CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE RELIGIOUS
POSITION OF JOSIAH ROYCE

A THESIS PRESENTED
TO
THE DIVINITY FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

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By

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AS A CANDIDATE FOR
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CHAPTER I

THE MAN — HIS INHERITANCE AND TRAINING

"There is a divinity that shapes our ends," and it begins before we are born. Preceding all our choices and plans there may be influences that are primary in directing our course and determining our career. These forces may be parental, political, economic, social or religious.

Often, a man's thinking and achievements owe far more to the lasting impress of his home or neighborhood, than to the spirit and traditions of the schools in which he was trained.

I - Early Influences

Royce's first important book on Philosophy was entitled, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. Thus early he struck the note of religious loyalty and from that time on his philosophical work and thinking were closely related to religion and theology.

Prof. John Wright Buckham characterizes this book, which Royce wrote at the age of thirty, as a "fresh and vigorous volume," and says that it came "from the reaction of a deeply reverent and penetrative mind, trained in a home of piety and a church of power."

In the study of Royce's lectures one often wonders why it is, that while he rejects some of the main positions of mysticism, yet he does it in a spirit of clinging interest and manifest sympathy. In fact, the mystical blending and reinforcement which Royce discounted has now been adopted by a present
day idealist, William Ernest Hocking, of Harvard, who is one of the most distinguished of his followers. But we get a clear insight into this element of his nature, when we read the book recently published under the title, A Frontier Lady, by Sarah Royce.

Sarah Royce was Josiah Royce's mother. The book is the story of the journey of the Royce family to California in the Gold Rush of '49. Josiah was not yet born. The family consisted of his father and mother and Mary Royce, the oldest child.

That was a hard, exhausting and almost fatal journey for them all. Starting from Iowa by ox-wagons in the early spring they did not reach California until late in the fall.

They barely escaped being hemmed in by the deep snows in the mountains and would have certainly perished if they had not been rescued by two men engaged in government relief work, who went over the mountains, irrespective of orders, to meet them. These two men of the mountains had instructions to go only to a certain point. But arriving there, they heard of a party that was coming, and in the party was a woman with a little girl. The call of humanity drew them days and days beyond their usual destination, and they were hailed by Mrs. Royce as angels of deliverance. Such experiences as this, in the long journey, tested and revealed the religious faith of Sarah Royce.

As she tells her own story her personal faith is described. She is an undoubted and unwavering mystic. The Eternal is an ever present and working reality. The very angels of his mercy and protection are encamped upon the long trail and this Power
brings them to the desired haven. Into this home six years after the arrival of the family in California, Josiah Royce, the only boy, was welcomed. He was born in the little mining town of Grass Valley on the east side of the Sacramento Valley. Here his elementary years were spent and his early schooling was received.

One who reads the words of Royce is struck with his favorable attitude toward mysticism. This comes out particularly in his World and the Individual. He has only to place himself in the home in which Royce was reared, and to become acquainted with his mother, who was a devout Christian mystic, with a profound and practical faith, to understand what the boy must have inherited, and possibly, all through his life suppressed. It is the opinion of the writer that if he had put into his books, all the mysticism that he had naturally in his heart, the sum total of his vast teachings would have been more rich and powerful, more true, and more appealing, than it has proved to be.

When Josiah Royce was born, in 1855, the State of California was still new, and isolated, from the more populous states of the Union, on the eastern seaboard, and east of the Mississippi River.

Around him, important history was being made. Though the first great wave of the Gold Rush was over, still it had been only six years since that movement began, and that Sacramento Valley was a thoroughfare for fortune seekers from all the world.

Though the tide had receded, the outstanding marks and
monuments of the great invasion were still fresh and familiar, in the days of his boyhood.

Such movements awaken far-reaching social and political problems. These tax the profoundest philosophies of the schools and the ablest political sagacity.

When he was six years old, the war between the states, over the institution of slavery, began. It ended four years later, with the freedom of the slaves, and the assassination of Abraham Lincoln.

This murder of Lincoln, made a deep impression on the growing boy. He says: "Since I grew during the civil war, heard a good deal about it from people near me, but saw nothing of the consequences of the war through closer inspection, I remained as vague about this matter as about most problems, vague but often enthusiastic. My earliest great patriotic experience came at the end of the civil war, when the news of the assassination of Lincoln reached us. Thenceforth, as I believe, I had a country as well as a religious interest."

Soon we find him in the grammar school at San Francisco, from 1866-71, where he spent five profitable, if not altogether pleasant, years. Looking back from his sixtieth birthday, he briefly recounts his experience: "I was one of a thousand boys. The ways of training were new to me. My comrades very generally found me disagreeably striking in my appearance, by reason of the fact that I was red-headed, freckled, countrified, quaint, and unable to play boys' games.

The boys in question gave me my first introduction to the
majesty of the community.'

The introduction was impressively disciplinary and persistent. On the whole it seemed to me 'not joyous but grievous.'

In the end it probably proved to be for my good. Many years later, in a lecture contained in the first volume of my Problem of Christianity, I summarized what I remember of the lesson of the training which my school-mates very frequently gave me, in what I there have to say about the meaning which lies behind the Pauline doctrine of original sin as set forth in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans."

II - University Years

Royce began his studies in the new State university at Berkeley in 1871. Here he had the good fortune to be under the teaching of Edward Rowland Sill, poet and Professor of English. Another great teacher was Joseph Le Conte, philosophic geologist, evolutionist, and earnest Christian. No one can tell what a molding and determining influence these great leaders had upon the future of Royce. In these days in university he read the books of Mill and Spencer.

Thus, Dr. Le Conte and Edward Rowland Sill stood before him in the flesh, he was associated with them in the class-room, and they guided him as he groped his way to knowledge.

They also taught him to understand himself. The one taught of origins, and the ascent of man from the lowest forms of life, and made his teachings consonant with the principles of the Christian faith. The other helped him in expressing to the

world what he had discovered and what he believed.

Though he met Mill and Spencer only in books, their pages had life, and any student of philosophy, however immature, will be inspired by these two great masters.

Graduating from the university at the age of twenty, his progress had been so satisfactory, and his future was so promising, that a group of gentlemen came forward with the necessary aid to insure his further study in Germany.

In Germany Royce attended several of the universities. It may be said that he came profoundly under the influence of Kant and Schopenhauer and the Romantic writers. He listened to Lotze at Gottengen and was deeply impressed by him. Later came the great influence of Hegel and with it, or a little after it, the influence of Thomas Hill Green and both the Cairds.

Home from Germany, he found Johns Hopkins University just opening and he here took his doctor's degree in 1878.

III - At Berkeley and Harvard

This was followed by four years of teaching in rhetoric and logic in the University of California. But he was destined to make only a short stay at his alma mater. Rhetoric and logic were not to be his life-work. However important they were as a preparation in argument and expression, they were only a preparation. A loftier theme was to engage his maturer years. In 1882 Professor James of Harvard was leaving for a year. Professor James and Professor George Herbert Palmer made request of President Eliot that Royce be invited to accept this temporary appointment. It was made, and Royce with his characteristic
courage accepted. He had a wife and baby, and the salary was only one thousand dollars for the year, and he had no assurance of further teaching at Harvard; but he made the venture. His work was so well accepted that the next year Professor Palmer decided to take his own sabbatical year which was long overdue, and this gave Royce the opportunity for a second year. By the end of the second year the entire University was convinced that Royce could not be spared, and he was employed the third year as instructor, and the fourth year, he became an assistant professor, in 1885, and a little later, a full professor, taking the place of Professor Palmer himself.

In this position he continued until his death in 1916.

IV - His Scholarship and Philosophic System

His outlook on life was large and seemingly inexhaustible. To quote from Professor Palmer: "All knowledge was his province. Among his specialties were psychology, logic, ethics, metaphysics, the philosophies of nature and religion; he knew - none better - the course which philosophy had taken since its rise; had elaborate acquaintance with mathematics, biology, and most of the natural sciences which relate to man; he wrote a novel and history of California; music and poetry were the arts that moved him, and he was at home in the literature of England, Germany, France, and Italy. Yet the living man was never lost in the scholar".

As is well known, the heart of his idealistic philosophy was the all-embracing Absolute. Unshaken loyalty to this

1. Barrett, Contemporary Idealism in America, p. 8
sovereign Person was for him the whole of religion. What form it took at different times and in different lectures will constitute a part of our study.

In his lectures on *The Problem of Christianity*, which are among his latest, his Absolute takes the form of the Community, which is referred to as the Great Community, the Ideal Community, or the Beloved Community. His last days were filled with the thoughts of the World War. By many articles, and on the public platform, he was urging the intervention of the United States on the side of the allies.

It seemed to him that his entire hope of the Great Community was in imminent danger of being overwhelmed.

He did not live long enough to witness the declaration of war by his nation, and, doubtless, died very much disappointed, and quite uncertain, what the future of his Community or any Community was to be.

The world as it stands today, seventeen years after his death, is a world in confusion, and presents a very discouraging prospect of his major hope and theme, the Great Community.
CHAPTER II
DEVELOPMENT OF HIS SYSTEM

Royce's first book on Philosophy was, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. It was written at the age of thirty and marked him from the beginning as essentially a religious philosopher. For nearly thirty years after this, all his great books had to do with religion or theology. This seems to have been a definite and preconceived intention during that period. For, while stating at the very beginning of the preface to this early volume, that he is sketching the basis of a system of philosophy while applying the principles of this system to religious problems, he gives notice at once, why the religious problems have been chosen.

I - Religious Problems

In his own words we get his high estimate of the importance of religious problems. He writes: "The religious problems have been chosen for the present study because they drove the author to philosophy, and because they, of all human interests, deserve our best efforts and our utmost loyalty."

It was, particularly, the narrow and limited conception of God that was held both by the liberal and conservative churches of that time that awakened his ringing challenge, and aroused his indignant criticism. He condemns the "little contemptible private notion and dim feeling of God." He warns against "your own little pet infinite that is sublime to you mainly be-

2. Ibid, Introduction, p. 13
cause it is yours." He then compares the traditional arguments to "medieval artillery on a modern battlefield." Over against such a conception he defines God as Universal Thought, and, as such, proceeds to interpret him.

He claims completeness for his theory, stating that it "makes experience as a whole possible. This theory which we offer as the one rational account of the nature of truth, is the doctrine that the world is in and for a thought, all-embracing, all-knowing, universal, for which are all relations and all truth, a thought that estimates perfectly our imperfect and halting thoughts, a thought in which and for which are we all." He holds that no other view is valid: "No other view, as we shall affirm, offers any chance of a philosophy, or any hope of even a rational scientific notion of things."

He also characterizes the design-argument and the general argument from causality as "baseless figments."

II - Nature and Possibility of Error

The study of the nature and possibility of error is the path by which he comes to his proof of this Being of Universal Thought.

Royce admits that he once held a doctrine that expressed itself for him as that of the total relativity of truth. But he was led through the depths of an imperfectly defined skepticism to this general truth: "All but the immediate content of the present moment's judgment, being doubtful, we may be

2. Ibid, Epilogue, p. 476
3. Ibid, p. 380
4. Ibid, p. 476
in error about it."

But now arises the question, What is an error and how is it possible? When a man says that an opinion is an error does he mean simply that he does not like it or does he mean that he ought not to like it? He means that he would not be right-minded if he did accept it, but also, because an ideal judge would not accept it. He then declares that error arises where a judgment fails to agree with its object. Every judgment true or false has an object at which it aims. But the object intended by the false judgment would be also the object corresponding to the true judgment. Then, if there is any such thing as error at all, both the true and false judgment must be contained in a universal and all-inclusive thought, to which time is present in all its moments once for all, this thought being Absolute Truth and Absolute knowledge, to which judgments true and false are but fragments.

Error, he defines as a judgment that does not agree with its object. But no single judgment can be an error. The false judgment can be an error only as it is included together with its completed object in a higher thought. The higher thought is then the whole truth of which the error is only a fragment. But the possibilities of error are infinite. So must be the inclusive thought. Hence, we cannot stop short of the Infinite Thought. By the path of error which is indubitable he reaches the proof of an Absolute Truth and an all-inclusive and Infinite and Universal Thought. And to this Universal Thought, which is Absolute Truth and Absolute Knowledge, time in all its moments
Before leaving this first book by Royce on the subject of religious philosophy, we want to record two statements made on the closing pages, which may come in for more careful examination later. He is dealing with the question of moral evil. On pages 444-5 he says: "Unsatisfied desire exists only in the finite beings, not in the inclusive infinite. The world then, as a whole, is and must be absolutely good, since the infinite thought must know what is desirable, and knowing it, must have present in itself the true objects of desire. ................. However stubborn this evil is for us, that has naught to do with the perfection of the Infinite. For the Infinite did not make this evil, but the evil, together with the making of it, which indeed was also in its separateness evil,- all this is a phenomenon for the infinite thought, which, in knowing this evil, merely knows the absolute desirableness of that which it also possesses, namely, the absolute good."

We quote now from pages 457 and 459. On 457 he writes:

"God’s life includes, in the organic total of one conscious eternal instant, all life, and so all goodness and evil. To say that God is nevertheless perfectly good is to say, not that God is innocent, knowing of no evil whatever, and including none; but that he so includes the evil will in the structure of his good will, as the good man, in one indivisible moment, includes his evil will in his good will; and that God is good only because he does so."

Then on page 459 he adds: "Goodness is this organism of
struggling elements. Now, as we declare, in the infinite and united thought of God this unity of goodness is eternally present. God's life is this infinite rest, not apart from but in the endless strife, as in substance Heraclitus so well and originally taught."

We note here also that Royce states at the close of this book that he is quite indifferent whether any one calls the result of his work Theism or Pantheism. He declares that if it is philosophy "traditional Theism can do what it pleases about the matter."

He then claims that his doctrine is the same as the Prologue of John's Gospel: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."

III - The World of Description and the World of Appreciation

Royce's next book, published in 1892, is a very substantial and attractive volume of lectures, entitled, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. For three hundred pages he tells the story of modern philosophy. He discusses at length the systems of Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer and contemporary and related authors.

Then, coming down to the rise of the doctrine of evolution, he declares that his attitude so far has been that of the chronicler. But now he is going to lay aside that attitude positively and finally and from this time on he will risk his own positive creed.

This book is a considerable advance upon his former lec-

1. Royce, Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 477
2. Cf. The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, pp. 304, 305
tures and studies, for he here develops his "World of Description," and his "World of Appreciation."

The World of Description is the world of the physically real, it is the world of natural science. It has form, categories, universality. It is the world that is describable, and in short, a world of rigid necessity.

The World of Appreciation, on the other hand, is a world such as a community of spiritual mind-readers might share, it is the world that the organic Self might view at a glance.1

This world of description represents only certain aspects of our conscious life, for the real objects revealed to us in physical science are describable in universal terms. Our description must take on the fashion of universals in order to be understood by intelligent beings.2

But it is obvious that there is another world not describable in terms of space and time, not revealed in the aspects of the physical world. The world of description is inadequate.

If I could look my friend through and through, I might observe system upon system, a quivering mass of molecules. I should behold a world of facts in time and space but in this world my friend would not be found, but lost. But here are his will, his character, his inner thoughts. Here are his wisdom and his approval and the many private facts of his inner life. They are a reality revealed to me through my will and my faith and my thought.

These things are facts. They are not describable in space

1. Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, P. 397
2. Ibid, p. 398
and time. The answer to all this is found in the world of appreciation. Both my friend and I are members of that world. We belong together in the inclusive transcendency of the larger Self. The world of science presupposes this, the spiritual oneness of this true Self "through and through His Own".

Here, then, in this world of appreciation, in this world of time - transcending completeness we find the world of value, that of real worth. It is the abiding world, the world of ideals.

He suggests that it is like Paul's charity but is not less self-conscious because it seeketh not its own and rejoiceth in the truth. "It stands for the unity of self-consciousness of the one Spirit, whom all finite things and experiences presuppose."

The important additions that he makes in this book, to his former conception of the Divine Being are found in the "World of Appreciation" and the world of worth or value.

IV - The Conception of God.

Now we note a very significant and fruitful advance upon Royce's former ideas in the proceedings of a remarkable philosophic conference held at the University of California, at Berkeley, in 1895.

At this conference Royce made the brilliant and absorbing address with which the conference opened, on "The Conception of God." The proceedings of this conference are found in Bulletin No. 15 of The Philosophical Union of the University of California and the proceedings are published in book form under the title,

1. Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, pp. 405-410
2. Ibid, pp. 412-413
"The Conception of God."

Here Royce defined God as an Omniscient Being. He interpreted such a being as possessing Absolute Thought and Absolute Experience. Having a complete and universal union of Absolute Thought and Absolute Experience, such an Omniscient Being would be technically called The Absolute. This means that he is sufficient unto himself and that his thought and experience are completely organized.

He brings an argument from our science as an appeal from our own inadequate and fragmentary experience to the contents or objects of a conceived or ideal experience which we call an organized experience. "An organized experience would be one that found a system of ideas fulfilled in and by its facts."

Our immediate experience is always fleeting and fragmentary. We can conceive infinitely more than we can directly verify. We therefore construct conceptions and proceed by hypotheses, prediction, and verification, to link up the fragments of our momentary flight of sensations with the content of an organized experience.

He holds that this conceived object of an ideal organized experience is in reality present to that experience just as truly as our sensory experiences are present to us.\(^1\)

But it may be claimed that there exists only a totality of finite experience. But such a proposition could be present as a fact only to an absolute experience. A totality of experience which is not itself an absolute experience is a self-contradiction.

2. Ibid, pp. 22,23
Experience in its entirety must constitute one absolute and organized whole.¹

For, a final experience that would declare that there was nothing beyond itself, that it knew the world in its fragmentariness as an absolute fact beyond which there was no reality, would itself be an all-inclusive experience. It turns out that: "the very effort to deny the absolute experience involves, then, the absolute assertion of such an absolute experience."²

In closing this persuasive and profound essay or address, Royce affirms that his conception of the Divine as here presented is essentially identical with that of Thomas Aquinas and that it undertakes to be not pantheistic, but theistic.

Then he declares himself to be in substantial agreement with the fathers. For he says: "For my own part, then, while I wish to be no slave of tradition, I am certainly disposed to insist that what the faith of our fathers has genuinely meant by God, is, despite all the blindness and unessential accidents of religious tradition, identical with the outcome of a reflective philosophy."³

This address by Professor Royce brought out immediately a very searching and incisive criticism from Professor Howison who presided at this conference. He represented what may be termed the distinctly personalistic view in the discussion.

