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IN

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

An Epistemological Study.
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In his preface to "Appearance and Reality," F.H. Bradley says that "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct." If this pregnant observation is true then it follows that instinct which produces belief is even more fundamental to human nature than the instinct which lies at the root of metaphysical enquiry. It also follows that the beliefs themselves are not dependent, except to a slight degree, upon the success or failure of philosophy to explain or justify them. A third conclusion can also be drawn. It is that the beliefs he refers to concern the ultimate Reality with which the Science of Metaphysics deals. We can therefore assume, without doing violence to Mr Bradley's meaning, that the beliefs in question are, in a comprehensive way, religious beliefs, for religion seems to be largely a matter of belief and its main interest lies in a realm above and beyond the physical and the natural.

Belief therefore, according to him, is a matter of instinct, and it neither grows out of reflexion nor is it dependent upon the reasons that can be produced in its defence.
In view of this it would seem somewhat remarkable that so much that passes as philosophy of Religion should handle religious beliefs as if they were a product of man's perplexity and the result of the problems which the facts of his earthly life thrust upon him. We would expect the treatment of Religion to begin rather from within the world of belief and not from without. Though he may be a metaphysician by nature yet man is first of all a creature of beliefs and his beliefs seem to have had a great deal to do with the rise of the problems themselves. For it looks as if rational reflexion does not spring directly even from beliefs but rather from practical problems which themselves presuppose the existence of instinctive beliefs. It so happens, however, that when philosophy undertakes the justification of religion it almost invariably takes up the position that man's religious beliefs are themselves a result of his reflexion upon the conditions of his life and the nature of the human struggle. Nowadays man's interest is supposed to be made up of, and comprehended altogether by, the three sets of values that have appeared in his life, viz: the scientific, the moral and the aesthetic. He is supposed to be in possession of these realms of worth ante:cedently to that higher interest involving belief which we call religious faith. Religion is interpreted as if it were
a conscious attempt to find some sort of a *modus vivendi* in face of the contradictions and conflicts within natural experience. Man is supposed to have fashioned his religion on the same ground as he built his metaphysic. When he raised his altars he was beginning to reason his way through his experience, as the metaphysician might do. He was finding reasons, or looking for help, not expressing a belief. He was in possession of certain 'values' which he wished to conserve. All the elemental powers of his mind were already functioning. His handling of the world of things, his life as a member of society, his attempts to body forth his natural feelings towards the world and his fellow-men in artistic productions, brought into play all the categories or principles of knowledge and action and feeling of which his nature was capable. In these directions all that was implied in his self-consciousness was adequately and fully expressed. When he came to have beliefs at all, beliefs that went beyond the limit of his 'natural' reaction to his environment, he formed them, as it were, deliberately, that is, after deliberation, because his experience was incoherent and he felt the need of some unifying conception that would bring a little more harmony among the incongruities and the warring elements of life. But when he was at this business he was only a little metaphysician employing the same ideas as those he already employed in his 'natural' dealings with
the world, and perhaps manufacturing a few new ones. His religion was in fact a hypothesis, similar in nature to that which he indulged in when he went out hunting in the morning or was laying a snare to catch his prey. His religious beliefs were 'thought out,' planned with conscious purpose, and in all this no more was expressed of his true self, of the constitution of his mind, than was already involved in his natural experience.

An illustration of this way of regarding religion is provided by these words of Dr Selbie's, "Belief in the existence of God and a spiritual world can be at best but a working hypothesis, but it is an hypothesis which meets the facts of the case, and to man's intelligence makes sense of the universe better than any other." 1)

Needless to say religion has a character which makes it something very different in all its workings and expressions from a scientific hypothesis. A theology may be a hypothesis, but a religion is always an experience and a faith.

The present essay takes its rise from the conviction that the nature of religion and the beliefs for which metaphysics finds 'bad reasons,' can never be adequately explained on this presupposition. Religious beliefs are not only

1) Selbie: Psychology of Religion, p.298.
logically prior to the metaphysical quest and involved already in every 'natural' dealing of man with his world, but they express a unique principle of evaluation of the world and a ground of self-conscious experience which underlies and informs all human activity whatsoever. Man's science and morality and art are controlled and inspired from an à priori epistemological principle organically determining these, yet never fully expressed in all of them together. Whether as Scientist, Moralist, Artist or Meta:physician, man is by the constitution of his mind and the nature of his self-consciousness, a religious creature, and his beliefs, for which philosophy seeks a reason and can find only bad ones, are with him as a native heritage with which he must come to terms in all the natural relationships of his life. The philosophy of Religion therefore must take its stand not outside religious experience and beliefs and consider them as if they were of the same order as the three main 'values' of life, and seek through these to understand the religious consciousness, but rather within religious beliefs themselves as the central light of all human seeing, the spiritual fount of all human striving and the root principle which has ordained from the dawn of self-consciousness the conditions and framework of all man's greatest beliefs.

Though we shall find occasion to disagree with Professor Höffding the following quotation from his
Philosophy of Religion expresses not inadequately this point of view. "Faith must always be the object never the product, of philosophy; it can only be the latter in so far as philosophy is able to prove the psychological possibility of a certain faith under certain spiritual conditions of life. The philosophy of religion investigates the epistemological, the psychological and the ethical conditions to which this kind of faith is subjected. But it cannot construct a faith; it can only describe, analyse and evaluate the faith which is evolved by life itself from different standpoints." 1)

The metaphysician must never forget that he is himself a religious man all the time. In obeying a metaphysician's instinct he is also obeying a deeper one, the instinct which has created his beliefs. He must not, in his approach to his problem, look at that problem from the outside, for it is already within him. In obeying one instinct he must not disobey the deeper instinct for the sake of which his metaphysical labours are undertaken. Religious value is not a species among others, but the genus, and even philosophical speculation itself is but one species of knowledge seeking to comprehend more of the wider hold upon Reality which is already a possession of the religious consciousness. Religion provides the major premise of life's

1) p.251.
syllogism. When it appears in the conclusion we must not forget that it is there because it is already our great universal affirmation.

The three 'eternal orders,' as Baron Von Hügel calls them, Truth, Goodness and Beauty, are 'within' the world of man's religious beliefs. He lays hold of them as separate 'values' only by abstraction from concrete experience. The unity of self-consciousness is a religious unity, so that all 'values' are at bottom religious values. Religious faith and experience is not a synthesis of 'orders' which were once separate both in origin and development. It is itself creative of the values and it lives in them all, though it never itself disappears or breaks up in the process. Religion remains religion still and no interest in the 'values' will ever provide a substitute wherein man's whole self can find full and satisfying expression. The service of Truth, Goodness and Beauty does not and cannot bring the Soul to its final rest, though these may help him upon his way. His rest and peace are in God in whom man knows by instinct that he lives and moves and has his being. Religion has always assumed that communion with God is life's greatest fact, and from this centre the power has come which has sent man to pursue his career unceasingly along the channels of the three Orders. When Saint Augustine wrote "Thou hast made us for "Thyself and our heart is inquiet until it finds its rest
in Thee," it was not only the Saint in him that was crying out, but the deeper voice of man's rational and fundamental Self.

The method and viewpoint of this essay is then, the opposite of that adopted by Höffding. Though we agree with him, as well as with Bradley, that religion is never the product of philosophy we do not, like him, make it the object and nothing more. For we dispute the sovereign right of the metaphysician to make himself the judge of faith. He is but a vassal in the Kingdom of the Soul, a vassal who may, it is true, claim some jurisdiction over the world of values but little or none over the Realm of Ends. He does not wield the sceptre expressive of all the forces of the whole country of the human mind. The final authority must remain with the more comprehensive and far reaching interest, and the most solemn affirmations of personality. There can be little doubt that such final Court of Appeal is found in the sphere of religious faith and belief. By the philosophy of Religion, then, we understand "a mode of thinking which is prompted by religion and takes religion as its foundation," and not, as Höffding prefers, "a mode of thinking which makes religion its object." 1)

The latter method has its place and its value, but

1) Philosophy of Religion, p.1
until justice is done to religion's own 'mode of thinking' or its logic is shown, by some inner contradiction, to be inadequate for metaphysical inquiry, we should not abandon its claims as a source of knowledge, and fly away, whether to Pure or Practical or Speculative Reason.

The keynote of what follows may be struck in the words of Professor Pringle-Pattison where he crystalises the intention, if not the exact meaning, of Descartes' doctrine of God. "This idea," Descartes reminds us, "is not just an idea, which "we happen to find as an individual item in the mind, like "our ideas of particular objects. It is innate," he says, in his old-fashioned misleading terminology. He means that it is organic to the very structure of intelligence, knit up indissolubly with that consciousness of self which he treated as his foundation-certainty, "so that our experience as "self-conscious beings cannot be described without implying it."

"The idea of God .... originates along with the idea of self "and is innate in the same sense as the latter." 1)

Religion, then, is based neither on a hypothesis nor an inference but on an experience, immediate and intuitional. Not being a hypothesis, its nature is not amenable to scientific methods or tests; not being an inference, philosophical

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treatment of it is inadequate to its full interpretation. As an experience, its essential nature and the revelation of reality which it provides refuse to yield up their secrets to ordinary conceptual thought. The only concepts adequate to its interpretation are those fashioned from the religious consciousness itself, which must always be its own interpreter. The one adequate and profitable method for the philosophy of religion therefore is an enquiry into the character of religious knowledge itself and the conditions implied in the valuation of the world and life given in what religion affirms to be direct communion with God. That there is such a valuation, original and sui generis, given in religious experience is widely admitted, and yet the problem of religion is, for the most part, handled on the assumption that it is entirely based, like science and philosophy, on hypothesis, or on inference from natural experience. Thus Professor Whitehead says that "The final principle of religion is that there is a wisdom in the nature of things from which flow our direction of practice, and our possibility of the theoretical analysis of fact." And with the same breath he proceeds, - "It grounds this principle upon two sources of evidence, first upon our success in various special theoretical sciences, physical and otherwise; and secondly, upon our knowledge of a discernment of ordered
relationships, especially in aesthetic valuations, which stretches far beyond anything which has been expressed systematically in words."  

Here the deliverance of the religious consciousness provides the final principle of science and morality and yet itself is grounded upon "two sources of evidence." But is the principle of religion logically prior or subsequent to the evidence? This is the crucial problem of the religious a priori. "The importance of rational religion "in the history of modern culture," we are told, "is that "it stands or falls with its fundamental position, that we "know more than can be formulated in one finite systematized "scheme of abstractions, however important that scheme may "be in the elucidation of some aspect of the order of things."  

Professor Whitehead insists that religious experience contains something more in its insight than can be put into any "scheme of abstractions."

"The formulations are the froth upon the surface. "Religion insists that the world is a mutually adjusted "disposition of things, issuing in value for its own sake. "This is the very point that science is always forgetting."  

And he admits that this insight into religious truths

1) "Religion in the Making," p.128.  
2) p. 128.  
3) pp. 128-9
is intuitive rather than inferential or hypothetical. The inspiration of religion "is to be found in the primary "expressions of the intuition of the finest types of "religious lives." And these expressions, which are not formulae, "elicit in us intuitive response which pierces "beyond dogma." 1)

Although Professor Whitehead does not seem to be decided in his own mind whether religious faith is at bottom a hypothesis, an inference or a direct experience - his doctrine admits all these factors as contributing to the total outlook - he clearly admits the presence in religion of an original insight which controls all other ways of knowledge, and which contains a kind of valuation that goes beyond the power of conceptional thought to express. It provides an "intuition" which is "not the discernment "of a form of words but of a type of character. It is "characteristic of the learned mind to exalt words, yet "mothers can ponder many things in their hearts which their "lips cannot express. These many things which are thus "known constitute the ultimate religious evidence, beyond "which there is no appeal." 2)

The real problem of the philosophy of Religion is the fuller understanding of this "character" of the world

1) p. 129.
2) p. 56.
which religious intuition provides, and of the conditions of its emergence in experience. We shall find that it is a character not only "inherent in things," but in self: consciousness, not merely a principle of wisdom in the world to guide practice and theoretical enquiry, but the very presence of God who alone relieves the essential 'solitariness' of the soul. We shall find that although religious experience is enriched and purified and deepened by the advance of science, the development of philosophy and the progressive moralisation of life, its nature is such that it alone provides the ground of the unification of personality and the only sure key to the final interpretation of the world and life. In other words the only true philosophy of religion is the philosophy which religion itself provides; it is religious philosophy.
INTRODUCTION

When the psalmist of old looked up and beheld the stars he saw much more than his natural eye revealed. His mind, outstripping his eye, took a leap beyond the farthest orb and caught sight of the Divine presence. "The heavens declare "the glory of God, and the firmament revealeth his handiwork." For him the stars were rich in meaning; they spoke of a reality beyond themselves, which they partly concealed and partly revealed. The heavens were not self-explanatory and so the mind which beheld them in order to find satisfaction and rest pressed on beyond the physical object to the discovery of a power of like nature with itself to explain them. This it found when it became aware of the Divine Architect behind the glittering orbs and an eternal glory underneath the order and beauty of the firmament. When the psalmist wrote his immortal couplet to express what he experienced as he looked up, the presence of God in that experience was quite as real a factor in it as the physical objects studied by astronomy. God was as real as the stars. Both were perceived together so to speak, in one moment of apprehension. If we were to institute a
comparison between the two elements we would probably not err if we gave the predominance to God. In the total reaction of his mind to the firmament God was, to the psalmist, the greater reality. Indeed it could scarcely be otherwise. God must be greater than his works. In the vision of God even the world itself falls away or is swallowed up by the light. What we now would wish to explain, however, is not the relative importance of God and the stars, but only the reality of both as factors in the psalmist's experience. And as factors of experience both were facts. In so far as experience, taken at its face value, so to speak, is our first no less than our last arbiter on questions connected with matters of fact, we must allow both to the physical bodies we call stars and to the spiritual reality we call God, a place on an equal footing in the world of existence.

But though the psalmist saw so much - a great deal more than some are able to see - he did not, as a religious man, experience all he might have seen or heard. His mind moved along two avenues only - the cosmological and the aesthetic. He saw God as the Creator, and the Creator's glory appeared through his handiwork. From the earliest beginnings the religious mind has been familiar with these highways of the spirit as it strikes out from the world towards God, passing from the physical to the spiritual, from the temporal to the eternal, the seen to the unseen. We may never reach a satisfactory explanation why man has journeyed thus, but that he
has taken this path ever since he became the possessor of his particular brand of consciousness and still finds it the natural thing to do, seems beyond question. That is now acknowledged to be a matter of fact.

In order to find another example of the religious mind at work upon the world, let us turn again to the Old Testament, this time to a richer experience even than that of the psalmist. When, on a hot afternoon the sun was scorching the brushwood on the slopes of Horeb, Moses, we are told, had a wonderful experience. "An angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a flame of fire out of the midst of the bush, and he looked and behold, the bush burned with fire and the bush was not consumed."

"And Moses said, I will turn aside now and see this great sight why the bush is not burnt. And when the Lord saw that he turned aside to see, God called unto him out of the midst of the bush and said, Moses! Moses! And he said, Here am I. And he said, Draw not nigh hither; put off thy shoes from off thy feet for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground."

"And Moses hid his face for he was afraid to look upon God. And the Lord said, I have surely seen the affliction of my people which are in Egypt and have heard their cry by reason of their taskmasters, for I know their sorrows, and I am come down to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians ......

"Come now therefore, and I will send thee unto Pharaoh." (Ex.III)

In this classic passage, whether we read it as history or
as a deliverance of the religious mind by a later generation working upon traditional data, we get expressed not only all that the psalmist experienced - God through the reality and the beauty of the natural world - but a sense of God's interest in the prophet, and the fortunes of a nation in captivity. In other words, the religious mind finds God not only through nature in its fact and its beauty, but also in terms of the moral life. God is to Moses more than the Creator and the source of Beauty. He is also Lord of the moral life. God is found by him in terms of the moral consciousness, and tribal life. Jehovah is the law giver and it is his voice which speaks in the region of the conscience and the moral passions. God is not indifferent to the fate of nations or to the experiences of men. The cry of the oppressed reaches up unto Him and the prophet is summoned as the instrument of the divine redemption.

In these two passages we have discovered three aspects at least of the meaning the world has for the religious consciousness. Moses and the psalmist together would teach us that the mind moves easily from the world to God as its Creator, from the order and beauty in it to the spirit whose glory it reveals, and from the voice of Duty and the urge of tribal passion to God who is the Lord of life, and to whom human conduct and experience, whether individual or tribal, matters.
In order to draw out still further the character of the religious view of the world, we will venture on a reference to another significant experience recorded in the Old Testament. This time it will be from the story of Jacob who, after destroying through personal ambition the domestic felicity of his home, becomes a fugitive from an angered brother. He arrives one night at the edge of the trackless desert. Behind him is the tragedy of his misconduct, in front the country of the unknown and the untrodden. Under the silent stars he goes to sleep with his mind marooned between guilt and fear. When he wakes up he experiences a great peace. During sleep he has seen angels ascending and descending the ladder whose top reached unto heaven, linking the changing world with the abode of the immortal Jehovah. "How dreadful is this place; this is none other than "the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven." He is aware of the divine presence, in whose light the world and his own life take on a new significance. He gains the hope of a safe journey and of ultimate reconciliation with his brother and a peaceful return to his now broken home. Jacob has reached God not by an intellectual or aesthetic intuition, like the psalmist, or under the stress of tribal feeling as in the case of Moses. He reaches him on the angel wings of a vivid imagination released in sleep, whose twin pinions were the elemental emotions of guilt and fear. The complete experience he gains is one which makes him the citizen of two worlds simultaneously.
Within him is engendered the most characteristic of all religious feelings, that of awe passing into reverence.

To illustrate still further the nature of religious experience let us turn to Isaiah's account of his Vision in the Temple. As the man nearest the throne his mind was deeply stirred by the death of King Uzziah. He felt that outward power and worldly authority were shaken, and fully aware of the moral degradation of the nation, he turns his mind wistfully towards God. The vision granted him was of the Holy God, who could have no fellowship with Sin, and could not therefore save the people from moral ruin except through a general conversion and change of heart. Becoming conscious of his own mission to preach the gospel of a new righteousness Isaiah, now face to face with the Holy God, is stricken by a sense of his own guilt. He gains the assurance of success only by undergoing an experience of inner purification through the Divine forgiveness.

"Then flew one of the Seraphim unto me, having a live coal in "his hand, which he had taken with the tongs from off the altar: "and he touched my mouth with it, and said, Lo, this hath "touched thy lips; and thine iniquity is taken away, and thy "sin purged." (Isaiah Ch.6).

Unlike Jacob, Isaiah's communion with God is achieved not along the path of mystic ascent through fear and the sense of utter loneliness, but in the light of his moral responsibilities and the vision of the righteous character of God. Isaiah's
experience is completely moralised and his fellowship with God is in terms of personal life in the fullness of all its relationships both to Society and to the world. His is a mysticism shot through and through with the highest personal idealism and the profoundest sense of the need for redemption by the Divine Spirit, from moral corruption.

These delirances of the religious consciousness are specimens of what the religious attitude towards the world and life essentially is. They shall serve us in place of a definition of religion. The definitions usually proposed are for the most part either barren or else beg the whole problem to be solved. A few concrete classical expressions of religious experience are more valuable than the most careful definition. A philosophy of religion which ignored the elements of religious experience embodied here could not be taken seriously, but if these were faced and the attitudes here expressed justified, then, we would be well on our way to a general solution.

One way, and perhaps the simplest way, of formulating the problem of the philosophy of religion is to ask how comes it that man has, from the earliest beginnings of which we have any
record, viewed the world in a religious setting and linked his individual and tribal life with an invisible divine Being? That he has done this and continues to do this is a matter not of surmise but of fact. Religion is of the texture of life and a primitive product of human self-consciousness. Religion, both as a system of ideas and as a type of experience must be classed with matters of fact. Man, it would seem, is religious by nature and not by civilisation. He developed religious practices before he began to reflect on what they might mean, at any rate in their detail. Religion is before the philosophy of religion and the religious attitude to the world is older than the scientific, and it has persisted right down the course of civilisation as the most powerful single factor, whether for good or for evil, which has determined the course of history. 

Now why is man a religious creature at all? Why has he believed in God and worshipped invisible Spirits at bleeding altars? Why has he linked his little life with powers not seen by the naked eye, and thought of the physical world as but the counterpart of a spiritual? Why has he thought that God was interested in him and for that reason was willing on conditions to help him and to succour him in life's conflicts?

There are at least five main lines along which this question has been answered.

(a) In the first place it has been maintained that man was taught religion. He was taught it by God Himself through
acts of direct revelation long ago in the infancy of
the race. Man was able to receive the instruction
because God appeared to him in human or semi-human
form, either as an angel or as a still small voice,
or through some transformation of physical phenomena.
This, which is the traditional view, solves at once
the problem of the origin of religion and a good many
things besides. It implies that God visits man, as it
were, from the outside, objectively, and His existence
and His nature are known directly as a matter of immediate
experience. There can no longer be any question regard-
ing the objective reality of religious ideas. Our know-
ledge of God takes its place alongside our knowledge of
any and every objective reality which comes to us through
the senses and the exercise of the ordinary processes
of thought. Doubts and misgivings may arise when we
come to enquire into the extent of this knowledge by
revelation, for the errors of inference may have crept
in at various points in the process, but of the objective
reality of God and of the spiritual world there can be
no question at all. The God of revelation must at least
exist and the transcendent world must at least be real.
Men have not, then, according to this theory, found God
by searching for Him. Indeed apart from revelation no
shadow of His presence would, for all we know, fall upon
the human mind. The initiative in this matter had to rest with God; for man could not, unaided, attain to any knowledge of Him or even guess that such a Being existed.

With the truth of this theory in its extreme forms we cannot now deal, except to point out that it rests entirely on evidence, the evidence of history and of personal experience. Its acceptance sets up religion as an interest and as an experience, not only different from, but largely independent of and almost entirely unrelated to ordinary life. Religion will have its own Science of Theology to examine and correlate the revelational acts of history and will take precedence over both the philosophy of religion and the psychology of religious experience. And Theology itself will be largely of the dogmatic type for it will profess to be an exposition of the character of God as revealed directly to the world through chosen peoples, prophets and saints.

(b) Another way of explaining the origin and nature of Religion is to attribute it to the character of self-conscious mind, which by virtue of its constitution is able to discover God in the midst of life as a presence that disturbs, either 'with the joy of elevated thought' or with abject fear and trembling. Man is religious by nature and rises to knowledge of God as the sparks fly
upwards. He cannot help viewing the world as expressive of a spiritual reality which is God whose power upholds and controls the physical universe. At first his idea of God, or Gods, was crude and childish, and his religious emotions primitive, but they were there in germ: from the beginning, and from them have grown all the great religions of history. The awareness and the experience of the divine and the spiritual sprang from the nature of mind itself which, in its growing contact with the world evaluates that world in terms of its own nature and finds in it a meaning that gives rise to the religious reaction. The explanation of religion is therefore to be found by an analysis of the way experience and knowledge of the world is built up, a knowledge which has always included a religious apprehension and evaluation of the real. On this epistemological theory the development of self-consciousness implies a religious object and a divinely ordered world. The key to the religious problem is, therefore, to be found in the mind quite as much as, if not more than, in any revelational action: on the part of God. In origin religion is essentially anthropocentric. A religious reason is a feature of mind, and a critique of that reason, if adequately carried out, would explain the origin and nature and also the validity of all religious ideas. Religion implies and grows out of
particular categories of thought predetermining all rational beings to view the world \textit{sub specie divinitatis}. Religious experience and the spiritual interpretation of the world and life are possible on the strength of some innate capacity of self-conscious mind which lightens up the world and gives it a divine meaning and significance from which for a rational mind there is no escape. This theory does not rule out the possibility nor even the necessity of revelation from the God-side of reality. But assuming this viewpoint to be correct religious experience is itself, as a valuation of the world, revelational, because it yields direct knowledge of divine and supersensible realities. Our knowledge of God is then \textit{a priori} in character for it grows out of an immediate apprehension, coincident with and conditioning all self-conscious experience. It is not derived, however, from 'innate' ideas in the sense of the rationalists, that is, previous to all experience and from which by deductive inference, the knowledge of God is elaborated. Religious \textit{à priorism} is an epistemological, not a metaphysical, explanation of religion and religious ideas. What the mind provides from its own side, is not full-fledged notions concerning God from which ontological deductions could be made, but a power to appreciate reality in the specific way we call religious. It makes
us aware of something spiritual, invisible, divine, behind all phenomena. Implied in this awareness is a distinct category of thought which, in contra-distinction to 'innate' ideas, can only yield knowledge through experience of the world, and not antecedent to that experience. This religious category determines experience itself and enters therefore into the constitution of the objective world as it is known to self-consciousness.

(c) Another method of explanation is that which might be described as the idealistic. Religion arose, it is alleged, from a sense of bondage to the finite world and to the facts - the conflicting facts - of everyday life. In his pursuit of knowledge, and other values of life, man became aware of an ideal, both of knowledge and of Goodness; he arrived at Kant's Ideas of Reason, theoretical and practical and made the demand on the ultimate Reality that it should conform to those ideals and ideals. In other words, he thought himself into religion through the awakening of the ideal elements within his experience. A thinker, a moralist, an artist, in the first place, he passed on later to the business of unifying and harmonising his ideals and came to think of God and a spiritual world wherein his values should he conserved and enhanced. He gained his belief in heaven on the wings of his idealism. He may have subsequently verified
14.

the truth of his venturesome ascent through direct and immediate experience, but in the last resort his religion must remain a problem for his speculative reason working on his ideal constructions. Although the philosophy of Religion admits that religion is something much too primitive to be explained in this way, it persists in dealing with it as if it provided no organ of knowledge but only a certain type of natural experience. The whole of this essay is a protest against this handling of religion.

(d) A fourth way of explaining religion is to say that the Gods were made by man in his own image. The ideas of religion are but man's ideas about himself and his own needs thrown out upon objective reality. The Gods were created and are kept alive by man's elemental fear, a fear which is nothing more than the natural reaction to what is unfamiliar or unknown, handed down from our animal ancestors. In this work of God-making, the creative imagination has also been at work until the world outside is made to re-echo all the subjective feelings and desires of the human heart, a deity being created to preside over each distinct department of human interest and every distinguishable power of Nature.

When religion is thus understood it need have no objective validity, because, arising from desire and
imagination, it is purely subjective both in origin and character. Though natural, as growing out of man's need in his conflict with the facts of the world, it carries within it no objective necessity as a valuation of ultimate reality. Religion may be studied as a psychological phenomenon but it cannot yield of itself any ground for valid conclusions regarding the nature of God or the Absolute. Religion must then submit to the judgment of a higher tribunal. It must be brought to the bar of Reason, - of Science and Philosophy, - where man is more sure of himself. If Reason can find a justification it will also claim authority to correct all that seems irrational in religious thought and practice and will in the long run, as with Hegel, substitute philosophy for faith, and dialectic for devotion.

There is still a fifth way to account for religion. It is the explanation offered by the School of Psychology which took its rise from Freud. This theory is different and is to be clearly distinguished from the last we have noted. The Gods have arisen - not by objectification of fear or desire, nor by imaginative construction or reflexion upon the facts of ordinary experience. Man, whether as a fretful child, an imaginative poet, or a speculative philosopher, did not make his Gods in his own image; he begat them rather, only he did not suspect them to be his own offspring until Freud and his School
discovered their parentage. Though still in a sense the creatures of fear and desire the Gods are not direct but only indirect objectifications of these subjective feelings. They arise from fears and desires driven first of all into the unconscious and then from there projected on to the real world. The Gods are not objectifications but projections. They are objectifications via the Unconscious and in the process a certain transformation of ideas and emotions takes place which makes it almost impossible to trace the connection between waking thoughts, from which projections originally arise, and the projected objects themselves. The process is something like this. When desire is baulked and the vital urge of life is dammed up in any channel, it is turned back upon itself, introverted or inhibited, with the result that it finds expression in another way to compensate for the defeat. Projection is this alternative way of gratifying desire or need, or some vital urge behind these, and it takes the form of a reversion to primitive or infantile forms of satisfaction which symbolically appear in religious ideas and practices.

"In religion the expressive reanimation of the father and mother-image is organised into a system. The benefits of religion are the benefits of parental hands; its protection and its peace are the results of parental care upon the child; its mystic feelings are
the unconscious memories of the tender emotions of the first childhood."

Religiously man is therefore the victim of a psychological illusion. The Gods and the whole system of religious thought and practices as well as the gamut of his religious experience are but his own natural self driven into the Unconscious and projected from there. Life's religious setting is but the shadow cast, not by the Almighty, but by man's own unconscious self, a shadow which is the result of an almost inevitable psychological process incidental to the unfolding of his rational and moral nature, and colouring all his experience of the eternal world. The light which he thinks streams from the throne of God turns out to be the flicker from the lamp of his own mundane consciousness reflected on to reality through the Unconscious. The voice he imagines to come from the mouth of the Eternal is simply the echo of his own feeble cry of long ago for an earthly parent or for his mate, reverberating from sacred grove or ancient rock.

We shall deal with this theory in a separate chapter. We will only remark here that this projection theory is a much more formidable weapon to attack religion with than that known as anthropomorphism, from which it must be distinguished. For if psychological analysis of

1) Jung: Psychology of the Unconscious, p.53.
the genesis and nature of human experience proved that the main ideas of religion were projections of the Unconscious, then it would appear as if religion were a sort of nightmare, the product of a kind of psychical indigestion, so to speak. If, for instance, the idea of God is but the idea of an earthly parent or of some one else, metamorphosed by the alchemy of the unconscious, and then projected along with its attendant emotional tone, on to the screen of reality, the sooner the bubble of our illusion is pricked the better. For this theory with its kindred and supporting process known as rationalisation, attacks religion at its most vital point. It brings into suspicion the mind itself which is the source of all ideas and the only instrument of knowledge, and makes self-consciousness the dupe of its own distinctive characteristic, which is its power of critical interrogation and reflection upon its own experience. The projection theory condemns the religious outlook more emphatically and more completely than the theory of biological Evolution could ever do. The Evolutionist who professed to trace the development of mind and of moral and religious ideas from small beginnings, and thought he had, by showing its humble origin, undermined the validity of religion, could be answered by the reflexion
that the validity of ideas is in no way dependent on the manner of their birth and growth. For although the mind of man in its intellectual, moral and spiritual functions has had a history and has grown and developed we may still hold that the mind is healthy and that through it reality is revealed. But when we are told that the origin and development of the religious mind is a disease and that the religious Soul is essentially a sick Soul, and self-consciousness is self-deluded in its greatest affirmation, then the discovery of the origin of religion brings about its undoing, for its validity as an instrument of truth concerning the nature of the world is undermined. When psychology attacks religion by bringing against it the charge of insanity we are, however, justified in entertaining some suspicion that the enquiry has taken a wrong turning, and a retracing of steps is necessary.

These then are the five main types of theories regarding the nature of religion as viewed from the standpoint of origins. The first, which is the traditional view, may be held simultaneously with the second. It is possible to admit a native ability or a power of the mind which is able to gain immediate knowledge of God, and at the same time hold to the fact of divine interference in human life, a tutelage of man directly
effected by special intervention or revelation. On the
other hand, and conversely, if we accept the fact of divine
revelation we seem to be driven to assume a human capacity
to recognise the divine as such even if we are not prepared
also to admit that that capacity could unaided have gained
any knowledge of God at all. At any rate there seems to be
no essential opposition between belief in divine revelation
as the source of our knowledge of God, and the theory that
religious experience is possible by virtue of the nature of
the mind as a self-conscious reality.

The fourth way of interpretation surrenders religion
altogether into the hands of the reflective reason. . .
Religion if it has no more secure a foundation in itself
than the activity of psychological factors, like fear and
the desire for life, must renounce forthwith its claim to
be creative or expressive of any original experience of a
supersensible world. The God of religion is a shadow of
man himself, and heaven a reflexion of earth a little trans:
formed and refashioned to satisfy the heart's deeper desires.

Of the last theory - the projectionist - we shall sub-
ject it to independent examination. Here we will only add
that, although both the third and the last theories - the
anthropomorphic and the projectionist - may have to be rejected
we shall still be free, once religion is vindicated on other
grounds, to admit that both objectification of human fears
and wishes and hopes, and the projection of complexes
have entered largely into religious life, and in many
ways determined the character of religious experience.
We shall also be able to say that philosophical reflexion
on the 'Values' of life has played a most important part
in the evolution of religion and in the vindication of
faith.
CHAPTER II.

RELIGION AS PROJECTION.

It is important, when facing the issue raised by such a theory as the projectionist, to see clearly where it presses most heavily on the assumed truth of religion and at what point it overthrows the religious edifice. That it may yet be possible to put in a plea that religion even after the projectionist has done his worst, can still on certain terms be permitted to live, we must of course concede. In the very realm of the unconscious where the religious illusion arises, and the religious object is given verisimilitude, the psychologist may, after all, discover a slumbering tribal or racial consciousness, or else a sense of an inexhaustible reservoir of psychic power surging there, something we might call, after Professor Leuba "a cosmic gregariousness", which may be the original psychological origin of the object of religious worship. God may be just another name, though man never knew it, for the "Creative Energy", or "the centre of Psychic Power" as this energy makes itself felt at the basis of life. Professor Leuba would have us believe that religion owes its
birth to this psychological factor, and that God and the ideas and practices of religion are due to the conscious projection of this active principle of cosmic life as it is known and felt by the individual.

"Active Religion" says Professor Leuba "may properly be looked upon as the portion of the struggle for life in which use is made of the Power we have roughly characterized as psychic and superhuman and for which other adjectives, 'spiritual', 'divine', are commonly used. In this biological view of religion, its necessary and natural spring is the same as that of non-religious life, i.e. the 'will to live' in its multiform appearances, while the ground of differentiation between the religious and the secular is neither specific feeling nor emotions, nor yet distinctive impulses, desires or purposes but the nature of the force which it is attempted to press into service".

Without this "conception of the Source of Psychic Energy" he adds, "no religion can exist". (p.94). This is the single root, the common denominator of all religion, the idea thrown up from the unconscious of a "psychic Power" active in human life.

Dr. Valentine ("Modern psychology and the validity of Christian experience" p. 37) rightly points out that this

1) "Psychological study of Religion". p.335.
2) "The psychological origin and nature of Religion" p.93.
projectionism of Professor Leuba, is not quite the same thing as that of the Freudians. It is not the result of repression on the part of the individual. What is here projected is the "primary unconscious" which we will explain further on. The religious object thus expressive of the racial consciousness or "cosmic gregariousness" though subjective and unconscious in origin, is not however necessarily an illusion. It may be a reality, however indefinable in character. But whosoever thus attempts to rehabilitate religion must show that this divine object is not only not an illusion but an objective reality, a difficult task indeed where it is only given through the unconscious and projected from there.

We may however say to the projectionist that he proves too much, that if his theory is true not only will religion go but his own theory will go too, for it also may very well be due to the presence of a complex which may account not only for the theory itself but also for its plausibility as truth. If man creates gods unconsciously to correct his own psychological abnormality and to come to terms with life, then he may be inventing religious theories to explain away religion to the same end. We might show the projectionist that he is but another Sir Ralph the Rover who comes to grief on the very rock which he has made silent and dangerous for other mariners by cutting down the warning bell. To do this would not, however, vindicate the truth of religion. It would only establish a tu quoque, and both projectionist and the man of faith would be found
like the two thieves, in the same condemnation.

Passing by then, these subsidiary avenues along which we might storm the enemy's castle, let us seek the point or points of greatest vulnerability. The idea of God, says the theory is not one derived from experience of the objective world of reality. Were it derived from there man would be able to point to some evidence of its origin in the objective world. "Every man," says Jung, "has eyes and all his senses to perceive that the world is dead, cold and unending, and he has never yet seen a God, nor brought to light the existence of such from empirical necessity." And yet in spite of this we are told that "should it happen that all traditions in the world were cut off with a single blow, then with the succeeding generations the whole mythology and history of religion would start over again". Although the idea of God was not fashioned nor arose from anything in the External world, still man is an incorrigible creator of divinities and will always have his way in this work in spite of all the evidence that he is a victim of an illusion created by the character and urge of the libido at the root of his psychic life. One charge against the validity of the idea of God, is, then, that our experience of the External world does not supply it. And because it is not derived from there, then, if it pretends to any objective reference at all, the reference must be illusionary and the product of unconscious projection. The author of the fourth Gospel, who admitted the failure of sensuous experience
to find God - "no one hath seen God at any time" - got over the difficulty by his belief that the "only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father" had revealed Him. He thus retained his belief in the reality of the supreme religious object. The theory of the projectionist employs another method. Because no one has seen God, God, he concludes, is not there at all. His existence as religion understands him, is a creation of repressed desire or longing. He is a projection of the spirit of revenge which is in the bosom of the libido. Our assumed inability to derive the idea of God from empirical sources is deemed to be in itself a reason for doubting the existence of God. Needless to say this theological negativism is obviously based on psychological dogmatism regarding the nature of what determines our perceptual outlook and experience. It assumes that the pure in heart do not and cannot see God.

This theological doubt becomes open denial, however, when the projectionist claims to prove by a study of the unconscious that the idea of God is due to psychological illusion. "I believe", says Freud, "that a large proportion of the mythological conception of the world, which reaches far into the most modern religions, is nothing but psychology projected into the outer world. The dim perception of psychic factors and relations of the unconscious was taken as a model in the construction of a transcendental reality, which is destined to be changed again by science into psychology of the unconscious."
"It is difficult to express it in other terms: the analogy to paranoia must here come to our aid. We venture to explain in this way the myths of paradise and the fall of man, of God, of good and evil, of immortality and the like - i.e. to transform metaphysics into metapsychology.  

Psychological analysis of dreams, and particularly of abnormal psychic states, we are told, has revealed the mental mechanism by which religious ideas are generated, a mechanism that appertains to the unconscious part of personality. The real origin of these ideas is the ordinary natural world of physical and social relationships. Their specifically religious character is given to them, however, not by self-consciousness but by the unconscious. But since they take their rise as religious ideas from the unconscious and are in every case transformations and combinations of images and ideas taken from natural human environment, they cannot have, as religious ideas, any objective validity whatsoever. Objective reality corresponding to images and ideas can only be ascribed to the content of consciousness whose contact with a real world enables it to gain knowledge of existent realities. The only true ideas, ideas which have real entities corresponding to them, are those which are supplied by perceptual experience. When the mind is in possession of ideas like those of God, or of conscience, or of a spiritual world, these are deemed/

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1) "Psychopathology of Everyday Life". p. 310. (Quoted by Selbie in "The Psychology of Religion").
to be due to elaborations and extensions of natural ideas. They are achieved by the alchemy of the unconscious, whose chief characteristic is that it retails, by a symbolism peculiar to itself, suppressed natural desires in the form of fantastic epics of the imagination, and ideas which provide the satisfaction denied to desire in experience.

The material upon which the unconscious processes work their miracles of projection may be derived also from the unconscious mind itself where, it is supposed, the psychic-inheritance of racial evolution is concerned for the individual. This "primary" unconscious, as Tansley calls it, to distinguish if from the Freudian unconscious which is the creation of introversion on the part of the individual, may itself be a source of ideas, for this "primary" region of the mind is the nebulous hinterland of self-consciousness, the region whence or through which the libido emerges or flows. But even when the libido itself, along with its racial urge, is supposed to account for certain elemental notions or myths universally found, these racial myths must themselves have grown out of conscious human experience. The projectionist theory of religion makes less use, however of this racial mind than it does of the Freudian unconscious which admittedly is made responsible for the creation of religious ideas no less than of the mythologies and wonder tales of gods and heroes.

The first question that suggests itself regarding the unconscious origin of religious ideas in this; if the unconscious
itself, so far as its mental furniture of ideas and desires, of images and emotions, are concerned, is built up from floor to ceiling of materials drawn from the individual's own experience.

On what ground is it inferred that no religious ideas have gone into the make up of the unconscious? The materials of all projections, of dreams and phantasies no less than of myths, is confessedly sought for in the waking life of the individual. The wealth of the unconscious is the creation of the conscious mind. Where else could the unconscious derive its materials seeing that complexes are formed by repression and introversion in conscious life? The images and ideas used by the libido, or elan vital, or whatever else we call the urge of life - are all derived from personal experience. That is why they have objective significance as images and ideas. They were born through consciousness reacting on a real world. In the case of the idea of God however, it is assumed that this cannot have had its origin in the mind's conscious life and awareness of the world in concrete experience. Its origin is accounted for by the activity of the unconscious working upon the one time conscious images, and ideas, desires and emotions driven from consciousness by inhibition and repression. The symbolical method, we are told, so characteristic of the working of the unconscious, accounts for the transformation and transference of the material supplied to it by conscious experience. This symbolism is the method of libido to gain its own end through the unconscious when the
conscious channels are blocked up. It creates, through projection, the object it needs for its satisfaction. Indeed the object thus created by libido is just a representative of libido itself, although to the self-conscious individual, the object seems to be objectively real, thus providing the required satisfaction.

"Since, psychologically understood", says Jung, "the divinity is nothing else than a projected complex of representation which is accentuated in feeling according to the degree of religiousness of the individual, so God is to be considered as the representative of a certain sum of energy (libido)". p.38. God, then is just the creation of the libido, the objective representation thrown on the screen of reality to satisfy the demand of life which has been refused it in concrete experience. It is this creative work of the libido which accounts not only for the projected illusion but also for the subject's belief that God is within him. "Psychologically, however, God is the name of a representation - complex which is grouped around a strong feeling, (the sum of libido).

"Properly the feeling is what gives character and reality to the complex. The attributes and symbols of the divinity must belong in a consistent manner to the feeling (longing, love, libido and so on). If one honours God, the sun or the fire, then one honours one's own vital force, the libido.

"it is as Seneca says: God is near you, he is with you, in you". "God is our own longing to which we pay divine honours". 1

1) "Psychology of the Unconscious" p.52).
This projected object, is, let us note, whether God, sun or fire, an object not to libido itself but to the individual who holds it in waking, conscious life. We can understand why the object may become for him the sun, or fire, for these are already objects of natural experience. But why should the urge of libido give rise to the idea of God to satisfy any longing at all? Would we not expect, assuming projection from the unconscious to be a fact, to find the kind of object into which the libido translates itself for the individual in all points answering to some physical reality or situation known already in his experience? If the libido, baulked of its natural satisfaction, must find a substituted object which it creates for itself, why should that object take a superhuman, and supersensible form when its real satisfaction is only attainable in the natural and human world? We can understand the sexual impulse driven to the unconscious creating in dream or phantasy a human situation to gratify its craving, but why should it create a God for that purpose? We can understand the parental emotion, defeated in actual experience by the loss of an offspring, dreaming of new human surroundings where the child is found again, but why should that new situation take the form of a spiritual invisible realm forming the background of the world? Remember that it is for the consciousness of the individual that the projected object exists, and in a form which he believes to be objective. Even if libido had a conceptually creative function to perform, the conscious
mind could not become aware of the unconsciously projected idea or image unless it already was familiar with it in experience. Were it otherwise, the world would be richer than it is in phantasies more grotesque and unnatural than all the mythologies of antiquity. The Imagination would no longer be subject to the constraint of the real world?

