THE VALIDITY OF
MYSTICAL KNOWLEDGE

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in the

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

by

J. WARREN MCALESTINE, B.A., M.A.
GRADUATE OF KNOX COLLEGE, TORONTO, and
the UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

November, 1931.

Degree conferred, 18th December, 1931.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION p. 1

CHAPTER II. STAGES OF THE MYSTIC LIFE p. 15

1. The Awakening of the Self 15
2. The Purgative Stage 30
3. Meditation (Contemplation 42
4. The Ecstasy 51
   a. Mystical Knowledge 62
   b. Ineffability 75

CHAPTER III. MYSTICISM AND NATURALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY 83

CHAPTER IV. THE NATURALNESS OF MYSTICISM 115

CHAPTER V. THE VALIDITY OF MYSTICAL KNOWLEDGE 139

CHAPTER VI. THE THEORY TESTED 150

1. The Mystic as Man 150
2. The Mystic's God 158
3. Mysticism and Pantheism 168

CHAPTER VII. INSPIRATION AND REVELATION 177

1. Revelation and the Sub-conscious 194

CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSION 202
A. Statement of Aim.

We propose to support the mystic's claim that he can know God immediately through worship. This involves, in philosophical language, the proposition of a theory that the mystic can have a direct approach to reality. We use the term "mystical knowledge" to indicate the "knowledge of acquaintance" and, while we plan to offer some explanation of revelation and inspiration as yielding 'knowledge about' or truth in its aspects, we regard the latter as incidental and the former as characteristically mystical knowledge.

B. Development of Proof.

The first step is the discovery, through an examination of numerous definitions of mysticism, of that which may be accepted as characteristic mysticism. The working definition decided upon is as follows:

"The mystic is one who apprehends the Real immediately or intuitively rather than by the processes of logic or conceptual thinking. This experience of the Real yields cognitive fruits but only incidentally."

The mystic is to be regarded as one who knows God immediately, whereas the non-mystic as religionist knows only an intellectually derived God.
The term 'ecstasy' is used throughout to indicate communication in general as practised by both the milder and grand mystics.

II. Descriptive Portion.

The description of the mystic life is lengthy, but we argue, not unduly so, since knowing by the mystic is by consciousness as a whole. If we are to understand him as 'knower' we must know him, not only in his characteristically mystical act, but in the entirety of his interests and undertakings.

Mysticism is described under four headings. The first stage of the mystic life is Awakening to some degree of assurance that the mystic way should be taken. Awakening may be due to such causes as intellectual despair, unsatisfied moral needs, tradition, aesthetic intuitions. It is the necessary antecedent to mystical life but is not essentially mystical.

The second stage is Purgation which has a two-fold purpose. It achieves a moral preparation in worthiness of the Vision and also removes distracting thoughts and desires.

The third stage is Meditation or Contemplation and consists of the worshipper reminding himself of God. Psychologically, this is an ordering of consciousness in relevance to the vision sought.
The final stage is Ecstasy or Union. This is an experience of knowing akin to the knowing of another person. It is 'acquaintance with' rather than 'knowledge about' God. This is the real 'mystical knowledge.' Illustrations of ecstasy are drawn from the reports of the grand or extreme mystics but the writer bears in mind throughout that the extreme experience may be taken only as illustration and not a true example of the best mysticism. It is useful for purpose of description because of its psychological 'out-rightness' or 'clear-cutness.'

**D. Mystical Knowing and Negative Psychology.**

Before proceeding to show in positive way that the mystic's claim may be accepted as valid, there is a negative aspect of proof which consists in meeting the conclusion of naturalistic psychology which identifies mysticism as extreme subjectivism. A brief criticism is offered of the position of Leuba, the best representative of this viewpoint.

**E. Proof.**

(a) The Naturalness of Mysticism.

An important phase of proof is the establishment of the
naturalness of mystical knowing. The mystic's motivation, preparation and meditation are examined with view to showing that they do not indicate an extreme and undesirable 'other-worldliness.'

(b) The Validity of Mystical Knowledge.

In coming to the heart of proof we show that in an understanding of friendship there is a key to a theoretical understanding of mystical ecstasy. Friendship is shown to be more than an intellectual or feeling response to the observed qualities of one Self by another. It is communion. This communion is ineffable. We make use of the proof of the 'subjective revelation,' an immediate knowing of the Self as real and more than its qualities, to show that there is available for the ineffable communion of friend with friend, or of man with God, a free and 'spiritual' Self. As friend enjoys ineffable communion with, or knowing of friend, so the worshipper enjoys ineffable communion with, or knowing of God. As a friend gets beyond the qualities of his friend to know the Self of those qualities, so the mystic gets beyond the world to the Self of the world who is God.

In testing this theory we show that it implies that the mystic is a true and not an attenuated personality. He is free, moral,
thinking being. His God is shown to be the Self of the world and not a neutral entity, a bare unity, or the unknowable in the agnostic sense.

(c) Mystic is frequently identified, by its critics, with pantheism. If our theory is to be pragmatically acceptable, this criticism has to be met. We show that the mystic is not a true pantheist.

F. Revelation and Inspiration.

Thus far we have dealt with knowing as ineffable communion. Related to the mystic's communion is his reception of truth in its aspects. We show that he is not a passive recipient of messages from God to which he merely gives verbal expression. We offer the theory that just as an ineffable experience of love or beauty returns one to the world to become a more zealous and efficient discoverer of truth, so the mystic's ineffable communion returns him to the world as an ardent, personal enterprise of truth finding. Only in this sense is he inspired or the recipient of revelation. So-called revelation of which the complete 'otherness' of source is affirmed is also shown to be personally achieved with the aid of sub-consciousness.
In conclusion we make brief reference to the superiority of mysticism over such representative systems as realism and idealism, to meet the philosophical and religious needs of men.
CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION.

Today's religious thinking is marked by a revival of interest in the study of religious mysticism. Anomalous although it is, this new interest seems neither to grow out of nor to accompany a revival of, nor even a persistent retention of traditional mysticism as a way of life and worship. While expositors of mysticism and protagonists of mysticism are legion, illustrious, self-proclaimed mystics seem to be very few and far between. It may well be that this multiplicity of analysts of the mystic life from without, together with the paucity of those who would feel free to make personal affirmation about mysticism, is responsible for the confusing diversity of opinion as to what the terms, 'Mystic' and 'Mysticism', really connote. Definitions and descriptions of mysticism are almost as numerous as mysticism's expositors and critics.

Our thesis is that the mystic has a valid way of approaching reality. If we are to test this unique approach in any final and satisfactory manner, it is quite obvious that, however disconcerting the task, we must try to discover those few qualities and enterprises of the mystic as "knower" which emerge from the many descriptions and claims, as characteristic ones.

All mystics affirm that they have an access to true
religious knowledge, which the non-mystic cannot have. Manifestly, our success in examining this claim will depend upon our success in acquainting ourselves, not merely with the mystic as knower, but with the mystic as whole man. In testing the result of scientific enquiry we can ignore the scientist as man and yet not be impeded in our examination of his enterprise and findings. This is also true, if in lesser degree, in the case of philosophers and their systems. Many accredited students of Immanuel Kant's philosophy have no other information about Kant as man than the somewhat hackneyed bit about the regularity of his habits, but this has not interfered seriously with their estimate of Kant, the philosopher. But with the mystic as knower it is quite different. His approach to reality is inextricably bound up with his emotional and moral life. He "knows," as we shall find, with consciousness as a whole. We must, then, so far as possible, cultivate his acquaintance in a thoroughgoing fashion.

In the main, either of two traditional methods of arriving at reality are believed in. By one of these the human mind, in a spirit of imperial independence arrives at its own conclusions, or believes that it does. By the other method, the consciousness, having disciplined itself suitably, receives, rather than achieves for itself, the great reward. Its mastery lies, not in asserting
and practising complete independence, but in casting itself upon the graciousness of a revealing Other. This latter is the method of mysticism. The mystic is an intuitionist. This is borne out by many definitions of mysticism which we cannot afford to overlook if we are to discover at the outset what is characteristically mystical.

For instance, Hocking defines mysticism as "a way of dealing with God, having cognitive and other fruits, affecting first the Mystic's being and then his thinking, affording thereby answers to prayer which he can distinguish from the results of his own reflection." Or Pratt: "Mysticism is the sense of the presence of a being or reality through other means than the ordinary perceptive processes of the reason." Or Leuba: "Mysticism is any experience taken by the experiencer to be a contact (not through the senses but 'immediate,' 'intuitive') or union of the self with a larger than self, be it called the World-Spirit, God, the Absolute, or otherwise." Or Bennett: "Mysticism is a way of life in which the conspicuous element is the immediate experience of God." Or James; who describes mysticism as an experience of the Absolute which has four marks: (1) Ineffability, (2) Neitic quality, (3) Transiency, (4) Passivity.

Or Underhill: "Mysticism is the art of establishing conscious relation with the Absolute."¹ Miss Underhill gives another definition which is particularly useful, in that it makes clear that this relation with the Absolute is one of dependence, and not complete absorption or self-obliteration. It is "Mysticism is an overwhelming consciousness of God and the mystic's own soul."² Or Inge; "Mysticism has its origin in that which is the raw material of all religion, and perhaps all philosophy and art as well, namely, that dim consciousness of the Beyond which is part of our nature as human beings." He describes this in religious language as "the voice of God speaking to us."³ Or Watkin (Edward Ingram); "Mysticism is a Union-Intuition with God."⁴ Or Holmes (Edward): "The mystic is a sharer in the sense of vision, living and intimate, more than personal with what is at once all-inclusive and transcendentally real."⁵ Or Oman; "It is the essence of mysticism that it is more than prayer -- it is banishing all ideas of sense from the mind...... and passive reception of revelation."⁶ Or Jones (Rufus): "The mystic is a person who insists on a somewhat wider range of first-hand acquaintance with reality than that confined to the operation of five or more special senses."⁷

¹ Underhill, Mysticism, p.97.
² Underhill, Essentials of Mysticism, p.2.
³ Inge, Christian Mysticism, p.5.
⁵ Holmes, The Mystic as Explorer, The Hibbert Journal, April 1928.
⁶ Oman, Mysticism and its Expositors.
⁷ Jones, Some Exponents of Mystical Religion, chap. 1.
From an invaluable group of definitions in Appendix A to Dean Inge's "Christian Mysticism" we select these:

Canon Overton: "That we bear the image of God is the starting point, one might say the postulate, of all mysticism. The complete union of the soul with God is the goal of all Mysticism."

Lasson: "The essence of Mysticism is the assertion of an intuition which transcends the temporal categories of the understanding, relying on speculative reason."

Victor Cousin: "Mysticism consists in substituting direct inspiration for indirect, ecstasy for reason, rapture for philosophy."

We introduced these definitions by asserting that the mystic does not seek reality unaided but that he casts himself upon the Other and trusts that by such surrender he will become the world's most efficient learner and knower. While there are some slight variations among the definitions, they are at one in showing that the mystic, in some way, derives his knowledge from an immediate experience of the Other, not through his senses or his ratio-sinative processes, but intuitively. He knows Reality, not in the sense of knowing about it, but in the sense of having acquaintance with it. His is like the friend's knowing of a friend or the lover's knowing of his beloved. It is more intimate, and, to him, more real than any knowledge based upon description, however detailed, of the one known. The mystic would remind us that it is knowing through love. Regarding the one thus known, or become acquainted with through love, the mystic can have little to say. In fact as a true mystic he would be enforced to say, "I know"
but also, "I cannot tell." To ascribe qualities to the Known One would be to limit Him and He is limitless. Thus the mystic says his experience of reality is ineffable. So he is silent, silent not as one who has nothing to describe, but as one who has too much to describe. This would seem at first sight a content-less knowing, inconsistent with the mystic's characteristic willingness to preach and teach. We find that it does not indicate fully the mystic's life as knower. Closely related to this experience of reality which is ineffable is one of revelation and inspiration. Mysticism is prolific in concrete statements of belief, both religious and moral. To mystics, can be traced great emancipating convictions, which seemed in the day they appeared to be wholly new and to supersede certain antecedent moral principles. Thus, while theoretically mystics should have been silent about their mystical experience of the Absolute, they have spoken repeatedly as recipients of inspirations. They seem to have been alternately quickened into speech and overwhelmed into silence.

This description in which we have attempted to gather up the essential points of the various definitions quoted above yields our own definition of the mystic: "The mystic is one who apprehends the Real immediately or intuitively, rather than by the processes of logic or conceptual thinking. This experience of the Real
yields cognitive fruits, but only incidentally." We use the term "apprehends;" for although it is not unusual for the mystics to speak of absorption in the Absolute, they really insist that, while the everyday clearly cut subject-object relationship is suspended in the ecstasy, yet personality is not absorbed, in the sense of being obliterated. This may seem a contradiction, but the expressions, "identification with the Real" and "absorption in the Real," are, so far as we can determine from the mystic's report, extreme statements of his experience, the extremism being due to the inadequacies of common thought forms. The mystic usually denies that he is a Pantheist, and absorption in the Real would imply Pantheism. Seeming to deny the "I" and "Thou" relationship, he yet insists upon it. The paradox is a typically mystical one. The mystic believes that consciousness, although passive, has identity. There is an "I" who apprehends.

Before proceeding to describe in some detail the entire enterprise of the mystic it is necessary, in the practical interest of clarity, to select the term to be used throughout our discussion to indicate what may be loosely described here as the object of the mystic's worship. This object, the mystic describes as the Absolute, Reality, the One, the Infinite, the Cosmos, the Nothing (Nirvana) or God. As many of our illustrations are to be drawn from
religion Christian mystics, we shall use the term 'God' to denote the One with whom the mystic has union.

We have already said that in the main there are two methods of approaching reality. It is important here to amplify this statement and to relate it more particularly to mysticism. A very simple and general estimate of religious persons resolves them into two classes. Those of the first class react emotionally and volitionally to an intellectually derived God. They may find Him in various ways. Some find Him in the wonder of a created universe which demands a first cause. Hocking quotes from a student:

"It seems required by reason that some great power is responsible for the existence of the universe and since man has found no satisfactory explanation of the beginning of things in nature itself, I believe that power to be God." 1

This is a somewhat naive statement of the cosmological argument.

Others may argue that the order of the universe implies a mentally cohering force. They detect design and as an act of intellectual faith they accept a designer. This is the telological argument.

Others believe that "the idea of God somehow guarantees its own truth." 2 A necessary condition of the birth of the idea of God is the corresponding reality, God. This is the ontological argument.

1. Hocking, Types of Philosophy, p.75.
2. Hocking, " " p.76.
Others fix upon that which is stable in the system in which they find themselves, namely their values. In certain motives or acts they maintain it is possible to discern worthwhileness and truth immediately. Loving is better than hating; honest witnessing is better than false witnessing. The truth of this is as dependable as the fact of consciousness and more profoundly real than the world of sense. This assurance is an intuition. It belongs to those of us who take our values "not as conventions but rather as revelations." But this seeming validity might be illusory. It demands a guarantor or ground. Compelled to believe in the reality of his values, man is further compelled to believe in their Guarantor or Ground who is God.

Others adopt an exceedingly laissez-faire metaphysic and conclude that some form of theism is requisite for human happiness; that theistic belief resolves life's disunity and adds to its fullness. The idea of God, believed in as the Real, elicits certain satisfactory responses, therefore the belief is warranted and substantiated. This is the pragmatic argument.

Others, less philosophic, take their belief in God from tradition, from authoritative persons, Books, the Church. These are barest indications of ways man has of arriving at God. Obviously this is neither the place to expand nor to
evaluate any of them. They illustrate a common activity of that first religious class which we set out to describe. It consists of those who depend upon their own personal effort to find God. He is not to be known empirically but metaphysically or, as is the case with most unphilosophic worshippers, from report. It is true that those who believe in God upon these conditions may regard their God thus thought of, with much warmth of feeling. They may look upon Him in awe. They may feel an impulse to live morally, in order to achieve harmony with the perfect being of their thought—God. But they can never be quite affirmative. They are able to say, "He may be" or "He should be." They will live as if they believe, "He is," but they can never say "He is." Their faith, when all is said, is only based upon theory or hearsay. The very multiplicity of these theory-faiths signifies that they are but theories.

The second class comprises those who commune with their God. They enjoy what is usually known as religious experience. They know God is, for they have been immediately related to Him. They may find Him in the depths of their being, having first expurgated all alien human impediments to worship. They may know Him through a kind of absorption in His very being. In either case they have personal experience of Him. They reach their
Beyond while all others can only picture it theoretically and imaginatively. These are the Mystics. They are the truly religious for whom worship is more than reflection. The first class comprises only religious theorists who hold their theories in a spirit of seriousness.

If, then, the mystics are those who commune with their God immediately and personally, it would appear that the mystic experience may range from the milder forms of communion experienced in ordinary worship to the indwelling of God in the ecstatic moments which have come to the extremist saints. In fact, we hold that the essential communion experience of quiet worship is incipiently ecstatic, its incipiency being due either to individual temperament, habit, or other restraining factors such as environment. We think Coe and Selbie are more nearly right than Thouless on this point. "Thouless describes a mystic as:"

"a person to whom the emotional, religious experiences which occur at times to all religious persons have become stronger and more permanent." 1

In other words, Thouless would seem to limit mysticism proper to extremism. Coe, on the other hand, says:"

"From inspiration to religious ecstasy the passage is continuous. The man who is merely inspired keeps up more or less discriminate thought, but the saint who is 'rapt' in God is supposed to let his thought

---

"activity cease in order that he may be filled with God only. Extreme mystics assert that a state is finally reached in which self-consciousness with its distinctions of "I" and "Thou" lapses and God is all. This, which is ecstasy is obviously just the maximum of 'possession.' 1

Selbie says:-

"There is no difference in kind between the assurance of God's help and presence which any humble Christian may feel, and the rapturous absorption of the mystic in the All. The mental attitudes and processes in both cases are the same." 2

The communicant at the Sacrament may be inspired by the "presence" of his Lord although he is still in conscious touch with the sense world. This may seem to be his experience and this is how he would probably describe it, but we suggest that the actual moments of inspiration take him "out of self" just as would ecstasy. Could these inspirations of momentary duration be isolated and examined by some super-psychologist they would appear as brief ecstasies, different only in duration and intensity from the ecstasy of grand mysticism. Sense or conceptual thought may hold the stage intermittently but be ruled off in the moments of inspiration or communion. Having experienced a series of these moments during the sacramental hour, the communicant may be led to look back and say that the time was one of continuous mystical inspiration. What actually has taken

place has been probably a series of rapid changes from inspiration or "possession" to full consciousness. The repeated interferences by ordinary consciousness prevent the coming of extreme "possession," a continuous ecstasy. But, to repeat, the moments of inspiration which intermittent full consciousness keeps from merging are the same in quality as ecstasy. They are moments of ecstasy. The person who experiences religious inspiration in the sense of feeling the immediate presence of the Object of his worship is a mystic, but more, for he is, paradoxically although it may appear in description, a mild ecstatic. This being the case, it is impossible to consider the religious ecstasy either in its nature or its noetic fruits as a separate phenomenon. All religious experience which is held to be immediate partakes of the nature of the ecstatic.

Enough has been said of the characteristic elements of mysticism to suggest how valuable to religion itself would be the smallest contribution made toward establishing the reasonableness, naturalness and validity of mysticism, as a way of knowing God. Religion, obviously, must be more than its theology or a positive metaphysics. It must be more even than suitable moral and emotional response to the God theology might
describe or metaphysics prove. There will be, forever, a difference to the worshipper between a known and a proved God. Man, for instance, longs to be able to believe that God is personal. Philosophers of religion have, with commendable zeal and skill, undertaken to prove that God is personal and to show why He is and must be personal. But the worshipper whose own personality finds itself in the warmth of fellowship with others will, upon the whole, be left cold by all such proof of the nature of His God. He wants to find God out as personal. He wants to know Him in some such way as he knows another person. He may be quite submissive to those conditions which true religion seems to impose in demanding awe and reverence toward its Object, and still crave to know that his prayer in some way brings him nearer to the All-Highest. The instinct of religion is an instinct for communion. The core of religion is communion. This being true, religion cannot survive without mysticism; and any modicum of assurance which proof can add to the assurance which religious experience gives, marks a real achievement in today's thought about religion. We ardently take up the cause of mysticism, for we believe it to be the cause of religion itself.
As we proceed to illustrate and describe the mystic experience, it is helpful to first indicate its framework or stages. Most writers agree upon three stages - the Purgative or Preparatory stage; the Meditative stage; and the Goal or Unitive stage at which the seeker has immediate or intuitive knowledge of the Real, his God. But all such schematic demarcation is more or less arbitrary and most mystics affirm that all attempts to direct their experience by these stages would stultify rather than enhance their spiritual life. Moreover, it is clear that there is no such progress in time as this conventional map suggests, for the forces, within and from without, may be evident at any time during the mystic's life. It would be more strictly correct to say that there are three or more aspects of the mystic life. However 'stages' has become an usage in mystical studies so we shall adhere to the term in order to avoid confusion. The conventional names of the stages supply useful headings for an ordered discussion of our subject.

The Awakening of the Self.

The undertaking of the first stage proper obviously presupposes an awakening to some degree of assurance that the
Mystic way is worthwhile following. But even this awakening may be preceded by non-mystical activity which bears close relation to it. This antecedent activity may assume various forms.

Let us look first into the religious life of the ordinary worshipper who is assured that God is real, and that he may know and does know God immediately. Why does he set out to gain this oneness or harmony with God which is the culmination of the effort of worship? In many cases his enterprise originates in a sense of the break-down or inadequacy of 'worldly' attempts to find fullness of life. The writer once made careful observation, over a period of one year, of the religious life of a congregation of 'Brethren' in a Canadian city. Its main service of worship, held each week night as well as on Sunday, was followed by an hour of prayer during which many of those 'saved' at some previous time came, as they said, "under the possession of the Holy Spirit," and fell into trance or "spoke in tongues." Although, upon subsequent analysis, this form of worship may be shown to contain some elements of perversion of a truer mysticism, we may take the various states of mind avowed by the subjects as illustrative of the less exaggerated states experienced by moderate worshippers. Psychologists have consistently had recourse to
mystical extremism for illustration of the quieter - and better -
forms of religious experience. Since informality was a charac-
teristic of this congregation both before and after its worship,
it was possible to converse freely with individual worshippers
who were not inclined to reticence. We found from much question-
ing that the greater number of the converts had been saved from
more or less sordid lives. At least three had served prison sen-
tences. Many had been drunkards. Some had been women of the
street. Others, less recreant, according to conventional stan-
dards, had been dishonest in business, or cruel to their families,
friends or neighbours. Even to an observer, unbiased by any
psychological interest or prejudice, it must have been apparent
that evil had done its work but too well with these people and
that although a new light was in their faces, there were there, too,
marks left by their kind of reckless living. Among them, one
would at one time have found the dissatisfied, the fearful and even
the desperate, ready to grasp at any way for the restoring of
peace in their distraught lives. Confronted by the promise of
compensating oneness with God, presented to them as the highest
of all goods, they were ready to respond. Some of them came
casually into this church which was for such as they. Others
were brought by pitying friends or congregational worshippers.
In response to the church's message and the mystical practice of its 'saved members' they had eventually become mystics.

This is, in somewhat exaggerated form, the story of the preparatory religious life of many a normal church worshipper and quiet mystic. The life begins with an awareness that its lonely moral effort cannot succeed. The worshipper feels that his will must have the support of another. The concentration of will upon moral ends only serves to remind of and summon and resummon those very forces which mean the defeat of such ends. Voluntary effort toward good is so apt to create obsessions of the opposite evil. Leuba quotes from the religious history of a woman teacher of botany in an American college who, having rejected the orthodox comforts of her early religion, yet found herself returning longingly to them. She says:

"One Sunday morning I went to church feeling so burdened and troubled that it seemed to me I could no longer endure it. Some change must come; the work was more than I could carry through alone. Almost the first sentence of the sermon was, 'It is of no use, we cannot get through this world and accomplish what we are placed here to do unless we let someone besides ourselves carry the heavy end of the burden.' The whole sermon was after this strain and how I blessed God for sending that comforting message which I need so much!"

In the lives of many of the saints we find this dissatisfaction and longing induced, often, by moral failure or, indeed, by a

feeling of the inadequacy even of conventional moral success, for the life which pronounces even sound righteousness attained by personal effort to be "as filthy rags," shows that temperament which impels to mystical pursuit. Miss Underhill describes the pre-mystical life of St. Francis of Assisi thus,-

"Now the opening of St. Francis' eyes which took place when he was twenty-four years old, had been preceded by a long, hard struggle between the life of the world and the persistent call of the spirit. His mind, in modern language, had not unified itself. He was a high-spirited boy, full of vitality; a natural artist, with all the fastidiousness which the artistic temperament involves. War and pleasure both attracted him, and upon them, says this legend, he 'miserably squandered his time.' Nevertheless he was vaguely dissatisfied. In the midst of festivities, he would have sudden fits of abstraction; abortive attempts of the growing transcendental consciousness, still imprisoned below the threshold but aware of any touch with the Real, to force itself to the surface and seize the reins. "Even in ignorance," says Thomas of Celano again, "he was being led to perfect knowledge." He loved beauty, for he was by nature a poet and a musician, and shrank instinctively from contact with ugliness and disease. But something within him ran counter to this temperamental bias and sometimes conquered it. He would then associate with beggars, tend the leprous, perform impulsive acts of charity and self-humiliation."

Here we see the beginnings of a reaction, if not from moral dissipation, at least from a deep sense of the failure of moral effort to yield complete satisfaction to a highly sensitive and imaginative soul.

In normal religious life, as in this more extreme case, mystical enterprise frequently begins with the realisation of the failure of moral effort or the incompetence of moral effort to yield the final satisfaction of which some vague awareness may exist. Under the clergyman's leading the worshipper confesses his sin and his need for restoration to right relationship with God, feeling that of himself he can do nothing. This is a well-recognised sequence of common Christian worship.

Again, mysticism may arise in intellectual despair. Widespread mystical movements have arisen in reaction from or as protest against pure intellection and its attempts to arrive at Reality or God. Such reaction or protest is frequently epitomised in the life of an individual mystic who has placed implicit confidence in the methods of logic to thus bring him to know Reality and feels at length that he has been cruelly betrayed. Also, among seekers for the mystic's goal, do we find those who in their awakening accepted as their faith, at a very early stage, that childlikeness of mind would win the highest revelations which forever elude the profound and the enquiring. The need for simplicity of heart is almost an axiom of the mystic faith. We might quote at length to illustrate mysticism as such a reaction.
Hocking says,-

"Mysticism is evidently often the product of an intensely philosophical spirit discontented with the mere rationality of philosophy, and of an intensely religious spirit discontented with the dogmatic systems of theology in every creed. It is inspired by the insatiable ambition of individual spirits to know reality by direct acquaintance, rather than by rumour or description." 1

Leuba identifies Ritschlianism as an attempt to save religion, that is, mystical religion, by "claiming the radical separation between Christian theology and what he called 'theoretical knowledge'." He further quotes a Ritschlian view,-

"It is incompetent for it (theology) to enter upon either a direct or an indirect proof of the Christian revelation by seeking to show that it agrees with some philosophy or some judicial view of the world; for to such Christianity simply stands opposed." 2

Owen says,-

"Mysticism is a phenomenon which always appears in times of political disillusionment and intellectual discouragement." 3

These quotations are seen to be at one in declaring mysticism to be a reaction to what it regards as cold and un-illuminating intellectualism. The most we can justifiably say is that many mystics have tried the methods of ratiocinative thinking in their effort to apprehend God, and, having failed, have become mystical. Owen is too unreserved in concluding that mysticism is

1. Hocking, Types of Philosophy, p.386.
characteristically such a reaction. Many philosophers would insist that a philosophical pursuit is a useful preparation to reach some higher intuition which pure reason cannot give. Mysticism is in this case, the fulfilment and not the negation of their conceptual activity. But in the history of mysticism it will be found that with certain warm temperaments, metaphysics and philosophy were not enough, hence a new way, the mystical, was undertaken. This has been the occasion of many a mystical awakening.

Again, the mystic may be impelled to seek a higher reality than sense can reveal, by potent inklings of such reality which impinge upon his aesthetic nature. An experience of beauty in nature, for example, is felt by some to be but a foretaste of a kindred but more completely real enjoyment or satisfaction. In the presence of beauty we are certain that something happens in consciousness, or to consciousness, which mere sense impression or intellectual description of the beautiful thing could not give. The materialistic psychologist might describe an impression of beauty as a sensuous feeling of pleasure. Somewhat under the conditions in which the bee is drawn to the flower, the human organism is won to the happily organized field, or to the non-irritating composition of colour or objects. But the aesthetic
person insists that there is a whole response of his tri-partite consciousness to the beautiful object which is more than a feeling of sensuous pleasure. A mere feeling of pleasure, as a professor has often remarked, is only that which happens to one enjoying a hot bath. The response to beauty is infinitely more than this; and such response is not intellectual, to be arrived at by studied observation and analysis. In fact, when consciousness begins to examine the beautiful, and concludes that compositions, proportions, rhythms and harmonies have been rightly present to yield beauty, it is engaged in an entirely different experience from the one in which it says spontaneously and absorbedly, "This is beautiful." It knows that this calculating estimate of the ingredients of beauty is really superficial whereas the immediate apprehension of beauty is real. It is of the nature of an intuition. It is not feeling alone. It is not analytical, for analysis stultifies and does not reveal. Consciousness, so far as it can observe itself, knows that as a whole it enjoys its impression of beauty and feels that in so doing, its reaction is higher than either the sensuous or conceptual. In the moving power of beauty consciousness touches reality which separate faculties, in so far as they can operate separately, could not reach.
In this harmony of self with beauty many have found that which has driven them to seek even a more transcendent harmony which is mystical union. Balfour is quoted by Hocking thus:—

"But when we look back on those too rare moments when feelings stirred in us by some beautiful object not only seem wholly to absorb us, but to raise us to the vision of things far above the ken of bodily sense or discursive reason, we cannot acquiesce in any attempt at explanation which confines itself to the bare enumeration of psychological and physiological causes and effects. However little, therefore, we may be prepared to accept any particular scheme of aesthetics— and most of these appear to me to be very absurd—we must believe that somewhere and for some Being there shines an unchanging splendour of beauty, of which in Nature and Art we see, each of us from his own standpoint, only passing gleams and stray reflections. No such mystical creed can, however, be squeezed out of observation and experiment; nor can it be forced into any sort of consistency with the naturalistic theory of the Universe." ¹

Hocking says further,—

"In such a mystic as Rabindranath Tagore, beauty becomes the chief guide to metaphysical initiation, and art the chief means of conveying metaphysical truth." ²

Without in the slightest degree disparaging the truth or the value of mysticism, it is also to be observed that mysticism may begin in the life of an individual because he has been denied some form of participation in the abundant life of this world.

