LAW AND GOSPEL

AND THEIR

RELATIONSHIP

IN THE

THEOLOGY OF LUTHER

by

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Introduction

A recent writer on Luther and the German Reformation has pointed out that it is impossible to understand a man out of the context of his times. This an important warning to the scholar seeking to understand the thought, personality and work, not only of Luther, but of any historical personage. In the case of Luther, however, it is also true that his age cannot properly be understood apart from the man. In a peculiar way, Luther became the center of the complex movements which culminated in the German Reformation at the beginning of the sixteenth century and in many ways his character left an indelible impression both on the immediate scene of his activities and on the whole later history of Western Europe.

As a result of his prominence Luther has been the subject of bitter controversy concerning his place in the generation and later development of the German Reformation. Some have said that the German Reformation was only one revolution within a set of revolutions, in which Luther was only an incidental and non-decisive personality. Others have said that without Luther there would have been no Reformation at all. It seems to me there is an element of truth in both sides of the argument, but that standing alone they are apt to be misleading.

It is true that there were forces already at work in Germany and elsewhere leading either toward reform, or definite cleavage of the Church. One may see these forces in such things
as the cultural and intellectual ferment of the day, with the
growing interest in classical learning, the renewed study of
the Scriptures in the original tongues, and the revival of
scientific and literary disciplines. Then too, there was the
religious unrest, expressed by the mystics and the strict ord-
ers within the Church and the small sects without, character-
ized by the appeal to Biblical precedents and the spirit and
organization of the primitive Church. Finally, there was the
vast political movement which was centered in the struggle be-
tween the papacy and the empire and the growing national states,
and which was complicated by the gradual deterioration of the
feudal structure of society.

It was in this incredibly complex environment—religious,
intellectual, social, economic and political—that Luther lived
out his life. The remarkable thing is that Luther—whether in-
tentionally or not—drew all these elements into what was to be-
come a comparatively unified movement. He caught the imagination
not only of the German prince, but also of the pious peasant, or
the intellectual University scholar like Melanchthon. These di-
verse elements all went into the makeup of the German Reformation
and it cannot be understood without taking these factors into con-
sideration.

But what of the man who was the center of so much of this?
Did he only happen to become the center of the revolution? Chance
undoubtedly did play a part in the career of Luther; had not the
forces already mentioned been at work he might well have been unknown to history, at least in the role which we now know to be his. On the other hand, without the force of Luther's personality the Reformation would likely have taken a different form than it did. It is therefore necessary to gain an understanding of Luther if one wishes to understand the Reformation which has had such an impressive influence on later history.

Few would deny that Luther is an important figure in history, even though some might dispute the claim that his contribution was a beneficial one and others might not wish to commit themselves as to whether he was a good or bad man. Most important of all, Luther is not merely a historical figure who is irrelevant to the modern scene. Today one may read books by Niebuhr, Dawson, Maritain, or even papal encyclicals, to discover that Luther's thought is real and alive, and that he still remains a worthy opponent—or ally, as the case may be—for contemporary political theorists, theologians, philosophers and ecclesiastics. Both for friend and foe, then, Luther is an important personality of history, who cannot safely be ignored.

To understand Luther, however, is far from a simple task. In the first place, the complex forces which were at work generally, were also at work within Luther himself; it could be said that Luther was in part a mystic, a humanist-scholar, a scholastic-theologian, a Church-man, a German patriot and even a peasant. To disentangle these threads in his personality is
practically an impossible task, and yet each of them had an influence on his thought and actions throughout his life. Luther himself was not always certain as to what underlying motives were pushing him and he often complained, for instance, that the doctrinal "oil" of Scholasticism had crept into his very bones, from where he could never completely drive it out. In the second place, Luther is particularly difficult to study because he wrote so voluminously and over such a wide range of subjects. Few persons have matched his literary output; the immense Weimar edition of his works, consisting of over eighty large volumes, is testimony to this obstacle in getting a first-hand knowledge of his thought. In the third place, Luther lived a long and full life and his views changed during his career. He often said that he did not become a mature theologian overnight; when he put an introduction on a new edition of one of his writings produced many years earlier, he left the text as it was—to bear testimony, as he said, to how his teaching had developed during that time. Finally, Luther was not a "systematic" theologian; he did not put down his views in concise and methodical form. Luther said that controversies were a stimulant to his spiritual and mental powers and it is true that we often find some of his most deep and original insights in the middle of his most violent controversial writings. To draw out those insights from the polemical shell in which they are cast is a delicate operation. Furthermore, when Luther is "systematic" in such
writings as his Catechisms, he is sometimes so concise that he becomes ambiguous by his very simplification. All these then, among others, are the obstacles which stand in the path of one who attempts to understand Luther—his thought, his work, his personality.

Various scholars have found different ways of overcoming these obstacles, and, indeed, the amount written about Luther is in fair proportion to his own immense production. A general survey of his life and teaching is one approach which is legitimate, though it has its serious limitations. In this paper another method is used, namely, examining in some detail one of the doctrines which he propounded. This again has its limitations, for it cannot give the general context in which the doctrine is set. Nevertheless, it does enable one to go deeper than a superficial survey is able. In this way, as a narrow pipe is sunk into the ground to get a sample of the geological stratification of a certain place, so a study of this concept may give a small sample of the theological "stratification" of Luther, and enable us to understand, in part at least, some of the strains, motivations and insights which made up his thought.
Law and Gospel in Luther's Theology

One of the most notable trends in contemporary theology has been the revival of interest in and the renewed study of the theology of Luther. This has not been limited to the traditionally Lutheran countries but has been apparent in other confessional traditions as well. For instance, in Britain two of the best recent studies on Luther's thought have been done by G. S. Hendry, a Scottish Presbyterian, in a series of lectures called *God the Creator*, and by P. S. Watson, an English Methodist, in a book entitled *Let God Be God*. Luther has never been entirely unfamiliar to English-speaking readers but most of the previous books in English were primarily biographical in character, emphasizing the personality of the man, as for instance Brian Lunn's *Martin Luther*. The new studies, however, are significant because they reveal Luther as a creative and reforming theologian, not merely as an ecclesiastical innovator or a corrector of moral abuses in the medieval church life as some of the earlier treatments had done.

The introduction of Luther "as a constructive thinker, whose breadth and consistency of outlook and depth of insight entitle him to rank among the greatest theologians" is one that is strange to our ears. The word "consistency" may seem especially strange to us for we have been accustomed to think of Luther as essentially the religious genius, who is a theologian by accident and only so in a very fragmentary and unsystematic way. Luther's great handicap, we have been told, is that he failed to
make his theology a suitable vehicle to convey his admittedly
great and creative religious insights. One recent scholar would
go so far as to say that the "Theology of Luther" is a phrase
without meaning; another has called him "The amateur theolog-
ian--for so, by any standard, Luther must surely be judged."7

Watson, however, has shown that Luther has every right
to be considered an eminent theologian, pointing out that Luther
himself considered that his most important reforming work was in
the field of doctrine rather than in that of "life" (as had been
characteristic of the earlier reformers).8 Even a cursory read-
ing of Luther's life should indicate the large amount of academ-
ic training which he received. Furthermore, his pride in his
title of "Doctor of Theology" and the deep sense of responsibil-
ity with which he bore the degree and carried on his work as a
university lecturer also help to show the intellectual and theo-
logical context in which his "reforming" work began. Or one may
examine his prolific literary output, finding in it a high per-
centage of theological works: lectures, academic theses and their
elaborate defence, philosophical debates, and commentaries and
further revealing the high importance of theological and doctrin-
al factors, not only in his own development, but as materials
with which he articulated his opposition to the whole Roman
Catholic system.

When, for example, he attacks monasticism he sees it not
only as an outward abuse which should be corrected, but even more
as the fruit of a theological system that holds that salvation
depends upon works; he therefore advises Melanchthon that the
vows must be rescinded "a priori" and not "a posteriori." They must apply themselves to the root of the matter, not to its fruit and result; most vows have been taken because of a legalistic view of the Christian life and a dependence on righteousness by works of the law. This binds a free evangelical conscience and must be condemned. If, however, one takes a vow in an evangelical spirit without depending upon works but upon Christ only for salvation (as he believed St. Bernhard and other had done), then a vow may be taken or an old one retained in a new spirit. Luther attacks monasticism, therefore, as the fruit of a perverted theological system and his attack is at the root of that system. The problem is not vows or no vows, but a theology which bases salvation on the law versus one which bases it on the gospel.

But if Luther be admitted as a theologian who has an important and creative role in theological history, how may this theology of Luther best be studied and understood? This has never really been given a fully satisfactory answer. His amazingly prolific literary production, the extreme complexity of the revolutionary historical setting of his work, the lack of rigid systematization in his treatment of theological questions, all help to make the honest representation of Luther's thought an unusually difficult task. The host of rival judgments and views on Luther by scholars down through the years since his death bears testimony to this fact. There are, however, certain aspects of his theological thought which most scholars, whether friendly or hostile, agree are of basic importance if we are to understand him. One of these points is
certainly the question of the relation of law and gospel. Various critics have noted the centrality of this conception in Luther's thinking and Luther himself testified to its importance in his theology.

Loofs, who shows a close knowledge of Luther's thought in his *Dogmengeschichte* says: "Luther hat die Frage nach dem Unterschied von Gesetz und Evangellium als die Kardinalfrage der Theologie angesehen." Adolph Harnack, who is less sympathetic towards Luther's position, also stresses the importance of this distinction and traces it back through Augustine to Paul: "he attached himself so closely to Paul that it does not seem necessary to state his view in detail." Grisar, the German Jesuit critic of Luther, also gives a considerable amount of space in his volumes on Luther to the distinction between law and gospel; he admits that it is a ground-principle of Luther's thought and quotes without disagreement the statement of Loofs that this marks a decisive difference between Lutheran and Roman theology.

Sasse in his *Was heisst lutherisch?* carries this a step further by defending the thesis that it is also the theological point at which Lutherans and Calvinists must part company.

Luther himself gives ample evidence of the high regard he has for this distinction. Works which must take their place in the first rank of his theological writings are: *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen* (1520), *De servo arbitrio* (1525), *Der grosse Katechismus* (1529), and *In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius* (1535). In all of them he stresses the importance
of the true interpretation of the relation between law and gospel.

In *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen* he points out that the whole of Scripture is divided into two parts—law and promise: "die gantze heylige schrifft, wirt yn zweyerley wort geteyllet, wilche seyn: Gebot oder gesetz gottis, und vorheyschen oder zusagunge." The commands teach and demand good works, telling us what we ought and ought not to do; but they give no power to fulfil the demand: "Die gebott, leren und schreyben uns fur, mancherley gutte werck aber damit seyn sie noch nit geschehen. Sie weyssen wol, sie helfen aber nit; leren was man thun soll, geben aber keyn sterck dartzu." The real purpose of the law is to make us realize that we are unable to do good and thereby teach us not to put confidence in ourselves: "lerne an yhm selbs vortzweyffeln." We then find that the promise gives what the law demands and fulfils what the law calls for: "Alsso geben die zusagung gottis, was die gepott erfoddern, und volnbracht, was die gepott heyssen." God, therefore, both gives the law and ultimately fulfils it: "es allis gottis eygen sey. Gepot und erfüllung, er heisset allein, er erfullet auch alleyn." Both the law and the promise are God's Word but they have different purposes. The law is given to convict sinners of their sin and drive them in fear to repentance and conversion; the promise, or the gospel, is to come to those convicted of their sin and teach them faith and forgiveness.23

In *De servo arbitrio* he brings out the necessity of distinguishing between law and gospel in a more polemic style, as be-
fitting the work, castigating Erasmus for not properly observing the distinction. He says that no one can understand theology or the Scriptures unless the distinction is made: "Obsecro autem te, quid ille in re Theologica vel sacris literis efficiat, qui nondum eo pervenit, ut, quid Lex, quid Evangelion sit, norit, aut, si norit, contemnit tane observare? Is omnia misceat oportet, caelum, infernum, vitam, mortem, ac prorsus nihil de Christo scire laborabit." Throughout the work he makes ample use of the distinction to build up his case against Erasmus: "In his locis Diatribe nostra prorsus nihil discernit inter voces legis et Evangelii, tam sic et ignara est, ut quid lex, quid Evangelion sit, non videat... Sed Diatribe nostra iterum nihil inter legis et promissionis verba distinguens." The third main section of De servo arbitrio contains most of his argument on the proper "office" of the law: the law is given, not to prove the freedom of the will, but to reveal sin. It is the gospel which comes to reveal the true remedy for our sin and bondage which the law has disclosed: "Respondet hic Paulus: per legem cognitio peccati...Non (ait) probatur liberum arbitrium per legem...Lex non iuvat, multo minus ipse se iuvare potest. Alia vero luce opus est, quae ostendat remedium. Haec est vox Evangelij ostendens Christum liberatorem ab istis omnibus."

Luther's catechetical writings, of which the chief is Der grosse Katechismus, are the nearest approach we have to a systematic presentation of his theology. In them Luther follows the
simple form of the catechisms for family instruction which he had known in his youth; these generally contained the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments and perhaps one or two Psalms. The interpretation that Luther gives these constituent elements and the order in which he places them, however, are absolutely consistent with the general structure of his theology, and with his interpretation of law and gospel in particular. He says that the Ten Commandments are a perfect summary of the law; they contain everything that is demanded of us to make our life pleasing to God: "So haben wir nu die zehm gepot, ein ausbund Gottlicher lere, was wir thuen sollen, das unser gantzes leben Gotte gefalle." But because our human efforts are far too weak and ineffective to keep the law, the Ten Commandments are properly followed in order by the Creed, which tells us what we are to receive from God and from where we are to receive strength to fulfil the demands of the law: "Bisher haben wir gehoret das erste stick Christlicher lere, und darynne gesehen alles was Gott von uns wil gethan und gelassen haben. Darauff folgt nu billich der glaube, der uns furlegt, alles was wir von Got gewarten und empfahen mussen...Darumb ist dis stick ia so notig als ihenes zu­lernen, das man wisse, wi man dazu kome, woher und wo durch solche krafft zu nemen sey." The third part of the Catechism is the Lord's Prayer, which is the model by which we pray to God for help and strength to enable us to have faith in the Creed and to fulfil the Ten Commandments in the sanctified life: "das er den glauben und erfullung der zehen gepot uns gebe, erhalte und mehre."
In contrast to the Heidelberg Catechism, for instance, Luther places the Ten Commandments first in order; for, he says, if we were able to keep the law, which the true teaching of the Ten Commandments shows is impossible, we would have no need of the Creed or the Lord's Prayer: "Den so wir kundten aus eigenen kreftten die zehen gepot halten, wie sie zuhalten sind, durffen wir nichts weiter, widder glauben noch vater unser." Luther here remains faithful to his teaching that the law must come before the gospel, preparing the way for it by convicting men of sin and driving them from self-confidence to humble penitence. The Ten Commandments should not lead us to pride and dependence on our own efforts but they should lead us ultimately to God to find what He has done and promises to do for us. This is found in the Creed. The Apostles' Creed, therefore, takes the central position in the Catechism "not only standing midway in the natural order, but occupying also by virtue of its contents the central position." As a bee goes from flower to flower collecting honey, so in the Creed is collected from the Bible the essence of the gospel; in fact, "Totum Evangelium est in Symbolo."

The Creed especially stresses, according to Luther, the forgiveness of sins through God's mighty acts. This is a very different lesson from that of the Commandments; they teach us what we have to do, while the Creed announces what God has done for us and given to us: "Aus dem sihestu nu, das der Glaube gar viel ein andere lere ist, denn die zehen gepot. Denn ihene leret wol, was wir thuen sollen; diese aber sagt, was uns Gott thue und
Luther finds such great comfort in the Creed because in it he finds the promise, the gospel, that God will and does give him the whole power and resources of the Trinity to fulfil the demands of the law. It is an insight into Luther's radical reading of the law that he felt nothing less than this would be sufficient to meet its requirements: "Denn durch diese erkentnis, kriegen wir lust und liebe zu allen gepoten Gottes, weil wir hie sehen, wie sich Gott gantz und gar, mit allem das er hat und vermag, uns gibt, zu hulffe und stewer die zehen gepot zuhalten: Der vater, alle creaturn; Christus, alle sein werck; der Heilige geist, alle seine gaben.

At yet a later period in his life and in the form of a Biblical commentary Luther centers almost his whole attention on the distinction between law and gospel. This is his In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius which many consider his most mature and profound theological work. Again and again he stresses the importance of the distinction. One is a real theologian who can make this distinction properly: "Qui igitur bene novit discernere Evangelium a lege, is gratias agat Deo et sciat se esse Theologum. Ego certe in tentatione nondum novi, ut deberem."

The whole of Christian doctrine is summarized in this distinction: "Is locus de discrimine legis et Evangelii scitu maxime necessarius est, quia continet summam totius Christianae doctrinae."

An intellectual division and comprehension of the distinction is not enough because one is dealing here with the inner-most realities of Christian life and experience: "Itaque si volumus esse..."
praedicatorum et doctores aliorum, oportet nos habere maximum
curarum rerum, et probe tenere hanc distinctionem Justitiae
legis et Christi. Est quidem dictu facilis, sed experientia et
usu est omnium difficillima, etiamsi diligentissime eam acuas et
exerceas, Quia in hora mortis vel alliis agonibus conscientiae
proprius concurrunt hae duae justitiae, quam tu optes aut velis. Luther admitted that he himself was not always able to make this
division rightly. The confusion of law and gospel was the foun-
dation of all the Roman errors. Even the apostles were not al-
ways clear here. Peter, for instance, had to be corrected on
this point by Paul. Because Paul understood this doctrine so
deeply, more so than any other apostle indeed, Luther thinks that
he was called as an elect vessel and given a special gift by God
to lay the right foundations for the doctrine of justification.

Luther describes his discovery of the "new" theology in
these terms as well. It was not merely the discovery of justi-
fication by faith as found in Rom. 1: 17. The real discovery
lay in making the proper distinction between law and gospel.
The passage in the Tischreden illustrates this: "Ich war lang
irre, wuste nicht, wie ich drinnen war. Ich wuste wol etwas,
oder wuste doch nichts, was es ware, bis so lang das ich uber
den locum ad Rom. 1. kam: Justus ex fide vivet. Der halff mir.
Da sa ich, von welcher iustitia Paulus redet. Da stand zuvor
im text iustitia, da rezeit ich das abstractum und concretum zu-
samen und wurde meiner sachen gewiss, lernet inter iustitiam leg-
is und euangelii discernirm. Zuuor mangelt mir nichts, denn das
ich kein discrimen inter legem et evangelium machet, hielt es alles vor eines et dicebam Christum a Mose non differre nisi tempore et perfectione. Aber do ich das discrimen fande, quod aliud esset lex, aliud evangelium, da riss ich her durch. The remarkable thing is that this doctrine on which Luther laid such great emphasis should have almost disappeared in the later history of Protestant dogmatics. Its recovery and reinterpretation is one of the unfinished tasks of the contemporary generation of theologians.
I. The Law: The Preparation for the Gospel

Luther separates the law and the gospel as completely as possible; one is earthly, the other heavenly—one is darkness and night, the other light and day. If it were possible he would even further separate them: "atque utinam adhuc longius eas discernere possemus." The sharpness of Luther's distinction is not unexpected in the light of what has already been said. What is surprising, however, are some of the apparently contradictory statements which he makes about the law. At some times he cannot praise it too highly and yet at other times he seems to say that it comes from the devil and is one of the most malignant enemies of mankind. For instance, in Der grosse Katechismus he says that the Ten Commandments are to be prized by men "als den hohisten schatz von Gott gegeben." On the other hand, in the Commentary on Galatians he speaks of Moses with the law as a heretic, excommunicated, and worse than the pope and the devil themselves! "Hic simpliciter sit tibi suspectus ut haereticus excommunicatus, damnatus, deterior Papa et diabolo." Or in the Heidelberg Disputation he speaks derogatorily of the law in one thesis and in the next one praises it highly; the same is true in Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam (1517), where in thesis 79 he says: "Maledicti sunt omnes, qui operantur opera legis" and in thesis 87: "lex sit bona." Luther says that one who reads Paul closely must be impressed by derogatory terms which he applies to the law, which he elsewhere calls a divine gift revealed from heaven. "We then ask "How can this be so?" and it is a question which must be asked of Luther as well.
Luther's contradictory remarks about the law are not to be simply resolved by distinguishing between the law in the Old Testament and that of the New Testament; for him the law is not to be identified (even though related) with the Old Testament, nor is the gospel the exclusive content of any one part of Scripture. Luther's appeal to the writings of Paul as substantiation for his own position is a more positive clue to what he is intending to say; it indicates that the contradiction is either only apparent, or intentional, or both. Luther claimed to be a faithful interpreter of Paul and it is from Paul that he draws his own ideas of the proper Christian interpretation of law. Whether his analysis of Paul's thought is correct is a question which must be decided by the Pauline scholar.

Luther says that the view of the law as both good and evil is neither a contradiction nor even a paradox if it is seen in the right perspective—that is, from within Christ. Luther says that Paul's answer (and the correct one) is that the law is truly both good and evil but it is so in divers respects: "respondet Paulus Legem utrumque esse, et sanctam, iustum, bonam etc. et administrationem peccati ac mortis, sed respectu diversorum." The distinction can best be brought out, it seems to me, by distinguishing between the nature, function, and effect of the law.

The nature of the law is absolutely good and Luther says that it is the most excellent of all things in the world: "quaes quamquam est summum omnium quae sunt in mundo." This is his primary view of the law's essential nature. Whenever he speaks dero-
gatorily of the law, calling it a prison or a thief or a robber for instance, he is speaking not of the nature of the law but of its office: "erat hoc legis officium, ut ea conclusi custodiæmur, tanquam in carcere." And, indeed, how could the law be of an evil nature since it is the expression of God's most holy and pure will. Or when Luther seems to imply that the law is an organ of the devil or when he includes it among those "tyrants" which Christ has overcome, it is such only in reference to the sinful nature of man and its effect upon that sinful nature, not in reference to its divine origin. He makes the comparison to the action of water on lime, in which the water is pure and blameless but stimulates the dormant qualities of the lime; so the law is pure and holy but it aggravates our sinful nature and will. Thus the law, though of God, works evil and becomes, as it were, "of the devil": "Debemus extra conscientiam, facere ex ea Deum, in conscientia vero est vere diabolus."
(A) The Nature of the Law

The most convenient summary of the law is in the Decalogue. According to Luther there are no good works except those which God has commanded nor are there any sins except those which God has forbidden. The Ten Commandments are to be used, therefore, as a means of self-examination before making one's confession, as he suggests in the Smaller Catechism. Without doubt all sins are forbidden somewhere in these precepts of God. The view of the Roman theologians that there are counsels of perfection which stand above the commandments and which, though not obligatory for all, represent a more perfect expression of God's will than the Decalogue, Luther strongly opposes. The basis of his opposition lies in the fact that he interprets the commandments in the widest possible sense, to show that they demand not only outward observances but a state of inward perfection as well. The Ten Commandments set a standard so high that one who could live up to them would no longer be a real man but a heavenly creature. "die den achen geboten gleich sind, weil sie so hoch sind, das sie niemand durch menschen krafft erlangen kan, und wer sie erlanget, ist ein hymlisch Engelisch mensch, weit uber alle heiligkeit der welt."

There is no essential difference between Christ's exposition of the law and its Old Testament form. When one reduces the whole of the Old Testament legislation into its most concise form it falls into two parts, corresponding to the two tables of the Decalogue. The first table deals with our relations with God and the second with our relations with our neighbors: "Bis her haben
wir die ersten drey gepot gelernen die da gegen Gott ge-
richtet sind...Folgen nu die andern siebene gegen unserm
nehisten."

Then Christ, therefore, summarizes the law he
uses an Old Testament quotation to do so.

The First Commandment is the summary, not only of the
first table of the law, but of the whole law. The command
that we would have complete faith and trust in God is the
basic law of our lives. Luther is absolutely confident (and
this is the heart of his whole ethical teaching) that a right
relation with God will insure that all the rest of our life
will be right as well: "wo das hertz wol mit Got dran ist,
und dis gepot gehalten wird, so gehen die andern alle hernach."

This First Commandment is the beginning and end of all other
laws in general and of the other commandments of the Deca-
logue in particular: "Also sihestu wie das erste gepot das
heubit und quell born ist, so durch die andern alle gehet, und
widderumb alle sich zurück ziehen und hangen ynn diesem, das
end und anfang alles ynn einander geknupfft und gebunden ist."

As one can see this is really a restatement of his doctrine of
justification by faith alone. Because all the demands of the
law are included in this First Commandment, so the response may
be summarized as one of faith for that is essentially what this
commandment asks for.

The other table of the law which deals with our relation
with our neighbor may be briefly summarized as the command of
love. What is then the relation of the faith demanded by the
first table and the love demanded by the second table of the law? In the Commentary on Galatians Luther says that love and faith are contrary to one another: "Quid autem est Lex? An non est etiam charitatis praecipendum? Imo Lex nihil aliud praecipit quam charitatem...Si ergo Lex praecipiens charitatem pugnat cum fide; Ergo et charitas non est ex fide." 74 Here Luther is in reaction against the Scholastic teaching that faith formed by love ("fides caritate formata") is the complete faith demanded by the law. Love interpreted in the sense of morally good works would introduce a legalistic element into the doctrine of justification; as Luther points out to Erasmus in De servo arbitrio the law of love does not infer our ability to fulfill it but shows us what we are unable to attain, as do all other parts of the law: "Scilicet, quod diligendi verbo ostenditur forma legis, quid debeamus, non autem vis voluntatis aut quid possimus, imo quid non possimus." 77 Acts of love, therefore, do not fulfill the law, in contrast to faith which does. But, on the other hand, a real faith freely bears as its fruit a life of love and service: "Und gegen meynen nehnsten auch werden ein Christen, wie Christus mir worden ist, und nichts mehr thun, denn was ich nur sehe, yhm nott, nutzlich und seliglich sey, die weyl ich doch, durch meynnenn glauben, allis dinys yn Christo gnez habe. Sih also fleusset aus dem glauben die liebe un lust zu gott, und aus der liebe, ein frey, willig, frolich leben dem nehnsten zu diene umbsonst." 78 As with good works, Luther does not condemn love but he rejects the idea that by meritorious acts of love one may fulfill the law. This
intimate relation between faith which alone fulfils the law, and love which is the fruit of true faith, Luther has beautifully expounded in such works as *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen* or *Vorrede auf die Epistel St. Pauli an die Romer*. For Luther, love is not a standard by which to judge moralistic achievement but is one of the free gifts of God of which we are entirely unworthy; as he says of Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians:

"Im 12. und 13. handelt er, wie mancherley Gaben Gottes sind, unter welchen doch die Liebe das beste sey."

Another question is raised in discussing Luther's teaching of the second table of the Decalogue. That question is: to what extent is Mosaic law binding on Christians? Two different answers had been given in Luther's time. First, the Roman Catholic theologians had held that the moral law was still binding even though the judicial and ceremonial legislation was no longer valid. Second, some of the sectarians had reintroduced Old Testament practices into their Christian communities. Luther dissented from both views and his teaching is developed in contrast to these two opposing interpretations. Against the Roman theologians Luther holds that the whole law is abrogated by the gospel and not only the judicial and ceremonial law: "Quare lex accipitur hic universaliter ut plane diversa et distincta ab Evangelio. Non tantum autem lex ceremoniarum distincta est ab Evangelio, sed etiam decalogus. Ergo de universa lege Paulus hic agit." It is in fact, he says, chiefly the moral law which Christ does away with because the moral law, which aggravates and becomes tyrannical over the
Conscience, is that which most hinders Christian liberty: "Nam cum Paulus ait nos per Christum a maledicto legis liberatos esse, certe de tota lege loquitur, ac praeceptae de morali, quae vel sola accusat, maledicit et condemnat conscientias, non item reliquae duae species." Here, as usual, Luther is striking at any attempt to introduce law, whatever its form, to a determinative position in the work of justification.

But though Luther refused to give law a place in justifying a man or aiding him in the attainment of salvation, he did not hold that the law is to be abolished completely. The law, he says, has its limits and its legitimate uses even though they may not be in the work of justification: "Quod lex in Christiano non debeat excedere limites suos, sed tantum habere dominum." What this dominion may be will be discussed later. The question here raised is in what form may the law be introduced for its legitimate functions? Luther had said that the ceremonial law had been as categorically commanded by God as the Ten Commandments: "Nam Lex ceremonialis aequae fuit Lex divina ac leges morum; Ut Circumcisio, institutio Sacerdotii, cultus et ritus aequae erant praecipi, divinitus ut decalogue." If this is so, must not the law then be reintroduced as a whole? Some of the sectarian had gone in this direction by appealing to Old Testament legislation for justification of many of their exotic practices, climax by the New Jerusalem at Munster with its polygamy and other abuses.

Luther, however, refused to recognize that the rigid appeal to the Old Testament by Munzer and Carlstadt was the logical outcome of his principles. Against the "Rottengeister" and
"Schwermeri" Luther wrote Ein Unterrichtung, wie sich die Christen in Mose sollen schicken. He deals with the whole question of how Moses and his law are to be taken by Christians. As strongly as he is able, Luther says that Moses is a law-giver for the Jews only and that his law is binding on them alone: "Moses ist ein mitler und ein gesetzgeber gewesen des Judischen volcks allein, denen hat er das gesetz geben...Die Heyden sind den Mose nicht schuldig gehorsam zu seyn. Moses ist der Juden Sachssenspiegel."

This applies to the whole of the Mosaic legislation, including for instance the law of Sabbath observance. If, says Luther, we accept even one commandment of Moses' as binding then we must take the whole Mosaic law and be circumcized, wash our clothes according to Jewish precepts, and eat and drink as the Jews are commanded to do. Once again Luther is emphasizing, as he did against the Romanists, that the Mosaic legislation must stand or fall as a whole.

Nevertheless, he continues, there is a sense in which the Mosaic law is valid: it is valid insofar as it conforms to the law of nature written on the hearts of all men: "Ich hab gesagt, das alle Christen und ynn sonderheit die ander leute leren wollen und das wort Gottes handeln, das die sich wol fursehen sollen und den Mosen recht lernen; Also, wo er gepot gibt, das wir yhn darynne nicht weiter annemen, denn so ferne er sich mit dem naeuralichen gesetz reymet." The proper meaning of Moses to the Christian is as a teacher and example, not as a law-giver: "Mosen wollen wir halten fur einen lerer, aber fur unsern gesetzgeber wollen wir
Moses is valuable in three ways, says Luther: first, his outward commandments, though not binding, are good examples for secular rulers; second, we find prophecies and promises of Christ in his writings; third, Moses is an admirable example of a life of faith and love as are the other ancient Fathers of the Old Testament. As a law-giver, however, Moses is only relevant to us Gentile Christians insofar as his law conforms to its exposition in the New Testament and in the natural law of man's heart: "Es sey denn (unsern gesetzgeber) das er gleich stymme mit dem neuen Testament und dem naturlichen gesetze."

Luther's appeal to a natural law may come as a surprise to those who believe that such conceptions have no place in Protestant theology. A reporter of a recent ecumenical meeting asks, for instance: "Had the concept of natural law crept into certain Lutheran interpretations?" As far as Luther is concerned it is not a case of the idea having "crept into" his teaching. One might expect to find it in some of his earlier writings such as Vorlesung über Romerbrief, when he was still under the strong influence of general Scholastic presuppositions. But Luther continued to appeal to a natural law written in the hearts of all men in some of his most mature and deliberate writings much later in his life. In his Commentary on Genesis (1535-45) he points out that the Decalogue is not something peculiarly Mosaic; it is something which Moses had in common with the other Old Testament Fathers. That which is specifically "Mosaic" are the ceremonial and judicial precepts which applied to a certain people, a cer-
tain time and a certain place. Furthermore, the Decalogue is not the exclusive possession of the Jews. They had it in written form but all other men have the Ten Commandments in their hearts; as he says in Der grosse Katechismus: "Die zehen gepot sind auch sonst ynn aller menschen hertzen geschrieben." In his Predigten über das 2. Buch Mose (Sept. 24, 1525) his view is identical: "Was nu Moses geschrieben hat ynn den Zehen gepoten, das fulen wir natürlic ynn unsserm gewissen Rom. 2."

When Luther describes the content of the natural law he simply repeats the Decalogue, commandment by commandment. The Decalogue is important to Christians, not because it was given by Moses, but because it is a convenient summary of the law of nature: "es klerer durch Mosen gegeben ist." As such it is extremely helpful for teaching purposes, such as in the Catechisms. But law does not find its ultimate expression even in the Decalogue; Christ has done this in the New Testament in the Golden Rule (Matt. 7: 12), which puts it all in a little bundle: "jnn ein klein bundlein...Also gehe durch alle gepot der andern tafel, so findestu das dis sey die rechte summa aller predigt die man thun kan." This summary is also found in men's hearts; as Luther says in Von weltlicher Oberkeit (1525): "Denn die natur leret, wie die liebe thut, das ich thun soll, was ich wör wollt gethan haben." He makes the same statement in Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein Konnen (1526): "hie zu stymmet auch das natürliche recht, Das Christus Matth. 7. leret: Was wör wollet das euch die leute thun, das thut wör yhn."
It is to be seen, therefore, that Luther deliberately maintained a consistent and articulate doctrine of natural law; Melanchthon’s view is a faithful reflection of Luther’s teaching at this point, even though not in some of the legalistic conclusions he drew from it. Luther is not the obscurantist that some make him out to be. He was not a complete sceptic about the natural powers of reason and conscience.

The conscience is amazingly sensitive: "Conscientia enim est tenerrima." Reason and understanding are part of the blessings which God’s goodness leads Him to give to His children: "Was meynestu mit dem wort: Ich bleube an Got Vater allmechtige Schepper etc.? Antwort. Das meine und bleube ich, das ich Gottes gescheppre bin, das ist, das er mir geben hat und on unterlas erhelt, leib, seele und leben, geliedmasse klein und gros, alle synne, vernunft und verstand." The weakness of reason, conscience and law lies not in their intrinsic natures but in the fact that they are incapable of putting a man into right relation with his God: "Evangelium autem talis doctrina est quae quiddam sublimius docet, quam est mundi sapientia, iustitia, religio etc. Relinquit quidem illa in suo gradu esse quod sunt, et ut bonas Dei creaturas commendat. Sed mundus anteponit has creaturas Creatori, Denique per eas vult abolere peccata, liberari a morte et mereri vitam aeternam. Hoc damnat Evangelium."

Brunner has pointed out that the relation between the natural law and the Biblical law is one of the most diffi-
cult and obscure points in the thought of the Reformers. In the case of Luther this is especially evident; in recent years there has been almost a continual theological controversy over the exact nature of his teaching. Troeltsch in his Sociallehren holds that Luther stood in the general stream of medieval thought on the subject and that his view is not markedly different from that of Aquinas. Holl, however, has attacked Troeltsch's thesis and has sought to demonstrate that Luther breaks with the Stoic-humanistic teaching of natural law as the naturally immanent reason in the world; for Luther, says Holl, natural law is not the "Seienden" but the "Seinsollenden" confronting human nature. Holl, in turn, has been criticized by Nygren, who accuses him of being unduly Kantian in his interpretation, and by Arnold, a German Roman Catholic, who in a sympathetic study has sought to demonstrate the close similarity between the views of Luther and Aquinas on natural law.

It seems fairly evident that part of this wide diversity of opinion is due to the failure to take Luther's distinction between law and gospel sufficiently seriously. In discussing law Luther is not primarily concerned with the relation of Biblical and natural law, but rather with the relation of law and gospel. The first distinction is a philosophic one; the latter lies at the heart of real religion and is therefore the crucial issue. For Luther law was essentially a religious concept. At the center of religious faith and at the center of the Biblical message is found, the tension between law and gospel. When Luther
discussed law, therefore, he did so against the background of
the gospel and undergirded by his personal religious experi-
ence. The same is true of his teaching on natural law; he
does not contrast it with other laws in a philosophic way but
he simply sets it up against the gospel: "find ich ynn Mose
welchs ich aus der natur nicht hab: Das sind nu die verheys-
sungen und zusagungen Gottes von Christo."

Luther's definition of the law does not show any par-
ticular desire on his part to be rigidly systematic. The im-
portant thing for him was so to define the law that no one
might escape its claims; as he says in Vorrede auf die Epistel
St. Pauli an die Romer: "Das Wortlein Gesetz musst du hier
nicht verstehen menschlicher Weise, dass es eine Lehre sey,
was fur Wercke zu thun oder zu lassen sind, wie es mit Mensch-
gesetzen zugehet, da man dem Gesetz mit Wercken genug thut,
obs Hertz schon nicht da ist. Gott richtet nach des Hertzens
Grund, darum fordert auch sein Gesetz des Hertzens Grund, und
lassen ihm an Wercken nicht begnugen, sondern strafet viel-
mehr die Wercke, ohne Hertzens Grund gethan, als Heucheley und
Lugen. Daher alle Menschen Lugner heissen, Ps. 116, 11., darum,
dass keiner aus Hertzens Grund Gottes Gesetz halt, noch halten
kann." For Luther the law has meaning and relevance because
it has to do with the problem of justification. Here, as else-
where, Luther abhorred abstract speculations. It seemed to
him the height of folly to discuss law in a philosophic con-
text; that robbed it of all its vitality and meaning. The pri-
mary fact for Luther was that a righteous God was confronting man and making a demand upon him. The fact that this demand is being made, and not how it is made (whether through the Decalogue, or the natural conscience) is the primary thing. By becoming unduly concerned in a speculative way over the "how" of the law, rather than in its "thou" one misses its most important meaning, and its consequent judgment.

One must, for this reason, be careful to see the distinction between the nature and the function of the law. The nature of the law is perfectly good and holy, reflecting God's nature and will. But one cannot discuss the nature of the law, nor study it, as though it were a dead and impersonal thing. If we seek to understand the fulness of the law we are falling into that speculation on God's majesty against which Luther warns us in such strong language: "Nihil enim est periculosius, cum agendum est in agone contra legem, peccatum et mortem cum Deo, quam nos vagari nostris speculationibus in coelo et considerare Deum ipsum in su incomprehensibili potentia, sapientia, et maiestate, Quomodo creaverit et gubernet mundum." Luther does in fact specifically include the divine law as one of those things to be avoided in our cogitations: "Quare cum voles cogitare et agere de salute tua, tum omisis speculationibus Maiestatis, omisis omnibus cogitationibus operum, traditionum, philosophiae et legis divinae rapias te in praepe et gremium matris et apprehendas istum infantem." Speculation on the nature of the law is futile, not because of the law, which is
holy, just and good: "Non enim dubium est, quin Lex sit sancta, iusta, bona;" but because of the nature of man. It is not an impersonal machine which is dealing with the law; though a man may be a philosopher he is first of all a man, or in other words a sinner. Because we are sinners—a category which cuts across all human distinctions—our relations with the law are anything but abstract or philosophical; we are in "agone contra legem".

Our only real knowledge of the law, therefore, is not in reference to its nature but in reference to its nature in so far as that is revealed in its office. Through our experience of the work of the law, and even more through our experience of the work of God's grace in the gospel, we come to discover the nature of the law: "Opus ergo legis accipe simpliciter per Antithesim contra gratiam: Quidquid non est gratia, Lex est, sive sit Iudicialis, Ceremonialis, sive Decalogus." The nature of the law, then, can never become the object of our human speculations. It is only when we become a subject of its demand upon us, and even more as we are delivered from its dominion, that we know what the law really is. "Nemo enim, sive sit homo sive Angelus, est supra legem, praeter solum Deum... Quia animalis homo non potest iudicare de lege Dei. Hic deficit Philosophorum, Iuristarum et omnium hominum. Lex enim dominatur homini. Ergo iudicat hominem, non homo legem. Solus Christianus iudicat legem. Quo modo? Quod non iustificet."
(B) The Uses of the Law

The relation between sin and law is a very intimate one in Luther's thought. As has been mentioned, the law is the expression of the holy and eternal will of God. It is, nevertheless, because of sin that the law reigns in the world; were there no sin there would be no need of the law. As he puts it in his Commentary on Romans: "Peccatum et ira est per legem. Ergo legi nullus moritur, nisi qui peccato moritur, et quicunque peccato moritur, etiam legi moritur. Et quam primum fit liber a peccato, etiam a lege liber est. Et Ubi fit feruus peccati, etiam feruus fit legi, et ita dum peccatum dominatur et regnat, etiam lex dominatur et regnat." In his last great Biblical commentary, his exposition of Genesis, he brings out the same thought that it is through sin that the law becomes effective in the world. The presupposition of Luther's understanding of the uses of the law is, therefore, the fact of sin. Because sin is universal, so also the dominion of law is universal. As shall be seen, one of the functions of the law is to reveal sin; in so doing the law establishes the legitimacy of its reign, for by showing the universality of sin it establishes the universality of its dominion.