Accepting the fact of projection, we must nevertheless remain dubious of the ability of the unconscious to present for the acceptance of conscious life images or ideas which are not already familiar to the concrete experience of the individual. In spite of the supposed creations of the projecting activity of the unconscious there is no conclusive proof that ideas of existent realities or supposed existent realities have been generated in that way. The unconscious is not an original source of ideas. Its stock in trade is provided by the conscious mind interacting with the world of real things. When and if the idea of God is a projection to satisfy the longings of the heart, it is only because that idea is already present to self-consciousness, before it ever appears as a projection. It was a sound saying that nothing is found in conception which was not first of all present in perception. The imagination can construct freely, whether symbolically as in dreams, or more realistically as in waking phantasy or by conscious effort, but its images and ideas are all provided from the world of concrete experience. Religious ideas emerge from the unconscious in projection only because
they were supplied in the first instance by the conscious mind. Were this not so, not only would their psychological origin be a mystery unfathomable, seeing that they would proceed from some a priori root in the unconscious, but the self-conscious individual would not be able to grasp their meaning. We have no reason for the assumption underlying the projectionist theory of the origin of the ideas of religion, that ideas not generated by self-consciousness can yet be grasped by it and accepted, as ideas of existent realities. The ideas of religion are employed freely by the unconscious to satisfy the libido, the urge of life, and projected by it only because those ideas, are familiar already to the mind of man. The reason they are so often found as projections of the libido is because in conscious life the ideas of religion are neglected, they are not used to solve the antagonisms and problems of moral and personal relationships, were they employed with zeal and consistency to harmonise and to sublimate the libido of consciousness itself, their appearance as projections would be less frequent and less vivid. It is significant that their discovery in the form of projections has been made, not in normal human beings who have found a solution to their moral problems even before those problems became pressing but in the morally abnormal, who, for some cause have failed to solve the problem of ethical discipline and spiritual integration. If religion is due to projection of complexes we would expect that psychoanalysis would put an end
to a patient's religious faith and life, and we would arrive at the queer rule, "no complexes, no projection; no projection, no religion". Experience does not however verify this anticipated result of mental therapy. "One would expect according to this theory", writes Dr. William Brown, "that deep analysis would leave the patient less religious than he was before. My own experience has been the exact opposite...... The analysis had indeed a purifying effect upon my religious feelings, freeing them from much that was merely infantile and supported by sentimental associations or historical accidents. But the ultimate result has been that I have become more convinced than ever that religion is the most important thing in life, and that it is essential to mental health..... although mere emotionalism and religiosity is diminished, the essentially religious outlook on life remains unimpaired."

The fact is, the theory of projection as an explanation of the origin and nature of religion and religious ideas leaves its advocates in a troublesome dilemma. On the one hand the theory is supposed to account for what is distinctive and original in religious thought - the idea of God, and of a spiritual world. On the other hand the projectionists' main argument is to show that these religious ideas are the creation of

1) "Mind and Personality" p.268.
of the life energy working exclusively upon material drawn from commonplace human environment and human experience. Although the ideas of religion are admittedly of a different order from the ideas of finite human relationship, yet every religious idea and every religious experience expressed in myth and ritual and religious practices generally are made to correspond almost point to point with human experience and relationships. This is done in order to show that the origin of the one series, the religious, is traceable to the other, the symbolic transformation alone being attributed to the activity of unconscious libido. But this endeavour to establish a point to point correspondence between the human and the divine, the secular and the sacred, assumes some direct vital relationship between the two series. It also leaves the libido impotent to originate anything in the way of the stuff of experience, whether ideas or feelings. Its creative activity is confined to its power of providing new symbolical dress for human ideas and feelings already provided by experience. The illusory nature of religion is arrived at on two contradictory grounds. On the one hand, because religion appears to be due to the activity of the unconscious it can have no vital relation as religion with the facts of the real world and of conscious rational life; on the other hand because it is proved, in spite of its symbolism, to answer almost point to point with real and rational human life, it cannot as religion lay claim to objective reality. In other words religion is illusion, both because it
is not concrete human experience, and because it is nothing else. But the projectionist cannot have it both ways. Either religion is the expression of true and real human experience and needs, or it is not. If it is not, then it will be a vain quest to search, by a study of religious ideas and practices for their underlying human interests, because, ex-hypothesi, there is no necessary connection between them. If it is, if religion is the expression of true, human experience and needs, then it cannot be pronounced an illusion because, ex-hypothesi, its claim to reality, subjectively and objectively, is on a par with conscious human experience itself.

From this dilemma there seems to be no escape. If the world of religion is built up from human material it cannot, were it only for that reason, be pronounced illusory. If on the other hand, as is supposed, all that gives this material its specifically religious character and significance comes from outside conscious experience altogether, no reason is given why the religious world so created should provide so fitting a solution to life's problems seeing that it grows out of a region - the unconscious libido - where there can be no knowledge whatsoever of conscious life with its discords and antagonisms.

It is not difficult to see why the projectionist's theory arrives at this debacle. In his anxiety to prove religion to be an illusion, having no objective validity, he seeks its origin in some sphere outside human experience - in
some psychic power beyond conscious experience, in any realm, in fact, where the test of reality provided by experience will be lacking. This he finds in the activity of the libido - the life energy which is at the root of our instinctive natures and the vital principle of every living organism. But to attain his purpose he must find the specific origin of religion, not in libido in its wider meaning, which of course would cover consciousness as well as the unconscious, but in its more limited sense as the energy that resides only in the unconscious and works only there. This unconscious part of 'libido', having been hypostatised into an independent energy and sharing not at all in the results of conscious experience of which it can of course, by definition, know nothing, is made solely responsible for the symbolism of dreams and myths and religious fancies. Life is then dichotomised into consciousness, experience, reality on the one hand, and unconsciousness, religion, illusion, on the other. But although libido as life-energy is supposed to work in and to express itself along both these channels, it is now divided, and the libido of the one has no relation to the libido of the other. But this division in the libido itself is quite arbitrary and wilful. The libido which works in the unconscious or is the unconscious, is a mere hypostatised abstraction. It does not exist apart from the libido within consciousness. The former shares throughout in the experience of the latter and cannot work independently of it, with the latter quite cut
Complexes arise in experience, and they take the fruit of experience - cognitive, emotional and conative - with them into the unconscious. Indeed they are the unconscious. If religious ideas do appear as projections - and no doubt they sometimes do, it is only because they were first of all in conscious experience, and if expressive of libido, then of libido in consciousness and not blindly and illusory through the unconscious. It is by means of this splitting up of libido into two distinct sources of ideas and emotions, the one working in consciousness, the other in the unconscious, that it becomes possible to pronounce religion and every other side of life which is susceptible of projection, to be a device of the unconscious and therefore an illusion. Once we resolve to keep to the unity of life, a unity, underlying the distinction of conscious and unconscious we escape the danger of pronouncing one whole side of life or one great interest or system of ideas as illusory and another, in opposition to it, as real. If and when there is illusion through projection, the illusion is partial only. Even illusions arise from real experience and are therefore not without some objective significance and validity. There is so much that is human and real in religious ideas - as indeed the Freudians have shown us to our lasting benefit, that we cannot easily believe that there is not after all much that is religious also bound up with the human. There is much evidence that this is so, and that it has always been so, and that the reason for it is that religion belongs to the texture of life and is a natural growth within conscious
experience and therefore the expression of our rational natures in the widest sense. If this be admitted religion, although still subject to occasional projection, is no longer open to the charge of illusion.

It may be objected, however, to this argument that it assails only the Freudian theory of projection as due to complexes which admittedly are the creation of individual concrete experience, but that it does not touch the other meaning of projection which makes it a function of the whole urge of life, or the racial psychic Power which is the whole libido itself felt by the individual as the current of his own energies. When this 'leuban' unconscious, let us call it - this élan vital, is supposed to give rise to religion through projection it is not possible to answer this theory, so it may be contended, by pointing out that nothing can be in the projection which was not first of all in conscious experience. Yet, as we have already hinted even a cosmic gregarious feeling must have been gradually built up through racial experience. If so, this unconscious is not unassociated with or unrelated to, the world of concrete life. Its materials may still be thought of as derived, in the last resort, from individual experience. Like habits of thought, they may have become fixed and capable of acting outside the field of consciousness; but this fact even so does not make them arise from the unconscious pure and simple. Their origin must still be in the conscious life.

But how do we stand, if it were urged against us: that
by the unconscious is meant the whole psychic world underlying all life - the cosmic soul, so to speak, the elan vital in Bergson's sense, that this psychic reality does create the objects of its own satisfaction, just as it is responsible for the emergence of needs and longings and cravings which we know as instinctive forms of behaviour. If instincts express the nature of this psychic energy because they derive their specific line of activity from it, we know then that the unconscious does give rise to the feeling of need and of longing, and it is an easy transition to the belief that it can also unconsciously give rise, through projection to the fitting objects that can satisfy that same need.

Our reply to this is two-fold. Firstly, if the vital force can do both while yet remaining unconscious, then it is difficult to see why consciousness should have arisen at all. Consciousness according to this view becomes a useless accretion, a spurious offshoot upon the tree of life. We are driven back upon Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann.

In the second place, it is surely a misreading of instincts and instinctive behaviour to think of them apart from conscious awareness. Desire, need, longing, craving are aspects of consciousness not of the unconscious. They are moments of waking life for the amoeba as well as for man, and it is as such moments that they imply purpose or a dim awareness of some end, some object, that will satisfy them. It is only within consciousness that we find experience in these terms and
the psychic power which we are led to postulate is merely a hypothesis by which we try to explain these facts. When, however, we call that power unconscious, we are setting up again a hypostatised abstraction, which, by the choice of terms frequently contradicts the very facts which we are trying to explain. We are committing again the same logical blunder as we did before, where the Freudian unconscious through projection was thought to create its own objects independently of the results of experience. The same answer must therefore be made to Freud and Leuba. Their unconscious, when it is made creative of illusory objects to satisfy natural desire in complete independence of conscious experience, is a hypostatised abstraction which can only explain by explaining away. Our conclusion must be, here as elsewhere, that the creative Force of the world, the libido, the elan vital, or whatever else we call it, must be interpreted at any rate in terms which gives consciousness its rightful place as the sine qua non of experience and, therefore, of ideas and purposes. On this interpretation religious ideas must be given their rightful place, not as projections to satisfy an unconscious need, whether arising from the primary or the Freudian unconscious, but as ideas appearing in consciousness and associated with desires and longings and needs also coming into being as moments of experience within conscious life itself.

It is important to note that the projectionist theory is based mainly on a study of abnormal psychic phenomena. Its
chief inductions were made from pathological data. But what is true of the psychology of the abnormal need not also be valid when we come to deal with the healthy and normal. Because projection and illusion play a part in the religious life of those who have developed complexes in their souls, and have become neurotic, it does not follow that all men of faith owe their religion to projection. Even on the assumptions of strictest orthodoxy it is still possible to believe in spurious religious ideas and illusions due to projection. It is however a false logic to pass from the fact of projection in abnormal cases to the judgment that all religion is likewise pathological and a projection by the unconscious. "It is 'argued by some', says Dr. Brown, 'that belief in God is a 'projection' upon the universe of man's inner feelings. In answer to this I would point out that, while the phenomenon of projection is an undisputed fact which can be verified in certain cases, these cases are all pathological'. "By analysis we can discover how they arose: and in every case we find that they are due to some definitely abnormal process. Hence to generalize and use the pathological conception of projection in dealing with normal psychology is an illegitimate use of the concept. The normal mind is one thing, the abnormal mind is another, and the mere fact that abnormal tendencies may be present in any man however apparently normal, does not alter that distinction". 1)

1) "Religion and Life" quoted by Dr. Selbie in "Psychology of Religion". p. 296.
Still, in spite of its false logic when it tries to overthrow faith in God and the supernatural, the psychological theory of projection is not without its contribution to the study of religion. Its reading of human nature points to the presence of needs which somehow religion alone can satisfy. The psychology of the unconscious as taught by the followers of Freud especially by Jung, is a revelation of the way the problems of the moral personality all tend towards a religious solution. That indeed is its chief lesson. The unconscious is the receptacle of all knots which the individual cannot undo in conscious life. When he fails to act along the lines of his instinctive tendencies because he is obliged to accommodate himself to social custom, he sinks his inner conflict into the unconscious. If he does find that some religious ideas are born to help him out, even if they proceed from the unconscious itself, it is a proof that moral problems are only resolved in the light of religion. The way from moral conflict to inward peace is admittedly the way of religion. But if the unconscious shows us that way, it is only because the conscious part of our personalities is already acquainted with it. For of more normal persons than of abnormal can it be said that religion solves the problems of moral trial and failure, providing deliverance from defeat and power to sublimate the raw materials and impulses of life. Religion proceeds, then, not from the unconscious but from self-consciousness, and, instead of being a principle of moral and spiritual salvation
supplied by the former, is rather a provision of the latter to solve the very problems which, but for it, would not be here to be solved, whether by the unconscious or any other aspect of the human mind.
When the central ideas of religion are called in question as regards their objective validity we are con­fronted with precisely the same problem as that which con­fronted Kant when the results of Hume's enquiry roused him from his dogmatic slumbers. Hume's problem was the ability of the mind in knowledge to reach the necessity which science assumed to belong to the sequence of events in nature. Science always proceeded in its investigations, and formulated its conclusions, so it appeared to Hume, on the assumption that it was discovering necessary connections among phenomena. The ideas employed so freely in scientific generalisation were taken to represent reality and therefore relations in nature. What experience provided however, was merely disparate matters of fact or sense data, and ideas were built up and laws formulated on the fragile basis of association. As for universality and necessity no clue to these characteristics of knowledge could be discovered in the realm of nature. If necessity was assumed to operate within the causal nexus, the mind could never gain
it objectively or prove it from experience. If science employed the notion of necessary connection and therefore of universality, it was derived from analogy drawn from subjective experience. The idea of necessity in regard to causal connection among events was arrived at by objectifying the mind's own sense of agency when it initiated changes in the world around. Its source was psychological and had therefore no objective reference except through analogy. Even the principle of causation itself, the axiom that every event must have a cause, was, according to Hume, non-rational in character. "It is an instrument useful for the organisation of experience, and for that reason nature has determined us to its formation and acceptance. Properly viewed it expresses a merely instinctive belief, and is explicable only in the naturalistic manner of our other propositions as necessary to the fulfilling of some practical need. "'Nature has determined us to judge, as well as to breathe and feel'."

The principles therefore of Causation and of the Uniformity of Nature were not subject to rational proof. They were characteristics of the way in which the human mind did its work in organising its experience for practical ends and were not susceptible of proof, because in any proof their validity would have to be assumed. All knowledge was merely synthetic in character revealing no necessary interconnection.

1) Kemp Smith: "Commentary to Kant" - p. XXVI.
among ideas. Inference and custom-bred expectation were indistinguishable. And what was true of formulated sequences of cause and effect was true also of empirical judgments. "They (empirical judgments) may correctly describe the uniformities that have hitherto occurred in the sequences of our sensations, and may express the natural expectations to which they spontaneously give rise; but they must never be regarded as capable of serving as a basis for inference". p. XXVII.

Hume's analysis of the nature of so-called scientific knowledge resulted in scepticism in so far as no rational proof could be forthcoming of the principles upon which scientific method rested. As no proof could be given of the principles of causation and uniformity, of the concatenation discoverable in nature, whether between events or ideas, or resemblance among sensations and perceptions, all inference, deductive as well as inductive, rested on subjective grounds and could not therefore be shown to have objective validity. To Kant it became clear that philosophy could not rest here. If, as Hume concluded, the principles of causation and uniformity were neither self-evident nor capable of rational proof, and yet were employed by science as if they were valid objectively, though they were in truth derived, like every other propensity, from the mind itself, then in order to vindicate the universality and necessity which we attach to laws of nature, these principles must be critically examined. "How are synthetic, a priori, judgments possible?" In other words what are the conditions in
knowledge which must be fulfilled if we are to arrive at judgments about events in Nature which shall have the two characteristics of Universality and necessity? If the source of these features of a valid judgment is not in the world of objects, how do they enter the act of knowing from the mind itself? In pursuing his enquiry Kant came to put his problem in another way. He asked what is the nature of objectivity? How does the world of objects arise at all, seeing that the mind starts with a bare manifold of sense data? The problem of the nature of knowledge resolved itself into an enquiry into the character of objectivity. One feature of knowledge is that it is always knowledge of objects, and it was the objective necessity which the principle of causation assumed which Hume's results had called in question.

Kant's conclusion was that an analysis of knowledge reveals the fact that, determining our experience, there are operative certain powers of the mind which control the organisation of reality as it appears within experience. Sense data can become constituents of experience only by taking on the appropriate forms prescribed by the mind itself. These forms of thought were the source of the \textit{a priori} elements in scientific knowledge. Judgments were valid objectively, and possessed the characteristics of universality and necessity, because the categories of the understanding imposed their own forms upon the matter of all experience. The world of related objects which constituted experience was, in consequence, a co-operative society in the mind, as well as sense data, was a partner.
There could be no longer therefore any question of the objective validity of scientific judgments, for all knowledge gained through experience of objects possessed an objective reference from the first. The objective world as it appears in experience would not be what it is had there not gone into its constitution synthetic elements supplied by a knowing mind. If objectivity within experience is itself organically related to the subjective mind, if the latter is one of the pivots only that support the structure of experience, then we have gone a long way to establish the objective validity of knowledge. Only on the basis of objective necessity can the world of organised experience be made possible. In this way the charge of subjectivism is met, for knowledge, like experience itself, is objective in its very nature; for the two factors, the subjective and the objective, are linked up and are mutually involved from the first. Scientific judgments owe their objective validity and universal necessity, then, to the conditions imposed upon sense data in their organisation as factors of experience. The mind through e.g. cause and substance the categories-legislates in the kingdom of experience, and for that reason secures universality for scientific judgments. The subjective and objective factors in knowledge are therefore organically and indissolubly united in the building up of experience and subjectivism is ruled out forthwith.

In his objective deduction of the categories Kant takes us a step further in the same direction. Starting from the unity of self-consciousness he asks how the awareness of this
unity can be accounted for. His answer is that this unity of self-consciousness is a necessary condition of all knowledge. Every act of self-consciousness implies an awareness of the unity and identity of the self, as the bearer of experience. Every act of knowledge attainable through the combining of the manifold of sense, every presentation or idea must be accompanied by the pure logical form of self-consciousness, - "I think" or "I am conscious". Without this self-conscious reference the ideas would not become part of my experience. This awareness of the self along with the consciousness of objects is then essential to knowledge. It follows, that "all the contents of acts of knowing which fall together in my experiences must be accompanied by the same consciousness of self - by the same unity of perception". But this awareness of the self, this realisation of self-consciousness necessary to all knowledge, arises only in and through the activity of the mind in combining the given manifold of presentations and bringing them, by means of the categories, into objective unity and order. The unity of the combining faculty can only become aware of itself, the transcendental unity of apperception can only become the unity also of self-consciousness, through its activity in unifying the given manifold of sense. The analytical unity of self-consciousness, the "I think", or "I am I", implies the synthetic unity of the manifold of presentations. It is only by the disparate elements of sense being brought together and steadied, as it were in the object, that
self-consciousness is possible. While then the unity of the manifold in the object is possible only by virtue of the unifying activity of the mind, at the same time the awareness of the mind's own unity - the unity of self-consciousness is only realised through the objective unity thus achieved. Objectivity is then essential to self-consciousness. These conditions each other, and cannot, within experience, be sundered without destroying knowledge.

But knowledge is attained through the faculty of judgment, and according to Kant all judgments are objective. They affirm not a relation between ideas viewed subjectively, but an essential objective relationship constituting the unity of the object. This unity of the object attained through the combining activity of the categories, and affirmed in a judgment having objective reference is nothing else than the objective unity of self-consciousness. It is as the counterpart of this objective unity that self-consciousness arises. The transcendental unity of all objectivity is also the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. They are indeed one and the same. Thus from different viewpoints Kant drives home his nails into the coffin of subjectivism. All knowledge must be objective in character, because objectivity is a constituent feature of self-conscious experience without which experience would not become possible.

That Kant was forced later on to admit also, that although he had, by his analysis, saved the objectivity - the necessity and the yet universality of knowledge, the knowledge which the scientific
mind gained, was knowledge of the phenomenal world only, and not of things-in-themselves, does not invalidate his contention that the mind does impose its own conditions on experience, and contributes certain elements to knowledge which gives it a sure objective character and validity. It is important to note that an idealistic theory of knowledge does not necessarily force us as it did Kant, to separate appearances and things in themselves. A legitimate development in one direction of Kant's epistemology has issued in a doctrine of idealism where scientific knowledge itself becomes knowledge of things in themselves.

When Kant passes from the analytic to the Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason, he suddenly makes the discovery that the ideas of Reason—the Unity of the self, the unity of the World, and God the unconditional, although a priori in character—fulfil a function in knowledge different from that of the categories of the Understanding, and the Unity of self-consciousness. Unlike the latter the ideas of Reason are not constitutive of experience. They are merely regulative. They do not stand for real objects but are only sign posts to show the way to the scientific quest. Kant distinguishes between representing an object absolutely and representing an object in the idea.

"In the former case our concepts are employed to determine the object, in the latter case there is in truth only, a schema for which no object, not even a hypothetical one, is directly
given, and which only enables us to represent to ourselves indirectly other objects in their systematic unity, by means of their relation to this idea. A 670-B 698. Prof. Kemp Smith comments as follows:- "An idea is only a schema whereby we represent to ourselves, as for instance in the concept of a Highest Intelligence, not an objective reality but only such perfection of Reason as will tend to the greatest possible unity in the empirical employment of understanding". "We must view the things of the world as if they derived their existence from a Highest Intelligence. That idea is heuristic only, not expository. Its purpose is not to enable us to comprehend such a Being, or even to think its existence but only to show us how we should seek to determine the constitution and connection of the objects of experience. The three transcendental Ideas do not determine an object corresponding to them, but under the presupposition of such an object in the Idea, lead us to systematic unity of empirical knowledge".

Kant's own critical position breaks down then at the very point where one would expect help from him regarding the objective validity of the ideas of religion. The Idea of God is regulative only. It does not, like the categories of the understanding, enter into the constitution of experience. It represents no object and plays no part in the constitution of actual experience. Neither is it an indispensable condition of self-consciousness. Kant's critical position yields then no

1) "Commentary"- p. 553.
ground upon which to base the objective validity of the idea of God. "The ideas are mere ideas. They yield not the slightest concept either of the internal impossibility or of the necessity of any object corresponding to them". p.555. "As ideas they are then without real meaning; but they can be employed by analogy to define an Ideal which serves an indispensable function in the extension of experience. From this point of view the transcendental deduction of the Ideas is radically distinct from that of the categories. The proof is not that they are necessary for the possibility of experience but only that they are required for its perfect, or at least more complete, development. And as Kant is unable to prove that such completion is really possible the objective validity of the Ideas is left open to question". p. 560. Prof. Kemp Smith, however, points out that Kant wavers "between the Idealistic and the merely sceptical view of the scope and powers of pure thought. On the Idealistic interpretation Reason is a metaphysical faculty, revealing to us the phenomenal character of experience and outlining possibilities such as may perhaps be established on moral grounds. From the sceptical standpoint, on the other hand, Reason gives expression to what may be only our subjective preference for unity and system the ordering of experience. According to the one, the criteria of truth and reality are bound up with the Ideas; according to the other, sense experience is the standard by which the validity even of the Ideas must ultimately be judged". p.560. Prof. Smith's conclusion however is as follows :-
"The Idealist solution is that to which his teaching as a whole most decisively points; but he is as conscious of the difficulties which lie in its path as he is personally convinced of its ultimate truth." p. 561.

Kant then did not decide definitely whether the Ideas of Reason had or had not objective validity. His main difficulty probably was that nowhere in experience did their objects appear in concrete. He has, however, no doubt regarding the reality of the ideas of Reason. And they have their use for they guide the understanding as headlights on a car guides the motorist. Moreover the Ideas are generated by the same Reason as generates the categories just as the headlights are lit from the same engine that drives the car. When Kant turns his attention to the moral consciousness he discovers there exactly what he found in pure Reason. He finds again a source whence radiates certain a priori principles constituting the possibility of the moral life. The awareness of duty, the consciousness of freedom, the guiding principles of all right actions, these are supplied by the mind itself independently of all experience and have a purely rational origin. In no way are they derived from the world of sense, or from desire, or natural inclination. The practical reason or reason on its practical side, legislates autonomously in the realm of action just as the theoretical reason determines the character of our experience of the world of physical objects. Its principles are not derived from experience; all moral experience is made possible by them. "The reason of itself-
"independent of all experience, ordains what ought to take place". It is at once the source of moral obligation, of freedom, of practical principles of conduct, and of the idea of moral perfection which is the summum bonum of life. And the moral law thus revealed independently of experience has a categorical character. It is a bare, direct and unconditional command. All moral obedience is to be rendered only on the ground of respect for the majesty of the law. Duty for duty's sake must therefore be the principle of true moral action.

But what in the realm of morality is the objective counterpart of the mind's synthetic activity? We have of course, answering to the manifold of sense, the material of human impulse and desire and the ways in which man reacts to the physical and social environment, and also, answering to the natural order, the highest good itself, the Kingdom of God which includes both virtue as complete obedience to the moral law for its own sake, and the happiness associated with it, but we are no nearer than we were at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason to a Divine object. The only objectivity implied in the a priori principles of moral experience is the objectivity of the moral law itself, with its character of universality and necessity. At the same time the nature of the moral consciousness as the autonomous source of the moral law, and of the principles of moral action, together with the character of the summum bonum, lift man above the world of appearances and make him participate in the noumenon. The moral consciousness therefore reveals in experience a moral world parallel to, but/
equally real with the physical. Within this world, however, the a priori powers of the mind do not supply us with the idea of God directly, but only indirectly. Duty must be obeyed for duty's sake, for that is the nature of the good will and therefore of virtue. The idea of God creeps in as a postulate of the practical reason, because without it there would be no ground for the belief that the highest good is possible of attainment.

"The moral laws lead through the conception of the sumnum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands .... which must be regarded as commands of the supreme Being, because it is only from a morally perfect (holy and good) and at the same time all-powerful will, and consequently only through harmony with this will, that we can hope to attain the sumnum bonum which the moral law makes it our duty to take as the object of our endeavours".

This postulate is however useful only and in no sense an essential constituent of the moral consciousness. "It is morally necessary to assume the existence of God" but "this necessity is subjective, that is, it is a want and not objective, that is, itself a duty for there cannot be a duty to suppose the existence of anything (since this concerns only the theoretical employment of reason)". In other words "it is not meant by this that it is necessary to suppose the existence of God as a basis of all obligation in general ...." The idea of God discoverable in the Critique of Practical Reason takes the same

1) "Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason" p. 226. - Abbott.
place and performs the same function as it did in the critique of Pure Reason. It is not constitutive but only regulative, useful not dynamic, an adjunct merely but not organic, and therefore not essential to moral experience.

There are in the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason, as in the Dialectic of pure Reason, expressions which bring Kant to the brink of admitting substantial reality to the idea of God. He is prevented from taking this step by his resolution to establish morality on its own foundations independently of all theological implications. When he does give religion a place, it is only by deriving it from morality, and his God appears in the end as a Deus Ex Machina brought in to unite the physical and moral universes, and thus reconcile virtue and happiness as essential factors in the summum bonum. The only necessity that belongs to the idea of God is that which is derived from our want and not from reason itself. Its proof is pragmatic rather than rational. And this because he is not prepared to accord to the ideas of religion, in particular the idea of God, the full à priori character which he accords the categories of the understanding and the principles of morality.

Kant's difficulties, one would fain believe, arose, not from his critical method but from the point at which he began his analysis. If the à priori nature and therefore the objective validity of the ideas of religion are discoverable at all, they must be sought by an analysis of experience in its most concrete form. For religion is man's most ancient and most comprehensive
interest. He was religious and in full possession of all the main ideas of religion long before he looked out on the world through the eyes of Plato and Aristotle, and long before he even dreamt of isolating the physical world from the moral or both from the religious. God was not discovered at the end of a syllogism nor a postulate of the moral life. As Fichte expressed it: "If God is for us only an object of knowledge, the "Ding-an-sich at the end of the series, there is no escape from "the answer that man, the thinker, in thinking God, made him".

Kant would have been more successful with his metaphysical theory if he had started with the Aesthetic instead of with Pure Reason. Even still more successful would he have been if he had taken as his starting point the religious consciousness, and traced the emergence of all the a priori elements implied in knowledge from that centre whence they flow. It is not difficult to see that his inability to admit a thoroughgoing a priori character to the idea of God arose from the narrow meaning he gave at the outset to objectivity, and the philosophical character he gave to the idea of God. Once the objectivity involved in experience was narrowed down to the physical object in space and time, only the categories involved in the constitution of such an object could be admitted as having objective validity in knowledge. In concrete experience however, the content of thought is always richer than the object in space and time as considered by science, which isolates by abstracting all its features which are not physical or material.

The religious outlook on the world involves the scientific, the

1) "Christian thought since Kant". (quoted by) Moore p. 57.
moral, and the aesthetic, within itself, and therefore complete objectivity is only given within the religious purview. Prof. J. Arthur Thomson was flagrantly putting the cart before the horse when, in an occasional article he wrote:— "Religious "activity is seen when man has reached the limits of his in- "tellectual emotion and practical endeavours, and, all unsatis- "fied with his Science, altogether overwhelmed with awe or with "joy, all ashamed of his sin, sends out tendrils towards the "Divine". If this is how religion functions, then few indeed ever attain to it, for few are they who have made this diligent search along the avenues of science and culture previous to any religious awakening. When this does happen, when reli- gion is thus awakened, it is only because the religious con- sciousness has previously been denied its true function, and wilfully stifled, under the misapprehension that it was not in itself a fundamental interest of man. Life was faced without the encumbrance of faith, in the hope that human knowledge would yield more complete satisfaction. When failure came, and religion was grasped as a drowning man lays hold of any floating object, it was a recovery of a lost faith, and not the discovery of a brand new article. It is this misunderstanding of the place of religion in life which is the root cause of the irreligion of civilisation and of culture. It is Kant looking for God along the avenues of science and morality and aesthetics, and failing to find him except as a necessary postulate to give the finishing touch to an otherwise disappointing world.

1) "Outline" March 2nd, 1929.
It is also the prodigal son leaving his father's house to seek satisfaction elsewhere, only to find that his reward is famine and exposure, with no alternative at last but to return to his father's house whence he set out. The ideas of religion, if they determine experience at all, and have objective validity, must in some way be shown to be constitutive of all experience and not derived from it, possessing, that is, an a priori character, and, therefore, fundamental and dynamic within the world of a self-conscious being.

But obviously, the ideas of religion, whose a priori character and objective validity we would seek to establish by reversing the order of Kant's critical method, would not be the ideas of Reason as he formulated them. Religious thought, as it has appeared and functioned in the history of the race, is something quite different from the idea of God, which for instance Kant found to be an idea of Reason. Kant's God is the philosopher's God - the absolute, which sums up all nature and mind in the infinite totality of things, the God who is all in all. Hardly is it necessary to point out that such an idea of Reason is the result of a very complicated process of reflexion. As an idea it is an elaborate intellectual construction built up on the basis of every kind of knowledge and experience of the world. It is this idea of God which Fichte had in mind when he pronounced it a human creation. The God of religion, and the ideas of religion clustering around the idea of God, are to human experience of a different order from the philosopher's God. It may be that Kant
could see his way to confer objective reality on his supreme idea of Reason. That he found it difficult to do so, we know, and are not surprised. For if God be not a fact in the real world of concrete experience, he cannot easily be found a place in that world when thought professes to discover him somewhere in its own hidden treasure house. When Kant finds him in the mind as an idea of Reason, he has already explored the real world, and submitted self-conscious experience to analysis without encountering God. When, later, he found God hiding under the seat of the moral Law, he could find no secure place for Him in the world of existent realities. In both realms the physical and the moral, Kant, after failing to discover God at the outset, meets every conceivable obstacle in the way of bringing Him into the world of actual concrete experience, and we are not surprised for God always has been a jealous God! He is there if you give Him the first place; when that is denied Him, you may not stumble across Him again though you seek Him ever so diligently!

The God of Religion has always been, from the dawn of history, a real Being, entering into the daily experience of men. He was real because His very existence was intertwined and interwoven with, and revealed through, the actual world of nature. The God of Religion has always been and still is, the God of Nature. He was there confronting the first eyes that saw the sunset, and without Him there was no sunset at all. There is an evaluation of the world, primitive in character, and due to some fundamental power of the human mind which brought God and man face to face at the dawn of/
self-consciousness in its interaction with its physical environment. It is this religious evaluation based upon an immediate intuition of the divine presence in and through our experience of the world of objects, which needs justification as an objective reality. The question is, as Baron Von Hügel has said, not whether we can know God, but whether we do. The real problem of the validity of the idea of God lies not at the summit of the pyramid of knowledge but at its base, where the foundations are laid, and human experience takes its rise. For surely, religion was there at the first entering into the most primitive form of purely human reaction to environment. The problem of the philosopher is not to find room for the God of religion or to justify belief in him, much less to discover him. It is rather to interpret the universe in the light of the religious evaluation which admittedly is the highest and most comprehensive form of human experience. The real apologetic which religion needs, and the only profitable one, is that which will demonstrate the objective necessity and validity of religious judgments in the light of the nature of self-consciousness, understood as comprising the consciousness of a world religiously evaluated.

Philosophy in the main accepts the scientific value of truth; it also accepts, as its starting point, the fundamental nature of the Good and the Beautiful. It proceeds, not to question these, but to interpret the universe in terms of them. The same attitude should be adopted in regard to the ideas of religion. These are also like the others fundamental, and it is the task of
philosophy not to seek their justification so much as to enquire into their essential nature and use them for metaphysical construction. It is pure dogmatism to assume that scientific truth, moral Goodness and aesthetic Beauty have a greater right than the judgments of religion, to be accepted as the avenues through which reality reveals its nature to us. What if the religious reason as an instrument of knowledge has a sharper edge and a surer light than the others we employ? There is no answer that we know to the question why the three Kingdoms of science, morality, and aesthetics, should tyrannise over the territory of the religious consciousness. The problem of religion is not met by a Critique of Pure Reason, nor of the Practical, nor of the Aesthetic Reason. It can only be effectively dealt with by a Critique of the Religious Reason. For the crucial task here is to show how the religious personality, or the religious consciousness, gains its peculiar insight into the real and what are the epistemological conditions involved in the evaluation of the world given in religious experience, - both as something specific and as organic to all human experience whatsoever. We shall in our constructive statement return to Kant's central doctrine of the unity of self-consciousness as providing the key to a critique of the religious Reason.
CHAPTER IV

RELIGION AS AN IMPERATIVE.

What now do we mean by the Religious Imperative? The term is obviously an echo of Kant's Ethical philosophy and any discussion of it must naturally begin with Kant's categorical Imperative. We propose however to make but a brief reference to Kant. We do so only to ask in what sense he used it and how it was related to the a priori character of the practical reason.

According to Kant the moral law is known as an unconditional commandment. It is an 'ought' which implies a 'must' quite as much as a 'can'. It was all three, - 'I ought, I must, I can'. It came like the martial command - "Yours not to reason why, yours but to do or die". In that sense the Law was an 'Imperative'. But it was also categorical. By that term was meant that the moral law was not prudential or pragmatic in its rationale. It did not declare a way of life which would, if followed, lead to some satisfaction of need or to happiness or even any particular state of felicity otherwise evaluated or desired.
It was not conditional on our wishing to arrive at a certain goal. Man as a rational being was not therefore free to choose whether he would obey or not. His freedom was constituted by the fact that he could obey, not by his ability to choose whether he would or not. The law was, then, not hypothetical, a way of achieving a moral result if man wished it — but categorical and therefore unconditional.

But on what ground did Kant base this categorically imperative character of the voice of duty? He based it on the fact that the practical reason was, in the moral life, itself the legislator just as Reason on its theoretical side was in the world of the physical. The moral law was not imposed from without; nor in any way the product of experience. It was a quality of consciousness itself, the condition and source of the possibility of moral experience and therefore strictly à priori in character. Without it man would not be capable of moral judgment or of moral conduct. Its discovery was not made independently of the material of social life, and yet its character was not derived from the empirical facts of experience. It was itself assumed in all moral action. The moral law was then Imperative just because it was à priori arising out of the nature of Reason itself. All rational conduct was therefore imperative because it rested on human nature as possessing the character of rationality.

In thus referring to Kant's ethical doctrine in order
to help us on our way, it is not necessary to accept the whole of his philosophy as it stands. His reading of the a priori elements in morality may or may not be convincing. But of one thing however there can be little doubt. Kant was able to establish the imperative of the moral law because he was able to show that it proceeded from something more fundamental in experience than the empirical factors. Its source was in self-consciousness itself and not in the external conditions of the struggle for existence, nor yet in the realm of the instincts which man has in common with the animals. Morality had its foundation in Reason which is the distinctive property of self-consciousness. And yet in spite of its subjective origin the charge of subjectivity could not be levelled against it because, being constitutive of all moral experience, it did not leave the matter of behaviour where it otherwise would be. In practical/reason clothed all behaviour with its own form and by so doing metamorphosed it into what we know specifically as moral conduct. Thus the objectivity of morality, with its imperative character, was secure, possessing the a priori qualities of universality and necessity.

We are now in a position to consider the religious imperative. What precisely do I mean by the term? I mean that man is under a necessity to relate his life to a spiritual environment and come to terms with it, exactly as he is compelled to relate himself to the physical and moral
worlds. That such a spiritual world is given to the mind and forms part of human experience is the axiom upon which all religious thinking proceeds and experience is built up. If this is not so, if the realm of the spiritual and the invisible is nothing more than an inference from the facts with which science and morality deal, then religion may be a speculative or experimental interest, but it will have no direct bearing upon life and can be neglected at will. Man will know of no commandment ordering him to his prayers and devotions. Of course, if by Divine Revelation, God and the spiritual are made known to him, and the way of approach to God declared to him in a set of ordinances, then the religion life would have an imperative character. But failing divine revelation, how can it be shown that man must believe in the existence of God and must bring his life into relation with Him? That is the problem of the religious Imperative, as I understand it.

Kant found the Imperative of morality by an analysis of Reason on its practical side. He found deep down in the mind an awareness of duty which was binding on every rational creature. Self-consciousness was a moral existent aware of good and evil. It had no option to be non-moral; it was shut up to morality just because it was itself. Yet in spite of the categorical Imperative of Duty, the practical reason contained no necessity beyond that of doing duty for duty's sake. That was all it directly enacted. As far the deeper needs of
the soul, its quest for happiness and deliverance from imperfection and mortality the moral imperative was indifferent. It had nothing to say except to point to the need there was for postulating God, Freedom and Immortality in order to guarantee that Virtue and happiness should coincide. But the moral Imperative stood on its own basis, and it in no way commanded men to believe in the existence of God, and in no way brought them to God. Although man is bound to relate his life to duty, he cannot help that, yet so far as God is concerned that remains a matter for speculation. The moral life is here and now complete without any Theology or religious belief or even religious practices. God is a postulate of the moral life; He is not given but inferred, and unless you happen to be a philosopher you may not worry much about Him. You need not relate your life to God but only to the voice of duty. And duty must be done for duty's sake and not for some ulterior End beyond the obedience itself, for the good is in the goodwill and not outside it. Morality is therefore firmly based on self-conscious Reason and is a necessary human interest but Religion has not a similar

in Reason. It may arise from fear or desire, or Imagination, or it may be equated with philosophy which arises from the impulse of men to know as much as possible about the world. But religion is not a matter of direct experience, and religious values are not among the staple goods of life. God Himself is not given in experience but only inferred
from it. All religion is therefore speculative in character and in no sense binding on anyone. A perfectly human, and a completely rational life is possible without it.

While therefore we have a categorical Imperative of duty upon which morality securely rests, religion is left hovering around us either on the pinions of the imagination and fleeting desire, or else on the somewhat heavier-than-air dirigible of metaphysical speculation. But this position is quite unsatisfactory and cannot meet the deeper problem of the religious life. The ideas of religion are certainly not the product of an inference based either upon the facts of the world as a scientist sees them, or on the implications of morality as a Kant might discover. The religious valuation of life is as primitive and as fundamental in human experience as the economic or the moral. In some way we must consider ourselves doomed to religion as the sparks fly upwards, and it is the problem of the philosophy of religion to discover why man is a religious animal, why he views the world religiously and discovers religious values in it, and why he has always felt compelled in one way or another to relate his life to a spiritual divine environment.

Now I think we must admit, if there is a religious imperative we must look for it in the human mind itself. If the religious attitude to the world is, to put it in the mildest terms, at least one of the avenues along which the meaning of ultimate reality is made known to us, if there are
religious values discoverable in our experience, values that cannot be equated with or derived from other values, say the scientific, moral or aesthetic, then there must be within the mind itself some pristine capacity for viewing the world in the way we call religious. Religion cannot be derived from non-religious characteristics of experience. Every attempt to do this has, in my opinion, failed. Should the attempt succeed it is likely that religion would no longer be a basic element of human experience. It would be for human life not a necessary article of diet but a luxury, perhaps to be indulged in only by a few choice and highly cultured minds, by poets, painters and metaphysicians. But religion has upon it the stamp of democracy and seems to belong to the very texture of all self-conscious experience.1) If this is so it must spring from some a priori root which predetermines man as a rational being to view the world religiously, to discover religious values in it and to seek fellowship with the spiritual and the supersensible. The universality of religion, its primitive character, its power to affect life in all its more secular relationships, points to some power of the mind which enters constitutively into all experience and colours everything within the sweep of the rational life with its own peculiar valuations. Should it be possible, by an analysis of self-consciousness in the interest of epistemology, to discover a priori predisposing the mind to view the world sub-specie divinitatis - and 1) cp Bosanquet: Value and Destiny, pp 238-9.
supplying certain forms of thought to which all experience must conform, then we would reach a religious imperative along the lines which brought Kant to the categorical Imperative of duty. Two things would be done for religious philosophy by the discovery. Religion would rest on Reason and would be shown to be a fundamental characteristic of self-conscious life. It would also solve for us the very question of the objectivity of religious value, for now the religious interpretation of the world would be based on the same foundation as the scientific and the moral. That there are such a priori principles, that the ideas of religion are generated by the activity of self-consciousness determining us in our outlook on the world is the thesis I would like to maintain, for it appears to be warranted by the facts, and in no other way do I think the imperative of religion is possible of demonstration. Should analysis and experience reveal their presence, the objective validity of religious ideas could no longer be seriously called in question. Man would no longer be free to react on the world except as that world is interpreted by the religious reading of its meaning and worth. Should he be guilty of reacting otherwise it would only be by emptying himself of a spiritual capacity native to his human nature, a capacity which will have in any case already provided him with some measure of religious insight and experience. For men do not reason themselves into a religious from a non-religious view of the world--; they rather awaken to it--;
they possess the experience long before they can reflect upon its meaning or gain the ability to make it articulate to themselves. Indeed did this not happen the power to receive instruction from others would not be theirs at all. The vision is originally given with the awakening self-consciousness. All that instruction and subsequent experience can do is to clarify, to enrich, to correct and to reveal the wider intellectual and moral implications of the vision already present. The categories of religious thought must be already operative in experience, and must be present determining experience, before the intellect could ever begin the work of interpretation and elucidation. The intellectual constructions of religion are not the whole of religion. They always presuppose an experience of the world in religious terms. The true character of the religious consciousness is therefore to be sought not in philosophy or theology but in the concrete experience when man confronts the world religiously and views it as something alive and pulsating with divinity. We cannot reduce religion to philosophy, to the attempt reason naturally makes to organise experience and think out the world as a unity or reach some absolute or God as the principle of that unity. This was Kant's impossible quest. The idea of God was viewed by him as the principle of unity, and the unconditional ground of the world which reason demanded that the world should possess.
But God thus conceived is not the God of the religious consciousness. He is the God of philosophy. Kant's ideas of reason are not the ideas of religion nor are his postulates of the moral life, except in a derivative sense. The ideas of Religion, including the idea of God, are all primitive in character and cannot therefore be based on any activity of Reason narrowly conceived whether as theoretical, practical or aesthetic. Religion does not come in, either historically or in experience, after science and morality have done their work. The order of human interest and experience are the exact reverse of this; primitive life was an undifferentiated religious life when nothing was purely secular. Secularism is a product of civilisation. Whatever else he was primitive man was not a secularist, nor were his gods the gods of modern philosophy. All his ideas and all his interests dwelt under the roof of religion and were made subservient to it. However, much modern life may owe to the development of the sciences and their delimitation from and their independence of religion, and no doubt the gain has been very great,—the way we estimate the value of this deliverance is often misleading. The deliverance and freedom gained is not freedom from the dominance of religion or of the main ideas of religion but from the heavy hand of the dogmas of religion. The
religious outlook on the world and life has not ceased to
dominate the sciences. Careful enquiry into human
motives might and probably would reveal the fact that the
religious view has all along the line of scientific and
philosophical advancement been the mainspring of the sustained
interest which accounts for its triumphs.