It is further to be noted that when faced by conditions which

¹. Hocking, quoted from Balfour's "The Foundation of Belief," in Types of Philosophy, p. 400.
². Hocking, Types of Philosophy, p. 400.
tended to induce feelings of loneliness, hopelessness, and despair, some have been driven to seek the compensations which they believed this world could not give. One who receives little appreciation or sympathy in the natural life seeks union with the supernatural. God will sympathise and appreciate; and the achievement of oneness with Him is the means of the depressed soul gaining for himself the self-respect which he longs to have and which may be denied him through the failure of his fellows to understand and appreciate him. The one who seems unable to attract friends, would make God his friend. The unloved finds in God the Transcendent Lover. The failure in this life would find success in its highest form through union with God. Miss Underhill says of Madam Guyon,—

"Her early married life in her mother-in-law's house was excessively unhappy. She was soon driven to look for comfort in the practices of religion."

Defeats, loneliness, ill-health, have been the occasions of many mystics turning to the consolations and compensations of the mystic way. This fact would seem to suggest that an extreme subjectivism has been the major influence. It is, no doubt, quite true that with many so-called mystics, their experience has had no objective validity, but this cannot call into question the reality of many

1. Underhill, Mysticism, p.222.
of those great mystical victories which began with defeated attempts to find full life in the normal world. The objection so often raised to mysticism upon the whole, on the grounds of its subjectivism, must be dealt with at length at a later stage.

It is evident, as well, that although in its culmination the mystic life involves a solitary flight of the mystic to the One or Real, yet in the earlier stages it finds the mystic dependent upon his environment. Most mystics learn from without that there is a mystic goal to be sought. This is awakening for them. A young Christian may be persistently confronted by the affirmations of his seniors that an immediate experience of God is the sine qua non of religion. The tradition of his world is present to remind him of the same. Tradition, creeds, current religious thought and practice, reports of friends, may act separately, alternately or unitedly to create a compulsion which certain temperaments will find irresistible. A quotation from Miss Underhill supports this view, although in this passage she is more concerned to show the wisdom of using tradition to further the quest, than to suggest that it is an occasion of Awakening. She says,—

"There is nothing of 'social Christianity' in that supreme adventure whereby 'God and the soul are made one thing'. At the same time, here as elsewhere, man cannot safely divorce his own personal history
"from that of the race. The best and truest experience does not come to the eccentric and individual pilgrim whose intuitions are his only law; but rather to him who submits personal intuition to the guidance afforded by the general history of the mystic type." 1

In dealing with awakening a tentative reference should be made to what seems to be an inherent tendency of human thought to turn from the ordinary life of sense to a Beyond. Dean Inge says,-

"Mysticism has its origin in that which is the raw material of all religion, and perhaps all philosophy and art as well, namely, that dim consciousness of the Beyond, which is part of our nature as human beings. Men have given different names to these 'obstinate questionings of sense and outward things.' We may call them, if we will, a sort of higher instinct, perhaps an anticipation of the evolutionary process; or an extension of the frontier of consciousness; or, in religious language, the voice of God speaking to us. Mysticism arises when we try to bring the higher consciousness into relation with the other contents of our minds." 2

It is true that the latitude Inge allows himself by these numerous descriptions leaves only vagueness as the mark of this 'dim consciousness of the Beyond,' but it is necessarily vague and its vagueness does not bring its reality into question. The consistent enterprise of self-conscious man is the quest of this goal.

It is the philosopher's quest. To say that the philosopher seeks to explain or identify the Real, only describes his quest and

1. Underhill, Mysticism, p.359.
2. Inge, Christian Mysticism, p.5.
does not explain why he undertakes it. The scientist says he
seeks the truth hidden in the material world, but each quest
rewarded is succeeded by a new one, for the scientist, like the
philosopher, is really seeking the eternally Beyond. The poet
forever tries to find and speak "The One Word More." Where we
find intelligence and higher emotion, there we will also find
man seeking the unrealized. His search presupposes his faith,
perhaps an inarticulate one, that the Beyond is real. Miss
Underhill would probably go so far as to call this "vague sense
of the Beyond," an "oblique glance" at the real. But even an
"oblique glance" at the real, is not distinguishable, unless
verbally, from an experience of the Real. Both would be mystical.
This feeling for the Beyond is not mystical. We merely accord it
a place here among those factors which induce awakening to the
need of some fully satisfying means of reaching it. It is non-
mystical but stands to mysticism in the relation of necessary
antecedent.

It is to be emphasized that in each of the conditions
just described, the potential mystic is not really distinguishable
from other persons. We have seen him to be dissatisfied with that
degree of reality which is revealed to the senses or by thought;
but such dissatisfaction would conceivably mark the emergence of
any normal religious experience. The mystic is, as yet, only pre-
pared to try a way of life which promises to satisfy his vague
longings. Characteristic mysticism begins with the mystic's effort
to prepare himself for the vision of God. In her painstaking exami-
nation of awakening, Miss Underhill seems to ascribe to awakening,
especially mystical qualities, which properly belong to Illumina-
tion or Ecstasy. Having first described the earlier "divided state"
of St. Francis to which we have referred, she quotes from Thomas
of Celano; - of how one day when St. Francis was walking in the
country outside the gates of Assisi, and passed the little church
of S. Damiano, "being led by the Spirit, he went in to pray; and
he fell down before the Crucifix in devout supplication, and having
been smitten by unwonted visitations, found himself another man
than when he had gone in." Miss Underhill concludes; "Here then,
is the first stage of conversion (Awakening), the struggle between
two discrepant ideals of life has attained its term. A sudden and
apparently "irrational" impulse to some decisive act reaches the
surface-consciousness from the seething deeps. The impulse is
followed; and the swift emergence of the transcendental sense
results." 1 This "unwonted visitation" effects an abrupt and

1. Underhill, Mysticism, p.218.
involuntary alteration in the subject's consciousness; whereby he literally "finds himself another man." He is one who slept and now awakes."

This, Miss Underhill describes as awakening. She calls it "a first fluid appearance of reality." But in doing so, she is appropriating for the Awakening stage, the culminative experience which is knowledge of reality actually gained. We insist that awakening is essentially a kind of dissatisfaction, that 'divine discontent' which can only be removed when the emptiness of self is filled with "all the fulness of God." Such dissatisfaction may arise in any or all of the conditions we have considered.

The Purgative Stage.

Usually the mystic believes that although his great intuition of the Real is due to the Real or God, rather than to himself, yet there is efficacy in voluntary preparation for the vision. This preparation is not always rewarded, but failure to receive the gift is due to faulty preparation and not to the whimsicality of God. The first stage of preparation is commonly called the Purgative and the second, the Meditative or Contemplative. When he undertakes to describe the preparatory stages, the student finds great difficulty in preventing interpretation from
creeping into his description. This is due to the exceeding lack of unanimity among personal reports by mystics and also to the unconscious inexactitudes which so very evidently feature in these reports. Nor have students themselves achieved a common point of view. We find, for instance, that a representative psychologist like Pratt who has given careful study to mystical experience and who concludes, with reservations, in its favour, thinks of the Meditative stage as voluntarily controlled. On the other hand, Miss Underhill who has set herself an extremely schematic ideal in undertaking her descriptions, concludes that in Meditation there is an involuntary enhancement of spiritual visionary powers, and that the mystic is already rewarded by what he cannot himself effect, a vision of God. In describing the Meditative act, she says,-

"In the contemplative act, his whole personality, directed by love and will, transcends the sense-world, casts off its fetters, and rises to freedom; becoming operative on those high levels where, says Tauler, 'reason cannot come.' There it apprehends the super-sensible by immediate contact, and knows itself to be in the presence of the 'Supplier of true life.'" 1

For Miss Underhill, contemplation would seem to differ little, if at all, unless in the degree of emotional awareness, from ecstasy as understood by Pratt. Such contradictions are indicative of the extreme difficulty of resolving the various opinions. All divisions are more or less arbitrary. We propose setting forth our

own opinion while endeavouring to be descriptive, rather than
unduly interpretative of the mystic experience as a whole.

In considering the mystic way in its preparatory as well
as in its culminating stages, it is useful to have in mind the
two types of mystic, the mild and the extreme. The milder type
is represented by the average worshipper who has communion, through
prayer, with God; the extreme type by the grand mystic who in
ecstasy reaches a state of being so clearly demarked from more
ordinary states. The via negativa of the former is well recog-
nised and need be but briefly described. It is simply the pre-
paration made that the worshipper may find God, whether in public
or private worship. To him it is a first tenet of faith that
only "the pure in heart shall see God." Accordingly he submits
himself to the disciplines of the moral life. He does what in
him lies that his hands may be clean and his heart pure as he
betakes himself to his sanctuary. He does not necessarily regard
the material as evil but he eschews absorption in worldliness,
believing that there is a higher good than it embodies or offers.
For the most part this seemingly dualistic view of spiritual and
material does not preclude the living of a normal life free from
the bizarre and the extremes of asceticism. It is true that the
Catholic and the Anglican have their fast periods but the main purpose in observing these is to discipline life as a whole rather than to subordinate the flesh so that spiritual sensitivity may be sharpened. The Catholic who foregoes sweets in Lent is training himself in self-sacrifice, a pursuit which has its end in itself. He probably does not, today at any rate, consciously deny himself sweets, or spirits, in order that, with the physical subordinated, he may be more receptive to spiritual truths of the Lenten period. The sacrifices of which the ordinary worshipper sets himself are not incipient flagellations. They are the discipline of the negative moral life. Drunkenness, lasciviousness, gluttony, selfishness, in fact all fleshly sins, as all spiritual ones, have the effect of closing the soul to God and are therefore to be cut-ruled from the life of the mystic. But although the mystic tries to keep his life free from sin, no one is more deeply conscious of his failure so to do than he. Pride in a moral sufficiency would be as sinful as ill-founded. He must approach his God with a humble heart. He consistently begins his worship with confession, one step in the purgation of his soul in its quest for God. Add to this his emphasis upon the value of simplicity of thought in worship, and we have a foreshortened view of the purgative preparation of
the milder mystic.

It is his extreme brother who has really given identity to purgation as a life discipline so different from the way of normal life with its quiet worship. It is in him that we find the practice of asceticism in its purest form. In the literature which mysticism has inspired, the history of ascetic mystics has prominent, if not the major place. It will profit us, if, in trying to understand mystics, we follow the ascetic in his disciplinary life rather more closely than we did the milder mystic. This is not because the less extreme practice is the less worthy. In fact, we hold that the truth and value of mysticism inhere in the milder type. It is this that must be evaluated, proved, and above all, made available as a way of life to the rank and file of men, if religion is to live. But because it is less obtrusive than grand mysticism, its meaning and significance so often escape us as we compare the two. We need to see it, as it were, under the microscope. An examination of grand, or exaggerated mysticism enables us thus to see it.

The extreme mystic, like the ordinary worshipper, believes that, if he is to see God and be one with Him, he must prepare himself through the achievement of moral purity. But he does nothing by halves. He lives in a fever of intenseness. His
temperament impels him to this kind of life. It would be so, whatever his choice of life role. So, unlike the more phlegmatic worshipper, he is not satisfied with a moral purity which bears what he might describe as a taint of the ordinary. Not content to discipline his desires, he undertakes a heroic and zealous aggression toward that flesh which is their seat, so that they may be utterly subordinated. The tale of austerities practised by certain of the great mystics provides strange reading. One is alternately quickened and all but nauseated by accounts of the sacrifices and disciplines of these hardy, if sometimes clearly misguided, souls. Two examples of ascetic mystics and the stern measures they adopted for subduing their fleshly cravings will suffice. Leuba illustrates asceticism by his references to St. Catherine and Mme. Guyon. Of the early period of St. Catherine's mystical enterprise he says,—

"We find her rivalling the great ascetics in the severity of her penances, wearing a hair shirt, never touching either meat or fruit, fasting often and long, lying at night on thorns, refusing herself even the innocent pleasure of conversation with friends. Six hours a day were spent in prayer. Her life 'was a continuous striving to do things contrary to her natural bias and an alert looking to do the will of others.' On entering the hospital service, one of her first self-imposed tasks was to get rid of her squeamishness by constraining herself to do the most menial and dirty work." ¹

Mme. Guyon was even more extreme. Leuba writes,-

"The suffering that came naturally to her seemed not enough. In order more quickly and completely to overcome her bad impulses, she invented additional torments. One can scarcely help admiring the heroism with which she seeks to conquer her egoism. Every day, this delicate woman undergoes long penances. She wears briars, thorns, and nettles next to her skin; she puts pebbles in her shoes; she denies herself everything that would please her palate. When she becomes conscious of a dislike, she has no rest until she has overcome it. She relates, for instance, how she took spittle into her mouth: 'One day, when I was alone, I saw some spittle, the most disgusting that I have ever seen, and I had to put my tongue and lips upon it; the act was so nauseating that I could not control myself, and my heart beat so violently that I thought it would burst every vein in me and that I would vomit blood. I continued doing that so long as my heart revolted; it was rather long'.

Upon the whole, the picture of extreme asceticism is one of almost unrelieved sordidness and unnaturalness. It is only as we look for the motive which has led to the voluntary imposition of these cruel burdens upon what were, in every case, highly sensitive lives, that we find the germs of truth and reasonableness in what seemed to be so alien to everyday reality.

It is quite obvious that the wide-spread practice of asceticism by mystics does not arise wholly from a common motive or conviction. In fact motivation may work by the alternative principle in the life of the individual mystic. We have given

---

1. Leuba, Psychology of Religious Mysticism, p.77, Drawn from La Vie de Mme. J.M.B. de la Mothe-Guyon écrite par elle-même.
one suggestion; moral purity is an ideal for every mystic. We
found concern for this purity influencing the milder mystic to
order his life in such worthiness as he can attain in prepara-
tion for the vision of God. The same concern, greatly deepened,
had exercised the greater mystics. To reach the highest degree
of purity, the latter, not content to discipline the Old Adam,
believed that he must be routed completely.

So far, asceticism has been seen as negative in both
method and purpose. But it is not wholly so. This negative
effort is the first step toward a positive goal, that of the
spiritualization of the self. The very old view that flesh and
spirit wage continuous warfare has been well fixed in the minds
of most grand mystics. They have believed that if the spirit is
to have free play in its rightful and higher role, the inimical
material must be subordinated. With this achieved, the theory
is, the spiritual reaches of life become unbounded. Illustrations
of the modicum of truth contained in this view could be multiplied.
The almost animal well-being of the modern athletic Philistine,
very certainly cuts him off from free participation in intellec-
tual and aesthetic delights, while in the spiritual field he is
even more seriously cramped. If he essays in the finer pursuits
he must see the need of devoting himself more to the mean. The
spiritual ascetic has seized upon this fact of life and eagerly, too eagerly perhaps, adopted the crucifixion of the physical, that the spiritual might function at its best.

Moreover, the physical, so in need of subjugation is not only a distraction in itself, but, says the mystic, a reminder and symbol of that outer world of appearance from which one must cut himself off if he is to find a home, if only briefly, in a supersensuous world. By his sense experience man apprehends the outer world so satisfyingly and immediately that it comes to be accepted as the one trustworthy world of fact. By its nearness and seeming readiness to be apprehended, it tempts us to forget the possibility of there being a more real world, the spiritual.
The mystics have held this easy acceptance of the material as the real world to be crude, superficial, and unworthy of man's best powers of apprehension. So long as the physical is rampant, or so long even as it shares the prerogative of discerning reality, just so long will contentment with this crudely superficial outlook continue. His asceticism is the means adopted by the mystic to save himself therefrom. By it he trains himself in a higher order of fitness.

Again, this most decisive ordering of the physical side of his nature, brings into operation an effective disciplining
of his will. Although he counts upon passivity as that final state of soul which will be awarded by the vision of the Real, he yet recognises that this must be a voluntary passivity, not to be reached without a thoroughly efficient operation of his will. As he waits for reality to break upon his soul, although he is passive, his, as we shall see, is not the passivity of emptiness. Hocking writes:—

"It is obvious that there can be no question here, of pure passivity. The state is the precise opposite of a state of drifting, or of psychical indolence. The will to worship remains to distinguish this nothingness from all others. The mind is in a state of powerfully directed attention." 1

Only those who have tried to accomplish this state of attention or simplification of consciousness will appreciate the niceties of voluntary control involved. Not only must all physical distraction be left behind but all extraneous and irrelevant ideas must be out-rulled. It is in this advanced moment of concentration that the mystic profits by that extreme discipline of will which he has undergone as he has subdued the flesh and even schooled himself to the denial of intellectual or alien emotional pleasures.

We have said that the mystic attempts purification through

mixed motives. The pre-eminent one is love for the God with whom he would be one. It would be difficult, indeed, to examine the autobiography of any mystic without becoming impressed by the warmth of his emotional life and the free flow of its love toward the Supreme Object of its seeking. In its beginnings this love may be very indeterminate. It may be little more than a longing for the undefined opposite of those worldly objects and experiences which fail to yield any real satisfaction. It is a yearning for the Beyond. But in the way we have already considered, this indeterminate object takes on a certain definiteness and character. The worshipper forms his idea of an object worthy to be loved. In this he is guided by tradition, theology, his church, his friends. If he be a Christian, Christ becomes the great aid to imparting concreteness to this idea which he so longs to find real. As he contemplates, first the indefinite, then the increasingly vivid, his feeling toward it passes from interest to love. Thus far he is not a true mystic. It is with communion that his love reaches its highest intensity, having then a more immediate object and stimulus. (The place in our discussion has not yet been reached; for examination of this, the emotional life of the mystic, our present interest being merely in description. The subject is introduced here because of its bearing upon the work of purgation.)
Love's first interest, as we might expect, is to free life from all that would keep the loving subject from his Object. It sustains him through the whole self-denying or self-punishing effort. It is the motive of the mystic life. But it has this more definite connection with the mystic's ascetic practice.

The Christian mystic hopes that by suffering as his Master suffered he not only may prove his love but imitate his Beloved. Imitation, he reasons, is a step toward identification or immediate union. Leuba says,

"The desire to be like Christ in all things, even in His suffering, is often present in Christian asceticism. It may not seem fair that we should escape suffering when Christ endured, even unto death, for our sake. There is also the desire to establish a closer bond with Christ by making ourselves like Him in this particular. After denying himself drink for several days, St. Luke found comfort in this communication from his Master: 'Even I also have suffered the anguish of death, and they gave me but a little vinegar and hyssop; and yet all the cool springs of the earth were mine.'"

These, in the main, are the causes or purposes of asceticisms:

1. Purification, man's part in preparation for the vision of God.

2. Spiritualization, or the subordination of the flesh that the spirit may be unhampered in its quest.

3. Discipline of will which is training for those

---

more exacting uses of will when it achieves the concentration of passivity.

An expression of love; also a means of effecting a close bond with the Beloved.

Meditation (Contemplation)

For descriptive purposes contemplation follows purgation, although in actual experience there is no regular sequence. Together they constitute an efficient partnership for furthering preparation for the final vision. Contemplation of God in prayer means an absorption which, while serving its own peculiar end, also indirectly succeeds in curbing the flesh. In reality the two are co-temporaneous. From the psychologist's point of view contemplation is to be chiefly distinguished as being more an activity of thought than of will.

We may approach our subject by studying contemplation in the milder and more extreme forms as one, since here there is not the same free scope for variation and excess as in purgation. Contemplation at its best is described with rare lucidity and sympathy by Miss Caroline Stephen, quoted by Pratts:-

"The inward silence and stillness for the sake of which we value and practise outward silence is a very different thing from vacancy. It is rather the quiescence of a perfectly ordered fullness—a leaving behind of hurrying outward thoughts and entering into the region of central calm. And let us remember that it is a condition to be resolutep/
"Lutely sought for, not a merely passive state into which we may lapse at will. In seeking to be still, the first step is to exclude all disturbances and commotions from without; but this is not all; there are inward disturbances and commotions to be subdued with a strong hand. There is a natural impulse to fly from the presence of God to a multitude of distractions which we must resolutely control if we would taste the blessedness of conscious nearness to Him. I believe it often is the case that the way to achieve this resolute self-control is through thought - through a deliberate act of attention to our own highest conceptions of the nature and the will of Him with whom we have to do." 1

It will be seen from the foregoing that mystic contemplation is an ordering of thought in relevance to the goal being sought. It has in it some marks of purgation, for it involves the removal of all unfriendly or extraneous ideas. But in this phase of purgation we find, not purely negative intention and effort but positive ideas exercising an explorative function.

Hecking writes,-

"In turning away from the world, the mystic has always needed something to turn toward; in all of his purgation there has been an element of 'meditation.' He has done what he can to find his own positive ultimate will, to make real to himself what it is that he deeply cares for. He has tried to remind himself of his absolute Good." 2

But although his aim is thoughtful engagement, the mystic has still to take into account physical conditions which he must

so order as to help him in his spiritual concentration. He is a past master in discovering how symbolic attitudes and gestures, as well as certain environments, are friendly to his prayer mood. Cathedral silences are helpful in inducing inner silences. He kneels; he bows his head; he makes the sign of the Cross; he may even prostrate himself. Oriental Mystics have placed great dependence upon the right physical and psychological conditions for inducing the best state of spiritual receptivity. Like most modern psychologists of religion, Pratt is interested in this practice of the Easterns and since it is frequently cited as an evidence of the self-hypnotic evil from which mysticism may suffer, it is worthwhile to quote Pratt at length with view to later criticism. He says:

"One device which they have practised for centuries as a means of cultivating the religious attitude of mind is the control of the breath. This practice originated, I suspect, in some long forgotten animistic theory, but there is probably more than theory in its continuation. The religious mood, like every other, being largely dependent upon the condition and the activities of its body, it is possible to control it to some extent by controlling them. Many of the organic activities which affect mood are not controllable by will but breathing is. The rate of breathing, moreover, affects directly the excitement - calm 'dimension' of feeling - rapid breathing being associated with the former, deep and slow breathing with the latter. By controlling the breath the Indian devotee is therefore able to do at least something toward determining/
"mixing the nature of his religious emotion." ¹

But while these physiological methods can aid and foster the worship mood, they cannot give the thought content which is peculiar to meditation. This is introduced voluntarily, as we found from the description given by Miss Stephen and already quoted. The Meditative worshipper summons the thought of God and dwells upon it as nearly as he can, to the exclusion of all else. It is not in the power of human thought to be able in its moments of voluntary direction, at least, to dwell upon a bare, characterless unity. Perforce, then, it will depend upon a thought of the historical Christ, a word he has spoken, or a doctrinal attribute of the Most High to help fix the essential thought of God in consciousness. But there will necessarily be a want of definition to this thought of the Object of his worship. At this stage the mystic proceeds by faith that God is and will reveal Himself. What God is he cannot yet know. He suggests to himself that God is real and will come as a reward of right preparation. Pratt goes further than this and says that meditation or contemplation consists in auto-suggestion. This is his conclusion:–

"The positive methods of the 'meditative' stage consist, then, in a long continual course of

¹ Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p.388.
"suggesting to oneself, by direct and indirect means, that God is present. Probably the most important of these methods is the 'practice of the presence of God,' - the habit, diligently cultivated, of keeping constantly either on the fringe, or the centre of one's mind the thought that God is present or that he is even within one." 1

We cannot but think that Pratt is being unduly arbitrary in fixing meditation as auto-suggestion of God's presence. So far as we have been able to determine, the mystic does not think of God as present in the Meditative Stage at all. Meditation, as the term denotes, is consciously directed thought, upon the object, in this case, God; but at this stage God is still in absentia. He is believed in; His coming is expected. It is not a fact, believed in as a fact through auto-suggestive process. The very simple description of the Meditative experience which we elicited from a mystic of the "Brethren" Church referred to above, suggests the true nature of meditation. He said of his seeking God, "I keep on wanting Him, and He comes." This "wanting which necessarily involves some thought of the "One" wanted is Meditation.

This is man's last voluntary act in all mystic effort. He does not, in meditation, as Pratt suggests, think of God as immediately present, or within him. Should it be provable that there is in meditation an attempt to auto-suggest the presence of God, the

implications for mysticism and its friendly supporters would be disastrous; suspicion would be quickly aroused that auto-suggestion, introduced thus early, might be the predominant factor at work throughout the entire enterprise. Thus the mystic's worship as a whole would become suspect as having no objective validity. Pratt finally concludes that it may have such validity, but having once introduced the bête noir, 'auto-suggestion,' he is not logically justified in out-ruling it at any stage. But, apart from this difficulty, it is, we hold, more in accordance with the facts, to accept meditation as a voluntarily controlled exercise. Worship begins with the desire for God. The worshipper who "kept on wanting God" was representative of his mystic group. In his prayer circle, the members prayed, most of them aloud, and in impassioned tones, that Jesus, or the Holy Spirit, come into their hearts. Miss Underhill finds that Meditation advances by stages of Recollection and Quiet, to a purer form which is contemplation proper, and is not readily distinguishable from the culmination of the Mystic Way, that is, Ecstasy itself. We may use her description of the early stages, in which the subject is self-controlled, to elaborate and illustrate Meditation as we understand it, a fully conscious waiting
or desire for God. Miss Underhill says:—

"This strange art of contemplation, which the mystic tends naturally to practise during the whole of his career— which develops step by step with his vision and his love—demands of the self which undertakes it the same hard dull work, the slow training of will, which lies behind all supreme achievement, and is the price of all true liberty." 1

Miss Underhill casts light upon the psychological aspect of this exercise thus:—

"Now the education which tradition has ever prescribed for the mystic, consists in the gradual development of an extraordinary faculty of concentration, a power of spiritual attention." 2

Again she says,—

"The price of this experience has been a stilling of the surface-mind, a calling in of all our scattered interests, an entire giving of ourselves to this one activity, without self-consciousness, without reflective thought. To reflect is always to distort; our minds are not good mirrors. The contemplative is contented to absorb and be absorbed; and by this humble access he attains to a plane of knowledge which no intellectual process can come near." 3

Let us try to reduce the foregoing description and illustrations to simpler common sense terms which anyone might use in describing ordinary worship. The mystic, by purgation and meditation, turns away from the everyday world of sense. He exercises his will to lead him to a higher plane of thought and of

1, 2 & 3. Underhill, Mysticism, p. 350-60-61.
feeling. His effort is toward a purely spiritual living. Re­
calling Hocking, as already quoted, we find that when he turns
from the world, the mystic turns toward "something." He tries
to "remind himself" of his absolute good. The phrase, "to remind
himself" provides one key to the simplest possible explanation of
the preparatory process of Meditation. The vision of the Real,
the mystic believes, could not break upon an alien or unprepared
state of soul; so he orders his thought Godward. But it would
be both presumptuous and irreverent if, while awaiting the vision,
he were, by his own discursive reason, to attribute qualities to
the Object yet to be revealed in the vision. So, although a
thought of God is present, it partakes of vagueness, the vagueness
of a most humble and reverent waiting. To repeat our use of lan­
guage which Hocking has originated, at the same time indicting it
as philosophically barbarous, the worshipper is concerned "that"
God is, and does not presume to think that he can say "what" He
is. He "reminds" himself, then, that God is; he wants God to come
to him, so that he may know His very presence. Or in language
less confusingly dualistic, he wants to realize the pure presence
of God who is forever immanent but ordinarily undiscovered, and
undiscoverable, owing to the eluding experience of sense.
But even this description, thus reduced as nearly as possible to non-philosophical and non-psychological terminology, may still obscure an experience shared by every worshipper who communes with his God. Many an unlearned but genuine worshipper would not recognize his worship in the description we have given. He would merely say that he waits upon God and, having prepared himself, his waiting proves not in vain. However this description really denotes an experience which, from the student's point of view, is not reducible to such ingenuous simplicity.

To return, for a moment, to a statement taking more into account the psychological factors in which we are interested, it may be said, to sum up: In Meditation thought is present but not aggressive. It is not concerned about intellectual discovery. It centres about God who is as yet, the Unknown. It has achieved an approximate unity. Consciousness is strictly limited. This fixation of thought in both positive and expansive acts, involves further, a most rigorous act of will. So far, then, thought and emotion are actively engaged to secure a near passivity; but Meditation in the sense of this waiting for God is never purely a matter of volition and thought; it is, as well, a strongly emotional experience. This is to be expected, since feeling is more conducive to the necessary state of passive waiting than
either of the other two phases of consciousness. The three, thus operative, mark that "the changing object of consciousness has a peculiar unity, and its variations are confined to a small circle." It is to this prepared unity that the great reward is made. This reward is ecstasy or vision which we must now proceed to examine.

The Ecstasy.

Thus far, we have known the mystic as an intensely absorbed outsider to an experience in which one, several, or even all of certain forces, already described, impel him to become an initiate. While it is not possible to isolate states of consciousness, it is yet advisable for purposes of clearer discussion to regard the mystic, when engaged in both Purgation and Meditation as really not a mystic at all. He has, it is true, been taken captive by great thoughts but he has been a voluntary captive and has not differed in general demeanour from any individual who comes under the compulsion of a great idea or desire. It is also true that he has "sky-cleared" his mind as Hocking has described it, so that its state is one of near-passivity; but even this state is consciously controlled. He is still the ordinary man directing his thought and affective being by well-recognized methods, if in unconventional places. Psychology, hostile or

friendly, might examine his reports of preparation and tabulate and identify in a manner which would not offend the mystic, his supporters from without, or disbelievers. He is still "in the world." But with ecstasy, there seems to come a decisive break and here evaluators and experiencers are likely to join rival camps. Heretofore, God has been mediated by tradition, by discursive thought, by environment; but these have been but reminders that "God may be." Now comes ecstasy or the unitive life to make more vivid and convincing than anything else, "That God is." God has at length become 'immediate,' "at one with," 'in, the soul,' of the mystic worshipper. This is ecstasy. This term 'ecstasy' leaves much to be desired, since it suggests the extreme or abnormal, whereas the experience it denotes is neither. Either 'Religious Experience,' or 'Communion with God' would more clearly indicate the characteristic mystical worship, which is, we hold, too loosely described by 'ecstasy.' But since we depend here, again, for many of our illustrations upon the extremists of whose life 'ecstasy' is more accurately descriptive, no useful purpose would be served in discarding it.

No one can attempt to describe the ecstasy without being conscious of doing much beating of the air. The outsider is confronted by a confusing diversity of reports. Mystics, themselves/
themselves, know that in attempting to describe it they engage in a vain effort to convey by words the nature of an experience which they all assert to be ineffable. Thus the air beating. But this should by no means discourage faith in the objective validity of the mystic's experience, since life in general provides many wonders by which only meagre justice is done in word description. All language is, in fact, necessarily symbolic of the reality it purports to describe.

In Meditation we have found the worshipper engaged in a mental, although not intellectually discursive, act of concentration. He has, as nearly as he is able, cleared his mind of, what may be fairly satisfactorily indicated in theological language, as non-spiritual elements. He waits upon God, having chosen a near passivity as the most effective waiting state. Ecstasy comes to this his waiting soul and the mystic participates in the Absolute. So 'other-worldly' an experience, as we have pointed out, necessarily lies beyond the field of everyday description. This has been, at the same time, not only its blessing but its bane, as the mystic has found when he has tried to convince others of the reality of his worship. Each term he uses is either so symbolical or so general as to be all but meaningless to those who cannot go with the mystic all his sometimes fiery way. The Object of
his worship is:

According to Augustine "That Which Is";
Plotinus, "The One," "The supplier of True Life;" St. Bernard,
"The Energetic Word;" Dante "Eternal Light;" Ruysbroeck -
"The Abyss;" St. Catherine of Genoa, "Pure Love." 1

In all of this there is little to enlighten or convince any but
mystics. The result is that writings of both outsiders, and mystics
who report in their experiences with intent to convert, have many
philosophical and psychological interpretations without which their
descriptions would be meagre and futile.

