THE THEISTIC PHILOSOPHY

of

HERMANN LOTZE.

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Chapter I.

THE PROBLEM OF LOTZE.

Man's inevitable attempt to unify and so explain his varied experience has reduced the world of thought to two great kingdoms which have offered strenuous resistance to our efforts toward further systematisation. On the one hand lies the realm of existence usually regarded as forming the proper object of the investigations of natural science; on the other, the realm of value, which is at least partially revealed in the normative sciences, in art, and in religion. That they lie in some sense, apart is quite obvious; that they belong together and must somehow be brought together both their unity in experience and the whole-constructing character of thought make equally evident. The natural scientist, as such, may be content to ignore questions of value as far as possible, and such a conception of natural science has sometimes been elevated into a veritable fetish, but this can be at most only a principle of method, and anything more than a relative success in the maintenance of such an attitude is utterly inconceivable. Certainly those whose attention is concentrated more directly on the questions of value will not usually be willing to ignore questions of existence, even if it were possible so to do;¹ and

¹. Sorley, Moral Values, p. 77 ff.
least of all can a developed religion, the Ritschlians to the contrary, withdraw into the realm of value and deny the pertinence of any questions of existence.¹ The result is that these two realms are apt to confront each other, each endeavouring to maintain itself as over against the other; each striving somehow - by compromise, by resort to points of view that promise to prove more ultimate, sometimes even by flat denial - either to absorb the other, or at least to remove the apparent contradiction of itself by the other. The problem had already emerged by Plato's time, for it appears quite explicitly in his attempt to understand all things in the light of The Good - indeed it can be traced back as far as to Anaxagoras - and ever since it has been fluctuating between the foreground and the immediate background of philosophic speculation. It began to be prominent in modern thinking in the eighteenth century, owing largely to the work of Immanuel Kant. The problem was widened and deepened by the German Idealists, who extended, in philosophy, the domain of value from the exclusive moralism of Kant to include also the regions of aesthetics and of religion, independently considered; it was again made prominent in the nineteenth century owing to the active aggression of Naturalism, and the modern tendency to give primacy to the conception of value - at least in very influential quarters - has brought the question of its relation to existence hardly less definitely into the philosophic

¹. cf. Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, Ch. III.
limelight.¹ Because of the fact that, of the disciplines that are devoted more explicitly to questions of value, religion is the most accessible and yet the most ultimate, it has tended to play the role in human thinking of the great protagonist of the value disciplines. As a result, the opposition between the realms of existence and of value has often betrayed a tendency to take the form of a conflict between natural science, relying on reason, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, religion, the medium of which is faith.

This conflict between existence and value, in its various forms, was violently agitating the intellectual environment in which Lotze grew up and did his life's work; his educational contacts were with both sides in the fray, and his writings can be appreciated only in its light. On the one hand, natural science had been advancing with such spectacular success that its spirit and principles were coming increasingly to dominate the thinking of the age. Since the stronghold of medieval thought, with its theologico-Ptolemaic background, its syllogistic ideal of method, its recourse to extra-mundane, supernatural agents and externally imposed purposes, had fallen one by one before the ever-increasing dominion of the purely mechanical conception of Nature, natural science had hastened from victory to victory. Philosophy, also, lent its support, both positively and negatively, to the increasing encroachment of science upon the whole domain of thought. As early at

¹ Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, Ch. II.
least as Descartes we find a fondness for the mathematical method that was destined to play a peculiarly important part in subsequent speculation, and the Cartesian doctrine of the automatism of animals, and the all but automatism of man, shows the extent of the dominance of purely physical categories in the realm of organic life. Biology, as a science, had not yet developed, and when it did there was a long struggle, complicated and intensified by the necessity of rejecting the mystical doctrine of Vitalism, and lasting almost up to the present time, to vindicate for it its own categories different from those of mathematics and physics. For Kant, science was just mathematico-physics; to this field he restricted the term "knowledge", all else being matter for subjective certainty or faith - and if this did not involve, on his part, any superior evaluation of the former, his terms soon carried that implication for others. When he finally came to the study of living organisms, he was forced to regard them as if other categories were operative in them; he did suggest, also, that for a higher intelligence the reconciliation of the mechanical and the teleological categories might be possible, but it remained his ideal to "explain all products and occurrences in nature, even the most purposive, by mechanism as far as is in our power." ¹

This widespread philosophic attitude was the positive contribution to which we referred.

During this period also, - and this is her negative

¹. Crit. of Judg., sect. 73.
contribution - philosophy was exhausting herself in a series of brilliant campaigns, which yet seemed to yield no satisfactory result. Now the last great philosophic drive had come to a decided end, and the proud Hegelian army that had showed promise of subduing the whole world of thought in one comprehensive movement had lost its sense of unity and its consciousness of power. A few faithful adherents of genuine Hegelianism still strove to commend the method and the doctrine of the master, but they were greatly surpassed in importance, on the one hand, by such pseudo-Hegelians as Christian Weisse, Lotze's teacher in Leipzig, who strove to retain the Hegelian form while applying it to more popular materials,¹ and, on the other hand, by the still more influential Young Hegelians. The latter - Arnold Ruge, Bruno Bauer, Strauss, and Feuerbach - were thoroughly materialistic in their sympathies, and were much more interested in the origin and machinery than in the meaning and function of natural existences and events.² Such a weakened and divided force was no match for the aggressive naturalism of contemporary science, whose mechanistic principle came easily to be regarded as a universal solvent, and whose materialistic philosophy was taken to be the only logical conclusion. As such, materialism was taken up with something of a religious fervour, and became the subject of a widespread propaganda. Everything claiming superiority to matter was fiercely denounced; matter was regarded as eternal, and

physical and chemical forces were looked on as being the only ultimate agents. Carl Vogt, in his bitter "Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft" (1854), declared that "thought stands in about the same relation to the brain as gall to the liver or urine to the kidneys," and that the world exists "without organic substance, without a known Creator, nay, without a leading idea.' Hellwald pronounced it to be the aim of science "to destroy all ideals, to manifest their hollowness and nothingness, to show that belief in God and Religion is deception." Büchner, in his book, "Force and Matter", which went through fourteen editions within twenty years, insisted that "Theism, or belief in a personal God, leads, as all history clearly shows, to Monarchism and the rule of priests; Pantheism, or belief in an all-pervading God, leads, where it is in the ascendency, to contempt of the senses, denial of the Ego, to absorption in God, and to a state of stagnation; Atheism, or philosophical Monism, alone leads to freedom, to intelligence, to progress, to due recognition of man - in a word, to Humanism." 1 The first edition of this book was published in 1858, while Lotze was working on his Microcosmus.

This waxing materialism, however, this passionate affirmation of existence to the exclusion of value, was only one side - the most vocal, perhaps, but still only one side - of the development of the times; and there had already come into more or less prominence in the circle of philosophical discussion

at least three elements, all dealing with questions of value, which were destined, after a long struggle, to bring militant materialism to a very complete discomfort. These were the newly awakened interest in the moral, the aesthetic, and the biological aspects of experience. The struggle was really only beginning, in its intensity, in Lotze's day, or had hardly yet begun, and for this reason his attitude to the situation has a quite peculiar interest. It needed the further development of biological science to rally the forces of value and lead them to the attack, though in this it was very materially assisted by an attack delivered in the rear of the materialistic stronghold by those, among whom Lotze was himself prominent, who gradually brought about a more adequate conception of the limits of the scientific point of view. It should perhaps be borne in mind that the latter attack was developed first, and that it is only within the last two or three decades that philosophers have had to their hand the full results of biological enquiry.¹ The first of these value-disciplines - the ethical - was brought into peculiar philosophic prominence by Immanuel Kant, who, reinforced in his own tendencies by the contrary influences of Hume and Rousseau, gradually abandoned his early intellectualism in favour of a fundamental moralism. It was in moral experience that he found that justification which his theoretical enquiries could not furnish of the belief in God, Freedom and Immortality - a belief which seemed to

¹ Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, Ch. IV.
constitute both an inescapable demand of the human soul and the goal of philosophic enquiry. Kant never succeeded in breaking away for the belief in a noumenal reality different from, and somehow more real than, the phenomenal, and since the latter alone was the object of scientific knowledge, and it was morality that brought us into touch with the noumenal reality, he really made morality the way to ultimate reality. Kant's spirit was caught, and his moralism extended, by J. G. Fichte who proceeded to build upon the needs of the moral ego his whole philosophic system. Fichte made self-consciousness the fundamental principle in his philosophy, and he regarded the presence in us of the moral law as the only guarantee of the reality of self-consciousness. The non-ego became for him but the foil created by the ego as offering the only sphere for the possibility of moral development. In short, "the supremacy which Kant had accorded to the practical reason was taken ... by Fichte in a much more literal and exclusive sense than it had borne to the elder philosopher. The activity of the practical Ego became the sole principle by which the existence of the intelligible world was to be explained."¹ It is unnecessary for us to trace out the history of this tradition in Germany. Its natural tendency - a tendency accentuated by Fichte's conception of the intelligence as an act - was to give primacy to the will, and this tradition has manifested its power in German thinking since that time. It may, however, be

¹. A. Seth, Devel. f. Kant to Hegel, p. 33.
of interest to notice that in other lands also at this period the tendency to make morality fundamental in the approach to reality was manifesting itself. In France, for instance, Auguste Comte was independently arriving at a position very similar to that of Kant, and placing moral ends above knowledge. He taught that the needs of Humanity, the needs of the heart, should set the only problems with which science can legitimately deal, and that only so much of the field of any science should be explored as is useful as a basis for the next higher science in his scale, at the top of which - served by all - he set the moral and social sciences. In England, at the same time, James Martineau was basing his theistic arguments on the reality of the moral ought. Clearly the tendency to fall back for ultimate assurance on the facts of moral experience was in the philosophic air during this period, as it had not been since the time of Plato, and here we have one of the influences which exercised an increasingly powerful opposition to the dominant materialism.

A second influence, as we have indicated, was the renewed interest in Aesthetics. Cousin says, "It is the eighteenth century which has introduced, or rather has restored, to philosophy those researches on the Beautiful and on Art which were so familiar to Plato and Aristotle, but which had been slighted by the Schoolmen, and had remained almost foreign to the great philosophers of the seventeenth century."¹ Professor

¹. Quoted from Caldecott & Mackintosh, Select. f. the Lit. of Theism, p. 306 f.
Bosanquet\(^1\) shows that there were "some traces of the aesthetic consciousness throughout the Middle Ages," and that the movement of theory passed through a remarkable circuit, "beginning with a special sympathy for nature as opposed to the works of men in the Christian successors of Plotinus . . . . , passing through a phase of hostility to the higher and more human arts in the destruction of Paganism and the iconoclastic controversy, and ending with a complete recognition of a more significant beauty as the manifestation of the Divine both through art and nature in the age of St. Francis, St. Thomas, Dante, and Giotto."\(^2\)

In the early scholastics beauty apparently received no theoretical consideration. St. Francis attained the intimate sympathy with nature which characterises the modern mind, while Thomas Aquinas made frequent references to aesthetic theory in his writings, his ideas being derived from Plotinus through the pseudo-Dionysius, whose writings had been translated by Scotus Erigena. What is noteworthy in this long period is not the absence of an aesthetic consciousness, for "the actual aesthetic consciousness of the middle age was as a historical fact the most continuous and creative that the world has ever seen"\(^3\), but the absence of deliberate aesthetic theorising; and this may be attributed both to the "directness of the art-impulse" and the pressure of those other needs which gave to this period its peculiar character. The first name of considerable importance in the modern philosophic consideration

1. History of Aesthetic, Ch. VI.
2. Bosanquet's Hist. etc. p. 131 f.
3. Ibid., p. 137.
of beauty is that of Kant. Previous thinkers had not entirely ignored the subject, but their contribution was rather to the setting of the problem which, in Kant, forced the consideration of beauty into prominence. It was Baumgarten who first erected the philosophy of the beautiful into a separate discipline, and gave to it its accepted title, Aesthetics. For him it took the form of an enquiry into "confused acts of thought", as the Rationalists were unanimous in regarding feeling, and its place in the philosophic Encyclopedia was as a preparation for the more respectable investigations which have clear ideas for their object. In the "Critique of Pure Reason", Kant had limited the sphere of knowledge, the work of the Understanding, to the mathematico-physical sciences; and in the "Critique of Practical Reason", he had made moral experience the sphere of the Ideals of Reason. "The separate worlds of Nature and of Freedom were thus established on the strength of two distinguishable orders of facts - the facts of science and those of the moral life - and all proof of their incompatibility was supposed to be rendered impossible by the strict negative demarcation between them, that is, by a necessity of ignorance." The question inevitably arose for Kant of a further unification of these worlds, and it was in the fields of beauty and of organism that Kant found the indications of which he was in search. Judgment, he taught, was a synthesis of parts - the sphere of the Understanding - in subordination to a totality,
which is, for Kant, the sphere of Reason, while disinterested feeling he regarded as mediating between action and theory. For these reasons he regarded the aesthetic judgment "as the guide to the required meeting-point of Nature and Freedom, Understanding and Reason, the sensuous and the intelligible."

Kant, however, was not able to give to the aesthetic judgment the objectivity which its central role in his system would seem to demand for it. For him it was merely the expression of "a felt harmony in the play of our powers on occasion of a certain perception."

The objectivity of the aesthetic judgment, the assurance of an objective harmony of which the subjective harmony was a revelation, was the work of Kant's successors. How they worked it out we need not pause to enquire; enough for our purpose to notice that the entrance of aesthetics into the forefront of philosophical speculation started a tradition, maintained by Schelling and Hegel and fostered by Schiller and Goethe, which exerted its strength against the aggressive materialism of the age. It should be mentioned in passing that the tendency, which we will have to notice in Lotze, to lay stress on feeling as a foundation of knowledge, was also, though perhaps less pervasively present in Lotze's environment. Like the moralistic tendency it was a revolt against exaggerated intellectualism, and the current interest in art, the Romantic movement, was one of its expressions. Perhaps its most prominent representative before Lotze was Friedrich Schleiermacher.
The third element, the interest in biology, organism, we need not pause to trace out, for its real influence was manifested only much later than the period in which we are now interested. It was introduced, as we have already seen, by Immanuel Kant in his third Critique, but it was not really fruitful until after the time of Darwin. When biology did begin to develop, strangely enough, its first result seemed to be to reinforce materialism, and it was only later that biology proved to be a "liberating influence" "emancipating us from the bad dream of Naturalism." Lotze regarded the body as a mere machine. Vogt, as we have seen, had as early as this described in organic substance an enemy to be denounced, and the conception, when finally taken seriously, was fatal to the faith he preached.

With both of these tendencies, the materialistic and the idealistic, Lotze came into intimate and sympathetic contact during his university training. When he entered the University of Leipsig, in 1834, though perhaps mainly interested in studies that belonged to the latter field, he was technically enrolled as a student of medecine. This fact is probably traceable to the influence of his father, an army doctor, who had died in 1829. To such effect did he pursue these studies that, on the completion of his course, he was able to acquire the right (habilitieren) to lecture in medecine in the University; he became a prolific author and original thinker on medical

subjects, and acquired considerable standing. Helmholtz later declared that Lotze had prepared the way for his own researches, having thoroughly, methodically, and with distinctive acuteness criticised and cleared away rubbish out of the domain of general pathology, as it existed before his time.\(^1\) In Lotze's earlier years medical science was still much under the influence of the theory of Vital Force. It was conceded that inorganic Nature must be mechanically explained, but it was generally felt that the peculiarities of the life of organisms necessitated some other explanation.\(^2\) The theory was obviously inadequate, and there were those who argued for a completely mechanistic account of physiological processes. Amongst them Lotze's anatomy teacher, E. H. Weber, was striving in his famous law of the relation of stimulus to conscious change to establish a mathematical law and so reduce psychology, at least in part, to an exact science. With this crusade against Vitalism Lotze actively allied himself, and it was mainly his success in this respect that drew forth Helmholtz's encomiums. In his last work, the Metaphysic of 1878, Lotze says, "In an essay on 'Life and Vital Energy,' which forms the introduction to Rudolph Wagner's Hand-Dictionary of physiology, I defended, six- and-thirty years ago, the claim of the mechanical view to a place in the science of Physiology."\(^3\) This is rather a modest claim. In these young days Lotze was so anxious to extend as far as possible the realm of mechanism that he was willing to contem-

\(^1\) cf. Stählin, "Kant, Lotze, Albrecht Ritschl," p. 305, n. 27 (Eng. tr.)
\(^2\) Metaphysic II, p. 129.
\(^3\) Vol. II. p. 128.
plate the reduction of Aesthetics to a mechanical science, and, though he finally receded from this position, the demonstration of the universality of mechanism was one of his abiding aims. In his opinion the mechanistic principle is to be applied to all matter, organic and inorganic; not only does it explain the sentient life of animals, but even the ideas in the human mind are in a relation of mechanical interaction with the outside world, and, though here Lotze is not at his best, he tends to fall into the Herbartian error of regarding the soul as a background, passive except in one respect, upon which the ideas interact mechanically among themselves.¹ In this revolt against Vitalism, therefore, Lotze is in the fullest harmony with that glorification of the mechanistic principle which, as we have seen, was the foundation of the rampant materialism of the day. But with the materialistic deductions from the mechanistic principle he will have nothing whatever to do. He is perfectly clear that mechanism does not involve materialism², and he speaks with evident scorn of those in his day who thought that it did.³ Even more important among his aims than the desire to show how universal is the sway of mechanism is the other desire to show how subordinate is its significance,⁴ and the inalienable claims of the soul found ever in him an ardent advocate. In short, Lotze sympathised with, and was preeminent in the application of, the scientific principle of his day, but clearly perceived the illegitimacy of its extension, as

materialism, into the philosophic domain.

And this brings us to the other tendency, the idealistic. Lotze tells us that "it was a lively inclination towards poetry and art which first made him philosophize",¹ and very early in his career, in 1840, he published a book of verse. Not only did his appreciation of the claims of living feeling protect him, as we have just seen, from the snare of materialism; it also led him to revolt against what seemed to him to be the barren intellectualism of the Hegelian Idealism. Any tendency he may have had from his early training toward the values of human life, was likely to be fostered and cultivated by the influence of Christian Weisse, his teacher of philosophy in Leipzig. Weisse too was dissatisfied with the content of the Hegelian speculation, and, while he retained the form of Hegelianism, he recognised the values of life by attempt to apply it to more popular materials. Weisse not only lectured on Aesthetics, but indulged in independent speculation in this field, his most important contribution being in relation to the place of the ugly in the beautiful. But perhaps Weisse's main interest was in religious speculation. In his published works he deals with the idea of God, Theodicee, Immortality, the Resurrection, the philosophy of Christianity and Gospel History. In the latter field Weisse was one of the forerunners of the Tubingen School of Criticism, and his individual contribution is of very great importance.² In the dogmatic field, Weisse

¹. Wallace, Lect. & Essays, p. 495.
². cf. Pfleiderer, Devel. of Theol. etc.
endeavoured to round out what was popularly regarded as the Hegelian conception of God by attributing to Him both feeling and will, in addition to reason, and tried to set these attributes forth in the form of a doctrine of the Trinity and to trace their mutual relations in the work of Creation. He had another doctrine of a Trinity constituted by God, the Son-Man, and the kingdom of Heaven; and in his Christology he attempted to show the relation of the man Jesus to an advancing incarnation of God in human history. Knowing this about the teacher, we need feel no surprise to find the pupil intensely interested in the realm of faith, and driven by the necessity he felt of rejecting the traditional theistic proofs to attempt what became the great purpose of his thinking - to vindicate the claims of faith while yet retaining, and extending as far as possible, the principle of mechanism.

Lotze's philosophy, therefore, may rightly be regarded as a defence of theism; and, though he considers the chasm between existence and value to be unbridgeable, he hopes to show, by reasoning from a world of experience to the existence of a personal God, how great is the necessity of bringing them into harmony. "Insight into what ought to be will alone open our eyes to discern what is; for there can be no body of facts," he tells us in an eloquent passage in the Microcosmus, "no arrangement of things, no course of destiny, apart from the end and meaning of the whole, from which each part has received,

1. Art. on Weisse, in Die Religion etc.
not only existence, but also the active nature in which it
glories." The promise is alluring, though all previous efforts
to bring existence and value together, and particularly to
harmonise science and religion without detriment to the
legitimate claims of either, have proved in the result to be
far from satisfactory. For Descartes and his successors, the
Occasionalists, God is merely a Deus ex machina, a convenient
resting place when the struggle with their difficulties has
exhausted their strength - an attitude which is correctly, if
somewhat bitingly, described as "the domestic animal conception
of God." Spinoza's God is too much of a greedy Moloch, demand­
ing the sacrifice of values - freedom, for example - which we
cannot readily give up. In the Leibnizian monadology God is
merely the convenient excuse lying patiently and unobtrusively
by until we human creatures require his services for introducing
a world of harmony which experience demands and Leibniz's
theory cannot supply. Kant makes some promising and suggestive
efforts, in his third Critique, actually pointing out the way
in which existence and value may be harmonised in our theories
of Nature and of Art; but his progress is with many a backward
glance; he does not trust his own discoveries; and his result
is but a defeat on the very verge of victory, while for him too
God is but a convenient principle, externally introduced, to
furnish in the practical sphere a moral requisite that Kant's
theoretical principles cannot afford. It is probable that
these previous failures are due in large part to the fact that
the questions of value were not really faced until the various thinkers had already committed themselves too far in dealing with questions of existence. Lotze's philosophy, with the reconciliation of both spheres before him from the first as his central problem, bids fare to be more successful in this respect.

But before we proceed to state and discuss it from this point of view, a brief consideration of Lotze's treatment of the traditional arguments would seem to be called for. We wish to bring out the fact that Lotze did not give a fair and sympathetic account of these arguments, and in order to do so we must hastily sketch the history of the theistic arguments, mainly with a view to showing the various forms in which the several arguments have been set forth.

In his Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God, Hegel disputes Kant's right to describe the teleological argument as the oldest, as he does in the famous phrase "the oldest, the clearest, and most in conformity with human reason." As a matter of pure history, this argument, it should be noted, appears quite clearly in the Old Testament, notably in Psalms 19 and 104, and in Isaiah 40, and these are perhaps the earliest references to it in literature. The dispute between Hegel and Kant relates, as far as I can discover, to the interpretation which is to be given to the much later words of Anaxagoras, "Nous is infinite and absolute, free from any mixture with anything

else, alone by itself; it is omniscient and omnipotent, and has disposed all things, in order and in beauty, within the encompassing whole, where the stars are, and the sun, and the moon, and ether, and the air." Socrates, it is recorded, was led by this statement to examine the work of Anaxagoras with eager expectation, but was disappointed at the failure of its author to make of it a real principle in his philosophy. He himself was profoundly impressed with the argument from design, and referred to it so frequently that he has usually been regarded as its author. It seems to have been chiefly the particular evidences of an external Designer that drew his attention, and here we have perhaps the origin of a tradition that long cherished this argument, and that drew upon it the biting satire of Goethe and the more sober strictures of Hegel. Socrates, however, did show an appreciation of the deeper conception of immanent design also. In the tenth book of the Laws, Plato offers as a conclusive proof of God's existence, a line of reasoning that contains features of the teleological argument along with elements of the cosmological. He reasons that motion which is derived must be thought as originating ultimately in spontaneous motion, and the latter, or motion which moves itself, is what we mean by soul. Souls are good or bad according as they give rise to orderly or disorderly motions. The great recurring motions of the universe are all orderly, and so must be the product of a supremely good soul.

1. Περὶ φύσεως.
or God. Elsewhere, notably in the Timaeus, Plato refers to the design argument, sometimes to instances of external design, and the whole conception is fundamental to his thinking. The same may be said of his successor. In reasoning to the existence of God, Aristotle lays more stress on the cosmological argument, but his whole system falls into a dualism of efficient and final causes of which the former are regarded as but a means to the realisation of the latter, and he does expressly employ the design argument also. Cicero professed to be copying from Aristotle when, in his de Natura Deorum, he advanced the argument from the beauty and grandeur of the creation, and his analogy of the house came probably from the same source. The argument was thus fully elaborated before the modern period began, and that, too, in a pagan setting. It was a favourite argument with many of the Church Fathers, and received the sanction of the Schoolmen when Aquinas made use of it in his great Summa. Aquinas's form of the argument is as follows: "Some things that have no power of knowing, such as natural bodies, work for ends, as is manifest from their constantly, or at least frequently, working in the same way for the attainment of that which is best; which shows that they arrive at their end not by chance but from intention. Now such things as have no power of knowing do not tend towards an end unless they are directed by some being which has knowledge and intelligence, as an arrow is directed by an archer. There is, therefore, some intelligent Being by which all natural things are directed
towards ends. And this we call God." By this argument, coming as the completion of various forms of the cosmological argument, Aquinas regarded the existence of God as conclusively demonstrated. Amongst the reformers, Melanchthon and Zwingli make use of the design argument; it was, as Wendland expresses it, the darling proof of the eighteenth century theology, and was accepted as valid by such a deist as Reimarus. The latter regarded "Natural Religion" as quite sufficient for our needs, writing very acutely against revelation, and he based his natural knowledge upon the teleological argument. The nature of his data may be gathered from the titles of some of his publications, viz. "The Instinct of Animals as a Proof for the Existence and the Wisdom of God," "General Considerations concerning the Instinct of Animals," etc. Leibniz has a form of this argument in his theory of Pre-established Harmony. Having enunciated a doctrine of extreme pluralism he felt constrained, in order to account for the world-plan to which experience bears at least a partial testimony, to hold that the individual monads were originally determined in their nature by God in harmony with a comprehensive plan. This doctrine is therefore an argument to God from the ordered harmony of the world. The argument plays the same fundamental part in Paley's system as it does in that of Reimarus. For Paley's "Moral and Political Philosophy" presupposes a system of future rewards and punishments as the only adequate source of ethical motive,

1. Art. on Gottesbeweise, in Die Religion etc.
and this, he thinks, depends on the credibility of the Christian Religion. His defence of the latter presupposes the existence of a benevolent Creator desirous of communicating with His creatures for their good; and it is the latter which he bases on the argument from design. He very skilfully brings his evidence together, all of it however characterised by that mechanical conception of the relation of God to the world which now makes all these arguments seem so unsatisfying, and the foundation of his whole argument rests on "the necessity, in each particular case" - taken from human anatomy - 'of an intelligent designing mind for the contriving and determining of the forms which organised bodies bear." Kant did good service to the design argument by his development of the conception of immanent design. Previously, though this idea was more or less present, as we have seen, as early as Socrates, there had been much too great a tendency to interpret all the cases where man found natural objects suitable to his needs - a classical example is the bark of a certain tree for making stoppers for bottles - as evidence that God created these objects precisely to meet these human needs, and to found the design argument largely, or even exclusively, on such instances. However this "collier faith" may appear to one who already possesses a well-developed theism, it can hardly be regarded as evidence conclusive enough to serve as the foundation of such a faith. What is more, the earlier tendency was to regard the source of design in nature, after the deistic fashion.
as a Being standing outside of nature, in the same way as Aquinas's archer stands outside of his arrow; to regard Him, in short, as a contractor rather than as an architect or creator. While the transcendence of God is vital to a full religious consciousness and must not be given up, this view scarcely does justice to His immanence. Kant's indication of a design which is immanent in nature - purpose and materials, end and means, being united there in the closest harmony - is, though made by him with excessive caution, from every point of view a deepening of the design conception. In quite modern times the application of the conception of evolution to the explanation of organic forms has rendered many of the instances of design on which such writers as Paley confidently rested no longer available, and it has even threatened to banish the very conception of design from nature. It was therefore strenuously resisted by popular theologians, and even by such philosophers as J. Hutchison Stirling. The later result has been, however, rather to deepen and widen the argument, and the modern Idealist movement, for example, is founded on the idea that all things must be interpreted in terms of a purposeful whole.