Now few, I think, would deny to the moral law an imperative
character. It would be foolish, we all admit, to try to
explain to a man why he should do that which is right. It
might take us a long time to convince him of what is
really right or good, and a longer time still to persuade him
to do as we think he ought to do. But in all moral instruction
we assume that every man knows himself shut up to moral
conduct merely by virtue of his rationality. As a son of
Adam he knows good and evil, and he must choose the one
and eschew the other all his life.

But where does the necessity of religion come in? Do we assume, and must assume, that every man is also shut up to
a religious life of some sort, that he must worship some God
and must act as if God is interested in him and will bring
him to judgment for his conduct? Is the religious valuation
of life normal to human nature and can we always deal with
men on that assumption? Is it a fact that the seemingly
irreligious really view life through purely secular eyes,
seeing nothing to suggest God or immortality to them, and
feeling no need of God, or is it only that they do not accept
the particular brand of religious thought and practice we are offering to them? If the former then there is no religious imperative, for the religious consciousness is not the normally human. Nothing is imperative in life which does not belong to life's very texture and meets some fundamental need of the soul. If the latter, if religious indifference is due not to a deficiency of nature so to speak but rather to a failure to accept religion on our own particular terms, then the imperative remains and is in fact operative.

But what does this imperative imply? It implies that man is religious by nature, incorrigibly, and imradically. It means that his religious ideas and experience and valuations have their source not in the world outside but somewhere in the mind itself. The world and our experience of it yields a religious meaning only because in some way that meaning is conferred upon it, or, is discovered in it. In either case, conferred or discovered - the mind makes its own contribution to the experience, and determines it in a fundamental way. Exactly as Kant by analysis of self-consciousness found that the objective validity of a scientific proposition was guaranteed by the fact that the understanding imposed its forms upon the data of sense and thus made its own specific contribution to the building up of scientific experience, and just as he also found the same thing present in moral experience, so are we justified in looking in the mind itself for the source of all religious valuations.
The scientific Imperative which compels the scientist to interpret the physical world in terms of causation, and the moral Imperative which decrees that all rational beings should act under a sense of duty, both originate in a priori qualities of the mind, qualities which are not derived from experience but rather enter themselves into all experience and determine its character. That there are a priori elements involved in scientific and moral experience is not today seriously questioned. Thinkers are ready to admit that the certainty of scientific, as well as of moral propositions, is ultimately based on the fact that the categories employed in scientific explanation and in moral philosophy, are derived, not from empirical sources, but from the mind itself. The function of the mind in knowing is not a merely passive one, accepting a ready made world and gaining experience of it, without making a real contribution of its own. The mind imposes its own forms upon the data of sense, and employs categories of its own in the building up of experience. The mind legislates, and the legislative enactments are discoverable by analysis of the knowing act. Thus for example Mr. Bertrand Russell admits the presence in logic of pure logical forms which are independent of the matter of any or all logical propositions. And these logical forms, because they are thus independent of all content, spring out of the nature of the mind itself and have an a priori character. Universal propositions derive their truth, not from particular instances empirically observed.
but must be based on something either self-evident or else inferred from premises which contain already a general truth. "Thus", he says, "general truths cannot be inferred from particular truths alone, but must, if they are to be known, be either self-evident or inferred from premises of which at least one is a general truth. But all empirical evidence is of particular truths. Hence if there is any knowledge of general truths at all, there must be some knowledge of general truth which is independent of empirical evidence, i.e. does not depend upon the data of sense. The above conclusion of which we had an instance in the case of the inductive principle, is important, since it affords a refutation of the older empiricists. They believed that all our knowledge is derived from the senses and dependent upon them. We see that, if this view is to be maintained we must refuse to admit that we know any general propositions...

We must therefore admit that there is general knowledge not derived from sense and that some of this knowledge is not obtained by inference, but is primitive. Such general knowledge is to be found in logic. Whether there is any such knowledge not derived from logic I do not know; but in 1) "logic at any rate we have such knowledge". pp.65-66.

Logical analysis therefore according to Mr. Russell discovers that there is knowledge which is, if not temporally, at least logically prior to all experience. In other words, knowledge contains forms or categories or schemata which are in no way

1) "Our knowledge of the External World" pp.65-66.
provided by the sense data but are contributed by the mind. These forms are the framework of knowledge and it is because of their presence that knowledge is both universal and objectively necessary.

As I have said, it is also readily admitted that morality has likewise a subjective or mental source. The knowledge of good and evil is not provided by experience. It is assumed in all moral experience. No particular fact of life could yield one of Kant's ethical propositions unless the mind already was aware of the moral law. Experience reveals what is right and what is wrong but there would be no morality at all were the mind not of itself aware of a categorical Imperative, not of course previous to experience but along with it. The moral consciousness contributes a constitutive factor to the world of behaviour and changes behaviour into what we know as moral conduct. The sense of duty comes not from the world of sense but from the world of thought. Its source is in the reason, and reason on its practical side, to use Kantian language - legislates in the world of action.

But if science and morality are both based on a priori elements derived from the constitution of self-consciousness, that is, from the mind itself, and if the validity both of scientific generalisations and of moral judgement ultimately rests on this a priori factor, why should it be difficult to believe that our religious judgements and values also have a
priori origin? Is there any serious objection to a critique of the religious reason or religious judgment? If the objective validity of science rests on a priori grounds, on the unprovable principles of the uniformity of nature and of causation, and if morality is based on a sense of duty which seems to be innate, why not suspect that all the edifice of religious thought and life may also rest on equally sure foundations? Should the discovery of the a priori be made it might give us the ground we need for the objective validity of religious judgments.

Professor John Baillie, in his recently published work on "The Interpretation of Religion" makes a vigorous attack on the attempt to derive religion from a priori principles. Dealing with Troeltsch, he charges the advocates of a priorism with using a faulty method, and tries to prove them guilty of begging the very question at issue when they search for a priori first principles. "They speak", he says, "as if to raise the epistemological question with reference to any realm of human experience were the same as to ask, 'What specific a priori principles does it contain?' This, however is to beg the very question at issue in a sense in which it is never begged in Kant's pages", p. 248. But as it happens this was the way in which Kant actually did formulate the epistemological problem raised by the scientific scepticism of Hume. He set out to discover the factors in knowledge which would account for the
universality and necessity which a proposition of science seemed to possess. In other words he made a straight search for some a priori root for the scientific understanding. He saw that the objective validity of a proposition must rest on a priori principles of experience and nowhere else. The failure of empiricism to reach validity showed that the only alternative open for the justification of scientific knowledge was a search for an a priori ground for it within the mind itself. That is precisely the method of a priorism in religion. The charge of subjectivism here drives the philosophy of religion to adapt Kant's own method. But the failure of Troeltsch and others to unearth the religious a priori is no argument against the method when employed in the interest of religious philosophy. Professor Baillie admits that Kant succeeded in basing morality on a priori foundations, so securely, indeed, that the edifice of religion can be safely reared upon it without troubling to find any similar a priori principles to serve as the peculiar ground of religion itself. "There are undoubtedly" he maintains "certain basic principles of our moral natures which stand in need of no proof and are susceptible of none - which are as little requiring or capable of being supported by prior evidence as are the Law of sufficient Reason and the Law of Universal Causation and whatever other laws are recognised by logicians to lie at the roots of our scientific knowledge. But even the most elementary of our religious beliefs are felt to stand in need of some
kind of further evidence and substantiation and are entirely capable of being doubted if such support does not appear. A self evident proposition is defined as a proposition the contradictory of which is not rationally conceivable; and of what article in one religious creed could one claim that to be true? Prof. Baillie admits the existence of à priori principles underlying morality, science, and logic, but he will not admit even the possibility of the existence of similar principles predisposing man to thing of the world religiously. His reason is that no religious beliefs seem to be self-evident, needing no support beyond themselves before the reason is constrained to accept them as true. But to shut the door in the face of the possibility of discovering a religious a priori on this ground is to misunderstand the nature of the a priori. The categories of thought are not self-evident propositions whose contradictory cannot be conceived. They are the forms employed by thought in the ordering, and therefore interpretation of experience and are only known through the function they perform. They are not in Kant equivalent to the self-evident propositions of the rationalists serving as starting points for the exploration of the supersensible world. Prof. Kemp Smith in his Commentary points this and with some insistence. "As the principles which lie at the basis of our knowledge are synthetic, they have no intrinsic necessity, and cannot possess the absolute authority ascribed to them by the rationalists. They are prescribed to human
reason, but cannot be shewn to be inherently rational in any usual sense of that highly ambiguous term. They can be established only as brute conditions, verifiable in fact, though not demonstrable in pure theory (if there be any such thing) of our actual experience. The a priori then is merely relational without inherent content, it is synthetic and therefore incapable of independent or metaphysical proof; it is relative to an experience which is only capable of yielding appearances. The a priori is as strictly factual as the experience which it conditions. Even in the field of morality, Kant held fast to this conviction. Morality no less than knowledge presupposes a priori principles. These however are never self-evident and cannot be established by any appeal to intuition. They have authority only to the extent to which they can be shown to be the indispensable presuppositions of a moral consciousness that is undeniably actual. That the a priori is of this character must be clearly understood. p. XXXVI.

The religious a priori if it exists must be of this character. What it will furnish us when found will not be a series of self-evident propositions serving as a key to the nature of the supersensible world and God. It will be the constitutive forms of human thought which are of experience when that experience reveals a religious meaning and significance in the world of ordinary life, forms of thought which make it possible for the mind to see the glory of God in
the heavens and his work revealed in the firmament and every bush afire with His presence. They will be involved in religious appreciation just as the practical reason makes possible moral appreciation. The religious a priori will be the principles operative in the construction of a religiously known world, possible and also inevitable for a self-conscious rational being. The religious a priori will of itself yield no definite religious beliefs or credal formulations, any more than the principle of causation can give us the cause of any one particular event. All that it could do would be to explain why religious judgments are possible and inevitable, and why they have necessary objective validity within experience. It will tell us why the mind is aware of religious values in the world by showing the subjective conditions underlying the ideas and values of religion, conditions which will guarantee the necessary truths of religious judgments. As "consciousness is in all cases awareness of meaning", the discovery of the religious a priori will give no more than a knowledge of the subjective conditions involved in experience of the world and valuation of it which we call religious. It will show us why we are living in a religious world, why God is here confronting us all the time in and through nature, why we react on the world as if it were alive with a divinity which echoes all our deeper thoughts and emotions, and why, because we are dimly aware of the world's divine background we desire, in order to gain the victory
over all physical conditions, to reach fellowship with the supernatural and the supersensible. If this can be done the a priori ground of religion will furnish also a religious categorical Imperative, commanding all men to go up to the mountain of the Lord to behold as by a transfiguration, the whole world glorified and wearing the garments of the eternal whose presence in life is already discerned by all, though for the most part only through a glass darkly.
CHAPTER V.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGIOUS Á PRIORISM.

That the world has always had for man a religious significance independently of his moral life can no longer remain in question. It is also true that historically morality has developed in strict dependence on religious ideas and practices, and even magic and primitive science was under the same control, both being born out of the womb of a nebulous religious awareness of some power other than human controlling the world. The world of primitive man like his experience was an undifferentiated whole, but if any one feature of it stands out more clearly than the rest and dominant, it is his religious outlook. His religious ideas might not be deeply moralized nor his gods beings of high moral quality, yet his own life in its practical relationships was associated with the invisible background of the world. The gods might be indifferent to him but he could not be indifferent to them. Religion must be given a place at least as primitive as morality itself. The attempt to explain man's religion as nothing more than the objectification of the

tribe, which amounts to a derivation of the religious consciousness from morality, is scarcely successful and is inadequate for the facts. The problem of the religious a priori however is not altogether a question of history, although were it proved that, as a historical fact, religious ideas arose late when man had attained a certain level of moral culture, it would be less easy to base religion in some fundamental characteristic of the human mind. But few have ever questioned the primitive character of religion. What has been seriously attempted is to show that the religious view is something merely primitive, a phase of developing mind, and that the progress of civilisation is fast shedding the outworn garment of religion and theology. What the a priori quest in the philosophy of religion must assume however is that the religious evaluation in experience is fundamental, original, and primitive, and is not derivable from the moral consciousness. Moral ideas do not necessarily and of themselves lead to religion in its highest and widest sense. The sense of duty and the moral order to which it leads, and which it creates with its system of objective moral values, is an integral part of the religious life as well as of the world of specifically religious experience, but that does not argue that religion is nothing more than morality touched with emotion. Religion includes morality but morality is not the whole of religion. From natural science and ethical philosophy it may be possible to rear a respectable theistic
metaphysic, but no one would be prepared to affirm that a moral universe is all that religion demands or is able to provide. A metaphysic expressive only of the true, the good and the beautiful, which seeks to arrive at a conception of God or the absolute alone in terms of these three kingdoms of human values may yet fall short of satisfying the needs of man as a religious being. Even Professor Sorley admits that the facts of the religious consciousness are necessary before some of the most pressing problems of Theism can be dealt with. Ethical Theism leaves out of its purview what to religion is central, viz. man's experience of direct contact and intimate, personal traffic with the Divine. If religion means that man does rise to such fellowship, the religious consciousness is at least supraethical in nature and gains with one leap and assurance of metaphysical reality not within reach of the moralist qua moralist. It is possible to deny the moralists the right to interpret ultimate reality in terms of moral values. Moral values may after all have a value for man here and now, and yet not be a characteristic of the real world. They are made to provide a basis for metaphysical construction only by an act of faith, a faith which has elsewhere its origin. Dr. Bosanquet, for example, concludes that Moral distinctions on account of their finite implications, must in the Absolute be transcended or metamorphosed.

1) "Value and Destiny of the Individual") P.259.
But if religion achieves what it professes to do, direct experience of the supersensible world we have in religion a safer foundation for our metaphysical superstructure for we already know something of the character of God Himself. Religious values are at least objective like the moral. But they are more, they are objective in a metaphysical sense. We reach them and develop them in our contact with the physical and social world, but the experience through which we possess them implies a specific setting for the world and human society, and is a realisation of a spiritual reality which overflows the soul and transfigures the world. We begin to see all things in God and God in all things.

But underlying this religious achievement a fresh power of the mind is involved predetermining all rational beings possessed of self-consciousness to view the world thus, and inspiring them to set out in quest of ever more intimate realisation of the divine in his experience, A sense of duty alone does not account for this spiritual adventure, and it certainly nowhere explains the religious experience of mysticism. God is no more than a task-master keeping back all secrets regarding the rewards of virtue if there be any. We may be only postulating His existence in order to make sure that some reward there must be, perhaps in the form of happiness. Moralists have found it possible, as in the doctrine of naturalism to deny to the moral consciousness
any validity whatsoever beyond the finite world of human society, and metaphysicians have found great difficulty in attributing moral qualities to the Absolute. Even if the a priori source of the moral law is accepted, and man is shut up to the performance of duty for duty's sake, even then so far as duty is duty and nothing more, to be performed for its own sake, the objective validity of morality though guaranteed does not bring us to where religion does, into personal, living fellowship with God, nor even to the possibility of evaluating the world in a religious way. For the reason that we are so accustomed to clothe all moral conduct with a religious significance, it is difficult to realise how poor and circumscribed the moral life is by itself in complete abstraction from religious faith and religious habits of thought. The same is true of beauty. Wordsworth's poetry is more than poetry; it is poetry inspired by religion, and many of his greatest verse is as much the inspiration of religion as it is of poetic fancy. In vain do the poets strip themselves of their priestly garments. They may throw away one article after another and refuse to retain even one of religion's sacred vestments but, alas! as soon as they tread the Muse's sanctuary it is not of beauty alone they sing. They know themselves in the presence of the Shekinah, and they cry like the seraphim whom Isaiah heard in the Temple "Holy, Holy, "Holy is the Lord of Hosts, the whole earth is full of His
"Glory".

Religion then cannot be equated either with philosophical speculation, science, morality or aesthetics. Not with philosophical speculation because religion was a human interest only before man turned philosopher, and the religious mind professes to know and to deal with realities into whose nature philosophy is merely enquiring. Not with science because science deals only with the physical world where it seeks to formulate the laws of physical changes in quantitative terms. Not with morality because though morality is an integral part of any religious life it is never the whole of it. Religion has features in it which stamps it as a human interest quite different in character from morality. From the side of religion you may pass to morality but from morality there is no obvious nor even a possible path to religious experience. Not with aesthetics, because the worship of beauty in the abstract, and the emotions awakened by a beautiful object considered in and for itself in no way resembles religion which always links all objects with the world as a whole, and sees God in all things and all things in God. In view of the refusal of religion to bow to philosophy science morality or aesthetics, for none of them embraces the religious quest, nor views the world with the eyes of religion, nor can give any clear answer to the demands of religion, we are forced to think of religion as something which grows from its own roots, and must be dealt with in its own domain and on its own terms.
The religious consciousness is sui generis but it is more. It is the ancient mother of all the sciences, - the science of nature, of morality, of aesthetics, of philosophy. These are but the children whom she has begotten and we must beware of trying to reverse the order of the spiritual Evolution of man, by seeking for the foundations of religion in some function of reason which is less primitive or less comprehensive than the religious quest itself. We must reverse the order of Kant's famous enquiry. Instead of beginning the examination of knowledge at the scientific end and then moving on to morality and aesthetics, we must begin with the Religious Reason and descend from that to its other employments in the world of science, morality and beauty. For these fields of enquiry and action are all partial abstractions from the concrete wholeness of life. Life is covered completely by none of them, and to look for God along any one of them is to seek the concrete by means of the abstract which is a futile quest. From the concrete to the abstract there is assuredly a way, but none from the abstract to the concrete. From within the categories of the understanding there is no possible path to the Idea or the Experience of God, and there is none from the categorical imperative either. Kant is obliged to give to the ideas of Reason, - the idea of God among them, a secondary place in the interpretation of the world. They are regulative only and not constitutive and do not guarantee the reality of their objects. This was the inevitable result
of taking reason to begin with in one of its functions only, the scientific, and making the standard of all rational methods of interpretation. He ought to have started with the religious view of the world where God is somehow given, and all things appear as in some way bound up with God and with a spiritual background of the world and life. Involved in such a primitive view of things, and underlying primitive experience in the concrete, there were mental factors as potent to determine that experience as the categories of the understanding or the moral consciousness. The ideas of religion were constituted of normal human experience at the first, so that the world was evaluated by primitive man in a religious way before the scientific or the moral view developed. When man became a scientist and a moralist he did not cease to be religious. He only abstracted from the religious view certain aspects of his experience and concentrated on them. He remained religious and still remains, for the offspring of the primitive mind did not take their Mother's patrimony entirely from her. The categories of religious thought are logically prior to all other categories, and we can only find their interdependence and their organic relationship by starting with the concrete, primitive, religious view of life, and work downwards to science, morality and aesthetics.

If then we tentatively accept the a priori source of religion, if, that is, religious ideas are already involved
in human experience of the world and not due to intellectual
construction or invention, if they have contributed something
essential to experience from the first then certain very
interesting consequences will follow. Let us see what they
are.

1) In the first place human experience will be seen to be
fundamentally religious experience. What appears secular
is not wholly secular; because the hinterland of life is
sacred and the world is lit up with divine meaning. Instead
of rising to religious experience on the foundation of a
secular reaction to the world, man falls rather into the
purely secular life from a religious pedestal. But the
lamp of religion is never entirely put out even in the case
of the secularist who consciously parades his irreligion.
Self-conscious irreligion has something of the religious
outlook left in it, for the world is still problematically
divine. It is the purely scientific or naturalistic view of
the world that is due to constructional activity, and not the
religious. Behind pure naturalism there is a process of
abstraction which leaves the world, though more in hand it may be,
yet infinitely poorer and seriously stripped of its wealth
of meaning. But to self-consciousness the world, in spite of
every violence done to it, remains at heart what religion
at first pronounced it to be.

2) Another consequence that will follow is this.
Developed religion is not an amalgam of non-religious
elements, built up from the primary emotions or instincts of our sub-human natures. The tree of religion, with its wealth of fruit in the form of experience and ideas, has grown, not from a graft placed in another root, but from its own root. Neither the ideas nor the emotions which constitute or express the specifically religious evaluation are derived from outside religion's own principle. They have evolved from within, and although light and sustenance and nourishment have come from other human interests and the separation of the sciences, energetic source of religions evolution is primitive in character and comes from the peculiar qualities of self-consciousness. "The God-idea", says Prof. Waterhouse, "is not an invention reached at a certain stage of "culture but the gradual unfolding of the implications of an "elemental emotional attitude". Religion comes neither from animal instincts and emotions, however intermingled, nor from morality, nor from the scientific view of the world, nor from tribal life, nor from any other way in which man reacts to his environment. It comes and can only come from its own plasm within self-consciousness.

(3) Still another consequence follows the a priori hypothesis. Religious experience if subjected to adequate analysis should reveal its own specific categories as constitutive factors in experience, just as Kant believed

1) Philosophy of Religious Experience, p. 42.
the categories of the understanding to be, and not as regulative only. It would show why the world as we know it speaks the language of religion as a native tongue which we can understand with the least effort of all, why man has always believed that somehow, somewhere, all his needs can be met, how in his quest for satisfaction he has persisted in his assumption that the world at heart is not alien to his own life, but in some deeper sense, of one piece with it, and will therefore respond to his effort to understand it and make it yield up its treasures. If and when the analysis gives us the a priori categories of religious thought, those categories will be seen not to be unrelated to the other categories which thought employs in the determination of natural or moral or aesthetic experience. We shall expect to find the religious a priori to be more fundamental than the others, yet organically related to them as their vital source. And perhaps also, the discovery would be made that a certain species of anthropomorphism underlies all our science of nature, morality and art and that unless man sees the world in terms of his own concrete image he cannot see it at all as it is. Should such a conclusion be forced on us and the charge brought against it that we are back again in a helpless subjectivity, I would point out that anthropomorphism acting on a priori lines is not the same thing as subjectivism understood as the objectification of desire or the projection of complexes. What we would have to
admit would be that man has no other way open to him to interpret the world and to think of God, except in terms of the native structure of his own thought. He is as much committed to that as any empiricist is to the reality of sense data. To sum up. The religious imperative arises from the fact that the mind is so constituted that it reacts upon the world in such a way as to discover there the foot-prints of the divine presence. This discovery is inevitable and is accompanied and interfused by a specific emotional reaction which is more than a mere amalgam of animal feelings - an original primitive religious emotion. But neither the reaction, nor the discovery, is the result of reflection and certainly not the product of science, whether physical, ethical, aesthetic or philosophical, - although all these do react upon the religious valuation in a thousand ways. Religion is primitive and persistent and all subsequent experience of the world is built upon and around this religious nucleus. Whatever categories are employed in the sciences for the understanding of the world, these are functions within the wider religious categories, from which in fact they arise. There is therefore no such thing for a rational being as a non-religious view of the world and life. He is shut up to religion, and he has no option but to relate his existence to a spiritual reality. It is moreover as a rational creature and not as a bundle of emotions that man so views the world so that religion is essentially a rational reaction, and
valuation. It follows that the voice of God is logically prior to the voice of duty, the religious imperative to the categorical imperative of morality, and I would dare go further and say that the principles of the uniformity of Nature and of Causation are logically based on, and grow out of what we know as religious intuition or religious faith. Finally the religious reaction is an immediate experience of reality, a coming face to face, through the ministry of nature and human life, with the spiritual power which pulsates and indwells every object and every environment in which man finds himself. In religion reality is given not to be analysed as in science, or reflected upon as in philosophy, or obeyed as in morality or even copied and interpreted as in art but worshipped and communed with as the soul of all that exists and the power immanent in the world and life.
CHAPTER VI.

FROM MORALITY TO RELIGION.

In order to pursue a step further the contention that religion springs from its own root within experience it is necessary to review the attempts made to derive it from or base it upon other sources within self-consciousness. For if, as the present argument seeks to establish, religion is essentially a priori in nature, it is reasonable to suppose that its fundamental character (though not, of course, all its features nor all the elements which have decided its course in evolution), cannot be adequately explained on any other view of its origin. To examine, and if possible to show the inadequacy of other explanations than the a priori will be seen to be therefore a relevant undertaking. In doing this we shall clear away a certain amount of mental confusion and also gain a better access to the truth we are in search of.

To some extent this task has occupied us already. What must now be done is a fuller treatment of the questions raised, and a more adequate justification of the conclusions
reached at the end of the last chapter.

I propose first of all to deal with the attempt to base religion and its valuations upon the moral consciousness, upon our sense of duty, and the values which grow out of the moral life. The most recent contribution of this subject is Professor John Baillie's very able book on the Interpretation of Religion" reference to which has already been made. Professor Baillie who is very definite in his rejection of the a priori hypothesis, argues very powerfully and eloquently for a philosophy of religion based upon moral experience. "What we have to do", he says, "is to trace, in as exact and careful a way as we can, the process by which faith in God comes to birth in the soul of man, and the first point to be firmly established is that the process begins from the awareness of our human values, that is to say from the moral consciousness as such. In the order of evidence, moral knowledge is anterior to religious knowledge. "The certainty of conscience is a certainty which is logically prior to the certainty of faith". "The certitude of duty is thus a genuine prius in the approach to faith. Unless appeal can be made to it, religious assurance can never be brought to birth in the soul". "It is simply the truth that there is nothing of which man is more certain than of his primary moral values." We possess, therefore", he goes on, "in the moral consciousness a firm standing ground from which we can hope to rise to the certainties of religion

"And it is of vital importance for the theologian that he should clearly recognise this character of self-sufficiency attaching to our moral knowledge." 1) "Here then is firm standing ground on which the man of faith may build his soul's house and the theologian his system. If only the foundational affirmations of religion can be made as certain as are our basic moral values, there will be few indeed who will ask for more". 2) 

Having thus affirmed the a priori character of the moral consciousness and therefore the validity within experience of all moral values, Professor Baillie goes on to pave the way for a secure foundation also for religion and religious values. He is obliged to make this transition because morality and religion cannot be equated, in-as-much as the latter deals with a reality not directly given in the moral consciousness itself. In this demand he accepts the leadership of Kant who saw that the moral imperative of duty contained implications which inevitably led on to something more than is immediately given in moral experience, into a further awareness of a reality from which the claim derives, an 'is' behind the 'ought'. "Our values refuse to hang in a permanent state of suspension in the thin air of the ideal; rather do they, as soon as apprehended, demand a cosmic setting for themselves; or indeed they weave for themselves a cosmic setting out of their own substance, or, to change the metaphor, they unfold out of themselves a

(1 p.343) (2 p.345)
"scaffolding that reaches down to the world of reality. 
judgement
"For the form 'I ought,' though indeed it is the very root 
and type of immediate and certain knowledge, has neverthe­ 
less never appeared capable of standing by itself in 
isolation from same kind of context in the reality to which 
"the 'I' in question belongs", p. 346. The moral con­ 
sciousness therefore leads us on to the affirmation of 
same kind of ground and source of it in the real order.

When we ask of what nature is this transition from morality 
to reality — this 'leading on', Professor Baillie is not 
quite sure what answer he will give. He says that "the 
mental process concerned is undoubtedly of the nature of 
"inference" and yet he adds with the same breath, that it 
is not a real inference "like a conscious piece of deductive 
"reasoning still less anything like argumentation". Indeed 
we seem here to be quite at the opposite pole from anything 
of that kind. The truth is that, under the long tuition of 
moral experience, the consciousness of the moral claim comes, 
by an almost imperceptible transition of thought, to be inter­ 
preted as an awareness of a Divine Reality. The process is 
not really a passage from believing in duty to believing in 
something else, but is much rather a passage from one way of 
reading the meaning of duty to another way of reading it. 
For what religion does is just to give a deeper meaning to duty, 
a deeper significance to our values. Moreover we cannot 

think that man is ever at any stage without some dim con­

1) p. 348
sciousness or premonition of this deeper meaning. The seed of religion is in every man's heart, ....... "and the slow 
growth of a firmly established faith in the soul of the 
earnest seeker is perhaps more than anything else the 
gradual dawning of the realisation that in believing (as 
he has all the time believed) in duty he has been believing 
in more than he thought". p. 348.

There is therefore implicit in the moral judgment, logically bound up with it, a reference to a system of 
reality which takes us beyond the world of moral conduct. 
Normally this system is not present to consciousness in 
any explicit way, yet in some real sense it is latently 
contained in the conscious judgment". How this wider experience is gained and how the moral life is and always 
has been directly associated with the world of reality, with the Divine order, Professor Baillie is unable to tell. Our psychological Knowledge, he thinks is inadequate to help us out. For this purpose we would require a much deeper insight into the workings and nature of mind, than we possess. "Now it may be difficult to know what psychological 
account we are to give of this 'implicit' existence in an 
intuition of a system which reflexion afterwards reveals to 
have been its logical basis from the beginning". After quoting Mr. Bradley approvingly that this implied system is 
a system of what the latter calls 'my station and its duties' he goes on to plead that the system is wider than the social 

1) p. 349  2) p. 349.
or merely human, which at most is but a fragment of the world in which we live and move and have our being. "We come to see that what the voice of conscience actually does say is something more like this: - "The very heart and nature of things, the most ultimate reality that there is, demands that I be pure and true and tender and brave". "No obligation can be absolute which does not derive from the Absolute". p. 350

Having reached this point in his effort to span the chasm separating morality from religion, Professor Baillie, although he knows himself to have begun from the side of the moral consciousness, is not quite sure whether he has not been drawing supports for his bridge from the side of religion also. In any case when he is only half way across he begins to tremble on account of the inability of his moral buttresses to get him right across to the other side. He is dimly aware of the inadequacy of the moral consciousness to get him over at all. But he will not avoid the issue for over he must get/somehow from his own particular side, using only materials he has deliberately chosen and which all along he defends and wishes to prove sufficient for his purpose. "Setting out from the knowledge, which is the essence of morality, that 'right is right though the 'heavens fall' it has arrived at the faith that because 'right is right' the highest Heaven will not fall or fail; and that is the essence of religion". p. 351
He is across Jordan, then, and in the Promised Land, but he is honest enough to admit that his bridge is not constructed, and that he has only jumped across by a sheer act of Faith. "But does this mean, he asks, that the truth of religion is capable of rigid logical demonstration? Does it mean that by a simple process of argument we can show the truth of it to be implied in certain ethical facts which are themselves too fundamental to admit of being questioned?" In his answer Professor Baillie unwittingly calls to his aid the religious consciousness itself.

Such proof as there can be is no more than a drawing out into more consciously deductive and syllogistic form of the thought-process that is always present in religion itself. The most we can do is to bring religion's own logic into sharper detail. This logic of religion he expresses thus:

What faith, when squarely interrogated seems centrally to insist upon is that in our consciousness of duty, or of ultimate values, there is contained an authentic intimation of the nature of the system to which we belong; and hence the only proper apologetic for religion is that which sets out the logic of this insistence. Perhaps there is no better way of setting it out than the very simple one of asking what else it can mean to say that I 'must' do this or this, except that the nature of things demands that I can do it. Can any possible meaning be attached to absolute obligation, or to ultimate value, if these are conceived as having no sanction in the all-enclosing system?

1) p.351 2) p. 351
"If I am right in feeling that it is absolutely demanded of me that I be pure in heart and just and honourable in all my dealings, then can this mean less than that reality demands these things of me? and if reality demands these things of me, then reality must be interested in moral value; it must have a stake in the moral issue; it must be on the side of the good and against the unworthy and the evil. But that is to say that it is a moral Being itself, not indifferent to moral distinctions, but, on the contrary, supremely sensitive to them and really and deeply caring whether good or evil prevails. The ultimate reality must thus be One who loves the Good". p.(352).

But has Professor Baillie in the course of his argument passed from the certitude of the moral consciousness, which to him is axiomatic and a priori, to equal certitude concerning the moral character of reality which religion affirms and with which it primarily deals? That he has passed from morality to religion in his thought is beyond question. The ethical nature of ultimate reality, the fact of a Lawgiver, behind the Law, the existence of a Being who takes sides in man's moral struggle are clearly affirmations of the specifically religious mind. But are they reached in the way Professor Baillie makes out? Does the moral consciousness per se provide a basis for such a superstructure, and if so, is the building as firm throughout as the foundations upon which it rests? He is willing to admit that morality demands
religion for its completion, that ideals are suspended in the void unless they are justified at the bar of Reality, but he insists nevertheless that the root of the assurance of such a real universe as will guarantee the conservation of all ethical values is to be found in the moral consciousness itself. Indeed he tries to evolve that assurance from the imperative of duty. But why, if the moral consciousness is itself able to furnish an implicate to guarantee the objective validity in reality of its own values is it necessary to call in religion to its aid to provide the required moral universe? Why does not morality provide its own guarantee throughout, both the certainty of a moral universe as well as the imperative of duty? This of course it cannot do so long as it remains itself, a consciousness of obligation to obey the voice of duty, for duty's sake, and nothing more. Acknowledging this deficiency in the moral ideal there are two ways open to us to seek its completion. The one way is to find it in the religious view of the world given in consciousness independently, or else logically antecedent to the moral imperative. The other is to make the moral imperative yield the assurance religion gives concerning the moral nature of reality. In the former case morality would be logically dependent on religion as an original evaluation of reality; in the latter religion would would be an appendage of the moral life, something added on to complete what is otherwise insufficient, though so far
as it goes, perfectly valid. Following Kant it is the latter course which Professor Baillie adopts. When however we follow him in his method of transition he wants to gain for religion the same objective validity as the moral imperative possesses. To do this he makes the moral consciousness yield from its very bosom as it were, and not by a process of inference or argumentation, direct contact with the ultimate reality itself. In doing this however he is aware that morality is morality no longer. It is religion, and it is of the logic of religion that he speaks when he affirms the moral character of the cosmos. But obviously the religious evaluation he has thus gained is not in anyway derived from the consciousness of duty for duty's sake, the knowledge of right and wrong. The assurance of a moral universe, of a Divine world, is gained by him, not by an analysis of the moral consciousness in the Kantian sense of duty for duty's sake, - which in any case must be to some extent indifferent to the ultimate nature of Reality - but by reading into morality an awareness of a Divine Reality not given to the purely moral consciousness itself. If it be that only by religion's own logic the objective moral universe is discovered to guarantee the moral life, why try to make out that the very logic which is religious is nevertheless but an implication and no more of what to consciousness is merely moral in nature? Either morality needs religion to complete itself, or it does not. If it does, then religion provides a valuation of the world
not given in the moral consciousness and therefore not derivable from it. If it does not, then there ought to be no need to seek for more in the awareness of duty and the nature of moral values than that awareness provides. Although Professor Baillie sets out with the statement that "moral knowledge is anterior to religious knowledge" and that "the certainty of conscience is logically prior to the certainty of faith", he soon finds himself irresistibly though perhaps unwittingly, affirming that what the voice of conscience actually does say is: "The very heart of and nature of things, the most ultimate reality that there is, demands that I be pure and true and tender and brave". Although he starts off with the belief that "we possess in the moral consciousness a firm standing ground from which we can hope to rise to the certainties of religion", and proceeds to throw his bridge across from the one to the other, he nevertheless admits later that "No obligation can be absolute which does not derive from the Absolute" which must mean that only religion itself can guarantee the validity of moral obligation. But if morality requires the sanction of religion, what becomes of the self sufficiency of the moral imperative of duty upon which religious faith itself is to rest, and how can religion be based on morality if morality needs for its enforcement what religion alone can provide? Professor Baillie even admits that what religion does is to give a deeper meaning to duty, a deeper
significance to our values, but if so, religion must be a more fundamental feature of consciousness than morality, and must spring from a supra-moral root, in human nature. When he also goes on to admit that "the seed of religion is in every man's heart" and that in believing in duty the earnest seeker has been believing in more than he thought, Professor Baillie is obviously employing categories of thought which in no sense can be derived from the moral consciousness, and he clearly contradicts the very thesis he sets out to establish namely, that the certainty of religious faith is based ultimately on our consciousness of moral values.

That Professor Baillie is led to make the religious consciousness confer an added validity on morality, at the very time when his object is to show how religious certainty must be based on the moral consciousness, is sufficient proof that morality itself, though a priori as a categorical imperative, does not cover the whole of human nature. It is a partial aspect only, and must be supplemented by other and equally fundamental reactions of the human mind to the sum total of life's environment. Although it may be true that morality cannot be evolved from non-moral elements, and is therefore an original endowment of mind, and an essential characteristic of Reason, it may yet be illegitimate to treat the moral consciousness in the strict sense as a sufficient or the only ground upon which the nature of reality is made known to us. The facts of morality are
doubtless of supreme worth both for philosophy and theology in their attempt to systematise experience and interpret ultimate reality. We certainly cannot argue cogently about the nature of the world and leave moral experience on one side. Any such omission would at once invalidate our method no less than our conclusions. From the point of view of the metaphysician, however, the real trouble about the moral consciousness is, not that it does not lend valuable, and indeed priceless aid, but that it does not take him far enough into the heart of reality, but leaves on his hand new difficulties and perplexities created by the moral life itself. In the words of Professor Galloway "on two "grounds the ethical consciousness requires to be supplemented "and completed; it can neither guarantee the persistence "of its values, nor can it state the ultimate Good in a 1) "finally satisfying form".

It is the merit of Professor Baillie's discussion that he sees clearly that this deficiency must be made good, not by a process of inference or argument or reflexion. Something more is required than a deeper speculative insight and dialectical acumen. What is wanted is a new transsubjective path along which the ethical character of reality itself may be intuitively grasped, and communion established through

immediate experience, a communion not altogether independent of the moral life but still capable both of anticipating and transcending ordinary moral relationships. It is this direct intuition of ethical reality that the religious consciousness provides, and it is because of this that religion is something sui generis and expresses an original endowment of the reason in no way implied, however we interpret that word, in the awareness of duty, and the distinction between right and wrong in conduct. Religion is thus not to be identified with philosophy, or the conscious effort of the discursive understanding to explain ultimate reality. The way religion completes morality, is not by providing a new dialectic, but by cutting an entirely new way into direct experience of the absolutely good which morality is impotent to reach. Religion has its own logic therefore, as Professor Baillie perceives, but it is not the logic of the moral consciousness any more; it is the logic born of another order of experience and a quite different power of reason. It is the logic of the religious consciousness, of the awareness of a divine meaning discoverable in concrete experience of the real. The persistence of moral values and the true nature of the ultimate good - the two demands which, according to Professor Galloway the moral consciousness, in spite of its alleged certitude, cannot meet, are guaranteed, by religion. They are not guaranteed by philosophy working
Philosophy can only guarantee them if they are already in some measure facts of experience. But it is only in religion that they are facts, and religion attains them because self-consciousness is richer in its capacity for evaluating and experiencing reality than is discoverable in the moral imperative of duty. "The problems raised by ethics find their solution in Religion and it shews that the inner connection of the two comes to light. For the religious consciousness states explicitly the implications of the moral consciousness; it affirms the reality of an ultimate Good in the form of a supreme and personal will, who is the Ground and End of the natural and the spiritual order of things. The God who is ethical Ground of the world guarantees the validity and persistence of the ethical values; and it is in and through man's relation to God, the perfect Good, that the ethical ideal can be transcended and completed. The moral end cannot be stated in an absolute form because morality itself is not absolute and final: it is a phase of spiritual life which points beyond itself and comes to its goal in religion. And the goal to which religion points is supra-mundane, a transcendent realm in which man's moral endeavour passes into a higher fulfilment, into communion with the Source and End of all goodness".

This is a clear and valid statement of the relationship between morality and religion. Religion is not to be derived from morality; it stands in its own right as an activity of self-consciousness that cannot be resolved into moral elements. But Professor Galloway deals with both religion and morality in the interest of philosophical construction and is not here concerned with the question how the religious view of the world arises, or in what way religion reaches this assurance of the ultimate Good. That its nature and growth are possible only in organic relationship with morality he readily admits, as indeed does Professor Baillie, but the admission that religion is other than morality and reaches reality in a different way is an important acknowledgment which must not be overlooked.

That religious experience of Reality, an awareness that is, of the spiritual and divine which gives rise to religious values independently of the moral, is primitive and original, is now a commonplace of anthropology. This Professor Baillie freely admits, "For the savage cannot but be aware of the "larger background against which his life is set and of which "his fate is for the most part determined. He cannot help "regarding himself as a fragment in a larger scheme of things. "No race known to history has been entirely without faith in "a possible interest, on the part of some superhuman agency, "in our mortal weal and woe. There the modern Christian "theist joins hands with the rudest of his ancestors. Where
he differs is only in the way in which that agency is conceived by him." (p. 321). If this is so then all discussion of the nature of the religious consciousness and the values it finds and creates must keep steadily in view this primitive and independent character of religion to which history bears witness. That science, morality, and art have played a big part in religion's growth and purification must not hide from us the fact that religion, as we know and live it, is still at heart and in all its potency and revelational quality something that is not completely accounted for by knowledge of nature, morality and Beauty which the sciences furnish. The epistemology of the soul is not exhausted along these lines of approach to reality. Human experience contains revelation of truth which is not derived from any one of them separately nor from all of them together. Christian theism may owe much to physics, ethics and aesthetics but it certainly does not owe all it possesses. Its foundation at least, and also its coping stone, are given by religion and every stage in its progress owes something to the intuitions of the religious consciousness. It may be that at the present moment our failure to make headway in theistic reconstruction is due to our lack of understanding concerning the character of the insight which religion can produce and the certainties which lie hidden at its heart. We have trusted too much to the
sciences to control our metaphysics in the belief that religion is completely covered by science morality and art. What if religion after all, because it has its own secret approach to the ultimate reality, has also its own logic which alone is adequate for philosophy, and which is necessary to reinforce or supplement the logic of the sciences which so frequently breaks in our hands? Not infrequently, when other armour fails us, such a logic is called in to help us out, but weak is the effort put forth to unravel its mystery and make it glow with its own light. Perhaps not until this is done shall we meet with greater success in our reading of the nature of ultimate reality.
CHAPTER VII

FROM PSYCHOLOGY TO EPISTEMOLOGY.