It is to be noted, first, that development in the mystic's
consciousness in ecstasy takes place without fully conscious vol-
untary control. The mystic says there is an in-pouring of the
Divine into his soul, which he cannot but receive. Some psycholo-
gists say that a certain state of consciousness having been
developed, the place is finally reached where thought becomes
automatic, just as actions made habitual are finally performed
without conscious volition. 2

It will be sufficient to say, here,
that the mystic in ecstasy no longer exercises full voluntary
control of his thought; that a new content fills his conscious-
ness, which he knows as the presence of God. He is no longer a
theorist. He does not now depend upon a faith that God is.

According to Pratt,-

1. Underhill, Mysticism, p. 296.
"He feels God united with his soul, so that his immediate awareness and its strong emotional content leave no room in his consciousness for anything else."

The foregoing description is necessarily meagre and really little more than a statement of what ecstasy is held to be by mystics. It is interesting, and perhaps more revealing, to study it in its psychological and physical manifestations.

Speaking psychologically, in ecstasy the field of consciousness is unusually narrowed and unified. In the main one idea, that of God, is present. In the first stages of ecstasy, although the subject is absorbed by contemplation of this unified idea, the sense world is only vaguely evident at the fringes of interest. It has been all but willed out of attention, although here, absorption is not so complete as to prevent a voluntary return to fuller consciousness of the non-mystical world. This stage is probably the one in which the mystic of milder type participates. In his case it is important to consider the duration of his absorption or absorptions in the idea of God. Duration may be no more than that which marks flashes of insight, which come, not to intellect or feeling singly, but to the whole of consciousness. The fact that they are not prolonged is probably due to the more or less phlegmatic nature.

phlegmatic temperament of the worshipper which will not permit of his enjoying the more protracted ecstasy of the extremists. These flashes may be those which occur in the consciousness of the average church worshipper who finds God immediately in his worship. He may look back on his worship hour as one of unbroken communion with God; but, - and here we must take into account psychological facts and his whole demeanour, - the experience of communion has been intermittent, the fuller absorption, fuller in the sense of more protracted, of ecstasy being prevented by recurring states of everyday world consciousness. This, which we call, milder or incipient ecstasy - there is here a slight but not confusing terminological contradiction - conforms to what Miss Underhill calls Contemplation. It is characteristically mystical.

Miss Underhill defines it thus:—

"It is a supreme manifestation of that indescribable 'power of knowing' which lies at the root of all our artistic and spiritual satisfactions. In it, man's 'made Trinity' of thought, love, and will, becomes a unity; and feeling and perception are fused as they are in all our perceptions of beauty, and best contacts with life. It is an act of the whole personality working under the stimulus of mystic love."

In ecstasy proper the psychological characteristics are more definite. Here the field of consciousness is more persistently and completely unified. Ecstasy, says Miss Underhill,

is "a form - the most perfect form of 'complete memo-ideism'." 1

The subject seems no longer actively aware of an interfering outer world. In contemplation he is free to return to the world. In ecstasy he has reached a wholly passive state in which his entire consciousness is absorbed with one idea, that of God. So completely is he given up to this idea that he may be wholly unaware of his own body. He may even speak of the soul having left the body as in the case of Catherine quoted by Miss Underhill:

"I, therefore, sometimes for a space withdraw from the union, making the soul return to the vessel of her body.....from which she was separated by the affection of love. From the body she did not depart, because that cannot be except in death; the bodily powers alone departed, becoming united to me through affection of love. The memory is full of nothing but Me; the intellect, elevated, gazes upon the object of Thy Truth; the affection, which follows the intellect, loves and becomes united with that which the intellect sees. These powers, being united and gathered together and immersed and inflamed in Me, the body loses its feeling, so that the seeing eye sees not, and the hearing ear hears not, and the tongue does not speak; except as the abundance of the heart will sometimes permit it for the alleviation of the heart and the praise and glory of My Name. The hand does not touch and the feet walk not, because the members are bound with the sentiment of love." 2

It will be seen from this description that the ecstasy which has this sense-subduing power, is also a strongly emotional experience. The mystic, even in meditation, has been moved by love

1. Underhill, Mysticism, p.433.  
2. Underhill, Mysticism, p.436.
for the Unknown but Believed-in. Now, love has its reward and as the Unknown becomes the Known, is greatly intensified, so much so that some writers would explain ecstasy as a purely emotional state. Pratt points out that the content of ecstasy must change, otherwise sleep would come. The change which takes place is, he says, the substitution of the affective for the ideational, while ideational clarity gives place to vagueness. But, although love of his object suffuses his being, we think this is not an all-absorbing, unperceiving emotionalism, narrowly concerned about the One, as worldly love might centre about its object. Love is the dynamic of the movement, but to quote Miss Underhill again,-

"the result is not merely a mind concentrated on one idea, nor a heart fixed on one desire, nor even a mind and heart united in the interest of a beloved thought; but a whole being welded into one, all its faculties, neglecting their normal universe, grouped about a new centre, serving a new life, and piercing like a single flame the barriers of the sensual world."

Here we have an act of higher perception, comparable to a higher aesthetic appreciation, which is the apprehension of the Real by the united personality, but with love the predominant and moving force. It is to be remembered that this act of higher consciousness is an act of consciousness. In it the individual is active

although his activity is according to his own word, induced by a Higher Power. The physical accompaniment of ecstasy is a trance-like condition which Miss Underhill concludes from the evidence of ecstatic mystics to be of two phases: (a) the short period of lucidity and (b) a longer period of complete unconsciousness. ¹ The "short period of lucidity" is the one which we have considered under the psychological phase of ecstasy. We shall turn our attention next to the second period described by Miss Underhill as one of complete unconsciousness.

By all who have responded to the appeal of oratory, patriotism or beauty, it will be readily understood that the ecstatic would experience certain physical changes due to his higher response to the presence of the Divine. Cerebral thrills, quickened heart beats, tensed muscles, are the accompaniments of many of life's humbler emotions and insights. Quite distinctive physiological changes would be expected as a result of the vision of God in mystical worship. We refer again to the ecstatic practices of the "Brethren" congregation: Beginning with vocal prayer simultaneously made by the candidates for Holy Spirit possession and also, by the leader, a point was finally reached where no words were spoken. Here lips would tremble, hands and even bodies would stiffen. Many would fall into what they afterwards/

¹ Underhill, Mysticism, p.429.
afterwards described as states of semi-consciousness. By semi-consciousness they seemed to mean unawareness of their physical selves and environment. About a spiritual experience of the Holy Spirit, implying a degree of consciousness, they were all quite affirmative. We would conclude that ecstasy is never accompanied by complete trance or unconsciousness. It seems to cover all the facts to hold that the perception of the real in ecstasy gives rise to certain physiological changes which recede farther and farther from the normal according as the ecstatic is of unstable psychic nature. Even the quiet mystic, in moments of the heightening of his spiritual consciousness, will be subject to incipient physical change.

The complete unconsciousness which Miss Underhill says marks the second and culminating stage of ecstasy, we do not accept as other than a pathological condition. If complete unconsciousness comes, it is because, by a reduction of the ideational-affective state to pure feeling the subject is self-hypnotized. If the term unconsciousness means anything at all it is absence of both ideational and affective elements. As such it is non-mystical, non-religious, non-intelligent and has no interest to us here. Pratt contrasts Eastern and Christian mysticism in this respect. He says,-
The extinction of what we know as consciousness in Nārāma, the freedom of the 'puruṣa' or soul from all content of consciousness, the identification of the 'atman' or self with Brahman or the pure perceiving subject who perceives nothing in particular—these are the ideals of many of the Indian mystics, and hence the unconsciousness of the trance is deliberately sought.¹

Of the more positive mysticism he says,—

"The ideal of the orthodox Christian mystic, on the other hand, is different; his goal is always some form of consciousness or activity. Hence it is only the exceptional Christian ecstasy that ends in trance."²

It is exceedingly questionable if even the Eastern mystic is so extremely negativistic as he is frequently made out to be. His negativism may well be but the mark of an abject reverence and awe and so really positive in the highest degree. He may regard the trance as symbolic of man's silence, a silence induced by the Infinite about which nothing can be said. In this case the trance would have some meagre value. But if the ecstasy of the Eastern only issues in the unconsciousness of trance and if this trance is regarded as the acme of mysticism, and not a mere symbol, then we can only say, much is at fault. Unconsciousness is void and, to those of us who regard man's faculties highly and as God-given for use, of little significance. Christian Mysticism which, as Pratt suggests, is more concerned to retain consciousness/¹ ² Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p.423.
consciousness in its moments of divine perception than to reach a state of worship of an Infinite Blank, makes a higher appeal; and the Christian ecstatic who lapses into complete unconsciousness as his ecstasy develops, is, let us be deeply thankful, quite exceptional. Where unconsciousness does come, it is simply unconsciousness which it is not worth our while to consider or evaluate, Wise Underhill, the Easterns, and certain of the grand mystics to the contrary. An exceptional state of consciousness, it is manifest, does develop. This has its characteristic physiological accompaniments; but it is doubtful if even the greater mystics reached a state of complete trance. If they did it indicated a psycho-physical condition of no religious significance, that was neither the ecstasy proper, nor vision. Pratt suggests Madeleine as one of these who had not departed so far from the normal as her own report would seem to indicate.  

**Mystical Knowledge.**

Mysticism is not to be rightly evaluated by the examination of it in cross sections. Our task is to support the thesis that the act of mystical knowing is a real and not a purely subjective one. Modern psychology, in the main, has been dubious of this and bases its doubt upon the discovery of tendencies in preparation which seem patently auto-suggestive and self-hypnotic.

---

Quite summarily, it says that what takes place in ecstasy is automatic, whereas the mystic says, if not voluntarily caused and controlled, it is God-caused. Obviously, it has been necessary to set forth the preparatory stages at some length in order to be able, at a later juncture, to deal with psychology's criticism; and also, to give the characteristic mystical act of knowing its setting.

This has kept us for a long time from the real heart of the matter, to which we now come. This is the mystical vision of God, one of knowing,—not inferential, long-distance knowing, but immediate personal knowing or realization of the presence of the real. We have examined its psychological and physiological manifestations and accompaniments. Let us now find what the mystic himself says of the greatest thing that can happen in the soul of man.

Like most modern students of mysticism we shall use two of James' classification marks of ecstasy, namely (a) its noetic quality and (b) its ineffability. The ecstasy yields the fruit of knowledge although, as Pratt says, only in a very special sense. Knowledge, as he points out, with the able support of James' distinction made in his "Principles of Psychology," is of two distinct kinds, namely "acquaintance with" and "knowledge about." 1 It is well worth while quoting James at length:

"There are two kinds of knowledge broadly and practically/

practically distinguishable; we may call them respectively knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge about. Most languages express the distinction; thus, *γνώσεις* and *Σίδηρος*; *mouscra, saire; kennen, wissen; connaître, savoir,*...... I know the colour blue when I see it and the flavour of the pear when I taste it... but about the inner nature of these facts or what makes them what they are I can say nothing at all. I cannot impart acquaintance with them to anyone who has not already made it himself. I cannot describe them, make a blind man guess what blue is like, or tell a philosopher in just what respect distance is just what it is and differs from other relations. At most I can say to my friends, Go to certain places and act in certain ways and these objects will probably come."

"Knowledge of acquaintance" illustrates - it does no more - that knowledge of a more transcendent order which the mystic has of the Real. Such knowledge is expurgated of all conceptual, descriptive, representative communicable aspects. Pratt says it is our feelings which are most accurately representative of it. 2 It is true that in love or aesthetic feeling we find some suggestion of how it functions, but, we think, it involves the consciousness in a more complete way. It is a higher consciousness, "transcendent feeling," "religious sense," "spiritual insight," to use but a few suggestive and accredited synonyms. It is not pure emotion; and to say that it is like sensation is only so superficially true as to obscure its characteristic of transcendence.

But this all seems negative or contentless, whereas the

mystic, according to his report, experiences that which is Full-
ness spelled with a great capital F. His is an immediate expe-
vience of greatest intensity. What he knows is more real than
that to which he could give metaphysical representation, more
real, even, than the immediate experience of the sense world. He
is overwhelmed by a consciousness of an Infinite Power and his
own soul. With this Power he holds communion of the most personal
and real order. He becomes a sharer, in the sense of union, which
is living and intimate, with the transcend Real. Of this sharing
in, or contact with the divine, the mystic has an assurance which
is wholly impregnable. He is as certain of it as he is of his
own soul. For him the thinking or doubting Cartesian ego, the
philosophically irrefutable, summons to its side, another irrefu-
table, the Divine with which the self becomes as one. Miss Under-
hill well describes ecstasy as knowing, thus,

"On its mystical side it is an exalted act of per-
ception. It represents the greatest possible ex-
tension of the spiritual consciousness in the
direction of Pure Being: the 'blind intent stretch-
ing' here receives its reward in a profound expe-
rience of Eternal Life. In this experience the
departamental activities of thought and feeling,
the consciousness of I - hood, of space and time -
all that belongs to the World of Becoming and our
own place therein - are suspended. The vitality
which we are accustomed to split amongst these
various things, is gathered up to form a state of
'pure apprehension': a vivid intuition of, or, if
you like, conjunction with - the Transcendent. For the time of his ecstasy the mystic is, for all practical purposes, as truly living in the supersensual world as the normal human animal is living in the sensual world. He is experiencing the highest and most joyous of those temporary and unstable states in which consciousness escapes the limitations of the senses, rises to freedom, and is united for an instant with the 'great life of the All'.

The claims set forth in this sketch of the mystic experience in ecstasy is affirmed by a remarkably consistent line of mystics. Plotinus' words provide the classic expression of mysticism:

"In the vision there were not two, but the seer was made one with the seen."

The following is a fuller statement of the Plotinian faith:

"Now often I am roused from the body to my true self and emerge from all else and enter myself, and behold a marvellous beauty, and am perfectly persuaded that I belong to a better sphere and live a supremely good life and become identical with the Godhead, and fast fixed therein, attain its divine activity, having reached a plane above the whole intelligible realm: .........

"Nor did he (who has had such a vision) concern himself with the beautiful, but had passed beyond beauty and had transcended the series of virtues as one might penetrate into the interior of the holy of holies, leaving behind in the temple the statues of the gods. These he would not see again until he came out after having had the vision of what lay within, and communion there with what was no statue or image but the divine itself - of which the statues were but secondary images. And perhaps his experience was not a vision but some other kind of seeing, ecstasy and simplification and self surrender ....... a thought centred upon being merged in the divine."

2. Hookings' quotation - Types of Philosophy, p.391.
It is a far cry from the philosophical mystical insight of Plotinus to anaesthetic 'revelation,' but in fairness to fast certain existing parallels must be taken into account. James who has looked into the matter of post-anaesthetic states, with great carefulness, quotes from the report of Benjamin Paul Blood who finds in the consciousness as it emerges from the anaesthetic trance, facts of religious as well as psychological significance. He writes,-

"Into this pervading genius we pass, forgetting and forgotten, and thenceforth each is all, in God. There is no higher, no deeper, no ether, than the life in which we are founded. The One remains, the many change and pass; and each and every one of us is the One that remains..... This is the illumination.....As sure as being - whence is all our care - so sure is content, beyond duplexity, antithesis, or trouble, where I have triumphed in a solitude that God is not above."

A more usual and wholesome experience was that of a police officer, of whom a Mr. Trine writes,-

"I know an officer on our police force who has told me that many times when off duty, and on his way home in the evening, there comes to him such vivid and vital realization of his oneness with this Infinite Power, and this Spirit of Infinite Peace so takes hold of and so fills him, that it seems as if his feet could hardly keep to the pavement, so buoyant and so exhilarated does he become by reason of this inflowing tide."

Unless in the case of Plotinus, ecstasy as we have illustrated,

illustrated it, has seemed to be spontaneous. But if we take into account the fact of sub-consciousness where preparation may be made, although not so schematically as with the grand and more representative mystics, it would appear that purely spontaneous ecstasy is rare, if not unknown. In cases where it does occur quite spontaneously, there is reason for believing that its origin is pathological. Leuba finds that epileptics in the aura or pre-attack stage find themselves "translated to Heaven," or participants in "the most overwhelming ecstatic state it is possible for the human being to conceive of," or one in which "all agitation was calmed, all doubt and perplexity resolved themselves into a superior harmony but these radiant moments were only a prelude to that last moment, - that immediately preceding the attack. That instant was, in truth, ineffable."¹ For the moment then, we rank all ecstasies, other than pathological ones, as due to preparation, made consciously or sub-consciously.

To provide illustration of the ecstasy which occurs less sporadically, we refer again to the worship of the "Brethren" congregation. Descriptions elicited by our enquiry revealed a unanimous conviction that ecstasy afforded a kind of perception, a vision of the Divine. The worshippers were neither analytical nor equipped with philosophical nor psychological vocabulary and technique. As

¹. Leuba, Psychology of Mysticism, p.204.
a result their reports were both simple and scanty; but the tone in which they were made was always intensely affirmative. The noetic and the ineffable marks of their ecstasies are evident in each instance. These are some of their comments:—A—said, "I cannot describe it (the ecstasy) to you; you must have it to know." B—said:"Having had this feeling, you know that God's Holy Spirit has been in your soul." C—said: "The state is one of semi-consciousness." D—described it as "a state of unconsciousness." When asked what ecstasy meant to them, or did for them, they were at one in saying, "It brings God to us." One worshipper said that previously he had been "saved," but he had fallen many times. Now, when he is tempted to sin the power of this experience makes itself felt and he is able to overcome temptation. For ten years, according to his own word, he has lived without sin. He enjoys the ecstasy frequently. Another said that the ecstasy or "Holy Spirit" possession is in some way related to her understanding of Christian truth. When she has doubt about any matter of faith, for instance, about the power of Christ to blot out her sins, the coming of the Holy Spirit makes all clear to her again.

Thus far, we have been dealing with the characteristic mystical act of "knowing" God, the Absolute, Reality, in the sense
of "having acquaintance with." We have found that this knowing reveals a known about whom nothing, or at any rate, nothing adequate can be said. It is incommunicable, ineffable. Mystics having thus known, could feel a kinship among their own number, but would be powerless to win theological converts to their esoteric position. But sight must not be lost of the mystic's claim that this essential act of knowing seems to have accompanying revelations and inspirations. The mystic asserts that through ecstasy he finds, not only truth in its ineffable unity, but in its aspects. This may be mediated by visions and voices, or it may make itself heard inwardly. As recipient of revelation by this means the worshipper seems again, to be passive. This is neither the place to evaluate, nor to explain, but only to describe; yet we can go so far as to say that of these "visitations," the "visions and voices" are the cruder and more suspect. From the psychologist's point of view they are readily identifiable with non-religious effects due to suitably jaded or excited conditions of the psycho-physical organism. However, since it would be unfair to mysticism as a whole to neglect even those phenomena that have even an appearance of relation to it, we shall provide two illustrations here: A Mrs. W. over-sensitive about her religious life and duty, became more and more fully under the conviction that she had committed the unpardonable/
unpardonable sin. In her moments of deepest and most painful indictments, she became conscious of the presence of a force which she believed to be Divine and described as personal. In reporting her experience to her minister, she would say that God had come to her and told her that she was guilty. As she was in indifferent physical health during the period of these most disturbing visitations, a ready explanation is found in pathological condition. At the same time, however, her report is useful for purposes of illustration and comparison.

A Mr. C. told the writer how as he walked through the wood on one occasion, quietly entertaining religious thoughts, a "strange feeling of intense happiness" came over him and he saw "one in dazzling white" before him. The "appearance" was only momentary, but when it had passed, he felt a vivid sense of God's presence with him. He was willing to be fully analytical of his experience, and said that although he received no definite message, he was convinced that the 'presence' was in some way effective in inducing in him this joyous assurance of God's nearness. Whatever the explanation of the 'presence,' it was, he said, of real religious significance.

The vision of Mr. C. is not without its more illustrious antecedents. St. Teresa wrote:-
"Now and then it seemed to me that what I saw was an image (of the Christ); but most frequently it was not so. I thought it was Christ Himself, judging by the brightness in which He was pleased to show Himself."

Again:

"This vision (of the Christ) passes like a flash of lightning.... the word image here employed, does not signify a picture placed before the eyes, but a veritable living image, which sometimes speaks to the soul, and reveals great secrets to her."

Modern psychology would have short shrift for all such visions; but the biographical and auto-biographical mystical literature reveals the prominent place they have held. It is true that often such literature is purely symbolical and the authors who are poets, not realists, have deliberately chosen sense images by which to describe experiences that were really incommunicable; but there is little doubt that such visions were often accepted as real.

A more usual mystical revelation is in the form of inward messages which are automatic in quality, the subject receiving them passively. These are to be classified under inspiration and have played a vital part in religion, literature, and even in science. Mystics insist upon the complete 'otherness' of their source. They may be prepared for either consciously or sub-consciously, but their occurrence is beyond man's power to control. Says the mystic,

1. Quoted by Underhill, Mysticism, p.346.
they rise because God speaks to man or in man.

"All productivity of the highest kind, every important conception, every discovery, every great thought which bears fruit, is in no one's control, and is beyond every earthly power. Such things are to be regarded as unexpected gifts from above; as pure divine products." 1

In wakeful moments, in the quiet hours of the dark, one clergyman received the inspiration for many of his sermons. So definite were the truths that "came to him," he was able, upon rising immediately, to write them down. He said that, if seated in more studious mood at his desk, these truths would have persistently evaded him. They were, as he said, "God speaking in me."

It is the not infrequent experience of worshippers, to find statements which repeated hearing had robbed of meaning, become new, vital and wholly convincing. Or meanings, never found before, have appeared in words of sacred literature when changed moods have made the reader more receptive to their truth. It is a commonplace among types of religious orators that they merely "speak the words which God puts in their mouths." Examples could be multiplied. Leuba quotes from Longfellow's diary, as follows,-

"I wrote, last evening, a notice of Allston's poems. After which I sat till twelve o'clock by my fire, smoking, when suddenly it came to my mind to write the 'Ballad of the Schooner Hesperus,' which I accordingly did. Then I went to bed, but could not sleep. New thoughts were running in my mind, and I got up to/

"to add them to the ballad. I felt pleased with the ballad. It hardly cost me an effort. It did not come into my mind by lines, but by stanzas." 1

Loeb's says of George Eliot,-

"Positivist although she was in philosophy, she declared that, in all the writings which she considered her best, there was a 'not herself' which took possession of her and made her feel 'her own personality to be merely the instrument through which the spirit acted'."

Our field here is the whole subject of revelation and inspiration. The mystic regards these as "beyond every earthly power," to use Goethe's expression again. But it is in worship that faith in this transcendent, revealing Other is most pervasive and persistent. James says,-

"The kinds of truth communicable in mystical ways whether these be sensible or supersensible are various. Some of them relate to this world,—visions of the future, the reading of hearts, the sudden understanding of texts, the knowledge of distant events, for example, but the most important revelations are theological or metaphysical." 3

The inspiration of Saint Ignatius is typical,-

"Saint Ignatius confessed one day to Father Laymes that a single hour of meditation at Mauresa had taught him more truths about heavenly things than all the teaching of all the doctors put together could have taught him....One day in orison, on the steps of the choir of the Dominican church, he saw in a distinct manner the plan of divine wisdom in the/

2. " " " 
"the creation of the world. On another occasion, during a procession, his spirit was ravished in God, and it was given him to contemplate, in a form and images fitted to the weak understanding of a dweller in the earth, the deep mystery of the Holy Trinity. This last vision flooded his heart with such sweetness that the mere memory of it in after times made him shed abundant tears."

In each of the illustrations given there is the subject's attestation that when he thinks best and most truly he does not think alone. He is at the most a prepared and willing recipient. He is inspired. According to the evidence we must consider all such knowledge as a part of, or at least akin to, mystical experience. It remains for us to carry our consideration of it from the present description to examination at a later stage of our discussion.

Ineffability.

Revelation has played a most important role in both religious and secular life. It is evident, that whatever the objective reality of the Revealer, the causes of beauty and truth have been greatly augmented by it. However, the true mystic would insist that, despite the intense gains which come by vision and the hearing of messages inwardly, these are not the mainstay of mysticism. Its characteristic act is one of perception or intuition, not of a this or a that, however sublime, but of the Whole, the

---

1. Quoted by James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p.410.
Real, of God. Pratt says,—

"The mystic experience, so far as it is noetic at all, is characterized by the 'immediate' kind of knowledge and has relatively little to do with 'knowledge about'; and the mystic, so far as he comes to theorize about the nature of knowledge usually glorifies the former kind and depreciates the latter." 1

The distinguishing mark of this experience of perception is its incommunicability, or, after James, its 'ineffability.' The observer who is but an outsider can learn methods; the mystic may tell him freely and clearly how he can come to the edge of the Beyond; but there he must leave him. Technique is of value so far, but the final insight cannot be imparted; one must see for himself. It is evident, then, that little that is substantial can be said about this, the most important of all to the mystic, since the mystic, if he be true to his insight, can himself say nothing.

"Those who have seen are quite convinced; those who have not seen, can never be told." 2

Reports of mystics, as is to be expected, consist chiefly of protestations and affirmations but no enlightening references to aspects of the Real. This is true of both the mild and the extreme forms of communion. The sense of Divine Presence felt by the quiet mystic may enhance his truth perceiving powers, but he distinguishes this perception of Divine Presence from the act of

---

2. Underhill, Mysticism, p.396.
learning about.' Communion is not by word or by message but immediately in the sense of conjunction with or absorption in — not necessarily a self-obliterating absorption — the Divine Object of worship. Of this immediate experience he is confident. It induces in him feelings of peace and joy; but he can do no more than report the resultant emotions and assurances; he is powerless to describe that which causes them. As we shall see later, this silence has led to much of the most telling criticism of mysticism. Why, ask the critics, if the mystic enters a region so satisfying and so transcendent, is he not able to give some enlightenment as to the qualities which mark its absolute superiority over the world of sense. His answer is simply that he is silent because he has been in the presence of the utterly transcending. His, so he claims, is the silence of complete reverence, of one who has too much, rather than too little to impart. For the most part the milder mystic observes faithfully the principle of silence in his post-worship life, content to show in his demeanour and his behaviour that he has been in a holy place. The more extreme mystic, on the other hand, has undertaken to be spokesman for the Unspeakable. No one knows better than does this fiery-hearted esoteric that his speech is utterly incompetent to tell what he would commend to others, but nevertheless he speaks. Because his task is so overwhelming.
overwhelming, his words come in contradictions, symbols, and poetry. There is not likely to be anything unique in the expressions themselves since he depends for them upon his ordinary life and tradition which offer the only language he knows. Miss Underhill says,—

"They (the mystics) tell us chiefly when we come to collect their evidence, two apparently contradictory things. They speak, almost in the same breath, of an exceeding joy, a Platonic vision, an intense communion, and a 'loving sight'; an Unfathomable Abyss, a nascence, a Divine Dark." 1

But these contradictions are not to be taken as signs of the nullity of that which they are used to denote. Their use is but the mark of a free abandonment, in keeping with the mystic's temperament, by which he would convey the ineffability of his experience.

The symbolism and impressionism by which many of the extreme mystics describe their vision of God are usually indicative of the strongly emotional character of the ecstasy. Again we quote from Miss Underhill:—

"'O, wonder of wonders' cries Eckhart, 'when I think of the union the soul has with God! He makes the enraptured soul to flee to herself, for she is no more satisfied with anything that can be named. The spring of Divine Love flows out of the soul and draws her out of herself into the unnamed Being, source, which is God alone.'" 2

A good example of the attempt to describe the ecstasy by symbol

1. Underhill, Mysticism, p.400.
is that of Rulman Norswin also quoted by Miss. Underhill. -

"The vision of the Infinite lasted only for a moment; when he came to himself he felt inundated with life and joy. He asked, "Where have I been?" and he was answered, "In the upper school of the Holy Spirit. There you were surrounded by the dazzling pages of the Book of Divine Wisdom. Your soul plunged therein with delight, and the Divine Master of the school has filled her with an exuberant love by which even your physical nature has been transfigured." 1

In summary, then, we can say that the heart of the mystical life is an immediate vision of the Real, convincing but really incommunicable, although the extreme participants have essayed by various uses of language to give some expression to their confidence and some inkling of the nature of its source. In indicating the ineffability of the mystical perception, James says:--

"The subject of it immediately says that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words. It follows from this that its quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others." 2

Hecking says:--

"It is this difficulty of communication, this separation from the mass in thought and habit, this embarrassment of speech, which has embodied itself in the word Mysticism." 3

Summary of Description of the Mystic Way.

The foregoing description of mystical life in its awaken-
awakening, its preparatory stages, and its culmination or ecstasy, has been protracted, but we are confident, not unduly so. Let us remind ourselves again of our task which is to establish grounds for faith in the validity of the mystic's experience of reality; to answer the pre-eminently important question, "Does he commune immediately with God?" According to its own unique claim advanced in all confidence, mysticism is a method of worship whereby the worshipper does apprehend Reality in the flash of ecstasy. This is the experience of 'knowing,' grounds for which we would establish. The proof that the mystic has a unique means of finding truth in theological dogma, scriptural texts, of creation in art, literature or science, we regard as only incidentally important. We are chiefly concerned with that kind of knowing which is an act of acquaintance of a transcendent kind which in religious life is called communion. Are we to take the mystic's word that he holds such communion; and if so, upon what grounds? Obviously, it would not have sufficed to have set down reports of this characteristic act, to deal with them in isolation from other reported facts of the mystic's life. A serious flaw of self-illusion, let us say, in the preparatory stage could conceivably bring the reality of his essentially mystical worship into question. If we are to know the mystic at all, we must know him, so far as we
can from without, in the wholeness of his being. If we are to meet current devaluations of his mysticism we must understand his longings and his efforts to satisfy them, as completely as we must know him in his higher moments of vision when he finds his satisfaction. In our attempt to enter into his life as sympathetically and completely as possible, we have therefore given almost as full attention to his really non-mystical preparatory states as to his affirmed mystical knowing.

Let us briefly recall the various stages:

1. **Awakening**, which may be due to (a) Disappointment with the world; (b) Failure of moral effort, or the deemed failure of conventionally successful moral effort; (c) Intellectual despair; (d) Inklings of Reality as they touch the aesthetic nature; (e) Tradition and environment; (f) A diffused sense of the Beyond.

2. **Purgation**, undertaken because of a belief that (a) Only the pure can see God; (b) Subordination of the flesh causes spiritual sensitivity; (c) The discipline of the will which is involved in purgation is in turn a training of the will for the concentration of passivity; (d) It expresses the love of the subject and effects a closer bond with the Worshipped.

3. **Contemplation**:

   (a) An ordering of thought so that consciousness may be receptive
to the vision. Attendant physical exercises are employed to further inner concentration.