Aristotle is traditionally named as the originator of the cosmological argument, although, as we have seen, Plato's argument in the Laws contains cosmological elements. Indeed Aristotle's cosmological argument is just Plato's with the

1. Phil. & Theol.
2. cf. Simpson, Man & the Attain.
Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, Ch. IV.
Bosanquet etc.
teleological ending omitted, and stated in terms of an astronomical theory - that of Eudoxus - which Plato had deliberately rejected. ¹ Aristotle argues that everything that moves has had a mover, except that the necessary ultimate member of the causal chain must be a self-mover, which must be infinite and eternal. This is God. God he conceives as an exalted mind the only worthy object of whose thinking is his own nature. God, therefore, is quite unaware of the existence of the universe, moving it by being the end of its striving - the teleological element that permeates the Aristotelian philosophy being here introduced. God, for Aristotle, cannot be said to have moral qualities, and the conception in general is that which has come to be termed deistic. The cosmological argument therefore, like the teleological, was first elaborated in a pagan setting, and only later taken over into the stream of Christian thought. Its clear expression of the divine sovereignty has made it very welcome, however, in the home of its adoption. Thomas Aquinas teaches that, while "human intelligence cannot by its natural strength achieve the apprehension of [God's] substance," still we are "led from things of sense into Divine knowledge, to the extent of knowing that God is;"² and of this fact we may attain a demonstrative certainty on the level of natural reason. The first of these demonstrative proofs is the Aristotelian argument from the fact of motion, which we have outlined above. Along with this

¹ Taylor - Art. on Theism, in Hasting's Encycl. of Relig. & Ethics.
Aquinas advances an argument from causal agency to a "first efficient Cause; and all men call this God." This second argument is ultimately of the same nature as the first, and shares its limitations. The third is more like that form of the cosmological argument which came to be regarded as typical. It starts from the idea of contingency, in the sense that certain actually existing things, being generated and corrupted, can either exist or not exist. But, Aquinas reasons, at some time or other that which is thus contingent does not exist, and if there were not something necessary nothing would now exist. But if there be anything necessary something must be necessary in itself, and "this all men call God." Aquinas's fourth argument, taken from Aristotle and Augustine, and found also in Anselm's Monologium, is based on the premise that the relative presupposes the Absolute. For instance, what is good presupposes The Good, what is true The Truth, and so forth. But all things participate in being, and so there must be a highest being, which is, as such, the cause of the existence of all other things and perfections; and this highest being we call God. The fundamental assumption of this fourth argument has acquired increasing prominence in modern thinking. It appears as a mere suggestion in Descartes. The most famous of the Cartesian theistic proofs is of the cosmological type. Descartes argues from the contingency in us of the idea of perfection to the existence of God as its cause, the suggestion that this idea is generated by us through our negating of the limits of the
finite being rejected by him on the two grounds, first that simplicity is included in the idea itself, and, second, that the finite comes through our limitation of the infinite and not the infinite through aggregation of the finite. The same idea, prominent in Spinoza, is the goal towards which the development of the Kantian thinking tended, but it was never deliberately worked out by him. It has since become, however, one of the fundamental generative principles of modern Idealism. The arduous struggle of the mind to transcend its finitude and overcome the dissociation of the Absolute is regarded, for instance by Bosanquet, as of the very nature of thought, and is expressly called by him the argument a contingentia mundi.¹ Locke presents the argument from causality, "badly stated."² He says, "If we know there is some real being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is evident demonstration that from eternity there has been something, since what was not from eternity had a beginning, and what had a beginning must be produced by something else." Leibniz argues that, since time, space, and matter might easily have assumed other forms, movements, and order, all finite things are contingent, and therefore demand for their explanation an eternal, necessary, self-caused substance which makes their existence necessary. The twenty-fourth section of the first part of Wolff's Natural Theology reads as follows: "An ens necessarium exists. The human mind exists, or we exist. Since

¹ Princ. of Ind. & Value, Lect. VII. ² Taylor, Art. on Theism etc. cf. also Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, p. 251.
there is nothing without a sufficient reason why it should be rather than not be, it is necessary that a sufficient reason be given why our mind exists, or why we ourselves exist. This reason is contained either in ourselves or in some other being diverse from us. But if you affirm that we have the reason for our existence in a being which again has the reason for its own existence in another, you have not reached a sufficient reason, unless at length you rest in some being which has the sufficient reason for its own existence in itself. Either therefore we ourselves are entia necessaria, or there is postulated another ens necessarium; consequently an ens necessarium exists." Wolff then proceeds to develop this conception of an ens necessarium into the full idea of God. The same indication of the point of departure as perhaps best centering in the self, and the same clear recognition of the fact that this argument properly contains two stages, is seen in Kant's formulation of it in the Critique of Pure Reason. What is essentially another form of this cosmological argument, somewhat akin to that of Descartes, is to be found in the philosophy of Berkeley, according to which the world of Nature is but a system of signs through which God speaks to finite souls. Nature is therefore a contingent existence which requires the existence of God for its explanation, of which, therefore, it is a constant evidence. It is because, in his philosophy, Nature is thus a constant witness of experience to the existence and nearness of God that Berkeley claimed for his
speculations such a high religious value. The same point of view finds an eminent, living champion in Canon Rashdall,¹ and appeared also in the earlier, Scottish thinker, Professor Ferrier.²

The last of the three great traditional arguments, the ontological, is the only one that has originated within Christendom. It may be described as the attempt to prove the existence of God from what is involved in our conception of Him. Anselm, its originator³ argued that God, being that than which nothing greater can be conceived, must necessarily exist. For, if He did not exist, by adding to this conception the fact of existence we could form a conception greater than the greatest that is possible for us. But this is a manifest absurdity, Anselm claims. Thus the mere ability to formulate the conception of God - an ability which falls within the capacity even of the fool who says there is no God - proves God's existence. Atheism is merely a verbal misuse. The latter idea commended itself even to such an empirical thinker as Francis Bacon. He says, "The Scripture saith: The Fool hath said in his Heart, there is no God: It is not said, The Fool hath thought in his Heart: So as, he hath said it by rote to himself, as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be persuaded of it." Anselm's argument was attacked by his contemporary, Gaunilo,⁴ who denied that atheism is merely the use of an expression without the corresponding conviction, and insisted that either we may fail to prove God's existence or else there

¹ cf., eg. Contentio Veritatis. ² Institutes of Metaphysic. ³ Proslogium Chs. II. & III. ⁴ Liber pro Insipiente etc.
is no necessary proof at all. Against Anselm's proof he
brought forward his celebrated analogy of a perfect island, and
drove home his attack by his claim, later urged by Hume and Kant,
that we can think as non-existent anything that can be thought
of as existing. Anselm's argument made little impression in
the twelfth century, perhaps owing to the slowness with which
books were then disseminated, but it was widely known in the
thirteenth. Of fifteen scholars examined by Daniels, three -
including Albertus Magnus - express no opinion on its validity,
ten - including Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Scotus -
regard it as sound, and only two - Richard of Middleton and
Thomas Aquinas - definitely reject it.¹ It was Duns Scotus
who first suggested that this argument should be regarded as
supplementary to the cosmological and teleological arguments -
Anselm elaborated it rather because of his dissatisfaction with
these - and the idea has proved attractive in modern times.
Kant, who rejects it, recognises that this is its true place;
Hegel, who accepts it, tries to present the three arguments in
this relation, and Flint strenuously defends the same conception.
The great authority of Aquinas, however, who decided against it
chiefly because his Aristotelian doctrine of the origin of all
knowledge in sense-perception prevents him from ascribing to it
anything more than a subjective validity, put this line of
reasoning out of favour until the time of Descartes. The
latter was prevented by his well marked dualism of mind and

¹ Taylor, Art. on Theism, etc.
matter and his subjective starting point, from elaborating a teleological argument. Since he needed the certainty of the existence of God as the only assurance of the validity of our knowledge of the objective world, he had to start his proofs from our own innate ideas. We have already dealt with his cosmological, causal argument from our idea of perfection. At the same time his strong leaning toward a falsely conceived mathematical method lead him to work out an ontological proof also. He reasoned that God, being the ens perfectissimum, must exist, because existence is a perfection. To the rather obvious objection, already offered by Gaunilo and later insisted on by Hume and Kant, that a necessity of thought does not establish a fact of existence, Descartes made the profound suggestion that the real existence of our ideals is a presupposition of our whole life, particularly on its practical side.¹ This assumption, of course, underlies the Kantian moral argument, though Kant was too timid to grant it its due. It has been explicitly accepted and built upon by thinkers of the Idealist type.² Leibniz felt that Descartes's formulation of the ontological argument was weak because it did not clearly prove that its definition of God contained no contradiction within itself. He therefore defined God as the ens realissimum which contains all possible positive predicates but which cannot contain any negative predicates, since negation is the same as limitation. The same necessity of excluding contra-

¹ cf. Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, Ch. XIII.
² Ibid, Ch. XII.
diction is seen in the arguments of Wolff and Baumgarten. The former regards the conception of ens perfectissimum as a confused notion which, though it may be valid, should not be employed when a clearer notion is available. He indicates however that the Cartesian term is still the popular one. Baumgarten retains the term ens perfectissimum but makes it a point to show that it excludes all negative attributes, but Kant again prefers the Leibnizian expression.

In the eighteenth century it was generally accepted that the existence of God could be conclusively proved by one or more of these three great proofs. There were other proofs, such as the proof from general consent, first employed by the Stoics, and later by Cicero, and certain early Christian writers; Descartes's proof from the duration of our life, and so forth. But these three, the metaphysical arguments, are the most important and were recognised to be such. True, objections had been raised either against one or other of these proofs, or against the possibility of any kind of theistic proof, at least since the time of the Greek Sceptics. These thinkers did not usually single out religion as in any way the special object of their sceptical attention, but in this respect Carneades was a notable exception. He not only rejected the teleological argument and that from general consent, but also strove to prove that the very idea of God is self-contradictory because, while He must be thought of as moral, it is impossible

1. Theologia Naturalis II., sec. 21.
2. Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kant, etc., p. 522 f.
3. Norman Smith, Cartesian Studies, p. 73 n.
to think of Him as overcoming imperfection which is what we mean by morality - an argument which has been made familiar to modern readers in the works of Bradley and William Wallace. The Epicureans also banished the conception of design from their view of nature, adopting instead the purely materialistic atomism of Democritus, and their whole temper was atheistic. In the Middle Ages, those who drew a sharp destruction between the spheres of reason and of faith, notably such Nominalists as Occam and D'Ailly, considered it impossible for the human mind to find reasons for belief in the existence of God, and they had recourse to legitimate authority as the only assurance for their faith. Similarly Pascal held that, so far as reason is concerned, there are equal grounds for believing and for disbelieving in the existence of God, and Peter Boyle declared that faith was free to accept even such doctrines as had been proved to be irrational because faith and reason were mutually contradictory.\(^1\) In spite of this line of contrary opinion, however, the eighteenth century slumbered on in the security of a dogmatic self-satisfaction, resting on the supposedly solid foundation of the metaphysical proofs, and sometimes stilling an uneasy stir by means of a doctrine of learned ignorance inherited from Neo-Platonism through the medium of Augustine and other Fathers of the early church.

The eighteenth century pride, however, was destined for a sudden and disastrous fall. Even more by the atmosphere which

\(^1\) For this history see Flint, Agnosticism, pp. 89 to 115.
they created than by the arguments which they brought forth. the terrible David and Kant, the all-destroyer, completely confounded the orthodox champions. To Berkeley his own philosophy brought God near to men and supplied the firmest foundation for Christian faith; Hume, with the same Lockian presuppositions, discovered the synthetic nature of the causal principle and therein set a problem for all who would use it in their thinking. Kant was led thereby to the discovery that all principles are synthetic, and to the consequent rejection of all previous types of proof as dogmatic. His own attempt to work out a transcendental proof lead to the consequence that sense-experience is an essential element in all knowledge, and that God's existence, while it may be a legitimate object of faith and a necessary practical postulate, is not capable of metaphysical demonstration. Had these two thinkers made no direct references to the theistic arguments the effect of their general conclusions on these arguments must have been profound, but both of them passed the orthodox "proofs" under review. Some of their particular objections will have to be considered by us in the next chapter, so that here only a general notice is called for. In the Dialogues, Hume pays scant attention to the Ontological Argument, and where it is introduced it is already prejudiced by being put into the mouth of Demea, the man of "rigid, inflexible orthodoxy." Cleanthes impatiently objects to it, first, that it is absurd to pretend to demonstrate a matter of fact, and, second, that, since we can
conceive anything as non-existent which we can conceive as existent, there is no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Philo approves this answer, reinforces it with further observations, and ends by insisting that the argument, even if it were valid, is purely academic. Elsewhere Hume had already anticipated the objection which Kant later made famous, namely, that, since existence is not an element in the content of any concept, it is impossible by analysis of any concept to prove the existence of its object. Hume would agree with the later emphatic statement of Hutchinson Stirling that "the very existence of Natural Theology is bound up with the existence of final causes," and to the teleological argument he devotes most of his attention. His conclusion is, in brief, that, though the presence of design in Nature will be acknowledged by any man of common sense, yet it cannot be proved conclusively that the design is not immanent in nature itself so that nature is the source of its own adaptations, and that, even if this point were conceded to the orthodox, the design is not sufficient to support an inference to the personal, moral God of traditional orthodoxy. Kant admits the great influence of the teleological argument, but, in distinction from Hume, he regards the ontological argument as the crucial one. His conclusion is that the teleological argument can at best only reach an architect who is very great, and that in attempting to go beyond this to the infinite it is resting on

1. Philosophy & Theology, Ch. III.
the ontological argument. Similarly the cosmological argument, in attempting, as a second step, to determine what properties ought to be possessed by the absolutely necessary Being which the first step is supposed to have supported, also rests on the ontological argument. The latter, however, fails because, since existence is not part of the content of any concept, it is illegitimate to base a question of fact on a necessity of thought.

Hegel ascribes to the influence of Kant the situation with regard to the theistic arguments in his own day, which he describes as follows; "The proofs of the existence of God are to such an extent fallen into discredil that they pass for something antecluated, belonging to the metaphysics of days gone by; a barren desert, out of which we have escaped and brought ourselves back to a living faith; the region of an Understanding out of which we have once more raised ourselves to the warm feeling of religion."¹ He further informs us that "it is not this or that proof, or this or that form or way of putting it, that has lost its weight, but the very proving of religious truth has so much lost credit with the mode of thought peculiar to our time that the impossibility of such proof is already a generally accepted opinion. Nay more, it has come to be regarded as irreligious to place confidence in such reasoned knowledge."¹ So prevalent is this spirit, indeed, that, he says, "the proofs themselves are barely even historically known

¹ Lectures on the Proofs etc. (Summer, 1831), Lect. I.
here and there - even to theologians."¹ This situation Hegel set himself to remedy by showing that the three traditional proofs, though usually wrongly stated in terms of a separating Understanding, really represent stages in the elevation of the mind to God by means of the dialectical process of Reason. How he works this out in detail we need not stop to make clear, but his vagueness and hesitation of statement seem to suggest that he experiences some uneasiness about the success of this effort, and he abandons it entirely when he complains that the Ontological Argument has been developed since Anselm's day "always along with the other proofs, though it alone is the true one."² Lotze's treatment of these arguments shows quite clearly that Hegel had failed to rescue them from the neglect about which he so eloquently complained.

¹ Lectures on the Proofs etc. (Summer, 1831), Lect. I.
² Lectures on the Proofs etc. (Summer, 1831).
Chapter II.

LOTZE and the TRADITIONAL PROOFS.

In no section of his published work, so far as I can find, does Lotze set himself the task of a detailed and systematic, far less historical, discussion of the traditional "proofs". His general treatment of them in the Microcosmus (English translation) occupies only seven pages,¹ claims to be only a "brief retrospective view" of a region of thought already sufficiently disposed of in other connections, and is introduced when he is confessedly "hastening to a conclusion." They are already prejudiced by the results arrived at in the preceding section. The reasoning here is that knowledge is a product of certain given elements and of general, hypothetical propositions which are "nothing but the expressions of the forms of activity, in which our reason according to our own nature must be exercised." In scientific knowledge the given elements come to us in sense-perception; in religious knowledge Lotze is willing to regard them, after the manner of Schleiermacher, as due to "a divine or supersensible influence upon our interior being"; and, until they are worked up into knowledge, they exist, Lotze declares, only as certain modes of our feeling - fear, dependence, aesthetic admiration, ethical

¹ Microcosmus II, pp. 664 - 671.
feelings of obligation being their more developed forms. The full development of these data by means of reflection is not possible for us, and so much of our religious experience must remain in this purely subjective form. Indeed Lotze goes so far as to say that the very best content of religion remains thus in the emotional sphere, where it is both superior to and remote from anything that can be established by formal, logical demonstration. The arguments themselves are introduced as an example of an out-grown attitude, and, though he does endeavour to reveal them as manifestations - however inadequate - of an inner, emotional urge which they almost entirely fail to express, but which is to be clearly revealed in his own argument, still his treatment is predominantly toned by his intention of rejecting them. One gets the impression that instead of sympathetically studying these proofs, as the important part they have played in human thinking would seem to demand, in order to find out what of truth is in them, Lotze is more anxious to reveal their inadequacies as a preliminary for his own more satisfactory arguments. Perhaps, however, this prominently negative attitude should be traced to the practical necessities under which Lotze worked, rather than to any narrowness in his remarkably catholic spirit. In other parts of the Microcosmus, indeed, various aspects of the several "proofs" have come up for discussion, but there again their treatment is rather incidental in order to throw light on, or

1. cf. also Phil. of Relig., sects. 2 - 4.
assist in the development of, the other arguments that are, in these passages, in course of construction.

Lotze faces the theistic proofs again in his Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion. This work consists of the sentences dictated in lectures to his students, and published, after his death, from their notes. Here the treatment is fuller, but it is still, as one would expect, sketchy and dogmatic, omitting everything that does not serve the practical purposes of the class-room. In these lectures, too, one feels, Lotze betrays the largely negative attitude to which we have already referred, being more interested in showing the fallacies and shortcomings of the "proofs" than in defending any elements of value they might contain. As is very natural in lectures, the treatment was changed from time to time. They are before me in two forms, first as they were delivered in 1875 having been translated, with the addition of two final chapters that were not delivered until later, under the direction of Professor G. T. Ladd, and second as they were delivered in 1878 and 1879 (not translated). The following discussion, therefore, is based on three different treatments, that of the Microcosmus belonging to the year 1868, that of the lectures of 1875, and the somewhat different treatment in the lectures of 1879.

I. Lotze seems to have experienced some difficulty in finding satisfactory short statements of the traditional "proofs." In the case of each proof his formulae vary considerably,
sometimes essentially, and he confesses, in his final attempt to state the cosmological argument, that "a real formula can hardly be advanced." The reasons for his changes of statement, as far as I can find, are nowhere indicated, and we are left for explanation to our own conjectures. In 1868 he states the teleological argument thus: "The Teleological Proof seeks to attain certainty of the reality of God from the purposiveness in the world." With this form, however, he became dissatisfied, evidently because it would seem to imply an admission on his part that the purposiveness in the world is a fact of indubitable certainty, and because it does not sufficiently indicate the nature of the reasoning as a causal argument to God as creator and designer. And so, in 1875, he tries to remedy these defects. The teleological argument, he now says, "proposes to make that empirical conformity to an end, which appears in the world, the point of departure for an inference concerning a single designing and creative reason as the supreme cause of the world." Lotze now has a formula which expresses the uncertainty which, he thinks, belongs to the datum from which the teleological argument starts, and is thus more in harmony with the views that are put forward in his criticisms; but it does not tell us clearly whether those who advance this argument consider purposiveness to be a certain, or only a probable, fact. From this point of view the earlier formula is more definite, though the later one makes more definite the fact, which Lotze intends to deny, that this argument, as
conceived by its believers, is able to prove the designer's unity. The earlier formula, also, is more definite in its expression of the degree of compulsion which is claimed for the argument. It makes quite clear that the argument "seeks to attain certainty"; in the second form it might claim to establish only a probable conclusion. The same remarks are applicable to the final formula, but here an additional criticism must be made. In the lectures of 1879 Lotze states that the teleological argument reasons "from the world's empirically given conformity to an end to the wisdom of a supreme, personal founder." Here, apparently, the main question at issue is the wisdom, not the existence, of God. All this uncertainty, however, belongs only to the formulae, not to Lotze's discussions. In his criticism he assumes that the datum of the argument is regarded by those who advance it as indubitable, that the point at issue is, not the wisdom of a God whose existence is conceded, but the existence of a God of infinite wisdom, and that the process of reasoning is considered to be demonstrative. We find, in his treatment of the teleological argument, no historical reference to any other form, neither to the Platonic, nor to that of Aquinas, nor to the Leibnizian. What is more, though - and perhaps, because - his own attitude to the essentials of this argument is that it has an extreme probability, he does not here indicate that the possibility of its being advanced in this form had ever occurred to him, nor does he, except on one occasion that
I have noticed, consider its validity when put forward, not as a proof, but as a confirmation. This attitude is quite in harmony with that of the negative tradition which began, as a modern phenomenon, with Hume, but it is somewhat strange if, as Sorley argues, 1 the traditional proofs, in the time of their special prominence, were really only confirmations, even though they were not clearly recognised to be such. Lotze's procedure is clearly dictated by the practical desire to formulate only that conception of the argument that was current in his day, and by the negative results which he wishes to establish in respect to that whole conception of theistic proof of which the current forms are, he thinks, sufficiently typical.

Against the teleological argument, so conceived, Lotze brings five main objections. He objects, in the first place, that it is impossible to prove the necessity of employing the concept of design in the explanation of the world, and that the starting-point of the argument is, therefore, incapable of the type of justification which such an argument demands. It is not the presence of a unitary design in Nature that Lotze calls in question; he is not, with Spinoza, regarding the concept of design as a mere fruit of our ignorance. On the contrary he would regard the detailed exhibition of such a unitary plan as the completion of philosophy; 2 but such a completion, he urges, is still far in the future. In a very striking passage, 3 Lotze remarks how extremely strange it is

that "our scientific illuminati" refuse to start from a single governing power that works intelligently, preferring to commence with the postulates of an original store of matter and force, and the unshaken authority of a group of universal and immutable laws of Nature. For, he says, apart from the fact that these are no trifling postulates, the comprehensive spirit of human reason would seem to favour the rejected procedure. Elsewhere he justifies this attitude, but in this passage he scornfully suggests that, in adopting it, the scientists in question are actuated by an easily understood, though unworthy, desire to draw within the limits of finitude, and so make agreeably intelligible to themselves, what, to the unprejudiced mind, is conceivable only as the product of infinite wisdom - a suggestion which clearly manifests Lotze's belief in teleology. The objection to the teleological argument which now concerns us is not, therefore, a denial of teleology, but a denial that it can be proved in the manner, and with the stringency, which are demanded by that form of the argument with which he is dealing. Perhaps the shortest and clearest expression of his position is the following: "Speculatively it is by no means to be demonstrated: it continues to be perfectly possible to think of the course of the world as an entirely purposeless, although more or less living development of an Absolute. But religious feeling has an immediate evidence that the case is not so, and that all the phenomena of inspiration, of adoration, and of the feeling of obligation to an ideal, are not explicable as causal
effects in the development of a purposeless Principle."¹

It may be questioned whether this view of Lotze's is not based on that impossible separation of various aspects or fields of mental activity which characterised the work of Immanuel Kant, and which his successors laboured to overcome. If religious feeling has any such immediate evidence, how is it possible for speculation to conceive of the course of the world as entirely purposeless without stultifying, in principle, that very experience from which it itself takes its rise? But we must return to the objection we are examining. The concept of design, Lotze argues, is borrowed from our experience of our own activity, and cannot be clearly understood unless first we study it in that reference. In order to achieve our purposes we bring together elements, each of which has, quite independently of human designs, a mode of operation peculiar to itself, but which, as a result of the massing of these peculiar modes of operation, will bring our purposes to fruition. Our only contribution to the result has been to bring the necessary elements together, and this change in their spatial relations has itself been produced by us by means of a blind force. How the purpose in our minds is able to influence these blind forces to alter the spatial relations of the elements must remain ultimately inexplicable. Elsewhere he teaches that the adoption of certain purposes, in which alone we are free, gives rise to the ideas of the corresponding

¹. Phil. of Relig., sect. 65.
things or conditions as actually existing. These ideas, further, in a purely mechanical way, give rise to the necessary intermediate ideas, and presently the latter, by means of an inexplicable mechanical interaction with the external world, set going the objective movements which, in due course, bring our purposes to realisation. In order, therefore, to justify our application of the conception of design to natural phenomena we would have to prove that the spatial relations of the efficient elements, in cases of adaptation, are due to an operation of blind forces which themselves demand for their full explanation this inexplicable leap which would lead finally to the purposes of an intelligent designer. To do this we would have to prove that disorder is more original in the world than order, - Hume's great point - , and that the world would be a vast Chaos if it were not for the ordering efficiency of an external power. But this can never be done. However probable the design explanation might be in any particular case, the exclusion of the possibility of a purely mechanical explanation could never be made absolute. That this objection, in general, is valid is betrayed, Lotze urges, by the further fact that even the most ardent adherents of teleology, when they leave generalities and proceed to the consideration of details, are forced to employ the very method which they try to reject, that is, to find the efficient means through whose necessary and blind causal connection the required effect must be brought about.¹

¹. Microcosmus I, p. 376.
We may, for the present, admit the incomprehensibility of the relation between human purposes and their objective execution since that is the main point here, without pausing to discuss Lotze's account of it. It must also be admitted that, if we are to think, in the teleological argument, of elements of the world each possessing an independent efficiency, and then, over against these, a wise and efficient Being who somehow arranges these world-elements so that the combination of their independent actions will produce the results He desires, then a study of these world-elements and their combinations can never reveal the necessity for such a Being. This is clearly Lotze's contention,¹ and, if the teleological argument rests essentially on such a view, it must be rejected.² Nor will it help matters to regard the world-elements as entirely passive, for this would add to, rather than subtracting from, the difficulties. But, just as clearly, no objection to the teleological argument, so conceived, should be left resting on such a decisively dualistic conception. It may be sufficient for a limited purpose, but it can never be really satisfactory, to oppose the dualism of this form of the argument merely by accepting the dualism, without any indicated qualification, and showing that, on such a basis, no conclusive argument is possible. The objection should proceed to challenge the dualism directly, and to exhibit the superiority of a view which does more justice to the immanence of God - that is, of course, if it is being

¹. cf. Microcosmus II, p. 131.
advanced by one who holds such a view. And Lotze does hold such a view, although, as we must see later, he finds some difficulty in working it out. His failure to make any hint of such a conception in the present connection is an evidence of the negative attitude to which we have referred.

So far the objection has been that the necessity of applying the concept of design to the world in general cannot be clearly established as the teleological argument in this form would demand. But now Lotze advances a step, and denies that that immanent adaptation which makes organisms appear to be self-sufficient, absolute ends is really in any better position. This conception, hesitatingly introduced by Kant, is usually regarded as a great advance on the external, anthropomorphic conception of design which is typical of eighteenth century thought, and which is the only one that Hume clearly faces. Lotze indicates that it was generally accepted as valid in his own day, but that it can be proved to be such he will not admit. Rather does this kind of adaptation, he urges, more than any other, admit of the reduction of its so-called design to an unpremeditating mechanism. For these instances of immanent adaptation, he thinks, may quite easily be explained by means of the law of survival. It is perfectly possible, that is to say, that an unpremeditating course of Nature has produced a large variety of forms all of which have become extinct except those which, either within themselves or in their relation to outer conditions, happened to possess a
superior equilibrium and fixity. The existence of evil in the world seems to show that nature produces the faulty and the well-adapted indifferently, and that the former pass again out of existence by reason of their inner contradictions. It follows that instances of immanent adaptation are not conclusive evidence of the operation of a designing intelligence in Nature. All this, of course, is not new in Lotze. Hume had made the same point against the teleological argument in general. But one cannot admit that this is a valid criticism against the teleological argument, as such. In the first place, it does not seem possible for any theory of survival to explain the lavish munificence with which beauty is manifested in Nature, and it is coming to be recognised that there is in organisms something peculiar which necessitates for their explanation categories different from those that apply in the inorganic sphere. Progress in the study of organisms is leading more and more strongly to such a conclusion; and among these categories purposiveness is prominent. However that might be, Lotze's contention has a second and fundamental weakness; for, in assuming that the ill-adapted pass out of existence while the well-balanced tend to be preserved, he is presupposing in the operation of Nature as a whole the very rational system which, in particular instances, he is calling in question. True, the various objects in Nature are produced, according to his argument, in a haphazard, fortuitous manner,

1. cf. further, Sorley, Moral Values etc., p. 325 ff.
but the selection which they then undergo is a manifestation, surely, of the teleological principle. Finally, we must admit that it is impossible to prove, with mathematical stringency and in a syllogistic manner, that adaptation of any kind in Nature is an evidence of designing intelligence. Instead this is an assumption that is in process of proof in the only way in which such as assumption could possibly be justified, that is, by its harmony with the general body of received truth. The inference from adaptation to design is only an application of the causal law of a kind that is repeatedly involved in the interpretation, or rather the formation, of experience. It involves the same assumption by which one person recognises the presence of other persons in the world from the actions which they perform. It cannot be formally demonstrated, but a systematic doubt of its truth would entail disastrous consequences. This will not necessarily establish an external Designer, but it will render necessary the belief in designing intelligence as operative in the world process.

Lotze's second main objection to the teleological argument is that it is impossible to prove the unity of the design in Nature, from which to argue to a unitary Designer. We could prove the unity of design, he urges, only if we could show that adaptation reigns without exception throughout the universe; but this we are unable to do, not only in view of the limitations of our knowledge, but also because, within the limits of our experience, there is much that is inexplicable, purposeless,
even obstructive to ends of which we had assumed the validity. The few examples of harmony that we can clearly recognise might be sufficient, he suggests with Hume, to confirm an existing faith in God, but they could never enable one who lacks that faith logically to attain it with certainty. Experience would lead more naturally, he adds, either to the scientific view of an unconditioned reality of given elements, forces, and laws, or else to the polytheistic conception of a plurality of divine beings, each of which rules, as its genius, over a special department of Nature, and the varying governments of which agree so far as to attain a certain general compatibility, but not a harmony that is altogether without exceptions. This criticism, also, is familiar to readers of Hume and Kant, and, when the design argument is offered as a demonstrative proof, we must, I think, grant its cogency. If, from our ability actually to trace design in Nature, we are to attain a certain demonstration of the unity of that design, and thence to deduce the unity of the Designer, then the task is, at least for the present, manifestly impossible. Elsewhere¹ Lotze points out that our faith in the unity of design rests, just as little as our belief in the most general points of view of the mechanistic system, on any such ability to trace it out through all the details of the course of things. The most that might be claimed is that unity, system is a presupposition of human thinking and of scientific investigation; that science is

¹ Microcosm us I, p. 412.
tracing, with ever increasing precision, the ramifications of what looks like a single system in Nature, and that, if it did not do so, it would stultify human reason and render it unreasonable. If there is design at all in Nature it must be a unity, if the possibility of knowledge is not ultimately to be denied. At the same time we gain nothing by underestimating our difficulties, and we cannot claim that the unity of a world design is more than a hypothesis in process of proving itself. If, for instance, sin has been rightly defined as that which absolutely ought not to be, a definition which seems to accord with the experiences of the greatest saints, then we must either maintain, with the Idealists, that the point of view here is not ultimate, or else there is in human experience a refractory element that must resist all our systematising efforts. It is the weight of this consideration which makes Cleanthes, in Hume's Dialogues, willing to justify the divine benevolence at the expense of His omnipotence, and the same hard problem inclined John Stuart Mill to hold a Manichaean dualism, evil being regarded as the result of the opposition of a chaotic power to a God whose power and love is limited. In the conceptions of a finite God to be found in the writings of Rashdall and H. G. Wells the same difficulty is clearly directive. But even though this conception of sin be granted, the assumption of a plurality of coordinate principles may, I think, be shown to raise more, and more fundamental, problems than it

solves. Lotze himself regards sin as presenting a problem which is at present insoluble, but he is sure that there is a solution, and he is not, therefore, constrained by the fact of evil to any pluralistic conclusions.¹

Thirdly, to be valid the teleological argument, Lotze contends, would need to prove the unconditional worth and sacredness of the designs which we plainly see pursued in the world. If the designs which, as far as we can see, are actually being pursued in the world are not worth while, or cannot be shown to be worth while, they will offer no evidence of the activity of the kind of designer whose existence we wish to prove. But this, he thinks, is precisely our position. In many of the ends which philosophy points out as cosmically supreme and sacred, living feeling can find no worth at all, and it is impossible to prove the worth of many of the instances of immanent adaptation. Lotze insists that a world-aim, to be acceptable as such, must be of such a nature as to render absurd the question why it, and not something else, is the aim. In his opinion - and here his general overemphasis on feeling expresses itself in the hedonistic conviction that the only real and substantial Good is the pleasure of some sensitive spirit - such an end is blessedness, existing in a kingdom of spirits. But this is a certainty, he says, only in the "common, unphilosophic view," and its nature and necessity are based only on ethical requirements. From such a supreme purpose, however,

¹ Microcosmus II, p. 716 ff.
it is not possible to deduce the necessity of the present inanimate world. The necessity of some kind of inanimate world may, indeed, be inferred from the need of some content for this blessedness, but we cannot be more explicit and prove the need of "just these substances, forces, organisms, and kinds of occurrence, which we discover empirically in the world." The obvious objection to all this is that, Lotze to the contrary, "living feeling" is not the ultimate test of values. Even if it be granted, as it must be, I think, that feeling is, subjectively, a necessary element in all that is valuable, surely there are intellectual and volitional elements in value also; and it should be clear that feeling can be a criterion of value only in so far as it has wrapped itself round standards of judgment, intellectual criteria, which have been previously established and made habitual. Value must reside, not in any emotional condition called blessedness, but in an objectively real system, and feeling is only a ready, but not always reliable indication to us of this value, and a test of our progress in moulding our character into harmony with the values which we have come to recognise. A good example is the moral emotion which is usually a very good, because readily available, guide to moral value, but that it is not always reliable as such is indicated by those instances when we feel pain at actions which we no longer judge to be wrong. If our contention be justified, the fact that certain of the ends which philosophy offers as

1. Phil. of Relig., sects. 66 - 69.
valuable do not awaken pleasurable feelings is no evidence that they do not possess value, but only that we are not yet so inwardly identified with them that they have become for us centres of feeling. It may be granted that Lotze's objection is to this extent valid that we cannot conclusively prove the unconditioned worth of the ends which our experience reveals to us in the world, - it certainly is true that the best we can do will not render doubt formally illogical - , but of this feeling cannot be the judge. The only test of the value of the ends which we seem to discover working in nature is their place in an objective system of ends, as revealed and approved, not by feeling alone, but by the whole self expressing itself in judgment. "Judgments of value, in other words, are not to be taken, like the intuitions of an older philosophy, as so many detached and mutually independent pronouncements of one faculty or another upon particular features or aspects of the world. They represent rather so many parts of one fundamental judgment in which the nature of reality, as exhibited in the system, may be said to affirm itself. Every particular judgment depends for its ultimate sanction on the recognition of its object as a contributory element to this inclusive whole."¹ A teleological argument that claims to be demonstrative is obviously exceeding the limits of human capacity, - and this, it must be borne in mind, is really all that Lotze means to contend - , but when this argument is rightly regarded, that is, as a partial con-
firmation of one part of our experience (the religious) by another (the teleological), then the legitimacy of basing an argument on the values with which we are acquainted will hardly be called in question; or, at least, it will not be questioned on the score of the imperfection of our knowledge of values.