So effective was this criticism that Royce wrote in reply a supplementary essay that is included, not in the bulletin of the Philosophic Union, but in the book entitled, The Conception of God, University of California Philosophical Union Bulletin No. 15, p. 30

¹ Cf. Royce, The Conception of God, University of California Philosophical Union Bulletin No. 15, p. 30
² Ibid, pp. 31,32
³ Ibid, pp. 35,36
of God, which is a much larger edition. The essay deals with the process of individuation in the Absolute.

In this Supplementary Essay that was brought out by the criticism of Howison and others, but especially by that of Howison, Royce introduces Will or the Divine Love as the Principle of Individuation. He makes the Individual the object of an exclusive interest or affection.¹

He then leads up to both the Absolute and the finite individuals as self-conscious and free.

The Absolute is the only ultimately and absolutely whole individual. He embodies one Will, and realizes it in the unity of one life. Every finite individual is real and moral and self-conscious. He too is unique in everything as far as the moral order requires him to be. He is free in his own measure, so that there is an aspect of his nature where nothing in all the universe, except his own choice, can determine him in that aspect of his nature. His consciousness cannot be shared by any other finite individual, neither can any other take his place or accomplish his ideal.

He is unique because he sets before himself his own Moral Goal which is the object of his exclusive interest, and, moreover, no other finite individual could reach that goal or fulfill his interest in it. In view of these principles just stated, Royce declares that there is no conflict between them, that the unique Absolute Individual with his inclusive unity, freedom, and self-possession, does not hinder the finite individuals in their separateness, choice, relative freedom, the relation of

¹ Cf. Royce, Conception of God, 2nd Ed., pp. 258-265
the contents of their lives, in so far as their grade of reality goes, and in what the moral order demands. It may not be necessary to dwell further on this discussion. It is evident to any one who reads it, that it is only preliminary to his great work that comes a few years later. This essay with its broader conception, and grasp of his great subject, was only a fore-runner and a preparation for his masterpiece which came in his Gifford Lectures in 1899 and 1900. These lectures were delivered at the University of Aberdeen and were published in two large volumes under the title, *The World and the Individual*. In this work, The Absolute, as Royce represents and interprets it, reaches full fruition; and in these two volumes he has given us one of the most sustained and impressive treatises of any American philosopher. The title of the work itself, *The World and the Individual*, is prophetic, and assuring, of the broadening, enlarging, and deepening thought, of the growing and progressive author.

V - His Conception of Being in The World and The Individual

In his preface to *The World and The Individual*, Royce tells us that in his first book he deliberately used the term Thought as the best name for the final unity of the Absolute.

He used the term then in such a way as to include in it both Will and experience. But now he sees that he has not given them enough emphasis. They have since become more prominent and central in his interests. For this reason, he now makes a deliberate effort to bring into synthesis more fully than he has ever

done before, "the relations of knowledge and will in our conception of God."

He, therefore, takes up here as his central theme for discussion, the place and concept of Individuality and carries out more fully the discussion to which we have just alluded, which appears in his, Supplementary Essay in the book entitled, The Conception of God.¹

As Royce presents his program and outlines his plan for his two series of lectures on The World and the Individual, he defines an "Idea" as follows: "Any state of consciousness, whether simple or complex, which, when present, is then and there viewed as at least the partial expression or embodiment of a single conscious purpose." By this single conscious purpose he makes the idea appear in inner consciousness as an act of will, and he here declares it to be his intention to dwell upon this inner purpose of the idea as its primary and essential nature rather than upon its outer or external relations².

He proposes to use the term, "Idea" like the creative idea of the artist, as representative of a fact beyond itself which it partially embodies. In so far as this fulfilled purpose gets itself expressed in the complex state that is called an idea, this partial expression is the Internal Meaning of the Idea³.

And now, in his introduction to the first volume of lectures on The World and the Individual he makes this plain statement of what he conceives his task to be:

3. Ibid, p. 25
"This consideration, that despite the seemingly hopeless contrast between internal and external meaning, ideas really possess truth or falsity only by virtue of their own selection of their task as ideas, is essentially the same as the consideration that led Kant to regard the understanding as the creator of the phenomenal nature over which science gradually wins conscious control, and that led Hegel to call the world the embodied Idea."  

He believes this consideration, just stated, to be of fundamental importance, and for this reason he will devote this course of lectures to a study of its relations to the various conceptions of Reality which "have determined the scientific and religious life of humanity." The completely expressed Internal Meaning of the Idea will involve finally the External Meaning of the Idea as an aspect of itself. This is his thesis for the relation of Idea and Being and his theory of the entire World Life.  

His definition of what it means "to be," follows upon this consideration: "To be means simply to express, to embody the complete internal meaning of a certain absolute system of ideas,—a system moreover, which is genuinely implied in the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea, however fragmentary."  

When I proceed to the limit of my internal meaning I face Being. To be able to pass from our fragmentary internal meaning of an idea in its vagueness and incompleteness to its completeness would be to gain that precision and determined character,
the bestimmt of Hegel. But this in its finality would be to know what I am as an Individual, what the Being called the World is, and what the Individual of Individuals, "namely, the Absolute, or God himself is."

His whole issue here is stated as the "relation between Ideas and Reality." He comes to it through the Internal and External Meaning of Ideas.¹

Royce gives us next a rather vivid picture of Thought warring with the brute facts of our nature. Our ideas have purpose, they have meaning, but the meaning is not complete and we are continually warring against the narrowness of our conscious field. The matter of living and looking for the full meaning of ideas he calls thinking.

Thinking is winning over facts to ideas and if the facts were fully interpreted they would fuse with the ideas. With the facts thoroughly interpreted and ideas and facts fusing, the conflict of Thought and Being would be ended.²

But now he has brought us to the question as to what constitutes Being. Out of the conflict of Fact and Idea, Immediacy and Thought how are we to gain this Other, this true Being which when gained will end our conflict?

He then presents the Four Fundamental Conceptions of Being:

I. Realistic

II. Mystical

III. Critical Rationalism

IV. Synthetic Idealism

2. Ibid, pp. 56-58
In the First Conception, the Real is that which is absolutely independent of what we think about it. Our thinking about it makes no difference with the facts.

In the Second Conception, the Real is that which is altogether Immediate and when found, or felt, it ends the effort at ideal definition and satisfies ideas and is the fact and the longed-for goal of our desire.

The Third Conception is that the Real is the Valid or True.

The Fourth Conception is that the Real in a completed experience presents the whole meaning of a System of Ideas.

Royce follows the naming of the Four Conceptions of Being with a brief preliminary statement of the history and nature of the first two, the Realistic and the Mystical.

As a result, he finds by the definitions, that these two are the exact opposites of each other.

"Realism defines Real Being as a total independence of any idea whose external object any given Being is. Mysticism defines Real Being as wholly within Immediate Feeling."

He rejects both concepts, but concedes that they are fragmentary views of the truth.

He then proceeds through lectures III, IV, V, VI to consider the first three Conceptions of Being. In lecture VII he discusses the Internal and External Meaning of Ideas, and in lecture VIII, he presents the Fourth, which is his own, Conception of Being.

The two remaining lectures of this first volume on The World and the Individual are devoted, IX, to Universality and Unity, X, to Individuality and Freedom.
All these subjects here mentioned and used as the captions of his several chapters, in this first volume of *The World and the Individual*, describe the materials that he is preparing, and shaping, and working into that massive structure which he essays to build, and which is characterized as the Other, the Absolute, God, the "Individual of Individuals."

Naturally, he will seek long and earnestly a definition of Being; for this definition will influence profoundly every other important conclusion.¹

He admits, that at the beginning, common sense seems to favor the independence of knowledge and being, but when the definition which begins as the very voice of common sense is carried to its logical conclusions, it finds empirical objects which were supposed to be independent, closely linked and related.

As a result of this, the history of Realism shows that it has given rise to astonishing metaphysical paradoxes.

Here we find, "the Atoms and the Monads, the Ideas of Plato, the isolated Souls of the Sankhya, the unknowable Things in Themselves of Kant, the Transcendent Reals of Herbart, the Eleatic One, the Substance of Spinoza, and the Unknowable of Spencer."

He finds historically that Realism has always vibrated between two extremes. Does the world contain One independently real Being or Many? Hence, the problem of the One and the Many is the test problem of realistic metaphysics².

And now, in this third lecture, Royce denies explicitly the possibility of Independent Reals.

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² Ibid. pp. 108-112
The Realist is an entity, and his ideas are a part of his being. But the object he defines exists independently of him and his ideas. The realist, therefore, does not know an independent being and can never find himself related to one. Royce maintains that the realist's realm, according to his own theory, is a realm of absolute void.

In other words, according to Royce, the realist's theory denies the very relation to his object that would be necessary to enable him to offer a definition of the object.

A completely independent person with ideas altogether independent of the object has no materials out of which to make a definition of the object. Thus the theory itself is self-destructive.

Royce is particularly severe with the theory of the Realist as we should naturally expect a thoroughgoing Idealist to be. If his statement of the position of the representative exponent of a world of Independent Reals is fair, the conclusion he reaches would seem to be inevitable.

He turns next to the Mystical Interpretation.

He dwells at length on the history of Mysticism as it is contained in the Upanishads, for the reason that though that story has been endlessly repeated in history, there has been no new story to tell. This story is the same whether we find it in Plotinus, or in the teachings of the Christians of the Middle Ages, or in the heretics of the church, or even in the poets or devotional books. It persists in the Imitation of Christ, in

2. Ibid, pp. 156-175
Spinoza, and in Browning's Last Ride Together.

These two Conceptions of Being reach two directly contrary results because they stand at the two opposite poles of Being and formulate their definitions from the positions they hold.

It may be said in general that Realism confines itself to the External Meaning of Ideas while the Mystic is determined to know only the Internal Meaning.

Realism tells us that truth is outside of us like the positive or negative quantity in mathematics. We are to submit to it. It is what it is and our knowing it or not does not change it.

On the other hand, Mysticism tells us that all truth is within. It exists only with the Knower and can be known only in him. He concludes that both theories are vain and end in nothing\(^1\).

But in closing this lecture he reveals his preference for Mysticism over Realism in these final words of the lecture:

"It follows that if Mysticism is to escape from its own finitude, and really is to mean by its absolute Being anything but a Mere Nothing, its account of Being must be so amended as to involve the assertion that our finite life is not mere illusion, that our ideas are not merely false, and that we are already, even as finite, in touch with Reality\(^2\)."

The above statement prepares one to meet the later treatment that Royce gives to Mysticism in the immediately succeeding lecture. It is also a hint of the constant impression that is forced upon the student as he reads his books, that, as a

2. Ibid, p. 182
matter of fact, his whole system is so tinctured with Mysticism that it might almost pass for Mysticism with "its account of Being...., so amended, etc.," as he suggests in the striking paragraph just quoted.

In his next lecture which is his fifth in the first volume of The World and the Individual, Royce estimates the outcome of Mysticism and introduces his critical examination of Critical Rationalism or the Conception of Validity and Experience.

He holds that Mysticism has in it both illusion and truth. When the mystic asserts that the real cannot be wholly independent of knowledge, and that the reality we seek must first be a reality to us, and that the sole motive that leads you to distinguish truth from error, reality from unreality, the contents of the passing moment from the world, is solely within yourself, he represents the facts about being,—facts that should be a part of our general education.

At present we are in disquietude and this disquietude we are trying to end. We find in ourselves a truth that we do not wholly mean and we mean a truth that we do not wholly find. It is beyond us.

The mystic is a practical thinker, for he points out a goal for us, and this goal is inner salvation through personal perfection. He sees the unity of life, and does not sunder the what and the that but he joins the moral Ought with the theoretical Ideal and holds that by its very function the absolutely Real must be also the absolutely Good.

Thus Mysticism, because it carries in it an inspiration, a
faith, a unity of life and an appeal to individuality, and promises as its goal, Reality, the Soul, the Self, has been the belief of teachers and counselors of generations of mankind. But here is the difficulty, the mystic takes us to the limit of consciousness, and to the limit of knowledge, before we meet the Knower and come into the presence of Being.

But have we found the Being or the Non-Being? Is this the Perfect or the Nothing? The mystic has made no distinction between these two. He is like Tennyson's Elaine with Love and Death. She sings: "I know not which is sweeter, No, not I."

The mystic makes his goal, his Absolute, the zero limit of a vanishing series of states of consciousness. If you find your Knower at the zero limit, at the end of a vanishing series of states of consciousness and if this is your Absolute, your Absolute is nothing, just in the degree that your finite ideas and facts are nothing.

Over against this theory, Royce replies that Reality is not only the goal, but the whole series of stages of knowledge and consciousness on the way to the goal. Mere Immediacy is only one aspect of Being. The conscious strivings after the Absolute are as real as the Absolute itself and the Absolute borrows all its Being from contrast with these strivings.

Royce here abandons what he is pleased to call the "abstractions" both of Realism and Mysticism with the significant and forward-looking remark that, "What we have learned from these abstractions is that our finite consciousness indeed seeks a meaning that it does not now find presented. We have learned too
that this meaning is neither a merely independent Being, nor a merely immediate Datum. What else can it be?"

Royce now seeks an entirely new type of Realism. It is not the old Realism modified or amended but actually transformed.

The new Real holds authority over our ideas. To it they correspond. Our ideas have an external standard determining their validity. It is the standard to which, if true, our ideas will correspond.

Quoting Kant's position on Mögliche Erfahrung he declares that that is what he means. Being is some fact that is possible for us, and to be, would be reaching or gaining that fact by making possible the fulfillment of the experience which our ideas define.

This is the Third Conception of Being. It identifies Reality with Validity and is held by the class of persons known as Critical Rationalists, of which class Kant is the spiritual father.

While Royce will recognize the truth that is found in this Third Conception of Being it is his purpose to show later how it leads inevitably to his own, or the Fourth Conception of Being.

But first, Royce notes the fact that Critical Rationalism alone among the Four Conceptions of Being attempts to "define the Real as explicitly and only Universal."

Royce's treatment of "Validity and Experience" in the first volume of his World and the Individual is in reality an extended

2. Ibid, pp. 202-3
3. Ibid, p. 205
4. Ibid, p. 207
5. Ibid, p. 240
discussion of the truth contained in Kant's Mögliche Erfahrung, or his concept of possible experience.

Admitting that this Third Conception, as far as it goes, has some degree of validity, he insists that while it obviously has its empirical foundation it nevertheless deals with a world that far transcends our physical powers of empirical verification.

Take the character \( \mathfrak{N} \) in mathematics. The thing that this character represents must be present to be surveyed and considered by the inner experience of the mathematician, if he is to arrive at any adequate result. The mathematician makes his artificial object. He plays with it, he experiments, he reasons, but he often arrives at very unexpected results. But to his inner experience this object represents an ideal. And through his present experience with his ideal object he is led on to true statements about an infinite number of ideal objects which neither he nor any one else will ever see.

But in the end, his experiment is just as trustworthy as another kind of experiment made in the laboratory\(^1\).

By our immediate test of truth, or nature, or mathematics, we verify certain ideas, but what is the difference between those truths that are concretely verified, and those that are not?

And now we are led up to the definite question, "What is a valid or determinately possible experience at the moment when it is supposed to be only possible\(^2\)"

He has now prepared the way for his great lecture on The Internal and External Meaning of Ideas.

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2. Ibid, pp. 260-1
It is Royce's purpose to reach a definition of Individuality through the nature and meaning of ideas.

He therefore considers the three judgments familiar to traditional logic, the "Categorical", "Hypothetical" and "Disjunctive." Through these he leads up to an examination of the universal and particular judgments only to find that they leave Reality still somewhat indeterminate.

He finds the internal meaning of ideas and the external experience when sundered from each other alike inadequate to present to us the Individual.

His conclusion is that neither the internal nor the external meaning of ideas is alone adequate to embody individuality.

The time-honored definition of Truth is, "Correspondence between any Idea and its Object."  

If an idea is true, then, it has an object that corresponds to the idea, and in like manner, if the object does not correspond to the idea the idea is false.

But he now discusses and develops this notion of correspondence of idea and object. He finds that idea and object may differ widely. What then does it mean for them to correspond and meet the requirement of Truth? He now falls back on Purpose as embodied in the Idea and contained in the definition of Idea as already given.

The question of the correspondence of the Idea to its Object is determined by the Purpose embodied in the Internal Meaning of the Idea. My idea might have for its object just the outward

2. Ibid, pp. 22, 23
expression of the physical features of my friend, such as might be carried by his photograph, or, on the other hand I may be aiming at the qualities of his inner life and character. The idea will be true accordingly as it corresponds to the object that the idea itself wants to possess. It is not agreement simply, but the agreement that the idea intends, that gives us the truth.¹

Our ideas embody a present conscious purpose. In the act of seeking the fulfillment of the idea the volitional and intellectual processes are equal. This embodied purpose, or internal meaning, is an indispensable condition for any external meaning or any truth.

The internal meaning determines in what way the idea is to correspond with its object.

The idea is itself selective and it is predetermined by the correspondence which it intends to maintain in some particular object. We may start with an idea more or less narrow and vague, we may proceed by hypothesis, conjecture, and tentative ideas and constructions, and in spite of much error during the process, we may through corrected insight arrive at satisfaction of purpose through presented fact. We need no other experience or light of fulfillment. When we reach that condition we have gained the Other that we sought from the beginning, for just this Other was there, vaguely, no doubt, but certainly, when our quest began.²

He now declares that if all possible instances that could illustrate our idea or give it embodiment were present at one

². Ibid, pp. 330-331
instant to clear consciousness, we should have the final satisfaction of will, and complete fulfillment of internal meaning, the absolute realization of the embodiment of the purpose, which means the individual realization of the idea. An individual fact is such that no other can be substituted for it. He now gives us his own, Fourth Conception of Being: "What is, or what is real is as such the complete embodiment in individual form and in final fulfillment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas."

He then defines this final form of the idea, or final object sought when we seek Being, as:

"(1) a complete expression of the internal meaning of the finite idea with which, in any case, we start our quest;
(2) a complete fulfillment of the will or purpose partially embodied in this idea;
(3) an individual life for which no other can be substituted."

He now holds that this individual life here defined is present as a whole, such as the scholastics would describe by the term totum simul. For Royce himself it is the definition of the Divine life.

Royce has now brought us very definitely to his Fourth Conception of Being and that is the title of his Eighth Lecture in the first volume of The World and the Individual.

He devotes the most important parts of this lecture to the thought just expressed under the three heads noted above, and to objections to the Third Theory of Being.

He tells us that we should face ultimate Being in our expen-

2. Ibid, pp.340-1
rience only in case we had reached finality, or the complete expression and fulfillment of our ideas.

Such finality would mean a life that permitted no other beyond it, and needed no other, and sought no other for the expression of its purpose or for its type of fulfillment.

