SCHLEIERMACHER'S IDEA

OF GOD

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by

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CHAPTER I

The Doctrine of God in Antecedent and Contemporary Thought

Dilthey remarks in the preface to his life of Schleiermacher that "The philosophy of Kant can be fully understood without any reference to his person and life, but for a thorough understanding of Schleiermacher's significance, his world view, and his work a biographical sketch is indispensable".* This observation applies to but few men so aptly as it does to him for few men have fit so snugly as he into the matrix of history. Much that is peculiar in his system can be accounted for through an understanding of the history which constitutes the background of his life. It is difficult to determine upon a right starting place, for admittedly men so remote as Plato, the Neo-Platonists, Augustine, Dionysius the Aereopagite, and Calvin have exerted an influence upon him. Because of his relation to modern philosophy, rather than because of any immediate relation to Schleiermacher, we have chosen Des Cartes for our starting point.

* Dilthey, Leben Schleiermacher, 1870, Vorwort, p. i.
The early scientific movement, reacting from Scholasticism, found in the realm of philosophy a kindred spirit in Des Cartes. He was the first to introduce the geometrical method into philosophy. The three axioms, psychologically deduced, upon which his later deductions are based, are (1) the reality of his own existence which is proven by his doubt of the same, (2) the existence of God which is the necessary source of the inevitable idea of perfect being in our minds, and (3) the reality of the corporeal world which follows from the conception of Him who gives reality to all things. The inevitable idea of perfect being cannot have arisen from anything within us for we are imperfect. It must have been stimulated by a corresponding reality outside of us, of which it is, as it were, a reflection. An essential element of perfect being is existence, therefore God exists. We are not to infer that the existence of God depends upon the idea of Him which is in our minds, but conversely the idea of Him depends upon His existence. He reveals Himself to us in the innate ideas of infinity and perfection. God was defined as infinite substance upon which everything depends, and which in itself depends upon nothing. Substance is a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist. The finite world of spirit and matter
was also designated substance, as for example, thinking
substance and extended substance, but it was of a differ­
ent order and the exact relation of the two was not made
clear.

In the hands of Spinoza these principles were devel­
oped into an absolute monism. The existence of two infinite
and independent substances was, of course, impossible, as
they would be conflicting and mutually limiting. Substance
is more closely defined as: "That which exists in itself,
and is conceived by itself, i.e. that which does not need
the conception of any other thing in order to be conceived".*

Another name for substance is *od, for God alone is sub­
stance and substance is God. It is absolutely free and
self-determining, that is, it acts, and must necessarily
act according to the laws of its own being, and not accor­
ding to external constraint. This liberty is equivalent
to necessity but not to coercion. Absolute freedom ex­
cludes both constraint and aprice. God is the immanent
and eternal cause of the Universe in as much as He, Him­
selves, is the universe, the cosmical substance. All deter­
minations are relative negations, therefore God can have
neither intellect, will, nor personality, for anything
that we could say about Him would only limit His dignity

* Ethics, White's Transl. 1883, I. Def. 3.
of His being. He has however an infinite number of relatively infinite attributes. Extension and thought are the only ones that are perceptible to us. The infinity of the attributes is such that it requires an infinite number of them to constitute the absolute infinity of substance. Substance is further subdivided, and here the transition is made from the infinite to the finite, in that the relatively infinite attributes are composed of an infinite number of finite modes which we recognize in the individual things and thoughts of the finite world. If we should liken this system to a tree, the trunk and infinity-minus-two branches are invisible and incomprehensible to us, while only two branches (thought and extension) and their leaves (the modes) are perceptible to us. The inflexible determinism and absolute monism of Spinoza was an uncomfortable formula for most men, especially for Christian thinkers. His system was uniformly condemned and rejected, rather than refuted. Escape was sought through other systems, of which the most fruitful was that of atomistic force.

Leibnitz escaped the Spinozistic dualism of thought and extension by his atomic theory of force, and his monism with an infinity of individual monads, each independent of the other, and each reflecting, according to its capacity,
the whole universe, but consistent in their relations and
integral operations by means of a pre-established harmony.
There are gradations of monads as seen in the natural world
varying from the gross material to the refined spiritual.
The highest of these, the absolute and infinite Monad, is
God, the Author of the pre-established harmony, and the
Creator of the lower monads. This Monad of monads is not
the infinite universe, but is distinct from it and greater
than it, as is shown by the principle of sufficient reason.
The sufficient cause of the universe cannot be found in
a succession of causes and effects, but must ultimately
be grounded in necessary being, or a substance having the
reason for its existence in itself, which is called God.
"This simple primitive substance must contain in itself
eminently the perfections contained in the derivative
substances which are its effects; hence it will have per­
fected power, knowledge and will, that is, it will have om­
nipotence, omniscience, and supreme goodness".* Since
God is the absolutely perfect artisan whose work requires
no correction or improvement, He does not later interfere
with His creation. At one point God is declared to be

* Principes de la nature et de la grace, Sec. 9.
Quoted from Metters Hist. Phil. Trs. Thilly. 1912. p. 301.
superrational, but the Theodicee describes Him with considerable detail. Even the will of God is subject to the divine reason and its eternal laws. The dominancy of reason is all pervading, and in consequence there is harmony in all things. The superrational is not against reason but there is harmony between the divine and finite, between the dogmas of the Church and human reason. Revelation helps to bring out the truths implanted in the human mind by the Creator.

Christian Wolff, the mathematician, revised the Leibnitzian system in true scholastic style. He abandoned the notion of force and reverted to the dualism of extension and thought. Religion could be stated now in scientific formulas and be given the certainty of mathematics. Reason is capable of discovering all the truths that are necessary to the welfare of man and the function of revelation is only to awaken the innate ideas of the mind or to confirm that which reason has already discovered. The kinship of the human reason to the divine reason guarantees its sufficiency for true and logical reflection, hence the method of philosophy is a priori. The basis principles of his thought were those of contradiction and sufficient reason. According to the first, truth may not contradict itself for all truth is related and harmonious. According
to the second, a sufficient reason is required for the being and existence of everything. Practically, this is the cosmological argument for the existence of God. The world requires a sufficient reason for its existence and, since it is contingent, it can be found only in the original uncaused cause, or God. This cause must be great enough to explain everything that is in the effect, and, conversely, the effect will exhibit all the perfection of the cause. The world is, potentially at least, a perfect world, and as such, it does not require or admit of later interference by its Creator. The idea of perfection is arrived at by the ontological argument which is the supplementing proof. God as the perfect being possesses all perfections, and accordingly the necessity of being or existence, from His own power. As a source of all other being, He reveals His nature and attributes, which are the qualities of man raised to infinite power and greatness. He is the sum of all realities that are actual and possible and hence His power is greater than His will. God is separate and distinct from the world and has no further relations with it except as observer.

Rationalism is the natural reaction from the preceding theological dogmatism. The doctrines of the reformers, in the hands of their successors, had crystallized into some-
what similar dogmas which became the criteria of dogmatics, metaphysics, and philosophy, for the truth of dogma was attested by the certainty of divine revelation. Just as the supernatural was above the natural so revelation was above reason. The function of reason in religion was to test, approve, and organize, but not to discover or create. The subordination of reason was extended even to the interpretation of natural phenomena which, in turn, were made to support the dogmas of the Church. But at this point the empirical tendencies given by Bacon to science began to destroy this relation, for in the realm of nature, reason proved itself a great discoverer. The principles underlying phenomena became apparent, many of the secrets of nature were revealed, and the mysteries, upon which religion had leaned so heavily, were resolved by the natural reason while much that had been assigned to the supernatural was shown to belong to the natural. Instead of the capricious hand of a somewhat arbitrary engineer, immutable law and order were found to lie at the basis of the universe. Some miracles were explained; the actuality and even the possibility of all were called into question. The revolution in science began to invade the realm of religion, not only in the explanation of some of the phenomena of religion, but in the enlargement of the legitimate
activity of reason, and in the sympathetic spirit of emancipation from the thraldom of the super-rational. The new conception of law and order in nature necessitated a revision of the conception of God and divine things. The swing of the pendulum was complete. The first step was to declare revelation and reason harmonious, the second was to make the latter wholly independent of the former, and the former was eventually abandoned. The former servant after exchanging places with the mistress discharged the new servant. Reason could discover all the necessary truths of religion which are three in number: God, immortality, and virtue. The distinctive elements of Christianity, along with all positive religions, were abandoned. Religion was resolved into a body of purely rational formulas, and morals dragged on the level of utilitarianism. The Creator was required to account for the existence of the world, but the optimism of a perfect world precluded any further relation between Creator and creation. The world was a machine which God had made and set going, and it continued to run according to the laws of its nature. The influence of English Deism which was introduced into Germany by Voltaire is here evident. The nature of God was further determined by the observed elements of intelligent and
moral purpose in the world and in man, which was but a reflection of the same in God. This type of thinking held sway during the quarter of a century following the death of Wolff. The principal disciples of the Leibnitz-Wolffian School were Ludovici, Belfanger, Thumming, Baumgarten, and closely related were the members of the Aufklärung as Reimarus, Mendelssohn, Lessing, Nicolai and, for a time, Kant.

Alongside the rationalists there were two other religious parties to be noticed, the orthodox or supernaturalists, and the Pietists. The first of these adhered to the traditions of the reformers, which at this stage of evolution was distinguished by a rather lifeless supernaturalism. God was an extra-mundane personal Being, somewhat resembling the God of the deists except that He sometimes interfered with the regular course of nature, not merely at the beginning, but intermittently according to His good pleasure. Thus miracles were wrought, revelations were made of God and of divine truth, and Christ, the second Person of the Trinity, came to earth in the form of man. These distinctions from the rationalists were more in dogmas than in living manifestation of the spirit of God in the life of the Church.

The Pietistic movement which had received its impulse from Spener and Franke was dying out, but the spirit of it
was revived in the work of Count Zinzendorf, the founder of the Moravian Brethren. A distinctive feature of this movement was the elevation of Christ to almost unique Deity. They spoke of the sufferings and death of God on the cross. Christ had supplanted God. Another feature was the immediate mystical intercourse with Jesus to which all dogma or system was subordinate. Religion did not consist of formulas but in mystic and living communion with God. Several outstanding men of the following age received early and vital influences from contact with communities and schools of the Moravian Brethren.

The Aufklärung or the Enlightenment, revolted against authority in thought and religion and carried the rationalistic tendencies to their ultimate extreme. This ended in natural religion and infidelity. Reason rose to such an ascendancy and authority that it overtopped and supplanted religion. This stage of affairs naturally prepared the way for the opposite swing of the pendulum which began with the critical philosophy. Kant, in his early days a member of the Aufklärung, overthrew this top-heavy system by undermining it. The whole process and validity of their reasoning was called into question by the examination of the faculties of reason and of their laws of operation in the Critique of Pure Reason. According to Kant knowledge
involves the dualism of subject and the world of phenomena. The objective being has a real being but we only know the phenomena, not the thing in itself. We can have knowledge only of things that yield sense data. God is supersensible and is therefore not an object of pure reason, and the arguments which seek to prove the being and nature of God overstep the limits of their legitimate spheres. The idea of perfect being in our minds does not prove the objective being or nature of God, but only of the idea of God, just as our notion of things of the physical world have no necessary correspondence in reality. The cosmological argument was resolved into an antinomy. The argument against the existence of an uncaused first cause either immanent as necessary being, or transcendent, is equally as unanswerable as that which demands a first cause for the later sequence of effects. Between this first cause and the following cause there lies the great gulf which separates the necessary from the contingent, and the absolute from the relative. But even if the argument for the existence of necessary being was valid it does not follow that that being is a personal God. The teleological argument which infers an intelligent Creator from the finality revealed in nature is, as a scientific argument, without value, for it passes from sensible data to a supersensible object. It seeks to
prove the existence of a God who is the creator of matter. The world may as well be an eternal reality which requires no creator or designer and the finality which we think to see may be of our own construction. The usual form of the moral argument from the existence of moral law and order in the world is but a variation of the teleological argument, and has no greater value than it for a theoretical knowledge of God. And though Kant denied the possibility of intellectual knowledge of God in the Critique of Pure Reason, he finds a place for Him in the Critique of Practical Reason, which is based on the will. The categorical imperative demands obedience to the moral laws and this oughtness implies ability and freedom. The perfect obedience to the moral law is defeated by the motives of sense desire and by the conditions of nature. Immortality is postulated in order to make possible a fuller obedience than the span of life on earth admits. The good are deserving of the reward of happiness, which, however, cannot be realized under the present obstructing conditions of nature. To this end God is postulated, who will suitably reward each man according to his work, and overcome nature's obstacles to his appropriate happiness. God then is a postulate of the practical reason, an object of moral faith, an not of pure knowledge. The existence of God is a prerequisite of the
realization of the supreme good. The Critique, which deals with aesthetics and teleology, yields a slightly varied conception of God. The teleology which embraces nature and humanity finds all so-called ends subordinate to one end, that is, the moral well being of man. This teleology in the moral realm gives an inductive conception of God, who is the Author of it, valid for the judgement but not for the reason. The supreme First Cause which this teleology requires is not only an intelligent Creator and Legislator for the natural realm, but is also the supreme Law-giver of a moral kingdom of ends.

Richte followed Kant in conceding supremacy to practical reason, but departed from him in denying the reality of the being-in-itself and in repudiating his postulates. Kant's conception of God, as an aid to morality, was dishonouring to the rational nature of man. The ego is the only real being; the non-ego is but the creation or self-limitation of the ego. The ego comes to consciousness or self-realization only through this self-limitation, since self-consciousness is possible only to that subject which has an object. The Absolute or supreme Ego comes to consciousness in millions of finite egos, which, however, taken even in their totality do not constitute the absolute Ego, but are only the self-conscious and finite manifesta-
tions of it. The absolute ego or God is the moral order of
the world, that and nothing else. God cannot be personal,
for a personal being or subject must have an object, which
in turn must limit the subject and, since personality is
involved in limitation, it is inapplicable to God. To con­
ceive God is to limit Him, hence to destroy Him. "If we
abstract all that limits God, all that makes Him comprehensi­
bile to us, there remains for us a Being quite incomprehensi­
bile, pure Consciousness, Intelligence, Spiritual Life (with­
out any further definition)".

The influence of Kant's philosophy in theology was
great and varied. The supernaturalists employed the super­
rationalness and unknowableness of the supersensuous to
justify their doctrine of the Trinity and to refute the
claims of the rationalists, while the rationalists accepted
the postulates of the practical reason as substantiation
of their claims. Tieftrunk was the most consistent Kantian.
According to him man is an independent, self-active being,
conscious of unconditioned freedom, and of the moral laws
or reason. The rational nature of his personality demands
his obedience to these laws in order to raise him to the
realm of pure spirits, but the restraining and opposing
powers of our sensuous inclinations and the external world
defeat our perfect obedience and consequent happiness. If
we would perfectly satisfy the moral law, we would have no 
need for external assistance, but as it is, God must be pos-
tulated to supply the deficiency of our power over the world, 
to make nature subservient to moral ends, and to reward the 
merits of man. His nature and the certainty of His being is 
established in ethical analogy and necessity.

The reaction against rationalistic, naturalistic, and 
purely ethical tendencies in religion was, in the meantime, 
finding expression in manifold ways.* Forces were operating 
which would eventually restore religion to her rightful 
place. Students like Ernesti and Semler were opening the 
way to a new understanding of the Bible and of history, while 
scientists like Euler and Haller protested against the ma-
terialism of the age. Klopstock and Hamann breathed the 
spirit of religion into poetry. Lessing renovated the drama 
and the theatre and, with Schelling, revived the study of 
and interest in the system of Spinoza which helped to 
bring the transcendent God of the deists back to earth.

* "Unter dem Kämpfen und Ringen zweier Zeitalter hat sich 
Schleiermacher's Weltanschauung entwickelt. Am Ausgang des 
18. Jahrhunderts war das Denken und Wollen der grössten 
deutschen Männer, bewusst oder unbewusst, darauf gerichtet, 
den Rationalismus zu überwinden. Je tiefer wir die treib-
enden Ideen und Interessen desselben erfassen, um so besser 
werden wir auch Schleiermacher und seine religions-
philosophischen Prinzipien verstehen, ist doch der Gegensatz gegen 
die rationalistische Lebensauffassung einer der wichtigsten 
Entwicklungsfaktoren für Schleiermacher Denken gewesen". 
Thimme, Die religionsphilosophischen Prämissen der Schleier-
Goethe and his compatriots of the "Sturm und Drang", like Wordsworth, turned from abstract rationalism, and found nature alive with God. Herder reanimated the study of the Old Testament, and Jacobi introduced faith and feeling into philosophy. Schlegel and the Romantic School revived interest in classical antiquity and revolted against everything of the preceding age. Romanticism was a reaction against the onesided intellectualism of the Aufklärung which had suppressed feeling and the inner impulses of the soul. It was a glorification of the ideal, the imaginative and the natural as opposed to the rational and the moral. Romanticism saw beauty in everything and viewed nature as a great living work of art. The natural freedom and the independence of man from social obligations was made almost absolute. Of this movement Selbie says: "It stands for a kind of culture touched with emotionalism. It involves an aesthetic view of life, the attempt to see the unknown and the mysterious in the most familiar things. It means mysticism in religion and subjectivism in art. At its worst it is individualism run mad, divorced from all obligations of morality and knowing no standards save those of a rather sensuous taste. At its best it became a counter movement to the rationalism of the enlightenment which in the end deprived it of all real influence. and gave to creative genius
the freedom and range needed for its full development".*

We will examine here briefly the systems of four men as they relate to the subject of our study, namely, Herder, Jacobi, Schelling and Hegel.

Herder, who was the outstanding opponent of the Kantian system of philosophy, considered Kant's postulates of the practical reason as a last resource for a destitute moral system. Kant was intellectual, analytical, and critical while Herder was emotional and synthetic. According to the latter God need not be postulated but may be known, for He is a primal being, recognized by the reason as given in all being, the primal force of all the forces, and the supreme reason in the world. Herder was attracted by the study of Spinoza, but could not accept his system without modification, so he supplemented it with Leibnitz' idea of force. "God is the undervived, original, and universal force, underlying and including all forces, most active being".** He is everywhere and wholly in the world. The attributes by which He manifests Himself are the organic forces of nature or modes of the divine force. Personality, being inseparable from limitation, is inapplicable to the Infinite. The divine force possesses infinite thought and

** Quoted from Hagenbach's, German Nationalism.
operation, and hence his power, wisdom, and goodness are indivisibly one. He is governed neither by blind necessity, arbitrary resolution, nor caprice. He operates through the forces of nature, and whoever observes the composition, laws, beauty, and harmony of things, discovers God in His totality in every object. The observation of the laws, life and activity of animate and inanimate nature arouses admiration, love and reverence for God. The laws of nature are the rules of the divine intelligence; His thought is truth; His activity is reality; and the divine wisdom and goodness reveal themselves in the golden chain of nature.

Jacobi was as ardent in his opposition to Spinozism and pantheism as Herder was to the Kantian criticism. He employs the word reason as that which perceives, "that inmost original sense", akin to intuition or feeling. There is indeed a knowledge of the supernatural, of God and of divine things, and this knowledge is the most certain in the human mind for it proceeds directly from the human reason; but it can never take the form of science. God cannot be an object of demonstrable knowledge, but of faith, which is the supplement of knowledge, feeling and experience. We know God as we love Him, because we are like Him, are made in His image, and our life is hid in Him. God reveals Himself, not intermittently and on
special occasions, but continuously through the inner man. We perceive this revelation with our reason, but cannot comprehend it with our understanding. "Jacobi taught an actual organ of apperception in the supersensuous side of our being, corresponding to those in the sensuous, which he named reason, or feeling, holy instinct or faith". *

God is known immediately, as a friend, as One with whom communion can be held. He is always and everywhere in the world, but He also transcends the world. He is personal for man can have intercourse with Him, can pray to Him. He is self-conscious and can say to Himself, I am that I am. Jacobi differed from the orthodox Christians in denying the supernatural manifestations of God, and in the rejection of all dogma and theological system, since formula and speculative dogmatics were too likely to supplant God Himself in the thoughts and interests of men.

Schelling followed Fichte's idealism for a time but turned later to "Naturphilosophie". Nature is not an inert mass, mere dead material, following the necessary laws of matter, nor God an extra-mundane, remote being, but the primary essence of matter is spirit. Nature and

* H. R. von Frank, Geschichte und Kritik der neueren Theologie, dritter Auflage, 1898. p. 66.
spirit are poles of one and the same life. The body is the embodied spirit, and the soul the spiritualized body. In all grades of being there is mind, but only in man does it come to self-consciousness. The mundane soul, which fills and animates nature is reflected in the human soul, for man is a miniature in which the world repeats itself. The ego and the non-ego are mutually dependent as soul and body; nature is existing reason, mind is thinking reason. And though the world of fact and the world of thought are different and even antithetical, they have their common source in the transcendental identity of the ideal and the real, which is the Absolute, or God: the unity of all antitheses. The contrary, though correlative, principles of mind and matter blend in their higher forms, and reach their perfect unity in the reason which becomes personified in the finite ego. We comprehend the Deity more perfectly as we transcend the personal ego and, as it were, identify ourselves with the impersonal reason. In speaking of the relative worth of philosophy, art, and religion, he says that philosophy conceives God: art is God, knowledge is the ideal presence, art the real presence of the Deity.

Schelling made God the identity of the ideal and the real, of reason and nature; but Hegel's God was reason
itself, which is the primary aspect of nature. The absolute, self-existent reason unfolds itself in nature which is the natural and necessary process of evolution through which it manifests itself. Reason becomes a subject by evolving its correlate, nature. We may not only say that reason permeates nature, but that it passes through nature and is nature. History is the orderly unfolding of eternal reason and the history of religion is the development of divine revelation in man's consciousness of God. God is the unity of the natural and the spiritual in so far as the natural is an aspect of the spiritual. The natural does not rank as an equal of the spiritual but as a created correlative. "Hegel's Absolute is a spiritual principle which creates and dominates the antithesis, not so as to be related in the same way to both sides, but so as to make nature, as its own correlate, an instrument for the purpose of the spirit in which it reproduces itself. It cannot be denied that this conception of God is at least more allied to theism than to what is generally understood by 'pantheism'". *

From this glance at the history which forms the background of Schleiermacher's life we can see that he lived and thought with his own age as well as with a future age.