Lotze brings against the teleological "proof", in the fourth place, the objection that it is quite incapable of giving us the right which it claims to characterise God in superlative terms. In order to prove that God is omnipotent wisdom it would be necessary to show that His designs are executed without opposition, and that He is never forced to produce even that which, in relation to His purposes, is indifferent. But this is quite impossible. On the contrary, not only does experience show much that seems to be the result of a resistance to the designing power on the part of a refractory material, but even the very concept of design seems to involve such opposition. "That will alone can have ends, whose volition is not tantamount to execution, whose purpose, on the contrary, hindered by the resistance of an independent nature of things, becomes converted into an aim to be reached in a particular way. Action adapted to an end is to be found not where an absolute moulding power produces everything directly out of itself, but where a limited efficacy needs means for the achievement of its results, means which it can make serviceable to its ends only on the condition of its accommodating the character of its own designs to the
nature of this foreign material." ¹ It is for this reason that, in his discussion of Creation,² Lotze refuses to think of God's will after the analogy of the finite will. The conclusion is that, if the concept of design can be legitimately attributed to the divine mode of activity, then God must be a limited Being. The consideration is of great weight, and has led modern thinkers to modify the conception of design, in one way or another, in its application to the Absolute.³ But still it seems to them that the idea of design may be purged without being completely volatilized, and that it may be usefully applied in its purged form to the Infinite. Lotze has another reason for denying that the teleological argument gives us any right to characterize God in superlative terms, namely, that we cannot so describe this world, which is the starting-point of the argument. For, he urges, while we know the world that is, we do not know those that might have been, and the latter might include a much better world than this. Until that possibility is excluded we cannot reason to the supreme wisdom of God. The objection, as stated, is that we must be able to prove that this is the best possible world in order to be able to prove from it the existence of a supremely wise God. It does not seem to me that any attempt to prove that this is the best possible world, such as that made by Leibniz, can be very impressive. It may be shown, as Professor Jones does most nobly in his recent Gifford Lectures, that this

¹ Microcosmus I, p. 412 f; cf. Mill, Three Essays in Relig., p. 176 f.
² Phil. of Relig., p. 73.
³ Bosanquet, Indiv. & Value, Ch. IV.; Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, Ch. XVII.
world, regarded as a school for the development of moral character, is a much better place than we might be inclined to think when we concentrate our attention (religiously) on the problem of sin as such, or (hedonistically) puzzle over the fact of pain. ¹ This, I think, is all that Professor Jones is able to accomplish, but Lotze would readily admit all this, and still press his objection. There are, however, three things that should be pointed out in reply. In the first place, the objection is an appeal to the limitation of human knowledge, and, as such, is equally valid, or invalid, against all our reasoning which stays within that limit. When the teleological argument is regarded as a demonstratively certain proof - and this, we repeat, is what Lotze is anxious to refute - the objection is fatal to it, but when it is reduced in its claims to a degree that will harmonise with the coherence theory the objection will lose its weight. For the principle of perfection can be shown to be operative within our experience, and thus any knowledge may be made to lead to the Perfect. This leads us to remark, secondly, that the objection is just that one, in essence, which appears in Kant but is by no means confined to him, and which is based on the principle that a conclusion cannot contain more than is already contained in its premises. The latter is undoubtedly true in formal logic, but Idealism has challenged its validity in the processes of living logic, and has very impressively argued that adherence to it is

fatal to true metaphysics. Idealists insist that, so far from it being true in philosophy that the stream cannot rise any higher than its source, that instead it is its very nature so to do. This is because, as we said above, the principle of perfection is operative in experience, and it is the very nature of the finite to transcend itself. These considerations suggest, what Professor Jones somewhere remarks in reference to Lotze, that the conception of the nature of reasoning that was current among earlier thinkers was defective, because still too much dominated by the syllogistic ideal. Finally, in reply to Lotze's objection, it is encumbent on us to enquire what can be meant by such an expression as "the best possible world." Lotze does not employ this exact wording, but this is what he has in mind. It comes at once to mind that possibility is based on actuality of some kind, and this Lotze admits. He speaks scornfully of the "strange power" whereby our minds, though dependent on actual conditions for their existence, can yet think away all those conditions and arrive at a situation from which they presume to criticise their own conditions. Do we, then, mean by the expression, "the best possible world", the best under the circumstances? But what circumstances? Lotze has himself contended that the original condition of the universe could not have been a chaos of infinite possibilities, but some definite condition; and, within the world, the only power that could introduce an element of possibility into the

mechanically determined development from that primitive state is, on his principles, the free choice of finite persons. But even the movements which they initiate are compensated by the Absolute, so as to restore the equation $M = M$. It seems to me that the expression, "the best possible world", can be given an intelligible meaning, only on the assumption of a theistic God, who is free to bring various kinds of world into being, but whose freedom is also limited either by an eternally existing material, or by His own character and purposes. If this be so, then, in the strictly negative attitude which he is adopting in these sections, Lotze has really debarred himself from employing this objection.

The fifth, and final, objection to the teleological argument is that it involves a petitio principii. We begin with a few instances of adaptation in Nature, he urges, and, assuming that adaptation proves design, regard them as evidences of design. Then we arbitrarily infer from our few instances a universal design in Nature, and proceed to argue from this to a unitary Designer. Finally, on the strength of our belief in a supreme Designer, we infer that design must be discoverable also in those all too numerous instances where we have not yet been able to discover it. That is, we believe in the absolute universality of design because of our faith in the Designer, and we justify our faith in the Designer by means of our belief in the universality of the design. But surely Lotze's account of the teleological argument is here grotesque and unfair. In
the case of those who regard this argument merely as a confirmation, the generalisation of the instances of design discoverable in the world may, as a matter of psychological fact, be unduly hastened in some cases by the pre-existing faith; but even so, as also when the argument is regarded as an independent and stringent proof, the discovery of instances of design must ultimately be universalised in harmony with the demand of our thinking for unity. In so doing we are not acting arbitrarily, as Lotze contends, unless reason itself be arbitrary. The same necessity which impels the philosopher to seek a unitary principle underlying the manifold of experience would lead to the conception of a universal design, if design is applicable to the world at all. Since, therefore, the universalising of the concept of design does not rest logically on the belief in God, this argument is not a petitio principii.

II. Lotze's statements of the cosmological argument show some interesting variations. In 1868 he worded it thus: "The Cosmological Proof concludes from the contingent and conditioned character of everything in the world to the existence of a Necessary and Unconditioned Being, and it seems to it that nothing but an absolutely perfect being can be thus unconditioned." This formula, in harmony with the treatment of the argument in Wolff and Kant, indicates two distinct steps; first, that from the contingent to the necessary, and, second, the identification of the necessary with the ens perfectissimum. In the statement
of 1875, only one step is indicated - though the discussion involves a recognition of the second step - for, as he then states it, the argument "begins in an apprehension of frequent occurrence, yet withal wholly incorrect, namely, that the existence of each individual thing and of the world in general is contingent, and therefore presupposes not a contingent but a necessary Being." In this form, more striking even than the elimination of the second step, is his characterisation of the starting-point and the conclusion of the argument. The earlier statement represents the starting-point as being "everything in the world" regarded as contingent and conditioned, and the conclusion as being a Necessary and Unconditioned Being. So to characterise the argument is historically accurate, but it evidently was not acceptable to Lotze because it fails to indicate what he regards as the proper attitude toward it. His investigation of the subject had convinced him that the world of things is rightly described as conditioned, but not as contingent, and that God might be referred to as the Unconditioned, but never as the Necessary Being. In the second form of statement, therefore, he employs only the terms which he regards as illegitimate, at the same time indicating very emphatically his opposition thereto. However this formula also proves unsatisfactory - and naturally so. When an argument is being stated for purposes of discussion, and especially for purposes of criticism, the argument itself, and not one's own attitude to it, should first be set forth in a perfectly fair and unbiassed.
manner. In the lectures of 1879, he is still dissatisfied with his formula, but offers as sufficiently accurate the follow­
ing: "The Cosmological Proof, of which a real formula can hardly be advanced, argues from the existence in the world of conditioned things and events, which do not have within them­selves the ground of their existence, to an Unconditioned and Necessary Principle, and believes that it is possible to set in the place of such a principle only an ens realissimum, which has the ground of its existence in itself." The points to notice here are the restoration of the second step, stated this time, however, in terms of the Leibnizian ens realissimum instead of the Cartesian ens perfectissimum; the elimination of the term 'contingent' in favour of the term 'conditioned', which he is also careful to define; and the characterisation of God, once more, as both Unconditioned and Necessary. None of these formulae is very clear as to the degree of constraint which the argument claims for itself, though the discussion presupposes that the claim is for demonstrative certainty. In this case, too, as in that of the teleological argument, Lotze has indicated only the form current in his day, without troubling to notice other forms that would have had, he probably considered, only a historical interest. Here again is his negative attitude, and we have seen it also struggling with his sense of fairness in determining the formulae. Such an exclusive attention to one type of the argument may be practically justifiable, but it can never be satisfactory, particularly when the one type is
examined only to be rejected. For it will often be possible that some other type of the argument would be found to be cogent. It is, therefore, disappointing that Lotze entirely overlooks the Aristotelian form, ignores Aquinas's distinction between the argument to a First Cause and that to a necessary Ground, fails to notice the famous cosmological argument of Descartes, and gives no indication that he was acquainted with the system of Berkeley.

Lotze's criticism of the cosmological argument, as thus formulated, is, in short, that the terms employed are inappropriate, and that, when this error is rectified, the result will be seen to fall short of what the argument claims for itself, in that it can be only an Unconditioned, not a God, and of this unconditioned the unity cannot be established.

In the treatment of 1868, which, as we have seen, is formulated by Lotze in terms of an ens perfectissimum, there is included a discussion of the term "perfection", which is naturally omitted from later treatments, though its results are involved in the treatment of 1875. When this term, in its strictly speculative sense, is applied to an object, Lotze declares, we mean only that the nature of the object is what it, as such, ought to be; that is, we mean that the object includes all that it, as such, ought to include, and nothing that does not belong to its nature. Imperfection, in this sense, might reasonably be taken to indicate the interference of, and so the object's dependence on, some foreign power. This however,
Lotze contends, is not the sense in which the term is employed in the cosmological argument. Instead imperfection is taken to be the absence of some merely conceivable excellence, and perfection signifies the possession of every conceivable excellence. When thus employed, he urges, the terms are not equivalent to conditioned and unconditioned, for "unconditioned existence may belong to that which is indifferent and petty as well as to that which is significant and great, and is not the exclusive privilege of that which is most excellent."¹ His reasoning seems to be that the unconditioned is, as such, dependent on no reasons of any kind; it merely is; and so there can be no reason why it should be most excellent rather than indifferent and petty. It is not surprising that Lotze omitted this section from his later treatments of the argument. For, in the first place, the ens perfectissimum, if that is a legitimate concept, surely satisfies both senses of the term perfect, and not merely the latter. Its peculiar nature is that, if it did not satisfy both, it would not satisfy either. Lotze seems to think that by pointing out the uniqueness of this concept he is condemning it, but that is precisely what it deliberately claims for itself. Nor is his second point of any greater value. It is perfectly true that an unconditioned can have nothing outside it determining it to be perfect rather than petty, but this is not the reason why it is identified with the ens perfectissimum. As he himself later recognises,

this identification is based on the belief that the unconditioned must be perfect enough to be the cause of the perfections in everything else. That, in order for this, the unconditioned must be perfectissimum certainly is a contention that goes beyond our experience, as he pointed out in dealing with the teleological argument. It was doubtless due to the desire to equate the Unconditioned with the God of Christianity, but it claimed as its basis the conception of causation which Neo-Platonism supplied. Lotze should, at least, have considered these facts - a modern objector might be expected to consider others besides - and in failing to do so he has, we believe, overlooked the essential point.

With regard to the term "necessary", we are told, it is valid to reason from a conditioned to an unconditioned, but not to describe this unconditioned as necessary; for the necessary, in the only sense that is clear to us, coincides exactly with the conditioned. We describe as necessary only that the existence or validity of which is grounded, in accordance with a general law, in the existence or validity of something else. We cannot, therefore, call the unconditioned necessary. "It must rather be called the absolute matter of fact, which exists for the reason merely that it does exist; which does not need for its existence any extraneous condition; but which, for precisely this reason, can only be an actual and never a necessary existence."¹ Our recognition of it may be necessary,

¹ Phil. of Relig., p. 13.
but it itself cannot be so described. Lotze's discussion of this term was clearly suggested by, and is, the Kantian contention that the removal of the conditions is also the removal of the necessity, and that the expression ens necessarium is therefore meaningless. The same idea is suggested by Hume, from whom, perhaps, Kant derived it. The point is now generally conceded, and when we speak of God as necessarily existing we mean only that we are constrained by the facts of experience to believe in His existence. The earlier characterisation of God in this way was intended to differentiate God from all those existences which were dependent for their existence on some external power, and it depended on the belief that God could be reached by means of a causal regress. It was seen, or perhaps felt, that the causal series was at least potentially infinite, though the argument involved the belief that in fact it could not be so - , and that, when, as they thought, the regress was actually terminated, the causal query could still be raised with respect to the ultimate member. The only possible answer to such a question, if their reasoning so far were valid, would be that God is causa sui; and that meant that, having the conditions of His existence in Himself alone, He must be a necessary Being. That is to say, His essence, they thought, renders His existence necessary. With the modern agreement that a causal regress will not prove the existence of God, and that the term "necessity" should be employed to mean only "conditioned necessity", such reasoning has been abandoned.
Lotze distinguishes five different senses of the term "contingent."¹ First, in the philosophic usage, it is applied "to everything whose non-existence in general would be thinkable without contradiction, and whose conception or whose nature accordingly offers no resistance to the cessation of its own existence." Secondly, the more common usage merely contrasts "the contingent with the designed, and understands by it all those secondary effects which, without being themselves designed, originate from action of ours that is designed." Thirdly, when in the application of a law of nature to a particular case processes occur which do not follow from the law, we call these contingent. Fourthly, rightly or wrongly, we often consider the world to have a predestined course, and then facts or events which find no direct place in this course, as we conceive it, are said to be contingent. Finally, the term signifies "that whose nature and content seem to deserve existence neither on account of its own value nor by connection with other values, although it, nevertheless, is in possession of such existence. In this sense, the 'contingent' is simply the matter of fact, whose being does not permit . . . . of justification by its own value." It is because we use the term in this last sense that we deny contingency, and affirm necessity, of the ultimate ground of the universe.² The proper meaning of the term is, however, somewhat different. Everything in the world follows from some general law, and is therefore necessary, not contingent.

If anything can be properly called contingent, then, it can be, Lotze concludes, only from some limited point of view. The general sense of the term is that the contingent is not entitled, according to its peculiar nature, to be met with in the unfolding of a design, in the working out of a law, or in the development of an existing thing, but that the grounds of its actual occurrence lie in some circumstances not included in the assigned causes of a given event.

When the necessary corrections are thus made in the terminology of the cosmological argument, it becomes clear, Lotze thinks, that it falls far short of being a proof of the existence of God. At best it can only reason "from the conditionalness and conditioned necessity of all individual real things in the universe, to an ultimate real being which, without being conditioned by anything else, simply is, and simply is what it is, and finally may be regarded as the sufficient reason through which all individual reality is, and is what it is."¹ This, however, is the metaphysical conception of an unconditioned, not the religious conception of God. It should be borne in mind that Lotze is criticising this argument only as it claims to be in itself a satisfactory proof of the existence of God. Against it, properly stated, and intended merely as a preliminary step in such a proof, he has advanced no objection, and he employs cosmological reasoning himself in this way. It is open to Lotze, of course, to go further; to identify the

¹ Microcosmus II, p. 666.
unconditioned with the world-unity, and to deny, as Ritschl later did, that such a world unity has anything to do with any religion; in which case, if this extension of his reasoning were valid, the whole criticism would bear against the cosmological argument, as such. But this he did not do, and with good reason, for it would have rendered his own reasoning impossible.

Lotze, then, is correct in his contention that the cosmological argument cannot alone establish the existence of the God of religion. We must, however, go further and ask if he is correct in his opinion that it can lead to an unconditioned. He seems, in the present discussion, to take this for granted, but how can we pass from the conditioned to the unconditioned? It may be that the conception of the unconditioned is a necessary principle of thought, but can we prove, from noticing that all the objects of experience are conditioned, that an unconditioned exists? We can pass from a conditioned object to its conditions, but, as far as natural science can see, these are also conditioned in every case. It must be granted that the causal series contains within itself no principle for its own termination; or, at least, if the conception of an infinite causal chain be conceded, for any reason, to be inadmissible, this fact in itself cannot indicate the First Cause. The scientist, who is already possessed of a certain concept or ideal of totality, may assume that this is the unconditioned; the theologian,

1. Justification & Reconciliation (Eng. tr.), p. 17.
already in possession of a remarkably rich idea of God, may claim that He alone can be the ultimate member of the series. The question is, in either case, as to their right to do so, and the justification, if justification there be, cannot come from the cosmological argument considered as a causal regress. Only practical considerations, considerations of value, can interrupt the infinite regress, and the break can never be made so decisive as to banish the possibility of a further causal query. It may be, however, that a valid argument from the conditioned to the unconditioned may be elaborated without employing the causal regressus. In his own cosmological reasoning Lotze has himself employed such a different method, which will lead, if valid, not to an unconditioned which gave to the world-process its initial push, but to one on which the world is eternally dependent. Our examination of this reasoning must wait until we can devote ourselves exclusively to it. In the present discussion he makes no reference to it, and, since he is examining an argument of the former type, his approval of the passage from the conditioned to the unconditioned would naturally suggest that he is supporting the argument which proceeds by means of a causal regress.

There is, as we have indicated, another respect in which, according to our author, the cosmological argument falls short, when it is stated in appropriate terms. So far we have noticed his objection against the second step only; that is, the identification of the unconditioned with the ens perfectissimum
(1868), or with the ens realissimum (1879). We have now to notice his contention that the first step also is defective, in that it is unable to prove the unity of the unconditioned. "It is indeed possible that at a further stage of development the demand for unconditionality may be found to have connected with it a demand for unity too; but this connection has not been discovered by the proof which we are considering, and hence it does not refute the assumption of an indefinite plurality of cosmic beginnings, or a plurality of unconditioned Real beings, in which, on the other hand, students of Nature may hope to find an explanation of the multiplicity of phenomena more easily than in the unity of the Supreme Principle."¹ In a later publication Lotze states more dogmatically that scientific pluralism lies much nearer to the cosmological argument than he here indicates. Here his statement merely is that the argument "does not refute" scientific pluralism; in the Lectures (1879) he contends that this pluralism is an assumption that lies nearer at hand to the argument, for the purpose of conceiving of the unconditioned, than does the religious conception. His later position is that the traditional cosmological argument is so framed that, though it cannot definitely locate its highest principle, it points toward scientific pluralism, which is epistemologically unsatisfactory, rather than to the religious conception of God.

For this conclusion he indicates three reasons. In the first place, the unconditioned to which it can legitimately lead

¹. Microcosmus II, p. 666.
is, he repeats, only a real, not a necessary existence; and it is, as such, on the same plane as other reals, not above them. The scientific conception of a pluralistic unconditioned is of this nature, while religion wishes to maintain the transcendence of God; the scientific unconditioned is a totality of the reals, the religious unconditioned is somehow apart from, and above, the reals, and the cosmological argument points to the former rather than the latter. In the second place, the cosmological argument, Lotze maintains, does not force us to the conclusion that the unconditioned is a unity. Rather would this be for it a difficulty, since we can "get no insight as to how a single unconditioned being, even though it were in existence, would be able to condition anything else, and therefore serve as the desired initial member in the conditioned series of the world's events." Finally, religion insists on regarding the unconditioned as a real Being, while science does not go so far. Such a contention on the part of religion lies quite outside the scope of the cosmological argument, as such, and, in this respect too, the scientific conception lies much nearer to what the cosmological argument can perform than does that of religion.

As long as theistic argumentation was dominated by the conception, drawn from theological sources, of the unity of God, the need of proving the unity of God was not easily appreciated. After Hume had drawn the distinction between the historical

causes of religion and its theoretical justification, and had further declared that polytheism was historically antecedent to theism, this need, however, was bound to be insisted on. The only way in which such an objection as this of Lotze’s, entirely justified as it is in reference to that form of the argument against which it is advanced, may be obviated is by abandoning the unnatural separation of the various aspects of the theistic argument into proofs that found on over-restricted fields of experience—such as is characteristic of earlier attitudes—and by building all the various, relevant aspects of our unitary experience into one comprehensive movement of thought, which does not claim for itself a demonstrative certainty such as our limited capacity can never attain to.

III. The most noticeable features of Lotze’s three statements of the ontological argument are, firstly, that, whereas in the earliest and latest he notices both the Anselmic and the Cartesian forms, in the Lectures of 1875 there is no hint of the former; and, secondly, that he ignores, in this connection, the Leibnizian substitution of realissimum for the Cartesian perfectissimum. In the Microcosmous the Cartesian argument is represented as stating that, "because the notion of a most perfect Being includes reality as one of its perfections, therefore a most perfect Being necessarily exists." The form of 1875 gives more emphasis to the fact that the argument is based on a claim of absolute uniqueness for the conception of God,
and makes as prominent as possible its analytic nature. It argues, so he now expresses it, that, "while the conception of other beings does not include their existence, the conception of the most perfect Being of all does include it, and that this being would in fact contradict its own conception if the one perfection - to wit, existence itself - did not belong to it." This form is repeated with only verbal changes in the later lectures. The Anselmic form is thus expressed: "the greatest which we can think, if we think it as only thought, is less than the same greatest if we think it as existent."

To advance the Cartesian form of this argument is, Lotze considers, "so obviously to conclude falsely, that after Kant's incisive refutation any attempt to defend such reasoning would be useless."¹ With this bare notice, in the Microcosmus, he turns away from it to discuss the Anselmic form, but in the Lectures he adds an explanation, brief in those of 1878, but fuller in 1879. We may outline his thought as follows. In no case, he holds, neither in that of finite beings nor in that of the Supreme Being, can we escape self-contradiction, if we try to think of the predicates of a subject without also thinking of the subject which alone unites them; but the proof of the actual existence of this subject is a further problem which can be solved only in terms of its relation to some other reality. That is to say, as Kant pointed out, when we think of the subject along with the attributes our result is only a self-

consistent concept, and the actual existence of a corresponding reality is a further question, which can be answered, not analytically, but only synthetically, not in terms of the content of the concept, but only in terms of its outer relations. More concretely, if one wishes to prove the existence of God, it is not enough to endeavour to show that the assumption of God's non-existence would introduce self-contradiction into the concept of God. Instead one must show that such an assumption would form an "outer contradiction" with some other acknowledged reality. Instead, however, of admitting that this is an "incisive refutation" of the Cartesian argument, it may be contended that the main point of Descartes's reasoning has been overlooked. To class the idea of God unqualifiedly with other ideas, assuming that what is true of them must be true also of it, is to assume the very question at issue. The ontological argument is based on a claim that the idea of God is absolutely unique - as, we have seen, Lotze recognises - in its implication of the existence of its object. This claim may or may not be justifiable. It may also be true that neither Anselm nor Descartes has adequately vindicated the uniqueness of this idea - and, of course, the burden of proof is on their shoulders - ; but, it may be urged, Kant has not refuted the argument because he has only assumed, he has not proved, that the idea of God is not thus unique.¹

¹. Sorley, Moral Values, p. 308 ff.
more sympathy, for he regards it as having only very narrowly missed the truth, or even as having here and there actually touched it. The truth is that there exists in our heart (Gemüt) a "dark compulsion" in the direction of belief in the reality of the supersensible. That this is so is an immediate fact to be accepted as such. Any attempt to express it as a logical process is bound to fail, because it is immediate, not discursive, in nature. "We do not from the perfection of that which is perfect immediately deduce its reality as a logical consequence; but without the circumlocution of a deduction we directly feel the impossibility of its non-existence,"¹ and, as other examples of such direct feeling, he quotes the perceptions of beauty and of moral quality. Just as we immediately perceive what is beautiful or good, he teaches, through the pleasurable feeling which it awakens in us, due to its stimulating us in harmony with the direction of our own development; just as what is ugly or bad, by its opposition to this life-process, awakens in us feelings of pain whereby we immediately perceive it to be ugly or bad; so the belief that our ideal is only "an idea produced by the action of thought but having no existence, no power, and no validity in the world of reality."¹ is immediately perceived, because it is intolerable, to be false, and its opposite is an immediate certainty. The basis of this immediate certainty is feeling, and it thus has, for Lotze, a higher authority than the products of thought; for feeling is

¹. Microcosmus II, p. 670.
not only - along with faith, presentiment, inspiration, and cognition - one of the elements in intellectual experience; feeling is of all these elements the superior and most fundamental. Feeling, he holds, is the only source of our impulse to know; being the source of our consciousness of harmony, it furnishes knowledge with the ideal of systematic wholeness - as, indeed, it is the source of all our ideals, intellectual, aesthetic, moral, and religious; it is, therefore, the ultimate criterion of truth; and, finally, it is the basis of the distinction between the self and the not-self upon which all human thought is hinged.¹

The true proof of the existence of God will, therefore, be merely an uncovering of this "dark compulsion." The traditional proofs, Lotze affirms, are all more or less clumsy attempts to express it, or at least this it is which, vaguely sensed, inspires them and leads them to run far ahead of their evidence. It underlies the teleological argument and carries it "far beyond the inferences which could be reached by means of its own impractical assumptions. For when once the dominion of significant moral forces that operate purposively has been confirmed by experience, though over but a small portion of the world, the silent enlargement of this experience into an assertion that there is a wisdom, a beauty, a goodness, and a perfection that pervade the whole world without exception, rests in this case not merely on the common logical mistake of a

¹. cf. Jones, The Phil. of Hermann Lotze, Ch. II.
generalisation of some truth proved to be valid in a particular case, but is supported by the living feeling that to this, which is greatest and most perfect, there belongs a perfect and all-embracing reality.\textsuperscript{1} In the Lectures of 1879, Lotze indicates that what we have thus seen to lie, in his opinion, beneath the teleological argument also underlies the cosmological. The latter is based, he says, on the three legitimate claims, first, that a highest principle must not be self-contradictory; second, that it must be necessary for explaining reality; and third, that, of all the thinkable principles which satisfy these formal postulates, that alone should be recognised as the highest principle of all which proves itself, at once through the greatness and exaltedness of its sense, to be entitled to occupy this highest place. The third claim is based directly on the dark compulsion of feeling. However, the ontological argument expresses it more adequately, and of its two forms the Anselmic is very nearly satisfactory. For this form "shares the formal indefiniteness which attaches to all the inner experiences of faith."\textsuperscript{2} The formal indefiniteness is shown, firstly, in the fact that "it leaves us in doubt as to what the reality is which that which is highest and most worthy must possess."\textsuperscript{2} For though, in the course of the argument, Anselm uses the term Deus, addresses a prayer to Deus in the second person, and employs Psalm 13 in such a way as to show clearly that he identifies Deus with the God of the Old Testament, still

\begin{enumerate}
\item Microcosmus II, p. 671.
\item Ibid., p. 671.
\end{enumerate}
in the definition upon which the whole argument depends God appears as an "id" which, Lotze contends, need not be a Being, but may be of the nature of an event, or a world-order. Whatever we may think of the conclusion which Lotze draws from it, the fact which he here indicates is undeniable, and it is probably due, as Professor Taylor claims,\(^1\) to the influence of Neo-Platonic conceptions in Scholastic thinking. This indeterminateness appears, further, we are told, along with a recognition that the argument is based on a value-judgment, in the predicate "majus." Anselm had himself said,\(^2\) "I do not mean greatness in space, like a body, but greatness in goodness and worth, like wisdom." Lotze is, therefore, justified in saying that the predicate majus expresses the sum of all predicates of worth, of the beautiful, the good, the exalted and the holy, in a quite indefinite way. This indefiniteness, then, and the recognition of the argument as based on a value-judgment, seem to indicate, Lotze thinks, that Anselm was struggling on the very verge of expressing the truth which yet eluded him. Anselm was also right, Lotze contends, in that he was thinking, not in terms of an inner contradiction within the conception of God, but in terms of a contradiction of our whole immediate certitude which, he thought, the denial of God's existence would create. The ontological argument, therefore, comes nearest to being an adequate expression of an immediate intuition of value; "to wit, the conviction that the totality

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1. Art. on Theism, Hasting's Encycl. etc.
2. Monologium, Ch. II.
of all that has value - all that is perfect, fair, and good - cannot possibly be homeless in the world or in the realm of actuality, but has the very best claim to be regarded by us as imperishable reality."¹ It falls short of a precise determination of that which has supreme value, but it "believes that it knows that this highest and best must be one with the Infinite which speculative philosophy found itself bound to recognise as the true reality."² This blending of the Existent and the Worthy is really a further step, Lotze considers, but it is one for which he hopes, in his own reasoning, to bring forward weighty considerations.

We must take exception to the role which Lotze assigns to feeling in this discussion, as we have already done in a different but essentially relevant connection. As Professor Jones complains, Lotze has handed over to feeling what is the essential function of thought; and it is unnecessary, if not fundamentally impossible, to assume, as Lotze does, that a process which is immediate must therefore be based on feeling. In striving to eliminate this element, however, we must be careful to recognise that his support of the fundamental assumption which the ontological argument strives to express - namely, the objectivity of our value-judgments - is of great value and validity.³ Sorley finds that there are two motives underlying the ontological argument; namely, an intellectual desire for completeness in our conceptions, and the demand -

¹.Phil. of Relig., p. 10. ².Microcosmus II, p. 671 ³.cf. Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, Ch. XII.
which Lotze recognises - "that our highest ideal, the best and most perfect being which we can conceive, shall not be severed from reality." He agrees also with Lotze that "it is clearly a mistake to clothe such a demand in the dress of an apodictic proof which can be demonstrated from the mere content of the idea." He is careful, however, not to err with Lotze in overemphasizing feeling. In his Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, McTaggart has an examination of this contention of Lotze's. He holds that, if Lotze's language be strictly interpreted, it merely records the fact that Lotze has this immediate certainty of the real existence of the Best - a fact that is merely of biographical interest, since his possession of this certainty cannot be the logical basis of an argument. Indeed the fact that it is a widespread possession, if that be a fact, could not have any logical significance, especially since there are some who do not have it. Lotze would probably admit the truth of most of McTaggart's contention, but he would deny its relevance. He would draw an analogy between the immediate certainty of the existence of the Best and the facts of sense-perception. In both cases, he would say, we cannot logically prove that those who lack them are wrong or deficient, because they are the necessary data from which all proof starts, and to which proof must ultimately return. But, for the same reason, it is important to have them, and to recognise them for what they are. Such a defence, however, could be granted to Lotze

1. Moral Values, p. 313.
only by those who agree with him that the data of sense are beyond the jurisdiction of reason. By those who hold the coherence view of truth - and Lotze was one of these - the data of sense must be regarded as subject to the test of harmony within a system, and the same will be true of this so-called immediate certainty of the existence of the Best. McTaggart, therefore, goes on to ask what could be said of this contention if it "presented itself as a proposition which reason directed us to believe," and his reply is, in brief, that, while it could not be accepted as a foundation on which to rest a metaphysical system, it might perhaps be acceptable "if we regard an idealist system of metaphysics as being already demonstrated."¹ Even of this, however, he is very doubtful.

IV. In the Lectures of 1879, Lotze included a brief paragraph on the moral argument. Previously he had confined his critical attention to the traditional metaphysical arguments, but apparently he felt that the importance assumed by the moral argument since the time of Kant merited some reference to it on his part. His treatment of it irresistibly suggests that he mentions it only to avoid the charge of failing to do so, rather than for any contribution it might yield to the development of his discussion. The argument proceeds, he says, from the lack of a due proportion between merit and reward in this world to a supreme ethical principle which is both willing and

¹. Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, sects. 73 - 78.
able to produce this proportion. Against this reasoning he brings only one, but that a perfectly fatal, objection - fatal, that is to say, if it is sustained; namely, that it involves a petitio principii. For without a prior faith in God, he urges, man has no ground for that belief in an ultimate proportion between merit and reward from which this argument endeavours to deduce the existence of God.

But surely this is a misrepresentation of the argument! Whatever may be the ethical status of the idea of merit and the demand that it shall meet its reward, it is not in its origin a religious deduction. If a belief in God be not its ultimate ground then clearly from it we cannot deduce the existence of God, but surely it does not arise out of a prior faith in God. The moral argument, in this form, may be properly expressed as follows. I find in myself and others an insistent and apparently innate, ethical demand for justice; for a due proportion, that is to say, between reward and merit. I find further that only my belief in God gives me a right to believe that such justice will finally obtain. Therefore my demand for justice reinforces my belief in God. It may be granted, as Wendland puts it,¹ that this argument is bristling with vulnerable points, but to characterise it as a circulus in demonstrando is to misunderstand its true nature. Instead, it simply is, what all factual proof is, a case where one element of our experience is confirmed by being shown to be in harmony with another

¹. Gottesbeweise, in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Vol. II.
element that arises in our experience independently of it.¹

It should also be noticed that Lotze considers, in this passage, only that form of the moral argument which—though it is hinted at in the closing section of Hume’s Dialogues—was made famous by Immanuel Kant. The argument is that complete good must be a union of virtue and felicity. But the present world, where that unconditioned obedience to the categorical imperative, in which virtue consists, often leads directly away from felicity, is not so constituted as to produce, or render possible, this complete good. There must exist, therefore, a God who brings it to pass in an eternal life in a higher world. But Lotze does not indicate the history of Kant’s relation to this argument; that is to say, that Kant realised its unsatisfactory nature and worked toward another that should be more adequate; nor does he hint at other forms of moral reasoning that, because they have satisfied eminent thinkers, would seem to demand notice in any consideration of the moral argument. A statement and criticism of what is claimed to be the moral argument, but which is really only one form of it—a form that was recognised by its author to be insupportable—is highly misleading and insufficient. And here we have another instance of Lotze’s undue negativity in this whole discussion. He was quite well acquainted, as we shall see, with a form of the moral argument which he, probably with justice, regarded as valid. In order to be fair to the moral argument, in its

¹ Jones, A Faith that Enquires, p. 23.
essence, he should have indicated that fact in the present connection. This criticism, of course, applies only to the published lectures. That these correctly reproduce the dictata I am assuming without investigation; what Lotze may have said in addition to his students I have no means of knowing.
Chapter III.