The law, according to Luther, has properly two functions or uses; the first is civil and the second is spiritual. The first use of the law is to maintain civil order and obedience; the second use is to reveal sin, death and the wrath of God: "Sic lex civiliter et Theologice carcer est. Primum enim civiliter cohibet et concludit impios, ne pro libidine su praecipi-
tes ferri possint omnia scelera. Deinde Spiritualiter
ostendit nobis peccatum, perterrefactit et humiliat nos, ut
sic pavefacti agnoscamus miseriam et damnationem nostram."

Alec Vidler, an Anglican theologian, has entitled these two
uses of the law, respectively: "God's Law as Means of Pre-
servation" and "God's Law as Summons to Repentance".

Following the Lutheran Formula of Concord, Vidler pro-
poses a third use ("tertius usus") of the law: "God's Law as
Guidance for the Church". Luther, however, recognized no
work of the law beyond the two uses which he has laid down.
This is in contrast to Calvin who not only teaches a third
use of the law but also calls it the principle use: "Tertius
usus, quid et praecipuus est, et in proprium Legis finem pro-
prius spectat, ergo fideles locum habet, quorum in cordibus
iam viget ac regnat Dei Spiritus." For Luther, however, the
law can only bring an outward conformity to what is righteous;
under the law one does good against one's will and real desires,
as it were, and this is the root of all hypocrisy. He distin-
guishes, therefore, between the "works of the law" and the "ful-
filling the law"; the former is brought by constraint but the
latter can only come through uncoerced love, which is a gift of
the Holy Spirit: "So gewohne dich nun der Rede, dass viel ein
ander Ding ist, des Gesetzes Werck thun, denn, das Gesetz erful-
len...das Gesetz erfullen, ist, mit Lust und Liebe sein Werck
thun, und frey, ohne des Gesetzes Zwang, gottlich und wohl leben,
as ware kein Gesetze oder Strafe. Solche Lust aber freyer Lie-
be gibt der Heilige Geist ins Hertz." Even after his controversy
with the Antinomians Luther still refused to admit a positive third use of the law in the sanctified life; as he summarized his case against them in *Von den Konziliis und Kirchen* (1539), it was not that they had abolished law from the sanctified life but that they had failed to do justice to the gift of the Holy Spirit through which we are cleansed of sin: "Aber unser Antinomi sehen nicht, das sie Christum predigen on und wider den Heiligen Geist." To continue the metaphor which he uses in reference to the first two uses of the law, Luther says that the imprisonment which we suffer under the law must continue only until faith comes, through which we are released: "Atque is verus et proprius legis usus est, modo non sit perpetuus, quia ista conclusio et custodia sub lege diutius durare non debet quam in futuram fidem, quae si venerit, desinere debet theologicos ille legis carcer." This rejection by Luther of a "tertius usus" of the law, as against some of his closest fellow-workers such as Melanchthon, is an extremely important fact; not only is it the key to his interpretation of Christian ethics but also a symbol of his radically new conception of the whole Christian faith. It is the point which marks him off from both his sworn theological opponents and from those who often claimed, or now claim, to be his faithful interpreters and followers.

The first use of the law is to maintain civil order and the general structure of society. It was Luther's opinion that some men were so evil that unless they were restrained by harsh laws and suitable punishment they would run wild in the world:
"Interim tamen hoc commodi habet lex, ut maxime corda maneant impia, ut primum externe et civiliter coherceat aliquo modo fures, homicidas et palam improbos." In order, therefore, to punish evil-doers and keep them in bounds to protect the righteous, God has instituted civil government to use the law in this way: "Alsoo das gewiss und klar gnug ist, wie es Gott-tis will ist, das welltlich schwerd und recht handhaben zur straff der bossen und zu schutz der frumen."

The second use of the law, however, is its most important and essential function. That function is to reveal sin.

One of the characteristics of Luther's religious life was the tremendous depth of his sense of sin. In some of his earliest recorded lectures his concern for the problem of sin is clearly revealed. The remarkable thing about Luther's understanding of sin is its divergence from most of the current trends of thought of his day. Medieval Roman theology as Luther knew it was never free from the Hellenistic idea that sin is bound up with the flesh, the Pauline ψυχή being interpreted in a physical sense.

"Concupiscencia", therefore, the key word of the Roman theologians in speaking of the seat of sin, has, as Loofs has pointed out, a physical connotation about it. The ascetic and mystic streams of Catholic thought, while showing some divergences from the orthodox theology, reinforced these tendencies by teaching that "creatureliness" is the main source of sin and that one's redemption consists in being brought up and out of the world of sense and matter into a spiritual realm where one has uninterrupted communion with the divine.
Luther was unquestionably influenced by these current views of sin. For instance, one cannot doubt that the dreadful seriousness with which he looked at sin was to some degree imparted to him through the mystical tradition from which he drew so heavily. He constantly emphasizes that no matter how small the sin, it separates us from God and makes us deserving of damnation: "soo waren kein sund soo kleyn, sie vordammet uns." This was said in 1519 but in 1555 his strict view had not been relaxed: "Peccata nostra tam magna, infinita et invicta esse, ut impossibile sit toti mundo pro uno satisfacere." Furthermore, the official theological line of the Roman church, as reflected in the Councils from Orange to Trent, had affirmed the belief in the universality of the effects of original sin: "If any one asserts that the disobedience of Adam injured only himself and not his off-spring...let him be anathema."

Nevertheless, when Luther uses these traditional doctrines and currents of thought he often transforms their meaning in a way which makes them peculiarly his own. He occasionally refers to "concupiscentia" as the source of sin but he restores the word to the Pauline connotation of the whole man—body and soul—turning himself from God. The New Testament is also reinterpreted in the Hebrew sense of relating not merely to physical nature but the entire man and his attributes, material and spiritual; flesh, says Luther in De servo arbitrio, is that which has not been renewed through faith: "qui non est renatus per fidem, esse carnem." Niebuhr has admirably shown how the factors of self-love, disobedience, anxiety and pride must all be included
in Luther's full teaching on sin, revealing the complexity and richness of his thought on the subject. Niebuhr, however, has not purposed to give a systematic survey of Luther's doctrine of sin; as a result the impression may be given that Luther's teaching on sin is a series of brilliant but unrelated insights without any central unifying principle.

As has been previously mentioned, sin and law are closely related in Luther's thought. This is the unifying principle for Luther's teaching on sin. The principle function of the law is to show what sin really is. This work of the law is so necessary because Luther has no confidence in the ability of man with his natural powers to understand what the most malignant sins are.

He bitterly attacks the Roman casuistic distinctions between mortal and venial sins. He also condemns the common held view that the outward actions are the real sins and that the inward affections are only secondary. For example, he says that it is not merely that concupiscence is the source of sin but concupiscence is itself a sin irrespective of the positive actions it ultimately produces. In the final analysis, Luther is so impatient with all these attempts to mitigate the seriousness of sin and the depth of its hold upon man because he feels that all such attempts are really means by which a man seeks to protect his pride and prevent himself from being classed as a sinner. As Niebuhr says: "Luther rightly insisted that the unwillingness of the sinner to be regarded as a sinner was the final form of sin."
Luther sees the glory of the law to be in its work of cutting through all of our pretensions and rationalizations and bringing us to our knees in terror and repentance at our sinfulness. The law passes over the outward, obvious, flagrant sins which it sees to be only the evil fruits of an evil tree. The real source of sin is the heart and the primal sin of which the heart is guilty is that of unbelief or lack of faith. All sins—outward or inward—can ultimately be traced back to this basic sin; as Luther says in Vorrede auf die Epistel St. Pauli an die Romer: "sonderlich sihet die Schrifft ins hertz, und auff die wirtzel und heubtquelle aller sünde, welche ist der Unglaube im grunde des hertzen...Darumb auch, ehe denn gute oder bose werck geschehen, als die guten oder bosen Fruchte, mus zuuor im hertzen da sein Glaube oder Unglaube, als die wurtzel safft und heubtkrafft aller sunde." In a sermon in the Hauspostille (1532-34) he comes to the same conclusion, rejecting the notion that "de fide formata per caritatem" is the divine requirement asked by the law, and saying that the essential demand upon us from God is for simple faith: "Darumb ist der unglaub die rechte haubt sünde und die quelle, da her alle sünd fleusset."

In summary, Luther held that all the divine requirements are included in the Decalogue, which in turn is epitomized in the First Commandment with its demand for faith and trust in God. So, conversely, he held that sin is all that does not conform to the law of God, in short, all that does not conform to the primary commandment of faith. This reduction of the moral
and religious life to the simple alternative of faith or sin is a daring simplification. While it successfully evades the pitfalls of medieval Catholic legalism with its intricate, hierarchical morality and subtle casuistic distinctions, it is always in danger of falling into the opposite pitfall of giving insufficient importance to the relative moral discrimination with which normal life is so full. Luther was not entirely unaware of the alternatives which he faced. The Antinomian controversy is probably the best place to see how successful he was in steering a middle course between the two extremes.
The Effect of the Law

The law's work of revealing sin has a startling and radical effect on human nature according to Luther. When the law has clearly and effectively spoken to us and showed us the dimensions of our sin we are driven into the depths of despair and anguish: "Deinde lex etiam in summo suo usu et vi nihil potest quam accusare, terrere, condemnare et occidere...Sic revelato peccato per radios quos lex in cor spargit, nihil est homini odiosius et intolerabilius legae. Ibi tum mortem potius eligeret, quam quod perferre debet vel brevissimum tempus istos terrores legis." This effect of the law, says Luther, is nothing new for the law has always had the same potency; at Sinai, when the law was first revealed, it came with lightning and thunder and smoke and the Israelites were shaken and terrified beyond measure. The events at Sinai are a true picture of the effective use of the law. Though the Jews prepared themselves carefully for the great event by every kind of ceremonial purification, this "holiness" was nothing before the blinding glory and majesty of God which brought them to a deathly desperation at their sinful misery.

The power of the law must be so great in order to break down presumptuous human pride and self-righteousness. Luther calls this presumption a horrible and obstinate monster, so rebellious a beast that it was necessary for God to send the law as a Hercules to overthrow and destroy it. To mix the metaphors, Luther calls the law the hammer of death, the thundering
of hell and the thunderbolt of God's wrath: "quae malleus est mortis, tonitru inferni et fulmen irae divinae." One cannot preach the free forgiveness of sins to one whose secure and comfortable heart is encased in a rock of self-righteousness; the mighty hammer of the law is needed to break through this: "Magna res opinio iustitiae. Ideo hat unser herr gott ein gros hamer da widder gestelt, acilicet lex." This mighty working of the law is to continue until the sinner is brought to the very brink of desperation: "desperationi proximus"; when this has been accomplished the work of the law is done: "Hicque resistit Lex."

Luther has a characteristic word which he applies to this frightful state of tribulation and desperation to which we are driven by the law. The word is "Anfæctung", or in the Latin "Tentatio". There is really no satisfactory English synonym for it, at least in the sense in which Luther uses it. A spiritual trial or tribulation conveys something of its connotation, but ultimately, only when it is seen in the context of Luther's theological thought and his personal religious experience can it be fully understood. There has been some question as to the origin of the concept. Some have suggested that Luther took it over from the medieval mystics of the German school, such as Gerson, Jacob von Jütterbog, Günther Zainer, Johann Geilers, etc. as seen in their meditations on death: "Ars moriendi" or "Sterbebuchlein". Others have claimed that his sense of "Anfæctung" is merely a psychological aberration, another example of his fundamental mental derangement.
Upon closer examination, whatever the origins of it may have been, it will be seen that "Anfectung" is a religious term which springs from the fulness of Luther's devotional life and is in complete harmony with his mature theological formulations. It is true that when Luther describes the content of this "Anfectung" he does so in the intimate and vivid terms of his own personal experience—the sense of the presence of the devil, the wrath of God, the nearness of hell, the heart filled with terrible voices: "Imo putamus, praesertim durante tentatione, diabolum horribiliter contra nos rugire, coelum mugire, terram tremere, omnia collapsura esse, omnes creaturas minari malum, infernun ap- eriri ac velle nos deglutire. Hic sensus est in corde nostro, has horribiles, hanc terrificam faciem nos audimus et videmus." 172

Luther, however, did not feel that this experience was peculiar to himself; one of the most important meanings to him of the phrase that Christ was "under the law" was that Christ had experienced fully this "Anfectung". His agony during the passion reveals that he felt this anguish of spirit as no man had before nor will again; therefore, by experiencing and overcoming this "Anfectung," Christ is also able to redeem us from its oppression. The spiritual agony of Christ in Gethsemane and on the Cross is perhaps the best definition of what "Anfectung" meant to Luther, again emphasizing its basic religious frame of reference.

The relation between "Anfectung" and the rest of Luther's theology is readily understood in this way. As the conflict with the law was one integral part of Christ's own spiritual tribul-
ation so this conflict rages in our own hearts. The law is the chief agent by which "Anfectung" comes and our conscience is the channel through which it comes. It has been shown what an important place the First Commandment must be given as a summary of the law and it is significant that Luther should find that commandment to be one of the main sources of his "Anfectung". At the foundation of his "Anfectung" lies the basic distinction between law and gospel. Luther, therefore, makes the same contradictory statements about "Anfectung" as he does about the law. It is the very door of death and hell and yet the worst "Anfectung" of all is to have no "Anfectung"! Luther means by this that a man must be brought to a realization of his own impotence, wretchedness and sinfulness before God is able to help him. As he says in his *Resolutiones disputationum de indulgentiarum virtute*, a man must be damned before he can be saved, destroyed before he can be edified, killed before he can be given life; the anxiety at the knowledge of sin is the beginning of salvation: "In ista autem conturbatione incipit salus." One may clearly see here the basic dialectic between law and gospel.

This effect of the law, therefore, however terrible and frightening it may be, is a very necessary and salutary part of God's plan of redemption. The law, says Luther, has its proper place and time; its work is a good one. It kills in order to prepare for life. It is not against the promises of God but confirms them. The law is preparing the way for the gospel. Luther uses various metaphors to describe this proper effect of the law. The law is the voice of servants but the gospel is the voice of
the Lord. The law is the schoolmaster to bring us to Christ. Even more vividly, as the dry ground desires the rain after the shining of the sun, so the law makes the afflicted consciences thirst for Christ; He comes only to "dry" souls for His life is too costly to be wasted on ground which does not desire the living water which He gives. All these metaphors, borrowed in part from Paul, stress the anticipatory character of the work and effect of the law. The law is making ready for something which is yet to come and that is the gospel.

It is here that the contradictory statements of Luther on the relation between law and gospel are resolved. Both law and gospel are the expression of God's will and yet they must be separated from one another as day is from night; to mingle them is the basis of false religion but neither can either of them stand alone. The true interpretation, says Luther, is that law and gospel have different functions which must never be confused and in this sense they must be divided as completely as possible; when seen in their proper perspective, however, it is apparent they are in perfect correlation for together they lead man to redemption and salvation: "Hic iterum videmus Legem et Evangelium quae inter se longissime distincta et plus quam contradictoria separata sunt, affectu coniunctissima esse... Quare non satis est nos conclusos esse sub lege, quia, si nihil aliud sequeretur, cogeremur desperare, in peccatis mori etc. Sed Paulus ad it nos conclusos esse et coherceri sub Paedagogo, lege, non in aeternum, sed in Christum qui est finis legis. Ista igi-
tur pavefactio, humiliatio et custodia non durare debet perpetuo, sed in futuram fidem, hoc est in salutem et bonum nostrum, ut nobis conterritis lege dulcescat gratia, remissio peccatorum, liberatio a lege, peccato, morte etc., quae operibus non acquiruntur, sed sola fide apprehenduntur etc."

It is when the true purpose of the law is distorted that it becomes the agent of the devil instead of the agent of God. If, when in a state of "Anfectung", we remain in this anguish and despair and do not see it as the preparatory stage for the gospel, we are truly in the hands of the devil. He seeks to bring the condemning and terrifying word of the law to us in our humiliation, after its proper work is finished; if we permit Satan to have his way we shall be destroyed and the word of the healing and saving gospel will not come to us.

One of the chief attacks of the devil is to convince the sinner that the terrors of conscience, the dark prison of despair, is the end of the work of the law, rather than a means to an end. The classic examples of those who remained and languished in this prison are Cain, Saul and Judas. We must take a different way than they did, realizing that this "Anfectung" of conscience is the means by which God is leading us to His gospel.

Luther's interpretation of "Anfectung" illustrates the subtle and expert division which he is making between law and gospel; he who knows how to divide and join together these two things is entitled to be called a real theologian: "Qui istam artem bene nosset ille merito diceretur Theologus." The effect
of the proper work of the law is to bring us to the very edge of desperation. On one side of the "razor's edge" are the wrath of God, the terrors of hell and the attacks of the devil; on the other, the sweet and heavenly consolations of Christ. The whole of the Christian life is in a tension between these two alternatives and the basic problem of Christian experience is to put law and gospel in right relationship to one another. Even if it were easy to make this distinction in a speculative way, the real testing comes at the times of spiritual crisis, in times of temptation—in short, at the height of our spiritual warfare. Here there is no time for quiet reflection or detached objectivity for every Christian is involved in this battle! "Idem certamen experitur unusquisque Christianus." This is so profoundly difficult that Luther admitted that he himself had hardly learned the first elements of how to make the division; nor will anyone be able to learn it perfectly as long as sin and flesh remain in this life: "Ego vero et mei similes vix tenemus huius artis prima elementa; Et tamen seduli sumus discipuli in ea schola, ubi ista ars discitur. Discitur quidem, sed donec caro et peccatum mandent, non potest edisci." Nevertheless, we must always strive to learn the art as best we can since it lies at the center of the mystery of our spiritual existence.
II. The Gospel: The Fulfilment of the Law

All natural religion, all religion of the man who is outside of Christ, all religion, indeed, which fails to understand the proper division of law and gospel, falls into two main errors. Religion which does not divide law and gospel rightly—whether it be Roman, Jewish, Moslem, or Sectarian—must eventually lead either to pride, on the one hand, or despair, on the other, or constantly oscillate between the two extremes. As we have seen, pride or presumption is ultimately based on a false understanding of the nature of the demand of the law. It is the work of the law to be the mighty hammer of God to break down the proud hearts and destroy the self-righteousness which is hiding within. But the law, having done its work, leaves a broken and terror-stricken conscience which does not know in which direction to turn and will languish in despair until it is lifted up. This is the work of the gospel.

Luther, with his vivid imagination, sees all false religion originating from the conspiracy of the devil. Satan, on one side, seeks to confirm men in their pride and bolster their natural presumption; on the other side, he seeks to confirm men in their misery and hold them in the prison of despair. If he loses the first battle against the law he then strives to win the next one against the gospel. The law and gospel working together, therefore, are the most powerful and effective weapons of God against the devil.
(A) The Nature of the Gospel

The gospel is the essence of the Christian message for Luther; it is the summary of the Christian faith. Luther often says that the gospel is the "New Testament", and he uses the two terms almost interchangeably. Nevertheless, he did not intend by this to identify the gospel and the New Testament, insofar as the latter is considered as one section of the Bible. The New Testament does in this Biblical sense properly contain the gospel and the Old Testament the law: "Novum testamentum proprie constat promissionibus et exhortationibus, sicut Vetus proprie constat legibus et minis." But the gospel is far more than the Scriptures; as he points out in the Commentary on Romans: "Evangellium non est solum, quod Mattheus, Marcus, Lucas, Iohannes scripserunt. Quod satis ex hoc loco patet. Quo Expresse dicit, Quod Evangellium sit verbum de filio Dei incarnato et passo et glorificato."

Speculative knowledge or definition of the gospel, as with the law, is not enough. Luther can only define the gospel in terms of what it does for and works within him: "Hatt die seele keyn ander dinck, widder yn hymel noch auff erden, darynnen sie lebe, frum, frey, und Christen sey, den das heylig Euagelij, das wort gottis von Christo geprediget." More specifically, the gospel is for Luther that which delivers us from our sins: "Was ist den diss testament oder was wirt uns drynnen bescheyden von Christo? furwar ein grosser, ewiger, unaussprechlicher schatz, nemlich vorgebung aller sund, wie die wort klar lautten 'diss ist der kilch eyns newen ewigen testaments yn meynen bluet, das fur
euch und fur viele vorgossen wirt zur vorgebung der sund."

Twenty years later Luther still maintains that the forgiveness of sins is the principle office of the gospel: "vergebung der sunde jnn alle welt, welchs ist das eigentliche Ampt des Euangelij." This work of the gospel is the true source of joy in the Christian life; it is the myrrh which makes the bitterness of sin and death sweet. The voice of the gospel is, therefore, the sweetest one possible: "illam vocem dulcissimi Euangelii", and the most pleasant consolation to the miserable sinner: "Vox Euangelica et dulcissimum solatium est miseris peccatoribus."

The clearest picture of the gospel may be painted against the background of the law. The law is an exactor which tells us what is required and what is demanded of us; the gospel is a giver which demands nothing of us except that we reach out our hands to receive what is given. The gospel never says to do this or that but only tells us what God has done for us. The gospel is a gift and promise, while the law is a demand and threat. This is the theme which runs through the whole of the Commentary on Galatians, and which appears even more concisely in other of his works, as for instance in a sermon from the year 1532 entitled: "Wie das Gesetz und Euangelion recht grundlich zu unterscheiden sind: "Euangelium non est aliud quam promissio et donum, ich sol den sack herhalten. Maxima differentia nemen und geben." By its fulfilment of the law the nature of the gospel is delineated.
The relation between Christ and the gospel is a very intimate one. The gospel is that heavenly teaching which tells the world the meaning of Christ; it is a combination of gift and promise of forgiveness of sins, redemption from death, victory over the devil, and life eternal. Luther calls this gospel the revelation of the Son of God, the "doctrine" which is different from all others: "doctrina Evangelii quae est revelatio filii Dei...Et ea diversa est doctrina ab omnibus aliis." The gospel alone reveals the Son of God: "Evangelium solum revelat filium Dei...Christus est objectum Evangelii." To use the word "doctrine" may seem to indicate that Luther has a Scholastic understanding of what the gospel is; Harnack falls into this error by saying that the gospel is for Luther: "saving doctrine...which certainly includes the old dogmas." Luther, however, explicitly disassociates himself from such a view by saying that this "genus doctrinae" cannot be learned or taught except through God—first by the outward word and then inwardly by the Holy Spirit: "Hoc autem genus doctrinae non discitur, docetur, indicatur per hominem, legem, sed per deum, externo verbo; deinde intus revelat spiritus per suum donum. Evangelium est verbum quod descendit de coelo et revelatur per spiritum sanctum qui ad hoc missus." The gospel is to Luther precisely what the words "εὐαγγέλιον" or "gospel" literally mean in the Greek and English respectively: the "good announcement" or the "glad tiding". That "good news" is to Luther the essential content of the Biblical, and more especially, of the
New Testament message; it is the heart of what we have come to know as the "Evangelium", the proclamation which first told the meaning of Christ to the world.

In his Vorrede auf das Neue Testament Luther gives a long discussion of his interpretation of the word gospel. He says of it: "Denn Evangelium ist ein Griechisch Wort, und heisset auf Deutsch: gute Botschaft, gute Mahre, gute neue Zeitung, gute Jeschrey, davon man singet, saget und frolich ist." Just as the good news which came to the Jewish people when David had overcome their great enemy Goliath, so the gospel is the good news of the true David who has overcome sin, death and the devil and rescued all those who are in bondage to them: "So ist nun das Evangelium nichts anders, denn eine Predigt von Christo, Gottes und Davids Sohn, wahren Gott und Menschen, der fur uns mit seinem Sterben und Auferstehen aller Menschen Sunde, Tod und Hölle überwunden hat, die an ihn glauben." This "good news" may also be called the New Testament for just as a dying man bequeaths his goods to his heirs, so Christ bequeathed the gospel to all who believe in it and his "goods" are His life, His righteousness and His salvation. The true gospel may, therefore, be either a short or a long message; it is a long message when the works of Christ are described in detail but it may be a brief one when it simply tells how the death and resurrection of Christ means the overcoming of sin, death and hell for those who believe in him, as Paul and Peter taught it: "der beschreibt aber kurz, der nicht von Christi Werken, sonder kurzlich anzeigt, wie er durch sein
Sterben und Auferstehen Sünde, Tod und Hölle überwunden habe
denen, die an ihn glauben, wie St. Petrus und Paulus." In
conclusion, Luther warns his readers not to make Christ into
a "Moses" or the gospel into a book of law or teaching: "Dar-
um siehe nun darauf, dass du nicht aus Christo einen Moses
machers, noch aus dem Evangelio ein Gesetz oder Lehrbuch.
It is true, Luther says, that Christ (and Paul and Peter be-
side) gives many commandments and teachings, but this is not
properly the gospel; the real gospel is the preaching and the
knowledge of the benefits of Christ: "seine Werke und Ge-
schichte wissen, ist noch nicht, das rechte Evangelium wissen
...also ist auch das nicht, das Evangelium wissen, wenn du
solche Lehre und Gebot weisest, sondern, wenn die Stimme
kommt, die da sagt, Christus sey dein eigen mit Leben, Lehren,
Werken, Sterben, Auferstehen und allem, was er ist, hat, thut
und vermag...dass man allenthalben sieht, wie das Evangelium
nicht ein Gesetzbuch, sondern eigentlich eine Predigt von den
Wohltaten Christi, uns erzeiget und zu eigen gegeben, so wir
27
glauben."

One may wonder whether Luther is really giving "Evangelium" its proper New Testament definition when he identifies
it so one-sidedly with the forgiveness of sins, as contrasted
to the teaching of the law. Heiler, for instance, says: "Das
Evangelium ist für Luther nicht das neutestamentliche "\gamma\nu\rho\mu\alpha\pi\nu\nu\sigma\nu\mu\alpha\nu", das Gesetz und Gnadenverkündigung umspannt, sondern
ausschliesslich die Predigt von der sündenvergebenden Gnade
Gottes." In his earlier writings Luther seems to include both the elements of law and gospel within the concept of "Evangelium"; the gospel has two offices: the first to interpret the old law and the second to preach the good tidings of forgiveness of sins. As he says in his *Sermo. Dominica II. Adventus* (1516): "Igitur Evangelium habet duplex officium. primum est interpretari legem veterem... hic iam venit officium Evangelii secundum et proprium et verum, quod nuntiat desperatae conscienciae auxilium et remedium." Here "gospel" has become an almost all-inclusive term, even though its "proprium et verum officium" is that of forgiveness and redemption. In another sermon of the same year Luther even speaks of a "Sacangelium" which reveals sin and preaches repentance: "In hoc quod dicit omnibus 'poenitentiam agite' utique omnes peccatores arguit et sic tristia et ingrata nunciat, quod est Sacangelium, i.e. malum nuntium et officium alienum."

Later, however, Luther interprets gospel in a far more circumscribed way so that no element of law is included in the term and indeed stands directly contrary to it. Luther does make the concession that Christ had a two-fold office, that of interpreting the law and that of proclaiming the gospel. It is the latter which is his proper work and the former—only a by-product of it for which he did not principally come into the world. But the important thing to note is that when Christ gives commandments or expounds the law He is precisely teaching the law and He is not revealing a legal side of the gospel.
That would be to make Christ into another law-giver and this to Luther is the betrayal of the Christian faith: "Ideo non legislator sed redemptor noster a lege, quia fecit se servum legis. Quod vero dat praecepta, das setz in alium locum. Das ist nicht officium praecipium Christi sed accidentale."

The gospel is, therefore, in Luther's thought neither the New Testament, nor the "\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)", nor even Christ, insofar as they are considered to contain elements of the law. The gospel is the divine word of forgiveness and salvation, which both abolishes and fulfills the law; as such it is the axis of the New Testament and of the whole Biblical revelation, it is the essence of the "\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)\(\nu\)", and the "doctrine" of the Son of God who was incarnated, crucified and resurrected that sinners might have life. Luther's teaching of the gospel as the "good news" which is offered only through God's grace, revealed only by the Holy Ghost, whose sole content is the redemptive work of Christ, and which is apprehended by faith alone is his central theological affirmation and his ultimate formulation of the Christian faith.
According to Luther the gospel comes to us in two forms: first, as the spoken word and second, as the sacramental word. The spoken or preached gospel is the exposition of the "doctrines" which has been discussed above; it is the articulation and clarification of the significance of Christ coming into the world. But the word of the gospel is not merely something spoken by word of mouth and heard by the ears. Through the sacraments we have visible and tangible signs of the gospel; they are testimonials or pledges of God's good will towards us and tokens of His promises. In De captivitate Babylonica (1520), one of Luther's first major pronouncements on the sacraments, he ultimately defines a sacrament as a promise to which has been added a sign: "Proprie tamen ea sacramenta vocari visum est, quae annexit signis promissa sunt." He says that if one wishes to speak quite exactly only two of the seven sacraments of the Roman church are to be considered real sacraments: Baptism and Holy Communion. The others are to be abolished because they do not fulfil this two-fold requirement. The sacrament of Penance, for instance, to which Luther was otherwise favorably disposed, though it contains a promise, does not have a divinely instituted and visible sign; it therefore cannot be considered as a real sacrament but only a renewal of baptism.

The special virtue of the visible, divinely appointed character of a true sacrament lies not in its own essence but primarily in the fact that it is a witness of God's presence and to
the promise of forgiveness of sins. Luther is very critical of those whose pride of heart makes them contemptuous of real and sensuous signs of God's love. It was Luther's own experience that men are so weak and poor that they need visible signs of grace and forgiveness to strengthen them in times of great spiritual tribulation; these signs are God-given antidotes against "Anfektung": "Drub ist yn dissem sacrament, unsz geben die unmessige gottis gnad und barmhertzickeit, das wir, da al-len yamer, alle anfektung, von unsz legen auff die gemeyn, und sonderlich auff Christo." The sinner who has been convicted of his sinfulness is utterly crushed down and it is only with extreme difficulty that he can believe the promises of the gospel. It is the paradox of the religious life that the pious should tend to see sins where none actually are; Christ comes to the sinners as one seeking the lost sheep or lost coins and tells them "das Gott den Sundern nicht feindt sey, er habe nit lust an jrems todt." Against the wiles of the devil, therefore, one holds fast to the signs (even though knowing that faith in one's heart is sufficient in the eyes of God) and says: "Siehe, du Tyrann, siehe, du Teufel fichtst mir an mein Leben und Ge-wissen; sib, da hab ich ein Zeichen, dass Christus sein Leib und Leben, Blut und Fleisch fur mich gesetzt hat."

1. Luther's teaching on Baptism reveals how sacraments may be considered as visible signs of the gospel of God. In Der kleiner Katechismus he defines Baptism in this way: "Die Tauffe ist nicht allein schlecht wasser, Sondern, sie ist das
That this is the word of the gospel is clearly shown when he asks what Baptism gives or of what benefit it is and answers:

"Sie wirckt vergebung der sunden, erlosset vom tod und teuffel, und gibt die ewigen seligkeit, allen die es gleuben, wie die wort und verheissung Gottes, lauten." This is a simple restatement of the work of the gospel; the fact that it comes in a different form does not affect its essential character of being a free gift from God. Luther's differences with the Roman and Anabaptist views of Baptism are only variations of his differences with them over the nature and work of the gospel.

Against the Roman teaching that original sin is completely eradicated in Baptism and that a new sacrament, Penance, is needed to repair the damage of sins committed after Baptism, and that the benefit of a sacrament is bestowed without the faith of the recipient, Luther stands firmly. He constantly maintains that Baptism is of life-long validity; it is the ship of salvation which never goes down and therefore we do not need the "second plank" of salvation, Penitence, as Jerome had taught: "Ianae una, solida, et invicta navis, nec unquam dissolvitur in ullas tabulas, in qua omnes vehuntur, qui ad portum salutis vehuntur, quae est veritas dei in sacramentis promittens." The sacrament is simply a sign of the promise or gospel of God and cannot perish; conversely, being a promise it may only be received by faith. There is no place here for either magical infusion or legalism.
The Anabaptists were not long in attacking him from the other side; for they said if a sacrament is only of value when it is received by faith then its intrinsic validity is also dependent upon faith. In Der grosse Katechismus Luther seeks to meet this difficult objection. He attacks the Anabaptist view that the validity of a sacrament depends on the faith of the recipient and of the administrator; a true sacrament, he says, is bound not to faith but to the Word. The water without the Word is simply cooking water such as a maid uses and might be called a bath-baptism: "mag wol ein bader Tauffe heissen." When it is bound to God's Word, however, baptismal water becomes something far different: "ein ander ding ist Tauffe, denn alle ander wasser." Though this is not in a natural way: "nicht des naturlichen wesens halben," nevertheless, where God's name is, there is life and salvation and the water is to be called godly, holy, fruitful and gracious water. The Word combined with the water brings us an inestimable treasure; this treasure being a work and gift of God stands by itself whether we have faith in it or not. Without faith, however, this treasure will avail us nothing: "On glauben ist es nichts nutz, ob es gleich an yhn selbs ein Gottlicher uberschwenglicher schatz ist."

On the one side, Luther is protesting against the view that a sacrament has efficacious power without faith and, on the other, that the validity of a sacrament is dependent upon faith. Between these two extremes Luther maintains that both the Word and faith are necessary to make a sacrament both valid and efficacious:
"Quilibet enim facile intelligit, quod haec duo sunt simul necessaria, promissio et fides. sine promissione enim credi nihil potest, sine fide autem promissio inutilis est, cum per fidem stabiliatur et impleatur." Baptism, for instance, is the promise of God in the form of an ordinance for washing by water. As a promise it is purely dependent upon God for its existence and validity. But as with all promises of God, faith and faith alone, is necessary for its apprehension and the conferring of its benefits. Luther's dislike of adult Baptism is largely based on his fear that any sort of legalism should penetrate this sacrament; it was one of the only sacraments which had been uncorrupted in the Roman church for even in it infants are baptized and this is certainly an implicit rejection of ideas of meritorious achievement or moralistic attainment, as a prerequisite of salvation.

This does not mean, however, that Luther is rejecting the possibility of moral attainment. Baptism is a perfect sign of the Christian life since it is the picture of the submerging of the old man and the emerging of the new man; it is the symbol of death and resurrection. For such a complete and perfect thing Luther would prefer to have a complete and perfect sign, that is, total immersion. Indeed, the whole of our Christian life is nothing more than a continual "re-Baptism" in which we daily die to the flesh and live to the spirit. Sacramentally, therefore, we are new creatures, reborn in a new creation; but in this life we have only begun to become what we really are because our body
of sin is not entirely laid aside until the final Resurrection. The new life of faith is a constant spiritual Baptism in which we begin to die to this world and live to God: "Quare, dum incipimus credere, simul incipimus mori huic mundo, et vivere deo in futura vita, ut fides vere sit more et resurrectio, hoc, spiritualis ille baptismus, quo immersimur et emergimus." Sins after Baptism are not to be dealt with by means of another sacrament, Penance, but they are to be viewed in terms of the promise of Baptism which has lasting significance. The whole problem of sin is to be resolved by a person simply returning to the promise of Baptism and resting in faith in that promise. The life of sanctification is simply the becoming of what we already are—of becoming actually what we are sacramentally: "Quam diu enim vivimus, semper id agimus, quod baptismus significat, id est, morimur resurgimus...Ita semel es baptisis sacramentaliter, sed semper baptisandus fide, semper moriendum, semperque vivendum. Baptismus totum corpus absorbuit, et rursus edidit; ita res baptismi totam vitam tuam cum corpore et anima absorbere debet, et reddere in novissimo die, indutam stola claritatis et immortalitatis."  

Baptism is to be seen as a symbol of the meaning of the gospel. There is no merit, nor law, nor self-achievement involved; it is simply the seal of God's promises to forgive us our sins and to make us new creatures. The fourth section on Baptism in Der kleiner Katechismus might seem on first reading to be a statement of the "new law" for those who have been bap-
tized: that they should drown the old Adam in them by daily repentance and that they should die to all sins and evil desires: "Was bedeut denn solch wasser teuffen? Antwort: Es bedeut, das der alte Adam jnn uns, durch tegliches rew und busse, sol erseufft werden, und sterben mit allen sunden und bosen lusten." Such is not Luther's meaning, however; he quotes Paul's words in Romans 6:4f., whose argument clearly is, as Dodd has pointed out: "that the death and resurrection of a Christian is sacramentally complete", even though actual resurrection is spoken of in a future tense. Luther plainly follows this symbolism of Paul by completing his discussion on Baptism with the Resurrection used as the analogy for the whole Christian life, an absolute repudiation of any thought of moral attainment through the law. Our old Adam: "widerumb teglich heraus komen und aufstehent. Ein newer mensch, der jnn gerechtigkeit und reinigkeit, fur Gott ewiglich lebe." Baptism is, therefore, the symbol of the Christian life as 'it is lived through the gospel. It symbolizes the life of grace and the gospel as one of pure gift, without any merit of our own, and of God's promise which is only dependent on our faith and trust in it to become effective in our lives.

2. Though Baptism and Holy Communion use different elements, their essential nature is the same. They both signify the forgiveness of sins and the new life in Christ. Luther says of the Lord's Supper in Der kleiner Katechismus: "Was nut-
zet denn solch essen und trincken? Antwort: Das zeigt uns diese wort. 'Fur euch gegeben und vergossen zur vergebung der sunden,' Nenlich, das uns jm Sacrament vergebung der sunden, leben und seligkeit durch solche wort gegeben wird, Denn wo vergebung der sunden ist, da ist auch, leben und seligkeit.

As with Baptism, so this sacrament is founded on God's Word and stands whether we believe in it or not: "Denn es ist nicht gegrundet auff menschen heiligkeit, sondern auff Gottes wort."

But faith is necessary for the conferring of its benefits:

"Und weil er vergebung der sunden anbeuet und verheisset, kann es nicht anders denn durch den glauben empfangen werden. Solchen glauben foddert er selbs ynn dem wort als wer spricht, FUR EUCH gegeben, und FUR EUCH vergossen, als solt er sagen."

He admits that fasting and prayer may be a good external discipline as preparation for the sacrament but this does not make us worthy of it; only humble faith in the promises offered by the sacrament is a worthy preparation, for this blessing may be grasped only with the heart: "Praeparatio itaque digna et usus legitime non est, nisi fides, qua creditur Missae, id est, divinae promissioni."

Those who do not come to the sacrament because they do not feel worthy of it, in the sense of being pure and without sin, are being misled; we should come to the Lord's Supper precisely because we are unworthy and sinful: "Darumb sollen solche leute lernen, das die hohiste kunst ist, das man wisse, das unser Sacrament stehet, nicht auff unser wridigkeit...Und eben
darumb, das wir unwürdig sind.  

Holy Communion, therefore, as a true sacrament is a pure blessing of God, the promise of the forgiveness of sins and a new life in Christ. The Mass is, as such, really a summary of the gospel: "Das ist das ganzt Evangelium ynn eyner kurtzen summa begriffen mit den worten dises testaments oder sacraments;" "At missa est pars Evangelii, immo summa et compendium Evangelii." As the character of the gospel helps us to understand the meaning of the Lord's Supper, so it in turn may help us to understand the meaning of the gospel.

Luther refuses to let any sort of legalism enter the true teaching on the Lord's Supper. It is not a good work, as taught by Roman theology, but a pure gift and promise of God. Neither is there room for legalism in the relation between the Mass and the sanctified life of a Christian. The Mass is rightly called food for the soul; through Baptism we become reborn men and the Lord's Supper is needed to strengthen and nourish the new man in us: "Darumb heisset es wol ein speisse der seelen, die den neuen menschen neeret und sterckt. Denn durch die Tauffe werden wir erstlich new geboren." We are constantly tormented by the world, our flesh and the devil; in our weariness and depression we are to turn to this sacrament to draw strength and comfort from it: "Dazu ist nu der trost gegeben, wenn das hertz solchs fulet, das yhm wil zu schwer werde, das er hie newe krafft und labsal hole." If we depend upon God and use His signs we need not be unduly pessimistic about this life; the battle may be a hard one but Luther is confident that the
new life in us will constantly increase and be strengthened:

"Darumb ist es gegeben zur täglichen weide und futterun, das sich der glaube erhole und stercke, das er ynn solchem kampff nicht zuruck falle, sondern ymmer yhe stercker und stercker werde. Denn das newe leben sol also gethan sein, das es stets zuneme und fort fare." This advancement in the spiritual life is, however, not of our doing or achieved through our efforts. We come to the Lord's Table as sinners and receive this rich food gratuitously for our profit and benefit. As with Baptism so this sacrament both makes us righteous by forgiving our sins and gives us strength to become what we are. This is the central paradox of Luther's ethical teaching by which he seeks to avoid legalism on one side and quietism on the other. His might be called a sacramental theory of morals.