* Otto Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology, 1890. p.75.
The age was one of unusual opulence and mobility in various phases of human endeavour, yet all the currents of thought and life touched him and influenced him; some by attraction and some by repulsion. The task of comparison begins first when the system of Schleiermacher itself has been presented, but this sketch will aid us in an understanding of the development of his character and in the determination of his place and influence in the world.
CHAPTER II

Schleiermacher and his Problem

Frederich Danielf Ernst Schleiermacher was born at Breslau, upper Lusatia on the 21st November 1768. His place of residence and study was changed twice during the twelve years which he spent in the paternal home, due to the fact that his father, who was an army chaplain, was required to move from place to place. In 1783 he was admitted to the Paedegogium at Niesky, gymnasium of the Moravians; and in 1785 he entered the theological Seminary at Barby where he remained for two years. The next two years were spent in the University of Halle, and the following year in Drossen, in preparation for his theological examination which he passed successfully in 1790. Following this he served as tutor in the family of Count Dohna of Schlobitten till 1793. The next year was spent in Berlin as teacher, but this position was exchanged for an assistantship at Landsberg on the Warthe, which he held for two years. He was appointed reformed chaplain of the Charité, hospital in Berlin, in 1796, where he remained until 1802, when he was transferred to the pastorate in Stolpe of Pomerania. In 1804 he was appointed extraordinary professor of and
Life of Schleiermacher

1783 85 87 90 93 94 96

Res. Niesky Barby Halla Brossen Schlobittenlin Landsberg

Occu. Student Tutor Teacher Preacher

Events *Admitted to *Becomes *First

writings Freiheit, Wert Leben, h. Gut, Spinoza, etc

(Continued)

96 1802 04 07

Berlin (Charite) Stolpe Halle

Chaplain, Author, Romanticist Pastor Professor

Reden, Mon. Plato Kritik Weihnäf, Reden 2

Lives with Schlegel & Romanticists "Exile" Steffen, Napoleon

(continued)

07 34

BERLIN

Professor, Preacher, Writer, Patriot, Reformer.

Kurze Darstellung Gls Reden 3 Gls 2

Trinity Church Founds Univ. Ber. Seeks reform, church union and dis-

Prof. of Theol. establishment.
preacher to the University of Halle where he lectured on theological subjects and preached for two years. During the Napoleonic disturbances he left Halle and returned to Berlin in 1807, where he continued private work and awaited the opening of the University of Berlin and the adjustment of international and national disturbances. In 1808 he became pastor of the Dreifaltigkeits Church and next year he was made the head of the theological faculty of the newly opened University of Berlin. He was married in the same year and established his home in Berlin where he continued to reside until his death. Besides preaching, and lecturing on all the subjects of the theological curriculum he was constantly engaged in political, patriotic, social, and ecclesiastical affairs of his nation. He took a prominent part in many lines of public activity and was often involved in conflict both with official and unofficial parties who found him a worthy opponent and a good fighter. He gained ultimately a prominence and influence which was excelled by but few in Germany. He died on the 12th February, 1834.

The religious genius and development of Schleiermacher was not in itself unique, but was the factor of primary importance in his life and work. He was originally endowed with a nature of unusual richness and susceptibility to
to religious influences. He was, on both sides, a descendant of ministerial families. His paternal grandfather, whom he resembled more than he did his own father, was a man of emotional temperament and was one of the last men in Germany to be charged with witchcraft in connection with certain "fantastic" religious movements on the lower Rhine.* His mother, who was a woman of deep spiritual nature, exerted a very great influence over him and surrounded his life with a Christian atmosphere. He was interested early in religious problems and while still under the paternal roof gave much thought to some of the more ponderous problems of theology. In Niesky he was encouraged to seek mystic soul intercourse with Jesus, and to live in immediate communion with Him. The experience of conversion which occurred at about the age of fourteen was scarcely perceptible to him himself, so slight was the change which accompanied it. His religious development continued normally and rapidly until in Barby the intrusion of the enlightenment influences rudely awoke the philosophic and scientific Schleiermacher, and inaugurated the characteristic period of student doubt and bewilderment, and complicated the expression of his religious life. Among other things he stumbled

* Dilthey, Leben Schleiermacher, pp. 4-6.
on the Deity of Christ. He wrote his father: "I cannot believe that He, who called Himself the Son of Man, was the true, eternal God: I cannot believe that His death was a vicarious atonement, because He never expressly said so Himself".* The transition from childhood belief was one of extreme severity, and the readjustment of balance between faith and science was long delayed, but it was nothing more than this. He says, in the Reden, that religion sustained him while his mind was finding his place in science, while he was purging his faith and heart from the rubbish of antiquity, and while God and immortality disappeared from his doubting eyes. His buoyant spiritual nature felt keenly the fetters of dwarfing and cramping formulas of thought, and drove him to a frenzied search for consistency and harmony, and compelled him to the renunciation of beliefs which had retarded his spiritual development. The consistency which his nature demanded was not merely harmony between the parts of a thought system, but harmony between the whole of it and a vital experience of religion. The chief datum, which was fundamental to all his thinking, was the religious consciousness of God. Religion was a more essential and potent element of his nature than the intellectual, for

it dominated his thought, rather than conversely. "Religion was the master passion of his spirit, and around it, as around a living center, he felt that all that he had yet learned took shape and found its rightful place".* There were other men who were his equal intellectually, but they did not have the religious foundation which gave them the impulse and direction necessary for the solution of certain problems which were important in philosophy. "His system sprang out of his spiritual experience and was dominated throughout by his desire to give expression to that which he had seen and felt of the action of God in his own soul".** That religion is given the primacy over thought is everywhere evident. In the Reden he says that a religious man may be a theist or a pantheist according to taste. In the Glaubenslehre he states that it is optional to everyone, without prejudice to their harmony with Christian dogmatics, to adhere to any form of speculation which provides an object to which they can relate their feeling of absolute dependence. The Dialektik leads up to and finds its culmination in feeling which is the ground of religion. The guiding star of Schleiermacher's thought and activity was his religious genius.

When at last he found the way to harmonize the two sides

* Schleiermacher, Personal and Speculative, 1903, Munro, p. 56.  
**Selbie, Schleiermacher, p. 15.
of his nature so that they could find expression without conflict, his religious development was rapid and without further interruption. His religious interests were throughout Christo-centric. Christ was the all and all of his religious interest, both in the home and among the Moravians where he was taught to think of Christ as the eternal God. As a student he studied the New Testament to the almost total exclusion of the Old Testament and as a preacher he drew his material from the same source, while the Redeemer was the central figure of his work on dogmatics. Strauss charged that Schleiermacher had no God except Christ, and others have claimed that in basing religion in feeling he has precluded the possibility of a doctrine of God, which however is not the case. God occupies a larger place in his sermons and in his devotional life than in his scientific writings. In 1832 Schleiermacher wrote to his wife relative to her instruction of one of their adopted daughters as follows: "You have adopted the way of speaking constantly of the Saviour and placing God quite in the background. If it be the Saviour also who speaks to us from nature, then there can hardly be any direct relation more between us and God. And yet Christ himself seeks above all to impress upon us that through him we come to the Father and that the Father abides in us. ***** Do try to hold fast the
belief that with Christ and through Christ, we are to rejoice in his and our Father".* His Spiritual development was as favorable as any to a religious communion with God and knowledge of Him, but his method of interpreting that experience was less favorable to a doctrine of God, as we shall see later.

The intellectual development of Schleiermacher is second in importance only to his religious development, for his primary significance lies in the scientific harmony of the two. As a child he was precocious and learned so readily that he ran into the danger of being one-sided from mere bookishness. The elementary part of his education was obtained in the schools at Breslau, where he easily excelled in his studies. In Pless he studied under a student of Ernesti's who awoke in him a fondness for the classics and paved the way for his later studies in Greek philosophy. He read prolifically from the Greek and even Hebrew authors while in Niesky. In Barby he belonged to a philosophical club which secretly secured books and periodicals denied them by the authorities of the school and read Kant's Prolegomena and other philosophical and scientific treatises which gave him a peep into the for-

bidden realm. His study of these proscribed books aroused questions in him which his professors would not answer. He was repulsed by the Moravian method of avoiding or ignoring the sciences which seemed hostile to their position. He was compelled to leave Barby under the greatest distress and uncertainty, for he felt that he had lost his faith entirely. In Halle he studied philosophy under Eberhard, the Wolffian, who opposed the Kantian philosophy and emphasized the superiority of the preceding systems. In this connection he studied, among others, Aristotle, Plato, the Neo-Platonists, Augustine, Calvin, Des Cartes, Leibnitz, Wolff, Lessing, Jacobi and Kant. Schleiermacher did not become either a Wolffian or an unqualified Kantian, but became profoundly interested in Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle and Plato. They furnished the basis for the essay on the Highest Good, directed primarily against the Kantian philosophy, which he wrote while still at Halle. Thus we find him at the end of his student days with at least a smattering knowledge of the history of philosophy, as presented in a university lecture course, supplemented by eager studies in the whole history of life and thought, especially in those authors of kindred bent who promised most
toward the solution of his perplexing situation.*

The year which he spent at Drossen was very helpful, for in his uncle he found that undisturbed harmony between religion and science, and he himself endeavoured to correlate and unify the undigested and fragmentary bits of knowledge which he had accumulated in his undisciplined reading. His religious nature reasserted itself more strongly, but he had not yet arrived at religious and mental equilibrium, and both exhibit the handicap of a restraining and repressing lack of harmony. He continued his studies during the following years in Schloßbitten and made an occasional effort with his own pen relative to the subjects of his reading. His essays of this period, "ueber die Freiheit des Menschen", and "ueber das Werth des Lebens", like the former, "ueber das höchste Gut" reveal a wide acquaintance with ancient and modern philosophy. Dilthey takes pains to point out that Schleiermacher was well grounded in general philos-

* "While at Halle I desired neither to learn the science of scripture interpretation, nor of philosophy, and I therefore attended no exegetical, and but one philosophical, course, and this merely to obtain data to which to attach my own reflections. One thing, however, I perceived that it was absolutely necessary to learn, and that was history, and more especially the history of human opinion, the need of which I keenly felt. In consequence I devoted myself to this science in both its branches, and soon began to search for the sources of those parts which particularly interested me". Schleiermacher's Autobiography, Quoted from Rowan, Vol. I pp.13-4.
ophy prior to his contact with Spinoza or the Romanticists. This period was one of eager search for mental calm and consistency. Gradually his own views began to take shape, but to the wide and unexplored realm to which they belonged the process was slow. "In Schlobitten he parted with the illumination and began his own development. None of his doctrines were yet clear, but traces of the all, dim foreshadowings in feeling rather than in thought, can be traced in his letters, his sermons and in a fragment on "The Value of Life". *

The two factors which constituted Schleiermacher's problem and ultimately determined the formation of his system were, first, the religious consciousness of God or the immediate recognition of the Transcendent One in religious emotions and feelings, and second, his confidence in the validity of science, based upon the unity and continuity of the natural order. ** The first of these was dominant for it was vivified in his peculiarly sensitive

spiritual nature and religious genius. The second found satisfactory expression in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which he accepted in the main. He felt that Kant stood on solid ground here, but his more highly refined religious consciousness was repulsed by the further development of his system as related to the Transcendental or God, which was apprehended only through the moral and aesthetic consciousness and unworthily subordinated to them. The first task before Schleiermacher was the unraveling of this confusion in the moral realm and the second was the completion of the critical system in a way that would worthily and harmoniously embrace the phenomena of the religious consciousness. For a time we find him primarily engaged in the problem of ethics, but this is not to be construed as a desertion from his religious interests, but as the negative process of disentangling the two, which was the necessary first step in the solution of the problem. When at last he had resolved this confusion into its constituent elements and established the separate independence of reason, morals and religion, we find him turning at once to the consideration of the latter whose scientific and consistent development was the second and major part of his problem. The first aspect of the problem urgently pressed for solution during the years intervening his departure from Barby and the ap-
pearance of the Reden in 1799. Among the various factors which contributed to its solution two are especially worthy of notice, namely, the study of Spinoza, and the association with the Romanticists.

The second edition of Jacobi's letters on the doctrines of Spinoza appeared in 1789. It is not known just when they fell into the hands of Schleiermacher, but the three commentaries upon them by him: "kurze Darstellung des spinozistischen Systems", "Spinozismus", and "über dasjenige in Jacobi's Briefen und Realismus, was den Spinoza nicht betrifft und besonders über seine eigene Philosophie", are assigned by Dilthey to the Landsberg period, that is, about the years 1793 or 1794.* In these papers Schleiermacher offers some corrections to Jacobi's interpretation of Spinoza's system, merely from the citations given by Jacobi himself. They relate principally to the nature and relations of the divine attributes, which Schleiermacher construes as not inherent in Substance itself but in the perceiver.** Dilthey thinks that he must have read the

* Dilthey, Leben Schleiermacher, Denkmale, p. 64.
** "Den schwächsten Punkt der Auffassung Jacobi's trifft Schleiermacher, indem er dessen Darstellung der Lehre von Denken und Ausdehnung als den Attributen der Substanz in Frage stellt.

"Nach Spinoza - sagte Jacobi - sind eine unendliche Ausdehnung und eine unendliches Denken Eigenschaften Gottes. Beide machen zusammen nur ein unzerstörliches Wesen aus". Schleiermacher divinirt, dass häd'r eine Seite dieser
Ethica not later than 1796 in as much as it would have been easily available in Berlin, especially since Dr Herz possessed a copy. He was attracted by the purity and unity of the Spinozistic system, by the vigorous and unrestrained logic and by the impartial and scientific nature which characterized it. These elements corresponded to his own tendencies and actuated them and were the qualities needed for the solution of his own problem. He was influenced temporarily also by other elements, which seemed to be cognate ideas, of this closely knit system of thought. These are exhibited primarily in his ideas of God and of the world. The pantheism of Spinoza seemed to offer a wholesome counterpart to the unbalanced transcendence of the rationalists and the deists. The total influence of Spinoza upon Schleiermacher was a distinct gain to him. The negative phases of it were superficial and the marring features have been greatly exaggerated.* Schleiermacher

* "Now however, the labours of Jacobi and others had helped to create a new interest in him. Among those who had thus been led to study his wonderful system was the young assistant clergyman at Landsberg. The impression it made upon him was deep and epochal. Perhaps, with the exception of Kant, no one had yet given such an impulse to his thought or had brought such light and harmony into his intellectual outlook as did the much neglected Baruch de Spinoza". Munro, Schleiermacher, p 43.
would later have reached approximately the same solution to his problem if he had never heard of Spinoza, for his system is ultimately his own and fits well upon the foundation of his own nature.

When Schleiermacher took up his residence in Berlin in 1796 he began to meet members of the Romantic School in the circle that gathered in the home of Dr and Mrs Merz. This brilliant company stimulated him and challenged a latent side of his nature into activity. He shared quarters for a time with Friedrich Schlegel whom Munro describes as "the apostle of a spiritualized or glorified naturalism", and soon came wholly under the romantic spirit, as is reflected in the first edition of the Reden which was written under the inspiration of this association. The romantic movement was a life object for most of its members, but for Schleiermacher it was only a temporary course of training, a filling in of a segment of his character which had been neglected, and he soon drifted from under its influence. The most enduring benefit derived from his contact with the romanticists was that arising from the translation of Plato, which his associates led him to undertake.

The Reden, or, Über die Religion, Reden an die gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern, first appeared in 1799 and
represents the solution of the first aspect of his problem. Religion is not science or morals but intuition of the universe and feeling. The process of disentanglement had been completed and the nature and realm of religion was given in outline. Religion is the consciousness of God in feeling or the intuition of the universe as unity. The Reden is highly polemic and in romantic independence revolts sharply from the customary conceptions and terminology of writers on the Christian religion. It may be viewed as a treatise on the philosophy of religion. It underwent revision in 1806 in which the principal changes were in making feeling preponderantly the basis of religion and in the elimination of romantic exaggerations. The changes in the third edition of 1821 consist in the addition of explanatory notes. Schleiermacher never repudiated anything about the Reden except its extravagances, but held that its fundamentals remained unaltered and that it was harmonious with the Glaubenslehre.

From this time onward Schleiermacher may be considered a student of all systems, men, and movements of his age. He met personally, and on equal footing, all the great scholars and writers of his time. Some of them like Jacobi attracted him, while others like Hegel repelled him. A modified form
of Schelling's philosophy helped to give form to his own philosophic system, but the foundation of his work was already laid, and the realm in which he primarily worked was an unexplored one. He continued his lectures and writings in philosophy and ethics but by virtue of his preeminent qualification and place in life his work was directed principally toward the unfolding of the content of religious consciousness.

Schleiermacher first delivered lectures in dialectics in 1811 and in modified forms in 1814, 1818, 1822, 1828 and in 1831. The preparation of the text book on this subject was interrupted by his death before the introduction was completed. The text prepared by Jonas for the sämtliche Werke is based on the lectures of 1814, but is largely supplemented from the other courses as they are found in part in Schleiermacher's own notes and in part in his students' notebooks. This book, which presents Schleiermacher's epistemology, includes both metaphysics and logic, and is defined as the art of thinking. It yields what we may call his philosophical conception of God.

Schleiermacher's master work, "der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche in zusammenhang dargestellt", or the "Glaubenslehre", 
first appeared in 1821 and in revised form in 1832. It is the complete exposition of the Christian faith as unfolded from the religious consciousness or the feeling of absolute dependence. It makes no pretence of containing universal or necessary truth, but presents the faith of a given Church of a given time. The unfolding of the process of redemption, accomplished by Jesus Christ, constitutes the heart of his dogmatic system. It yields us what we may call the dogmatic conception of God.

Schleiermacher's idea of God, as discussed here, will be based on these three works in their chronological order as given above. Each of these approaches the idea of God from a different angle and thus furnishes the outline of the present essay, which will be developed under the three heads, the conception of God in the philosophy of religion, the philosophical conception of God, and the dogmatic conception of God.
CHAPTER III

The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Religion. (The Reden *)

Schleiermacher's remark that the right understanding of the Reden will be conditioned by the recognition of its rhetorical character should aid us in the correct method of interpreting it. We must not be governed by every individual statement taken apart from its connection with the whole, but we must aim at an understanding of the purpose, the method, and the presuppositions toward which he is seeking to create a favorable impression. The application of logical standards to detailed statements of this book has led its interpreters to false premises and to a confusion of his aims. There are several expressions which are fundamental to his thought, but which have been the basis of much misunderstanding due to the unscientific way in which

* This chapter is based on the first edition of Schleiermacher's earliest published work: Über die Religion, Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern. The text used is that edited by Otto Braun, Leipzig, 1920. The references will be to sections rather than to pages and will be incorporated into the body of the paper thus (15), etc. The endeavour has been made to translate it in the light of the changes and additions of the second and third editions, from which numerous quotations are given in the footnotes. Oman's translation, London, 1893, will be used for these editions.
he employs them. Our first endeavour will be to define these terms as they are found in this book.

UNIVERSE:— The Universe is the totality of being, the All, the Whole. It comprehends the corporeal worlds and all spiritual being. It is a living unity, an organic whole. The word world is employed in the same sense, but the plural of it refers to the finite heavenly bodies. Both the speculative idealist and the mere realist require mediators to teach them to find, comprehend, and enjoy the Universe (11-2). It arouses the divine spark in man (30). The Universe and the relation of man to it is the object of metaphysics, morals, and religion (41). It was the only and eternal love of Spinoza (55). An intuition of the Universe is the highest formula of religion (55). It is uninterruptedly active and reveals itself to us each moment (56). Religion is the immediate experience of the being and action of the Universe (58, 129). To perceive all individual as a part of the whole and all limited as a representation of the infinite is religion (56). The possible intuitions of the Universe are infinite (61, 249). Space and mass do not constitute the world for the most limited body is as infinite as those worlds (82). The divine unit, and eternal immutability of the World is revealed in a particle of
dust (83). Observed law or the perception of the Universe as a great unified work of art is the element of the outer world which corresponds to the religious sense (83). A marvelous system of laws, design, purpose, and harmony is revealed in the world order (83-7). The World appears to the religious man as organized, unified, and permeated by God (87). The unity of the World is first discovered in the inner nature of man. It is copied in his inner being and only through it is the outer understandable (87). The harmony of the Universe is revealed in the unity and variety of humanity, its eternal work of art (97). Humanity is not the Universe (104). Neither is the moral world the Universe of religion (107). All feelings engendered in the ego by the Universe are religious (111). Each new and original intuition of the Universe is a revelation (118). Religious feelings are produced by immediate operations of the Universe (120). All gods are subordinate to the Universe (126). The Universe presents itself to the crude man as chaos - uniform in its confusion, to the polytheist, as multiplicity without unity, and to the monotheist as totality, as unity in multiplicity, as system (126-8, 240). Immortality is achieved by merging ourselves with the Universe through intuition (131). The Universe invites
man to lose his life in it (131). The Universe is more in religion than God (133). Every one and everything is a work and a tool of the Universe (143). In deep contemplation of any part of the World we lose ourselves but find the Universe (166). The art sense leads easily to the sense for the Universe (167). The greatest art is humanity which the Universe itself fashions (172). The Universe is personified by some (186). The divine operation and life of the Universe reveals itself in the religious man (233). The whole Christian society becomes blended and united in the Universe (234). Pantheism and personalism are but different ways of comprehending the Universe (257-8). The definite character of a man's religion is determined by the manner in which his spirit is first greeted and embraced by the Universe (68, 267). To view the Universe in its highest unity is vital to religion (286). The living intuition of the Universe was developed in Christ to perfection (302). The finite requires mediation to come to unity and consciousness of the Universe (302). In all ways the Universe is to be perceived (angeschaut) and adored (310). From this it may be seen that the Universe is the primary object of religion, the unity of all being both spiritual and material, the body
that embraces all worlds and all gods, an infinitely active being comprehending the unity of existence. * It is not to be confused with the Deity, World-Spirit, or God, but is the more comprehensive unity which embraces both God and the material worlds. The value of this unity declines in his thought and later disappears. It is supplanted in the main by some designation of the Supreme Being, but with a different connotation.