INTERACTION - LOTZE'S STARTING POINT.

We are now in a position to understand the problem as it presented itself to Lotze. On the one hand, as we have shown was a victorious natural science, with a purely empirical outlook, a completely mechanical method, and, as an explicitly deduced and enthusiastically advocated philosophical conclusion, a thorough-going materialism. As a competent scientist, we have seen, he was thoroughly in sympathy with the mechanistic method of his day, yet he protested against the philosophical assumptions of contemporary science, and insisted, firstly, that its pure empiricism involved it logically in a denial of the possibility of scientific prediction, a conclusion which it escaped only by a happy inconsistency; secondly, that its mechanical method, while universally applicable, was everywhere subordinate in significance; and, thirdly, that its materialism was a quite unnecessary, and indeed mistaken deduction from its mechanistic method; and unwarranted limitation of intelligent consciousness, and an insufficient explanation of the facts of experience. On the other hand were the value-disciplines, strong in every respect in which contemporary natural science was weak, and yet the religion at their head was unable

1. Metaphysic Bk. I, sect. II. 2. Ibid. sect. IV.
to offer as proofs of the existence of God, Lotze felt, any arguments which were not either fallacious or inconclusive, and was therefore quite incapable of a scientific vindication of her right of existence. Nor could the religious apologist retort, according to Lotze, that in this respect science and religion are in the same situation; for, though it is true that science cannot, any more than religion, prove the existence of that with which it deals, still science is not under the same obligation to do so. Its laws do not claim to be more than hypothetical. Religion, on the contrary, claims, and must claim, to be true of real existence, and a failure on its part to justify this claim must ultimately prove fatal to its very existence.

In attempting to formulate such a justification, Lotze will avoid, as far as possible, the sources of previous failures. The teleological argument had proved unsatisfactory, as we saw in our previous chapter, because of its inability to find an empirical vindication for its starting point; Lotze will bring forward a cosmological argument, with a starting point that is simpler and more easily established. But the traditional form of the cosmological argument had also met with failure, the reason being that it had attempted too much. Instead of establishing the existence of God it was able to argue only to a philosophical unconditioned. Lotze's argument will not be so ambitious. He will not try to deduce the existence of God in one step from his simpler starting point, but will rather
endeavour to establish "a more modest conclusion, which shall serve us as a preliminary condition for that other conclusion." 1 His argument, that is to say, has two main steps, in the former of which he endeavours cosmologically to prove the existence of an Absolute, and in the latter of which he endeavours to build into the conception of an Absolute such other conceptions, based on various considerations, as will transform it into the religious conception of God. It is with the former step that we are now concerned.

The starting point which he selects is the fact of interaction, "the assumption that all the elements of the world, without exception, act upon each other, no matter whether adapted to an end or the reverse; and therefore that each exerts influences upon the rest, or, in turn, receives influences from them." 2 Such an assumption, unlike that which forms the starting point of the traditional teleological argument, is completely confirmed, so Lotze is convinced, by our experience, so far as it goes, and even where we have not experienced its validity - in the remote past, the future, and in present instances of apparently indifferent elements - its direct or indirect presence must be assumed, unless the very possibility of science is not to be denied. 3

There are certain systems of thought, however, which advocate such a mutual independence on the part of the world-elements that they find it necessary to deny the fact, though

1. Phil. of Relig., p. 25. 2. Phil. of Relig., p. 25 f. 3. Ibid., p. 26 f.
they admit the appearance, of interaction; and these must be shown to be invalid if Lotze is to rest his argument securely upon interaction. The first of these to be noticed is the doctrine of Occasionalism.¹ Lotze himself taught a doctrine that either had been, or he feared might be, confused with Occasionalism, but he taught it, he claimed, only as a precedent of Methodology, necessary in order to permit science to proceed with her proper investigations without waiting on the solution of the more ultimate problems involved. He points out that physics must be content at first to describe the connections between things without awaiting the solution of the metaphysical problem as to how these connections are brought about; psychology can study the factual interrelation of mental and bodily processes without knowing how it is produced; and, in short, all our knowledge of Nature is but a "study of the occasions on which - by means of a mechanism whose inner moving springs we do not understand - phenomena are manifested, each attached by universal laws to an occasion belonging exclusively to itself, and each with an equally constant regularity changing with a change in that occasion."² Occasionalism, as a metaphysical doctrine, is very different from this. It does not, like the above, pass by the question of the "inner moving springs;" it concerns itself directly therewith, and is indeed a doctrine of these inner moving springs. It is a denial of causality. It teaches that if, when A and B enter into the relation C, A changes

¹ cf. Microcosmus I, p. 280 f; Metaphysic I, p. 147 f.
² Microcosmus I, p. 280.
to A and B to b, the most that we can say is, not that there is a mutual influence between A and B, but only that C is the occasion of these changes. But, as Lotze is content in this section to point out, this is not to banish an active process from the effectuation of these changes. It is rather to presuppose an active process as having already occurred between A and B, on the one hand, and some other element, on the other. With such a contention, Malebranche, for instance, would readily agree. God, he would say, is the other element; it is God who recognises the occasion C, and causes the change of A to a to be followed by the change of B to b. Elsewhere, however, Lotze refers, though not by name, to the doctrine of Occasionalism, and there contends that such a source of the necessary active process serves to magnify, rather than to solve, the problem. He is criticising the Leibnizian doctrine of Pre-established Harmony, and one of his objections to it is the fact of contingency. Now, he argues, a doctrine of Occasionalism cannot be brought in to meet this need so long as it illegitimately separates God from things; for this would result only in a multiplication of the problem. His words are; "And the most desperate efforts to find in the continual mediating activity of God the bond to which it is due that the states of one thing become the efficient causes of change in another, cannot obviate our speculative scruples, as long as they separate God and things from one another in the same way as

1. Metaphysic I, p. 147.  
3. cf. p. 98 f.
individual things used to be separated from one another. For these views, too, only double the unsolved problem - they suppose an action of things upon God, and a reaction of God upon them, and explain neither the action nor the reaction."

Lotze has correctly indicated an essential weakness of this form of the doctrine of Occasionalism; namely, its deistic presuppositions. And yet I cannot avoid a suspicion that he has himself left an opening for a very shrewd counter-thrust. As we shall see more fully in our next chapter, he is induced by the difficulties involved in the conception of transeunt action to reduce everything to immanent action; but he recognises that the latter conception is really full of difficulties too, and he justifies his reduction of the one to the other merely by claiming that the difficulties in the latter conception are not so obtrusive, because we think we know that immanent action can take place even if we have to confess our ignorance of the how. Now, may not this doctrine of Occasionalism retort that the interaction of material particles is inconceivable to us; whereas we know the fact, even if we do not know its explanation, that material particles can impress a mind in order to be known thereby, and that a mind can produce movements in these material particles? Lotze, who was not entirely free from the epistemological subjectivism which gives to this retort its plausibility, would be hard put to it for a reply, unless he called in question the conception of matter which underlies Occasionalism. For Occasionalism is based upon the Cartesian
conception of matter as essentially passive and inert, and motion as something that comes to matter and changes its spatial relations from an outside source. Lotze's doctrine of matter is essentially different, for he converts atoms into souls. Until it is successfully challenged, it gives him the right to assert that the relation between any of the so-called material atoms in interaction does not differ essentially from the relation of knowledge and will presupposed by Occasionalism, and to deny that the latter is any better known to us than the former. If this claim be allowed him, Occasionalism loses its raison d'être. I suppose his doctrine of matter is presupposed in all his discussions of Occasionalism, but in those with which I am acquainted he does not explicitly refer to it, nor does he definitely challenge the conception of matter which underlies the doctrine he is criticising.

In the Metaphysic,¹ Lotze notices a more refined form of Occasionalism to which, it may be claimed, the criticisms which he has brought against the grosser form do not apply. It would regard the relation C, between A and B, as the complete reason of the consequent F, and deny that we need look any further for an active process of any kind; and it would appeal against Lotze to his own repeated assertion that an action cannot be delayed when the sum of its conditions is complete. Such an argument is fallacious, Lotze contends, because it regards law, which is only a mental connection of truths and so purely

¹. Section 62.
hypothetical, as containing in itself the actuating power which really resides only in things. Such a view of the nature of law, as Lotze is ever insisting, is quite false; but even if it were true, this view would be merely substituting, for the conception of God in the other form of the doctrine, its own conception of law, and would presuppose an action exercised by the elements on the law itself, "in order, by help of the power of the law, to dispense with the action of things upon each other." ¹

It will be remembered that Lotze himself denies interaction in the usual acceptation of that term in his attempt to explain its possibility; but his is not intended to be a doctrine of Occasionalism, and he strives to save himself from the error which he regards as invalidating such a doctrine. In the first place, he endeavours - how successfully we will have to enquire in the following chapter - to bridge the gap between God and things; and in consequence of this endeavour, secondly, a change in one thing is not usually regarded by him as the occasion on which God produces a change in another. Sometimes he does seem to be teaching that, on the occasion of a change in itself produced by, or at least manifesting itself in, one thing, the Absolute makes such changes in other things as are necessary to preserve its own identity - and this surely is Occasionalism. But his explicit repudiation of the charge of Occasionalism shows that this is not his real meaning.

¹ Section 62.
Rather does he intend so to unify the world elements in and with the Absolute that a change in one element does not merely produce but actually is, a change in the Absolute itself, and this does not merely produce, but actually is, a change in certain world elements which may be different from the former. The passages that seem to teach Occasionalism occur when Lotze is thinking of the fact that not every world element is manifestly changed when any one element changes; for his explanation of this fact is that, on the occurrence of any disturbance in an element, and so in itself, the Absolute changes only so much as is necessary in order to restore its own identity; but he clearly intends such an explanation to be understood, somehow, in the light of his closer identification of the changes involved. All this may be admitted, and yet it may be contended that it is true of Lotze only while his discussion moves on physical levels. When he has shown that by the finite individuals he means souls and spirits, and that by the Absolute he means God, and when further he has insisted on the independence of souls, and still more of spirits, this vindication of Lotze, it may be urged, will no longer apply. It must be admitted that there is much in his writings that would seem to justify such a criticism, and whether he has succeeded in avoiding a form of Occasionalism is at least open to question. We can claim, however, that he did not intend to enunciate such a doctrine, and that, at his best, he avoids it. This difficulty is but one aspect of a

1. Ward, Realm of Ends, Ch. XII.
fundamental problem which underlies the whole Lotzian system, and the failure to solve which infected his writings with a confusing vacillation; namely, the harmonising of the apparently conflicting claims of pluralism and absolutism.

A second theory which must be disposed of before Lotze can start from interaction as a datum is Leibnitz's theory of Pre-established Harmony. It is described as an attempt to put in the place of reciprocal action "a predetermined harmony of cosmic order, according to which the states of the different things accompany and correspond to one another, without having to be produced by reciprocal action." The theory is more fully characterised in the Metaphysic. Leibnitz starts, we are there informed, from "the supposition of a relation of complete mutual exclusion between the simple essences on which he builds his universe," a supposition which renders necessary that "the de facto correspondence which takes place between the states of things" should be attributed "to the deity which had designed their developments." Before the mind of God, according to Leibnitz as Lotze interprets him, there hover innumerable images of possible worlds, each image being unalterably ordered in the minutest detail in accordance with certain eternal laws which are binding on God Himself. Each image is exclusive of all the others, and must be accepted or rejected entire, just as it is. God, that is to say, cannot assemble the excellences of the several worlds, rejecting their peculiar drawbacks, and

1, Microcosmus II, p. 597. 2. I, pp. 150 - 162.
so forming a new, and vastly superior, world-image. All He can do is to grant to "the one which is relatively most perfect, just as it is, admission to reality." In the further development of his theory, Leibnitz might have been content, Lotze suggests, to regard only the general laws governing the world, and not the particular cases of their application, as originally determined, but this, he says, would have led ultimately to Occasionalism. Instead, Leibnitz unhesitatingly decided that the cases of their application were also once for all, irrevocably determined; that is to say, that the internal development of each of the mutually exclusive essences was predetermined by God in all its details in such a way that there would be the correspondence which we experience between the various stages of their independent developments. In reading what Lotze has to say of Leibnitz, whether in exposition or in criticism, it is necessary to bear in mind that, as Professor Taylor warns us,\(^1\) the latter's principal works had not been published in Lotze's day, and considerable caution must therefore be employed. Our interest, however is in Lotze's argument at present, and we do not think it necessary to investigate the adequacy of his conception of the Leibnitzian system.

In criticism of Leibnitz's theory, Lotze states, in the first place, but does not develop, an opposition to the presupposition that "the monads are without windows." He cannot see that this stringency is either justified empirically or

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required by the theory.\textsuperscript{1} In very properly excluding the possibility of a transference of "ready-made states" from monad to monad, he thinks, Leibnitz has gone further than was necessary, and has gratuitously rejected the possibility, which the facts would seem to warrant, of a communication, on the part of the monads, of their inner states one to another. Leibnitz could have claimed all the advantages he sought, in other words, without rejecting the view of interaction to which, as we shall presently see, Lotze adheres, and his opposition to the Lotzian argument is not called for by the necessities of his system.

In the Microcosmus\textsuperscript{2} Lotze is more aggressive, and stoutly denies that any theory of Pre-established Harmony can be an explanation of the facts of the world. If the course of even the most trivial event were fixed by immutable predestination, then the theory in question might, he admits, be an accurate description, but obviously never an explanation, of the facts. To say that the universe consists of a number of independent monads developing in correspondence with one another because each, with absolute necessity, pursues a course irrevocably fixed for it in harmony with that of all the others - this is clearly to offer no explanation of the inner working of the universe. Lotze elsewhere points out that, regarded as a description, the theory leaves some vital questions undecided; here however his attitude is more positive. He insists, in the present discussion, that the fact of contingency must both cause

\textsuperscript{1} Metaphysic I, p. 150.  \textsuperscript{2} II, p. 597.
the theory of Pre-established Harmony to fall short even of being a correct description of the facts, and also render necessary some form of that very interaction with which it is intended to do away. "But it is impossible," he says,¹ "that there could be such a harmony which as a general law should pre-determine the necessary consequences of contingent events; for if a change of some constituent of the universe (and it is of such that all these consequences must finally consist) has to follow and correspond to any event that may or may not happen whenever it does happen, then that constituent must be able to distinguish the occurrence from the non-occurrence of the event by some passion which the event produces in it, and the action and reaction which it was desired to banish would thus be necessary for the comprehension of that harmony which is intended to replace it."

The force of this objection, of course, depends on its assumption of contingency - an assumption which Leibnitz would strenuously resist. Accordingly something must be said here concerning the place of contingency in Lotze's teaching, and the reasons which he brings in support of his view. It is the fact of spiritual life, according to him, which renders the assumption of contingency unavoidable. Within the realms of natural science the principle of causality would, at first glance, appear to banish the possibility of accident or freedom, and yet, even here, it is not regarded in such a way as to

¹ Microcosmus II, p. 597.
render freedom entirely impossible. For the necessity belongs only to universal law, which is essentially hypothetical. No natural law "indicates by itself the cases in which it comes to be applied. It waits for the requisite points of application to be supplied from some other quarter."¹ And here, to say the least, room is left for contingency. But Lotze is not willing to say only the least. He regards interaction as a mutual stimulation of atoms, which he regards after the analogy of souls, whereby these atoms are led to develop within themselves certain states which belong to their several natures, and which, apparently, they are unable to develop unaided only because of a certain weakness, or lack of initiative, which makes them dependent on an external push to start the movement. Generally he teaches, or allows to be assumed, that the response of a stimulated atom is but an effort to maintain or restore its own threatened self-identity; but at times he suggests the possibility that the atoms may actually develop under the stimulus of these external shocks. This would leave room for the appearance of the new, which Lotze identifies with the contingent, even apart from the agency of those souls which are of a sufficiently high grade to be called spirits. But, however this may be, spirits must be regarded, Lotze insists, as capable of the free production of the new. "A deep and irresistible demand of our spirit, under the influence of which we all act in life," impels us to the conviction that history must be "something more than

¹ Metaphysic I, p. 155.
a translation into time of the eternally complete content of an ordered world."¹ This conviction manifests itself most clearly in our ethical judgments, notably in our feelings of remorse and in our censure of wrong-doing in others.² Spirits, therefore, must be regarded as capable of the production of the new, though, once introduced into the world, the new series must themselves be mechanically determined. Lotze does not leave us without more light on his view as to how the new is produced.³ The series of sensations and feelings in our minds are all part of the mechanical order. The soul is free, not in respect of these, but only in its power of freely adopting its purposes. Somehow or other, how is not clear, an adopted purpose gives rise to the idea of its object as existing, and this, in a purely mechanical way, sets going a series of other ideas which escape, by some unknown connection, from the mental to the material, where they set going the operations necessary for the realisation of the freely-adopted purpose. This theory, to which we referred without further comment in our second chapter, we must now proceed briefly to examine.

In the first place, we must ask, is this explanation psychologically accurate? Is it the adoption of a purpose which originates the idea of its object as existing, or is it the latter which conditions the former? Obviously the second is the correct alternative, and, if so, Lotze will be hard put to it to explain how the idea of something new originates, on his

1. Metaphysic I, p. 156.
2. cf. Phil. of Relig., sects. 59, 60.
3. Metaphysic, Bk. III., Ch. V.
assumption of the widened scope of mechanical action. This mechanical conception of the nature and relations of ideas, it may further be pointed out, does not represent Lotze's best thought on the subject. One suspects that he is unduly influenced in it by the views of his predecessor, Herbart. According to the latter, the soul - a simple, indestructible real - , on being brought together with other reals, reserves its identity under the form of an idea or object of consciousness. This is its one act. Subsequently, the soul is a purely passive background in which the ideas react on one another in a mechanical manner, building up, in this fashion, the complete mental structure.¹ In the present connection, Lotze has altered the Herbartian view of the nature of the soul's creative act, but otherwise has been too much influenced by that view. He also has, however, - and it is much more characteristic of him - a more adequate view of thought in which its active nature is fully recognised, and he even criticises, as maintained by Herbart, the very mechanistic view of thinking which we have seen him, in the present section, himself advocating.² It is a cause for great regret that Lotze died before he had had an opportunity to develop that part of his system in which the subject of freedom would naturally have received a more detailed treatment; namely, his ethical doctrines. Here he speaks of the soul freely adopting its purposes, and an attempt to discover what he regards the soul as free from in this activity would seem to reveal a doctrine of extreme indeterminism which we believe to be quite

¹ cf. Microcosmus II, p. 611 f.
² Microcosmus I, p. 183; Metaphysic, sects. 24, 269, 270.
indefensible. Indeed Lotze gives explicit expression to just this conception of freedom.¹ Thomas has drawn attention to another difficulty in this general view of Lotze's.² He points out that, according to Lotze, since the sense-content in the mechanical-whole is inextricably involved in the chain of mechanical necessity, the new element introduced must be, not a new movement among these sense-contents, but new sense-content, which at once becomes a part of the mechanical chain. But this would seem to conflict with Lotze's doctrine of substance, Thomas objects. He has insisted, Thomas urges, that a thing is real only if it is a substance; that is to say, it must consist of a unitary group of sense-qualities changing according to law under varying conditions. It follows from this that a spirit could introduce into the being of a thing only such beginnings as the thing itself, under favourable conditions, could mechanically produce, and these would not be really new. To sum up, Lotze needs contingency in his system, and yet it conflicts with his view of necessity. In the absence of a more adequate vindication of his doctrine of contingency we must question his right to use it as an argument against the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony.

A third feature of this doctrine to which Lotze objects is its substituting the connection of a system of consistent ideas for a connection in the way of active causation. Both the presuppositions and the results of such an attitude are, he

¹. Phil. of Relig., sect. 61.
². Lotze's Theory of Reality, pp. 115 - 121.
thinks, thoroughly unsatisfactory. Its chief presupposition is that there can be an order separated from the things in the changes of which alone it could have any reality - an order existing prior to the things, and exercising some constraint on their realisation. Lotze's oft-repeated view on this subject is characterised by the intensest realism. Laws can exist, he is convinced, either as the activity of the elements which seem to obey them and at the instant when they are apparently obeyed, or "in the observing spirits which compare the events, as conscious rules for the combination of the ideas, by which we (the observing spirits) are enabled, in accordance with the reality, to determine beforehand from given states those which succeed them"; but "laws never exist outside, between, beside, or above the Things that are to obey them."¹ There can be no order apart from the things that are in order.² "This ceaselessly advancing melody of events - it and nothing else - is the metaphysical place in which the connectedness of the world of Ideas, the multiplicity of its harmonious relations, not only is found by us but alone has its reality."³ When, therefore, Leibnitz pictured the mind of God as confronted with an infinite number of possible worlds, one of which he could translate, otherwise without change, from an ideal to a real existence, he was imagining something wholly illusory. Such an error is easily understandable, Lotze concedes; indeed, it is almost unavoidable; for, in relation to the movement of our cognition

¹. Phil. of Relig., p. 83.
². Metaphysic, sect. 43.
³. Metaphysic, sects. 35, 36.
in predicting the future, the ideas which we have obtained by a previous comparison of phenomena do constitute a prius. That they can function in this way, however, is due solely to the fact that in them, since they have originated in reality, reality expresses itself to guide our expectations; but to regard an ideal world as an absolute prius is certainly, so Lotze contends, as erroneous as it has been conceded to be understandable.

It is but another form of this objection when Lotze urges that the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony involves a wrong view of the relation of possibility to God. We cannot think of Him as limited by any prior necessity external to Himself, nor even by a necessity of His own nature, if that nature be conceived of as in some way imposed on Him or as one among many possible natures. His nature has no prius - such would be a "strange and utterly unthinkable idea" - ; but this does not mean, on the other hand, that His is a merely indeterminate nature. Rather has it an actual form, in harmony with which God's energising proceeds, and this is the only meaning of possibility in relation to Him.¹

Certain other objections are advanced by Lotze against the doctrine under review, but their discussion would not contribute so much to an understanding of Lotze's own views as has been the case above, and we must therefore pass them by with a briefer mention. Even if the possibility of the existence of

¹ cf. Phil. of Relig., sects. 48 - 54.
a prior ideal world were conceded, he charges, the theory would still be by no means free from serious difficulty, especially in respect of time. Into the relation of the elements of the ideal world time of course does not enter, so that the motion of a ship may be said to be as much the condition of the wind and waves as the latter are the conditions of the former. When, now, this ideal world has become real, it is impossible to discover from Leibnitz, Lotze complains, what has actually happened in it; for its development in time clearly cannot add anything to its eternally predetermined order. This, in turn, gives rise to the question of value. What good was the realisation of the ideal world? The only conceivable answer to this question, as far as Lotze can see, is that, by the realisation of the world which previously was ideal, finite spirits were created who could be independent centres of its enjoyment; and this answer, he thinks, is at least not alien to the Leibnitzian system. But such an answer, he hastens to point out, constitutes spiritual life the import of the monads, and this introduces into the system, he considers, as we have seen above, that contingency which must render the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony quite insupportable.

But further; from at least one point of view, it may be shown, he adds, that the granting of reality to the best of all possible worlds, as conceived by Leibnitz, actually would produce a negative result as far as value is concerned.¹ That

¹. Metaphysic, sect. 79.
which, on this theory, rendered certain of the worlds which confronted the divine intelligence possible, as opposed to others, which were impossible, was the rationality of the former; and that in which one of them was the best of all was its superior rationality. This can only mean, so Lotze interprets it, that the presentation to the divine consciousness of one idea \( a \) in this complex image was the efficient cause of the presentation of another of its constituent ideas \( b \), or at the very least, of its retention in the divine consciousness when once presented; and that the best of all possible worlds excelled the others through the superiority within it of this relation of efficient causation amongst its members. When, now, the image becomes a reality it loses this inherent rationality. While everything goes on within the real world as if causation were in operation between its members, such is not actually the case; and, "in one word, its reality consists in a hollow and delusive imitation of that inner consistency which was pronounced to be, as such, the ultimate reason why its realisation was possible." Thus, so far from its realisation being a gain, it was a loss; and we are mystified by the fact that God did not prefer the image to the reality.

The doctrine of Pre-established Harmony is based, furthermore, on what Lotze regards as an illusory view of the relation between our minds and their actions in the external world. It falsely assumes, so he thinks, that our act of will produces the willed result in the world. Instead, all that we can say is
that there is an unknown mechanism whereby results are connected with our purposes, if the latter are really accepted as such by the mind. As a result we may be sure that all our purposes have the reality of which they are capable, and any that are capable of realisation in the external world come thus to fruition. Similarly, it must not be thought, according to Lotze, that the present world alone was actually realised because God picked it out as the best possible, and willed its realisation; but we must believe that God saw that it alone was capable of that realisation which has come to it alone. This would be the truth of the matter, he corrects himself, if the conception of any truth as externally confronting the mind of God were a possible one.¹

Lotze complains, once more, that Leibnitz has not made it clear how the correspondence of all the changes that occur together in the world is provided for; how, for instance, in the monads A and B, states a and b correspond, and then later states a' and b'. This result might obtain if A and B develop at an equal velocity, a' being separated from a by the same number of states as b' is from b, so that there is throughout a state to state correspondence between A and B; or it might happen if the gaps a - a' and b - b' are of different sizes the difference being neutralised by different rates of development in the respective monads. His analogy of the clocks, borrowed from Geulinx, probably favours the former, but it itself, so Lotze

¹. cf. Microcosmus II, p. 704 f.
contends, was not a very happy illustration for Leibnitz to employ. Finally, Lotze complains that Leibnitz has not satisfactorily solved the difficulties involved in the fact of general laws in the universe. Leibnitz assumes, he says, that general laws were necessary to the perfection of that world which should receive the divine approval, but this is by no means self-evident. A world is perfectly conceivable which would be a consistent whole, and in which every detail might be the inevitable result of a preconceived plan, but in which those repetitions never occurred which are the basis of our general laws. And it is quite possible to regard general laws as "vexatious hindrances, cutting short a multitude of beautiful developments which but for their troublesome intervention might have made the system of the most perfect world still more perfect." Leibnitz should either have shown that general laws are necessary to the perfection of the best possible world, and this, Lotze thinks, he would probably have attempted had he ever faced the question, or "he should have given up the attempt to substitute for the unintelligible action of one thing on another an even more unintelligible pre-establishment of all things."  

We have seen, thus far, that Lotze proposes to make the fact of interaction the starting point of his theistic argument, and that, in vindication of his right to do so, he has appealed to the uncontradicted testimony of experience and the necessary presuppositions of knowledge. We have also followed the dis-
cussion, and criticised those elements in it which are most important for our purpose, whereby he seeks to contravert those theories which strive to explain the appearance of interaction while denying its reality. It remains for us to bring together certain considerations, from different parts of the Metaphysic, which, if valid, will constitute a positive proof of interaction. The argument, briefly, is this: it is impossible to say what we mean by the Being of a Thing without involving the conception of relatedness, and relations can have reality in the world only in the form of interaction. But we must develop this reasoning more fully.

The human race, so he begins, early became possessed of the distinction between true and untrue Being, through detecting the deceptions of sense-illusions; and this distinction has been sharpened and rendered more enduring through the contrast between the conditioned and the unconditioned, and through that between Being and Becoming. To pursue the latter contrast a little further with Lotze; we naturally think of a Thing, he continues, as essentially a simple, immovable whole, a something that remains identical with itself even though certain of its aspects undergo change. But closer investigation reveals the fact, he points out, that change penetrates more deeply into the Being of Things than we had originally supposed, and, indeed, our study of a Thing is confronted on every hand only with that which changes, and fails entirely to locate the permanent. When this fact is noticed an attempt may be made, of which the history
of philosophy since the time of Heraclitus affords several examples, to do away completely with the permanent in Things, and to explain the world entirely in terms of Becoming. Such an attempt, Lotze is convinced, is quite impossible. Even Heraclitus had to introduce the permanent in the shape of inexorable laws,¹ and some such concession would seem to be inevitable. Whatever may be the difficulties in so doing, we find it necessary to regard Things as participant in immutable, independent Being, and as presenting the fixed points to which is somehow attached the varying course of events.² Two questions, therefore, present themselves for solution; first, what is that Being that we require in Things in order that our theory of the world may find in them a firm foundation?; and, second, how and what must Things be in order to participate in such Being? The latter question does not here concern us, though we will have to outline with some fullness, in our next chapter, the answer which Lotze gives to it. We may merely remark, in passing, that he finds it necessary to regard Things after the analogy of souls in order that they may satisfy the conditions which his answer to the former question reveals. It is, however, with the former question that we have now to deal.³

The first and most natural answer is that there is in real Being something that is essentially opposed to all merely intelligible existence, something which renders it quite impossible that we should ever by mere thinking penetrate and exhaust the

essential property of real Being; that it is only in sensation that we experience real Being, and here we do so immediately; and that this alone, therefore, is our warrant for regarding real Being as present to us. Such a view may perhaps point for vindication of its claim to our practical custom of resolving doubts by referring from proofs and testimony to the confirmation of actual sense-experience; and it may also point to the fact, Lotze concedes, that the material, as distinct from the formal, validity of the premises of a syllogism is ultimately assured only through the test of sense-experience. Lotze admits the truth of these claims, merely suggesting that care must be taken to guard against the deceptions of sense. It seems to me, as I pointed out in our second chapter, that Lotze here betrays a faulty theory of knowledge,¹ and that, had he sufficiently considered what is involved in that guarding against sense-deceptions which he recommends, he would not have allowed these claims to pass without challenge in the present connection, nor would he have advanced them himself in other passages. For, the data of sense are subject to the test of consistency within a system; and, this being so, it is at least as true to say that they are tested by thinking as that thinking is tested by them. But if this be once admitted the view under consideration must dissipate. Lotze's criticism of this view, however, follows a different line. The question he raises is as to whether sensation is able to afford insight into the real as it

¹ p. 83.
is. It is quite impossible, he contends, to isolate the content of sense from the act of sensing, in such a way that either the sense-content could be imagined as it would be apart from the act of sensing, or the act of sensing apart from the qualities sensed. If, therefore, we are wholly dependent on sensation for our knowledge of the real, as this theory claims we are, the latter must be private to each sensuous being, and the act of sensing must be creative of the real, which, however, ceases again to be real with a change in our attention. But this, Lotze objects, is not what we mean by the real. We think of it, he urges, as objective to us, the same for all, and as persisting whether we are sensing it or not. Those who claim that Things exist only in their being perceived are misled by the variety and distinctness of sense-qualities into first making, in thought, this separation which, in reality, is quite impossible, and then illegitimately transferring the separation to reality, affirming self-existence of the sense-qualities, in spite of the fact that they are recognised and discovered only by an act of feeling. When, however, they are asked to state wherein the real Being of these sense-qualities consists, they cannot do otherwise than find it in the simple fact of being felt, thus reuniting the aspects of sensation that should never have been separated at all.

Accordingly, Lotze concludes, it is impossible to find in sensation that real Being of which we are in search, for its very nature is independence and permanence. Nor may this theory
satisfy these claims of real Being by appealing to the sense-experience of others; by claiming, that is to say, that on the disappearance of our own sensation that of others maintains Things in Being. For real Being claims independence of all consciousness; and that very natural thinking which would equate Being with sensing would also inconsistently claim that, even were all consciousness banished from the universe, Things would continue in Being, and would stand to one another in the same relations as when they are objects of perception.