What to many has been the chief stumbling block in Luther's theology is his doctrine of the real presence in the Lord's Supper. In the light of what has been said about his sacramental theory as a whole, however, and his understanding of the relation of law and gospel, his views may seem somewhat more acceptable than what one has described as "a crude and unintelligible theory of the Eucharist, repellent to the enlightened mind and the spiritual consciousness of men." Luther's attitude towards the theory of "concomitance" has already been mentioned, in which he disparages attempts to understand the manner of the presence of Christ's body and blood in the sacrament and advocates a simple and unquestioning acceptance of the fact by faith: "Es ist gnug, das
du wissest, es sei ein gotthlich Zeichen, da Christi Fleisch und Blut wahrhaftig innen ist; wie und wo, lost ihm befohlen sein. This, of course, is in perfect harmony with Luther's consistent suspicion of attempts to pry into the divine mysteries by abstract speculations.

Even more important is Luther's strong emphasis on the presence of the Word in the sacrament. Without it the wine and bread remain what they always have been; when the Word is added, however, they become something entirely different. Luther quotes with high approval the words of Augustine: "Accedat verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum;" and says that Augustine has hardly said anything better. But this union of the Word with the elements must not be thought to bring a magical change of those elements; on this point Luther's strong words against the doctrine of "transubstantiation" must be clear enough. The body and blood are indeed in and under ("ynn und unter") the bread and wine; this bread and wine, therefore, is not ordinary bread and wine but bread and wine "ynn Gottes wort gesasset, und daran gebunden." To go beyond this affirmation is to indulge in needless and dangerous philosophizing.

The question still remains as to why Luther was so insistent on maintaining the doctrine of the real presence, even though he attacked transubstantiation so bitterly. It may seem, as it apparently did to Zwingli, an arbitrary distinction and hardly less speculative than the doctrine it purported to displace. As in the case of Baptism, Luther again is trying to
steer a course between what seems to him to equally unpalatable alternatives. He admits that at one time he had seriously con­
sidered abandoning the doctrine of the bodily presence and would have welcomed a convincing case by which an even stronger blow might have been struck against the Romanists. This, however, had not come forth and indeed Carlstadt's arguments in this direction had only confirmed him to the opposite view. Neverthe­
less, the real presence is not to be thought of in a crude or literal way. The presence of Christ in the sacrament is related to the manner of the omnipresence of God throughout creation, he says in Dass diese worte Christ: 'Das ist mein Leib' noch fest-

stehen (1527); though no one can say exactly how, it is perhaps present like light and color, as objects in the eyes of the one seeing them, as a tree is in the acorn, or as God is in our heart. Luther's strongest analogy is that of the Incarnation of the Word; the Lord is present in the sacrament as His two natures were inseparable in the Incarnation.

That the bodily presence in itself was not of primary importance to Luther may seem a misrepresentation in view of his violent philippics against those who denied it. Neverthe­
less, an examination of his more irenic writings seems to indi­
cate that it is the presence of the Word which is of primary importance to him. That Word is the word of the gospel which promises us forgiveness of sins and a renewal of life: "Wie kann leiblich essen und trincken solch gros din; thun? Antwort: Essen und trincken thuts freilich nicht, Sondern die Wort so da
stehen, 'Fur euch gegeben und vergossen zur vergebung der sun-
den.' Welche wort sind neben dem leiblichen essen und trincken,
als das heubstick jm Sacrament. Und wer den selbigen worten
pleubt, der hat was sie sagen, und wie sie lauten, Namblich,
'Vergebung der sunden.' The bodily presence of Christ is,
therefore, not important per se but because it reinforces and
establishes the validity of the promise which the sacrament sig-
nifies. In the first place, Luther is protesting against a ri-
gid rationalism of a man like Zwingli which would deny the pos-
sibility of the real presence and thereby challenge the omni-
potence and omnipresence of God. In the second place, he is
attacking a pride which tends to despise the union of the sen-
suous and divine and thereby challenges the need of personal,
tangible symbols of God's love and forgiveness and promises and,
implicitly, the central meaning of the Incarnation. The strong-
est and most acute argument of Luther throughout the whole Zwing-
lian controversy was his observation: "You have a different
spirit from us."

The whole of Luther's sacramental theory is a confirmation
of his fundamental theological principles. The gospel is the same
gospel even though it comes in sacramental form, and its relation
to the law remains the same. Even in the heat of the controversies
over infant Baptism and the real presence in the Lord's Supper,
Luther held to his original views, however far provoked he may
have been not to do so and however paradoxical his attempts at har-
monization may appear on first reading. The real presence in the
mass and the legitimacy of infant Baptism, which he affirmed, in no way compromised his basic principles that the sacraments are promises or the gospel in symbolic form and that faith alone is necessary to apprehend their benefits. Beard's view that there is a "radical incompatibility between the doctrine of justification by faith alone and a theory of sacraments" in Luther's theology is a questionable one in view of Luther's position which maintains that the gospel can come either as the spoken word or as the sacramental word. The admitted incongruities, medieval theological residues, controversial exaggerations of Luther's thought take on their proper proportion when they are set against this dominant background.

3. Finally, the gospel comes to us through the power of the Keys and the fellowship of the brotherhood of the Church. In the Schmalkaldische Artikel (1538) Luther summarizes the means by which the gospel comes to us, saying that it comes to us: first, by word of mouth: "mundlich wort"; then, through the sacraments of Baptism and Holy Communion; and finally, "durch die krafft der Schliessel, und auch per mutuum colloquium, et consolationem fratrum." In what way is Luther able to reinterpret the Roman doctrine of the Keys so that it conforms with his view of the nature and purpose of the gospel and in what relation does the fellowship of the Christian community stand to it?

Luther's whole teaching on the power of the Keys was formed against the background and in opposition to the Roman sacrament of Penance. One of his most explicit statements of his opposition
to the Roman theology which formed the foundation for the sacrament of Penance is in the Schmalkaldische Artikel quoted above. Here he bitterly attacks the false repentance of the Papists: "Von der falschen Busse der Papisten", who teach that contrition, confession and satisfaction are necessary for the forgiveness of sins. Those who do not feel real contrition have their attrition reckoned as the beginning of real contrition and therefore are considered as having satisfied the requirements. This system, says Luther, either leads to desperation (for no one really feels as contrite as he ought) or to callousness (for attrition is only word for lack of contrition). The Roman teaching is that of active contrition ("activa contritio") while the true doctrine is that of passive contrition ("passiva contritio").

Luther's chief reason for rejecting Penance as a sacrament was, as has been mentioned, that it did not have a divinely ordained sign. Nevertheless, he prized the essential meaning of it and his case against the Roman theologians is that they have perverted its original significance. Originally, says Luther in De captivitate Babylonica ecclesiae praeludium, Penance consisted in a divine promise on one side and our faith on the other (as in the real sacraments): "Nam cum et ipsum, sicut et alia duo, constet verbo promissionis divinae et fide nostra."

The Papists have corrupted the original meaning of the sacrament and made out of the promise of the Keys the worst kind of tyranny. Though contrition, confession, and satisfaction are good if
they are interpreted in an evangelical way, the Roman treat-
ment of them subverts their meaning: "Obliteratis itaque ac
subversis promissione et fide videamus, quid substituerint in
locum earum. Tres partes dederunt poenitentiae: Contritionem,
confessionem, satisfactionem, sed sic, ut in singulis, si quid
boni inesset, tollerent, et in eisdem quoque sum libidinem et
tyannidem constituerent." They have made contrition something
prior to faith, and have even claimed that it is a work of merit;
by adding the conception of "attrition" the original significance
has been still further degraded. The true Christian teaching of
contrition is that it comes from the contemplation of the divine
threatenings (the law) and leads to the divine promises (the gos-
pel), through which by faith man gains forgiveness of sins:
"veritas comminutio sit causa contritionis, veritas promissa-
onis sit solacii, si credatur, et hac fide homo mereatur pecca-
torum remissionem." Confession has also been corrupted. The
secret confession, which has become a tyrannical instrument in
the hands of the Roman hierarchy, was intended to be a wonderful
remedy for burdened consciences, who after confessing their sins
to a brother would receive the word of forgiveness from him.
Finally, the whole legalistic system of the Roman church has been
built up on a false interpretation of satisfaction, which Luther
says he has fully discussed in the indulgence controversy. Sa-
tisfaction in its real meaning, he points out, is a renewal of the
entire life; this cannot come by fasts, vigils, scourgings, vows
or any outward works by which Roman theology plagues men's con-
sciences, but only by the faith of a truly contrite heart:
"Quae monstra tibi debemus, Romana sedes, et tuis homicidis
legibus et ritibus, quibus mundum totum eo perdidisti, ut
arbitrentur sese posse deo per opera pro peccatis satis-
facere, cui sola fide cordis contriti satisfit."

The combination of radical and conservative strains in
Luther's character are shown here. With rare theological acu-
men and keenness he has cut through the Roman penitential sys-
tem and stripped it to the simple formula of: threatenings or
the law to bring contrition, the promises or the gospel to bring
consolation, and faith to complete the satisfaction. To dis-
cuss Luther's criticisms of the Roman sacrament of Penance and
his theological "re-formation" of it in detail would be a large-
scale job. Suffice it to say that he transposed the concepts of
penance, contrition, confession and absolution out of the realm
of law into that of the gospel. The sacrament of Penance became
for him, then, not the confirmation of the way of the law to
salvation, but an affirmation of the way of the gospel. Consis-
ting essentially in demand, promise and faith, it could not pro-
perly be considered as a real sacrament because of its lack of
a divinely instituted sign. It is, nevertheless, a real ministry
of the gospel and is to be treasured and exercised accordingly.

Luther's interpretation of the Keys is one facet of his re-
formulation of the sacrament of Penance. The power and the office
of the Keys is essentially the work of preaching the law and gos-
pel rightly. The binding of sins through the preaching of the law
leads to real contrition and the loosing of sins through the gospel gives real forgiveness. In one of his main discussions on the doctrine of the Keys, Von den Schlüsseln (1530), Luther brings out this thought very clearly: "Und treibt also dieser schlussel und richtet aus das ampt des gesetzes, das auch die sünde zeigt und zur furcht Gottes treibt; der ander schlussel treibt und richtet aus des Euangelij ampt, lockt zur gnade und barmhertzigkeit, trostet und verheisst, leben und seligkeit, verkundigt vergebung der sunden."

The work of the Keys has to do with both law and gospel but Luther's special concern is for its expression of the gospel. The second office of the Keys—to loose sins ("zu losen die sünde")—is the one that has been most perverted by Roman theology: "Also mus nu das arme Loseschlusselin, nicht seines ampts brauchen, sondern den binde schlussel, helffen gelt und gewallt mehren, obs der bindeschlussel fur sich allein zu weng thet." Furthermore, whereas absolution ("Absolutio") is meant to be a free gift of consolation to the troubled consciences, the Roman system has made a tyrant of it by demanding that a full confession should be made before it is granted. In his earlier writings Luther subjects the Roman teaching on the power of the Keys to the same criticism. In Grund und Ursach aller Artikel D. Martin Luthers, so durch römische Bülle unrecht- lich verdammnt sind (1521) he says that true repentance signifies a change of the whole life and this can never come by our own efforts. Were we to be forgiven on the basis of our self-
made contrition it would mean that we were being forgiven on
the basis of our own merit. Also, contrition by itself is
simply "gallows" or "Judas" contrition. Full repentance de­
pends upon the working of the law, followed by the working
of the gospel; the first use of the power of the Keys must
always be followed by the second or else despair results:
"Den d' teuffel und alle vordampten haben auch solche rew,
die heisset man auff deutsch: Judas rew, un galgen rew." The
same thought is brought out in the Schmalkaldische Artikel:
"Also sagt'auch Christus Luce ultimo selbs, Man mus jnn mein­
em Namen jnn alle welt predigen, Busse und Vergebung der sun­
den. Wo aber das Gesetze solch sein Ampt allein treibet on
zuthun des Evangelij, da ist der Tod und die Helle."

It has been mentioned before how desperately Luther
felt the need for positive confirmation of the forgiveness of
sins. He found that confirmation in the proclamation of the
gospel through preaching. He also found that confirmation in
an even more vivid and tangible way in the sacraments. Now he
finds another confirmation in the power of the Keys which Christ
has granted to His Church; as he says in Von den Schlüsseln:
"So sind nu die Schlussel nicht anders, denn ein Gottlicher
befelh odder Gottlich wort, darinn Christus befelhet odder
macht gibt, seiner kirchen die sunden zu behalten und zuuerggeben." 116
As he indicates in the Schmalkaldische Artikel, it is for this
reason that the power of the Keys should never be surrendered by
the Church: "Weil die Absolutio, oder kraft des Schlussels auch ein hulffe und trost ist, wider die sunde und bose gewissen, im Evangello durch Christum gestifft; So sol man die Beicht oder Absolutio bey leib nicht lassen abkommen jnn der Kirchen."

This power of the Keys is not an absolute power, however. In the first place, the Church may only exercize the Keys insofar as their offices are interpreted in the light of the Scriptures, that is by rightly dividing law and gospel. In the second place, the power of the Keys is of no effect without our faith; this is to be interpreted in the same way as with the sacraments, in which the validity of the Keys (as a promise of God) is dependent on God alone but the Keys only become efficacious through our faith. We must truly believe that we are loosed of our sins before God when we receive absolution here on earth: "Sse muss er do beicht und pusset, fur allen dingen, ya fleyssig warnnehmen, das er disse wort, warhaftig halte, unnd festiglich glewbe er sey loss fur got ym hymell, wo er absoluiert wirt auff erdenn." The worst sin of which we can be guilty is unbelief, for we thereby despise God by mistrusting His promises: "Denn der unglawb lessit yhn da stehen als einen narre odder lugener. Sse gar ein schwere unchristlich, grewlich, schrecklich, sund ist der unglawb odder misstraw, yn den Sacramenten."

Luther attacks papal pretensions based on the Roman interpretation of the office of the Keys in two ways. Firstly,
the power of absolution does not reside solely in the Pope but belongs to every priest in the Church of Christ; as he points out in Von den Konziliis und Kirchen (1539) one of the marks of the people of Christ, or the Church, is the power of the Keys and this belongs to the whole Church not exclusively to the Pope: "Gleich wie die Tauffe, Sacrament, Gottes wort nicht des 3apsts, sondern des volcks Christi sind und heissen auch 'claves Ecclesiae', nicht 'claves Papae'." The power of loosing from sins is not based on a papal prerogative but on the word and promise of Christ: "Aber das, soo prachen alle Priester dyesser wort Christi, wenn sie absoluiern, und absoluiern nit denn yn crafft der selben wort und zusagung Christi." If the Pope pretends to be doing anything more than the work of a humble priest when he grants absolution, he is pretending to drink rare wine out of a cask from which others get only water! In the second place, were Peter and the Pope to absolve our penalty and guilt a thousand times it would make no difference, since it depends on our faith before it is of any benefit to us. If God Himself cannot give heaven to one who does not believe, how can the Pope do it? "d' glawb macht die schlussel tetti und tuchtig, d' unglaub macht sie untettig und untuchtig...kan doch got selb de hymel nit geben de d' nit glewbt, wz solt den d' Bapst mit de schlusseln thun, an de d' nit gleubt." Luther's view that the power of the Keys lies in the hands of all priests, combined with his doctrine of the priest-
hood of all believers, has revolutionary implications for papal pretensions and for the whole Roman theory of the Church. As Luther himself put it, this knocks the Keys out of the Roman coat-of-arms! But Luther’s theory of the universality of the power of the Keys is not purely a destructive doctrine. It is positively the "mutuum colloquium et consolationem fratrum" mentioned previously. Here Luther steps beyond a purely spiritual conception of the Church and speaks of it as an actual, visible congregation of believers. One of the most important activities of such a community is the mutual strengthening and consoling through the exercise of the power of the Keys by all the members of the group. It is in this context that Luther in *Ein Sermon von de hochwurdigen Sakrament des heiligen wahren Leichnams Christi* (1519) speaks of laying all our fears and "Anfektung" on the congregation as well as on Christ: "das wir da allen yamer, alle anfektung, von unss legen auff die gemeyn, und sonderlich auff Christo." In this sermon Luther elaborates on this theme, further developing it in *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen* where he says that as we have received good things from God so these things ought to flow from one to another in the Christian community; my faith and righteousness ought to be laid down as an intercession and covering for the sins of my neighbor, as Christ has done for all of us: "Sihe also mussen gottis gutter fliessen auss eyne, yn den andern un gemeyn werde." Specifically, this working of true Christian love may be seen in
the use of the Keys, when fellow Christians confirm one another in the faith and assure one another of the mercy of God and His forgiveness. The confessional, which has become a means of tyranny and extortion for the hierarchy of the Roman church, is to become part of the glory of the Christian brotherhood ("fraternitatis Christianae gloria") in which we find a truly great remedy for a turbulent conscience by unveiling our evil heart before our brother and receiving from his mouth the word of consolation sent by God.

Luther's vision of the living, active "communio sanctorum" of faith and spontaneous love stands in sharpest contrast to the medieval Roman church with its elaborate ritual, its complicated dogmatic structure, its rigid hierarchical framework, its autocratic clericalism, and its casuistic moralism. Today, even Roman ecclesiastical scholars recognize that Luther's protest had a real basis and justification and that his word was, in part at least, a prophetic one. As Hughes in one of the most recent Roman church histories points out, of the thirty-four popes between Aquinas and Luther not one has been canonized so far and "of the episcopate as a whole, in these last fifty years before the Reformation it can only be said that it rapidly went from bad to worse."

Such an admission, however, should only remind us that Luther spoke as he did because his theology was built on a different foundation from that of medieval Scholasticism, of which he felt that the flagrant abuses in practical matters were only
outward symptoms. And the Council of Trent, while it attempted a practical purification of the life of the Roman church, confirmed rather than reformed the medieval theology which was the root cause of Luther's protest. Luther, it is true, was often very conservative; but he could also be very radical. His sacramental theory, including his interpretation of the power of the Keys, shows this blend of conservatism and radicalism. As Fairbairn has said of him: "he was a revolutionary without being a radical, or, as it were, a Protestant under protest."

This paradox becomes less stark when one sees how strongly Luther affirmed that he was a true son and servant of the Church. He was not destroying the Church but he was recalling it to its original charter; he was pleading for a return to the form and spirit of the early Christian brotherhood communities, built on a theology and sacramental theory which rightly divided law and gospel. Luther was confident that it was not he who was guilty of heresy but the Roman church to which he was speaking.

It is one of the tragedies of the Church that the supremacy of the papacy over the Conciliar movement insured the fact that any such protest or attempt at reformation could only lead to suppression or revolution.
Luther's exposition of law and gospel up to this point has largely referred to its context in the New Testament and in the Christian Church. The question now raised is whether the relation of law and gospel was the same under the Old Dispensation as it is under the New since the coming of Christ. The most concise summary of Luther's position on this question is found in his Vorrede auf das Alte Testament, which first appeared in the 1522 edition of the Deutsche Bibel. In this introduction Luther defines the relation of the Old and New Testaments and it is not difficult to see that the distinction between law and gospel is the scheme on which his interpretation is based.

He makes the complaint, so familiar among modern Biblical scholars, that the Old Testament is being ignored by Christians, who tend to look at it as an antiquated history of interest only to the Jews; these Christians think that the New Testament is enough for them. But, says Luther, we should not despise the writings of the Old Testament; Christ, Peter and Paul all bear witness to the importance of them. The Old Testament is the ground on which the New Testament rests and is the means by which it establishes its validity. The New Testament is really the preaching of the Old Testament promises fulfilled by Christ: "Und was ist das Neue Testament anders, denn eine offentliche Predigt und Verkundigung, durch die Spruche im Alten Testament gesetzt und durch Christum erfullet?" We are not to disdain the
the simple stories that we find in the Old Testament because in them is hidden the highest majesty and wisdom of God; in this way God makes fools of all who are wise and clever, and reveals Himself to the young and simple. Here we find the crib and swaddling clothes in which Christ lies; the clothes are poor and humble, but rich is the treasure within.

It is true that the Old Testament is a law-book ("Gesetzbuch" "librum legis") which tells us what we may or may not do, just as the New Testament is the gospel or grace-book ("ein Evangelium oder Gnadenbuch") which tells us how to fulfill the law. But as the New Testament is not purely the gospel but also has commands and law, so the Old Testament is not purely a book of the law; in it are promises of the gospel through which the ancient fathers and prophets, though "under the law" are saved by faith just as we: "also sind auch im Alten Testament neben den Gesetzen etliche Verheissungen und Gnadenspruche, damit die heiligen Vater und Propheten unter dem Gesetz im Glauben Christi, wie wir, erhalten sind." The fact that the chief teaching of the New Testament is the gospel and the chief teaching of the Old Testament is the law, does not affect Luther's conclusion that under both covenants man is saved only through faith in the gospel of Christ.

Luther finds substantiation for his view in the contents of the first five books of Moses. In Genesis we learn about the creation of all things but the primary purpose of the book is to tell us from where sin and death have come, namely from
the evil of Satan and from Adam's fall. Before the law is given, however, we are taught from where we are to seek release from sin and death and that is from the "seed of a woman"—Christ. Such promises or preaching of the gospel are found in Gen. 3: 15, 12: 3 and 22: 18. The first gospel in the Bible is not the one according to Matthew but, as Luther points out in several of his writings, it is the one in Gen. 3: 15. The emphasis on faith and its exaltation over law and good works which he sees in Genesis, so delights Luther that he calls it an evangelical book: "Fast ein evangelisch Buch."

Further substantiation is found in the other books of Moses. The book of Exodus tells us that because the world had sunk into blindness, by which it could not see what sin was, nor from where death came, God gave the law through Moses that sin might once again be recognized. In the third book the priests are instituted; their office is to show the people their sin and to intercede to God on their behalf. Sin and sinners make priests necessary: "Da siehet man, wie ein priest- erlich Amt nur um der Sunde will wird eingesetzt...also, dass alle sein Werck ist, mit Sunden und Sundern umgehen." The book of Numbers, says Luther, is to be seen as a note-worthy example that laws don't make people better but only aggravate sin and wrath. The fifth book establishes the religious and secular authorities and summarizes the law as: faith in God and love to one's neighbor: "diese Erklärung im fünften Buch halt eigentlich nichts anders innen, denn den Glauben zu Gott
und die Liebe zum Nachsten.  

In summary, Luther points out that the law, even under the Old Dispensation, was given for only two purposes. First, as a means by which civil order is maintained and outward forms of worship are regulated; and second, as a means by which sin may be recognized. This latter work of the law—to reveal sin and death—is its chief and most important use in the world.

The law was never at any time intended to make man able to do good and to live well but far more to show us our blindness to sin and teach us our inability to do that which is right. This should force us to seek further so that we find our ultimate succour in the grace of God through Christ. There are three types of pupils of this work of the law: the contemptuous, the presumptuous and the pious. The first ignore the law and go their own way without fear. The second think that they can fulfill the law with their own strength. The third are they who see Moses unveiled, that is, who understand the real inner meaning of the law and see that Moses does not only reveal the "natural" sins of the Ten Commandments but teaches that unbelief is sin, which the natural reason of man is too blind to see. Realizing that the law demands impossible things they fasten themselves to Christ: "Die dritten sind, die Moses klar ohne Decke sehen. Das sind die, die des Gesetzes Meinung verstehen, wie es unmöglich Ding fordere...Diese fallen ab von allen Werken und Vermessens- heit und lernen am Gesetz nicht mehr, denn allein Sunde erkennen
und nach Christo zu seufzen, welches auch das eigentliche
Amt Mosias und des Gesetzes Art ist."

And what of the other parts of the Old Testament, for instance the prophetic and historical writings? Luther says that they are simply Moses in another guise. The prophets, for example, are administrators and witnesses of Moses and his office of the law, convicting the people of their sin and unrighteousness and driving them to Christ: "Was sind aber nun die andern Bucher der Propheten und der Geschichte? Antwort: Nichts anders, denn, was Moses ist...das sie durch des Gesetzes rechten Verstand die Leute in ihrer eigenen Untuchtigkeit behalten und auf Christum treiben, wie Moses thut." in his Vorrede auf den Psalter he says that the Psalter would be valuable and lovely for no other reason than it contains promises of Christ's death and resurrection: "Und sollte der Psalter allein deshalb theuer und lieb seyn, dass er von Christi Sterben und Auferstehung so klarlich verheisset, und sein Reich und der gantzen Christenheit Stand und Wesen vorbildet." Even the sacraments of the Old Testament are the same in essentials as those of the New Testament; they contain God's promises and are efficacious only through faith: "Denn es ist kein unterscheyd, zwischen alten un neuen Sacramente, es geben widd' disse noch ihene die gnade gottis, ssonden wie gesagt ist, d' glaub allei auff gottis wort un zeiche, gab dort un gibt, hie gnade. Darumb habe die alten eben ssowol durch de selbe glawbe gnade er-
The gospel is therefore the center of both the Old and New Testament and it is the relation between law and gospel which gives meaning and unity to the whole of the Biblical revelation.

With this foundation securely laid, Luther felt free to judge and criticize the relative worth of the various Biblical writings in what was a radical way for his time. The authorship of Genesis is a matter of indifference. The book of Esther might better be excluded from the canon. The prophets were sometimes mistaken in their predictions of worldly affairs. The synoptic Gospels contain discrepancies and have misquotations from the Old Testament. The letter to the Hebrews seems to be mistaken in its teaching on repentance. No one can deny that Jude is only a condensation of II Peter. James is not an apostolic writing, for what does not preach Christ is not apostolic even if Peter and Paul were to teach it: "Was Christum nicht lehret, das ist noch nicht apostolisch, wenn es gleich St. Petrus oder St. Paulus lehrete; widenum, was Christum prediget, das ware apostolisch, wenns gleich Judas, Hannas, Pilatus und Herodas that." Though Luther had grave doubts as to the value of the Apocalypse he did think that it was praiseworthy insofar as it assures us, as a word of the gospel, that Christ will be with us though all the powers of heaven and earth seek to prevent Him: "So allein das Wort des Evangelii bey uns rein bleiben, und wirs liebe und werth habe, so sollen wir nicht zweifeln, Christus sey bey und mit
Luther is no modern Biblical scholar, but, on the other hand, his introduction of a new standard of critical discrimination based on the gospel of the Incarnate Word was both objective and dynamic. It was a radical break with the mechanical and brittle exegesis of the medieval theologians and yet avoided the excesses of the rationalistic subjectivism into which some of the humanists had fallen. Luther's interest in the Scriptures, as Scheel has pointed out, was not primarily historical but "Heilsinteressen". This soteriocentric interpretation of the Bible, while it has its limitations and dangers as a theory, is one of Luther's most important contributions to Christian learning. What Luther was so strongly against (and much of the disagreement over his views of Biblical criticism arise from a misunderstanding of this point) was the dependence on human reason and understanding as the sole standards for Scriptural study. This can lead only to perversion and heresy. Real Biblical study must rest on: "Oratio, meditatio, tentatio"—prayer, meditation and spiritual trial. The Holy Spirit working in us—guiding, enlightening and teaching—will bring us to a true understanding of the holy treasures which Scripture contains. The Bible is of immense authority to Luther but that authority does not rest primarily on its historical precedence.
nor does it arise from an obsession of Luther to appeal to some kind of external judge. Luther does not, as some have said, substitute the authoritarian Bible for the authoritarian Roman church. The Bible is of ultimate authority insofar as it contains the Word of God which presupposes, validates and confirms our deepest experiences of being confronted by the living God. The Word of God is spiritually self-validating in the way that a great work of art is aesthetically self-validating; it cannot be proved in a rational or dogmatic manner but the sensitive mind and soul needs no such "proof". Scriptural authority is of the same ineffable quality as that of the Lord to Whom it bears witness.

For Luther, law and gospel is the essence of the Biblical message just as it is of our spiritual experience. Those portions of Scripture, therefore, which bring out this relationship most clearly are to be prized above the others. The grand theme of the Bible is Christ and His redemptive work. The Psalter, for instance, because it has the main elements of the theme could be considered as a miniature Bible. Or Paul's Epistle to the Romans, with its elaborate exposition of the relation between law and gospel, is to him the best part of the New Testament, which ought to become the daily bread of our souls; it can never be read or meditated on too much or too well.
In his Commentary on Galatians Luther sums up his view of the continuity of God's dealing with men and the unity of the Biblical witness to that unchangeable pattern. It is "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, today and to all eternity" through Whom all faithful—Jew or Gentile—either have been, or are, or shall be, delivered from the law and justified and saved: "Sic et patribus quotidie in spiritu veniebat, antequam cero tempore semel veniret. Habeant illi in spiritu Christum in quem revelandum, ut nos in iam revelatum, credebant, ac aque per eum salvati sunt ut nos, Iuxta illud: 'Iesus Christus heri et hodie Idem est et in secula.' Heri, ante tempus sui adventus in carnem; Hodie, cum revelatus est in tempore; Nunc et in secula est idem Christus. Per unum et eundem igitur Iesum Christum liberantur a lege, justificantur et salvantur omnes credentes praeteriti, praesentes et futuri."
Luther had developed his teaching on law and gospel against two main parties; these were the Romanists on one side and the Anabaptists on the other. Up to the middle of the 1530's most of his polemical writing on this subject had been directed against these two antagonists. But, says Luther in the preface to *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas*, though outwardly they appear to be very different they are really very similar in their teaching. They are foxes whose heads are separate but who are tied together by their tails: "Sic et Papistae non cessant urgere usque hodie opera et personae dignitatem contra gratiam et fratres suos Anabaptistas (saltem verbo) fortiter iuvare...Fingunt enim sese foris magnos hostes illorum, cum tamen intus vere idem sentiant, doceant ac defendant contra unicum illum salvatorem Christum qui solus est iustitia nostra." The Romanists and the Anabaptists, as well as the Jews and Turks (the latter representing all pagan religions), were guilty of legalism and they perverted the whole meaning of the gospel. The emphasis on such things as regulations concerning wearing apparel, dietary restrictions, elaborate moral legislation, which these groups had in common, convinced Luther they were all cut from
the same cloth and it brought down upon them the full force of Luther's often vitriolic criticism.

By the time the second edition of the Commentary on Galatians had appeared in 1538 Luther regretfully added a note to his preface recording the appearance of a new sect raised up against him by the devil: "Sed in dies novas suscitat Satan, Deus ille factiosorum hominum, Et proxime hanc quam minime omnium praevidissem aut sperassem, scilicet eorum qui docent detollendum ex ecclesia nec homines per legem terrendos, sed per Christi gratiam suaviter monendos esse." Luther is here referring to a group known as the Antinomians, and the leading personality among them, Johann Agricola of Eisleben. Their chief tenet was that the law should be abolished in the Church and that the gospel should be depended upon to accomplish the work of leading men to repentance by preaching to them the mercies of God.

Though Luther says that this faction sprang up most unexpectedly and where he would have least foreseen it, in some ways it is surprising that it did not arise earlier. His statements regarding the ending of the law through the coming of Christ were often apparently unqualified; in the Galatian Commentary of 1531 Luther said: "Si est (Christ) victoria, so geht das lex hin weg," or in the Commentary of 1535: "Quare Christianus proprie definitus est liber ab omnibus legibus et nulli prorsus nec intus nec foris subiectus." It would seem almost
inevitable that some should interpret this to mean that the law was of no use whatsoever and that it should be put "on the gallows": "aus an galgen mitrose und dem Gesetze, wie jetzt die Gesetzsturmer auch lestern." Roman Catholic critics, among others, have not spared themselves to point out that Luther was showing his typical duplicity and lack of logical consistency when he so sharply repudiated Agricola and the Antinomians, who "merely carried certain theses of Luther's to their logical conclusion," and whose contentions were "largely his own, formulated anew."

But is such a criticism, in fact, just? Did the Antinomians really only develop and enlarge Luther's own principles, which he was then forced to repudiate when they were shown in their true light? If so, then much of Luther's earlier writings would have to be discounted and his doctrine of law and gospel in particular would have to be radically revised. In fact, such a conviction would be an extremely damaging one to the whole foundation of his theology. Luther himself was in no doubt as to the fact that Agricola and the Antinomians were misrepresenting his teaching. He was not long in taking up the gauntlet against them, attacking them with as much vigor as he showed against his other opponents. He termed Agricola a slanderer and a second Judas, whose doctrine was subverting both the law and the gospel; eventually he succeeded in forcing Agricola's resignation from the Wittenberg University
faculty when he persisted in his teaching. Luther's vindictiveness and the bellicose spirit with which he carried on the dispute are deserving of censure, though it should be added that this was characteristic of the debates of that day and which, in his case, was aggravated by the ill-health of his later years and the heavy load of responsibility which his ever increasing prominence placed upon him. But whatever the virtues of the spirit in which the contestants waged the battle, the controversy does give an excellent opportunity to see to what extent Luther remained true to his original teaching on law and gospel in his later years and in the face of the only other main criticism which could be brought against the doctrine when the legalists had had their say.

There is no need to go into the full details of the Antinomian controversy nor into Luther's personal dealings with Agricola, both of which are excellently described by Mackinnon in "Conflict with the Antinomians" of his work on Luther, as well as by other biographers. As to the exact nature of Agricola's teachings, one is limited by the fact that Luther has somewhat exaggerated it in his discussions and on the other hand, it was not freely divulged by Agricola himself who was in constant fear of retribution. Since our interest is primarily in Luther's teaching, it is sufficient to know the general outlines of the Antinomian position and the arguments which Luther used to refute those views and establish his own distinctive position.
Luther first showed his hand against the Antinomians in a sermon on the Fifth Sunday after Trinity, July 1, 1557, followed by another in the Eighteenth Sunday after Trinity, September 30, 1557. In both of these, Luther gives only a general warning against the reported views of the group. By the beginning of December, however, Luther's suspicions were so aroused that he published a set of Theses against the Antinomians and held a disputation on them. Agricola's failure to appear at the disputation further annoyed Luther, who as Dean of the Divinity Faculty, suspended Agricola's right to lecture there. Luther soon published another set of Theses and the disputation was held on January 12, 1558. There was a brief reconciliation between Luther and Agricola but it was soon broken; another set of Theses was drawn up and the disputation held on September 6, 1558. An examination of the Theses and disputations shows that two main questions were raised: the first, on the relation of law to repentance and the second, on the relation of law to the sanctified life. These were the central issues around which the controversy revolved.

1. The first and second sets of Theses deal with the relative place of law and gospel in the work of repentance. Agricola's view apparently was that repentance is not to be brought through the law but through the teaching of the gospel; accordingly, he stressed the need of a doctrine which not only condemns but also at the same time saves: "Opus est aucta doc-
trina, quae magna efficacia non tantum damnat, sed et salvat simul. Ea autem est Evangelium, quae coniunctio docet poenitentiam et remissionem peccatorum." Against this view Luther brings forward his familiar argument that a man must be convicted of his sin by the law before he is ready to receive the gospel: "Poenitentiae priores pars, scilicet dolor, est ex lege tantum. Altera pars, scilicet propositum bonum, non potest ex lege esse... Ideo addenda est lege promissio seu Evangelium quae conscientiam territam pacet et erigat, ut bonum proponat."

In Wider die Antinomer (1539) Luther also deals with this problem. He says that no one can know what sin is without the law. And if one does not know what law or sin are, how can one understand Christ, who came to fulfill the law and to make satisfaction for sin?: "Wo her weis man aber, was sünde sey, wo das Gesetz und gewissen nicht ist? Und wo wil man lernen, was Christus sey (welchs wir fur uns erfullet), oder was sünde sünde sey, da fur er gnug gethan hat?" Furthermore, he says that law is still law even if it comes through a contemplation of Christ's costly fulfillment of the law; that which convicts me of sin is law, no matter by what name it is called: "Darumb mus doch das Gesetze gepredigt werden, wo man Christum predigen wil, ob man gleich das wort Gesetz nicht nennen wolt, Damit wird gleichwol das gewissen erschreckt durchs Gesetze, wenn die predigt sagt, das Christus das Gesetz fur uns hat so theur erfullen mussen."
In Theses ten to twenty of the first disputation, Luther attacks the Scholastic theologians who think that the first part of repentance is enough; these pretentious Sophists remain under the law because they do not see the real depth of its demand and therefore they feel no need of the gospel. The Antinomians, on the other hand, do not understand that the law must precede the gospel. We are first sinners by nature, therefore the law must come first: "Ordo rei est, quod mors et pecatum est in natura ante vitam et iustitiam...Quare prior ducendus est Adam (id est, pecatum et mors) qui forma est futuri Christi postea docendi." And only the law can reveal sin and death: "Pecatum vero et mors non per verbum gratiae et solatii, sed per legem necesse est ostendi."

Luther’s main criticism against the Antinomians is that they have failed to distinguish between law and gospel, giving each its proper function. It is significant that he should draw the Scholastics into the discussion to emphasize the middle position he was occupying. While the Romanists err on one side, the Antinomians have erred on the other: they have both committed the same fundamental error of treating the law and the gospel as though each could stand alone permanently. As he sums up his case in the disputation: "Lex et Evangelium non possunt nec debent separari, sicut nec poenitentia et remissio peccatorum. Ita enim sunt inter se col-ligata et implicita." As one can see, Luther is simply re-
affirming his basic theological doctrine of the distinction between law and gospel. This new attack, while it required Luther to restate his views with a slightly different emphasis to meet the arguments of his opponents, has not caused a deviation but rather a deepening of his basic premises.

2. The second main question which was raised was that of the relative places of law and gospel in the sanctified life. Agricola and the other Antinomians are not to be credited with the immorality or libertinism which their name might suggest; the fears of Luther and Melanchthon on this point seem to have been largely misplaced. Agricola did, nevertheless, believe that men do not need the teaching of the law for the beginning, the middle or the end of justification, and that the gospel is a sufficient doctrine for the whole of the Christian life. In the second set of Theses Luther agrees that the law is not intended to give life but to reveal sin and wrath: "Ita lex non est lata, ut per eam iusti fieremus...Summa, quantum coelum a terra distat, tantum debet lex a justificatione separari."

Justification is purely a work of the gospel: "Et nihil docendum, dicendum, cogitandum in re justificationis, nisi solum verbum gratiae in Christo exhibitae."

It does not follow from this, however, that the law is to be abolished: "Ex his autem non sequitur, legem esse abolendam, ut concionibus Ecclesiae tollendam." In the following three sets of Theses Luther develops his reasons for this belief. He repeats his long-held opinion that sin lives in the flesh of a
justified man throughout his life: "Toto enim tempore vitae durat peccatum in carne nostra, et adversarii spiritui sibi adversario." According to his, the three things—law, sin and death—are inseparable: "Haec tria, lex, peccatum, mors sunt inseparabilia." It is true that in Christ the law is fulfilled, sin is done away with and death is destroyed: "In Christo quidem lex impleta est, peccatum deletum, mors destru-cta est." But the fact of the matter is (and this is the center of his argument) that we are not yet entirely "in Christ"; insofar as we are not, we are still under the dominion of law, sin and death: "Quatenus Christus in nobis suscitatus, eatenus sumus sub lege, peccato et morte...Quatenus vero nondum est in suscitatus, eatenus sumus sub lege, peccato et morte." The fact of the existence of death proves that law and sin, which are inseparable from it, are also still effective, even though Christ has released us from them. This is the paradox of our human existence which the oversimplified anthropology of the Antinomians fails to do justice. The law is, therefore, to be taught generally ("promiscue") to both the pious and impious: to the impious that they may be humbled by the preaching of God's wrath and to the pious as an admonition for the crucifixion of the flesh: "Impiis, ut territi agnoscant suum pecca-tum, mortem et inevitabilem iram Dei, per quam humilientur... Piis, ut admoveantur, carnem suam crucificere cum concupiscen-tiis et vitiiis, ne securi fiant."
It has been said that Luther, in reaction against the views of the Antinomians, lapsed into a subtle kind of legalism and, as a result of the controversy, repudiated, or at least radically revised, some of his most distinctive views on the release of Christians from the tyranny of the law. It is undoubtedly true that Luther stressed the admonishing and exhorting work of the law in the sanctified life more than usual during the dispute. He also spoke more of the fulfilment of the law by the penitential life and good works of the believer than he generally did: "Summa: Lex non est utilis nec necessaria neque ad justificationem, neque ad ulla opera bona, multo minus ad salutem...Sed contra justificatio, bona opera et salus sunt necessaria ad legis impletionem." He even goes so far as to say that the law is before, under and after the gospel.