In such a position we should face Being directly. We should stand in the presence of the Real, and such an entire instance of Being is an Individual.

Of this completely integrated Self he says: "That art thou." He declares that such a complete life is ours and that this is "The Fourth Conception of Being".

Royce adopts the *nur in der erfahrung ist Warheit*, of Kant, resists every movement that would sunder the *what* from the *that*, and makes his Fourth Conception of Being a synthesis of the other three.

But over and above these other Conceptions, he finds the real only in the complete fulfillment in the divine life, of whatever is embodied in the ideas.

In his next lecture on Universality and Unity, Royce reminds us that we now have the problem of The World and the Individual on our hands. Royce has already said that the object of an idea is an individual life, present as a whole, totum simul, a system of facts and fulfillment of the true purpose already fragmentarily present in the idea. Here we have completed will and experience corresponding to the will and ex-

2. Ibid, p. 362
3. Ibid, p. 363
4. Ibid, pp. 358-9
perience in the idea. Now the world of Being is an individual life gathering up all the wills embodied in finite ideas. To be, in its final sense is to be such a life. From this time on, he devotes the rest of the two volumes of Gifford Lectures frankly and explicitly to the discussion of the relation of the World and the Individual. He says: "What is, as we have already asserted, is the World. We have also asserted that it is the Individual."

But now the question arises about the various worlds that are to be considered. Evidently the world of the mathematician is one world and that of the moralist another. What are the relations of these worlds?

There are various individuals too. He has said that the individual is real. When pressed to know what individual is meant he says: "The whole individual life that expresses and presents the meaning of a single idea." He now confesses that he must meet the issue of the relation of these individuals of which he has spoken, as, "to what we mean when we talk of individual men, of souls, of moral personalities, or of one man as different from another man 1 ."

We have now reached the point where Royce after his long explanation and presentation of his Fourth Conception of Being, undertakes to show what it involves on the field of religion.

Our next effort will be to discover how he applies his system to religion.

VI - His Religious Theory

Speaking of what we mean when we talk of individual men, or souls, or moral personalities or the difference between one man and another and of such relations and their bearing on the meaning of the World and the Individual, he now makes this very important statement:

"Now these are precisely the central questions of religion. These, therefore, are the problems most significant for our whole quest. These too are issues which no one who attacks the central concepts of metaphysical doctrine ought to ignore. The unity of the world, the triumph of the divine plan, the supremacy of good in the universe, these are the interests which religion expresses by asserting that God reigns as a rational, self-conscious, world-possessing and single Being. The freedom of individuals, the deathless meaning of the life of each person, the opportunity for moral action, these are the interests of every form of ethical religion. I have been forced, before approaching these issues, to dwell elaborately and so long on the concept of Being, because that concept is no abstraction, but is precisely the richest and most inclusive of all conceptions, and because, until we have grasped its meaning, any speech as to the various beings that may be found in the world, and as to their relations to the whole and to one another, would have altogether lacked metaphysical foundation. But our task having been so far accomplished, we are prepared to pass from the doctrine of what it is to be real, to the consequent theory regarding what are the existent realities. Hereupon, however, we
enter upon the true task of a religious theory."

Here then is his task, to show us the World of Universality and Unity. He means that differences are only apparent and that all varieties are secondary and only aspects of the whole world of truth. One is all, and all are in that One. It is a universal type where every meaning of every finite idea is completely fulfilled, expressed, and applied. And he thus concludes the thesis of this first problem:

"Since this one world of expression is a life of experience fulfilling ideas, it possesses precisely the attributes which the ages have most associated with the name of God. For God is the Absolute Being, and the perfect fulness of life. Only God, when thus viewed, is indeed not other than his world, but the very life of the world taken in its wholeness as a single conscious and self-possessed life. In God we live and move and have our being.

Turning to his other thesis, that of the Individual, he maintains, that while a momentary idea is not alone a self, yet it contains fragmentarily and partially the will of a self, an individual thinker, a soul. "Now, however mysterious may be the difference between you and me, we are in such wise different beings, that the unity of Being must find room for our variety. Above all, our ethical freedom, our practical, even if limited, moral independence of one another, must be preserved. The world then is a realm of individuality. Hence it must be a realm of individuals, self-possessed, morally free, and sufficiently in-

dependent of one another to make their freedom of action possible and finally significant.

These two interpretations, or two sides of the same problem, he now undertakes to reconcile. So he now maintains in his two closing lectures of his first volume of *The World and the Individual*, first the unity and universality of the divine plan as one aspect of his Fourth Conception of Being and as the second aspect, that this unity is not only consistent with the ethical meaning of individuality, but is the very foundation thereof.

He again reiterates what we now recognize as the essential principle of his entire system, that the whole world of truth in all its variety, wealth, relationship and constitution, including all finite, conscious meanings, is present in its entirety to a final, eternal insight.

For a thing can have being only as a fact observed or as the fulfilment of a conscious meaning. "That is our definition of Being."  

He now proceeds to the proof of the outcome of his Fourth Conception of Being.

The world of fact may have ever so many knowers and knowing processes and varieties of knowledge but whatever its conditions, facts, and relations, all multiplicity, variety, isolation, or sundering would imply that these facts are present to a knower who observes the sundering as the fulfilment of his own single meaning.

2. Ibid, p. 396
3. Ibid, pp. 397-398
4. Ibid, p. 399
For the sundering cannot exist without being consciously present to somebody.

But since everything that exists can exist only as it is known, then the existence of knowledge itself can be known only to the final knower\(^1\). He argues that the Fourth Conception of Being is an empirical conception. He brings together the past, present and future, ascribing a form of Being to them all as in their own measure real. So with the world of mathematics, the social world, and all fashions of Being. They are all held together in the network of reality. They are all a part of one system that stands or falls together\(^2\). He then makes this remarkable assertion: "We are related to God through our consciousness of our fellows, and our fellows, in the end, prove to be far more various than mere men."

Again, he says: "Our doctrine, indeed, invites man to be at home in his universe, but does not make man, in so far as you first separate him from nature, the one finite end that nature seeks."

In the last lecture of the first volume of his Gifford lectures Royce states his position on the question of individual activity and individual freedom.

He cites the assertions of common sense that when the will is expressed I am both individually active and individually free.

Into the interminable discussions of the causal relations of the human will he declines to enter.

He holds to the unique character of every moment of finite

2. Ibid, pp. 401-413
3. Ibid, p. 416
consciousness, but he finds in the momentary will and its finite expression an aspect which no causation can possibly explain.

The thing that is unique cannot be causally explained. "The individual as such is never the mere result of law." If our finite purpose is different from that of any other finite being, in so much that, it uniquely expresses its own determinate meaning, then we have a right to say:

"I alone amongst all the different beings of the universe will this act. That it is true that God also here wills in me, is indeed the unquestionable result of the unity of divine consciousness. But it is equally true that this divine unity is here and now realized by me, and by me only, through my unique act. My act, too, is a part of the divine life that however fragmentary, is not elsewhere repeated in the divine consciousness. When I thus consciously and uniquely will, it is I then who just here am God's will, or who just here consciously act for the whole. I then am so far free."

He explains further that he means by activity, "just the unique significance of the present expression of our will."

He then declares that our individuality in our act is our freedom. Our freedom and our individuality actually centre in the fact that the unity and uniqueness of the divine life imply just such essential originality of meaning as our consciousness and common sense assume.

To meet the arguments of Bradley in his great volume Appearance and Reality. Royce appended to this first volume a

2. Ibid, pp. 468-470
long and studied Supplementary Essay on which he frequently
draws in the second volume.

We have now summed up with considerable fulness Royce's
teaching in the first volume of his World and the Individual.
Our reason for this is, that his Fourth Conception of Being
domines this entire course of lectures. This Conception is
of major importance in understanding to any degree his doctrine
of the Absolute. In the last four or five lectures of his se-
cond volume of The World and the Individual, we actually reach
the high mark of his application of his philosophical system
to religion. We may hastily indicate the main points of his
discussion in the first five lectures of this volume until he
reaches the discussion of The Human Self in his sixth lecture.
Royce delivered many lectures and wrote several books, but the
heart of his philosophy is found here in his Gifford Lectures.

VII - Outline and Scope of Second Volume of The World and the
Individual.

In his preface he outlines the scope of his subjects to be
treated in this second volume:

"The scope of this closing volume includes a sketch of an
Idealistic Theory of Human Knowledge, an outline of a Philosophy
of Nature, a doctrine about the Self, a discussion of the origin
and destiny of the Human Individual, a summary consideration of
the world as a Moral Order, a Study of the Problem of Evil, and
finally, an estimate of all these views in the light of what seems
to me to be the interests of Natural Religion."

In the first lecture he pleads for a recognition of the facts. He defines the Category of the Ought as implying three subordinate Categories. They are the Objectivity of the facts, the Subjectivity of the grounds for their acknowledgment, and the synthesis of these two through the universal Teleology of the constitution of the realm of facts. In the second lecture, on The Linkage of Facts, he comes again to his theory of Description and Appreciation.

Through the world of social beings and his Well-ordered Series which he now applies to the linkage of facts, he comes once more to his now well-known conclusion that, "The true world, the World of Values or of Appreciation, as rightly viewed by an absolute insight, would be a world of Selves, forming in the unity of their systems One Self. This world would appear to such an insight as a social order¹." He does not permit this central tenet of his teaching ever to remain long out of sight in his whole discussion of The World and the Individual.

In his third lecture on The Temporal and Eternal we come upon the conclusions of his Well-Ordered Infinite Series and the conclusion of his Supplementary Essay of the first volume, that the whole of time contains a single expression of the divine will.

In this lecture we are thrust again into that discussion how our whole past and present and future can be present at once to the Absolute, and yet we are free, and there is an aspect of our freedom which God possesses only in the way in which our unique individuality presents it to him.

But everything of us and about us is in the presence of the Absolute and eternally viewed.\(^1\)

In his fourth lecture on Physical and Social Reality he asks that we take such a view of Nature as would recognize in it some actual inner relation to our own life and meaning.

Both our social organization and industrial art have failed in this. Royce would have us find in it a hint of a vast realm of life and meaning to which we belong and which has its final unity in the life of God.\(^2\)

He carries this appeal through his fifth lecture on The Interpretation of Nature. He would find in all life a conscious meaning and a rational end. He would find all life, organic and inorganic, shot through and through with Being and conscious life. The whole world is conscious and is bound up with the experience of actually conscious beings.\(^3\)

But we are now ready for The Human Self, and The Place of the Self in Being, The Moral Order, The Struggle with Evil and finally, The Union of God and Man. We are clearly coming now in these next lectures, whose titles are here indicated, to his view of the relation of God and man and the relations of both of them to this world of sin and struggle. Here we shall see his philosophy in deep, and often, desperate action, on the field of Religion.

In his discussion and definition of The Human Self Royce presents us immediately with two views. The first is that the Self is distinctly honorable and essentially good. The inner

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2. Ibid., pp. 203, 204
3. Ibid., pp. 240, 241
self if corrupted is corrupted by outer temptations. The true
Self is the moral individual and in the assertion of that Self
we are saved.

The other view is exactly opposite. This view teaches
that the chief evil of our lives is selfishness. The paramount
virtue is self-sacrifice. Literally, "Love thyself last."

He holds, then, that we not only have the higher and lower
Self in the same man, but there are often found such variations
in the same individual that there would seem to be a multiple
Self or many selves in one.

What we want to find now is the unity in these variations
and how we are to distinguish the single Self from the rest of
the world. Our empirical Ego finds itself in contrast with
the social life of other men. To this we add our inner life of
experience and memory. But these relations do not present the
final meaning of Self. So he characterizes the inadequacy of
the empirical Ego in very definite terms.

"Were our life not hid in an infinitely richer and more
significant life behind the veil, we who have once observed the
essential fragmentariness of the empirical Ego would indeed
have parted with our hope of a true Selfhood."

He now considers two other types of conception of the Self.
The first is that the Self is a Soul-Substance. He declares
that this theory perishes together with Realism and that its
purified and inner meaning only can appear again in the world of
Idealism.

2. Ibid, p. 256
And with Realism passes away every view of self except that which regards it as "A meaning embodied in a conscious life, present as a relative whole within the unity of the Absolute life."

The other type of conception of the Self is his own, the idealistic type. Any finite idea taken as an Internal Meaning is a Self. It can be contrasted with a past or future Self, or with the social life of all my fellow beings or with the entire life of God himself. In this we have the Self and the not-Self.

We can identify the Self with the momentary expression of our will or we can expand it by gathering into the idea both our past as we remember it, and our future as we intend it, and in such a contrast the momentary expression is the Internal Meaning, while its richer expression, —over against which we have set the fragmentary expression of our momentary will, including the entire life of our fellow men and the world and God,— is the External meaning.

The fact that one is persuaded that he ought to select from the universe a certain portion of life that is remembered and expected, conceived and intended, contrasted with his larger and truer individuality which consists of all other individual Selves and God's life in its wholeness —it is this, that makes the Self an Ethical Category. My task is unique. It is this purpose and no other. I am then, one with God in the expression of my Selfhood and God's will is expressed in a manifold life.

So we come to his definition of Self: "By this meaning of my

2. Ibid. pp. 272, 273
life-plan, by this possession of an ideal, by this Intent always to remain another from my fellows despite my divinely planned unity with them, — by this, and not by the possession of any Soul-Substance, I am defined and created a Self. We now have here his definition of an idealistic human Self regarded as a real Being.

Royce discusses the Place of Self in Being.

His comparison of his own theory of Self with the theories that have been maintained in the history of thought we need only to mention. His consideration of how new individuals may appear in the course of evolution need not detain us. He takes up the question how far Self is causally determined in its experience and will by its relations to the natural order.

On this question as to how far the Self is causally determined he makes two very important pronouncements before proceeding to his further defense of the freedom of the will.

First, he says: "Hence it is true that human nature, down to the least describable detail of its temporal fashion of expressing itself, is a natural phenomenon, a part of universal Nature, and is as much capable of some kind of explanation in causal terms as any natural fact."

But this is to view man as an external observer would. It does not give us his inner life as having Internal Meaning.

His second declaration is that you cannot define the individual in causal terms.

And now when in his fourth thesis he tells us in what sense

the individual Self can possess ethical Freedom in its relation to the divine Will, we are very deeply interested.

When we admit that man is subject to law and that the describable characters of the Self, such as, temperament, motives, impulses, training, deeds, knowledge, appear to be caused by heredity and environment, does not all this endanger the doctrine of the freedom of the Individual Self? He answers: "No."

He replies that there is an inseparable aspect of my nature that neither God nor man can causally explain and that is "Just my conscious intent to be, in God's world, myself and nobody else."

His language here in his discussion of the freedom of the will is so intricate and involved and at the same time so meticulously guarded that it may be wise to give it at some length in his own words:

"For, as our idealistic argument from the very outset has maintained, I purpose at all only by purposing that my will should find its expression in what is Other than myself, and consequently in what, in some sense, gives my will its own determination that lives in this world of other life than my private life. That I depend for my life and meaning upon life not my own, is as true as that I am I at all. That this dependence involves a temporal origin, is due to the very nature of Time. The question is whether I wholly thus depend. And our answer has been that there is that about me which makes my will, as the will of an individual, not wholly the expression of other

2. Ibid, P. 326
purposes than my private or individual purpose. This answer has been based upon our whole Theory of Being. If now I, the individual, exist, in one aspect, as the expression of nobody's will but my own, does this assertion in the least conflict with the other assertion that I and all beings exist as the expressions of the divine will? I answer: There is no conflict; for the Divine Will gets expressed in the existence of me the individual only in so far as this Divine Will first not merely recognizes from without, but includes within itself my own will, as one of its own purposes. And since God, for our view, is not an external cause of the world, but is the very existence of the world in its wholeness as the fulfilment of purpose, it follows once more that my existence has its place in the Divine Existence as the existence of an individual will, determined, just in so far as it is this individual will, by nothing except itself."

In his treatment of The Moral Order Royce recalls to our minds the familiar fact that the present finite Self aiming for the Absolute which it is seeking to know as the Real, is conscious of a contrast with the world lying beyond that range of experience in which its Internal Meaning is now consciously expressed.

The Self is to gain its meaning, and accomplish its search through obedience to an order not of its own momentary creation. It is always possible for this Self instead of rendering obedience, to undertake to subdue to itself this world beyond. Instead of

bringing its Internal Meaning into harmony with its External Meaning it may undertake to reverse the order. Instead of obeying Tennyson:

"Our wills are ours to make them thine," it may on the contrary seek expression in rebellion.

He tells us that such rebellion is not wholly evil for conscious choice of a total evil is impossible.

His statement here of how a rebellious Self expresses a truth that is divine, unwillingly, is so arresting that we need to get it complete: "I always will to become one with my world, and so, with God. But when I explicitly follow the Ought, I seek to transform myself as I now am into the likeness and expression of God. And when I oppose what a clearer insight would see to be the Ought, I seek to fashion the truth after the image, and to make God the mere tool of myself as I now am. In both cases it is indeed impossible for me to avoid seeking a good, and expressing a truth as I act.

For, as a fact, I can only assert my finite Self by actively transforming myself; so that I actually obey, in some measure, even while I rebel. For the finite Self cannot seek its own, without passing over into new life. And there is self-sacrifice involved in even the most stubborn rebellion; and courage and endurance are exercised, unwillingly, even by the most cowardly of pleasure-seekers. The soul of goodness in things evil lies deeper than those admit who see not the tie that binds all Being in one. Even in the depths of hell the lost, if such there were, would still, despite themselves, serve God amidst their darkness.
Nor can any being wander so far as to escape not only the presence but the indwelling of the Absolute." He then says that when a finite self follows its own caprice, it is expressing in its own way a truth and that there is no caprice however perverse that is not a fragmentary aspect of God's meaning. The Self rebels only because the Spirit dwells in it, and in its rebellion it utters the truth in its own degree that "it is the object and expression of the divine interest."

He then discusses the process of Attention as pointed out by William James.

By this process, an idea arising in the mind involves its own nascent deed. If the idea fills the whole circle of consciousness it turns into its completed deed whether that deed is good or evil.

He teaches that an idea holding an ominous internal meaning may come to consciousness as the already nascent deed of a rebellious Self. Then to the psychologist as an external observer it would appear that the deed is automatically carried out in the man's conduct.

That which determines the choice is then, "the field of attention." But such a deed is not automatic. We voluntarily narrow the field of our attention and that does alter our range of knowledge. Our deed turns upon the way in which we give attention to the warring interests between the Ought and the rebellious Self.