There are at least two ways in which the psychology of religion can view its main task. On the one hand, because religion always deals with the ultimate Reality or God, it may seem to be the business of the psychologist to lay bare the avenues along which the supernatural enters the soul, tracing its operations as a determining factor in human experience. Accepting his problem in this sense the psychologist will naturally call to his aid the witness of the saints of history, of all abnormal religious souls who may have had strange experience, as well as the testimony of the ordinary devout man. In particular he will turn to the great mystics and will scrutinize carefully their writings as classical expressions of the working of the spirit of God in human life. Religious experience, on this reading, will be taken in its narrower connotation and the presupposition of the method will be that God reveals Himself directly to the individual soul. Religious experience is experience not merely of God but experience engendered by Him directly and therefore providing clear evidence of His presence and reality.
When the task of religious psychology is accepted in this way the enquiry tends to be dominated by the psychologist's own theological or scientific prepossessions. The theist, e.g. will proceed to his analysis in full faith that what the mystic says is in the main true, that he has experienced contact with God and that God is as real in him, as his own hands and feet. The materialist, however, though interested in understanding the religious life, so called, will proceed to explain it all on the assumption that the experience of God is really little more than an illusion due to certain psychological factors, which he is able to point out and explain. When the problem of the psychology of Religion is thus understood it is difficult to avoid extreme positions, involving a whole metaphysic of reality to the neglect of psychology's main business and more humble method.

The second, and as we think the more profitable way of reading the problem of religious psychology is to view religious experience, not exclusively as something inexplicable apart from the hypothesis that God Himself enters directly into the soul, or as an experience obviously God-created, but as essentially an evaluation natural to man, of the world sub specie divinitatis an evaluation in and through which the soul is aware of God as the indwelling spirit and power, sustaining both the world and the soul in their intercommunion.
Here God is not the object, so to speak of the religious consciousness in the ordinary sense of object as distinguished from the subject of cognition. God is rather the over-arching reality, or 'over-soul' as Emerson would say, which is experienced along with and through our experience of the world outside. God is a factor of experience not independently of the world which is always with us, but through the medium of that world when the soul is able to view it in a certain light which we know as the light of religious faith. The problem of the psychology of religion is then not first of all to decide whether God is found in experience in a unique and exclusive way independent of and outside the world altogether, but whether our experience of the world is at heart also an experience of God, whether, in fine, the world and our experience of it does not imply an awareness of God, in any case, as something inescapable and therefore positively real. Putting the problem in this way we are able to avoid the departmental view of the soul, and we bring religious experience into organic relationship to every other form of experience. We also keep the religious consciousness close up to the real world, and we avoid the temptation to lift God and our awareness of Him above the flow of the all encircling reality of which we ourselves form a part, and which enters into the context of all experience whatsoever. Although in religion God is spoken of as the object of worship, we cannot in strictness reduce even the God of religion to the limitations of ordinary
objectivity. God cannot be an object of perception, as the sun or any physical thing, nor is God for religion an object of thought merely. Religion is neither idolatry nor philosophy. The God of religious experience is more than object and more than idea. He is reality experienced in and through our consciousness of the world of objects, when we view that world as having a spiritual significance, both subspecie divinitatis and also, if our religion be mature - subspecie aeternitatis. In religion God has, after all, something of the character of the Absolute, in that He appears in experience only at the point where the subject-object relationship becomes partly transcended in the soul's communion with the world illumined by the eye of faith. But never in religious experience does the soul cancel out the world, except perhaps at the point of its highest illumination. Whether it be through the contemplation of Nature, or the ordinary affections of human life, or through in this sense history, God is for finite experience always mediated. The psychology of religion has to deal therefore not with an exclusive experience of God direct or immediate, however specific the experience may be in itself, but with the experience of the world and life in which more than the world and more than human life is present, an experience of these which sets them in spiritual and divine relationships, and sees them all transfused with a significance and a glory that is but not transcendent/abiding, not physical merely but spiritual, not temporal but eternal. This is a more concrete quest than
the endeavour to find the hand of God touching life directly in the individual soul. The method of the latter must be the Elimination of every 'natural' factor, and the attribution of the residuum to divine agency, - a very unsatisfactory procedure indeed. We could never be sure that we had ruled out all possible 'natural' explanations of religious experience. If however we adopt the concrete path of concrete experience and trace the characteristic values which the religious outlook discovers in the world and life, and show how they affect all other values and how these are all given a supersensible setting by religious faith, we shall be better able to give religion its true place and more likely to discover the equal validity of its valuations with those on other levels of experience. Religious psychology is not confined to the study of mysticism on the one hand as with Leuba, nor to abnormal souls, on the other as with James and the Freudians. Its main task is with the normal commonplace folk who/their religious lives seem to be exercising themselves along lines ordained for them by the constitution of their minds and can do no other, to whom God comes in divers forms and in divers ways and who see, as by an inner necessity, though perhaps, dimly enough, all things in God and God in all things. In this chapter we will follow the more concrete method and consider religious experience as a constituent of experience in its wider range.

Let us begin with a statement from Prof. Galloway. "However "valuable the psychological study of religion may be," says
Prof. Galloway, "the facts themselves hardly allow us to rest at the psychological point of view. The tendency will always be for those who examine religious experience to draw conclusions, expressed or unexpressed, on religious truth. Religious experiences, in point of fact, do not come to us, in a perfectly pure form, so that they can be reckoned as immediate data. Here as elsewhere the psychologist finds that presentations and representations, facts and meanings cannot be separated by a hard and narrow line. A psychology of pure presentations or facts is not practicable; for psychical facts are more than bare events; being facts for a self-conscious mind, they possess meaning and involve inference. It is because religious experiences are more than mere events that they acquire spiritual significance and value, and play a part in the religious life.  

In this passage Professor Galloway faces up to the crucial difficulty of religious psychology. The borderland between the psychology and the metaphysics of religion is very treacherous territory at the present time and until some more exploration has been undertaken there is small promise of any real advance. It is notorious that the psychologists are finding it difficult, when dealing with religious experience, to keep to their own peculiar domain. Not satisfied with prosecuting their own science they insist on passing beyond its province to pass judgment on the truth of religious ideas and beliefs. Although as psychologists they theoretically accept the rule of detached

1) Philosophy of Religion, pp 253-4.
and disinterested observers, taking religious experiences as a series of psychic facts to be examined and correlated in the interests of science, they cannot or will not stop at scientific generalisations concerning the working of the religious mind. They irresistibly pass over beyond the limits of science and pronounce on the objective validity of religious judgments. In the study of religion our psychologists are almost all metaphysicians. Those who disagree with their conclusions are never tired of pointing out to them their trespass, declaring that religious psychology ought to leave questions of the truth of religion alone, not only because psychological knowledge is not advanced in that way, but because the weapons of science, even of psychology, are quite inadequate for the higher tasks of metaphysical enquiry. But the rebuke goes unheeded and the psychologists persist in their waywardness as if in spite of themselves. Perhaps Professor Galloway is right, as we shall presently see that he is, in pointing out that in religion, the facts themselves hardly allow us to rest at the psychological point of view.

To return to the passage quoted above, Professor Galloway is insisting on two important but quite distinct considerations. In the first place he reminds us of the difficulties the religious psychologist has to contend with, difficulties due to the nature of his subject matter. Religious experience, he points out, is never pure fact as it comes to the notice
of the investigator. It is fact plus interpretation and inference. When he comes to relate his experience the religious man finds it difficult to differentiate between the experience itself and his own theological and mental predisposition. In his account, presentation and representation, fact and meaning are intermingled, and, more important still, the experienc's own intellectual beliefs and personal history colour and determine his experiences in a real way, entering as it were into their very texture. The psychologist is seldom therefore, able to get at the facts, as they appear in so called pure experience, already they are clothed facts, interpreted events, whose meaning is given along with them. The psychologist is obliged therefore to look critically into his data and endeavour, as best he can, to sift fact from meaning, event from interpretation.

This however is not the crucial difficulty facing the student of religious experience. For even were it possible to get behind the individual's own interpretative falsification of his experience would we then come up against 'pure' experience and bare fact? Would the psychologist then be faced with immediate, unsophisticated data upon which to base his induction? One thing is quite certain - and this is the very important second point in the quotation from Professor Galloway - the fact would not be a bare fact, or event in the natural sense. It would be a 'fact' plus 'meaning', and the meaning would be the biggest and most important element in the
Experience as a fact. There is no event for a self-conscious being which we can speak of as a bare event. Experience never gives mere facts; the facts are always facts with a definite meaning, a meaning that itself constitutes the fact, and apart from which the fact would not be what it is. The presence of meaning as the essence, or core of the fact, so to speak, is a characteristic of all experience. For psychology therefore the data to be studied are not quite like the 'facts' which are the subject matter of the physical sciences. The fact here is a concrete experience of an individual mind, and experience, as Prof. Ward insists in his 'Psychological Principles', always implies the duality of subject and object, in which the experient is aware of the presented object. This duality within every psychic event must be respected in psychological analysis of experience. Neither the subjective side of it, nor the objective, taken in abstraction, constitutes the 'fact' or datum for psychology but always the concrete experience as a whole, including both the act of awareness and the content of which the individual is aware, cognition and the thing cognised. To sunder experience into two, and, taking one side of the duality, treat it as a psychic fact to be investigated in independence, is a fruitful source of confusion, as Prof. Ward points out. It turns duality into dualism.

Psychic facts, just because they are facts within the individual's experience, possess a character very different from the physical facts with which the ordinary sciences deal.
There are for the psychologist no 'objects' in the strict sense to study in the same way as there are for the physicist. The elements of experience are not psychic objects in any real sense, because self-consciousness which is the bearer of experience is itself the condition of all objectivity. When experience, within which objects arise, is investigated it is plain that we cannot treat the whole psychic fact as if it were an object and nothing more. The object here is but a part of the fact and the part must not be treated as if it were the whole. The objective fact alone is not the whole, but that object as it is held and evaluated within the experience, an experience which is always the experience of an individual self-conscious being. Prof. Ward insists that the empirical psychologist cannot imitate the procedure of the natural or objective sciences because the two standpoints are entirely different. "The language the physicist uses is simply: "there is this or that - a, b, c, or d. But the psychologist cannot by saying: there are such and such presentations or feelings, or movements - as if they were independent entities - bring out the characteristics of his own standpoint. To this end his statements must (and always do) either explicitly or implicitly, take the form: The individual experient has such and such presentations, feels thus or thus, and acts in this wise or in that. And this is the 'form of 'consciousness': to eliminate it is to ignore the concrete
experience of the individual subject altogether, 
"and to abolish what is characteristic of psychology; when 
"its 'absolute presupposition' goes, the content is no longer 
"content of consciousness in the psychological sense".

The abstract character of psychological method is well 
expressed by Prof. Bergson. "Psychology, in fact, proceeds 
"like all the other sciences by analysis. It resolves the 
"self, which has been given it, at first in a simple intuition, 
"into sensations, feelings, ideas etc. which it studies 
"separately. It substitutes, then, for the self a series of 
"elements which form the facts of psychology. But are these 
"elements really parts? That is the whole question, and it is 
"because it has been evaded that the problem of human 
"personality has so often been stated in insoluble terms".

When Prof. Ward exhorts us to adapt in psychology the 
viewpoint of the experient and not to handle psychic events 
in a radically objective way, he is saying pretty much the 
same thing as Prof. Galloway. A particular experience as the 
latter asserts is always more than a mere event. It is an 
event having a definite meaning, a meaning in the first place 
not for the psychologist but for the experient himself. The 
meaning is the heart of the psychic fact. It is indeed the 
major constituent of the fact. The 'fact' and the 'meaning'

1) "Psychological Principles" p. 23-4.
2) "An Introduction to Metaphysics" p. 21.
of Prof. Galloway must not however be identified with the 'subject' and the 'object' respectively of Prof. Ward. It is the experience as a whole including its subjective and its objective side that is a 'fact' or an event, and the 'meaning' it has for the self-conscious experient covers the whole experience likewise. Experience must be accepted therefore in its entirety both as a fact and as 'meaning' for these are so indissolubly bound together as the subject and the object are. If the recognition of the latter relationship is necessary for psychology, the acknowledgment of fact and meaning is equally fundamental for epistemology. For psychology then let us repeat, the duality of subject and object is an essential, the essential and basic feature of experience; concrete experience implies the subject-object relationship. The object, the content of conscious experience must in psychology be dealt with always as a constituent element of a psychic fact, and in strict relationship with the subject or the experient. The 'object' must always be the 'subjective object' within self-consciousness; never the 'objective object' of scientific investigation. What the nature of the object may be outside experience is no concern of psychology. It cannot decide the knowledge value of a presentation. That is the task of epistemology which enquires into the nature and extent of the knowledge of reality which experience provides. In 'subjective object', that is, the object as correlated with the subject in concrete experience must
not be identified forthwith with the 'objective object' of physical science, which in any case, is a very elaborate mental construction built up on the intersubjective intercourse of many minds.

The psychology of religious experience cannot afford to ignore this subject-object relationship upon which Prof. Ward lays so much emphasis. The object in religious experience must be viewed in strict dependence on the act of awareness as the content of a concrete experience. If this were strictly adhered to there would, in religious psychology, be no falling into the temptation of passing judgment on the objective validity of religious experience. The question of objective validity would not arise, for the simple but sufficient reason that the objective factor in the experience is but the object within the concrete individual experience, and not the object viewed 'objectively' as in physical science. It is of the utmost importance that the psychological and the epistemological study of religious experience should be carefully distinguished. The mischief due to their confusion is more serious in religious than in general psychology. If, as Prof. Ward asserts psychology suffered in the hands of Descartes and Locke by being burdened with epistemological problems, today the problems of religious epistemology is suffering by the attempt to solve them with the methodology of psychological enquiry.  

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between the standpoint of a given experience and the standpoint of its exposition, a confusion to which no other science is liable except psychology and the sciences dependent upon it, is still prevalent in religious psychology. 'Facts' and 'meanings' are taken together and discussed as if they were 'just' facts in the objective sense of the natural science. To strike the delimitation between psychology and epistemology is as important for epistemology as it is for psychology - particularly the epistemology of religion.

"In Epistemology" says Prof. Ward "objective we may say, means so much of experience as is common property, and subjective so much as is private property. In psychology 'subjective' refers to the owner and 'objective' to the property that he owns. To turn the object into common property is to transcend the point of view of individual concrete experience. It is to think of it as a thing standing in its own right and independently of the apprehending subject. It belongs to the transsubjective order of reality the reality with which physics and the other natural sciences deal. When this object is reached and its nature discussed we have passed beyond the realm of psychology.

It is important to note however that when the object of experience has thus become common property it has not cut its moorings within psychic experience. The object is still a thing owned and its reality is not independent of mind which perceives it. Common property is still property. True

1) Ward: Psychological Principles p. 19
2) Ibid p. 18
objectivity in knowledge is not independence of mind, but only independence of the individual mind, in so far as, and no further than, the individual experience is peculiar and does not permit the object to fit into the scheme of public ownership. An object is pronounced illusory when it is not apprehended alike, and the same character is not ascribed to it, by all minds. Only in this sense is subjectivism in knowledge condemned. Objective validity is not inconsistent with subjectivity but only with subjectivism.

To make matters clearer, let us at this point distinguish still more definitely the three ways of handling experience known as the psychological, the epistemological and the metaphysical. Psychology takes experience as it is for the individual concrete mind in its interaction with the world of objects. Whatever is revealed within the subject-object relationship be it real or illusory is subject matter of psychology. In epistemology although the subject-object relationship is not transcended, the individual experient qua individual experient is. For now the problem is to find some standard by which the individual experient can judge what is objectively real and what illusory. It is the attempt to 'socialise' property, to define what is truly common to all experients and therefore objectively valid, and also - seeing that experience alone is the giver of reality - objectively real. And yet such common property is not to be viewed as if it were real independently of the individual minds who possess it. The objectivity demanded
by a theory of knowledge is never independence of experience; but only independence of the individual experient qua individual. The realm of truth, the system of judgments having objective validity, is the creation of many minds and therefore not only transcends the individual but is essentially transsubjective in character. The objective validity of our judgments is established when they attain this universality. And yet we cannot proceed to treat the system of objective judgments as if it could stand for the whole of reality independently of the minds that sustain those judgments.

When however, epistemology has done its work of deciding the elements of experience that are truly objective and therefore universally valid for all minds it leaves the larger task of enquiring into the nature of ultimate reality in the hands of the metaphysicians. For the ultimate reality comprehends the subject and the object, the world of minds and the realm of objective fact. Complete reality is given, not at one pole of experience the subjective or the objective, but within experience itself which comprises both. Epistemology therefore does not give the final answer concerning the nature of the absolute; it does not do that even when it decides what judgments are objectively valid. What it gains is a half way house only. But it is an important point on the way to metaphysics, and religion in particular has need of greater certainty than it possesses regarding the objective nature of its own evaluation. No metaphysics can be safe which has not made sure first of all
that the judgments of religion concerning the world are to be taken seriously as having objective worth, at least as great as other judgments.

Now, in ordinary perceptual experience there is general agreement concerning the character of the objective world. The region of common property is extensive and well delimited. The epistemological problem as to the illusory nature of experience is not so pressing here, in as much as the objective world of concrete private experience is not very different from the world of common knowledge. The reality of the objective world as it is given in perceptual experience is accepted and taken for granted. Generally speaking the objective world is very much the same to concrete sense perception as it is for thought and public discussion. And yet it should not be forgotten that in dealing with it as common property as a world of objects constituting a realm of reality, it is no longer the concrete reality it is to immediate experience. When a physical object is considered in itself and is an object of thought, as distinguished from immediate experience, we are dealing—metaphysically—with an abstraction. Concrete Reality is given only in immediate experience, which depends upon the subject-object relationship. When the 'subjective object' becomes the 'objective object' we have passed from concrete reality to a metaphysical abstraction and also away from the field of psychological enquiry.

Turning now to religious experience we must still hold
that concrete reality is given only within the subject-object relationship. But here it is not so easy, as in ordinary experience of the world, to come to an understanding regarding the amount of common property to be conceded. The object in religious experience, it is contended, is not a reality but only an illusion, and illusions are seldom more than a private and therefore subjective reality in the epistemological sense. Psychologically, of course, the object is conceded to be real enough for even an illusion implies the subject-object relationship and to that extent is a fact of experience.

But why is the religious object, whatever it may be, pronounced illusory? It cannot be because it is merely private property, for that it is not. There are not as many religious objects as there are subjects. Religion has always had a public interest, and men have not singly, but in groups and tribes and nations, worshipped the same objects. Religious objects, and ideas concerning them, are declared illusory on the assumption that the character of the world is already known independently of religious experience. The world of scientific knowledge, we are told, leaves no room for the world as evaluated by the religious consciousness. But what right has the scientist to take his own world of physical objects physically related as if it were metaphysically real outside the subject-object relationship? Our final and only criterion of Reality is after all concrete experience, and whatever 'objective' world is constructed to become common property and actually real,
that world depends altogether upon its 'absolute' presupposition, which is the human mind itself. The objective world of science is a world of objects declared to be common property, but treated as if they were not owned. But owned they are nevertheless, and the owners have the disposal of their property.

Reality is only given in concrete experience, let us repeat. Both the subject and the object are constituent parts of that reality. The object must not therefore be taken as equivalent to reality, because it is not the whole of the experience. Nor can the experience be viewed merely as an occurrence or event, either from the side of the object, or the subject, for the experience, as Professor Galloway points out is always more than mere fact. It is fact plus meaning, and as a revelation of meaning it is for ever a potential source of new knowledge of reality. To regard experience as an object physical or other in the scientific sense, to be looked at and handled, is to assume that the world as it is expressed in experience can have no other meaning than that which is discoverable in the objects given in sensation and perception.

But experience has many strands and each strand reveals a new meaning of the real. The world of scientific knowledge expresses only one stratum of reality, and gives us the meaning of the world on one plane only. We are not justified in setting up that world of physical objects whose behaviour is mechanically determined by natural law as the pattern of reality. Experience
pronounces the reality to be richer than science reveals it and we have no warrant for delving into concrete experience and demanding that the categories of thought which we employ in physical science shall be adequate also to interpret the meanings bound up with the facts of the inner life of man. For one thing, in concrete experience, the meaning the object may possess depends as much on the subjective as it does on the objective factor. Interest controls both attention and action. But it is not the object only that depends for its meaning on the perceiving mind. For self-consciousness, the subjective factor, through exalted feeling and conation, determines the meaning of the whole experience too, and it is the whole experience, and not the object only valuated in a particular way, which gives reality, and yet the object does share whatever illumination experience achieves, and it may be that only through this evaluation of the objective world that philosophy can rise to speculative knowledge. We know that the truths of religion realised in concrete experience do lighten up the universe with a "light that never was on sea or land" and the soul thus enriched does seem to see into the very life of things. "The knowledge of God and eternity" says Prof. Otto, "and the real value, transcending space and time of our own inner being, cannot, even in form, be mixed up with the trivial truths of the normal human understanding or the conclusions of science. In fact the truths of religion are altogether bound up with exalted states of feeling". "It is
only in exaltation, in quiet enthusiasm, that religious feelings can come to life and become pervasive, and religious truth can only become a possession available for everyday use in proportion as it is possible to make this non-secular and exalted state of mind permanent and to maintain enthusiasm as the enduring mood of life and conduct.  

Now in religious experience the meaning of it is paramount to the experient. As an experience its very esse lies in its meaning, the meaning it gives to the world and to the life of the individual. It is not novel or peculiar situations which account for the insight we call religious. Religious meanings are discoverable in perfectly familiar and commonplace environment. Whence does this meaning arise? It is not due to scientific inference, for very unscientific persons possess it, and scientific inference could not in any case create it. Sacred objects and rites and events have nothing in themselves to mark them out from what is strictly secular. They all belong to the order of nature but they owe their sacred quality to the religious mind which concentrates in them the religious meanings it finds in the world. But whence this evaluation of experience expressed in sacred rites and objects and events? It is due, we believe, to a quality of self-consciousness, deeprooted

1) "Naturalism and Religion" pp. 11-13.
and fundamental, a quality which is more than feeling, which is rather cognitive in character constituting a category of thought, a principle of knowledge through which the meaning of the world and life, and so of the ultimate reality itself, becomes revealed in human experience. As a vehicle of meaning it can lay claim to epistemological value. It is one of the coloured glasses in the dome of life through which the white radiance of eternity affects our finite minds and enters our experience. It may even be the only window which is not coloured, through which the white radiance itself reaches the soul. In any case, as a principle of knowledge its meanings cannot be adequately handled by psychological science. There may be a branch of psychology dealing entirely with the way this meaning affects and works its way through human experience but as an instrument of knowledge it takes us beyond the realm of descriptive science. Its full implications are epistemological and metaphysical and must be metaphysically handled. "The final question of the objectivity of religion can only be raised in connection with what Weisse refers to as the ultimate grounds of knowledge; and these must necessarily involve also the ultimate grounds of Being. From the psychology of religion we are bound to go on to the epistemology of religion. We must ask what ground we have for holding that the beliefs of religion are valid, and that its feelings are justified and warranted. The answer to these questions constitutes the epistemology of religion; but this
again in its turn must lead us to the metaphysics of
religion. We have not merely to consider the relation of
religion to the ultimate grounds of knowledge; we have also
to relate it to the ultimate grounds of Being. All questions
as to the validity of knowledge finally merge themselves into
the question of the objective reality of its content

Religion forces this enquiry upon us by virtue of the
specific content of its valuations, which cannot be reduced
to other and lower values, and, although Principal Franks is
right when he urges the implied metaphysical problem, it is
the epistemological inquiry that is very urgent, both as a
deliverance from the limitations of psychology, and as a
preparation for metaphysical construction.

In religion, then, the meaning is everything, for religion
takes its rise from the discovery that the earth below, the
firmament above, and all the romance of human fellowship, yield
a spiritual and divine significance to the mind of man, and
become, to his wondering eyes, as the very garments of God.
To the religious man, the meaning of his experience is the
very heart of it. It is what it means. No account of a
psychic event in this region can be of any use which does
not deal with its meaning. The psychology of religion is

1) Robert S. Franks in "The Metaphysical Justification of
"Religion", pp. 31-32.
always finding this out and cannot resist the temptation to draw conclusions regarding the meaning and value so clearly constituting the very core of the experience itself. It feels that unless the nature of this meaning is cleared up, psychological knowledge in the sphere of religion takes us but a little way. The bigger problem is left on our hands, because the accepted meaning is not here so readily agreed upon as in natural experience of the physical and social world.
CHAPTER VIII.

A PRIORISM IN RECENT WRITERS.

The position we have now reached rules out altogether the attempt to derive the religious view of the world from aspects of experience which are non-religious. For if, as we hold, the world view which is characteristic of the religious consciousness is something primitive and fundamental to human nature, the religious evaluation is already a factor underlying and colouring, and in some sense determining, experience from the first. It will be unnecessary therefore, in the light of our guiding principle, to examine further the efforts that have been made to find the origin of religion in some non-religious aspects of self-conscious life. Neither the Freudians, who derive religion, like everything else, from sex, nor Durkheim and the French school of Sociologists, who see the origin of all religious beliefs and practice in the gregarious instinct, nor those who would find the root of religion in the demands put forth by the struggle for existence, will delay us in our quest. No doubt religion has made use of all the raw material provided by the instinctive basis of
life and the conditions of earthly existence in its development and in the manner of its expression, but the religious view must have been already operative independently of life's other interests and native tendencies, or at any rate concomitantly with these, before it could reveal itself in association with them.

We will turn our attention instead to those writers who, while they do not pretend to enquire into the a priori basis of religion, and who perhaps, would, if pressed, vote against a radical a priorism, yet confess openly that man is religious by virtue of his rational nature, and that the religious outlook is ultimately derivable from the essential nature of self-consciousness itself. In this chapter we will seek help from these upon our way.

We will begin with Professor William James' oft-quoted passage, from his 'Varieties'. Dealing with the origin of the Greek gods he says that "the whole array of our instances leads to a conclusion something like this: It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call 'something there', more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed". Prof. Otto commenting on this passage

1) "Varieties of Religious Experience" p. 58.
in a footnote in "Das Heilige," sees in it a recognition of original faculties of knowledge and potentialities of thought in the spirit itself, the existence of which Prof. James owing to his empirical and pragmatist standpoint, seeks to explain by singular and mysterious hypothesis. "But he grasps the fact itself clearly enough" he adds, "and is sufficient of a realist not to explain it away". Prof. Otto naturally identifies this 'sense of reality' with the feeling of a 'numinous' object, which to him is a 'primary immediate datum of consciousness' thus finding in Prof. James' almost casual admission a support to his own a priori doctrine.  

1) In his chapter on "philosophy" James openly admits that the philosophy of religion has for its basis and subject matter a definite and immediate religious awareness which however he identifies with feeling. Without such immediate experience of the spiritual or 'religious feeling' he doubts "whether any philosophical theology could ever have been framed. I doubt if dispassionate intellectual contemplation of the universe, apart from inner unhappiness and need of deliverance on the one hand, and mystical emotion on the other, would ever have resulted in religious philosophies such as we now possess". p., 431.

"What religion reports, you must remember, always purports
to be a fact of experience: the divine is actually present,
religion says, and between it and ourselves relations of
give and take are actual. If definite perceptions of fact
like this cannot stand upon their own feet, surely abstract
reasoning cannot give them the support they are in need of.
Conceptual processes can class facts, define them, interpret
them; but they do not produce them, nor can they reproduce
their individuality. There is always a plus, a thisness,
which feeling alone can answer for. Philosophy in this
sphere is thus a secondary function, unable to warrant
faith's veracity ...." pp. 454-5.

"The study of comparative religion", says Dr. Selbie,
and of the psychology of religion has made it more than
ever evident that religion is something natural to man,
and is not imposed upon him by any extraneous authority,
art, or device. It belongs to the very constitution of
his nature that his reaction to the universe should find
expression in forms which we can only call religious. Man
is made that way, and can do no other if he is to fulfill
his proper bent."

Touching upon the relationship of the religious con-
sciousness to the instinctive basis of life Dr. Selbie rightly

1) "Psychology of Religion" p. 2.
finds confirmation of the fundamental nature of the former in the fact that it is able to sublimate the latter. "If there is any meaning at all in the term natural religion, it will imply that religion is closely bound up with the normal operations of human nature ........ Strong instincts like those of fear and sex undoubtedly serve to determine the direction of religious emotions and impulses, and it is one of the differentiae of humanity that these instincts should be so used. They are themselves, as it were, merely raw material, and it is the use of them that counts. The fact that religion is capable of sublimating primitive instincts like those of fear and sex shows clearly enough that it is not all compacted of them, but is something sui generis, and therefore able to use them for its own high ends". p. 13.

And again - "as we have already seen, in the light of psychology the term natural religion takes to itself an entirely new meaning ..... It rather implies that religion is now to be regarded as natural to man, an essential element in his being. It is his distinguishing characteristic to react to the universe in a religious way. The instincts and tendencies which find their ultimate expression in religious ideas and practices, however crudely set forth, are known to be universal and are therefore to be regarded as rooted in man's nature as such. We can therefore no longer see in religion something imposed on man by interested parties,
priests, medicine men, or even by the pressure of social
needs and the herd instinct. It belongs to his most intimate
self". (pp. 23-24).

Rather is it the case that man, in the lower stages of his
development tends to read nature in religious terms and to
ascribe to natural phenomena powers greater than those with
which he is himself endowed. The form in which this is
done may be determined by the necessities of his group or
social life but the thing itself belongs to the very nature
of man. Again we have to admit that man is made in this
way and can do no other. The earliest expressions of his
religious consciousness witness to the fact that it is his
distinguishing characteristic so to express himself". p. 36

In his Gifford Lectures on "The Nature of Religion"
Prof. W.P. Paterson is explicit in grounding religion in the
mind itself as a natural movement of the human spirit.
It seems undeniable that man, whatever may have been the
precise factors and stages of his development as a moral
being, is now endowed with a moral instinct, in virtue of
which he forms judgments and experiences emotions of a
special kind, and is impelled to special lines of action.
And man, however he may have acquired them, is certainly
moved now by religious tendencies of the instinctive sort ....
There is also good ground for saying that this tendency,
though in a much weaker and more intermittent form, and
operating in large measure below the threshold of consciousness,
"has been an important factor in the general human experience."
The age long duration and the world-wide prevalence of
"religion raise a presumption that it has had a root in human
"nature, and that man has felt an inward constraint to lift
"up his eyes to the hills and to set his feet in the way to
"some Jerusalem". (p. 99). Using Prof. McDougall's famous
definition of instinct, Prof. Paterson applies its terms to
a description of the root of religion: "In virtue of an
"inmante disposition man has been determined to pay attention
"to a class of divine or sacred objects, he has experienced a
"peculiar emotional excitement, and he has been instigated
"to act in a characteristic way". p. 101.

After dealing with Troeltsch and Otto, both advocates
of the religious `a priori, Prof. Paterson remarks: "The
document of a religious sense has persisted because there
are peculiar facts connected with the religious mind and
its working which obstinately continue to force themselves on
the attention. The point which seems to me to be best
established is that man has a religious instinct which, in
its cognitive aspect, is an awareness of the existence of
the divine, and in its conative aspect is a godward impulse
involving a sense of control by the divine. It also seems
"to be a just observation that he has a capacity for
"recognising the divine, which he marks off by a distinct
"category as belonging to the sacred sphere". Answering the
question whether these things represent an integral element
of the human constitution, or are adequately accounted for by early education and discipline, Prof. Paterson rightly concludes that "even if it were true that the individual owed to education the direction given to his sense of reverence, the question would still remain why the family, the religious group, and the national community had thought it necessary to provide such a training, and in the last resort we seem to come back to a constraint that has its source in the depths of human nature". (p. 171).

A different kind of witness to the independent and specific nature of the religious valuation, and its origin deep down in the mind itself is Dr. William Brown. Contrasting the religious with other human values he says:-

"The value experiences of the good, the beautiful and the true, are not identical with religious experience, although they are related to it. Religion is not exactly on all fours with them; it is not on the same level, but is on a higher level still. Religious experience arises so far as the individual is facing the totality of existence. The feeling thus aroused, so far as the personality takes up a mental attitude towards the whole universe, is religious experience. Within it the value attitudes are of the utmost importance and we tend nowadays to emphasize the ethical attitude, the appreciation of goodness, duty, obligation in relation to religion. But, if we study it psychologically, we see that there is not always a point to
"point correspondence between genuine feelings of religion and genuine feelings of morality".

"There is the level of value but the level of religion is higher than the level of value in the sense that it is more all-inclusive and more face to face with totality and the innermost mystery of existence. Thus there are aspects, ethical, aesthetic and logical which are all aspects of reality but religion itself is an attitude to reality in its concreteness. The values are important, and it is difficult to conceive religion apart from them. We should probably be right in saying that normal human nature has a religious sense, not in the out-of-date sense of faculty psychology but in the form of a primitive tendency towards the religious attitude to feel the mystery, the beneficence and perhaps the sternness of the spirit of the universe". p.299-30.

This isolating of the religions from the other three great values, and the affirmation of its essential independence, is important as coming from one who is certainly not writing ostensibly in defence of religion. So also is his claim that there exists in normal human nature an independent 'sense' as the spring of religion. What Dr. Brown does not seem to realise however, is the logical priority of the religious attitude to the rest. He speaks as if the religious

\[1\) "Mind and Personality" pp. 298-9.\]
values, because they occupy a higher level were outgrowths of the other three. This impression of his meaning is deepened when he speaks of the religious attitude as being towards the totality of the universe in its concreteness which seems to rule out the logical priority of religion. Our contention is however that although all that Dr. Brown says is true we must add that the totality with which the religious consciousness deals is strictly relative to the stage of intellectual development, and that the true values are themselves offshoots of the fundamentally primitive religious attitude towards the totality of things confronting primitive man. At every stage in the development of religion the distinctively pious attitude has been towards the totality and the ultimate nature of things, but the meaning of totality has varied concomitantly with intellectual expansion. If we characterise religion in terms of such an attitude, we are next door to admitting the inclusion of the great trinity of values within the religions' consciousness, the very thing we are indeed contending for.

The witness of Baron Von Hügel, to whom we now turn, to the independent reality of the religious consciousness is of great importance. In his Essays and Addresses on the philosophy of religion he opens his defence of the objectivity of religious experience by reminding us that "the data of man's actual experience are subject and object, each giving to and taking from the other, the two and not the one only
"are included within the single human consciousness". 1) "In the endless contacts, friendly, hostile, of give, of take, between ourselves and the objects of all kinds which act upon us, and upon which we act in some degree or way, we do not obtain, of ourselves a real knowledge, and of the other things a merely subjective impression as to their mere appearance; but such contacts always simultaneously convey some real experience, some real knowledge, both of ourselves and of the objects thus experienced, and indeed of each precisely on occasion, and because of the other". 2)

While he finds no difficulty in affirming the "more-than-merely-subjective" character of the three realms of reality gained by science morality and aesthetics, calling to his aid here such names as Fichte, Windleband and Eucken, he admits that in neither of these do we gain a vivid experience of God as a Distinct Reality, as the Supreme Subject, as Self-Conscious Spirit." Now even with these three more-than-simply-subjective worlds we have not, it is true yet reached the self-conscious Spirit experienced by Religion. But we have thus established important points.

"Man's general human experience ... reveals intimations and orders of more than merely human origin, truth and range.

"Man's general human experience, reveals this Trans-subjective, superhuman world in at least three specific forms, on three different sides of his experience. And whether or not there be still another legitimate form and side of human experience,
"a fourth revelation of the trans-subjective superhuman
"world, which can bring further light and support to those
"three, it is certain that, having got as far as those three
"revelations, it is exceedingly difficult for men at large
"to retain a vivid faith in those three world; and yet
"deliberately to reject the revelation of self-conscious
"spirit offered to them in Religion".¹ Von Hügel's own
contention is, as against Fichte this time, that we cannot
rest in these three orders, and must proceed, if we accept their
validity to the acceptance also of the affirmations of
religious experience as equally a revelation of objective
reality. To refuse to do so, as Fichte did, is, he thinks
to fly in the face of the "now immensely abundant testimony
"of Religion" and "to confound philosophical thinking and
"the general idea of religiousness with the specifically
"religious experiences themselves". "These experiences
"themselves", he adds, "always present their object as
"overwhelmingly existent; and, in proportion as spirituality
"becomes more conscious of its own requirements and more
"sensitively discriminating, this object is apprehended
"as perfect self-conscious spirit, as very source of all
"existence and reality. We may indeed argue against
"religion, as mistaken in so doing, but that Religion
"actually does so, and this not in the form of deductive
"reasoning, but in that of intuitive experience, cannot
"seriously be denied".²

¹p.53-5  p.55
Although Von Hügel speaks of the Religious consciousness as providing an original revelation of Reality in contradistinction from the three orders revealed in science, ethics and aesthetics, he allows a certain religious character also to the apprehension of the three "Intelligible Orders".

His mode of expression also justifies the conclusion that the manner in which he thought the mind gained knowledge of truth, goodness and beauty is the same as in the case of religious experience. His term 'Revelation', which he employs to express the agency of knowledge, applies to both activities and in the same sense. When he relates the 'Intelligible Orders' to the divine reality itself reached in religious experience he allows to the latter an all-inclusive range which comprehends in every way the revelations of the former. He does not however proceed to show in any precise fashion how they may be logically related as expressions of the minds activity working on one and the same world. It is clear, nevertheless, that what the religious consciousness attains takes up into itself the results of all knowledge providing not the crown only but the base and the setting as well. Beyond this admission he does not unfortunately go.

"In the case of these intelligible orders we have already something more or less religious. Indeed the sense of givenness, of prevenience, of a grace, of something
transcendent having in part become Immanent to our human world as a Fact within this factual world, and of this Fact as alone rendering even possible that sense of givenness - all these experiences are already present in the apprehension and affirmation of those Intelligible Orders as truly extant. And yet it is only the specifically religious experience which gives us Revelation at its fullest not only as to Revelation's content but also as to Revelation's form. For Religion alone brings the vivid revelation of spirit other than the human - a spirit so perfect and so richly real as Itself to be the ultimate, overwhelmingly self-conscious cause of man's very capacity for apprehending It. Nevertheless, such a self-manifestation of perfect spirit, once found and accepted, gives a base, a setting and a crown to all those other self-manifestations of the lesser realities - a base, a setting and a crown which their graduated series, taken as a whole, so greatly requires, and which indeed it dimly and semi-consciously prepares, yet cannot itself effectuate. 1) We have to admit, however, that Von Hügel, in spite of expressions which would justify a contrary interpretation of his meaning, thinks of the content of the specifically religious apprehension of the self-conscious spirit itself - as due to an act of Revelation from the God side of Reality, so to speak, and not to the native constitution of the human self-consciousness. Man attains to an experience of God by an act of Revelation which also takes the form of miracle. 1) pp. 56-7
Truth, Beauty, and Goodness though in themselves purely human achievements are yet revelations, in a sense, but religious experience of God Himself is Revelation par excellence, spelt with a capital 'R'. This seems to be his meaning in the passage immediately following the last quotation. He goes on - "and this same self-manifestation of spirit and the human spirit's response to It, render superfluous all attempts, always more or less hopeless, to construct God a priori, or even to demonstrate Him, from the facts of nature and of human life, by any single deductive argument of a strictly constraining force. Because spirit, God, works in our midst and in our depths, we can and we do know Him; because God has been the first to condescend to us and to love us, can we arise and love Him in return". 1) The a priorism here regarded as superfluous and inconsistent with his own doctrine is however for Von Hügel not the a priorism taught by Prof. Otto or that for which we are here provisionally contending. It is rather the rationalism of Descartes and his school who professed to discover in the mind an idea of God, complete and adequate to the understanding of the Divine nature, an idea present antecedently to all experience and needing no a posteriori factors for its actualisation. Such an a priori knowledge of God was knowledge gained deductively from an analysis of the idea itself. What Von Hügel writes of is not an idea of God, but a warm-personal experience of Him - an awareness of a spiritual Reality directly and

1) p.57
intuitively apprehended. Whenever such an experience becomes actual it does provide a more sure proof of the Divine Reality than any rationalistic proof could be. Such a proof would, as our author states, be quite superfluous. Equally would an inductive argument from the facts of nature and human life be superfluous and less forceful or convincing.

But the Baron's Claim that God is directly known in religious experience in a unique yet certain way whether in the form of Revelation or not, is not inconsistent with the position that the mind possesses powers sui generis in and through which such knowledge becomes possible and without which it would not be possible at all not even by Revelation. Indeed the fact of Revelation has to postulate some kind of native capacity of self-consciousness to apprehend God directly and intuitively. A priorism of the epistemological sort,—not the rationalistic, — of Kant, and not of Descartes, does not rule out Revelation as a fact. It only connects the Godward side of religious experience with a definite, and specific category of thought, predisposing man to view the world under the form of the divine, and determing him to associate all phenomena with a spiritual background, thus making him continuously aware of the divine presence and expectant of divine revelation. What can the Baron mean when he speaks of God working "in our midst and in our depths", but the recognition of a hidden source of religion knowledge within self-consciousness? In such mystic depths revelation and intuitive powers
of understanding are surely not separable in fact, though they may be distinguishable in analysis. Only on this supposition can we reconcile to any extent the claims of natural and revealed religion. It is true that Von Hügel, when referring to religious experience "as a vivid revelation of spirit other than human" speaks of that spirit as being "so perfect and richly real as Itself to be the ultimate, overflowingly self-conscious cause of man's very capacity for apprehending It". But here he is referring to religious experience on a comparatively mature level of development where no doubt revelation appears as a quickening of the powers of the mind as well as the unveiling of a spiritual reality. That there must always be this subjective expansion of mental powers accompanying every new revelation of spirit, no one can deny. Objective Revelation must imply this subjective expansion as its counterpart. To acknowledge this, however, does not carry with it the implication that previous to, or apart from all objective revelation, the mind is not already aware of God and able to some extent to hold fellowship with him. If Revelation actually creates the capacity for knowledge of God one would like to know when such a revelational movement began in history. If the Revelation Von Hügel speaks of is something late and particular and special as e.g. exclusively in Hebrew life, then anthropology forces us to believe that religious experience, in all its essential characteristics, was a fact beyond the boundaries of Revelation. If on the other hand Revelation
merely describes what seems to be a characteristic of all truly religious experience, then there is nothing inconsistent in maintaining that the mind of man knows God by virtue of a specific religious category of thought of which he is possessed in his human constitution, and the fact of Revelation as the active operation of God "in our midst and in our "depths". Otherwise to use the term 'Revelation' with a Capital "R" is to introduce a theological and dogmatic prepossession into the philosophy of Religion to the initial detriment of that philosophy. Moreover, unless the response to the self-manifestation of Spirit made by the human spirit is not due to the native propensity of the mind, it is difficult, perhaps almost impossible, to understand how such a self-manifestation, producing religious experience, should become a base, a setting and a crown, to our knowledge and experience of the three "Intelligible Orders" of Truth, Goodness and Beauty. More natural and more logical is it to search for the cause of this comprehension of the lesser realities within the religious experience by an analysis of the conditions of knowledge within the mind itself. The logical relationships among the categories of thought themselves may give us the key to this subsumption of all human knowledge under the wider roof of religion.

We conclude therefore that Baron Von Hügel's philosophy of Religion is not, even in its narrowest interpretation, antagonistic to the doctrine of religious a priorism but that on its more
positive side, along with a liberal interpretation of its spirit, it constitutes a real and valuable contribution towards the recognition of a priori roots of religion, as distinguished from other values, in the mind itself.