(b) A definite centring of thought upon God or, since thought cannot dwell protractedly upon a unity - upon Christ, a sacred word, a doctrinal attribute of God. This phase is a reminding oneself of God; it is not discursive thought.

4. The Ecstasy:-

(a) An immediate experience of God. Psychologically speaking, the field of consciousness in ecstasy is narrowed, the idea of God being central. This limitation of consciousness is more pronounced in the extreme than in the milder forms of ecstasy. Physiological changes take place in ecstasy and in some cases issue in trance.

5. Mystical Knowledge:-

(a) The Mystic knows God in the sense of 'having acquaintance with' rather than 'knowledge about' Him.

(b) This immediate experience is a knowing of the 'whole.' It is claimed in addition that truth in its aspects is revealed through vision or inward message; this is revelation or inspiration.

(c) Ineffability:- The experience of ecstasy is incommunicable; it beggars description. When the mystic undertakes to convey what has happened, he is forced to employ contradictions, symbols, poetry.
CHAPTER 3.

MYSTICISM AND NATURALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

No apology for mysticism could afford to ignore the concerted attack made upon it by what may be called the negative school of the psychology of religion, whose most confident members are to be found among American Behaviourists. The most influential of these is, doubtless, Prof. James Leuba who is said by his followers to have delivered the quietus to mysticism, and in fact to all religious experience claiming to be personal and immediate. In 1926 Prof. Leuba published "The Psychology of Religious Mysticism" which expanded and augmented his already generally recognized viewpoint. At the appearance of this work, some acclaimed its author as the prophet who would remove from religious life all the obscurantism and diffidence in thought which had made for hypocrisy and the perpetual danger of disillusionment. To others, he seemed to bring only disillusionment since, by what was taken to be a logic as faultless as relentless, he seemed to sweep away all ground for the faith they held, or the faith held by others which they hoped might become their own. Others, fully appreciative of Leuba's success in removing much of the froth of mysticism, were at the same time convinced that, although logical and unremitting, he had encroached upon a territory about which he knew nothing that
was significant, and about which in the nature of his case as a pure psychologist he could know nothing. They concluded further that his ardent iconoclasm, logical and thorough-going from a point had, too carelessly, - or studiously - evaded all that lay beyond that point. So whatever our reaction to Prof. Leuba's faith, it will not be marked by indifference to his influence. He will be regarded as the spokesman of the emancipators, the disillusionists or the over-presumptuous, according to one's viewpoint. There are few serious writers in the psychology of religion or in metaphysics but have either summoned his views to their support or joined serious issue with them. Interested as we are in finding support for Mysticism, we cannot afford to ignore the work of so free a writer on the subject. Rather, shall we regard his views as for the most part antithetical to our own conclusions, and the nullification of them as one achievement in the task of validating mysticism as a real experience.

Leuba's opening offensive is a piling up of evidence to prove that ecstasy is often produced by physical means. It is sufficient to name these means and methods: - Drugs, including various plant drugs, and alcoholic intoxicants are effective in producing a changed state of consciousness regarded by the users in primitive stages of human development as of supernatural origin.
and significance. "But" says Leuba, "drugs are not the only physical means of producing the ecstasy dear to men of every degree of culture. Deprivation of food and sleep, isolation, even active tortures are well-known and frequent means of religious ecstasy. Rhythmic bodily movements and shouting or singing, when long continued, yield results similar in several respects to that of alcohol, stramonium, mescal and other drugs." He also cites ether and nitrous oxide as ecstasy producers. The states produced by these means in primitive usage, it was believed, marked man's commerce with the supernatural.

Ecstasy thus produced may be marked by impressions of enhanced personality, unusually invigorated thought, and heightened feelings of joy, power or freedom. Sensations of levitation, illusions of partial loss of the body, are also among the effects. In a word, ecstasy thus produced, seems to have the effect of taking the subject out of his ordinary life. There seems to be a parallel between this primitive religious ecstasy and the more noetic ecstasy of advanced religions.

In the religious practices of India, Leuba finds a higher method employed to reach the same end, the enhancement of life, by taking it out of its ordinary ways. The Yoga method is chiefly one of mental concentration. It finds its motive in a philosophy

1. Leuba, Psychology of Religious Mysticism, p.11.
which it is sufficient to describe here, as one demanding the suppression of mental activity, in fact of every form of activity which signifies personality. Concentration, centred first upon some thought, by degrees shuts out attention from the sensuous world until finally consciousness is lost and "subliminal"consciouness alone remains. The devices used are both negative and positive; the former involve absences, observances, postures, regulation -of-the breath, and withdrawal of the senses; the latter, fixed attention, contemplation, and concentration. There seems to be a parallel here, if a superficial one, with the asceticism, mild or extreme, and the meditation of Christian Mysticism which we have described. The intellectual result of the final trance which follows this process of concentration is the possession of "all truth" which is un-discoverable by ordinary thought processes. Here again, Leuba would point to the kinship of Eastern with Christian mysticism with its intuition of God gained in ecstasy.

The third and major attention of Leuba is to Christian mysticism. This emphasis upon Christian mysticism is, however, not meant to obscure the common quality which it shares with ecstasy by intoxication and physical means, and also by mental concentration as practised by the Oriental. His examples of Christian mys-
mystics are drawn almost wholly from the extremists, ancient, mediaeval and modern. He chooses his examples thus, because the extremists have given fuller reports; also because he thinks that they are most truly representative of essential Christian mysticism. We grant the value of his first reason, but insist that he is not fully justified in choosing the exaggerated form as the best example. We have, ourselves, depended upon the reports of grand mystics when illustrating mysticism but chiefly because the definiteness of their reports helps to give concreteness to discussion and description. We have been mindful throughout that our reference to the grand mystics was for illustration rather than for example. The best examples would be drawn from ordinary worshippers who commune with God. But these are usually reticent. Moreover their worship life as a whole, to the outsider at least, lacks that mystical outrightness, if we may use the expression, which in the extremists, so lends itself to purposes of clearer description by illustration. While it is useful and quite safe to illustrate by the more diagrammatic lives of the grand mystics, there is a danger, when the student dwells upon them as true examples of mystics, of mistaking the bizarre accompaniments of their worship for the worship itself. These accompaniments may be arresting, without being of any great religious significance. Leuba seems to forget
this. He says "ordinary communion constitutes the first step on
the way to ecstasy." 1 May we not hold that 'ordinary communion'
is the very core of mysticism? May it not be the case that the
later stages, upon which Leuba concentrates his attack, lead in
irrelevant, even non-mystical directions. In this latter, and we
think the true case, Leuba will be found engaging in knocking over
many straw men.

Of the grand mystics, Leuba considers Heinrich Suso,
Catherine of Genoa, Mme. Guyon and Santa Teresa. Upon his observa-
tion of the patently unstable lives of these, he bases his conclu-
sion that the motivation of Christian mysticism in general is other
than that persistently avowed by mystics. For the most part the
real, if not the known or confessed, motive of worship lies in a
desire for self-affirmation or even in needs which rise in the psy-
cho-physical organism. Leuba concludes that in the latter case,
the physical is usually more clamorous for satisfaction than the
mental.

The universally proclaimed desire of the mystic is for
God, but says Leuba, in this he is only guided by tradition. His
real desire, he can neither know nor interpret. That must be
left to the psychiatrist. The competence of the psychiatrist to
tell those of us who are average worshipers that things are not

what they seem is one which few of us would be diffident in ques-
tioning. In psychically havoc-stricken lives, the psychiatrist
can do much to effect the restoration of balance. Leuba seems to
assume that all mystic worship is abnormal and so he arrogates to
psychiatry, if not the task of restoring order, at least that of
discovering the facts of the case. The psychiatrist, better than
any other person, could become "aware of the other promptings
hidden to the patient." ¹ Leuba asks:

"The mystics say that they want 'God.' That is a
convenient traditional way of naming their goal.
But what is it that urges them on, what do they
really want when they want 'God'?" ²

His answer is fourfold:

¹. He first identifies the mystic quest with "tendencies to self-
affirmation and the need for self-esteem." ³ The great mystics
are pictured as self-assertive and aggressive persons who in their
ordinary lives sustained losses for which compensation had to be
made if their characteristic high self-esteem was to be kept.

Francis Assisi, a highly strung youth, felt this need for esteem
and attention. When finally, at the hands of his fellows he re-
ceived only contempt and rebuff, his ambition began to covet a
compensating aggrandizement. Accordingly he chose the Holy Life
and found in the elevation to life with the Divine that which

¹, ² & ³, Leuba, Psychology of Religious Mysticism, pp. 116, 117,
& 120.
obscured in his mind the sense of neglect by men. Similarly, losses, defeats, sufferings, in the lives of Ignatius Loyola, Santa Teresa, and Mme. Guyon, were the spur to religion with its ineffable peace and joy. 1

2. A kindred motive lies in "the dread of isolation; the needs for moral support, for affection, and for peace in passivity and activity." 2 There are few among men who can endure life without friendly understanding companionship. With some, this need is not satisfied by ordinary association with men, hence the need for friendship with the Divine becomes insistent; or, where friends are lacking, God has to take their place. Without Him some persons would be fearful in a lonely world. Not only does this communion yield the joy of friendship but it brings to life a sense of peace and trust. Again Leuba, who would be seriously circumscribed had he no access to psychopathic cases for illustration, draws for evidence, not only upon the great mystics, but upon modern patients who find solace in the presence of particular individuals and become distraught when these are absent. This influence, Leuba describes as hypnotic. He even finds that the relation of Mme. Guyon to God is that of the hypnotized to the hypnotizer, the hypnotizer being in this case, we are left to believe, an autosuggested God.

3. The third motive is of a higher order and rises in what the Christian would call conscience. It calls man to "universalize or socialize his individual will."¹ This process involves the gaining of moral command of the self, and since moral effort is only possible in social relationships, the morally intent person must take these relationships into account and adapt himself in them. This dictum stressing certain attitudes as higher than others, Leuba concedes to be immediately given; he calls it the voice of Universal Reason. It is independent of Christianity or any religion; is in fact found in all religions and outside of all religions. It is at the behest of this Universal Reason that many mystics undertake moral excellence of which the first demand is service for men. It is to be noted that with some mystics who have been social servants, their consciences have only been apparently socialized. For these communion with God is the supreme objective; their seeming social loyalty and service are only a preparation for the greater good, union with the Divine. But Leuba insists that with others, Santa Teresa being one, the union with God is only important because it sends the worshipper back to men to serve them. The social conscience speaks prior to the voice calling them to God. It provides a non-religious motivation to a religious or mystical quest.

Still having in mind the grand mystics, Leuba discovers that the sex impulse has played an important, and with some, a pre-eminent part, in motivation. The sacred love which the mystic seems to feel toward God is not always distinguishable in quality and even in its manifestations or in the descriptions of it, from profane or sexual love. Among mystics, he finds that those who have been denied the latter, "urged by a starved body, cry to Heaven for solace and peace." He says:

"The great mystics united in themselves all or most of the conditions which we have just seen to be favourable to the induction of auto-erotic phenomena. They were young and had either never become acquainted with the sexual relation, or, after a brief and unsatisfactory, if not frigid, practice of it, had lived in abstinence. At the same time, and without being aware of it, they were sexually excited by their "spiritual" love for Jesus or the Virgin Mary; and also, in most cases, for persons of the opposite sex."  

His witness is the language by which the mystics have described their worship life, together with the not infrequent condition of abnormality or inhibition in their sex life. In stressing this view of mystical motivation, Leuba puts two and two together almost without reservation.

These, according to Leuba, are the motives of the mystics. The mystic, he concludes, is deluded when he says he is seeking God; for he only seeks God in order that he may satisfy his sexual

conscience; his instinct of 'cosmic gregariousness'; his egotism, or even so lowly needs as those of his sex life. It matters not to the mystic as understood by Leuba, whether God or any other being or force be introduced into his life, so long as these needs are met. The mystic is not religious in any true sense for he is not first and last concerned to know and commune with an all-transcending One.

Since, in the main, Leuba follows, as we have, the traditional description of the methods and stages of Christian mysticism, it is unnecessary to dwell upon this phase of his criticism. It is to be noted, however, that whereas we have found voluntary passivity to be the stage upon which the final intuition of ecstasy breaks, Leuba holds that the whole process is definitely that of self-hypnotism. He illustrates by the Mystical Trance of Islamism:

"He (the Mussulman ascetic) is to train himself in the practice of the mental dikr, that is to say, of the meditation of a sentence of the Koran, of a formula, of a word .......... The purpose of the mental dikr is to 'extract the divine essence from all the concepts of the understanding, out of all the ideas of the mind' (Abd el Aben). The dikr causes the soufi to forget his family and business affairs, his name, his own physiognomy, and his humanity. Thus by the successive elimination of all the accessory qualities of a thing or a concept, he approaches nearer and nearer to a homogeneous state.

In the third stage, a state of peaceful expectation is reached, very hard to describe. Personality
"has almost disappeared. The simplification and the narrowing of consciousness have reached their extreme limits.

In complete ecstasy the soufi is lost as a wave in a sea of unity, and he has the intuition of being inseparable from it; he lives of the general life without sensible qualities, 'as an atom lost in the light of the sun'." 1

Similar methods, Leuba observes, are used to produce the hypnotic trance. These are "fixation of attention and directions (suggestions) intended to produce relaxation and mental passivity and, ultimately sleep." 2 Any ideational content in the trance consciousness is induced by the hypnotizer. Accompaniments of the hypnotic, as of the mystical trance, may be incapacity for physical movement, hallucinations, or an automatic acting out of the dreams or ideas induced by the hypnotizer. Leuba's conclusion is:

"The only essential differences existing between the mystical and the hypnotic trance are due to the direct action of the hypnotizer upon the hypnotized, and to the differences between that which is expected of God by the mystic and of the hypnotizer by his subject." 3

His general conclusion on the methods of mysticism is sweeping indeed. He holds that the mystic begins with an idea of God. By auto-suggestion and self-hypnotism he convinces himself that God is present. His conviction may have unusual physical and mental reactions which the mystic will regard as ecstasy but

2 & 3. " " " " " " " p.172.
which the psychologist can identify as hypnotic trance. The whole experience is subjective. Religious experience, in the sense of immediate communion with God, is illusion. God is not to be thus known or proved. Mystical knowledge is invalid.

Thus far Leuba has been concerned with mystic experience in general. He turns next to a careful examination of ecstasy and trance consciousness which he finds to be identical in quality. It is sufficient for our purposes of criticism to enumerate his conclusions:

1. Some ecstasies, unlike those which come when the mystic has followed preparation, break spontaneously. Akin to these, if not identical with them, is the mental state which precedes the epileptic attack. A great intensification of consciousness, a general enhancement of existence, an awareness which is ineffable; these are reported by some epileptics. Obviously, in this case, the cause is physiological. So Leuba concludes,-

"In many cases these psychical storms (so-called spontaneous religious ecstasies among them) have no conscious cause. Neither perception, nor idea, nor emotion brings them about. They break out suddenly, as of themselves. In other instances, a beautiful landscape, the idea of a speech, music, etc., are the occasions of the discharge. I say the occasions, because there is evidently no exact correspondence between the conscious antecedents of the storm and the intensity and the quality of the rapture. We must, therefore, conclude that these phenomena have unconscious causes which may
"be sufficient in themselves to warrant the further conclusion that the unconscious causes are organic." 1

2. Of ecstasy (not necessarily issuing in trance) which involves moral enlightenment, poetic creation, and scientific discovery, Leuba says:

"If we are not able to say how the creation or invention is formed, we can at least reduce the mysticism to the commonplace by showing that even in the most striking of the well-authenticated instances there is nothing more to explain than in ordinary thinking." 2

3. In his explanation of trance consciousness, Leuba introduces numerous data on such psychical and physiological phenomena as disturbance of time and space perception, levitation and photism. Experiences similar to these, which have been claimed by ecstatic mystics as proofs of the unique power of their method to release supernatural forces in their lives, are held by Leuba to be paralleled by phenomena, caused by abnormal physiological conditions or those artificially produced by drugs and intoxicants.

Having multiplied proof that the extreme ecstasy with its incidental inspiration and revelation are explainable upon commonplace, and not transcendent, grounds, Leuba turns to examine the "Sense of God's Presence." This phenomenon, it would seem, should receive his major attention since intimate communion with God is

regarded by the mystic as the culminating and distinctive experience of the mystic life. However, Leuba dismisses it in this manner: Side by side with the ardent testimony of worshippers who claim to have known the presence of the Divine he places that of the psychically unstable, Miss L and Miss J. These women have "experienced" presences not discerned by the senses but as impressively present as if they had been. He prescribes an exercise of suggestion which the more stable person may use to create a 'presence' in his immediate environment. He concludes:

"Our theory of the Sense of Presence is then, in brief, that the cause of strange impressions (sensations, feelings, emotions) whose origin is not perceived, is, according to a deeply ingrained habit of the human mind, automatically personified, or at least externalized in an Agent, and that the idea of this Agent sets off in the subject reactions which themselves contribute to the formation of the idea of the nature of the Agent and to the certainty of his presence. The production of the phenomenon is much facilitated by a state of trance as induced in mystical worship." 1

Let us summarize Leuba's indictment of mysticism. The various motives which the mystic professes are transcendent and religious, rise in egoism, or even in sex needs. His methods, where goals are voluntarily sought are those of auto-suggestion and self-hypnotism. Where ecstasy is spontaneous, explanation is to be found in abnormal physiological conditions. Inspiration and revelation, that is new knowledge, come by undetected commonplace.

commonplace, not supernatural means. The sense of communion with
the Divine is explainable as illusion. The object of worship is
not real, but a regulative fiction.

Obviously, an apology for mysticism would, from the point
of view of a protagonist for mysticism, provide the best means of
meeting Leuba's attack. This will follow. In the meanwhile a
direct criticism of his conclusions is demanded.

In the very nature of the case Prof. Leuba is beset by a
limitation, of which we need but remind ourselves, to realize the
insecurity of his findings. Much has been said in attempt to prove
the psychologist's incompetence, not merely to comment, but to evalu­
ate and prove in the field of religious consciousness. It is not
necessary, we are reminded, to be religious - or a mystic - in order
to be able to pass judgment upon the validity of the religious
assurance. In fact Leuba would probably hold that the religious
person is so wrapped up in his peculiar life that he "cannot see
the wood for the trees." We can know the soldier's life without
being soldiers; so the psychologist can understand the religious
life and pass accurate judgment upon its professed values.¹ His
argument is suspect, not so much on the grounds of its being based
upon analogy, but upon the grounds that the first half of his ana­
logy is too loosely drawn. Must we not participate in the soldier's

life to really know it? The onlooker is always partly a theorist. This is particularly true of the psychologist of religion. He must draw his conclusions from the religious person's report; he can have no other. Into this report inaccuracy may be unintentionally introduced. Memory is very fallible, and although a religious experience may be so real and intense as to transform a life, the report made to the psychologist may be inaccurate. At the same time, the power of the experience may persist. Again, in religious, as for instance in aesthetic experience, there is always a degree of incommunicability. The religious man may confess his inability to describe his experience, or if he attempts description, he will use symbols which may convey an entirely wrong impression. In either case the investigator is excluded from the real heart of the experience.

Moreover, the psychologist of religion must recognize that he is not dealing in the field of test tubes and microscopes. He might well learn from the recently discovered want of fixity in this realm, so long thought of as one where predictability could be unqualifiedly affirmative, that diffidence should be his role when he enters the even more elusive realm of the religious consciousness. It is true that many psychologists have shown this diffidence and have enhanced their usefulness because they have.
These have been content, for the most part, to elicit the fact that law, not chaos, prevails in religious as in the everyday life. Its laws they have been able to identify, thus making available useful guidance for religious teachers and leaders, as well as candidates for religious faith. Leuba does not set himself the task of thus smoothing the way for religion, but rather of identifying it as subjectivism. He therefore exceeds his province. His methods and conclusion, we can best devaluate, by considering step by step his explanation of the mystic life based upon an examination of its behaviour.

The first step he takes toward the invalidation of mysticism is the reduction of its motives from transcendent to earthly reasons, his assumption being that if its motives are lower than, or other than those claimed for it, its culmination will be proved false. The mystic, says Leuba, seeks communion with God, not because religious desires are insistent, but because his ordinary life has been denied its rightful fullness. Given a more abundant normal life, we are left to assume, the great mystics by whose lives he illustrates, would not have become mystics. We have noted his insistence upon the greater than average desire for self-esteem which actuated St. Francis and his conclusion that the union with God was only incidental to the egoistic quest; or the lonely,
distraught Mrs. Guyon apparently seeking God, but really seeking friendship and the resolution of life's disunity into peace; or Santa Teresa's unusual moral aspirations which took precedence over religious ones, but which were realized by the aid of her incidental mystic life; or, as Leuba holds, most of the grand mystics seeking indirectly the satisfaction of the natural needs of an inhibited sex life. These, says Leuba, cover all the motives of the mystics.

We have but to recall our general statement of the limitations of the psychologist when we attempt to meet this conclusion which so traduces mysticism. In the first place, let us grant that the foregoing are the respective motives of four mystics or four classes of mystics. But does it follow that all mysticism is thus motivated? By no means. It has been well said that were there but one true mystic, then the whole case for mysticism stands. It might also be said that one mystic, moved by a selfless, transcendent desire, would rescue mysticism from the suspicion that its roots are inevitably and universally unworthy. Leuba must do more than count heads to a total of four, or four thousand, if he is to show that mysticism invariably rises in sources other than those claimed by mystics. He is guilty of the besetting transgression of his school, that of seizing upon extreme, or even pathological
cases, and concluding from his observations of these that they
exemplify the laws governing what may be entirely different expe-
riences. It is conceivable that some mystics, so called, are only
pathological cases, and not religious geniuses. Religious insan-
ity is not an unknown state; these may have verged upon it. They
may even have been incipiently insane. But this does not prove all
mystics to be even incipiently insane. It would be quite as reason-
able to conclude that since some mystics are insane, then all are
insane, as to conclude as Leuba does, that some mystics having mis-
taken their motives, all mystics are thus mistaken. Any examina-
tion of the neurotics among mystics may have much to teach us, but
there is danger in accepting them as representative. It is just
possible that they provide material for the psychiatrist or psycho-
therapeutist, rather than the psychologist of religion. Selbie
says:

"It is far safer, as well as more scientific, to de-
rive our materials from the widespread religious
experience of mankind in its more elementary as
well as more advanced forms."

We conclude that although those mystics Leuba selects as types
may have had other than religious interests in seeking to be one
with God, this is not necessarily true of all mystics.

There is an alternative conclusion. We are under no com-
pulsion/

compulsion to accept Leuba's verdict on the motives even of the
extremists. At the most, the psychologist is here only an inter-
preter of a form of human experience to which he is an outsider.
We may grant that St. Francis experienced strong tendencies toward
self-affirmation, without accepting Leuba's assumption that mystic
union meant only self-realization and that the anticipation of it
led to the performance of auto-suggestive exercises which would
make it a fact. This is merely Leuba's view. Others have every
right to hold different views, views to which perchance they can
summon as much support as Leuba can to his. They have as much
right, theoretically at least, to say that theirs is true, as has
Leuba. Both views are at the most, interpretations. The states
under examination are mental, or as the mystic would say, spiri-
tual. These are highly variable and elusive. The psychologist
can only undertake long-distance examination. For these reasons,
he cannot identify cause and effect, as he claims he is able, with
scientific accuracy. His estimate must be always more or less ar-
bitrary. And we must ask him to remember that even the psycholo-
gist who is so prone to explain religion as subjectivism, is him-
self open to criticism on the same grounds. In the abstract sci-
ences, findings are the same for many finders. In the case of the
psychologist, his own prejudices, tradition, even his libido, are
determinants of his conclusions, whether or not he realises or welcomes the fact. His conclusions are only interpretations, not merely of facts, but of facts as they appear to him. The psycho-analyst of the religious consciousness if psycho-analyzed himself, would conceivably reveal, his utter incompetence to give unprejudiced evaluations of the former. As psychology evolves and becomes emancipated, it is quite possible that the psycho-analysis of psychologists will become the favourite exercise of someone, perhaps religious psychologists, not necessarily psychologists of religion - the object in view would be the uprooting of their dogmatism.

Again, we could accept Leuba's view that the motivation of mystics is as he has decided, neither specifically religious nor accurately interpreted by the mystics themselves, and yet not agree with him in his conclusion that the whole mystic enterprise is therefore without worth or objective validity. It is clear to the student of religion in its origins that like other phases of human behaviour, it has emerged from lower to higher forms. Yet it would be impossible to indict religion in its higher forms because its origins were lowly. It would be fairer to remark the fact that in this human tendency to be religious there was that which had in it the germs of development and that development came;
or to recognize that in the forces which religion released in human consciousness there were those efficacious to impel men to reach higher ends. What has taken place in the religious life of mankind, we must believe, is frequently epitomized in the religious life of individuals. Three of the motives of mystics, named by Leuba, are by his description, little more than primitive instincts, -- self-aggression, fear of loneliness, and sex impulse. Yet we may go so far as to say these are only the instincts of the arboreal man, without multiplying the results in which they issue in mystic life. We pay tribute to religion because it can sublimate primitive instincts, thus raising man from a "blind life within the brain," or within the psycho-physical organism, to higher consciousness. Religion uses even primitive instincts; it is neither their slave nor are they its prison house. The sex-trammeling in the life of a mystic may be an occasion of his resort to the solaces of religion. Yet, even in spite of his retention of the language of amour to describe his enjoyment of mystic goals, it is not impossible that at these later stages he is a purified, spiritualized person. It is at least beyond the province of psychology to say that a transformation of motive does not take place.

But, we ask, has Leuba been just in limiting the motives
of mysticism to the four we have examined. Others who have tried to know the mystics would conclude that his list is too meagre; and in our delimitation of the psychologist’s province we have foreseen that their assumption may be as authoritative as his. These would hold that Leuba’s list of motives is meagre, not only as to number, but quality. In fact, we think that he has evaded the real issue and has neglected those which are more characteristic. In our account of the awakening or motive stage of the mystic life, we gave six motives or causes of awakening to the importance of the quest. Two of these, (a) disappointment with the world and (b) sense of the failure of moral effort may be taken as roughly coincident with the four given by Leuba. There is no need to consider these further. We maintain that Leuba is unfair in neglecting such motives as arise from (a) Intellectual despair, (b) inklings of reality apprehended in aesthetic intuition, and (c) the sense of the Beyond. Here again, of course, Leuba would retreat into his stronghold and say from there that these are not the real motives, just as he says the desire for God is not a real motive. But the mystic reports that they are. Who is to be believed? The mystic who trusts his own faculties — surely a wise and a safe thing to do — or the psychologist who in his turn is merely using and trusting his faculties in the exercise of long-distance
interpretation? Here are reasons or motives which we must consider at a later stage, but in the meantime we can say that it seems to be given us to know immediately that they are of a distinctly high order, honouring to those who hold them, and indicative of the excellence of the enterprise they originate. The mystic avows they are his. This Leuba cannot really disapprove.

We have next to consider Leuba's examination of ecstasy and the preparation for it. It is unnecessary to repeat at length how it is, that here, as in his interpretation of the motives of the mystic, the psychologist's approach is from without, so that at the most he can be but a theorist.

It is to be recalled that ecstasy can be produced artificially by drugs and intoxicants, by fasting, rhythmic bodily movements, shouting, etc; also by the plainly self-hypnotic methods of the Moslem religion. The psycho-physical effects of these means are to be classified with all so-called religious ecstasy. Leuba leaves no doubt in our minds as to his ultimate conclusion for he boldly captions an early chapter, 'Mystical ecstasy as produced by physical means.' Ecstasy and mystical ecstasy are one and the same. There are no supernatural or divine contacts or messages. 'Mystical Ecstasy,' 'hypnotic trance' self-induced or by a hypnotizer, 'ecstasy by drug or intoxication,' in some instances of
'the epileptic aura,' - these are for the most part synonyms denoting an abnormal psycho-physical state. Within this group of states there may be variations but none sufficiently wide to mark a transcendence over ordinary non-religious events in consciousness.

We are warranted in holding either of two opposing views to that advanced by Leuba. He can trace, he thinks, a continuity of impulses, methods and results from intoxication or entrance by physical means, to religious ecstasy. In the case of religious ecstasy a more inward and mentally higher, or more intricate method, that of auto-suggestion, takes the place of the artificial methods. But the psychologist has no infallible method of determining that the results are really the same. He concludes from the mystic's report that the divine union excludes extraneous ideas and allows but the idea of God, that the state of consciousness is a mentally degraded one of mono-ideism similar to that of drug intoxication, trance or even the epileptic aura. This only amounts to saying that there seems to be a similarity. In the nature of the case this is all the psychologist is able to do. Moreover, he is greatly handicapped in his undertaking to identify them because of the mystic's confessed inability to describe what really takes place in union. If the mystic seems by his description
to reduce ecstasy to an experience like mono-theism, enhancement of consciousness by drug, hypnotic trance, this may be due to his limitation to such terminology and not to the inherent similarity of his ecstasy to these.

There is, moreover, a distinct difference in the retrospective conclusions in each case. The drug user, the epileptic or the auto-hypnotized will look back to what Leuba would classify as mystical ecstasy, and know that there had been induced in him certain abnormal reactions, not known at the time as abnormal. The result of the post-examination of the mystic union by the mystic is quite different; the mystic still believes as he did in ecstasy, in the reality of the divine presence and causation.

It is to be noted, also, that the sense of divine interference in the flux of consciousness is marked by its great intensity. The mystic knows that he meets God in his worship. To him, it is a real presence that is accountable for his impregnable assurance. Leuba says the presence is auto-suggested; but such simplification of the problem cannot but be suspect. Doubtless some mystics have practised self-hypnotism which has issued in trance similar to hypnotic trance. Among these there may have been patients suffering from hysteria, or neurasthenia which greatly facilitated the auto-suggestive enterprise. But it is sheer
unscientific dogmatism which classifies all ecstasy as thus caused. Hosts of true mystics are so fully cognizant of the way in which auto-suggestion works to change mental states as to be able to identify it were it the cause of their assurance in worship. Yet these, including in their number healthy, alert and practically minded folk, have claimed the objective reality of the Presence met in ecstasy. In concluding, as they have, that God was not auto-suggested but real, they have, let us remind ourselves once more, only followed the normal practice of trusting their own faculties, the practice upon which Leuba depends as does any one. The psychologist with a proposition to establish, and at that, a proposition whose proof he often envisions before he begins to explore the facts, is at least, no more trustworthy than these professing empiricists, the mystics.