What we choose to attend to and what we choose to ignore,

2. Ibid, pp. 354, 355
what we retain and what we exclude from our field of attention gives us the expression of our present knowledge. But the present state of our knowledge is the expression of the present attention and the present attention is our will at this moment. Royce teaches, then, that in spite of all the relations of Self and its dependence upon social and natural conditions, this act of attention is the free act of the Self.

Following this, his definition of sin is very stimulating and impressive. He makes sin a present fixing of attention and a choosing to forget. We cannot but choose to obey the Ought so long as we know it, but by inattention we choose to forget it.

"To sin, is consciously to choose to forget, through a narrowing of the field of attention, an Ought that one already recognizes." "Sin depends upon a narrowing of consciousness, so that a present ignorance of what one ought to know occurs."

Sin, then, is a deliberate forgetting of what one already knows of God and the truth, while my moral freedom is my freedom to hold by attention or forget by inattention the Ought that I have present in consciousness.

There follows now a long discussion as to how the finite agent's evil will is to be supplemented, overcome, thwarted and overruled in a perfect eternal order, how his evil deed can make the world worse or how a good deed can make it better, and how he can be free while his will is identical even in his blindness with the will of the Absolute.

Here is where a large part of our future criticism will centre.

2. Ibid, pp. 359, 360
and we leave it with this brief reference, to return to it in a later chapter of the thesis. But now, there are two striking statements that we must notice before leaving this lecture on The Moral Order.

The first is:

"The world is not now good, nor is Being at this instant a temporally present whole, nor does either God or man at this instant see what now is as a fulfilment, or as right. Hence the future is needed to supplement the present." Final good is found only in the eternal order.\(^1\)

The other statement is in the closing words of this lecture where Royce cites an objector as saying that his doctrine has still to face the ancient difficulty concerning the reconciliation of the divine foreknowledge and the free will of man.

His answer is this: "My response to this last objection is that, for our Idealism this ancient difficulty simply does not exist. We do not conceive that God, first preexisting and foreknowing, then in time created a world that is real beyond himself, and that, in time, is subsequent in its events to his preexistent knowledge. For us, God does not temporally foreknow anything, excepting in so far as he is expressed in us finite beings. The knowledge that exists in time is the knowledge that finite Selves possess, in so far as they are finite. And no such foreknowledge can predict the special features of individual deeds precisely in so far as they are unique. Foreknowledge in time is possible only of the general, and of the causally predeter-

\(^1\) Royce, The World and the Individual, Vol. II, p. 373
nor man can perfectly foreknow, at any temporal moment, what a free-will agent is yet to do. On the other hand, the Absolute possesses a perfect knowledge at one glance of the whole of the temporal order, present, past, and future. This knowledge is ill-called foreknowledge. It is eternal knowledge. And as there is an eternal knowledge of all individuality, and all freedom, free acts are known as occurring like the chords in the musical succession, precisely when and how they actually occur.

This statement of Royce is quoted by Ward in his Realm of Ends and severely criticized by him there. But at this moment we are confident that he has misunderstood and misinterpreted this paragraph. This we shall try to show later in our critical examination of Royce's religious position. We merely give notice of this now.

In treating of The Struggle with Evil, Royce sketches the idealistic view of the solidarity of the moral order and the interrelation of evil doing and ill-fortune. He reasserts his doctrine of individuality, demanding that every Self shall be free in some respect, and also the doctrine of the unity of Being where all the Selves must be known without separation in the unity of the life of the world, in a single organism.

He then proceeds to examine the older Theodicies before presenting the idealistic view. We here note briefly his own view.

My deeds and meanings are here beset by misfortune. I suf-

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2. Ibid. pp.379-383
3. Ibid. p. 393
4. Ibid. pp.385-405
fer because the magnitude and depth of the meaning of my life are far beyond what my present experience permits me to become. I can devote myself to my divine task, taking my share of the work and accepting the sorrow that is inseparable from having these ideals.

We get our comfort from the fact that the ideal sorrows of our finitude are identically God's sorrows and through our bitterness and tribulation we share with him in overcoming the world. So, he teaches that our very experience of sorrow is not absorbed and transmuted and then reduced to its unity in the divine life, but on the contrary our experience of sorrow is included in this richer life.

A very broad and remarkable statement of Royce follows this claim.

"As the Absolute is identically our whole Will expressed, our experience brought to finality, our life individuated, so, on the other hand, we are the divine as it expresses itself here and now; and no item of what we are is other than an occurrence within the whole of the divine existence. In our more real sorrows we may become more clearly aware how our intention, our plan, our meaning, is one with the divine intent, and how our experience is a part of the life through which God wins in eternity his own 1." He concludes that God knows sorrow and the overcoming of sorrow and that his eternal triumph is being won through our temporal sorrows.

Royce begins his final Gifford Lecture, the last of his second volume on *The World and the Individual*, secure in the conviction that he has furnished an outline and established a basis for a Philosophy of Christianity. He is now, in closing, chiefly interested in The Union of God and Man. Their definite relations to each other will now occupy his thought.

Conceive man in his relation to and with all that is petty, transient and uncertain. Let him be the mere plaything of natural destiny, let him view himself only as an incident or an episode, yet how can he know these things? And we find that the only way we know them is by an ontological relation which links our life and the whole universe to the life of God. In him we have our individuality. Just because of our finite bondage and all that it implies, we are filled with God's presence and his freedom.

He now defines Personality. "A Person is a conscious being, whose life, temporally viewed, seeks its completion through deeds, while this same life, eternally viewed, consciously attains its perfection by means of the present knowledge of the whole of its temporal strivings.

Now from our point of view God is a Person because, from our view he is self-conscious, and because the Self of which he is conscious is a Self whose eternal perfection is attained through the totality of the ethically significant temporal strivings, these processes of evolution, these linked activities of finite Selves."

2. Ibid, pp. 418, 419
After tracing some of the results of his general view of the divine Personality he turns to man. He says: "Man, too, in our view, is a Person. He is not, indeed, an Absolute Person; for he needs his constant contrast with his fellows, and with the whole of the rest of the universe, to constitute him what he is. He is, however, a conscious being, whose life, temporally viewed, seeks its completion through deeds."

Now from this eternal point of view of man's temporal strivings, from his intentional contrast of his life with the life of all the rest of the world, as through his knowledge he seeks perfection, arises the corollary which gives the basis of the philosophical theory of Immortality.

He bases his conception of Immortality on three considerations:

His first consideration is, in brief, that our wills are fulfilled through union with God and we become aware of how they are fulfilled only through union with him. His own Will is satisfied only by our unique share in it. By our union with him we awake in the eternal world. He asserts that our individuality is real and belongs to our entire life, but it does not appear real to us in our present form of consciousness, but that in our life in God we have another form of consciousness which is yet to be made manifest.

As the second consideration, he takes up the Problem of Death. All around us from year to year, we see pathetic examples of temporal transiency. Spring dies, lovers part, and perhaps forget, youth passes away, and the physical life of

artist, soldier, or hero, ends. The mother's love for the in­
fant becomes only a memory, while the infant grows into an evil
maturity. How can such death have any place in Being?

Here is a conscious process with a meaning cut short by
death. But the Absolute views the life that is ended as follow­
ed at some time by a life whose meaning is continuous with the
first.

These two Selves, the former and the later, the old and the
new, are stages in the development of the one Individual. The
new Self transcends and is inclusive of the old, so that the
meaning of the old is continuous with the new. He who dies with
the meaning of his life unexpressed sees the meaning of that
life expressed in the eternal world.

And now the third consideration is, that every service
wrought for God creates new opportunities for service. We are
continually creating by our acts new situations, in relations
with our fellows, that demand more and more. There is no last
ethical task. We must look to eternity, for in time there is
no end to our individual task.¹

In closing this lecture he touches upon the question of
the Human Individual as a finite being. He states that the
finite Ethical Individual when it comes to distinguish itself
from all others in the eternal world, the single Ethical In­
dividual, remains finite there in contrast to the completely
integrated Self of the Absolute Individual. Then, for this
reason, he suggests the term to characterize the eternal ethical
Individual, in keeping with the Self-representative System of

purpose and fulfilment, as infinite but partial.

He then refers to his Supplementary Essay at the end of his first volume, and declares that to an infinite collection of objects the axiom, that a part is not equal to the whole, does not apply. The Ethical Individual may be a small part of the infinite System of Individuals but may be as rich in knowledge, in details, and may have a meaning as complex as the Absolute in its completeness.

To quote his own statement:

"We therefore need not conceive the eternal Ethical Individual, however partial he may be, as in any sense less in the grade of multiplication of his activity or in the multitude of his acts of will than is the Absolute."

The works of Royce that we have here summarized at considerable length: The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, The Concept of God, and, The World and the Individual, give a very comprehensive outline of his philosophy of the Ideal Absolute. The same views are expressed in part in the Ingersoll Lecture on, The Concept of Immortality and in two essays in, William James and Other Essays. The two essays are entitled, What is Vital in Christianity? and, Immortality. They add very little to the books whose contents we have summarized with considerable care.

In case their teaching shall be needed to clarify or enlarge any statement made in our critical examination of his Ideal Absolute they will be quoted.

His teachings in The Problem of Christianity, since it is

in a field by itself, and represents essentially a study of Christianity through the medium of the Pauline Churches, will be given a separate chapter. In this same chapter may properly be reckoned any offering or addition along the same line arising out of, *The Religion of Loyalty*, and, *The Sources of Religious Insight*. Any of his utterances from any source whatever will be freely used whenever and wherever they apply to the subject under consideration.
Chapter III
Is His Ideal Absolute Tenable?

The foundation of Royce's entire system is the Ideal Absolute. It is not the Ideal Absolute as represented by any other philosopher, but his own Ideal Absolute.

Many other philosophers, whether or not they can be classed as Idealists, have felt that some kind of an Absolute is necessary to human thinking. But Royce's Ideal Absolute is in a way unique, because he has attempted specifically and definitely to harmonize his philosophy with the genuine belief of Christianity.

He insists that in his philosophy he means by God what the early Christians meant. It is clearly our business then, to inquire whether or not his system can be reconciled with the principles and teachings of Christian Theism.

I
His Disagreement with Bradley

One of the greatest of Royce's contemporary idealists was F. H. Bradley. A few years before Royce delivered his Gifford Lectures, The World and the Individual, Bradley had published his metaphysical essay, Appearance and Reality. In this essay, Reality is only another name for the Absolute.

Professor Bradley's contention is that everything except Reality is appearance. Reality is all-pervading and all transcending. It is one experience and is present in all finite experience.

There are two sides to his contention. The first is, that "All is appearance, and no appearance nor any combination of these,
is the same as Reality." The other side of the same truth is, "The Absolute is its appearances, it really is all and every one of them." 

Thus everything is appearance but Reality itself. Bradley names all relations, qualities, facts, and conditions, with which we deal in our finite world, appearances, — space and time, motion and change, cause and effect, activity, things, thought, nature itself, truth and goodness — everything short of Reality itself, — appearance. Bradley feels driven to the conclusion that experience is the same as reality.

Reality is nothing apart from its appearances. The whole of its contents is experience but it takes up and harmonizes in one system every fragment of appearance. This unity, then, is experience. Naturally such unity in its completion would increase and enrich all lesser modes of experience and in its fulness would transcend in power and importance the sum total of all its parts.

But the difficulty with this essay so far as Royce was concerned was that it denied the possibility of any positive theory of how individuals find their real place in the Absolute, and held that for our minds as now constituted, there is no "explicit and detailed reconciliation of the One and the Many."

This detailed effort to interpret our life in its relation to the Absolute was precisely the task in which Royce was engaged in his Gifford Lectures; hence, his rejoinder to Bradley

1. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 2nd Ed. p. 486
2. Ibid. p. 145
3. Ibid. p. 548
4. Ibid. p. 525
5. Ibid. p. 281
in the Supplementary Essay appended to the first volume of these lectures.

This will serve to indicate the difference between the Bradleian and Roycean Absolute.

Let us look a little more carefully into this difference and see what is involved. Bradley's Reality, that fills up the outline of the Absolute, is "sentient experience", and that which is not sentient experience is not real.

All differences are lost in the whole, and yet the differences are there. "The self-consciousness of the part, its consciousness of itself even in opposition to the whole — all will be contained within the one absorbing experience. For this will embrace all self-consciousness harmonized, though, as such, transmuted and suppressed."

Thus, according to Bradley, the Absolute is a unity which is a super-rational whole of experience. It includes all finite experience, not as finite, but with all relations transformed. In the Absolute all the finite things are reblended and transmuted and lose their individual natures.

We may have a positive and abstract knowledge of the general nature of the Absolute, but of its being in detail we are altogether ignorant. It is higher than our experience and higher than our knowledge, although it contains both our experience and our knowledge. But it transforms them both into its own unity and meaning. Instead of personal, he would describe the Absolute as super-personal.

1. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 2nd Ed. p. 144
2. Ibid. pp. 427-429
3. Ibid. pp. 530, 531
4. Ibid. p. 531 See Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism, 2nd Ed. p. 32
He maintains further, that if you identify the Absolute with God, it is not the God of religion. For the God of religion calls for relations with men, and these relations would destroy the unity of the Absolute. Under such conditions God would be only an aspect or appearance of the Absolute.¹

To sum up briefly, Bradley comes to four important conclusions bearing directly on the question of Christian Theism:

First, he reduces the God of religion to an appearance.

Secondly, when both the God of religion and religion standing in relation to man pass into the Absolute experience, both are lost.

Thirdly, he rejects the doctrine of free will as a "lingering chimera."²

Fourthly, he decides that "a future life must be taken as decidedly improbable."³

One recognizes at once that Bradley from his own standpoint would have no inclination whatever to identify his Absolute and his philosophy with the Christian God and the Christian religion.

But his system as touching the contents of experience is gravely questionable. Can it be true in fact? His Absolute is all-inclusive of experience. But he teaches that in the Absolute our finite experience is transmuted and transformed. If then, our experience is changed when it becomes the experience of the Absolute, then the Absolute does not contain all experience.

We have an experience that is included in the Absolute after it

2. Ibid. See notes pp. 393, 495
3. Ibid. p. 506
is modified, but the modified experience is different from the original experience which was mine.

Then his so called all-inclusive Absolute is not all-inclusive. The finite experience when it was mine unchanged, before becoming the transmuted and transformed experience of the Absolute, is left out of the all-embracing Whole. For when it was mine, it was as truly an experience as after it was modified by becoming an experience of the Absolute. The experience of the Absolute never could be all-inclusive unless it contained my finite experience, when it was still mine, untransmuted and unchanged.

But the point we desire to emphasize here is that Bradley himself who is ranked with the idealists and stands for the all-including Absolute, over against Royce's all-including and all-knowing Absolute, made no attempt whatever to harmonize or reconcile his Absolute with the God of Theism. On the contrary he was careful to show that if his position was correct, then the teaching of Christianity in regard to God and religion was incorrect, and that the tenet of the church in regard to free will was a chimera, and that in regard to immortality was exceedingly doubtful. Royce, with both an all-inclusive and an all-knowing Absolute not only attempts to make it equivalent, but identical, with the God of Christianity, in every relation and condition that he regards as essential.
II
The Problem of An All-Inclusive Experience

Royce teaches that the Absolute Being possesses a self-contained, complete, absolute, all-inclusive Experience.

Such a Being must contain all experience. It matters not how trivial or childish the experience may be. It may be built upon truth or falsehood. It may be due to the most guilty, cruel and devilish wrongdoing. It may be the fruit of baseborn deeds or sins of the deepest dye. It may be a passion that was foolish to begin with and is persisted in against all the considerations of reason, yet it is the experience of a finite being, and must be included in the experience of the Absolute Being.

This Absolute and all-inclusive experience is also an organized experience according to Royce, and it is related to our experience as an organic whole to its own fragments.

He adds that its "contents are not foreign to those of our finite experience, but are inclusive of them in the unity of one life." ¹

We have already suggested that according to Bradley the finite experience when taken up into the Absolute is reblended and transmuted and thus the finite material has lost its individual nature and is no longer a finite experience, whatever else it may be. If it is still an experience, it is no longer what it was. It has undergone a change and the original experience is gone. What remains in the Absolute is no longer mine. In the same way, but from the other side, because the Absolute mind is all-inclusive and all-knowing, he cannot have my experience. Part of my experience

¹. Royce, The Conception of God, p. 44
is due to my ignorance, and error and finitude. Much of my ex-
perience I never should have had at all, if I had been omniscient.
It was due to the fact of my limitation. Certainly a Being who
sees eternity at a glance, who knows all things in a moment of
time, cannot feel as I feel and experience my sorrows and disap-
pointments as I do, when he knows the end from the beginning,
and is aware that there was really no cause for my anxiety or
sorrow on certain occasions, and he knows just as clearly that
on other occasions when I am gay, that if I were only wiser, I
should know that I had deep cause for grief. The conditions do
not obtain with the Absolute that would repeat my experience as
an identical portion of his. Certainly when my ignorance be-
comes a part of an all-inclusive experience, the ignorance as
such can no longer exist. If God's knowledge does not banish
my ignorance when my experience is taken up into his Omniscience,
then he is not Omniscient. He is still growing in knowledge.
With me there is a before and after. The later events modify
the earlier and this condition in time is a part of my experience.
But if God sees everything in one eternal moment, he knows all
occurrences in one eternal span, the influence of all develop-
ments in the time series is already known. All unfoldings in
life and time are before him, spread out in an eternal Now.
How then can we speak of the Absolute as having an experience
at all? The word "experience" comes from the Latin verb
"experior" which means to try or test. Rightly, experience means
knowledge that is gained by observation or trial. In a very real
sense then, if God is Omniscient he cannot have experience.
Experience is feeling one's way along, and increasing in knowledge as one goes, by the tests and hazards of the effort. We do this, but an All-Knowing Absolute has no need of this. To say that he learned in this way would be a contradiction.

As we understand experience the time element is an essential condition of its existence. How can it arise in the life of One to whom time is swallowed up in an eternal moment and all truth is known and included?

Are not the words of the Second Isaiah far more true than we are ready to realize? His words would at least have the effect of excluding some of earth's discords and tragedies and lies from the contents of the all-inclusive Absolute.

"Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts; and let him return unto Jehovah, and he will have mercy upon him; and unto our God, for he will abundantly pardon. For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are my ways your ways, saith Jehovah. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts."  

This does not mean that God is remote, or that he is not so close to the finite self, that it would be incorrect even to speak of him as near. This view would affirm the words of Paul on Mars Hill, "Though He be not far from each one of us: for in him we live, and move, and have our being."  