WORLD-SPIRIT: - "To love the World-Spirit and joyfully contemplate its work, that is the goal of our religion", is a fair example of the references to the World-Spirit. Occasionally it is called the Spirit of the Universe. It is the generic or philosophic name for the Highest Being as perceived by all people under however different circumstances. It designates the universal Deity in contradistinction to local or partial representations of it. The high World-Spirit pervades Spinoza (54).

* Reden, third edition. "What however has struck most readers is that the infinite existence does not appear to be the highest being: as cause of the world but the world itself. I do not think that God can be placed in such a relation as cause, and I leave you to say whether the world can be conceived as a true All and Whole without God. Therefore I remained satisfied with that expression that I might not decide upon the various ways of conceiving God and the "world as together or as outside of one another, which did not fall to be considered here, and could have only limited the horizon in a hurtful manner". Oman, Reden, p. 103.
The ancients felt the ever striving, living, and serene activity of the world and its Spirit which lay beyond strife and finitude (57). The Spirit of the World reveals itself in the least as perfectly and as visibly as the greatest (87). The unity and coherence of the world is the work of the World-Spirit (87).* The laws of the Universe and their execution are the works of the World-Spirit (87). He laughingly sweeps away all that opposes itself to Him and the sublime Nemesis mows down with iron hand all those who do not submit themselves to the gentle breath of the great Spirit (105). This same work of purging, reviving, organizing, and perfecting humanity is the great ever continuing work of redemption of the eternal Love (103-4). Religion knows how to discover and pursue in every thing that belongs to man the actions of the World-Spirit (107). When the World-Spirit majestically reveals itself to us, when we recall the greatness of its work and perceive the glory of its laws, we are filled with reverence before the Eternal and Invisible (108). The Spirit of the Universe

* Heden, second edition. "Is not God the highest, the only unity? Is it not God alone before whom and in whom all particular things disappear? And if you see the world as a Whole, a Universe, can you do it otherwise than in God? If not how could you distinguish the highest existence, the original and eternal Being from a temporal and derived individual?" Ophan, p. 94.
is personified into a God by those whose imagination inclines toward freedom (129). The high world-Spirit appears to every one and casts upon them one of those piercing glances that the downcast eye feels without seeing (161). The religious man is the work of the all-fashioning world-Spirit (237). Generic religion is to be comprehended as the infinitely progressive work of the world-Spirit (242). Before Christ, the natural and moral world was so steeped in sin and corruption that nothing was produced in which the Spirit of the Universe could dwell (292). The expression itself was later supplanted by the term "God" but the import and the idea remained unaltered.

DEITY:— The Deity is the more distinctively religious name for the Supreme Being. It refers to the spiritual being of the Universe as opposed to the mere material, or as the author of religion as opposed to his instruments or tools. Nature is the work of the Deity (5). The Deity sends ambassadors who are interpreters of Him and His work (9-10). The Deity is living (20); is universal (29); speaks to mortals through His ambassadors (30); is to be reconciled (110); and the history of religion reveals many traces of Him (247). He recognized that the world was nothing so long as man was alone. Adam was first able to hear and
answer the voice of the Deity when he had discovered the World through humanity (88). There is no authoritative definition of the Deity in the German Empire (124). The Deity is found and enjoyed by the members of the true Church (217). The spirit of the few gathered in the name of the Deity rules everywhere (232). He appears to wake the spiritual life of the Christian; and reveals Himself in the rich abundance of soul expression in all the religions (269). He reconciles hostility to Himself (291); He finds ever new devices, raises up more exalted mediators between Himself and men and unites ever more closely with humanity (293). The distinctive idea of Christianity is that all the finite requires a higher mediation in order to be united with the Deity (301). The expression is partially absorbed in the later editions by the term "God".

GOD:- The word God is used in this edition with an imported connotation. The conceptions to which it referred were current Christian, philosophical, and pagan ideas of God. In the main the word and its context was consciously borrowed from the Bible, philosophy, history, or mythology. Naturally the Christian idea predominated. Its meaning fluctuated as widely as the variant conceptions of the people from whom it was borrowed. The gradations from the highly
sensuous to the highly spiritual answer broadly to the corresponding stages of culture and development in those who held these conceptions. Thus he speaks of the God of the earth (231); of the gods of the Greeks (57); of the God of the Jews (288); and of the God that became flesh (237). The term is frequently employed in the plural. The idea of a spiritual being generally prevails, but the distinguishing characteristic is personality, or the imputation of human attributes to the being of their adoration or reflection, as opposed to the impersonal or pantheistic conceptions of God (129). Thus the idea of God in the hands of the men of lowest culture gave rise to fetishism; among the ancients it engendered polytheism; but among the Jews and Christians it became monotheism. The element which gives meaning to the word is the idea of personality. In section 15 he speaks of God disappearing from his doubting eyes. The will of God is the criterion of the moralist (43). The gods were discovered, named and honoured by the religious Greeks (57). To understand the nature of God is a proper study for metaphysics, but in religion it becomes empty mythology (58). There is as yet no authoritative definition of God, and to deny God (i.e. the personal conception of the highest being) is not to deny religion (124). "To most
people, apparently, God is none other than the genius of humanity. Man is the prototype of their God and humanity is the whole of it" (125). To some poetical minds God is distinct and separate from humanity, "a sole species of his own genus" (125). God can be only one way of having an intuition of the Universe (125). Religion is not even dependent upon the highest idea of God, i.e. the Highest Being, the God of the Universe who rules it with freedom and understanding (126). The idea of God accommodates itself to the various ways of having an intuition of the Universe (126). One religion without a God may be higher than another with a God (126). Whether a man has a God or not depends upon his imagination (128). One man personifies the World-Spirit and has a God, another understands it differently and has a World (129). "You cannot have a God without a World" (129). Orthodox ideas of God have never bulked so large in the great minds of religion (130). Religion has nothing to do with an existing and governing God but only with an acting God (130). God is of no value to the natural philosopher, or the moralist, but is rather the source of their sad errors. The God of religion cannot guarantee our happiness either by pleasure or pain as that would be destructive of morals (130). "God is not all in
religion but one, and the universe is more"; neither can you believe on Him arbitrarily or because you need Him for consolation or help, but because you must (133). "God" is an idea, or the deistic mode of conceiving the "world-spirit as a personal Being. Later when the word God was expanded and applied to Schleiermacher's own conception of deity, this idea was referred to as an "anthropomorphic conception of God".

The supersensible and living element of the universe is the Deity or world-spirit, which can be known to us only through its activity. It operates through the tangible and sensible parts of the Universe, principally through the exhibition of law, through humanity, history and Christ for the production of religious intuitions and feelings in man. The peculiar character of each man's religion will be determined by the manner in which his spirit is first greeted by the universe, which, in turn, is determined largely by his own character or imagination. The possible intuitions of the universe which may become the nucleus of a religious life are as varied as humanity itself, and it is only through these that the Deity is given in the consciousness of man. He is not given in sensible knowledge, but in immediate consciousness, in religious intui-
tion and feelings which, however, man will inevitably interpret into somewhat corresponding conceptual forms or into ideas of God. The conceptions of God, then, accommodate themselves to the individual intuitions, and since they are as varied as humanity, the corresponding ideas of God will differ from man to man. This might be illustrated by a simple figure from physics: electricity is a substance of unknown nature, but it manifests itself in various ways. At different times it reveals itself as light, heat, power, motion, sound, in the stimulation of life, and in the production of death. This would lead some to think of electricity in terms of light, heat, or power according to the product of it which they had seen. But the description of electricity through any of its results would be inaccurate for they are determined by the agents of transmission and the circumstances of its application. In a similar way ideas of God are the products of

* Kedem, second edition. "But to treat this objective conception of God just as if it were a perception, as if apart from his operation on us through the world, the existence of God before the world, and outside of the world though for the world, were either by or in religion exhibited as science is, so far as religion is concerned, vain mythology". Oman, p. 50.

Kedem, second edition. "There as elsewhere then, the manner in which the Deity is present to man in feeling, is decisive of the worth of his religion, not the manner, always inadequate, in which it is copied in idea". Oman, p. 97.
the individual character or type of imagination, in reaction from the activity of the universe upon it.

Religious humanity is divided into two types: those who think in terms of freedom and personality, and those who think in terms of necessity and destiny; the one animates, the other seeks to understand; the one is personalistic, the other is pantheistic. Religion, according to development, is divided into three stages: fetichism, polytheism, and monotheism. Each of these stages is divided into two groups corresponding to the two types of religious dispositions or imaginations. The universe represents itself to the primitive man, who has no idea of wholeness or infinity, but only a dark instinct, as unity in which no manifoldness is to be distinguished, as chaos - uniform in its confusion, without division, order or law. If he does not have the impulse to animate it, it appears to him as blind destiny, but if he does animate it, his God becomes an idol, a fetich. The Universe represents itself to the man of the next stage of culture as multiplicity without unity, as an indefinite manifoldness of heterogeneous elements and forces, whose constant and eternal strife determine its phenomena. To the man of the first group it appears, not as blind destiny, but as established necessity, and the impulse is to understand it.
But if the idea of God is applied here, the various forces and elements are animated and polytheism results. To the men of the third stage of culture the universe represents itself as totality, unity in multiplicity, as system. In religion the universe is posited as originally acting upon man. The man who can interpret this activity only as the work of a free being, will personify the Spirit of the universe and will have a God. The man who recognizes that freedom has meaning only in the individual and for the individual will have a World and no God. Whether or not a man has a God depends upon his sense for the universe, upon his imagination, or whether he, by nature, inclines to personalism or pantheism.* From this we can see that the word God relates to the God of the Deists and Theists and to that class of men, who, in whatever stage of culture, personify the Supreme Being.

And what is Schleiermacher’s relation to each of these two ways of conceiving God? The most obvious aspect of his position is that he endeavours to transcend them and to blend them in a higher harmony. "Wenn die sich

* Reden, second edition. "This rejection of the idea of a personal Deity does not decide against the presence of the Deity in his feelings. The ground of such a rejection might be a humble consciousness of the limitation of personal existence, and particularly of personality joined to consciousness". Oman, p. 97.
aneinander schließen, in denen die eine Sinnesart her-
schend ist, so gibt es doch einige, welche beide verstehen
und beiden angehören, und der, in dessen Natur es liegt,
das Universum zu personifizieren, ist doch im wesentlichen,
im Stoff der Religion, gar nicht von dem unterschieden, der
dieses nicht tut, und es wird nie an solchen fehlen, welche
sich auch in die entgegengesetzte Form mit Leichtigkeit hin-
ein denken können" (456). Spinoza was a deeply religious
man filled with holy spirit, and stood religiously as far
above the Roman polytheists as Lucretius stood above the
idolators.* Among the Moravians and the adherents of
Nationalism he had seen undeniable evidence of genuine
piety in connection with the narrowest conceptions of God.
And though these parties had always been in deadly strug-
gle over philosophy there was not lacking evidence of the

* Reden, their edition. "It was incumbent upon me to
protest against this view of Spinoza, seeing I would re-
view the whole sphere of piety, something essential would
have seemed wanting in the exposition of my views if I had
not in some way said that the mind and heart of this great
man seemed deeply influenced by piety, even though it were
not Christian piety. The results might have been different,
had not the Christianity of that time been so distorted
and obscured by dry formulas and vain subtleties that the
divine form would not be expected to win the regard of a
stranger. This I said in the first edition, somewhat
youthfully indeed, yet so that I have found nothing now
needing to be altered, for there was no reason to believe
that I ascribed the Holy Spirit to Spinoza in the special
Christian sense of the word". Oman, p. 104.
activity of the Spirit in both.* And why not? If the idea of God is a product rather than a source of religion and belongs to the personal equation rather than to the essential nature of God, it is more or less superficial and unimportant ** and the most variant conceptions of God are fundamentally harmonious. The prevailing type of thought at that time relative to the Deity was the deistic conception of God, that is, a transcendental personal being so remote from the world that He scarcely touched the personal life of man. At the other extreme was the rising pantheistic mode of conceiving God as the universal substance with its all-pervading natura naturans. The various schools and parties of that time, such as rationalism and the critical school, the Aufklärung and the Romantic School,

* Keden, second edition. "Nothing seemed to me less fitting that for the adherents of the former view to charge with godlessness those who, in dread of this anthropomorphism, take refuge in the other, or for the adherents of the latter view to make the humanness of the idea of God a ground for charging the adherents of the former with idolatry, or for declaring their piety void". Oman, p. 95.

** Keden, second edition. "It matters not what conception a man adheres to, he can still be pious. His piety, the divine in his feeling, may be better than his conception, and the desire to place the essence of piety in conception, only makes him misunderstand himself. Consider how narrow is the presentation of God in the one conception, and how dead and rigid in the other. Neither corresponds to its object, and thus cannot be a proof of piety, except in so far as it rests on something in the mind, of which it has come far short". Oman, p.
deism and pantheism, were produced by reaction from other schools and tendencies which were also extreme and onesided. Schleiermacher, with his broad sympathies, his wide outlook and comprehensive grasp of the unity and relation of things was the natural counterpart to his age which was narrow and intolerant. He had the habit, and it was the most distinctive quality of his character, of viewing everything from a broad perspective. His place in life, his work, his art sense, and his attitude toward every problem reflect this quality. He was the only man of his day whose views and sympathies were wide enough to comprehend and harmonize the most divergent positions in the realm of religion, i.e. deism and pantheism. He recognized their partial and supplementary nature and endeavoured to unite their positive elements into a harmonious and complete system.* The great majority of those whom he was addressing denied the immanence of God, but insisted upon a rather anthropomorphic

* Heden, second edition. "How cannot the same inwardness of religion be combined with both? Would not a closer consideration show that the two ways of conceiving are not very wide apart? But the pantheistic idea is not to be thought of as death, and no effort is to be spared to surpass in thought the limits of the personal idea. ***But whoever insists that the highest piety consists in confessing that the Highest Being thinks as a person and wills outside of the world, cannot be far traveled in the region of piety. Say the profoundest words of the most zealous defenders of his own faith must still be strange to him". Oman, pp. 98-9.
conception of divine personality. For this reason, perhaps, Schleiermacher's counterpoise is not always faithfully re-
tained.

Accusers have not been lacking who saw in the development of this system, and in his emphasis upon the immanence of the world-Spirit, evidence of pronounced pantheistic leanings in Schleiermacher's personal religious consciousness or type of imagination.* In terminology at least, the book is akin to pantheism, and it exhibits a generosity toward that type of thinking which is unusual in men who claim to be Christian writers. Is this pantheism confined to language and tolerance, or does it determine the structure of his philosophic system? ** There are several tendencies of his thought which suggest pantheism. (1) He denies the necessity of conceiving God as a personal being for religion. (2) He admits the validity of pantheistic thinking in connection with genuine religious feeling. (3)

* See, G. Frank's, Geschichte der protestantische Theologie, vierter Theil, pp. 241-3.

** Reden, third edition. "For myself I am supposed to prefer the impersonal form of thinking of the highest Being, and this has been called now my atheism, and again my Spinozism. I, however, thought it was truly Christian to seek for piety everywhere, and to acknowledge it under every form. I find at least that Christ enjoined this upon his disciples." Oman, p. 117.
In the Reden the Universe is pictured as the fundamental unit of existence, the All, while in the Dialektik the transcendental identity of the ideal and the real is called God.* (4) The Universe rather than the Deity is made the primary object of religion. (5) "You cannot have a God without a World". And finally, (6) he frequently employs the term world-spirit, which is elsewhere associated with pantheism.

The indications noted above of Schleiermacher's personal preference toward pantheistic types of thought can be modified if examined in relation to other parts of his system. Relative to (1) and (2) we may reply that neither the denial of the necessity of personal thinking nor the admission of the validity of pantheistic conceptions

* "Delbrück's opinion was shared by H. Schmidt respecting the Reden, as in it the divine is not formed through the negation of the finite and the annulling of the same, but through the corporation (Zusammenfassung) of the finite itself. Already the confusion of the infinite (equals: the endless being in time and space) with the eternal (equals: endless being above time and space) constitutes the being of pantheism". G. Frank, Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie, Vierter Theil, p. 241

"Denn die Bezeichnung Gottes mit dem Namen des Universum weist, milde gerechitet, doch recht deutlich auf jene pantheistische Neigung hin, von der wir nicht sagen können, dass sie in der Glaubenslehre völlig überwunden sei. Der Pantheismus beginnt überall da, wo man die an sich seiende Ichheit Gottes verkennt oder läugnet." H. R. von Frank, Geschichte und Kritik der neueren Theologie, p. 73.
in the interpretation of religious intuitions and feelings constitute any proof of his own pantheism. (3) The Universe of the Reden has no corresponding unit of being in the Dialektik. The transcendental unity of the ideal and the real of the Dialektik answers to the World-Spirit or the unitary principle of the World (87). The ideal and the real are the same as the two opposed forces which enter into the constitution of all thoughts and things of the World, mentioned in the first discourse (5-6). The emphasis and point of view is different but the thought is in agreement.* (4) Schleiermacher held that every action of the Universe upon man, through whatever medium, was productive of religious feeling. The most insignificant particle of matter as an integral part, representation, and instrument of the Universe arouses religious emotions in us. These material agents, however, have motion, power, or influence only as it is communicated by the living Spirit of the Universe.** It is because of the instrumentality

* "Wenn es aber erlaubt ist, seine aphoristischen Erklärung zusammentragen und zu vergleichen, so ergiebt sich als Antwort auf die gestellte Frage, dass eine bemerkenswerte Differenz zwischen der religiösen und philosophischen Gottesidee nicht obwaltet, ****" Bender, Schleiermacher's Theologie, p. 246. We cannot admit, however, as Bender further claims, that his religious idea of God is primarily a postulate of his metaphysical requirements. See above.

** Reden, second edition."Remember in the first place that any feeling is not an emotion of piety because it is a single object as such which effects us, but only in so far as in it
of both the material and spiritual in the production of
religious feelings that the Universe, which embraces both
these, rather than the Deity, is made the primary object
of religious intuitions.* This agrees also with the view
stated in the Wlabenslehre that God operates through the
regular course of nature rather than through supernatural
activity in the production of religious feelings. The pre-
eminence of the spiritual over the material in that unity
is revealed by the fact that the Deity and the world-Spirit

and along with it, it effects us as a revelation of God.
It is therefore not an individual or finite thing, but
God, in whom alone the particular thing is one and all
that enters our life". Oman, p. 92.
Reden, third edition. "But here the universe is put for
God and the pantheism of the author is undeniable! This
is the interpolation, not interpretation of superficial
and suspicious readers who do not consider that the subject
here is the production of light and warmth in such a spirit,
the springing of such pious emotions as pass immediately
into religious ideas and views (light) and into a tempera-
ment of surrender to God (warmth). It was desirable therefore
to call attention to the way in which such emotions take
take their rise. They arise when a man surrenders himself to the
Universe, and are only habitual in a spirit in which such
surrender is habitual. Not only in general but on each
occasion we are conscious of God and of His divine power
and Godhead by the work of creation, and not by any one thing
taken by itself, but by it only in so far as it is embraced
in the unity and completeness in which God alone is immediate-
* Reden, third edition. "What however has struck most
readers is that the infinite existence does not appear to be
the Highest Being as cause of the World but the World itself.
I do not think that God can be placed in such a relation
as cause, and I leave you to say whether the world can be
conceived as a true All and Whole without God". Oman,p. 103.
are occasionally referred to in a way almost identical to that of the Universe. (5) That we cannot have a God without a world refers to the conception of God, for He is supersensible and manifests Himself only through the world in religious intuitions such as law, humanity, Christ, etc. If there was no world to stimulate us we could have no religious consciousness and so no conception of God. (6) And what is the significance of the term World-Spirit as employed by Schleiermacher? It is symbolical of the monotheistic stage of religious development and it is the generic name for the universal Deity. He felt that most men had not escaped the idea of local Deities. "To most people, apparently, God is none other than the genius of humanity. Man is the prototype of their God and humanity is the whole of it". (125). The Jews held to the notion of a national Deity, and the pantheists, theists, and deists contended for the descriptive exclusiveness of their Gods, all of which, of course, are but partial and imperfect representations of the one universal Deity. Omnis determinatio est negatio. Schleiermacher seeks to avoid the limitation of determination by designating God by the undefined name of World-Spirit, which refers to the universal Deity in contrast to any lower conception of spiritual being. If then, the desire for univer-
sality and unity in the conception of the divine Being is the right and sufficient explanation for the choice of the name World-Spirit with which to describe the Deity, one of the main supports of the argument for Schleiermacher's pantheism is rendered innocuous.*

The failure to recognize the fundamental purpose and to make allowance for its rhetorical nature have been the principal causes of accusations of pantheism. The above considerations show that it is possible to interpret Schleiermacher's thought in logical harmony with his fundamental principles and statements, with the further unfolding of his system and with later comments and explanations upon this book in a way which has nothing in common with materialistic pantheism.** This is the conclusion also of those who

*Reden, third edition. "It would hardly be necessary to justify the use of the expression World-Spirit where I wish to indicate the object of pious adoration in a way that would include all different stages and forms of religion. In particular I do not believe that it can be said with justice that, by this choice of expression, I have sacrificed the interests of the most perfect form of religion to the inferior. On the contrary, I believe, not only that it is a perfectly Christian name for the Highest Being, but that the expression could only have arisen on Monotheistic soil, *******. No one will confuse it with World-Soul. It neither expresses reciprocal action between the world and the highest Being, nor any kind of independence of the World from Him". Oman, p. 111.

** Reden, third edition. "But no one who reflects on the little that is said about pantheism will suspect me of any materialistic pantheism". Oman, p. 116.
have made special studies of the relations between Schleiermacher and Spinoza. "The well known and the more hidden points of contact of Schleiermacher with the Spinozistic world of thought are always only partial and represent in part overemphasized consequences of an essentially different tendency."* According to Spinoza God is all being, and there is none outside of Him; according to Schleiermacher God is in all being and there is no being without Him".**

All that remains then of the much mooted pantheism of Schleiermacher is the over stressed immanence of the World-Spirit which pervades and animates the World and all its parts. In this doctrine he realizes the longing of the human heart for immediate nearness to the great Spirit of the Universe and mystic communion with it. The ardent, emotional nature, and vital religious experience of Schleiermacher allowed no harmony with the deistic scheme of things which had expelled God from His creation. "In op-

* Reden, third edition. "How was I to expect that because I ascribed piety to Spinoza, I would myself be taken for a Spinozist? Yet I have never defended his system, and anything that was philosophic in my book was manifestly inconsistent with the characteristics of his views and had quite a different basis than the unity of substance" Oman, p. 104.