A second criticism of Leuba's explanation of ecstasy is called for. Here, we come more nearly to the heart of the matter. Leuba does fall a prey to that error which we forecasted for him when we found him taking the grand mystics as examples. His predilection for the consideration of extremism and abnormality has carried him farther and farther away from the characteristic mystical act of knowing God immediately. We have seen how, in exceedingly loose fashion, he groups such phenomena as mental states...
produced by drugs, intoxication, hysteria, neurasthenia, auto-
hypnosis, and hypnotism caused by dwelling upon the thought of God
as present. Any or all of these mental states are ecstasy. Quite
assiduously and particularly does he liken hypnotic trance to es-
static trance with intent to establish them as identical. But we
hold that these psycho-physical states are not the essential mys-
tical states at all. The mystical act or state is one of apprehen-
sion. Ecstasy in the sense of communion, is not the trance of semi-
consciousness or unconsciousness. Psychical disturbances, mono-
ideism, degenerated attention and even trance itself, were undoub-
tedly to be found in the experience of the great mystics quoted by
Leuba. But these were the extravagant accompaniments, and not the
essence of their mysticism. It is conceivable that psychic storms,
coming under any one of Leuba's categories, waged in their lives
but these were due to the fact that although geniuses of worship,
their consciousness functioned in over-sensitive or distraught
psycho-physical organisms. It is understandable that the over-
whelming sense of God's presence would result in strange reactions
in such unstable lives; but this was incidental, not significant.
True, a frequently occurring phenomenon of their lives was trance,
but had they been more phlegmatic, trance might have been absent,
and this without their mysticism having been called into question. They were mystics but not in moments of trance which, we would insist, is in itself a state of little religious significance. Ecstasy is an experience of perception in which consciousness functions at its highest and most unified. So say the mystics. Ecstasy is hypnotic trance in which state consciousness disappears or functions indeterminately. So says Leuba. It seems that he has mistaken the accompaniments of certain ecstasies, due to the instability of the subjects, for the ecstasies themselves. One feels while following his painstaking examination that he is tilting with shadows; that had there been no neurasthenics and easily suggestible persons among mystics, Leuba would long since have concluded there were no mystics. If he is to be a true psychiatrist of the mystic ailment, as he would describe it, he should explore the lives of today's mystics, not those who excite attention because they speak in tongues or fall in trances and believe in these as manifestations of the indwelling Divine, but those more normal folk who believe that through higher consciousness and not through trance, semi-consciousness or even unconsciousness, is the way to knowledge of God.

Leuba's attempt to explain the "Sense of God's Presence" upon commonplace, rather than transcendent, grounds is not any
more satisfying from the point of view of the religious or the scientific mind, than those attempts we have been examining. We have seen how he likens the experience of Divine Presence to the "experience" of presence felt by numerous unstable persons, or others who were able through suggestion or auto-suggestion to create such an illusion. Mystical worship, he concludes, does no more. The presence of God, he would say, is no more real than the ghosts and shadows which owe their being to jaded or suitably excited nervous states. Again Leuba talks about two entirely different things, about one of which the mystic worshipper might pardonoablv say, he knows nothing. Words or combinations of words have not been devised which are adequate to describe a spiritual intuition of the Real. But many a worshipper would stake his life that his belief in such a vision is founded on experienced fact. To such belief he can bring, as we shall see later, philosophical support which Leuba's little theory of anthropomorphized ghosts and illusions could never summon. But he holds his absolute assurance of spiritual immediacy without any sense of the need of such support. When the ghosts and shadows of illusory presence are gone, man knows they have been unreal. He may even know this when they are 'present.' But long after the high moment of mystical worship has passed, the worshipper knows he has been in a spiritual Presence.
If he anthropomorphises it, he does so, not to limit it, but because he has none other than anthropomorphic thought forms.

In the main we find ourselves in agreement with Leuba's viewpoint on revelation and inspiration. Since we are to give considerable attention to this subject in another place, it is unnecessary to discuss his conclusions here.

This treatment of Leuba's thesis has been negative and therefore meagre. It has been meagre, too, because it has seemed in instances to involve an examination of obviously false and generally discredited late nineteenth century psychology. It will have been worthwhile if it has served to show that the psychologist, as such, is in a greater world than he knows, and that his descriptions and explanations of it are therefore marked by their incompetence and even by their irrelevance. Mystic worship is not in the hands of the psychologist to do with what he wills. This should become more apparent as we proceed in more positive mood to acquaint ourselves as best we can with this transcendent and therefore elusive phenomenon, the mystic life of knowing. In the meantime, it is reassuring in an indirect way for the friends of mysticism to note that the psychology of Leuba would reduce, not only mystical or religious knowledge, but all knowledge to a state of chaos, since for him man is not a knowing, creating being but merely a behaving one.
The greatest disservice has been done the mystic as a discoverer of reality by wide assumptions that he is an alien among us. Most of us share an intuitive predilection for a world and life in which our own experience and that of our fellows will follow well-known predictable ways. This is not to be discredited, of course. There is evidence here of an instinct for order as against chaos, an instinct which in the large has impelled us not only to conform to the order of the universe but to discover that order. The overtly unpredictable and unidentifiable shocks us and arouses our aversion. But like all good tendencies, this one may defeat the true ends of life, when it is followed too tenaciously and without imagination. The too phlegmatic temper of the protagonists of order, always in overwhelming majority, has incited to the stoning of the prophets, and a contemptuous regard for visionaries, poets and artists, in the past. Later, the reviled have become the revered, but upon the whole, we are slow to learn the lesson which has been thus taught with monotonous regularity.

This love of order, and perhaps more especially such love in its more reactionary moods, has, we think, been the mainstay of the
suspicion with which the mystic has ever been regarded by the non-mystic. The mystic has seemed the odd fledgling on the nest, deteriorating the homeliness of its atmosphere. This being the case, the first, and perhaps the most important step to take in an attempt to validate the mystic life, would be toward identification of his aims and even his goal with those of the seemingly more ordered whole of men's interests and pursuits. This can be done, and that without involving the acceptance of the behaviourist psychologist's conclusion that, without the mystic knowing it, his life is to be identified with the lower impulses and their issue.

It can be shown that the mystic is one with all of us. His aspirations are universal ones. In his effort to realize them he shows, not exceptional gifts, but universal gifts exceptionally developed.

We are told that he is merely a psycho-physical organism blindly pursuing ends which would bring some order to its disjuncted state; an emotionalist, or even an eroticist without thought; a passivist who surrenders the high prerogatives of personality; that his philosophy is one of unity, the negation of appearances. All in us that is wholesome, natural and pragmatic, seems to have given it immediately to know that if this be mysticism it stands discredited. It is not life. But we hope to show that to identify
essential mysticism with this formidable result is to restrict and obscure it; that it is conformable in certain of its characteristics to the more readily known order of our natural life, and that when its contention is for a unique power of knowing, it can support its claim with reasonableness.

We shall examine first the motivation of what we have called the Awakening of the mystic, to try to determine if at this stage of his life the mystic is an alien or a member of the great human friendship. We found him undertaking his quest because of disappointment with the world; the sense of the failure of his own moral effort even when conventionally successful; intellectual despair; suggestions from his aesthetic experience that reality may be known immediately; the influence of tradition and environment; the impulse provided in a sense of the Beyond. This all seems normal and understandable but is its appearance of homeliness in the world a misleading one? Let us think of his motives one by one.

Mystics have been at one in their disappointment with the world. Even the nature mystics when roused to a love of nature which was almost a worship were not content to think of and to worship a mere natural world of appearances. Their outer world had to become for them a spiritualized world. They, too, were
dissatisfied with the world which makes itself known to five senses. Have the mystics, nature and religious, been shown as "other-worldly" because they did not find in the world the abundant life? We think not but recognize that here, conclusions depend upon what one calls the world. There is a world of fact and another world which we may, speaking in the broadest sense, call a spiritual world. The first world is the field of science. It is made up of space-occupying objects, related and interactive in certain law abiding ways. From the point of view of the human mind it is an interesting world but if the mind were restricted to the contemplation of this world with its objects, its animal pleasures, its laws, the issue would be madness or death. No one lives only in such a world, hence it is merely a theoretical conclusion which says all men are disappointed with it. But among self-conscious beings there are degrees of such disappointment. Animals, so far as we know, are satisfied with the world of fact. Some men are not greatly dissatisfied with it but even these are emancipated to a degree. The mind of early man yielded to the fascination of his own power directed to interpret and discover the laws of this world. Here was intellectual flight. As advance has persisted, man has retained his concern for the world of fact, has developed a greater nicety of power for dealing with it, but he has simultaneously
been learning to take longer and longer flights from it. The
witness has been his absorption in art, poetry, all works of the
imagination, discursive thinking, in fact all attempts not merely
to relate the facts of the fact world but to discover the meaning
hidden in it. By these signs has man shown that his interests are
beyond a world of fact and appearance. He can take the world, of a
fact into account, accept it as a good and not an evil world, and
yet not tie himself to it. This is how the mystic regards the
world. The only difference between him and the rest of men is that
perchance he is more deeply stirred by his dissatisfaction with the
fact world and so undertakes a further flight from it than do most
of us. It is only a superficial view which isolates him because he
feels an urge to widen his horizon, for the urge is one he shares
with all of us.

But it will be said that it is not only this universal dis-
appointment with the world which the mystic feels; that it is not
merely from the world of fact but from the world as it appears to
most of us that he seeks to escape; that often his disappointment is
due to his failure to take a wholesome place in the world of men, a
failure due to his own temperament or to accidents of life which
have robbed life of its rightful fullness. He is described as a
misanthrope, a poor citizen of the world, one with the longings of
the recluse, longings which a better ordering of self and a happier shaping of circumstances would have prevented. So he undertakes to break away from the world in order to find compensation. We have only this to say, that such occasion for disappointment may be regrettable, but it does not conclusively distinguish the mystic from others; and we are concerned here to find him one with the human family. Many who have not become mystics have, through ever-sensitivity of nature, or some misfortune or less, turned from the world. Sometimes the outcome has been defeatism and despair; but the occasions of their rejection of the world's offerings, high or low, have been the same as those which turn mystics from the world to God.

We found that one class of mystics is motivated by the sense of moral failure. In fact all religious mystics feel a concern about their moral life, so intense that they are dissatisfied with even unusual achievement in conventional morality. Here again, the mystic shares his motive life with others. The mystic enjoys the blessing of a peculiarly sensitive conscience, which merely signifies that he is like all good men, but so far as moral intent goes, better than most. It is a sad comment on non-mysticism in general if it deems the mystic an eccentric because his conscience is unusually keen. Once more we conclude that the mystic's motiva-
motivation identifies him as kindred with all of us.

A further mark of the motivation of mysticism was its inception in intellectual despair. Here, once more, we fail to find that singularity which would keep us from knowing the mystic in friendly and sympathetic way. Mysticism has been called the science of reality. Philosophy purports to be a science of reality, although it is at the most the propounder of a theory of reality. Some philosophers, in their attempts to discover and know reality have reached the place where they were satisfied, although their satisfaction was, as they knew, only in a theory of reality, in which case their faith became a reverent agnosticism. In other instances philosophers merely arrived at a place of intellectual despair from which they turned to agnosticism without the reverence. Still other philosophers have turned from intellectual despair to mysticism. Intellectual despair is not peculiar to mystics. It is merely a state from which there are alternative reactions. Some philosophers react in negative way, others become mystics. Intellectual despair does not necessarily issue in mysticism.

The mystic consciousness, we found, is sometimes aroused by the aesthetic intuition. We quoted Hocking's conclusion that in the mysticism of Tagore, beauty was the "chief guide to metaphysical initiation." In his experience of beauty, the subject
gains an inkling of reality which points him toward a similar
but higher intuition of reality which may become his. Accordingly,
nature mystics may tend to become religious mystics, but this is
not a necessary sequence. The intuitions of beauty received by the
nature mystics may, on the other hand, motivate him to seek his
religious satisfactions in Pantheism. Or they may provide him
only with an impulse to achieve further sensitivity to natural
beauty. Here again, there is no especial mark of 'otherness' in
the mystic's motive or awakening. He shares his motive with nature
mystics and non-mystics, that is, with all of us. He is neither
placed outside the pale of naturalness nor understandable-ness be-
cause of such a motive.

Again, we described the mystic as impelled to his quest
by tradition and environment. Here, no comment need be made. The
mystic, just as the non-mystic, depends for his religious interest
and venture, upon what has been written and said, and what others
commend to him by word and practice. He becomes a mystic because
there are and have been mystics.

We come now to the grand motive of mysticism, the sense of
the Beyond which Deen Inge has described as "that dim consciousness
of the Beyond, which is part of our nature as human beings." Here
is the motive pre-eminent which has stirred the whole awakening
life of the mystic. It matters not whether we call it as Inge suggests, "a sort of higher instinct, perhaps an anticipation of the evolutionary process; or an extension of the frontier of consciousness; or in religious language, the voice of God speaking to us." The important thing is to recognize it as a fact as we must. Nor should we be discouraged if actual identification of its cause and quality is impossible. It may be shrouded in vagueness and mystery, but so is consciousness of which it is but one of the amazing activities. Let us, if we cannot identify it in scientific fashion, at least record its manifestations. We think that no one would quarrel with our conclusion that back of man's desire to know reality is this "dim consciousness of the Beyond" where reality is discoverable. Man seeks to discover reality because of a dim consciousness that reality is discoverable. We have already grouped the philosopher, the scientist and the poet as fellows in an attempt to know or to describe the real. But this only describes their quest and does not explain why they undertake the quest. The explanation seems to lie in their diffused belief that somewhere reality may be known. For these seekers, goals are always intermediate; satisfaction is only half-satisfaction. The quest must persist. Why? Because the sense of the Beyond persists. It persists because man is the kind of creature
he is. This is the fullest answer we can give. Where human consciousness seems to function at its freest and highest, there we find man seeking the unrealised. His search presupposes that for him the Beyond is already believed in as real. The mystic shares such belief with the philosopher, the scientist, the poet. If he is disappointed with the meagre vision of reality which the world affords, and with the feebleness of his moral effort as a gainer or revealer of reality, it is because of this picture of the Beyond which is ever before him, not a photographic or pen-drawn picture, but an impressionist picture, vaguely symbolical, perhaps, but for him, possessed of the efficacy of a Holy Grail. So the mystic is "other-worldly" if you like, but only in the sense in which philosophers, scientists and the rest of men are "other-worldly." Why this is so we cannot answer unless the answer be that a creature has become a being, a man, to whom certain visions and longings are as inherently natural as his breathing. But we are not so much concerned here to know why as to know ourselves and the mystic, who in this as in all his impulses to gain the abundant life, is like us all. If there be a difference between others and the mystic here, it is that with the others, including the philosophers, scientists and poets, this sense of the Beyond impels them without their full awareness and consent, while the mystic is for once
more articulate than they, and boldly claims that there is a
beyond where reality is and may be known.

These facts emerge, then, from an examination of the mo-
tives of the mystic: He sets out to gain his mystical knowledge
for reasons which we all share. His motives are natural ones, -
not naturalistic, as some of the psychologists would say. We are
no more warranted in saying that his motives are the kind which
issue in auto-suggestion and extreme subjectivism than we are in
saying this of the philosopher, for instance. If the mystic is
exceptional, his 'exceptionality' is one of superiority rather
than difference. He is sensitive but not over-sensitive; sincere
but not fanatical, "other-worldly" but not inordinately so. In
a word, he is one of us.

It is scarcely necessary to add that his motives are good
ones. From our examination, which we think has been fair and in-
clusive, we have found the mystic in his outlook and anticipation
to be wholesome, normal and eminently sane. He is at the same
time morally excellent. If our universe be moral as well as or-
dered, - and sanity is only possible through believing this to be
so - the mystic by his motives at least merits the place he
holds, and we may conclude, although this is anticipatory, his own
peculiar reward of insight into the Divine or Real.
It is when the mystic begins actually to prepare his life for the reception of the vision that to the casual observer, at least, he appears as more completely a stranger. This is doubtless due partly to the casual observer's too hasty conclusion that hostilities to the body and expurgation of all discursive thought with view to gaining a state of empty passivity, are the essential acts of preparation. But he makes the mistake of accepting mysticism in its extreme forms as true or best mysticism. There is no necessity for thinking that the mystic at his best despises the body, the world, or the activity of mind. He is not guilty of this form of dualism, as is so often held against him.

We must look first into his life of preparation to find, if we can, tendencies which it shares with forms of non-mystical life so readily taken for granted as more normal. If we fail to recognize everyday signs, we must look then to discover the principles of reasonableness and coherence exemplified in his peculiarities and differences.

Preparation, we found to consist of two stages, purgation and meditation. In reality, these would be better described as aspects or activities of preparation since they are more or less contemporaneous. They may be broadly distinguished by the fact that will is more aggressive in purgation and thought, in contemplation/
contemplation.

Purgation consists of purification, subordination of the flesh, a discipline of the will, and is intended as an act of love to effect a closer bond with the Beloved. To the milder mystic whom we have consistently regarded as the best exponent of mysticism, purification meant merely the maintenance of life at the level of a high standard of morality. Closely associated with this moral effort and intent was subordination of the physical nature which involved restraint as opposed to licence and excess. This exercise of sovereignty in a positive way over behaviour, and the accompanying curbing, not flagellation, of the flesh achieved a highly desirable training of the will which must be prepared to function at its best at the subsequent stage, meditation. Thus far, purgation is an exercise which should never have occasioned the hue and cry of the critics who have said the mystic is a dualist and regards the flesh as evil; he is an ascetic; he progresses by the sacrifice of the wholeness of man. These indictments are really of the extremists who in their feverish lives have been so prone to carry the good and wholesome to such excesses that they ceased to be good and wholesome. The wearing of hair shirts and the kissing of lepers were acts of purgative fanaticism. Fanaticism is always distortion and never a true expression of the underlying
truth and reasonableness of a faith. Purgation and purification, as we see them practised by the milder and truer mystics, have been normal, reasonable and good. Wholly apart from the inherent value of the cathartic discipline they involve, is their indispensability to the act of thought and knowing which constitute the characteristic experience of the mystic life. They involve a turning away from the world of sense of which the physical is the persistent reminder. This means merely that they give thought a greater measure of liberty. Thought always depends upon this liberty if it is to proceed to its rightful goals. Hocking says, "In all concentration of thought there must be some leaning away from the distraction of the senses." Socrates in the Phaedo makes a whimsical comment on this fact in the phrase, "the true disciple of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men; they do not perceive that he is ever pursuing death and dying," - a remark which he explains in the dialogue as follows:

"What shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge? Is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? Are not sight and hearing, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? - When does the soul attain truth? Must not existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?

Yes.

And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself, and none of these things trouble her, - neither sounds nor sight nor pain nor any pleasure,
"When she has as little as possible to do with the
body, and has no bodily sense or feeling, but is
appiring after being?
That is true." 1

The true mystic, not an ascetic - wisely follows that practice
of detachment lauded by the father of philosophers. The faculty
of creativity is an exceedingly tenacious one and functions best
in the protected area of detachment. The mystic intends to create
or discover. Accordingly he betakes himself, as would any other
with a product of higher consciousness to create, to this pro-
tected area. In doing so, he marks his kinship with all thinkers.
Mysticism has been for too long unjustifiably identified with an
asceticism which was never more than incidental to it and most
frequently but accidental.

The wisdom the mystic shows in disciplining his will by
the exercises of purgation and purification is also apparent. We
have seen that in the meditation which follows purgation and puri-
fication, a strong need for concentration appears. Thought always
languishes where will fails to be its active partner. If insight
is to be gained will must be as vigorous as thought, a fact well
known to anyone who has attempted to solve a philosophical problem
for instance. In meditation, although the mystic's thought is con-
centrative rather than discursive, as great effort of will is involved

1. Hooking, Types of Philosophy, p.402.
as there would be were it discursive. To exclude unfriendly ideas and successfully remind himself of the One, as the mystic does in meditation, he must be able to practice an unusual vigilance. In other words he must come to meditation equipped with a nicety of poise and control. It is in meditation, then, that he profits from the discipline of will gained in the previous ordering of his moral and physical life. He has a long and arduous road to go, a road which he counts upon following to the very end. He believes that at the end and not as a blessed accident by the way, will come the sense of personal communion with God. If he is to go the full way and succeed, consciousness as a whole must be in the best training form, to borrow the term of the athlete. A phase of full training is training of the will. Mystics cannot afford to be weaklings and upon the whole they have impressed us by their tenacity. The mystic wills the purification of his life and through execution of this willing, he further trains his will in habits of strength and endurance. In this there is further evidence of the soundness and reasonableness of the steps he takes as he advances in an effort of discovery.

We found, too, that he thinks of his sacrifices as acts of love toward the One he is seeking to know. Good and great Christians have made sacrifices as a necessary expression of their love
for God, as well as for men, and also because they have felt that in some way these sacrifices would establish a bond of union between themselves and their God. It is in this spirit that the mystic brings himself to suffer. Again we are impressed, not only by the inherent courage shown by such love, but by the fact that it is integral to his whole life. It is by the whole of consciousness that the mystic hopes to apprehend God immediately. Thought alone cannot suffice; nor can will; nor can both in co-operation. There must be feeling to energize the whole enterprise. It is ever thus in what man undertakes to do. Kantian categories are not evolved coldly. A feeling of pleasure rewards the scientific discoverer at each stage and provides at least one element of the urge to go on from stage to stage. So it is with the mystic. He is more than a thinking, willing seeker. He feels, and strongly, and his emotion is love for the Hoped-for but as yet Unknown Beloved. We are drawn to the mystic by the tenderness of his nature which loves. We respect him for that instinct for reasonableness and coherence which induces him to give love a place so that in fullness of consciousness he can seek his goal.

Thus far, purgation has been a course of outer preparation although obviously one with inward effects. There is a more particularly inward course of preparation which comes partly under
purgation and partly under meditation. In fact purgation in its more inward form and meditation are complementary, and it is to be remembered that however diagrammatic our description makes the mystic life to appear in form, its stages are never clear-cut and separate. This more inward purgation consists in the removal of extraneous ideas and the discounting of the more usual methods of thought as means of knowing God. Carrying over these conclusions forced upon him by the realized failure of his worldly moral effort to gain reality, the mystic, in purgation refuses to dwell upon this effort unless it be to confess its unworthiness. He eschews all forms of theological reasoning, forgets his social contacts, his pleasures and his pains. In a word, he renounces, for the time of worship at least, his world. But psychologically speaking, it is impossible to accomplish this renunciation completely. The will to expel, if left alone with such a task, would find that which it would expel, but summoned to an unusual insistence. To expurgate ideas of thought and appearance from consciousness, it is necessary to employ positive as well as negative means. Meditation is really the positive element of the purgative exercise. In meditation thought partners with the will and exercises an expulsive function as well as a content-filling one. Meditation, we found to consist of reminding oneself of God, and a desire
for communion with Him. In turning away from the world the mystic does not necessarily turn to vacuity, although certain schools of mystical thought may have done so with practical motive based in their negative philosophical faith. The true mystic turns toward something. He turns toward God and while we may trace dimly in the background in these penultimate moments of his worship, a conception of God which may have issued from his reasoning, his interpretation of the world, and his tradition, we find him contemplating God finally in a waiting rather than an aggressive or discursive mood. He is like the ardent admirer of the subject of a biographical sketch who awaits the consummation of acquaintance through personal meeting. Thus only can acquaintance become real and vital. Through it, and it alone, is he really able to know the other. The mystics wait reverently to thus "know" God.

What can we say of this more inward phase of preparation? The more outward preparation we found to be of a kind, physically and psychologically, to aid consciousness in an effort of discovery. Is meditation recognizable as a usual and reasonable step in a process of discovery; or does the mystic here cut himself off irrevocably from the rest of us?

First it is to be noted that the mystic recognizes and conforms to well-established principles of psychological continuity.
He knows that although his state of consciousness must be a simpli-
ified one it must not be alien to the intuition of the Real
which he awaits. Graham Wallas says:

"Our mind is not likely to give us a clear answer
to any particular problem unless we set it a clear
question and we are more likely to notice the
significance of any new piece of evidence, or new
association of ideas, if we have formed a definite
conception of a case to be proved or disproved." 1

Leuba writes:

"Whatever its explanation, the fact itself has to be
accepted; in artistic as in scientific discovery, i.e., both in the field of imagination and of rational
construction, there come after periods of mental
striving or vague brooding, fructifying moments,
effortless and unexpected, which give the impression
of inspiration." 2

Each of these writers traces a continuity from incident to incident
in the mental activity to the final issue, inspiration, or as Leuba
calls it, "the impression of inspiration." Despite the psycholo-
gist's confessed inability to trace the intricacies of the course
followed by mind in reaching the place of inspiration or discovery,
he concludes, as do most of us, that there are no accidents; that
whether or not we are the masters of inspiration and discovery, we
must at least follow methodically in certain ways if we are to gain
or receive them. The mystic is fully possessed of this truth. He
knows that neither upon a state of moral, mental nor emotional ca-
sualness will the great revelation break, but upon one of meticulous

1. Wallas, The Art of Thought, p.84.
attention; that if there is to be a break from ordinary to trans-
cendent consciousness, this break will come at a regular place and
time for which he must prepare. So he orders his mind in relevance
to his goal; he reminds himself of God; he desires God.

We have suggested that the mystic's consciousness in medi-
tation is in a state of simplification. We have to consider here
if the achievement of this simplification has its parallels in life
in general. Enough has been said of the mystic in meditation to
make it clear that while he aims at passivity which is voluntary,
implies a degree of activity in consciousness, he trusts, too, in
a state, "sky-cleared," of any complexity of ideas as the one which
will be most effective in opening the doors to reality. For the
time he must cease to be philosopher, metaphysician or scientist.
He avoids the complexities involved in any process of reasoning
himself, as it were into God's presence. Simplification or passi-
vity are the terms which best describe his psychological condition.
Numerous parallels are to be found outside the mystic life. Gra-
ham Wallas says of Helmholtz, the German physicist,

"He said that after previous investigation of the pro-
blem (a scientific one) in all directions .......... happy ideas came unexpectedly without effort, like an
inspiration. "So far as I am concerned, they have
never come to me when my mind was fatigued, or when I
was at my working table.....They came particularly
readily/
"readily during the slow ascent of wooded hills on a sunny day." He describes this process as consisting of Preparation, Incubation, and Illumination.1

The mind of the scientist shows here two activities which parallel those of the mind of the mystic. Preparation may be taken, for our purposes, to conform to mystical preparation. Incubation is less complex but none the less integral to the whole work of mystical discovery. It is a state of relative mental quiescence as compared with the vigorous aggression of preparation. It is well symbolised by the act of leisurely ascent of a hill on a sunny day, an act which would also be conducive to this mental quiet. Creativity, then, has its passive or simplified as well as its active moments for mystics as for scientists.

A more easily recognised instance of simplification in consciousness is that which shows in aesthetic intuitions. There are two possible ways of regarding a beautiful thing. One consists in examination of the beautiful thing into those components which, in combination, yield beauty. From the point of view of the scientific man a sunset may be explainable in terms of light rays, vapour, refraction and reflection. A sunset will suggest only these phenomena to him if he be in the mood of a scientist. In this case the sunset is really not beautiful but only factual. But in other moods it is seen by him as beautiful. This is when he approaches

the beautiful with consciousness passive or simplified. He merely
goes where beauty is and if he be a certain kind of man in a cer-
tain mood beauty does its peculiar work in him. If we are to suc-
ceed in friendship, love, or aesthetic experience we must not de-
pend upon our pragmatic, analytical selves being forever uppermost.
Take from life those experiences in which we feel no need to ask
why or wherefore and the residue would be, for most of us, not worth
the keeping. It is in simplified or passive moments, to use the
descriptions which would satisfy either mystic or psychologist, that
we find ourselves open-hearted to reality. We conclude that if the
mystic has an exceptionally developed gift for achieving this state
of the simple heart, he is, not only one of us, but one of the best
of all of us. He is not only an esoteric in the understanding and
use of a profoundly valuable psychological exercises; he may have a
dependable access to a reality of which most men gain only precious
hints in their perceptions of beauty or their participation in hu-
man love or friendship.

Upon the whole the conclusion seems warranted that the mys-
tic in preparation has shown himself to be, not a stranger among
men, but a person particularly discerning where those psychological
principles which bear upon discovery are concerned. He is an ex-
pert in the practice of detachment from an, at times, stultifying
sense world; and in the disciplining of will in the condition which makes the intense concentration of meditation possible. He knows how consciousness can command its fullest powers of insight when it functions with will, thought and emotion in union, so he wills and thinks, but also loves his Supreme Good. He sees that discovery is through observance of the principle of coherence or continuity and so he orders his thought in relevance to the goal he expects to reach. Nor does he overlook the part to be played by simplification or "incubation" in the gaining of insight.

In summary, then:—the mystic seems worthy of the reward he seeks. Psychologically, he adheres to sound general principles. He is consistent and purposeful. He knows whether he is going and how. Certainly, he does not seem to be a pathological case, blindly pushed by a psycho-physical machine out of one organic storm area into another. Nor does his intelligent normal grasp and use of psychological laws in general, readily lend support to a conclusion that he would employ certain psychological laws to delude himself into a belief that the imagined is the Real. Rather would we conclude that here is a man in unique command of himself and his faculties. His most vulnerable point is certainly not in his psychological insight, his purposiveness, and his coherence.

........................
CHAPTER 5
THE VALIDITY OF MYSTICAL KNOWLEDGE

Where mysticism has seemed most vulnerable has been in the seeming connection of its negative preparation with a negative philosophy. Its critics have said that its self-obliterating preliminaries are but of a piece with its metaphysical and philosophical conclusions that God and the world are separate and opposed; that personality is to be persistently ignored; that of the Absolute nothing can be said or known and that the issue is nescience or agnosticism. Here is a most disconcerting array of negatives which are for the most part as philosophically discredited as they are from the religious point of view, undesirable. But is it fair to mysticism to thus identify it as so completely negativistic?

Our examination of its preparatory stages has contained many suggestions that it acts in more positive mood; that not self-obliteration but self-realization and enhancement are its real objective. But that mysticism is positive, not negative, in its outlook and fulfilment, will appear when we discuss, as we now proceed to do, the characteristic act of mysticism, that is, its knowing of God.

We have said again and again that the core of mysticism is an immediate experience of God which enforces an overwhelming assurance, but which is not directly informative about the nature
of God. This is ecstasy, which means that the worshipper is confronted by a silence-inducing Presence. We have quoted the mystic as silent because he has too much rather than too little to say. His experience is ineffable, which, he insists, does not imply that God is Infinite Not or Blank but only that man is incompetent to describe God, a positive Infinite. Mystics, we found, were not content with the role of worshippers, but have tried to give a philosophical basis for their experience. They and their supporters have also tried to trace in mystic experience, psychological laws at work as they are in non-mystical experience, for both have believed that by so doing they could commend this seemingly peculiar way of life upon the grounds of its universality as opposed to its uniqueness. We plan here to identify ourselves with both endeavours.

In casting about for that to which this experience of knowing may be likened among more easily recognizable and understandable experiences, our attention is struck by the kinship between ecstasy or mystical knowing and friendship. In fact, we hold that in an understanding of that most concrete analogy, friendship, there is a key to theoretical understanding of the mystical ecstasy. It is not without significance that an important sect of mystic worshippers has taken the name, "Friends of God." Strange as it may seem, the possible parallel to be drawn here, has been for the most part
neglected by writers on the subject.