This does not necessarily prove, as some of the statements made by Luther during the controversy quoted out of their context might seem to, that he has radically revised some of his basic assumptions on the relation of law and gospel to the sanctified life. In his Vorrede auf das Alte Testament (1522) Luther says that laws and commandments are given in the New Testament to rule the flesh, for the spirit is not perfected in this life: "im Neuen Testament...Gesetz und Gebot sind, das Fleisch zu regieren, sinnental in diesem Leben der Geist nicht vollkommen, noch eitel Gnade regieren kann." Or in his discussion of Baptism, as we have seen in his sacramental theory, he affirms that we, re-born as new men, once and for all, must also
be re-baptized each day, as the new man is strengthened and the old man in us is subdued; as he says in Der große Katechismus (1529): "Also sihet man wie ein hoch trefflich ding es ist umb die Tauffe, so uns den Teuffel aus dem hals reisset, Gott zu eignet macht, die sund dempfft und weg nympt, darnach teglich den newen menschen sterckst...Wie nu ein mal ynn der Tauffe, vergebung der sunden über komen ist, so bleibt sie noch teglich so lang wir leben, das ist, den alten menschen am hals tragen."

The basic premise on which these statements, sometimes appearing contradictory when set against one another in isolation, are founded is that a Christian is not a unified man but rather a split personality. This is not to be interpreted in terms of modern psychology but in the religious context in which Luther placed it. As such it forms the fundamental premise upon which Luther's anthropology was developed and to which he remained true from the beginning of his theological career as a reformer to its end. Luther expresses it by saying that a Christian man is simultaneously just and sinful: "simul justus et peccator!" He expounded this doctrine in his Römerbriefvorlesung (1515-16), developed it in such writings as Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen (1520), and reaffirmed it in In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius (1535): "Sic homo Christianus simul iustus et peccator, Sanctus, prophanus, inimicus et filius Dei est." Luther's thought becomes peculiarly enigmatic unless these fundamental paradoxes (or "contaria"
as Luther terms them) are recognized and fully taken into consideration in interpreting specific parts of his teaching. The Christian man is freed from law, sin and death through Christ. On the other hand, while he remains in this life he is in part dominated by all three. This is not to be considered in a chronological order, nor as a state of fluctuation from one status to the other, nor as "another" man within us for whom we might claim not to be entirely responsible. It is one and the same man who serves the law of God and the law of sin: "unus et idem homo simul servit legi Dei et legi peccati." When, therefore, Luther speaks of a time to hear the law and a time to ignore it: "est tempus legem audiendi, est tempus legem contemnendi", he is at the same time saying that a Christian is himself living in two "times": "Ideo Christianus est divisus in 2 tempora: quatenus caro, est sub lege; quatenus spiritus, est sub Evangelio." Such a "resolution" of the problem of the sanctified life may seem to pose an even more profound difficulty, as any one who introspectively seeks to distinguish the "old" from the "new" man within soon discovers.

Luther recognized the difficulty of applying his "solution" to the practical problems of the sanctified life and he explicated his definition "simul iustus et peccator" in two ways. In the first place, the relation of the Christian to the law has changed and is changing. Even under the pressure of the Anti-
nomian controversy Luther recognized this; the work of the law in the sanctified life has to do with the flesh: "carnem suam crucifigere", and even here it is only intended to admonish ("admoneantur") or exhort, not to damn: "Non sic docenda est lex piis, ut arguat, damnet, sed ut hortetur ad bonum." The law working in such a way is really the law in name only. This new relation of the Christian to the law has been described by Th. Harnack as the change from the "gesetz des Herzens" to the "Herz des Gesetzes". It might be considered as analogous to the angels, who out of free love, naturally do that which the law requires without any sort of compulsion or force, though in the case of a Christian man this free obedience is hindered by the remnants of sin clinging to the flesh.

Luther draws his most elaborate analogy for the relation of a Christian to the law from the example of Adam and his relationship to the law and gospel in paradise. Luther's fullest treatment of this is in Vorlesungen über 1. Mose (1535–45). In it he says that the "ord of God which came to Adam before the Fall was both law and gospel to him: "Hoc verbum erat Adae Evangelium et lex, erat eius cultus, erat servitus et obedientia, quam poterat Deo in ista innocentia praestare." Luther calls this kind of commandment a "praecptum" or a "mandatum", which can only come to an innocent creature like Gabriel when he was told to inform Daniel of certain things or to announce to Mary that she was to become the mother of Christ: "Haec sunt vere praecpta, quae innocentii naturae proposita sunt." There is
no doubt, therefore, says Luther, that the "law" given to Adam must be a very different one from that which was given to the unrighteous: "Nihil enim aliud inde sequitur, quam legem, quae iniustis est posita, eam legem non esse positam iusto Adae. Cum autem Adae iusto posita lex sit, sequiturs, eam esse aliam legem, quam quae posthac iniustis est posita." Two things must be made very clear; the first is that the law before sin is far different from the law after sin, and second, a righteous man before sin and a righteous man after sin are not righteous in quite the same way: "Prima in eo, quod aliud est lex ante peccatum, et aliud post peccatum, Secunda, quod iustus quoque non eodem modo dicitur post peccatum, et ante peccatum."

Because we Christians never become pure and innocent creatures like Adam or Gabriel, therefore the Word of God cannot come to us as a "mandatum" or "praecptum" which combines both law and gospel. Nevertheless, through Christ our redemption and re-creation has begun and part of that re-creation is the gradual restoring of the relation between us and the Word which existed between it and Adam before the Fall: "Deum Adae verbum, cultum et religionem dedisse nudissimam, purissimam et simplicissimam, in qua nihil laboriosum, nihil sumptuosum fuit...Huius cultus reliquias habemus aliquomodo per Christum restitutas in hac carnis nostrae infirmitate, quod nos quoque laudamus Deum, et gratias ei agimus de omni bensdictione spirituali et corporali."

In the second place, Luther explicates his understanding of the relation between law and gospel in the sanctified life
by pointing out how Christ brings an end to the reign of law in the Christian life. Our release from the law through the gospel is to be seen in two stages. First, Christ came in the flesh to set us free from the law in the appointed time, a deed once and for all accomplished; second he comes to us daily in the Spirit to complete the abrogation of the law: "Tempus autem legis dupliciter finitur: Primum, per adventum Christi in carne tempore a Patre praefinito... Deinde ille idem Christus qui semel in tempore venit, quotidianus et singulis horis ad nos in spiritu venit... Ideo quotidie venit spiritualiter et indies magis magisque absolvit tempus praefinitum a patre, abrogat et tollit legem."

Just as he was unwilling to admit that the law, as we now know it, guided Adam's life in paradise before sin, so Luther is equally unwilling to admit that the law has a positive place in the sanctified life, the "New Creation". When he summarizes his case against the Antinomians in Von den Konziliiis und Kirchen he bases his criticism, not on the fact that they have ignored the place of the law in the sanctified life, but that they have failed to understand the working of the Holy Spirit in creating the new life. The Antinomians are fine "Easter" preachers, but poor "Pentecost" preachers; they only preach of the deliverance through Christ and forget to preach of "de sanctificatione & vivificatione Spiritus sancti". Christ has not only gained for us grace but also the gift of the
Holy Spirit through Whom sins are ended: "Denn Christus hat uns nicht allein 'gratiam', die gnade, sondern auch 'donum', die gabe des Heiligen geists verdienet, das wir nicht allein vergebung der sunden, sondern auch aufrufen von den sunden hatten." It is not the law, or even a "new law", therefore, which is the center of Luther's teaching on sanctification.

As before the dispute, so now after the Antinomian controversy Luther affirms that it is the Holy Spirit Who is to re-create, vivify and rule the new life in Christ. In doing so the Holy Spirit is restoring the unity of law and gospel, and healing the tragic split in a Christian "simul iustus et peccator", until all again becomes one in the New Day.

The controversy with the Antinomians is really the concluding episode in the development of the conception of law and gospel in the theology of Luther. It is a very revealing episode in more than one way. In the first place, it establishes the distinctive nature of Luther's teaching, setting it off from both legalism and antinomianism. Stange has made the acute observation that the Romanists and the Antinomians, widely divergent as their views appear superficially, were both making the same kind of mistake; they both tended to identify religion and morality so that for the Romanists religion was simply the fulfilment of the law, while for the Antinomians it was simply freedom from the law. Luther's case against both parties was on the basis of the "and". His opponents were trying to decide whether it should be law or gospel; for Luther
the correct formulation was always law and gospel. Those who seek to abolish the "and" are attempting to harmonize a dualism between law and gospel which for Luther can only be resolved through the work of the Holy Spirit now in this life and completed eschatologically by the direct intervention of God at the New Day.

In the second place, the Antinomian controversy reveals the fallacy of the ideas that Luther is no systematic theologian and that there is a lack of consistency between his early and later theology. Throughout the controversy and afterwards Luther continued to reiterate the basic principles of the relation between law and gospel which he had already laid down in some of his earliest Reformation writings and which he had elaborated and expounded with such force and clarity in others of his works, especially his great Galatian commentaries. A study of the treatment of law and gospel by Luther in the Antinomian dispute substantiates the view of Seeberg, who has collected ample evidence in his Studien zu Luthers Jenesisvorlesung, that Luther remained faithful to the great theological conceptions of his youth in his last large Biblical commentary of 1535 to 1545. It is a remarkable testimony to the integrity and consistency of Luther's thought that the many years of fierce theological warfare should not have shaken, but rather deepened and sharpened, his fundamental views on the relation between law and gospel.
NOTES

Section I: 101 - 137.

Section II: 138 - 188.
Notes

1. George S. Hendry, God the Creator: The Hastie Lectures in the University of Glasgow, 1935 (London, 1937). The lectures are not specifically on Luther’s theology, but large use is made of Luther's writings and one part of his theology is discussed in some detail.

2. Philip S. Watson, Let God Be God! An Interpretation of the Theology of Martin Luther: (London, 1947). This is a discussion of Luther's whole theological thought in systematic form. A note of introduction says that the book is "the first of its kind in English", indicating how recent this development is.

3. Brian Lunn, Martin Luther: The Man and His God (London, 1954). A biography intended for popular consumption, it nevertheless shows a real acquaintance with the source materials and an understanding of some of the theological issues involved.


5. "The defects of his education and the limitations of his learning made him ill-equipped for the task of proclaiming a new theology." Sykes, Crisis of the Reformation, 39-40. "Luther was singularly untouched by the intellectual currents of his day. The impulses which controlled him were never those of the scholar, the scientist, or the philosopher. He cared little for clearness and consistency of thought...he had mental gifts of a very high order, but his genius was wholly practical. He was pre-eminently a religious genius...His confidence in the Catholic system was absolute, and his acceptance of its tenets complete, until he was shaken out of it by practical considerations which had nothing to do with theology...Under these circumstances it is a mistake to think of him as a theologian and of his work as a reformation of theology." McGiffert, Protestant Thought Before Kant, 20-1. McGiffert goes on to discuss Luther's teaching on grace, salvation, Christian liberty, predestination, faith, the Church as a sacramental institution, etc. as though these were not to be included in the realm of theology.


7. Hughes, History of the Church III, 508. The general tone of his analysis of Luther is indicated by the following statement: "Luther as a Christian force was to prove sterile; there would not follow upon his activities any betterment of the moral lives of his disciples, any advance in learning, any new peace through social renewal." Ibid. 499. The work is the newest Roman Catholic church history and is not yet completed; his views reflect
all too well the general Roman interpretation of Luther. For a criticism of his treatment of Luther see *Times Literary Supplement*, July 5, 1947.

8. Watson's first chapter: "Luther as a Theologian" deals with this. He points out the mistake of thinking of Luther's reformation of theology as a destruction of theology as a result of an ignorance as to the real meaning of the discipline.

9. For his work as lecturer at Erfurt: Mackinnon, *Luther and the Reformation*, I, 13ff. He tells how the discovery of some of the books which Luther used and annotated for his lectures has thrown new light on his wide reading and shows his careful preparation for his teaching. Schoel has made a careful study of Luther's acquaintance with Aristotelian thought, the Scholastics, Stoicism, etc.: *Martin Luther*, I, 120-229. Smith says that Luther later regretted that he had spent so much time reading scholastic theology to the exclusion of poetry: *Martin Luther*, 6; this study was chiefly in the "Modernists" though his lack of intimate knowledge of Aquinas and the "high" Scholastics seems to have been mainly due to the general lack of interest in their writings in his day: Loof, *Dogmen-geschichte*, 690. Of his theological studies Lindsay says: "His aptness for study, his vigour and precision in debate, his acumen, excited the admiration of his teachers." *Cambridge Modern History*, II, 114.

For his earlier studies: Ibid. 110f. Boehmer, *Luther and the Reformation in the Light of Modern Research* refutes the Roman Catholic disparagements of Luther's learning: 54-6, 159ff., 163f. Smith says that Luther's lectures show "extreme thoroughness" for which German scholarship is still renowned; "He criticised his authors and with such acumen that two words attributed to Augustine, the genuineness of which he first disputed, have been proved by modern criticism to be spurious." *Martin Luther*, 22.

Luther himself gave evidence that he had considerable confidence in his understanding of Scholastic theology; in *Operationes in Psalms* (1519-21) he says: "Scio, quid mihi fecerit scholastica Theologia; Scio rurnished, quid eis debeam, guadeo me erutum, et gracios ago Christo domino meo. Non est, quod me docent eam, novi eam, nec quod concilient mihi eam, nolo eam." W. A. V, 22. In *An'den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation von des christlichen Standes Besserung* (1520), Luther claims a better knowledge of Aristotle than the scholastic theologians; an exaggerated statement no doubt but one that indicates that Luther was not entirely unfamiliar with this field of studies and that he felt he was sufficiently competent in them to suggest certain reforms of the curriculum in the schools. He furthermore says he will prove his competence if necessary: "wo es nodt ist, wol beweysen kan... Darff mir niemant auf'colle, ich rede zuwiel oder vorwirff das ich nit wisse. Lieber freund ich weyss wol was ich rede; Aristoteles
10. When, for instance, Luther posted his famous Ninety-five Theses on the door of the Castle Church of Wittenberg he was not just a simple monk defying the Roman hierarchy. He was following the usual academic procedure by which a doctor of theology offered to hold a disputation on a certain subject as set forth in a number of theses, in this case on the indulgence traffic: "The theses were posted on the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg on 31 October 1517. This was the usual procedure for giving notice of such disputations, which were a regular feature of University life, and there was nothing dramatic in the action." Bettenson, Documents of the Christian Church, 260. Lindsay, however, holds that Luther "approached the whole question not from the side of theological theory but from its practical moral effect on the minds of the common people...Luther's Theses, in their lack of precise theological definition and of logical arrangement, are singularly unlike what might have been expected from a professional theologian." Cambridge Modern History II, 129. Luther himself admitted the manifest limitations of the Theses, but his own criticism is mainly that he did not go far enough in them to reflect the tyranny of the papacy: W. A. VI, 497 (De captivitate Babylonica ecclesiae praeludium, 1520). He may have been influenced to propose the disputation because of certain practical abuses of the Indulgence sellers but the Theses themselves are a heavy blow at the whole Roman Catholic view of the doctrine of repentance. Köstlin points out that the Theses were produced at a time when Luther was evidently seeking some kind of theological justification for the indul-
genres, as revealed in his sermons and lectures at that period. Also, in his defense of the Theses: *Resolutiones disputatationum de indulgentiarum virtute* (1518), W. A. I, 525ff., Luther makes an extensive theological statement of the reasons for his opposition "which involves, at the same time, a statement of the entire doctrine of salvation." "Stolzin, Theology of Luther I, 218. Lindsay has recognized the importance of the Resolutiones but he does not seem to recognize that they might refute his view that Luther's interest in the indulgences was only a practical moral concern: "The book, Resolutiones, was probably the most carefully prepared of all Luther's writings. It was meditated over long and rewritten several times." Cambridge Modern History II, 131. Mackinnon says that the Theses were the outcome of indignation against both practical abuses and theological aberrations: Luther and the Reformation I, 294ff; "The doctrine of justification by faith is assumed in the theses and finds explicit expression in the "Resolutiones". It is at the bottom of his antagonism to the crass conception of such an ecclesiastical expedient as the papal indulgence." Ibid. 304.

Even were the Indulgence Theses to be considered as purely a practical protest, it is interesting to note that Luther published a disputation against Scholastic theology, *Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam*, W. A. I, 221ff., at about the same time—September 4, 1517. Andreen, in a brief study entitled Martin Luther, Humanist, holds that this factor has been overlooked by most scholars, indicating a general neglect of the scholarly and humanistic phase of the Reformation: "The Reformation cannot be adequately understood or studied unless these two factors are presented. The movement must be approached not only from the angle of the Ninety-five Theses against Indulgences, but also from the angle of the Ninety-five Theses against Scholasticism." Ibid. 18ff. Andreen quotes Smith's observation: "Everyone is familiar with the Ninety-five Theses against indulgences...yet Luther, who did not think the theses on indulgences worth publishing, printed this protest against Aristotle and his followers, and sent it around to numerous friends for opinions." Martin Luther, 25. Mackinnon, on the other hand, says that Luther did not print the Ninety-five Theses: "in order, if possible, to avoid scandal." Luther and the Reformation I, 307. The whole question as to which set of Theses is to be considered more important becomes irrelevant when it is seen that both Theses originate from the same theological presuppositions and both sets reveal Luther's strong theological approach to the problems confronting the church. The Ninety-five Theses interpreted in the light of the Resolutiones show by themselves that: "it was no longer a mere dispute as to indulgences and their abuse; obscure, and almost alone, he had challenged the whole Papal system." Beard, Martin Luther, 230ff. Before the Resolutiones
were published the Heidelberg Disputation was held (W. A. I, 353ff.) and in it there is "no mention of indulgences. . . . he seems to regard that controversy as a quite unimportant thing compared with the 'Theology of the Cross'... The Lutheran doctrine of salvation could not be more vividly stated than in these theses." Beard, Martin Luther, 227-8. That Luther's differences with the Roman system were primarily of a theological and doctrinal nature is a thesis which would be difficult to refute. This emphasis he maintained: "Quare non tam in sceleratam vitam Papistarum intendere oculos debemus, quam in impiam ipsorum doctrinam et hypocrisin, quam in praecipue im­ pugnamus." W. A. XL, 1, 686 (1535).

11. "Ne tu rationem, sed Scripturam in hac re observes, et votum a priori, non a posteriori rescindas, hoc est, ut legem voti et ritum ejus confutes." De Wette, Briefe II, 45 (Sept. 9, 1521).


14. "Si autem animo libero et evangelico voveris, sponteque te servum feceris: justum est, ut serves et solvas; quamquam non asseram evangelicum animum hoc aliquando ausurum, aut ausum fuisse, nisi deceptum." D. Wette, Briefe II, 48. De votis monasticis judicium (1521) is Luther's full treatment of the problem: W. A. VIII, 573ff. His first point is that the vow is contrary to the Word of God: Ibid. 578; next, that it is contrary to faith: Ibid. 591; contrary to evangelical liberty: "Vota Adversari Libertati Evangelicae" Ibid. 605, etc. The contrast between law and gospel is one of the prominent ideas brought out in the work: "Christi opera nobis facta sunt libere et gratis. Verum tunc amplus non sunt opera legis, sed Christi iis nobis per fides operantis et viventi per omnia; ideo non possunt magis omitti quam ipsa fides, nec sunt minus necessaria quam fides. Sae­ terum opera, que vere sunt opera legis, ficta et falsa sunt ... Officium legis est, non exigere nostra opera, sed ostendere peccatum et impossibilitatem nostram. Per legem enim cognitio peccati." Ibid. 608-9. 653ff. "opus legis et iustitiam actorum operarentur, quod est maxime adversar­ ium Vanrelio." Ibid. 655.


17. Grisar, Luther V, 7ff.

18. It is his contention that Calvin gives greater emphasis to Christ's office of interpreting the law than does Luther: "In diesem theologischen System hat der Satz allerdings keinen Raum, dass die Gesetzespredigt nur das 'fremde Werk' Christi sei. Hier gehört es vielmehr zu den eigentlichen Amt Jesu Christi und damit zu seinem 'Wesen als Erlöser, dass er der authentische Ausleger des göttlichen Gesetzes ist." Sasse, Was heisst lutherisch?, 128. For the main differences between the Lutheran and Reformed view of law and gospel: Ibid. 118ff. He says that there are many similarities but seems to think that the differences are more important: "Der Unterschied besteht darin, dass die Reformierten meinen, beides, die Predigt des Gesetzes und die Predigt des Evangeliums, gehören zu dem eigentlichen Werk Christi und beides gehören daher zu den wesensmäßigen Funktionen der Kirche, während die lutherische Kirche lehrt: die Predigt des Gesetzes ist das 'fremde', die Predigt des Evangeliums das eigentliche Werk Christi." Ibid. 128-9. This may seem like a small difference, says Sasse, "Aber die Nähe ist nur eine scheinbare." One place where this is reflected is in the conception of the Church; both communions hold to be a "congregatio sanctorum", but in which the Calvinists lay greater emphasis on obedience than do the Lutherans: "Das Evangelium fordert Glauben, das Gesetz Gehorsam. Die Gemeinde, die aus der Predigt des Wortes erwächst, die 'congregatio sanctorum', ist nach lutherischer Lehre Gemeinde der Glaubenden und Gehorchenden, nach reformierter Lehre Gemeinde der Glaubenden und Gehorchenden." Ibid. 139. Schlink, Gesetz und Evangelium.

19. W. A. VII, 20ff. The work was originally written in Latin for presentation to the Pope: Tractatus de Libertate Christiana, W. A. VII, 49ff., but Luther's free German translation in a more concise form was meant for general circulation among the people. The text as found in Elmen's edition, B. A. II, 1ff., is used herein. Mackinnon calls the tract a "magnificent delineation of Christianity." Luther and the Reformation II, 270. Lindsay says that it contains the principles which underlie the other two great treatises of 1520: Cambridge Modern History II, 136. Käelblin believes that it represents the views which Luther continued to maintain regarding external works throughout his life: Theology of Luther I, 410-19.


21. W. A. XXX, 1, 129ff. When it was suggested that a collection be made of his writings, Luther said that only De servo arbitrio and the Catechisms were worth saving. De Wette, Briefe V, 70 (July 9, 1537). Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation IV, 318.
22. W. A. XL, 1 & 2.


25. Ibid. 680, 683.

26. Ibid. 756ff.

27. Ibid. 766.


29. W. A. XXX, 1, 178.

30. Ibid. 182.

31. Ibid. 193.

32. Ibid. 182.

33. Grisar, in criticism of Luther's view, says: "Luther refuses to admit what all people naturally believe, viz. that if God gives commandments man must be able either to obey or to dis­obey, and thus incur guilt." Luther II, 271f. Luther believes that the Decalogue is impossible to fulfil because its demand, as reduced to the two-fold summary of the law--love God and love one's neighbor, is really the demand for perfection: "Die erste und rechte Tafell Mosi begreyf't die ersten drey gepott, yn wilchen der mensch geleret wirt, was er gott soll un schul­dig ist zu thun unnd lassen, das ist, wie er euch gegen gott halten soll...Die andere un lincke Tafell Mosi helt ynne die sieben folgende gepott, ynn wilchen der mensch geleret wirt was er den menschen un seynem nehsten schuldig ist zu lassen un thun." W. A. VII, 205-6 (Eine kurze Form der zehn Gebote, etc. 1520). This is a forerunner of the later Catechisms: Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften I, 493f. The inclusive nature of the commandments according to Luther is indicated by his summary of each one: "Da gehort her, alles...Da gehort her, alles...etc." W. A. VII, 212-3. "So sihst du das in den tzehen gepotten gar ordenlich un kurzlich begriffen seyn alle lere, die dem menschlichen leben nott sein." Ibid. 214.

35. "wie eine bine das hönnig aus mancherley schönen lustigen blümlin zu samen zeucht, also ist die Symblolum...aus der gantzen Schrifft fein kurz gefasset für die kinder und einfeltiget Christen." W. A. XI, 275.


38. W. A. XXX, 1, 192.

39. Ibid. In one of the "primitive" Catechisms Luther uses the analogy of sickness to describe the functions of each part: "Gleich als wynem knacken ist zu ersten nott, das er wisse, was seyn knackeyt ist...Also leren die gepott den menschen seyn knackeyt erkennen, das er siht und empfindet, was er thun und nit thun, lassen und nit lassen kan, un erkennen sich synen sunder und bosen mensche. Darnach helt yhm d' glaub fur un leret yhn, wo er die ertzney die gnaden finden soll, die yhm helfff frum werden, das er die gepott halte; und zeygt yhm, gott, und seyne barmhertzickheit ynm Christo ertzeygt, und angepotten, und angepotten." W. A. VII, 204f.

40. Kostlin-Kawerau, Martin Luther II, 300f.

41. W. A. XL, 1, 207.

42. Ibid. 209. "Ideo nox sic semper repetimus, urgenus et inculcamus hunc locum de ide seu Christiana iustitia, ut in assiduo usu servetur et accurate discernatur ab activa iustitia legis. (Ex illa enim et in alla sola doctrina fit et consistit Ecclesia)." Ibid. 49.

43. Ibid. 49, 209, 45, 50.

44. "Papa autem non solum miscuit legem cum Evangelio, sed meras leges et eas tantum ceremonialis ex Evangelio fecit. Confudit politica et Ecclesiastica, quae vere Satanica et infernalis confusio est." Ibid. 209.

Apostolis, ut ipse ceu electum organon fidelissime iaceret fundamenta articuli de justificatione emoue clarissime traderet." Ibid. 559-60.


47. Stange, Studien zur Theologie Luthers I, 53.

48. "Sic autem discernenda sunt, ut Evangelium ponas in coelo, legem in terra...Ut haec sit lux et dies, illa tenebrae et nox." W. A. XL, 1, 207.

49. W. A. XXX, 1, 182.

50. W. A. XL, 1, 558.


52. W. A. I, 228.

53. "Nam attento lectori Pauli, cum audit Apostolum vocare legem 'Administrationem mortis', 'Occidentem literam' etc., statim venit in mentem, Cur tam odiosas et, ut apparet rationi, blasphemas appellaciones tribuat legi, quae divina doctrina est, e coelo revelata?" W. A. XL, 1, 559.

54. Schömpf, Luthers Stellung zur Heiligen Schrift, 75. Loofs, Dogmengeschichte, 772.

55. Roman Catholic exegetes obviously do not accept Luther's analysis of Pauline theology: Maritain, St. Paul. Even among Lutherans, however, there have been conflicting views of the validity of Luther's exegesis; Althaus is one who believes that Luther misinterprets Paul at some important points; Paulus und Luther über den Menschen. Feine, Die Erneuerung des Paulinischen Christentums durch Luther also discusses this problem.

56. W. A. XL, 1, 559.

57. Ibid. 42.

58. Ibid. 518. "Et, quod spectaculum valde iucundum est, proponit et producit legem velut furem aut latronem aliquem iam damnatum et adiudicatum morti, etc." Ibid. 277.
59. W. A. XL, 1, 505.

60. "Solet enim diabolus in afflictione et pugna conscientiae per legem terrere nos et opponere conscientiam peccati, vitam nostram pessime transactam, iram et iudicium dei, infernum et aeternam mortem, ut sic nos in desperationem adigat, nos sibi subjiciat et a Christo abstrahat." Ibid. 50. According to Luther we commit a double sin when we refuse to acknowledge the goodness of the law; the law comes and brings to light our secret sins, which makes us hate the law and its Author. It is for this reason that the law can never be redemptive; it increases sins rather than releasing man from them: "Qui igitur potest capre, capiat, quod lex in Christiana Theologia et su vera descriptione non justificet, sed omni contrarum effectum habet, ostendit enim nos nobis, Deum iratum exhibet, iram aperit, perterrefacit nos et non solum revelat, sed etiam abundare facit peccatum, ut, ubi prius peccatum parvum erat, per legem illuminantem fiat magnum, ut homo incipiat odisse et fugere legem et perfecto odio horrere Deum, legit condit ratio etiam facere, sed dupliciter peccare in legem: Primum non solum absens, legis habitant voluntatem, ut non possis ea audi, sed contra eam facere, Imo deinde etiam sic odisse, ut cuperes eam aboliam una cum Deo qui est summe bonus, eius autore." Ibid. 505.

Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 109ff.


62. W. A. XL, 1, 558.

63. "kei gutte werck sein, dan allein die got gebotenn hat. gleich kein sund ist, dann allein die got verbote hat." W. A. VI, 204 (Von den guten Werken, 1520).

64. Kidd, Documents of the Continental Reformation, 216.

65. "Quare ipsa praecepta dei breviter sunt inspicienda, in quibus sine dubio omnia peccata continentur, si recte intelligantur." W. A. VI, 164 (Confiteri ratio, 1520).

66. "Luther, while finding fault with the self-chosen works of the Catholics, points to the Ten Commandments as summing up every good work willed by God...As for the Evangelical Counsels so solemnly enacted in the New Testament, viz. the striving after a perfection which is not of obligation, Luther, urged on by his theory that only what is actually commanded partakes of the nature of a good work, came very near branding them as an invention of the Papists." Grisar, Luther V, 46-7. Luther says that it would take an angelic being to perfectly fulfil the Ten Commandments and yet the monks presume to seek an even higher way! It is as though we were not able to pay a farthing and yet boasted of being able to pay ten shillings: "So haben
wir nu die zehen gepot, ein ausbund Gottlicher lere, was wir thuen sollen, das unser gantzes leben Gotte gefalle, und den rechten born und rohre, aus und ynn welchen quellen und gehen müssen, alles was gute werck sein sollen, also, das ausser den zehen gepoten kein werck noch weren gut und Gott gefellig kan sein...Sehe aber, ist es nicht ein verfluchte vermessenheit der verzweivelten heiligen, so da sich unterstehen ein hoher und besser leben und stande zu finden, denn die zehen gepot leren, zeben fur, wie gesagt, es sey ein schlecht leben für den gemeinen man, yhres aber sey für die heiligen und wolkomenen. Und sehen nicht die elenden blinden leute, das kein mensch so weit bringen kan, das er eins von den zehen gepoten halte, wie es zuhalten ist...Darumb ist yhr rhumen gerade soviel, als wenn ich rhumete und sagte, Ich habe zwar nicht ein groschen zubezalen, aber zehen gulden trawe ich wol zubezalen." W. A. XXX, 1, 178-9. This cuts the ground from under the Roman hierarchical view of vocation; gradations of merit according to occupation obscures the fact that the ultimate demand of God can never be satisfied by human effort or achievement. The law reduces all men to the same rank, that of sinners. As Calhoun points out, the term "vocatio" was reserved for monastic or clerical callings; it was left to the Reformers to wipe out the distinctions between the common life and the spiritual life and to apply the term "vocatio" generally: God and the Common Life, 18ff., 253ff.

67. "Luther betont nur immer---in Einklang mit Augustin und in der Hauptsache auch mit der Scholastik---, das des Gesetz 'geistlich' zu deuten, d. h. auf die Gesinnung und nicht nur auf das Werk der Hände zu beziehen sei." Holl, Gesammelte Aufsatze I, 156. See Luther's treatment of the Fifth Commandment: W. A. XXX, 1, 159.

68. Ibid. 179.
69. Ibid. 147.
70. Ibid. 180.
71. Ibid. 139.
72. Ibid. 181.
73. "Also hat die gantze schrifft uberal dis gepot gepredigt und vertrawen gerichtet." Ibid. 180. There are only two alternatives to its demand: faith or sin: "dis werck des 1. gebots ist grosser, ja viel grosser denn alle Monchskappen, fasten, beten und all jre werck, und sind also die werck des 1. gebots gar heilige werck des Gesetzes, aber wer kan sie thun? Warlich, kein mensch, denn sie sind alle sunder bis auff Christum." W. A. XLVI, 664 (Ausleung 1 & 2 Kapitels Johannis, 1537-38).
74. W. A. XL, 1, 424.

75. "Sic Paulus clare confutat confictam a Sophistis glossam de fide formata loquiturque de fide sola, deponens legem, seposita autem lege seponitur etiam caritas et omnia quae legis sunt, et sola fides retinetur quae justificat et vivificat." W. A. V., 1, 424.

76. "The more seriously he takes the commandment to love God with all his heart, and the more strict the demand that his love for God shall be pure and unselfish, the more impossible it becomes...External commandments are easier to deal with, but the commandment which requires love with all the heart can only be a law which damns. In the monastery Luther learnt by personal experience that the Commandment of Love in its most intense and inward form is the most tyrannical law; indeed it is a real devil for the troubled conscience." Nygren, Agape and Eros II, 2, 476-7. Aulen, Christus Victor, 129.

77. "A. XVIII, 681.

78. B. A. II, 25 (W. A. VII, 35-6).


80. Ibid. 86 (Vorrede auf die erste Epistel St. Pauli an die Corinthier). He speaks of love, in the same way, as the fruit of the Holy Communion in which one receives Christ and therefore must bear the fruit of love towards one's neighbors: "Nun wollen wir von der Frucht dieses Sakraments, welche die Liebe ist, reden, dass wir uns also lassen finden gegen unsern Nachsten, wie es von Gott geschen ist...Die Liebe, sag ich, ist ein Frucht dieses Sakraments." W. A. X, 3, 55f. (Ein Sermon an Sonnabend oder Samstag vor Reminisere, 1522).

Luther's emphasis on faith rather than on love is one of his chief differences with the mystic tradition which in many ways was the source of much of his own thinking: "For the mystic God is wholly love, and the only obstacle to union with him is human self-assertion, which must be cowed and the old Adam crucified, that the human may become divine. Hence the religious life is a repetition of the incarnation. But for Luther God was not only love but also anger, to be placated by the sacrificial death of Christ. Hence the atonement was more important than the incarnation. As a consequence love gave way to faith." Bainton, Harvard Theological Review XXII, 2,
(April, 1929), 134. Baintoa has overemphasized the legalistic side of Luther's theology in reference to the atonement; as a result he presents Luther's view as one which contrasts faith and love. Luther did contrast them but only insofar as love was considered as a means of gaining justification; we are justified by faith alone, and love has no place here. But love is the fruit of the justifying faith. Luther did not hesitate to say that faith without love is probably not real faith at all: W. A. XL, 1, 421.

82. Ibid. 672.
83. Ibid. 50.
84. Ibid. 242.
85. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation IV, 51ff. ("The Münster Madness"). Köstlin, Theology of Luther II, 21ff. Carlstadt and the "Zwickau Prophets" appealed to the Old Testament writings and practices for justification to break down images; and the Anabaptists began to teach that wicked men might be destroyed according to the example of the Old Testament zealots. Some had proposed that the Mosaic law should be introduced as nearly as possible in its entirety and the Roman law abrogated as heathenish and the canon law as un-Christian. Duke Johann was almost won over to this view by a court preacher, Wolfgang Stein, before Luther and Melanchthon intervened. Grisar, Luther VI, 86.


89. See note 81 above.
90. W. A. XXIV, 15. "Also halt ich nu die gepot, die Moses geben hat, nicht darumb, das sie Moses geboten hat, sondern das sie mir vun natur eingepflanzet sind und Moses alhie gleich mit der natur uberein stemmet, etc. Aber die andern gepot ym Moses, die allen menschen von natur nicht sind eingepflanzet, hatten die Heyden nicht, gehen auch sie nicht an...Das ist nu das erste, das ich ynn Hose sehen sol, nemlich Die gepot, zu welchen ich nichts verbunden bin denn so ferne sie einem yglichen von natur sind eingeblendet und ynn sein hertz geschrieben." Ibid. 10.

91. Ibid. 7.

92. "Zum ersten, das er schöne Exempel der gesetz gibt, die daraus mogen genommen werden, eusserlich land und leute fein ordentlich zu regiren. Zum andern sind darynne die zusagungen Gottes, damit der glaube gestercket und erhalten wird...Zum dritten lesen wir Moses von wegen der schönen Exempel des glaubens, der liebe und des crucizes ynn den lieben heiligen vetern Adam, Habel, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob." Ibid. Öff. Luther constantly emphasized that Moses in his right sphere was admirable and worthy of praise: "Ja wol diesen unterschied Mosi und Christi lernen und wissen: Moses ist ein feiner, nützlicher und kostlicher Prediger, der da vleissig treibet in den drei geboten der I. Tafeln, das man lerne Gott lieben, furchten und yne vertrawen. Ist also Moses ampt ein kostlich ampt und selige predigt, aber nicht ferner denn allein, etc." W. A. XLVI, 665. Luther often uses Moses as the symbol of the law and for this reason his remarks on him sometimes appear contradictory.

93. W. A. XXIV, 7.

94. Schneider, Christendom X VI, 344.

95. W. A. LVI, 176 (Rom. 1:19), 203 (Rom. 2: 14-5).


97. W. A. XXX, 1, 192. "Wenn nu die Rottengeister komen und sprechen: Moses hat es geboten, so las du Iossen faren und sprich...Denn was Gott von hymel geben hat den Juden durch Moses, das hat er auch geschrieben ynn aller menschen hertzen." W. A. XXIV, 9.
98. W. A. XVI, 431.

99. "Ich frage nicht nach dem was Moses geboten hat. Ja (sprechen sie) er hat geboten, man sol ein Gott haben, dem trauen und glauben, nicht bey seinen namen schweren, Vater und mutter ehren, nicht todtten, nicht stelen, nicht ehebrechen, nicht falsch gezeugnis geben und eines andern weib noch gut bereren. Sol man denn das nicht hatten? Sprich also: Die natur hat diese gesetze auch...Die Heyden, die kein gesetz haben, die haben das gesetz ynn yhrem hertzgen geschrieben. Wie aber die Juden fehlen, also fehlen auch die Heyden." W. A. XXIV, 9.

100. W. A. XLVI, 667.


102. W. A. XI, 279.

103. W. A. XIX, 638.

104. "The law does not last, because it is given by Moses, but because it is divinely written in the hearts. Itaque donec hominum natura, manet lex. The law of Moses does not concern us any more than the laws of Solon, therefore we are bound by the law not because of Moses but because it is written in nature." Corp. Ref. XII, 473; quoted by Hildebrandt, Melanchthon, 40.

In his introduction to an English translation of the Loci Communes Hill says that through Melanchthon's work: "Natural law is now emancipated forever from theology and all so-called supernatural authority." It is doubtful whether this is Melanchthon's intention; certainly Luther would not abide it. According to Luther, though the Jews and the heathen may have received the law in different ways, they are worshipping the same God; the law no matter how it comes is God's law: "Zum ersten ist zu mercken, das uns Heyden und Christen die Zehen gepot nicht betreffen, sondern alleine die Juden...Das wir aber gleich auch dem Gott, den die Juden ehren, der sie aus Egypten gefurt hat, erkennen, anbeten, und ehren, haben wir nicht durch Moses oder aus dem geschrieben gesetz, sondern aus andern schriften und auss dem gesetz der natur." W. A. XVI, 424.

105. "In religion he was obscurantist." Lloyd, Approach to Reform, 220. Webb says of Luther that he was a consistent anti-rationalist: Studies in Natural Theology, 39, 231, 343. Luther identified law and reason and therefore in this sense, as Aulen has pointed out, Christ's work was "contra rationem et legem." Just as with the law, however, Luther believed that reason was the gift of God and was to be highly prized in its proper work. Preusse says that Luther see both the positive and negative possibilities of reason according to the three forms of its activity: "Die menschliche Vernunft hat für Luther drei Formen ihrer Betatigung." First, the pure formal operations of logical thought.
Second, these operations exercised in theoretical, practical and worldly affairs such as science, art, politics, etc. Third, reason intruding in matters of faith. "Die zweite Fähigkeit der Vernunft hat Luther stets gepriesen... Aber Luthers voller Zorn bricht hervor, wenn die Vernunft etwas in Glaubenssachen dranreden will. Hier ist kein Ausdruck zu stark, um sie abzuweisen und aus dem Heiligtum hinauszuschwerfen." Martin Luther, 96-9. One cannot depict Luther as a "despisier of reason" without badly misrepresenting his full view. For a flagrant example of this type of caricature see Maritain, Three Reformers, 28ff. Luther's mature view is that human reason can only know material and formal causes; we must depend upon the Word of God to teach us final and efficient causes, for instance, for what end God created man, etc. "W. A. XLII, 92ff. (Vorlesungen über I. Mose).