In his "Psychology of Religions Belief" Prof. Pratt finds the foundations of religion among the native capacities and powers of the soul.

"The belief in God of the religion of Feeling is then, "I repeat, a vital rather than a theoretical matter, and like breathing, is an outcome of the needs and demands of the organism, not of the reason. It has its roots deep in the field of vital feeling; its roots go deeper than do those of most of our practical beliefs. It is an attitude towards the universe; our reaction to the stimulus of the whole cosmos. This reflex is determined by no momentary reasoning of the individual; the whole line of his heredity, the whole of his conscious, and of his subconscious personality is involved in it. It is not so much the individual that thinks; the race thinks in him .......and this same religious feeling apart from its accidental and purely intellectual accretions, is biological rather than conceptual, it is not so much an acceptance of a proposition as an instinct. I do not mean by this that it is an instinct in the technical sense of the term, but it has its roots in the same field and is in many ways comparable." (p. 294).
But more definitely:-

"Such belief is in essence quite independent of argument. Argument is irrelevant to it. The particular formulations that arise from it in order to make it articulate may be refuted, but the fundamental religious demand and attitude is not amenable to refutation. For it must be remembered that this belief is not the result of an argument based on an emotional experience; it is an immediate experience of belief. It is an organic, a biological matter and hence has a strength and certainty that puts its possessor quite out of the region of doubt. This absolute certainty is characteristic of the Religion of Feeling in all times and in all Creeds". (p. 295).

Although the grounding of religious belief in biological soil makes one desire a clearer statement of his meaning than Prof. Pratt supplies, these passages do enforce the contention that the roots of religion go much deeper into life than the discursive understanding or the moral consciousness. The emphasis here on Feeling, as the main factor in religious belief does not rule out all cognitive or conative elements. Indeed the conative side is involved in the biological reference. The Feeling element is stressed, not in contrast either to cognition or conation, but to the analytical reason upon which argumentation is based. We are justified, in the light of this passage from Prof. Pratt, in claiming him also as an important supporter of à priori elements in religious
Let us now turn to Prof. Alexander. In his second volume of Gifford Lectures "Space, Time and Deity" he reaches a conclusion not far removed, except in one particular, from the position of Von Hügel. In the following passages he speaks not as a metaphysician but as a psychologist. He says:

"Various emotions enter into the full constitution of the religious sentiment - fear, admiration, self-abasement - but its distinctive constituent is the feeling of our going out towards something not ourselves and greater and higher than ourselves, with which we are in communion, a feeling whose object is not that of any of these subsidiary or suggesting emotions, nor of any combination of them. Like the other sentiments it is fed from many sources but it gathers around some distinctive constituent of its primary nucleus ........ without this distinctive element a sentiment would be a mere composite without its peculiar flavour". (pp. 374, 5).

"It is impossible to explain the religious sentiment as a composite of various emotions, not specifically religious, which we feel towards God. For this presumes that we can begin with a cognition of God and that towards the object so presented we feel these emotions. The question we have rather to ask is, how is the intellectual notion of God revealed to us? The fear of the thunderstorm is not the fear of God, though such fear may be the first channel by
which the religious sentiment is provoked. It is merely the feeling that the thunder is terrible. That God is present in the thunderstorm is discovered only in the feeling which is our outgoing towards something or other which works through the thunderstorm or resides therein. That there is this something or other is not the discovery of reflexion. The metaphysical interpretation of deity as that to which the world is tending or any other metaphysical interpretation of God, is as far as possible from being an original discovery of knowledge; it is only possible to reflexion working upon primitive notions already acquired. Even the idea that there is something mysterious which we fear or reverence is never in the first instance a piece of cognition, but is revealed to our wondering response, our uneasy astonishment and curiosity. It is the feeling or emotion which images the object, not the idea which induces the emotion. When we ask how we come by the cognition of God we must answer that, as with love and hate and appetite and aversion, it is because the world itself provokes in us a specific response which makes us aware, no matter in how primitive a form, of God, and this specific reaction is what has been described above as a going out to something in the world with which we are in communion.

(pp. 374, 5).

The religious sentiment, then, according to Prof. Alexander does not create its object, but finds it. At the
same time this discovery is something more than a bare cognition of the world of objects; it is a cognition made possible by a certain emotional response which enriches the cognitive content, and gives to the world a new meaning - the specific valuation of the religious consciousness.

The idea does not of itself induce the emotional reaction; it is the emotional reaction, arising spontaneously, which images the definitely religious object, thus discovering the divine meaning in the world. Bare, cold, detached cognition does not, therefore, discover God in and through the world; that discovery is essentially due to the emotional response.

"In the developed life, " he adds," cognition and emotion become intertwined so that the cognition may seem to be prior. But in our original experience it is the emotion which discovers the corresponding object of cognition". p. 374. Whether we accept or not Prof. Alexander's reading of the psychological Genesis of the religious evaluation, finding the roots of it, as he does, in the emotional reaction to cognitive apprehension not itself religious at all, his doctrine definitely gives to religion a specific psychic origin. The religious interpretation of the world is for him a discovery of the real in an original way, due to the soul's power of reacting peculiarly to the phenomena of nature. It is not the outcome of philosophical reflexion upon the world. Indeed philosophy itself can only elaborate and make articulate what religious experience itself provides; the emotional reaction which leads to the discovery of deity expresses a fundamental aspect
of the structure of the human mind. It is indeed the mark of the presence of what he calls the 'Nisus' of the world within the mind. "The religious appetite of emotion depends upon the whole make-up or constitution of the mind and body, and is the response of it to the whole of reality in its rise towards a new quality." "The whole world with its real tendency to deity sits in us, from the depths of our nature, a vague endeavour or desire which shadows forth its object."

One other quotation will enable us to range Prof. Alexander on our side as claiming for religious experience, not only the reality of its object and an independent root in the human spirit, but also as providing a faith in God which is higher than the faith expressed in Prof. Hoffding's phrase "The Conservation of values" - the values of Truth, Goodness and Beauty.

"The faith of religion was, as we saw, a faith in the existence of deity, not in the conservation of value; and we do not need a faith in the conservation of valuable existence to tell us that we are sustained by something greater than ourselves, for this is an immediate consciousness evoked by our pre-adapted nature by the world of reality itself. But enquiry into the object of faith, God, does show us that deity is in the line of value; and I find myself regretfully expressing dissent from this writer (Hoffding), while seeming
"to say the same thing, on the ground that he appears to me to do less than justice to the immediately felt reality of God". (pp. 408-9)

One could go on almost indefinitely gathering support from other modern writers on the psychology of religion to the presence in religion of an element which, because it cannot be derived from other aspects of experience, must somehow be attributed to the epistemological properties of the mind itself. Those we have passed in review seem to agree, without, however attempting a radical analysis of the subjective factors in religious knowledge, in affirming the presence in religious experience of at least five features which stamp it as something sui generis and unique.

(a) There is in religious experience a specific nature not reducible to, or derivable from, any other single or cumulative reaction of the mind to the world.

(b) This specific nature is constituted by the character:

(1) of the object which, instead of being something finite or partial, is always thought of as the 'whole' or ultimate Reality.

(2) of the subject as being related altogether and in every way to this sum total of the universe or God.

(c) The experience is also of the intuitive sort gaining direct intercourse with the Divine nature, on this rather than on argument is religious belief founded.

(d) All other experiences through which aspects of Reality are revealed in self-consciousness - the "Intelligible Orders" - are somehow comprehended by the religious experience or become subsumed under it.

(e) The religious evaluation of Reality implied in
religious experience grows out of unique but fundamental epistemological powers of the mind which seem to be ultimate, and all that can be said about them, or all that is said about them is, that they belong to the mental make up of the human personality.
CHAPTER IX.

OTTO'S DOCTRINE OF "THE HOLY".

Undoubtedly the most important recent contribution to the interpretation of religion in terms of a priori principles is that made by Professor Rudolf Otto in his well known book Das Heilige, "The Idea of the Holy". No attempt to deal with the religious a priori can well afford to ignore this work. As a contribution to the analysis of religious experience it has distinctive and original value quite independently of the particular theory of religion which it supports. Should a priorism be further developed and gain a more secure place than it at present seems to hold in the philosophy of religion, Professor Otto's work will become a permanent landmark in the progress of religious thought.

The Enquiry sets out with the contention that the religious life as an experience is something much richer than theological thought is able to express. In theology the nature of the Deity is formulated by means of concepts drawn from human analogy, concepts which can never express adequately
the divine object of religious experience. God may be Spirit, Reason, Purpose, Goodwill, Power, but these concepts fail to convey what God means to the worshipper. No rational concepts can do justice to the unique nature of Deity. God is the subject, of whom we predicate these attributes, but his value for personal religion is not covered by these predicates. There is this rational element in religion, but there is also an irrational one which is the more profound aspect of it. This contrast between the elements in religion which have been singled out by analysis and which are expressible in conceptual terms, and the residuum which eludes such analysis and conceptualisation, is the key to Prof. Otto's method. The presence of this residuum, which he designates the non-rational, in contradistinction to the rational, i.e. conceptual, is the most fundamental element in the religious consciousness. It has a unique character, and the true nature of religion itself is discoverable somewhere in this region of the ineffable and the mystical, and it baffles conceptual expression. According to Prof. Otto, the particular category of thought underlying and determining religious experience, is the "Holy". But 'Holiness' is for him, a complex category, covering the rational and the non-rational elements. It is, in fact, the term which best expresses the religious evaluation of the world and life, not in its more primitive or narrow but its modern and wider connotation. Within this category of 'The Holy' he finds, by analysis, that there is implied, what he calls another/
category which accounts for the specific and characteristic 'moment' in religious experience. This category he terms the 'numinous', and it is this which lies at the basis of the irrational and ineffable element at the heart of all religion. The term "Holy" as applied to the Deity in developed religion includes of course rational and moral attributes which are transferred to Him by analogy from human life, but it also has an 'overplus of meaning' which gives it its peculiar tone or flavour. It is this element, this overplus which Prof. Otto isolates and calls the 'numinous'. "I shall speak then of a "unique 'numinous' category of value and of a definitely "'numinous' state of mind, which is always found whenever the "category is applied". "This mental state", he adds, "is "perfectly sui generis and irreducible to any other, and "therefore like every absolutely primary and elementary "datum while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be "strictly defined". (p. 7). Having isolated this primary element in religious evaluation, he proceeds to analyse its component features. From the subjective point of view it yields what he calls a 'creature feeling', an experience more self-obliterating than Schleiermacher's 'feeling of dependence'. The worshipper aware of the 'numinous' feels himself to be mere 'dust and ashes'. Further analysis reveals the presence of a complex reaction which he calls the experience of the 'mysterium tremendum', or the awareness of the numinous object as a 'mystery inexpressible and above all creatures'. Accompanying this awareness of the numinous or "mysterium
"Tremendum", there is a specific emotional response which can best be expressed by the German word Schauer, or the English 'awe'. This emotion is also sui generis, a thing quite by itself indefinable and primary. Its specific character or quale persists throughout the evolution of religion from the primitive feeling of 'something uncanny', 'eerie', or 'weird' right up to the 'awe' of the developed religious Consciousness. "It is this feeling, which, emerging in the mind of primeval man, forms the starting point for the entire religious development in history. "It implies the first application of a category of valuation which has no place in the everyday natural world of ordinary experience, and is only possible to a being in whom has awakened a mental predisposition unique in kind and different in a definite way from any 'natural' faculty. And this newly revealed capacity even in the crude and violent manifestations which are all it at first evinces, bears witness to a completely new function of experience and standard of valuation only belonging to the spirit of man". (PP. 15-16).

On the objective side the mysterium Tremendum possesses the characteristics of 'overpoweringness' (majestas), of 'energy' or 'urgency', and it is viewed as "wholly other". 'The truly mysterious' object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, not only because our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently 'wholly other', whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder
"that strikes us chill and numb". (p. 28). And yet in spite of this 'wholly other' character of the 'mysterium' with the dread and awe we feel in regard to it, it yet has a fascination for the worshipper who is led to seek fellowship with it and to share its very life. This 'fascinans' element in the 'numen' or the 'mysterium', is its positive character for the worshipper, in contrast to the 'wholly other'. It is the root of mysticism and asceticism. But this positive experience is not expressible in conceptual thought. "Only from afar, by metaphors and analogies do we come to apprehend what it is in itself, and even so our notion is but inadequate and confused". (p. 34).

Having thus discovered by analysis the non-rational elements in religious experience viewed both subjectively as emotion and objectively as content of the religious consciousness, and having pronounced them 'a priori and sui generis, springing from an original root in the soul and constituting the very essence of the religious reaction, Prof. Otto goes on to show how the category of the numinous clothes itself in rational and moral forms. The experience of the numinous which originally and essentially had nothing to do with what is rational and ethical in religious life and ideas, yet in the development of religion on ever closer association is established between them. The category of the numinous spreads out as it were, or grows into the more complex category of the 'Holy' by taking up into itself rational and ethical elements. This process of comprehension is described as a process of 'Schmatization of the
'categories' much in the fashion of Kant. In this way religion becomes moralised and human, and rational qualities are conferred on the numinous, and appear as a corresponding enrichment of the religious emotions. Prof. Otto takes some pains to show how this rationalising and moralising of the numinous takes place. The numinous as something sui generis cannot from itself become moralised, nor can what has been pronounced non-rational put on rationality. There is no logical evolution of the one from the other. Yet the miracle does happen, not by chance association, but on account of "necessary connections according to principles of true inward affinity and cohesion". (p. 46). Both the category of the numinous and the category of moral obligations are a priori and sui generis. The one cannot and need not be derived from the other. Both spring directly from the spirit of man, but they become associated or 'conjoined' in the course of history. At the same time the numinous or non-rational element is never eclipsed in developed religion by the rational and the moral. The former element continues present in it and gives it its specific character as an experience of reality.

There are, however, according to Prof. Otto, two processes in the development of Religion. The numinous consciousness develops along its own inner non-rational impulsion. "This "element or 'moment' passes in itself through a process of "development of its own, quite apart from the other process - "which begins at an early stage by which it is 'rationalised'
"and 'moralised'. Then, "secondary and subsidiary to this, "is the task of tracing the course of the process of rationalisa-
tion and moralisation on the basis of the numinous conscious-
"ness". These two processes 'if not quite' yet 'nearly', 
synchronise and keep pace one with the other. Thus is the 
category of the 'Holy' enriched by the non-rational and the 
rational, the numinous and the moral, the sacrosanct and the 
good, developing in harmony and pari passu; as if by a pre-
established harmony. But the 'Holy' as the supreme religious 
category must be regarded throughout as definitely à priori 
in character. "It follows from what has been said, that the 
"'holy' in the fullest sense of the word is a combined, complex 
category, the combining elements being its rational and non-
"rational components. But in both - and the assertion must 
"must be strictly maintained against all Sensationalism and 
"Naturalism - it is a purely à priori category". P. 116.

"We conclude then, that not only the rational but also the 
"non-rational elements of the complex category of 'holiness' are 
"à priori elements in the same degree. Religion is not in 
"vassalage either to morality or teleology, 'ethos' or 
"'telos' and does not draw its life from postulates; and its 
"non-rational content has, no less than its rational, its own 
"independent roots in the hidden depths of the spirit itself. 
"But the same à priori character belongs, in the third place, to 
"the connection of the rational and the non-rational elements 
"in religion, their inward and necessary union. The histories
of religion recount indeed, as though it were something axiomatic.
the gradual interpenetration of the two, the process by which
'the divine' is charged and filled out with ethical meaning, and
this process is in fact felt as something axiomatic, something
whose inner necessity we feel to be self-evident. But then
this inward self-evidence is a problem in itself; we are
forced to assume an obscure 'a priori' knowledge of the necessity
of this synthesis combining rational and non-rational. For it
is not by any means a logical necessity. How should it be
logically inferred from the still 'crude', half-daemonic
character of a moon-god or a sun-god or a numen attached to
some locality that he is a guardian and guarantor of the oath
and of honourable dealing, of hospitality, of the sanctity of
marriage and of duties to tribe and clan?"

For the purpose of this enquiry it is not necessary to
proceed further with the exposition of Professor Otto's work.
The brief outline given is sufficient as a starting point to
the help we may gain from it on our 'a priori' quest, and also
for a basis to any criticism we shall want to make.

In the first place let us point out a few of the results
of Prof. Otto's analysis which we will provisionally accept
as well founded and likely to bear careful scrutiny.

(1) He is certainly justified in his contention that there
is present in religious experience an emotional quality not to
be identified with any of the 'natural' feelings, nor produced
out of any synthesis or fusion of these. Religious 'awe' or
'reverence', is something different from the emotional compound supposed to be made up of certain primary or elementary feelings which Dr. McDougall calls "reverence"—the religious emotion par excellence. Within the strictly religious experience there is present a feeling element that gives colour and tone to whatever natural emotions are joined with it, and in the total experience, and this element is unique and belongs to man as a religious creature. It is found in primitive religion and it persists, though refined and moralised, as the dominant factor and characteristic of mystical experience on the higher planes of developed religion. And the difference between this emotion and all 'natural' emotional reactions is not one of degree but of kind. It springs from an original root in the soul and for that reason is a priori. Without the presence of this specific 'dread' or 'awe' religious experience would lose its real and specific quality as religious. There would be nothing to differentiate it from other emotional reactions. In thus establishing religious experience on the firm ground of psychological fact Prof. Otto is throwing down a challenge to the current tendency in religious psychology which, masquerading as science and therefore jealously regarding all matters of fact, confidently affirms that religious experience contains no emotional element that cannot be traced to perfectly natural sources within the mind. Whether further analysis will sustain Prof. Otto's position or not, what he contends for seems perfectly true at any rate, to religious people, who can widely testify
to a unique experience, in worship, which they do not get in any other moral or spiritual exercise. If this emotion is native or natural to man then it will be necessary to revise our conception of what natural experience is composed of, and religion will gain a standing ground very different from that now accorded to it by psychological science.

(2) The discovery of a specific religious emotion is not, however, Prof. Otto's main achievement. There are psychologists who, while denying the existence of a specific root to the religious emotion, would account for what is characteristic of it as due to a difference on the objective side of the experience. They would say that reverence awakens in the soul when man by inference from the facts of the physical world and from the sense of duty, rises to the idea of God, that it is this idea as the object of thought which creates the specifically emotional reaction of reverence. In contrast to this Prof. Otto connects the specific emotion with an equally specific cognition of the real world, an objective evaluation which he calls the perception of the numinous. According to him the emotion has a cognitive counterpart which indeed is prior to the emotion and through which the emotion is awakened and on which it depends. The numinous is not gained by inference but is a simple and direct apprehension of a quality of the real world. This numinous consciousness is an inalienable element in every religious experience strictly so called, and it answers on the cognitive side to the emotion.
of 'awe' on the subjective as the specific feeling element. Although it is in and through the emotion that the character of the numinous in its essential nature is revealed, yet it is intuitively apprehended if not as an object, yet as a reality clothing itself in the objective world.

Now if there be a religious evaluation of the real in this way, and if it cannot be derived from any other kind of evaluation, physical or moral, then it is not gratuitious to conclude as Prof. Otto does, that it springs from an original category of thought, and is therefore strictly à priori. And it is important to note that once we have accepted the numinous category we are gaining a new foothold on our way to the establishment of the objective validity of religious experience. For with the recognition of a cognitive element which, like the religious emotion, is also sui generis, we escape the charge of subjectivism. We are admitting a transubjective reference as of the very core of the religious outlook.

With Prof. Otto then, we are led to think of religious experience as based on independent and ultimate factors in the human mind. This experience is à priori in regard both to the cognitive and the emotional elements in it. As an experience it cannot of course be altogether à priori; it is à priori in so far as it involves a category of thought without which the empirical experience would not be possible.

Now in estimating the position thus gained by Prof. Otto's analysis it may be pointed out that, like so many other
pioneers of thought. His discussion is open to much misunderstanding owing to the cut and dried distinctions he is driven to make in order to make his actual discovery clear. Let us take first of all his doctrine of the non-rational which he seems to have the religious edifice. At the outset of his enquiry he makes it quite clear why he makes the distinction between the rational and the non-rational. He makes it in order to show that there is in religious experience something which is never adequately expressed in religious thought and doctrine. God in personal experience is richer and greater and better than He is to the mind of the thinker, whose business it is to interpret the character of God in conceptual terms in the light of that experience. Thinking about God and holding fellowship with Him in worship are two different functions of the soul. True, the thinking presupposes the experience, but in the nature of things thought can only take so much of experience with it as can be pitchforked into concepts. And even if much of the experience is explicated by conceptual thought, the experience itself is, when all is said and done, something real and warm and personal, and touches the very pulse of life, whereas thought deals with abstract ideas which can in no way be equated with the real experience.

Now, in order to understand better the inner core of religious experience it is clear that we must turn not to doctrines that profess to explain experience, but to concrete experience itself. This surely is the only way to gain new
knowledge. It is to face what is real in concrete in hope that some unlabelled feature may be found which has escaped observation, but which may be after all fundamental. All scientific advance has been gained by this process of looking first into experience, and scrutinising the real in a new way. That is surely how the stone became an assemblage of atoms and an atom a universe composed of electrons. What Prof. Otto has done with religious experience is to subject it to analysis in a new way, and the new way was to separate—in thought of course—all the elements in it already labelled from those which were unlabelled. He professes to find a residuum of unlabelled features, and he calls them non-rational, but only in opposition to distinguish them from labelled features. But of course this residuum, is no longer quite non-rational because Prof. Otto has given it a local habitation and a name. The numinous is less non-rational than it was, for we can now at any rate call it the 'mysterium Tremendum' and the emotion of 'dread' or awe will put on the garment of rational concept. Indeed on page 61 he distinctly tells us that the distinction is a purely formal one. "So that this name (i.e. the 'non-rational') is for us a "purely formal one merely commoting a contrast and hence merely "provisional. It has no longer any particular aptness when "once we have succeeded in coming to an understanding of the "way in which this hidden deep affects religion". These words ought to be marked by the critics of Otto's non-rational.
He does not equate religion with these hitherto non-rational elements. He cannot be doing that because he allows that
the character of religion is also revealed through the rational
concepts, and that experience on its rational side is already
affected by the non-rational elements, and would not be what it
is apart from these latter. Prof. Otto does not identify re-
ligion with the non-rational then; what he does is to affirm that
there are more things in the realm of religion than have
hitherto been dreamt of in our philosophy. It would be less
misleading if instead of speaking of the rational and the non-
rational, as he does, we were to use the terms 'rationalised'
and 'non-rationalised'. The non-rational in Otto's analysis is
not incapable of progressive rationalisation. In fact he
admits that a great deal can be said about it.

"Although it eludes the conceptual way of understanding,
"it must be in some way or other within our grasp, else nothing
"could be asserted of it, and even mysticism, in speaking of
"it as τὸ ἄκριτον, the ineffable, does not really mean to
"imply that absolutely nothing can be asserted of the object of
"the religious consciousness; otherwise, mysticism could
"exist only in a broken silence, whereas what has generally
"been a characteristic of the mystics is their copious eloquence". (p. 2). The non-rational is not then the incomprehensible;
it is only what as yet has not been expressed in conceptual
terms. That is all he means by the non-rational. If he meant
more, his own attempt to make known the nature of the non-
rational would appear futile from the first, nor can he mean that the non-rational does not provide an insight into the nature of reality. That would be equivalent to the assumption that experience distils no truth, unless first of all it is made to pass through the sieve of the discursive intellect. It is Prof. Otto's basic assumption that the non-rational does give knowledge of an intuitive sort which, like every intuition, awakens in spontaneously/ the mind, and is not, except indirectly, the result of instruction. The non-rational is a bearer of knowledge, like the rational, to the experienc. The only real difference between them is that the one can be expressed and conveyed to others, whereas the other, though equally real, remains for the most part private property.

It may also be pointed out that the distinction of rational and non-rational has no existential import whatsoever. It expresses a distinction in thought, in analysis, and not a rift in experience. Religious experience is not given within two distinct compartments yielding two different kinds of knowledge. As we have said the rational is shot through and through with the non-rational and vice versa. The Christian's consciousness of his own Sonship when he cries out with St. Paul "Abba, Father", is not something entirely apart and different from the numinous consciousness which Prof. Otto's terms the non-rational. The former is itself numinous in character; the mysterium Tremendum is a constituent of the Christian's experience of the Fatherhood of God. He feels
differently when he addresses God directly in worship as Father from what he feels when he cries to his earthly father. The concept Father as applied to God is a rational concept in a new sense from that obtaining in the natural filial relationship. The difference is made up by the numinous quality which the Deity possesses in concrete religious experience. The recognition of this fact is the answer to the projectionist theory that the idea of God is derived solely from the natural filial feeling, reemerging through the unconscious. God is not merely 'Father'; He is the 'divine' Father, the numinous reality, the mysterium Tremendum, in fact. And this numinous quality surrounds Him like a halo. Whence this numinous addition to the idea of Fatherhood? The projectionist has no. answer to give, except the elusive one that it is produced by the alchemy of the unconscious. That there must be such alchemy cannot well be disputed if the projectionist theory is true, because the fatherhood of God is very different from human fatherhood. The unconscious must therefore out of its own resources transform the idea very fundamentally. But our point at the moment is that the rational concepts by which religious experience is interpreted, and the character of God expressed, are not independent of the specifically numinous element which Prof. Otto calls the non-rational. What he aims at establishing is not that there are no numinous elements in the rational, but that there is a numinous whose nature is not fully conveyed through it, whose presence in the experience is not generally discerned, because the analogical character of the concepts used tend to eliminate the
numinous nature of all religious experience.

Having thus pointed out the real significance of Prof. Otto's distinction between the rational and the non-rational, and safe-guarding ourselves from seriously misunderstanding his essential position, we must go on to admit freely that Prof. Otto himself does not remain faithful to his own distinctions. In the development of his doctrine of the numinous consciousness he forgets the nature of the distinction he has made between the rational and the non-rational. Instead of accepting it as an expression of two phases of one and the same experience, he persists in regarding the numinous as a specific experience per se, occurring as it were in complete independence of all rational factors. What he starts with as a mere 'overplus' of meaning in association with rational elements, he hypostatises later on into a completed experience, thus converting what is a distinction of value within the same experience into an existential difference, yielding two experiences which can happen in complete independence of one another. Throughout the latter part of his book the numinous consciousness is treated, not as an element or feature of religious experience, but as the whole of it. The numinous originates and persists and even develops in complete independence of the rational and moral factors usually found as constituent aspects of all religion. A religious experience, non-rational in character, is therefore possible outside the rational and the moral, and both theology and morality, which have their own 'a priori' root, can develop independ-
ently of the numinous consciousness. We therefore have on the one hand, an a priori religious evaluation which is non-rational the awareness of the numinous quality of the real, and on the other a rational and moral consciousness wherein no definitely religious import appears, though this in turn is also derived from a priori grounds in the mind. Religion and morality, the non-rational and the rational, are thus not only distinct in their source, but can and do often develop independently of one another. Morality is not derived from religion therefore, nor religion from morality. They are parallel developments, and, although they do meet and coalesce and influence each other, there is no inner necessity why they should meet and move together as one stream.

Having established the numinous on its own specific a priori basis, independent of both the rational and the moral ideas, the 'telos' and the 'ethos' with which it is associated in developing consciousness, Prof. Otto faces the new problem which this hypostatisation or separation of religion, philosophy, and morality has laid upon his hands. He has now to forge the link of connection between them, to restore morality to the bosom of religion and religion at the heart of the moral life, and philosophical reflection. He is aware that religion and morality, the non-rational and the rational, are somehow essentially related as the history of religion distinctly shows, but having separated them, not only in analysis but in fact, as both sui generis and totally independent in origin and essential develop-
ment, he makes a desperate attempt to reconcile them and brings in a Deus ex machina to effect the reconciliation. This Deus ex machina is another a priori factor which establishes the essential connexion required to explain religious history and experience. "But the same a priori character belongs, -- to the connexion of the rational and the non-rational elements in religion, their inward and necessary union". "This process is as something axiomatic, something whose inner necessity we feel to be self-evident". and he goes on to add a significant remark. "But then this inward self-evidence is a problem in itself; we are forced to assume an obscure a priori knowledge of the necessity of this synthesis, combining rational and non-rational". (p. 140). But he nowhere attempts to say anything in explanation of this new a priori factor which he introduces surreptitiously to solve the problem of the inner harmony between the rational and the non-rational which his system has created for him. The synthesis of the non-rational and the rational, the way in which "beings obviously born originally of horror and terror, become gods -- beings to whom men pray, to whom they confide their sorrow or their happiness, in whom they behold the origin and the sanction of morality, law, and the whole canon of justice", remains for him a process explicable only on the assumption of some obscure a priori knowledge native to human self-consciousness. His resort to Plato, Luther and Christian missionaries helps him not at all in his endeavour to interpret this relational
a priori; it but enables him to affirm its existence by calling witnesses to his side.

But Prof. Otto does try to explain the working of this obscure 'a priori source of knowledge which, like, Leibnitz's preestablished harmony and Descartes' God, he calls to his aid to secure an inner correspondence between the rational and the non-rational. His attempt however proceeds on different lines. In pure Kantian fashion he explains the miracle by the help of Kant's doctrine of the Schematisation of the categories. Although he has told us that the rational and the non-rational elements in religion - the rational covering also the moral - are both strictly 'a priori in their origin, he now subordinates the rational to the non-rational and makes the formerto appear only as a schematisation of the latter. "As the rational elements, following 'a priori principles, come together in the historical evolution of religions with the non-rational, they serve to 'schematise' these..... The tremendum, the daunting and repelling moment of the numinous is schematised by means of the rational ideas of justice, moral will, and the exclusion of what is opposed to morality; and schematised thus, it becomes the 'wrath of God' .... The fascinans, the attracting and alluring moment of the numinous, is schematised by means of the ideas of goodness, mercy, love, and, so schematised becomes all we mean by 'Grace ....." (.44-5). And not only so but the Numinous Category thus schematised transforms the rational ideas ordinarily under-
stood by infusing them with the potency so to speak of its own form. In this way "by the continual living activity of its non-rational elements a... religion is guarded from passing and into rationalism", and equally, per contra, the numinous by being steeped in and saturated with rational elements (it) is guarded from sinking into fanaticism or mere mysticality ..... and is qualified to become a religion for all civilised humanity". (146).

As we have already pointed out Prof. Otto's real intention in making his distinction between the rational and the non-rational was not to sunder experience into two compartments, the religious and the rational, each possessing existential reality apart from the other, but rather the distinction was one in analysis merely. If Prof. Otto had kept strictly to this first intention the problem how the rational and the non-rational came together and coalesced in history and experience would never arise, and no obscure a priori knowledge to effect the fusion would be needed. The new problem has arisen for him because he has gone beyond his first intention and turned a distinction into a radical existential differentiation. In his endeavour to bridge the chasm he has thus created between religion and morality on the one hand and religion and rational thought on the other he is obliged to relinquish the dual a priori character of the rational and the non-rational, and to subordinate the former into a schema only of the latter, and this after saying distinctly that the rational and the non-rational elements
are a priori "each in the same degree". But if one is merely the schematisation of the other they cannot stand on the same a priori footing as forms of knowledge. On the other hand, if they are a priori principles "each in the same degree" the one is something more than a schematisation of the other. They will stand shoulder to shoulder, so to speak on perfect equality, each having an independent root in the mind. Prof. Otto in one and the same chapter gives them, at first, equality and a priori independence, and he goes in quest of some explanation of how they have developed together in religious history; he then subordinates the rational to the non-rational, the former appearing as a schematization of the latter. It is this second line of explanation which is true to his main position and his first intention, for if the rational elements in religious experience are a schematisation of the pure category of the numinous it is obvious that the distinction of rational and non-rational, with which he starts out, is a distinction in analysis only and not in fact. The appearance of the 'new problem' upon his path, the problem of how religion becomes rationalised, and how the gods become moral beings, a problem which he confesses to be insoluble, except on the assumption of some obscure source of knowledge, is obviously due to Prof. Otto's inadvertence in introducing a rift into religious experience, when he only meant a distinction of elements within the same concrete fact. It is one thing to insist that religion is other than philosophical speculation and more than morality; it is
a different thing to say that religion and morality arise and move in essential independence of each other. Once religion and morality are radically separated they cannot be united again. If they arise in complete independence they cannot be made one. From pure morality as Kant e.g. explained it, there is no way to religion. Equally from Religion, as Prof. Otto occasionally understands it, as purely a numinous on non-rational category, there is no way to the moral life. Gods born in horror and terror, having only a numinous character obviously can never become moralised unless the numinous includes already moral elements, as indeed it does for Prof. Otto in his first reading of it when e.g. he admits an element of fascinans into the mysterium Tremendum. What Prof. Otto fails to grasp clearly is the all-inclusive and fundamental character of his numinous category. In his anxiety to keep true to Kant's 'a priori discoveries he is unwilling to detract anything from the strictly 'a priori nature of the categories of the understanding and the moral Imperative as Kant understood these. He is therefore straining himself to find a link of connection between his own 'a priori discovery in the realm of the non-rational and Kant's perfectly rational categories. This is the source of all his trouble and accounts for his vacillation between two different positions and his search for one more 'a priori to get him out of his predicaments. His own numinous Category as formulated by him, and his apparent failure to relate it to the rational and the moral in religion,
leads us to suspect that the religious category is really the root category of self-consciousness and that once understood it might it will yield out of its own treasures, by the force of its own logic, the rational and the moral categories which to Kant were primary and which Prof. Otto cannot quite reconcile with his own category of the numinous.

In his more elaborate discussion of the process of schematization which the non-rational undergoes Prof. Otto seems to be quite aware of the interdependence and essential inner connexion that exists between the non-rational and the rational. Discussing the nature of this process he compares it with the "Association of Ideas", and insists that religious ideas and feelings when they are associated with 'rational' ideas and feelings are 'conjoined' with these rather than outwardly connected. They are "necessary connections" to be distinguished from "chance connections according to laws of purely external analogy". An instance of the former or necessary connection he finds in the connexion of Kant's Category of Causality with its temporal 'schema', the temporal sequence of two successive events, which, by being brought into connexion with the Category of Causality, is known and recognized as the causal relation of the two. He then adds: "Now the relation of the rational to the non-rational element in the idea of the Holy or Sacred is just such a one of 'schematization', and the non-rational
"numinous fact schematized by the rational concepts we have
"suggested above yields us the complete category of 'holy'
"itself richly charged and complete and in its full meaning.
"And that the schematism is a genuine one, and not a mere
"combination of analogies, may be distinctly seen from the fact
"that it does not fall to pieces, and cannot be cut out as the
"development of the consciousness of religious truth proceeds
"onwards and upwards, but is only recognized with greater
"definiteness and certainty". p. 46-47. In other words
Prof. Otto admits that the non-rational and the rational are
organically related elements within the one and the same
experience. The numinous becomes schematized into the complete
category of the 'holy' by means of the rational elements
which are essentially bound up with it as an Experience and
not added on as it were in an external fashion. The rational
elements are therefore, on his own showing, strictly dependent on the
non-rational, and are indeed always transfused by the latter.
Their connexion in concrete and developing experience is not
due therefore to some third obscure a priori source of knowledge,
but rather is the result of the logical unfolding of the numinous
category itself, and the schematization is not an event
temporally subsequent to the numinous moment of consciousness,
but that consciousness awakening to an evaluation of the real
world. Prof. Otto's failure to see this in its bare nakedness
is probably due to his slavery to Kantian methods. Kant's
schematizing of the pure forms of the understanding easily
misleads into the assumption that the a priori and the a posteriori factors in knowledge are separable moments, that in knowing we first use the a priori principles and then apply them as it were to the data of sense. That however is not the case. Schematization is not a process in time and therefore not two experiences; they are but two moments distinguishable in thought only but not separable in fact. Both are constitutive of experience and without either of them there could be no experience at all. If the rational is the schematism of the non-rational in religion their connection is not a temporal event at all; they are epistemologically correlative and organically related. To understand their interdependence we must undertake a logical analysis of the religious consciousness and its specific evaluations of the real world. This Prof. Otto does not attempt, although he clearly assumes throughout his book that the numinous category is more fundamental in consciousness then the rational and the moral. But he is too good a Kantian to admit the prerogative which he really assigns to the numinous category. He will break with his master only to the extent of raising religion on to the a priori level of Kant's categories of pure Reason and of moral obligation. What he is really doing is to prepare the way for the logical priority of the religious a priori to all the rest, thus turning Kant's system upside down, and making it possible to base all activities of human thought and evaluations, rational, moral, and aesthetic, on the foundation of the religious consciousness. Both the
history of religious thought and practice, and the nature of religious experience will, we would fain believe, bear out the cogency of this new epistemological doctrine of the religious a priori.
PART II. CONSTRUCTIVE

CHAPTER 10.

THE OBJECTIVE GROUND OF RELIGION.

In passing on to our constructive statement we must take up again, in accordance with the anticipation at the close of the third chapter, Kant's doctrine of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception and the nature of self-consciousness. This procedure is advisable both in the interest of continuity in our argument as well as for the sake of clarity. Up to this point our thesis while in many respects boldly and even rashly antagonistic to Kant's procedure in his analysis of knowledge, a procedure to which we have traced his theological agnosticism, is still based on Kant's critical method as alone adequate to the solution of the epistemological problems of religion. And we have adopted not his method only but his main critical results, both as our starting point, and as the main tenet upon which our enquiry has proceeded, and will proceed to the end.

In his "Study of Kant"; Prof. James Ward, who accepts his analysis of self-consciousness as Kant's central truth, points out that the categories are ultimately derived "from what the experient subject is and at the intellectual level knows itself to be". "This seems to be the true
"answer", he adds, "and it is the answer which really underlies the whole of Kant's transcendental deduction in its final form". The unity of self-consciousness is "itself the ground and presupposition of all categories, and therefore of these supreme categories - substance and cause". p. 81-2. "In maintaining these categories to be indispensable to the possibility of any intelligible experience of the world is Kant not really maintaining that the world is intelligible only when it is interpreted in terms of what the experiensubject at the transsubjective and self-conscious level knows itself to be? On what other grounds can it be assumed that the transcendental object or non-ego, so far from being utterly alien, is verily the ego's own correlate?" p. 83.

Prof. Ward then goes on to point out, what for the purpose of our argument is of the utmost importance, that Kant interpreted the activity of self-consciousness in the synthesis of knowledge much too narrowly, was guilty in fact of abstracting from the mind both feeling and conation, leaving the cognitive faculty alone to work the miracle of lifting man into self-consciousness through the synthetic unity of the object. If, as Kant affirms, the unity of self-consciousness in knowledge, the individual's awareness of himself is attained through, and is essentially the correlate of, the objective unity, it follows that the nature of the object, i.e. the kind of unity it possesses must have something to do with the character of the self which the individual experiensubject thinks of himself to have. In other words, the unity/self-consciousness
being realised in its esse by the objective unity, will also be determined in its quale, through the same objective unity. There will be a character correspondence between the subject and the object. Whereas the active self through its synthesis of the manifold imposes its own law upon the objective world and through the order and unity thus achieved realises its own nature as self-consciousness, the content of that which is apprehended in knowledge will naturally correspond to the experience of the self-conscious subject and vice versa. What the thinking subject finds in the world of objects will answer to what he finds in himself. In saying this one is aware that we are seriously departing from Kant's own position. The unity of self-consciousness was for him a purely logical unity as was also the unity of the object. Neither was to be identified with the concrete unity of the object whether outside the mind or within it, that is to say with the category of unity. Both were for him transcendental, and were merely discoverable as logical conditions of all knowledge, the source of the categories and the ultimate presuppositions of all experience whatsoever. But this reading of the nature of the ego, which led Kant to his questionable and perplexing doctrine of "Inner Sense" is just a defect of his psychology now generally admitted. The self that is active in the building up of experience is something very different from the logical unity which Kant separates from the empirical self. Prof. Ward is certainly justified in his statement that Kant overlooked an important fact of experience viz: - "that the
activity of the subject is not confined to the synthesis of sense-data, is never merely cognitive but always and from the first conative and reactive as well. In our intercourse with the external world we have limbs which the Ego controls as well as senses which the Non-ego affects". - p. 83.
The fact that we fully realise what energy ("Kraft") means when we find our own movements inhibited, when the object or Gegenstand, that we perceive, is also an obstacle or Widerstand which resists — this all-important psychological fact Kant seems to have overlooked altogether". (p. 84). And Prof. Ward agrees with earlier critics that "Kant's first concern should have been to ascertain how experience has developed from this centre, (the original synthetic unity of apperception) and all that such development from a single source implies". p. 84-5.

"The gradually unfolding stem of experience was hidden by its own branches; so much so that Kant seriously doubted if there were a single stem at all, nay, began by asserting that there was not". (pp. 84, 85).

Following the lead of Prof. Ward we are justified in giving to the synthetic unity of self-consciousness a much more concrete character than was given to it by Kant himself. The origin of the categories of the understanding through which the synthesis of the manifold is achieved and experience made possible, is not 'logomorphic' to use Prof. Ward's term, but anthropomorphic, not a bare logical unity but a concrete
psychic centre. Kant's disruption of the mind into cognition, feeling and conation, making each of these a subject of three independent critiques, and each providing exclusive kinds of knowledge can no longer be accepted. We have moved away from the faculty psychology prevalent in his day. The synthetic unity of apperception is a concrete unity wherein the three distinguishable, but not separable, aspects of consciousness all function, so that the objective world of knowledge, through which self-consciousness comes to birth, is not only the intelligible realm of matter with which science and mathematics deal, nor the realm of ends revealed in the moral consciousness considered in abstraction, nor yet the teleological order given in feeling. The synthetic unity of self-consciousness, as we know it in ourselves, is much richer than any one of these objective orders taken singly can account for. The system of objective judgments we call knowledge grows out not of a logical figment, an abstract unity of which nothing can be asserted except a bare identity which is meaningless, but rather from a living, interested active, ever aggressive reaction to the manifold presented to the individual by his sensible environment. The study of instinctive behaviour has greatly helped as out of all narrow rationalistic theories concerning the genesis of our knowledge of the external world. Although our new doctrine may bring us into a new kind of faculty psychology, it has clearly helped us to shed the older type, so pernicious to philosophy. If however we can still hold to Kant's doctrine
of the objective unity of self-consciousness we must be prepared to give to that unity a nature very different from that which he gave to it. For a bare logical unity, we repeat, is meaningless. The only true unity is that which includes within itself diversity and multiplicity.