Ordinary thought is thus led to conceive of the Being of Things, Lotze continues, as consisting in relatedness. "It was these relations that formerly gave to them a firm hold on reality; and these constituted their existence up to the moment of their being again perceived by us. But this being perceived is itself nothing but a new relation which is added to, or dissolves, the old ones; while of greater importance for us, because it is only through it that we come to have cognisance of existence, it is to the existent thing itself not more indispensable for its existence than those relations which subsist or subsisted between it and other things."¹ This is the view which, subject to certain qualifications which he will later bring to our attention, Lotze wishes to maintain. In order to do so, however, he must meet certain objections.

If the reality of Things is to consist in their relatedness, these relations must themselves be real. This is a contention

¹ Microcosmus II, p. 580.
on which Lotze himself strenuously insists, and the implications of which form a later stage in the course of reasoning which we are now pursuing. When it is advanced as an objection to the view that real Being exists only as related, it really takes the form, Lotze holds, of a desire to know how there is anything real at all. His reply is that this is an impossible and improper question. The task of thinking is to define, not to construct, reality; and our present problem is, accepting reality as given, to distinguish within it the Being of Things from other instances of reality.

A second objection, admitting the truth of Lotze's characterisation of the task of philosophy, denies that the view he wishes to maintain in the present instance is successful. Philosophy has been very unanimous, Lotze admits, in attempting "to reach beyond this and in a reality devoid of relations, in a wholly self-sufficing self-dependence, to find the true and pure existence which belongs to things in themselves, and first makes them capable of serving as points from which relations may start."¹ For, it is insisted, the relations in which such men as Lotze wish to find the Being of Things must needs be relations between the Things themselves, discoverable but not created by our thought. That they should be created by our thought is quite impossible. If Things ordered themselves according to such intellectual relations we would be wholly unable to find the independent Being for which we are in search, and if they

¹ Microcosmus II, p. 580.
failed to do so it would be thereby made clear that the Being of Things involved something which our definition had omitted. But if the relations are to be, on the other hand, real relations between Things, then surely, it is argued, the centres of these relations must first be established in independent reality. Clearly, that is to say, Things must be before they can enter into relations, even though it be only through their relations that they can become perceptible to us. Now, as the argument proceeds, this Being that they have prior to their entering into relations, and which alone makes it possible for them ever to enter into relations at all, is the pure Being for which Philosophy has so often sought. "It is opposed by Philosophy, as being of the same significance for all things, to the empirical Being which, originating in the various relations that have come into play between things, is different for every second thing from what it is for the third, and which Philosophy hopes somehow to deduce as a supervening result from the pure Being."¹ Here, then, we have a doctrine the direct opposite of that which Lotze wishes to maintain. What can he bring forward by way of reply?

It should be noted that, even if Lotze were unable to refute this theory, the proof of interaction which we are considering would not thereby be completely invalidated. For this theory admits that all the Being of experience is, as a matter of fact, related Being, and that, indeed, everything has stood in relations from eternity.² If, therefore, Lotze can show, as he claims to

¹. Metaphysic, sect. 6. ². Ibid., sect. 14.
do, that the only possible relations between Things are relations of interaction, then, even on this theory, he has advanced a valid proof of interaction, and demonstrated his right to start from it as a basis in his theistic argument. But if, in opposition to this theory, he can show that pure Being, apart from relations, is an abstraction, valid for thought but inapplicable to reality, then the starting-point of his theistic argument will be even more secure. His criticism of this theory is therefore very much in place in our discussion.

Lotze's first objection to the theory in question is that its definition does not enable us to distinguish between Being and non-Being. ¹ "For not to be at any place, not to have any position in the complex of other things, not to undergo any operation from anything nor to display itself by the exercise of any activity upon anything; to be thus void of relation is just that in which we should find the nonentity of a thing if it was our purpose to define it." This objection, so he hastens to defend himself, is not a foolish expression of the desire to know the process or the inner structure whereby Being is endowed with the reality which distinguishes it from non-Being; it is merely the entirely legitimate demand that our definition of Being should enable us to distinguish it from its opposite; a demand which the definition of pure Being in terms of the absence of relations is quite unable to fulfil. An attempt may be made to meet this objection, he anticipates, by denying that this

theory defines pure Being as mere unrelatedness. "It will be urged that if, starting from the comparison of the multiform Being of experience, we omit all the relations on which its distinction rests, that which remains as pure Being is not the mere privation of relations but that of which this very unrelatedness serves only as a predicate, and which, resting on itself and independent, is distinguished by this hardly to be indicated but still positive trait from that which is not." Lotze's reply is that, though in practice we apply such predicates as independence and self-existence only to that which is, and not to that which is not, still they get their meaning only from the thought of relatedness, and that, once the implication of relatedness is dropped, they are quite as applicable to Nothing as they are to Being. This contention of Lotze's, I think, must be sustained.

In bringing forward this objection, Lotze repeats, he is not contradicting his own previous assertion that the business of Philosophy is to define a given reality, not to construct reality de novo, though he fears that this may be charged against him. It may be said, he suggests, that reality is indefinable, only to be learned by living experience, and that within this reality so experienced we rightly isolate pure Being as the positive element in all experienced Being. Consequently, his opponents may continue, Lotze's objection is based on the question which he himself has previously disallowed, and an answer

1. Metaphysic, sect. 7.
to it is not called for, since the problem of distinguishing between Being and non-Being is not before us. But this, Lotze replies, would be to mistake his meaning. It is not logical Being, but real Being, with which he is concerned; and his point is that a pure Being defined as unrelatedness would be, in reality, indistinguishable from Nothing. It is perfectly possible and legitimate for purposes of thought, he readily concedes, to form the conception of a pure, unrelated Being underlying the related Being of experience, just as it is allowable and necessary to abstract out of actual movement its various aspects, velocity, direction, and motion. But, in the real world, it is to be clearly understood, there can be no motion without direction and velocity, no velocity without motion in a definite direction, and so forth. Similarly there can be in reality no such thing as Being apart from all relations. Pure Being is an abstraction that does not admit of application to anything real. "Just as an abstract motion cannot take place, just as it never occurs but in the form of velocity in a definite direction, so pure Being cannot in reality be an antecedent or substance of such a kind as that empirical existence with its manifold determinations should be in any sort a secondary emanation from it, either as its consequence or as its modification. It has no reality except as latent in these particular cases of it, in each of these definite forms of existence. It is merely in the system of our conceptions that these supervene upon it as subsequent and subordinate kinds." 1

1. Metaphysic, sect. 9.
In both the Metaphysic and the Microcosmus, Lotze proceeds to enforce this conclusion by examining the other terms, namely, position and affirmation, which have been applied to pure Being, but the point is already sufficiently clear for our purposes, and we may pass on.

So far, then, Lotze has shown that it would be impossible, in the real world, to distinguish between a pure Being, the essence of which was the absence of relations, and non-Being. His second objection is that any communication between such a pure Being and the related Being of experience would be wholly impossible. The priority of pure Being to empirical Being is only a logical, not a metaphysical, priority. If it were not so, it would be quite impossible to understand how, in reality, empirical Being could either issue forth from pure Being or sink back into it again. There would, of course, be no logical contradiction involved in such conceptions, but the real process would be thoroughly incomprehensible. For an element cannot pass from the unrelated stage merely into relations in general. It could enter only into certain definite relations, to definite other Things, at a definite time and place. But how could it be determined to enter into these relations rather than into others? There could certainly be nothing in its own nature thus to determine it, and only some other relation could be decisive. Without such other relation it could never issue from its "ontological seclusion", and be "wrought into the web of this universe"; and once having become part of this related
whole it could never escape. More generally it may be said that a transition from unrelatedness to relatedness is unintelligible to us, all that is intelligible being a transition from one form of relation to another. Lotze, therefore, feels justified in asserting that relatedness is the only kind of real existence, and that pure Being does not exist in reality.

Such a conclusion inevitably calls to mind T. H. Green's contention that things are constituted by their relations, and also the criticism of it by William James. Neither Green nor Lotze, however, it seems clear, intended to reduce reality to a "train of couplings", though unguarded expressions at times might seem to lay them open to such a charge. But any such doctrine, and this is a much more serious problem, will now have to maintain itself against the rejection of relations on the part of J. H. Bradley. ¹ The latter agrees that there can be no qualities without relations. ² He also accepts what we have stated to be the real view of Lotze and of Green, namely, that qualities cannot be wholly resolved into relations. ³ It follows, he argues, that each quality "has a double character, as both supporting and as being made by the relation"; and this, he continues, involves us in the dilemma that the quality cannot have this double character without a relation between its two aspects, and yet, if a relation is admitted into it, the quality loses its unity. Or, looking at the problem from the side of relations; how there can be relations without terms Bradley

1. Appearance & Reality, Ch. III.
3. Ibid., p. 30.
cannot see, so that the terms appear to be something beyond
their relations; but this raises the problem how the relation
can stand to the related qualities. If it is something, then
it must itself be related to both qualities, and this leads to
an infinite regress; but if it is nothing, the qualities are
not related. Bradley's conclusion is that our experience, where
relational, is mere appearance. Lotze, as this chapter shows,
is not unacquainted with the difficulties which lead Bradley to
such a conclusion, but, in harmony with his more positive atti-
tude to experience, he is driven by them to a very different
result. Bradley argues that, if our experience turns out to
involve contradiction, it cannot be valid of reality; he pits
experience against itself, finds that it is not consistent, and
therefore rejects it; but in rejecting experience he would seem
to be rejecting that which alone makes the rejection possible.
Lotze, on the other hand, assumes the validity of our experience
in general, and searches for a point of view that will remove
contradictions from it. He is more constructive, at least in
his published works, and therefore, as it seems to me, ultimately
more profound. This stark contrast between the two philosophers
however, is true only of their fundamental attitudes in the
writings in question; each, in practice, makes approaches to
the position represented by the other. Bradley, that is to say,
is not really willing to reject experience entirely, nor will
Lotze accept it without considerable modification; but at the
least there is a very striking and far-reaching difference of
emphasis.

We must proceed with Lotze's argument. In what way, he asks, are we to conceive of relations in reality? The latter phrase, "in reality", should be noted, for it marks a necessary distinction between those relations which seem to belong to Things themselves and others into which Things are brought somewhat arbitrarily by the mind. This distinction must neither be misconceived nor pressed too far. It is misconceived, Lotze asserts, when it is regarded as a distinction between subjective and objective relations, for the latter kind of relation are in a very real sense objective. True, they are relations between our ideas of Things rather than relations between the real Things, but they are objective in the sense that they are independent of the individual thinking subject, and of the several phases of his thought. Given the same conditions, they will always repeat themselves, for "our soul is so constituted, and we suppose every other soul which inwardly resembles our own to be so constituted, that the same a and b, how often and by whomsoever they may be thought, will always produce in thought the same relation."\(^1\) The distinction, further, is pressed too far when the relations that are introduced in Things by our thought are regarded as foreign to the nature of things. If this were so, if the thought-relations did not correspond to and express something in the Things themselves, then the process which produced them would be, not thought, but merely mental

aberration.¹ The distinction, however, does mark a difference. The relations which we regard as belonging to Things themselves encounter and affect one another in reality, supplementing or annulling one another; but the other kind of relations exhibit their oppositions only in thought. The latter have to do with logic, the former with metaphysics; and it is the metaphysical relations which we regard as constitutive of reality, and about the real nature of which we have, with Lotze, raised a query.

The ordinary view, he proceeds, is that we have a multiplicity of Things spread out in space, through which relations, like some kind of material threads, hold the Things together, and act as a bridge between them. It is inevitable, he adds, that we should endeavour to conceive of relations in this way, because only in space have we a concrete means of imaging what we mean by relations; but in so doing we are merely serving subjective ends. Relations, as existent in reality, cannot be spatial in character, for space, we are told, does not belong to the real world. "I hold," he says, "that space and all spatial connections are merely forms of our subjective intuition, not applicable to those things and those relations of things which are the efficient causes of all particular sensuous intuitions."

¹ Microcosmos II, p. 578; Metaphysic, sect. 81.² His reason for thus agreeing with Kant is not acceptance of the grounds on which Kant based the doctrine, to wit, that the necessity and universality of spatial experience proved its a

² Microcosmus II, p. 603 f.
priori character; not was he willing to deduce from it all of
the Kantian deductions, notably, the limitation of spatial ex-
perience to human consciousness. Lotze’s main reason for deny-
ing the objectivity of space is his insistent realism, which
forbids him to think of empty forms as existing prior to the
objects which are to fill them. Space, so he argues, is but
the generalised result of an infinite number of possible re-
lations of the logical kind, and so can have no existence except
in "the activity of intuition which is conscious of this result
of its relating movement, manifested in combination, division,
and systematization."¹ To speak, therefore, of relations
between Things is to employ a spatial image, legitimate enough
for practical purposes, he concedes, but not correctly expressive
of the relations of the real world. What, then, is the true
idea lying concealed in this incorrect expression? It should
be noticed, Lotze says, that, in order actually to contribute to
the union of two Things, the thread of relation which we regard
as between them would have to exercise, in some way, a definite
tension upon them; and, however far we endeavour to remove this
fact from the centre of our discussion by interposing inter-
mediate links between two interacting elements, we must come to
face it in the end. Ultimately we are driven to admit that the
inner condition of one element, as soon as it exists, is the
direct producing cause of some new inner condition in a second
element. Here, says Lotze, we have our clue. There is no

¹ Ibid., p. 609.
need of supposing any thread of relation joining Things through an otherwise empty space which lies between them. All we need to suppose, he urges, is that Things are able to influence each other immediately, communicating directly to one another those modifications which, on any theory, they must be admitted somehow to communicate. "Let us admit," Lotze therefore concludes, "that there is no such thing as this interval between things, in which, as its various possible modifications, we sought a place for those relations, C, that we supposed to form the ground of the changing action of things upon each other. That which we sought under this name of an objective relation between things can only subsist if it is more than mere relation, and if it subsists not between things but immediately in them as the mutual action which they exercise on each other and the mutual effects which they sustain from each other."¹ That is to say, the conception of relations between Things must give place to the conception of interaction; and, since it is impossible to say what we mean by a Thing apart from its relatedness, the very conception of a Thing involves interaction, and justifies Lotze in making it the starting-point of his theistic argument.

There are some aspects of this proof of interaction which we cannot profitably discuss until we have considered other aspects of Lotze's teaching with which we are not yet in a position to deal. We would need to consider, for instance, to what extent Things may be said to have any existence at all in

¹. Metaphysic, sect. 81.
Lotze's teaching, and, though we have already touched on this question, we cannot answer it satisfactorily until his doctrine of the Absolute is before us. Until then, also, we are not in a position to deal with his suggestion of immediate and direct modifications of one Thing by another, which is, indeed, but another aspect of the former question. It should also be questioned whether this doctrine of essential relatedness would not disqualify Lotze from holding a doctrine of the Absolute, which, of course, must be unrelated to anything beyond itself. Some points, however, call for immediate attention. In the first place, once his rejection of the sensational doctrine has brought to his attention the doctrine of the essential relatedness of Things, Lotze's proof of the latter takes merely the negative form of a proof of the impossibility of unrelated Being, and this, we believe, is hardly satisfactory. We are not advocating a doctrine of pure Being, in the sense which Lotze rejects, but neither are we satisfied with the reasoning whereby he seeks to justify his rejection of it. We must challenge his right to claim that if "there is nothing that is unrelated, we are entitled to say that it belongs to the notion and nature of existence to be related."¹ Of course we know of nothing that is unrelated, for an object enters into a relation when we perceive it. To some realists the reply is open that the very efficiency of the perceptual relation consists in the fact that it makes no essential difference to the object known, and that

¹ Microcosmus II, p. 587.
this object is known as sustaining a wealth of relations to other objects. Lotze himself adopts this position, and indeed it may be regarded as one of his foundation principles. His whole philosophy is intended to be based on the claim that, as we have already seen, the only legitimate task of philosophy is to describe, not to create, reality. But he does not hold consistently to such a position. Like the pre-Critical philosophers, he has placed the perceptual relation on exactly the same footing as the objective relations, if we may so describe them; but he differs from those philosophers in rejecting the conception of pure Being and making relations, not merely adjectival, but constitutive. Presumably, therefore, the perceptual relation is also constitutive, and, if this is so, the way is at least open for the Kantian ascription of the whole relational element in knowledge to the activity of the knowing mind. But this, in turn, would seem to involve, if it is valid, either a doctrine of the pure subjectivity of knowledge, or else some kind of conception of pure Being. When he is driven to make this choice, Lotze really adopts the former alternative, and he has therefore - inconsistently enough - committed "the unpardonable philosophic sin - the assertion of the thing-in-itself as an unknown and unknowable kernel of reality." It would be true, I think, to say that while Lotze always rejects the conception of pure Being so far as our knowledge is concerned, his position in this respect is far from satisfactory.

Another feature of Lotze's argument is open to objection, namely, his proof that an unrelated element could never enter into relations, or, once having done so, return to unrelatedness again. The proof as it stands seems to be cogent, but he has proved the wrong point. What Lotze has proved is that an unrelated element could never enter into the universe of related things, or subsequently escape again. But this is to assume that there is, and not merely appears to be, a universe of related things. But that real things are essentially related is the very point that calls for proof. Lotze has certainly shown that, within our experience, each objective element can be understood only as part of a net-work of related elements; but this is conceded from the start. What he had to prove was that things-in-themselves, entirely unrelated, do not exist, and I fail to see that any or all of his contentions has any validity as against, for instance, the Kantian phenomenalism. We have already pointed out, however, that this in itself does not completely invalidate his proof of interaction, since the essential relatedness of all the objects of experience has not been called in question.

Another serious difficulty confronts Lotze's argument. He has divided all relations whatsoever into two classes - relations that are merely logical, and interaction; is his classification exhaustive? It must be exhaustive, or the reasoning whereby he endeavours to establish the starting-point of his theistic argument becomes quite inconclusive. That reasoning progresses,
to repeat, as follows; the Being of Things is essentially related Being; but, relation, as it exists in Things, is inter-
action; therefore interaction is essentially involved in the Being of all Things, and is a universally valid basis for further reasoning. But the argument breaks down, whatever we may think of its conclusion, if it can be shown that not all relations in Things can be regarded as interactions. And this must surely be the case. Take, for example, an instance where one object is said to be bigger than another; can we properly regard this relation in terms of interaction? It may be replied that a relation of size is spatial, and that Lotze regards space as only a subjective form. But even if Lotze's view of space be granted, since it is not our place to attempt to refute it at present, size cannot be resolved into a merely subjective relation in this way; for, as Lotze himself admits, even those mental relations have some objective foundation, if thought is not to be mere mental aberration. What then, we may ask, is it in the object which we interpret spatially as a relation of size? Lotze would reply that it is a difference in intensity of Being - whatever that may mean. Very well, can that difference be resolved into interaction? It must, I think, be recog-
nised that, whatever it may be in objects that corresponds to their relatedness in human thinking, it must be of at least two kinds, to which the terms static and dynamic, however unsuitable, are somehow applicable. However the case may be in regard to the dynamic, it does not seem profitable to attempt to reduce that which we have proposed to call static to interaction.
Chapter IV.

THE ABSOLUTE.

Briefly to summarise before proceeding; Lotze has proposed to make the principle of interaction the basis of the first step in his theistic argument, and he has attempted to justify this procedure by appeal to the uncontradicted testimony of experience, to the presuppositions of thinking, and to the implications of our conception of the Being of Things. We have now to see how, from this starting-point, he develops the reasoning which will ultimately lead, so he considers, to the conclusion that a personal God exists.

Interaction, as far as he has yet informed us, involves two or more Things, the states of each of which are somehow determined by those of the others, by means of a relation which, however, is more than a mere relation, and which lies, not between them, but in them. He has also shown us some reason for questioning the separateness of these Things, but in this respect has already progressed somewhat beyond the popular view of interaction. "In the first instance we only find occasion for assuming the exercise of an influence by one element a over another b in a change to b' which occurs in b when a, having been constantly present, incurs a change to a'."

1. Metaphysic sect. 45.
Science, that is to say, ordinarily conceives of interaction as occurring between Things that are yet essentially independent, and this view, Lotze concedes, has been forced into the respectful attention of metaphysicians by its advocacy, in their field, on the part of Herbart. Lotze, however, proposes to show that the fact of interaction makes such a pluralism insupportable, both because it involves a commensurability of Things which is inconsistent with the independence which Herbart and the scientists attribute to them, and because interaction, on a pluralistic basis, would have to take the wholly inconceivable form of "transeunt action." We must differentiate these two reasons a little more clearly before taking up each in turn. In order fully to explain a given effect, Lotze urges, it is necessary to state, not only its logical ground, but also the operative causes. It is worth remarking, in passing, that this distinction has not always been drawn. On the contrary, we find in Descartes, very notably in Spinoza, and also in Leibnitz that the cause and the explanation of an event tend to be identified. It was Hume who first triumphantly divorced ground from cause; Kant insisted on the separation, and to him, perhaps, its general acceptance is due. Lotze's argument draws its strength from a clear recognition of the distinction. By causes he understands all those real things of which the connection with each other, when brought about, leads to the occurrence of facts that were not previously present. The reason or ground, on the other hand, is neither a thing nor a
single fact, but the complex of all relations obtaining between things and their natures, relations from which the character of the supervening effect is deducible as a logically necessary consequence.\(^1\) The full explanation of an effect, that is to say, involves a logical and a metaphysical aspect, a sufficient reason and an efficient cause. Now, the very application of the concept of sufficient reason, so Lotze contends, is enough greatly to modify the Herbartian and scientific pluralism, although we have to rely on the other factor, he concedes, on the idea of causation, in order finally to refute that position.

We shall consider first what Lotze has to say on the subject of comparability or commensurability. Herbart taught, according to Lotze, that the contradictions revealed in experience make it necessary for us to substitute, for the apparent things of perception, a multiplicity of real beings, each of which is to be regarded as a simple and positive quality, apparently after the analogy of sensible qualities. Of these simple qualities, it is admitted by Herbart, we have no direct knowledge; but he wishes to think of them as different from each other, though unchangeably self-identical. Lotze charges that this self-identity, as conceived by Herbart, is different in the case of soul-reals from what it is in the case of all the others, involving in the former case an active self-maintainance which takes the form of ideas, while in the case of other reals it merely involves a "completely undisturbed continuance of that

1. Ibid., sect. 51.
which in its nature is inaccessible to every disturbance that
might threaten it." 1 However, he continues, Herbart undoubtedly
wished to regard all reals as self-dependent, standing in need
of no relation whatsoever in order to their Being, and just for
that very reason capable of freely entering into every kind of
relation. Even Herbart allowed, however, that the reals stand
in one essential relation to each other, namely, coexistence,
with Lotze's treatment of which we will have shortly to do.
Here we will merely record the fact, and notice that, according
to Herbart, their coexistence makes it necessary for the reals
to enter into some of the relations which are rendered possible
for them at all only by their essential independence. But the
mere fact that the reals can ever interact, Lotze replies,
proves a comparability between their natures which renders the
doctrine of their essential independence quite untenable. For,
if all the world-elements were as incomparable, he argues, as,
for instance, our feelings of red and of sweet, then the
relation between any two such elements would not differ from
that between any other two; and there would be no reason, there­
fore, for attaching a certain consequence to any one pair of
related elements rather than to any other, or indeed for attach­
ing any consequence to any antecedent whatever. In practice,
Lotze points out, as soon as Herbart faces the task of showing
how the world that appears is produced by the reals, he has
himself to admit this commensurability. He has to regard his

1. Ibid., sects. 23, 24.
incomparable reals as possessing certain contingent aspects, according to which, for the simple real and without detriment to its simplicity, it is possible to regard combinations of several qualities as substituted; and these he has to view as comparable. This fact of comparability, Lotze continues, is generally taken for granted in practice; but it is not so generally recognised, he adds, that it renders quite impossible the doctrine of the essential independence of things of which also the popular view is inconsistently convinced. It is perfectly evident, he concedes, that we cannot argue at once from it to the common origin of things or to their permanent immanence in one Being. Such an inference could have only a measure of probability. Instead this comparability is to be regarded, he says, as only a "first suggestion" in the direction of such a conclusion; for it certainly does demand that the world-elements be conceived as "members of a system in which various series are in some way related to each other,"¹ so that ultimately it would be possible "for one to proceed from the nature of each individual element to the nature of every other, by a definite number of steps, taken within this net-work of system."²

So much, then, is involved in the logical element which every complete explanation of an event must include. But Lotze insists, as we have seen, that a logical ground is not enough. "The most that follows from the comparable natures a and b concerns the result which they are necessitated to produce, or

¹. Ibid., sect. 69.  
². Phil. of Relig., sect. 17.
the manner in which they are necessitated to act upon one another; but it does not follow that they must produce anything whatever, or that they must act at all upon each other." For a full explanation, therefore, we must also discover the causa efficiens, he urges, the dynamic factors, which, since the logical factors are permanently valid, will have to be variable in order to account for the variability of the occurrence of the event. When Lotze has shown what is involved in causation, it will have to be conceded, he concludes, that, though things are separate from one another relatively to our apprehension, they are actually only parts of a single Being, and not independent. The problem to be faced is this: here are two elements so related in the real world that a definite change in one of them is invariably accompanied by a certain change in the other; what can that active relation in the real world be?

Perhaps the first suggestion that demands examination, according to Lotze, is that this variable real relation is spatial coexistence. This was Herbart's view; it is regarded by many as self-evident; and it can plead in its favour, he admits, the fact that at least some of the relations between things, and these precisely the relations of interaction, vary directly with the distance involved. Lotze's doctrine of the subjectivity of space, to which we referred in our preceding chapter and which we will elaborate more fully later on in the present chapter, would naturally prevent his acceptance of such

1. Ibid., sect. 18.
a suggestion; but he does not base his rejection of it, in the present discussion, on that doctrine. His reply to Herbart is that the latter furnishes no proof of the necessity of conceiving in spatial terms the coexistence which, ontologically considered, is "merely the indication of a postulate, not the indication of that by which this postulate is fulfilled." That is to say, he urges that the term coexistence can only mark the necessity of postulating some relation of two reals which banishes their independence of each other, but it cannot indicate what that relation is. In spite of this fact, Herbart was mislead, so it seems to Lotze, merely by the spatial implications of the term he employed, into identifying that ontological relation which he called coexistence with spatial coexistence. His advocacy of this position, Lotze concludes, may therefore be disregarded; because his system, far from laying on him a necessity, did not even give him a right so to teach. The popular view that the suggestion under examination is self-evidently true, Lotze continues, is certainly erroneous. For, if there is a self-evident connection between spatial coexistence and reciprocal action, the analysis of the former concept, he rightly insists, must reveal the latter as one of its constituent ideas. But this is clearly not the case; or at least, Lotze says, if he is in error in thinking so, it is an error which he has attempted in vain to discover. The importance of distance in relation to the laws of motion is, of course, undeniable; but it is a fact, he urges, which stands greatly in need of careful metaphysical
interpretation. We cannot regard the space between objects as the determinant factor in their interaction, for, as a matter of simple observation, the nearest neighbours, he points out, do not always interact most freely. The interaction of elements is determined, so Lotze explains it, not by space, but by their own natures, and it depends on their metaphysical affinities. Indeed the distance between objects is really itself only one way in which their metaphysical affinity manifests itself; and to substitute the manifestation for the real, he contends, is to reject what is in favour of that which merely appears. Even if it could be shown, he urges in conclusion, that spatial contact is an indispensable precondition of interaction, the question would still remain as to how spatial contact can make possible that which is otherwise impossible; and this question, he contends, no analysis of the idea of spatial coexistence can answer. It follows, therefore, that spatial coexistence cannot be regarded as the metaphysical cause of an event.

A second, very popular attempt to explain the interaction of a and b is by reference to a law which constrains b to change in a particular way whenever a changes in a certain way. But Lotze rejects this attempt, also, as wholly vain. Laws, Lotze is continually insisting, are not constraining forces separate from and superior to things, determining their changes; they are simply human formulae descriptive of the observed changes of things. The things act in certain uniform ways, and we express this fact in general statements, or laws. Lotze states this
truth very strikingly when he says, "Now we know that it might be ordained by a law external to a and b that b should direct its course according to these different circumstances; but it would only obey this ordinance if it were superfluous, and if its own nature moved it to carry out what the ordinance contains."¹

A law, in short, is at best only a statement of the sufficient reason, and can never be the efficient cause. But it is the latter, not the former, of which we are in search. The fact that the state of one element should contain a call to another element to change its state, and the fact of the internal consistency of each being, both show that there is some universal system of constraining power corresponding to our system of laws;² but it is the metaphysical system, and not the system of laws, with which we are now concerned.

When thus it is brought face to face with the actual problem, Lotze continues, popular thinking usually seeks a solution in terms of the transfer of an influence from an active element to another which is regarded as passive. It is involved in what we have said above that Lotze regards the recipient element, if the expression may be allowed, as also necessarily active. For if the second element is to be affected by the condition of the first, he claims, it must somehow be aware of that condition, and must change itself in harmony therewith. This idea will appear again as we proceed. When the popular view is rectified in this particular, it is an

¹Metaphysic, sect. 45. ²Microcosmus I, p. 444.
accurate indication of the fact which calls for explanation, Lotze concedes, but that it is not itself an explanation of that fact becomes evident when we strive to determine more precisely what it means by the vague expression, "an influence." The clearest answer to this question, he considers, would be to regard the influence as a Thing capable of independent existence, which detaches itself from the one element, passes unchanged through the intervening space, and then enters into connection with the second element. He offers, as an illustration, the passage of water from a wet to a dry body, in consequence of which the latter undergoes characteristic changes. This suggestion, he admits, has several distinct advantages over any other which may be offered. In the first place, it avoids all those difficulties, which are insoluble problems for the other views, with regard to the relation of states to their subject, motion to that which moves, and so forth; and it is perfectly easy to understand how a transferred thing can exist during the interval of the transfer. But for all that Lotze cannot regard even this view as adequate. In the case of his illustration, as he points out, the passage of water from the first object to the second obviously does not, except in the superficial view of practical expediency, explain the changes that are observable in the second object. Without this transfer the changes would not occur - that is conceded; but when the transfer is completed the changes have still to follow. The transfer, which precedes the arrival of the water at the second object, cannot be the
explanation of changes which do not occur until after the arrival. This illustration he regards as typical; and we may say in general, he concludes, that the transfer of a thing from one object to another may be a necessary preliminary condition of changes in the latter object, but it cannot be their explanation.

The alternative suggestions, that the transferred influence is not a causative thing, but a force, an action, or a state, are even less satisfactory to Lotze. For, in the first place, as he points out, it is wholly illusory to imagine that a state or event could detach itself from the thing of which it is a state or in which it occurs, and still persist. If, however, it could thus tear itself loose, he adds, we are utterly unable to conceive of it existing in the void between the interacting elements. For only things and their states or conditions exist, and what is not a thing and is not in a thing has no existence. But space is no thing; and so this influence while on its way between the interacting elements, would be neither a thing nor in a thing, and would therefore have no existence at all. Even if this were not so, he continues, it would be quite impossible to account for the passage of the influence to one element rather than to any other without presupposing the very interaction which we are striving to explain. For the element it leaves could determine its direction, only if we presuppose a causative relation between it and that element; and, in addition to having thus assumed the very thing to be explained, we would still have on our hands the unsolved problem.
why the original element selected one of the many possible elements, rather than any other, to be the goal of the transfer. The answer to the latter question, Lotze insists, would involve an action of the chosen element on the original element which is absent in the case of all the other elements. "Thus for the second time we should have to presuppose an action which we do not understand before we could present to ourselves so much as the possibility of that condition which is no more than the preliminary to a determinate action."¹ When, finally, the migrating state had overcome all these difficulties, Lotze continues, and had arrived at the metaphysical place which is occupied by the second of the interacting elements, we would still be by no means at the end of our problems. For, in the first place, he explains, an arresting action of this second element upon it would have to be assumed in order to account for the fact that the motion of the state does not continue on beyond the second element indefinitely; and, in the second place, once this had been done, its change from being, as it were, a state at large, to become a state of the second element would still be entirely unintelligible. In short, we are driven to the conclusion that causal interaction cannot be explained in terms of the transfer of an influence, however it may be conceived.