It is our thesis here that the wall of separation between one self and another self can be broken down so that there may ensue an immediate knowing of or communion with the self by another. The antithesis is suggested indirectly by Haldane, to quote one instance. He states,-

"Hume was quite right when he pointed out in his "Treatise" that he could not find what Bishop Berkeley seemed to think he could find, some idea of the mind as apart from its impressions and ideas. He could not catch any perception of the Self. No, because there is no perception of the Self to catch. The Self is nothing apart from the activity of its mental life and the mental life has no existence except as in a self, as a mind which gives it unity and its meaning." 1

In other words the writer recognizes as a Self, the aggregate of related qualities and activities which he can name and describe. Acquaintance with such a Self would be merely the intellectual and emotional reaction to these qualities and activities and would depend chiefly upon interpretation and analysis. At best, the one Self would have but a theory of the other Self as a unity with certain characteristics. Friendship could be never more than second-hand. It would be based always upon theory; and were Self number two sufficiently adroit in the practice of hypocrisy, self number one would be forever deluded.

But we know that true friendship, or friendship known as

true, is not based upon falsity of impression. It is based upon an immediate knowing and not a theory, as it would necessarily be were the Self or "I" merely a cohering aggregate of qualities and activities. This knowing is possible because Self is more than such an aggregate or synthesized entity.

We are indebted to Kantian thought for this view that the Idea of the Self may be Real. There are three ways of regarding the Self: (a) The behaviourist psychologist thinks of it as a psycho-physical organism; that the life of mind and body run together because they are really the same. The logical conclusion of this theory is that a fully completed physiological science would explain the brain, mind, soul, consciousness and Self. There is no real Self apart from behaviour. (b) Or the Self or Subject is regarded as by Haldane, whom we have quoted, as the sum of the thoughts, feelings, actions, memories and hopes that occur in the one Self or Subject. (c) But there is always to be remembered that the psycho-physical Self, or the psychical Self, is being regarded with an air of possession by a higher Self, the true "I." The former belong to "me." There is a pure Self, most closely related to the more concrete, empirical aspects of Self, it is true, but it is less hampered, more possessive, more imperial.

Most of us in other than our analytical moments accept this.
But this naive conclusion is supportable by a proof that seems to brook no denial. Here is certainty. Let us use an illustration: A man looks upon his fields and wonders at their beauty. There is, then, an "I" regarding beauty. He turns his thought more inwardly and sees the wonder of a man, an "I," so constituted and ordered that he can feel in certain way in the presence of beauty. Still further in the recesses of his "I-hood" he goes and contemplates the wonder of a man, an "I," thinking upon the wonder of an "I" thinking of an "I" moved by beauty. So he concludes that he could go on thinking in a series; that always this "I" which he thinks he is examining, is doing the examining. He concludes further that the series of these "I" acts of thought is an infinite one; and that this "I" which trails back into the shadows of infinity is always there, but can never be brought out into the light of day and looked upon or into. It is a non-objectifiable thing. About it-in-itself he can say or know nothing. But that he knows it, is to him, the most certain thing in experience. Consciousness, then, is in series. If "I" stands for this non-objectifiable, the real Self, then \[ I = I \rightarrow I + I + \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots I \text{nth} \]. We are neither able to objectify ourselves nor other selves. But we know immediately that this non-objectifiable Self is real. This is, in
fact, one of the few forms of immediate knowledge. Even knowledge of an outer object is always a relayed one and is not attended by the same certainty which accompanies the knowledge of the non-objectifiable self.

But, it will be asked, what bearing has the proof of this non-objectifiable Self upon mystical knowing or upon friendship which we have taken as an analogy to establish the even more important truth about the mystic's worship. We anticipate our conclusion and say here that it is between these ineffable but known non-objectifiable Selves that friendship or higher love really takes place. The real interchange is not of ideas, gestures, kindness but occurs as a form of communion or mystic union of one Self with another.

Let us think, for a moment, of friendship as thus explainable. We have seen how it is accepted by friends that in friendship they are more than mere observers one of the other. Observation does not enable us really to know one another; we are constantly getting back of the more outward traits to something which is the owner and manipulator of the qualities. Theoretically, there is no way of getting beyond the outward Self to the essential Self. But actually we sometimes do, thus entering the closest relationship or communion possible. So we may say that in friendship there
are two activities or experiences, observation and communion. I know my friend as a philosopher, a poet, an artist; he is buoyant, imaginative, sympathetic. Accordingly he interests me, but so might anyone possessed of these gifts and qualities. It is because of a deeper communion that I call him my friend. There are moments in our relationship when qualities are forgotten, when no words are spoken, ineffable moments, upon which the whole relationship depends, and in the light of which I see his qualities. We are sure that this is the view which Hocking stresses in a passage which we regard as being as true as it is beautiful:

"But the best known of all experiences of the mystic type is that of discovering the individuality of other persons.

We deal with men for the most part through their qualities and properties, that is, through their universal, describable, recommendable or condemnable sides; each man stands to us, or tends to stand, for a certain formula, quality, function, in semi-official manner. We have our theory of him; he plays his part in our artificial world, as one of many. We note in him many qualities, good and bad, interesting and perhaps contradictory; we wonder how all these characters are united in one being who feels no such variety in himself. The one quality that combines these many in a consistent identity we can neither describe nor convey; nor can we surely hold the memory of it except by return from time to time to his presence. But for the most part we are not concerned with this; the man is a function, and would be improved by the excision of his bad qualities; we could easily re-make him to his advantage, after the pattern of our own universal standard. Our critical judgment of him is, we have said, pluralistic and general; there is a miracle/
"miracle in him—that is, his individuality—but we remain outside the mystery, and willingly. For it is the business of men to fit well together in the work of the world, to be officers there, reliable working universals.

But at times we are granted something like a mystic vision; it seems to us we have come into the presence of the individual and have seen the miracle as such. We have found the other soul in its seclusion and simplicity—so we think—and we begin to appreciate the place even of its apparent defects in that synthesis which is itself. The critical attitude is no longer able to hold its negation against this interest in the person as substance—as something that is, and is one. The vision in fact begins to work upon us; we cannot forget it; we no longer attend to it with voluntary effort, but it forms a part of our consciousness and begins to make us over after its own pattern, as if it were active and we were plastic before it. This perception of the other as an individual being is love, in its special meaning. Love does not displace criticism; it contains it. Love accepts the individual with his defects, because the One which it has seen contains the inward remedy for those defects. Nor does love feel the need of concealing its own faults, for love of another involves also a discovery of the individual in oneself: it is a presence of the individual to the individual, a flight of the alone to the alone." 1

The foregoing is but a theory of friendship but it is one which seems to fit the facts. We are dealing here with an act of knowing but not one which yields knowledge as discursive or analytical and interpretative effort yield it. This is immediate knowing between Self and Self. We have seen that our own non-objective Self does not yield to observation, inference and interpretation.

The same is to be said of the non-objective Self which is the real Other of the friendship relation. The agnostic psychologist would say that this knowing is due merely to inference having become automatic and unconscious; but such a conclusion is reached by basing logic upon surmise. Nothing is more certain to us than that knowing a friend is more than the possession of sufficient data upon which to base an exhaustive description of him.

If we were to attempt to amplify Hocking's explanation of friendship as dependent upon this "finding of the other soul in its seclusion and simplicity" it would be merely by adding this reference to the non-objective Self. It is, we have said, the most provable of all things, being one of the few immediately known things. Hocking regards it as an empirical fact that in certain moments the Self does commune with the other Self and that in this communion there is no simultaneous dependence upon observation of personal qualities. Such communion implies that there are needed two real or pure Selves to whom these qualities belong. The doctrine of the non-objective Self established the fact that there are available for this communion, two such real or pure selves. It is between these that communion takes place; friendship exists in the non-objective.

This knowing which among human experiences is peculiar to
friendship - and human love, and perhaps aesthetic intuitions - is the kind of knowing which the mystic experiences. It is, we have said, analogous to mystic knowing. May we not go a step further and say that it is the very key to an understanding of our problem.

With the analogy still in mind, we offer our theory of what and how the mystic knows. The friend experiences two sets of facts, the observable qualities and the Self or Owner of the qualities. The first experience is more or less continuous and controllable; the second is transient. That there is a connection, if a non-traceable one, between the knowing of the qualities and the knowing of their Self, goes without saying. In some way, one friend depends upon the impact of these outward qualities upon himself, for his admission to the inner Self of the other. Friendship is not likely to be born upon first sight. It is only after we have seen and got to know a person in the more usual sense that we are prepared for that fortunate moment, more than a moment of synthesis, when our intercourse passes from inference and comment to communion. It may even be true that the observable qualities are the necessary clue to the knowledge of the real Self; but that knowledge transcends the inferential knowledge of these qualities.

How then, can we trace briefly the analogy between friendship and mystical knowledge? Hocking says,-
"What is the mystic experience but finding the idea of the whole, as love finds the idea of a person? Worship seeks the self of the world as an individual being, etc." 1

In the case of friendship there is a cohering aggregate of qualities and activities, and there is the Idea or Self which coheres them. In the case of worship, there is the world and there is God, the world's Coherer and Owner. Just as I may speak of my mind, will, emotions, efforts, God may think of His world. To us, the world is the necessary clue to the non-objective but real Self, God, the Idea of the world. In everyday life I am regarding the world, interested in it, taught by it, moved to wonder and awe by it. But in my worship life I, in some way, push through beyond this outer world and find its Self just as I get beyond qualities to commune with the reality which is my friend. This is our theory. We state it in few words and necessarily, for when we deal with either friendship or worship we are in the realm, as the mystic would say, "of the Ineffable." Our statement of the theory of friendship has been more exhaustive than that of the related theory of mystic communion. In fact it would almost seem that we have subordinated our main thesis to its illustration. But this has also been necessary and with intention, for friendship as we have described and explained it is more readily approachable and understandable than mystical knowing.

CHAPTER 6
THE THEORY TESTED

We have now to consider several very important questions, the answers to which should indicate the value and truth of our theory which explains mystical knowledge, a knowing of God who is the Self of the world, as akin to friendship which is knowing the real Self of the qualities of a friend.

The Mystic as Man.

The first of these questions is, What kind of a man does our theory imply? Many interpreters of the mystic's friendship with God have not gone deeply enough in their examination, and as a result they have only succeeded in drawing a most unflattering picture of the Mystic. They have said that in personality the highest recognizable values are to be discerned, and yet the mystic reaches knowledge of reality by a denial of personality and the cessation of those functions which are usually thought to show personality at its truest and highest. He belittles all effort of logical understanding; he discredits philosophy; his morality consists of ascesis. He thinks that he is at his best, not when active, but when he is passively awaiting the revelation of Reality. For him, there is no giving for he has nothing worthwhile giving.
Upon the whole he is a person emptied of all that fullness which signifies personality at its best. But is this really the kind of man who becomes a friend of God? Let us see.

We found that in his preparation for the culmination of worship he achieved a voluntary passivity; that when he excluded sense and thought he did so by an effort of will of the most impressive vigour. This much, then, goes to the positive side of personality. His will is active. To that extent he is a self-assertive person and not a personality - effacing one. His moral effort, we found to be, not ascetic, but self-curbing; that is, he exemplifies the superiority of restraint over licence. This marks him as not less but more of a personality. Such preparation, we might justifiably describe, as a conscious outgoing of himself to the friendship with God.

But it is his alleged subordination or denial of his power of reason and interpretation which has called down upon him the condemnation of those who assert that, to be at its best in the role of discovery, personality must parade all its faculties. These critics regard the mystic with that scorn which we think the intellectual nihilist would deserve. But would it not be fairer to fast to observe that the mystic does not deny, in such wholesale fashion, the prerogative of the thinker; that he is a thinker but that he
does his discursive thinking in the right places. We have seen how inference no longer holds the field in those moments when the non-objective communes with the non-objective in friendship. But it must not be forgotten that friendship does first engage itself in inference. The friend knows the Other Self in the sense of having 'knowledge about' him and he depends upon this 'knowledge about' to lead the way to that 'acquaintance with' which is the essence of friendship. In similar way the mystic depends upon his interpretation of many things in the world to lead up to that knowing of the Whole in worship. The mystic may have his cosmological, ontological, teleological, pragmatic, or values arguments. He learns the lessons which tradition teaches about religion and God. All of these may be convincing to him, but only as a logical interpretation of facts is convincing. They cannot be fully assuring. We have seen how inference from observable facts will not provide the basis for friendship and that friendship comes from the deeper communion of Self with Self; but the observation of qualities comes first and is the essential preparation for the communion. The mystic does not cut himself off from thought, tradition, the world, saying that these are non-revealing. These are intermediary, and if not as important as the goal, then only in the sense in which the stage in a logical process is not as important as the conclusion. Both have
value. The intermediate steps must be taken. The mystic in communion can no more be cut off wholly from the world of which God is the Self, than the friend can be cut off from some knowing of the qualities of his friend. The mystic does contemplate the world and life, even as a philosopher, but this contemplation is not final. It merely orders his consciousness in a relevance to the final insight. Qualities can be forgotten in the moment of vision but they have brought the mystic to the place where he can afford to forget them in the interest of the fuller and richer experience of union.

The mystic, we have said, reminds himself of God, prior to the ecstasy. But an idea of God is neither so simple nor so simply come by as this brief phrase would seem to suggest. The intricacies of the entry of such an idea into the mind even of the simplest worshipper are innumerable. The mystic must be a metaphysician of sorts before he is a worshipper.

But we would not be wholly warranted in concluding that because the mystic asserts the rights of personality by doing his own thinking, he is as much a personality in the actual revelation. Here it is, say the critics, that consciousness is not actively but passively receptive; which suggests the negation of personality rather than its enhancement or fulfilment. But the critics have overlooked the fact that this passivity is not an absolute one. We
have stressed the fact that the will is involved in maintaining a state of attention. It is our thesis that more than the will is involved. Modern psychology stresses the fact that intellect, feeling and will operate as one and not as divided functions. In certain activities one member of the indissolubly tri-partite consciousness may be more assertive than the others. In dealing in the abstractions of a mathematical problem, reason is more in evidence than feeling and will, but both the latter are active. This is one form of knowing; mystic knowing is another form involving the full consciousness but with love in the guiding role, instead of reason. The supremacy of love over thought and will which are nevertheless present, has led to the conclusion by mystics that ratiocination and emotion are not present in union. But this is over-emphasis. Pure feeling might be feeling for either a god or a devil. Were it possible to achieve a state of pure feeling, consciousness would be gone. But with feeling to guide and control, consciousness may conceivably gain its most satisfying insights. To be assured that feeling does assume this superior role in the perception of reality, we have but to consider the sense of beauty, or the knowing of a person. We have seen that in what may be called the intuitions of friendship, there is a deeper knowing than reasoned observation could yield. We know a friend through love. Such
knowing is neither philosophic nor scientific but that it is a more satisfying knowing we are very certain. It is knowing without the detachment which characterizes discursive procedure. It is more personal and vital.

It is this personal knowing which the mystic enjoys in ecstasy. He is not like Coe's example who said "I feel - I feel - I feel - I feel. I can't tell you how I feel, but oh! I feel! I feel!" His feeling is love but his love is not, nor could it be, the sole discoverer. His love is intelligent; it is also volitional. It is with a loving consciousness but consciousness as a whole that the mystic knows God.

So in worship the mystic is not an attenuated man, the empty form of a personality; he is personality attentive and active. When man loves a friend, we think of him, not as less, but as greater than he would be without such love. When he experiences a sense of the beautiful, he is once more an emancipated being, in touch with reality. When he knows God through love he is neither an exotic nor a sensualist but a true man so ordered and poised in his own personality that he can penetrate to the Real Self of the world.

Not only is the personality of the mystic active in its own right when he knows God; it is enhanced. A personality as such is only possible through its contacts with other personalities. The

freer and wider our commerce with our environment made up of other
selves, the richer will be our personalities. The recluse with his
books is likely to be less a man than the one who goes into the
world and gives of his best there. The philosopher in his study or
the scientist in his laboratory will each be sadly truncated unless
he has in mind some enlightenment or service he can bring to his
fellows through thought or research. He stultifies personality,
first, through not giving of himself, and then by not receiving any­
thing because he does not give. In those relationships in which
man offers and receives love, he experiences the greatest enrichment.
Great personalities owe their greatness, in most instances, not only
to what they have given to, but also received from, friendship or
love. The environment of the mystic is the richest possible. Not
only does he find the number of his personal contacts increased but
their quality deepend, for among those with whom he communes is
the Divine. And as a personality through the give and take of social
personal relationships wins a truer and fuller personality, so the
personality of the mystic, having first been enriched by the offering
of its moral achievement and the outpouring of its love, is in turn
enriched to an unusual degree by the response made by the personality
of the Absolute. The truth of this can be tested by examining the
history of the mystics. Upon the whole we are convinced that the
grand mystics were neither puppets in the hands of a divine manipulator nor a distraught libido, but personalities par excellence. They have given voluntarily and intelligently and they have received. They have left their impress upon the pages of human history. Their history reads like a story of reality itself and not of its shadow.

If the mystic knows, as he claims to, that God is personal and knows this God who is personal— and this is his essential claim based upon an experience more immediate than his experience of the world around him— then he is the only man who can be a true personality. Whether his system be true or false, there is no place in it for that thoroughgoing denial or attenuation of personality of which it is so persistently accused.

What kind of man is the mystic, we asked. Is not this the answer? He is moral with a higher, more selfless purpose than that which motivates holders of doctrines of utility or hedonism. He is a thinker within reason, higher reason. He becomes a friend of God. This would seem to be a picture, not of personality quiescent, but of personality triumphant; a picture, not of less but of more of a man. That he keeps to the role of real personality, not only in his preparation for worship but in his enjoyment of it, we shall see even more clearly as we go on to consider what kind of God it is that he knows.
The Mystic's God.

The mystic says that he knows God in worship, but that the experience is incommunicable. Unfortunately, when he has undertaken to give philosophical explanation of his peculiar inarticulateness he has only succeeded in giving the impression that the Indescribable is also the Unknowable. What we have to determine is this: Is the mystic's knowing of an Indescribable God necessarily shown to be an experience with no objective reality, because the subject comes from his knowing with no report other than an affirmation that he has held communion with God?

Briefly, the negative philosophy of mysticism seems to be the "determinatio est negatio" credo of Spinoza. In his fearful reverence toward God the mystic is so diffident about saying God is "This" or He is "That," that he gives the impression that God is "Not This" and "Not That." The issue is the implication that God is Infinite Not, or Bare unity which amounts to the same. Critics have joined issue with him on this point. Oman says,-

"In real knowing we have something like a knowledge of a person. We know a person by his external manifestations but we reach beyond to a unity. We feel and interpret, and all becomes knowledge. Thus reaching beyond sense, we make a world out of sense. This is the essential element of religion. Mysticism is an attempt to capture this, not in and by its manifestations but as empty." 1

1 Oman, The Hibbert Journal, April, 1928.
Oman also cites Edward Caird's conclusion that the mystic arrives at unity with empty hands. Hocking has shown the perils which beset the mystic when he becomes philosopher. Were the mystic to describe God, his feeling preference would be for positive terms such as 'great,' 'wise' etc; but even these imply the exclusion of God from possession of the opposites, 'not-great', etc. Similarly, in goodness, or Mentality, God is beyond mere descriptives. He is an entity but from the point of view of logic, a neutral one. Hocking continues—

"But if we are persistent in our logic, we shall remind ourselves that to describe the 'One' as 'neutral' or as 'Cosmic,' or even as 'One' in the ordinary numerical sense would be to exclude from it the characters of 'non-neutral' and the like, for these are descriptives. In all constancy, we should find ourselves reduced to silence! Are we not, in fact reviving from another angle the considerations which led certain thinkers to agnosticism and the doctrine of the Unknowable?" ¹

Rufus Jones criticizes Eckhart's philosophy by showing how he "relegates the supreme reality of our universe to the blank of 'a nameless nothing,' to 'the empty stillness of absolute 'naught'." According to Eckhart as interpreted by Jones, "We turn to unknowing to find the supreme realities." The outcome is agnosticism and nescience. Of God, Eckhart can only say, "He is 'Not,' 'Not this, 'Not' that, 'Not' here, 'Not' there." ²

¹. Hocking, Types of Philosophy, p.391.
This seems to summarize the philosophy of mysticism and, either to expose the weakness of mysticism itself, or the inadequacy of its philosophy to convey the reality of the mystic life. Confronted as we are with the fervour and intensity of worshippers who have known and loved their God, we are impelled to enquire - "Are not the mystic life and its Object more than the philosophy of mysticism conveys?" Attempts to reconcile the philosophy of mysticism and mystic life have always been as trying as unsuccessful. Hocking explains that as a matter of fact even mystics, who have been negative or agnostic in their philosophy and who therefore should have been indifferent to their God, have regarded Him in a warm, personal way. While hesitant about applying attributes to God, lest they seem to limit Him, they yet favour the more positive rather than the negative moral and mental qualities when they try - without success, let it be noted - to say what God is like. He is more truly described as 'good' than as 'evil,' as 'mind' or 'spirit' than as 'matter.' Most mystics, whether avowed pantheists or not, have, in fact, insisted that their God is personal. This is one of the characteristic contradictions between their philosophy and their faith.

As a philosophic alternative to agnosticism, Hocking offers
the theory that the mystic may find it sufficient to know 'that' God is without knowing 'what' He is like. This he describes as a middle position between theism and atheism.

"The atheist says there is no God. The theist says God exists, meaning thereby a personal deity. The mystic says, the atheist is right; the God of theistic imagination does not exist, the theist is also right,- that God is.  

This point of view will enable the mystic to keep going. His position becomes a little more positive than agnosticism. It is reverent agnosticism; and the Unknown but Revered could act in a long distance way, something like the influence of an ideal, to keep the worshipper, if he could be called such, looking beyond nature, and yet doing better in nature for his looks beyond.

This is all very theoretical and, as we think back to all the wealth of avowal of immediate communion, of 'oneness with God,' it seems artificial as well. A philosophy of mysticism never does justice to the experience which is the heart of mysticism. This half-faith, half-agnosticism toward a 'That' with the 'What' at the irreducible minimum, is surely not to be identified with that all-satisfying Real, the God whom the mystic finds in his worship, however water-tight the theory of it may seem as a logical explanation.

As we have pointed out, the negative or agnostic philosophy

1. Hosking, Types of Philosophy, p. 394.
of mysticism arises because the mystic's experience, although real to him, is ineffable. Philosophers of mysticism and some mystics having become philosophers, have made the error of thinking that because man is mute, because his vision is ineffable, God is ineffability. But we by no means reduce the objectivity of any experience by remarking that it renders us inarticulate. Leuba's comment is:

"When you have said, as Professor Hocking does, that the 'that' of mystical ecstasy has no meaning until interpreted, that it is mind stuff or 'neutral-stuff' out of which in a natural mind, knowledge issues, logic compels you, it seems to hold that the same is true of all the 'thats' immediately given in any other experience. The immediately-given in ecstasy is no longer isolated as a unique phenomenon; it is now properly classified together with the meaningless and yet potentially meaningful something which is at the root of every psychical experience whatever. For, not only in mystical ecstasy but also in every perceptual or affective experience, something unassailable and ineffable is given. Thus, the metaphysical effort to find God is provided with a much broader intuitive basis than that of mystical ecstasy alone; its basis includes the given in consciousness generally. In the search for God no position of vantage may now be claimed a priori for the immediately given in trance experience."

We welcome this from Leuba and are able to turn it to a use which he would not have anticipated. For the moment, at least, Leuba groups mysticism with all those experiences which are "unassailable and ineffable." He is concerned with showing that it is not unique

and would have us infer from the lack of uniqueness that it is invalidated. But it has been our constant aim to identify mysticism, not with the supra-normal pretensions of the extremists, but with that which it is the right of the normal person to enjoy in his worship. Mysticism, so Leuba concludes, as we do, but with a different interest and intent, is but one form of those wonted experiences which render the subject inarticulate.

We have made reference already to aesthetic intuitions. The true lover of beauty is always inarticulate, so his description of the beautiful takes the form of symbol and figure. But he knows that the beautiful is always greater than his description can convey. He is too much in the experience of beauty to be calculatingly and accurately descriptive. It is the same in the case either of great sorrow or joy. When the sorrow or joy is immediate we do not catch its full significance. We have all said "I do not realize yet, what has taken place." We have taken much time to show that the reality of friendship which occurs when observation and inference are in abeyance, and one Self communes with the Other, is ineffable. Here, description of qualities, if not negation, would certainly be inadequate.

In these experiences there is an Other, either an Object or a person, which makes its impact upon me, the subject; the result
is that although I am aware of the Other, I can neither describe it nor the experience I have of it. I merely live through the experience of it. But although I find the experience incommunicable, I have no doubt that it is real, not illusory. So far as we are aware, no attempt has been made, for instance, to offer as a philosophy of aesthetics, a philosophy of Unknowing. The naturalistic psychologist may offer his theory which is something like a chemical hypothesis but this, although it outrages our feeling in the matter, does not at any rate question that the experience of beauty has some form of reality. It is a conclusion shared by all unless it be the cynics, the phlegmatic, and the materialists in philosophy or personal taste, that such experiences and their objects, each of which is ineffable, partake more of reality than all else that goes to make up life.

So we conclude that the vision of the Real claimed by the mystic is at least like other unquestioned experiences, and that its object is not proved a cold characterless 'that' because it cannot be described. In a footnote Hocking says that the knowing 'that' God is, implies that one already knows some 'what' about God. But worship is not so parsimonious as to give only this sadly restricted 'what.' Just as there is in friendship an intimacy which is 'content-ful', so in worship there is a sublime inti-
intimacy which yields a 'what' which, if overwhelming, is overwhelmingly real. It is more than the 'that' with a minimum of 'what' to act as a Kantian 'regulative idea' or a working hypothesis.

If pressed for an answer to the question why such experiences as we have described, including the experience of God, are ineffable we repeat our theory that they occur in or to the non-objective Self. We have found that this immediately known Self is itself unanalysable and indescribable; that again we must have recourse to the term 'ineffable' by which to designate a certain thing, this 'I' or Self. It is this 'I' which deals with all the elements of experience. Certain of these experiences it can objectify readily. A material object, the qualities of a person, the abstractions of mathematics belong in this category of readily objectifiable things. It is their distinguishing mark that they can always be regarded more or less coldly, or in a spirit of detachment. But other elements of experience defy this ready objectification. These are the elements which come home to the Self in more vital way. To these, the Self seems to impart its own non-objectivity. This can be made clearer by illustration: A flower as a botanical specimen is readily objectified. A flower as an object of beauty may so absorb me that objectification is not immediately
possible. In the moment of absorption I have no descriptives to apply nor do I feel the need of them. I am too much in the experience, or 'at - one' with beauty to describe the object in which beauty dwells. It is only when the intuition of beauty has passed that I am able to objectify the beauty, and then my only guide in objectification is my memory of the experience, a different thing entirely from the experience itself.

To immediate intuitions of beauty, the immediate knowing in friendship or love, the overwhelming sorrow or joy, can we not add the mystic's knowing of God, as an element of experience which takes place in this Holy of Holies of the Real or Non-Objective Self. Here, Self and the Other, both non-objectifiable, are in communion. This is vision. And again the human Self must say, "It is Ineffable," ineffable, not because unreal, but because so intensely real. If we think about it at all we must see that the really important events of life are those in which not only words but objectification fail us. The most important events never pass fully out of the non-objective to submit to description.

This is a most cursory presentation of the theory suggested by Karl Heim. It is a theory which renders at least partially articulate the immediate conviction, shared by most of us, that to be mute - or mystical - in the moment of vision, does not signify

1. The writer is indebted to Prof. Lyman, New College, Edinburgh, for an interpretation of Karl Heim's philosophy.
the unreality of the object of the vision, but rather, that the experience of this object is of the "very stuff of life."

But we are concerned here, not so much with this explanation by theory, as with the fact that the mystic's inability to say what God is like is a mark, not of the bizarre or eccentric, but of the best of which man is capable. He is akin to those who become lovers of beauty or a lover of men. He becomes a lover of God.

We began this section by asking, what kind of God does the mystic know. Is He to be thought of as a neutral entity, a bare unity, an unknowable, because the mystic comes from his communion in a mood of silence, or to use contradictions, or descriptives which are recognized by the user as adjuncts of an inadequate symbolism? We think that we have met these implied criticisms and have shown that the mystic's God may be real and known in the way in which another Self is known. This is not the knowing of Spencerian agnosticism but a full, rich knowing which is more than intellectual. It is knowing by consciousness as a whole.

What we have offered is, it is true, but a theory to explain mystic knowing. It is a matter of analogy and guessing but as we have emphasized constantly, analogy and guessing are what really constitute philosophy. We cannot prove that the mystic does know God immediately. We can but take what the mystic describes as
the facts of his experience, liken these to other unquestioned facts of experience, and upon our conclusion that they have kinship, base our theory that the former facts may be as described and do not contradict experience in general. We have brought ourselves merely to the point where we can say, "The mystic may be right." Nor are we brow-beaten by the mystic's fiery affirmations into making this admission. It is one to which we have given at least a measure of reasoned support by approaching the mystic and his system from two main points of view, the psychological and the philosophical.

Mysticism and Pantheism.

So far, then, we have been able to show that the mystic's communion is knowing and not Unknowing, and that his God is a Known God. Strictly speaking, this should mark the accomplishment of our task of proving the theoretical validity of mystical knowledge. But there remains to be undertaken, a pragmatic phase of our proof. We have taken cognizance already, of the need to show that the pragmatic test of mysticism is an important one, and have tried to show that the whole enterprise of mystical knowing satisfies because it allows for a freely functioning, self-maintaining personality in the role of knower or discoverer. To this extent mysticism as a practice is in harmony with any doctrine which
insists that the highest values inher in personality. To this extent it works and is true, and a frequent criticism is met.

There are other salient criticisms to be met if we are to be pragmatically satisfied with mysticism. For instance, it is as frequently held against the mystic that he is a pantheist, as that he claims his God as Unknown and Unknowable. Edmund Holmes says that the true mystics are all Pantheists at heart. If true, this would not seem, at first sight, to merit an indictment. Particularly as a philosophy has pantheism been the essence of great systems. It has been welcomed for the intellectual permission which it gives to think of the universe as one Being who is inclusive of things and events including those which are finally causal. It has seemed to be the system within which the philosopher could realize his characteristic attempt to think things whole. But to the religious man as philosopher, the shortcomings of pantheism are many; and to say that the true mystic is a pantheist is to make a most serious indictment.

This is not the place for a full exposition of the doctrine of Pantheism. It will be sufficient to touch its characteristic points of contact with mysticism. It ascribes unity to God, but not personal identity. God is the Inclusive One in the sense that everything and every being are part of Him. He possesses self-consciousness.

self-consciousness, knowledge, wisdom, moral qualities, only as
these are the attributes of beings who are modes of His being.
Since He is all, from the view point of logic He is as much in the
grain of sand as in the moral struggle.