In pursuing this line of advance it is important to point out that we are assuming that Kant's central truth still stands, that the unity of self-consciousness still remains an objective unity bound up with the organisation of the matter of sensation into ordered and intelligible experience. If we give to the unity of the self a concrete character, linking it up with the empirical self as closely as possible we are not denying the constitutive function of the mind in knowledge. We are only insisting that the mind is active altogether in every determination of the manifold of sense, and that the synthetic activity analysed in Kant's three critiques is present, and functions together in the concrete situations where the Ego and the Non-ego come face to face. In realisation of self-consciousness, the judgment, 'I am I', attainable through the synthetic unity of the object, is something more than a purely logical awakening. It is and must be an experience into which other subjective or psychic elements enter besides the purely logical unity which Kant calls transcendental. We never have a purely logical relationship to any object. If and when we do speak of such a relationship, it is only by an effort of abstraction from the concreteness of experience. We are not at liberty,
therefore, to think of this abstract unity as something alone active and independently functioning as the ultimate Condition of self-consciousness. It only functions within concrete experience through the employment of the categories in the synthesis of the manifold. When the unity is taken in an abstract way, we can call it nothing else than what Kant himself called it - the transcendental unity both of the object and of the subject, the one being identical with the other, an "X" above and behind the unity of apperception, concerning which nothing can be known, a blank identity without differentiation or content at all. The bare unity of self-consciousness, not distinguishable only but separable from the empirical self, must, so long as it retains its transcendental character, remain a thing-in-itself and consequently unknown. The unity of self-consciousness is however, not a logical unity to the experient. For him, it is a concrete unity, realising itself as an experience both of individuality and identity, in direct and living relationship with the synthetic activity of thought working upon the manifold of sense. It is not a transcendental but an immanental unity, not logical but experiential, a self indeed, which has a definite and concrete content in living contact with the objective world. The unity of the self is a logical unity and nothing more, only to the philosopher who looks on and analyses self-consciousness into its various aspects. Kant was perfectly consistent with himself when he taught that this logical unity could not be known inasmuch as, being the ground of all objectivity, it could never be
made into an object of knowledge. But as a matter of fact, the self is known in self-consciousness, both in and through our experience of the world, and when the inner life itself is made the object of contemplation. Even the affirmation of Kant's bare identity 'I am I' is, so far as it goes, a kind of knowledge of the self. The characteristic quality of self-consciousness, which is to be aware of the identity and continuity of the self as against the objective world which is known, points to the concrete character of the implied unity. If the self is conscious of itself, in knowledge, then the self cannot be wholly unknown. To fall into scepticism here would be to land ourselves in a hopeless contradiction in terms. We would be denying that we were aware of something we were aware of. It would be saying that in self-consciousness we are not conscious of self—an impossible position. We would argue, then, that the unity of self-consciousness is a concrete unity, the immanent unity in fact of the empirical self, and that in knowledge of the world the self is aware of its own experience as a thinking active reality, that, in fine, it is the peculiar nature of self-consciousness to know itself not as a mere logical unity but as an experiencing self, through all objects whether in the world outside or within consciousness itself. In knowledge the self transcends the object it knows and is aware of its own inner workings as well as the object that occupies its attention. True, the Ego and the Non-ego must both remain, the subject must be a subject still in all acts of knowledge, but this does not preclude the subject from making
its own experience a matter of contemplation, nor does it prevent
the subject from being able to rise above itself, at least in
part, without destroying the subject-object relationship in
the knowing process.

There are expressions in Kant, hints here and there, which
show that he was himself not unaware of the new difficulties
that were raised by his own architectonic and enslavement to
logical procedure. Concrete experience was seen by him to be
something more than the sum of the parts into which his analysis
had reduced it. The Unity of apperception was more than a
merely logical unity. "The consciousness of my own existence is
"at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of
"other things besides myself". B. p. 276. "What is this",
asks Prof. Ward"but the recognition of the duality of subject
"and object in consciousness, i.e. in experience? How then
"can the subject alone be called 'the mere form' of consciousness?
"p. 160. and again "only inasmuch as I can conjoin a manifold
"of presentations in one (moment of) consciousness is it possible
"for me to conceive the identity of the consciousness in these
"presentations themselves; in other words, the analytic unity
"of consciousness is only possible on presupposition of some
"sort of synthesis (i.e. Synthesizing) unity". 16.B. p. 133.

The unity of self-consciousness here, the 'I think' is
definitely existential and not logical. "It states", as Prof.
Ward points out, "an act, that is to say, a fact". p. 162.
This does not imply that Kant's unity of apperception was not
for him in the last resort a transcendental and logical unity. For him no doubt the unity was merely logical but it is clear, nevertheless that he easily slipped into speaking of it as existential. Prof. Ward also points out that in one place Kant actually refers to the Ego as 'nothing more than the feeling of an existence ... to which all thinking stands in relation'. "Here", comments Ward, "the Ego of apperception is generally defined as feeling. Obviously this could not be said of the transcendental object". "Here, however, what he saw was that the Ego of apperception is neither a definite intuition nor a concept nor yet the mere form of consciousness". Though feeling is never a complete state of consciousness, it is the most central one, as Kant came at long last to recognise. Had he at this junction been awake to the considerations that dawned upon him in working out his third Critique, his whole doctrine of the self might well have been different". 1) That Kant became at last dissatisfied with his abstract psychological method and saw that all the water-tight compartments of the mind according to the faculty psychology which he in the main adopted could not be equated with the concrete character of self-conscious... experience itself, seems clear from the fact that he thought of writing still another Critique "dealing at last with the world as a whole" and with man as a whole". 2)

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2) Ward p. 135.
Having reached this point, having got rid of the abstract, logical, pure unity of self-consciousness, and thus opening the way for the concrete self to function in knowledge, concrete in opposition both to a logical unity and to the merely cognitive awareness, can we hold fast to the results of Kant's objective deduction? It is our belief that we can, but with this addition that the same proof of the dependence of the unity of self-consciousness upon the objective unity of the world which Kant put forth for the cognitive faculty, is valid for all self-consciousness in its most concrete and comprehensive range. It is not as a thinking being alone, as a creature of cognition pure and simple that man, through the activity of his mind combining the manifold of sense into the synthesis of objectivity, gains self-consciousness. Now that we have dispensed with the pure logical unity of the subject, we must hold that the concrete unity, comprising feeling and conation, as well as cognition still awakens to self-consciousness in and through the synthetic correlation of sense data into the ordered unity of the objective world. The concrete subject comes to self-consciousness via the object, and can only know itself through the epistemological relationship that it holds with the object, i.e. through the part it has played in the building up of the unified object it knows. The relationship of subject and object, is throughout concrete, and the unity of both is likewise a concrete unity living in and informing the multiplicity which is also a feature of all experience. When now we accept the
concrete situation, we find that self-consciousness is an experience and not merely a recognition of a logical relationship between subject and object. But in experience there are always feeling and conative elements. Self-consciousness is most certainly an awareness of the self as a multiplicity in unity, as a real existent that is, standing in a living relation to an objective order which, likewise, is real, a multiplicity in unity which is the correlate, in a specific and definite sense, of the subject.

The manner, then, in which the objective synthesis, the combining of sense data takes place, will be seen to be not a thought process only but an activity depending upon feeling and interest as well. The objective order which becomes the counterpart of the self-conscious subject will be more than a space-time order. It will be social also. No doubt the space-time relationship will be a fundamental characteristic of all objectivity, but it will never stand alone. All objects will, for self-consciousness, possess a meaning over and beyond that of mere physical existents. Self-consciousness is as much a social reality as anything else. To reach it there must arise for the individual a world of other individuals like himself forming an intelligent and moral order. It is in relation to Other Mind or to other minds through transsubjective intercourse, that man becomes aware of his own independent existence as a moral personality. Something of himself goes over into the physical order too, for the causal interaction which he comes to know through the category of causation is, in the last resort, expressive of his own
experience as an interacting and determining agent. Our objective world is, after all, anthropomorphically constructed as well as construed, it is built up, for us, by our own impact upon it in the urgent business of perpetuating our own existence as embodied spirits. Whatever may be said against pragmatism there is surely a pragmatic principle at work in the construction of our human world.

In pointing out the wider factors underlying our knowledge of the world we would not be understood to deny the agency of the categories of the understanding. What we do wish to affirm is that other categories of a similar a priori character are involved also, not subsequent to, but coincident with, the employment of the former, that the mind contributes more than the categories of Kant to the synthesis which makes self-conscious experience possible. The structure of the world is conditioned anthropologically more than Kant would allow, and the additional principles constitutive of knowledge, and therefore of the world known, are as important as those he discovered and must be given a place similar to them as epistemological factors underlying human self-consciousness.

Our consciousness of self will still be seen to be objectively conditioned, just as the transcendental unity of apperception was for Kant. The subjective, while conditioning the objective as the active factor, and in that sense prior, as a source of experience, will itself be dependent on the object, and upon all that the object is capable of becoming, for its knowledge of its own existence, not only as a thinking but as an active and
sentient being. Self-consciousness as we know it in personality, is a highly complex reality, never static but always in flux. Conditioning it at every point of its development is the objective, physical, moral, and spiritual order, through which alone it can rise to knowledge of itself. If the bare unity of self-consciousness requires the pivot of objectivity for its genesis, so does the moral personality require a moral society for its emergence and support. In the same way the religious personality which knows itself related to a divine being and a spiritual world, becomes possible only through the discovery of a religious meaning and purpose in the objects of experience.

Religious self-consciousness cannot be a merely subjective phenomenon. It is derived in the first place on the strength of the awareness of divine reality in the objective world. It is indeed objectively conditioned from the start. The religious conception of the world is neither a projection nor an objectification in the psychological sense. The objectification if we must use the term, is an epistemological process whereby the subject comes to religious self-consciousness through his own activity in the building up of experience. The mind does not first of all produce religious ideas out of its own entrails, like the spider his web, and then transfers those ideas. Man does not clothe reality with religious significance, subsequent to an awareness of the spiritual, subjectively produced, whatever that might mean. The whole doctrine of subjectivism here is made possible by the assumption that man comes to full
self-consciousness in the Kantian sense, to the awareness of himself as a unity through the judgment, 'I think', independently of any evaluation of the objective world beyond that which is achieved through the categories of the understanding. For this assumption of the priority, whether temporal or logical of the scientific categories we have no warrant at all. The religious character of objectivity as a factor in the development of self-consciousness is not a surmise but a well-grounded fact. As we have already pointed out more than once in the course of this discussion, the religious evaluation of the objective world is as primitive, to say the least, as any other. Every object for human self-consciousness is linked up in some way with a spiritual background, and has therefore a religious character. Man read the world's meaning religiously before he began to think of it scientifically in the modern sense. He applied religious categories in the building up of experience from the very start, at least as early as he applied the categories of substance and cause. The scientific world was not born first, and afterwards the religious. But even were it not so, even if historically scientific categories preceded the religious, their right to form the basis of metaphysical theory as against the religious valuation need not be accepted. What is first for us, as Aristotle said, need not be first in nature. All that our theory requires is that we should acknowledge the a priori and independent source within experience of the religious interpretation and evaluation of the world and life. But there is every reason for placing religion among the
most primitive interests of man and as expressing a fundamental characteristic of self-conscious personality.

In contending for the objective ground of the religious consciousness we do not deny, let us point out, the subjective and mental source of religious meanings within experience. Nor in maintaining the a priori character of religion are we to be understood to be falling into the pit of rationalism. The a priori source is not independent of a posteriori factors and cannot therefore create experience independently of the objective world. Religious experience arises through the employment of certain modes of interpretation of phenomena derived from the mind itself through which the world is spiritually estimated. It is only in and through the discovery of such a spiritual value in the world confronting man that he attains knowledge of himself as a religious personality related spiritually to the divine background of the physical order. The subject-object relationship which is fundamental to self-consciousness is fundamental also to self-consciousness on the religious plane. Man becomes aware of himself as a religious creature, whose life is directly related to invisible reality, through his experience of the concrete world of objects which is the environment of his life. Religion is not a matter of abstract thinking. It is an interest born and nurtured and exercised on the perceptive level. It gets its concrete nature from its birth in the world of objects in contrast to which man first knew himself in the presence of a spiritual reality not
unlike himself. And that objective world is the result of the synthetic activity of his own mind bringing together the factors of sense into the unity of the object which gains its religious character by virtue of the fact that it is fashioned in accordance with the categories of religious appreciation issuing, like the categories of the understanding, from the mind itself. The individual becomes a religious personality through the religious character of the object, but in thinking it in a religious way he is only finding again what he has put into the object in the act of knowing it. If this be so, if the religious self-consciousness is only possible through the synthesis of the religious object, a synthesis which is yet subjectively conditioned, then the objective validity of religious judgments of expressive/the spiritual evaluation of the world is as well grounded as the validity of scientific judgments based on causation and the Uniformity of Nature. Man is, then, as a religious being, organic to nature, and subjectivism is ruled out in religious knowledge even as it is in science. Our religious knowledge is true and valid exactly in the same way, and for the same reason, as the truth of science, morality and aesthetics. In all cases it is an insight into the real as it is revealed in experience, the experience itself being built up through the marriage of subject and object in the act of knowing, each contributing an essential factor without which self-conscious experience would not be possible.

Support for our divergence from Kant's conclusions can be found in Canon Streeter's "Reality". "With Kant", he says
"I should hold that in the Categorical Imperative of the voice of conscience and in the appreciation of the beautiful we are directly cognisant of the quality of Reality. But while Kant concerns himself with these as known in internal feeling my emphasis is on the fact that Art and Religion are attempts of life to externalise its consciousness of its own inner quality. "Kant maintained that the qualitative character of Reality is known to us mainly through the 'Categorical Imperative' of ethics. I seek it in the first instance in the objectifications of the inner spirit of Religion. 1) Here Art and Religion are given priority to morality as avenues of revelation of the Real. But Canon Streeter only comes half way with us. He speaks of the objectification of internal feeling, as if the feelings aroused in aesthetic and Religious appreciation were internal and that only. But internal they never are in the sense that they arise independently of objective facts. Aesthetic and Religious feelings, though more subjective than thought, are yet always engendered by perception of what is objective and real. "Religious feeling", says Dean Inge, "is only aroused by religious ideas of objective truth and value. "Feeling is the mirror which reflects ideas and ideals ....... "It creates nothing; it seems to project ideas and ideals, "because it reflects unconscious motions of thought and will. ----------------------- 1) "Reality" p. 114.
"Feeling in itself is neither good nor bad, true nor untrue. It is simply a fact of the soul and life. Its truth depends on the truth of the idea which determines it; its goodness on the goodness of the motive which is bound up with it".

When 'Feeling' is made the central core of religious experience, as by Schleiermacher, there is a danger of divorcing religion from the objective content of self-consciousness. "Mere dependence", is nonsense, unless there is a known object on which to depend. "The feeling of value is always dependent on the judgment of value, and all judgment is an intellectual process." We do not therefore objectify "internal feeling" either in art or Religion. What seems to be objectification is not objectification at all; it is the bringing into more clear consciousness of the situation which is already bound up with our feeling, from the perception of which indeed the feeling proceeds. We cannot insist too strongly on the priority of cognition to feeling. Even the feeling associated with the sense of need, or desire, is not altogether divorced from cognitive apprehension of what will supply the want. No doubt there is often in religious experience an intense awakening of emotions that do not seem, at first, to arise from clear intellectual apprehension of objective facts or ideas, but that is only because feeling has a tendency to overflow its legitimate

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(1) "Faith and its psychology" p. 67.
(2) Ibid. p. 67.
boundaries which thought never exhibits. But reflexion reveals an intellectual system of things most surely believed to be objectively true underlying the emotional experience. Religion is entirely grounded on judgments of value made in regard to reality, and is essentially objective both in its origin and in its development. These judgments are doubtless made in association with feeling and conative activity which determine in large measure the kind of judgments that are made, but cognitive awareness is still fundamental in all religious reactions to the real world. The true basis of the objective validity of religion must, therefore, be sought in the intellectual categories by means of which man is determined to think of the world as the expression of a divine and spiritual order. Upon the apprehension of such a world rests in the last resort, the religious reaction and all religious emotion.
Chapter XI.

THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF RELIGION.

Our argument up to this point has revealed four main lines of advance, lines which converge and yield a clear direction for our a priori quest.

(a) Religious self-consciousness, or the awareness of our: selves as religious beings, is an awareness emerging in immediate experience within the subject-object relationship. Its emergence takes place on the basis of the synthetic activity of the mind working upon the manifold of sense and constructing the objective order in such a way as to make that order yield a religious significance. It is through the awareness of this meaning in the object that the religious self-consciousness comes to birth, and on this its development is rendered possible. The human self therefore presupposes an objective determination and valuation as a constructive factor in experience. The acknowledgment of this objective ground of religion renders null and void all theories of religion which would make it a merely subjective phenomenon. That which requires the determination of an objective world, religious in character, as the ground of its possibility
cannot be thought of as having no objective validity. Religious self-consciousness is the subjective correlate of a definitely spiritual and supernatural World-Order, apprehended as objective, and immanent in the world of Nature.

(b) In the religious reaction to, and interpretation of, the world all the powers of the mind are active. Cognition, emotion and conviction are all involved. It is the concrete self, and not only one part or faculty, least of all a bare logical unity, that determines and builds up the objective content of experience. We have insisted on the presence of Cognition in the concrete sense, as well as on creative and practical interest, in order to correct the tendency, so prevalent in some quarters, to base religion on mere feeling. The religious à priori principles being fundamental elements of the mind, must not be sought in any one faculty or aspect of conscious life. As religion comprehends all human reactions to the world, and enters into every human interest, whether intellectual, emotional or practical, we are forced to find in the initial source of the religious outlook the agency of the whole personality.

(c) The religious self-consciousness, we have maintained, is not a later growth on the basis of a secular self-consciousness supposed to be already attained before man became religious. The self and the not-self are elements of one consciousness
and for that reason the mind when it reaches Self-consciousness is dimly aware of a higher Unity embracing both subject and object.

This Unity has, we have insisted, a religious character. But its nature, its experience value, is constituted strictly by the content both of the Self and the Not-Self. Unless the object therefore had a religious meaning, neither the Self nor the Unity grasped in Self-consciousness could have a religious character. Unless this Unity contained already, as an implicitate of self-conscious awareness, a religious and spiritual significance there could be no way of finding out how it got that character.

We must then think of Self-consciousness as essentially religious from the first, inasmuch as it implies an awareness of the self as a unified reality confronting a world that is more than merely physical, a world in fact which, just because it is a religious world, is expressive of a wider context within which both it and the self find their true being. As self-consciousness the finite mind transcends the object it knows, and in transcending it, becomes aware of the Unity that embraces both Subject and Object. This Unity is a religious Unity for the reason that the objective content of self-consciousness is a religious content, an awareness of God as a spiritual being, indwelling all objects and comprehending
the knowing Self as well.

"The idea of an absolute Unity," says Caird, "which
"transcends all the oppositions of finitude, and especially
"the last opposition which includes all others - the opposition
"of subject and object - is the ultimate presupposition of
"our consciousness. Hence we cannot understand the real
"character of our rational life or appreciate the full compass
"of its movements, unless we recognise as its necessary con:
"stituents or guiding ideas, not only the ideas of object and
"subject, but also the idea of God. The idea of God, therefore,
"meaning by that, in the first instance, only the idea of an
"absolute principle of Unity which blends in one "all thinking
"things, all objects of all thought," which is at once the
"source of being to all things that are, and of knowing to all
"beings that know - is an essential principle, or rather the
"ultimate essential principle of our intelligence, a principle
"which must manifest itself in the life of every rational
"creature. Every creature who is capable of the consciousness
"of an objective world and of the consciousness of a self, is
"capable also of the consciousness of God. Or to sum up the
"whole matter in one word, every rational being as such is
"a religious being." "The Germ," he adds, "of the idea of God
"as the ultimate Unity of being and knowing, subject and object,
"must in some way be present in every rational consciousness." 1)

Although Caird points out that it was Kant who first discerned the presence of these ideas of Reason - the unity of the self, of the world, and of God - as the controlling forces of the human mind in its search for Unity and order within experience, he himself allows to these ideas a formative and constitutive function from the first, and not merely regulative of scientific and philosophical enquiry. "These ideas," he says, "are thus at once the beginning and the end of our "rational life."

"We cannot say a single rational word without expressing "of implying a principle of unity which manifests itself in and "through the difference of self and the world; and the utmost "goal of all our knowledge, nay we may say, of our whole rational "life, is to discover what is contained in that principle. Self, "Not-Self, God, - these three ideas, mark out the sphere within "which the movement of our spirits is confined; and all that we "can attain by the utmost effort of our spirits is to realise a "little more clearly what we mean by the Self, by the Not-Self "and by God." 1)

The germ of religion lies then in this principle of Unity which is an inalienable feature of rational life. And this principle is the matrix of the idea of God. "All our life "is a journey from God to God." "All our secular consciousness "can only be the explication or the differentiation of the primi: "tive unity presupposed alike in consciousness and self-conscious:

1) Ibid p.165.
"M:ness, and all that it can achieve by its activity is, so to "speak, to furnish materials for the religious Consciousness." 1) (d). We have further maintained that the object in knowledge could not put on a religious meaning unless its constitution as an object of knowledge revealed the nature of the mind that knows it. That is to say, an object possesses a religious character in and through the employment in the building up of experience of a specific religious principle of thought. Although it is through the object, that is, within experience, that that principle reveals itself, its source is and must be mental. The objective order gains its spiritual import on account of the nature of the mind that is able to know it in that guise. And further, the consciousness of the unity that is involved in, and which transcends, the subject-object relationship is the direct result of the constitutive function of thought in the building up of experience. It would be difficult to understand how thought transcends the opposition between itself and the object in knowledge, and attains to self-consciousness, except on the assumption that reason is a constitutive power synthetically determining all objects whatsoever. If we denied to the ideas of religion, in particular the idea of God, a constitutive function in knowledge of the world we could never be sure that the transcending Unity overarching the subject-object

relationship could be identified with what in religious experience we know as a consciousness of God. What Kant could not do because the Ideas of Reason were not constitutive but merely regulative, Edward Caird, following Hegel, is able to achieve. For Caird, the Unity present to Self-consciousness in knowledge is no other than God, and religion becomes for him a fundamental and primitive feature of all rational minds. This identification is possible for him because he concedes to self-consciousness a religious, and not a merely secular character, and to reason a power to determine objectivity in a religious way. Religious self-consciousness is therefore the fundamental form of self-consciousness. Our journey is veritably from God to God, right through from the moment man became man and began to build his altars of earth, up to the Christian Mystic who, intensely aware of the Unity that transcends all differences — even the difference of subject and object, mounts up on the wings of his meditation above all finite antagonism into the bosom of the God who is all in all.

Taking our stand then on the religious self-consciousness, we must ask, what are the conditions implied and the factors involved in its constitution? In other words, what principles of knowledge must be assumed to be operative in making possible religious experience? How comes it that man, in knowing himself as a being confronting the world, seems to
be shut up to thinking of that world as the expression of a
supersensible reality, within which his own life is also lived,
and outside which he cannot fall, and to which he owes the
dedication of his life?

We will tentatively formulate a fundamental epistemo-
logical principle of religion thus:

Self-consciousness is only possible in so far as I am
able to find in the object not only a reality other than myself
but a reality expressive of Another Mind which knows me through
my awareness of the object, - or more simply put: - In knowing,
I am always known. To be aware of myself as a subject who
knows the world outside me, implies that I should confess that
through the world I know there speaks a voice which apprehends
me even as I am able to apprehend the world. The act of
self-consciousness in which I know, not only that I am, but that
I know a reality other than my own life, is always accompanied
as one of its essential and constitutive features by an aware-
ness of being myself known by Another Mind which cries out to
me through the object/giving thought. Knowledge makes all
things articulate; it gives tongue to Nature and makes her
re-echo the voice of someone who is finding us out, even as
we come to find out the objective world. Man as a self-
conscious being cannot stand before dumb objects or a blank
inscrutable world. If and when he knows, and, through the
object, becomes aware of his own reality as the subject of
knowledge and the bearer of experience, he is also aware that the object in some sense knows him in return, or that, in knowing, the world he knows drags him into the light of a higher intelligence. Man, the Knower, is drawn by every act of knowledge into a greater light than he, so to speak, bargained for. Like a hooked fish he is lifted out of the stream of reality where, without knowing it, he moved freely as the stream itself, and is now above the current and in other hands. The voice of God is never silent in the garden of knowledge. Self-conscious man, aware of himself and his environment, hears also the footsteps of the Lord God walking in the Garden. He knows that the footsteps are in search of him, and he hears the divine Voice calling him. Without this objective presence of the divine revealing itself in and through the Not-Self, the Self would not become the human self, the self-conscious bearer of human experience.

If it be true that the Unity of Self-consciousness is an objective-unity, derived from the mind's own synthetic activity in the determination and organisation of the manifold presented to it, then it is also true that the concrete Self we know, the knowing, feeling, active self of man, is explicable only on the supposition that the Not-Self, standing over against the knowing subject, must be viewed as possessing a nature similar to that of Self-consciousness. The Unity of the self-conscious subject and the Unity of the object are correlates,
only the correlation is more than the correlation of two abstract unities. The Self and the Not-self, subject and object, are both knowing centres. Indeed it is only by becoming aware of a Knower in Nature that man becomes aware of himself as a self-conscious reality. Involved in human experience are two Knowers, the subjective knower and the objective. I can only know myself as an intelligent existent being in so far as I become aware also that my world has a nature similar to my own. The idea of self arises in strict dependence upon the idea of the Not-Self, which means that self-consciousness comes to birth in the act of knowing the world. But that is not all. Analysis of the idea of self will reveal the important fact that it implies a certain Evaluation of the Not-Self which makes the latter the expression and in some sense the bearer also, of self-conscious Spirit. It would be difficult indeed to imagine man possessing an idea of self as an intelligent reality unless at the same time he was aware, in some measure, of another mind as the ground of the world which he knows. We must conclude then, as our first step, that Self-consciousness is only possible on the basis of an objective order which itself expresses a Spirit that knows us through the object, even as the object is known by us.

To support this conclusion we may turn to Professor Hocking's searching analysis in his well-known work "The Meaning of God in Human Experience." "It seems to me,"
he says, "that the original source of the knowledge of God "is an experience which might be described as an experience "of not being alone in knowing the world, and especially the "world of Nature." (p.236) But he thinks that this amount of insight into the character of God would leave man facing an oppressive mystery. It would lead to no positive affirmation about the possibilities of the world, and man the worshipper, although he might fling himself on the Unknown, would still be conscious of a great gulf between him and God.

Professor Hocking improves on his first statement of the ultimate deliverance of the religious Consciousness. "If "that original experience of the presence of God in the world "can reach to some permanent hold on its object, so that it "might be expressed 'I know not; but He knows,' the entire "aspect of religion is altered. The reconciliation of men with "such a world is no longer degrading nor disloyal.......From "the knowledge that 'He knows' will be inferred the thesis "that the Unknown of Nature is Knowable." (p.237).

The original sources of religion, he finds in "Man's "awareness of an other than himself; an Other who may be a "companion, but also an enemy more deadly than death, more "dreadful than Nature in herself has any image of." (p.238) And again, "At the source of all religion, so far as our "analysis can discover, we find an experience of God as an "Other Knower of our world, already in close relation to self,"
"and also in some natural bond with our social and physical "experience." (p.240)

After thus describing the content of the religious consciousness he proceeds to enquire how the mind of man arrives at an experience of God as an Other Knower. He sees that the difficulties involved in this problem are similar to those we meet with in trying to explain the origin and nature of our social intercourse with other finite minds.

"We have, he thinks, no direct experience of other minds. "Souls, by their own nature, cannot touch each other; cannot "experience each other; their relations do not rise to the "point of knowledge, they remain excursions, adventures, "hypotheses, wonderfully sustained by their results, but none "the less, launches from solitude in the direction of an "assumed reality; which reality if it exists, is no less "solitary." "I have no organ" he adds, "for the experience "of other mind; by the nature of other mind, I could have none." (p.245).

According to him, the communications by means of which we do achieve social experience - physical signs and symbols from gestures to explicit language - do not build us a "veritable "experience of other mind." There is communication, but no immediate experience. The conviction of the reality of other mind is based on an inference - a thought process in fact, - and not on direct apprehension. "We can still speak only of "'the source of our belief in the reality of our fellow men,' "not of an experience of that reality." (p.249).
All these ways of striking contacts with another mind by which it is sought to prove its reality presuppose that the mind is "furnished in advance with an idea of an Other Mind. "We are able to read our signs as we do, because we already expect them to mean something, we have already framed somehow "the conception of another mind ..... The conception of the "fellow-man, somehow obtained, is necessary before my duty of "acknowledging him can be performed, or understood." (p.251)

The failure of outward signs to bring me into immediate experience of an other mind, makes it necessary to seek for such experience of him, along the only other way open, viz: - through the world which he as Knower holds as the content of his thought. In knowing his world I shall get nearer to knowing him as Knower, and striking real social intercourse with him,} "A perfect social experience would require that "this present world of Nature should be known as being the "World of the Other, precisely as it is my World." "For as it "seems to me, this present World of Nature is known by me as "being, in just this sense, a common World; it seems to me, "indeed, that it is not otherwise known - that is, that a "knowledge of Other Knower is an integral part of the simplest "knowledge of Nature itself." (P.268-9).

The proof which Professor Hocking gives of this implied social consciousness in all consciousness of Nature is twofold. In the first, place he points out that every attempt to establish
my own loneliness with Nature implies a setting up of barriers
to shut out all intruders. In shutting myself in I am also
shutting everyone else out. My loneliness is not solitariness,
therefore, because it implies the awareness of other minds
which at any moment may break in upon me. "My negative
"sociability has a very positive social consciousness at its
"basis." Underlying my own separation from other minds there
is a continuous reality which serves as the basis of all
possibility of communication. "All actual approach implies
"a deeper-going presence as an accomplished fact." (p.273)
Social experience is then something fundamental and has no
beginning, except the beginning of life itself.

The second line of proof is the contention that we
could only know our experience to be non-social by contrasting
it with an experience not-so-confined, an experience that is
of a world shared by an Other Mind. If I know that my world
is mine alone I make that judgment only because I have an
Idea of my experience not-so-confined. The Idea of social
experience is, therefore, logically prior to the idea of a
world as a world in my experience alone.

But this Idea, so Professor Hocking argues, cannot be
a mere Idea. It must, as an Idea, arise from actual experience.
"In any sense in which I can imagine or think or conceive an
"experience of Other Mind, in that same sense I have an experi-
ence of Other mind, apart from which I should have no such
"Idea." "The only point of view from which supposed social "experience can be criticised as incomplete is the point of "view of social experience itself. The only ground upon which this idea can be judged a 'mere idea' is the ground of this same idea as not mere, namely as actually bringing me into presence of Mind which is not my own." (p.274.) There is nothing from which this idea of a genuine experience of Other Mind can arise except from the experience itself. It is not an imaginative construction based upon other material, whether physical or psychical or both together. "To reach the idea from there we must use the special relation "of Other-self-hood, which is the idea itself." (p.276). "My "idea of social experience is them, of social experience as it is: "my ideal and my idea are the same, - they refer me to what "I have." (p.277.)

But this idea of Other Mind although it arises from and is found within experience, is not derived from any impression made upon the mind. "My idea of Other Mind is at "the same time an experience of Other Mind." It is an Idea which is organic to the idea of Self. "Let me but think what "I mean by the Other Mind and there, as I find my Self, I find "the Other also. As an idea of a fundamental and constant "experience, bound up with my equally permanent experiences of Self and Nature, this idea is not prior to experience, but is indeed prior to all further social experience, to all such as is intermittent and subject to error. This fundamental
experience, and its idea, deserve from their position in knowledge, to be called a concrete a priori knowledge." (p. 277-8.)

According to Professor Hocking then, the enquiry into our Knowledge of other minds leads to the conclusion that it is only through our consciousness of Nature that any immediate knowledge of them is at all possible. The knowledge we have seems to be knowledge based on inference from outward and bodily expression which only leads to belief, and not to immediate experience. Real experience of other minds is, however, something given as a fundamental feature of self-consciousness through intercourse with the natural world of objects. But this immediate awareness of other minds turns out to be not directly achieved even through our consciousness of Nature. What that consciousness reveals in the first place is the awareness of an Other Mind not of other minds. The awareness of Self implies, as its correlate, an awareness of Other Mind, of God in fact, revealed within the subject-object relationship. A self-conscious being is constrained by the condition of its awakening, through its own activity in the building up of experience, to think of the objective world as known by an Other. "We cannot genuinely "conceive ourselves as mentally alone in this Cosmos." (p.278) And this awareness of an Other is not first an idea but an experience, from which Self-consciousness takes its rise, and from which it cannot escape. It is an experience involved in
the development of the Self from the first, an experience arising from the peculiar part that Nature herself plays in that development. As I am creative of Nature, so also is Nature creative of me. The Not-Self is found to have a character that both submits to and controls my mental reaction to it as a Given of Experience. But Nature obstinate is also Nature Creative, creative of the self which knows her. "Is not that outer activity then essentially creative in its constant action - creative of me? My dependence upon Nature, my momentary submission to its independent, obstinate, objective decision of what Fact and Truth shall be, both in principle and detail: - is not this a finding of my own mind? It is here in this momentary (as well as permanent) creation of my Self that I begin, I say, to find Nature taking on the aspect of an Other Mind. For if the full-fledged otherness of that which is thus over against me cannot be doubted neither can it be doubted that this which so immediately becomes Self, makes Self, is already a Self even in its otherness - namely an Other Self." (pp. 286-7).

This awareness of an Other Mind is then "our fundamental social experience." Our social consciousness is essentially a religious consciousness, an awareness of God as the meaning of the world, the universal Knower implied in every act of Knowing. This social experience is not an inference but an immediate experience. As simply as Nature presents itself as objective,
"Just so simply and directly is the Other Mind present to me in that objectivity, as its actual meaning. I do not first know my physical world as a world of objects and then as a world of shared objects: it is through a prior recognition of the presence of Other Mind that my physical experience acquires objectivity at all. The objectivity of Nature is its community, not two facts, but one; but the whole truth of this fact —— the whole of this fact is Community."

(pp.288-9.)

Here then is definite support for our thesis that Self-consciousness is possible only through the determination of the objective order as expressive of a Mind, in the sense of a Knower who knows the world of objects even as we know it. Self-consciousness is essentially a communal consciousness. It arises on the basis of an intuitive apprehension of God in relation to all objects of experience. But that apprehension is made possible through the presence in knowledge of an a priori principle of evaluation conditioning experience and not derived from it. It is not through objectivity, in the physical sense of an object determined by the categories of the Understanding, that Self-consciousness arises. There is something more fundamental involved. It is the presence in all Self-conscious apprehension of the world, of a sense of community with an Other Mind. It is this Other Mind as
present in the object that gives it objectivity, as Professor Hocking rightly insists. It could not be 'objective' to me unless it was known also as the object of an Other Mind. The objectivity therefore, which as Kant taught the conditions Self-consciousness is richer than his objective unity; it is now a religious object - an object which is known not by me only but by an Other Mind, that is, by God. My own rational Self of which I am aware is, on this showing, a religious Self. Its genesis is made possible through a religious determination of the Not-self. God is not an inference, therefore, from the facts of the world known in a secular way as a world of mere physical or even psychical objects. Self-consciousness knows no such secular order of Nature. Secularism is, as we pointed out earlier, an achievement of the scientific spirit, and an impoverishment of the pristine and pure nature of self-consciousness.

Religion then takes root in the self-conscious spirit itself, and without religion there would be no self-conscious spirit. As a consequence, religious ideas, especially the idea of God, are an experience on the perceptive level even before they become ideas, and since experience is essentially objective as well as subjective, the religious evaluation of the world is objectively valid, for it is itself the objective ground of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a communal consciousness from the moment of its genesis. It implies an objective
order depending on the presence in it of an Other Mind, the apprehension of which conditions even objectivity itself. Religion therefore claims objective validity, not only on the same basis as Science claims it; its claim is prior, for without the religious evaluation the objective world would not be there at all as it is known in the pure act of self-conscious awareness.

Moreover, if the idea of God, of an Other Mind, is thus constitutive of experience and not merely regulative, if it arises in the mind through the objectivity that conditions self-consciousness, it is no longer a posteriori, derived from experience; it is strictly and concretely a priori. Its source is in the mind itself which throws it up through the objectivity by which self-consciousness comes to birth. It is not a priori in the Cartesian sense, however, but in the Kantian sense as a principle of knowledge through which experience, as we have it, is made possible. Religion then, is a characteristic of rational life, and its valuations are objectively valid and express real features of the world we know in self-conscious experience. Religion is at least as real as self-consciousness, and God at least as real as the world.

Having gained this point we must face certain difficulties which so abstruse a matter as this naturally leaves on our hands. We have claimed Professor Hocking on our side, and, in so far as we have allowed him to be our guide and inspiration, our claim
will be seen to be justified. The quotations already given support our a priori thesis in four ways. According to him self-consciousness implies community. This sense of community is a priori a constitutive element in self-consciousness and therefore is not an inference from anything different from itself. It arises in the first place through the world of objects which is evaluated in such a way as to be expressive of an Other Mind. This Other Mind of which the self has experience is in some way bound up with the world of objects and my knowledge of Him is not through inference as in the case of my fellow men but immediate.

Now it is obvious that, although these conclusions help us materially, they leave us in severe perplexity regarding many things vital to our argument. In one particular at least the position of Professor Hocking as revealed in our quotations falls short of our fundamental a priori principle of religion, as we have tentatively formulated that principle. For him the Other Mind is experienced not, as in our principle, as the Knower who, in the moment of my self-consciousness knows me through my awareness of the world, but only as an Other Mind, known to me as another Self knowing and indwelling the object. The Community is one-sided. I know the object and the Other Mind, but the Other Mind does not necessarily know me in the very act of self-conscious awareness on my part. But so long as the Other Mind remains thus ignorant of me, not only
is he not on an equality with me but he is definitely inferior, in that, while he knows the object only, I know both the object and him. Self-consciousness therefore, while it implies the awareness of an immanent mind in the object, - my other Self as the correlate of my true Self, - does not imply, on this showing, that the Other Self knows me in my knowing act. We are not told that Self-consciousness implies both knowing an Other Mind and being known by Him. Until we have reached the position when the Other Mind, not only is known by me, but also knows me in my act of knowing, there is no real community. Unless the Other Mind, which Professor Hocking admits to be an implicate of self-consciousness, - rises to the dignity of a divine mind, it will not, and cannot, be identified with the God of Religion. Our God is but the God of animism or spiritism. He must therefore, as the Other Mind, be shown to bear this character for self-consciousness, and become the Supreme Being who can be identified with the Unity of the self and the Not-Self, the Unity, which Caird found, underlying the oppositions of the finite, and present in every self-conscious act. It must be shown, then, that in being aware of myself I am aware, not only of the object and of an Other Mind indwelling it, but also of being known by the Other Mind, which transcends the subject-object relationship in a more real sense than I do. In other words I must be aware that in my knowing, I am known, that in fact through all my knowing, the world, because of the Other Mind
that indwells it, is creating me and knowing itself through me. Professor Hocking has already taken us so far as to admit that the Other Mind does in some way indwell the object, and not merely has it as an object of thought. He has definitely laid it down that real social experience is not achieved so long as the only link between two knowers, the only common ground of communication, is the world which each knows. That is not real community, nor does it create real community, unless community is already in some way a fact. Professor Hocking clearly sees that real community must be immediate, and that the Other Mind must be in the objective world in a sense which enables me to hold him as the not-self of my consciousness. So far, he has not told us how the truly religious community is reached, how the Other Self transcends the subject-object relationship, and comes to know me even as in my self-consciousness I become aware of him. Until we discover the conditions which will elucidate this backward movement - this return of the other mind upon my consciousness - we have not explained the nature of the Religious Consciousness in its concrete reality. For the Other Mind is and always has been for religion a transcendent reality which lives in the world Order as well as in the mind and heart of the thinker and the worshipper. The objective Order, therefore, through which the religious Self arises, must be shown to reveal:

"A presence that disturbs me with the joy
"Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
"Of something far more deeply interfused,
"Whose dwelling is the light of setting Suns,
"And the round ocean and the living air,
"And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;"
"A motive and a spirit, that impels
"All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
"And rolls through all things." 1)

The Divine Reality of the religious consciousness is not in the world only but in the mind of man too, as Wordsworth saw, rolling indeed through all things. It implies the power to return upon me from the world I know, and is experienced both as an objective Presence and as a living Power within my own life. The community known to religion is more than community of minds thinking the same thought. It is a community of souls, of spirit touching spirit, a community which is, what in religion is known as Communion. This is the supreme task of religious philosophy, to show how this communion implied in religious experience is created through man's intercourse with nature, and how it is implied in the fact of the religious self-consciousness. Religion is never a fellowship among equals but a communion with the Spirit of the Universe, which expresses itself both in me as knower and in the world which I know. In all my knowing, therefore, I am known. The transcendence of the subject-object relationship by my religious Self-consciousness is not an achievement of my own mind alone. It is achieved through the Other Mind's knowledge of me. In so knowing me It makes the Unity underlying the subject-object synthesis a spiritual and intelligent reality, instead of a bare unity of

1) Wordsworth: "Tintern Abbey."
knower and known. It becomes a divine Unity because the antithesis is resolved, not by me only, as the subject who knows the object, but by the object itself which I am constrained to deem a Subject who knows me, and creates me, in all knowledge of the world.

For religion, God's relation to man is more important than his relation to the world. The fundamental thing in the religious consciousness is not the awareness of God as Knower or owner of the world; this is secondary and a logical consequent of a deeper epistemological fact. The deeper Spirit of religion is the awareness that God's eyes are upon us, that He knows us. What the religious a priori provides, then, is a consciousness of an Other Mind which finds me out, and knows me, in my knowledge of the world. For religion, every object is, in some deep mystical way, a subject. God not only knows the object I know; He dwells in it and from its windows looks out at me. He is, then, more than I am. He is an Other Self who is more than an echo of my Self. He looks down on me, and owns both me and the world. In the objects where I find Him, He is active, active in His search for me, and all objects are in His hand working His own Will. This awareness is, let us repeat, the fundamental deliverance of religion, and is the a priori condition of self-consciousness.

The religious consciousness, therefore, is aware not only that an Other Mind exists and knows the same world as the Self. It knows something positive about the character of the Other.
It knows him as Superhuman, who possesses the world and dwells in it, and for that reason, possesses also the Self-conscious subject too. In other words he is God, before whom the Self falls down in worship. He is the Spirit that indwells the objective order, the Unity in a vague sense that over-arches the subject-object relationship. Self-consciousness implies, then, more than the consciousness of objects, and more than the awareness of an Other Knower: it implies a God consciousness. It is essentially a religious consciousness.

But Professor Hocking is on our side even in this demand that the other Mind should be more than another mind merely like our own. "That is no genuine social experience," he says "which is not known as such by the participants." "Two conscious beings can communicate only if they already have some known point in common, some object known by each as object to both. "If I have any genuine social experience at all, then at some point I do actually know the Other Mind in its knowing ....... that is, in the address of the communication to me." "This," he adds, "seems a great deal to claim of the experience of Other Mind in Nature; but I cannot escape these conclusions. "And I see clearly that there is in no assembly of fellow minds any conscious reference of Nature to me; as I see that I have no conscious part in presenting my world of objects to them." "In short we are all, whether singly or collectively, empirical knowers of Nature. But if there are none but empirical knowers
"in the world there is no social experience. I am only in
presence of an Other Mind when I have pressed through the
region of my passivity, and turning its corner, have come upon
that which is there actively and intentionally creating me."