In the relationship of God and man there must be room and

1. Isaiah 55:7-9
scope for finite duty, responsibility and freedom. The creature and that which makes the creature a creator must not be lost in the God who created him. God is a Creator, but he is Creator of other selves who in their own measure and right and relation are to maintain their selfhood. But cannot this high relation be secured through sympathy and a joyous reciprocity and a willing obedience of the finite self to the Absolute Self, without the all-inclusive bond of an Absolute and identical experience?

Do we not have in the relation of a father to his child an analogy of the relation of God to his children? Here we have free and distinct personalities who stand to each other in a union of interest and sympathy without an identical experience. The father may spend hours in the nursery proving his love and interest by many tender words and deeds. When the child is ill he may suffer more deeply than the child because he knows more and thinks the thoughts of a larger world. The course of the disease, the prospect of the child, his mind, his health, his future are all considered. The pain that the parent suffers as he looks upon the face of the little one may wring his very soul in a way that none but a parent can understand. But his suffering is sympathetic. His pain is reciprocal. It is also far more intelligent than that of the child, and for that reason it becomes constructive and remedial. The experience of the father overarches that of the child. Their experiences arouse and influence each other, but each in its place is of far more practical and higher value because each is his own distinct other. The father's is not all-inclusive nor inclusive of the experience of

1. Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism, 2nd Ed. p. 35
the child. Howison in his rejoinder to Professor Royce's treat-
ment of *The Conception of God*, says: "We must go farther, and
attain to the distinct reality, the full otherhood, of the crea-
tion; so there shall be no confusion of the creature with the
Creator, nor any interfusion of the Creator with the creature."

Let us now recall Royce's argument for the existence of an
absolute Experience which he presents before he gathers up all
the fragments of finite experience into his completed whole of
the Absolute. He argues, that all concrete or genuine truth is
experienced somewhere. Knowledge comes by experience. Truth is
truth only as it is known. This applies both to finite experience
and to all parts of the world. It applies to the whole of finite
experience. But the constitution of finite experience with all
its narrowness and limitation must be present to a final expe-
rience just as surely as there is such a constitution of finite
experience. This final experience would know that there was
nothing beyond this constitution of the finite experience. But
this final experience could not know that there was nothing be-
yond this limited constitution of finite experience, as a fact,
without at the same time being itself an absolute experience, for
we cannot have a totality of finite experience without an absolute
experience. It takes the latter to adjudge the former as a fact.

Further, the very effort to deny the existence of an abso-
lute experience involves the assertion of such an experience, for
the simple reason that in that case, the experience that pronounced
the absolute experience impossible would itself become the final

1. Royce, Conception of God, p. 98
and absolute experience. However false such a pronouncement might be, the decision and the decider would assume all the responsibility of the absolute experience which it repudiated.

He concludes, therefore, that there is an Absolute Experience that gets its conception of absolute reality, which is a system of ideal truth, fulfilled by the contents that are presented to the Experience.\(^1\)

But does this argument prove Omniscience, and where does it place the arguer in his relation to the supreme authority or the Absolute Wisdom? In the discussion that followed the presentation of Professor Royce's essay on *The Conception of God* at Berkeley, Howison formulated Royce's argument into a syllogism with a conditional major and a categorical minor premise. It ran thus: "If my ignorance is real, then Omniscience is real: but my ignorance assuredly is real; and, therefore, so is Omniscience." Now as a matter of fact just plain I myself am the authority for the major premise, and the minor premise, and the conclusion. If there is any omniscience that makes this entire course of reasoning and the confident conclusion valid it is mine. I have convinced myself and stated at the end my own conviction. Is not Howison correct when he says that, "In using either premise as proof of the conclusion, and *a fortiori* in using both, I implicate myself in actual omniscience?"

He calls it "the introversive act of a reasoning being, discovering the real infinity that lies implicit in his seeming finitude."

1. Royce, Conception of God, pp. 41-43
2. Ibid. p. 109
He characterizes it as an "affection of omniscience."\(^1\)
The significant fact brought out by Howison is the mood of the mystic which this argument indicates. He practically charges Royce with taking literally what the mystic takes mystically. He has called that sovereign judgment of enlightenment, God, which is rather the witness of God within, but is not God himself.\(^2\)

This criticism, severe as it is, seems to be warranted, for Royce frankly and explicitly gives the honor to Christian mysticism for having bridged the gulf that seemed to separate the God of practical faith from the God of philosophical definition.

Following this, he accords to St. Thomas Aquinas the credit for an explicit and fully developed synthesis of the Aristotelian and Christian conceptions of God. Royce approves St. Thomas's definition of the Divine as essentially identical with his own.\(^3\) This sounds reasonable enough, but he is getting more and more into mystical company and approving mystical conceptions.

We now meet with rather a startling surprise. Royce regards St. Thomas himself as in some respects a mystic and even more than that, as his own language in The World and the Individual will show: "In the doctrine of St. Thomas, the faithful, in this life, are permitted only a moderate though respectful use of mystical notions. Yet it is plain that the God of St. Thomas's theology is himself-a mystic, and even a pantheistic mystic.

2. Ibid. pp. 111, 112
3. Ibid. p. 49
since the Being of the world, although for us real in the formal or realistic sense, makes absolutely no real difference to God, who was just as complete before he created it as afterwards.\(^1\)

What are we now to make of Royce's own conception of God if his definition is identical with the definition of St. Thomas Aquinas? One of the clearest and strangest facts in all of Royce's philosophic work is the place he now gives and then denies to mysticism. He seems to be always hovering on the edge of mysticism. May this not have been because his definition of the Ideal Absolute savored so much of mysticism that it never could be at home very far from the confines of its native heath? To certain aspects of mysticism he is very friendly. He accepts them readily and incorporates them into his fourth conception of being. But at other times he is very severe in his criticism of mysticism as a means of quenching thought. We are driven to the conclusion that he was more of a mystic than even he himself discovered.

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III

Did Royce Escape Pantheism?

One of the remarkable facts of Christian history is the intimate association of Mysticism with Pantheism. The Fourth Gospel is such an instance. On this subject the words of Fairbairn are illuminating: "\textit{\Phi\lambda\omicron\omicron\upsilon\sigma\upsilon} is one of the dark terms we owe to Heraclitus; from him it passed into the school of the Stoics and was there stamped with their image and superscription." Fairbairn then traces the development of this idea through Philo and the Hellenism of Alexandria and adds: "It is not to be doubted, then, that John neither invented his transcendental terms nor the ideas they expressed. But he did a more daring and original thing — he brought them out of the clouds into the market-place, incorporated, personalized, individuated them. He distinctly saw what the man who had coined the terms had been dimly feeling after — that a solitary Deity was an impotent abstraction, without life, without love, void of thought, incapable of movement, and divorced from all reality. But his vision passed through the region of speculation, and discovered the person who realized his ideal. \textit{Logos} he translated by \textit{\Sigma\omicron} and in doing so he did two things — revolutionized the Conception of God, and changed an abstract and purely metaphysical idea into a concrete and intensely ethical person. And then he made this person take flesh and become a visible God; but with the most singular audacity he restricted this incarnation to a single individual whom he identified with Jesus of Nazareth, and then straightway proceeded to tell his history."

As we have just noticed we are indebted to Heraclitus for a very early use of the term Logos which is the theme of the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel. But the Logos in the mind of Heraclitus was a very elementary expression. It connoted, at the best, that rhythm of events which we would now call the uniformity of nature under law. The conception that he grasped and advanced was that of order which he described as the destiny and reason of the world.

This elementary idea of the Logos which Fairbairn has called "one of the dark terms we owe to Heraclitus" was seized upon and developed by the Stoics into a doctrine of conscious, fundamental pantheism. "All the more decisive was the force with which the thoughts suggested in the peripatetic philosophy of Nature came forward, in which the attempt was made to understand the World as a living being in purposive motion of itself. For all these motives, the Logos doctrine of Heraclitus seemed to present itself as in like measure a solution of the problem, and this became, therefore, the central point of the Stoic metaphysics. ......... Their doctrine is in its fundamental principles pantheism, and (in opposition to Aristotle) conscious pantheism." 2 This primitive World-being, World-ground, and World-mind contains the conditioning laws and the purposeful determination of all things and all cosmic processes.

We quote from Windelband's History of Philosophy: "But this all-determining 'law' is for the Stoics as it was for Heraclitus, likewise the all-compelling power which as inviolable necessity - (ά γάρ ὄν) - and so as inevitable destiny.

1. Windelband, History of Philosophy, 2nd Ed. pp. 36-37
2. Ibid. p. 180
(κατά) brings forth every particular phenomenon in the unalterable succession of causes and effects.

We shall notice presently how this line of thought in Greek philosophy influenced Royce from the beginning of his philosophical career to the end of his life. Having detected this fact, it brings to us no surprise, when Howison without hesitation refuses to concede the claim of Royce when he was disposed to insist that all that the faith of the fathers had genuinely meant by God was capable of interpretation in terms of his view. Howison declared that if it was to be called a conception of God at all, it is the conception that presents him as All and in all and should be correctly called Pantheism. "Absolutism by its very nature leans toward Pantheism." Let us note the words of Howison in which he characterizes Royce's theory as distinctly pantheistic: "But if the Infinite Self includes us all, and all our experiences, — sensations and sins, as well as the rest, — in the unity of one life, and includes us and them directly; if there is but one and the same final Self for us each and all; then, with a literalness indeed appalling, He is we, and we are He; nay, He is I, and I am He. And I think it will appear later from the nature of the argument by which the Absolute Reality as Absolute Experience is reached, that the exact and direct way of stating the case is baldly: I am He. Now, if we read the conception in the first way, what becomes of our ethical independence: — what, of our personal reality, our righteous i.e. reasonable responsibility — responsibility to which we ought to be held?

2. Royce, Conception of God, p. 100. See Knudsen, The Philosophy of Personalism, 2nd Ed. p. 37
Is not He the sole real agent? Are we anything but the steadfast and changeless modes of his eternal thinking and perceiv­ing? Or, if we read the conception in the second way, what becomes of Him? Then, surely, he is but another name for me; or, for any one of you, if you will. And how can there be talk of a Moral Order, since there is but a single mind in the Case: We cannot legitimately call that mind a person.\(^1\) Is this Solipsism or is it Pantheism?\(^2\) It may be either, according to the pole of the reality that we take. The finite and the infinite Self are at the opposite poles. But there is no manifold of selves. The sole agent rules supreme. In his Supplementary Essay in *The Conception of God*, which was long and studied, Royce laid emphasis on the Will in the Absolute, which was only another name for Divine Love, and upon the object of Will as an individuated object, but he did not succeed in extricating himself from the eternal clutch of the Omniscience of that Absolute Experience with which his argument began. Naturally, we shall notice his argument further in his *The World and the Individual*, which is, in a very true sense, an expansion and rich fruition of his Supplementary Essay in *The Conception of God*.

Having briefly traced the development of the idea of the Logos in Greek Philosophy, we now turn to examine the statements wherein Royce identifies his Absolute with the Logos. In one of his most important books, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, he gives us his working philosophic creed:

2. James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 182, 196, 206
"For herewith, indeed, the task of these lectures is ended. We have found in a world of doubt but one assurance -- but one, and yet how rich! All else is hypothesis. The Logos alone is sure. The brief and seemingly abstract creed of philosophy: 'This world is the world of the Logos', has answered our questions in the one sense in which we can dare to hope for an answer."

One would think at first blush that he had in mind the prologue of John's Gospel. But if we follow him through his several books we shall find that if he had this in mind it was only remotely. It was not the term Logos in the sense that John used it that determined the course of his thinking here or at any other time. In one of his last utterances a year before his death he throws a flood of light on what he meant by this early declaration. He is there declaring that a genuinely united and loyal community, living a coherent life, is in a perfectly literal sense a person. He declares just as emphatically that any human individual person is a community! "The coherent life which includes past, present, and future, and holds them reasonably together, is the life of what I have called a Community of Interpretation, in which the present, with an endless fecundity of invention, interprets the past to the future, precisely as in the Johannine-Pauline type of theology, Christ or the Spirit, interprets the united individuals who constitute the human aspect of the church to the divine being in whom these members seek, at once their fulfillment, their unity, their diversity, and the goal of their loyalty."

Interpreting the Community as a person and a person as a Community, His Ideal Absolute is so all-embracing, and we may add, so all-consuming that it swallows three conceptions that have always been

distinct in Christian theism. He identifies God and Christ and the Church. When at last he comes to consider the reach and sweep of the Beloved Community as the Universal Community, the universal Church is still crying, "Create me," while the criterion of truth and righteousness, the source of salvation of its members is the Beloved Community. And this is presented as the religion of the Pauline churches without any definite hypothesis as to its origin or how such a religion came to Paul or the churches under his min- istration.

This attitude is consistent with his whole teaching in regard to the all-containing, comprehensive self of the Ideal Absolute. Everything yielded to that sovereign idea. He did not draw his theory of the nature and constitution of the Pauline churches from Paul and his epistles, but he brought to the churches and epistles the convictions which he wanted them to sustain.

Then he said in his earlier book: "The Logos alone is sure", and "This is the world of the Logos", he did not mean the Logos as it was interpreted in John's Gospel. He had in mind the Logos of early Greek philosophy. It was from that that he drew his con- ception and doctrine of the Ideal Absolute, for that is the concep- tion of the Logos that is consonant with his theory of the Ideal Absolute, the World-Whole, the Beloved Community and any other of the forms in which he expresses his thought.

By the very nature of the case he could not accept the profound affirmation with which the fourth Gospel begins, "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things

were made by him, and without him was not anything made that hath been made.....and the Logos was made flesh and dwelt among us." In those words the New Testament writer identifies the Logos with the historic Jesus. Royce states definitely that his book, (The Problem of Christianity)--"has no positive thesis to maintain regarding the person of the founder of Christianity." He further states that this book "has no hypothesis whatever to offer as to how the Christian community originated." It was wise, therefore, if the doctrine of his Absolute was to be maintained, for him to ignore the question as to the nature and mission and work of Jesus, and begin with the Pauline churches as they were, and ascribe all saving power an fulness to them as the Beloved Community, growing into what he was pleased to call the Universal Community, when the greater had been created out of the less. It was due to this consideration that he does not affirm anything definite concerning the historic Jesus. "I have a right to decline, and I actually do decline to express an opinion as to any details about the person and life of the founder." But now we get in his own words what the Logos had meant to him from the beginning. It was only another name for the Ideal Absolute, the Universal, or Beloved Community. He expands the whole community idea until it includes his world idea and ends as he began.

The Beloved Community in its completion is the Logos with which he started. This fact is brought out more clearly in a letter he wrote after his 60th birthday, in which he says in regard to the Community: 'I do not know any reason why this phase of my thinking should attract any other interest than what may be l. cf. Royce. The Problem of Christianity, Vol. I, pp. X.VI and X.VII
due to its actual relations to a process which has been going on in human thought, ever since Heraclitus remarked that the Logos is fluent, and ever since Israel began to idealize the life of a little hill town in Judaea.  

With the Logos he began, and with it concludes. When he sets forth the doctrine of his Ideal Absolute in his early book, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, and later, in The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, his one sure tenet is the Logos. When he is criticised for his attitude in regard to the Beloved Community as he sought to find it in the Pauline churches, again he appeals to the Logos and the Logos as it was interpreted by Heraclitus.

We are now in a position to see more clearly the significance of his Ideal Absolute. The Logos as presented by Heraclitus and later as taken up by the Stoics was not the Logos as taught by John's Gospel at all. As we have seen, the doctrine which came with the Heraclitean Logos was this, that the "world is a living being, in purposive motion of itself." Hence, Windelband says in his History of Philosophy: "The fundamental view of the Stoics is, then, that the entire universe forms a single, unitary, living, connected whole, and that all particular things are the determinate forms assumed by a divine primitive power which is in a state of eternal activity." Their doctrine is one whose fundamental principles are Pantheism and consciously so.

It is to this Logos of Heraclitus that the mind of Royce returns as he considers the Beloved Community, and it is this same Logos which held him to the closely drawn and severely bound and

2. Windelband, History of Philosophy, 2nd Ed., p. 180
all-inclusive Absolute from which he never escapes. The effect of it all is to bring together the Infinite Self and the finite selves in such a unity that no matter how hard he labored and fought for an agreement with Christian theism, the result remained as it began, a universal World-Spirit including the Whole of things, all controlling, and determining all things, having no place for any will or purpose save its own.

In John's Gospel the Logos is personal. It is incarnate in the Jesus of Christian history. He is the Son of God, who is made flesh and dwells among men as Mediator between God and man. According to Christian theology he is the Divine Savior and Redeemer. Though Royce may use many Christian expressions, the Logos in this sense has no place in his system. The free play of such a will for such a service is not in keeping with Royce's explication of the Absolute. For in this One man God assumes man's shape and is translated into man's speech.

Let us now bring together the different statements of Royce in different connections. At the close of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy he writes: "And now we must add that we are quite indifferent whether anybody calls all this Theism or Pantheism. It differs from the common traditional forms of both. Both usually consider God as a Power, and either leave him off on one side to push things occasionally, or to set them going at the outset, or else identify him with his products. We take neither of these ways. God as Power would be nothing, or finite. God as thought can be and is all in all. And if this is philosophy, traditional Theism can do what it wishes about the matter. In short, the present doctrine is the doctrine that in...

the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God."

Further than this, he refuses to go, and states bluntly, "Beyond that, with the rational consequences that we have been able to draw from it in the foregoing, we are frankly agnostic." But when he reaches the closing words of his opening essay of The Conception of God he says, that he there undertakes to be "distinctly theistic and not pantheistic". And in that same connection in The Conception of God he declares that St. Thomas's definition of the Divine is essentially identical with his own. Now in his later book, The World and the Individual, we have seen what he says about St. Thomas's God, that the "God of St. Thomas's theology is himself a mystic, and even a pantheistic mystic." How can free personality continue when the will of a created soul is made an identical part of the Divine Will?

This doctrine of the identity of the finite with the Infinite Will is one that Royce nowhere surrenders.

We do not for a moment doubt the agreement of his Logos with the Logos of Hellenistic philosophy before the Logos was personalized and identified with Jesus of Nazareth by the author of the Fourth Gospel.

Between the Logos of Hellenism where the author of the Fourth Gospel found it, and the Logos when he had brought it out and interpreted it in the Prologue, there is a great gulf fixed. And Royce has failed to carry forward the implications of the Hellenistic Logos to their true fulfillment, when he declines "to express an

1. cf. Royce, Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 477,478
2. Ibid. p. 49
opinion as to any details about the person and life of the founder." He "has no hypothesis whatever to offer as to how the Christian community originated."

