for Rome's attitude. But we believe in the sovereignty of the individual, and that as soon as he has prepared himself by gaining a knowledge of history, by familiarity with the Scriptures, by the teachings of the Church, and by constant communion with God in prayer, he must be granted full freedom to make his own choices. The point at which this occurs is necessarily vague and variable; but we hold it is better to recognise the God-given freedom of man's spirit, even though mistakes are made, than it is to cramp him and suppress him and deny all rights to his individuality.

e) Finally we come to a consideration of the work of the Holy Spirit in its bearing upon the question of authority in religion. "The Age of the Father", said the medieval mystic, "is past; the Age of the Son is passing; the Age of the Spirit is yet to be". E.F.Scott remarks that from many signs it would appear as if this prophesy were now on the way to fulfilment. And J.A.Spender writes, "..... one article in the creed which seems to gain a deeper and fuller meaning as the others fade is, 'I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of Life'". The Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit sprang from the need of explaining certain human experiences, and has become deeply embedded in the Christian tradition; yet, to Evangelical Christians it has always been something of an embarrassment, and has not fitted comfortably into their scheme of thought. "But its survival in the religious mind proves that it corresponds to certain abiding features of religious experience; and some attempt should be made to restate the doctrine for these days". (1)

restatement can not, of course, be made here; we shall seek merely to
indicate a few lines of the Spirit's activity.

The origins of the doctrine of the Spirit are in the Old Testament;
but in Christian tradition its classical manifestation is associated with
the feast of Pentecost. The consequences of Pentecost were that the
disciples found themselves filled with a fearless courage; with a unique
power of utterance; with a clear perception of the Gospel of Jesus; and
with a realisation that they were a Church. It was a creative event; it
was a spiritual emergent. This spirit is still influencing human life;
"that there is at work in the world an influence which may be described as
creative wherever it operates, which is capable of reinforcing life and
enhancing natural faculty and of producing characteristic effects in the
intellectual, aesthetic, and ethical fields - for this there is impressive
evidence", (1). It leads scientific men to discoveries; it fills poets,
prophets, and preachers with ecstasy; it is the bridge of revelation; it is
the spirit of moral reinforcement, of conversion, of fellowship.

In the strictly religious sphere, the operation of the spirit is
clearly seen in the case of the prophet. Isaiah and Amos, for example,
were inspired with a terrific assurance. The prophet transcends himself in
his prophesy; he speaks, as the poet sings, as the mother loves, because
he must. And his distinction lies in his confidence that he speaks
with a kind of ultimate authority. "Thus saith the Lord!"

In application to the considerations that have occupied the paragraphs
immediately above, we would say that it is by the action of the Holy Spirit
that authority in religious matters speaks to man and convinces him of its
worthiness to be followed. The Spirit is that active principle at work in

(1) Roberts, op.cit., p. 52.
the living world which interprets God to man and is accountable for all
his higher religious experiences, notably in the practice of prayer. It
is, in a sense, a summing up of the various authorities that impinge upon
men in his communion with God, his loyalty to Christ, his dependence upon
Scripture, his co-operation in the work of the Church, and his following
of the voice of his trained conscience. It is the bond which holds these
authorities together and fuses them into one consistent whole.

To summarise the doctrine at which we have been arriving, we see
that authority wherever found is a spiritual matter, and not embodied in
materialistic forms as Newman taught. In the realm of religion, there
can be no such thing as an external authority; to be rightly called
authority, it must be internally authenticating. The search for authority
is the search for spiritual reality, which is God. The one thing needful
is to know God, the one saving fact is Jesus Christ. God is apprehended in
His revelation of Himself; this revelation is mediated through Jesus Christ,
the Bible, the Church, and conscience, and is borne home to the hearts and
minds of men by the effective working of the Holy Spirit. Man can not rest
content in his opinions; he must get beyond them to truth. God has given
us the faculty of reason; we must act on our sense of truth and duty, and
enlighten our minds and consciences through the influences of nature,
history, and God. "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good".
"Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord".

One of the finest examples of our Lord's conception of authority in
religion is found in a story recorded by both Matthew and Luke, concerning
Jesus and John the Baptist. John is in prison; the outlook is indeed
very dark, and he is tormented by grave doubts. So he calls two of his
disciples and sends them to Jesus, to ask whether He is truly the Messiah
or whether they should look for another. The answer which Jesus sends back to John is significant; he does not make a definite, final, dogmatic reply; rather, He says, "Go and show John again these things which you do hear and see". He does not tell John to give up thinking, to accept the testimony and conclusion of another, but He sends him more light and additional facts, and tells John on the basis of these facts to think the matter through for himself. This throws John back upon his own reasoning power and the primary authority of his own mind. This is the Protestant principle of private judgment as Jesus authorises it. "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind". This was the way of the Master. There is no better way. There is no other way.

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