** P. Schmidt, Spinoza und Schleiermacher; quoted from, Geschichte der protestantische Theologie. Frank. p 243.
position to this cold deistic faith, at that time haunting many who called themselves the educated, and which still haunts many minds and hearts, Schleiermacher placed the living spiritual view of a God dwelling in the world always present with us, uniting Himself with our nature and becoming our friend, and making us happy by making His habitation with us".*

The other more prevalent extreme type of religious thinking, which stood over against pantheism, was deism. The two criteria for deism are, (1) God is transcendent, that is, spiritual as opposed to material, and (2) He is personal, that is, He bears the relation to the world of intelligent Creator and extra-mundane Governor. The transcendence of Schleiermacher's World-Spirit, though less stressed, can, nevertheless, be shown. "You know that the Deity has by an unalterable law compelled Himself to divide His great work even unto infinity, ****. This whole corporeal world *******". (5-6). "Space and mass do not constitute the world and are not the material of religion; to seek infinity in it is a childish way of thinking" (82). In sections 86 and 87 it is pointed out that it is the work of the World-Spirit which brings unity.

coherence, infinity, and law into the corporeal world. The
great fundamental intuitions of religion are not to be
found in the outer or material world, but in the exhibi-
tion of laws governing the apparently conflicting, in the
inner spiritual nature of man, in the divinely directed
course of history, and in that other, infinitely greater,
source, the mention of which, would be nonsense to his
auditors. He was repulsed by the pantheistic confusion
of spirit and matter. Religion belongs to the realm of
the spiritual and not to the material. The validity of
personal thinking in relation to the Deity is admitted
in the acknowledgement that the conception of God accom-
odates itself to all kinds of intuitions, and that some by
nature construe God as personal.*

And yet it is fairly obvious that Schleiermacher did
not hold the current conception of divine personality.
This would have been precluded by the doctrine of divine
immanence. ** The word God refers, in the main, to the

* Reden, second edition. "If, however, this idea is
formed not arbitrarily, but somehow by: the necessity of
a man's way of thinking, if he needs it for the security
of his piety, the imperfections of his idea will not cum-
ber him nor contaminate his piety". Oman, p. 101.
** Reden, second edition. "But to treat this objective
conception of God just as if it were a perception, as if
apart from his operation on us through the world the ex-
istence of God before the world and outside of the world
deistic conception since that was the prevalent view which he was combatting. We may say then relative to deistic tendencies that he accepted in one sense the divine transcendence, but rejected their idea of divine personality.

The three criteria by which theistic conceptions of God may be judged are, (1) God is immanent, (2) He is transcendent, and (3) He is personal, i.e. He governs the world according to His own free will. In seeking theistic tendencies in the Reden we are not to be led by what he says about "God", but rather by what he says about the Deity and the world-spirit, which more faithfully represent his idea of the Supreme Being. We have already shown that he accepts the immanence and transcendence of the divine being, so there remains to be discussed only the question of personality. We have seen to that he did not accept the deistic notions of personality. Our question here, then, is, does he hold any sort of conception of divine personality, and, if so, what? There are a number of evidences which indicate that he was inclined toward a personal imagination. His own character and disposition was such that he could have had no intercourse with an

though for the world, were either by or in religion exhibited as science is, so far as religion is concerned, vain mythology". Oman, p. 50.
impersonal being. His contemporary sermons intimately refer to God as Father. There are several passages in the Reden which also suggest it. "Still these may be only imperfect conceptions of God. Let us go at once to the highest, to that of a highest Being, a Spirit of the Universe who rules it with freedom and understanding" (126). The following quotation will be significant if we remember that the word God stands for the personal conception of the Supreme Being. "Belief on God depends upon the bent of the imagination *****. And no one will be less certain on that account, nor will anyone better escape from the almost unalterable necessity of accepting Him because he knows whence this necessity comes" (129).* Some of the above cited passages also may indicate the trend of his thought, as, "He sends ambassadors"; He speaks to man; "He reconciles hostility to Himself"; "He finds new devices"; "He is to be loved"; He is living"; He laughingly

Reden, third edition. "And if any one will look at it rightly, he will find that, on the one side, every one must recognize it as an almost absolute necessity for the highest stage of piety to acquire the conception of a personal God, and on the other side he will recognize the essential imperfection in the conception of a personality of the Highest Being, nay, how hazardous it is, if it is not most carefully kept pure. The conception is necessary whenever one would interpret to himself or to others immediate religious emotions, or whenever the heart has immediate intercourse with the highest Being". Oman. p. 117.
sweeps away all that opposes Him"; "His work of reviving and restoring humanity is the work of the eternal Love"; He appears to men"; "He awakens and fashions the new life of the religious man." The intellectual presuppositions of the outlines of his thought system here will aid in understanding his position. The individual man is the basis and model of his system. Each man is both an individual unit of being and an integral part of the greater unity of humanity, which in turn is an integral part of the highest unit of being, or the Universe. Humanity and man are not only the test models of the Universe, but are also the only avenues to an understanding of it (87, 97). This relationship of the three units of being is repeatedly emphasized. But that is not all; the parallelism goes further. Each is composed of two distinct but harmonious and integral elements - the material and the spiritual. In man it is body and spirit; in humanity it is the race and the genius or the spirit of humanity; in the Universe it is the corporeal worlds and the World-Spirit. Further, the World-Spirit, which gives unity, law, and design to the world and humanity, resembles the art-genius of humanity and the spirit of man. Thus we have the simple proportion, THE UNIVERSE :

man :: THE WORLD-SPRITIT : the spirit of man. This should lead
it would seem, to personality in the World-Spirit.

But despite all this evidence it cannot be said that Schleiermacher held the ordinary theistic conceptions of divine personality. And why not? The answer can best be shown from the above mentioned parallelism between the Universe and man. There was one difficulty which Schleiermacher could not overlook, i.e. the proportion lay across the line which divides the finite and the infinite. It is not certain that in elevating the human personality to infinity it would retain unaltered its present form and parts. If in that process only the positive elements can be retained, then some aspects of it which are as they are because of the absence of perfect knowledge and power, such as the usual conception of the freedom of the will, could not be carried over to an infinite being. If the usual theistic standards of personality, self-consciousness, self-determination, and feeling are to be accepted we can say that Schleiermacher did not hold to the personality of God, since he could not harmonize their limitations with the infinite nature of God, but held a super-personal view of God.* The elements of human nature which

* Reden, second edition. "let this idea of God, as it is usually conceived, is different from the other ideas
Schleiermacher retains and ascribes to the Infinite are unity, power, design, and love. If these, rather than the above named, are the distinctive qualities of personality we may say that Schleiermacher adheres to the standards of theism. He, himself, undoubtedly considered that he held a conception of personality purged of its weaknesses and vulnerable points, but retaining all the elements necessary for religious fellowship. This conception lies between spiritualistic pantheism and theism, "Schleiermacher, led by the proposition, omnis determination est negatio, remained vacillating between deistic and pantheistic conceptions of the idea of God, consequently has sought the living theism lying in the middle".* "On this ground Schleiermacher argues for a conception of the personality of God less narrow and inadequate than that usually in vogue. What he seems to desiderate is a God who works through consciousness rather than by authority, and

whose laws are obeyed through an internal impulse and not from external incentives. He urges that this does not imply any real weakening of the conception of the divine personality".*

In the first edition of the Reden Schleiermacher probably approached more nearly to what is usually called spiritualistic pantheism, but in the later editions he arrived at a modified form of theism. The first edition does not lack theistic evidences and tendencies, but they are obscured, in part, by the rhetorical justification of the validity of pantheistic thinking in religion. The fundamental principles and purposes of the book were not altered but there was a perceptible diminution in his estimation of the value of pantheistic and impersonal modes of thought in religion. Schleiermacher soon saw that the only fruitful truth of pantheism was its idea of the divine immanence. When it had been dissociated and reincorporated into its more native environment of revitalized theism there remained nothing of pantheism but an empty husk of philosophy. In the meantime his conceptions of the positive elements of personality had been taking shape in a way that could be applied to the Highest Being.

* Selbie, Schleiermacher. p. 49.
In the first edition it is obvious that he is striving for a representation of the Supreme Being which is both infinite and personal, i.e. personal in the sense that man feels an affinity toward Him and can have the consciousness of fellowship with Him. From the outset Schleiermacher was one of those who "felt" rather than "conceived" God as personal, but there were two stumbling blocks between him and the acceptance of the prevalent ideas of divine personality.

(1) The peculiar mystic tendencies of his religious nature demanded the immanence of the divine Being. This element had to be restored from pantheism. (2) His keen dialectic conscience demanded the compatibility of the symbolical representations of the divine Being with the infinity of His nature.* It is undeniable that these were the principal deficiencies which confronted him. The Reden does not represent the solution of this problem, but the recognition

* Reden, third edition. "The analogy with the human in the conception of the Highest Being and the analogy with the earthly still remains the shell of the hidden kernel. But those who are early absorbed in a pure speculative endeavour take another way. There is nothing in God, they say to themselves, opposed, divided or isolated. Wherefore nothing human can be said of Him. Nothing earthly is to be transferred from the earthly world that gave it birth in our souls. "*** Such a misunderstanding could only arise in those who have never felt the speculative impulse to annihilate anthropomorphism in the conception of the Highest Being, an impulse most clearly expressed in the writings of the profoundest Christian teachers". Oman, p. 22
of it and the accumulation of the unrefined material,* which was to give body to the figure that represents the highest harmony of a vital religious genius and a strictly scientific nature. The conception of the Highest Being at which he finally arrived contained the positive elements of the various partial and fragmentary notions of the Deity. But even here it is evident that Schleiermacher belongs to that wing of humanity which personifies the Spirit of the Universe.

* Cf. Bender's statement: "Die Grundgedanken der Reden, in welchem Schleiermacher, wie "die Erläuterungen" vom Jahre 1821 bezeugen, das eigentlich Programm seiner religions-philosophischen Stellung jederzeit anerkannt hat, verhalten sich zu seiner späteren wissenschaftlichen Religionslehre wie der Stoff zur Form". Schleiermacher's Theologie, p. 156.
CHAPTER IV

The Philosophical Conception of God

(Dialektik)*

In the realm of philosophy, in its broadest sense, there are three distinct, but supplementary, approaches which converge in the direction of the divine Being. The first is based upon knowledge which postulates the being of God as the transcendental identity of the ideal and the real presupposed in mental consciousness. The second is based upon will or the moral faculty. It also postulates the being of God as the transcendental identity of the ideal and the real which is involved as a prerequisite

* "It is an independent study of the problem of knowledge," Munro, Schleiermacher, pp. 131-2.
of ethical consciousness. The third is based upon feeling, the indifference point of knowing and willing, and recognizes God through immediate contact. This presentation requires a brief analysis of Schleiermacher epistemology including the fundamentals of ethics and religion.

Thought is posited as a function recognized in consciousness. That thought is knowledge which (1) is put forward with the necessity that it is produced by all thinking agents in the same way, and (2) as corresponding to the being which is its object.* Knowledge is in an equal manner the product of reason and organization, of the subjective and the objective, of the ego and of the non-ego. Reason is the unitary principle of knowledge just as organization or being is the principle of multiplicity. Reason is grounded in the ideal while the organic is grounded in the real. These modes of being run parallel courses. The ideal is that in being which is the principle of all activity of reason which does not arise from the organic; and the real is that in being by means of which it is the principle of organic activity in as far as it is not derived from the activity of reason. The world, of which man is a miniature is a com-

* Dialektik, p. 43.
pound of these two elements, the ideal and the real, reason and nature, the spiritual and the material, thinking being and unthinking being. Between these modes of being there is constant antithesis which cannot be proved, but may be assumed, since it is given in consciousness and since it is fundamental to all knowledge, to personal identity, to self-consciousness and intuition. If we should stop by this antithesis there would be only empty mystery, but back of it, but back of it there must be a fundamental unity which is the ground and source of both. We never immediately perceive this original being, or the transcendental unity, but we can be conscious of it as a necessary assumption. The universal unity of being remains for us

* "The way in which Schleiermacher reached this result is very similar to that by which Spinoza was led to the central thought in his system. Spinoza set before him the perfecting of the Cartesian doctrine by reducing the opposed substances of thought and extension into one substance of which thought and extension were the two necessary attributes. Schleiermacher, starting with the antithesis of thought and being - which had, again, been brought into prominence by the critical philosophy - tried to reach the unifying principles presupposed by each, and demanded by a consistent theory of knowledge. One developed Cartesianism in the line of its logical issue; the other did the same thing for Kantianism. They both sought for the entity at the ground of appearance and reality, and they both found it in the same idea - the idea of God. The more the philosophies of the two are compared, the more clearly it will appear how widely they differ. God, the world and man and their mutual relations, are the ideas peculiar to each; yet the meaning which they severally assign to them is fundamentally distinct. Spinoza defines God as the infinitely absolute being, or substance, which is the immanent and necessary cause of all things. He makes no di-

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wholly behind the veil. We can go no further in detail than to define it as the transcendental unity of all being. We can neither conceive, comprehend, and least of all perceive it. We cannot say that we know the identity of that highest difference, but we only postulate it as an indispensable aid to knowledge. The belief in the existence of it must be equivalent to religious faith, which is the ultimate ground for all activity, for the assumption of it

tinction between God and nature; and the world is merely a mode of the divine being. The absolute substance, with its attributes and modes whether it be taken as conscious or unconscious, as abstract or real, is the One and All, moving forever blindly in its separate lines of thought and extension, ****. Schleiermacher, on his part, does not conceive the absolute as entering into, and constituting, the existence of all finite things. God is not simply represented as either the highest power or causality; neither is He called substance, nature, or natura naturans. He and the world are distinct; yet they are not to be separated". Munro, Schleiermacher, pp. 136-8.

is the ground and condition of all knowledge. A picture of this Being must necessarily be poetical; a conception, negative and rhetorical. The dialectic can go no further than to approach the original Being, for when this is represented, or the finite derived from it, the presentation goes over into the mystical. This has no advantage for philosophy, for the certainty of this Being is given in consciousness. We have found here the ground of knowledge and being, behind knowledge and being, but we can neither comprehend it, nor derive from it the being present in knowledge. "For, since God is the ground of the common law, dwelling alike in spirit and in nature, we cannot otherwise conceive Him than in relation to both; therefore, as the ground of that which, taken together, constitutes the world"*

Knowledge exists only in the form of concept or judgment.* One is akin to feeling and receptivity, the other to will and spontaneity. The idea of absolute being as identity of concept and object is not knowledge since it is neither concept nor judgment, but is the transcendental ground and form of all knowledge. Concepts are either universal or particular, corresponding

to species or individual. The boundaries of concepts will be, on the lower side, the observation of mere material as chaos without unity or system; on the upper side it will be the highest species or force, that from which all particular arises, and which belongs to no higher species. But still the highest species belongs to the realm of the antithetical and not to the transcendental identity of its two elements. Hence we can have no concept of God. A judgment involves a subject and a predicate. The subject is posited in itself, while the predicate is posited in an exterior being, or in a non-being of the subject. As the subject increases the predicable non-being of the subject correspondingly diminishes. Of the absolute unity of being, then, nothing can be predicated. The unity of being which annuls the antithesis of judgment and fact is the ground of all judgment, but cannot be predicated, as there is nothing outside of it. The being to which these highest reaches of knowledge correspond is identical, i.e. the All of finite being, but this only attests the mutual limitation and dependence of knowledge and being. The idea of Deity corresponds as little to the one as to the other. The highest cause must be distinguished from its production. The causality relation ever presupposes a higher
being. In a similar way the idea of the highest subject is insufficient. Neither the conception of destiny nor providence, to which these notions of highest species or power and highest subject belong, answer to the idea of Deity. The idea of destiny places all causality under the conception of the unconscious, and providence, under that of the conscious. The idea of the Deity, rightly comprehended, is that which cannot be known, but must ever be presupposed as the identity of thinking and being. This is the element of truth in the ontological proof.

Our action is inseparable from the organic affections for the will is stimulated only through the aroused consciousness. That type of action wherein the consciousness is active is ethics; that type of action wherein it is passive is physics or the ethics of the inanimate. In ethics the ideal is predominant or active, while the real is receptive of the influence of the ideal. Our wills go out from us and the antithetical real being, toward which they are directed, receives their influence and stamp as though it were the counterpart of ideal being, just as in knowledge the ideal receives the influence of the real. This pre-established harmony between the ideal and the real points to a common ground of both.
we require a transcendental ground for certainty in knowing, so we require a transcendental ground for our certainty in willing. The transcendental identity of the ideal and the real which must be postulated for the will cannot be different from that postulated in knowing, for the elements of both activities are the same, the two are inseparable, and so must have ultimately the same basis.*

These two approaches, based upon contrasting functions and resting upon a speculative basis, point to the same transcendental source from which both spring, but neither singly nor collectively can they lead us to it. They are equally valid and equally indispensable in the solution of the problem, but also equally incompetent in themselves. For most men, faith in God rests more upon the certainty of the conscience than upon the certainty of the understanding. They may fortify or strengthen the utterances of the conscience with speculative auxiliaries, but these are seldom original to the conviction. Most philosophers have arrived at the conception of God either through speculative or moral considerations, but both are legitimate and both should be employed. Kant retains only the moral and does not rightly comprehend it, for his conception of happiness is too low (gemein).* See next page.
The sphere of activity of thought and will are limited to the realm of the antithetical and the finite, and are wholly incapable of apprehending the Absolute, which is the ultimate ground of both. Since they both postulate and convergently lead up to the Supreme Being, there must be some way of apprehending Him. It is found in the common ground or indifference point of both these, that is, in feeling, which constitutes the fundamental unity of our being. In feeling the transition is made from thought to will and conversely, for it is the relative identity of both. As such it is a more fundamental and a more vital part of our being. There is an ascending series of feelings culminating in the immediate self-consciousness which is the highest stage in the evolution of subjective consciousness. It is also the religious faculty of our being, but we have approached it here in a purely philosophical way and employ it as such. In feeling, the unitary ground of knowing and willing, is God, the unity of the ideal and the real, immediately given.

"What we feel is not something external or finite, not the totality of being or the highest power: what we feel is our own self-consciousness as essentially related to

God. Feeling is the form of subjective knowledge corresponding to the Absolute. It is not wrought in us; it is the immediate relation of the soul to the transcendental Unity appearing and revealing itself in finite things, and it simply comes to existence in the individual consciousness.° The immediate self-consciousness is the completion and highest development of the faculties of the human spirit and its apprehension of God through vital contact is the realization of the postulates of Him required in thought and will. The purely speculative way, i.e. through thought and will, of reaching God is only schematic and incomplete, but is pure of all extraneous matter, while the feeling of God is perfected but is never pure, for the consciousness of God is ever related to other things.

We can know God only as He is in ourselves and in things, not as He is in Himself or outside of the world. God exists in us in the form of ideas and conscience, which are the faculties of our being in which the ideal and the real are united, in that they involve the correspondence of thought and being, and will and being. This innate being of God in us constitutes the essential ele-

° Munro, Schleiermacher, pp 196-7.
ment of our own being and raises us above the brutes. We may not reverse this proposition and say that God has ideas or conscience, for that would import limitation and inequality into Him. The being of God is given to us in things, in as much as each is a model of the whole, and thus in miniature, foreshadows the transcendental identity of the ideal and the real. If God were given outside of the world, the two would be separate and could not be reconciled either as two independent existences or as unequal and dependent. The being of God in and for itself cannot be given to us, but we can have a conception of God only in so far as we ourselves are God, that is, have Him in us. There is no organic affection corresponding to the senses through which we can arrive at a knowledge of God. Conceptions of God, whether philosophical or theological, are only symbolical and schematic. God can be known only as given immediately in feeling.

The world as multiplicity may be known part by part, but that process is interminable. It is the transcendental terminus ad quem of all knowledge, or the principle of the reality of knowledge in its becoming. God as unity can be known only uno actu, since there is no multiplicity in Him, hence He cannot be known at all. The idea of the
Deity is the principle of the possibility of knowledge or the transcendental terminus a quo.* The world and God are not identical but correlative. "For in thought the Deity is always posited as unity without multiplicity, but the world as multiplicity without unity; the world occupies space and time, the Deity is spaceless and timeless; the world is the totality of antitheses, the Deity the negation of all antitheses".** We cannot think of the world without God nor of God without the world. "God is the postulate of the world even as the world is the postulate of God".*** The idea of God before the world is an empty phantasm and the world without God, chaos.

We are not entitled to posit either an identity nor an antithesis of God and the world, but they are simply co-existent. *It may be objected that this representation of the Absolute, as distinctionless and without contrast, is an empty unit, equivalent to zero, and that the real unity is the world. It is not so, however. God is the full and positive unity which embraces all within itself. As the Absolute, nothing can exist independently of Him. He is the source of all life and the life from which all contrast are developed - the productive ground whence

the finite and its antithesis arise - but, as this takes place in Him timelessly, He himself never comes within the region of the contrasted. Even the world itself does not stand opposed to Him as an independent being. Its parallel modes of the ideal and the real, find their unity in Him; just as the organic and the intellectual functions are united in the conscious ego". The world and God cannot be separated, for in being they are identical and differ only in constitution, that is, the world is the totality while God is the unity of all antitheses. In the same way they cannot be identified, for the world is unity in multiplicity and God is the unity with the exclusion of multiplicity, or the absolute Unity.