Royce's Logos is the world spirit as the Prologue found it, but not the incarnation as the Prologue left it.

For Royce the gulf remains unbridged. He took the Pauline Churches as he found them and established a new base, or point of departure, but his confessed agnosticism knows no gulf, no bridge, no Christ, as Christian Theism understands and interprets him.

This thought will be further expanded and more carefully considered in some of its implications in a later chapter.

IV
Does Royce Preserve Personality?

The attitude of Christian Theism on certain attributes of God and man is very clearly set forth in every comprehensive system of theology. God is a Person, Omnipresent, Omniscient, Omnipotent and Immutable. These are his attributes of activity. Long lists of attributes have often been given to describe his character. However, they may all be properly brought under two, i.e., Holiness and Love. Our God is Personal because he is self-conscious and free, he is self-directing self-consciousness. Such a God created the world. He is not external to it, but is both in the world and above it and has not finished his creation, but is continually creating. God is, therefore,

both immanent and transcendent. Man is also a person. He is a person because he has intellect, sensibility and volition. These are united in self-consciousness and he has a moral judgment that crowns these qualities with significance.\(^1\)

In addition to these views as to the nature of God and man, Christian Theism is Christocentric. It believes in the historic Jesus and in his life, death, and resurrection, and in his continuous work as a present, life-giving spirit. In the words of a modern theologian, "He is the Christ, or Messiah, in the sense that he is the representative and revealer of God through whom historically the Christian salvation has been mediated to men. Christianity is the Christocentric religion, a Christlike attitude toward a Christlike God for the sake of realizing Christlike purposes in the individual life and in the world.\(^2\)" We shall try to show later in our discussion of his Problem of Christianity how the place of Christ in human redemption has been ignored by Professor Royce. Here we must deal more directly with the Ideal Absolute.

Every individual fact or finite self has according to Royce a uniqueness of meaning. This means that no other could be substituted for it. This conception of individuality has been criticized as too negative. Both Bosanquet and Bradley lay emphasis upon individuality as a positive conception. Bosanquet makes direct reference to Royce's The World and the Individual in his criticism. He says: "The first and most important matter that the argument leads me to insist on is this, that Individuality is

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2. The Reasonableness of Christianity, D. C. Macintosh, p. 156
essentially a positive conception. There has been far too
great a tendency to state the essence of Individuality not as
being oneself, but as the not being some one else, and in the
Absolute no doubt these two sides must come together; in a per­
fected arrangement there can be no repetition, but in finite expe­
rience it is all-important on which of the two we insist." 
again: "Its essence lies in the richness and completeness of a
self, not in the non-existence of any other self approaching
to it." 

It is certainly impressive to see how Royce returns again
and again in both volumes of The World and the Individual to the
one central theme and tenet of his teachings. That theme is the
unique meaning of every individual Self and the presence of a
world of Selves in the Absolute Self so that they all constitute
one expression and form in the unity of their systems the One Self.
Every finite Self is so far a part and an organic part of the Ab­
solute Self that it can be truly said of it, of any Self and all
Selves holding a place in this completely integrated Self, "That
Art Thou."

For Royce, God, the World, and the Individual, are one and
the same. It does not matter which of these expressions is used,
by each means that complete Self that gathers up into itself fi­
nite wills and becomes the expression of a single idea. It is not
necessary to dwell upon this "unique meaning" that Royce gives to
every finite Self. By such a qualification he would save it from
being swallowed up by the Absolute. Such uniqueness of meaning,

as one writer has pointed out, gives the finite individual a certain worth and significance to the Universal Self, but what is he worth to himself? It would appear that he has been almost if not completely absorbed. Royce seems to scent this very danger when he tells us that man's freedom is a "relative" freedom and then he so far softens and modifies this assertion that he leaves that freedom, whatever it may be in his mind, a very indefinite and insignificant thing.

If it is true as Royce contends that "When I thus consciously and uniquely will, it is I then who am God's will, or who just here consciously act for the whole," does it follow that "I then am so far free?"

Royce gives us no choice in the matter. We express God's will whatever we do. Where is my freedom if my act is God's and not my own, or if it must by its very necessity express his will? Royce further asserts that our individuality in the act is our freedom. Where is its freedom, where is its uniqueness of meaning except as it expresses God's will, but not mine?

If on the other hand, we allow the Absolute Self to be torn by all the expressions of the various conflicting wills that make up the Universal Self, where is God's Personality, where is his Individuality? The orderly constitution of his Being is torn to fragments by the unreasonable, hostile and malevolent wills that make up the ill-styled Unity of his Being.

According to The World and the Individual, God becomes only an aggregate of finite wills losing his own Individuality, or

he becomes the sole and only Absolute Will with all lesser wills absorbed. If, as Joyce has declared, our Individuality in our act is our freedom, then by analogy God's Individuality must also be his freedom. If I by my unique act am God's will and some other finite Self by his unique act is also God's will, and if God must be the embodiment of a world of warring, rebellious, obedient and disobedient, and conflicting wills, what becomes of his freedom, or the Moral Order, in such a world of confusion and disorder?

Paul preached, "By grace have ye been saved through faith; and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God." That grace as under-
stood by the older theologians is the free and unpurchased love of God coming out from Him to bless the undeserving. It comes to men through penitence and faith. Paul also taught that men were "justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." May not the teaching that the finite Self that has experienced a spiritual renewal through the Grace of God and who through such a renewal by the power of the Spirit of life becomes a new creature, and in obedience and love is made a cheerful and eager coworker with God — may this not express a truer relation than being taken up with all the other wills of the world into the Absolute Self? To be a worker together with God, and to choose so to be, is to be free with the freedom with which Christ makes men free. But Hodge's theory of the totality of finite Selves embodied in the One Self must issue either in Absolute Determinism on the one hand, or in a world of anarchy and disorder in the Whole, of the finite wills, on the other. So far then as Individuality is concerned, may it not be more reasonable to lay the emphasis on its positive aspect? Bosanquet says, "It lies in what a man is, not in what he is not. The essence of individuality, then, is to be a world in oneself, and this holds true in its degree for the most finite 'individual.'"

This is practically the position of A.K. Rogers, that for the selves to contribute to one another's life there must be the unity of end. They must act together and mutually contribute through cooperation. This makes a community and not an identity of a single consciousness. God would then exist as a member of this community with-

1. Bosanquet, Individuality and Value, 1st Ed., P. 319
out the limitation and ignorance of men.\(^1\)

Persuasive as Royce is, earnestly as he strives, he does not leave scope for the freedom of the finite will. The will of an Absolute experience can be nothing else but an Absolute Will just as the will of the least and most unimportant man anywhere is his own will. And such a will of the Absolute is Absolutely determined. As Eugene William Lyman says concerning Royce: "Metaphysically speaking, the whole career of every finite individual is as completely spread out in realized form as in that of a character of a play of Shakespeare." His conclusion seems to be the true one, that "A metaphysical freedom for the finite individual is extinguished by monistic idealism\(^2\)."

In the study of Royce's extensive treatment of the Ideal Absolute it becomes more and more apparent, the further we go, that we must delve beneath the surface of his imagery. For his language is that of a prose-poet rather than the critically accurate expression one would expect to meet in a well-defined system of philosophy.

Let us bring together two statements. In one place he writes: "I alone amongst all the different beings of the universe, will this act. That it is true that God also here wills in me, is indeed the unquestionable result of the unity of divine consciousness............ When I thus consciously and uniquely will, it is I then who just here am God's will, or who just here consciously act for the whole\(^3\)."

The other statement is his definition of Self: "By this meaning of my life-plan, by this possession of an ideal, by this Intent always to remain another from my fellows despite my divinely planned unity with

1. A.K. Rogers, Phil. Rev., Vol. XII, P. 55
them, — by this, and not by the possession of any soul-substance. I am defined and created a Self."  

According to this doctrine, it is the possession of a definite ideal, whether it is a worthy one or not, that makes me a Self, and whether the expression of my will is right or wrong, good or evil, nevertheless, I "am God's will", and "act for the whole." He makes these further statements:

"I always will to become one with my world, and so, with God. But when I explicitly follow the Ought, I seek to transform myself as I now am into the likeness and expression of God. And when I oppose what a clearer insight would see to be the Ought, I seek to fashion the truth after the image, and to make God the mere tool of myself as I now am. — In both cases it is impossible for me to avoid seeking a good, and expressing a truth as I act". Again, "I actually obey, in some measure, even when I rebel. For the finite cannot seek its own without passing over into new life". He further declares that the Self rebels only because the spirit dwells in it, and in its rebellion it utters the truth in its own degree that, "it is the object and expression of the divine interest".

How any dialectic can reconcile the statements here given, and others equally opposite and contradictory is more than the present writer can understand.

Royce makes, in the same connection, another very significant statement: "Even in the depths of hell the lost, if such there were, would still, despite themselves, serve God amidst their darkness." Where is the virtue either in hell or on earth in serving God "despite themselves?" As long as we are discussing the free will of a finite

2. Ibid, pp. 348-351, Vol. II
self, his doing a thing despite himself, or obeying when he means to rebel, or when he does not choose to obey, gives little assurance of his personality or his freedom.

Royce defines the Personality both of God and of man. "Now from our point of view, God is a Person. Temporally viewed, His life is that of an entire realm of consciousness in so far as, in its temporal efforts toward perfection, this consciousness of the universe passes from instant to instant of the temporal order, from act to act, from experience to experience, from stage to stage. Eternally viewed, however, God's life is the infinite whole that includes this endless temporal process, and that consciously surveys it as one life. God is thus a person, because, for our view, He is self-conscious, and because the Self of which he is conscious is a Self whose eternal perfection is attained through the totality of these ethically significant temporal strivings, these processes of evolution, these linked activities of finite selves." His definition of man's Personality is: "Man too, in our view is a Person. He is not, indeed, an absolute Person; for he needs his contrast with his fellows, and with the whole of the rest of the universe to constitute him what he is. He is, however, a conscious being, whose life, temporally viewed, seeks its completion through deeds." But how can God be a Person if He must have in and of Himself both self-consciousness and self-direction and if at the same time He embodies all finite wills? Royce tells us that each of these finite Selves has a right to say: "I alone amongst all the different beings of the universe, will this act." We have learned that such a finite

2. Ibid. p. 425
act may be either obedient or rebellious and at the same time an expression of God's will. How then can He be a Person, free and self-directing? How can he be infinitely good when I and my evil self malignantly expressed are an integral part of his integrated self? Yet he has said that "my existence has its place in the Divine Existence as the existence of an individual will, determined just in so far as it is this individual will, by nothing except itself."

Again, Royce everywhere returns to the thesis that all finite wills are identical with the Absolute Will. They are the expression of the Absolute Will. God is an aggregate of Selves. But what is the end or purpose of a uniqueness of meaning of the finite Personality if it is only a channel for the Absolute Will? How can it rebel and obey at the same time? However much Royce may contend in words for the Personality of man and the freedom of the finite Self, by its very inclusion in the Absolute Will as an identical portion of that will, is determined in its nature and suppressed in its action.

V

The Absolute in Relation to The Temporal and Eternal

In our earlier summary of the teaching of Royce in The World and the Individual we called attention to two very significant statements in the lecture on the Moral Order near the end of the second volume.

The first statement was this: "The world is not now good, nor is Being at this instant a temporally present whole, nor does either God or man at this instant see what now is as a fulfillment, or as right. Hence the future is needed to supplement the present." The meaning here is that final good is only in the eternal order. 1

This seems a strange statement when we are dealing with an Absolute whose insight is totum simul, who sees all things in an eternal Now, to whom there is no past or not yet.

The other statement which we wish to notice is near the close of the lecture on the Moral Order and is made in response to a supposed objector to his doctrine, who tells him that he has yet to face the ancient difficulty concerning the reconciliation of the divine foreknowledge and the free will of man.

"My response to this last objection is that, for our Idealism this ancient difficulty simply does not exist. We do not conceive that God, first preexisting and foreknowing, then in time created a world that is real beyond itself, and that, in time, is subsequent in its events to his preexistent knowledge. For us, God does not temporally foreknow anything, excepting in so far as he is expressed in us finite beings. The knowledge that exists in time is the knowledge that finite Selves possess, in so far as they are finite. And no such foreknowledge can predict the special features of individual deeds precisely in so far as they are unique. Foreknowledge in time is possible only of the general, and of the causally predetermined, and not of the unique and free. Hence neither God nor man can perfectly foreknow, at any temporal moment what a free-will agent is yet to do. On the other hand, the Absolute possesses a perfect knowledge at one glance of the whole of the temporal order, present, past, and future. This knowledge is ill-called foreknowledge. It is eternal knowledge. And as there is an eternal knowledge of all individuality, and all freedom, free acts are known as occurring like the chords in the musical succession, precisely when and how they actually occur."

This statement has been taken up by a leading British philo-
osopher and roundly criticised on the theory that Royce who has every-
where identified God with the Absolute had here made a slip and had
now severed the two, and had conceived the Absolute as the greater
Self and God as the lesser Self and possessed by the Absolute.

Ward says: "It is noteworthy that, it is of God that Professor
Royce denies perfect foreknowledge, it is of the Absolute that he
asserts eternal knowledge. There is here more than an accidental dif-
ference of expression. Professor Royce in fact, like only too many
theists, is guilty of that vacillation between God and the Absolute
which we found Mr. Bradley comparing to the futile attempt of a dog to
follow two masters. The Absolute must be in every respect all-
nclusive, but God, if his creatures are free, is so far not all-
nclusive." ¹

To one who will undertake to compare the two statements of Royce
seriously, the first in regard to God, and the second in regard to the
Absolute, it will readily appear that he has used the name "God" in
the first instance and the name "Absolute" in the second as equiva-
lents, but the modification in his assertion is due to what he has to
say about temporally foreknowing in contrast to eternal knowledge.
He uses the word "God" to express the Absolute while he is gaining
knowledge through the temporal order and Absolute to mean God in his
relation to the eternal order. In this lecture he has been careful
to trace the action of God as temporally conceived and as eternally
considered. He does not deal with two separate entities in these two
statements however misleading and cumbersome they may seem. It is
just the use of the two names for the one Absolute.

¹ cf. James Ward, The Realm of Ends, 3rd Ed., pp. 312, 313
And though he uses one name in relation to the temporal order and the other in relation to the eternal order, a careful reading will discover that he makes no distinction between the two. But this conclusion helps us little. We still have the Absolute viewing the entire eternal order at a glance. He is the process and he is the end of the process. He is the strivings and at the same time he holds the strivings in full survey as eternal beholder. He is at the same time both the symphony and the auditor. Is it not a contradiction to attribute to his One the limitations of the temporal standpoint together with the perfection of the eternal? It is all too absorbing and consuming. The close embrace of all finite Selves in the organic whole will have the effect of smothering all else save the Absolute. Truly did Royce say of his system, "One is all and all are in that One." The statement is far more accurate and definite for his system than he meant it to be.

VI

Inevitable Dualism

One is amazed at the plausible and persuasive devices to which Royce has recourse in order to hold his world of an aggregate of Persons and his world of the Absolute together as a Unity. But his monism falls apart by his very effort to hold it together by his intricate constructions and his bold, but doubtful, explanations. He develops the idea of the World of Description and the World of Appreciation. He gives us the Internal and External meaning of ideas. He devotes two long series of lectures in his two large volumes to The World and the Individual. In different books he takes up and discusses at length the Absolute in his relation to the temporal and finite strivings, and in his relation to the universe through his insight in one eternal moment, totum simul.

The net result is that we have two rival Gods. There is the God of the time series and the God of the complete world total, there is a God of the World of Description and a God of the World of Appreciation. There is a God whose will is identical with ours, and one in whom our wills are as free as his own. Finally, there is a God of our temporal strivings and another of everlasting rest and peace.

He never gets away from a God who includes the evil that is in the will of man and another God in whom there is nothing but goodness. Here we recall his strange statement in his Religious Aspect of Philosophy: "However stubborn this evil is for us, that has naught to do with the perfection of the Infinite. For the Infinite did not make this evil, but the evil, together with the making of it, which was also in its separateness evil, -- all this is a phenomenon for the infinite thought, which, in knowing this evil, merely knows the absolute desirableness of that which it possesses, namely, the absolute good."

What are we to understand by the statement: "All this is a phenomenon for the infinite thought"? Does the infinite thought deal in phenomena? Whether we take the Latin or Greek derivation of the word "phenomenon", or consider its usage generally, or in philosophy, it means that which appears or is perceived by observation or experiment or that which is apprehended by the mind as distinguished from real existence. We inquire, Does Royce mean that the infinite thought is engaged in observation or experiment? Does he mean that evil is apprehended by the infinite thought in distinction from the Ding an Sich? If the infinite thought does not know Reality without the intervention of phenomena, what or who does?

1. Royce, Religious Aspect of Philosophy, PP. 444-5
Royce's Absolute appears after long study as a most elusive character. The temporal and eternal elements in the discussion are like two refuges into which one may run when pursued. They are literally two hiding-places for his argument concerning the nature of his Ideal Absolute. If a difficulty arises that cannot be met by the temporal claims and the temporal strivings, there is shelter in the totum simul or seeing eternity at a glance. If a difficulty arises that cannot be resolved by the eternal insight, it can be referred to the temporal strivings or linked activities of the finite Selves by which God attains eternal perfection.

God is perfectly good and yet he includes our evil will in his good will just as a good man includes his evil will in his good will and Royce teaches that God is good just because he does so. But the good man who includes his evil will in the structure of his good will knows that he is a sinner. If God includes our will as the good man his evil will, then God knows what it is to repent and to have his will and affections changed, for Royce teaches that our personalities are identical with God's Personality.

If the Absolute has our experience, and he must if he includes all experience, then he possesses and knows identically the meaning of an evil will which welcomes wrong and rebellion and which repents and seeks forgiveness and is restored through forgiveness. This problem presents a complication for Royce's Absolute which he has failed to work out.

The temporal and eternal aspects of his Absolute are dealt with with a great deal of clever dialectic, varied expression, and literary imagery, but the difficulty still remains. His Absolute still eludes
us. We still cry, "O that I knew where I might find him, that I might come even to his seat." There is such a thing as being too close to see or handle or hear the subject which we wish to understand. Identity is not what we want, but personality free and unhampered to work out its destiny for weal or for woe; and that freedom to do and to choose is one of the most important tenets of Christian Theism.