Two views of the essential nature of God have been held by
pantheists. Materialistic pantheism which offers meagre religious
satisfaction regards its God as being of the nature of substance.
Higher Pantheism has thought of Him in the terms of human mental or
moral activity; in other words, He is spirit. Some pantheists have
called Him a spirit who thinks; others, the spirit who wills; and
others, fewer in number, the spirit who feels. But He is not to be
thought of as a person who thinks or wills. He cannot think of Him-
self as an "I" with the power to think or will. He is a principle
of thought or of will which creates and co-ordinates the universe.
To think of Him as person would be to put Him outside his thinking
and willing and, perforce, outside his thought or willed universe
which would mean the rejection of the essential pantheistic tenet
that He is merely this rational or conative universe.

The inadequacies of Pantheism to meet the personal religious
needs of man are immediately apparent. The pantheistic worshipper
who seeks to commune with the pantheistic Divine must renounce lo-
gic and run the risk of falling into self-hypnotic practices. His
God is already one with himself and the worshipper has not really to seek God at all. Unity is given at the outset. There is no call for the worshipper to prepare himself by moral fitness or by achieving a state of relevance in full consciousness to the goal which he seeks. To thus engage himself as an individual in individual preparation, as the pantheistic worshipper has consistently done, is to discount his faith that he has no personality apart from the Divine.

Strictly speaking a pantheistic God cannot be worshipped at all since worship means, if anything, a Self-Other relationship. Pantheistic worship, to be consistent with pantheistic principles, would be no more than a contemplation of the wonders of the universe itself, and of the wonder of God being in each part of it. It would be a kind of self-determined and self-controlled exercise in consciousness having as its aim the bringing of self into harmony with the Whole or God. To this effort the Whole, an exceedingly poor unity, could not, being impersonal, make response. Worship under pantheism is always one-sided. Moreover it would seem to be unnecessary, whether its intent be union with God, moral strengthening or inspiration and enlightenment, for the worshipper is a part of God already, and his morality or his knowledge, whether good or bad, meagre or full, are the same in significance. Logically, the spirit of pantheism would be fatalism or resignation.
Further, the God of pantheism, only moral as there is morality in His creatures, is equally present in the saint and the utter recreant. The religious person may have to recognize his incapability of explaining how God is personal, but it is his characteristic faith that He is; and that as personal, 'good' is more of his essential nature than 'evil.' The pantheistic God, as present in evil as in good, will not meet his need.

Again, the healthily religious person maintains the right of conscious independence of the worshipper and believes that just as God is necessary to man so man is necessary to God. He will not submit to obliteration in God. Pantheism achieves unity by denying this independence and the reality of personality. But even the pantheist, by the very activity of his thought and worship, asserts his personality and contradicts his philosophical conclusion that personality is neither real nor free. Although his creed defines personality as a fettered moment in God, he acts as if he were a personality in the accepted sense of the term.

Finally, pantheism fails to satisfy the religious man's inherent desire to know God, in the sense of having acquaintance or communion with Him. We have described this as a knowing by consciousness as a whole, with love as the guiding factor in the desire and expectancy of knowing. Such knowing which is intimate and satisfying/
satisfying is denied the pantheist, since it is a personal knowing of a person. In other words, the pantheist could not really speak of God as love, nor of man as loving God. It is true that pantheists have talked of their love of God, just as Spinoza talked of an intellectual love of God, but these feelings are love so thinned out that the term 'love' becomes really a misnomer. This is love of the God of a theory and not of a God communed with. Where, as has been so often the case in pantheistic mysticism, this love is marked by great intensity and issues in ecstasy, the explanation is most likely to be found in self-hypnotism; or, in the case of nature mystics, in the absorption in the natural object, intensified, not by the experience of God as in the object, but by the thought that God is in the object. Human nature is not so constituted as to be able to love genuinely a God who is impersonal and who therefore neither knows nor cares about the one who loves.

If our estimate of the religious inadequacies of Pantheism be a correct one, it is not to be wondered at that mysticism has lost ground through being identified with it. But although there has been a tendency toward pantheism in much pseudo-mysticism, mysticism as we have known and described it in these pages has not been essentially pantheistic. Interpreters have made the mistake of accepting the psychological report of the mystic's experience as being
the mystic's doctrine. The mystic has spoken of God as Unknowable and of himself as becoming absorbed in God in worship. But interpreting these reports is a different matter from interpreting the experience which occasions them. Pantheism has held that God belongs to an order of being unlike our own, in which case we have no equipment in consciousness for knowing Him. The result is pantheistic agnosticism. God is, in this case, Unknown because he is impersonal. Here is a superficial likeness to much mysticism, but, upon the whole, we have found that whereas the mystic may say that his experience of God is ineffable, and that he cannot describe God as he would a known object, yet the issue is not agnosticism. God the Indescribable, is really known, but this knowing of Him is one of those overwhelming experiences which take place in the realm of the non-objective. The knowing is what matters; description and report are as incompetent as inadequate. The experience of God is but one of many such which are ineffable. And, let it be observed, there is an experience. On the other hand, when pantheism is of the agnostic type, there is not necessarily any felt Other - Thou experience at all. Moreover, we need not accept the mystic's report that God is Unknowable because the mystic's report is not descriptive. Hocking makes this very clear:

"What I want to point out is that these words, unitary, immediate/
"Immediate, ineffable, which at all events apply to the mystic's experience, are precisely the words which the metaphysician applies to the mystic's doctrine. And I suggest that the misinterpretation of mysticism here in question is due to the fact that what is a psychological report (and a true one) is taken as a metaphysical statement (and a false one). From the fact that one's experience of God has been 'one, immediate, and ineffable,' it does not follow that God Himself is merely, 'one, immediate and ineffable' -- and so a being wholly removed from all concrete reality. It is true that this inference from the nature of the experience to the nature of its object is here of the closest order; and it is also true that many a mystic has committed himself to that inference. But it is possible, and necessary to reject it." 1

Rather than agree with Holmes that the mystics are all pantheists at heart, we would conclude, as we think more reasonably, that at heart and in their whole experience they were not pantheists but theists, and that it was only when they became metaphysicians that they made themselves to appear as pantheists. This view finds further support in the fact that mystics have consistently described their God as personal and their communion with Him as personal.

Mysticism has been also identified with Pantheism because of its supposed subordination or delimitation of self. As a pantheist, I am not a person in the true sense. I am destroyed through being merged in God. As a mystic, popularly interpreted, I also destroy self, by asceticism, by suspending my intellectual effort in an attempt to reach passivity, and finally by unconsciousness, or complete

absorption in God. This self-abnegation would seem to be sufficiently thorough-going to satisfy the demands of the most extreme pantheism. But we hope we have been able to show quite convincingly that the mystic is personality at its intensest even in the seemingly passive moment of vision. The hysterical prayers of mystics that they "might be nothing" always veiled the fact that the mystic wanted life in its most abundant form. In preparation, and even in vision, we found the mystic a self-assertive, actively conscious person never losing sight of his goal. All pantheistic utterances suggesting loss of self through absorption in God were but evidences of that verbal extremism which has been true of much mysticism. We must bear in mind always when seeking to understand the mystic that he is forever trying to communicate to us the incommunicable. This should help us to avoid the error of taking him too much at his word.

So we can conclude that some mystics have been pantheists at heart, that many who have been theists by experience, gave an impression that they were pantheists when they reported their experience. And upon the whole, it seems a warranted finding that mysticism as we have understood it and pantheism are only superficially akin or inter-dependent.

........................................
Our achievement up to the present is a proof that the mystic's knowledge of God is real knowledge of a Self. It is true that we have reasoned from analogy, but the analogy has been genuine and concrete. In certain cases analogy is incompetent to establish truth. For instance any attempt to argue from analogy that God is the Creator of the universe must fail since we ourselves can have no experience of creation. The most that man can do with material substance is to order, combine and manipulate. Creativity on man's part is never more. Strictly speaking, original creation is a wholly different thing which we cannot illustrate in order to prove or explain. But the analogy of friendship which we have used to prove the mystic's friendship with God is one which is inherently akin to what we were endeavouring to prove. True friendship about which we can never be articulate is actually so known as to be beyond the power of critics to invalidate. Argument which employs such an analogy meets the requirements of proof.

This knowledge, we have described as acquaintance with rather than knowledge about God. As such, it is even more real and satisfying than knowledge of any other kind. Only theoretically is
it the knowledge of agnosticism as it has been labelled so constant-
ly by its critics. It is more life-giving and engrossing than the
most positive and complete philosophical knowledge which is always
theory and therefore agnosticism of a kind.

But we would be doing mysticism scant justice were we to
overlook that wealth of 'knowledge about' God, about values and du-
ties, about the real world as a whole, which has been, if not the
essential knowing of mysticism, at least its highly important by-
product. We are impelled to enquire into the mystic's source of
such knowledge for two reasons. Firstly, although life affords wor-
ship with its vision of the real, there is also the work of life to
do. If we are to do this well we must have guidance, also the as-
surance that it is worth-while doing. In a word, important as it
is to know God and that God is, it is also important to know what
God is like, and what He asks of us. The mystic claims to be an
esoteric in the matter of finding this out. It is profoundly impor-
tant to learn if his claim be a true one. Secondly, we are so im-
pressed by the wealth of the mystic's claimed knowledge about God,
as it has been expressed in his life and in his literature, that we
are further led to enquire how he comes by it.

Can the mystic tell us better than anyone else what God is
like? Has he a way of finding truth in detail which others cannot
command? Does God speak to him in inspiration and vision so that, for instance, his duty will be made clearer in certain definite circumstances of life? Our answer is, yes, but neither as one person speaks to another, nor in the crude way which we described under the caption of 'Voices and Visions.'

Again, we must have recourse to our analogy of friendship of which the core is ineffable communion of Self with Self. In that, which for the sake of our analogy we may call the "vision of friendship," we do not receive in automatic way any points of guidance to go here and there or to do this or that. But the vision does work in us so that of ourselves we are better able to discover what we should do and how to set about it. An experience of beauty has its peculiar power of returning us to our work with greater interest and sincerity. The result is that we do better work than we would have otherwise. Should we be artisans, we will use the gifts we have to more effective purpose; or musicians, we will interpret with greater feeling and express more worthily. It is conceivable that even a scientist will be the better able to use his powers of discovery because he takes his hours off to contemplate nature or art. More, perhaps than we realize, do these visions of reality quicken our flagging wills and our creative thought. Manifestly, this formless, inarticulate thing we call beauty does not give us directly, an in-
increase of honest vigour for our work. Nor would anyone claim for it that it yields that insight of the scientist which gives some new discovery to the world. But its indirect creativity is everywhere traceable in life. That pure love of men for woman has this power of indirect creativity is one of the great and beautiful commonplace. It is easy to wax facetious over the effusions of the lover turned poet, but there is only occasion for facetiousness where innate or cultivated gifts for poetry are lacking. The creativity of true poets has been stimulated and enhanced by their love. This force of love does not give ready-formed sonnets to the passive mind of the poet, but it does inspire him to use his own gifts to their fullest extent. These are illustrations of the way in which the mystic's vision of God is creative. They help us to reconcile the apparent contradiction in his two-fold claim that his knowledge of God is incommunicable and that he can say what God is like, or, receive truth by inspiration.

The question we have really to answer is this: "Has the mystic a more effective way, than the non-mystic of reaching the sources of inspiration?" We have set forth at an earlier stage the mystic's claim that there is a complete "other-ness" about these sources; that to re-quote Goethe, "All productivity of the highest kind, every important conception, every discovery, every
great thought which bears fruit, is in no one's control, and is beyond every earthly power. Such things are to be regarded as unexpected gifts from above; as pure divine products." We quoted the minister who experienced unsought visitations of truth which later became his messages to his congregation. This man disclaimed any personal ownership of these ideas, and in instances, of the phrases which gave them expression. Can such knowledge be termed mystical in the sense that it is essentially an automatically received message? Does God give 'knowledge about' as well as the immediate knowledge of communion?

There are inherent weaknesses in any theory of knowledge being received passively. We have taken pains to show that mysticism is not inimical to the fullest development and expression of personality. It is almost axiomatic that personality is only at its best when it uses its faculties, which the religious man would describe as God-given. It seems therefore to be demeaning to man as a personality to hold that, if as a personality he would discover truth, he must forego all personal critical or creative effort. We find ourselves in agreement, in the main, with John Caird who says:

"It is not necessary to think of revelation as a source of knowledge which is either contrary to reason or above reason -- which either revolts human intelligence or reduces it to absolute passivity, or leaves it no other function than the formal one of grammatical construction and logical interpretation and arrangement. On the
"contrary, it would not be difficult to show that the true idea of revelation, that which is most honouring to God, is at the same time most ennobling to man — the idea, that is, of revelation which addresses itself, not to the ear or the logical understanding only, but to the whole spiritual nature, which does not constrain us mechanically to receive the truth, but enables us to know it, which does not tell us merely what God would have us believe but raises us into conscious, intelligent sympathy with His mind and will." 1

All theories of inspiration by "voices," inward or outward, all immediate reception of knowledge in the sense of given, run as counter to Caird's as to our own view. Passive reception of truth would seem to mark a falling away from the original and essential mystical experience in which, we found, there was a conscious outgoing of self as well as a receiving, just as in the knowing of a person.

Further objection should be raised to passive inspiration on the ground that it implies a dualistic source of knowledge, which is always confusing. Many ideas which "pop" into the mind, whether or not there has been a previous quest for them, are so trivial that it would be dishonouring to God to speak of Him as their source. Goethe thought of the "highest productivity" as God-caused; but the question will ever arise: where is the line to be drawn between the lower, man evolved and the higher, God-caused ideas? To answer it man would have to judge himself which means that he would be

exercising quite as high a prerogative as if he were himself the originator of the ideas. To escape chaos, life as a whole must have one method of gaining "knowledge about."

Yet another objection is to be raised to passive inspiration, this one, on religious grounds. It must be evident to any serious student of religion that, in his effort to make his religion a homely affair, many a worshipper has unconsciously allowed his wish to father the thought and in thought has seemed to bring God so near to his own circle of worship, that God was no longer one to be revered in the truest religious sense. The feeling called forth by this God believed in by this type of worshipper would be more that of respect for a worthy friend than that of deep awe which is properly the emotion of religion. In those worshipping bodies where the hearty and homely atmosphere prevails, the language of prayer becomes intimate and humanly personal. Members of these bodies, so they claim, hear God or His Son speaking to them in definite words to tell them to do certain definite things. This as Caird would probably have said is less than "honouring to God." The sensitive religious soul will tend to revolt from the idea of his God stooping to use man's thought forms by which to convey His meanings. There is a sense in which it is unsafe religiously to try over zealously to bring God down from His heaven. Religion at its best has had always in it to
a degree, that spirit which believes that man "cannot look upon
God and live." Theological dogmatists who have given expression
to this spirit have shown a closer sympathy than usual with actual
religious experience. It must have been due to the same mood that
the French philosopher exclaimed: "I am tired of certainties and I
seek everywhere for ways of hope." ¹ From the viewpoint of reli-
gion it would seem that inspiration, as it is popularly understood,
implies a too anthropomorphic God. It will be argued against us here
that we have constantly upheld the mystic in his claims that he knows
God immediately. But it is to be remarked that there is a hush in
his soul as he comes from this knowing or worship. This worship is
no ordinary commerce of words and ideas conformable to man's work-
day intelligence. The mystic says it is ineffable. Reverence to
the fullest degree is his.

In the foregoing we have intended to do no more than show
that man who is religious does not necessarily forego the exercise
of his faculties because he is religious. But it is not our thesis
that his mystical worship gives him merely an ineffable vision of
reality, and then leaves him to think his way to truth in an entirely
different compartment of life. There is a free play between the
mystic's vision and his only partially independent personal creative
activity. It is not easy to trace this interaction but to say that

¹ Holmes, The Hibbert Journal, April, 1927.
we cannot trace it is only to take us back to those lesser worships
or communions which have their mysterious way of working changes in
our lives.

Let us describe, so far as we are able, how the mystic's wor-
ship does work to inspire him. One fact which strikes us forcibly
when we get to know him is that he seems to have been admitted to a
state of assurance and peace which is not shared by others. The
quest of the philosopher for God is born in unrest and in the very
nature of the case the unrest is likely to be continuous. When he
has built up a system in which all the pieces seem to fit, he is not
really content with it but will more probably than not continue the
fitting of the pieces; or, indeed, he may turn to the work of crea-
ting other systems. To him truth is a flying goal; he is apt to be
an incipient Hamlet. Or if he escapes the ill of uncertainty which
befalls the excessive thinker, he is apt to find in thinking itself
the one reality and in the end it will become his God. The result
is alienation, if not from the minds of men, at least from their
hearts with their sorrows and joys. The choice of either alterna-
tive will prevent the development of true personality. The mystic
escapes both the uncertainty which purely intellectual effort creates
and the absorption in thought which cuts men off from life. He knows
his God, and if he cannot dwell forever on the mountain top where
the vision is, when he goes among men, doing his work in their company, or serving them, it can always be the burden of his song that God lives. So instead of being distraught and lonely in a universe thought of as unfriendly he gains a poise which enables him not to bear with life merely but to rejoice in living it. When he visualizes ideals, he can believe that he and his ideals are a part of God's Universe and that therefore the latter are not mere tantalizing mirages. There is within the mystic a kingdom and not the anarchy of the divided soul. We have only to realize with what intense longing, often unvoiced, man has through the centuries sought everywhere to find certainty about God, to see that to the men who has found that certainty has come life's greatest boon.

But this is really but the inspired blessing which follows upon man's knowing 'that' God is. It is not an informative blessing, if we may use the expression. Men is so constituted that he cannot spend his days contemplating truth in its unity. He wants and needs to know the 'what' of truth. He wants to know and to be able to say what God is like. Is He loving and kind, wise and good? He wants not merely to know the 'what' of truth but to be able to tell it as one inspired. He would aspire even to discover new truth where such is needed for his own emancipation and that of his fellows. He may aspire even to be metaphysician, theologian, or prophet so that he
may be able to make truth understandable to men. Does the fact of
his being a mystic prepare him for success in such roles? We have
already stated it as our thesis that it does. It becomes necessary
now to offer some theory of why and how it does.

We have insisted that if he is to be most honouring to God,
and at his own best as an inspired worshipper, he must be a free
thinking man and no slave. This is the only condition under which
there is sanction to a true personality. We hold that the vision
of God does work in him to make him a more ardent and more effective
seeker than the non-mystic, but without any sacrifice of his persona-

lity. Again, we must illustrate: If I have in me the graces of
character which enable friendship, and am permitted with another,
that knowing which is like mystic union, an ineffable experience, I
may turn from that knowing without having gained any definite infor-
mation about how to be a better man, a more skilful artisan, a truer
artist, a more successful philosopher, but I am inspired by the com-
munion of Self with Self in friendship to gain the right attitude or
skill for myself. A general idea of friendship could not stimulate
me to such enterprise. I must be a participant in friendship if I
am to be moved thus. Friendship, then, does create activities of a
different quality from its own, but it is in a real sense their ori-
ginator or inspirer. To particularise the illustration: My friend


may know nothing about astronomy, but I, an astronomer, may be inspired indirectly by him with a new reverence for my field and to a greater zest for work and discovery in it. I am a better astronomer because I have a friendship. There is no numbering of the ways in which this ineffable experience of reality which comes to all of us, provides us with the impulse to know and to do the real things of life in realms which friendship does not enter actually. Friendship or love are constantly at work in their mysterious way to transform meanings and to enhance experiences. The friend or the lover sees beauty where he would not see it were friendship or love denied him.

In some such mysterious way our friendship with God inspires us to interpret truth and duty for ourselves. We pass from the non-objective, incommunicable experience of worship to find truth and to translate our awareness into action which will enable us to attain to a fuller measure of harmony with that One of whom we were vouchsafed a vision while we worshipped. Again the ineffable makes its power felt in the realm of the describable. Once more the efficacy is more than that which would lie in a mere idea of the Real. The inspired mystic, then, is not the mere mouthpiece of God, but a free man who has been in the Holy of Holies with God, from which he emerges with fixed purpose to know the best, to achieve it in his own life, and to reveal it by word and act to men. The vision does not
reveal truth to the mystic. It makes him go out to discover truth for himself. But because of his vision he will have greater zeal and sincerity than others. He will work harder as a servant of men. He will be a better philosopher, or poet, or artist because of the added stimulus to both mind and will.

We have seen that the knowing of the Self as it occurs in friendship, enables us to find new meaning and value in the observable qualities owned by the Self with whom we have communed. In a similar way, having known God, the Self of the world, the mystic will be the better able to trace the nature of God in His world than will the non-mystic. The non-mystic may conclude from his observation that the God of the universe is kindly, that he has shown His love in the progress of man and in the gifts of great personalities, but this conclusion may leave him cold. Not so the mystic. He has known the Self or Owner of the qualities which are revealed in the world, so it comes home to him in more vital way that God is loving or kind or good. These are not to him just the qualities of the God of the universe. They are the qualities of His God whom he has known in worship.

Not only will the mystic be able to discern the nature of God in the world, but a new love for the world will be inspired in him. It is because of this inspired love for the world of which the
Self is God that the mystic is a genuinely interested citizen of the world and not as has so often been held against him, a misanthrope who accepts the world upon sufferance. The mystic, as we understand him, could not be dualistic in the sense of regarding the world as evil, nor could he persistently regard other persons in the ascetic's spirit of detachment. Critics have maintained that the choice of the via negativa alienates the mystic from the world. This self-imposed separation is intended to leave him free to know God. Having known God or become one with Him, there is no logical reason, say these critics, for the mystic being interested in the world subsequent to his vision which some mystics have said achieved deification, surely an other-worldly experience. But we hope that our efforts to show how this is misinterpretation have not been unavailing. If the mystic eschews worldliness or even the world at certain times, it is not because he attributes no value to the world but because he aspires to get beyond the world of qualities to the Self of these qualitics. And having known this Self, its qualities, which are the world of objects, laws, men, ideas, take on a new meaning and interest. Hocking describes the Hindu mystic as "counselled to continue his worldly affairs but without desire." On the eve of a battle, having first prayed to his God, he is told to fight as one "looking alike on victory and defeat, who is alike toward the
That this is not the true mystical spirit is evidenced by the heroism and self-sacrifice shown by many Christian mystics. Nor is it the logical issue of union. As a true friend of another Self which is to its qualities as God is to His world, I am more deeply interested in those qualities than those of one with whom I have not communed or known as a friend. The mystic must return to the world, not to endure it, nor to use it in preparation for another flight to God, but to know it and to love it as the world of the Divine Self or God who has been in the mystic's own consciousness. Thus we can understand how his interest in the world will be intense and a fruitful source of creativity and discovery.

So we may conclude that there is a connection between the mystic's worship and his knowledge, but that worship, although it gives the impulse to know truth, does not enforce truth upon the passive mind of the worshipper. The honouring role of discovery is left to man. He is free to think, free to discern the good from the evil, free to act; but having experienced the Real, he is the better able to make choices which will achieve for him harmony with the Real.

According to the hidden principles of some strange alchemy of spirit those ineffable experiences which occur in consciousness in its most united state, have, as their by-products, thoughts and acts which

man has learned to rate as the highest of all. We should, therefore, expect better moral judgments, sounder philosophies, finer feelings, from those who have known God in union than from those who have only known Him from afar. The analogy of friendship, love, or beauty perception, helps us to believe this, and to understand why it is true. If anyone wishes to retain the word 'revelation' by which to designate this experience we should not quarrel with him, but would insist that revelation is achieved rather than given. The impulse to achieve comes through knowing the One who is all truth.

It will be seen that, since truth is not a direct gift from God, but man's achievement, it will reflect the qualities of the discoverer; and, because man is imperfect, the truth he discovers will be partial. It will be but a moment in the evolution of consciousness as a whole, whose goal for all we know, may be a flying one, just as the goal of truth in certain respects seems to be. But, granted similar talents and tastes, the mystic will have a distinct advantage in all effort of discernment or expression.

It is not to be expected that in every case mystics as knowers will be originators. We maintain, merely, that, granted a capacity for originality in any realm, the mystic will be more successful in the use of his capacity. It has been held against
mystics who have claimed a unique access to truth, that their findings have contained nothing that was new. We should not expect all mystics to be original any more than we should expect it of non-mystics. As Hocking has so well pointed out, "the mystic is only original in the sense that he finds new meaning in old truth." ¹ The Christian may have no illumination to throw upon any aspect of Christian teaching but the difference between him and, let us say, a non-Christian student of Christian truth will lie in his ability to make it his very own. Christian truth is not, for him, merely an accredited ethical system, for example. It is his own system of motivation. The mystic has his peculiar way of transforming theories, systems, dogmas, into the dieta of his own conscience. We can the better understand how this is possible by thinking of how truths, once more or less casually accepted, come home to us with new meaning in a particular set of circumstances. Such circumstances are most likely to be those in which there is immediate need either to accept and act upon these truths, or to reject them. Hocking says,-

"Mystic insight has been compared by William James with our occasional experience of realizing, more or less suddenly, the meaning of words, sayings, points of view, which may have been familiar and empty possessions for a long time. Such realizing is this, we may observe, is never simply the discovery of the meaning of a general proposition. It is a flowing together, after some

¹. Hocking, Meaning of God in Human Experience, p.446.
"artificial separation, of universal and particular. I wake up to the meaning of an old adage, or of an opinion to which I have been hostile or prejudiced, when I bring such a generality into connection with a concrete occasion, only suggesting a foreshadowing of the universal meanings which they have." 1

Whether or not these sudden dawns of the real truth contained in what was previously only the formal expression of the truth, are mystical, they do seem to suggest how the mystic can approach old truths to vitalize them or to appropriate them in the more personal sense.

Revelation and the Sub-conscious.

The picture we have presented is of an independent individual, a true personality, who enjoys a vision of truth in its Unity, and is moved by the vision to discover new knowledge, or the meaning of old statements or facts, so that by his knowledge and the life in which he expresses it, he may be worthy of the One whom he knows in union. In presenting this picture we may seem to have done less than justice to those experiences of revelation in which the complete other-ness of the revealer has been averred. We turn now to a brief examination of these.

There is a widespread opinion, particularly among religious people, that all inspiration is revelation in the sense of being wholly 'given.' The scientist, it is said, personally orders his

materials or his data, but in the last stages of discovery God speaks to him and imparts the new truth. Poets affirm that they receive completely formed stanzas without conscious mental effort on their own part. Webb says of William Blake that he "regarded his Prophetic Books as written at the dictation of his 'friends in eternity'." ¹ Mathematicians report that solutions of problems, long sought, come finally in moments when attempts at solution have been given up. Leuba refers in this connexion to Henri Poincaré's conclusion that an important mathematical solution came to him at a time when he was unconscious of the problem. ² Since knowledge sometimes comes under these seemingly abnormal conditions, it is not to be wondered at that some discoverers have thought of discovery as a divine gift from a completely alter-ego source. A partially alternative conclusion, which appeals more to the realistic or scientific mind, holds that such revelation is made, not to consciousness directly but to that which is called sub-consciousness, unconsciousness, or subliminal consciousness. That truth may come thus from a source other than that of the mind which is 'enlightened' was the tentative opinion of William James. He says,-

"It (the sub-conscious) is also the fountain-head of much that feeds our religion. In persons deep in the religious life the door into this region seems unusually wide open; at any rate experiences making their entrance through that door have had emphatic influence in shaping religious history." ³

But before we accept this as a final explanation, certain significant observations need to be made. In the first place, the objections we have found to a completely 'other' source of knowledge arise again here. This condition of truth getting, we have said, is belittling to personality; it also projects us into the confusion of attending to a dualistic source of knowledge. These difficulties stand in the way of accepting any theory of knowledge received by consciousness passively. But when all is said and done, my subconscious mind is my own just as consciousness is my own, and we merely push the difficulty back a stage when we say that revelation is made, not to my passive consciousness, but to my passive sub-consciousness.

Again, we are impelled to ask, if the seemingly unsought revelations, which have beauty or value, are made by God speaking to the mind of man, what of the trivial unsought 'revelations.' It is common knowledge, for instance, that the forgotten name which we have sought in vain comes suddenly into the mind when the search for it has been given up. Would we go out of the way to reach the conclusion that God troubles Himself to satisfy our wish which is rarely more than an idly curious one for the forgotten name? Not only does the forgotten name or word stray into our minds thus suddenly, but ideas, plans of action which have no moral value and do not even make sense, make the same kind of entrance. One man reports that when he
is watching a cinema picture he frequently finds himself thinking that, had he a pistol, he would shoot at the heads of the pictured actors, and this, whether or not the story or the acting is good or bad. Being a sane man, he attributes the thought to neither God nor Satan. He knows that it merely enters his mind through some combined working of imagination and association, although the intricacies of its entrance preclude the making of an adequate description. Obviously, the explanation is in terms of the natural rather than the supernatural. A similar explanation of the more original inspirations which are morally or aesthetically valuable seems to suggest itself as a reasonable one.

Again, it is significant that the forces of inspiration yield effects which are in faithful keeping with the characteristic interests and pursuits of the inspired person. Poems come to poets; new combinations come to scientists; pleasing word combinations come to writers and speakers; prophets receive essentially prophetic messages. Coe says,—

"Each religionist brings back from his contemplation the sort of ideas he took into it. This is the general situation. It tends to refute the theory that the mystic is ever released from his own past." 1

The entire life of the recipient of inspiration seems to be a preparation for the inspiration. Were we to witness a poet arrested

in the midst of his poetic creation to receive enlightenment on the cause and removal of atmospherics from wireless broadcasting or reception, we might be led, in spite of ourselves, to conclude that men do receive supernatural messages. But nothing so strange is likely to happen.

Any theory of passive reception of truth, we have said, leaves only an insignificant role to personality. And this difficulty is not theoretically overcome by saying that revelation is to a passive sub-consciousness rather than to a passive consciousness. In either case, the only function left the subject as truth finder or truth teller would be a repetitive one. Selbie emphasizes a related difficulty when he shows that this theory of the self as passive in revelation is the originator of various cult errors. The outcome of the practical acceptance of the theory, he says, would be the reduction of religion to spiritualism, and prayer to telepathy. Religion actuated by such a theory would revive the old errors of faith in psychic forces, demons and magic.1

Our conclusion is that so-called inspiration comes, not in any abnormal or supernatural way, but naturally by way of the mind of the subject. It may come through what is sometimes called the sub-conscious region of the mind, but there is no evidence at hand to show that this region is any less natural and any less the subject's

own than the region of full consciousness. When trivial ideas "pop" into the mind we do not trouble to explain them as divinely caused. There is surely no need to explain the loftier messages by a different reference. We are forced to the admission that in neither case can we trace every step by which the idea comes into full consciousness, but this does not constitute an admission that divine interference takes place. The mind's working is so complicated that it can only be described as the greatest of mysteries, but we know that in a natural way it builds up its store of ideas. These are never all in consciousness at one time. While I write these thoughts, I am not entertaining the solution of a problem in Algebraic permutations. But I am potentially able to deal with such a problem. The mind is a store-house of quiescent but potential ideas. When required, the potential ideas often become working ideas. Ideas in this mental store-house are sometimes forgotten, or half-forgotten. Those that under organization give the solution of the scientist's problem, for example, may be potentially present in the mind before the solution is reached. The organization or synthesis of these into solution may take place partially below the level of full consciousness, but it need not be explained as supernaturally caused. The very nature of the case precludes the possibility of saying the last word of explanation of the sub-conscious,
or of ordinary consciousness, for that matter. We shall never advance beyond the use of a great deal of theory in explaining mental activity as a whole. What we offer as an explanation of so-called inspiration as coming naturally through the subconscious is partly theoretical, but it seems more readily conformable to facts than the explanation, partly theoretical and partly dogmatic, which attributes inspiration, in the sense of truth 'given,' to supernatural interference in the mental process. Leuba’s explanation is quite satisfactory. He concludes—

"The solutions that come in the form of inspiration refer to problems which have not been finally dismissed, which have remained in the 'back of the mind,' ready to force themselves upon the attention. A problem in a quiescent stage may flash unexpectedly into the fringe of consciousness and be immediately and almost unconsciously repressed and dismissed unless it should happen— as it occasionally does—that it present itself in a new light. Then interest and attention are aroused, and the problem is again taken up. In the new light, the way to the solution may be discerned."