The being of God differs from the world, and so is transcendent, in two respects. In the first place the being of God is absolute unity as opposed to the world's multiplicity; and second it transcends man's knowledge and lies in the realm of the incomprehensible and unknowable as opposed to the world's comprehensibility. As we have seen, there is no being of God outside of the world and so in that respect it is not transcendental. The immanence of God receives full recognition. God is

* Munro, Schleiermacher, p 213.
given in every self-consciousness; He Himself constitutes the essential unity and distinctive character of our own being; and He is revealed in every individual thing. This sort of transcendency is, to say the least, very intangible and is denied just there where it is usually maintained, that is, that there is a being of God outside of the world. This has given rise frequently to the charge of pantheism and Spinozism. Schleiermacher was aware of this and gave in the Dialektik a clear analysis of the difference between his system and pantheism when speaking of the conceptual difference between the highest species and the transcendental identity of the ideal and the real. The mode of conceiving God as the highest species or power is pantheism. It may be arrived at in two ways. First by a process of abstract conception through a mounting of the antitheses of the ideal and the real to that conception of unity which embraces both. The Spinozistic system is a product of such abstract thought. The second way is more empirical. An individual, as for example, man is also a member of a species, i.e. humanity, which again belongs to a still higher species. Men have mounted up through the inorganic, the organic, the human, the world and the world bodies to a simple unity of the worlds
which embraces both the ideal and the real, and this highest species is called God. But the highest conception to which reason can mount does not transcend the antithesis between the ideal and the real, but remains within the realm of contrasts. The pantheist arbitrarily combines the ideal and the real at the top in a highest but comprehensible species which embraces all contrasts in a single compound and designates this unity by the name God. Pantheism can never be the expression of a religious consciousness because it belongs to the realm of the antithetical and finite. The God of the pantheists corresponds to Schleiermacher's idea of the world, i.e. the totality rather than the unity of contrasts, whereas Schleiermacher's God is the transcendental identity of the highest contrasts. This distinction may be accepted as the expression of the general difference between the two systems of thought.

Schleiermacher's philosophical conception of God is remarkable principally for its indefiniteness or transcendental nature. The positive knowledge of God is limited to the unity of His being, and even this is a postulate of knowledge and consciousness rather than an absolute act of knowledge. As in the Reden the individual person is the basis and model of his system and is the best example of relative identity of the ideal and the real.
The relative being of God in man, i.e. the existence of ideas and conscience in him, cannot be taken as representative of the absolute nature of God, but only as a finite manifestation of it. Hence we can say nothing about divine personality. The dialectic representation of God differs from that of the Reden only as required by a revised cosmology which admits a greater emphasis upon the divine transcendence along with the divine immensity. Philosophy knows nothing of the inner motives or fundamental disposition of the divine nature since that lies beyond its realm. It can go no further than to describe Him as the transcendental identity of the ideal and the real.
CHAPTER V

The Dogmatic Conception of God (Glaubenslehre*).

The function of dogmatics is to derive and systematize the body of truth that relates to the religious life of man. Dogmaticians have usually drawn their material from two sources of which the principal one was the Bible and ecclesiastical traditions which contained the experiences and teachings of the men associated with the great events and movements of the early life of the Church. The records were made the primary source because a high authority, based upon the claims of revelation and inspiration were assigned to them. A secondary source of religious truth, but primarily a criterion of interpretation, was the religious experience of the thinker himself. A third factor, whose influence was felt in dogmatics somewhat in inverse ratio to the spiritual vitality of the age, was the speculative thought of philosophers, both inside and outside of the Church. The total result was a system which headed up in the doctrine of God. The emphasis upon this part of the system fluctuated irregularly with

* The dogmatic conception of God is based upon the second edition of der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhang dargestellt, as contained in the fourth edition of the sämtliche Werke, Berlin, 1842.
the influence of speculative thought upon dogmatics; for that doctrine lent itself most readily to speculative interest. At a time when the spiritual life of the Church was at a low ebb and the speculative impulse was prevalent, such as the age of rationalism, the doctrine of God assumed a wholly disproportionate role in religious thought. Schleiermacher in reacting from this condition reversed the priority of the sources of dogmatics, made religious experience regulative and assigned to the Bible only a confirmatory authority. The first effect was to transfer the seat of religion to the emotional nature of man and to remove dogmatics from the reach of purely speculative thought. The business of the new dogmatics was the interpretation of religious experiences into their appropriate expression, and not in the manipulation of authorized or necessary truth. This released it at once from the task of formulating a doctrine of God from universal principles or from revelations of supersensuous truth, and any doctrine concerning him which it does set forth must be subservient to the interests of religion rather than to those of inquisitiveness or curiosity. Religious emotions are not engendered by any preconceived notions of deity intellectually produced, but the ideas of God are the products of reflection over the religious consciousness of God.
Schleiermacher hoped to escape the corruptions which had crept into dogmatics from alien origins by working out immediately from the original source, namely, the immediate experience of God in religion.

"Piety **** considered purely in itself, is neither a knowing or a doing but a modification of feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness".* Religion bears the same relation to feeling that science bears to thought and morals to will. Schleiermacher goes to great length to distinguish feeling, as the source of religious consciousness, from knowing and doing as a separate compartment of our being. But still nothing that is said need absolutely exclude an element of apprehension from religious feeling, not indeed, intellectual cognition, but of immediate awareness from vital contact.** If there is

* Glaubenslehre, I. p. 6.
** "Ther Absehen geht nur darauf, solche Aussagen über Gott zu machen, die ihn zum Gegenstand haben, soweit er in Gefühl gegeben ist. an sich wäre letzteres auf zweierlei Weise möglich. Gott könnte sich auf unmittelbar Art dem Gefühl kundmachen oder aber mittlehbar zu seinem Inhalt gehören, so fern ein Bestandteil desselben nur als göttliche Wirkung verstanden werden kann. Der erste Standpunkt ist in den Satze Pascals ausgesprochen; les principes se sentent. Gott ist nicht für die intellectuelle erkennniss erreichbar, wohl aber für das Gefühl. Hier werden wir unmittelbar der Existence Gottes ebenso gewiss wie unseres eigenen Daseins. Ja das Gefühl wird fast ein ins Übersinnliche erhobener Tastsinn, der in ähnlicher Weise ein Organ für die Perception Gottes ist wie die fünf Sinne für die Wahrnehmung der äusseren Welt". Himme, die religions philosophischen Grämissen der Schleiermacheren Glaubenslehre, p. 54.
no such element, his conception of God is hardly to be distin-
guished from agnosticism, and the narrow basis of his re-
flections barely separate them from speculation. In the
Heden the immediate awareness or consciousness of God was
described as intuition and feeling. If this conception
has been retained but adapted to polemical use by the in-
corporation of intuition into feeling, we may assume a re-
ligious self-consciousness which is able to apprehend both
its own states and something of the nature of that which
produced them. This is not only admissible in his descrip-
tion of our immediate self-consciousness and in the appli-
cation which he makes of it, but it aids in an understand-
ing of the whole system and helps to rescue it from some
of the most serious charges to which it is otherwise ex-
posed. But whether the nature of this feeling is similar
to Jacobi's description of the same which was a sort of
sixth sense by means of which we apprehend God, or whether
it is wholly dissociated from any source of awareness, it
is to be translated into intellectual formulas by reflec-
tion upon it. In neither case do we arrive at any immediate
intellectual knowledge of God, but in one case we have
religious knowledge of God translated into conceptual forms,
and in the other a speculative notion of God based upon
introspection and psychological analysis.

The distinctive type of feeling which characterizes all expressions of piety is the consciousness of absolute dependence, or, which is the same thing of our relation with God. This highest stage of human self-consciousness which is produced by the operation of God upon us transcend the finite and limited but is never actually separated from the antithetical or objective consciousness which is produced by the operation of the world upon our sense. They are always connected and the former can find expression only through the latter. Doctrines of God arise from the interpretation of religious soul states into conceptual forms or into the translation of religious feelings into images symbolical of the absolute nature of the Author of that feeling.* This accounts for the anthropomorphistic conceptions of God held by men who took the symbolical representations of the religious consciousness and made them the basis of much unfitting speculation. It is, of course, impossible to describe the Infinite in conceptual forms

without introducing the finite and conflicting, but re-
ligious men are aware that in the feeling of absolute 
dependence a being is given that transcends all that is 
antithetical and limited.

Every act of human self-consciousness involves two 
elements: the subjective and the objective or the ego 
and the non-ego. When these two come together our con-
sciousness is aroused and the nature of the consciousness 
depends upon which of them is predominant. When we influ-
ence the objective world a feeling of partial freedom is 
aroused, but when it operates upon us a feeling of partial 
dependence is produced, corresponding to our spontaneity 
or receptivity, and in this relationship of reciprocity 
we are conscious of our oneness with the world. We do, 
however, have a feeling of absolute dependence separate 
from these objective and partial feelings. The object 
of this feeling must necessarily be another than the 
material world, toward which we can only have a partial 
feeling of dependence. The origin or "Whence" (Woher) 
of this feeling of absolute dependence shall be designated 
by the expression God, and this shall be its true and 
original significance. "This whence", he says, "is not 
the world in the sense of the totality of temporal being, 
and still less of any individual part of the same"* We 

* Glaubenslehre, I. p. 20.
have a limited sense of freedom toward the world and a consciousness that we can influence any of its parts, but this is not true of the other feeling which must therefore spring from a wholly different source. There can be no doubt that Schleiermacher means to designate a being which transcends the material and finite world as the origin of the feeling of absolute dependence. This undefined Deity or generic determination of the being of God as the whence of the feeling of absolute dependence is sometimes alluded to as "unknown greatness", but at this point he is only indicating the method of approach and the absolute nature of God.* The transference of this conception he says, to any perceptible object, to any object capable of reciprocal action, unless it is consciously symbolical, whether as a temporary transference to theosophy, "or a constitutive one in which God is represented as a perceptible, persevering individual

* "Das fromme Selbstbewusstsein hat nicht das Vermögen, Gott gegenständlich zu erfassen, wohl aber ist es ein Phänomen, das wir nicht aus der Weltexistenz ableiten können, weil wir ihr gegenüber nur ein relatives Abhängigkeitsgefühl haben. Daher deshalb müssen wir es auf ein andres Woher, nämlich Gott, zurückschieben, wobei aber Gott zunächst eine dunkle, unbekannte Größe bleibt, "wie denn niemals aus der Wirkung das Wesen dessen selbst, was angewirkt hat, erkannt werden kann". Relig. phil. Prämisse der Schulaubs. Thieme, p. 56.
The highest stage of religious development is that in which all religious affections express the dependence of all that is finite upon one Supreme and Infinite Being. Monotheistic religions are different from the lower forms in that they clearly distinguish the religious feeling from the antithetical world-consciousness and in that they relate them to the supreme unity which transcends the world. Christian dogmatics presuppose the unity or uniqueness of God as one of its most fundamental postulates.

Pantheism is not a type of religion, and has never been the confession of any historical religious body, but is rather a speculative mode of conceiving the things that belong to religion and as such may belong to any stage of religious development. As a manner of conception it is compatible with genuine religious feelings if it is a form of theism rather than a masked materialistic negation of it. "So it remains optional to each one, without injury to his adherence to the Christian dogmatic, to adhere to any form of speculation which admits an object to which he can relate the feeling

* Glaubs. p. 22.
of absolute dependence". The ordinary pantheistic formula involves the One and the all. God and the world, then, must, at least, be distinguished in respect of function. The pious man, with the consciousness of his organic relation to the world, may feel himself with the All absolutely dependent upon the One. The religious expressions accompanying such a mode of conception could hardly be distinguished from some forms of theism. "Mich tröstet nur, dass ich nun wenigstens ebensoviel Anspruch habe, ein Ichheitlicher genannt zu werden, als ein All-Einheitler. Aber ist es auch wirklich dieselbe Erklärung? Kommt auch die Weisheit und die Liebe auf diese Weise heraus?" The crude distinction between an extra-mundane or transcendent God and an immanent God cannot be made without endangering the divine omnipotence and omnipresence, for God is non-spatial and cannot be assigned to any portion of space. The net result of this argument is to admit the validity of religious expressions which are compatible with the feeling of absolute dependence.

Dogmatics differ from speculation in that God is consciously given in feeling and in immediate awareness

* Glaubenslehre, I. p. 258.
** Schleiermacher, Sendeschreiben über seine Glaubenslehre an Lüke, sämtlich Werke, p. 599.
feeling of absolute dependence. Since this feeling is universal, and the presence of God is an essential element of each human consciousness, it can be no part of the business of dogmatics to formulate proof for the existence of God, for such has value only for the objective consciousness. Speculation or science may prove the existence or nature of a God wholly similar to that of dogmatics, but it can have no more value nor place in it than if it were wholly incongruous.* The assumption of the existence of God is the most fundamental thing in dogmatics which seeks to develop and unfold the immediate consciousness of God as given in religious experience and feeling. Proof and demonstration are wholly alien to the method of dogmatics.

The feeling of absolute dependence, like any other type of human consciousness can be aroused only through the active influence of the agent which produces it or the "whence" of that feeling. No such feelings are produced by any passive or resting attributes but only by that aspect

* "Ist aber etwa unter jenem Ausdruck doch ein speculatives wissen um Gott gemeint: so bleiben diese beiden bei mir immer auseinander, weil sie - so ist meine Überzeugung -, wenn sie gleich zusammenstimmen müssen, doch nicht zusammengehören, und nicht durch einander bestimmt werden. Ich bin mir auf das bestimmteste bewusst, von jener Regel nirgend auch nur um eine Linie abgewichen zu sein, sondern aus ihr sind nicht nur meine Sätze, sondern auch meine Kritiken der bisherigen Formeln allein hervorgegangen". Thimme, Relig. Phil. Prämisse, p 2c. Sendeschreiben, p. 502
of the divine Being which is active. In limiting the scope of dogmatics to the task of unfolding and interpreting the feeling of absolute dependence, Schleiermacher has limited his doctrine of God to that aspect of the divine Being which is operative in our religious consciousness. He knows nothing of a negative or merely existing being of God, but only of an active universal causality, of the author of the feeling of absolute dependence. The doctrine of God which results from this method will have the advantage of being positive throughout and will preclude the temptation to much unprofitable speculation over metaphysical subtleties.

The feeling of absolute dependence which is the self-identical essence of piety can be made to yield propositions under three different relationships, namely, the relation of God to man as an integral part of the world, the relation of God to man in sin, and the relation of God to redeemed man. Each of these relationships will yield likewise three groups of doctrines, namely, those which refer to human states, to divine attributes, and to the constitution of the world.

The relation of God to the world belongs to dogmatics because of the essential unity of man and the world. The
feeling of absolute dependence is contained in each religious excitation in the measure that we realize our place in the natural order, that is, in the measure that we are conscious of ourselves as a part of the world.* The absolute dependence of the world upon God will be unfolded first in the doctrine of creation and preservation, second in the doctrine of the divine attributes and third in the doctrine of the original perfection of the world. The first of these reveals something of the divine activity in originating and sustaining the world and will be further treated in Chapter VI in which the absoluteness, the independence, and the orderly nature of God will be discussed. The attributes of God which are exhibited in the relation of the divine causality to the world in general, as opposed to its relation to man, are eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence and omniscience. These attributes, together with those revealed in the relation of God to the antithesis of redemption will be treated further in Chapter VII. This section is equivalent in extent and corresponds in a more or less general way, to the cosmological argument for the nature of God. It is not to be viewed as the distinctively Christian conception of God but as that

* Glaubenslehre, I. p. 177.
universally presupposed in the Christian consciousness and contained in the feeling of absolute dependence.

The relation of God to sin is exhibited in the unfolding of the first side of the antithesis of redemption, or in the stimulation of the consciousness of the need of redemption. Sin as an element of the world which is absolutely dependent upon God must be ascribed to divine authorship. This necessitates a definition of sin compatible with the nature of Him who has ordained it. It is described as a negative element, as an imperfect triumph of the spirit over the flesh or of the God-consciousness over the world-consciousness. It is a condition which quickens the consciousness of the need of redemption and prepared the way for a greater impartation of the divine nature to human nature and for the union of the two. Sin does not exist in and for itself but as a condition of redemption and a spur to it. In a similar way, it is shown that God is the Author of evil which has an indispensable connection with sin. God as the Author and Punisher of sin is looking toward the fuller perfection of His design of redemption. The divine attributes which are exhibited in the consciousness of sin and evil are holiness and justice. This
section covers in general the same ground as that covered by the moral argument for the nature of God, and is only an introduction to the positive, Christian conception of God.

The relation of God to redemption is contained in the consciousness of a new corporate life of the spirit in which the God-consciousness is triumphant over the sin consciousness. We are conscious that this new life and power is not a natural development of the former nature of sin, but that it is imparted to us from the spontaneous activity of Jesus Christ and may be viewed as the completion of the creation of human nature. The provision through which this is accomplished is not a super-added or supernatural divine activity but belongs to the divine world government as decreed from all eternity. The idea of preservation first receives its full significance when it is made to include the sending of Christ, the establishment and perfection of the Church and the inauguration of the Kingdom of God. The whole divine government of the world heads up in the Kingdom of God, and all forces or tendencies whether physical or spiritual are contributory to the one divine design of redemption of humanity or union of the
divine and human natures, as is prophetically and perfectly contained in the archetypal character of the Redeemer in whom God became man.

In the unfolding of the divine plan relative to the world human nature passes through various stages of development corresponding to the animalistic, self-consciousness or sin-consciousness, and the God-consciousness. The transition to the latter of these is marked by the appearance of Christ who came in the fullness of time or in accordance with the divine government of the world and completed the creation of human nature by imparting to it His own sinlessness and perfect blessedness. The Author of this redemptive or new creative activity is like all men by virtue of the identity of human nature, but is distinguished from them by the constant strength of his God-consciousness which was a veritable existence of God in Him. His nature or new creating activity was not communicated to all, but only to those whose stage of development or place in the divine world government enabled them to have faith. The nature and method of the divine activity in the establishment of the Church or in election will be presented further in Chapter VIII.

The divine attributes which are manifested in redem-
ption are Love and Wisdom (see Chapter VII). These are the peculiarly Christian attributes and represent the more distinctively religious conception of God. This section may be viewed as the heart of the dogmatic conception of God and as the one which gives meaning and character to the other attributes. "God is love". The others are only descriptive and are without significance except in so far as they relate to love.

The summary of the essential elements of the last section of the Glaubenslehre are contained in the doctrine of the Trinity which seeks to establish the essential deity of Christ and the Holy Spirit. The relation of the second and third Persons of the Trinity to the First as unity of essence is not logical on the hypothesis of an eternal separation in the Godhead, which hypothesis is also incompatible with the absolute nature of God. Christ and the Holy Spirit, then, represent the first and second acts of divine union with humanity. The doctrine of the Trinity will be presented in Chapter IX.

Schleiermacher's system of dogmatics is so arranged as to lead to a climax rather than to an anti-climax. The framework of religious philosophy with which it is
introduced is not to be taken as an index of the doxmatic conception of God. He recognized the misleading nature of the introductory principles and contemplated a reversal of the order of treatment so that the divine love would be introductory, but retained the present arrangement as more scientific. An estimate of this part of the conception of God must be reserved until the whole of it has been presented.
CHAPTER VI

The Nature of God Revealed in Creation

and Preservation

The feeling of absolute dependence, which we have seen derived and made the fundamental of all dogmatics, experiences its first and most general process of unfolding in the doctrines of creation and preservation which express the relation between the world and God. These doctrines do not deal primarily with the divine nature, but with the nature of the world, with relationships and modes of action, from which, however, certain qualities inhering in the nature of the Author of the worlds may be inferred.

The feeling of dependence of which we, as articulate parts of the finite world, are conscious is so absolute and is such a universal element of our self-consciousness that we are justified in inferring the same dependence for every part of the world. Briefly and essentially that relationship is that the world subsists only in absolute dependence upon God. This negative unit of truth is the sole basis of the two doctrines of creation and preservation, either of which is sufficient to express that relationship if in each God is regarded as the sole
Determinant. The division is not scientific, but rests in part upon the desire to exalt the nature of God by multiplying the dignities and achievements belonging to Him. In order to deduce a doctrine of God it is necessary, in the main, to transpose from the negative to the positive and in the case of creation from the double negative to the positive. From the nature of the case, the positive statements which relate to the independence and absoluteness of God must be less scientific, comprehensive, and detailed than those which relate to the ever present consciousness of absolute dependence of the finite world.

The references to the nature of the divine activity which appear in this discussion may be classed under three heads: the absoluteness of God, the independence of God, and the orderly nature of God.

Probably the one word which most accurately describes Schleiermacher's conception of God, as revealed in the doctrines of creation and preservation, would be "absoluteness". It is an immediate converse of the principal proposition that the world is absolutely dependent upon God. This absoluteness extends to every aspect of God's relationship to the world. If there were any part of the world which in any respect was not absolutely dependent upon God,
it would enter in some measure into our constitution, because the world is an interrelated unit, and so make the feeling of absolute dependence impossible. The counterpart of this absolute dependence of the world is that God is the absolute Author and Sustainer of every part of the world. To Him alone is original activity ascribed. We know nothing of the origin of the world except that it is of God: "The worlds have been framed by the word of God" (Heb. 11;3). God is the universal cause which gives being and sustentation to the world system and, through it, to every part of its being, to the smallest and the greatest, to free causes and the mechanisms of nature, and to the evil as well as to the good. Further than this the absoluteness of God can be developed negatively only, i.e. through the correction of cognate doctrines which have developed from false premises. Thus God must not be brought under the antitheses or limitations of time and space, for they relate only to the world and not to its Author. We know nothing of the manner or time of creation, but we can deny a beginning of exterior activity or lordship on the part of God. Neither may the divine activity be conceived after the analogy of human activity which gives form to a pre-existent material, nor after the manner of nature
which organizes the complex from the simple. The division of the divine activity into separate acts of creation and preservation or the assumption of pre-existent mass, form, or force prior to creation, would involve God in division, antithesis, temporal sequence and reciprocity with the world and would destroy the feeling of absolute dependence. Similarly, the idea of co-operation or divine government is incompatible with the absoluteness of God. Few men have been so thorough-going in the establishment of the sovereignty of God. It has usually been felt that it would be less derogatory to the dignity of God to detract from His absoluteness rather than to assign to Him the authorship of evil. It has been ascribed to some other source, to fallen and apostate angels, or to the devil - independent of God and capable of opposition to Him. But for Schleiermacher, to whom the feeling of absolute dependence was the very heart of religion, nothing could be more destructive than a being outside of God’s absolute government. He denied the existence of the devil and defined evil in such a way that it did not detract from the goodness of God. Evil does not exist in and for itself, nor does it inhere in the essential nature of any of God’s creatures. "There remains, therefore, no alternative other than, on the one side, to relate the divine co-operation equally upon everything that happens and, on
the other side, to assert that evils, certainly not in and for themselves, but only as a condition of the good and in relation upon the same are ordered of God".* The sovereignty of God is absolute.