Later on we shall deal with Royce's conception of sin, which in our view is wholly inadequate, but it may be said here that the nature and the definition allowed to sin have much to do with the doctrine of personality and freedom.

Just as a great forest fire, however terrible and devastating it may be, at last burns out and falls down in ashes, so sin in certain aspects and areas will run its course and correct itself, for it will completely destroy what it feeds upon.

Human freedom carries with it the power to sin. Sin can exist as the work of finite and free individuals in the Kingdom of God. It cannot overthrow that kingdom for there are barriers that it cannot pass. How far it can go and how long it can rage we do not know. How far God the Creator knows what other creators to whom he has given free will may do and how far they may choose to go wrong, we do not know. But it is possible that when he gave them freedom he at the same time consented to give with it certain contingencies that are open to the creatures of free will. How far they are open, and how free we are, may awaken many and varied opinions.

Finally, on God's foreknowledge and man's freedom, Royce, like many others, seems to have met defeat. But as we have just suggested, in granting free will to men God may have opened with that free-
dom a field of possibilities which were not to be hampered by any fore-
knowledge, in fact, to which no accurate knowledge was to extend.
To be sure, his kingdom is established and is over all, but has he not
given his creatures a world within a world in which they too are crea-
tors? May he not here have supplied them with ample contingencies
as free agents, and abundant opportunities to learn under his own
guidance how to work out a destiny worthy of Sons of God?

If Theism recognizes obligation, responsibility, and penalty for
wrong-doing, as well as praise for virtue and worthy effort, it must
with these heavy requirements claim also a large enough liberty to
supply abundant room for all men's powers to strive and win. For
they must live and operate in freer air and with more vigorous effort
than ever could have been theirs, if they were to be members of the
vast aggregate of the Ideal Absolute, as they would be in Royce's
system.

Our last observations suggest Royce's position in regard to sin,
and sin leads on to the question of atonement. These questions will
be better considered later, where they more properly belong, in his
mature and definite discussion of the Christian religion, in The
Problem of Christianity, and his other lectures intimately connected
with that subject.

We believe it has been shown in the course of our study that an
all-inclusive conscious experience is self-contradictory, that when
Royce goes directly from a subjective idealism to an absolute monism,
reaching a solipsism of the Absolute, he cannot by any reason-
able process identify his Absolute with the Christian's God.

2. cf. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 2nd Ed. pp. 447-8
His presentation of the Ideal Absolute as an all-inclusive experience and at the same time as a self-conscious personality is fatal to any sound doctrine of free-will, individuality, or personality. We believe that it can be further shown that it is equally fatal to the meaning of sin and obligation and the place of Jesus Christ in Christianity as a Savior and Redeemer by the way of atonement. From the very moment that Royce passes by the way of perception and conception through interpretation into the Absolute Self, and makes the human mind so far as it is a finite Self, identical with the Absolute Self, he opens the way for the criticisms of his system which are here made.¹

¹. Phil. Rev. XVI, 1907, p. 143
CHAPTER IV
CHRISTIANITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LOYALTY

During the next ten or twelve years after the publication of *The World and the Individual* a rare and beautiful note is struck and dwelt upon in the best known writings and lectures of Royce.

He turns from the more metaphysical to the social, ethical, and spiritual application of his doctrine. He now becomes in a unique sense the teacher and the "philosopher of loyalty."

We find this new development of his thought, as it is drawn more closely to the interpretation of Christianity, embodied principally in four volumes of his writings and lectures. These are: *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908); *William James and Other Essays* (1911); *The Sources of Religious Insight* (1912); and *The Problem of Christianity* (1913).

We may examine profitably his earlier and briefer works in preparation for his more elaborate and exhaustive treatment of the same subject in *The Problem of Christianity*. In the Manchester College Lectures, which are published under the title *The Problem of Christianity*, he may correctly be said to have fully developed, matured, and completed his discussion of the same subject that he was really considering in the other addresses.

I - The Philosophy of Loyalty

In his *Philosophy of Loyalty* he teaches that Loyalty is social and that the cause to which Loyalty devotes itself has always the union of the personal and the super-individual. In
the case of loyal lovers, they are not simply loyal to one another, but their love binds them to something more than either or both of them. It binds them to a union higher than they. ¹ "My duty is simply my own will brought to my clear self-consciousness." He quotes with approval the well-known statement of St. Augustine that God has made humanity for himself and that our wills are by nature inwardly restless until they rest in harmony with God's will. Such restlessness and lack of harmony give us the reason, when we are enlightened, to surrender our wills to God.²

He, therefore, defines the loyal man as the one who does not lose himself, but finds himself, by finding a cause so appealing and fascinating that he can say to it: "Thy will is mine and mine is thine. In thee I do not lose but find myself, living intensely as I live for thee."³

In his discussion of Individualism he cites the cause beyond the private self that is social and capable of linking up into unity the wills of various individuals, a cause that is personal and from the human point of view super-personal. Whenever such a cause appears worthy to be served with all one's might and soul and strength, it has awakened the spirit of loyalty, and if we obey that spirit we become loyal. He here teaches that loyalty is chief among all the moral goods of life whether the cause be worthy or unworthy.⁴

All forms of individualism end in slavery.⁵ This is true of individualism in the form of power, for instance, Der Wille zur

² Ibid. pp. 26, 27
³ cf. Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 43
⁴ Ibid. pp. 56, 57.
⁵ Ibid. p. 84
Macht of Nietzsche.¹

The seeker after power pursues his own destruction, for power is a matter of fortune, and the man who gets it is like Napoleon, insatiable, and furthermore, to quote Spinoza: "The power of man is infinitely surpassed by the power of external things."²

Royce tells the man who would assert his moral autonomy and his personal independence of judgment that the social order will crush him and all the consolation he will have at the end will be, "Lo, I asserted myself." He tells the mystic seeking spiritual serenity and inward peace, away from the world, to seek the serenity of a social and devoted and active being, or this repose will represent only the sensuous side of his nature.³

In Royce's lecture on Loyalty to Loyalty he urges that if a cause is to be a fitting object of loyalty it must be one that from the purely individual point of view is super-personal.⁴

He asks that the cause be chosen in such a way as to be loyal to loyalty. By this he means that the cause should be chosen with the purpose of making loyalty prosper among men.⁵ He then declares that all the commonplace virtues, in so far as they are defensible, are forms of loyalty to loyalty, and are justified, centralized, and inspired, by the effort to make loyalty triumphant among men.⁶

Then at one sweep, he gathers up all the recognized duties of civilized man, and groups them around his one principle, Be Loyal to loyalty, and then declares that all the duties and well-

¹ cf. Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 85
² Ibid. pp. 87-89
³ Ibid. pp. 94-96
⁴ Ibid. pp. 107-108
⁵ Ibid. p. 121
⁶ Ibid. fn. 129-130
known principles of life belong here,\textsuperscript{1} and that loyalty to universal loyalty is the fulfilment of the whole law.\textsuperscript{2}

In his lecture on Conscience, Royce maintains that his principle of loyalty to loyalty expresses what common sense means by "the dictates of conscience".\textsuperscript{3} He defines conscience as "my cause as interpreted through my ideal of my personal life." The cause furnishes a conscience by setting before me a plan of life and bidding me contrast the ideal of this plan with my impulses that are only transient and momentary.\textsuperscript{4} The conscience then becomes, by this definition, that ideal of life that constitutes one's moral personality. And conscience is just as fallible or infallible as the cause itself is subject to error or capable of leading us aright. In living our lives, though conscience may be misleading, it is unquestionably the best guide we have. Two characteristics of conduct are inseparable from the Law: Be loyal to loyalty. They are Decision and Fidelity. "Decide, knowingly if you can, ignorantly if you must, but in any case decide, and have no fear."\textsuperscript{5} Fidelity, also to a chosen cause is as obvious an aspect of universal loyalty as decisiveness. Conscience is fallible but decisive and faithful, and this is loyalty.\textsuperscript{7}

In his lecture on Some American Problems in their Relation to Loyalty, he discusses two very serious American problems. They are the family, and our relation to our various political powers and institutions and to the larger social organizations generally.

He suggests that the way to train the great mass of the people in Loyalty to loyalty is "to help them to be less estranged

1. Royce, the Philosophy of Loyalty, pp. 139,140
2. Ibid. pp. 142,146
3. Ibid. p. 162
4. Ibid. pp. 173,174
5. Ibid. pp. 177,178
6. Ibid. p. 169
7. Ibid. p. 196
than they are from their own social order." This self-estranged spirit must be taught to know itself better. He therefore recommends a new and wiser provincialism like that of Scotland, England, or Germany, as a remedy for our failure in the spirit of loyalty to loyalty.¹

In discussing Training to Loyalty he calls upon history and daily experience to be our guides. These guides teach us that there are three main lessons in our training to Loyalty. First, our loyalty is trained and kept alive by the influence of our personal leaders, and secondly, the higher forms of loyalty involve that momentous process known as the Idealizing of the Cause, and thirdly, loyalty is perfected "through great strains, labors, and sacrifices in the service of the Cause."²

In his lecture on Loyalty, Truth and Reality, Royce returns to a doctrine with which we have now grown very familiar. He tells us that Reality is a conspectus of life on a higher level than ours. It is "a city out of sight" which consists of the whole of truth and is a unity of truth, "and we ourselves with all our ideas and strivings are in and of this higher unity of life."

The "real world" means just that whole of experience in which we live and in whose unity alone we succeed. He gives us in brief statement what he means by the whole of experience. "I mean simply that the whole of experience includes all temporal happenings, contains within itself all changes, and, since it is the one whole that we all want and need, succeeds in so far as it supplements all failures; accepts all, even the blindest of services, and wins what we seek."³

1. cf. Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, pp. 245-248
2. Ibid. pp. 268-269
3. Ibid. pp. 341-345
In his last lecture in *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, which is entitled, Loyalty and Religion, after reiterating his theory of an eternal world which "includes all temporal happenings and strivings in the conspectus of a single consciousness, and fulfills all our rational purposes together and is all that we seek to be" he proposes a new definition of loyalty. This new definition results from the study of loyalty in the previous lectures in *The Philosophy of Loyalty*. This is the definition which he proposes: "Loyalty is the will to manifest, so far as is possible, the Eternal, that is, the conscious and superhuman unity of life, in the form of the acts of an individual Self." or "Loyalty is the Will to Believe in something eternal and to express that belief in the practical life of a human being."^1

Whoever has all of experience possesses the whole content of reality. Anything that is real is real because it is a present content to some conscious being.^2 By being in unity with the world-consciousness I get my success and my concord with the truth. I may get the truth or I may err, still my loyal search for truth puts me into significant unity with the world's conscious life.^3 "Whoever seeks any truth is loyal, for he is determining his life by reference to a life that transcends his own."

He now holds that this real world whose true unity the loyal acknowledge in every deed, and whose conscious unity every process of truth-seeking presupposes, is also the world that religion recognizes.

2. Ibid. pp. 364-368
3. Ibid. p. 372
He then asks, if this is so, "what is the relation of loyalty to religion?" Following this, he gives us the only full definition of religion that we have yet met with in his treatment of that subject. It probably holds good for all his discussions of religion. "Religion (in these its highest forms) is the interpretation both of the eternal and of the spirit of loyalty through emotion, and through a fitting activity of the imagination."  

Loyalty means a transformation of our nature because any cause that is worthy of a life-long service and capable of signifying our life plans will prove that it is a cause "which we cannot successfully express in any set of human experiences of transient days and of crumbling successes."  

And now toward the end of this last lecture of the book, he recites the creed of the absolute religion: "First, the rational unity and goodness of the world-life; next, its true but invisible nearness to us, despite our ignorance; further, its fulness of meaning despite our barrenness of present experience; and yet more, its interest in our personal destiny as moral beings; and finally, the certainty that, through our actual human loyalty, we come like Moses, face to face with the true will of the world, as a man speaks to his friend."

We know two things at least, he tells us, if his theory is true. "First, it is defined in terms of our own needs; and it includes and completes our experience."

1. cf. Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, pp. 370-377
2. Ibid. p. 377
3. Ibid. pp. 386, 387, 388
4. Ibid. pp. 390-392
Secondly, so long as the cause itself can only be viewed as a living whole, the loyal alone know the one great good of suffering, ignorance, finitude, loss and defeat. And here is the good of loyalty, that, since spiritual peace is not an easy thing, and is won only through stress, and suffering, and loss and labor, when we do find the preciousness of the idealized cause emphasized through grief, "we see that, whatever evil is, it at least may have its place in an ideal order." Each of us can say: "If my deed were not done, the world would miss my deed."

II - Jesus and the Supernatural

In 1911 William James and Other Essays was published. The third essay in that volume is entitled, What is Vital in Christianity? This essay is unique in one very important particular. In it Royce accords to Jesus of Nazareth a position in the Gospel narrative superior to that which he concedes to him in any other writing or address of his, with which we are familiar. He tells us there, that this much about Jesus at least was true, that he was the teacher that taught the doctrine that is recorded of him, that he was one who fully meant the doctrine that he taught, that while he taught it, he also lived it, and lived it in such a way as to win the entire confidence of those nearest to him, that he was ready to die for it, and whatever else belonged to that cause that he served, and that when the time came he did die for his cause. This much of the gospel narrative may be regarded as historical, with all reasonable certainty. He was the author of the sayings and the parables, and the recorded interpretation of his life,

1. cf. Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 393
2. Ibid. 395
3. cf. Royce, William James and Other Essays, pp. 143, 144
whether we consider that recorded interpretation complete or not.¹

He declares that he is no disciple of Eckhart, but that
"whatever is vital in Christianity concerns in fact the relation
of the real individual human person to the real God."²

He thinks that the supernatural narratives in which the church
has embodied its faith, are only symbols, produced not to deceive,
but as the outcome of the religious imagination in a constructive
age. Back of these symbols, there is truth that is capable of
rational statement and Eckhart has indicated to us the direction
this statement is to take. He also maintains that those who in
various ways and degrees have tried to define what they have
called the "essential Christ", in distinction from the historical
Christ, have been nearing in various degrees the comprehension
of what is vital in Christianity."³

He now makes a statement identifying the world with God. He
says, "Like the Logos of the Fourth Gospel, this entire world is
not only with God but is God."⁴ This statement seems definite,
deliberate and direct. Did Royce mean it?

And now, since Royce gives us here what he considers the true
doctrine of the Atonement it may be well to give it in his own
words even at the cost of a long quotation. The subject is suffi-
ciently important and profound to warrant it. He says: "The true
doctrine of the Atonement seems to me to be simply this: We, as
we temporally and transiently are, are destined to win our union
with the divine only through learning to triumph over our own

¹ cf. Royce, William James and Other Essays, p. 186
² Ibid. 185
³ Ibid. 190
⁴ Ibid. 169
evil, over the griefs of fortune, over the unreasonable and the sin that now beset us. This conquest we never accomplish alone. As the mother that bore you suffered, so the world suffers for you and through and in you until you win your peace in union with the divine will. Upon such suffering you actually depend for your natural existence, for the toleration which your natural self constantly demands from the world, for the help that your helplessness so often needs when you sorrow, then, remember that God sorrows, — sorrows in you, since in all your finitude you still are part of his life; sorrows for you, since it is the intent of the divine spirit, in the plan of its reasonable world, that you should not remain what you now are; and sorrows, too, in waiting for higher fulfillment, since indeed the whole universe needs your spiritual triumph for the sake of its completion.1

III - Whence Are Our Insights?

In Royce's lectures on The Sources of Religious Insight, which were delivered at Lake Forest College and published in 1912, he often follows paths that are parallel to his arguments in The Philosophy of Loyalty and these paths frequently converge and become not only practically, but literally, identical with the material presented in the earlier book. We shall summarize the main points of these seven lectures briefly, before coming to his larger work on The Problem of Christianity.

In his first lecture he deals with The Individual Experience as a source of Religious Insight and in the second lecture he combines the Individual and Social Experience.

At the beginning he abandons the attempt to give a technical or finished definition of religion or the nature of religious objects. He will, however, present a certain feature that he regards as essentially characteristic of religion and religious objects. That feature is that "interest in the salvation of man" that has been shown by the higher religions when they have desired to free him from "some vast and universal burden, of imperfection, of unreasonableness, of evil, of misery, of fate, of unworthiness, of sin."

His central postulate is that man needs to be saved, while religious insight, in these lectures, will mean insight into the way of salvation. This main idea of man's salvation depends on two simpler ideas: first, there is one end of human life to which all others are secondary and unimportant, and, perhaps, even empty. Secondly, man as he now is, and naturally is, is in great danger of making his life a senseless failure by missing this true goal. Religious need means for his present purpose, "insight into the need and into the way of salvation". It will be the problem of the lectures to find what the sources of this insight are.

According to William James, a religious experience means that the person who has gained it, has gotten into touch with something that has given a "new dimension" to life. But Royce claims that there are three objects which the individual experience as a source of religious insight has always undertaken to reveal.

1. cf. Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight, pp.8-10
2. Ibid. p. 12.
3. Ibid. p. 17.
4. Ibid. p. 27
These are "the Ideal, the Need, the Deliverer". Our Need in order to reach this goal of the "new dimension" is unity of Spirit, conformity to an universal Will, it means peace and power, but this condition is brought about, or this need is met, by coming into touch with a spirit that is in some true sense not ourselves.

This Other will be, in some sense, the Master of life, it will have the Light that overcomes the world, will be a revealer of final truth and will have the nature of reality. As one aspect of religious experience, individual experience will be present to the end of this discussion as a principal and fundamental source of religious insight.

He makes the point, that religious experience is "the experience of an individual who feels himself to be "alone with the divine". Two considerations reveal to us the possibility and nature of a religion of the social consciousness:

(1) Man as a being cannot be saved alone, notwithstanding the value of solitude in helping to insight.

(2) So long as man views his fellow-man only as fellow-man he complicates the problem, for both of them equally need salvation.

Salvation involves reconciliation, both with the social and divine order through love and suffering. Man must come out of the wilderness of guilt, and into the realm where he and his fellow will understand each other. Royce concludes that if there is a way to salvation, it must lead normally through social experience.

1. cf. Royce, Sources of Religious Insight, p. 29
2. Ibid. p. 32
3. Ibid p. 34
4. Ibid p. 65
5. Ibid. p. 71
6. Ibid. p. 75
Taking up The Office of Reason, Royce urges the rule of reason as we have now learned it from the Individual and Social experience. Let our other needs be what they will, "one of our needs is to come into touch with a life that in its unity, in its meaning, in its perfection, is vastly superior to our present human type of life."

Accordingly, there is a wider insight beyond us which determines our judgments whether they are true or false.