106. W. A. XL, 1, 521.
108. W. A. XL, 1, 52.
110. Troeltsch, Ges. Schr. I, 558.
111. "Luther hat nicht zurückgriiffen auf ein Naturrecht; Ich finde mich hier und im folgenden in einem starken Gegensatz zu Troeltsch... Das eine Mal sind lex naturae die unveränderlichen Naturverhältnisse, unter denen der Mensch steht—also etwas Tatsächliches; das andere Mal ist es das Bewusstsein eines Seinsollenden, das Bewusstsein eines sittlichen Gesetzes; soweit er dem 'natürlichen' Menschen eignet... In Troeltsch's Lutherdarstellung ist diese Vermischung des Seienden mit dem Seinsollenden geradezu ins Grelle gesteigert... Er redet ständig von dem 'stoischen Naturrecht'..." Ges. Aufs. I, 243 n. 2f. See Brunner's short survey of the origins of the concept of natural law, especially its treatment by ancient humanists; this was characterized by three elements: 1. The rationalism of the lex. 2. The pantheism of the natura. 3. The natural immanence of the divine in man. Man in Revolt, 555ff. Luther would have little affinity with the view of natural law expressed here; "Auch gegen das rationale Gebilde des Naturrechts bewährte er diese Haltung. Es galt ihm sehr wenig." Evangelium, Kirche und Volk, 54-5. Scheel goes on to say that for Luther natural law was essentially a "praktisches Prinzip" for keeping order in the world.

On the other hand, one must say that it is questionable whether all medieval teaching on natural law was merely an elaboration of the views of ancient humanism. Natural law has an extremely involved history in Western civilization...
and many diverse elements entered its make-up. The Fathers and Scholastic theologians appealed to the words of Paul in Rom. 2: 14-15 for justification to include natural law within their systems, as Luther himself did. William of Ockham appealed to it and that is probably from whom Luther first learned of it. Gierke discusses the controversy between the Nominalists and the Realists as to whether the essence of the law was God's will or God's reason: Political Theories, 173. "The influence exercised by that system of thought in the development of English, and generally, European social and political speculations could hardly be over-estimated. Schoolmen, theologians, statesmen, lawyers, revolutionists and poets based their reasonings and wove their imaginings on it. And yet, during all those centuries the concept of 'ius naturale' was practically always passing through divers changes and interpretations which all but obliterated its original traits." Beer, British Socialism I, 10-11. It should be remembered, therefore, that merely because Luther appealed to the concept of natural law, does not establish the fact that his views are identical with those generally held in the Middle Ages. His doctrine must be interpreted in the light of his general theological convictions, and in particular, it seems to me, in the context of his teaching on the relation of law and gospel.


113. "Denn in allen Stadien seiner Entwicklung hielt der Reformator nachgewiesenemassen daran fest, dass das für alle Völker gleichmässig gültige Naturgesetz und Naturrecht die gemeinsame Quelle aller Rechte einschliesslich das mosaischen darstellt...die dargelegten Auffassungen des Reformators zeigen, vom völligen Fehlen der lex aeterna-Lehre abgesehen, in wesentlichen Punkten eine auffallende Übereinstimmung mit der thomistischen Theorie." Arnold, Zur Frage des Naturrechts bei Luther, 127-8. "Mit dieser beschränkung der Geltung des alt-testamentlichen Gesetzes auf das Judentum und seiner Begründung auf das Naturrecht folgt Luther nur dem Vorgang der Scholastik." Seeberg, Die Lehre Luthers, 203. This shows a trend among modern scholars, including Roman Catholics, to credit Luther with greater conformity with general medieval theological trends than had before been suspected. For the older view: Von Hugel, Essays and Addresses I, 250.


115. "Und das ist das beste fast ynn dem gantzen yose welche da nicht natürlich ynn die hertzen der menschen geschrieben ist, sondern kombt von hymel herab." W. A. XXIV, 10.
116. H. A. X, 70.
117. W. A. XL, 1, 77.
118. Ibid. 79.
119. Ibid. 218.
120. Ibid.
120a. Ibid. 569-70.
121. W. A. LVI, 354.
122. "Nisi enim peccatum extitisset, illa lex peccatum prohibens etiam non extitisset, sicut supra dixi, Politia et legibus ceu cauterio et, ut Paulus vocat, pedagogo non fuisse opus in integra natura." W. A. XLII, 82.
123. "Ergo per contrarium non est ibi iustitia, benedictio, salus et vita, sed peccatum, maledictio, mors, diabolus et aeterna perdition. Sic ergo ipsi promissionibus-Scriptura concludit omnes homines sub peccato et maledicto." W. A. XL, 1, 515-4. Even the promises shut all men under sin, but it is really the proper office of the law: "Hoc est, antequam veniret tempus Evangelii et gratiae, erat hoc legis officium, ut ea conclusi custodiremur, tanquam in carcere." Ibid. 518.
124. In doing this, the law is doing the work for which God ordained it: "Hic lex exercuit in eum omnia, quae in nobis exercuit, Accusavit aute autem et terruit nos, subiecit nos peccato, morti, irae Dei ac judicio su condemnavit. Et hoc iure fecit, quia omnes peccavimus etc." Ibid. 564-5.
127. Ibid. 47ff. For the Formula of Concord see Schaff, Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches III, 93ff.
128. Instit. II, 7, 12. For the other two uses of the law according to Calvin: Instit. II, 6ff. The work of sanctification is, according to Luther, the work of the Holy Spirit and not of the law; this may be seen, for instance, in his treatment of the Third Article of the Creed in his Larger Catechism. "Sic in diversa instrumenta transfunditur Spiritus qui non semel extinguit naturae vitia, sed per totam vitam purgat illud peccatum inhaerens." W. A. XL, 1, 312. Calvin shows a marked difference in his advocacy of using the law in the work of sanctification: "Deinde quia non sola doctrina, sed exhortatione quoque indigemus, hanc quoque utilitatem ex Lege capiet servus Dei, ut frequenti
eius meditations excitetur ad obsequium, in eo roboretur, a
delinquendi lubrico retrahatur." *Instit.* II, 7, 12. In
counter to this notice Luther's remarks: "Quare nullo modo
sinamus eam dominari in conscientia, praesertim cum tanti
constititer Christo, ut legis tyrannidem e conscientia au-
ferret...Disce igitur pius Legem et Christum duo contraria
esse, prorsus incompatibilitia; præsentis Christo lex nullo
modo dominari, sed cedere debet e conscientia et relinquere
cubile...soli Christo. Is solus dominetur in iustitia, sec-
uritate, laetitia et vita, ut conscientia lasta obdormiat
in Christo sine ullo sensu legis, peccati et mortis." W. A.
XL, 1, 558-9. Or as he concludes in *Von der Freiheit*: "Sihe
das ist, die rechte, geystliche, Christliche freyheyt, die
das hertz frey macht, von allen sunden, gesetzen, und ge-
potten, welch alle andere freyheyt unbertriffet, wie der
hymell die erdenn, Wilch geb uns gott recht zuvorsten und
behalten, Amen." B. A. Ii, 27 (W. A. VII, 35). See Loofs,
Dogmengeschichte, 777.

129. "Denn ob due wol auswendig das Gesetz mit Wercken haltest,
aus Furcht der Strafe oder Liebe des Lohns: so thust du
doch alles ohne frey Liebte und Lust zum jetzets, sondern
mit Unlust und Zwang, wolbest lieber anders thun, wenn das
Gesetz nicht ware...wiewohl auch das ausserliche Werck die
Lange nicht nachbleibet bey solchen Hauchern." H. A. X, 71.

130. Ibid. 72.

131. W. A. L, 600.

132. W. A. XL, 1, 520.

133. Hildebrandt gives a full discussion of Melanchthon's vacillat-
ing attitude toward the third use of the law: melanchtho, 42ff.

134. "The three uses of the Law, introduced by Luther, raised to a
fundamental principle by Calvin, and found among Anglicans even
before him, require thorough examination in their application
to the ideologies and problems of today." Ehrenberg, "The Au-
thority and Relevance of the New Testament Ethos Today" in
From the Bible to the Modern World, 16. Luther places great
importance on knowing what the proper offices of the law are;
if the law isn't kept within its proper limits the whole of
theology is perverted: "Si definio legem propria definitione
et relievo in suo officio et usu, res optima est. Si vero
transfero eam in alium usum et tribuo, quod non est tribuendum,
non solum legem, sed todat Theologiae perverta." W. A. XL, 1,
476. "His sciendum est duplicem esse legis usum." Ibid. 479.

135. Ibid. 519. "Primum ergi: intellectus et usus legum est coher-
cere impios. Diabolus manque regnat in toto orbe terrarum
et impellit homines ad omnia flagitia. Ideo Deus ordinavit Magistratus, Parentes, praeceptores, leges, vincula et omnes ordinationes civiles, ut, si non possint amplius, reversionem saltem diabolo manus, ne pro libidine suaeviat etc."

W. A. XL, 1, 479-80. W. A. XLII, 79.


139. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation I, 139, 160, 162ff.

140. Loofs, Dogmengeschichte, 737-3. It must be added, however, that while this was true of Roman theology as Luther knew it, there were some variations between the various schools. According to Niebuhr, it was chiefly the Hellenistic schools (as represented by Origen, Clement of Alexandria, etc.) who tended to identify sin with sensuality. The Augustinian tradition, and even the semi-Augustine as represented by Aquinas, held that sensuality and concupiscence is "derivative of the more primal sin of self-love." Nature and Destiny I, 242ff.

141. "Thou must be pure in heart; and only that heart is pure which has exterminated creaturehood." Meister Eckhardt quoted by Niebuhr, Ibid. 61. Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, 23, 70.


144. W. A. XL, 1, 84.

145. Council of Trent, Session V, June 17, 1546 (on original sin); Bettenson, Documents of the Christian Church, 366.

146. Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny I, 247: "For Luther, as for St. Thomas, sin is essentially lust ('concupiscencia' or 'cupiditas') but he does not mean by this the natural desires and impulses of physical life. Lust is the consequence of man's turning from God, which results in the corruption of his heart and will with evil desire."

147. Flesh, according to Luther, is the whole natural man, including his reason, understanding, will, etc.: "Caro autem non significat in Paulo, ut Sophistae putant, crassa illa peccata; ea enim apertis nomibus solet appellare adulterium, fornicationem, immunditiam etc...Significat ergo Caro totam naturam hominis cum ratione et omnibus viribus suis...Quare Paulo significat Caro summum iustitiam, sapientiam, cultum, religionem, intellectum, voluntatem, quanta potest esse in mundo." W. A. XL, 1, 244. "Sin as pride and sin as concupiscence both 'have their source in 'caro', which for Luther has the exact connotation of the Pauline capta. It is not the 'body' as symbol of man's finiteness but 'flesh' as symbol of his sinfulness." Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny I, 199. Nygren, Agape and eros II, 2, 471. Dodd says that Paul uses 'flesh' in two ways: 1. As a purely physical term. 2. "As a psychological and ethical term, for the sum of the instincts wrongly directed", and that he is "somewhat embarrassed" by the two-fold use he makes of the term. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 119-20.

148. W. A. XVIII, 745.


150. W. A. XL, 1, 73, 223f., 257f.

151. "quod oculus cordis non satis purus est, quo videremus quanta sit ignominia et miseria hominis sub peccato incenis, id est a deo separati et a diabolo possessor." W. A. VI, 114. The natural man tends to see only the sins of an obvious kind, such as those against the second table of the Decalogue; it is the work of the Holy Spirit to teach the inner meaning of the law: "Von solcher sünde ways die welt nichts, der heylig Geyst muss sies aller ernst lernen. Denn die welt hält nur das für sünde, das in der andern Tafel verboten ist. Von Christo waiss sie nichts, wil weniger waiss sie, das es sünde sey, an jn nicht glauben...Denn predigen, Das der unglaub ein sünde sey, kan niemand denn der heilig Geist." W. A. LII, 291.
Holl says that Luther's doubts about the legitimacy of the
distinction between venial and mortal sins was one of his
earliest points of disagreement with the Roman confessional
system: "Schon die für die Beichte so wichtige Unterscheid-
ung von Todsünden und lasslichen Sünden bereitete ihm Qualen.
may have been influenced by the mystics in this matter. Ibid.
12. In his Commentary on Romans Luther's position is clear:
"Der Unterschied zwischen Todsünde und lasslicher Sünde ist
nicht zu halten. Jede Sünde ist in Wahrheit Todsünde." Ibid.
115. O'Neil explains the Roman teaching on the distinction:
"Venial sin is essentially different from mortal sin. It
does not avert us from our true last end, it does not destroy
charity, the principle of union with God, nor deprive the
soul of sanctifying grace, and it is intrinsically reparable.
It is called venial precisely because, considered in its own
proper nature, it is pardonable; in itself meriting, not
eternal, but temporal punishment." Catholic Encyclopedia
XIV, 9. Köstlin explains that venial sins are those which
do not alienate a man "from God, and His holy law which he
loves." Symbolism, 111.

O'Neil goes on to say that Luther taught that "all
sins of unbelievers are mortal and all sins of the regener­
ate, with the exception of infidelity, are venial." Catholic
Encyclopedia XIV, 9. Köstlin also thinks that Luther distin­
guishes between sins committed in ignorance, on sudden pro­
vocation, and deliberate sins with an evil desire, in the life
of a regenerate believer; if Köstlin is right, this would be
the reintroduction of the distinction between venial and mor­
tal sins into the sanctified life after it had been rejected
for the pre-justified life. Theology of Luther II, 465ff.
Against these views, it seems to me that Luther is quite de­
dinite that all sins are mortal, whether in the life of an
unbeliever or in the life of a believer. The only thing that
distinguishes sins, he says, is not their essential nature but
the relation between the person who commits them and Christ,
Who has overcome sin. The believer's sins are forgiven and
therefore harmless, even though the sins in themselves are
worthy of death; the sins of the unbeliever are not covered
and therefore any one of them is sufficient to bring death.
Imputation versus non-imputation is the key distinction in
Luther's teaching on sin, rather than that between mortal and
venial sins. "Hoc ideo dico, ne quis putet peccatum post ac­
ceptam fidem non esse magnificandum. Peccatum est vere pecc­
catum, sive illud ante sive post Christum cognitum comnisieris.
Et Deus peccatum odit, Imo omne peccatum, quod ad substantiam
facti attinet, est mortale. Quod autem credenti non est mor­
tale, fit propter Christus Propiciatorem, qui peccatum sua
morte explavit. Non credent in Christum non solum omnia pecc­
cata mortalia sunt, sed etiam bona ipsius opera peccata sunt.
...Ideo Sophistae perniciosi errant, qui peccata distinguunt
penes substantum facti, non penes personam." W. A. XL, 2, 95-6.
153. "Sunde heisset in der Schriftt, nicht allein das eusserliche werck am Leibe. Sondern alle das Gescheffte das sich mit reget und weget zu dem eusserlichen werck, nemlich, des hertzen grund mit allen krefften." W. A. DB VII, 9. Luther constantly maintained that the sins of the first table—the deeply hidden sins of the inner man—are those which are the most serious: "peccata et ea vera et gravissima, non ficta aut inania, ut est summa infidelitas, dubitatio, desperatio, quotidians contemptus Dei, odium, ignorantia, Blasphemia dei, Ingratitudo, Abusus nominis Dei, Negligentia, fastidium, contemptus verbi Dei etc., Quae summa peccata sunt contra primam tabulam—Deinde etiam illa carnalia contra secundam, Qualia sunt: non habere honorem parentibus, Non obedire magistratui, apeteres alterius res, uxoren, etc. ("quorum ista levia sint respectu superiorum"). W. A. XL, 1, 88. The worst sins of all are those "virtues" which are acclaimed by the world, but which detract from the righteousness and wisdom of Christ; these are the blasphemous double-sins in which the devil pretends to be an angel of light: "Quare ista tua sapientia, si extra Christum ea, duplex est inapientia, tua iustitia duplex peccatum et impietas est, Quia ignorat sapientiam et iustitiam Christi...In religiosis, sapientibus et doctis hominibus mundus est optimus, et ibi vere dupliciter malus est. Praeterea iam carnalia vitia quibus mundus plenus est, qualia sunt Adulturia, scortationes, avaritia, furta, caedes, invidia, virulentia, Quae levia sunt, si conferas cum superioribus. Candidus diabolus transfigurans se in angelum lucis est vere diabolus." Ibid. 95-6. Luther called the third temptation of Christ the temptation by the "godly" devil: "ist nicht mehr ein schwächer Teuffel wie der erste, auch nicht der ander kluge Teuffel, der aus der schriftt disputirt, sondern ganz ein Gottlicher maestetischer Teuffel, der da schlecht heraus fert, als sey er Gtts selbs." W. A. XLV, 36-40 (Predigten des Jahres, 1537).

154. As Luther says in the proofs for the Heidelberg Disputation, no one can resist concupiscence and therefore all that we do is motivated by it: "Cur ergo concedimus concupiscensiam invincibilern? Fac quod est in te, et non concupisce. At non potes. Quare nec Legem naturaliter imples." W. A. I, 374. According to the Roman teaching it is only when the will consents to the yearning of concupiscence that there is real sin: "Hence the distinction of concupiscence antecedent and concupiscence consequent to the consent of will; the latter is sinful, the former is not." Catholic Encyclopedia IV, 208. "He (Luther) pays no attention to the theology of the Church, which had hitherto seen in the 'Non concupiscas' a prohibition of any voluntary consent to the concupiscence existing without actual sin." Grissar, Luther I, 203. In his exposition of the Fift-first Psalm (1531) Luther points out that we do not become sinners by committing individual sins; we commit
sins because we are already sinners. Hol. Ed. I, 76. As Murray points out, Luther by declaring that after sin came into the world free will was such in name only; "and that w'en a man has done the most he is capable of, he commits a mortal sin," undermined the whole theological basis of indulgences and of ecclesiastical power as well: "Even the saints cannot fulfill the commands of God, for all have sinned, all have come short...If the saints have not been able to carry out the law, obviously they have no merits to spare for mortals. The treasury of the Church is empty." Erasmus and Luther, 58. "Das ursprüngl. L. sieht in der Erbsünde das organische Lebenprinzip der gefallenen Menschheit, eine reale Wesenheit, eine eingefleischte böse Kraft, die nicht nur das Bild Gottes in der Seele ausgetilgt, sondern sich an seine Stelle gesetzt hat, die persönl. Sünden als Früchte aus sich herausstrijt u. bewirkt, dass alles, was der Mensch tut, in seinem innersten Wesen Sünde ist." Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche VI, 753.

155. Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny I, 212-3. In an early letter to an Augustinian brother, Luther says that we must not aim at a purity which struggles against being classed with sinners: "Cave ne aliquando ad tantam puritatem aspires, ut peccator tibi videri nolis, imo esse. Christus enim non nisi in peccatoribus habitat...Sif enim nostris laboribus et afflictionibus ad conscientiae quietem pervenire oportet: at quid ille mortuos est? Igitur non nisi in illo, per fiduciam desperationem sui et operum tuorum pacem invenias." De Wette, Briefe I, 17 (April 7, 1516). Luther fears that the devil is trying to make us righteous before Christ comes and Christ died only for sinners: "Du heiliger Teufel, vis me sanctum facere." W. A. XL, 1, 88 (1531). "Christus Dei filius traditus est Non pro iusticia et Sanctis, sed pro injusticia et peccatoribus. Si iustus esset et peccatum non haberem, non indigerem Placitore Christo. Cur ergo, O perversum in modum, Sancte Satan, vis me facere Sanctum et a me exigere iustitias." Ibid.

156. "Nun seindt vil menschen, die so men und stern anbetten. Darumb wollen wir zufarn und wollen die sonne und gesterne von hymsel werffen; wir werden lassen...Ja wenn wir unser ergsten feindt vertreyben wolten, der uns auf aller scheldlichen ist, so musten wir uns selber toden, dann wir haben keynnen schelder feindt weder unser hertz." W. A. X, 3, 33-4. Luther says that though he has not committed outward sins he has committed them in his heart: "cont.te transgressor omnium mandatorum Dei, tantaque est peccatorum meorum multitudo, ut bubalus corium ea complecti non possit, Imo non est numerus eorum peccavi enim 'supra numerum arenae maris'" W. A. XL, 1, 88. Luther's conviction of the tenacity with which sin clung to man's innermost nature sprang out of the depths of his own religious
life. In a touching letter to Osiander (June 3, 1545) Luther speaks of even the closest human bonds of love as standing in the way of God's will: "I often marvel that I am unable to forget the loss of my Lenchen, although I know she is in the regions above, in the new life, saved and redeemed, and that God has thereby given me a true token of His love, in having, during my life, taken my flesh and blood to His Fatherly heart. But the love of which I speak is only natural love, which, although good and natural, must still be crucified with us, so that the gracious will of God may be done." Currie, Letters of Martin Luther, 456.


158. W. A. LII, 291-2. In this sermon Luther compares unbelief to a great tree which bears evil deeds and thoughts as fruit; only the Holy Ghost is able to stem its growth. According to Luther, the first sin of Eve was unbelief, which then resulted in disobedience, which then resulted in excuses, etc. Harnack describes Luther's view of the sequence of sins as follows: unbelief, disobedience, self-excuse, justification of the sins, damning of God, and finally accusing God of being the source of sin: "und ist dieses der letzte Grad der Sünden, nämlich Gott lästern und ihm zu­mesen, dass die Sünde vor ihm herkomme." Luthers Theologie I, 553f. According to Niebuhr "Christian orthodoxy has consistently defined unbelief as the root of sin." Nature and Destiny I, 195.

159. "Also sol nu das erste gepot leuchten und sein glantz geben ynn die anvern alle...ist nu die meinung dieses gepots, das es foddert rechten glauben und zuversicht des hertzens, welche den rechten einigen Gott treffe und an yhn alleine hange." W. A. X:XX, 1, 133, 180. "Ein Gebot ergreift er als das Letzte, gerade das Gebot, das ihn richtet--den in-ersten Gebot fasst sich die ganze Verpflichtung gegen Gott zusammen, die Ver­pflichtung, der er nicht genünd hat: alle seine Sünde war ja als Ichsucht zuletzt Unglaube und Undank!" Holl, Ges. Aufs I, 74. When Luther says that sin is anything contrary to the law, this view in itself does not mark him off from the Scholastics. As has been pointed out, medieval religion as Luther knew it, tended to identify sin with physical, outward sins. The sophisticated Scholastic theologians, however, said that sin was anything not in conformity with the law of God: "Sin is nothing else than a morally bad act (St. Thomas, De Malo, Z. VII, a. 3.), an act not in accord with reason informed by the Divine law...[God]has made us subject to His law, which is known to us by the dictates of conscience, and our acts must conform with these dictates, otherwise we sin." Catholic Encyclopedia XIV, 4.
Despite this apparent similarity of viewpoints there is a fundamental difference between them. This is seen in two ways. First, there is a difference in the understanding of the effect of original sin on human nature. The orthodox Roman teaching on original sin discriminates between the original nature of man ("pura naturalia") and the additional gift bestowed on man by grace ("donum superadditum"); sin has taken away the "donum superadditum" but has left the original nature essentially unchanged. Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia X, 456. Seeberg, History of Doctrines II, 114ff. Against the idea that righteousness is a superadded gift, Luther anticipated the rest of the Reformers by saying that original righteousness ("justitia originalis") was part of the natural endowment of man. Sin, therefore, has affected the whole of man's nature and every part of him is alienated from God. This is also discussed on the basis of the distinction between the "image" and "similitudo", Roman theology holding that only the latter is essentially distorted by sin and the Protestant theologians holding that the image itself was deformed: Lampert, The Divine Realm, 67ff. Luther's view is revealed in some detail in Vorlesungen über 1. Moses von 1535-45: "Ad hunc modum stulte disputant adversarii hodie: Imaginem et similitudinem Dei manere etiam in homine impio. Mihi multo rectius viderentur dicere, si dicerent: Imaginem Dei in homine ita post peccatum periisse, scit originalis mundus et Paradisus perierunt." W. A. XLII, 68, 45ff. It should be added, however, that according to Aquinas the effect of original sin was not only the loss or original righteousness but also the disordering and wounding of the soul; even though reason and freedom remain they are no longer inclined towards the good. Original sin results in the loss of original righteousness formally and in concupiscence materially. Seeberg, History of Doctrines II, 116-7. Furthermore, when the Scholastics made this "strict line of discrimination between the original state of the first man and the additional endowment bestowed on him by grace," the motive was not in the desire "to minimize the distance separating the natural state from the state of sin. Such was an incidental result, but not the ground on which the argument was based." Ibid. 115. The fact remains, however, that even though Aquinas and other moderate theologians viewed sin in a deep and serious way, the general trend in medieval thought up to Luther's time had been Pelagian, however admirable may have been the motive of emphasizing human responsibility for sin. Luther was rejecting this trend towards Pelagianism. Today the official doctrine of the Roman church is probably to be considered as semi-Pelagian with some advocating a more semi-Augustinian position, if that distinction is not too fine.

In the second place, another fundamental difference between Luther's and the Roman doctrine of sin lies in his radical teaching of the nature of the demand of the law. Roman theology, as has been mentioned, held that sin is the trans-
gression of the law, as did Luther. They interpreted the law in such a way, however, that one could only transgress the law by a free and voluntary act of the reason and will: "sin, being the free and deliberate transgression of the law of God, can only be in the rational will." Catholic Encyclopedia IV, 208. They also held that only mortal and not venial sins were really trespasses of the law, since they alone are repugnant to the primary end of the law: Ibid. XIV, 9. Aquinas says that unbelief is the greatest of sins, and that faith is the first of the theological virtues, but the greatest of the virtues, to him, is "caritas", without which real virtue is impossible: Summa Theol. II, II, Q. 2, a. 3. McNeillert, History of Christian Thought II, 285. Even at its highest, Roman theology had a moralistic view of sin and law, which inevitably must reduce the demand of the law into an intricate hierarchy of grades and degrees of sins: "in contradistinction to the Protestant doctrine of an absolute corruption of man's nature, Trent speaks only of a wounding, weakening or clouding of human nature, thus admitting in its practical application a host of qualifications and adaptations." Schmitt, Necessity of Politics.

Luther, on the other hand, by reducing the absolute demand of the law to faith (and by refusing to include "caritas" as an integral part of a "complete" faith, which he felt would immediately introduce a subtle kind of legalism), defined sin in terms of the contrast between law and faith. Otto says that Paul's rejection of the flesh is at its highest plane the rejection of the law and the whole way of the law: "this meaning was rediscovered in its entirety and purity by Luther, and is the most profound and characteristic element in his teaching. Here all that does not proceed from Faith is sin and flesh." Religious Essays, 12. Elert summarizes Luther's view of sin: "Es gibt keinen Menschen ohne Sünde. Es gibt auch keine Neutralität zwischen Sünde und Gerechtigkeit. Und es gibt keine Sünde, die nicht Feindschaft wider Gott wäre." Morphologie des Luthertums I, 15. Hohl thinks that Luther's view of sin is still a decisive point for or against him: "Und noch heute fällt die Entscheidung für oder wider Luther eben an dem Punkt, ob man den Begriff der Sünde ernsthaft anerkennt oder ihn freundlich unterdrückt." Ges. Aufs. I, 447.

160. W. A. XL, 1, 554.
161. Ibid. 496.
163. "Nunc legis usum significant terribilis ille aspectus et
pompa qua Deus legem tulit in monte Syna...Hoc ergo of-
ficium lex habet quod in monte Syna habuit, cum primum
lata est et audiebatur a lotis, iustis, purificatis et
castis, et tamen rediget illos Sanctos in agnitionem suae
miseriae usque ad desperationem et mortem." "...A. XL, 1
463-4.

164. "Quia enim ratio humana opinione iustitiae insolescit et
putat se propter eam placere Deo, Ideo oportet Deum mit-
tere aliquem Herculem, scilicet Legem quae monstrum istud
toto impetu adoriatur, prosternat et conficiat. Igitur
lex hanc bestiam solam petit, non aliam...Quare magnum
et horribile monstrum est Opinio iustitiae." Ibid. 481-2.

165. Ibid. 482.

166. "Non intrat in cor neque sapit praedicatio de gratuita et
remissione peccatorum, quia ingens rupes et adamantinus
murus, scilicet Opinio iustitiae, sua cor ipsum cinctum
est, hoc impedit." Ibid.

167. Ibid. 489.

168. Ibid. 486.

169. Luther found many examples of this type of spiritual experi-
ence in the Bible, for instance, in the Psalms, in the lives
of great saints such as Abraham, Jacob, Job, and Paul, and
above all in Christ: Lunn, Martin Luther, 162-4. One of the
first full treatments of Luther's special use of the term
has recently appeared: Buhler, Anfechtung bei Martin Luther
(Zürich University Diss., 1942). Hall has pointed out that
"Anfechtung" was a characteristic element of Luther's whole
spiritual experience: "So ziehen sich bei ihm, anders als
bei Zwingli und Calvin, 'Anfechtungen' durch das ganze Le-
ben hindurch." Ges. Aufs., I, 385. Luther's spelling has
been retained in the use of the term in this paper.

170. Heiler has pointed out the similarities between Luther's deep
spiritual tribulation: "diesen furchtbaren inneren Anfechtungen"
and mystics' dark night of the soul: "dunkle Nacht der Seele";
"Luther hat die Schrecken dieser 'dunklen Nacht' durchschrit-
ten und in wandervoller Plastik beschrieben." Heiler, "Luthers
Bedeutung für die christliche Kirche" in Luther in Okumenischer
Sicht, 149. Appel has treated this problem in some detail:
Anfechtung und Trost im Spätmittelalter und bei Luther. He draws
attention to two main groups of mystics in Germany: One group
tended to develop their meditations on the thought of trust and
dependence on God's goodness and mercy; the "Trostbücher" are
the productions of this school. On the other hand, there were
those who dwelt on the contemplation of death; the "ars moriendi", or "Todesanfektung-" and "Sterbenbüchlein" reflect this type of mysticism. Appel says that these mystics had a deep understanding of the law and identified it with the love commandment as did Luther: Ibid. 28-9. They also taught that the law and the doctrine of election are two of the main sources of "Anfektung": "Gesetzanfektung und Erwägungszweifel, die die Krise bei Luther herbeiführten, sind auch die entscheidenden Anfektungen für die alten Trost- und Sterbenbücher." There are some important differences between Luther and the mystics, however; the mystics distinguished between mortal and venial sins and felt that the wrath of God was directed against their baser self rather than against the whole man as with Luther: "gegen seine niederen 'Krafte', unter der der innere Mensch (zwar mit leidet), von der er aber im Grunde nicht selbst getroffen wird." Finally, the mystics emphasized the work of Christ as the Example for overcoming the law, while Luther looked to Him as the Victor over the law: Ibid. 129-31. Holl, Ges. Aufs. I, 12. Bühler, Die Anfektung bei Martin Luther, 148-68. Luther had psychological affinities with the mystics but the whole theological interpretation which he gave to "Anfektung" was an indication of the different ground which he stood upon: "The so-called German Mysticism, dogmatically considered, furnishes scarcely anything further than a popular rendering of the Scholastic, i.e. Thomistic ideas." Seeberg, History of Doctrines II, 178.

171. Reiter, Martin Luthers Umwelt, Character und Psychose (2 vol.) is one of the most notable attempts at making a psychoanalytic study of Luther; it has been written in a rather polemic style with a good deal of prejudice against Luther so that its views must be taken with a grain of salt. Reiter treats "Anfektung" in the chapter: "Übersicht über Verlauf und Symptomatologie von Luthers psychischen Leiden": Ibid. II, 359ff.; he believes that Luther's obsession with the law was another of his psychoses. It does seem to be true that Luther was peculiarly subject to fits of melancholy and depression, and his confessors and teachers were often disturbed (as he was himself) at his chronic sinister experiences: Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation I, 124. Mackinnon, nevertheless, rejects the idea that one can explain Luther's sense of dread purely by means of abnormal psychology and says that that was only one element in his religious experience. Holl also stresses the religious-theological context of the concept: Ges. Aufs. I, 447-8. Scheel says that even if the attacks of fear and morbid horror were related to an unhealthy body and had physical repercussions on Luther, the root of the fear was his deep sense of the righteous judgment of God: Die Entwicklung Luthers, 80. If one were to take Reiter's judgments too seriously, he could be led to make similar statements about many great saints.
172. "W. A. XL, 1, 585. "Was ist nu grosser anfechtung denn die
sundt und boss gewissen, das gottis zorn altzeyt furcht und
nymmer ruge hatt?...solch vortzagen und unruge des gewissen
nit anders ist, denn ein gesprochen des glaubens, die aller
schwereste kranckheit, die der mensch mag haben an leyb und
seele, und si nit auff ein mall oder aylend mar gesund wer-
den." W. A. VI, 376-7 (Sermon v. d. neuen Testament, 1520).

173. "Ita haec verba: 'Christus factus est sub legera' etc., ut
valde sunt significantia, ita diligenter ponderanda sunt,
indicant enim filium Dei sub legem factum non unum atque
alterum opus legis fecisse aut tantum civiliter sub ea fu-
isse, sed omnen legis tyrannidem passumuisse. Lex enim
in summo suo usu exercuit Christum, tam horribiliter per-
terrefecit eum, ut tantum angorem senserit, quantum nullus
homnum anquam sensit." W. A. XL, 1, 567. Aulen says that
Luther speaks of the law "in the same language as that in
which Chrysostom spoke of the devil as attacking Christ,
exceeding his rights and therefore losing them." Christus
Victor, 127f. "er ward unter das Gesetz getan (Gal. 4,4)
auf zwietsche Weise: zum ersten frewillig unter die Werke
des Gesetzes, sie zu erfiillen, zum andern unter die Strafe
des Gesetzes, die ihre Bitterkeit von dem Erschrecken des
Gewissens unter Gottes Zorn nimmt. Das Gesetz hat ihn der
Sünde des ganzen Welt geschuldigt, erschreckt und gedangstet
--diese Angst was sein blutiger Schweiss in Gethsemane." Vogelsang, Der Angefochtene Christus bei Luther, 29. But
how can the law be considered a tyrant when it is so in-
timately related to the will of God? Vogelsang gives a
clue when he describes the second way in which Christ was
under the law; when Christ took upon himself the sins of
the world, the law as it rightly should condemned and at-
tacked that sin. Christ, however, overcame the law because
the sin which he bore was not really his. The law is a
tyrant to Christ only when He identifies Himself with the
sins of the world.

174. "Sic Christus, persona divina et humana, natur ex Deo aetern-
aliter, ex Virgine temporaliter, non venit ad concendas leges,
sed tolerandas et tollendas. Non factus est Magister legis,
sed discipulus obedientis legi, ut hac sua obedientia redimert
eos, qui sub lege erant." W. A. XL, 1, 565, 566. In speaking
of Christ's vict-ry over the law, Luther includes the somewhat
exotic idea of the law accusing and terrifying Christ by mis-
take and thereby sealing its own condemnation: "Hoc profecto
mirabile duellum est, ubi Lex Creatura cum Creatore sic con-
greditur et praeter omne ius omnem tyrannidem suam in filio
Dei exercet, quam in nobis fillis irae exercuit. Quia ergo
lex tam horribiliter et impie peccavit in Deum suum, vocatur
in ius et accusatur." Ibid. 565. Luther's justifies pictur-
ing the law in these personal terms on Biblical precedents. The Bible always uses this kind of figurative speech, he says: "Ad hunc modum Paulus de illo mirabili duello loquitur et, ut res incendur et illustrior fiat, legem pingere solet per prosopopeiam, quasi sit potentissima quaedam persona, quae Christum condemnaverit et occiderit, quam ipse superata morte vicissim vicerit, condemnaverit et occiderit, Ephesios 2:...et Cap. 4 ex Psalmo 68:... Ea prosopopeia usus est etiam ad Roma., Corinth., Collos."

W. A. XL, 1, 1566. As Dodd has pointed out, however, Paul himself was adverse to the use of anthropomorphisms in referring to God; also "he constantly uses 'wrath' or 'the Wrath' in a curiously impersonal way...Again, there are several passages where 'the Wrath' is used absolutely, almost as a proper noun, rightly represented by a capital letter in English." The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 20ff.

Luther here reveals his remarkable affinity with the Hebrew cast of mind, perhaps one of the reasons his commentaries and translations of the Bible have had such enduring value, and that he had such a deep understanding of Pauline theology.

175. The awful effect of the law upon the heart is an inevitable one, according to Luther, the law being what it is—good and holy, and our heart being what it is—sinful and fallen. As he puts it in Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam (1517): "Lex et voluntas sunt adversarii duo sine gratia implacabiles. (Th. 71) Lex facit abundare peccatum, quia irritat et retrahit voluntatem a seipsa (Th. 74)... Lex sit bona... omnis voluntas naturalis est iniquia et mala... Necessaria est mediatrix gratia, quia conciliet legem voluntati (Th. 87-9)."

W. A. I, 227-8. "Quare ista fuga indicat infinitum odium cordis humani contra legem et per consequens contra ipsum Deum." W. A. XL, 1, 196. Althaus says that Luther badly misrepresents Paul's thought at this point: "Das Unterschied von Paulus und Luther in der Anthropologie ist deutlich geworden... Das Bild des Menschen ohne Christus, wie Paulus es sah, findet sich bei Luther nicht." Paulus und Luther, 47, 41. Althaus has drawn up a table of differences between Paul's and Luther's theology, in one of which the difference lies in the fact that according to Paul the natural man has a real love of the law of God and desires to fulfill it: "hat als inwendiger Mensch Freude an Gottes Gesetz", while for Luther even the inner man hates the law: "hasst Gottes Gesetz." Ibid. 46. Althaus' main criticism of Luther is that he misinterprets Rom. 7:18, not realizing that "nicht bezeichnung des ganzen Ich sein." Ibid. 49 n. 1. Althaus' criticism really rests on a particular reading of the autobiographical passage in Romans in which Paul describes his own inner experience of what Luther would call "Anfechtung"; for Luther that experience is part of our Christian experience and the man outside of Christ is in a different situation,
for he simply hates the law. The Christian, on the other hand, has a dynamic relation with the law for when he can realize that Christ has overcome the law, then he can appreciate the goodness and justice of it.

176. "Conscientia enim res est tenerima; ita, cum sic carcer legis concluditur, nusquam patet ei exitus, sed aeternae ei istam antiquationem subinde augeri usque in infinitum. Sen­tit enim tunc iram Dei qui infinitus est, euius manum effugere non potest." W. A. Xl, l, 521-2. "legem Dei. quae quamquam est summum omnium quae sunt in mundo, tamen tam­tum abest, ut conscientiam contritam possit pacatam red­dere, ut etiam plus contristet ac in desperationem adigat." Ibid. 42. The conscience is the organ of knowledge of both the natural and Biblical law: "Das Gewissen als Organ fürs Naturgesetz ist auch Organ für willige Anerkennung der sich mit diesem deckenden Gottesgebote." Meyer, Hist. Komm. zu Luthers Kleine Katechismus, 155-6. The natural conscience, however, must be enlightened by God: "Es wirkt aber nicht als rein autoritative Mitteilung (wie bei Augustin, vgl.)...sondern durch leuchtung Jottes." Ibid. 157. The collaboration between the law and the natural conscience ultimately produces moralistic religion and finally despair: Jacob, Der Gewissensbegriff in der Theologie Luthers, 3-11. It is therefore necessary that the conscience should depend not only on the law for enlightenment but also upon the gospel for relief; the conscience must be bound to the Word of God as both gospel and law and as it becomes a good and profitable servant: "Luthers Gewissen war im Worte Gottes gefangen. Dies war das grosse Geheimnis seines Lebens und Wirkens und zugleich das Geheimmis und der innerste Kern der Reformation." Alanen, Das Gewissen bei Luther, 5.