This result, to which we have been led by the difficulties involved in the notion itself, is further reinforced, Lotze

¹ Metaphysic, sect. 56.
maintains, when the metaphysical conclusions that follow from it are taken into consideration; for, he holds, it is responsible for the erroneous belief that an effect must resemble its cause, and for the allied error that only such objects can interact whose natures are homogeneous. These beliefs follow naturally, he claims, from the presuppositions of the transference theory; namely, that the transferred influence is a ready-made effect, and that the object affected, being passive, is bound to accept as one of its own states any such ready-made effect as reaches it. But Lotze denies, as we have seen, that the object affected is passive, and it follows at once that the effect cannot be ready-made. This being so the doctrines of the homogeneity of interacting elements, and of the similarity of cause and effect lose their foundation, and with them vanishes the plausibility of that view which empowers the universe by endeavouring to reduce all events to vibrations, and to oversimplify the manifold variety in the natures of things.

The popular view of interaction, therefore, to continue the thread of Lotze's argument, is so full of difficulties that either it or some of its constituent elements must be rejected. But the first course is closed by the proofs of interaction already considered, and Lotze therefore turns to an examination of its constituent elements. His discussion of the implications of logical explanation has already indicated where the weak point lies. The cause of all the trouble, Lotze is sure, is the initial assumption of a plurality of Things underlying, and
accounting for, the multiplicity of appearances, and the subsequent identification of each of these Things with that unconditioned Being which we regard as lying at the foundation of this conditioned Being. In order to remove the difficulties in the conception of interaction, in short, we must abandon our old prejudice that Things are independent unities, and must somehow merge them into a single, real Being. But Lotze is careful to insist that this conclusion is not to be regarded as a conjecture happily hit upon as a means of rendering reciprocal action intelligible; it is not what we have to think in order to achieve such a result, so he contends; it is rather what we do think as soon as we make clear to ourselves what we mean by interaction.

Before going any further, we may, I think, freely admit that Lotze's indication of the intellectual difficulties involved in the popular conception of interaction has been successful in the main. These, of course, were no discovery of Lotze's. The problems involved had been more or less clearly evident at least since the time of Descartes. Henry More urged them as against Descartes's view of interaction, and a recognition of their importance drove the Cartesians to Occasionalism.¹ Locke also finds that the transference of motion is "as obscure and inconceivable as how our minds move or stop our bodies by thought"; and, he adds, "Constant experience makes us sensible of both of these, though our narrow understand-

¹ Kemp Smith, Cartesian Studies, p. 73 ff.
ings can comprehend neither." ¹ Without an examination of its details, therefore, which is hardly called for in the present discussion, we shall readily concede the general validity of this part of the argument, and pass on at once to enquire how far the solution which Lotze offers may be accepted. In order to arrive at some answer to this question, we must consider the further development of the discussion. I am informed, on what should be good authority, that the usual criticism of Lotze assumes that his argument is wholly cosmological. I have not been able personally to check up this statement, but, if it be true, such criticism is based on a misconception that is quite unpardonable. We have already seen, in the preceding chapter, that he expressly disclaims that his cosmological argument is anything more than a preliminary step. When this step has been elaborated, further, he is careful to point out that he has so far proved only the unity of the Absolute, and is not yet in a position to indicate what the Absolute is, what the nature of its unity may be, or how we are to conceive of the relation between the Absolute and the changes which are popularly regarded as instances of interaction. Nor can any inference yet be made, he adds, as to the process of creation or the particular order of Nature, except to such consequences as would follow, in any creation, from the unity of the Supreme Cause, whatever his nature. ² We may, however, take note of one or two suggested criticisms before opening up this more detailed discussion.

It is urged, for instance,¹ that Lotze's derivation of the Absolute from the fact of interaction is valid only if every case of interaction involves the whole universe, for only the objects actually included in any instance of interaction are thereby proved to be parts of a single whole; that, further, this vital element in the proof is not recognised by Lotze to be such; and that, finally, he not only does not believe the assumption, but actually advances an explanation - to wit, the connection of all the changes in any event with the preservation of the meaning of the Absolute - for the fact that it is not true. In other words, the charge is, if I rightly understand it, that Lotze is so inconsistent as to employ the nature of his Absolute as an explanation of the non-existence of one of the most vital elements in his proof of the Absolute's existence. Such an objection, if valid, would be quite fatal to Lotze's argument. A priori, that such a careful thinker as Lotze should land himself in such a palpable contradiction by failing to notice so vital an assumption would seem to cast suspicion on the validity of the charge. We have ourselves had occasion, we must admit, to refer to what look like contradictions in his teaching; and we may further concede that this would seem to be almost inevitable in one whose thinking was so unsystematic. But yet it should be recognised that Lotze had, in a highly developed state, the Kantian virtue of making clear the hidden assumptions of the views that came before him, and indeed it was precisely

¹. Thomas, Lotze's Theory of Reality, p. 188.
his devotion to this task which contributed more than any other factor, we may urge, to the lack of systematisation in his final conclusions. If this be so we would not have expected him to overlook, as is charged, what would appear to be such an obvious assumption of his own.

And yet it does not appear that Lotze ever considered it in relation to his argument for the Absolute - this we will have to admit. Such a criticism may point out, with perfect justice, that, in the Philosophy of Religion, Lotze states his starting-point as though he was totally oblivious of such an assumption; and it may further be argued, at least with some plausibility, that his subsequent discussion indicates some of the reasons for its escaping his notice. For, as his proof of interaction clearly shows, and as this passage implies, he identified interaction with that in things which is logically expressed in our system of natural laws; and in consequence of this identification, it may be contended, the necessity of assuming a unitary and universal system of laws led him to regard interaction as also unitary and universal. But this, it may further be urged, is to overlook the all-important fact that, whereas the less general laws are unified by the mind by means of laws of increasing generality until at last one absolutely general law, at least ideally, unifies them all, it is hardly possible to think of particular interactions as being unified in any such fashion. Another factor, it may be added, that determined Lotze's thinking causing him, by its subconscious influence, to overlook the
assumption on which his reasoning rested was the fact that, in certain scientific fields, we do have in mind a unitary system of interactions. For instance, we do regard physical interaction in this way, and do not hesitate to say that the ultimate explanation of the course of a feather carried before the wind would involve every physical feature of the whole universe. But it may be replied, as Thomas does, that there are other kinds of interaction, - for instance, chemical interaction - which cannot be reduced to physical terms, and that, according to Lotze himself, the free activity of spirits produces effects in the world, which would be another obstacle in his path. Such considerations might seem to necessitate Thomas's conclusion that "reciprocal action cannot of itself lead to a world unity," and that Lotze's proof has therefore broken down.

Such reasoning, however, is based on a misunderstanding of Lotze's real contention. He is not arguing that since any instance of interaction binds into a unity the interacting elements; and since - the suppressed premise - the various instances of interaction, either singly or collectively, run through the whole universe; therefore the universe is a whole. His argument is, in a sense, less direct than that. It is based, not directly on interaction, but on the difficulties involved in interaction; and the contention is not only that any instance of interaction is inexplicable unless we recognise in it the present of an active unity which is the Absolute, but also that

1. Ibid., p. 188.
we actually make this assumption, or recognise this unity, whenever we indicate a case of interaction. What is more, - and this is rather a confirmation of Lotze's reasoning than a necessary presupposition of it - the gap between the physical, chemical, sensuous, and intellectual spheres is by no means as absolute as the objection we are considering would seem to imply. It is true, no doubt, that such gaps must be recognised; but it should also be acknowledged that nature is able to transcend them, and that continuity is a fact in nature as well as a necessary working hypothesis of science.

It is when we come to consider the results at which Lotze arrives that the more serious questions confront us. One point we may notice in passing. In the Metaphysic\(^1\) he clearly recognises, and takes it for granted that his readers will readily agree, that immanent action is "completely incomprehensible in respect of the manner in which it comes about." But his solution of the problem of transeunt action is to reduce it to immanent action. Has he not, then, endeavoured to explain in terms of the inexplicable, and are we any better off for his "solution"? This is the point to which we referred, in our third chapter, in discussing Lotze's criticism of Occasionalism. The answer to the first part of the question must be in the affirmative, but whether he is justified in this course is another question. That a philosophic system takes for granted certain data to which experience testifies, but for which no

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1. sect. 46.
explanation is forthcoming, need not be regarded as invalidating
the system so far as it goes. Every system is bound to do this;
but all such data should receive the closest scrutiny. Lotze
endeavours to justify himself in the present connection, as we
saw, by claiming, first, "that the unity of the essence, in
which the unintelligible process in this case goes on, makes it
seem superfluous to us to enquire after conditions of its
possibility," and, second, that "if we refused to be guided by
this fundamental thought, there would be no hope left of finding
means of explanation for any occurrence whatever." However
that may be, I venture to think that further consideration of
what he means by immanent action, especially as it occurs, accord­
ing to his theory, in the Absolute, might have resulted in far­
reaching changes in his system as a whole. A study of the
passage in the *Metaphysic* where immanent action is discussed
does not allay the suspicion which the system as a whole has
created that by immanent action Lotze really means action within
a complex unity, which, however, is transeunt in its relation to
the relatively independent elements in that unity. But if that
is so, any instance of what is transeunt action, when only the
interacting elements are considered, is also immanent action,
when the universe is considered; and Lotze's change of transeunt
into immanent action is merely an insistence that the whole be
taken into consideration. It is this aspect of Lotze's teaching
which leads Thomas to complain that he has uncritically taken

1. sect. 46.
over into his system the popular conception of the meaning of a Thing.\(^1\) If this be his real view of immanent action, and if it be consistently applied, the nature of the Absolute in which action is immanent becomes immediately evident; for we may then think of the Absolute as an active whole within which are elements, relatively independent of one another and of it, but which somehow renders it possible that the states of one of these elements should immediately influence the states of others in what is popularly regarded as interaction. And this is clearly Lotze's main teaching. But sometimes he seems to wish to take the term immanent more seriously, to deny even the relative independence of the elements within the Absolute, and to be left with a blank Monism in which differentiations are but the product of a distorting human perception. The question of what we are to understand by immanence is thus the same as that question which we raised in the preceding chapter, but found it necessary to postpone; viz., what really becomes of Things in the Lotzian system? This question cannot be put off any longer; it goes to the very heart of Lotze's argument so far as we have yet traced it, and an attempt to answer it will involve an exposition of the later stages of Lotze's theism. We may state the situation, perhaps, in the following terms: If Things have not vanished in the Absolute, then we are left with a Pluralism which contains at least a potential threat to the Absolute's very existence; the blank Monism that would seem to result, if

\(^1\) Lotze's Theory of Reality, p. 74 ff.
Things have disappeared in the Absolute, is quite abhorrent to Lotze's interests, scientific, aesthetic, moral, and religious; if, according to Lotze, the truth lies somewhere between the extremes, then we wish from him some clear and consistent indication as to its precise relation to these extremes.

An examination of the relevant passages will show, I believe, that it is the intermediate position which Lotze wishes to maintain, and that this agrees with the conception of the Absolute to which we were led by our interpretation of his use of the term "immanent action." But, at the same time, even the most sympathetic reader will have to admit that, under the stress of the varying interests of his particular discussions, he has allowed himself to employ expressions and illustrations which would more naturally identify him, now with the one, now with the other, of the two extremes. We are told that a change in any one element is a change in the Absolute, and does not need to become such, the reason being that finite things are mere modifications, or parts, of the Absolute, which is in them the truly existent; and, lest it might be thought that even here things are granted to have a certain independence of the Absolute, we are further informed that it is only relatively to our faculties of presentation and observation that the unity of the Absolute resolves itself into single things. 1 In such passages as these, the Absolute appears to be regarded as an undifferentiated unity, its apparent differentiation being due

to its distortion in the medium of human perception. At other times, however, Lotze uses expressions which lay more stress on the independent reality of things. Things are the moulds into which the Infinite has been cast; and this must not be regarded as a mere transitory, unessential, or phenomenal modification of the Infinite, for, we are told, the relation of the finite many to the Infinite One is a permanent relation of real to real,\(^1\) which is further described as a relation of interaction.\(^2\) Although we are told that the Absolute is a sovereign power, and not a mere indifferent bridge for the passage of action between elements,\(^3\) still in other passages this is precisely the way in which it is represented. It does seem at times to be just the background of Being, which space could not supply, in order that action can pass from one element to another without having to leave the "solid background of being." The elements, too, are granted sufficient independence to be able to initiate action, which forces the Absolute, in turn, to make a compensating reaction - the latter often appearing in elements different from the former - in order to retain, or restore, its own identity. It would be easy to multiply instances of the conflicting tendencies in the expressions which Lotze employs, but these perhaps will suffice to indicate that neither Scylla nor Carybdis has been always and entirely avoided.

So far, Lotze has dealt with the conception of Things and their unity in an Absolute, all of which, as far as we yet know,

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may be wholly material. He has, indeed, indicated that space is a mere subjective form, and he now goes on to hint that all his spatial and material expressions are but unsatisfactory figures. He has also spoken of elements needing to be aware of the changing conditions around them—an expression which sounded somewhat strange, but which one might be inclined to interpret as figuratively as, Lotze contends, Herbart's term "coexistence" is to be understood. One is hardly prepared, therefore, for the somewhat startling way in which a discussion which has so far moved on the level of apparently physical interaction, and an Absolute which is involved in this conception, move up into the vastly different atmosphere of souls and spirits; or perhaps we may say, with Ward, what is the same thing from the opposite side—that it seems more than passing strange, after we have made the transition with him, that Lotze ever discussed this problem of causation at all in connection with physical action. When we have seen how the transformation takes place, we must return, on this higher plane, to the problem which we are discussing; namely, the relation of Pluralism and Monism in Lotze's system.

We will take up first Lotze's conception of matter, and it will be evident that several of his strongest convictions converge in the view he has adopted. Of these the most important is the fundamental conviction, shared by Leibnitz, Fichte, and Idealists generally, that the only kind of existence that is

ultimately conceivable is existence for a self. Lotze insists that our own existence depends on self-consciousness, and would vanish with it; and this, he adds, is the only kind of existence with which we have any direct acquaintance. "What manner of being, however, could we consistently predicate," he asks, "of that from which we had expressly excluded the universal characteristics of animate existence, every active relation of itself, every active distinction from everything else?" Nor is he content to say that the reality of material things consists in their being known by sentient beings. He is very insistent that atoms must have an existence independently of us, and this seems to drive him, not to the position of Berkeley whom, in many respects, he resembles, but to the position that atoms experience their own existence. Their existence must, like ours, depend on self-experience. "Precisely what we want is this: that the things shall really enjoy these states of their own, and not merely be thought of as existing in them; Reality is being for self." Material things, in short, are souls; under our gaze atoms have come alive.

In the Philosophy of Religion, Lotze's conclusion is not quite so definite. In the chapter on Government, he points out that the very conception of divine government implies a certain independence of behaviour on the part of finite individuals, in the exercise of which they "threaten to withdraw from a plan prescribed to them, which the governing principle intends to
realise." Such independence, he considers, can only reside in the possession by the elements of their own states, and in their power of initiating processes which do not proceed from the Absolute. "If now we consider how these abstract postulates might be fulfilled, we find but one Reality which actually fulfills them; namely, spiritual life." But if this be so, "then our current idea of a motionless, blind and lifeless 'stuff', which should exist outside of us, can signify nothing that is actual," and we are left with the alternatives of either a Fichtian Idealism, on the one hand, according to which "the self-coherent semblance of such a 'world-stuff' . . . . . is merely produced within spirits, and for them only, by a universal power which works in all spirits", or, on the other hand, a Spiritualism which regards the atoms as living beings, which experience their own states. Between these alternatives, he adds, religion does not force us to choose - but metaphysics, apparently, is more decisive. For here the conception of action and passion involved in interaction forces us, Lotze feels, to adopt the Spiritualist view. Up to this conclusion he leads but gradually. We are first informed\(^1\) that the scientific conception of the atoms as homogeneous in nature, or identical in substance, is only one of several possible views. Science, he says, is interested only in the external activity of the atoms, not in their internal character, and its attitude to the latter question is adopted merely because, in this way, science is enabled to pursue

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1. Microcosmus Bk. I., Ch. II.
its interests without a complication of its problems which, for its limited purpose, is entirely unnecessary. The view in question, however, so Lotze argues, is not only opposed to naive reflection; it is not even required by any higher point of view, and it is actually rendered suspect by the persistence with which many natural products retain their distinctive attributes under large variation in their conditions. It is, indeed, quite possible to be strictly scientific, he considers, - and the authority of his high scientific standing must not be forgotten - and still to hold both that forces do not attach themselves to a lifeless inner nature of things, but arise out of things, and also that nothing can take place between the individual elements until something has taken place within them, - to hold, in short, that each atom is a living point inwardly in a state of motion.

Lotze proceeds at once to convert this possibility into a necessity. He feels\(^1\) that any theory is unsatisfactory which holds that one half of creation - that which we comprise under the name of the material world - has no function save that of serving the other half - the realm of mind. Such a theory would apparently do away with all the characteristics which contain for naive feeling the essence of all the poetry of life; and its repulsiveness to aesthetic feeling is not entirely removed, he continues, even by the perfectly just reflection that the world revealed to us by our sense-experience has a value and a

1. Ibid., Bk. III., Ch. IV.
reality, whether it be an exact copy of the external world or not. In order to show that the aesthetic "longing" which underlies this conviction is a valid insight into reality, Lotze goes on to argue that the form in which we immediately apprehend matter - namely, infinitely divisible extension - is an illusion. He insists that only a system can be extended, and that the ultimate points which constitute it must be unextended. Matter is really a system of unextended beings that, by their forces, fix one another's position in space - this is the result so far achieved - and, by the resistance which they offer to any attempt to make them change their place, produce the phenomena of impenetrability, and the continuous occupation of space. But later\(^1\) we learn that this conclusion must be revised in the one respect that the atoms are not in space, the latter being only a subjective form of our apprehension. What, in the atom, corresponds to our spatial experience is really interaction; which means, as we have seen, that the change of the states of one thing is followed by the change in the states of some other, in such a way that the second suffers in consequence of the condition of the first.\(^2\) But it is impossible to give any meaning to the verb "suffers", so the argument proceeds, without presupposing a capacity for feeling in that which suffers. It follows, therefore, that the atoms must be regarded as living souls. Even here, however, Lotze is very cautious. He proceeds to discuss the threefold question whether we should, in view of

\(^1\) Ibid., Bk. IX., Ch. II. \(^2\) Ibid., Bk. IX., Ch. III.
this conclusion, regard things as merely subjective forms; or, with Idealism, abandon the conception of things altogether; or finally strive somehow to supplement the ordinary views so as to make room for this conclusion. The first possibility does not appeal to him. He is very sympathetic toward Idealism, in the present connection, but he dissociates himself from it as follows: "The real difference between Idealism and our view is that Idealism regards things as selfless, and therefore as states of the Infinite; we hold that things are probably not selfless though we cannot know whether they are or not."¹

A lengthy criticism of these views would lead us too far out of our course, both immediate and general, and we will not attempt it. We may pause in our exposition of Lotze's main argument, however, long enough to associate ourselves with the usual criticisms of panpsychism; namely, that even if an atom were a soul it could not possibly know itself as efficiently as we can know it; and, secondly, that, even if it could, what we need from it is its body, and not its soul. We have already said enough of Lotze's views to show that he would admit the truth of the second contention, from the limited viewpoint of science, but would insist that higher points of view demand the soul of the atoms. He has, therefore, to some extent forestalled this criticism, and we are justified in bringing it against him only if we are not satisfied with what he has to say about the higher points of view. This is our position, though we cannot

¹. Ibid. II., p. 647.
pause to develop it. It is highly significant in this connection that, as Thomas points out, ¹ Lotze first differentiates the souls of things, which have only self-experience through feeling, from spirits, which have an additional self-knowledge through ideas, and then drops out the former, giving them no function as souls, in the higher development of his system. Although they are souls, like Leibnitz, Lotze gives them no place, as souls, in his kingdom of spirits — evidently because, whatever the higher point of view require, the highest point of view cannot tolerate their claim to be kindred to spirits. This also indicates Lotze's attitude to the first criticism. He would admit that, as far as ideal knowledge is concerned, the contention is obviously justified; but he would claim for the atom-souls a self-experience which constitutes their unique contribution to the sum of knowledge, on which their existence depends, and from which he expressly excludes human knowledge. We shall see, too, in the sequel, that he attributes to this self-experience an importance which, whatever we may think of it, must never be overlooked in the interpretation of his views. Professor Pringle-Pattison contends ² as against pan-psychism, that we know spirits only in bodies, and that indeed bodies seem to be necessary for their individuation. If, therefore, we use the analogy of finite spirits, as Lotze does, we would have to regard the atom-souls, he urges, as possessing bodies; and thus, to regard the atoms as souls at all, would result either in merely pushing the

¹ Lotze's Theory of Reality, p. 175 f.
problem one step further back, or else in embarking on an in-
finite progress. Such an objection I would have to regard with
some caution, because the existence of an unembodied spirit does
not seem impossible, or even improbable, to me. All the necess-
ities of the case in point, however, - we may readily agree with
Professor Pringle-Pattison - seem to be satisfied by the doctrine
that man and Nature are "organic" one to the other; and it does
not seem at all necessary that the relation of Nature to a know-
ing mind should shut us up to a choice between a subjective
Idealism, on the one hand, and pan-psychism, on the other. Our
general purpose, however, is to study Lotze's Absolute, and our
present concern with his theory of things is merely in order to
throw some light on the place of the Absolute in his system. We
are now striving to discover the relation of things to the
Absolute. We have so far seen how, on the apparently physical
plane, Lotze tends to vacillate between the extremes of Plural-
ism and Monism; and we have outlined his attempt to transform
things into souls. We must now notice a similar process in
his characterisation of the Absolute.

It might have been thought that the Absolute which exists
as an explanation of interaction would have to be a material
Absolute; but this does not appear to be the case. It is
necessary, Lotze repeatedly urges, that science should reduce the
interactions to mechanical principles of explanation; but this
is so, he explains, only because scientific attention is directed
exclusively to the external behaviour of the interacting elements
and not to their internal character. A mechanistic science, however, does not justify a materialistic philosophy; and if the so-called material atoms are in reality souls, then the Absolute in which interaction forces us to believe — or rather which it presupposes — need not be material either. Further than that; Lotze contends that the Absolute cannot be regarded as purely material, unless all the spiritual factors of the world are to be sacrificed. Instead, he feels that "the assumption that the common substance of the world is only matter, and matter as endowed only with those properties which we in physical science attribute to every portion of the same, has probably never been made in earnest by anyone;"2 for such a view would have to deduce everything in the world merely from a matter whose sole properties are space-filling, inertia, divisibility and mobility. But this, Lotze is convinced, is clearly impossible. He is persuaded that every mode of thought that calls itself Materialism ultimately rests on the presupposition, and must soon be led by a little reflection to admit the fact, that matter is really something much better than it looks from the outside, and that it really possesses an inner life as well as an outer manifestation.3 In an eloquent passage in the Microcosmus,4 Lotze strives to show how the mechanical view can recognise a moral impulse as "one of the most important and original characteristics of the soul," and that it is, in this respect, "very different from that bizarre Materialism which

takes on itself the office of bringing intelligent life out of unintelligent matter as an incidental product whose trifling and precarious value does not permit of its setting up any peculiar claims in presence of matter, the one true substance," - the difference between these views being due, of course, to the former's recognition that atoms are living souls. The crucial objection to materialism, therefore, is the independent origin and nature of spirit. When this is recognised, "Materialism may prolong its existence and celebrate its triumphs within the schools, where so many ideas estranged from life find shelter, but its own professors will belie their false creed in their living action. For they will all continue to love and hate, to hope and fear, to dream and study, and they will in vain seek to persuade us that this varied exercise of mental energies . . . is a product of their bodily organisation, or that the love of truth exhibited by some, the sensitive vanity betrayed by others;" - he later adds, 1 the work of systematising the materials of sense manifested by all - , "has its origin in their cerebral fibres." 2 What, then, is the basis of this belief in respect of spirit?

Lotze has two reasons for his denial that it rests on the fact of freedom; firstly, freedom appears, he teaches, only at one point in the mental life, and so cannot be regarded as one of its universal characteristics; and, secondly, we have no assurance that freedom does not also characterise some of the

vast tracts of nature that are unknown to us. Nor does it rest on the fact, he continues, that sensations, ideas, emotions, and desires are not comparable with those states - spatial motion, figure, position, and energy - which we believe we observe in matter; for this fact would not exclude the possibility of a common ground for these two types of experience. This latter theory, however, is found to be unproductive for the psychology of the individual, he urges, and it is, further, quite excluded by the fact of the unity of consciousness, upon which the belief in the independence of spirit securely rests. Before we proceed to examine further a contention which must always sound suspicious to readers of Kant, we should notice what Lotze has to say of this identity theory, not in the realm of psychology, but in that of cosmology. Here, he says, it has, "at first, more to recommend it; and it forms the text of the spirited descriptions in which Pantheism glorifies the unresting life of the eternally One Substance, both corporal and spiritual, which in ceaseless vicissitude fashions its individual shapes, and lets them be absorbed again into itself." But such a view, as he points out, is only a dualism, thinly veiled in Spinoza's case by his assumption that extension and thought are only two out of an infinite number of incomparable divine attributes, of which the others are unknown to us, and quite unresolved by the Schellingian assumption of a single root, from which they issue as consequences, but which they do not constitute. Such a single

1. Metaphysic, sect. 238.
2. Ibid., sects. 239, 240.
3. Phil. of Relig., sect. 23.
root, as Lotze urges, may sound well enough in words; but nothing in our experience can be typical of its nature, and it is quite incomprehensible to us. In the cosmological field, therefore, - this, in brief, is Lotze's contention - this theory is no advance on an explicit dualism, and in the field of psychology the fact of the unity of consciousness excludes it by establishing the independent reality of spiritual substance. It is the latter claim which we must now investigate.

By substance, here, Lotze does not mean that the soul is a hard kernel of unchangeable, spiritual stuff which must be inferred as the ground of the unity which all consciousness manifests. He has already disposed of the idea of substance as a permanent something underlying the facts of change, and instead has proposed to regard substance as a unitary group of qualities changing according to law. He therefore feels justified in saying that "the fact of the unity of consciousness is eo ipso at once the fact of the existence of a substance: we do not need by a process of reasoning to conclude from the former to the latter as the condition of its existence, - a fallacious process of reasoning which seeks in an extraneous and superior substance supposed to be known beforehand, the source from which the soul and each particular thing would acquire the capacity of figuring as the unity and centre of manifold actions and affections." 1 This being so, the Kantian criticism of Rational Psychology does not apply to Lotze. For Kant was denying the validity of an

inference from the unity of our consciousness, as it appears to us, to the existence of a simple substance lying behind and causing it. To Lotze it seems utterly inconceivable that anyone who has followed his ontological discussions should look for the 'what' of a thing in anything other than in what the thing is and does, or imagine that the soul is unknown because it is not possible to point to any substance lying behind and causing its activities.\(^1\) The conception of substance which we have attributed to Lotze may not have been consistently adhered to in his various references to the subject,\(^2\) but it is of extreme value, as modern Idealists have recognised, and a sympathetic reader will both give him the credit for it and also understand his references in its light whenever possible. To such a reader the harsh and dogmatic criticisms which are brought against Lotze by Leonhard Stählin,\(^3\) though they will be admitted to have all too much foundation in Lotze's writings, will yet seem one-sided and unfair. But not only is Lotze not arguing to that idea of the soul which Kant shows to be without foundation; he is not even arguing from the felt unity of consciousness. His contention is that the unity of the self as subject is involved in the mere fact of judgment, and "supposing the self appeared to itself as a multiplicity, we should on the same grounds conclude that it was certainly mistaken if it took itself really to be what it appeared. Every judgment, whatever it may assert, testifies by the mere fact that it is pronounced at all, to the

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\(^1\) Ibid., sect. 245.  
\(^3\) Kant, Lotze, Albrecht Ritschl (Eng. tr.), p. 120 ff.
indivisible unity of the subject which utters it."¹

The foregoing proof of the independent reality of spiritual substance is sufficient, according to Lotze, to dispose of Materialism, and herein accordingly is to be found "one of the motives that lead us to the opposite attempt, - to the pure Spiritualism which undertakes to comprehend the spirit alone as truly existent, and all else as its product."² It is, of course, only one of the motives leading to Spiritualism, not a complete proof of that doctrine; for a disproof of crude Materialism, and a rejection of the Spinozistic-Schellingian Pantheism on the ground that it is practically dualism - and this is all that Lotze has so far accomplished - does not suffice to banish matter entirely, and to establish Spiritualism. In order to this result some more positive proof of the last named doctrine will have to be advanced. It will have to be shown that such a doctrine can be satisfactorily worked out, and this, when it is accomplished, will have to throw some light on the strange illusion that there is such a thing as matter. Even though it has been proved that matter is not the whole story, it has not been shown so far that the inclusion of matter in the universe does not add to the value of the whole.³ Dualism, of course, is abhorrent to that demand for system which is the very nature of our thinking, but the general objection to dualism may not be regarded as sufficient to establish a pure Spiritualism, when only the independent reality of spiritual substance has been

¹. Metaphysic, sect. 244.
². Phil. of Relig., sect. 23.
proved; and this is true for the simple reason that human thought is still, by general confession, far from its goal, and dualism may possibly turn out to be the best that the facts will so far warrant. With such a contention Lotze himself would not disagree.\footnote{Microcosmus II, p. 726.} We must therefore enquire what other reasons he advances in support of Spiritualism; and it will be both convenient and justifiable for us to merge this enquiry into an investigation of his positive proof of the personality of the Absolute, since he will not tolerate any view which would regard the Absolute as spiritual, but not personal.

For practical purposes we may divide his arguments into three types - the metaphysical, the moral, and the religious - though various motives may be admitted to underlie some of them. To deal first with the metaphysical considerations - Lotze urges, against those who would limit personality to finite beings, that finitude is not a sine qua non of, but is really a hindrance to, personality, and that in truth only the Infinite can be a person. The argument - if Lotze intends this as such - is that belief in the personality of the Absolute is a necessity forced upon us by the demand that our ideal of personality should exist in reality. With this consideration we will have to deal more fully in our next chapter; here we would merely point out that, even if its validity be conceded, it can prove the personality of the Absolute only when the identity of the Absolute with the God of religion has been further estab-
lished. Until this has been done, it may still be possible to
hold that the Absolute somehow comprehends within itself a
Perfect Person, a host of finite persons, and a world of matter.
I am not now arguing for such a conclusion, but am merely indi-
cating that Lotze has not yet banished this as one of the
possibilities, or at least has done so only because he has taken
much for granted. Another of his metaphysical arguments is
that the only kind of existence conceivable is existence for
self. We have already noticed this assumption in connection
with his argument for pan-psychism, and have seen reason to re-
ject it. If it were valid, matter would be banished from the
universe, and the Absolute would have to be, if not personal, at
least spiritual. A third metaphysical argument arises from the
fact that, according to Lotze, the Absolute interacts with the
finite elements of the universe. Lotze is convinced, as we
have already seen, that interaction involves a capacity for
action and passion on the part of the elements concerned, and
this capacity is peculiar to souls. The interaction of the
Absolute with finite things, therefore, shows that it is at least
a soul. This argument does not carry much conviction with it.
We may grant that the terms "action" and "passion" are primarily
applicable only to persons; but that they must therefore be
predicable only of living things does not seem to follow from
this fact. If the application of these terms to the world-elem-
ents, as Lotze argues, must carry with it the implication of life,
why does it not, contrary to Lotze's teaching, carry also the
implication of a personality, as fully developed as we find it in human beings? And if it does not do the latter, why should it do the former? It does not follow, from the use of the same terms, that the objects designated are similar, except in the respect which the employment of the terms is explicitly intended to mark. In the present case, we are clearly endeavouring to understand physical motion in the light of our own self-experience. To speak of world-elements "acting" and "suffering" is obviously a metaphor, borrowed from human experience, and intended to signify only that these elements are the points of origin, in the one case, and the destination, in the second, of a transferred motion; or if this is not the case, some proof other than the mere terms employed will have to be advanced for understanding those terms literally. None of Lotze's metaphysical arguments, therefore, can be said to be impressive.