From the original datum that the world is absolutely dependent upon God we may axiomatically arrive at the independence of God, for it is self evident that that is absolutely free from which everything else is absolutely dependent. Hence, God is absolutely free.** By freedom is meant the absence of constraint. It is said that God created the world by a free resolve. This freedom is not to be so understood as though, after cogitation, God decided to create rather than to leave uncreated, or as though there was an alternative—not to create. Freedom is not an antithesis of necessity, for—if it were—God would be limited in His freedom. God was free to act according to His own good pleasure but that does not involve any uncertainty or capriciousness. "As in the case of human beings we may say that God's action is determined by His character".*** The divine activity is as inexorable as necessity but its source in the nature

* Glaubenslehre, I. p. 248.
** Cf. Sendeschreiben, p. 591.
*** Selbie, Schleiermacher, p. 96.
of His own being and not from any external coercion.*

This is equivalent to the Spinozistic formula and is the only freedom that is compatible with the divine absoluteness of the Schleiermacherian thought.

Another quality by which Schleiermacher characterizes the divine activity in creation and especially in preservation is that of orderliness. As we have seen above, he objects to any suggestion of variableness or anything that implies capriciousness on the part of God. The gist of the doctrine of preservation is that the divine sustentation of the world is accomplished through the system of nature. The effect of this is to exclude from the world's course anything not strictly natural and logical. God does not stretch forth His hand to sustain any individual thing or to produce a result which would not otherwise have taken place. According to Schleiermacher the divine nature is more faithfully and nobly portrayed in the logical sequence of the natural order than in any interruption of it. Our consciousness knows nothing of a beginning of the world but only of preservation, and nothing of preservation except through the forces of nature. The nature, place, and function of every object is determined by the innumer-

able causes which enter into its existence and relationship with the world. As an effect, it is just equal to all the causes which have gone into its makeup, and it, in turn, transmits a commensurate influence toward other effects. But this does not deny that preservation is an act of God. The whole system of nature with its manifold of cause and effect has its origin in the one universal cause which is God. Thus God sustains the whole world as one great unit whose parts act and react in harmony with the unalterable laws of its own being. To deny this is to deny universal law and to make impossible all science, which has in our consciousness an equal validity with that of religion. It is wholly impossible to harmonize the idea of miracles with any worthy conception of the nature of God and of His handiwork. A supernatural act, introduced into the world's course of events, would not only modify all the effect of all previous divine activities but would alter the whole future course of nature and destroy the balance of cause and effect. And what justification could there be for such an arbitrary act? We may not say that it is to correct a defect of the natural system, for that would imply imperfection in the divine workmanship. Neither is it to reveal the omnipotent
power of God to man, for it is more perfectly revealed in the unity and harmony of nature than it would be in the interruption of His work. It cannot be required to counteract the operations of free acting causes, for that is accomplished through the sending of Christ which is not a suprenatural act but a part of the divine preservation or world government. Some propose the necessity of it as a ground for the immediate relation of God to man, but this implies antithesis between the mediate and the immediate and its application brings God into the sphere of limitation. So-called wonders are the products of forces and natural laws not wholly known to us. God is honoured most where science is greatest rather than where it is least, as is believed sometimes. It is said that rebirth is a divine act apart from the natural order, but anything which inheres in and issues from the sending of Christ, which belongs to the divine government of the world, need not be viewed as supernatural. It is commonly believed that God deviates from this rigid adherence to the laws of nature and causes wholly different issues to ensue than that which would otherwise have taken place in the answer to prayer, but this supposition rests upon a misconception of the nature of prayer.
A harmonious treatment of this subject is given in sections 146-7, entitled, "Prayer in the Name of Jesus". God answers true prayer but does not abrogate the laws of nature in doing it. Prayer and its fulfilment or non-fulfilment are a part of the divine preservation or world government, which comprehends not only all free causes, but also the life and well being of the Church and the Kingdom of God. Hence, prayer itself, or the desire of the Church for that which will be salutary for its in its co-existence with the world, is a part of the natural order, and its fulfilment is the expression of the governing activity of God relative to the same object. True prayer can have no other object than that which lies in the divine ordering of the world. The hearing of prayer is as inseparable from prayer as effect is from cause, and the answer to true prayer is as inevitable as prayer itself. The two together form an essential part of the natural order. God truly answers prayer, not indeed in the interruption of the natural law but through the medium of nature itself. The ordinary conception of prayer presupposes a reciprocity of action between God and man, and makes the divine activity conditional upon human activity which conflicts with the absoluteness and independence of God.
The counsels of God are immutable and His activities unvarying.
CHAPTER VII

The Divine Attributes

Schleiermacher introduces his discussion of the divine attributes with the proposition, "All attributes which we ascribe to God are not to be taken as indicating something specific in God, but only something specific in our manner of referring to Him the feeling of absolute dependence".* This was said in reply to those who had allowed the symbolical language of hymnology, exhortation, and the commonplace expressions of popular devotional life, which in the interests of piety described God in conceptual and finite images, to usurp the scientific language of dogmatics whose function it was to guard against dangerous tendencies of popular religious thought.

The notion was prevalent in current theology that God was

* Glaubenslehre, I. p. 255. Translated by Baillie, The Christian Faith in Outline, 1922, p. 23. Cf. also, "All attributes which we ascribe to God denote nothing separate in God, but only something separate in the manner in which we refer our feeling of dependence to Him". Selbie, Schleiermacher, pp. 88-9., and, "All attributes which we ascribe to God have the function, not of denoting something particular in God, but only of denoting something particular in the mode in which the feeling of absolute dependence is related to Him". Paterson, The Rule of Faith, 1905. p. 361.
a Being with distinct characteristics or attributes corresponding to the human personality. * Each known attribute of God was supposed to add to the knowledge of God but it also added to His complexity. "For if they, as such, should represent a knowledge of the divine Being, then each one of them must express something in God which the others do not express, and - if the knowledge would correspond to its object - He would have to be a composite Being like the compilation of knowledge about Him". ** This conception of God, as "involved in a manifold of function" - mutually limiting and partially opposed to one another - would place God in the realm of the antithetical. This conception of God as a complex of attributes violated two of the most fundamental presuppositions of Schleiermacher's system of dogmatics.


Sendschreiben, pp. 602-3.
namely, the unity and infinity of the divine nature which transcends all division, limitation, and antithesis and could not be divided into segments or parts. Such a conception would be incompatible with the uniformity and universality of the feeling of absolute dependence. If the attributes pertained to the essential being of God and that Being was infinite and indivisible, there could, of course, be only one such. It was in this sense, that is, as embracing all that was implied in the others, that the attribute of love was equated with the divine Being. Such a conception, however is too abstract, and synthetic to be comprehended by a finite or analytic understanding. The attributes, then, must correspond to the human power of conception rather than to the infinite and indivisible being of God.

The above proposition, however, is not to be understood as though the attributes had no reference to the being of God. They are to be viewed not as constitutive, but as descriptive. The true and scientific description of the being of God is "Love". If, however, we would be more specific we should say God is causal love, or, eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent, omnipresent, holy, just, and wise Love. The divine Being is an indivisible
and incomprehensible unit of activity which is eternal, omnipotent, just, etc, but is not a complex of these abstract and meaningless attributes. The attributes, then, are symbolical, descriptive representations of the modes of divine activity manifested in our consciousness of absolute dependence.

The converse of our feeling of absolute dependence is causality, hence we must necessarily posit absolute causality in God as that which gives rise to our feeling of absolute dependence. The generic definition of the "whence" of our feeling of absolute dependence will be "causality" and all the attributes will relate to some modification of it. In the realm of dogmatics this is the only legitimate way of deriving divine attributes. The customary two other co-ordinating methods, non-limitation and negation are at best only canons of interpretation. The first of these is a negation of limits and so is identical with the second. Negative attributes are wholly without meaning and have no place in the positive method of dogmatics. The value of both these methods is exemplified in the so-called attribute of infinity. God is infinite, but is he infinite time, infinite love, infinite evil, or infinite negation? It may be anything
or it may be nothing, and so is incapable of determining the nature of God. They may aid us however, as criteria for emphasizing that in God which stimulates the God-consciousness and for denying that in God which destroys the God-consciousness.

The various methods which have been offered for the classification of divine attributes, such as the natural and moral, the original and the derived, the static and the active, the absolute and the relative, etc, import inequality and division into the divine Being and so cannot be accepted. The dogmatic method of examining all modifications of feeling and of interpreting them into divine attributes yields also its own classification. It is developed according to the three relationships under which we have a consciousness of God, and yields as many groups of divine attributes. The first group is developed from the universal religious consciousness or the feeling of absolute dependence which is common to all men. This group of attributes is based upon the relation of God to the world in general and is simply an unfolding of the idea of universal causality which is the reciprocal equivalent of the idea of the world's total dependence as presupposed by and also contained in the Christian consciousness. The attributes exhibited in God's causal re-
lation to the world in general are eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence and omniscience. These are truly the most general ones and should be recognized by all men under all circumstances, and may in that respect, for convenience, be called the original divine attributes. The second group is developed from the religious consciousness which is involved in the first side of the antithesis of redemption, or the consciousness of sin. This group is based upon the relation of God to man in the first stage of redemption and is simply the unfolding of the idea of conscience as it is reflected in the nature of man. The attributes exhibited in God's pre-redemptive relation to man are holiness and justice. The type of consciousness involved here is negative, i.e. the consciousness of absolute dependence and the need of redemption. The third group is developed from the other side of the antithesis or the consciousness of redemption communicated through the gracious activity of Jesus of Nazareth. This group is based on the relation of God to redeemed man and is the unfolding of the idea of the communicated blessedness of Christ. The attributes exhibited in God's redemptive are love and wisdom. They are derived from the positive consciousness of a new life and power and represent the
Christian conception of God.

And how can the divine causality of which the feeling of absolute dependence is a reflection be resolved into a group of attributes? We have the feeling of absolute dependence simultaneously with the feeling of partial dependence and partial freedom which are aroused by our interaction with the world. In the finite world, every dependence or passivity has a corresponding causality or spontaneity, and these constitute the natural order. If each dependence or passivity has a commensurate causality, we must infer from the total dependence upon the divine causality that it is not less than the world order and that, in embrace, it is equal to the finite causality. But in another respect, the feeling of absolute dependence is unlike the feeling of partial dependence and bears the same relation to it that it does to the feeling of partial freedom, that is, that of the absolute to the conditioned. The finite causality is what it is because of its interrelationship with the finite passivity and so belongs to the realm of reciprocal action and variation, and this is just the respect in which the absolute causality differs from it. The divine causality is, on the one hand, like the finite causality, but only in the measure that it is unlike
it in another respect. That aspect of the divine causality in which it resembles the finite causality and is equal to it, will be designated the divine omnipotence, and that in which it is dissimilar, that is,- in manner - will be called the divine eternity, because eternity differs from temporality in the same way that the absolute differs from the sequential and variable. It should be noted that neither of these conceptions have any meaning except in relation to the divine causality. Instead, therefore, of saying that God is eternal and omnipotent we should say that God is the eternal Omnipotence or the omnipotent Eternal. The coordinating and supplementing attributes of omniscience and omnipresence may be derived in the same way. In the finite world, we distinguish between living and dead forces, and if this latter idea should be born over into the idea of God, we might have a conception of God as a principle of dead force. We, however, as self-conscious beings could not feel ourselves absolutely dependent upon such a being, and, in so far as omniscience is the antithesis of dead force, we may say that the divine causality is omniscient. The finite causality belongs to the realm of the variable and antithetical, not only in its temporality, but also by virtue of its spatiality. In as much, then, as omnipresence
is the antithesis of spatiality we may ascribe that attribute to the divine causality, and thus we have arrived at the four divine attributes revealed in the universal causality as related to the world in general. The identity of these attributes can be briefly expressed in another way. If space and time represent externality and we presuppose something which first becomes objective when it assumes existence in time and space, then we may designate that which is antithetical to time and space as subjective. In the same way if omniscience is so construed that the omnipotence is not considered as dead force we reach the same thought that is expressed in absolute livingness. The representation of the divine nature through the conceptions of subjectivity and livingness would be as exhaustive as the other and perhaps less susceptible to misconstruction through the intrusion of alien influences.

God is eternal.

The divine eternity is defined as "The absolutely timeless causality of God".* Eternity is simply the being of God looked at from the point of view of His relation to time. "In another words, God is to him an eternal now, a measureless moment in eternity".** The religious consciousness becomes actual only as the consciousness of

* Glaubs. I.p. 268. ** Selbie, Sch.p. 94
His eternal power. Eternity, conceived as a quality in itself, is without meaning, but it can only be conceived as a modification or description of some positive existence such as the divine omnipotence. It is nothing but the divine causality or power with the emphasis upon the aspect of its eternity. In this way we preserve the unity of the divine Being. This causality is more narrowly defined as "timeless" and "as conditioning all that is temporal and time itself". It transcends time and is antithetical to it, in as much as it is constant, while time is involved in sequence, change, and limitation. This departure from the usual conception of eternity as endless duration inheres in the inseparable and absolute nature of the divine Being. Men have sought to annihilate the limitations of time as applied to God by extending it to infinity, or by denying to God beginning or ending of being, but such definitions still involve Him in time, sequence, and change which inheres in infinite duration the same as in circumscribed time. To define eternity as timeless is purely negative and so without meaning. God has no relation to time except that He has made it and conditioned it. Time belongs to the world and was created with the world which first appeared at the begin-
ning of time, but that is not to bring the divine will or activity within the scope or limitation of time. The world may endure throughout infinite time, but that does not in any wise lessen the difference between it and the eternity of God, for it is not an infinity of time but the antithesis of time. This is the meaning of the language of the New Testament when it says, "A thousand years in thy sight are but as a day and a day as a thousand years". An analogy to the divine eternity may be found in the finite ego in so far as it is productive and persevering. The personal identity persists throughout all changes and, in its relation to that which is caused, is, as it were, timeless. We may avoid all dangers of confusion if we do not dissociate the divine eternity from omnipotence.

God is Omnipresent.

The other aspect of the antithesis between the divine and finite causalities is spatiality. The two conceptions are co-ordinate and demand parallel treatment. If the words time and eternity were replaced by the words space and omnipresence, the argument would not be far wrong. "By the omnipresence of God we understand the absolutely spaceless causality of God, which conditions not only every thing spatial but also space itself".* Omnipresence is

just the divine omnipotence with the emphasis upon the omnipresence. Unless related to the divine causality, it would be only a resting attribute and so would introduce antithesis into the being of God. It transcends space and has no relation to it except to create and condition it. It is antithetical to space in the absence of extension and the varying degrees of fullness. By omnipresence most men have understood the presence of God, in some places greater and in others less, in all space. The negative attribute of immeasurability has meaning only on the assumption that the divine omnipresence is spatial. The formula of Augustine, "Nulla contentus loco, sed in se ipsum ubique totus", (Ep. 187, 14) escapes the idea of spatiality in God. Unless we abolish the spatiality of the divine omnipresence a suspicion of pantheism is not easily avoided. When omnipresence is considered an abstract, resting attribute without reference to the divine causality the essential uniqueness of the divine Being is infallibly destroyed by introducing various shades of omnipresence.

God is Omnipotent.

We have seen that, though in respect of manner, the divine and finite causalities are unequal, they are equal
in compass, and that the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience are exhibited therein. Our consciousness of absolute dependence upon God is clearest when accompanied by the consciousness of our integral relation to the world and of the universal reference of the feeling of absolute dependence to the whole finite being. The consciousness of total receptivity on our part implies total activity in the Author of our feeling, or in God. From this we may infer that the whole natural order is grounded in the divine causality. "The entire system of nature, comprehending all spaces and times, is grounded in the divine causality, which, as eternal and omnipresent, is antithetical to all finite causality".* The divine omnipotence, though outside of space and time, has given being and impetus to the finite world, which subsists only in absolute dependence upon Him. It is the universal causality which has communicated the force and direction to the whole natural causality. The system of nature sustained in the finite realm by the divine causality is just that interminable and unalterable sequence of cause and effect, or immutable law. But the subsistence of all finite being upon the divine omnipotence is not to be so construed that

* Glaubenslehre, I. p. 280.
anything is taken out of that sequence or considered an immediate product of the divine activity.* A thing is not less grounded in the divine causality because it appears in time and space in the natural sequence, nor less in the finite, because we cannot trace it back to its natural cause. If the divine omnipotence is to be conceived only as eternal and omnipresent, then it may not be conceived as operating in space and time as a finite causality. A thing may first appear objectively in space and time but it is eternally posited in the divine causality which is not a supplement to the finite, but the producer of it. The assumption that God interferes directly with the orderly sequence of nature draws Him into the realm of time and space, associates Him with finite agents and involves Him in an alteration of rest and activity. We can now answer the question of the Scholastics as to whether the divine omnipotence is directly exercised or whether only through intermediate causes. The individual things are certainly the products of the sequential process of nature, however deeply that may be concealed from our understanding, but the world itself as a whole being can only be ascribed to the immediate exercise of the divine

* Compare the discussion of the doctrine of preservation.
omnipotence. "Vielmehr ist und wird alles ganz durch den "natursammenhang, so dass jedes durch alles besteht, und alles ganz durch die göttliche Allmacht, so dass Alles ungeteilt durch eines besteht".*

It is generally thought that the divine omnipotence far exceeds that required for the establishment and maintenance of the system of nature, but the feeling of absolute dependence gives us no point of contact with any part of the divine omnipotence which goes out beyond the natural order. "The divine causality, as expressed in our feeling of dependence, is completely exhibited in the totality of finite existence, and consequently everything for which there is a causality in God actually exists and comes to pass".** The All which perfectly represents the divine causality, then, one will correct, must consist not only of the actual but also of the possible. But if every effect truly represents the nature and measure of all causes which enter into its production, then there is nothing possible which does not also become actual. To the objection that another convergence of forces could have produced a different result, it may be replied that

* Glaubenslehre, I. p 281.
** Glaubenslehre, I. p 280.
all causes including both the mechanical and the free are the product of preceding causes and are determined in space and time by the laws of the divine world government. Only the natural result of all entering causal factors is possible in any case. Our idea of the possible outside of the actual rests upon our ignorance of the nature and extent of the causes. From the point of view of the divine omniscience, there could be no suggestion of a possible outside of the actual, for nothing can be separated from its place in the whole. Such a conception implies self-limitation and partiality in God. The definitions of omnipotence as the attribute by means of which God is able to do all that is possible, or all that He wills to do, are misleading for God actually does all that He wills to do or is able to do. To assume that one is greater is to admit that the other is less. Neither can the separation of these faculties be admitted, for a will without a power of execution or a power without a will must arise from different sources, and thus divide the being of God. "And so, because willing and power together are necessarily action, neither willing and action, nor power and action are to be separated from each other, but the whole omnipotence is undivided and undiminished, doing and accomplishing all
things".* The antithesis of simple and conditioned, or active and inactive divine will - which determines the divine omnipotence - violates the unity and inseparableness of the divine Being. The divine omnipotence is productive of the whole natural order and fully represents itself therein.

God is Omniscient.

The other attribute exhibited through the equality of the divine and finite causalities is omniscience. "By the divine omniscience is to be understood the absolute spirituality of the divine omnipotence".** It is possible to conceive of the divine omnipotence as dead force or blind necessity, but such a force could not yield religious emotions but only fatalism. In so far as he is spiritual, man would not be wholly dependent upon such a force, just as he is partially free in his relation to the material forces of nature because of the superiority of his spiritual nature over that of the material world. But since we - as self-conscious and free beings - have the consciousness of absolute dependence, we may infer the absolutely spiritual nature of the divine omnipotence. This attribute distinguishes the divine omnipotence from the material

forces inhering in the finite causality. By this is to be understood more a livingness than anything resembling the spiritual nature of man. The translation of this idea into more detailed conceptual forms after the customary human analogy is beset with many difficulties, because every aspect of our knowledge is conditioned both in content and in form by its finite and partial nature. The divine Being is an inseparable unity and suffers no influences from outside forces. The first canon is to exclude from the divine omniscience any element or receptivity or passivity. The divine omniscience does not rest upon perception, experience, or synthetic or comparative thinking. Unlike our thought, it does not relate to pre-existent material. Our design may be more comprehensive than our knowledge of the finished product because of the intrusion of unknown factors, but, for God, there is no pre-existent material and so no unknown factors. God can have knowledge only of that which He has willed and brought forth. Our knowledge, even though it were perfect, would still be conditioned by being, but the divine thought produces being. The second canon is that there can be no division in the divine Being and no sequence between design and accomplishment. Thought, will,
word, and action are separate and sequential in our finite
modes of conception, but the infinite and inseparable being
of God admits no such distinction between the divine
thought, work, and achievement as is reflected in the
biblical narrative that God spoke and the worlds were
created. If between design and accomplishment there
was a period of non- or partial realization, the divine
omnipotence would never be fully exhibited in the natural
order. The biblical record mentions no intervening time
between design and creation: "God said let there be light
and there was light". The divine omniscience is not dis-
tinguishable in form or content from the divine wisdom,
but only in our manner of derivation. The unity and
comprehensiveness of the attributes are implied in the
statement that "God knows all that is and all is that
God knows, and this assertion is not ambiguous but simple,
because His knowledge and His almighty will are one and
the same".* The transference of anthropomorphic elements
into the divine omniscience has involved God in pure or
unproductive thoughts, rejected thoughts, mediate or
conditioned thought, and free and necessary thought, all
of which are derogatory to the nature of God. A truer

* Glaubenslehre, I. p. 295.
picture would be that of the artist of perfect certainty, who in the condition of the inspired discoverer, thinks no thought and finds no conception presented to him to which he does not at once give reality.

Of Some Other Divine Attributes.

There are a number of so-called divine attributes which do not belong to the antithesis of sin and grace and so are due to be examined here. It cannot be the attribute of anything to be of a definite number, and furthermore the whence of our feeling of absolute dependence is not objectively given, and so cannot be numerically comprehended. The unity of God is based upon the homogeneity of the pious excitations from which the doctrine of God is developed, but this is not a type of divine activity in the same sense that the preceding attributes are. The unity of God then is the monotheistic canon rather than a divine attribute and is presupposed rather than proven. Any other endeavour to discuss or prove the unity of God could hardly avoid a distinction between the conception of God and the conception of the Highest Being. The unity of God, as we have seen, is presupposed by the method of dogmatics. Polytheism is a development of the religious consciousness in which the feeling of absolute dependence and the sensuous
self-consciousness is not clearly distinguished, with the consequence that the conception of God corresponds to the antithetical nature of the world-consciousness. The unity of God is presupposed in the unity of the feeling of absolute dependence.