177. Bühler, Die Anfassung bei Martin Luther, 121ff. "Was Luther in solcher duersten Bedrängnis noch aufrecht erhielt, war etwas überraschend Einfaches. Es war das erste Gebot. An dessen Anfangsworte, an das: 'Ich bin der Herr dein Gott', hat er sich immer in seiner Todesnot geklammert." Holl, Ges. Aufs. I, 73. Watson criticizes Holl for saying that Luther felt himself confronted by God without the mediation of Christ in the First Commandment and this brought on periods of "Anfechtung". According to Watson "In times of spiritual distress, Luther returns again and again to the First Commandment with its assurance: 'I am thy God'." Holl, therefore, "ignores the fact that he (Luther) could not have interpreted the First Commandment as he does, apart from his understanding of Christ. The Commandment has become for him one of the 'larvae Dei' which 'as it were contain Christ'.' Let God Be God, 183 n. 92. Watson here seems to miss the distinction between law and gospel which he elsewhere brings out very clearly. The believer, secure in his faith and trust in God through Christ, can see the law as something
which no longer must be feared, but rather admired and praised as the holy and pure agent by which God drove him to the gospel. But it is only "in Christ" that it takes on such an aspect. When the faith of the believer becomes shaken or dimmed (as it does in the periods of "Anflechtung") then the law once again brings the dread and horror which it originally conveyed. The First Commandment is one of the "larvae Dei" but it can only been seen as such by those "in Christ". And being "in Christ" was never a mechanical or static thing for Luther. Furthermore, it is the First Commandment as gospel and as promise which gives Luther comfort; as law it continues to terrify him. Even though our conscience is liberated from the tyranny of the law, the law continues to reveal sin and bring terror: "Hac ergo victoria sua fugavit Christus e conscientia nostra Legerum, ut amplius non possit nos confundere in conspectu Dei, in desperationem adire et damare. Non desint quidem ostendere peccatum, accusare et peterrefacere, sed conscientia apprehendens hoc Apostoli verbum: 'Christus a lege nos redemit', fide erigitur et consolationem accipit." W. A. XL, 1, 566.

Luther's thought at this point is very difficult to set into a consistent pattern. Part of the difficulty arises from his distinction of the old and new man which exist at the same time within the Christian; the flesh, or old man, must be bound by the law, while the spirit, or new man, is free under the gospel: "Iustitia Christiana pertinet ad novum hominem, iustitia vero legis ad vetern qui natus est ex carne et sanguine." W. A. XL, 1, 45. Another complication is that Luther sometimes says of the First Commandment that it contains both law and gospel: "Das dritte stück des Ersten gepots ist eine trostliche zusagung." W. A. XVI, 445. There has been a good bit of discussion recently as to whether Luther thought of the First Commandment as essentially a promise or command. Meyer, for instance, holds that Luther tended to teach that the whole Decalogue was essentially gospel or "promissio mit ihren ethischen Konsequenzen." This was in the period from 1530 to 1537; in the Antinomian controversy "der Dekalog wieder als 'lex' betont." Hist. Komm. zu Luthers Kleine Katechismus, 165ff. Döhler has made a full study of this in his Gebieten und Schäffen Jottes in Luthers Auslegung des ersten Gebotes (Göttingen University Diss., 1939); it is his conclusion that the division of law and gospel within the First Commandment (which Thiene says Luther teaches) cannot be strictly defended; Luther, he believes, consistently held that the First Commandment is the summary of the whole law of God and only in a deeper sense can it be said to be gospel—perhaps as they were one in the garden of Eden so they may still be in the eyes of God. Döhler holds that Luther taught that both law and gospel are included in the
First Commandment: Die Anfechtung bei Martin Luther, 121ff., 124. The solution may be found in comparing Luther's treatment of the First Commandment with his understanding of the relation between Christ and the law. Christ's proper work ("opus proprium") is to bring the gospel, but he also has the strange work ("opus alienum") of expounding the law. So the First Commandment has the proper work of summarizing the law, but also the strange work of telling of the promise. This does not mean, however, that the law and gospel have become one; they continue to have their peculiar functions which must not be mingled: "Das Dritte stück des Ersten gepots ist eine trestliche zusagung...den. Gott that alles beydes ynn der schrifft, drawet odder schrecket und troset...er am ersten drawet, schrecket und das hertz verzagt macht, darnach troset und richt das hertz wider-umb auff." W. A. XVI, 445-6. Luther, of course, never maintained that there is an ultimate dualism between the law and gospel; both are part of God's Word and they have their ultimate unity in Him; but i. Him alone, however.


180. "Quando deus incipit hominem iustificare prius eum damnat, et quem vult aedificare, destruit, quam vult sanare, percutit, quem vivificare, occidit...Hoc autem facit, quando hominem contigit et in sui supremae peccatorum cognitionem humiliat ac tremefacit...In ista autem conturbatione incipit salus, quia initium sapientiae timor domini." W. A. I, 540. "Deus certo promisit humiliati, id est, depioratis et desperatis, gratiam suam. Humiliari vero penitus non potest homo, donec sciat, prorsus extra suas vires, consilia, studia, voluntatem, opera, omnino ex alterius arbitrio, consilio, voluntate opera suam pendere salutem, nape Dei solius...Qui vero nihil dubitat, totum in voluntate Dei pendere, is prorsus de se desperat, nihil eligit, sed expectat operantem Deum, est proximus est gratiae, ut salvus fiat. Itaque propter electos ista vulgantur, ut isto modo humiliati et in nihilum redacti, salvi fiat." W. A. XVIII, 652-3. "den freyen, sichern geysten, die yhre sund nit beysset, die mess keyn nutz ist." W. A. VI, 377. "Den er (Jott) from machen wil, den macht er vorhyn zum sund, Und wen er reich machen wil, den stost er vor ynn die helle." W. A. XVI, 445.

182. "Quanquam ergo Lex occidit, tamen Deus utitur isto effectu legis, hoc est ista morte, in bonum usum, scilicet ad vitam." Ibid. 517.

183. "Quare lex non est contra promissa Dei, sed potius pro illis. Quanquam autem non implen promissionem et non affert iustitiam, tamen suo officio et usu humiliat nos etque ita reddit capaces gratiae et beneficii Christi." Ibid. 512, 509.

184. "Lex ergo cum cogit hoc modo agnoscere malitia et ex animo peccatum confiteri, suum officium fecit et tempus eius completum est Tarnusque gratiae adest, ut veniat benedictum Semen, quod conterrimit et contusum lege iterum erigat ac consoletur." Ibid. 509.


186. "Post istas ergo confutationes et argumentationes satis prolixe et pulchre docet Paulus legem nihil aliud esse, si verum et optimum eius usum perspexeris, quam Paedogonian quandam ad iustitiam." Ibid. 512.


188. Ibid. 520.

189. The first danger is that we may be untouched by the voice of the law through the extreme hardness of our hearts. But even when we have heard the demand of the law, we may still be misled by the devil into misinterpreting the meaning of the "Anfectung" into which the law has plunged us. It is in this way that the law may become the organ of the devil as well as an organ of God. Sormugen, Die Eigenart der Lutherschen Ethik, 40-1. In this way the devil may lead a man to misuse the Ten Commandments; Luther writes to Hieronymus
eller, who is suffering from an over-scrupulous conscience, that we must sin and jest out of hatred for the devil, now and then, so that he cannot burden our conscience with mere trifles: "I tell you, we must put all the Ten Commandments with which the devil tempts and plagues us so greatly, out of sight and out of mind. If the devil upbraids us with our sins and declares us to be deserving of death and hell, then we must say: 'I confess that I have merited death and hell', but what then? Are you for that reason to be damned eternally? By no means. 'I know One Who suffered and made satisfaction for me, viz. Jesus Christ, the Son of God. Where He is, There I also shall be'." Quoted by Grisar, Luther III, 175. Some critics have used such letters as these to show that Luther advocated libertinism. He is simply trying to show that obsession with sins is as bad as not being conscious of them. Christ is the Lord, even over sins is essentially what Luther is trying to say. In another letter to Weller this comes out: "Magister Veit tells me that at times you are a prey to a spirit of melancholy...A joyful heart is life to a man, and an unceasing fountain of health, and prolongs his years...be sure that these black thoughts proceed from the devil, for God is not a God of sadness, but of consolation and joy. Is not joy in the Lord real life? ...God takes no pleasure in such sorrow. Sorrow over our sins is very different. It is a sweet sorrow, in view of forgiveness; but that which proceeds from the devil has no promises annexed. It is of no avail." Currie, Letters of Martin Luther, 220-1.

190. "Solet enim diabolus in afflictione et pugna conscientiae per legem terrere nos et opponere conscientiam peccati, vitam nostram pessime transactam, iram et iudicium dei, infernum et aeternam mortem, ut sic nos in desperationem adigat, nos sibi subiiciat et a Christo abstrahat." W. A. XL, 1, 50.

191. The devil attacks us with accusations of sin all through our life, even to the very death bed: "Und gar auf dem Totenbett kommt der Teufel und hält die Sünder vor und will das Gewissen in Zweifel führen. Da ists dann gut, dass man da den Tyrannen, Tod und Teufel köнет trotzen und sagen: 'Siehe, du Tyrann, siehe, du Teufel fichtst mir an mein Leben und Gewissen; sieh, da hab ich ein Zeichen, das Christus sein Leib und Leben, Blut und Fleisch für mich gesetzt hat'." Von heiligen Abendmahl, 34 (Ein Sermon am grünen Donnerstag, 1523) W. A. XII, 476ff. In a sermon on the confessional and the sacraments in 1534, Luther attacks the kind of confession which probes deeper into hearts which are already broken and penitent: Jacobs, Hol. Ed. I, 77. "Ita Theologice carcer est perturbatio et auxiantes animi, qua conclusus privatum pace conscientiae et quiete cordis. Non tamen in aeternum, ut ratio iudicat." W. A. XL, 1, 52.
"Lege occideris, ut per Christum vivificeris, Quare ne desperes ut Cain, Saul et Iudas; qui conclusi in illo carcere nihil addiderunt, sed in illa ipsa conclusione manserunt, ideo coacti sunt desperare. Te alter geras in istis conscientiae pavoribus oportet quam illi, nempe, ut scias benefactum esse, quod sic conclusus est confusus es, sed vide, ut ista conclusione recte utaris, scilicet in futuram fidem. " W. A. XL, 1, 522.

Ibid. 526.

"Qui ista extreme contraria in tentatione novit coniungere, hoc est, qui, ubi maxime lege terretur, novit finem legis et initium gratiae seu futurae fidei adesse, is recte utitur lege. Hanc artem ignorant omnes impii." Ibid. 521.

"Alterum infernum, alterum coelum est, et tamen ea oportet esse in corde coniunctissima. Speculative coniunguntur facillime, sed in practice ea coniungere est omnium difficillimum, Id quod propria experientia saepe inciderat. Papistae et Sectarii de hac re prorsus nihil noverunt." Ibid. 523.

"Ideo et Paulus hanc luctam spiritualer describens utitur valde Emphaticis ac significantibus verbis, scilicet militandi, repugnandi et captivandi." Ibid. 524. Luther includes in the "luctam spiritualer" even such apparently speculative and abstract problems as the omnipotence and omniscience of God: "Ego ipse non semel offensus sum usque ad profundum et abyssum desperationis, ut optarem nunquam esse me creatum hominem, antequam scirem, quam salutaris illa esset desperatio et quam gratiae propinqua." W. A. XVIII, 719.

W. A. XL, 1, 525.

Ibid. 526.
Notes - II

1. Luther says that we should neither underestimate the gravity of sins, nor overestimate their greatness when compared to Christ; for He came to deliver us from the really great sins! "Itaque ne fingas ea esse parva quae tuis operibus oboleri possint; Neque desperes propter ipsorum magnitudinem, cum aliquando in vita vel in morte serio ea senseris, Sed discere hic ex Paulo credere Christum non pro fictis aut pictis, sed veris, Non pro parvis, sed maximus, Non pro uno atque altero, sed omnibus, Non pro invictis (Quia nullus homo, nullus etiam angelus vel minimum peccatum vincere potest), sed pro invictis peccatis traditum esse." W. A. XL, 1, 87. "The law and the works to which it prompts only confirm man in his self-righteousness and in his belief in his natural goodness or moral perfectability, or alternatively drive him to despair. The psychological situation of the world is consequently one of oscillation between pride and despair." Oldham, The Church and Its Function in Society, 136. Oldham ascribes this view to all of the Reformers. Luther says that the natural man throughout the world has constantly been worried about the problem of salvation; feeling his sin (through the law written in his heart) he thinks that by outward observances, by following the external injunctions of the Ten Commandments, all will be well. He then either falls into pride through believing that he has fulfilled the law, or into despair when he realizes that he cannot. W. A. LII, 347 (Hauspostille, 1532-34). Despair is nearer the gospel than pride because it is the necessary preparatory step for acceptance of the gospel; but it is only a step and unless the law eventually drives us to the gospel its work is hopeless and futile; fear of the law in itself is not enough. W. A. XIV, 421.


3. "No aber das Gesetze solch sein Ampt allein treibet on zuthun des Evangeli, da ist der Tod und die Helle, und mus der Mensch verzweiuein, wie Saul und Judas." Ibid. 226. One might say there was a subtle element of pride in the despair which refuses to be delivered from its wretchedness. Luther recognizes this by emphasizing the "our" in Gal. 1: 4: "who gave himself for our sins". "Perpende autem diligenter singula verba Pauli, et imprimis bene nota et urge hoc pronomen: Nosris...Hinc hypocrityae ignari Christi, etiamsi sentiant remorum peccati, tamen cogitant se facile sui operibus et illud abolituros." W. A. XL, 1, 85-6. As Nygren points out
this desire of the natural man to gain a standing before God, in wishing to purify himself before taking refuge in God’s "misericordia", is at its heart, according to Luther, a secret "praesumptio". Agape and Eros II, 2, 466. The fact that Christ died for our sins is the judgment of God—the heavenly thunder—against all self-righteousness based on the law: "Sed sind eitel tonitra contra iusticiam legis, hominum." W. A. XL, 1, 83 (1531).

4. "Du heiliger Teufel, vis me sanctum facere...Postea sol Teufel peccatum machen ex bono opere." Ibid. 88. Those who have fallen into the hands of the devil, first have no real feeling of sin and only pretend to be sinners, feigning humility: "ut humiles fratres...sint plane inania et falsa. Ideo neque ea intelligunt, neque in tentatione, cum peccatum serio sentiunt, consolationem ex eis accipere possunt, Sed ibi simpliciter desperare coguntur." Ibid. 87. Obendiek seems to believe that Luther’s view is that only the gospel is a means of combating the devil and that the law plays no part here: "Nicht Gesetz und Vorschrift, sondern das Wort der Gnade tritt dem Teufel entgegen. Erst im Wort der Gnade ist Leben und Sieg...Die Bekämpfung des Teufels ist nur durch das Evangelium möglich." Der Teufel bei Martin Luther, 117, 120. This is a misrepresentation of Luther’s thought. The law in its proper work of revealing sin is doing a work of God and is an enemy of the devil by destroying human presumption. It is only when the devil confirms a man in the despair to which he has been driven by the law (by insinuating an element of pride into the despair) that the work of the law is to the advantage of the devil. It is the work of the gospel to repair this damage. The gospel is the last enemy of the devil, but not the only one. The law and the gospel together form the two-edged sword by which the devil is destroyed.

5. "Darumb sein die zusagung gottis, wort des newen testaments und gehoren auch yns newe testament." B. A. II, 14. Luther often uses the word "promise" in referring to the gospel, especially in reference to the gospel as found in the Old Testament.

6. W. A. XVIII, 692. "Nam in novo testamento praedicatur Evangelion, quod est aliud nihil, quam sermo, quo offertur spiritus et gratia in remissionem peccatorum per Christum crucifixum pro nobis impretratam, iaque totum gratis solaque misericordia Dei patris nobis indignis et damnationem merentibus potius quam aliud aliud, favente."
7. W. A. LVI, 169 (Schol., Rom. 1: 3,4).
10. W. A. L, 240 (Schmalkaldische Artikel, 1538). These quotations should illustrate the point of A. Harnack: "Where Luther, undisturbed by any shibboleth, gave expression to what was really his own Christianity, he never reflected on the gospel 'in itself'—that was for him a Jewish or heathenish reflection, similar to the reflection on God 'in Himself', atonement 'in itself', faith 'in itself'—but he kept in view the gospel together with its effects." History of Dogma VII, 204-5. Loofs, Doxengeschichte, 714.
12. "Hic est Ihesus Christus crucifixus, caput omnium sanctorum princeps omnium patientium... Huius agni sanguis in limine signatus arcet percussorem angelum... Hoc est lignum, quod Moses iussus est mittere in aquas Marath, id est amaras passionem, et dulces factae sunt. Nihil est quod haec passionis non dulcor etiam mortem..." W. A. VI, 117 (Tessaradecas, 1520).
13. W. A. XVIII, 683 (De servo arbitrio, 1525).
15. "Hoc est, lex facit nos peccatores, peccatum facit nos reos mortis. Quis haec duo vicit? Nostra iustitia? nostra vita? non, sed Iesus Christus a morte resurgens, peccatum et mortem damnans, suam iustitiam nobis impartiens, sua merita nobis donans, suum manum super nos ponens, et bene habemus, et legem implenimus, et peccatum mortemque superamus." W. A. VI, 133 (Tessaradescaes, 1520). "Das gesetz gebaut und foddert von uns was wir thuen sollen...Das Evangelion aber prediget nicht was wir thuen oder lassen sollen, foddert nichts von uns, sondern wendet es umb, thut das widderspiel und sagt nicht: thue dis, thue das, sondern heyst uns nur die schoes her-halten und nemen und spricht: Sihe lieber mensch, das hat dir Gott gethan, etc." W. A. XXIV, 4 (Uber das 1. Buch Mose. Predigten, 1527). "das Gesetz ist zwar ein Gesetz des lebens, Gerechtigkeit und alles guten, so durch Mosen gegeben ist, aber durch Christum ist etwas mehr geschehen, der komet und tullt den ledigen Beutel und leere Hand und bringet, was das Gesetze lert und von uns erfoddert...Derdhalben so sollen wir diesen herrlichen unterscheid des Gesetzes und gnade wol lernen, das wir von einander das ampt Christi und Mosi, Mosen und Christum recht erkennen, das man einem jeglichen zueigene, was sein recht ampt und werck sey, auf das mans nicht in einander meng." W. A. XLVI, 661, 663 (Auslegung 1. und 2. Kapitels Johannis, 1537-38).


17. W. A. XL, 1, 140. "Ipse plantaverat puram doctrinam Evangelii...Evangelium autem talis doctrina est quae quiddam sublimius docet...hanc salutis et vitae aeternae doctrinam." Ibid. 52-3.

18. Ibid. 141.

19. Harnack, History of Dogma VII, 175. Luther, of course, supported the ancient symbols but he did not look upon them as the means by which salvation comes; some of the later Lutheran dogmatists tended to fall into the error of saying that salvation comes by dogmatic consistency.

20. W. A. XL, 1, 142 (1531).


22. Ibid. 64.

23. Ibid. 66.
24. "wenn ein sterbender Mann sein Gut bescheidet, nach seinem Tode den benannten Erben auszuteilen: also hat auch Christus vor seinem Sterben befohlen und beschieden, solches Evangelium nach seinem Tode auszurufen in alle Welt, und damit allen die da glauben, zu eigen gegeben alles sein Gut, das ist, sein Leben, damit er den Tod verschlingen, seine Gerechtigkeit, damit er die Sünde vertilget, und seine Seligkeit, damit er die ewige Verdammniss überwunden hat." H. A. X, 65. Christ alone has fulfilled the law and has thereby become Master over it: W. A. TR VI, 146. As Christ takes on our sin and subjection, so we take on his righteousness and dominion: "Therefore, dear brother, learn Christ and him crucified. Praise and laud His name, and despairing of self, say to him, 'Thou, Lord Jesus, art my righteousness, but I am Thy sin. Thou hast taken what is mine, and given me what is Thine. Thou hast assumed that which Thou wert not, and given me what I had not.' " Currie, Letters of Martin Luther, 5 (To George Spenlein, April 7, 1516). The gospel is the announcement of these facts and thereby itself becomes one agent by which the devil's kingdom is demolished: "Deinde per Evangelii doctrinam conculcatur quoque diabolus, destruitur eius Regnum, eripitur ei Lex, peccatum et mori (quibus ceu potentissimis et invictissimis Tyrannis universum genus humanum suo imperio subjugavit). Denique transferuntur sui captivi e Regno tenebrarum et servitutis in Regnum lucis et libertatis." W. A. XL, 1, 53.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid. 67. Luther is protesting the interpretation of the relation of Christ and the law made by Roman theology and still maintained in that tradition: "Christ is the author of the New Law...When the Gospel had been duly promulgated the civil and ceremonial precepts of the Law of Moses became not only useless, but false and superstitious, and thus forbidden. It was otherwise with the moral precepts of the Mosaic Law. The Master expressly taught that the observance of these, inasmuch as they are prescribed by nature herself, is necessary for salvation." Catholic Encyclopedia IX, 71. See also Adam, Spirit of Catholicism, 77ff., whose opinion is that Christ came to religiously deepen the demands of the Old Testament. In contrast to this position, C.H. Dodd (who cannot be suspected of holding a brief for Luther) says: "The Christian religion has its centre in the Gospel...This Gospel was embodied in the apostolic 'kerygma'...To men whose lives are spoiled and enslaved by sin, the divine 'agape' is known as power to forgive, heal and renew. Hence the Gospel of the glory of God comes to us as a Gospel of salvation." The Gospel and the Law of Christ, 5-7.

29. W. A. I, 104-6. In his earlier writings Luther still maintains the official Roman position and speaks of the gospel as the new law of Christ: "Lex Christi, lex pacis, lex gratiae, evangelium, vocatur multis nominibus aliis ut 'via domini'...Hoc videndum: Sine dubio ideo qui iudicet et justificet credentem ei." W. A. III, 462 (Dictata super Psalterium, 1514-16). "Lex autem spiritualiter intellecta est idem cum evangelio." Ibid. 96 (Marg. Gloss, Ps. 10). But Luther's views were changing and in the sermon quoted above he says: "Multi enim vocant Evangelium praecepta vivendi in nova lege. Quibus fit impossibile, ut Apostolum Paulum intelligant, qui sicut et Christus proprie accipit 'Evangelium'." W. A. I, 105.

30. W. A. I, 113 (Sermo in die S. Thomae, Dec. 21, 1516). Watson presents this "double-office" of the gospel as Luther's mature view; this seems to me to be extremely doubtful. He used such terminology in his early theological writings but later he drew a sharper distinction between the office of the law and the office of the gospel. When Luther uses these terms in the strict sense which he later gave them, they do not overlap in their functions, even though they may be complementary. Watson, Let God Be God, 156ff.

31. "Ex quidem gloria ac divina opera et beneficia sunt, sed non propria Christi. Nam Prophetae ducuerunt etiam legem, et miracula aediderunt. Christus vero est Deus et homo, qui pugnans cum lege passus est extremam ipsius saevitiam ac tyrannidem...Quare Christi verum et proprium officium est, luctari cum lege, peccato et morte totius mundi...Itaque particularia beneficia Christi sunt legem docere et miracula aedere, propter quae praecipue non venit. Nam Prophetae et praecipue Apostoli maiora miracula fecerunt quam Christus ipse." W. A. XL, 1, 569.

32. "Ob Gottes Zorn oder Gottes Gütte sie hervorruft, macht keinen Unterschied. Alles (Dekalog oder Evangelium) was uns die Sünde zeigt, ist Gesetze...Christus als einer, der zur Buße der Sündenerkenntnis führt hat mit dem Evangelium noch nichts zu tun." Müller, Erfahrung und Glaube bei Luther, 52.

33. W.A. XL, 1, 568 (1531). "Haecl prorsus aliena sunt a doctrina Papistarum, qui Christum fecerunt legislatorum, et Mose seueriorum. Paulus hic omnino contrarium docet...Habuit ergo Christus se ad legem passive, non active. Non est igitur legislator et iudex secundum legem, sed in eo, dum fecit se servum legis, factus est noster redemptor a lege." Ibid.
The teaching of Christ as judge and the new lawgiver was one of the chief sources of Luther's "Anfechtung" in the monastery: "Und wir alle haben im Papstthumb also geblaubet, und auch also geprediget und gelehret und furgegeben: Wie, wenn Christus nicht mehr dein Heiland ware? Drumb suche einen ander, denn Christus ist nun dein Richter worden... In Klostern hatten wir genug zu essen und zu trinken, aber do hatten wir Leiden und Marter am Herzen und Gewissen, und der Seelen Leiden ist das allergrösste. Ich bin c't fur dem Namen Jesu erschrocken, und wenn ich ihnen anblickte am Kreuz, so dunkte mich, er war mir als ein Blitz, und wenn sein Name genannt wurde, so hatte ich lieber den Teufel horen nennen, denn ich gedachte, ich musste so lange gute Werk thun, bis Christus mir där durch zum Freunde und genadig gemacht wurde." Scheel, Dokumente, 24-5 (Aus den Predigten über Matth. 18-24, 1559). Luther testifies that it was through the discovery of the meaning of the gospel that he found relief from his spiritual tribulation: "Ego ipse nisi liberatus fuissem consolations Christi! per evangelium." Ibid. 22 (Enarr. in £en., ca. 1540). One may discount this somewhat to the failing memory of an elderly man but he could hardly have forgotten the central outlines of his spiritual experience in the monastery; one of the main elements in that experience apparently had been his sense of dread at the thought of Christ, the lawgiver, and the relief which he ultimately found through a new insight into the nature of the gospel. So deeply had his early religious training impressed him, however, that even in his Commentary on Galatians of 1535 he still refers to it, as though looking back on a bad dream that cannot be erased from the memory, and says that the doctrine has entered his bones like oil: "Adeo ista doctrina est pestilens opinio de Christo legislatore intravit ut oleum in ossa mea." W. A. XL, 1, 298.

34. W. A. XL, 1, 141-2: "Euangelium est nosse Iesum Christum... Christus est objectum, ipsa res comprehensa per fidem, opus divinum mihi donatum quod mea fide apprehenditur, et hoc sol mich Evangelium leren. Hoc autem genus doctrinae non discitur, docetur, indicatur per hominem, legem, sed per deum, externo verbo; deinde intus revelat spiritus per suum donum."

35. "Hoc sane verum est, in omni promissione sua deus fere solitus est adiicere signum aliquod, ceu monumentum, ceu memoriale promissionis sua, quo fidelius servaretur, et efficacius moneret... Talia multa legimus signa promissionum dei in scripturis... Ex quibus intelligimus, in qualibet promissione dei duo proponi, verbum et signum, ut verbum intelligamus esse testamentum, signum vero esse sacramentum." W. A. VI, 517-8 (De captivitate Babylonica ecclesiae praeludium, 1520).

36. Ibid. 572. It is significant that in this same passage Luther says that the whole Scripture is divided into commandments and
and promises and that they together are to lead us to faith. This is the familiar division of law and gospel and his sacramental theory fits directly into that framework: "cum tota scriptura hoc agat, ut nos ad fidem provocet, hinc praeceptis et minis urgens, illinc promissionibus et consolationibus suis, promissa exaltant humiliatos remissionibus suis. Proprie tamen ea sacramenta vocari visum est, quae annexis signis promissa sunt. Caetera, qui signis alligata non sunt, nuda promissa sunt." W. A. VI, 572.

37. "Quo fit, ut, si rigide loqui volumus, tantum duo sunt in Ecclesia dei sacramenta, Baptismus et panis, cum in his solis et institutum divinitus signum et promissionem remissionis peccatorum videamus." Ibid. Speaking even more exactly, Luther says that there is really only one sacrament and three sacramental signs: "neganda mihi sunt septem sacramenta, et tantum tria pro tempore ponenda, Baptismus, Poenitentia, Panis...Quanquam, si usu scripturae loqui velim, non nisi unum sacramentum habeam, et tria signa sacramentalia." Ibid. 501. Here he includes Penance, though he later tends to exclude it as a sacrament proper.

38. "Nam poenitentiae sacramentum, quod ego his duobus accensui, signo visibili et divinitus instituto caret, et alid non esse dixi, quam via ac reitum ad baptismum." Ibid. 572. "Und hie sihestu das die Tauffe beyde mit yhrer krafft und deutunge, begriffst auch das dritte Sacrament, welchs man gennet hat die Busse, a Is die eigentlich nicht anders ist, denn die Tauffe. Denn was heisset busse anders, den den alten menschen mit ernst angreiffen, und yn ein newes leben tretten?" W. A. XXX, 1, 221 (Der grosse Katechismus, 1529).

39. Anbeten des Sacraments des heiligen Leichnams Christi (1523) W. A. XI, 417ff. In this treatise Luther discusses the manner of the presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper; against the discussions of the Bohemian Brethren over the way in which the Trinity in found in the bread and wine, Luther says that such questions merely pry into the hidden mystery of God and should be avoided. In a letter to Speratus on the Waldensian views of "concomitance", Luther says that faith is satisfied with the knowledge of the body of Christ under the bread, and the blood under the wine, living and reigning: "Quomodo autem concomitantur ibi sanguis, humanitas, deltas, pili, ossa, cutis sint, cum non sint necessaria sciri, quid opus est fatigari? Fides ex his rebus et verbis neque docetur neque augetur, sed scrupuli seruntur, et dissensiones: fides non vult plus nosse, quam sub pane esse corpus Christi, sub vino sanguinem Christi viventis et regnantis: in hac simplicitate perseverat, contentis quaeestionibus curiosis." As to the form of the presence, he can
only say it is there and not how: "corpus et sanguinem Christi ibi esse, qui adorandus est. Hoc sufficit concomitantiam dici. Qui vero scrutari volent quomodo deitas ibi comprehendatur concomitans, hos argu et stulte curiosos et carnalibus phantasmatibus in mysteria Dei ruentes, quo eos serves in simplicitate fidei et in pura sacramenti cognitio."

Adoration of the presence may or may not be practiced by the believer in his worship: "dico: liberum esse, Christum adorari et invocari sub sacramento, neque enim peccat, qui non adorat, neque peccat, qui adorat." De Wette, Briefe II, 208ff. (June 13, 1522). In the Anbeten des Sakraments des heiligen Leichnams Christi and De captivitate Babylonica Luther stresses that the important thing in the sacrament is the word of promise; it is this that makes the sacrament a source of life and salvation. The presence of Christ in the elements makes the signs peculiarly exalted but the promise of the gospel is the real blessing, because it means forgiveness of sins and redemption: "Recta itaque dixi, totam virtutem Missae conocietur in verbis Christi, quibus testatur, remissionem peccatorum donari omnibus, qui credunt, corpus eius tradi, et sanguinem eius fundi, pro se." W. A. VI, 517


42. "Sicut vel unus locus comminationis ex scriptura omnem obruat et obnubilat consolationes adeo omnia interiora nostra concomitant, ut plane obliviscamus causae iustificationis gratiae, Christi et Evangelii...Resistit insuper spiritui caro quae non potest certo statuere promissa Dei vera esse." W. A. XL, 1, 129. "Arduum est enim et divinae gratiae virtus, deum credere exaltorem capitis et coronatorum in media morte et inferis. Hic enim abscondita est exaltatio, et par est non
nisi desperatio et nulla salus in deo." W. A. V, 84 (Operationes in Psalms, 1519). "Iam duo sunt, quae solent nos tentare, ne fructus missae percipiamus. Alterum est, nos esse peccatores et dignos prae nimia vilitate rebus tantis. Alterum, etiam si digni essessemus, magnitudo tamen rerum tanta est, ut natura puellaminiis non audeat, oportet, ut verbum Christi apprehendamus, ipsumque multo fortius intuearis, quam has cognitiones infirmitatis tuae." W. A. VI, 519.

43. "Talis est enim uniuscuiusque pia conscientia, quantumlibet innocens, ibi culpam timere, ubi culpa non est. Timor dei facit hoc et judicii eius inscrutabilis altitudo." W. A. V, 220.

44. W. A. LII, 578. "Sed difficillimum est, ut Tu qui indignum te iudicas hac Gratia, ex corde dicas et credas Christum traditum pro tua multa et magnis peccatis." W. A. XL, 1, 86.


47. Schneider, Luthers kl. Katechismus, 42.

48. W. A. VI, 529. "Simul vides, quam periculosum imo falso sit, opinari, poenitentiam esse secundam tabulam post naufragium, et quam perniciosus sit error, putare, pr peccatum excidisse vim baptismi, et navem hanc esse illiam." The Council of Trent (Session XIV, November 1551) condemned and anathematized these propositions: "1. That penance is not truly and properly a sacrament of the Catholic Church, instituted for the faithful by Christ our Lord, for their reconciliation to God whenever they fall into sin after baptism. 2. That baptism itself is the sacrament of penance (as if there were not two distinct sacraments) and that therefore it is not right to call penance the 'second plank after shipwreck.' " Betterson, Documents of the Christian Church, 369.

49. "Ita de missa contigit, quae impiorum hominum doctrina mutata est in opus bonum, quod ipsi vocant opus operatum...Ine processum est ad extremum insaniae, ut, quia Missam ex vi operis
operis operati valere mentiti sunt." W. A. VI, 520. The theory of "opus operatum" is that even without the faith of the recipient the blessing of the sacrament is bestowed. Jacobs, Hol. Ed. I, 55f. Luther strikes against this by saying that the Mass is not a "good work" but a promise or testament, which obviously can only be accepted as a gift and legacy: "Audisti enim, Missam aliud non esse, quam promissione, divinam seu testamentum Christi, sacramento corporis et sanguiinis sui commendatum, quod verum est, intelligis. Non possum esse opus ullo modo, nec quicquam in ipso fieri, nec alio studio a quoquam tractari, quae sola fides; fides autem non est opus, sed magistra et vita operum. Quis enim est uspiam tarn insanus, ut promissionem acceptam, aut testamentum donatam, vocet opus bonum, quod suo testator faciat accipiens?" W. A. VI, 520. In the same way, Baptism is simply a promise to be accepted by faith: "Primum itaque in Baptismo observanda est divina promissio...Quae promissio praefertur incomparabiliter universis pompis operum, votorum, religionum, et quicquid humanitus est introductum." Ibid. 527. It is not the sacrament, but faith in the sacrament which justifies: "Ine proverbium illud: non sacramentum, sed fides sacramenti iustificat. Ita baptismus neminem iustificat, nec uili prodest, sed fides in verbum promissionis, cui additur baptismus, haec enim iustificat, et implet id." Ibid. 532-3.

50. "Also seiheust klar, das da kein werck ist von uns gethan, sondern ein sachtz den er uns gibt, und der glaube ergriffet. So wol als der HERR Christus am creutz, nicht ein werck ist, sondern ein sachtz am wort gefasset und uns gewalt, das sie wider uns schreuyen, als predigen wir wider den glauben. So wir doch alleine darrauff treiben, als der so notig dazu ist, das ons yhn nicht empfangen noch genossen, mag werden." W. A. XXX, 1, 216. The accusation against which Luther is defending himself, namely that he has abandoned his principle of the primacy of faith, is one that is still leveled against him by the theological descendants of the Free Spirit sects, but unfortunately with as little real understanding of his thought as his original antagonists showed. Coutts, for instance, accuses Luther of a "sacramentarianism which restored the formalism and mysterious opus operatum of the Middle Ages." Hans Denck, 138.

51. W. A. XXX, 1, 214-5.

52. Ibid. 214.

53. Ibid.

54. "Wo aber Gottes name ist, da muss auch leben und seligkeit sein, das es wol ein Gottlich, selig, fruchtbarelich und gnadenreich wasser heisset." Ibid. 215. Luther quotes
as partial justification for his position: "Darumb ist es nicht allein ein naturlich wasser, sondern ein Gotlich, hymnisch, heilig und selig wasser...Daher hat es auch sein wesen, das es ein Sacrament heisset, wie auch S. Augustinus geleret hat, Accedat verbum ad elemenum, et fit sacramentum." W. A. XXX, 1, 214. This in itself might be taken as an indication that Luther was reverting to medieval dogma in reaction against the attacks of the Anabaptists. It is to be seen, however, that though he does hold to a mysterious union between the element and the Word (as in the Lord's Supper) he does not emphasize this but uses it as a defense of the validity of the signs; their efficacy still depends on the faith of the recipient.

55. Ibid. 216.

56. W. A. VI, 516-7. "Neque enim deus (ut dixi) a liter cum hominibus unquam eget aut agit, quam verbo promissionis. Rursus, nec nos cum deo unquam agere aliter possimus, quam fide in verbum promissionis eius..."

57. In his brief summary of his views in the Short Catechism, Luther stresses both the Word and faith: "Wie kan wasser solche grosse thing thun? Antwort: Wasser thut freilich nicht, Sondern das wort Gottes, so mit und by dem wasser ist, und der glaube, so solchem wort Gottes jm wasser trawet." Schneider, Luthers kl. Katechismus, 43. W. A. VI,

58. "Quia vero unquam fuit tam demens, ut baptismum duceret esse bonum opus?" W. A. VI, 527. "Benedictus deus et pater domini nostri Iesu Christi...so scilicet consilio usus, quod parvulos, qui avaritia et superstitionis capaces non sunt, eo voluit initiari, et simplicissime fide verbi sui sanctificari...Nam, si adultis et maioribus donandum esset hoc sacramentum." Ibid. 526. Nevertheless, every man must stand for himself where the promises of God are involved: "Stet ergo insuperabilla veritas; ubi promissio divina est, ibi unusquisque pro se stat, su fides exigitur, quisque pro se rationem reddet, et suum onus portabit." Ibid. 521. How does this then apply to infants who are baptized? On one side, Luther must defend himself against the charge that he is making the sacrament an "efficacious" work not needing faith and on the other, that he is destroying the foundations of infant Baptism: "Opponetur forsitans iis, quae dicta sunt, baptismus parvulorum, qui promissionem dei non capiant, nec fide baptismi habere possunt, ideoque aut non requiri fideam, aut parvulos frustra baptisari." W. A. VI, 558. It has also been claimed that Luther defended infant Baptism "for the safeguarding of the State Church", and that "infant baptism became the opus operatum of regeneration." Coutts, Hans Denck, 193-5.
Luther uses various arguments to justify the practice of infant Baptism. In *De captivitate Babylonica* he maintains his view that faith is necessary to make Baptism efficacious; this qualification is met by infants, says Luther, through the faith of others—their sponsors' and the congregation's through its prayers: "Hic dico, quod omnes dicunt, fide alia parsulius succurri, illorum, qui offerunt...ita per orationem Ecclesiae offerentis et credentis." W. A. VI, 538.

In other writings Luther rejects the idea of the Bohemian Brethren that children are baptized on the basis of a future faith which they will reveal. He even appeals to the continuous tradition of the Church to justify the baptizing of infants. In a letter to Melanchthon (Jan. 13, 1522) Luther asks whether it can be proved that children do not have real faith; could it not be, he says, that God preserves the faith of children through their childhood as ours is preserved during a long sleep? "Quomodo enim probabunt, eos non credere? At quod non loquantur et ostendunt fidem, pulchre. Hac ratione quot horis et nos Christiani erimus, dum dormimus et alia facimus? Annon ergo eodem modo potest Deus tota infantiae tempore, eo continuo somno, fidem in illis servare?" De Wette, *Briefe II*, 126.

He brings out the further argument that an adult is able to have even less faith than an infant because human reason, wisdom and experience stand in the way: "Apud me nihil differt per verbum converti adultum et parvulum, imo in adulto plus est rebellio contra verbum, puta rationem, sapientiam, experientiam, etc." Ibid. 202 (To Spalatin, May 29, 1522). In *Der grosse Katechismus*, appended to the section on Baptism, there is a discussion of infant Baptism; this, it seems to me, represents Luther's mature view on the subject, though he is stressing one side of the argument against the Anabaptists. His three points are:

1. The existence of the Christian Church shows that God has, in fact, bestowed the gift of the Holy Spirit on those who have been baptized as children: "Die ist fast die beste und sterckste beweisung fur die einfaltigen und ungelerten; Denn man wird uns diesen Artikel: Ich glaube eine heilige Christliche kyrche, die gemeins der heiligen etc., nicht nemen noch umbestossen." W. A. XXX, 1, 218. It will be seen that Luther is not reverting to the appeal to authority of tradition itself, but he is appealing to the empirical fact of the existence of the Church and the gifts of the Holy Spirit among its members, as a demonstration of the effectiveness of infant Baptism. 2. He makes the affirmation that children really do have faith (even if we are not able to verify the fact) and we bring them to Baptism confident that God will give them faith: "Also siheu, das der Rotten-geist einrede nichts taug. Denn wie gesagt, wenn gleich die kinder nicht glaubten, welches doch nicht ist (als isst
bewiesen)... Also thun wir nu auch mit der Kindertauffe, das kind tragen wir erzu, der meinung und hoffnung, das es glauben gebe." W. A. XXX, 1, 219. 3. Finally, Luther simply appeals to the fact of the commandment of God as reason why infant Baptism should be practiced: "aber darauff teuffen wirs nicht, sondern allein darauff, das Gott befohlen hat." Ibid.