"There is no sociality for any knower, so we now discover,
until the objectivity of Nature wins its further meaning and
is found as an intentional communication of a Self wholly
active." (pp.294-5)

Here Professor Hocking admits the unique character of
the Other Mind. To gain social experience, both It and I must
not only be knowers of the same object but we must both be
aware of each other's knowing it. I must know that the Other
Mind knows me in my act of knowing, both the object and It.
We must know that we know each other as knowers. But this is
never given in the relation of empirical knowers. They may
know the same object, but they need not and cannot know each
other as knowers. Since therefore, the Other Mind does seem
to know me, even as I know him, he is veritably an Other Self
who is active in the world I know, and who finds me out, so to
speak, in all my knowing. Bound up then with my self-conscious:
ness is a consciousness of an Other Self who, because I am known
of Him, transcends me and my world - both subject and object -
and is not any longer an empirical knower merely. He is the
active principle of my world, and I recognise in him the divine
reality. He is more than a "mere That Which, without predicates."
"Substance is known as Subject: reality from the beginning is known as God. The idea of God is not an attribute which in the course of experience I come to attach to my original whole-idea: the unity of my world which makes it from the beginning a whole knowable in simplicity, is the unity of other selfhood. God then is immediately known, and permanently known, as the Other Mind which in creating Nature is also creating me. Of this knowledge nothing can despoil us; this knowledge has never been wanting to the self-knowing mind of man." (p.296-7)

When Professor A. N. Whitehead ¹) defined religion as "What the individual does with his own solitariness," he is not expressing the whole truth. The solitariness of the individual is not absolute. We do not start with "God the Void" but with God the "Watcher of men." "I am not alone," said Jesus, "because the Father is with me." The progress of religion is rather from God the Watcher to "God the enemy, and from God the enemy to God the companion." It cannot be from God the Void; from the void nothing can come. Self-consciousness implies communion, and although its solitariness is "an awful ultimate fact" as regards finite relationships, it is not the final basis of the Soul. Self-consciousness is God-consciousness.

To sum up: Self-consciousness implies a consciousness of an other mind as another knower of my world. The objective

¹) Religion in the Making, p.6
world, through knowledge of which I gain consciousness of self, is not a dumb or dead world. As I know it, it expresses for me a meaning which, because it is partly independent of my knowing act, I perceive as the object of an Other Mind. But the Other Mind is always more than another knower of my world. He knows me also as well as my world, for since I discern him in the object, He indwells the object and constitutes its meaning and reality. He therefore transcends the subject-object relationship and is the Unity which I recognise as present in every act of knowledge. But He is a self-conscious Unity sustaining both me and my world. He is what we mean by God, and our awareness of His presence in knowledge is the root of religious experience.

But this awareness is immediate and not based on an inference. It is an implicate of our knowledge of Self mediated through the mind's reactions to the world of sense data. The consciousness of God is a concomitant of the consciousness of self, and apart from the former the latter would not be possible. We could have no self-consciousness were we not also aware of the world as the expression of the Infinite Mind.

At the same time this consciousness of God is a priori in character. Though it emerges within experience of the world and could not emerge without it, it is not derived from experience in the sense that a self-conscious experience is first given,
and then an experience of God built up thereon. The consciousness of God is due to a principle of Evaluation implied in all self-conscious experience, and its source must be attributed, in the last resort, to the Mind itself. It is one of the ways of knowing the world, and a condition, albeit a fundamental condition, of the rise of self-consciousness. And if Professor Hocking is right, as we think he is, the consciousness of God is at once the basic principle of social intercourse, and, as we hope to show later, of the moral consciousness as well. Self-consciousness then implies community from the start as one of its conditions. But the community is not between finite minds. It is a communion with God, and as communion with God is the very essence of religion, Self-consciousness is also everywhere and always a consciousness of God.
Chapter XII.

THE METAPHYSICS OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.

The epistemological principle of religion which we enunciated in the last Chapter and found to be a characteristic of self-conscious mind, is not without a suggestion of novelty. For that reason, if for no other, it may be well to crystalise it by giving it a local habitation and a name.

Obviously Professor Otto's term, "numinous" will not serve our purpose. For one thing Otto's term is too subjective as being merely a quality of the real world, apprehended by the mind without any direct identification of the Numen with the Unity implied in all self-consciousness. The numinous category, although constitutive of experience, and therefore a priori, is neither comprehensive of other categories of thought, nor yet organically related to them. It is only one characteristic mode of self-conscious awareness, parallel to but not conditioning other categories.

As we saw, Professor Otto, because of this defect in his reading of the religion a priori, found it no easy matter to discover any essential, organic connection between the
numinous and the moral consciousness, between religion and morality. He could only accomplish the rapprochement by a tour de force, by the assumption of a still further a priori principle involved in the development of the religious personality. What that principle of connection is he does not tell us, nor does he attempt to formulate it. As for our principle it has become clear that it purports to be the fundamental ground of self-consciousness itself, and as such is at once the condition both of social experience and of the ways in which the human spirit reacts to its physical environment.

It will therefore be organically related to all ways of knowing, of acting, and of aesthetic appreciation.

Following the Gnostics and Professor Huxley, we will make use of the Greek verb which served their purpose so well. We will call our supreme principle "Gnosthentic", using the passive form, and expressing thereby what we have laid down as the chief element in the religious self-consciousness, viz: the awareness of an Other Self who knows me in all my knowing. Self-consciousness is therefore essentially a Gnosthentic consciousness and for that reason every rational mind who is capable of the consciousness of self and of the world, is also, not only capable of knowing God, as Caird put it, but already is conscious of a Divine Mind that knows the knower, and possesses both him and the world he knows, both, that is to say, the Self and the Not-Self. Through the recognition of
this principle as fundamental for self-consciousness we can see the way opening before us for the ultimate reconciliation of the God of religion with the Absolute of Philosophy, and with the supreme end of human conduct. Religion is now not the result of speculation or a postulate of the practical reason. It is the ground and inspiration of all human effort to know the world and to realise the chief end of life. As self-conscious beings we begin with God as the Unity of all knowing, and as the mediator of all social intercourse.

But something more must be said concerning the nature of this 'Gnosthentic.' consciousness. If bound up with awareness of the Self and of the world, self-consciousness includes also an awareness not merely of the Unity underlying Self and the Not-Self, but of God who knows both subject and object, we are forced to revise somewhat our estimate of the act of knowing. Hitherto we have emphasised/synthetic activity of the mind in the building up of a world of objects. Self-consciousness, we pointed out, following Kant, is possible on account of the Mind's own contribution to the constitution of the object and therefore of Experience. Only through the labour of our own hands, so to speak, is it possible to become aware of ourselves as thinking beings. By constructing the object along lines laid down by the categories of thought, I am able to find the objective unity which mediates for me the sense of the Unity
and continuity and separate Existence/ giving our life. The unity of the object in making self-consciousness possible provides, however, not only knowledge of the Self and the object, but of the Unity also that the subject-object relationship. It is clear therefore that if self-consciousness is Gnosthentic in character the nature of the object which conditions it will give rise to an awareness of a transcending Unity having a nature similar to the nature of the object, and richer than a mere logical bond of union. Self-consciousness is never, except by abstraction, an awareness of Self as a logical Unity. This logical Unity is a discovery of metaphysicians. It is a pure concept and not to be identified with Reality.

If there be an objective ground to our knowledge of ourselves, that ground is a concrete objective world, and the self which is known through it is always a concrete self standing in a real environment and facing a concrete situation. The real objective ground of the Self must, therefore, be an other Self, a concrete intelligent existent. The Unity underlying the subject-object relationship in self-consciousness, and of which the Self is aware in every act of knowledge, is a Unity determined by the nature of the object known, for it is the nature of the content apprehended in knowledge which, on any idealist doctrine, accounts for self-conscious awareness. The Unity of subject and object is, then, both concrete and objectively constituted, and must be understood in terms of the object. This seems to be
the fact, the fundamental fact of self-consciousness, by which all self-consciousness takes on its religious character, as its very essence.

Since the Other Mind which is the objective correlate of Self-consciousness, indwelling and constituting the world of experience, becomes the Knower of the Self, it also transcends the subject-object relationship, only now the transcendence is from the side of the object and not of the Self. It is because, in the religious consciousness, the transcendence takes place from the objective side, that the Unity of the world is, for religion, a personal Reality, and not a blank characterless Absolute. It is more than a formal Unity because the Self-consciousness through which we become aware of it is more than a mere unity, even as the object is. When once we realise that the awareness of the Self is never merely an awareness of a subjective Unity persisting and identical in all mental reactions to stimuli, but rather of a Self that is concrete and active, the bearer of experience, standing in a living real relationship with the world, we see that the Unity of Subject-object is also a concrete, living unity. In fact when we do speak of 'Unity' in this connection, whether of Self, of Not-Self, or of God, we are guilty of hypostatising an Abstraction. The Unity here is but one aspect of a concrete reality. The true nature of Self-consciousness does not lie in the Unity but in that which
constitutes the Unity, which is the concrete thinking or experiencing mind.

If now, we are in earnest about the Gnosthentic principle as the fundamental form of self-consciousness, we are naturally driven to accept this awareness of an Other Mind as the real Unity in Knowledge, the true form of the Synthesis of Subject-and object. To say that, in knowledge, the self transcends itself and the object that it knows, is not the whole truth. What is the whole truth is that the real transcendence of subject-object in knowledge is accomplished by the Other Mind, who, because it indwells the object and knows the subjective-knower, becomes the Subject - the objective Subject - of all predication. But that is not all. Because the Objective Subject knows me as well as the object, it becomes the Absolute Spirit, the absolute Reality, who reconciles and contains both me and my object. Within It all finite experience comes to pass. For this reason the Unity implied in knowledge is not a subjectively supported Unity nor a blank objective Unity. If I think of It as a blank Unity it is something less than myself, seeing that it has nothing wherewith to enrich my life, nor yet to be communed with. It can never inspire worship, for I cannot bow the knee in the presence of a characterless Absolute. It is something so vague and so completely lacking in character that, though it may be an inalienable feature of self-consciousness, the individual knower can live his life in serene indifference to it. It is only, after all, an echo of the logical Unity of the Subject and Object
in the Kantian sense. The subject and the object are the only reals that matter. The Unity that binds them is a blank Absolute which is not real enough to be even interesting. When the Unity implied in self-conscious experience is understood in this abstract way as a mere Notion, it is not strange that the God of Absolute Idealism is so very remote from the God of Religious faith, and that the way of their reconciliation becomes so difficult.

The truth is, however, that the main support, the chief buttress of the bridge over-arching subject and object is found, not on the subjective, but on the objective side of the relationship. The logical prior and ground of self-conscious awareness lies in the objective order; not in its Unity merely but in its concrete Otherness, as an All-Knowing Not-Self standing over against me. The bridge is thrown across from that side, through the Other Mind knowing me. My awareness of myself as human personality comes to birth at the moment when I am aware that I am known by a Mind holding me through the world I perceive. I can have no human self-consciousness except on the ground of my awareness of an Other Mind that knows me. Some other condition than mere objective Unity is required to explain the Self as we know it. This other condition is the awareness of "being known," which is the transcendental ground of my self-conscious awareness. This objective buttress of the unity of subject and object in
knowledge makes that unity real and concrete and intelligent, fit to become a true Absolute to be identified with the God of religion. The Absolute is now not a Notion but an experience. It is the Reality in which "we live and move and have our being." It is not an It at all, for It knows me in every act of knowledge on my part. The Absolute is God, known not directly as I know the objective world but immediately nevertheless, as the Supreme Reality who actualises Himself in my finite experience. He is more immediate than perceptive experience. I experience God more intimately and more immediately indeed when I am known of Him, than when I know Him. Being known is the only perfect way of Knowing, as St. Paul discovered. "Then shall I know even as also I am known."

The God of Religion cannot be finally distinguished from the Absolute of Philosophy. When the demand is made that the latter must be above all relations, whereas the former must imply an external relationship, at least to the finite worshipper, we must not hastily conclude that it is the God of Religion that must be sacrificed. It may well be that the God of Religion is the only Satisfactory Absolute. At any rate the Absolute of Philosophy which transcends all the relations of human experience, including religious experience, remains unsatisfactory. We can never make sure that the finite self is real or not, and no Philosophy can
hope to stand which compromises the permanent integrity of the Soul. Man does not relish a philosophical Self-immolation. Hegel was right in insisting that the two are one, and the religious consciousness reveals the same logic at work as that which he found operative in all self-conscious activity. Yet Hegel's Absolute Spirit is far removed from the God of religion, so that religion with him passes over into philosophy. This takes place because he did not realise that all thinking is concrete before it is abstract, that self-conscious awareness is individual and immediate, that more than logic is present in the building up of experience, that the unifying principle of knowledge has, to begin with, a religious character. If this standpoint were clearly grasped, instead of the God of Religion becoming superseded by the Absolute of Philosophy, we would have the former controlling our metaphysics right to the summit of our speculation. Indeed Hegel admits that "the form in which in the first instance, God exists for us is the mode of Sense-perception, of ideas, of ordinary thought," and only "finally in the form of thought as such." But there is no reason why this primitive form should not yield us the true logic both of the religious reason and of dialectic, if we diligently searched for it in concrete experience. The logic which determines man to find God present in Sense perception may well be the logic which is deepest in his nature and which may therefore give him the key to the nature also of the Absolute Spirit. Indeed
Hegel finds the logic of religion to be identical with the
deepest logic of Self-consciousness, but unfortunately he is
controlled throughout by the logic of the Idea, leaving the
religious self in tutelage to the abstract Notion. A few
extracts will help us to see how near he is to identifying
the religious valuation with the nature of self-conscious
activity, although, owing to his abstract starting point, he
robs the objective ground of religion of its distinctive
character as the Other Mind.

"Religion as something essentially spiritual, is, by
its very existence itself this process and this transition."
"(i.e. the passing of thought from the finite object beyond
itself to what is other)." In the case of natural things
as, for example, the Sun, we are in presence of an immediate
existence at rest, and in the mental picture or idea we form
of it there is no consciousness of an act of passing over,
or transition. The religious consciousness, on the other
hand is in its very essence the parting from and forsaking
of what is immediate, what is finite; it is a passing over
to the intellectual, or objectively defined, the gathering up
of what is perishable into its absolute substantial essence.
"Religion is the consciousness of what is in and for itself
true, in contrast to sensuous, finite truth, and to sense
perception. Accordingly, it is a rising above, a reflect:
ing upon, a transition from what is immediate, sensuous,
individual (for the immediate is what is first and therefore
"is not exaltation) and is thus a going out and on to an Other. "This does not mean however a going on to a Third, and so on, "for in that case the Other would be itself again something "finite and not an Other. Consequently it is a progress onward "to a Second, but of such a kind that this progress, this pro: "duction of a Second, annuls and absorbs itself, and this Second "is rather the First, that which is truly immediate and unposited "or independent. The standpoint of religion shows itself in "this transition as the standpoint of truth, in which the whole "wealth of the natural and spiritual world is contained ...... "By this demonstration, then, it is made clearly apparent that "Spirit cannot stop short at any of those states, nor can it "remain there, and that it is only religion which is the true "reality or actuality of self-consciousness." 1)

Here Hegel insists upon the onward and upward movement of the mind from every finite object. But it is not we who force this exaltation. That is due to the objective content itself. "Therefore it is not our reflection and study of the "subject, our judgment, which tells us that the finite with "which we begin is founded on something that is true. It is not "we who bring forward its foundation. On the contrary, the "movement of the finite itself shows that it loses itself in "something other, in something higher than itself. We follow "the object as it returns of itself to the fountain of its true "being. 2)

This process is, according to Hegel, a process through the object, through Nature. The Absolute, or unity of subject and object is gained via the object. The movement of thought is essentially an objective movement through Nature to Spirit. "It is the essential character of Nature to sacrifice itself, "to consume itself, so that the Psyche comes forth out of this "burnt-offering and the idea rises into its proper element, "into its own ethereality." (p.109)

The religious consciousness is therefore a seeing in the object of a higher reality which comprehends the subject-object relationship. It implies a return to the Self through the object and the Spirit which unites them. Hegel is obviously dealing here with religion as seen from the heights of his own metaphysical theory, but it is significant that he should find in the religious consciousness, the awareness of God, a movement of thought similar to and illustrative of, the essential nature of self-consciousness. Religion is for him the true reality or actuality of self-consciousness, because self-consciousness in its native activity passes beyond the physical, finite object as by an inner law, not beyond it in the sense of leaving it behind, but in the sense of absorption in a higher synthesis,—And this in obedience to the nature of thought as expressive of Consciousness.

The importance of this for our purpose resides in
the identification of religion with the movement of mind towards the transcendence of itself through the object into the unity of the absolute. Religion like Philosophy is here not a partial interest of man but the expression of his self-conscious spirit. The standpoint of religion comprehends "the whole wealth of the natural and the spiritual world." This comprehension is however, primitive and fundamental and not, as Hegel seems to imply, an achievement of religion on the higher plane of self-conscious life. The true logic of the Spirit evolves from a religious matrix where God is already a fact, the deepest fact of human awareness. The sciences, physical, moral, and aesthetic, and even speculative, are differentiations of the religious consciousness and the logic of the Spirit is in truth the logic of the religious self wherein God is not only known by the self but the self is also known of God. Religion does not then pass over to philosophy; its logic is the only true dialectic on our way right up to the Absolute.

The ground of the unity of subject-object implied in self-consciousness is, then, primarily objective. It is also subjective, for any awareness of the object is also a bridging of the gulf that separates me from it. The Unity, the Absolute, is then a bridge built in the first instance from the object and carrying the materials of that support into itself. It is also built from the subjective side but this is only a
secondary movement. It is but passing over a structure already there as a framework, the throwing of planks for the feet of man to tread and pass over. The Other Mind builds the bridge in the first place, and does it from the objective side. This accomplished, the Self is enabled to return the compliment and go over to the object in full possession of knowledge both of itself, the object, and of God. But without the Divine Bridge the Self could not go over as a Self. This is a parable of what is a logical process, from first to last, the unfolding of the nature of the mind in the act of knowledge. It declares the conditions of all possible experience, making Self-consciousness fundamentally religious.

The importance of our insistence on the objective ground of the Unity of Knowledge, and its concrete character derived from the objective evaluation of reality, will be seen if we reflect on the inadequacy of a merely logical bond, which inevitably issues in a colourless Absolute. All monistic systems, whether those of the Eleatics, the *aneícov* of Parmenides, for example, or those of Spinoza and the Hegelians, fail to satisfy the requirements of religion. They are reached either by the *via negativa*, a denial of the reality of the finite, or else by a complete transmutation of all particulars in the Universal. In both cases we are left with
a 'lion's den' to which everything goes and nothing returns. Such a doctrine cannot satisfy the finite self which seeks for life and ever more life. All values, therefore, are removed from finite experience, and instead of being conserved are really lost. Against this absorption the religious consciousness must, and always does, rise up in protest.

"The religious attitude - all that we mean by worship, adoration, self-surrender - is wholly impossible, if the selves are conceived as telephone wires, along which the Absolute acts or thinks. As it has often been remarked "the system of Spinoza has no room in it for Spinoza himself, and the 'intellectual love of God' with which he closes his Ethics. That sublime acquiescence, that ardour of self-identification with the Spirit of the Universe, is possible only to beings who are more than mere modes of a divine Substance - whose prerogative it rather is to become sons of God." 1)

Religion asks that the infinite appearing in Knowledge, all the universal elements, together with the infinite implied in the Subject-object relationship, shall be so understood as not to cancel out the finite particulars, and among them the finite Self. Metaphysics must therefore give due heed to the nature of self-conscious awareness of

of a Knower confronting every knowing subject. The deliver:
ances of the religious consciousness must be jealously
regarded in all metaphysical approach to Reality.

The Infinite present in all acts of knowledge, the
infinite wherein both subject and object find their subsis:
tence and coherence must be interpreted in strict accord
with the supreme principle of religion. The Absolute cannot
be less than personal spirit, even if He may be more.
Philosophy must not destroy Him as the Object of Piety. If
the religious mind knows God as the intelligent Unity of
self-consciousness there is no justification for departing
from such a Divine Presence when we face the supreme task of
thought in speculative philosophy. The religious man will
always remain adamant against any impoverishment of the
Ultimate Reality. No Absolute can be acceptable which does
not provide a God at least as warm, and concrete, and personal
as the God of religion.

On the other hand the finite self, the only true centre
of experience known to us, must not suffer the loss of absorp:
tion or radical transformation in the Absolute. Self at least
must remain real in a genuine sense. God though present in
our immediate experience is never identical with the self.
His reality is objective because He is given within self-
consciousness as the Soul of the world. His being remains
rooted in the objective order. That fact together with His character as the Knower of the Self makes Him a Real Unity of Self and Not-Self, at once immanent in the world and present to the finite mind. In other words, God is both immanent and transcendent, in organic union with the world and yet above it, neither on the one hand robbing the finite of reality, nor on the other, passing into a shadowy absolute without any inner determination at all.

Philosophers have always found this reconciliation of immanence with transcendence to be their stiffest speculative problem. They find themselves steering continually between the Scylla of an immanent Absolute which destroys the reality of the finite, and the Charybdis of a transcendent, deistic God, which leaves the finite world where it stood. A straight course seems impossible to them, and all their systems, like rudderless vessels, are driven, as by an unfriendly Fate, on to one or other of these rocks.

Discussion of the nature of the supreme Unity implied in knowledge proceeds as a rule on the supposition that the subject and the object, the Self and the Not-Self, must be treated alike as regards their dependence on the synthetic unity that binds them. In relation to God, the finite Self as the centre of experience and a finite world of objects as the content of thought, are treated as if the dependence were
of the same nature in both. If the Absolute as immanent obliterates the one it ipso facto obliterates the other. On the other hand, as a completely transcendent Absolute, it again metes out to them equal treatment. But why this equal treatment of subject and object within the unity of knowledge? Could not the objective world be sacrificed so long as we retained the complete reality of the thinking and experiencing self? May not the world we know be no more than appearance, without implying that the finite Self is appearance also? The supreme interest of religion is the conservation and redemption of the Self. No doctrine of God can satisfy man which does not provide for this.

Now the supreme principle of religion as we have formulated it, which is also the fundamental epistemological basis of all self-consciousness, while it finds God present in the world, retains the independence of the finite self. God's relation to the world is not quite on all fours with His relation to man. The world is known of God and God indwells the world and, if we remain true to our principle, apart from God the world has no independent existence or true reality. All our knowledge of the world is knowledge of God as its ultimate reality. But to the self, God, like the world, is objective, and includes the only Self as the Omnis: cient Spirit. His relation to the world is essential, but to the Self it is mainly ideal.
Although as touching the objective world God is both immanent and transcendent, as touching the self his transcendence is more obvious than his immanence. Indeed his immanence in the knowing Subject is ideal rather than actual. He is immanent but His indwelling is in terms of the apprehension of Him as transcending the world. Were He completely immanent, the Self would be but a finite centre of the Infinite's own experience. But the reality of the finite Self is religion's basic conviction, which cannot be surrendered without destroying moral freedom and all real piety. But how then can we read the nature of the Absolute without doing violence to the Self? In some way God must take the finite centre of experience into Himself, for He must be inclusive of all Reality. It were no loss to religion, if Nature, as objective, were proved to be mere appearance, but the Self must retain its reality at all costs.

Now, God as the Divine Mind which knows me in every act of knowledge is prevented from taking over into Himself the finite thinker. He is prevented for the simple reason that He is the objective condition of the Self, and as such cannot, we repeat, ever be identified with the finite mind. He is too much bound up with the objective conditions of self-conscious awareness to be made the Infinite thinker in the finite centres of experience. This kind of immanence
is only possible when God is thought of as the abstract unity of the subject-object relationship. As the third term, the synthesis only, he is neither subject nor object or else He is both. We are thus doomed to a God altogether transcendent or altogether immanent, and whichever we choose our Absolute is unfit to satisfy the religious need. A God altogether above the universe and a God altogether in the universe are equally destructive of real religion. In the same way neither kind of Absolute, one too abstract and the other too concrete, seems to meet the needs of Reason.

The religious consciousness alone, as it seems to me, can hold out hope of better success. Here God is an objective Reality indwelling "all objects of all thought."

By knowing the self He also transcends the objective world and stretches across to the subject. In all His knowledge the subject is, therefore, under the eye of God. On account of this discovery of the All-Knower, of the over-arching intelligent mind as the transcendental objective condition of self-consciousness, we are saved from identifying God with the finite knowing Subject. We are saved because God must remain objective. To make Him also the subject is both to destroy God and to obliterate the Self. God and the Self instead of being antagonistic are mutually implied. Destroy the one and the other goes as well.
Monistic philosophies fail to retain the equal reality of God and the finite Self. They are faced always with a fateful choice. In order to affirm God they must deny man: in order to affirm man they must deny God. If our principle be the fundamental form of all self-consciousness we escape this dilemma. By affirming God we must affirm also the finite Self and *vice versa*, for God is the objective ground of self-consciousness.

What then is the nature of the relationship between the finite Self and God as the unity of knowledge and therefore of self-consciousness? God, we must hold, remains objective, and fellowship with Him is a *fellowship* in terms of truth, goodness, and beauty. These values are values for the religious and not for the secular Self. The world which yields them is forever a world wherein God is immanent, not in but to, the mind of man. The world is God's world, and all the values are already, and can be nothing else than, religious values. Through them does the mind rise to an increasing and ever deepening communion with God. And this communion is not an advancement only in our knowledge of God, it is a fuller realisation also of being known of God, or of God's omniscience and omnipresence. There is a serious fallacy involved in speaking of God as indwelling the finite self: We slip easily into thinking of Him on the analogy of an electrical charge indwelling a physical
object. When we do thus speak of Divine Immanence we think of the soul as if it were a concrete physical thing to be seen and handled. All talk of God's immanence in the mind of man is purely analogical. The only way into the human mind is through the gate of the mind's own awareness. And God enters that way too. And He can only enter that way without destroying the ethical personality. "Even the "divine importunity," says Professor Pringle-Pattison, "will not force an entrance." 1)

If we speak of God as thinking in the finite centre we know not what we say, for there is no trace of this anywhere in experience. It is we ourselves who think, and feel, and will, inside our own skins. Our communion with God is not a community of thinking but a communion of thoughts, and of feeling dependent on thought. We find Him and He finds us in the world of truth and goodness and beauty, and we cannot go any distance into these "Eternal Orders" without knowing that we are indeed walking with God. For do we not start off in his company? Was He not there to begin with when we awoke to the distinction of Self and Not-Self?

The religious consciousness, as we have expressed it, prevents us from identifying God, the absolute thinker, with the finite mind. At the same time, as we have already

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admitted, all finite centres must somehow be comprehended in God, for outside Him there can be no contingent reals. Are we then any nearer to a solution of the mystery of the indwelling of God and in the individual Soul? In our anxiety to make the idea of God objectively valid have we made it impossible to bring Him into organic, existential relationship with finite mind itself? Let us hear Professor Pringle Pattison again.

"No doubt the creation of beings who are really selves, "with this measure of 'apartness' and independent action is "the 'main miracle' of the universe. It is in the very "nature of the case, impossible that we should understand "the relation ...... between a creative Spirit and its "creatures whether as regards the independence conferred "or the mode in which the life-history of the finite being "still remains part of the infinite experience. Finite "beings know one another from the outside, as it were, the "knower being ipso facto excluded from the immediate "experience of any other centre. But there can be no such "barrier, we may suppose, between the finite consciousness "and the Being in which its existence is rooted. It must "remain open and accessible - it must enter into the divine "experience in a way for which our mode of knowing hardly "furnishes us with an analogy." ¹

Such a deliverance as this from so great an authority would justify us in not pursuing the matter further. Yet its agnostic flavour is by no means congenial. The religious man certainly stakes his life on his communion with God, and it would be strange indeed if the religious consciousness contained no clue to the manner of God's indwelling. Perhaps we already possess such a clue in our Gnosthetic principle. For if I am known of God in every act of knowledge, all my thinking, as well as my thoughts are known to Him. To Him all my heart is open and all my desires are known. His presence penetrates the inner chambers of my thinking and experiencing self. I am all open to Him as the objective ground of my own self-conscious life. God enters my experience objectively but His entrance is not arrested at the outer Court. He penetrates to the Holy of Holies, yet He never takes possession of the Temple. He illumines it, and cleanses it but leaves me in charge all the time. My very innermost, the Ego itself, is not hidden from the light of His countenance. All my experience is therefore not mine alone; it is His too, without ceasing to be mine. This is possible only in terms of self-conscious awareness, so that the distinction between my own finite life and God's immanence in my experience remains unchallenged. God's indwelling in the finite Self through the door of objectivity shares the finite experience without destroying
the finite experience itself. The nature of self-conscious
awareness determines that all finite experience is a
social experience and cannot therefore exist in isolation.
God and the Soul stand or fall together.

What other kind of indwelling of God in man we require
than this it is difficult to conceive. The notion of the
Soul as a thinking substance can no longer be justified.
It is this terminology which has given rise to all the
difficulties associated with the manner of God's presence
in the finite centre. It is clearly in terms of experience
that we must view both God and man, the Infinite and the
finite, and in this way the manner of God's indwelling must
be understood. If, then, our finite Conscious selves
are conditioned as finite centres of experience by the
presence of God in all thinking and feeling and acting,
our relation with Him and His relation with us is as
intimate as we can possibly desire or conceive. It is
an existential relationship, not on the physical analogy
of interpenetration but in terms of spiritual Communion.
God, without being the finite self is yet with us and
within us. Our experience is His experience and only
by being His experience is it ours as self-conscious
centres. Yet the separateness though it be more or less
distinct is never removed. Even mysticism never succeeds
in attaining complete identification of the Soul and God,
nor can sin totally destroy the communion. Indeed true piety enhances both the reality of God and the richness of finite experience when it realises and affirms in ever increasing measure the bond of union. Surely no more vital relationship than this, which is given in the religious consciousness, could well be imagined. All finite experience is experience in God, and to God, and here, if anywhere, is the key to all metaphysical truth. It is the metaphysic of the religious soul, where God is not an inference but an experience, the Infinite in whom we "live and move and have our being." To this our a priori quest leads us. God who is present to me as the content of all my thinking is immanent in me in the truest and only sense we can attach to 'immanence' in the realm of the spirit.

We do not therefore find God by reflexion on the nature of our values; we find our values in the world and in Society where God is already present.

Religious experience is our fundamental experience. All ascent into the world of knowledge, every step in the realisation of the Good, every thrill engendered by the contemplation of the Beautiful is a stage in the soul's communion with God. But in this exaltation there is no loss of self-consciousness. That cannot be, for,
as we have maintained, God is given in self-conscious awareness. The clearer our vision of God the deeper our consciousness of self.

On the other hand every secularising tendency in the pursuit of truth, every denial of God in Science and in moral living, is an impoverishment of self-consciousness, a narrowing of the capacity both for vision and for moral experience. When God drops out of a man's world something drops out of himself as a finite centre of experience, even from his own self-respect and sense of his own greatness. He takes the path of loneliness and isolation. If God is reduced to, and is lost in, a system of ideals, He at once becomes impoverished and stands definitely below the human personality. The universe becomes depersonalised, and in such a universe the finite self must at the last suffer eclipse and destruction. The presence of the Ideal in life does not argue that the God of religion exists. That is the philosopher's way of speech. Instead we ought to say that the Ideal is God's presence, for it is within our God-consciousness that we know our ideals. The quest for scientific knowledge does not lead to God as its goal; it rather interprets and reveals to us more clearly the God whom we already know. Nature is not really Godless to the human self, nor is the kingdom of humanity, where moral values are generated, itself an object of worship. As a
world of moral ideals it is less real because more abstract than the self which knows and experiences social fellowship. All social intercourse is conditioned throughout by the more fundamental social experience of our God-consciousness.

It may be well here to make it once more clear that when the awareness of an Other Mind is made to condition self-consciousness we are dealing with the self epistemologically, not psychologically. We are not saying that it is a natural thing for man to read the world in terms of his own image and cannot help doing so. We are not talking anthropomorphically in the accepted meaning of that term. Our doctrine is that men would have no image of himself at all wherewith to interpret the world, unless the world was already crammed with the features of the Divine. The Other Mind is a logical condition of the self and is therefore a transcendental principle of knowledge. The Other Mind cannot then be anthropomorphically created because, apart from it, there is no anthropos from which it can spring. There is an anthropomorphism which is epistemological, as when we speak in a fundamental sense, of man as the measure of all things, and the key to Reality. It is to this that Professor Ward refers when he makes out that Kant's doctrine of knowledge was more anthropomorphic than he thought. But there is a psychological anthropomorphism by which man sees himself
everywhere around him, and clothes reality with meanings and intentions reechoing his own particular desires and passions, and providing answers to the needs which spring from his own heart. The philosophy of religion has suffered much through the failure to distinguish between those two ways of interpreting the function of mind in knowledge, confusing psychology with epistemology. Writers still speak of religion and the idea of God as a postulate thrown up from the pit of man's utter loneliness and impotence to serve as a support for the values of his life. To them religious faith is a kind of hypothesis sent out, like the dove from Noah's Ark, in search of dry land where the treasures of the soul may escape the engulfing waters of the great flood of time, and change, and mortality. Thus we find Dr Waterhouse still facing the problem of religion as if "God were the embodiment of human desire" and thus religious faith nothing more than a postulate to reconcile the subjective need with the nature of reality. He does this after he has previously admitted it to be a "rather strange notion that the idea of gods is due to the imagination of "primitive peoples wistfully seeking comfort in an unkindly "world." 1) The proof of the postulate is to be found in experience, and it is assumed that though the postulate is

1) "The Philosophy of Religions Experience," p.119.
bound up with experience, man was a rational creature before he discovered the need of such a postulate. Dr Edward, while agreeing in the main with Waterhouse, feels constrained to remark that "The religious attitude was almost certainly adopted on far other than experimental grounds ...."

"I think it most likely that it was adopted and maintained because of the presence of that original numinous element "in human experience to which Otto has drawn attention." ¹)

This means that the psychological treatment of the religious consciousness forces us back all along the line to epistemological considerations which must face the nature of this human phenomenon as something bound up with the character of self-consciousness. The anthropomorphism of religion, let us insist once more, is epistemological and not psychological. When therefore we say that awareness of Self implies as its condition an awareness of an Other Mind that knows the Self in every act of knowledge on the latter's part, we do not mean that man projects or objectifies his own Self, for he has as yet no Self to project. What we mean is that the religious evaluation is essential to the rise of the human personality itself, and is therefore a transcendental ground of self-conscious experience.

¹) "Religious Experience," p.200.
CHAPTER XIII.

RELIGION AS AWARENESS AND FEELING.

It may be urged, in criticism of the foregoing analysis of religious experience, that it makes religion to depend entirely on cognitive apprehension. According to our theory religion takes its rise from an awareness of a Mind in Nature that knows us in all our knowing, - whose presence is discernible in close association with the concrete objects of sense perception. Our argument seems to have proceeded without any regard to the undoubted fact that feeling is an essential feature of consciousness, and an important element in religious experience. The truth seems to be that religion instead of being a cold, intellectual interest is mainly a matter of emotion, and feeling is admittedly a constant and essential aspect of all conscious life. Moreover, if we insist on speaking of religion as arising from a certain specific and original valuation of objective reality then we must remember that values are to a large extent, if not altogether, dependent upon our feeling attitude towards the world of objects. Does not the a priori doctrine shut us up to cognition as alone
providing the foundation of the religious consciousness and will it not also bring us at last to rationalism? It might then be urged against our position that not only has a priorism no place for feeling in the constitution of religious experience but that our own quest has completely ignored the place of emotion in the religious life.

Let us answer this objection. In point of fact we have already admitted to feeling a permanent place in religious experience even among the conditions of self-consciousness. We pointed out that the self is always a concrete self; never a mere unity, that it is indeed an experiencing self from the start, implying both feeling and conation. The neglect of feeling is really only apparent and nowhere has the discussion even suggested that the door is to be closed against feeling as an inalienable aspect of the religious consciousness. The way we have handled the subject-object relationship has implied, all along, that self-conscious awareness is as much a 'feeling' experience as it is any thing else. When we insisted upon a search for the conditions of self-consciousness, not in terms of the unity of the self alone, but in terms rather of the concrete subject-object situation, we were preserving for feeling a sure place in the constitution of the Self.

At the same time, our method has given to cognition the priority among the three aspects of mental life. This priority, logical rather than psychological, needs emphasising
in the philosophy of religion because religious experience is very much a matter of emotion, and writers are easily led to make feeling the real differentia of religious experience. Doubt regarding the objective validity of religious ideas and judgments springs directly from this over-emphasis upon emotion. We have stressed the importance of cognition not to prejudice the place of feeling, but only to rule out one particular theory of religion which would make it a mere matter of feeling. We refer to that which would make the emotional reaction to the world itself the sole origin of religious experience. This is what Professor Alexander seems to do, as we saw earlier. According to him, man is not aware of the divine quality or the voice of God in the thunder as cognised; he confers that quality on the object by virtue of the emotional response itself. First we have a perception, then an emotional reaction, and the object puts on its religious character only as a result of the emotion. Such a theory might be called emotional a priorism, but it would seriously imperil the objective validity of religious ideas. Indeed it would make them entrenched rather in the subject. Religion would be entirely divorced from knowledge, and would become mere sentimentalism. The religion of feeling understood in this way is not far removed from the well-known James-Lange theory of the Emotions wherein emotion is deemed to be determined, not
by the content of the subject's mind but by the organic
disturbances occasioned by the objective situation. Both
leave the feeling element independent of the nature of the
content of which the subject is aware. In the one case
it is caused by the physical reaction, in the other by the
psychic reaction. In neither does the emotion depend
directly on the character of the object which forms
the content of the apprehending mind. It is against this
form of emotionalism that our own emphasis upon cognition,
as a necessary element in all religious experience, has
been directed.

The Epistemology of religion, let us repeat, is a
quest, not for the psychological or temporal origin of
conscious life, but for the category of thought or awareness
or valuation within self-consciousness which can explain
the phenomena of religion without explaining it away. Even
if we decided in favour of a feeling continuum as the
simplest and most primitive form of consciousness, that
would not commit us to an emotional theory of religion.
The problem of the philosophy of religion is not the same
thing as the problem of genetic psychology. The resultsof
the latter do not prejudice the inquiries of the former,
or even influence it seriously. Religion is a character:
istic not of all conscious life but only of self-conscious
man. Religion is a feature of self-consciousness and our
a priori doctrine concerns only the prious involved in the religious valuation of the world, and the presence in man of the idea of God. We must begin with the three aspects of consciousness, and cannot, in the nature of things, rule out any one of them. All theories of religion go wrong when they base religion on one aspect alone to the exclusion of the rest. We give the priority to Cognition only because Cognition is more 'objective' in its grasp than either feeling or conation and the deepest problem of religion appears to be that of its objective validity. But the principle we have enunciated is not merely a principle of cognition. It is equally an affective and a conative principle. As the faculty of judgment, cognition seems to be more fundamental to the rational self than either of the others, but of course, without the others it would never give rise to religious experience. Our quest is not for the psychological origin but for the logical priority. This we have found on the cognitive side as an awareness of a divine background to the world of objects, which is also the unity underlying the subject-object relation.

Religion then arises from a cognitive awareness of an Other Mind confronting the finite subject. It is therefore cognitive in character, and all religious experience is sustained by the percept, the image, or the idea.
Perceptive awareness is never absent from experience. The jaw is always there even at the moment when the tooth is being drawn. Love at its intensest holds fast the loved one. Indeed emotion never cancels the object, never blots out cognition. Consciousness never can let go its object without ceasing to be itself. When we are conscious we are always conscious of something as the object of our awareness. But this point need not be stressed here because we have insisted all along on the presence of cognition, feeling and conation in all religious reaction to the world. It will be seen then that our supreme religious principle implies the presence of feeling as an essential element of religion, and in a striking way accounts for its importance, and intensity, in religious experience. For if, in knowledge of the world and of myself, I am always face to face with an Other Mind that knows me and my world, how can my Soul be without some emotional reaction to that Reality? The Gnosthentic Consciousness is intensely emotional. It could not exist otherwise. If I stood before a dead world, a meaningless reality, I could have no emotion of any kind towards it. All emotion implies the presence of a reality that means something, that has some definite and positive relation to my own existence. If the categories of the Understanding can be called 'bloodless,' the supreme category
of religion cannot deserve that epithet. That which brings my Soul before God and keeps me living and moving under His eye and in His world, is anything but bloodless. It is warm, vital, living, pulsating with the deep throb of self-consciousness. My emotions pre-suppose objects that are in some sense alive and able to make or mar my life. We can have no feeling attitude towards an object that has never had, and never will have, any power over us.

When religion is seen to grow out of an awareness of a Divine Mind to whom all hearts are open and all desires known, and when this awareness is an inalienable feature of the human consciousness, we do not leave feeling out of our reckoning. On the contrary we make it the very core of religious experience and indeed of all experience. The human individual cannot stand unmoved in the presence of a God he cannot escape, nor can he, seeing that he is religious by his very constitution as a thinking being, view the world unemotionally, inasmuch as it is already for him crammed with heaven and every bush is afire with God. What our a priori principle will not permit us to do, however, is to talk of religion as if it sprang from emotion in the first place, altogether independently of any specific apprehension, as a logical precondition of the emotion, of a divine reality confronting and surrounding our lives. It is of course perfectly true that a particular religious
experience does seem to arise from an emotional source, as, for instance, during revivals, when the emotional excitement originates the experience. But it would be a mistake to conclude that no intellectual factors are involved. We must still remember that it is in religious surroundings and among religious suggestions and intentions that the emotion is aroused. The reason we fit on emotion as itself the sole root of religious experience is because it is feeling that gives colour and intensity to the experience. Feeling is also the chief factor in every vivid revival of past experience through association, and is mainly responsible for the liveliness and glow of memory. But feeling is always conditioned by a cognitive awareness of meaning, and this meaning is there for religion because of an a priori principle of judgment present in all self-conscious awareness. The demand that real religion should be and always is a matter of emotional experience does not mean that, if we are to have reality in religion, ideas and beliefs must be discounted, and thrown on the rubbish heap. It only means that emotion must be present, and not that ideas must be absent.

"Feeling is quite as much an objective consciousness as the idea: it refers always to something beyond the present self, and has no existence save in directing the self toward that object in whose presence its own career must end."
"It is true that ideas apart from feelings do no work; but it is also true that a feeling does no work apart from its guiding idea." "All positive feeling reaches its terminus in knowledge. All feeling means to instate some experience which is essentially Cognitive." And again, "Cognizance and feeling are but different stages of the same thing." 1)

If self-consciousness implies confronting God, it implies also and for that reason, an emotional experience of a specific and unique kind. We are no longer free to 'manufacture' religious emotions from simpler elements that are 'natural' to man, as Professor McDougall seems to do. 'Reverence,' which he calls the religious emotion par excellence, Professor McDougall finds to be really a compound of simpler primary emotions all of which, like awe and gratitude, belong to man in his natural relations to the world and human society. Although he does refer to a religious object as having something to do with the highest forms of awe and reverence he seems to take it for granted, as others of his school certainly do, that all religious emotion is only 'natural' emotion intensified by the difference in the nature of the object or situation in relation to which it is aroused. If our 'Gnosthentic' theory is well founded and God is already a 'given' of

1) Hocking, pp. 66-68.
self-conscious awareness we can no longer be content to see in religious feeling nothing more than 'natural' feelings added together. We must now be prepared to seek for a specified emotional reaction made possible by the experience of God, an emotion which is a primitive and inalienable constituent of all rational consciousness. As there is a Divine supernatural quality bound up with the objective ground of self-consciousness, so there is also a specific emotion present in, and experienced by, all men, and answering to the consciousness of God. Otto we found admits both an a priori religious awareness of the numinous and a specific religious emotional reaction. In this he is fully justified by the facts. All the saints could testify to the presence of a peculiar element in their experience during their religious exercises which they do not have in secular connections and activities. Our own principle brings us to re-affirm with Otto, a specific religious emotion bound up with self-conscious awareness, and known of all rational creatures. The capacity for reverence, or at any rate for the primitive feeling that lies at the root of religious reverence, is universal. The Other Mind, the Knower of all knowing, the Owner of me and my world, the Divine Unity underlying all things, God in fact, determines for me all my emotional life and without Him I could have no emotion. He is an ever present reality
to my consciousness. We cannot here specify the nature of religious emotion, nor can we indicate the law of its evolution. Otto has done much to help us and we accept, in a general way, his analysis.