The general conception of infinity as "the denial of limits" is negative, indefinite, and presupposes the nature of God, hence it is rather a criterion for the determination of the divine attributes than an attribute itself, or it is an attribute of all attributes. Nothing is to be posited in God which is involved in anywise in finitude or limitation. It is inapplicable, for the transference of finite predicates to God, such for instance, as the definition of omniscience as the infinitude of the divine power of thought, for that imports into God the character and division which belongs only to finite beings. Infinity is opposite in nature to finitude, and so is the canon for the exclusion from the divine Being of any qualities that inhere in finite being.

By the simplicity of God is usually understood the exclusion of materiality or complexity from the being of God; and it is a negative canon rather than a positive attribute. Not only is materiality to be excluded from God, but also that which we usually designate as finite spirit,
in function and determination it is involved in antithesis and partiality, and so is incapplicable to the divine Being.* "As infinity is the attribute of all attributes, simplicity, so simplicity is the unseparated and inseparable unity of all divine attributes and activities, as has been represented here in general and each one in particular. And just as infinity prevent the ascription of anything to God which cannot be thought of without its limitations, so simplicity shall exclude everything which belongs essentially to the sphere of antithesis".*

From this group of attributes, neither singly nor collectively, can moral dispositions, duty toward God, nor religious ethics be derived. They belong elsewhere. These are not to be viewed as a description of the divine Being, but they are the indispensable first forms to the completed.


** Glaubenslehre, I p. 308.
conception of God, and any activities encountered in the other forms of religious consciousness, which cannot be conceived under the form of the eternal omnipotence, are not divine activities. In a grossly material figure we might describe this group of attributes as the skeleton of the conception of God to which flesh and spirit are to be added in the other two groups.

God is Holy.

The unfolding of the first side of the antithesis grows out of the consciousness of the need of redemption or the consciousness of sin. This consciousness is stimulated and quickened by the ever-present implanted conscience which demands the conformity of all the activities of our life to the God-consciousness. The demands of the conscience are so vividly realized in living feelings or in the commands of moral law and are of such a nature that any deviation from them in our manner of life is recognized as obstruction to life, or as sin. That the conscience, when traced back to its source, is accepted as a divine causality and as a voice of God in the soul, as an original revelation of God requires no proof, but belongs to the inner experiences which we in our sphere can universally presuppose. The divine causality in
which the conscience is grounded belongs to the sphere of antithesis in which we are, and is the same divine causality in which sin is also grounded, for only through the conscience, that is, the margin of the judgment over the will, does anything become sin to us. The divine causality operates through the universal conscience to establish uniform moral and civil laws in the world. Since this law is recognized in us as absolutely holy, and as that which has determined the whole course of history we may infer that the divine causality is the absolutely holy and designate the corresponding attribute as holiness. The holiness of God, then, is the divine legislative causality, which demands, through the laws and feelings of conscience, the absolute conformity of all the activities of our lives to the God-consciousness. The usual conception of holiness as the divine pleasure over the good and displeasure with the bad, when good and bad refer to the activities of finite free beings, implies reciprocal action between God and man, since God's states are conditioned by man's action, and would make it only a resting, inactive attribute. Of this we can retain only the operation of the divine displeasure in conscience and in law. If by good and bad, we understand antithetical elements of the divine productiv-
ity, our proposition is without foundation, for the bad as opposed to the good is non-existent, but only as an absence of the good. The divine holiness may be negatively defined as the divine displeasure in the retardation of the God-consciousness as expressed through the feeling of conscience. This harmonizes also with the other idea of holiness as that attribute by means of which God demands perfect good of His creatures as expressed in the conception of absolute good. These explanations assume in part the inner purity of God as motive for those demands, but the dogmatic method knows only of its expression in causality. We may now add to our former conception that the divine omnipotence is absolutely holy.

God is Just.

The other attribute exhibited in the unfolding of the consciousness of sin is justice, which is revealed in a divine arrangement for the punishment of sin. "The justice of God is that divine causality through which, in the state of general sinfulness, there is ordained a connection between evil and actual sin". * From the nature of the basal feeling we can know nothing of the divine justice except as it relates to actual sin, and

since, further, man himself is incapable of deserving any reward, but receives only from the divine grace, the rewarding tendency of the divine justice can find no other object than Christ and only in so far as He is different from other men. If our race life were sinless we could not derive a conception of a divine justice in this manner. As sin disappears, whether through moral improvement or through forgiveness, the connection between sin and evil is annulled and forgiveness belongs to the same divine causality, for therein consists the rewarding of Christ. The divine causality reveals itself in such a world order that the obstructions of life springing from sin cannot, under the most favourable circumstances of the outer world, be averted or annulled; i.e. all sin perfectly mirrors itself in the totality of evil. The individual, however, is not the object of the divine justice in this respect for this would debase the divine causality to the level of civil justice and would bring it into the realm of finite activity. On the other hand, the connection between sin and evil is universally revealed in our consciousness of the desert of punishment, which is the engendering of the divine justice in the human soul just as conscience is the
engendering of the divine holiness. The separation of evil, which we are accustomed to make, into natural and arbitrary punishment is not to be borne over into the divine casualty, for these are only supplementary parts of the natural order. It is not the design of the divine justice to effect immediate moral improvement, for in that case it might supplant redemption, nor to revenge or recompense, nor to restrain sensuality, nor to unite a people under a common law, but to stimulate the consciousness of the need of redemption. Thus do we see divine justice tinged with love, for it looks toward redemption.

The attributes of holiness and justice presuppose the divine authorship of sin and evil, and would be without significance on any other assumption. The consciousness of the desert of punishment, from which we derive the attribute of justice, presupposes the conscience from which we attain the attribute of holiness, while the latter without the former would not be able to develop the consciousness of the need of redemption; still, they must be construed as two separate attributes. If we should arrive at a point where natural evil and sin were no longer comprehended as evil but only as stimulants, in our pure personal condition we should no more have the immediate con-
sciousness of the justice of God, but we should still require the conscience which reflects the holiness of God. They are not the product of a transitory consciousness, but belong to the essentials of our common feeling. It is objected that these are not divine attributes in the same sense as those developed in the former section, since they rest upon natural imperfections and must cease when they are abolished, but this would annul also those attributes to be developed from the other side of the antithesis, since they also relate to the first side of the antithesis, just as all other moral attributes do. Yet, on the positive side, we may say that the holiness of God is an essential element of our God-consciousness, for we can only know of the absolute power of the God-consciousness as the annulning, through redemption, of a condition of sin. The same is true of the divine justice in as much as the Redeemer's desert of reward is only the other side of the desert of the punishment of sin, and as one was always contained in the other as a presentiment, so the other will ever be contained in it as a remembrance. These attributes do not support the notion of an angry God punishing and destroying sinners, but of a benevolent God who spurs men on to the acceptance of gracious redemption. They have equal claim to validity with all other attributes.
The so-called attribute of mercy fits better in the less scientific language of homiletics and poetry than in that of dogmatics. It assumes that God is stimulated through a fellow feeling to succor the distressed. Like its counterpart, the divine goodness, which assumes that God helps men because of his joy in their well-being, it involves God in passivity conditioned through a sensuous compassion, namely the divine pleasure and displeasure in the conditions which further or obstruct life. The definition of mercy as the alleviation of punishment through sympathy is not less fruitful of difficulties. It partially annuls or limits the divine justice, and so is inadmissible in dogmatics.

Of the Divine Love.

Love is the tendency to unite with another and the desire to be in others. We have seen that the focal point in the divine world government is the founding of the Kingdom of God which is accomplished in the union of the divine Being with human nature, or in redemption. The fundamental disposition of the Author of that act of union is love. The divine love, then, is the attribute by means of which the divine Being imparts Himself and it is seen only in redemption. The divine love is
not found in the beneficent, protecting and forwarding arrangements of nature except in so far as they stimulate the consciousness of the need of redemption or the God-consciousness. In the non-Christian man is to be found the image of God, reason, original perfection, the fundamental God-consciousness, etc, but the divine love may be realized through these only in redemption, for in the pre-Christian state where fear prevails instead of love, man comes only to the negative consciousness of God. All men are potentially the objects of the divine love, but they can never come to a knowledge of it until they themselves are in Christ, and God loves them only as He sees them in Christ. The extra-Christian achievements of human knowledge or lordship over the earth do not reveal the divine love, for it cannot be recognized in that which does not represent the divine will. The divine love or self-impartation is supremely and indisputably revealed in the union of God with human nature through Jesus Christ. The full measure of that love is comprehended only when the union is perfected with all humanity. This is the attribute which gives character and meaning to all others.

"God is love". (I John,4:16). This is the only
attribute that has ever been equated to the divine Being. Since the being of God is indivisible, the conception of attributes does not lend itself perfectly to the representation of the Highest Being, for in so far as an attribute expresses the Being of God it must be capable of equation with it. If we say the omnipotent Love or the loving omnipotence, in either case we only equate love with the being of God. "Schleiermacher would thus seem to make the love of God the regulative principle of His action in regard to men, and in a lesser degree of all His actions".* The divine omnipotence has been defined as the attribute by means of which the finite exists through God. In this we have indeed the divine act, but without motive, merely as indefinite action. The other attributes of the first group are involved in the same limitations. Because of the evolutionary nature of the finite being we see it at only one point, and not in its full development, and so never realize, except merely through the feeling of absolute dependence, either the measure of the divine omnipotence or know the divine will concerning it. The God portrayed by this group of attributes can command only the shadow of faith which the devils may also have.

* Selbie, Schleiermacher, p 105.
Neither are holiness or justice such attributes could express the whole being of God. They are unmeaning except as they relate to redemption and that relationship is preparatory and introductory. In the derivation of all these attributes the positive consciousness of redemption is still not involved. The attributes derived from the consciousness of redemption comprehend the whole realm of religious consciousness and so express the whole being of God. This can be said only of the divine love, for it comprehends the divine wisdom which is separated only for analytic conception. The other attributes have meaning only as they relate to love. It is the epitome of our conception of the divine Being.

Of the Divine Wisdom.

The divine wisdom is the attribute through which the divine love is provided a perfect medium of self-impartation in the adaptation of the world to the furthering of the plan of redemption or in the union of God with human nature. It differs primarily from the divine omniscience in respect of design which determines adaptation to purpose, but resembles it in that it is also productive of its own design. In this connection it may be recalled that the divine wisdom itself is only separated
in the human mode of conception from the divine love
which, in reality, is both the designing and producing
factor. In the human realm the perfect sketch of a
work of art includes both the original design and the
means of execution. The skilful artist employs outside
tools which never enter into the product itself, and
the most perfect artist is he whose total product of work
most perfectly expresses his whole character and being.
Our religious consciousness is able to view the world
only as a simple, harmonious, divine work of art. The
human distinction, however, between design and execution
may not be carried over into God since the divine wis­
dom is immediately productive. There are no outside me­ns
of production for the divine wisdom and consequently no
antithesis of means and purpose in the divine art, but
each part relates itself to the other as part to the
whole, and each individual is equally means and purpose.
Neither must the human distinction between communication
(production) and representation (product) be borne over
into God, but both are one, as is seen in the sending of
Christ, which is both the communication and the represen­
tation of the divine Being. The divine wisdom does not
include any element of cleverness relative to the deter­
ination of purpose and choice of modes of production, for the former rests upon the rejected presupposition of mediate knowledge, and the latter upon that of instruments of alien origin. The divine wisdom and productiveness are not only equal but are the same thing. Our religious self-consciousness refers all of the divine world order that affects us to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, from which we may conclude that redemption is the true key to the understanding of the divine wisdom. This does not mean that we are to seek an immediate relationship for every isolated thing or event to the Kingdom of God, but that neither the natural nor spiritual arrangements for the development are to be ascribed to the divine wisdom in such a way as to separate them from the realm of redemption. No production of the divine wisdom is to be construed as hostile to the highest interests of men, but must be related to the redeeming or new creating revelation of God. The work of the divine wisdom consists in the broadening of redemption, in the order which determines election and rebirth, and in the adaptation of Christian communities to the ever changing conditions of human life. This conception presupposes and completes the doctrine of the original perfection of the
world. The interrelationship of sin and grace and the complete triumph of the God-consciousness in Jesus Christ is sufficient evidence that we may not expect a greater divine communication than that contained in the redemption wrought through Christ. Sin retards the God-consciousness, but if there had been no fall, or sin requiring redemption, the divine communication would have been less. The unregenerate of a Christian community receive accruing of blessedness which affect them as preparatory works of grace. Our proposition assumes that a greater self-impartation of God would be possible if instead of eternal punishment the possibility of rebirth after death should continue for those who have not advanced so far.

The presence of the God-consciousness which is found in Christ to perfection grades off through the various stages of development and disappears entirely in the unreasoning and the inanimate. This leads us to believe that that which is incapable of receiving the divine impartation, is an object of the divine love only as it is brought into living and harmonious connection with that wherein the divine impartation is actual. Where this connection is not found the
world cannot appear to us as the perfect work of the 
divine wisdom. This leads us initially into the realm 
of Christian ethics. It is a problem of the Church to 
bring to recognition the essential nature of the world 
as good, to make all conform to the fundamental divine 
idea, to act as organs of the Spirit, and so to bring all 
into such relation with the system of redemption, that 
we may attain to the perfect life intercourse with Jesus. 
"The world, then, can be conceived as a perfect revelation 
of the divine wisdom only in so far as the Holy Spirit, 
working thorough the Christian Church, establishes it-
self, as the last world-forming power".*

The conception of God to which Schleiermacher seeks 
to give representation through the divine attributes is 
such that all descriptions of it must be only symbolical. 
In the first place God is an indivisible unit of being.** 
No criterion is more potent in the formation of his system, 
or more frequently brought into application than the mono-
theistic canon whose function is to exclude all antithesis 
and division. The unity of God is presupposed along with 
His existence. For this reason the conception of attributes

* Glaubenslehre, II, p. 526.
** Cf. Dorner’s Geleitwort to the "Werke", p. xxii, quoted by Selbie, Schleiermacher, p. 106.
is inadapted and must be recognized as symbolical representations. In the second place He is absolute as contrasted with the finite and limited. He does not operate as a finite agent and must not be conceived after the analogy of finite beings or modes. This is the principal barrier to the ascription of personality to God. In the third place the essential nature of God is love. God is omnipotent and holy, but these are only subordinate aspects of the divine love. The fullest and most accurate description of God which we can give is, the eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, holy, just, and wise Love. In the fourth place God is superpersonal. The divine Being possesses nature or character rather than will, and productive omniscience rather than perception or reasoned judgment. He is personal in respect to spirituality or livingness and in the quality of love. In other words, God has the positive qualities of personality but not the negative ones. This conception is usually classed as super-personal.
CHAPTER VIII

Election

The consciousness of redemption is not now shared by all the members of the human race, but only by a part of them. The latter constitute the Church or the inner circle of redemption and are designated the "elect" as distinguished from the "called" who constitute the outer-circle, or those still in the stage of prevenient grace. Men from the lowest stages of culture and barbarism are sometimes reborn into the community with Christ while other men living in the noblest Christian environment spend their whole life in the outer circle. This order is called the divine election because it is grounded ultimately in the divine good pleasure. It is, however, not an arbitrary divine activity, but the conditions of its determination and modes of expression are legitimate problems of inquiry. Rebirth is not a supernatural communication or new creation, but is the natural development, under the stimulus of the divine activity in the Church and in the world, of the capacity for redemption inherent in each human nature. The election of
some to the blessedness of Christ and the passing over of others belongs to the divine decree, for if God had willed otherwise He would either have prepared another order of human nature or a different plan of salvation. Our task is to interpret the religious consciousness in a way that will be conformable to these conditions and without inner contradictions. Schleiermacher departs from the usual notion of election in making it yield primarily a doctrine of universal salvation. It gives us, however, a view of the divine good pleasure and predestination as manifested in the origin and growth of the Church.

The acts or events in the world, which appear to us as arbitrary, or which are not fully understood in their relations to the other parts of the world, are generally assigned immediately to the divine good pleasure. The system of laws operating in the higher spiritual realm is less apparent and less understood, and consequently many things connected with the plan of redemption are assigned immediately or mediately to the divine good pleasure. The time and manner of sending Christ corresponded to the conditions most productive of spiritual life and most conducive to the realization of
the plan for the union of the divine and human natures. But beyond this we can only say that it is an act of the divine good pleasure. The reason that it was not earlier or was not manifested in some other manner accords with the divine foreknowledge of the conditions to which it belonged, which in turn, belonged to the divine good pleasure, for they are as inseparable as the divine love and wisdom. In the same way the time and manner of individual rebirth into the Kingdom of God, the failure of some to attain to rebirth in this life, the relation of faith and rebirth, the grounding of natural causality, space, time, human conditions, etc., all belong to the divine good pleasure. Why are any reborn and brought into the life-communion with God? It is not through own activity or deserving for every man is conscious that his salvation is divinely and graciously wrought. The death of some while still under the influence of prevenient grace is not to be construed as evidence of absolute failure to attain redemption, for that would violate the unity of our race consciousness which recognizes the equal need and capacity of all men for redemption, and would involve God in particular-
ism and partiality. We have seen above that the free resolution of God which led to the creation of the world was not the product of a freedom to choose between alternatives, but of a freedom to give unrestrained expression to His own nature. We have seen further that the fundamental disposition of the Author of the divine world government, which makes all things subservient to redemption or the impartation of the divine nature to man, is best characterized as love. That is what is meant by the divine good pleasure, that is, the essential nature of God which expresses itself in the form and order of the world. We can harmonize the mission of Christ with the unity of our race-consciousness and with the divine good pleasure or essential nature of love only in case it is made to comprehend all humanity, for less than this would involve the divine Being in limitation, arbitrariness, and particularism. The assumption that God has created all men alike in sin and in capacity for redemption, but that His plan for salvation is designed for only a part of them, that He includes one and excludes another, "presupposes such a divine arbitrariness that we would have to call this order a
simple decree of will." Some have sought to justify the exclusion of a part of humanity from the blessedness of Christ on the hypothesis that God designs to reveal to men both His justice and His mercy; His justice through those who are lost and His mercy through those who are saved. But the divine justice could be revealed adequately and more faithfully in the punishment of man so long as he continued in the life of sin, or in the rewarding of Christ. Neither can it be admitted that there is a divided revelation of the divine attributes since that would make them limited and God would be an unlimited Being with limited attributes. On the other hand, the divine mercy or the essential nature of God could not be revealed by the exclusion of some from the communicated blessedness of Christ.

"The election of those who are justified is a divine predestination to salvation in Christ".* This, however, is not to be construed in such a way as to involve God in finite modes of operation, arbitrariness, or particularism. Rather we are conscious that our divinely wrought salvation and its development, both in the preparatory stages of prevenient grace and in the later

* Glaubenslehre, II. p 260.
progress of sanctification, accords with human environment and harmonizes with the operation of the divine world order. The justifying divine activity, in its manifestation, is not only determined through the universal world order, but is a part of the same. The manner and time of the individual rebirth is determined by the reaction of the peculiar personal character or temperament of the individual with his place in the natural historical development of the justifying divine activity, which includes, of course, the proclamation of the Gospel, the lives of the saints, and the total influence of the Church. Therefore the kingdom of grace or of the Son, is identical with the kingdom of the omniscient Omnipotence, or of the Father, and nothing happens in either of them without a divine predestination. The redeemed may say, then, that their condition is a work of the divine grace in Christ or that it is a result of the divine predestination, for each of these is contained in the other. Looked at from the human point of view, election is grounded in a foreseen act of faith. The apparent antithesis implies a distinction between foreknowledge and predestination, and a conditioning of the divine activity through human activity, but this is remanded through
the right understanding of the origin of faith, which is engendered in man through the influences of the predesti-
nated divine world government upon him, and so, in reality, is itself predestinated. Predestination then is not an
irresistible aid to one and opposition to the other, but the determination of all through all. Our consciousness
knows nothing of an opposed predestination to death of those who do not attain to regeneration in this life,
but they are temporarily passed over. Those who have sought to relieve the harshness of the doctrine of a
divine predestination to eternal damnation by placing it under the divine foreknowledge rather than through a
divine decree, involve God in inequality, for the divine knowledge cannot be greater in extent than the
divine predestination. Since God everywhere predesti-
nates the conditions of life and foresees the essential character of those thus conditioned, and knows the in-
evitable interaction of those elements, it follows that if He did not alter the predestinated fatal conditions,
He has also predestinated those who are thus conditioned. The inevitable conclusion is that God has predestinated
the whole of humanity for union with the divine nature
through Christ. There was one divine predestination for things to be as they are. It was outside of time and space but it referred to the scheme of things which includes them and their laws of operation.

The doctrine of election completes the doctrine of preservation by extending its scope so as to include the Kingdom of God and the whole divine world government. It further recognizes and harmonizes the the absolute determinism of God and the freedom of the individual man. The divine Absoluteness, however, it is to be remembered, is also divine Love. The God of election is the transcendent and infinite God of the Universe who operates only through the eternal order of the divine world government, which objectively unfolds in time and space, and which embraces both mechanical and free causes.
CHAPTER IX

The Doctrine of the Trinity.

The doctrine of the Trinity is not an immediate product of the religious self-consciousness, but is a combination or summary of the most essential doctrines which it yields. The primary motive in the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity is the desire to establish the essential Deity of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, or to guarantee their equality with the divine Being. That this is the real ground for the doctrine of the Trinity is shown by the fact that the parties of the Christian Church which have held another view of redemption have not promulgated a doctrine of the Trinity. Their view of God and of the divine attributes may agree entirely with that of the Trinitarians, but if their views of Christ do not admit of His Deity they do not arrive at a doctrine of the Trinity. If redemption is a union of the divine Nature with human nature in Christ and the Holy Spirit, then they can be nothing less than divine. In so far as these elements are fundamental it is a legitimate doctrine and it may be viewed rightly as the coping stone of the dogmatic
structure.