The moral argument, according to Lotze, will establish the full personality of the Absolute. It depends on the ethical demand that wisdom, justice, and holiness shall have an objective existence in the universe; and it concludes that, because these are personal attributes and can exist only as belonging to persons, the universe must be a personal Being. "The longing of the soul to apprehend as reality the Highest Good which it is able to feel, cannot be satisfied by or even consider any form of the existence of that Good except Personality. So strong is its conviction that some living Ego, possessing and enjoying Self, is the inevitable presupposition and the only possible
source and abode of all goodness, and all good things, so filled is it with unspoken contempt for all existence that is apparently lifeless, that we always find the myth-constructing beginnings of religion busied in transforming natural to spiritual reality; but never find them actuated by any desire to trace back living spiritual activity to unintelligent Reality as to a firmer foundation.\(^1\) It is this immediate certainty which, as we saw in our second chapter, underlies all the traditional "proofs", according to Lotze, and very nearly receives expression in the Anselmic form of the ontological argument. Lotze goes on\(^2\) to discuss the relation of truth and goodness to God, raising the old questions as to whether God recognises truth and goodness, or creates them. His answer is the same in each case, that neither alternative is correct. For, he insists, even if Good could be decided independently of God, He could recognise it as Good only if it actually were so for Him by reason of His own nature; and the same is true in respect of God's creating Good. "The Good cannot be established by any divine will, nor be to it an object of recognition, unless that will already contains that Good in the same way as we have said that truth must be contained by the mind which apprehends it."\(^3\) The contention is, then, that ethical goodness must be a characteristic of the Absolute, and that the Absolute must, for this reason, be a person. Such an argument will be received by many readers with assent. It is the same consideration which Rashdall, for instance, has warmly

1. Microcosmus II, p. 672.
2. Ibid, Bk. IX., Ch. V.
3. Ibid., II, p. 698.
advocated though his God is not the Absolute. He says, "Only if we believe in the existence of a Mind for which the true moral ideal is already in some sense real . . . . . can we rationally think of the moral ideal as no less real than the world itself,"¹ a contention which Sorley also regards as valid.² This will be regarded as the true moral argument, which Lotze should have referred to, but did not, when, in the Lectures of 1879, he claimed to be discussing the moral argument.

A modern reader of Lotze, however, must inevitably be driven by this contention of his to consider the contrary contention of Bradley, Wallace, Bosanquet, and others, that morality cannot be regarded as a characteristic of the Absolute. Bradley says of goodness in general that "it manifests its relativity by inconsistency, by a self-contradiction in principle, and by a tendency towards separation in that principle's working, an attempted division, which again is inconsistent and cannot rest in itself. Goodness, as such, is but appearance which is transcended in the Absolute."³ A lengthy discussion leads him to the result⁴ that moral goodness and badness do not depend entirely on ourselves, and that therefore it is a moral principle to be non-moral, that is to say, to be religious.⁵ Morality, in short, essentially transcends itself, and is therefore not ultimate. Wallace claims that morality, which essentially involves the idea of obligation eliminates itself by perfecting itself, for it then passes into the guise of autonomy. "Perfect

morality and perfect religion carry us beyond themselves to an
absolute in which we may suppose them to be satisfied: satisfied,
however, by being carried out to that consummation which destroys
what is their very essence." ¹ For Bosanquet morality belongs
to the "world of claims and counterclaims" in which finite indi­
viduals foolishly stand in isolation, or attempt to do so, and
make claims against the whole. This attitude, he holds with
Bradley, is necessarily transcended in religion, in which the
self identifies itself with the whole. Lotze's argument,
broadened out, would be that values can be conserved only in a
Person; a proposition which the Absolutists to whom we have
referred are not willing to accept. For them, as for Lotze,
values are preserved in the Absolute, but they differ from Lotze
in regarding the Absolute as, not personal, but superpersonal.
In so far as this last term is to be understood, negatively, as
a protest against limiting the character of God to what we are
acquainted with in human personality, it is extremely valuable;
but with this protest Lotze would actively associate himself.
When a positive significance is to be given to it, the difficul­
ties begin. It is hard to see how Bradley's Absolute, when he
compares it to an undifferentiated feeling, can be legitimately
described as superpersonal at all, though perhaps he did not
mean this analogy to be pressed very far. This tendency to
describe the Absolute as superpersonal is very apt to pass into
the region, so it seems to me, where words are used without

¹. Lectures & Essays on Nat. Theol. & Ethics, p. 277.
corresponding ideas; and great caution is called for in consequence.

It must be admitted, however, that this moral argument has to face some serious difficulties, some of which are due to the characteristics of the Lotzian system, while others are more general. In the first place, it is hard to see how the highest value of all, namely love, can exist in a one-and-only person, unless, indeed, as is maintained in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, that single person be also, in some sense, manifold in respect of personality. But Lotze was not fully willing to adopt this doctrine from Christianity, which would have saved him in this connection. A second difficulty, for Lotze, arises out of his definition of the term, "value." For him value signifies the enlargement of the soul in accordance with its true nature; but one is constrained to ask how such a conception can be applied to the Absolute. An obvious reply would be that our true relation to the Absolute enlarges our soul, and that the Absolute therefore has value for us. But Lotze claims more than this. He is not content merely to argue that the Absolute has value for us, for this would not necessarily involve its personality. He is maintaining that the Absolute has value in itself; but how, on his definition of value, is that possible? The Absolute certainly cannot be thought of as enlarging itself by absorption from without, nor yet, unless it is to be regarded as imperfect, by a progressive organisation of its content. But

1. Phil. of Relig., p. 149.
this exhausts the ways known to us in which enlargement of life is possible. And, indeed, if we are to accept Lotze's doctrine that the supreme purpose of the Absolute is the preservation of the equation $M = M$, how can enlargement at all be also predicated of it?¹ There is another question which we must raise in connection with this argument of Lotze's. We may admit — as, I think, we must — that value can exist only in persons, or for persons; that is to say, that instrumental value, if there is anything which possesses only that, exists only for persons, and that intrinsic value exists only in persons. As I have above indicated I cannot sympathise with the denial of this proposition on the part of the Absolutists. We may also admit that value must be, in some sense, objective. But do these admissions necessitate the conclusion of pure Spiritualism which Lotze wishes to establish? I think not. In what sense do we affirm moral predicates of Nature? In order to complete his argument Lotze would have to show that something more is necessary than is allowed for, for instance, by Professor Sorley.² The latter would allow to Nature only an instrumental value, and contends that those who seem to predicate intrinsic value of Nature are, consciously or unconsciously, personifying her. What these writers, if Sorley is correct, are doing figuratively, Lotze is doing in sober earnest, but this would seem to demand some further justification. As we saw above, Lotze does protest against regarding anything as possessed merely of instru-

². Moral Values etc., Ch. V.
mental value; but his protest is represented as based on an aesthetic longing, that is, on feeling, and this we can hardly recognise as a sufficient foundation for it. But we need not return again to this topic, which we have already disposed of.

Lotze also has certain religious arguments for the personality of the Absolute, which apply to the Absolute at all only if its identification with the God of religion be conceded. This question we will take up in our next chapter; at present we will concede the point and confine our attention to the arguments as given. Lotze says, "the religious mind is led to apprehend the Supreme Good under the form of a Personal God both by humility and the longing to be able to reverence and love."¹ I have not noticed, in his writings, any more expanded reference to humility, and am therefore driven to an interpretation of my own. It is a fact that humility is an essential element in the religious consciousness. If, now, it be true that we are so conscious of the value of personality that anything non-personal must necessarily seem inferior, then it would follow that the Object toward which we persons are to feel humility must be a Person. Such an argument would obviously lose its force if anything that is superpersonal could be shown to exist. To my present thinking it appears to be valid; though I cannot pretend to offer any more convincing defence of it than that which is suggested above in connection with the doctrine that the Absolute is superpersonal. Such an argument, and the demand of the religious attitudes

¹ Microcosmus II, p. 676.
of love and worship for a personal Object, seem to be the strongest proof we can offer, - other than the Person of Jesus Christ, which proof is not in order in this discussion - , of the existence of a personal God.

Lotze has a second religious argument, namely, that certain of the doctrines that are essential to religion involve the personality of God. The argument here centres around the doctrine of God's eternity, which, he says, we are constrained to hold both because of a religious need for reliability on God's part, and because "eternal duration is aesthetically an imposing idea on account of a sublimity which is worthy of the Absolute Principle." ¹ By describing God as eternal, we do not mean to say, Lotze thinks, that He eternally fills time in a perfectly unchangeable way, for such an idea would be of no service to religion. We think of Him as a living God, the subject of change, and yet we mean also to assert that He remains identical with Himself throughout the changes. For this to be possible, Lotze continues, not only must His successive states be comprehensible as different consequences of one and the same nature, but He must comprehend Himself as a unity. "In no respect can we assert of selfless 'Things', but only of a self-conscious 'Spirit', that it remains in the course of its history one and the same; and, for the very reason that only it actualizes the aforesaid unity by means of this deed of self-consciousness." ² This argument clearly rests on the belief of Lotze's that

¹ Phil. of Relig., p. 51. ² Ibid., sects. 31, 32.
existence must be felt existence, and unity must be felt unity. With our rejection of that belief, the argument in this form loses its cogency. Such an argument also raises a question, which we must face in the following chapter, as to how Lotze determines what is, and what is not, an essential religious doctrine - a question which, widened out, may be called the problem of Lotze's sources.

That religion may be made the basis of an argument for the personality of God, certain contentions that have received great prominence in modern times will have to be rejected. In the first place, it is denied that religion demands a personal Object. Bradley¹ defines religion as "a fixed feeling of fear, resignation, admiration or approval, no matter what may be the object, provided only that this feeling reaches a certain strength" - which, he admits, cannot be accurately determined - "and is qualified by a certain degree of reflection." He recognises that the term is used in senses which are higher or lower according as the object of the feeling is higher or lower, though he does not clearly indicate what his standard of judgment is in this connection. He contends that, in the highest sense, religion can have but one object, and that this object must be of such a nature as to render possible toward it, what is implicit in all religion, an attitude of moral prostration. But whether moral prostration is ultimately possible toward any but a personal object may well be called in question. In his

¹ Appearance & Reality, p. 439, n.
earlier writings, I believe, Bradley was willing to admit that religion demands a personal God, though he denied that the Absolute can be identified with that God. Bosanquet also has denied that religion requires a personal object; but he makes his case plausible, so it seems to me, only by abandoning his own general principle of founding on experience at its highest. If this general principle justifies him in finding in religion the key to the nature of reality, surely it should drive him to finding it in the highest religion. By generalising what is common to all religions, instead of fixing on what is peculiar to that religion which he admits to be the highest; by inconsistently reducing religion, that is to say, to its lowest, rather than to its highest, terms, he resolves it into a sense of dependence, and denies that dependence needs a personal object. On the contrary, it seems likely that, in the cases where the object of dependence is not a person, it is personified or else regarded as under the control of a person. A more serious challenge to the argument from religion to the personality of the Absolute is the contention of Bradley and Wallace that religion is transcended, and, as such, destroyed, in the Absolute. Bradley argues that religion, because it is practical is dominated by the self-contradictory idea of the Good. It exists "by a kind of perpetual oscillation and compromise,"\(^1\) and is therefore mere appearance. Faith, which he regards as the central point of religion, is a contradiction between making

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 440 ff.
believe and making as if we did not believe. Practically, religion is a compromise between a peace which forgets discord, and thus tends to pass into immorality and irreligion, and a consciousness of the discord, which banishes its peace and perfection. It belongs to relational consciousness, since it implies a relation between man and God; and this particular relation, like all the rest, passes into contradictions. That religion does essentially imply a relation between man and God, I am willing to admit and, against Wallace, to contend. Whether this reduces religion to mere appearance will depend on our attitude to Bradley's view of relations, which we have already called in question in our third chapter. It may also be admitted that religion usually manifests itself as an oscillation such as Bradley describes, but that it does so always and essentially is not so evident. There is, I think, a truer view of what religion at its best involves than Bradley has presented to his readers; a peace, not merely in spite of, but actually in and through discord, is what such a religion would make possible. The same criticism applies, mutatis mutandis, to Wallace. He argues that the aim of the religious man is likeness to God, the ideal limit of which is identity. The perfection of religion, therefore, by reducing the terms to a unity, would be its destruction.\(^1\) It may, however, be questioned whether identity is the true ideal of likeness, although it must be granted that identity has been the goal of much religious

1. \textit{Essays \\& Lects. etc.}, p. 276.
aspiration. Likewise, would rather seem to involve a distinction between similars. Surely the promise is not ridiculous, "but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is." And when, for likeness, we substitute fellowship as the truer aim of the religious man, this distinction, as well as the essential personality of those who enjoy the fellowship, is made even more emphatic.

What may be regarded as a psychological argument for Spiritualism arises out of the analogy which Lotze draws between the Absolute and the human soul, in respect of the way in which, in both, the unity is maintained through a diversity of elements. This is the psychological form of what we have called Lotze's second religious argument. The soul, he says, "is exhausted in thought no more than in any other particular form of its manifestation; in all fully present and active, it finds in each but a one-sided and partial expression, and behind the action evolved at each several moment a larger and more abundant and potential reservoir remains undisclosed and concealed. And this very wholeness of the soul's presence, common alike to all the manifold forms of its manifestation, is the instrumentality that makes the reciprocal action of the various internal states possible, and fixes the character of their resultant." Exactly similarly he conceives the Absolute. It was therefore quite natural that he should regard it as personal spirit. We will take up this question of the personality of the Absolute in our

next chapter; we must now return to the question in hand, viz. the relation between Pluralism and Monism in the Lotzian system.

We began with a world of interacting elements, material as far as we then knew, and followed Lotze's argument which sought to show that this involved an Absolute, which we might have been pardoned for regarding as also material. Our question was as to whether the elements really disappeared in the Absolute, as the argument might seem to require, or maintained some kind of independence. We glanced, in answer, at certain physical analogies of which Lotze availed himself, and found that some of them were decidedly monistic, while others were more pluralistic, in significance. But his indication of the inadequacy of these analogies led us to study the way in which he sought to convert the world-elements into souls, and his Absolute into a personal spirit. Our question now arises again. Are the elements to be regarded as independent of the Absolute, or are they not? It will have to be admitted that Lotze still vacillates, and this is only to be expected. It may be true that the elements are in a sense independent, and in another sense dependent. The Christian would want to adopt such a position; and if Lotze has urged this view it may be regarded as a point in his favour. We must also be prepared to find that Lotze cannot tell us as much as we would wish to know as to the senses in which the elements are both dependent and independent. It may well be, - it is highly probable, - that the present stage of human insight does not afford sufficient data for a decision, and it is possible that
what look like self-contradictions may be an evidence of greater profundity than harmony might be. Our task at present is merely to record the facts as they stand in Lotze's writings.

And, first, we may draw attention to Lotze's comparison of the Absolute with the human soul. The human soul is a spiritual substance; that is, according to his best view of substance, a unitary group of states changing, under different conditions, according to a law. The soul acts as a whole in any of its states, so that the production of one state affects the whole soul, and thus calls forth other states. The various states interact, the result being determined by the nature of the whole. Here, then, we have a type, Lotze says, of the Absolute. The soul, in its indivisible being, typifies the Absolute, and the mental states stand for the finite things in the Absolute. This analogy would most naturally indicate that the finite things can have no independence of the Absolute, other than a state can have of that of which it is a state; but the assertion that the various states interact is scarcely harmonious with such a view. If he were willing to regard this as only a figure of speech, applicable only in a limited sense, and borrowed from the realm of physical experience, we might be prepared to overlook the point; although even this should have been rendered impossible for Lotze by his belief that the whole soul acts in each of its states. If this is what he means by interaction in general, - and this is the conception of it that undoubtedly underlies his cosmological reasoning - , then he has no right to
grant to the elements the measure of independence which he does allow them. For he admits that the theological doctrine of divine Government involves the independence of the finite particulars, and this is found by him to consist in their possession of their own states, and of the power to initiate action. Both of these aspects of freedom belong to human spirits, according to him, the latter being the indispensable condition of morality, and at least the former belongs to sub-human souls.¹ Later² he speaks of piety as the only means whereby "the finite spirit ceases to be such absolutely dependent product of the course of nature," and of God as standing nearer to humanity in some cases than in others.³ It should be obvious that his cosmological reasoning is based on a view of interaction which logically involves consequences which he is not willing to accept. The result is that between the scientific plane on which the first part of his argument moves and the realm of values in which the later stages of the reasoning find themselves at home there is a gulf which Lotze never succeeded in crossing.

It is one of his merits that he was not oblivious to this fact, and explicitly declared the passage from existence to value to be the fundamental, but insoluble problem of metaphysics.

1. Phil. of Relig., sect. 55.
2. Ibid., sect. 82.
3. Ibid., sect. 89.
Chapter V.

SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS.

In the preceding chapters we have examined Lotze's attempt to establish the conclusion that there exists an Absolute, which is a Person in the fullest sense of the term. It is necessary that, before bringing our discussion of his theistic philosophy to a close, we should draw attention to certain points which have not yet received the attention which is their due. The first of these special problems arises out of the widespread belief that Personality and Infinity are incompatible attributes. By way of approach to it, we may indicate some of the difficulties which any such a philosophy may be expected to take into consideration. These we may conveniently gather around two main questions, the second of which arises only if the first receives an affirmative answer.

The first, and most basic, question is this, Is there an Absolute at all? The discussion of this question is somewhat complicated by a confusing uncertainty in the meaning of the term Absolute. We have already seen in Lotze a tendency to waver in this respect. Running through, and fundamental to, his whole system is a conception of the Absolute as not merely the Whole, but the All; a tendency to lose the finite in the Infinite; but he also wishes to think of the Absolute as different
from the All, as the ground of all, or as a Personal Spirit
standing over against finite spirits. Perhaps it would not be
too much to say that a similar tendency is discoverable in all
the principle exponents of Absolutism. To support such a con-
tention would take us far beyond the limits and purpose of the
present discussion; but we may quote with approval the remark
of Professor Pringle-Pattison, in regard to the theories of
Bradley and Bosanquet, "It would seem, then, as if the unity with
which the system concludes tends to abolish the plurality of
centres from which it starts."¹ But it would seem that Pringle-
Pattison has himself fallen at times into a similar confusion,
in many passages apparently equating the Absolute with the All,
and yet so characterising it elsewhere as to make such an iden-
tification impossible.² The reasons for such a wavering are
the affirmative and negative considerations which our question
calls forth. The extremes are, on the one hand, an absolute
Monism towards which those interests seem very naturally to lead
which favour the belief in an Absolute at all, and, on the other
hand, a Pluralism the attractions of which seem always strong
enough to induce the Absolutists, in one way or another, to
modify their characteristic conception. The main considerations
that favour the belief in an Absolute are the intellectual and
aesthetic demand for wholeness, a demand which is progressively
justifying itself, as far as we can see, in practice, and the
moral demand for security; Pluralism is favoured by the moral

of God, 2nd. Edn.
demand for freedom and progress, and by practical experience of the reality of finite existence. Since the only satisfactory relation to these contending claims is not that of disjunction, but that of inclusion, we find pronounced Absolutists, on the one hand, making concessions to the opposite opinion, and equally convinced Pluralists, on the other, verging in the direction of the position from which they explicitly revolt. Others, like Professors Pringle-Pattison¹ and Sorley², explicitly set out to balance the claims of monism and pluralism; and this, we may say, was also Lotze's purpose.

Secondly, we must ask, Is the Absolute of philosophy the God of religion? And this question will lead into the heart of Lotze's system, for he adopts and defends the affirmative answer. Among modern writers who believe in the Absolute, Bradley would champion the negative side, but most of the others will be found against him. Bosanquet would deny that the Absolute is the personal God of popular Theism, but would regard it as the proper object of enlightened religious devotion. Webb wishes to identify the Triune God of Christian Theology with the Absolute, and sweepingly rejects all theories of a finite God, except Bradley's, on the ground that, by abandoning the attempt to identify God with the Absolute, they are abandoning the quest which is Religion.³ Professor Jones was also insistent that a failure to make this identification would not only stultify the unity of human thought, but would finally destroy religious faith by

1. Idea of God (2nd. Edn.), p. VIII.
2. Moral Values, p. X.
3. God & Personality, Ch. VI. etc.
undermining the ultimate reality of its Object. The most impressive reason for regarding the Absolute as the God of religion seems to be the religious demand that its Object should possess supreme and ultimate reality; and - setting aside, for reasons indicated in our first chapter, the Ritschlian contention that God is to be conceived, not in terms of metaphysical reality, but only in terms of religious value - we may admit that, if the desired result can be achieved only by making the identification in question, then anyone who has had a vital religious experience is left without a choice in the matter. Another religious consideration which bears on the same conclusion is the complete independence of any necessary relation to an external reality which religion usually predicates of God, and which, according to Lotze, 1 is what we mean by God's unity. There can be no doubt that the very strongest assertion of the self-dependence and independence of God, such, for instance, as led, in combination with his peculiar doctrine of knowledge, to Mansell's agnosticism, is grateful to the religious consciousness; although it may also be true that, in this respect, the religious consciousness is not self-consistent. Such an independence on God's part is possible, if there be an Absolute at all, only if God is the Absolute. The alternative seems to be a finite God, and this, many feel, is no God at all. Lotze shares this attitude. He thinks that it is a sufficient condemnation of polytheism to say that, in the only form which is not "useless and

1. Phil. of Relig., p. 46.
adventurous", it involves the finitude of its gods. ¹ If it can be shown, however, that a God who is in some sense finite will satisfy all the essential requirements of the religious consciousness, then the ground will be cut from under the contention that God must be identified with the Absolute. It is perfectly obvious that both finitude and infinitude are predicable of the same subject without contradiction; and it is perfectly possible, therefore, that God may be regarded as Infinite in some essential and characteristic respect, and yet as finite in the sense that He is not the All. What is more it is possible that experience may furnish sufficient data to lead to such a conviction without furnishing enough to permit of a satisfactory definition of the sense in which God may be said to be Infinite. It is not a logical necessity that we regard God as the All if we wish to avoid the belief that God is imperfect, in any vital significance of that term, or that He is struggling against evil in a battle the issue of which is uncertain both in reality and in His knowledge - in short, the rejection of Absolutism does not inevitably lead to the extravagances and shortcomings which characterise those theories of a finite God which wound enlightened religious susceptibilities and stultify some essential aspects of religious experience.²

If this be true, the question arises, Are there any reasons for believing that God is, as we have seen He may be, finite in the above sense? Two main reasons have sometimes seemed to be

¹. Ibid., p. 45.
². cf. Mackintosh, Expositor, Nov. 1918.
compelling. The first is that the identification of God with the Absolute accentuates the problem of evil, and particularly the problem of sin. Our experience of sin presents a problem for any philosophy; indeed, if the definition of it sometimes given as that which absolutely ought not to be is tenable, the problem is essentially insoluble, and the probability of its solution recedes as any less rigorous conception of sin approaches that definition in rigour. Any philosophy which could solve this problem without denying what is fundamental in the conception of sin would receive from that fact a tremendous confirmation; but the failure to solve the problem of sin does not, at least for Christian thinkers, necessarily invalidate a system, since Christianity itself does not claim a theoretical explanation, but only a practical solution of sin. The objection that is advanced against the identification of God with the Absolute, therefore, is not that it fails to solve, or even to help toward a solution of, the problem of sin. It is rather that this identification accentuates the problem by making sin somehow a constituent in the divine nature — a conception that is thoroughly abhorrent to religious sentiment — or else it explains sin away. The way in which the Absolutists in general meet this problem will seem to many religious thinkers to err in the latter direction. To them it will seem a positive failure to appreciate the awful sinfulness of sin to regard it as a necessary element in the good, although they will concede that sin's intrusion into history must somehow minister to the
world-plan. The spirit of the attempt made by the Idealists to show that evil is less ultimate than good will be warmly wel­comed by them; but it will seem that such an attempt, as it works itself out, tends almost inevitably to an underestimation of the reality of evil, especially in the moral and spiritual aspects, and a spirit of caution will commend itself as more in keeping with our ignorance. From this point of view Lotze's attitude to the subject may be more satisfactory. He is no less convinced than the Idealists that the Good is primary, and that there is a solution of the problem of evil, but he frankly re­cognises that he cannot advance it. His "philosophic faith" is that there is "only the one real power appearing to us under a threefold image of an end to be realized - namely, first some definite and desired Good, then on account of the definiteness of this, a formed and developing Reality, and finally in this activity an unvarying reign of Law." But he admits that there is in "the existence of evil and of sin in Nature and in History," a "decisive and altogether insurmountable difficulty" which stands in the way of a scientific elaboration of this faith.¹ He continues, "No one has here found the thought which would save us from our difficulty, and I too know it not." He therefore proposes to say "that where there appears to be an irreconcile­able contradiction between the omnipotence and the goodness of God, there our finite wisdom has come to the end of its tether, and that we do not understand the solution which yet we believe

¹ Microcosmus II, p. 716.
Lotze's answer to this objection, that is to say, is to admit its validity, but, in spite of it, to affirm his faith in the identity of God with the Absolute - and this, many will admit, is so far a tenable position.

The second main objection to the identification of God with the Absolute is that religion demands the personality of God, whereas the Absolute cannot be personal. Such an objection has been attacked from two points of vantage; it has been denied, that is, that the God of religion need be a Person, and an attempt has been made to prove the personality of the Absolute. It will be perfectly obvious that Lotze takes the second, but not the first, line of attack. We will not pause to consider the first, therefore, especially since we have already referred to it in the preceding chapter. Lotze's presentation of the second contention, however, must be carefully studied, for it is regarded as his most original contribution to philosophical theology. The objection is that the fundamental element in personality as we know it is self-consciousness, and that the dependence of self-consciousness on the contrast of self with not-self makes it impossible for us to regard the Absolute as personal. Amongst the Cartesians, who regarded the knowledge of the isolated self as the primary certainty, it would be perfectly easy to believe in the personality of the Absolute; but Lotze recognises that the objection to this doctrine has arisen out of an insight which far surpasses the Cartesian position.

1. Ibid., p. 717.
and he accordingly mentions it with respect. It was Kant who laid its foundation by his proof that a knowledge of the Ego apart from the non-Ego is wholly impossible. He taught that the unity of apperception cannot be rendered intelligible except in reference to an object, whose synthesis it is. The knowing self, though the first or supreme condition of experience, demands in turn, as the indispensable prerequisite of its existence a knowable world to which it is related. Kant's discovery in this respect changed the whole aspect of philosophy. It is fundamental to the Fichtean system, in which the self becomes conscious of itself only because its outgoing activity is reflected back upon itself by the resistance of the not-self which it creates. For Fichte, that is to say, the opposition of a non-Ego to the Ego is a condition of the possibility of intelligence - on this as a foundation principle his whole system is built. In Schelling's opinion, to say that his absolute reason is beyond the opposition of subject and object is to say that it is entirely without attributes. Fichte had said that the Ego necessarily creates the non-Ego; Schelling contends that it is equally true to say that the non-Ego creates the Ego. Hegel, in opposition to the Identity Philosophy, insists that it is only in the opposition of subject and object that the Absolute exists. Thus the principle of the inseparability of subject and object, the dependence of reason, at least as conscious, upon this opposition, underlies the reasonings of all the German Idealists.

1. Ibid., p. 672 f.
2. cf. Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kant etc., p. 251 f.
It is regarded in our day, among the Idealists, as a philosophical commonplace. Knowledge is regarded as the whole or unity in separation from which subject as well as object is a mere abstraction. But, if this be so, seeing that the Absolute cannot be regarded as having anything outside of itself to function as a not-self, the conclusion would seem to be unavoidable that self-consciousness, and so personality, is not possible for the Absolute. It is this conclusion that Lotze sets himself to break down, and the reasoning by which he attempts to do so is both negative and positive. Negatively, he examines the theories of a non-personal Absolute, and finds reasons for rejecting them all; positively, in addition to advancing the reasons which we noticed in the preceding chapter for believing that the Absolute actually is a Person, he carries the war into the enemy's camp by his contentions, firstly, that a real non-Ego is not a sine qua non of self-consciousness, and secondly that, so far from the Absolute not being a Person, only the Absolute can be a Person in the fullest sense. These arguments we must now state and examine.

And, first, Lotze rejects the three views which were brought forward in the development of German Idealism, and which regarded the Absolute as spiritual but not personal. The first, that of J. G. Fichte, regards the Absolute as a Moral World-Order. In his later years Fichte, under the influence of the studies in philosophy of religion to which the difficulties in his earlier, moralistic thinking had driven him, spoke frequently and defin-
itely of God as a Being whom he more and more tended to charac-
terise as transcendent, and as a creative force preceding the
material created. In the earlier writings he spoke more vaguely
of the "idea of Deity," and regarded this as an impossible con-
ception. "I abhor," he said, "all religious conceptions which
personify God, and regard them as unworthy of a reasonable being."
Such an attitude is somewhat remarkable in one who taught both
that, by creating the non-Ego, the Ego makes itself a person, and
that the absolute Ego does thus create a non-Ego. However, it
is a fact that, as Lotze says, he regarded "personality as an
impossible conception of the Godhead," and substituted for it
the conception of an ideal, Moral World-Order. Fichte says,
"That living and active moral order is itself God; we need no
other God, and can conceive no other." Lotze himself believed
in, and endeavoured to establish, a moral world-order, but he
was unable to regard this as the Supreme Principle. For, as he
continually insists, there can be no order apart from the things
ordered. Order is but relation, and when we seek to discover
what it is in Reality which corresponds to relations, we are
back again on the line of reasoning which, as we have seen, led
Lotze to his Absolute. We can never regard the Absolute as a
world-order, he argues, because we can never rest in such a con-
ception. It inevitably leads us on to the idea of an ordering
Being; and, if the world-order is further regarded as moral, we
are driven to regard the ordering Being as also moral, consciously
and purposively establishing the moral order. But here again
we are well on the way toward that personal conception of God for which Fichte wished to substitute the conception of a Moral World-Order. Thus far we have been following Lotze's discussion of the Fichtean doctrine in the Microcosmus. In the Philosophy of Religion¹ he attacks another of its aspects. "The non-ego, Fichte had said, is the unconscious product of the ego, or, what amounts to the same thing, the product of the unconscious ego."² Now Lotze denies that the spiritual element of the Absolute can be regarded as a reason that is 'per se unconscious.' He contends that, since we come to know reason always as conscious, or at least always in connection with conscious reason, we have no right to persuade ourselves that the elimination of the consciousness would not destroy the reason. To speak of a reason acting unconsciously in the world, he adds, can only mean that blind forces produce a result similar to that which a conscious reason would aim at; and such a claim, as his criticism of the teleological argument has endeavoured to make clear, is incapable of empirical justification. Finally, he urges that the Fichtean doctrine can never show how a self-conscious reason could issue from such blind forces, but we will elaborate this contention at a later point in the present chapter.

In his discussion of personality in the Microcosmus³ Lotze treats the Schellingian and the Hegelian views of the Absolute together. Schelling began as an enthusiastic Fichtean, but later revolted in favour of a more positive treatment of Nature.

¹. sect. 24.
He wished to show that Nature is visible intelligence, and intelligence invisible Nature. It seemed to follow that Nature is, what Fichte had already shown the Ego to be, subject-object. This, however, landed him in a dualism, and Schelling was led thereby into the working out of the Philosophy of Identity, which he later declared to be the only authentic exposition of his views. At this stage he came very powerfully under the influence of Spinoza, and his Supreme Principle soon developed into what Lotze calls it, an Infinite Substance. Not that this is, for Lotze, a term of reproach, for he does not hesitate to characterise his own Absolute in the same way;¹ but for all that, Lotze cannot accept the Schellingian conclusion. In the Philosophy of Religion² he criticises Schelling's characterisation of this Infinite Substance as impersonal reason. The words are easily uttered, he says, but to mean anything by them is a different matter. The impersonal states which we sometimes experience, and to which this view appeals for confirmation, are known only as occurring in personal spirits, and it cannot be shown, he urges, that they are possible in the absence of personality. Those attempts which aim to show how the Absolute, from being impersonal, attains to personality, he continues, concede that it is now in some sense personal, and for the rest, whatever their metaphysical cogency, are entirely devoid of religious value.