Most of Luther's writings on infant Baptism are polemical in nature, written against Anabaptist groups; they must be read with this fact in mind. Luther's general view of the sacraments, according to Troeltsch, is that they should be outward symbols of the pure gift of grace and the independence of the Christian gospel from all individualistic effort and achievement (as we have seen); the Anabaptists represented a legalistic theory: "Die Spät- und Wiedertauf e dagegen ist das Symbol der Gesetzlichkeit und der Sekte, die Gemeinschaft und Heil auf die personliche subjektive Leistung begründet." Ges. Schr. I, 455. In the heat of some of his disputes with the Sectarians, Luther sometimes did not step carefully enough not to throw some doubt as to whether he had repudiated his original principle that a sacrament is not in itself efficacious. Nevertheless, his insistence on proving the existence of real faith in the children who are baptized, shows that he still paid at least lip-service to his original views. That this is more than lip-service, however, is seen in some of his more ironic writings. For instance, in a letter to Nicolas Hausman (Feb. 8, 1534) he gives "a simple exposition of the subject. The prerogatives of baptism are these: The sacred water is administered according to God's Word, and is not of man's invention—that it is a fresh covenant between God and the nations, to their everlasting salvation, and is God's work, and therefore cannot be sullied by any sin on the part of the dispenser. That there is one baptism, which must be appropriated through faith to be efficacious, and dare not be repeated, except through a blasphemous denial of the first ceremony, cannot be denied. It must accompany us through life, adorning the walk with the fruits of faith, thus surpassing all vows and works of any kind, even preceding obedience to parents and guardians." Currie, Letters of Martin Luther, 296-7. This gives every indication that the central principles which he affirmed in 1520 as seen in De captivitate Babylonica, for instance, are still being maintained intact, in spite of the long years of violent controversy which had intervened.


61. "Die bedeutung iat ein seliglich sterben der sund und aufsertheung yn gnaden gottis, das der alt mensch, der yn sunden empfangen wirt und geporen, do ersauss wirt, und ein neuer mensch erausz geht und auff steht, yn gnaden geporen... Die bedeutung und sterben odder ersauffen der sund, geschicht nit vollkommen, yn dissem leben, biss der mensch auch leyplich sterb und gantz vorwesse zu pulver. Das sacrament odder tzeychen der tauff iat bald geschechen, wie wir vor augen sehen, aber die bedeutung, die geystliche tauff, die ersauffung, weret die weyl wir leben, und wirt aller ernst yn tod volbracht, da wirt der mensch recht yn die tauff geschenkt, unnd geschicht, was die tauff bedeut. Drumb ist disse gantz leben nit anders den eyn geystlich tauffen an unterlass biss yn denn todt." W. A. II, 727-8. "Quicquid enim vivimus, Baptismus esse debet, et signum seu sacramentum baptismi implore, cum a caeteris omnibus liberati uni tantum baptismo simus addici, id est, morti et resurrectioni." W. A. VI, 535. "Darumb hat ein yglichar Christen sein lebenlang gnug zulernen und zu uben an der Tauffe, denn er hat ymmerdar zuszaffen, das er festiglich gleube, was sie zusagt und bringet, überwindung des Teuffels und tods, vergebung der sunde, Gottes gnade, den gantzen Christum und Heiligen geist mit seinen gaben." W. A. XXX, 1, 217.

62. "die bedeutung die geystlich geburt, die mehrung der gnaden und gerechtigkeit, hebt woll an yn der tauff, weret aber auch biss yn den tod, ya biss an jungsten tag." W. A. II, 728. "ist also das sacraments ist noch nit gar geschehen, das ist, der todt und auffertheung am Jungsten tag ist noch vorhanden." Ibid. 730.

63. W. A. VI, 534.

64. "Hic iterum vides, Baptismi sacramentum, etiam quo ad signum non esse momentaneum aliquod negotium, sed perpetuum." Ibid. Some had been misled into thinking that Baptism was to release a Christian from all sins; this, however, says Luther, is not the promise. It is to release man from his sins completely but only sacramentally; in this world of sin even the Christian is still burdened by sins: "Eynn mensch, soo es auss der tauff
krept, sey reyn und an sund gantz unschuldig, aber es wirt von vielen nit recht vorstanden; die maynen, es sey gar keyn sund mehr da, und werden faull und hynlessig, die sundlich natur zu toden, gleich wie auch etlich thun, wan sie peycht haben: Drumb, wie oben gesagt ist, soll man es recht vorstehn und wissen, das unser fleysch, die weyl es yhe lebt, naturlich boss und sundhafftig ist." W. A. II, 729. Luther does believe, nevertheless, that a Christian will actually begin to grow in purity and innocence through the power of God: "angefangen, reyn und unschuldig zu werden." Ibid. 730. "Morimur inquam non tantum affectu et spiritualiter, quo peccatis et vanitatis mundi renunciamus, sed revera, vitam hanc corporalem incipimus relinquere, et futuram vitam apprehendere, ut sit res lis (quod dicunt) et corporalis quoque transitus ex hoc mundo ad patrem." W. A. VI, 534. Luther should not be accused, therefore, of completely separating our "actual" from our "sacramental" righteousness; the sacrament of Baptism confers righteousness and the power to become righteous.

65. W. A. VI, 535.

66. Baptism is not to be considered the fundamental sacrament merely because it is temporally the first one; its primacy is also due to its character of being a pure promise and gift representing the whole life in Christ: "Semper enim manet veritas promissio semel factae, nos extensa manu susceptura reversae. Atque id, ni fallor, volunt, qui obscure dicunt, Baptismum esse primum et fundamentum omnium sacramentorum, sine quo nullum queat aliorum obtineri." W. A. VI, 528.

67. Schneider, Luthers kl. Katechismus, 44. Coutts, for instance, has apparently interpreted Luther in this way: "Luther...gave them...a legalism which found expression in his Shorter Catechism, and constituted a Code of Morals which had all the authority of Divine Law." Hans Denck, 138.

68. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 89. If Dodd's interpretation of Paul's teaching on Baptism in Romans 6: 1-14 is correct, Luther has been remarkably true to Paul's thought in developing his own sacramental theory—a fact of which Luther himself was quite confident.

69. Schneider, Luthers kl. Katechismus, 44.

70. Ibid. 56-7.

71. W. A. XXX, 1, 224. "Denn umb der person odder unglæbens willen, wird das wort nicht falsch, dadurch es sein Sacrament worden und eingesetzt ist...Denn auff den worten steht alle unser grund;
schutz und wehre widder alle yrthumb und verfurung, so yhe komen sind, odder noch komen mogen." W. A. XXX, 1, 224.

72. W. A. XXX, 1, 226.


74. Ibid. 230.


76. W. A. VI, 525.

77. Luther is speaking against the Roman doctrine that the Mass is a real sacrifice of the Lamb of God, and, therefore, a good work irrespective of the faith of the dispenser or the recipient. "As often as the commemoration of this victim is celebrated, the work of our Redemption is performed." Roman Missal: Secret, IX Sunday after Pentecost; Pope Pius XII, Christian Worship (Encyclical Letter: Mediator Dei), 40. This is opposed by Luther in De captivitate Babylonica, for instance: "Ita de missa contigit, quae impiorum hominum doctrina mutata est in opus bonum, quod ipsi vocant opus operatum." W. A. VI, 520. He also discusses it in "von dem dritten gepot" in Von den guten Werken (1520): W. A. VI, 229ff.

78. W. A. XXX, 1, 225.

79. Ibid. "Auss dem allen ists nu clar, das syss heylig sacrament, sey nit anders, dan eyn göttlich tsychen, darymne zu gesagt, gebe, un zu gesygent wirt Christ un alle heyligen mit allen
yhren wercken leyden, vordiensten, gnaden un guttern zu trotz und sterck allen, die yn engsten und betrubniss seyn, vorvol-get, vom teuffell, sunden, welt, fleysch und allen ubell, und das sacrament empfahen, sey nit anders, dan dasselben alls be-geren und glauben festlichig, es gescheh al.so." W. A. II, 749. "Der ein ein solchen glauben stat, der gehort hieher und nimpt das sacrament als zu einer sicherung oder sigel oder verzeichung, das er der gotliche versprechung und zu-sagung gewiss sey." W. A. X, 3, 51-2 (Predigten, 1522).

80. W. A. XXX, 1, 225.

81. It is only those who are convinced of their sins (those in whom the law has done its proper work) who are properly prepared for the Mass: "Concludimus ex omnibus his, quibus nam Missa sit parata, et qui digné communicent. Nempe, soli ii, qui tristes, afflictas, perturbas, confusas et erroneas ha-bent conscientias. Nam, verbum divinae promissionis huius sacramenti cum exhibeat peccatorum suorum vexatur sive mor-su, sive titillatione." W. A. VI, 526.

82. Goutts, Hans Denck, 192-3.


84. W. A. XXX, 1, 223.

85. "donec in profundum venerint, et de transsubstantiatione, aliisque infinitis metaphysica nugis." W. A. VI, 515. Luther points to Aristotelian philosophy as the source of the doc-trine: "Sed et Ecclesia ultra mille ducentos annos recte cre-didit, nec usquam nec unquam de ista transsubstantiatione (portentoso scilicet vocabulo et somnio) meminerunt sancti patres, donec cepit Aristotelis simulata philosophia in Ecc-esia grassari." W. A. VI, 509. Luther was not far off the mark in this analysis: "In its technical sense transub-stantiation denotes a doctrine which is based on the Aristo-telean philosophy as taught by the schoolmen, according to which a physical object consists of 'accidents', the proper-ties perceptible to the senses, and an underlying 'substance' in which the accidents inhere, and which gives to the object its essential nature. According to the doctrine of transub-stantiation, the accidents of bread and wine remain after consecration, but their substance is changed into that of
the body and blood of Christ." Bettenson, *Documents of the Christian Church*, 207. Bettenson gives an excellent summary of the history of the doctrine: Ibid. 205f. See also Gavin, *Liturgy and Worship*, 113ff. Even in medieval times the doctrine was suspect by certain groups, who "followed in the main the earlier views of St. Augustine and the theology of the primitive Roman Liturgy." Ibid. 121.


87. After arguing some of the subtleties of Aristotelian philosophy on the relation of accidents and substance, Luther rejoices that the common people aren't touched by this kind of disputation: "Et plane gaudeo, saltem apud vulgum relictum esse simplicem fidem sacramenti huius. Nam, ut non capiunt, ita nec disputant, an accidentia ibi sint sine substantia, sed simplici fide Christi corpus et sanguinem veraciter ibi contineri credunt, dato ociosis illis negotio, de eo, quod continet, disputandi...Quid hic dicamus? quando Aristotelem et humanas doctrinas facimus tam sublimium et divinarum rerum censores? Our non explosa ista curiositate, in verbis Christi simpliciter haeremus, parati ignorare, quicquid ibi fiat, contentique verum corpus Christi virtute verborum illic adesse? An est necesse, modos operationis divinae omnino comprehenderes? " W. A. VI, 510. The reasons for Luther's dislike of the doctrine of transubstantiation should be kept in mind when one is trying to understand his position in the later sacramentarian controversies on the question of the real presence. Both the Sacramentarians and the Roman Catholics tried to explain—or explain away—the real presence in terms of philosophical reasoning; both attempts were equally obnoxious to Luther, who felt that this was a matter which could only be rightly apprehended by faith, just as the other mysteries of the Christian faith such as predestination, the Incarnation, the attributes of God, etc. "Das Sacrament ist nur als Wunder Gottes zu erfassen." Dietz in *Vom heiligen Abendmahl*, 85.


89. "Hier will vonndten sein, dass ihr euer Herz und Gewissen wohl verstanden und einen grossen Unterschied machet zwischen dem auserlichen Empfang und dem innerlichen und geistlichen Empfang. Der leibliche und auserliche Empfang ist der, wenn
ein Mensch den Leichnam Christi und sein Blut mit seinem Munde empfanget; und solcher Empfang kann wohl ohn Glauben und Liebe geschehen von allen Menschen. Das macht aber keinen Christenmenschen nit. Ja, wenn das einen Christen machte, so wäre die Maus auch ein Christ; denn sie kann das Brot auch essen, kann auch wohl aus dem Kelch trinken. Ei, das ist ein schlecht Ding. Aber der innerliche, geistliche, rechte Empfang ist ganz ein ander Ding; denn er steht in der Ubung, Gebrauch und Früchten." Vom heiligen Abendmahl, 20 (Sermon, gepredigt am Freitag nach Invocavit, 1522).

W. A. X, 3, 48ff.

Luther is attacking the ideas of Sod which would think of Him in a "local" heaven. God is indeed everywhere, says Luther, and Christ as part of the God-head is everywhere. Why then not partake of His body in a wine-house? God is omnipresent but He is where He chooses to be: W. A. XXIII, 135ff., 149, 151ff. Brilioth says of this "doctrine of Ubiquity" that it "was to become the corner-stone of Luther's eucharistic teaching." Combining the immanence emphasis of German mysticism with a Christocentric view of revelation, Luther brought forth his view that "Ubiquity is the omnipresence of the Incarnate God." In so doing, says Brilioth, he moved the doctrine of the real presence from mythology to religion. Eucharist Faith and Practice Evangelical and Catholic, 103ff.

For a full exposition of Luther's thought on the Lord's Supper as the "Incarnation of the Word": Sommerlath, Der Sinn des Abendmahls nach Luthers Gedanken über das Abendmahl 1527-29, 117ff. "Wir sehen im im tunckeln wort oder bild verhullet, nämlich ynn dem wort und Sacramenten, Das sind gleich als seine larven oder kleid, darunter er sich verbirgt." W. A. XLV, 522. The Incarnation played a tremendously important part in Luther's whole devotional life; this may be seen in some of his verses and songs:

"Merk auf, mein Herz, und sieh dort hin, 
Was liegt doch in dem Krippelin, 
Wes ist das schöne Kindelin? 
Es ist das liebe Jesulin 

.........................

Ach Herr, du Schöpfer aller Ding, 
Wie bist du worden so gering, 
Dass du da liegst auf dünrem Gras, 
Davon ein Rind und Esel ass." 

Martin Luthers Geistliche Lieder, 42f. (Ein Kinderlied auf die Weihnacht Christi, 1535). Luther's combination of wonder and joy at the mystery of Christmas is shown in The Martin Luther Christmas Book, translated and arranged by R. H. Bainton. This same sense of joy and wonder Luther brought with him to the
Holy Communion, which is again revealed in some of his songs:

"Gott sei gelobet und gebenedeiet,
Der uns selber hat gespeiset
Mit seinem Fleische und mit seinem Blute,
Das gib uns, Herr Gott, zu Gute.
Kyrieleison.
Herr, durch deinen heiligen Leichnam,
Der von deiner Mutter Maria kam,
Und das heilige Blut
Hilf uns, Herr, aus aller Not.
Kyrieleison."

Martin Luthers Geistliche Lieder, 30 (Der Gesang: Gott sei gelobet, 1524).

"Das wir nimmer des vergessen,
Gib er uns sein Leib zu essen,
Verborgen im Brot so klein,
Und zu trinken sein Blut im Wein."

Ibid. 29 (Das Lied S. Johannis Huss, gebessert, 1524).

It is Sommerlath's belief that Luther did not clarify his position on the relation between the Word and the Sacrament until 1527-29. Before that time, he seemed to view the Sacrament as a "help"—the staff of Jacob by which he crossed the Jordan, a lantern in the darkness of "Anfectung": "Das Wort ist alles, das Sakrament erscheint nur als eine besondere Form des Wortes." In this early theology, according to Sommerlath, the relationship between the Word and Sacrament is primarily a psychological one: "Es ist nicht Gnadenmittel sondern nur Erkenntnis mittel. Es ist selbst leer und es hat Wert nur im Hindeuten auf das, was es selbst nicht hat. Es ist fremder Wert, von dem es lebt, den es nur bekraftigt." Luther's Lehre von der Realpraesenz, 103ff. Sommerlath says that only in later years did Luther stress the Incarnation of the Word in the sacrament. The reason for this should be kept in mind, however; in his early theology he also spoke of the intimate relation of the Word and sacrament, even though he was loath to discuss the exact nature of the relation: "Ist es den von noten, dass wir die Art und Weise, wie Gott wirkt, vollig begreifen? Ich wenigsten, wenn ich nit begreifen kann, wie das Brot Christi Leib ist, bleibe einfaltig bei seinen Worten stehen und glaube festlich mit nit allein, dass Christi Leib im Brot sei, sondern dass das Brot Christi Leib sei. Der hl. Geist ist grisser als Aristoteles!" Von heiligen Abendmahl, 85. W. A. II, 201f.

92. "Das ist unsere Lehre, dass Brot und Wein nicht helfe, ja auch Leib und Blut in Brot und Wein nicht helfe. Ich will noch weiter reden: Christus am Kreuz mit all seinem Leiden und Tod hilft nichts, wenn's auch aufs drastigste, hitzigste, herzlichtete erkannt und bedacht wird. Es muss alles noch ein
Anderes da sein. Was denn? Das Wort, das Wort, das Wort tut! Denn ob Christus tausendmal für uns gegeben und gekreuzigt würde, wäre es alles umsonst, wenn nicht das Wort Gottes käme und teilte es aus und schenkte mirs und spräche: Das soll dein sein, nimm und habe dies!" Thiel, Luther II, 129. In the Sacramentarian controversy, however, Mackinnon thinks that Luther lapsed towards a "medieval materialism" and reverted "to the idea of inherent sacramental grace". Luther and the Reformation III, 312-3. This may have been the result of the exigency of the moment; certainly his later writings indicate that he never repudiated his position that faith is necessary to make the sacrament efficacious. Once again, Luther may be caught up on points which are not of fundamental importance to his central principles; Christ is really present but how we cannot know. Faith apprehends the benefits of the sacrament but how that benefit works within us is not of essential importance, nor should it become the subject of abstract speculations.

93. Schneider, Luther's kl. Katechismus, 57. Brilioth points out that Luther gave the term "Vergbung der sunden" a far wider and deeper meaning that it commonly has today. Eucharist Faith and Practice Evangelical and Catholic, 102-3.

94. Sommerlath shows the close harmony between Luther's view on the sacraments and the rest of his theology; for instance: "im Abendmahl wird die Schöpferkraft Gottes und seines Wortes eindrücklich und immer aufs neue erfahren." Luthers Lehre von der Realpräsenz, 320, 326ff. God is able to do as He wishes, says Luther: W. A. XXIII, 117. We men are not in a position to say what God may or may not be able to do.

95. Luther accuses Zwingli of tending towards Manichaeism: W. A. XXIII, 173. Brilioth speaks of Zwingli's position as characterized by a "harsh transcendence" and Lunn notes his "austere rationalism". Luther's deep appreciation for the mystery of the Incarnation influenced his whole sacramental theory. It also showed itself in his views of revelation. See for instance Baillie's discussion of "A Mediated Immediacy" in Our Knowledge of God and Luther's understanding of the relation between "Deus revelatus...Deus velatus...Deus absconditus" etc.: 189ff. The real presence is immediate but veiled in the sacrament; Zwingli had little sense of the "mystery", either in regard to the sacraments or to the Incarnation. As Baillie points out the terms "Deus absconditus" and "Deus revelatus" are not antithetical terms in Luther's thought, but correlative: Our Knowledge of God, 191; for this sort of paradox Zwingli had little taste. See, for instance, Luther's repudiation of the words of Philip in John 14: 8ff. as a typical example of a false theology which seeks to fly
directly to the divine majesty: W. A. XLV (Das XIV und XV Kapitel S. Johannis, 1537-38). Christ does indeed have all the attributes of God within Him: Gennrich, Die Christologie Luthers, 23-4; therefore, when we know Him we know both the "Deus absconditus" and the "Deus revelatus"—they are One in the "Deus incarnatus": Kugelgen, Luthers Auffassung der Gottheit Christi, 13-4. "Es ist ein Missverstandnis, wenn man den verborgenen Gott bei Luther als einen fremden, zornigen dem in Christo geoffenbarten Gott der Liebe entgegengesetzt. Denn der Deus revelatus (Offenbarte Gott) in Christo ist ja zugleich selber Deus absconditus." Die Religion in Gesch. und Gegenw. III, 1767-8. See also: Nygren, Agape and Eros II, 2, 484-5, 490-1. Hendry, God the Creator, 123. Aulen in Revelation, 508. Blanke, Der Verborgene Gott bei Luther.

96. Zwingli accuses Luther of saying that sins are forgiven merely by the eating of the true body of Christ: "Auch wenn der wahre Leib gegessen wird, dann das nie den Glauben stärken und die Sünden vergeben, denn Geistiges muss eine geistige Ursache haben. Es ist klar, dass das heil nicht im Essen steckt. Es ist irreligios, dass Sünden durchs Essen vergeben werden." Luther responds with a typically sharp remonstrance: "Sagt mir, Herr Lüdergeist, wann haben wir jemals gelehrt, dass ein Stück Brot die Sünden vergebe?...Das aber ist unsere Lehre: Wer ein böses Gewissen hat von Sünden, der soll zum Abendmahl gehen und Trost holen, nicht am Brot und Wein, nicht am Leib und Blut, sondern am Wort, das wir im Sakrament Leib und Blut Christi, als für mich gegeben und vergessen, darbietet, schenkt und gibt. Ist das nicht klar genug?" Thiel, Luther II, 159, 161. Such exchanges vividly illustrate the deep separation of "spirit" which divided the two men. This is certainly intimately related to Luther's deep sense of sin and "Anfechtung" which we have described previously. After the meeting at Marburg Zwingli expressed views which seemed to justify Luther's suspicion of him: "He not only substitutes the merely spiritual presence of the body of Christ for the bodily, but he persists, also, in locating the essential character of the celebration in the act of confession and thanking upon the part of the communicant, instead of in the reception of the gift from above. The communicants should give thanks while they themselves, in their devout contemplation, set before themselves as present the flesh which Christ assumed and in which He suffered." Köstlin, Theology of Luther II, 155. See Zwingli's Fidei ratio ad Carolum imperator (1530), Articles VII, VIII.

For Luther, on the other hand, a sense of sin and "Anfechtung" were the prerequisites of the invitation to the Lord's Table: "gibt es noch einen Zweifel, dass hier zwei grundverschiedene Charaktere sprechen? Martin Luther nimmt in tieffter
Demut, als ein kranker glaubenschwacher Sünder das über-
schwänglich reiche Testament des Heilandes zu sich--Ulrich
Zwingli kommt mit erschütterlichen Sinn zu dem Gedächtnis-
niemals des Herrn, um seinen starken, selbstgewissen Glauben
zu verschönern." Thiel, Luther II, 141. Thiel's conclusions
may be somewhat overstated in favor of Luther but the fact
remains that there was a deep-seated difference of attitude
and approach between Luther and Zwingli, not only on the
question of the real presence, but in many other fields of
thought as well. Brilioth traces their differences, for
instance, to a fundamentally different doctrine of God;
Zwingli favoring a transcendent view and Luther an immanent
one. Zwingli's strong humanistic and intellectualistic
predilections and his political activities are other ex-
amples. Kidd's view is also that Luther's cogent expression
was a "just appreciation, at paring, of the gulf between
his opponents' position and his own." The Continental
Reformation, 53-4.

Luther's attitude to Zwingli was not a peculiar one.
Long before he had expressed himself on the necessity of a
sense of sin as proper preparation for the Mass: "So ists
gewiss, das den freyen, sichern geysten, die yhre sund nit
beysat, die mess keyn nutz ist, dan sie haben noch keynen
hunger zu disser speys, seyn noch zu wol, die mess wil und
muss ein hungerige seel haben, die vorlangen hab noch vorge-
bung der sund unnd gottlicher huld." W. A. VI, 576 (Sermon
von dem neuen Testament, 1520). His views on the adoration
of the sacrament mark him off from both the Roman Catholic
and Zwinglian attitude toward the Lord's Supper: "Summa, wo
nicht ist das hertzlich vertrawen und tzuversicht des rechten
lebendigen glawbens, davon ich soo oft geredt habe, da kan
solk anbeten nicht geschehen, denn gott wirtt da selbs
nicht erkandt hertzlich mit gweibiger tzuversicht." W. A.
XI, 446 (Von Anbeten des Sakraments des heiligen Leichnams
Christi, 1525). An insight into Luther's moderation and
an insight into the spirit which was motivating him is re-
vealed by the concessions which he was willing to grant the
Zwinglians at Marburg: "Luther drew up a formula which, while
asserting that 'the body of Christ is truly', i. e. essen-
tially and substantially ('essentialiter et substantivae'),
present in the Sacrament and not merely in the remembrance
of the partaker,' waives further discussion on the question
as to the mode of its presence, i. e. 'whether bodily or spir-
itually, naturally or supernaturally, spatially or non-spati-
ally.' On this understanding he and his colleagues were pre-
pared to recognise their opponents as brethren." Mackinnon,
Luther and the Reformation III, 525. From the little he
knew of it, Luther seems to have approved of Calvin's teach-
ing on the subject and it is reported that he was pleased
with Calvin's pamphlet on the Lord's Supper. Kostlin, The-
logy of Luther II, 183, 191. This is further evidence of Luther's moderate position in regard to the real presence and the extent to which he was willing to see his interpretation modified by one with whom he felt a certain communion of "Geist".

97. Beard, Martin Luther, 390.

98. W. A. L, 240-1.

99. Ibid. 228-9.

100. Ibid. 229-30: "Wer nicht kundte Contritionem, das ist, rew haben, der solte Attritionem haben, welches ich mag eine halbe oder anfang der Rewe nennen...Solche Attritio ward denn Contritio gerechent, wenn man zu Beicht gieng." "Alexander of Hales and Bonaventura, and, later, Scotus and the Nominalists discriminated between contrition and attrition, between real repentance and the mere fear of the consequences of sin. According to this theory, the penitent, who may be actuated only by the fear of hell, may nevertheless receive the benefit of the sacrament, which by the infusion of grace changes attrition into contrition, and thus becomes valid in his case for the remission of guilt." Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation I, 87.

101. "Das ist nicht activa contritio, eine gemachte Rew; Sondern passiva contritio, das rechte hertzleid, leiden und fulen des todes." W. A. L, 226. To Luther the idea of forced penitence and contrition is simply another form of Pelagianism: Muller, Christian Doctrine of Sin I, 214. He says in the Fourteenth Article of Grund und Ursache aller Artikel (1521) that only God knows whether our contrition is genuine or not; for a man to say, or be required to say, he is really contrite is pure presumption: W. A. VII, 385f. "There is no final guarantee against the spiritual pride of man. Even the recognition in the sight of God that he is a sinner can be used as a vehicle of that very sin." Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny I, 215.

102. W. A. VI, 543.

103. Ibid. 544.

104. "Contritionem sic ducerunt, et eam fide præmissionis priorem facerent, et longe viliorem, ut quae non esset fidei opus, sed meritum, immo non memorantur eam...His audatiores et peisiores finixerunt quandam attritionem, quae virtute clavium (quam ignorant) fieret contritio, eam donant impiis et incredulis, ut sic universa contritio aboleretur." Ibid.
105. W. A. VI, 545.

106. "Non est dubium, confessionem peccatorum esse necessariam et divinitus mandatam Matt. iii." Ibid. 546.

107. "Occulta autem confessio, quae modo celebratur, et si probari ex scriptura non possit, miro modo tamen placet, et utilis imo necessaria est, nec vellem eam non esse, immo gaudeo eam esse in Ecclesia Christi, cum sit ipsa afflictis conscientiis unicum remedium. Siquidem, detecta fratrum nostro conscientia et malo, quod latebat, familiariter revelato, verbum solacii recipimus ex ore fratris a deo prolatum, quod fide suscipientes, pacatos nos facimus in misericordia dei per fratrem nobis loquenti. Hoc solum detestor, Esse eam confessionem in tyrannidem et exactionem pontificum redactam. " Ibid.


110. Ibid. 441.

111. Luther's main point here is that no one can possibly confess all his sins; if a man really seeks to do this with his whole heart and soul it will be the death of him. Luther knew this from his own experience in the monastery. He became renowned both in his own and in nearby monasteries for his constant use of the sacrament of Penance and the desperate zeal with which he sought to release himself from the feeling of being "gallows-ripe". Lindsay, History of the Reformation I, 199-205. "As to the method of administration of Penance, both in the Roman and Eastern Churches, a necessary element, and therefore a necessary condition of receiving sacramental Absolution, is that, in all ordinary cases, there should be a detailed confession of sins to a priest." Stone, Outlines of Christian Dogma, 199. The Roman church, recognizing the fact that a literally complete confession is impossible, made the distinction between mortal and venial sins; "This came to
be stereotyped into the later distinction that Absolution is necessary for the forgiveness of mortal sin, but not necessary for the forgiveness of venial sin." Stone, Outlines of Christian Dogma, 199. One of the earliest points of disagreement of Luther with the Roman system had been over the distinction between mortal and venial sins and this grew as the years went by: "Die schlussel sind ein Ampt und ge­walt der Kirchen von Christo gegeben, zu binden und zu losen die sunde. Nicht allein die groben und wolbekannten wunde, sondern auch die subtilen heimlichen, die Gott allein er­kennet... Denn es steht nicht by uns, sondern bey Gott alle­in, zu urteilen, welche, wie gros und wie viel die sunde sind... Weil die Absolutio, oder kraft des Schlussels auch ein hulffe und trost ist, wider die sunde und bese gewissen, im Evangliio durch Christum gestifft... Die erzelung aber der sunder, sol frey sein ein jedern, was er erzelen oder nicht erzelen wil. Den so lang wir im fleisch sind, werden wir nicht liegen, wenn wir sagen, Ich bin ein armer Mensch voller sunde." W. A. L, 243-4.


113. "wie solt den unsser rew sso wirdig seyn, das umb yrend wil­len, got die sunde und nit umb seynet willen vorgebe...wen nu umb unser rew willen die sunde vorgebe wurde, sso were die ehre unsser und nit gottes." Ibid. 377. "Ja die weil, alle heyligen noch bessund sunde ynn sich habenn, ists nit muglich das yemand rew hab, die fur gottes gericht gmug sey." Ibid. 385.

114. Ibid. 355. Luther says this contrition is that of the natur­al man, while real contrition is followed by grace and means a new life: "Sso muss er gewysslich sage, das die Judas rew un galgen rew, die peste puus sey, wilch on gotlich gnade auss lautter natur vormuge gemacht, ym grud falsch ist, un nit macht ei new leben, auch nit aufhoaret zu sundige, ern­ster un hertzlicher meinug, wie drobe gnusse erweyset ist, das on gnad kein gottis nit ist ym meschen, sso auch die ynn d' gnaden leben, boss un sund ynn sich streyttend habe." Ibid. 363. Luther goes on to tell how this new life and begin­ning of grace starts with the terrifying of conscience and "Anfectung", after which comes the comfort and end of despair: "Wol ist war, da ein new weessen unnd einfluss der gnaden anhebt, mit einer grossen anfectung unnd erschrecken des gewissens." Ibid.

115. W. A. L, 227.

117. W. A. L, 244.

118. "Das wort Christi zu Petro, was du auffpindest auff erde, soll loss sein ym himel, erstrecket sich nit weitter, denn auff die, die Peter gepunden hat. Wie gern ware der Bapst ein got, das er mocht pinden, was got loset, und losen was got pindet, auff das er Christus wort umbkeret, und alse setzet, was ich bynd unnd losse ym hymell, solt du losen und byndenn auff erden, das unser got vortriesen hinfurt nichts mehr thun kund, den was der Bapst wolt." W. A. VII, 421. Luther's argument in this article (Twenty-six) is that the Pope is subject to the Keys (the Word of God) and not the Keys to the Pope. As he goes on to say, Christ did not give Peter the Keys that he might do anything with them but that he might be a servant of them for the forgiveness of sins: "Christ hat sie nit geben, das S. Peter solt gewalt damit habe etwas zu thun, sondern unssern glaubwe sein sie gebe, d' selb sol sich dra halte, dz yhm die sund vorgebe werde, un S. Peter ist ein knecht darynne." Ibid. 421-3.

119. "Es ist bischer gnug beweisset, das nit des priesters werck, sonderm der glawb, des pussers, vorgebung der sund wirckt, den so der Bapst un alle priester auff einen hauffen vor- samet, ein absolutio uber einen unsander sprechen, so girt und hilft sie nichts, wo er der selben nicht glaubet...Aber die vorgebug d' schuld ist eygentlich d' schlussel un sacrament d' puss, die foddert de glawbe, die vorgebug d' pein, foddet nit glawben, un gehoret nit eigentlich zum sacrament der schlussell." Ibid. 383-5.

120. Ibid. 325.

121. Ibid. 323.

122. W. A. L, 632. "Die schlussel sind nicht des Bapsts (wie er leuget), sonder der Kirchen, das ist des volckers Christi, des volcks Gottes oder des heiligen Christlichen volck, so weit die gantze welt ist, oder wo Christen sind." Ibid. "In de sacramet d' puss un vorgebug d' schult, thut der Bapst ad' bisschoff nit mehr, den d' geringst priester, ja wo ein priest er nit vorhande were, thut ebe soo viel, eyn yglicher Christen mensch, ob er gleich ym weib oder kind were...Seyntemal die schlussell nit anderses, den zum sacrament der puss geben seinn, wilchs alle Christe gleich gemein ist." W. A. VII, 381-3.

123. Ibid. 421. "So ist Christus in dem, das er von binden und losen der sunden redet, weil es Schlussel sind zum Himelreich,
dahin niemand kompt on durch vergebung der sunden, und nie-
man davon ausgeschlossen wird, denn dem sie umb sein unbus-
fertigs leben willen gebunden werden. Das also die wort
nicht S. Petrus gewalt, sondern die notturfft der elenden
sunder oder der stoltzen sunder angehet." W. A. L, 548.

124. "Sihe also gauckelt un furet d' Bapst die ganzt welt, nymp
auss dem gotliche wort was er will, ob es wol yderma gleich
un gemein ist, yn gibt fur aus de fass malmasier trincken,
da and' leut kaumet wasser ausstrincken." W. A. VII, 421.

125. W. A. VII, 423. Luther's view of the Keys as a dispenser of
the gospel, and which, therefore, depends upon God for its
power and upon our faith for its effectiveness, is brought
out in the Thirteenth Article; here he says that even were
God Himself to pronounce absolution it would be of no effect
unless it were accepted by us through faith. And, he con­
tinues, God does do exactly this when He preaches and does
His works among men every day, but it helps no one except
those who believe in Him: "Ja wie solt des Bapst und aller
priester absolution helfen on glawben, wen sie Christ auch
got selber sprech, hulftt sie dennoch nichts, on den glawbe.
Ists nit also? das got teglich prediget und wund' wirck
fur den mensche, und hilfft doch nit, denn allein die yhm
glewben?" Ibid. 381.

126. "Da da, der artickell hat den rechten blutschweren troffen,
hie ist not gewessen zu weren, un vordamnen, denn der artickel
solt machen, das de abtgot zu Rom, die schlussel aus de schild
fielen." Ibid. 381.

127. W. A. II, 745. Brilioth says of this sermon: "The rediscovery
of the idea of communion is the greatest positive contribution
of the Reformation in regard to the eucharist; it is of more
value than all the criticisms of the mass." Eucharist Faith
and Practice Evangelical and Catholic, 97. The idea of com­
munion is, however, an implicit criticism of the Roman view
of the Mass; for instance, one of the most recent papal pro­
nouncements on Holy Communion says: "Therefore it is a false
doctrine that would lead a priest to refuse to celebrate un­
less the faithful come to Communion; and it is still worse
to ground this view—that the faithful must necessarily com­
municate together with the priest—on the sophistical con­
tention that the Mass besides being a Sacrifice is also the
banquet of a community of brethren; and that the general Com­
munion of the faithful is to be regarded as the culminating
point of the whole celebration. It must be emphasized again
and again that the Eucharistic Sacrifice is essentially the
unbloody immolation of the divine victim, etc." Pope Pius
Brilioth seems to feel that Luther's positive ideas about the communion of brethren became distorted in the controversial writings. In the face of the Roman attitude, however, it was necessary that Luther's writings should be controversial but in their essence they maintain the positive teachings of the earlier treatments. This can be clearly seen in Luther's views on the Keys; even in his most violent polemic writings he maintains and even deepens his emphasis on the Church as the community of brethren, using the gifts of God for mutual comfort and enrichment.


129. W. A. VI, 546f. Christ has given the power of absolution to all believers and therewith the right to hear confessions: "Proinde, ego non dubito eum esse a peccatis suis occultis absolutum, quiaquis sive sponte confessus, sive correptus, veniam petierit et amendaverit, coram quovis privatim fratre, quicquid contra haec insanierit pontificum violentia, quando Christus et manifesta dedit absolvere cuilibet suo fidelii." Ibid. 547. Luther's inclusion of a section on how to say one's confession in the Shorter Catechism is an indication of the high value he placed on it. Though the practice died out in most of the German Lutheran churches, it persisted in the Scandinavian countries and is showing signs of revival there. Jarrett-Kerr, Our Trespasses, 99-100. Jarrett-Kerr's book, incidentally, which bears the sub-title of A Study in Christian Penitence, concludes with a chapter on "The Exchange of Penitence"; this is an Anglican treatment of the same problem with which Luther was so concerned. Jarrett-Kerr speaks of the need for members of the congregation to bear one another's sins, though he does not bring out as strongly as Luther the need for mutual comfort through confessing to one's brother in the Church and receiving from him the assurance and consolation of God's promises. The book is a very suggestive one, indicating a renewed desire to develop a constructive theology of repentance, and showing a remarkable similarity of views (as coming from the Anglican tradition) with those of Luther, for instance, in the criticism of the distinction between mortal and venial sins, etc. Ibid. 77ff.

130. Hughes, History of the Church III, 436-8. Flick in Decline of the Medieval Church describes, for instance, the results of the Babylonian Captivity of the Roman church as being extremely subversive for the whole stability of the Roman curia. It gave an opportunity and occasion for the keenest minds in Europe to attack the abuses in the church, the Pope's claim to temporal authority, and the claim of spiritual authority of the whole Roman hierarchy. There was a
general demand by scholars, priests and laity for reformation and purification. The whole period was one of ferment and revolution. Marsiglio of Padua, for instance, made criticisms of the papacy which in many points are almost identical with those of Luther: Emerton, _The Defensor Pacis of Marsiglio of Padua_. Luther's work and writings must always be interpreted with this background in mind.

131. Once again it must be evident what a large part theological factors played in Luther's reforming work; this treatment of his sacramental theory in the light of law and gospel should have shown this in part at least. Nevertheless, some still continue to discount the originality of his theological insights. Whitney in his _Reformation Essays_ is one who has been rather misled here and unfortunately he is not an isolated example. He quotes Denifle to prove that Luther's claim to original exegesis of "Justitia" in the passive sense breaks down in the light of the fact that many medieval theologians interpreted it in the same way. Murray in _Erasmus and Luther_ points this out as well: 61. Whitney believes, therefore, that the most solid part of Denifle's work is on justification: "Denifle has shown that this interpretation (of Rom. 1: 17) so far from being novel was traditional;...the special truth which stands out, and which must be admitted in any future estimates of Luther, is that here, where his cardinal doctrine of 'justification by faith' was concerned, he was more medieval than we are apt to think...no great revolution, although there was a change in proportion and a shifting of emphasis." _Reformation Essays_, 12. Denifle believes that Luther really knew of the earlier interpretations and is therefore a deliberate liar; Whitney would only go so far as to call it a "defensive illusion".

Even though Luther may have been ignorant of, or ignored, the patristic and medieval interpretation of Rom. 1: 17, it does not mean that his exegesis of it was not novel. To say that Luther's interpretation of it in the light of law and gospel (see note 46, part I) is the same as that of medieval theology is a misrepresentation of either one party of the other. It is true that medieval theology generally held that a man could not merit grace, nor naturally acquire it; the Augustinian influence remained sufficiently strong to insure that that basic premise would not be ignored: Williams, _The Grace of God_, 55ff. Seeberg, _History of Doctrines I_, 209 illustrates the extent to which the "pre-reformers" such as Goch, Wessel, etc. adhered to the medieval teaching on grace. "Theology in the West found its centre and principle of organization in the doctrine of Grace...the tendency of Western theology finds its representative and embodiment in St. Augustine, the Doctor of Grace, whose influence dominates
the whole medieval development." Dawson, Medieval Religion, 36. Nevertheless, medieval theology gave a large place to the idea of merit in the work of salvation; though there may be no merit without grace, neither is there blessedness without merit: "Grace makes it possible to win blessedness but merit must win it." Nygren, Agape and Eros II, 2, 403ff. Nor is the concept of merit entirely absent from Augustine himself: Hamel, Der junge Luther I, 129-31. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation I, 59ff. Nygren, Agape and Eros, II, 2, 256-7. "The idea of merit and the idea of virtue as a way to God are no alien additions to Augustine's thought, but belong organically to it." Ibid. 296, 309-10.