The ecclesiastical doctrine has been developed and modified further in order to avoid the appearance of polytheism in the formation of the doctrine of the Highest Being. According to it the Godhead is divided by an eternal separation into three Persons who are equal to each other and together constitute a unit equal to each and to all the Persons. The Logos doctrine of John abounds in references to Christ and the Holy Spirit as having Deity and as having been eternally by the Father, but this was never further developed by him into the ecclesiastical formula despite the abundant opportunity to do so. He had no need for such an edition. This peculiar aspect of the ecclesiastical formula clearly cannot be a product of the religious consciousness as it is wholly alien to the nature of its pronouncements. If the testimony of Christ and the Apostles is so definite that we must accept it as a supersensuous fact, we accept it as such, but can give no place to it in the Glaubenslehre. It can have no more value for religion or theology than any other scientific fact or product of speculative thought. Moreover it offers insurmountable
difficulties and demands belief in untenable and mutually contradicting proposition.

If we start with the assumption of an eternal separation in the divine Being, the presupposition of two-fold equality in the Godhead must necessarily be made. If the Deity, power or glory of the three Persons was less than that of the Highest Being conceived as unity, then the three Persons would not be in the Highest Being, but would be inferior to It, the divine in Them would be unreal, and our community of life with Christ as well as our portion of the Holy Spirit would not be fellowship with God. It would be the same if the three Persons were unequal in respect to divinity, as, for example, if true Deity inhered only in the Father while that of the Son and the Spirit were only subordinate Deity, for then the indwelling consciousness of the need of redemption must be satisfied with something less than that which brings us into fellowship with God, and all the most vital elements of Christianity would be altered. From the nature of the fundamental presupposition the further development of the ecclesiastical formula is inevitable, but still it is beset with difficulties. The symbolical formulas assert the
equality of each of the Persons of the Godhead to each of the others, and this is designed to rank as the canon for the separation of the Persons so that nothing may be included in one which does not belong equally well to the others. But if we distinguish the Father as Son as eternally engendering and eternally begotten, however remote from the natural analogy, still an inequality is involved for the Son does not have the power of engendering the Father, but only the converse is true and so a relationship of inequality and dependence is established. The same relationship holds true for the Spirit whether it emanates from the Father alone or from the Father and the Son. Thus the Church doctrine itself cannot attain to an equality of being but only to a gradation. In the same way the proposition that the Deity of all the three Persons is the same as that of the Divine Being, should be the canon according to which the relation of the Trinity of Persons to the unity of Being shall be conceived. If we think of the three Persons as distinguished by their peculiar but inessential determinations as seen above, the divine Being Itself exists only in the three Persons,
Not outside of them, nor as a fourth Person, nor as impersonal, nor as a Being whose attributes are allocated to the three Persons but held by each Person wholly and undivided, still the demanded equality cannot be secured. The only analogy which we have for this relation is that of the conception of the species which exists solely in the totality of its individuals and has no reality outside of them. But if the relation is not according to this type there is no definite condition of unity and none is conceivable. If we adhere to the analogy there is no equality between the Trinity and the unity, for as the one is emphasized the other retreats. We can only fluctuate between an unreal unity and tritheism, for no middle course is possible, but a subordination of one to the other is not contained in the presupposition. If we retain the eternal separation in the divine Being we can only accept one or the other, in contradiction with the formula, or remain constantly vacillating between the two.

It remains only to show how unity and Trinity relate to the divine causality of our feeling of absolute dependence, in creation, preservation, redemption,
and sanctification. We shall not divide the divine causality among the Persons, as we might say, the Father alone is Creator and Preserver, the Son alone Redeemer, and the Spirit alone Sanctifier. We come then to these two alternatives, that either (1) these causalities belong all together to the one divine Being as such, but to the Persons only in so far as they are in It, and not in so far as they are distinguished from one another, or (2) they belong to the three Persons as such, but to the unity of the Being only in so far as it consists of these. In the first of these the Trinity retreats more than the prevalent tendency admits, for the Persons have retained a reality almost solely for those special acts, and so it has not established itself. The Father is distinct in that He has engendered the Son eternally, the Son was not merely engendered but also became man, the Spirit was not merely breathed but also communicated; but creation, preservation and the justifying and sanctifying activities belong not to the distinct Persons but to the unity of the divine Being. The view that the divine causality belongs to the three Persons has become prevalent despite the subtle contradiction which the ecclesiastical formulas contain. If the divine causal-
ity belongs to the Persons as such it belongs to them only in so far as they are distinct from one another, and each has the full power of the three Persons but actually accomplishes only that which belongs to its own realm. This has not been accepted because the unity retreats so that nothing remains except the unity of the three Persons to be according to their own nature and will. But what has been accepted is that causality belongs indeed to the three Persons as such, not as distinct individuals, but as one and the same, or as the divine Being in its unity. And thus we come back to the same vacillation between the prominence of one and the recession of the other and conversely.

The Trinitarian formula has not been the canon for the formulation of dogmatic systems, for it has not been retained in application. The doctrine of God and of the divine attributes is developed first without reference to the Trinity, which is added later, and proof is offered only to show that any given attribute belongs to the Son or the Spirit, for it is accepted as self-evident that it belongs to the Father, who is usually made equivalent to the unity of the divine Being. Such dog-
maticians are not strict Trinitarians. The conception of Origin - that the Father is absolutely God, but the Son and Spirit are God only through participation in the divine Being - underlies the practice of many who in theory are strict Trinitarians.

Our ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity comes from a time when the mind of the Church was still much confused with foreign and heathen types of thought. The safeguards which were erected against one type of danger resulted in driving into the opposite evil, and when the original danger was removed the deformity of the doctrine became all the more obvious. The circumstances which produced the doctrine of the Trinity have long since passed away, but the doctrine received no correction at the time of the Reformation and so is in need of fundamental revision today. If we follow the original tendency of the doctrine which designs to show that it is not a hyperbolical expression of our consciousness of Christ and the Spirit when we assert that God is in both of them, the first problem, then, appears to be to determine the relationship of the essential Deity of Christ both to the Being of God in and for himself, and to the Being of God, as related to the world in general. In our religious
consciousness, we have no formula for the being of God in Himself, distinct from the being of God in the world, but must digress and borrow one from the realm of speculation. Hence our problem has no prospect of final solution, for since it rests in part upon speculative thought, it will vary from age to age with the progress and peculiarities of human thought. Our representation of the being of God in the world is necessarily burdened with anthropomorphic elements, and the difficulties are infinitely increased and complicated when we begin to deal with the being of God in Himself. The problem involves the distinction between the essential or inner being of God in Christ and in the Spirit from the omnipotent presence of God in the world in general. We will find that the problem can be solved only through reassessment, and that formulas which arise from opposing premises will ever remain in strife and interest in the problem will renew itself continually.

The doctrine of the Trinity has been retained almost unaltered from the original statement of it, in part to the fact that it was fundamentally presupposed in the solution of the cognate doctrines and so
cannot be altered without disturbing them, and partly to a passionate polemical zeal which commits mistakes so easily. The inconsistencies of the doctrine which have been noted above have given rise to anti-trinitarian views and even to the rejection of all related doctrines, just as the customary representations of God have often repulsed men who have by no means lost the soul states characteristics of the God-consciousness, into avowed atheism. The piety of many anti-trinitarians by no means lacks the genuine Christian stamp. This situation challenges us, on one hand, to assure free room for a fundamental critique of the previous formation of this doctrine, and on the other hand, to prepare and introduce a fitting revision of the prevalent condition of the cognate dogmatic.

The first pre-requisite either for a critique or revision of this doctrine is the ability to show that our faith in the divine in Christ and in the common Spirit of the Church can find fitting dogmatic expression prior to any consideration of the doctrine of the Trinity and independent of it. When this doctrine, which rests heavily upon a speculative foundation, is made fundamental to faith in those great cardinal doctrines of redemption
and the founding of the Kingdom of God, the dogmatic character of the whole presentation is clouded, it lacks the right foundation either for a critique or revision, and the whole system is exposed at the very outset to the intrusion of speculative elements. Beyond this preliminary step we can only point the way in which correction and future development lie. Since the first insoluble difficulty lies in the relation of the unity of the being to the Trinity of the Persons, and this depends upon the original and eternal separation within the divine Being, the first examination should be to ascertain whether this conception is given in the New Testament passages in such a clear and definite manner that one must view it as an utterance of Christ and of the divine Spirit relative to themselves. The best way to do this is to determine whether these passages can be harmonized with the Sabellian manner of conception. If this is denied then nothing remains other than to see if the ecclesiastical doctrine can be restated, without injury to those essential presuppositions, in formulas which, without contradiction to those Biblical passages, can avoid the rocks against which the ecclesiastical doctrine strike. If, however, it is found that the Bible supports the Sabellian hypothe-
sis so that the Athanasian and Sabellian creeds stand on equal footing, it may be asked whether the latter cannot accomplish the same service without becoming entangled in such insoluble difficulties. Such a formula should be able to represent both unions of the Highest Being with human nature. This need not involve the Highest Being in alterability, for the uniting activities – like the fulfilment of all other eternal decrees – must be conceived temporarily.

The second difficulty which the ecclesiastical doctrine offered us was that the designation of the first Person as Father and His relation to the others appeared rather to represent the relation of the unity of the Being to the Persons than to agree with the equality of the three Persons. The primary questions which appear here are whether it has been correct to name only the divine in Christ "The Son of God", and whether the expression Father should relate to one of the separations in the divine Being and not rather to the divine Being itself. If it should appear that the Scriptures employ the expression "The Son of God" only for the whole Christ himself (i.e., the divine-human Christ) and do not recognize a difference between "God" as the designation of the Highest Being and "Father
of our Lord Jesus Christ", but use them interchangeably; and if the same examination were applied to the Holy Spirit with similar results, propositions would be yielded which should solve the second difficulty. If the result of the two inquiries should converge, a revision would follow easily, but if that should not be the case, new means must be sought corresponding to the remaining differences. Thus, it appears that from the nature of the circumstances, i.e. from the condition of dogmatics in general, the doctrine of the Trinity, exegesis and Biblical and systematic theology, that we can go no farther in the formulation of this doctrine, but we can only indicate the way of approach and so end our task for the present.

For Schleiermacher the insuperable difficulty in the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity is the separation within the Godhead. This conflicts with his fundamental or monotheistic presupposition of the unity of God. This is not a denial of the Deity of Christ or of the Holy Spirit but an identification of the divine in Them with God Himself. The Second Person of the Trinity or the "Son of God" is the God-man union. Viewed from one angle, He is God in full union with man, viewed from another angle, He is man in perfect union with God, or, uniting both of these
Christ is the original and perfect union of the divine and human nature and the prophecy of the ultimate union of God and humanity in the Kingdom of God. This conception coheres with the idea of redemption as the union of the divine and human nature, or as the completion of the creation of human nature in Christ. The Holy Spirit, or the Common Spirit of the Church, is the union of God with the Church, or the God-humanity union as it is accomplished in time. This conception of the Trinity is an inevitable outcome of the Schleiermacherian premises and method. It is cognate to the other parts of the system and its strength is not less nor greater than the rest of it. Its Sabellian simplicity avoids the otherwise insoluble difficulties of the doctrine of the Trinity, but it does it through a conception of the Person of Christ which corresponds more closely to the needs of his system than to the biblical representation of the historical Christ. His construction of the doctrine has unusual logical strength and conformity to data.
CHAPTER X

Estimate.

An estimate of Schleiermacher's system, and especially of his doctrine of God, must begin with an estimate of Schleiermacher himself, for his work is, in a remarkable way, a reflection of his own life and character. One prolific source of misunderstanding of Schleiermacher and his work lies in the failure to recognize the independence and individuality of the man, which was one of his most distinctive characteristics. He has often been called a Vermittler, or even an eclectic, by some. If by this is meant that his system is a patchwork of elements from other men's thoughts nothing could be further from the truth, for Schleiermacher was most uncompromising and his closest friends could not persuade him to accept an amendment to his work when once he had formulated it. * He was, however, a Vermittler in the best sense of the word, that is, he was willing

* "In accordance with his expressed desire, we openly communicated to him our opinions of the parts of the work completed, but without ever succeeding in inducing him to make any alterations in conformity with such of our views as did not coincide with his own". Statement by Frau Herz, Life of Schleiermacher, Nowan, Vol. I. B. 140.
to accept the truth wherever he found it, however partial it was, or however much it was intermingled with alien elements. No system or expression of truth was ever taken bodily into his own system, but its fruitful parts were hunted out and digested into his own thought. "He did not regard religion, ethics, philosophy, politics and the various interests in which he engaged, as so many branches of knowledge to be blindly accepted in the fashion most in vogue; they had life and meaning for him only when they passed through the alembic of his being, and were stamped with the signature of his own creative personality".* His doctrine of God is not a compilation of pantheistic, theistic and deistic elements, but it is the product of the peculiar combination of qualities in his own nature or personality.

The first of these, as we have seen above, was his rich religious nature or genius which was the preeminent quality of his being. It was the most vital and positive element both of his life and of his thought system. His sermons and devotional life exhibit a wealth of religious consciousness and an intimate relationship with God which is unusual. His sensitive

* Munro, Schleiermacher, p. 120.
religious nature enabled him to have the immediate consciousness of God in feeling and experience, and those experiences did not lack the elements of fellowship and personal intercourse, for in religious experience Schleiermacher knew God as a loving Father. This was the positive element of his being in what it provided him the material which constituted the body of his system. The substance of his doctrine of God was the immediate consciousness of Him in feeling rather than the product of apriori thought or the evidence of Him in the realm of phenomena.

The second major factor in the determination of his doctrine of God and of divine things is what he calls the dialectic conscience, or the philosophic side of his being. His scientific or critical nature is not less strong than that of many men who are primarily critics. It appears everywhere as the police factor of his thought, disciplining the expression of his religious consciousness. It might be called the negative element of his makeup in the sense that it restrains the extravagances and rejects the unfitting which attaches to our interpretation of the religious life, rather than creating positive consciousness.
It may more fittingly be called the sculptor who chisels away the unnatural, and gives symmetry and balance to the figurative representation of the religious consciousness, whose expression is especially susceptible to the intrusion of marring and deforming features or excrescences. The critical faculty of Schleiermacher stands ever ready with the measuring rod of logical truth to test the fitness of every doctrine which demands a place in the scientific body of religious expression. Kattenbusch says that the significance of Schleiermacher in theology lies in the fact that he has taught us the art of logical thinking. It was not his principal quality but the scientific supplement to it. If it sometimes made mistakes or admitted inconsistencies, that may be assigned primarily to the almost incomprehensible breadth and unexplored nature of the field in which he worked as a pathfinder.

These are the two factors which have been regulative in the formation of his doctrine of God. The two existed alongside each other in his being in a remarkable manner and with unusual harmony and fitness. My proposition, on the contrary, stands thus: in point of understanding I am a philosopher; for to be such is to exercise the original and independent activity of the understanding,
and in point of feeling I am religious and a Christian, and have renounced all heathenism, or rather I have never possessed any. ******* So far we are entirely agreed; for I will not, either, in all eternity allow myself to be deprived of the right to philosophise. *******

This is my mode of establishing an equilibrium between the two ways; it is in reality, likewise, an alteration of the rising of one and the sinking of the other. But, dear friend, why should we not be content with this? Oscillation is, after all, the universal form of all finite existence, and there exists in me at the same time an immediate consciousness that the undulation is, in fact, caused by the two foci of my own ellipse, and that through it I enjoy the fulness of earthly life. My philosophy and my dogmatics are thus firmly determined not to contradict each other, but for this very reason, neither pretends to be complete; and as long as I have been able to think they have always been more or less attuning themselves to each other and drawing nearer to each other",* In a note to the Reden Schleiermacher makes a statement which furnishes the secret to the formation of his doctrine of God, and in a lesser

way, to the formation of his whole system. "Within that limit any further wavering in respect of personality must be left to the representative imagination and the dialectic conscience, and when the pious sense exists, they will guard each other. Does the former fashion a too human personality, the latter restrains by exhibiting the doubtful consequences; does the latter limit the representation too much by negative formulas, the former knows how to suit it to its need".* In this statement we have the key to the understanding of his conception of God. The religious consciousness is the formative element and the dialectic conscience tests, approves, and prunes.

Schleiermacher's early life coincided with the reaction against rationalism with its unspiritual and unscientific representation of God. He sympathized with this reaction and followed Kant in his determination of the nature and sphere of science as it related to the world of phenomena and to God, but parted company with him when he approached the realm of religion, for Kant lacked the equipment for a thorough-going critique or

* Oman, Reden, p. 116.
appreciation of the consciousness of God or the phenomena of religion. The school of philosophy which followed Kant erred in making reason regulative, and that which opposed him erred in making faith and feeling regulative of the whole expression of life. Schleiermacher's course was not so much a middle ground as it was a comprehension or combination of both based on a different analysis of the total sphere of philosophy: reason was regulative in the field of pure science, and feeling in religion, or in the realm of the transcendental. These may legitimately influence the other, but each has its own independent sphere.* This separation of reason and religion and the grounding of religion in feeling determined in a very large measure the ultimate character of his doctrine of God. It follows immediately that the doctrine of God does not belong to strict science, but that it is an interpretation of religious experience. The parts of

* "One word more in reference to your simile of the two waves, the waters of which will not unite in you. In me they also refuse to unite; but while you desire this union, and miss it painfully, I submit cheerfully to the separation. Understanding and feeling in me also remain distinct, but they touch each other and form a galvanic pile. To me it seems that the inmost life of the spirit consists in the galvanic action thus produced in the feeling of the understanding, and the understanding of the feeling, during which, however, the two poles remain deflected from each other". Sch. To Jacobi; Rowan, Life of Sch. Vol. II. p 284.
his system which grow out of his fundamental principles which were established prior to 1799 may be called the unvarying elements of his doctrine of God. The more closely determined definition of the Supreme Being will depend upon the personal equation and represents the variable element of the doctrine of God.

The fundamental premises of Schleiermacher's system remain unaltered throughout the period of our study and the corresponding elements of his doctrine of God remain the same from the beginning to the end. (1) The unity of the divine Being is presupposed as the monotheistic canon in religion and is postulated in knowledge and morals as the transcendental identity of the ideal and the real. This means that it belongs to the fundamental instincts rather than to either of the separate faculties of human nature. (2) The absolute and infinite nature of God was recognized at all times and served as a canon of formation. (3) This potentially includes the dependence of all finite upon the Infinite. (4) The limitation of science to the realm of phenomena and the grounding of religion in feeling determined from the beginning the indefinite and accommodating nature of the mental representation of God to the personal equation.
The less fundamental aspect of his doctrine of God, that is, that part of it which may vary from man to man and from day to day with the development of his views will be limited to such aspects as distinguish theism, pantheism, deism, etc. This part belongs more to the realm of character than to any other, and the form it assumes will be determined principally by whether or not a man is speculatively inclined. The man who is predominantly religious rather than speculative will naturally incline to a theistic view of God, while the man who is predominantly speculative will find no occasion for personifying Him, but will recognize the inadaptibility of the conception of personality to an infinite Being. The philosopher who lacks religious stimulus is likely to arrive at pantheism or deism as the explanation of the world and its phenomena. To which of these does Schleiermacher belong? As we have already seen he has a remarkable combination of both these qualities.

The question of Schleiermacher's pantheism has been the chief ground of attack on his work. Did he belong to that group of scientists who conceived God as the natura naturans or as the world-Soul or did he belong rather to the mystics who personified the Spirit of
the Universe? It is immediately obvious that his system shows traces of the influence of both. At no time, however, is there any evidence of materialistic pantheism. Such a form of mental representation is unthinkable for a man like Schleiermacher. There is no affinity between his character and such a mode of conception. He had the speculative impulse and zeal for truth which enabled him to view the problem of the philosophy of religion and the relation of the religions from its right perspective. The quality in him which caused him to deny that the relation of Christianity to the religions was that of the true to the false, was the same that invited his study of pantheism. He could recognize and admit the truth wherever it existed, whether in paganism or in pantheism. His attitude toward pantheism was due, in the main, to the fact that it, almost exclusively, recognized an invaluable element of religion, that is, the divine immanence or the immediacy of God in the world and in man. The pantheism which he glorified was that of Herder, Jacobi, or Goethe rather than that of Spinoza. The only positive element of pantheism is native also to Christian doctrine, but it had been lost to it through the spiritual deadness of rationalism.
Schleiermacher exhibits less interest in pantheism in his later works, but that is due more to the fact that deeply spiritual men such as Schleiermacher had succeeded in reincorporating the kernel of truth which pantheism contained into the common thought of Christianity. Still there is but little change in his earlier and later positions relative to pantheism and it consists largely in removing the traces of its origin. Schleiermacher was not a pantheist and has not deserved the accusations which have been hurled against him.

There can be little doubt that Schleiermacher belongs by virtue of his religious genius to that group of humanity which personifies the Supreme Being. His whole religious life reflects this quality in him. For him God is a Being with whom Man may have fellowship, who loves and can be loved. It is He that awakes the tender emotions of religion in man, that accepts man in union with Himself through Christ. The distinctive nature of His Being is love. Certainly love must be the most perfect quality of personality and that which can love cannot be less than personal. This tendency toward the

* "Es ist deutlicher als in den Reden, dass Schleiermacher nicht Pantheist ist und jedenfalls nicht sein will; Kattenbusch, von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl, p. 11
personal view of God belongs to the positive content of his religious nature, while his departure from the usual representations of divine personality belong to the activity of his dialectic conscience which restrains the religious tendency from unfitting and too anthropomorphic representations of God. His scientific mind could not harmonize the limitations and finite nature of the prevalent notions of personality with the nature of God as an infinite and absolute Being. He has, however, retained its positive elements, and so his conception of divine personality represents a refined or scientific view of the divine Being. If it be objected that he has used the pruning knife too freely and has taken away as excrescences much that is not only harmless but is even helpful to religion, it may be replied that he is writing not for the immediate purpose of stimulating devotion and popular religious life, but that the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre belong to the realm of technical science. The free use of the pruning knife of science has been the ground for most of the criticism of Schleiermacher's system. He has, perhaps, used it freely, in some measure, to the fact that others had failed to use it. This
is not altogether a fault, for even if he has pruned too closely the anthropomorphic elements which are so inevitable in popular religious life, they will grow again. The well carved figure which Schleiermacher presents as the representation of God may appear to some to be mechanical or to have an exterior appearance of marble, but underneath is a heart. "God is love".
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