Hegel was not satisfied with the way in which, by dropping

¹. Ibid., I, p. 381.  ². sects. 25, 26.
all differentiations, Schelling's Absolute was reached. It seemed to him that Schelling, had he taken seriously his own attempt to regard the Absolute as reason, would have preserved the differentiations within it, and would thus have afforded it, what is quite indispensable, a structure. His own attempt to take seriously the view that the Absolute is reason resulted in his substituting for Schelling's pure Identity the conception of a Self-developing Idea. Elsewhere Lotze has sharply criticised this Hegelian result. In his "History of the German Philosophy since Kant," he contends that Hegel's idea of the Absolute Spirit as merely a Self-developing Idea is not consistent with what his general idea of the dialectic would seem to demand. For the fact that, according to Hegel, Spirit falls into the triad of subjective, objective, and Absolute, would naturally lead us to expect "that absolute spirit . . . . would have returned, . . . only with greater depth of meaning and perfection, to the form that spirit possessed in the first stage of this development, the form, that is to say, of personal, individual Spirit."¹ In the Microcosmus, however, without entering on a separate and detailed criticism of the views of Schelling and Hegel, Lotze merely classes them together as pantheism, and brings two general objections against them. Philosophically he objects to their attitude to the physical, material world. For, he thinks - why, I do not know - they are willing to regard space as real and matter as primary to spirit, while he "could only agree with

¹ cf. Ward, Realm of Ends, p. 171.
Pantheism as a possible conception of the world if it renounced all inclination to apprehend the Infinite Real under any other than a spiritual form. But probably the objection that weighed most heavily with him, and which he here characterises as religious, is their pantheistic suppression of the finite in favour of the Infinite. This to Lotze, the ardent realist striving to do philosophic justice to the legitimate claims of science, was an unpardonable sin. His religious objection, however, is that, in the interests of the mere "formal properties of immensity, unity, eternity, and inexhaustible fulness," such views would sacrifice "all that is of value to the living soul." The thought is not more explicitly developed in the present passage, but he probably has in mind those values which we have noticed in the preceding chapter, and which seem to demand both the independence of spirits and the personality of God.

Underlying all these views of a non-personal Absolute is the belief that self-consciousness, which is fundamental to personality, essentially involves the limitation of self by not-self, and is therefore repugnant to Infinity. This view, so widespread in his day and since, he now sets out to refute. The doctrine of the dependence of self on not-self, he finds, is held in two different senses. On the one hand it is declared to be a necessity of our understanding; on the other it is said to be necessary for the very existence of the self. Lotze deals with each in turn. In the first place, then, it is held that

the Ego **has significance** only as contrasted with the non-Ego, and can be experienced only in the contrast, for the terms that express this contrast are strictly correlative.¹ But to say, as is here done, that "neither of these conceptions has in general any significance apart from its opposition to the other," that each contains "barely the negation of the other," Lotze feels to be "perfectly absurd." If this were so, he contends, neither term could have, or ever acquire, any meaning whatever, and there could be no reason why the soul, which always, on becoming conscious of the distinction, classifies itself as Ego and not as non-Ego, should show this preference. For this to be possible one of the terms must be primary, and it is not difficult, he says, to determine which it is. The very form of the terms, he points out, shows that the Ego alone is positively apprehended, and, he adds, the form is here an accurate indication of what the meaning clearly reveals. What the term non-Ego signifies is in general vague and obscure, and only in this one particular is it made definite, namely, that it is not the Ego. The meaning of the term Ego, on the contrary, is "directly obvious." It should be noticed, further, that, according to Lotze, the vagueness of the term non-Ego is highly significant of its psychological conditions. We have already seen, in discussing his treatment of Anselm's ontological argument, how the vagueness of its terms was interpreted by Lotze as an indication that the conviction which Anselm was striving to express

¹ Microcosmus II, p. 678 ff; Phil. of Relig., p. 62 ff.
was based, not on reason, but on feeling. Here he makes the same suggestion. The indefiniteness of meaning of the term non-Ego indicates, he thinks, that the distinction between it and the Ego is based on feeling - a suggestion that will be worked out more fully in connection with the second view of the meaning of the contrast. Lotze's conclusion, therefore, is that the term Ego is primary, and that it is so because we get through feeling an immediate certainty of self, which may be made clearer by subsequent contrast with the not-self, but which is in itself a sufficient basis of personality.

But it will be urged in reply, Lotze anticipates, that the soul has not been shown to be in a different situation in respect of its apprehension of the self from its position in regard to the perception of colours. If the soul did not possess an original capacity for apprehending colours no apprehension of colour would ever occur, but the actual perception of colour is also dependent on external stimulation. Similarly, it may be urged, this feeling of the self can never arise except at the moment when the Ego is contrasted with the non-Ego. Lotze's reply is to fall back on the fallacious doctrine of representative perception. "In all sensations and perceptions," he says, "what enters consciousness in consequence of such an influence, is invariably nothing but some inner state belonging to the spiritual being, - the sensation or mental representation itself; it is never the reality by means of which the state is brought about." The same is true, he says, of the contrast between the
Ego and the non-Ego. "A reciprocal action with a real non-ego, of such a kind that this as such might enter into consciousness and the ego thus be posited in opposition to this perceived non-ego, never occurs at all." The opposition, in short, is not between the Ego and the non-Ego, but between the Ego and that representation of the non-Ego which is itself but a state of the Ego. All that is necessary, then, for self-consciousness is that the self should be able to distinguish itself from its own states. "A relation to an external reality is not necessary, and, consequently, 'personality' also is not bound to the condition of finiteness, - to wit, to that of being limited by another reality of the same kind." Lotze concedes that in finite persons these states receive their primary impulse from the stimulation of an external world, but this is only because, as finite, they are necessarily parts of this interrelated world. God, on the other hand, cannot be regarded as standing in need of any external stimulus, for it is as absurd to raise, in respect of the movement within God, a question as to its origin as it would be to raise a similar question in respect of the movement within the universe. Lotze has thus shown, he thinks, that, as far as the objection to the personality of the Absolute which arises from the correlative significance of the terms Ego and non-Ego is concerned, the Absolute may be a Person.

In the second place Lotze finds that the dependence of the Ego upon the non-Ego is declared to be a presupposition of its
existence; that is to say, it is maintained that the existence and active influence of a non-Ego is the condition without which the being upon which this influence works could not be an Ego.\(^1\)

Such a doctrine is quite modern, he declares, and is to be regarded as the result of an exaggerated reaction against the point of view which preceded it. The earlier view was that self-consciousness is "an essential and inborn characteristic, without which mind itself would be unthinkable, or by whose presence it is at least distinguished from the self-less soul of the lower animals."\(^2\) The custom in his own day, he points out, was to regard self-consciousness as either the goal of a mental development, or one of its secondary products, and so in either case as the result of a long course of training. Lotze's view is that the truth lies somewhere between these extremes. Self-consciousness involves two thoughts of which the first is "an image of cognition or an image of representation, of that which this subject itself is, and by means of which it distinguishes itself from others."\(^3\) This element in self-consciousness, he concedes, is subject to growth, being gradually enriched by "an accumulation of external and internal experiences," whereby its content becomes clearer and it acquires a wider circumference.

In the *Microcosmus*\(^4\) he indicates some of the stages through which, largely under the influence of the non-Ego, the development of this cognitive element proceeds; but, he is convinced, and this is important for his subsequent argument, however far

2. Ibid., I, p. 248.
it may advance, the process is never complete, so that "self-
consciousness is by no means identical with 'adequate self-
cognition.'" ¹

But this cognitive element, he continues, is not sufficient,
for it alone could never give to our Ego that uniqueness which
is peculiar to it. For such uniqueness the fact of the identity
of knowing subject with known object is not enough. This would
do as a means of distinguishing Egos as a class from non-Egos as
a class, but it would not explain that "fundamental and incom-
parable opposition to all else" which distinguishes my Ego from
all else, whether other Egos or non-personal objects. The
uniqueness of the Ego is one of value, and, like all value, is
apprehended only by means of feelings of pleasure and pain.
"To this end simple feelings of sense are adequate no less than
those more elaborate intellectual ones by which highly developed
minds bring home to themselves the worth and peculiar merit of
their personality." The "crushed worm", though its lack of the
necessary cognitive element would debar it from ever attaining a
consciousness of its Ego, could yet distinguish its own suffering
as its own; "but the consummate intelligence of an angel, did
it lack that feeling, would indeed be capable of keen insight
into the hidden essence of the soul and of things, and in full
light would observe the phenomena of its own self-reflection,
but it would never learn why it should attach greater value to
the distinction between itself and the rest of the world than to

¹ Phil. of Relig., p. 55.
the numerous differences between things in general that presented themselves to its notice."¹ The contention is, in short, that, if the image of our Ego were not rendered unique to start with by its accompaniment of feeling, it cannot be shown how it could ever become unique; and Lotze proceeds to reinforce this view by an examination of certain theories which endeavour to show, without presupposing an original self-experience, how self-consciousness is generated by means of the non-Ego. And first, "the materialistic attempts to generate self-consciousness from all manner of motions in brain-atoms returning upon themselves, are deserving of no respect. As they are unable in general to deduce any 'consciousness' from motions, so is this return of the motions also unable to generate any self-consciousness."²

But those "frequent philosophic assertions" that in a being originally self-less, a purely out-going activity is turned back or reflected, by the resistance of a non-Ego, upon its point of issue, so generating self-consciousness - these assertions are really "not a whit better." Against such views Lotze brings two objections. In the first place, he objects to their employment of analogies which are drawn from the physical world, but which here can have no meaning. Secondly, he contends that, even if in some fashion such an outgoing activity could be turned back upon its point of issue, it has not been, and can never be, made clear how, in the absence of self-feeling, it could apprehend this point as its own self. To be of any value any such theory

¹. Microcosmus I, p. 250.  
². Phil. of Relig., p. 58.
would have to show "how the soul originally produces merely intuitive ideas, and then, in the course of the reciprocal actions of these its individual products, projects also conceptions of non-intuitive subjects to which the aforesaid ideas belong as predicates; that it finally succeeds also in assigning by thought one subject to the totality of all its inner states; and that it thus generates the consciousness of the 'ego' as of that one which is at the same time subject and object of the act of ideation." ¹ But all this, apart from self-feeling, could only serve to distinguish Egos as a class from other objects. In answer to the contention that self-consciousness is a product of training, Lotze has thus insisted that self-consciousness contains as a necessary element, self-feeling, and that this, though it is capable of indirect development as a result of the influence of the non-Ego, is a sufficient basis of personality before any such development has occurred. In other words, his contention is that what is fundamental to personality is not that self-knowledge which is perhaps dependent on the influence of a non-Ego, but self-feeling which is possible without any non-Ego.

We shall break the thread of the argument at this point and essay an estimate of some of its main features. In the first place, it should be freely acknowledged that Lotze's emphasis on the necessity of feeling for self-knowledge, in opposition to those theories which attempt to deduce self-knowledge, and even self-existence, from some kind of purely cognitive activity, is

¹. Ibid., p. 59.
of very high value. This, I think, would be very generally admitted today. Thus, in words that are strongly reminiscent of Lotze, Sorley says,¹ "The feeling of pleasure or displeasure is, I believe, the experience which brings home to a man most convincingly this identity of the self as a continuous life. This experience compels him to a subjectivity of attitude which he cannot confuse with the experience of any one else"; and he refers to the judgment of Varisco that "a subject without feeling would care nothing for itself or anything else - such a subject would have no existence for self, would not strictly exist at all." Bosanquet goes so far as to suggest that a very slight change in the feelings of two selves would sometimes produce their complete mergence,² and, while Pringle-Pattison would not concede this, he also acknowledges the importance of feeling in self-knowledge. We may agree with Lotze, in the second place, that, though our concept of our Ego is capable of becoming larger and more distinct in the course of experience, still there is something present from the first, even before real self-knowledge has arisen, which is the basis of self-knowledge and the necessary foundation of personality. But it does not seem so clear that this is in itself a sufficient basis of personality. In this primitive state we must acknowledge the presence, and perhaps also the predominance, of feeling; but - thirdly - we must ask in what sense, if any, Lotze is justified in equating it with feeling. We have already had occasion to notice the

¹ Moral Values, p. 219.
² Value & Destiny, Ch. II; cf. Bradley, Appearance, p. 101, 106, etc.
prominence of feeling in his thinking. We have seen that he finds the truth that underlies the traditional theistic proofs in an inner emotional urge; and we also pointed out that he regards the undifferentiated datum of religion as feeling, which, in order to become knowledge, must be worked up by the general forms of reason, but much of which never does become knowledge in this way. This is how he regards self-experience also. In what sense, then, can the primary datum of self-consciousness be said to be feeling? The term is employed psychologically in several senses. It is used, firstly, as synonymous with intuition, as an impression produced by an object before it is worked up into knowledge—a usage that would seem at first glance to correspond with Lotze's; it is used, secondly, for a psychosis in which the affective aspect predominates; and, thirdly, it is used for the affective aspect of consciousness. There are probably other usages, but these are sufficient for our purpose. Of these three, the one sense in which we cannot admit that the primary basis of self-consciousness is feeling is the third, yet we fear that this is precisely the one that Lotze often hankered after. For feeling in this sense obviously cannot stand alone; it is always an element in a mental state which involves also cognitive and volitional features; and when it predominates we have feeling in the second sense. In either the first or the second senses of the term, however, feeling may be admitted to be a primary basis of self-consciousness, and perhaps, in this case, the two senses might coincide; but it is at
least arguable that conative, and possibly intellectual, psychoses may have an equal claim to be so regarded.

We must ask, fourthly, how much Lotze has gained by his contentions. He set out to prove, apparently, that the Ego is not necessarily dependent either for its self-knowledge or for its existence on a non-Ego. The first move was to deny that Ego and non-Ego are strictly correlative terms, his ground being that the terms must contain a basis for the contrast before it could ever arise, and that in this case the positive term is clearly primary. But this might be granted without admitting that either term could possess meaning before the contrast arose, unless we grant to feeling a cognitive function. It is in this ambiguity of the term feeling that the source of the difficulty is to be found. Either we must grant to feeling a cognitive function, in which case it alone is a sufficient basis of personality, but then it is impossible to exclude the influence of a non-Ego; or we must endeavour to simplify feeling in order to do away with the necessity of a non-Ego, but then it is not a sufficient basis for personality. But I have argued above that even in the latter case, so far as our experience goes, feeling is indirectly dependent on a non-Ego. And this Lotze is constrained to admit. The question arises, therefore, whether he has not given his whole case away. He admits that, in the case of finite beings, the simplest basis of personality is somehow dependent on the opposition of a non-Ego. Nor can we permit

1. McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, sect. 69.
him to escape this admission by substituting for a real non-Ego the states of the Ego itself; for, apart from the fact that, within our experience of persons, our states are most naturally explained by the operation of a real non-Ego, his is a doctrine of representative perception which, logically developed, dissipates all knowledge. He has also insisted that there can be for the Absolute no non-Ego. "The Absolute, then, has not a characteristic which is admitted to be essential to all finite personality, which is all the personality of which we have any experience."¹ Now Lotze should have regarded this admission, McTaggart argues,² as a reason for denying the personality of the Absolute. For, as he points out, Lotze himself has contended that, since personality and spirit are never separated in our experience, they should never be separated in our theories, as is done by those who maintain that the Absolute is impersonal spirit. But if this be valid, McTaggart urges, it is equally valid to argue against Lotze that, since in our experience personality is never separated from the opposition of a non-Ego, it is illegitimate to believe in a personality where this opposition is not possible. McTaggart has scored a good point against Lotze, but it may be questioned whether it does not bear more against his argument in refutation of the doctrine of an impersonal Absolute than against his views on personality. That this is so McTaggart very grudgingly concedes. "It is abstractly possible," he says, "that in some way utterly inexplicable to us the Absolute may be

¹ McTaggart, Ibid., p. 69. ² Ibid., sect. 72.
personal. But," he adds, "this is the barest and most worthless abstraction of possibility." We may admit that this judgment is correct. Lotze, however, has advanced some weighty reasons for believing that this abstraction of possibility is actual reality. If he could have maintained the position, which he obviously hankered after, that self-feeling is a sufficient basis of personality and that, even in finite persons, the influence of a non-Ego is unnecessary for the production of this feeling, then the way in which the Absolute is personal would no longer have been "inexplicable". But the admission to which he finally comes that this is not possible should have saved him from even the appearance of an attempt to do it.

Now, however, Lotze brings forward a contention that promises to advance his argument considerably. It is not worked out to any great length by him, but he is extremely suggestive. His doctrine that the states of the Ego flow from its own nature, the objective world merely supplying the necessary initial stimulus, is one with which we would not wish unqualifiedly to identify ourselves; but his suggestion that our need of the non-Ego is not a producing cause of our personality but a limitation thereof due to our necessary relation, as finite, to the system of finite existences - this may prove to be a very valuable contribution to the discussion. A perfect personality, he argues, would be thoroughly transparent to itself, a complete unity in action, existing wholly for itself. Personality, in short, is "an ideal, which, like all ideals, belongs only to the Infinite
as unconditioned, but to us, as every good, is only given as conditioned and therefore imperfect." It may be admitted that personality in us is only "a feeble reflection" of perfect personality, and that the proper procedure in the study of personality is to begin with the ideal; but when we come to the further conclusion that the Absolute is therefore a person, certain objections will have to be faced.

McTaggart, it should be noticed, admits neither of these points. 1 "There is no reason to hold," he says, "that a finite person is necessarily an imperfect person," for there is no essential contradiction between determination from without and self-determination, and, indeed, the latter is realised through the former. This would seem to prove that finite personality can be perfect, and to disprove Lotze's contention that perfect personality is possible only for the Infinite. If, that is to say, personality in us is actually imperfect, that is not a necessary consequence of our finitude. If this point is conceded, and it seems to be both valid in itself and consonant with religious aspirations, then Lotze's claim will have to be modified to the extent that, in addition to the existence of a perfect Infinite Person, the possibility of perfect finite persons will have to be admitted. If it is further conceded that, as a matter of fact, personality in finite persons is not perfect, then some explanation of its imperfection other than their finitude will have to be found; but it may still be claimed, with Lotze, that

1. Ibid., sect. 79 - 84.
finitude is not essential to personality. This brings us to McTaggart's second point. "It may be freely admitted," he says, "that a perfect personality is a self-determined whole, not hampered and thwarted from the outside, and that the Absolute is such a whole"; but it does not follow from this, he urges, that the Absolute is a person. For, he continues, "not every self-determined whole is a person, and the Absolute may therefore be self-determined without being personal." It should, I think, be clear enough that this argument of Lotze's, in itself, does not prove the personality of the Absolute. I am not convinced, however, that Lotze intended it as such, even though I have included it among his proofs in the preceding chapter. Rather does his reasoning seem to run as follows. We have good reasons for believing that the Absolute is a person; we have also good reasons for believing that personality as we find it in finite centres is imperfect; therefore, since the Absolute alone is perfect as a person, the natural and reasonable procedure is to argue from the personality of the Absolute to that of the finite centres, and not, as is usually done, in the reverse direction. If this be his contention, McTaggart's argument, while true in its facts, is beside the point.

We have already referred to the contention of some modern Idealists that the Absolute is not personal, but super-personal, and we will not take up again the positive part of their teaching. Certain aspects of their negative doctrine should, however, be referred to; and we will not endeavour to do more than that.
Mr. Bradley charges most of those who insist on what they call "the personality of God" with intellectual dishonesty.¹ For, he says, "the Deity, which they want, is of course finite, a person much like themselves, with thoughts and feelings limited and mutable in the process of time. They desire a person in the sense of a self, amongst and over against other selves;" but, he charges, they pretend to argue for a Deity who is neither finite nor mutable. The justice of this charge in general we are not prepared to debate, but it is obviously applicable to Lotze. For he both claims to be proving the personality of the Absolute, and yet really wants a God who is both mutable and a self which is, in some sense, "amongst and over against other selves." Whether it is possible to show that there is no essential chasm between the two views is also a question more general than we feel called upon to discuss; but we are ready to admit that Lotze has failed to bridge the chasm. This admission is, in fact, but the recognition of that general weakness that we have previously laid bare, namely, his failure to achieve a satisfactory reconciliation between pluralism and monism, or to reject either.

Those who wish to regard the Absolute as a self will have to face also the argument whereby Bradley seeks to show that the concept of the self is full of contradictions, and so is mere appearance.² First he tries to attain a clear definition of what we mean by the self, but every suggestion that occurs to

1. Appearance & Reality, p. 532.
2. Ibid., Chs. IX & X.
him proves unsatisfactory from one point of view or another. This subtle enquiry, and its negative result, inevitably raise the question whether Lotze's handling of the subject is not too dogmatic. He has assumed that we know what we mean when we speak of the Ego and the non-Ego. Bradley would admit that the denotation of the term is in general clear; but his enquiries into its connotation, which of course must decide any particular question of its denotation, reveal a problem that Lotze betrays no suspicion of. Bradley then goes on to ask whether in the self may be found any special experience which will supply the key to the whole puzzle about reality, the puzzle as to the connection of diversity with unity. But he can find no suggestion that is not plainly inadequate and full of contradictions. His conclusion, therefore, is, "The self is no doubt the highest form of experience which we have, but, for all that, is not a true form. It does not give us the facts as they are in reality; and, as it gives them, they are appearance, appearance and error." In Wallace's opinion, personality is "only a position assumed to mark out and define individual existence." Its ideal involves a contradiction. On the one hand, "the complete penetration of all that comes within the compass of the person" involves the distinction between mine and thine; but, on the other hand, this distinction is eliminated by the essential universality of the mine. Whether there is in this any necessary contradiction may, I think, be seriously questioned. However, to continue with

1. Lectures & Essays, p. 278.
Wallace, the only limitation of this universality can come from other personalities, and hence a person, he contends, is necessarily a member of a world. The Absolute is therefore, he concludes, incapable of personality. For Bosanquet, the limitations of finite persons, though they doubtless have some value, are merely de facto; they are dependent on feeling, which again is dependent on our bodily constitution. Selves are adjectival, not substantial; they are elements in, not members of, the Absolute. He is able to hold this view because, for him, a self is merely a focus of content, the emphasis being laid on the "content" and the "focus", perhaps, hardly receiving serious consideration. These finite selves finally lose their individuality in the Absolute, in which they are maintained, if we may properly say this of them, only through the realisation and preservation of the values which they pursued in this life. He speaks of the universe as a conscious being; but it is not personal, because personality, he thinks, involves that finiteness which is transcended in the Absolute.

Throughout our discussion of Lotze's theistic argument we have referred frequently to more modern thinkers, not that we wish to discuss their views, or feel competent to do so, but rather to indicate the broader aspects of the subject, the features of Lotze's work that are still received favourably, and the way in which the discussion has moved on since his day. We may perhaps summarise our results as follows. Lotze has brought forward arguments, some of which are still regarded as weighty by
thinkers of considerable authority, in favour of the personality of God, by which he means the Absolute. He has endeavoured to show that Infinity is not repugnant to Personality. This argument resolves itself into the contention that arguments from personality in us to personality in God are moving in the wrong direction, and this, in addition to his insistence on the necessity of feeling for self-consciousness, is his reply to those who begin from finite persons and conclude that finiteness is a condition of personality. Both of these points, in general, we were willing to accept. But we have seen that his discussion is weak in some of its details, that he takes more for granted than he was justified in doing, that the precise definition of some of his principle terms is lacking - a point which he himself urged against the traditional cosmological argument - , and that an attempt has since been made by extremely influential thinkers to undermine the very foundations on which rest those of his arguments that appear to be most convincing.

We must now leave the problem of personality, and glance briefly at a feature of Lotze's thinking that has been most frequently criticised, namely, his lack of a final system. We have already referred to it in the foregoing pages, and indicated what we regard as one of its most important causes, namely, his preoccupation with the task of sifting and analysis. This is perhaps the natural consequence of his somewhat exaggerated reaction against system-building as it confronted him in Hegelianism. At present we are interested in only one of its aspects
which we have called the problem of Lotze's sources. This in itself is a subject which would demand, for its adequate discussion, a thorough perusal of all his writings and much more space than we can devote to it; but we are bound to say something, however inadequate, on the subject. We find Lotze continually defending some doctrine, perhaps greatly purged from its accepted form, by describing it as a legitimate demand of science, of metaphysics, of living feeling; it is an aesthetic longing, or religion needs it, and so forth. Two questions arise at once - first, how does he determine what is, and what is not, a legitimate demand in any of these fields?; and, second, what has he done to bring these potential contestants into an ultimate harmony? To answer the second question one would need to do for all the strands in Lotze's thinking what Sir Henry Jones has done mainly for his logic;\(^1\) and this task would be complicated by the fact, which we have noticed, that Lotze died before he was able to finish the exposition of his views. We have already noticed his tendency to make feeling the ultimate test, and have hinted that such a solution cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Nothing more can be done by us at present in this connection. The first question is also much wider than we can attempt at this late stage, but it is also, fortunately, much wider than our purposes involve. Our question rather is, How has he determined what is, and what is not, a legitimate demand of religion? Even in this restricted field we must be content to be suggestive, and not

\(^1\) cf. The Philosophy of Hermann Lotze.
We have seen how he regards religious knowledge as the result of the application of the forms of reason to data which he is willing to describe as due to the stimulation of our feeling by the Deity. This would lead us to expect that, for him, religion is an independent means for the attainment of knowledge, but his carefully guarded expressions in the opening section of the Philosophy of Religion suggest a doubt as to how definitely he is willing to stand by such a conclusion. When, in the fourth section of the same work, he turns to determine what kinds of feeling serve as the basis of religious knowledge, he leaves the way open for it, however, by recognising feelings of fear and dependence; but, though he concedes their effectiveness, he emphasises also their crudity in contrast with the nobler aesthetic and moral feelings which, along with them, exhaust the kinds of feeling in this connection. A religious doctrine, then, one gathers, must be based on a demand of feeling in one or more of these three forms, and, since all doctrines are the product of reflection, they must all, apparently, meet the test of metaphysical consistence. Lotze, however, as we have seen, is inclined to reduce the latter to the former, and to make the test of intuition ultimate. Unfortunately, when he is concerned with the actual decision as to whether any particular doctrine, as it stands or in some modified form, is essential to religion, he is not always, indeed not often, careful to indicate which of the various tests determines his conclusion. What is more, he
sometimes actually contrasts a religious need with one or other of the elements which, we were led to believe, constitute religion. Thus his objection to the attempt to show how an impersonal Absolute became personal is that "an account of the way in which this result is reached is demanded by no religious need, but at the very most only by speculative curiosity." Of course he is contrasting the practical interest of religion with the less directly practical interest of speculation, and in ordinary thinking such a contrast is legitimate enough; but in a study of the Philosophy of Religion it should be clearly recognised both that no interest is purely speculative, without practical bearings, and that, if reflection is indispensable to the formulation of a religious doctrine, it is highly improper to draw such an unqualified contrast between their respective claims. Again; he bases the doctrine of God's eternity on two foundations, - on the religious need for security, and on the aesthetic impressiveness of the idea, - and he further emphasises the implied contrast between these two bases by declaring that the latter is "apart from every religious need." But if aesthetic feeling is one of the sources of religious knowledge, how can an aesthetically imposing idea be thus apart from every religious need? He offers certain interpretations of the doctrines of God's Unity, Omnipresence, and Omnipotence, which, he claims, are really what religion means to assert, but, in case we are not willing to accept his interpretations, we are not told how our false

1. Phil. of Relig., sect. 26. 2. Ibid., sect. 31.
conceptions and his truer insight are to be recognised as such by us. We are told that religious faith in the personality of God, though it is involved in the metaphysical attributes, as he has shown us, is actually arrived at by means of "familiar motives that lie nearer at hand." What he means by this we are left to infer for ourselves; but one fears that a son of India who sought in Lotze's writings for some enlightenment as to where his people have erred in thinking that religion does not demand a personal object at all would receive very little satisfaction. It should be noticed that we are not now criticising the decisions which Lotze makes as to what are the necessary doctrines of religion. It seems to us that he had a much keener insight in this respect than many of those who come to religion from philosophy with views already formed in the latter field. We have called in question only his indication of the grounds on which he bases these judgments, and it seems to us that he was probably influenced far more than he should have been by his religious environment. He seems to have largely overlooked the fact that his was a judgment educated in a particular religious tradition; but if he is going to decide for himself, on some principle of his own, what is essential for religion, then surely he should clearly indicate his principle, apply it consistently, and take into impartial consideration - unless he can justify some other course - the chief religious judgments of all mankind. But further; within the Christian environment on which he so largely, perhaps unconsciously, relies, there is a wide diversity
of judgments. Surely we have a right to expect some indication of his method of solving these diversities. There is, for instance, the difference between trinitarianism and unitarianism. Lotze, as far as I can find, has no doctrine of the Holy Spirit at all, and he is willing to go with trinitarianism only as far as it intends to assert the unique value of Christ. He would obviously prefer that this subject be left in the realm of feeling, since it cannot receive adequate expression. The doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ, precious to many Christians of general culture, is based, he thinks, on a crude conception of God, and on an "altogether impossible conception of a solidaric unity of the human race and of the possibility of a transfer of its guilt and obligation to a single representative." The ideas of Reconciliation and Redemption do not specify the captivating power from which we are released. He thinks it must be the "order of natural law, which has connected sin with our finiteness and condemnation with our sin" - an idea that most Christians, we imagine, would repudiate. Evidently he will not credit the doctrines of a Fall, a Personal Devil, or the principle of representation. Speculations as to the origin of sin and as to its consequences are, he thinks, "perfectly useless as regards the religious life"; nor does Eschatology permit of being speculatively cultivated. It is obvious, of course, that in every one of these opinions, there are many people who cannot agree with him; but whether we agree or not, in the absence of any sufficient principle of decision, his adherence to them
ceases to have anything more than a biographical importance.

In closing this review of his theistic philosophy, we owe it to Lotze to indicate what we regard as his chief merits; and here we shall leave behind all question of the details of his argument. Philosophies must be judged, like persons, as much by their aims as by their deeds, and Lotze's has three which we wish especially to commend. In the first place, we think it one of his outstanding merits that he aimed to give due weight, not only to man's intellect, but also to the claims of feeling, of aesthetics, of morality, and of religion; and that he was willing to do this even if it must be done at the expense of a final system. He saw clearly that, in building a system, intellect has its materials supplied to it from various sources; that systems become coldly "rationalistic" when they unduly limit these sources; and, though he did show a tendency to confuse the intellect with the sources, he is to be commended for the fact that, in the collection of his data, he cast his net wide. A second merit is, perhaps, but an aspect of the first. He clearly recognised that a theistic argument, in particular, cannot shut itself up too closely. It must plant its feet on solid ground, he thought, and so its point of origin should be simple and in itself undoubted. In this, perhaps, he was influenced by the tendency which we have noticed in him towards what Bosanquet calls the "centrifugal type" of illusion, an attempt to take a "form of immediateness, understood as excluding mediation, for an absolute and reliable datum"; but he quickly recovers himself,
if this be so, by offering a metaphysical proof of his starting-point. When, however, he has deduced from this all that he feels it will legitimately yield, he then proceeds, with a magnificent sweep, to press the whole world of experience into the service of his argument. In this, we are convinced, he manifests a true insight. And finally, we wish to indicate one decided merit in Lotze's attitude to the cosmological argument. Most of the forms of it which we examined in our opening chapter involve the idea of God as the final member of what would otherwise be an infinite causal regress. His remarks on the form which he takes as typical are not careful, as we saw in our second chapter, to differentiate between this idea and one that may be more satisfactory; in the elaboration of his own argument, however, he is arguing, not for a First Mover, an Initiator of the causal series of which the present universe is a stage, but for a present Cause who is, in theological terms, not a deistic Creator, but a sustaining Providence. Whatever one may think of the former idea, it certainly is not sufficient without the latter, and if only one is to be adhered to the latter is clearly preferable. This idea is clearly recognised by Lotze in its distinction from the other, and is deliberately chosen by him. Many passages might be quoted to show this, but one will suffice. In the Microcosmus, he is discussing the problem as to whether and in what sense God may be said to have willed the world, and, with certain reservations,

he finds the expression acceptable. Then he adds, "It is only for the finite being that will is principally an impulse towards change, towards the establishment of something which did not exist; but the real nature of will is only the approval by which the being that wills attributes to himself that which he wills, whether it is something that is to be realised in the future, or something that exists in eternal reality." He has, in other words, broken away from that idea of the exclusive transcendence of God which is implied in the eighteenth century cosmological arguments, and has endeavoured to work out one that will do more justice to God's immanence.