The key place which the concept of merit took in medieval theology is seen in such doctrines as "meritum de congruo" and "meritum de condigno" and "fides charitate formata". By willing not to sin a man is able to merit the first gift of grace: "meritum de congruo"; Aquinas uses the term but does not credit the human will with the freedom which the Nominalists posited. Furthermore, with the aid of grace one may attain to more merit: "meritum de condigno". Also, when it is said that medieval theology taught that justification is by faith alone, it must be remembered that it is faith formed by love: "fides charitate formata". This is taught by Aquinas: "the faith through which we are cleansed from sin, is not the unliving faith ('fides informis'), which can co-exist with sin, but faith living through love ('fides formata')." Moehler, Symbolism, 123. "Charity is a virtue, through which man's salvation is operated by man's action too. Sanctifying grace—the grace which, making man pleasing to God, justifies man—is a real vital principle, whence acts proceed that really are man's acts; man's merit before God is a reality, as man's freedom to posit these acts is a reality, and as the supernatural efficacy of those acts when posited is real." Hughes, History of the Church III, 460.

The Franciscan divines generally tended toward a modified synergism and "the milder doctrine of grace continued to gain ground in the theological schools of Europe all through the Middle Ages; on the eve of the Reformation Gabriel Biel... defended without challenge the theory of 'congruous merit', which, as we have pointed out, contains by implication the whole of Synergism." Williams, The Grace of God, 68. Luther was a student of Biel's writings and was less well acquainted with Aquinas who represents a more Augustinian tendency.

Luther's reaction against this general development must be considered in interpreting his view of "passive righteousness;" one could hardly say that his "discovery" of a passive meaning in Rom. 1: 17 is a "defensive illusion". He understood it in terms of the relation between law and gospel. For
Roman theology law is one of the standards of attainment, the moral and meritorious fulfilment of which is necessary for salvation; for Luther, the law is not only fulfilled by Christ, but in a far deeper way, abolished by Christ: "The Latin doctrine involved the idea of law and justice as the typical expression of God's relation to man; but this is just what Luther tears to pieces, raising God's claim to a higher level, and therefore treating law as, in one aspect, a tyrant from which man needs to be delivered." Aulen, Christus Victor, 137. Luther's break with medieval legalism becomes radical at this point. For the extent to which Luther was conscious of his differences with medieval theological views such as have been mentioned, see his expert analysis and criticism of "meritum de congruo" and "meritum de condigno" in his Commentary on Galatians: W. A. XL, 1, 220; and his attack against the idea of "fides formata": "Haec est Sophistarum opinio et eorum qui optimi sunt. Alii non sunt tam boni, ut Scotus et Occam qui dixerunt non esse acquirenda gratia Dei charitate illa divinitus donata, sed hominem posse ex naturalibus viribus elicere charitatem Dei super omnia... Sic fides est corpus, siliqua, color, charitas vero est vita, nucleus, forma. Haec sunt Scholasticorum somnia." Ibid. 226ff.


133. "Zum andern sag ich, das der Bapst un alle sein wissentliche forwandtten ynn dissem stuck ketzer, abtrinnige, vorpannet, und vormaldeisit sein. Darumb das sie anders leren, denn das Evangelium ynnen hat, un folgen ihrem eigen kopff, widder den gemeinen prach der gantzen Christenheit. Denn das heissen ketzer und abtrinniger, wilch ubertretten die lere yherer vatter, und seyndern sich selb, von gemeiner weisse un masse auss lautter mutwillen, on ursach, widder das heylig Evangelium, das thut der Endchrist zu Rom, ynn dissem und viel mehr stucken, noch erhebt er sein unvorschampts laster maul ynn den hymel, un lastert die kriechschen kirchen, das sie zwispaltig und abtrinnig sey. Seo er der erst un allein is aller abtrinnug und partyen heubt ur-sach un anheber, wie das am tag ist, und alle historien beweissenn." W. A. VII, 395-7. Luther's combination of sorrow and wrath with which he attacked Roman theology and practices was based on the depth of his conviction that the papacy and Scholastic theology were deviations from the true faith and order of Christ's Church: "Horrendissimum autem est Papam hoc potuisse officere in Ecclesia, quod Christus negatus, conculcatus, consputus et blasphematus sit, et hoc per Evangelium et Sacramenta quae ita obscuravit et in tam detestabilem abusum vertit, ut sibi contra Christum ser-
vierint pro statuendis et corroporandis suis diabolicis abominationibus. O tenebras et infinitam iram Dei! " W. A. XI, 1, 258. It was as a deeply consecrated son of the Church that Luther accused the Pope of being "anti-Christ". Luther is essentially the Reformer in spirit, not the Revolutionary.

134. Ward, Counter-Reformation, 2ff. Flick, Decline of the Medieval Church.

135. Hamburg Auswahl X, 5ff. (D. Martin Luthers Vorreden über die einzelnen biblischen Bücher und vermischte Aufsätze.)

136. Ibid. 5. "So wenig nun des Neuen Testaments Grund und Beweisung zu verachten ist, so theuer ist auch das Alte Testament zu achten."


139. "(das seines Schreibens meiste Ursache ist) wo die Sunde und der Tod herkommen sey...lehret er, woher die Hülfe wieder kommen sollte, die Sunde und den Tod zu vertreiben, nemlich nicht durch Gesetz noch eigen Werck, weil noch kein Gesetz war, sondern durch des Weibes Saamen, Christum." H. A. X, 6.

140. "Das ist das erste Evangélium und verheysung von Christo geschehen auff erden, das er soll sünde, tod und helle überwinden und uns von der schlangen gewalt selig machen...(Gen. 22: 18) Das war das andere Evangélium von Christo, das durch den alle menschen sollen gesegnet und selig werden." W. A. XXIV, 11. He says that the whole of the Old Testament is filled with such gospel preachings: "Der spruche sind vil ym alten Testament." Ibid. See, for instance, the examples of the gospel in the Old Testament in his Vorrede auf das Neue Testament: H. A. X, 65f. In Vorlesungen über 1. Mose von 1535-45, he continues to emphasize that the gospel began in
141. "der Glaube von Anfang der Schrift durch und durch gepreiset werde über alle Wercke, Gesetz und Verdienst. Also hat das erste Buch Mosis fast eitel Exempel des Glaubens und Unglaubens, und was Glaube und Unglaube vor Fruchte tragen, und ist fast ein evangelisch Buch." H. A. X, 6-7.

142. "Darnach im andern Buch, da die Welt nun voll und in der Blindheit versunken war, das man schier nicht wusste, was Sunde war, oder wo Tod herkommen sey, bringet Gott Mosen hervor mit dem gesetz." Ibid. 7.

143. Ibid. 7. "Sacerdotes igitur officium non est aliud quam peccata et peccatores curare." W. A. DB V, 4.


146. In both church order and civil government, faith and love are to stand supreme over strict law; the whole Old Testament, says Luther, is full of examples of how priests and kings modified the laws in respect to the ultimate standards of faith and love: "Aus diesen und dergleichen Geschichten siehet man wohl dass die Konige, Priester und Obersten haben oft frisch ins Gesetz gegriffen, wo es der Glaube und die Liebe haben gefordert: dass also der Glaube und die Liebe soll aller Gesetze Meisterin seyn, und sie alle in ihrer Macht haben." H. A. X, 9. See also the Eight Wittenberg Sermons of 1522: W. A. X, 3, 2ff. In Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können (1526) Luther discusses the whole problem of administering law in the secular order as tempered by "Billicheit" or "Equitas": W. A. XIX, 650ff. This is one of the key concepts in Luther's political theory.

147. "Also sehen wir, dass solche und so mancherley Gesetze Mosis nicht allsin darum gegeben sind, dass niemand etwas eigenes durfte erwahlen, Gutes zu thun und wohl zu Leben, wie droben gesagt ist, sondern vielmehr darum, dass der Sunden nur viel wurden, und sich uber die Massen haufeten, das Gewissen zu
beschweren, auf dass die verstockte Blindheit sich erkennen musste und ihr eigen Unvermogen und Nichtigkeit zum Guten musste fühlen, und also durch das Gesetz genothiget und gedrungen wurde, etwas weiteres zu suchen, denn das Gesetz und eigen Vermögen, nämlich Gottes Gnade, im kunstigen Christo verheissen." H. A. X, 13.


149. "Die andern, die es angreiffen, mit eigener Kraft zu erfüllen, ohne Gnade." Ibid.


151. Ibid. 14.

152. Ibid. 15. In Vorrede auf die Propheten Luther enlarges his discussion of the work of the prophets in expounding the law and preaching the promise of the gospel: H. A. X, 32.

153. Ibid. 21.

154. W. A. VII, 327. "Error enim est, sacramenta novae legis differri a sacramentis veteris legis, penes efficaciam significationis, utraque aequaliter significabunt. Idem enim deus, qui nos nunc per baptismum et panem salvat, salvavit Abel per sacrificium, Noe per arcum, Abraham per circumcisionem, et alios omnes per sua signa...At nostra et patrum signa seu sacramenta habent annexum verbum promissionis, quod fidem exigit, et nullo opere alio impleri potest." W. A. VI, 532.


159. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation IV, 302-3. When Luther argues against the "Schwermgeister", who are justifying their positions on the basis of Old Testament precedents, etc., he says that it is not enough to simply appeal to the Bible; one must understand the context of the words in the Bible, to whom they were spoken and why, before they can be interpreted rightly. It is against the perversion of this critical activity that Luther is protesting when he speaks to the Humanists.

160. W. A. L, 659 (Vorrede zum 1. Bande der Wittenberger Ausgabe der deutschen Schriften, 1559). In the light of what has been said about "Anfechtung", it is interesting to note Luther's inclusion of it as one of the means of insight into the Bible; this again illustrates his strong personal and religious approach to the study of Scripture: "Zum dritten ist da Tentatio, anfechtung. Die ist der Prüfstein, die leret dich nicht allein wissen und verstehen, sondern auch erfahren, wie recht, wie wahrhaftig, wie süß, wie lieblich, wie mächtig, wie trostlich Gottes wort sey, weisheit über alle weisheit." Ibid. 660.

161. "We see then, that in his personal life, both religious and secular, in his family life, in his ecclesiastical life, and in his political life each man must unreservedly and in every detail submit himself wholly to the Word of God, to be found within the pages of the Bible... We finally conclude, therefore, that Luther set up the totalitarian, omnipotent Word of God in place of the totalitarian, omnipotent Church of the Middle Ages." Davies, The Problem of Authority, 55, 55. There has been considerable difference of opinion among scholars over Luther's interpretation of the Bible. On one side are those who hold that Luther's interpretation was a radical departure from the previous times and that he laid the foundations for modern historical Biblical criticism; Loofs, for instance, maintains this view: Dogmengeschichte, 745. Seeburg also believes that Luther made a great advance from the medieval interpretations of the authority of Scripture: Revelation and Inspiration, 16ff. On the other side are those who
hold that Luther merely continued the medieval views and identified the Word of God with the Bible; Harnack interprets his position in this way: History of Dogma VII, 246-7. Herrmann says that Luther "came to place reliance on an obedience to the Scripture as a sort of law. In this, of course, he and his Roman Catholic opponents were at one." Communion with God, 49-50. Other writings on Luther as a Biblical critic are listed in a bibliographical footnote in Bainton, "Luther's Attitude to Religious Liberty", Harvard Theological Review XXII, 2, 125ff. Bainton's own position is that Luther, while strongly influenced by the humanists in his early career, later became much more conservative in his attitude towards the Bible.

Davies has presented one of the most recent studies of Luther's Biblical interpretation; he says that it is "quite true that Luther did not substitute an infallible Bible for an infallible Church." The Problem of Authority, 39. Nevertheless, for Luther the Word of God is infallible; "Its writers, though they remained free personalities when they wrote, were nevertheless preserved by the Spirit from writing what was false." Ibid. 40. Davies fails to appreciate that the Word is infallible to Luther, not as it is written down by men, but as it is the Incarnate Word. The relation of the Word to the Bible is like that of the elements to the presence of Christ in the sacraments. Furthermore, as Seeberg says: "his view of Scripture was entirely different from that of the Middle Ages. When Luther refers to Scripture, he is thinking of the Gospel of Christ and His kingdom, of sin and grace, in short, of the religious content of Scripture, of 'Christ and the Christian faith'." Revelation and Inspiration, 16ff. It is true that Luther's views on the authority of the Bible are particularly difficult to determine since, as Beard points out, the problem of authority, as such, was never raised for him: Martin Luther, 394ff. There is no excuse, however, to make a statement that Luther's theory of interpretation is "stark and inflexible", as Davies does: The Problem of Authority, 54. Law and gospel is the central doctrine in Luther's Biblical theology; Davies quotes Schempp's Luthers Stellung zur Heiligen Schrift but he shows little evidence that he has taken Schempp's conclusions seriously, namely as to the importance of law and gospel in Luther's teaching on the subject: "Diese Thesen können hier nur den Zweck haben, die Einheit, die zeitlich unaufhebbare Gegensätzlichkeit und die aktuelle Dynamik in der Stellung Luthers zur Schrift aufzuzeigen: Die Schrift ist als ganze Gottes Wort, aber sie enthält zwei Arten von Gottes Wort, die nicht vermischt werden dürfen, das Gesetz und das Evangelium." Ibid. 75. If Davies had taken this fully into consideration Luther's interpretation of the Psalms and the Epistle to the Romans would not seem so incongruous to him: "In his study of it he was constantly looking for the Gospel of justification, and finding it, too, in the most
unlikely places, such as the Book of Psalms." The Problem of Authority, 52. He also mentions Luther's "naive view that the Epistle to the Romans preaches Christ better than any other book in the Bible." Ibid. 56. If Luther's view is as "naive" as Davies seems to think it, so must be the rest of his theology which is the foundation for such statements as these. Davies gives further evidence of failing to understand Luther's position: "The distinction between the Law and the Gospel, which had worked well enough in the Old Testament, would not here meet the case, for the New Testament had no right to concern itself with the Law." Ibid. 55. If critics such as Davies were to take Luther's concept of "Anfœcung" and see how it was for Luther one of the pre­requisites for a proper understanding of Scripture, they might be able to interpret Luther's views far more correctly.

162. "Dass es wol mochte eine kleine Biblia heissen...wer die gantze Biblia nicht lesen konnte, hatte hierinnen doch fast die gantze Summa verfasset in ein klein Bucklein." H. A. X, 21.

163. "Diese Epistel ist das rechte Hauptstucke des Neuen Testaments und das aller lauterste Evangelium, welche wol würdig und werth ist, dass sie ein Christenmensch nicht allein von Wort zu Wort auswendig wisse, sondern taglich damit umgehe, als mit taglichen Brod der Seele. Denn sie nimmt kann zu viel und zu wohls gelesen und betrachtet werden, und je mehr sie gehandelt wird, je kostlicher sie wird und dass schmecket." H. A. X, 70. Luther has been accused of reading the Bible solely through the eyes of Paul. Loewenich has shown that even though Luther had more in common with Paul, and found the relation of faith and love in Johannine thought difficult to grasp, nevertheless he showed a real understanding and appreciation of Johannine theology: Luther und das Johann­neische Christentum, 12ff.

164. W. A. XL, 1, 550-1.

165. Ibid. 36.

166. Ibid. Luther's opposition to the Anabaptists(a term he often applied loosely to the left-wing sects of his day) was consistently sharp, and his attitude grew more hostile as the years passed. He was especially repelled by their legalistic tendencies; as Grisar points out, one of Luther's chief criticisms against the Anabaptists and Thomas Munzer in particular, one of their chiefs, was that they failed to distinguish between law and gospel: Luther II, 375. Troeltsch has also indicated the dominant place which the law took in the theology of the sects and Luther's opposition to them because of this: Ges. Schr. I, 382, 453-4.
Moehler has given remarkable substantiation for Luther's analysis when he admits (as a Roman Catholic theologian still highly considered within his communion: Adam, Spirit of Catholicism, 17): "in more than one respect these new sprung sects approximated to the Catholic Church, from which they appeared to be still further removed than even the Lutheran and the Calvinistic communities. It was almost always in the doctrine of justification, which, though they made use of unwonted forms of expression, they mostly conceived in the spirit of Christ's Church, this approximation was perceptible." Symbolism, 364. It is interesting to note that: "The Lutherans and Zwinglians never converted the Anabaptists. Those who yielded to stress of persecution fall back into Papalism and went to swell the tide of the Catholic reaction." Conybeare, Encyclopedia Britannica I, 904-5. Conybeare believes there is some relation between some of the Roman sects and the Anabaptists; among these Roman sects the legalistic spirit was often quite strong with the emphasis on the "law of Jesus": Troeltsch, Ges. Schr. I, 382. There are notable exceptions to this, of course; Luther often paid tribute to such monastic saints as Bernhard, who he thought showed a true evangelical spirit. He was critical of the Manicheans for the opposite reason: Schäfer, Luther als Kirchenhistoriker, 271f. To Luther, both the Anabaptists and the Roman monks, each having distinctive dress, are the wolves in sheeps' clothing described in the New Testament: "Also heist das auch ein Schaffeltz, Das die falschen Propheten eusserlich einen schonen schein und gliessendes leben furen, Wie man an den Widertauffern sihet, da horet man nit ein fluchlin von, kleider, essen und trincken ist auff dat schlechtest, einer setz dan andern fur, die gern vil mit Gottes wort umb, betten vil, sind im leiden gedultig, nit rachgirig. Solchs ist an jm selb nit unrecht, und wer zu wünschen, das solcher stuck halben alle menschen werden wie sie. Aber das man darumb jr lehr fűr recht halten und jnen folgen solt, da sagt Christus: Hute dich für. Denn unter dem schaffeltz wirstu auch wol einen Wolff finden, Das sie wie die Münchener jren trost auff jr eigene gerechtigkeit setzen." W. A. LII, 424 (Hauspostille, 1532-34). He brings out the same idea when he says that the ungodly hide behind the sheeps' clothing of ceremonial-work righteousness: W. A. V, 30-1 (Operationes in Psalmos, 1519-21). So all human laws, through the work of the devil, become tyrannical and there is an implacable discord between them and the Word of God: "Princeps mundi Papam et Pontifices suos non sinit eorum leges libere servari, sed conscientias captare et ligare in animo habet, Hoc Deus versus ferre non potest, Ita implacabili discordia verbum Dei et traditiones hominum pugnant." W. A. XVIII, 627.

167. "Was thut aber der Bapst, Die widertauffer, Die Juden, Turken und der gleichen? Sie lassen Christum und sein wort faren und
gehen die weyl mit menschen satzungen umb." W. A. LII, 325. "Papa, Turcae, Iudaei et omnes sectarii hunc canoneum non observant...Alia extra hunc locum Iustificationis si quando disputandum est cum Iudaeis, Turcis, Sectariis." W. A. XL, 1, 76, 78.

168. W. A. XL, 1, 36-7.

169. They should not be confused with the libertines against whom Luther speaks in the earlier edition: "Et hodie multi ex nostriis etiam idem faciunt qui crepti doctrina Evangellii ex tyrannide Papae somniant libertatem Christianam carnalem esse licentiam faciendi quidvis." W. A. XL, 1, 528. Luther is probably referring to the Anabaptist libertinism at Munster: "ut Sectarii tentabant et illa occasione seditionem rustiorum movebant." Ibid.

170. Ibid. 65.

171. Ibid. 235.


174. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation IV, 175.


176. Newman draws up a list of the "acknowledged articles" of Agricola and then adds to it statements of "doubtful authenticity which Agricola was supposed to have made" credited to him by Luther; Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia I, 199 n. 1. "Agricola disowned the most manifestly immoral of these propositions, and there is no reason to believe that he practiced or approved the immorality that seems to be involved in his teachings." Ibid. Hildebrandt gives Agricola even further benefit of the doubt: "the simple 'abolition' of the Law is out of the question—and in practice, despite the de-
nunciations of his enemies, Agricola never doubted that."

Melanchthon, 36. Agricola's form of Antinomianism is cer-
tainly not to be considered of the objectionable kind that
would transform the gospel into uninhibited license but his
views must have left room for that sort of interpretation,
just as he tended to misinterpret Luther.

177. W. A. XLV, 102ff.
178. Ibid. 145ff.
179. Luther drew up five sets of Theses, but the third and fourth
set were never formally disputed as a result of the agreement
reached on January 12. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation
IV, 171 n. 36. The Theses and disputations are found in W. A.
XXXIX, part 1.
180. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 345 (Th. 17). "Poenitentia docenda est non
ex Decalogo, aut ulla lege Mosi, sed ex violatione filii per
Evangelium." Ibid. 342 (Th. 1). "Ergo lex Mosi non est neces-
sari mut docetur, neque pro principio, neque medio, neque
fine justificationis." Ibid. (Th. 9). "Qui enim affingunt
verbis Christi improprium hunc sermonem et docent, primum
legem, deinde Evangelium docendum esse, hi sunt verborum
Christi contortores, non enim consistunt in simplicitate ver-
borum Christi." Ibid. (Th. 14). Agricola appealed to cer-
tain statements of Luther in which he had said that the gospel
may drive men to repentance; but as has been pointed out be-
fore, this was for Luther always the "strange work" of the
gospel and when Christ expounded the law this was not to be
taken as a part of the work of the gospel. See note 185.
181. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 345-7 (Th. 4, 7). "Poenitentia omnium testi-
monio et vero est dolor de peccato cum adiuncto proposito
melioris vitae." Ibid. (Th. 1). Luther is reiterating his
view that real repentance includes the whole life of a man
and comes from the working of both law and gospel: "Hic
dolor proprie aliud nihil est, nec esse potest, quam ipse
tactus seu sensus legis in corde sua conscientia." Ibid.
(Th. 2).
182. W. A. L, 473.
183. Ibid. "Denn an dem Son Gottes sehe ich, als jnn der that,
den zorn Gottes, den mir das Gesetze mit wortern und geringern
wercken zeigt."
184. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 346. "Poenitentia solum ex lege ist dimidium
vel initium poenitentiae seu per synedochen poenitentia,
qui caret bono proposito." (Th. 8). The inadequacy of the
Scholastic view of the nature and purpose of the law had long been one of Luther's main points of criticism and even in this Antinomian controversy he does not forget his antipathy to the "Nomians." Kurz, Die Heilsgewissheit bei Luther, 71.

185. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 346-7 (Th. 28, 30). This does not contradict his view that the gospel came before the law in Genesis; it was only as men gradually became less and less able to know what sin was (as a result of the Fall) that it became necessary for God to send the law: "Darnach im andern Buch, da die Welt nun voll und in der Blindheit versauncken war, dass man schier nicht wusste, was Sunde war, oder wo Tod herkommen sey, bringet Gott Mosen hervor mit dem Gesetz." H. A. X, 7. Adam lost much of his original righteousness and powers by the Fall, but the full results have only come by degrees to his descendants: "Quantum mare cognitionis et sapientiae in hoc uno homine fuit! Etsi autem de hac cognitione quoque multum anisit Adam per peccatum, tamen credo, quicquid adhuc in omnium sapientum libris est, qui tot seculis ab eo tempore, quo literae primum natae sunt, scripserunt, id totum saepe sapientiam non dum potuit square, quae tamen postea in Adam haesit, sed paulatim in posteris obscurata, et pene extincta est." W. A. XLII, 90-1 (Vorlesungen über 1. Mose, 1535-45).

186. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 347 (Th. 31).

187. Ibid. 416-7. "Nec miranda haec eorum ignorantia, cum scriptura posthabita nec quid lex, nec quid Evangelion esse posuerint." Ibid. 346 (Th. 19). Hildebrandt, Melanchthon,34.

188. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation IV, 178.

189. "docendam esse poenitentiam (quam vocat timorem et tremorem) ex memoria Christi, non ex lege...At datus olim, et datur perpetuo Spiritus sanctus, et justificantur homines sine lege, per solum Evangelium de Christo...Ergo lex Mosi non est necessari ut doceatur, neque pro principio, neque medio, neque fine iustificationis...Quare pro conservanda puritate doctrinæ resistendum est iis, qui docent, Evangelium non praedicandum, nisi animus prius quassatis et contritus per legem...Nam Evangelium Christi docet iram Dei et coelo, et simul iustitiam Dei." W. A. XXXIX, 1, 342-5 (Th. 5, 8, 9, 13, 18).

190. Ibid. 347-50 (Th. 7, 8). "Neque enim data est lex, ut iustificet aut vivificet aut quidquam iuvet ad iustitiam...Sed ut peccatum ostendat et iram operetur, hoc est conscientiam ream faciat." Ibid. (Th. 4, 5).
Luther's view of sin is more radical than that of either the legalists or the Antinomians; the Antinomians do not see that sin is so deep that the harsh and forceful teaching of the law is necessary to show its reality, while the legalists do not understand that such radical sin can only be done away with by the gospel of Christ, not through man's efforts.

It is to be remembered that for Luther "flesh" and "spirit" are primarily religious terms; the nature of a man—his spirit, soul and body—can be a combination of "flesh" and "spirit" in all three parts: "Und ein iglichs diesser dreier, sapt de gesche, wirt auch geteylet auff ein and' weiss yn zwyey stuck, die da heissen, geist un fleisich, welch teilung nit d' natur, ssondern d' eygeschaff ist, dz ist, die natur hat drey stuck, geist, seel, leip, un muge alle sampt gut od' boss sein, dz heist den geist un fleysich sein." W. A. VII, 550 (Das magnificat verdeutschet und ausgelegt, 1520-21).
205. W. A. XL, 1, 368.

206. "It is not necessary to point out the discrepancies and contradictions in the above train of thought...Here, even more plainly than elsewhere, we see both his lack of system and the irreconcilable contradictions lying in the very core of his ethics and theology." Grisar, Luther V, 10. "However clearly we can see what Luther ultimately wished with his distinction between law and gospel—the Reformer's expositions are not found when we go into detail to be harmonious." Harnack, History of Dogma VII, 206. Carlson in Luther in Modern Swedish Theology describes how the various "types" (as taken from Wolff, Die Haupttypen der neueren Lutherdeutung) of Luther scholars have interpreted the dualism in Luther's thought: Ritschl looks at it as a remnant of medievalism, Harnack as an epistemological dualism, Seeberg as a psychological dualism, Holl does not explain it away but makes little positive use of it. It is the modern Luther students of Sweden, according to Carlson, who have made positive use of Luther's dualism: "Swedish research interprets all of Luther against the dualistic background. It is unwilling to grant that this element in his theology is merely a reflection of the mythology of his time." Harnack, Luthers Theologie I, 577-8. Schlink has put the same thought in another way: "Die Wiedergeborenen leben nicht mehr unter dem Gesetz, sondern in dem Gesetz." Theologie der lutherischen Bekenntnisschriften, 161. One must tread carefully here, however, so that Luther's insight is not lost; these statements might indicate that the Christian has a love of the law through
grace, so that the law becomes a "new law" through the gospel. Such a position is maintained by Luther only in his early theology when he was still strongly under the influence of Nominalist teaching; his mature position is something far different:

"Er sagt zwar in der disput. He. Antin., 'lex est jam valde mitigata per justificationem'; aber er meint nichts anderes als dies, dass bei dem justificatus neben das 'sum peccator' nun das 'non sum peccator' tritt." Loofs, Dogmengeschichte, 776-7, 777 n. 1. Luther's most important contribution to the understanding of the relation between the ethical life and the law is his affirmation that only when a man is freed from the law is he able to fulfil the law. As he puts it in reference to sin, only that man who is righteous can really desire the end of sin: "So ists nit muglich das widd un von den sünde bitte odd begere, denn die do schon frum seinn. Der angehabende geist, un das erste stuck der gnaden, hat allein die art, das es widd' die ubrige sünde erbeittet, und wolt gern allein durch und durch frum sein, un vormag doch nit, fur dem widerspanst des fleisches. Den wilche nit angefangen habe frum zu sein, die streitte nit, klagen nit, bitten nit wider yhr fleisch un sünd, ia sie fullen nichts widerspenatiges, faren und folgen, wie das fleisch wil." W. A. VII, 557. The Christian life is the life of "becoming": "Denn dies Leben ist nichts anders denn ein Leben des Glaubens, der Liebe und des heiligen Kreuzes. Aber diese drei werden nimmer in uns vollkommen, weil wir auf Erden leben...Denn dies Leben ist ein solcher Wandel, darinnen man immerdar fortfähret von Glauben in Glauben, von Liebe in Liebe, von Geduld in Geduld oder von Kreuz in Kreuz. Es ist nit Gerechtigkeit, sondern Rechtfertigung, nit Reinigkeit, sondern Reiniigung. Wir sind noch nit kommen, dahin wir sollen, wir sind aber alle auf der Bahn und dem Weg; darauf sind etliche weiter und weiter." Vom heiligen Abendmahl, 43 (Predigt am Grün­donnerstag, 1524).

Hermann, who has made a full study of Luther's thought on this subject, says that for Luther the Christian life of constant struggle between sin and the Spirit is analogous to the experience in sickness in which the patient is already well in the eyes of the doctor but the cure and convalescence take time: 'Luthers These 'Gerecht und Sunder zugleich', 10-14, 16.

212. "Ita Angeli et beati in coelo non debent esse, sed sunt sine lege iusti, et pura creatura Dei." V. A. XXXIX, 1, 203.

The angels, as messengers of God, are not "free" to follow their own wills but neither are they under a legal "compulsion" from God; their obedience is spontaneous. This is further evidence that Luther thinks that the legal relationship between God and His creatures is not the natural one in God's original plan.
218. W. A. XL, 1, 550. Even after the Antinomian controversy the only "legal" concession which Luther would make in his teaching of the work of the gospel in the sanctified life was that it was blasphemy and the word of the devil to say that the gospel gave "license" to commit evil: "Evangelium non concedat licentiam usuaram, rapinaram, luxum, aleae etc." W. A. XLIII, 456. His more characteristic affirmation is that the Christian man is released from the law: "Summa ars Christianorum ignoscere totam iusticiam activam et ignorare legem, Sicut extra populum dei est Summa sapientia nosse et inspicere legem." W. A. XL, 1, 43. Luther is afraid of the entering wedge of the law in the sanctified life; one law is the beginning of thousands more: "Darnach kamen die Bepste, die wolten auch etwas darzu thun und macheten Gesetze, da erwuckse aus des einigen Gesetzes abethun viel Tausenterlay Gesetze, so das sie uns mit Gesetzen nu haben uberschuttet." W. A. X, 3, 20 (Predigten, 1522). All experience and history teaches that the less law the more justice, and the fewer commands, the more good works: "Das lefet uns die orfarung, alle cronicken, dartzu die heyligen schrifft, das, yhe weni-ger gesetz, yhe besser recht, yhe weniger gepott, yhe mehr gutter werck." W. A. VI, 555 (Ein Sermon von dem neuen Testament, 1520). One of the most important reasons for Luther's distrust in the law is his conviction that the law may drive men to outwardly "good" works but since these are done unwillingly they only lead to hypocrisy and cannot be pleasing in God's eyes: "dan ob wol das gesetz treybt und zwinget zu guten wercken von den bossen, ists doch nit muglich, das der mensch dasselb willig und gerne thu, sondern befindet sich altzeyt ungunstig dem gesetz und wolt lieber frey seyn. Die weil den unwill da ist, soo ist nymmer keyn gutt werck da, dan was nit willig geschicht, ist nit gut und gleysset nur als were es gut. Darumb mugen alle gesetz niemant gründlich frum machen on die gnad gottis, sondern es müssen eytel gleysser, heuchler, eusserliche, hoffertige heylige drauss werden, die hie yhren lohn empfangen und gott nymmer gefallen." Ibid. "Ergo omnis lex lata est ad impedienda peccata. Ergo lex, cum cohercet peccata, iustificat? Nihil minus. Quod enim non occido, non committo adulterium, furtum non facio, quod ad aliis peccatis abstineo, non volens aut virtutis amore
As Nygren points out, Luther looks at the law as demanding a free surrender to God but because it demands a free surrender it renders it impossible; it would be a contradiction in terms to think of it succeeding: *Agape and Eros*, II, 2, 509f. Seeberg's view, therefore, that the law remains as a "Lebensnorm" in the Christian life but the "du sollst" is gone is hardly adequate to explain Luther's full view: *Grundzüge der Theologie Luthers*, 110, 132. Lammers is closer to the spirit of Luther's teaching when he says that the "Erfullung" of the law is lifted beyond being a moralistic problem by Luther: Luthers Anschauung vom Willen, 20ff. Luther's true teaching is of a doctrine which stands above the law; the transcending of the law is Luther's key to the Christian life: "Haec ideo dico, nequis putet nos bona opera reiicere aut prohibere, ut papistae nos falso accusant, non intelligentes, neque quid ipsi loquantur, neque quid nos doceamus. Nihil enim noverunt nisi solam iustitiam legis, et tamen volunt iudicare de doctrina, quae posita est longe supra et ultra legem." W. A. XL, 1, 46.

219. "Und sind wol seine Oster prediger, aber schendliche Pfingst prediger." W. A. L, 599.

220. Ibid. "Itaque pii non sunt sub lege, scilicet Spiritu...Docet ergo Paulus in summa, hac disputations de lucta Carnis et Spiritus, quod reconciliati seu Sancti non possint perficere hoc, quod Spiritus vult. Libenter enim Spiritus vellet totus esse purus, sed Caro coniuncta illa non permittit. Salvi tamen sunt et iunt per remissionem peccatorum quae est in Christo. Desinde quia etiam ambulant et ducentur Spiritu, non sunt sub lege, hoc est, Lex non potest accusare et perturbar eam eos, aut se etiam hoc tentat, tamen non potest adiger eos ad desperationem." W. A. XL, 2, 97, 99. According to Luther, the Holy Spirit preaches both the law and the gospel; He both convicts of sin and saves: W. A. LIII, 353. Mayer, "The Una Sancta in Luther's Theology", *Christendom* XII, 326. Seeberg, Die Lehre Luthers, 206. The special work of the Holy Spirit is as "der Geber der Freiheit"; Otto, Anschauung vom heiligen Geiste bei Luther, 15. The office and functions of the Holy Spirit can best be seen in relation to the other Persons of the Trinity; the Father and Son have created (and re-created through Christ's death and resurrection) and it is the work of the Holy Spirit to give life to that which has been created: "Et magnus Ecclesiae consensus est de mysterio Trinitatis hic prodito. Pater per Filium, quem verbum Mose vocat, creavit coelum et terram ex nihilo. His Spiritus sanctus incubat...Nam Spiritus sancti officium est vivificare." W. A. XLIII, 8.

The relation between the Holy Spirit and the justified Christian is determined by this division of work within the Trinity. When a man is baptized as a Christian--when he "puts
on Christ"—he is a new creation: "Induere vero Christum Evangelice non est imitationis, sed nativitatis et creationis novae, quod videlicet ego induor ipso Christo, hoc est, ipsius innocentia, iustitia, sapientia, potentia, salute, vita, Spiritu etc." W. A. XL, 1, 540. It is the work of the Holy Spirit to vivify this new creation: "Also richtet der heilige geist die heiligung aus durch die folgende stücke das ist durch die gemeine der heiligen oder Christliche kyrche vergebung der sünden aufferstehung des fleisches und das ewige leben...Ynn des aber weil die heilickeit angefangen ist und teglich zunimpt...Denn itzt bleiben wir halb und halb reine und heilig auff das der Heilig geist ymer an uns erbeite durch das wort und teglich vergebung austeilte bis ynn ihemes leben da nicht mehr vergebung wird sein...Sihe das alles sol des heiligen geistes ampt und werck sein das er auff erden die heilickeit anfahe und teglich mere durch die zwey stück Christliche kyrche und vergebung der sünde." W. A. XXX, 1, 186, 190-1.

Good works are, therefore, fruits of the Spirit; one must distinguish between "active" and "passive" love, for the latter is the true love which is the "work" of faith and the Holy Spirit: Müller, Das Lob Gottes bei Luther, 15, 102ff.

Niebuhr, among others, has accused Luther of a "defeatism" which originates from a subordination of sanctification to justification. Pauck has severely criticized Niebuhr's interpretation of Luther: "He takes frequent occasions to suggest inadequacies in Luther's teachings, but these criticisms do not seem to be founded on a careful study of Luther's work...Luther's faith certainly was that in Christ sinful man had not only the assurance but the actual gift of forgiveness, sanctification, renewal. This confidence was the citadel of the freedom of the Christian man, because it was the trust that the Gospel really was good news." Pauck, "Luther and the Reformation", Theology Today III, 3, 325ff. This is a slight misrepresentation of Niebuhr for he says of Luther: "He does not deny, in other words, that the new life is capable of a new righteousness." Nature and Destiny II, 193; Niebuhr is primarily critical of Luther's social ethic. Nevertheless, Pauck has drawn attention to an emphasis in Luther's theology which is often ignored; that is, that the gospel is for Luther the good news of the working of the whole of the Trinity: "Dem Vater gibt man die schöpfung, dem Son die erl'sung und den heyligen Geyst die krafft der heiligung...Solches sind alles werck des einigen Gottes. Aber bey der unterschid der werck soll man auch die unterschid der personen fassen...Das ist ein sehr trostliche predig, die uns ye solt ein fröhliches hertz gegen Gott machen, sintemal wir sehen, das alle drey personen, die gantze Gottheyt, sich dahin wendet und damit umbgehet, das den armen, ellenden menschen wider die sünde, den tod und teuffel zur
gerechtigkeit, ewigen leben und dem Reich Gottes geholfen
Werd." W. A. LII, 344, 346. It is in this context that
Luther speaks of the Christian being freed from the law;
it is this "doctrina" of the gospel which is truly "longe
supra et ultra legem."

221. The legalism is not to be considered only a Roman or sec-
tarian attribute. Such tendencies were already beginning to
be seen within Luther's own "family". Hildebrandt describes
the "Concessions to Law" which some of Luther's colleagues
were tempted to make. He points out that Melanchthon's Arti-
culi de quibus exerunt per visitatores (1527) so strongly
emphasized the work of the law that it offended others of
Luther's friends, among whom was Agricola, who appealed to
the "real" Luther in protest. Hildebrandt, Melanchthon, 34-5.
Kawerau gives a brief account of these early strained relations
between Melanchthon and Agricola and the conference at Torgau
(Nov. 26-28, 1527) which theoretically resolved their differ-
ences. Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia I, 198-200. Under these
circumstances, Hildebrandt believes that: "To have pressed
this point was at any rate the relative right of Agricola's
protest." Melanchthon, 43. Melanchthon showed other ten-
dencies which would indicate his difference of temper and
outlook from Luther. Whitney, Reformation Essays, 29. One
wonders whether Luther's strong personal affection for Melanch-
thon didn't often blind him to the divergence of their view-
points. There is an interesting disputation between Luther
and Melanchthon in the Table-talk on the whole question of
justification: good works, the work of the law, etc. which
was supposed to have taken place in 1536; from what has been
said it may well be authentic, at least in outline, and it
gives a vivid insight into the different approaches of the
two men: Michelet, The Life of Martin Luther, 425ff. This is
an important issue in the history of later Lutheranism. Aulen
has described the Osian andrian controversy which ultimately led
to a victory of "rational nomism", as represented by Mörlin,
Flacius, etc.: "The result was that law now came to be taken
as the essential basis of man's relation to God...Luther's
fundamental thought, that law is in one respect a tyrant and
an enemy from whose power Christ came to set men free, is al-
together lost." Christus Victor, 139ff. Aulen's verdict on
Melanchthon is: "The inner tensions within Luther's theology,
the vigour and force of his thoughts, and his sharply para-
doxical language, Melanchthon wholly lacked the power to un-
derstand." Ibid. 140. The Antinomian controversy vividly
illustrates the difficulty Luther faced in trying to maintain
a middle position; it also reveals the depth and creativeness
of his views which made them so difficult to be passed on to and
grasped by his followers: "The tragedy of the debate on Justifi-
cation between Osiander on the one side, and Melanchthon, Mörlin, and others on the other, was that both sides could claim to appeal to Luther, but that neither side had grasped anything like his whole width of view. " Aulen, Christus Victor, 142.

222. "Beide, Romanismus and Antinomismus, haben also dies miteinander gemeinsam, dass sie Gottes Willen nur als einheitlich zu denken vermögen, und sie unterscheiden sich nur dadurch von einander, dass sie diesen einheitlichen Willen Gottes entweder im Gesetz oder im Evangelium finden." Stange, Studien zur Theologie Luthers I, 55-6. Husfeldt discusses the relation of the law to the Christian life in Studien zum Problem des Gesetzes in der Theologie Luthers and comes to the conclusion that Luther gives law an important place in Christian ethics; 61ff.; his conclusions seem to me to be highly questionable, largely because he has failed to take into consideration Luther's understanding of the work of the Holy Spirit in the "new creation".

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