We must go on, however, to point out that our religious a priori renders void all attempts to analyse religious emotions into their so-called natural elements, and for this reason. Since man is religious by his rational nature, all his heritage of feeling capacity handed down to him from his subhuman ancestry is no longer found in him as it was in them. His religious Self, emerging not from without as an accretion or addition, externally attached to his soul like a wing to a house, but from the psychic centre of his consciousness, leaves not one of his emotions unaffected in their quality. As a self-conscious being, aware of a living Universe, all his emotional life undergoes at once "a sea-change into something rich and strange." Even fear is no more simple fear as the animal experiences it. Man's fear is already in a sense the fear of God: and so with other 'natural' emotions. His shame is a new shame, his sorrow a deepened and a sacred sorrow. In man all 'natural' emotion is already tinged with a fresh hue cast throughout his soul, floor, ceiling and walls, by his God-consciousness which is an essential part of himself.
This religious element in self-consciousness, affecting as it does all feeling capacity and the nature of all emotion, accounts for the possibility of what is called the process of sublimation of the instincts. Modern psychology, which finds in instinctive tendency with its emotional accompaniment, the true foundation of character, is left between the Scylla and Charybdis of a fatal choice. On the one hand it demands that instincts should not be repressed but rather gratified. Repression breeds confusion, and disorder sets in among the emotions. On the other hand, instincts must not be gratified and allowed to function as nature seems to have ordained. All instincts must be under the direction of moral ideas. And yet it is moral idealism that calls for repression, and is, indeed, responsible for almost all our emotional conflicts. The way out of this dilemma is, as a rule, a call for what is known as sublimation, which means the linking up of an instinctive urge from below with a moral ideal from above. Let the instinct be forced into moral channels, and let it spend its energy in that way.

But sublimation as thus demanded does not solve the problem of character, because the modern doctrine of instincts makes these more fundamental, and more deeply rooted in human nature, than the moral consciousness. The way instincts are spoken of leaves us with the impression that they must have a place in life, and must be allowed to function, because, if
not, they will have their revenge. And besides, each of the instincts has a foreordained end, and only that particular end can actually gratify it as an impulse of life. It is difficult to see how, if sex, for example, with its attendant emotion is a fundamental instinct, you can turn the instinct into another channel at all. By so doing you compromise the individual's happiness and you impoverish the personality. The instincts as the raw material of life and as the channels through which the primordial urge of life flows must, by the definition that is given of them, find adequate expression. As Nature's own products they cannot be suppressed, nor, indeed, turned out of their courses. When either method is employed with them they have their vengeance by demanding an outlet beyond the territory of the Will. Unless human nature in its sublimating demand gets its authority from another instinct more deeply rooted than the animal instincts, their sublimation is really impossible. Unless the religious and moral consciousness is understood in a way that will make it, not only as fundamental but more fundamental, than the instincts in man, sublimation can be nothing better than a device of the discursive reason to hoodwink nature in order to make her serve an end not set by herself.

When, however, we find that self-consciousness is already a God-consciousness, man can only be true to himself in the deepest sense by bringing all his instincts into the
service of religion. Through the new door thus open to the life impulse within him all the instincts must pass. Religion is now the door keeper of the Soul's palace, and it will not matter very much if some instinctive impulses are turned back and not allowed to enter at all. The religious consciousness implies a new orientation for all life and impulses. Whereas the animal is not destroyed or even impaired by obeying its instincts, man, if he does this, is immediately laid in the dust. He is bound, through the inner constraint of his religious self, to relate all his instincts to God who claims him by the very constitution of his human self-consciousness. And because the unique quality of his mind has emerged, as a result of "Emergent Evolution," to use Professor Lloyd Morgan's term, from the mystic fount of the *elan vital*, the source of man's psychic energies can drain off into itself, so to speak, the sources of all instinctive impulses. Thus and only thus is sublimation possible, because now pernicious repression is avoided, and any one instinct can be turned back without loss to human character and happiness. Either the religious consciousness is something deeper in the nature of the Soul than the instincts, or else sublimation is psychologically impossible and biologically indefensible. For sublimation requires, not suppression merely, nor even discipline, but a redirection of
impulses into ethical and spiritual channels. This is only possible if self-consciousness is already, by its own law and its own constitution, moral and religious, aware at the moment of its birth, of a spiritual and moral reality immanent in the world and life. Religious a priorism, it will be readily seen, makes sublimation both possible and real, and man, to attain perfection as a rational animal, need not allow all his instincts to function. He can turn the streams away from the lesser waterwheels, and allow them to stand still, without in any way affecting the one great turbine which turns unceasingly the mills of God within the soul of man.

After this slight digression let us return to the relation between cognition and feeling as elements of the religious consciousness. Schleiermacher's definition of religion as the "feeling of dependence" has inspired many thinkers to find in feeling alone the core of religion. It is fairly certain, however, that Schleiermacher himself did not intend his definition to mean that in the "feeling of dependence" no cognitive elements are present to support the feeling. "Such a separation of knowledge and piety, and of action and piety, do not accuse me of making." 1) Schleiermacher's protest all along was not against the

1) Selections from the Literature of Theism. Caldecott & Mackintosh, p.264.
cognitive element in consciousness but against the knowledge of God through Science and Philosophy, supposed to be attainable in detachment from immediate experience of the world where feeling is always an important element. His polemic was against the banishment of feeling from religion, not in behalf of feeling as alone, and independently of all cognitive apprehension and valuation, the basis of religion. "What Schleiermacher means is no "ecstatic rapture but the emotional consciousness of the "Infinite as awakened through the finite, i.e., a warm and "intimate awareness of an eternal essence and significance "in all being and becoming around us." 1)

At the same time he contrasts feeling as the source of religion with perception and activity as the organs of Science and morality respectively. Perhaps we would be near to his main intention if we said that the religious consciousness, though largely independent of scientific thought and practical life in a secular sense, is yet dependent on cognition and conation in a vital way, only without feeling it cannot exist at all. What he emphasized was the concrete consciousness, the reaction of the whole personality to the world in immediate experience where feeling predominates.

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1) Ibid, Note, page 270.
In other words, the consciousness of God is given in and through an immediate experience where feeling is the element through which in particular the God-consciousness arises. "The whole world is the mirror of the individual spirit, and the being of God is involved in the very idea of personality. The soul, through meditation and self-contemplation, enters into union with the Eternal. This union is an act, not of will or of intellect, but of feeling, and it is in this feeling, or consciousness, that religion consists." 1)

If we take his definition as it stands, it is not difficult to see that it cannot be understood as exclusively a religion of feeling. The sense of dependence, though a feeling attitude, does not imply a very deep emotional experience. Otto, correcting Schleiermacher, found fault with it for this reason, and wished to state the experience as a feeling of "nothingness," a "dust-and-ashes" feeling. But clearly, the feeling of dependence is a dependent feeling after all. Before I can "feel" myself altogether dependent on God I must be aware of the situation which creates the feeling. If I am dependent I must know that I am so placed before I can also "feel" the fact.

"In Schleiermacher's famous reduction of religion to the

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"feeling of dependence," writes Höfding, "he does not "sufficiently emphasise the point that this dependence is "conditioned by an activity, and that it appears at the "limits of this activity. Nor does he make it sufficiently "obvious that this dependence makes itself felt in the "struggle for those values which appear to man to be the "highest." 1)

The condition of the dependence is, however, seen not in the finite world but through the awareness of God. The positive ground is presupposed in the negative.

Schleiermacher's definition as it stands is in no way therefore inconsistent with an a priori doctrine of religion. Indeed it clearly points that way.

The challenge of his definition is seen, however, when we ask in what way is this sense of Being dependent awakened on its cognitive side? Does it arise in the mind through patient reflexion on the outer facts of life and the world, through knowledge gained by observation and experiment and experience? Or is it an awareness taking place as a moment in all self-conscious life? In other words, is it the result of a process of inference from the facts of life, or is it an immediate experience bound up with every self-conscious act? Whether we can claim Schleiermacher on our side or not depends on this choice. If he meant the feeling to be

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1) "Philosophy of Religion," p.115.
immediate, as something man cannot escape just because he is self-conscious, then his doctrine is not far removed from a priorism. This beyond doubt is what he meant. His whole polemic was against those who thought that God was found by a philosophical search for Him. His emphasis on feeling, though it naturally led to subjectivism, made religion of necessity a matter of immediate experience and direct contact with God. The 'dependence' which he meant was, then, something that arose from the nature of man as a complete self and not one-sidedly as the result of his intellectual labours whether as Science or Philosophy. His position if almost equivalent to an emotional a priorism, a religious valuation of the world made possible by man's feeling capacity. And yet if the 'dependence' was also an awareness of God through finite things, his doctrine is not far removed from and almost implies a cognitive a priorism. Schleiermacher's difference from the position we are maintaining lies in this, that whereas his doctrine places the religious valuation of the world through which God is experienced, primarily in the feelings, while assuming a corresponding cognitive apprehension, our theory finds the religious valuation in cognitive awareness expressing a unique category of thought, and conditioning and awakening the feelings distinctive of religion. A few quotations will help us to see how, if, instead of emphasising the
feeling element he had stressed rather the "dependence" side of his definition he would have found a deeper basis still for what he wrote. Religion would have been not only independent of, and other than, science, philosophy and morality, but comprehensive of them all, and a basal implicate and final interest of all self-conscious and rational beings.

"What we feel and are conscious of in religious emotions is not the nature of things, but their operation on us. What you may know or believe about the nature of things is far beneath the sphere of religion. The Universe is ceaselessly active and at every moment is revealing itself to us. Every form it has produced, everything to which, from the fulness of its life, it has given a separate existence, every occurrence scattered from its fertile bosom is an operation of the Universe upon us. Now religion is to take up into our lives and to submit to be swayed by them, each of these influences and their consequent emotions, not by themselves but as a part of the Whole, not as limited and in opposition to other things, but as an exhibition of the Infinite in our life."

"The sum total of religion is to feel that, in its highest unity, all that moves us in feeling is one; to feel that aught single and particular is only possible by
"means of this unity, to feel that is to say, that our
"being and living is a being and living in and through God."

"A sense of the Whole must be first found, chiefly
"within our own minds, and from thence transferred to cor:
"poral nature. Wherefore the spirit is for us not only the
"seat of religion but its nearest world. The Universe
"portrays itself in the inner life, and then the corporeal
"is comprehensible from the spiritual. If the mind is to
"produce and sustain religion it must operate upon us as a
"world and as in a world."

"The Infinite is near to everyone, for whatever be
"the object you have chosen for your deliberate technical
"working, it does not demand much thought to advance from
"it to find the Universe. ...... The only way of acquiring
"what lies outside the direction of the mind we have
"selected, is to enjoy and comprehend it then as a whole,
"not by will as art, but by instinct for the Universe as
"religion." 1)

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Turning now to the relationship between morality and religion, we see that our supreme principle which conditions Self-consciousness, throws an interesting light upon this age-long problem. If self-consciousness implies a God-consciousness, an awareness of an Other Mind which is also the All-Knower and the intelligent unity of knowledge, then instead of morality conditioning religion, we have religion as the social atmosphere within which all moral action and thought and feeling must develop. All relationship with our fellowmen is determined and informed by a fellowship with a transcendent reality we know as God. The sense of God is prior to, and conditions, the sense of duty. Though it may be true, as Kant said, that to believe in the existence of God is no part of moral obligation, yet we could have no knowledge of moral obligation unless we already believed in God's existence. The voice of duty was, and is, first of all the voice of God; it was the voice of God before Socrates
fashioned the concept of virtue, or Plato formed the idea of the Good, or Kant taught that duty must be done for duty's sake, and that nothing is added to Goodness but everything taken from it if our moral motives rest on something beyond the Good. In history, morality has always been associated with religion. This much is freely conceded on all hands. Let us quote Professor McDougall only.

"It has been contended by some authors that religion and morality were primitively distinct, and that the intimate connection commonly obtaining between them in civilised societies arose comparatively late in the course of social development.

"This contention which is opposed to the view of religious development sketched in the foregoing pages, is true only if we attach an unduly narrow meaning to the words 'religion' and 'morality.' .......... We must admit that religion from its first crude beginnings was bound up with morality in some such way as we have briefly sketched; that the two things, religion and morality, were not at first separate and later fused together; but that they were always intimately related, and have reciprocally acted and reacted upon one another throughout the course of their Evolution." 1)

Our main concern in the philosophy of religion is,


however, not with the historical association but with the logical dependence of religion and morality as facts of the consciousness. If our a priori doctrine is valid/religious consciousness is more fundamental in man than his morality. Indeed the latter is logically dependent on the former. The 'Good' is a concept formed by abstraction from the facts of experience, and the sense of duty, when taken alone, is an aspect of concrete self-consciousness.

It is quite true, as Kant taught, that we must will the Good for its own sake, that there is no standard higher by which it can be judged than Goodness itself. Let us freely admit that, if morality is to retain its true character as obligation, and the Good Will its final worth, then the Good must itself be the Moral End and must be chosen for its own sake. In moral consciousness, the Categorical Imperative of Duty can stand on its own feet, as an a priori principle of human life, quite independently of religion, just because the Good is an End in itself, and is its own justification and authority. No doubt Kant was right in his claim that the moral life is independent of theology, and can survive the partial eclipse of religious faith. The moral consciousness as expressive of a final End can be treated also, and must be treated, as an important basal fact for philosophical speculation.

But why has the Good this quality of finality? Surely it is because goodness is found to be an ultimate quality
of Reality as revealed in experience, and therefore, as a quality of reality, there can be nothing beyond it for the Will to lay hold on. But that does not mean that Reality is nothing more than the Good, - nothing more for human Self-consciousness than an ethical ideal. Though we must confer reality, objective validity within experience, to moral Goodness the moral nature of man does not exhaust Reality as it is known to self-consciousness. We touch reality too in science and in aesthetic appreciation. As a moral being man cannot go beyond the Good, but that does not mean that Reality may not be known in self-consciousness in a more direct and immediate way and even more fully, breastforward, as it were, than in obedience to the Good, and in a way that shall be inclusive even of the moral consciousness. Indeed, though the Good be chosen for what it is, and not for some other end, at the same time the self-conscious individual, when he does so choose, finds that the Good he accepts is more than moral Value. ¹ Its choice brings him into fellowship, not with Society or the physical world only, but with the Supreme Unity of the Self and the Not-Self. In other words, the Good is always found in God. It brings man into fellowship with the totality of things. And this happens not because morality leads to religion and impels man to push beyond the moral Values in order to conserve them, but because his moral choice is

¹ cp Bosanquet: Indiv. and Value. p. 17.
a choice not of the merely moral self, but of the religious Self which already holds God firmly within its grasp.

The mind then has a direct access, over and above the way of moral choice to a knowledge of Reality, even in terms of the morally Good. He already possesses the religious Good which is God, as an original endowment of his self-conscious life.

The Sense of Duty and the idea of the Good, taken in their bare abstractness, do not cover the ethical sweep of personal life. The moral consciousness qua moral may be free from theological implications, but qua consciousness it certainly cannot be. The whole moral self is surely not exhausted in what appertains to man's relation to man as a member of society. The knowledge of good and evil and the call of Duty implies a demand upon a Reality that is not yet made actual in the world that is. Morality hangs upon an ideal, and touches a world other than that which is known within concrete experience at any one moment. As we saw earlier, morality does not "guarantee the persis:
tence of its values nor can it state the Ultimate Good in a satisfying form." It always goes beyond itself, not in the sense that there is something beyond the Good, but that the Good of the moral consciousness tabernacles with a wider spiritual reality which is known to self-consciousness and
which self-conscious personality demands for its complete satisfaction. In other words, moral goodness is but one string on the lyre of life. There are others, and although each string produces an ultimate tone which is its own standard, yet the musician already knows the music of the whole instrument, and of each string, as an element in the whole effect. And this total effect is what he knows in the first place. His knowledge of each note characteristic of each of the strings is gained through abstraction and isolation, but this particular knowledge is never accepted as equivalent to the full and rich harmonies of the harp. It is this rich music of all the strings that religion knows, and the real meaning of each separate note is derived from the wider setting and each string is tuned accordingly.

If, now, self-consciousness is already an awareness of God, and if this awareness is the condition of all social experience, as we have contended, then the moral consciousness, the sense of duty, is something which must be logically dependent on and implied in the religious consciousness. The root of morality is then, in religion and the sense of duty an implicate, not a postulate, of our sense of the presence of God. Man may, by an act of intellectual abstraction, isolate the specifically moral and narrowly social aspect of this sense of personal and religious obligation to God as the Unity of the Self and the Not-Self,
but the moral consciousness thus isolated and formulated will always bear upon it the stamp of abstractedness. It will not be the whole round of the circle of human life but a segment only, and religion must be brought in to complete the circle. This means that moralism is always obliged to give the Good a setting in Reality wider than by its own nature it can occupy, though not of course in a way that will compromise its own final character.

This recourse to religion, or to metaphysics, to complete morality, to round it off, is itself a witness to the intellectual abstraction underlying the ethical philosophy which exalts the moral consciousness above the religious.

The self-assumptiveness of Ethics as our chief instructor and final authority in the spiritual interpretation of the world, and its claim to ascendancy over religion, even to the point of descrediting the latter, is never satisfactory and cannot be justified. This modern tendency is based on an unwarranted extension of the meaning of morality and a misunderstanding of religion. "It is plain," writes Professor Galloway, "that the quarrel of Ethics is not with "Religion as such, but with its defective or unsatisfactory "form. The demand of the moral Consciousness is for a "purification of the old faith; it has no thought of offering "itself as the substitute of Religion. And we can understand "why it has been so. For Religion is older than Ethics."
and under its sheltering shadow the virtues have grown up."  

Let us repeat that the reason why we are obliged to carry morality over to Religion is because the Moral Imperative, though *a priori*, is not an adequate expression of what we find in a spiritual personality, even of what we find in the way of awareness of obligations. We are forced back to religion in order to make good the broken arc of life which morality leaves on our hands, just because in our endeavour to arrive at the moral Imperative pure and simple, we have broken up the whole round of self-consciousness. When we go to Religion to guarantee the validity of moral idealism and to provide a satisfying formulation of the true End of Life, we are but returning to our starting point. The child, the moral Imperative, is but returning to the mother, the religious consciousness which gave it birth. The reality of Conscience, for instance, is not covered nor accounted for, by the moral Imperative. It reflects, not a world of moral ideals merely, but in a very sure and clear way the face of God. Moral guilt is always more than a breach of an obligation to act in a certain way. It is invariably a sense of alienation from fellowship with God, as well as from fellowship with man. Moral Guilt is always religious Sin, a placing of ourself in opposition

to the Divine Reality that encircles and owns our lives. Man obeys the moral Imperative by the force of his will only; but he obeys God as a necessity laid upon him by his thought and the constraint of his feeling attitude towards the whole of life. Sin and Guilt and the feeling of the need for atonement, as these are known in religion, do not arise from, and cannot be explained by, reference to the work of the reflective reason arguing its way from the fact of the physical world and moral experience, and within the limits of the categorical Imperative of Duty, upwards to God. These momentous facts of the Soul of man were here before philosophy, and the moral consciousness taken alone has nothing to say in explanation of tabu and the bleeding altars of primitive society. They point to a deeper spiritual and moral nature in man than is expressed either in Science, morality or aesthetics. Man's sense of obligation has always been and still is something that reveals to him more than a call to moral action as a member of Society, and the Good he seeks is always more than the Good of social intercourse. But man does not first discover the insufficiency of the voice of Duty and the Social Good to claim him and satisfy him, and then, on account of that failure, postulates a God behind the voice, and a heaven, where morality and happiness converge and blend. He does nothing of the kind. His spiritual nature has trafficked with the
Ultimate Reality, and heard a Divine Voice, from the dawn of self-consciousness. He has always felt the need of a salvation which morality cannot furnish and the world cannot give. Sabatier, although he does not come with us all the way, has put this point finely. - "The synthesis and reconciliation can only be found in the consciousness of something superior to self and the world on which both of them depend. This synthetic and pacificatory consciousness is the consciousness of universal and sovereign Being; it is the sense of the presence of God. To escape from his distress man has never had any but this means of salvation ..... He needs a Universal Being on whom he feels himself to depend and on whom he may equally make to depend the whole universe. In uniting himself to Him, he affirms and confirms his own life; he feels God to be active and present, in his thought under the form of logical law, and in his will under the form of moral law. He is saved by faith in the interior God, in whom is realised the unity of his being. It is therefore true to say that the human mind cannot believe in itself without believing in God, and that, on the other hand, it cannot believe in God without finding Him within himself." 1)

Our contention is that the Universal Being through

1) "Outline of a Philosophy of Religion," pp. 290-1.
which man affirms and confirms his own life, is already a Presence in self-consciousness. Man is able to believe in his moral values and their relation to the real world, only through the immediate certainty he has of God within him who holds both Value and Reality, as it were, in the hollow of his hand.

No treatment of the relationship between Ethics and Religion can well ignore the writings of Professor Höffding, who in his "Philosophy of Religion" has argued cogently for the logical priority of Ethics. "If we study the relation between religion and ethics," he says, "in its historical development, we shall find a constant process of action and reaction going on between them, so that not only does religion influence ethics, but, conversely, the ethical development of man reacts on the character and content of his religion. Moreover, when we come to speak of basis and justification, we shall find that, in the long run, it is religion which is based upon ethical ideas, and not - even in the classical ages of religion - vice versa. The value and significance which are attributed to religion have, as their logical presupposition, certain ethical ideas, to the precise formulation of which the religious consciousness does not feel itself impelled." 1)

In support of this position Höffding lays emphasis upon two considerations. The first is that "in the lowest

1) p.323.
"forms of it with which we are acquainted religion cannot "be said to have any ethical significance. The Gods appear "as powers on which man is dependent, but not as patterns "of conduct or administrators of an ethical world-order."

Here ethical as applied to religion is equivalent to a certain standard of moral conduct understood to prevail at any one time in the life of a community. No doubt primitive Gods were not highly moralised, any more than society was and they were, moreover, in the nature of things, thought of as exalted to some extent above the moral standards obtaining in the social life of man. But this does not mean that the Gods were non-moral, nor that they did not stand in a moral relationship with man. The Gods were always more than powers; they were moral beings more or less interested in human conditions but never quite disinterested. Surely the Gods of religion have always had an ethical character; at least among themselves; and the relationship between them and the worshipper was, in a vague way, personal, and therefore both intelligent and ethical. The gods of primitive religion were never 'things' nor mere 'beasts', though they were often represented by both. Professor Höf:
ding is here confusing two meanings of ethical. He is confusing the 'capacity for moral conduct', with 'obeying a certain moral code.' But gods could not be
moralised in the second sense unless they were moral in the first sense, but if they were moral in the first sense, then they were not at any time mere Nature deities and nothing more. But Professor Höfßding admits that "even nature religions have their ethic, for they make definite claims on man. He must show respect and obedience to the divine powers who demand ceremonies and sacrifices in their honour." 1)

But if so, the distinction between Nature religions and ethical religions, on which Professor Höfßding lays so much emphasis, is of small importance. What we have is religion less ethical and more ethical, the one passing continually into the other.

Professor Höfßding's second point is that the moralisation of the gods could only proceed through man's ethical evaluation as a member of society. "Ethical feeling develops in the struggle for life; in the struggle of the individual, but more especially in the struggle of the family, of the clan and of the nation for existence." "Not till men have discovered ethical problems in practical life and have developed ethical feeling . . . . not till then can the figures of the gods assume an ethical character." 2)

But though this may be perfectly true, it in no way helps us to decide the issue as between religion and morality:

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1) p. 325.
2) pp. 323-4.
we know that moral knowledge cannot be acquired without experience; *a posteriori* factors are as necessary as the *a priori* principles which condition all moral judgment. In the same way the religious consciousness, and the appearance of gods on the human horizon, could not emerge apart from an objective world, and could not develop without human society. But the necessity of experience as a condition of knowledge, whether religious or moral, proves nothing regarding the inner relationship within self-consciousness of moral and religious judgments. Whatever view we take of the matter it is through experience of the world and of social intercourse that the development of both must take place. Our problem is not whether experience is necessary, but what are the principles that condition both moral and religious experience, and how these are related, as expressive of the nature of self-conscious mind.

When Professor Höfönding expresses the axiom of religion, its root principle, as "faith in the conservation of value" he is taking religion as something that "grows out of life itself," and "springs out of the basal mood of man in his struggle for life, out of his resolution to hold fast, under all circumstances, to the validity of that which he has learnt from experience to be the highest value." "If the religious ideas are to have any significance at all," he
adds, "it can only be in serving as symbolical expressions "for the feeling, the aspirations, and the wishes of men "in their struggle for existence; thus they are secondary "not primary both in significance and origin." 1)

The logical and the historical relationship of morality and religion are, therefore, one and the same. First comes morality with its creation of value; then follow religious ideas to serve, in a utilitarian way, as a means whereby moral value shall be conserved. Man grows into religion because he finds that his moral values are not safe, for, although nothing can add to the nature of these values, the Good being good for its own sake, yet their relation to what exists, to the world of real entities, is seen to be contingent.

In order therefore to give to moral Goodness a sure place in the scheme of things, some knowledge must be got of the "relation between what seems to us men the highest "value and existence as a whole." Faith in the conservation of value is, then, the supreme axiom of religion. Religion, instead of being an end, is really a means. The end is moral value.

To see the inadequacy of this reading of religion we have but to ask why man should demand this faith at all. If he went on creating moral value without this faith in its

1) pp. 92-3.
conservation, why could he not continue doing so without worrying himself over the problem of religious faith? For this principle of religion does not help the creation of value but only its conservation. Creation could then go on independently of religion, except of course in so far as the hope of possessing what you gain is itself part of the stimulus to create. But this motive only operates in regard to material things. The good of morality is not stored, and cannot therefore be acquired and laid aside for a rainy day. Conservation of moral value is the same thing as its creation. It can only be conserved as moral value by being recreated continually. But Professor Höfding could not very well make religion to mean faith in the possibility of the creation of value because man was, according to him, already a creator before he developed religious faith. For to him, morality is, in every sense, prior to religion. We are then faced with this dilemma. If religion is only faith in the conservation of value already gained and enjoyed, then it has nothing at all to do with the creation of that value, inasmuch as the value is a moral not a religious value. It is therefore difficult to see why man ever felt the need of religion at all. Let him go on creating his moral values for they exist or not according as they are created anew. The only Good is the good will.

But if religion has anything to do with the creation of
value, then of course morality is not sufficient unto itself; it becomes grounded in a faith which already unites the moral and the natural order as elements in the whole. When faith helps to create value it is only because faith is already in possession of the 'whole' and informs the human spirit of the promising possibility of moral creative-ness and advance, saying to him that the world of Reality will yield, to moral adventure, a rich and unending harvest. If religious faith is of this nature, if its essence is to reconcile value and reality, and this reconciliation is a demand which morality makes, then to make religion come in as an afterthought at a certain level of advance, is quite arbitrary.

This distinction between value and reality is, however, not valid in any discussion of the relationship between morality and religion. It is relevant, and is raised, only when the problem of the ultimate Reality is dealt with in total disregard of, and apart altogether, from the facts of the religious consciousness. Höfding's faith is not a religious but a philosophical faith. Religion is already, at every point in its evolution, an interest which will not acknowledge the distinction of value and Reality. It is, by its very nature, an affirmation that these are reconciled already because they are never separated. If morality
really demands this reconciliation, and if this is what Höfdding's principle implies, then religion, whose nature it is to affirm the union of the two, is the ground of morality. The moral man goes on creating values because he believes in them as values; but this belief already implies that the values are values also in the scheme of Reality. For how indeed can any quality of life be deemed valuable if that value is not understood as a value for the whole universe?

Strictly speaking, self-conscious man has no 'values' he can call merely moral. All his moral values are personal values, and he estimates them in relation to himself as he stands confronting, not social life and the world only, but also the Whole which embraces both himself and the world including society.

"The moment of religious consciousness starts from self-valuation, but it broadens into the concept of the world as a realm of adjusted values, mutually intensifying or mutually destructive. The intuition into the actual world gives a particular definite content to the bare notion of a principle determining the grading of values. It also exhibits emotions, purposes, and physical conditions, as subservient factors in the emergence of value." 1)

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In all moral evaluation the consciousness of Reality as a whole is always present. Man seeks values and cultivates them not as a member of society but as an individual centre of experience in which the pulse of the whole universe beats. It is within this unity that he lives his moral life and seeks his moral goods. The unity and harmony of value and Reality are never absent from his consciousness, for as a self-conscious being, he, in all his striving, is a part of that greater whole. In other words, man is already religious in all his struggle for the values of life. And what in religion he seeks and wants to conserve is, not value, but himself. The principle of Religion is not faith in the conservation of values, a faith which philosophical reflexion might well provide, but a faith in the possibility of moral value, and in the conservation of the self and the world within the unity of both. Self-consciousness implies an awareness of this higher synthesis as a condition of its own functioning, and it is within this Whole, that the moral life is lived.

"I find in the love of God," says Lord Balfour, "a moral end which reconciles other moral ends, because it includes them ...... It implies loyal service to One who by His essential nature wills the good of all." And he adds, - "At no time has the mass of mankind treated
"morals and religion as mutually independent. They have
left this to the enlightened; and the enlightened have
(as I think) been wrong." 1)

It is not the consciousness of value, therefore, that
determines what the self shall think or demand regarding
ultimate Reality; it is rather consciousness of self and
of its value which decides what ought to be deemed valuable
for the Self. The valuation of the Self as the Subject of
experience is prior to all valuations within the moral
relationship, and the quest for life or for self-preservation
already amountsto, and implies such a valuation of the Self.
The fact, acknowledged even by the principle of the conser:
vation of value, the fact namely of man's restlessness as a
creator and bearer of moral value, points to some quality
in self-consciousness from which the demand for the conser:
vation arises. And when we remember that the moral self
operates as a demand for the ideal, for what is not yet a
possession, the moral quest presupposes a reference to the
'whole'; and involves a faith that its demand will be met.
But this faith is religion, and springs from something
deeper than the moral nature of man. It springs from a
deeper centre of self-consciousness which knows the Self
and the Not-Self as moments in the all embracing Reality.

The supreme principle conditioning self-consciousness
as we have formulated it, the awareness of an Other Mind
as the Unity of self and the world, provides the ground for

the moral consciousness itself. It does so in two ways. On the one hand it gives to man a moral fellowship, a personal relationship with God in the first place, for in all his actions he is known and therefore not alone. He is a citizen of a moral Universe within which all his values, whatever they be, must fall. On the other hand, he has confidence and faith that this world of his moral adventure and his quest for moral values, will not betray him, but will rather respond, though it may be through much disillusionment and tribulation, to courageous and consistent endeavour. All the time he has God to look to for help.

Of course the development of his religious consciousness and his moral life will not always proceed pari passu. There will be oscillation and serious discrepancy between the two, one developing apace and the other lagging behind. But the inner correspondence will never cease to operate. Man's fellowship with God will be affected by his moral experience; his theology will be fashioned by the results of his experiments in moral living. His moral feeling also, as it becomes enriched, will enrich his religion and determine the nature of his piety. But this moral evaluation will go on in organic connection with his God-consciousness whence, in turn, he will draw his inspiration and his faith. By his religious thought and feeling his moral endeavour will be guided along the high road of advance, because piety will
always be correcting his self-centredness, in as much as his world whether of things or of men will be envisaged as God's world. He will possess a conscience to admonish him and direct him into ever wider and deeper fellowship with his fellow men. The religious experience of mankind bears eloquent testimony to the presence in the Soul of a spiritual power, quite other than that derived from human fellowship, which brings an inward enrichment of its own touching all the sides of personal life. Whether we call this power spirit, or grace, or love, it enters the Soul from the Godward side of experience and not from worldly or social sources. The effect of this 'religious' experience is direct and unmistakable throughout the moral life, but it is over: looked almost entirely by those writers who, like Matthew Arnold, think of religion as 'morality touched with emotion. A more clear insight into, and appreciation of, this side of religious experience would give serious pause to all who will persist in treating religion and theology as nothing more than an intellectual faith, supported by a certain amount of moral feeling, brought forth to sustain and round off the moral life.

What Professor Otto could not do, because his analysis of self-consciousness left him with religion and morality developing along parallel lines with no organic relationship controlling their evolution, we can do, in the light of our
principle. For him, both religion and morality sprang from distinct à priori sources in the mind, and he could only explain their concomitant development and co-ordination by postulating a third à priori principle which he did not, and could not, formulate. His problem was created for him, as we saw, by his initial sundering of religion and morality. What man thus puts asunder even God, except as a Deus ex machina, cannot join together. Professor Höffding retains the organic union of the two by making religion grow out of morality, and dependent throughout upon it. Otto, by making them independent in origin and principle, failed to find any inner connection. The only alternative open to us is to find morality, though capable of retaining an à priori character as a sense of obligation, dependent on a religious à priori that can be so expressed as to include the principle of morality within itself. This our Gnosthentic principle of self-consciousness endeavours to accomplish. All moral obligation is bound up with the consciousness of a religious obligation arising from the sense of the presence of God as the objective ground of self-consciousness. Morality and Religion are interdependent, and must develop in organic relation, because all social intercourse presupposes a religious fellowship with God as the Unity of Self-consciousness. This morality, implied in faith, controls the morality actualised in social relationship.
"My current social experience," writes Hocking, "the finding of any fellow finite mind, is an application of my prior idea of an Other; in a sense, an application of my idea of God. It is through the knowledge of God that I am able to know men; not first through the knowledge of men that I am able to know or imagine God."

Morality is therefore something deeper than moralism, and conscience, though operating as a moral determinant, springs from a deeper strand in self-conscious awareness than the sense of abstract obligation. The fact of Conscience is explicable only as the meeting place of morality and religion, and points to the religious consciousness as expressing the fundamental nature of all self-consciousness.

In life, morality and religion are never separated. The separation is the work of thought whose conceptual weapons, instead of attacking the enemy, are so readily employed in beating the air of abstractions. Religion is not morality touched with emotion. If that were true we ought to find morality existing in its own right in concrete living, but this we never meet with. We must say rather that morality is religion in terms of intercourse of man with man. It is an extension of the higher social intercourse with God to include social intercourse with man. It is divine Communion becoming human Community. Without morality religion would not be itself, and equally without religion morality would be.

not exist. We have no ground for thinking that the moral imperative of duty would be known to a self not already aware of a Religious Imperative. The 'ought' of morality is born of the 'is' of religion. What man seeks to attain promised on earth in human fellowship is already achieved by him in his fellowship with God. He works out in the former relation the salvation already gained in the latter.

And yet religion, no less than morality, must be progressive, for although in religion man finds God it is God alone who is perfect; both the religious individual and society remain imperfect. In the light of our supreme principle of religion, we find that the moral life can never be wholly transcended by, or lost in, the religious consciousness. So long as man is man, and God is God as known in piety, the 'is' and the 'ought' never really coincide. The disappearance of the antithesis essential to morality can never take place, and absolute Idealism is ruled out forthwith. The 'ought' of the one is preserved within the 'is' of the other; morality remains itself throughout all possible stages in the evolution of the religious Self. A Theistic philosophy alone seems, then, capable of satisfying the requirements of self-conscious personality.

"Religion," says Bradley, "is more than morality. In the religious consciousness we find the belief however
"vague and indistinct, in an object, a not-myself; an
object further which is real. An ideal which is not real,
which is only in our heads, can not be the object of
religion; and in particular the ideal self, as the 'is to
be' which is real only so far as we put it forth by our
Wills and which as an ideal we can not put forth is not
a real object and so not the object for religion."

"Religion, we have seen, must have an object and that
object is neither an abstract idea in the head nor one
particular thing or quality, nor any collection of such
things or qualities, nor any phrase which stands for one
of them or a collection of them. In short it is nothing
finite. It can not be a thing or person in the world; it
can not exist in the world, as a part of it, or as this
or that course of events in time; it can not be the 'All,'
the sum of things or persons, - since if one is not divine
no putting of ones together will beget divinity. All this
it is not. Its positive character is that it is real;
and further, on examining what we find in the religious
consciousness we discover that it is the ideal self
considered as realized and real. The ideal self, which
in morality is to be, is here the real ideal which truly is." \[1\]

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1) "Ethical Studies," pp.316, 319.
CHAPTER XV.

CONCLUSION

It will be evident to the reader of the foregoing pages that there is a close resemblance between the theory we have outlined, and that of Professor Otto in 'Das Heilige.' Indeed we have indicated our agreement with him in no uncertain terms. In particular we have insisted with him on the a priori nature of Religion as a human interest which has a foundation of its own in the mind. The idea of God and all the great ideas that are characteristic of religion, together with religious emotion, are not derived or inferred. They are in some way unique and original, and enter as organic elements into the very constitution of experience.

When we have said this, our agreement, though important, seems to end. To trace the points of the divergence in detail would however lead us far beyond the limits of this essay. We will content ourselves therefore with recalling Otto's category of the numinous. Although he derives the term from the Latin 'Numen,' it is the adjective which he employs not the substantive, and all along the 'numinous'
is for him a quality of the real. It expresses a principle of valuation just as our own Gnosthentic Category does. But Otto's 'numinous' remains a quality throughout, and is never more than adjectival, a predicate attached to the world as subject. For that reason the category yields no more than a qualitative determination of the real world. It does not bring us face to face with God as the subject of all predication, as the ground of every other determination and characterisation of all objects, including the Self. It never becomes the unity of the subject-object relationship, nor is the numinous expressive of a principle conditioning the reality of self-conscious awareness. In other words, it is not, as Otto explains it, a transcendental principle of knowledge. His treatment is more psychological than epistemological. This accounts, as we pointed out, for his failure to relate religion to morality in any organic fashion.

Our own principle, it will be seen, takes a deeper root in knowledge than Otto's numinous. If, in every act of knowing, we are known of an Other, all our judgments are religiously conditioned. The religious principle becomes the root of all the categories, and God, as an intelligent and Infinite Being, the ultimate Subject of all predication. Even the category of Substance and Causality, as well as the moral Imperative, are logically dependent on the supreme principle of Religion. For the self-conscious individual,
God is the ground of the permanent element in the real world and the source of all activity working in the causal series and in all change. He is at once the eternal background and the energy of the universe, and also the voice behind the moral law. As knower in all knowledge, he remains for ever distinct from the individual, and cannot be lost in the world which He conditions. Our Gnosthentic principle can therefore yield a Theistic philosophy wherein the individual and the world are endowed with permanent reality, and the moral life allowed to retain both its freedom and the assurance of unlimited and certain attainment towards perfection.

As Professor Otto turned to the Bible and the literature of religion to find illustrations of the category of the numinous functioning, so can we, with more reason, cite, not peculiar passages as in Das Heilige, but the profoundest expressions of the religious mind, even the whole mass of human literature. For our principle affirms God to be the inescapable, the all-besetting God, from whose presence there is for man no escape. God is with us even as we are with ourselves and the world, and the religious history of mankind is the story, not so much of man looking for God, as of man trying to break away from Him, or else rediscovering Him, or rather being rediscovered by Him after an attempt at concealment from His presence. Our journey is, indeed, "from God to God." What we find is only what we once had, though we find anew.
No one remembers stumbling across God for the first time. When we meet Him, it is not we that find Him; it is rather He that finds us. Every apprehension of God is an apprehending of us by Him. Discovery here is nothing else than being re-discovered. But with the rediscovery there comes a deepened conviction that escape now is impossible.

The real justification of our Thesis is the existence of religious literature itself, and the religious element in all literature. If religion is natural to man, then the presence of God will overshadow all the deeper utterances of his experience. This is what we find. Few indeed are the poets and philosophers who have been able to speak or write as if the reality of the God of religion were not known to them. The thinkers, and singers, and the world's great men of action, have not been Atheists. None has thought himself to be a lonely traveller on the cosmic highway. God has always moved across the heavens among the starry hosts, and His Voice has ever been heard in the silent place of the soul. The story of man, and the words with which he has uttered the thoughts and experiences of his heart, bear ample testimony to the presence of God within him. Let us hear two great witnesses to the inescapable Divinity, both of them men who sought to fly from God's presence, only to find that no place could hide them from Him. Here is the psalmist:
"Whither shall I go from thy spirit?
"Or whither shall I flee from thy presence?
"If I ascend up into heaven, thou are there:
"If I make my bed in hell, behold thou are there.
"If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the Sea,
"Even there shall thy hand lead me,
"And thy right hand shall hold me.
"If I say, Surely the darkness shall cover me;
"Even the night shall be light about me.
"Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee:
"But the night shineth as the day.
"The darkness and the light are both alike to Thee."

But the psalmist's immediate sense of the divine presence is more fully expressed in the opening stanzas:-

"O Lord, thou hast searched me, and known me, "Thou knowest my down-sitting and mine uprising, "Thou understandest my thought afar off. "Thou compassest my path and my lying down, "And are acquainted with all my ways. "For there is not a word in my tongue, "But lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether. "Thou hast beset me behind and before, "And laid thine hand upon me."
And this God-Consciousness is for the psalmist not the conclusion of a search. It is knowledge which he possesses yet cannot understand. It is within him, but also above him. "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me. It is high, I cannot attain unto it." (Psalms 139.)

In the whole range of literature, there is no more adequate or profound an expression of the inescapable God than that of Francis Thompson in "The Hound of Heaven." The poem begins, not with man's search for God, but with man's effort to flee away from Him. Man escapes and God pursues.

"I fled Him, down the night and down the days;
   "I fled Him, down the arches of the years;
   "I fled Him, down the labyrinthine ways
   "Of my own mind; and in the midst of tears
   "I hid from Him, and under running laughter.
       "Up vistaed hopes, I sped;
       "And shot, precipitated
   "Adown Titanic glooms of chasmèd fears,
   "From those strong Feet that followed, followed after,
       "But with unhurrying chase
       "And unperturbed pace,
   "Deliberate speed, majestic instancy,
       "They beat, - and a Voice beat
   "More instant than the Feet, -
   "All things betray thee, who betrayest Me."
The echo of the voice which falls periodically on the ear of the fugitive soul declares the insufficiency and incompleteness of the Godless life.

"Naught shelters thee, who wilt not shelter Me."

"Lo! naught contents thee, who content'st not Me."

"Lo! all things fly thee, for thou fliest Me."

Separated from God, the Soul moves ever in the land of shadows, and carries within it a sense of need which only God can satisfy. And this because, when God is found again, the Self refinds its own lost chord, and the music of life is once more restored. The broken arc is replaced to complete the round. A Godless Self is like a wandering star adrift from its orbit, and obeying no central Sun. It regains its true freedom, its light and its life, only when it passes once more under the governance of its original Source, whence it took its rise.

"All which I took from thee I did but take

"Not for thy harms,

"But just that thou might'st seek it

"In My arms.

"All which thy child's mistake

"Fancies as lost, I have stored for thee at home:

"Rise, clasp My hand, and come."
And so, when God is found, and His fellowship experienced, the Soul is homeward bound. But the home it finds is no other than that which it knew before when it broke away from God. Its return is to the place of its birth where "heaven lies about us in our infancy." "Except ye turn and become as little children, ye shall in no wise enter into the Kingdom of heaven." Surely "Thou hast made us for Thyself and our hearts are restless until they find their rest in Thee."

THE END.
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