Revelation to consciousness or subconscious, then, does not, if we understand it rightly, take the responsibility for seeking and finding, out of the hands of the worshipper. So far, we agree with the psychologists quoted above. But where we would differ from them is in our conclusion already stated that there is a connection, if an indirect one, between the mystic’s characteristic

experience of ineffable knowing or communion, and this knowing of truth in its aspects, a knowing sometimes described as revelation. My communion, we have said, makes me a more earnest and efficient seeker after life's meanings. Having discovered these meanings, I delegate them to the store-house of the sub-conscious or unconscious. This means that the kind of sub-consciousness I create will depend upon whether or not, as a worshipper, I have gained that energizing experience of union which makes me, as a fully conscious being, seek truth. In other words, my worship influences my sub-consciousness through my full consciousness and not vice versa as it is sometimes said to be. This means that when my sub-consciousness in turn comes to the aid of my full consciousness in its truth finding effort, the kind of help it will be able to give will depend indirectly upon my being a mystic in the sense of a worshipper who communes immediately with God.
CHAPTER 8.

CONCLUSION.

Strictly speaking, we have only set ourselves the task of establishing a theory to support the mystic's faith that he knows God and is not the prey to a great illusion. We have kept our examination, as nearly as possible, to the characteristic mystical experience and those other experiences with which it seems to be akin. We are fully aware that the outer ramifications of such proof might be multiplied. For instance, our theory of mystical knowing involves a knowing of God as a person by a person. It is apparent that it would be relevant to our theory to combine with it, an explication and establishment of the truth and superiority of the doctrine of personality of both the Worshipped and the worshipper.

Again, it will be seen that there would be some purpose in showing that mysticism, as we know it, favours rather than hinders the maintenance and development of the worshipper's highest values. Or, we might examine and evaluate the services which mystics have rendered mankind as a whole, in order to establish mysticism's truth on this more distinctly pragmatic ground. In fact, the contacts which mysticism, as a way of reaching reality, has with other systems are many. We could find a total of some seven or eight systems and in
an attempt to make the treatment of our subject exhaustive and our proof a fully pragmatic one we could go on to compare to a length which, within the compass of this thesis would yield only an exceedingly thin and unsatisfying result. But such proof by comparison belongs really to the task of propounding a philosophy of mysticism, a more ambitious task than this thesis recognizes as its own.

However, we could not be content to leave our subject without making some reference to the more representative ways man has adopted in his effort to approach reality, and the way in which mysticism benefits through being compared with these. The proposition of a theory of how the mystic knows is one method of establishing his essential claim. We have offered such a theory. If this theory describes a way of knowing which seems more satisfying to life as a whole than other theories then we will have one more ground for believing that it is not merely theory but fact. We attempt, here, a brief comparison.

Without limiting our discussion and comparison too particularly to realism and idealism, although keeping these in mind as representative ways of regarding ultimate things, let us observe, first, that apart from mysticism there are, speaking broadly, two ways of thinking about, or approaching the real. There are persons who think highly of the senses and their power to percusive reality.
On the other hand, are those who regard thought as that which can give a truer hint as to the nature of the ultimately real.

For some of us the former attitude is naive and simple; for others it betakes itself into ways of great complexity. The plain, unphilosophic man, in other than his religious moods, at any rate, believes that objects are as seen by him. They have a separate and independent identity and do not in any real sense depend upon him for their being or qualities. As practical beings, most of us regard the outer world in this fashion; the object is 'there,' and it is 'real,' when our senses say it is. Realism is a convention which we have all accepted in order to deal with our outer world. Thus far, we have the plain man's realism.

The realist, as a plain man, has his religious as well as his practical interests. As a religious person he still thinks of his sense world as a real world but of God as the Supreme Being of the world; as the Creator of the objects man perceives by his senses but not in any sense in the world which He has created, except perchance as an artificer is in his handiwork. This was the viewpoint of the elder realism. It eschewed any form of monism. God and created object or creature were separate entities. To the religious realist God could not be known except by a faith which was always a blind faith, never energized by moments of vision or union.
Subsequent realism has departed from this earlier naivety. It still insists upon a plurality of separate although related existences. It adheres to the faith that reality can only be arrived at through sense perception but to the plain man's equipment for seeing the world it adds the intricacies of analysis. It believes that by carrying analysis far enough an explanation of all things would be reached. It refuses to accept the conclusion that thought is in any real sense unique but maintains that were analysis but skilled enough it could reveal the true nature of thought or consciousness just as it could explain any physical or physiological phenomenon. It deplores the intellectual monism of idealism but substitutes a monism which would, in the final analysis, be no more than physical. The realist is wary about thinking about his own power to think. 'Consciousness' is a word which so far as possible, he avoids. The use of 'mental' as indicating a free or creative power, he deprecates, while such a word as 'spiritual' is anathema to him. He believes that he must outrule the "I" element from the 'external' half of the experience of the outer world. If he speaks of God, it is only as he has in mind a universal force or principle.

The question we have to ask is: How does the foregoing doctrine fit experience as a whole? Does it meet the needs of the plain man? Firstly, does it meet his philosophic needs? It is to
remembered that even the plain man is something of a philoso-
pher. He has his theory of reality, just as his more professional
brother philosopher has. He believes that there are fictions and
real things. He believes that the loaf with which he satisfies his
hunger is a real and not an apparent thing. He can be sure of its
reality. A spiritual world is only a hypothetical one. He shares
with all of us an instinctive preference for certainty and he finds
certainty in a world of loaves and stones, and flesh and blood peo-
ple. But it is today's commonplace that apparent reals are filled
with fictions. The plain man has only to read the advertising li-
terature of the ubiquitous daily press to learn that his most con-
crete loaf has in it mysterious germs of health and strength called
vitamins. If he reads popular reports on the scientific discoveries
of the day he learns that when he eats a brown or white loaf weigh-
ing or appearing to weigh one pound he is really eating millions and
millions of particles, each of which is not an infinitesimal granule
of inert solid but a seething mass of motion centres. The plain man
today would have to live an isolated life indeed if he were to be
denied, or spared - the startling news that appearances are deceit-
ful, that things are not what they seem. His instinct for certainty
is not really satisfied by the world of things as sensed. He has
always known that his senses might betray him upon occasion but he
believed that upon the whole he could depend upon them to reveal that about which he could say, "That is, it is there, it is real." But it is coming home to him more and more that the once thought, or conventionally thought real world, is one of shifting sands and that he cannot take a fully independent stand upon it and be confident and secure. As one who has enforced upon him the limited philosophic role which we must all accept he will find neither certainty nor reality in a world which he once thought he could know immediately as real. The plain man as realist cannot construct for himself a satisfactory philosophy.

But should he as realist become a scientist able to carry out the most complete examination of the sensed world possible, or a philosopher with the fullest command of his rationalizing talent, would his case be any better? As plain man he cannot be sure of appearances. But let us suppose that as a scientist he can pursue analysis so far that he finally reaches the place where he can actually distinguish "reality" from "appearance." What then would be his accomplishment? On the positive side he would be able to say to his own satisfaction "This now appears as it actually is. Appearance and reality have become the same." He would be able to conclude, "I have discovered reality." But what of his erstwhile fellows who are still plain men and not scientists or philosophers.
The report he makes to them on how he has been able to come to the place where the real can be known will be necessarily a highly technical and involved one. It will be even more difficult for the plain man to interpret and understand this report than it is for the scientist or philosopher to make, through analysis, the discovery set forth in the report. The plain man will be no better off than when his more superficial observation of the sense world convinced him that the apparent is not the real. He could, himself, become one of these skilled esoterics in the discovery of the true nature of the world; that is, all could become scientists or philosophers.

But, while all are on this present plane of existence, this is a course to which there are as many objections as there are obstacles in its way.

But we have only supposed that the scientist could reach the ultimate simple form of being. Actually, there are reasons for supposing that he could not. For instance, he would be among the first to hail the doctrine of relativity as a scientific one. But, accepting it, he must, if he be logical, acknowledge that the result of his most painstaking analysis may be only relatively accurate. It is true that the fact of relativity only implies that physical measurements are relatively accurate, but these are the measurements which the scientist must employ. But, while the direct bearing of
the theory is upon scientific analysis, it has its philosophic im-
lications as well. The realist philosopher who depends upon the
results of the scientist's attempts by analysis to discover the
ture nature of the ultimately real must not forget that he will
necessarily base his own doctrine of the real upon findings which
are only relatively true. Moreover, it becomes more and more evi-
dent as scientific method proceeds and yesterday's element becomes
today's complexity, that the real elements are quite spontaneous
things; that, with the possible exception of consciousness itself,
they are the only really spontaneous things, and that they have
their way of ignoring those staid old friends of the scientist,
cause and effect. All of which goes to show that the realist as
scientist, or with the scientist's help, only reaches ultimately a
place which is as 'unhinged' as the plain man's world in which seem-
ingly plain wires are dynamic with electrical energy and leaves of
bread are vitamin armies. In other words, if philosophy be the
science of reality, the realist can never be a really satisfactory
philosopher, for he will never be able to pin reality down, to say
nothing of describing it.

But the great weakness of the realist's method lies in its
failure to do full justice to consciousness itself. We have said
that he avoids the word 'consciousness' where he can. When he has
to speak of this something which is universally regarded in conventional thinking and conversation as a fact, he does so with a reservation to the effect that consciousness with its activities of thinking, willing and feeling, belongs among other objective things and is in no sense unique. He holds that a later day psychologist, or better still, physicist, should be able to explain consciousness and its activities, just as the scientist can explain today, say, electric energy. Refusing to accept the uniqueness of the mental, he of course denies that it can assume any prior creative function, either in a God or in a man. But the real "I" or consciousness, we have seen to be non-objective. Obviously, the methods of analysis are only useful where objective things are involved and even there, we have found that they are not absolutely final. The realist, become a super-psycho-physicist could conceivably observe the way movement takes place in brain cells when a certain idea is formed. To this extent his analysis would be objective, but his objective examination could be carried no further. Under such examination the movement in brain cells would probably be shown as the same whether the idea formed was a dreamed one or a consciously formed one. The realist would not grant that they are the same, either in essence or in value. But logically he would have to accept them as the same, since he outrules the priority of consciousness.
consciousness which really makes the difference. Great as are the difficulties of the realist when he tries to fix upon the real in the world of objects, they offer him child's play as compared with the difficulty of objectifying and examining consciousness itself. The difficulty is unassailable. The realist can neither objectify his own consciousness nor that of another. And yet consciousness is the one most real and pervasive of all things. When he thinks he applies his analytical methods to it, the realist is under a complete illusion. He can bring all his knowledge and all his charts, questionnaires, and implements to the task and lo! what he would analyse is gone. Realism as a method of identifying reality either in the sensed objects or in consciousness cannot succeed.

If its philosophical failure is great, its failure to satisfy religious needs is greater and more serious. The plain man will not be content for long with a world perceived by his senses. All thinking, poetry, aestheticism, and higher love are significant of his unwillingness to be a thoroughgoing realist. We have seen that the plain man as a naive realist accepts the seen as the real world and thinks of God as the Creator who stands apart from his creation. But in thinking thus he is theoretically sundering himself from God for he is himself a part of this world from which God stands apart.
If he has a strong sense of religious need the result will probably be that while remaining a practical realist he will seek direct communion with God and really identify himself with the mystics. In this role he will find satisfaction until some philosopher comes along to point out that his position is confusingly dualistic. If left to himself, however, he will find his religious satisfaction in mystical worship, while remaining a practical realist in his everyday life.

But the more rationalistic realist will find it harder to be religious in the true sense. Worship could be defined as an attitude to the most real that one knows. The realists, including the materialistic philosophers, determinists and behaviourists, find this real, or hope to find it, through analysis. We have shown that this is impossible. But no matter. The realist thinks that he has found it. But what he thinks he has found is profoundly less than God-like. At the best his whole philosophy or religion will be a highly developed materialism. His God will be no more than the force or principle at work in the world which the senses reveal. This God cannot be personal. Moreover, since the realist outrules there being any possibility of spirit in the world, the only logical conclusion for him to accept is that everywhere there is implacable determinism. Determinism regards freedom as an illusion. The realist will, of
course, act as if he has pre-supposed his own freedom but such action should be accepted by him as meaningless and illogical. Freedom, for him, does not exist and, since it does not, worship, in the sense of a seeking of God by a free creature, could have neither meaning nor purpose. Realism, inconsistent and incompetent in itself, offers no single opportunity or solace to man who strives to know God as real. It cannot in any real sense be a substitute for religion. Its world is a cohering one without being purposive. Its force—God may inspire awe but He neither needs nor gives love. Nor can He be really known except scientifically. Consciousness as a whole finds little in these facts to elicit those sentiments which are peculiarly those of religion.

The conclusion most antithetical to that of the realist, who says he can find ultimate things in physical nature, is that of the idealist who says that the ultimate is to be identified as mental. It will be seen at once that idealism is more in sympathy with mysticism than is realism. The idealist thinks highly of consciousness which the realist virtually, and, as we have seen, unjustifiably, ignores. Thus he starts with the advantage there is in having a known, if non-objectifiable, thing to regard as a reality. But so impressed has the idealist been by this certainty that he has proceeded to believe that this certain thing, consciousness, is the real
maker of his world. That he has some ground for believing that
his mind is not merely a passive recipient of impressions, as the
realist holds it is, can be shown. In memory, for instance, there
occur perceptions of a kind which are not dependent for their crea­
tion upon the presence of an independent outer object. Here, mind
is the creator of the memory image. Moreover, in the actual per­
ception of an object conventionally regarded as an outer real ob­
ject, there is clearly some form of free or spontaneous manipula­
tion of elements by mind, otherwise objects would be seen as the
same by all perceivers, which they are not. The subjective idea­
list has been right in holding that mind is at least an active and
determining factor in the experience of an object. But to hold
that it is the creative factor has led to difficulties and a thor­
oughly subjective idealistic philosophy has had to be corrected. A
theory that my world is wholly in my mind is offensive to the intui­
tions of common sense. It begins, and rightly, with the recognition
of the majesty and spontaneity of consciousness. But it must take
into account that there are other consciousnesses in the world who
may be convinced of their sheer freedom and originating power. To
be consistent, the subjective idealist must lump these with the
world which is in his mind; but in doing so he obliterates conscious­
ness as belonging to other persons. Moreover, while we may believe
that consciousness is the prior and freer factor in experience of
the world most of us lean toward belief in, rather than scepticism
about the world. We believe that it has some form of reality in-
dependent of our minds. This is no place for a full criticism of
subjective idealism. We have said enough to show that this high
thinking tendency to enthrone mind had to be corrected and purified
if its truths were to be preserved. The correction and purification
have been accomplished, partly by the common sense spirit of realism,
but more particularly by objective idealism. It is enough to say in
a word that, stirred by the awareness of the uniqueness of his own
consciousness the idealist has gone on to postulate a Great Thinker
or Consciousness whose thoughts are the world of objects and beings.
This theory allows for a world independent of my thinking it, exis-
tent before me, and with a promise of existence after me. Thus
common sense intuitions are placated, and the spiritual or mental
nature of the world is affirmed. Object idealism has, upon the whole,
been acceptable to the religious thinker, if not so completely to
the religious worshipper. But even this splendid theory has its
shortcomings. Man will be always haunted by the thought that if he
is but a part of this world which is the thought of God, then his
sense of personal freedom and spontaneity is only illusory, that his
moral effort is not free and is therefore meaningless. In moments of
such disturbing thought, he will fear that the realization of the philosopher's monistic ideal has been too dearly bought for, if true, it robs him of his own personality.

But where idealism fails most seriously is by pushing reality too far from the human consciousness. Let us recapitulate: Realism has at least the merit of believing that reality can be known immediately. The incompetence of its attempts thus to know reality, we have examined. Moreover, it fails to take into adequate account the indisputable fact of the uniqueness of the one immediately known thing, the non-objective consciousness. Idealism is influenced by the subjective revelation and reasons from the fact of the unique nature of the "I" to an Absolute or Ultimate "I" or Self. But here in its resort to reason to establish the Final Reality, is its weakness and shortcoming for since pure reason is depended upon to know, or better, establish reality, reality can never be known except theoretically. Objective idealism can never be more than a plausible philosophical system of transcendental flavour. In fact any positive philosophical system may be described broadly as a form of idealism.

The realist, then, proceeds upon the assumption that he can know his real immediately. The idealist recognizes that he can only have theoretical knowledge of Ultimate Reality. Mysticism offers a
correction and completion of both realism and idealism. The mystic is a realist for he knows his Real immediately, but, unlike the more limited realism, the mystic's system does full honour to the self, both his own and the Self of the world. He could be called a transcendental realist. But the mystic is idealist as well for he regards the world as a Self. However, he holds that the idealist, as properly understood, can never be sure of the reality he describes. The realist, then, depends upon examination of the sense world to reveal the real. The idealist begins with his known Self and upon this as basic sureness builds a cohering logical theory of the Self of the world. A further method remains to be tried. This is worship with love as the invigorating factor. This is the method of the mystic. Through worship the mystic knows immediately the Self which the idealist establishes theoretically. It is not necessary to repeat our explanation of how he knows or our proof that he knows. But granted that this proof is valid, the superiority of mysticism at once appears. The realist's knowing leaves the more significant half of the facts explained. Idealism takes into account the stupendous fact of human consciousness but cannot do more than offer a theory of the Transcendent Consciousness. Mysticism recognizes the uniqueness of consciousness and personally and immediately knows the Transcendent Consciousness, theoretically known by the Idealist.
Leaving the realist out of the question for the moment, since his viewpoint is too limited, we say of the idealist's faith that like all theoretically established faiths, it is liable to be shattered at any time. The idealist can never be quite sure. The mystic, on the other hand, has a way of learning by consciousness as a whole which arrives at certain knowing. Mysticism's knowledge belongs in that group of life's unshatterable certainties which comprises intuitions of beauty, love, or friendship. The mystic is the highly favoured person who by living experience establishes for himself the truth of the idealist's theory.

Summary.

It will be advantageous now to cast our gaze backward to find the true individual who has been, so to speak, the hero of our tale. It might be said that in trying to make out a case for mysticism we have allowed ourselves to be mastered by expediency and have pictured only a mystic who conforms to our system. Some would offer the criticism that we have failed to take account of certain phenomena usually thought to be mystical. It is to be noted that we have neither regarded the mystic as Nihilist, Agnostic, Absorptionist, nor Pantheist. We have out-rulled various forms of philosophical and practical extremisms which some writers have characteristic-
characteristically identified with mysticism. But in doing so we have not been unduly arbitrary. There is an experience conformable to what we have described, after having first examined mysticism as a whole. This experience is merely the communion with God enjoyed by the ordinary worshipper. It is a form of knowing about which the knower is inarticulate. We defined the mystic at the outset as one who "apprehends the Real immediately or intuitively, rather than by the processes of logic or conceptual thinking." We have had in mind throughout, the kind of person described in this definition. That the mystic, as thus defined, is the representative mystic is affirmed by such careful students of the subject as James, Pratt, Hocking, Coe, Royce, Selbie, to name only a few. But did our definition mark any variation from theirs, we would not be unduly concerned about the relevance of our treatment of the subject as a whole, since of the making of definitions of mysticism there seems to be no end.

That mysticism is not necessarily to be identified with the various forms of extremism, we hope we have been able to show in our treatment of the questions, What of the mystic as man, and What of the mystic's God? Mysticism, let us repeat, is communion. Such terms as 'absorption' and 'deification' overstate the case of mysticism as we have known it. The psychological accompaniment of union
is not a degraded consciousness nor yet less of consciousness in
trance. Mysticism has, upon the whole, been made to lose greatly
through two causes. Mystics themselves, in their ardent desire to
communicate the incommunicable, have given a wrong impression of
their real experience. Psychologists, impressed by the psycholo­
gical 'cut-rightness' of the extremists, verbal or practical, have,
through giving extremism the major attention, obscured the impor­
tance of the more essential experience, communion. The total result
has been the identification of mysticism with the extreme and ab­
normal. This has in turn issued in a reaction from the more spiri­
tual form of worship which has always been the germ of mystical wor­
ship. The effects of this reaction are doubtless more far reaching
today than many of us realize. Add to these effects those of cer­
tain rationalizing practices, not in themselves undesirable, but
disturbing to those who are incompetent to understand them and who
are restricted to hearing the mere rumors of rationalism, and we
have a combination which has done much to undermine religious interest
and enthusiasm. Leuba and his school would explain today's religious
defection as due to time's correction of the illusions of primitive
or nearly primitive faith. It is surely as reasonable to say that
the psychologists, through identifying an unwholesome and erroneous
extremism as worship have themselves brought a temporary discredit
upon worship itself. We have been mindful while writing this thesis of the present religious default and have aimed, not only to offer an epistemology of mysticism but to state a case for worship.

In summary, we say of the mystic's way of knowing, that knowing, to him, is an act which summons all his powers in their fullness. It is more than the limited knowing yielded by abstract thinking. It is more than the knowing which pure feeling, were there such an experience, could yield. It is more than scientific knowing through analysis of sense data. It is knowing by consciousness as a whole. That is, it is a knowing in which the real "I", the non-objective self, is involved. That this act of knowing fits into the scheme of life in general and thus justifies itself, thereby forming a kind of proof of its validity, we have seen. Man has his moral needs and believes that his attempts to satisfy these needs are neither meaningless nor illusory. Mysticism satisfied moral needs, for both in preparation for the vision and in expression of the vision is there a full demand for moral effort. Mysticism teaches that the world is the world of a Divine Self who is God, and that therefore, while this world must not absorb us wholly, it is a good world, and that in it, not as an appearance of an endeavour but as a whole-hearted genuine effort, man must, in part, work out his salvation. Worship and work in the world are each a part of
the true mystic life. Mysticism teaches that the Universe is monistic but that within the monism the self or "I" is a person and knows freedom. It fully recognises the prerogatives of true personality as a whole. It affords full opportunity for moral effort, as we have seen. It allows for the growth of personality through contacts with the other personalities of God's world, but greater still, with God Himself. It accords to the candidate for worship the right of thinker. Mystic knowing is not 'unknowing.' By thought the mystic orders consciousness in a state relevant to the vision. Energised by the vision he returns to the work of thoughtful interpretation of life's meanings and duty with more purposeful mien than others.

(1) We agree with Hocking that the mystic life is explainable in part by reference to a principle of alternation. We have not stressed this conclusion, since in doing so we would have been duplicating Hocking's well known statement.

The mystic finds his ultimate good in worship. Why then, it is asked, does he return to the world? Why does he not spend his life in worship? Hocking points out how a law of rhythm works through life; that life demands realistic dealing with facts, and then times of inspiration. Mystic worship is needed to energise the mystic's life in general.

Again, the mystic's preparation for vision is moral. Moral life, to have meaning, must be achieved through effort in a world of work. This struggle precedes and constitutes a preparation for the vision.

Moreover, the mystic knows the world as God's world and God as the Self of the world. It would be a betrayal of the high moment of loving union were he
afterward to disregard this world whose self is God. Or, looked at from the opposite point of view, he could not reach the place for knowing the Self of the world did he not take seriously into account the world of that Self.

Of the vision itself, it is to be said that it is one of those timeless experiences which come to us all. It is impossible to confine man to the limitations of space and time. It is true that we have embodied minds; that in countless ways we are reminded that we are exceedingly finite parts of our world. But it is also true that we are able sometimes to make flights from the time and space world. Thought itself is a timeless activity; so is the intuition of beauty; so also is the knowing of another person in the sense in which we have described it. We have grouped the mystic's knowing with these other experiences in which we exceed the mundane limits. The mystic has his moments of knowing that time is appearance and not reality. That he is right, or may be right, we may know from our own experience of the time-freeness of certain of our own experience, whether we be mystics or not. If in these unshackled moments he has to forego the usual definite sense of individuality it is not necessarily true that he loses individuality. In those other timeless experiences which we have named we may not think of ourselves, but that gain, not loss of personality, is the total result, we are very sure. Mysticism then, beyond wavil or question,
allows a man to be a man, a full personality. In truth no other man can be so really a personality. Moreover it enables him as a personality to know reality. Further, this way of knowing reality fully satisfies religious needs, for it affords both certainty and communion.

Mysticism, we believe, will come more fully into its own again, both as a science of reality and a way of religious life. There are signs of a widespread revival of interest in the philosophical and psychological study of mysticism. We said at the outset that this renewal seems neither to grow out of nor to attend a revival of spirituality in life as a whole. It may be that this time, however, the analytical thought will be the preparer of the way for the practice of the kind of life which it so enthusiastically examines and sometimes commands. It is to be noted that mystics, so fully convinced of the reality of spirit and its freedom and spontaneity, should find friends in those growingly important schools of scientific thought which are today hinting at the universality of spirit or thinking substance. It is our hope that these tendencies, the revival of the study of mysticism and the discovery of the universe as spiritual - will combine to effect a revival of mystical or spiritual worship. This desire of ours rises through taking thought that man, as a religious being, only finds satisfaction, not in
knowing that there may be a God and that He may be described by all the superlatives of theology or the absolutes of philosophy, but in knowing God. Mysticism alone meets this need. It is religion in the true sense of the word.
**Books and Articles used or consulted in the preparation of the thesis.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHOR</th>
<th>WORK</th>
<th>PUBLISHED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balfour, A. J.</td>
<td>Foundation of Belief</td>
<td>1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bennett, C. A.</td>
<td>A Philosophical Study of Mysticism</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, Adams</td>
<td>Pathways to Certainty</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baillie</td>
<td>The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bailey, John</td>
<td>Mind and Personality</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, William</td>
<td>Mind and Personality</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bentley, Dunlop, etc.</td>
<td>Psychologies of 1925</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caird, John</td>
<td>An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion</td>
<td>1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caird, Edward</td>
<td>The Evolution of Religion</td>
<td>1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrit, E. Y.</td>
<td>The Theory of Beauty</td>
<td>1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chevalier, Jacques</td>
<td>Henri Bergson, (Translation by Claire, Lilian A.)</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHOR</td>
<td>WORK</td>
<td>PUBLISHED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleagues of Wm. James</td>
<td>Essays Philosophical and Psychological</td>
<td>1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewey, John</td>
<td>The Quest for Certainty</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellis, Havelock</td>
<td>The Dance of Life</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eucken, Rudolf</td>
<td>Main Currents of Modern Thought</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer, H.H.</td>
<td>Experience of God</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galloway, C.</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Religion</td>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grensted, L.W.</td>
<td>Psychology and God</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoffding, H.</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Religion</td>
<td>1901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugel, F. Von</td>
<td>Eternal Life</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hocking, W. E.</td>
<td>The Meaning of God in Human Experience</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hocking, W. E.</td>
<td>Types of Philosophy</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermann, W.</td>
<td>The Communion of the Christian with God</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermann, E.</td>
<td>Eucken and Bergson</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHOR</td>
<td>WORK</td>
<td>PUBLISHED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huxley, J.</td>
<td>Religion without Revelation</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert, S.</td>
<td>The Unconscious Mind</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howley, J.</td>
<td>Psychology and Mystical Experience</td>
<td>1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haldane, R. B.</td>
<td>The Pathway to Reality (2 vols.)</td>
<td>1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inge, W. R.</td>
<td>Faith and its Psychology</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inge, W. R.</td>
<td>Personal Idealism and Mysticism</td>
<td>1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inge, W. R.</td>
<td>Christian Mysticism</td>
<td>1899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingram, E. W.</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Mysticism</td>
<td>1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacks, L. P.</td>
<td>The Inner Sentinel</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James, Wm.</td>
<td>Varieties of Religious Experience</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James, Wm.</td>
<td>A Pluralistic Universe</td>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, R. M.</td>
<td>Some Exponents of Mystical Religion</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, R. M.</td>
<td>Studies in Mystical Religion</td>
<td>1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, R. M.</td>
<td>New Studies in Mystical Religion</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHOR</td>
<td>WORK</td>
<td>PUBLISHED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, Sir Henry</td>
<td>A Faith that Enquires</td>
<td>1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jung, C. J.</td>
<td>Psychology of the Unconscious, (translated by R. M. Hinkle)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KnudsoB, A. C.</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Personalism</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leuba, J. H.</td>
<td>The Psychology of Religious Mysticism</td>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leuba, J. H.</td>
<td>A Psychological Study of Religion</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levine, I</td>
<td>The Unconscious</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan, Lloyd C.</td>
<td>Life, Mind and Spirit</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maeterlinck, M.</td>
<td>Ruysbroeck and the Mystics (Translation by Jane Stoddart)</td>
<td>1894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman, John</td>
<td>Grace and Personality</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otto, Rudolf</td>
<td>The Idea of the Holy</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterson, W.P.</td>
<td>The Nature of Religion</td>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pringle-Pattison, A. Seth</td>
<td>The Idea of God</td>
<td>1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry, R. B.</td>
<td>Present Philosophical Tendencies</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHOR</td>
<td>WORK</td>
<td>PUBLISHED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratt, J.B.</td>
<td>The Religious Consciousness</td>
<td>1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashdall, H.</td>
<td>Philosophy of Religion</td>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royce, J.</td>
<td>The World and the Individual (2 vols)</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell, Bertrand</td>
<td>An Outline of Philosophy</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starbuck, E. D.</td>
<td>The Psychology of Religion</td>
<td>1899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selbie, W. B.</td>
<td>The Psychology of Religion</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santayana, G.</td>
<td>Reason in Religion</td>
<td>1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thouless, R. H.</td>
<td>Psychology of Religion</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennant, F. R.</td>
<td>The Soul and its Faculties</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tansley, A. G.</td>
<td>The New Psychology and its Relation to Life</td>
<td>1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underhill, E.</td>
<td>Mysticism</td>
<td>1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underhill, E.</td>
<td>Man and the Supernatural</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underhill, E.</td>
<td>The Essentials of Mysticism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHOR</td>
<td>WORK</td>
<td>PUBLISHED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uren, A. R.</td>
<td>Recent Psychologies of Religion</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson, J.</td>
<td>The Interpretation of Religions Experience (2 vols)</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webb, C. J.</td>
<td>God and Personality</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weiman, H. M.</td>
<td>The Wrestle of Religion with Truth</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallas, Graham</td>
<td>The Art of Thought</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numerous articles in philosophical and psychological periodicals