We presuppose this insight as an actuality, and from this actuality our own opinions get their truth or falsity. The common sense of mankind really makes its appeal to this genuine superhuman insight. Anyone who is at all acquainted with Royce's philosophy, will see in this lecture on The Office of Reason, more than a hint of his general theory. In Royce's consideration of The World and the Will, he discusses at some length, the relation of our rational knowledge to our active life, and the relation of our rational will to the world in which we are attempting to work out our salvation.

He now gives his opinion of what this unity of experience, this one Self, is. In giving his opinion he takes frank issue with Kant, who defines it as a virtual insight, but purely human, "as a knowledge of appearances - not of any ultimate realities."

Royce on the other hand contends: "In my opinion it must be conceived as more live and real and concrete and conscious and genuine than are any of our passing moments of fleeting human experience." And the very being of facts, as facts, depends upon

1. cf. Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight, p. 102
2. Ibid. pp. 108, 109
3. Ibid. pp. 110, 112
their presence as objects in the experience of this world-embracing insight.¹ As a fact, then, the will as well as the reason, is a source of religious insight; for no truth is a saving truth, or a truth at all, unless it guides and directs life. And here he agrees with James and the other pragmatists, "that the will is a collection of restless caprices unless it is unified by a rational ideal."²

Any truth by its very working, so far as it works, shows itself thereby to be an eternal truth. Otherwise, it can have no working at all. He agrees with the pragmatists that there is no genuine insight which does not exist as a guide to some kind of action.³

The common sense of mankind is a conceived integral experience which no individual ever gets before him. "But if such an integral experience is real, then that by which the 'pragmatic workings' of our private and personal opinions are to be tested and are tested is a certain integral whole of life in which we live and move and have our being."

Unless there is such a life, such a concrete whole of experience above our individual level, where our ideas have their workings and our wills are striving to agree, and where our narrowness and pettiness get moulded into reasonableness, unless there is such a real life triumphant above our human strivings, then, chaos drowns out the meaning of the pragmatists and idealists alike.

And our significant assertions are judged and estimated, according to the standard of such higher experience, as they conform to

2. Ibid. p. 144
3. Ibid. pp. 145, 146
its will, or fall short of it, "by leading toward or away from salvation."\(^1\)

He here recalls the thesis on which the pragmatist lays great stress, "that since the truth of an opinion consists in the agreement or disagreement of its empirical workings with their anticipated consequences, all truth is both temporal and relative and cannot be either eternal or absolute."\(^2\)

Over against this, Royce insists: "This distinction between the truth and falsity of an opinion that counsels an individual deed is as absolute and irrevocable as is the place of the deed when once done on the score of life."\(^3\)

He refers here to opinions about the universe and insists that any such opinion whether true or false is an effort to adjust will and conduct to the intents of a supreme will which decides values, estimates purposes, and establishes the rule of life in the light of a supreme insight. He concludes that this complete insight to which our opinions appeal is the insight of a real being who values, decides, estimates and establishes as concretely as we do, and that he is not only all-wise but possessed of a will.\(^4\)

We are well acquainted now with this course of argument. Again he tells us that all is temporal in the flow and sequence of human deeds but all is eternal in the unity of its meaning.\(^5\)

He now promises that in the lecture immediately following this one, on, The Religion of Loyalty, he will present a source of insight not yet expressly named, which "includes in a beautiful

1. Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight pp. 148, 149
2. Ibid. p. 151
3. Ibid. p. 156
4. Ibid. p. 159
5. Ibid. p. 160
and spiritual unity the true sense of our individual experience, of our social experience, of our reason, and of our will, and gives us at length a genuine religion."¹

In this lecture on The Religion of Loyalty he brings before us again his two well-known postulates on religion: that there is some highest good or chief end of life, and that man is in danger of completely missing this highest good of life and needs to be saved from that danger.² He cites certain individuals who are masters of their own lives and then offers three principles by which they are dominated.

(1) They are individuals of considerable wealth and strength of character.

(2) They have strong social motives.

(3) They have a peculiar grace or gift that may be called their Cause.³

He holds that the Cause of such devoted servants is a real spiritual unity which links many lives into one and is therefore superhuman in exactly the sense that we have found the world of the realities of the reason to be. This Cause is based on human need and is alive with all the highest human possibilities of effort, consciousness, desire and love. It must be thought of as "superhuman in the scope, the wealth, the unity, and the reasonableness of its purposes and its accomplishments."⁴

This attitude toward a Cause, Royce names Loyalty, and to

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¹ of. Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight p. 101
² Ibid. p. 171
³ Ibid. pp. 197-199
⁴ Ibid. pp. 199-200
describe it he lays down the searching principle which is a union of two others. The first is: Be loyal, and the second is, Be loyal in such a way as to "so seek, so accept, so serve your cause that thereby the loyalty of all your brethren throughout all the world, through your example, through your influence, through your own love of loyalty wherever you find it, as well as through the sort of loyalty which you exemplify in your deeds, shall be aided, furthered, increased, as far as in you lies."

In short, this means being so loyal to one's Cause, in such a manner, and in such a spirit, that the cause of universal loyalty will be advanced. He considers this principle a fit one to be made the basis of a universal code. How thorough and sweeping he believes this principle just enunciated to be, can only be told in the ringing and almost exultant declaration which he now adds: "Charity, justice, fidelity, decisiveness, strenuousness, truthfulness, efficiency, wise self-assertion, watchful self-restraint, patience, defiance of fortune, resignation in defeat, your daily social duties, your individual self-development, your personal rights and dignity, your obedience to the calls of duty, your justified self-sacrifice, your rational pride in the unique moral office to which you have individually been called - all these, I assert, can be rightly defined, defended, estimated, and put into practice through an accurate understanding and development of the principle of loyalty just laid down."

He now makes the true cause of the man who is loyal the spiritual unity of the whole world of reasonable beings. Your loyalty no matter how far in it you may advance, will never be a mere morality but will always be "in essence a religion".

1. cf. Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight, pp. 201-204
2. Ibid. p. 205
To you your loyalty will mean that you are discovering an object from outside of you and above you. It comes like divine grace. The spirit of loyalty is in its essence a complete synthesis of the moral and religious interests. Its cause is a religious object that finds us in our need and points the way to salvation. It is a gift not of ourselves. It has come to us from the realm of the spirit. It has come to us because the world has been willing to manifest the way of salvation. This free gift compels our love and we freely surrender ourselves in return.\(^1\)

Royce's sixth lecture on The Religious Mission of Sorrow, is a remarkable treatment of that subject. His problem with sorrow, as with the objects in other lectures, is how to establish the relation of tribulation to religious insight. He maintains that an experience of ill is not always or wholly an experience that ought to be driven from the world. He teaches that all the world's most practical guides, to the most concrete living, support this view. It is no soft doctrine.\(^2\)

He holds that if these sorrows, and idealized evils, and the grief caused by them, were wholly removed from the world, the courage, the fidelity, the spiritual self-possession, made possible by them, would go with them. They show us that the divine will must be made perfect through suffering and that the abstract principle: "evil ought to be abolished", is false. Sorrow, then, as a source of religious insight leads us up very close to the most vital of all religious teachings, the doctrine of the Atonement.\(^3\)

2. Ibid. p. 240.
The final lecture on The Sources of Religious Insight is entitled, The Unity of the Spirit and the Invisible Church. Royce calls the limitation of our span of consciousness a defect in the 'form' of our conscious life. He adds: "Our form of consciousness is one of the chief human sorrows." We are now well acquainted with his all-inclusive ideal as taught in other books and lectures, and he now comes back to that thesis and makes the emphatic statement in his doctrine of the Unity of the Spirit, that "the whole reality of the universe must itself be defined, in terms of the reality of such an inclusive and direct grasp of the whole sense of things."

Our own form of consciousness, he calls human, but the wider conscious view of things that we share only indirectly he calls both superhuman and supernatural. As used by him the term, "unity of the spirit" means the "unity of meaning which belongs to these superhuman forms of consciousness." We ourselves partake of this unity and share in it as far as our own lives discover and express, in ways that our consciousness permits, the truth and life that bring us into harmony with the higher form of consciousness, the spirit of wholeness which expresses itself in the life of the world. Salvation means our positive harmony with the purpose and manifestation of this unity of the spirit.

He now claims that in this new source we have the crowning source of religious insight, for the reason that it opens all the previous sources that have been discussed and makes them bear fruit and become effective. —And he says: "I call the community of all

1. of. Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight, pp. 261,262
2. Ibid. pp. 266-268
3. Ibid. pp. 271,272
4. Ibid. p. 276
who have sought for salvation through loyalty the Invisible Church. He here teaches that the robber or the pirate may be a genuinely religious man.1 He concludes: "The work of the invisible church - it is just that work to which all these lectures have been directing your attention. The sources or insight are themselves the working of its spirit in our spirits."2

Royce's discussions of religion, including the lecture, What is Vital in Christianity, which is the third lecture in the volume entitled, William James and Other Essays, including The Philosophy of Loyalty and The Sources of Religious Insight, all lead up to his fuller work, The Problem of Christianity, which is now to engage our attention.

IV - The Appeal to Christian Experience.

Royce tells us in the preface to The Problem of Christianity that in his lecture on "The Religion of Loyalty, in the Sources of Religious Insight, he had made the promise that it possible in some future discussion he would apply the principles that he there presented to the special case of Christianity. By his two volumes of lectures delivered at Manchester College, Oxford, in 1913, and published in 1914, he considered that promise redeemed.3 It was almost thirty years from the time when he wrote his first book on religious philosophy, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, to the time when he published The Problem of Christianity. At the time he wrote the latter book, by all the laws of human development, he had reached the mature measure of his intellectual, moral,

1. cf. Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight pp. 280-283
2. Ibid. p. 297
and religious life and thinking. We have a right to consider this the ripened fruitage of his intellectual and spiritual growth. In his treatment of religious subject The Problems of Christianity is, in a very real sense, the crown of his thinking and the harvest of his years.

His one thought which we have met with in The Philosophy of Loyalty and which is here expanded, and extended, is that of Loyalty, and the Religion of Loyalty. All our experience is at least individual, but if it is not at the same time social, it is only sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal. He thinks that Paul saw this truth in the way that Royce himself undertakes to apply it in these lectures. He believes that the ideal church must be built upon this foundation, and that this doctrine asserted and lived, is the very core of Christian experience. He tells us now that if we are saved at all it is by devotion to the Community. This is the position that his two volumes will attempt to defend. His short, direct definition of loyalty with which he begins is, "by loyalty I mean the practically devoted love of an individual for a community."  

Royce states that his view of The Problem of Christianity is different from both the view of the "orthodox" and the "liberal". The reason he gives for his disagreement with the liberal position of Harnack, for instance, with regard to the significance of the personality of Jesus, would doubtless seem strange to Harnack, but it is considered "momentous" by Royce. He reasons thus: If Christianity is, in its inmost essence, the 'religion of Loyalty'

2. Ibid. p. XVII
the religion of that which in this book I have called 'The Beloved Community', and if Pauline Christianity contained the essence of the only doctrine by which mankind, through devotion to the community, through loyalty, are to be saved, - then Buddhism is right in holding that the very form of the individual self is a necessary source of woe and of wrong. In that case, no individual human self can be saved except through ceasing to be a mere individual.

But if this be so, Harnack's view and the usual 'liberal' view, to the effect that there was an ideally perfect human individual, whose example, or whose personal influence, involves a solution of the problem of human life, and is saving, - this whole view is an opinion essentially opposed to the deepest facts of human nature, and to the very essence of the 'religion of loyalty'. Not through imitating nor yet through loving any mere individual human being can we be saved, but only through loyalty to the 'Beloved Community'.

Early in this book Royce identifies Jesus Christ with the "Beloved Community". The thesis of his book as he states it is clear on that point. "The thesis of this book is that the essence of Christianity, as the Apostle Paul stated that essence, depends upon regarding the being which the early Christian Church believed itself to represent, and the being which I call, in this book, the 'Beloved Community' as the true source, through loyalty, of the salvation of man."

As we have stated before, he has no hypothesis to offer as

2. Ibid. p. xxvi.
to the origin of the Christian Community and refuses to express any opinion as to the details of the life of its founder.¹

He teaches that the founder of Christianity apparently did not define the Christian ideas adequately, that the Pauline churches were first conscious of the essence of Christianity and that these ideas came to a relatively full statement through the religious life of these churches. Paul, who was certainly not the founder of Christianity, himself learned the value of universal loyalty from the religious and social life of these churches, and in his work as teacher and missionary he enriched and transformed it. For this reason he considers the epistles of Paul priceless in that they reveal the religion of loyalty in classic and universal form.²

Some of the leading theses of The Problem of Christianity are these: That Christianity is essentially the most typical, the most highly developed, religion of loyalty, that loyalty is a perfectly concrete form and interest of mankind, and, as we have just said, that Paul learned the value of universal loyalty from the religious and social life of the Christian communities and then went out and enriched and transformed it, and that whatever may be the fortune of Christian institutions in the future, if men are to be saved at all, the hopelessly lost individual must be saved "through devotion to the life of the genuinely real and Universal Community". In other words, the religion of loyalty will be the salvation of mankind.³

In the study of other works of Royce we have summarized so

¹ cf. Royce, The Problem of Christianity, Vol. 1, p. 28
² Ibid. pp. XXI, XXII, XIX
³ Ibid. pp. XVIII, XIX
many of his teachings that are now brought together in these two volumes of *The Problem of Christianity*, that we shall content ourselves here with a study of the few lectures that deal with certain disputed, novel, or highly questionable doctrines.

In his two volumes of lectures on *The Problem of Christianity*, in Part I, he discusses religious experience, and in Part II, he deals with its metaphysical foundations. There are three ideas of Christianity that guide this study in *The Problem of Christianity*. We are already familiar with them all from the other books whose teachings we have summarized. The first is, that there is a certain spiritual community, universal and divine, membership in which is necessary to salvation.

The second is, that man is by nature "subject to some overwhelming moral burden" from which he cannot escape unaided. The third is, that the escape, and the only escape for the individual into this union with the divine spiritual community, which is necessary to salvation, is by a plan of redemption from sin and guilt through Atonement. And the divine plan has provided and accomplished the atoning work.\(^1\) In his Discussion of the Universal Community, Royce attempts to show that Jesus left the Sermon on the Mount, the Parables, and the Golden Rule, with their teachings undeveloped, and that the original Gospel did not furnish guidance for the social program needed now, or in the days of the Pauline churches that sprang up directly after the crucifixion. Royce holds that in the world of the parables there are two beings, God and our neighbor, to whom Christian love is due.

He further teaches that the master set these two side by side as mysteries and asked the loving soul not to seek knowledge of that which is not yet revealed, but to leave it to the end of the world, which is coming in the near future, to lift all veils and reconcile all conflicts.\(^1\)

Enter now, the Apostle Paul, who discovers a third being, a corporate entity which he calls the body of Christ and at different times he calls its nature a "mystery".\(^2\) According to Royce, Paul considers this entity as something new in his experience, and he believes its daily life is bound up with the influence which he considers is due to the spirit of "his risen and ascended Lord." The above is what Paul believes, but Royce simply announces it as the attitude of Paul, not as his own position. But he credits Paul's doctrine, nevertheless, with a practical concreteness and clear common sense, and says that the apostle restates the doctrine of Christian love according to all its active heroism and interprets much that was left problematic in the parables.\(^3\)

In short, he declares that Christian love as Paul conceives it has been changed into Loyalty. He claims that in the mind of Paul this community of the Christian faith, as he knew it, was "a genuinely universal community through God's grace and all men whom God was pleased to save at all would soon belong to it."\(^4\)

In his lecture on The Moral Burden of the Individual, Royce teaches that this burden is due to the war between the social and

2. Ibid. p. 92
3. Ibid. p. 96
4. Ibid. pp. 98, 103
individual wills. As the social order grows, individualism and collectivism intensify each other. Royce claims that only a little more emphasis on moral and religious problems in our day is needed, than is now seen in worldly people, to wring Paul's cry from a full heart: "O wretched man that I am!" Of course, he finds Paul's salvation in obedience to the spirit of the divinely constituted community, the body of Christ. But he here seems to make the community identical with Christ himself. We quote: "It is the body of Christ. The risen Lord dwells in it, and is its life. It is as much a person as he was when he walked the earth. And he is as much the spirit of that community as he is a person."1

In Royce's lecture on The Mystery of Grace, he makes it the same as the mystery of loyalty. He says that Paul knew that the mystery of loyalty was typical of the mystery of grace, and in another guise it is the mystery of the incarnation, because the early Christian Church held that one individual had solved the mystery for all men.2

Under Time and Guilt, Royce defines what he considers the unpardonable sin and its consequences. It is sinning against the light. It is a deliberate deed of treason, and as such it consigns the wrong-doer to the "hell of the irrevocable". Whatever the traitor does in the future, even if he becomes a saint and remains one, so far as that one deed is concerned, he will continue henceforth as he was. The guilt of his act of betrayal is as enduring as time.3

2. Ibid. p. 209
3. Ibid. pp. 262-264
Royce's view of the Atonement, as we have learned in our earlier study, is quite unique. It is for this reason all the more important that it should be clearly set forth here. His statements on the subject are sufficiently definite, that the main points of his position can be brought into a comparatively brief summary.

He believes that if the world had no Christianity or Christians the idea of the atonement would still have to be invented, in order to understand the higher levels of our moral existence. He chooses the "problem of the traitor", which he discussed under Time and Guilt, as his typical instance of the human need of atonement. The case of the traitor is this, he had a cause and he loved it in the language of the first commandment, "with all his heart and soul and mind and strength". He embraced it with complete loyalty, and it was his way of salvation, his Beloved Community. But he deliberately betrayed his cause. What now is the nature and means of Atonement, Royce rejects the "penal satisfaction" and "moral theories" of the atonement. The traitor knows too well that they will not aid him, and he really does not know what will. The problem of reconciliation is the problem not only of the traitor himself, but of the shattered community which he has done his utmost to wreck. While the traitor must remain in the hell of the Irrevocable, since nothing can erase the record of his deed, the community can create a means of reconciliation by a deed of its own, or by becoming incarnate in some one of its faithful servants.

2. Ibid. pp. 273, 278
3. Ibid. pp. 292, 293
4. Ibid. p. 304
Royce here guards and narrows his discussion, by stating definitely that he is, for the present, ignoring the metaphysical problem of atonement between God and man. But now comes the faithful and suffering servant of the community, who performs a deed so fitting and practical, and ingenious, that it is not only creative, but is exactly the finest deed made possible by the treason; and after it is done "The world as transformed by this creative deed, is better than it would have been had all else remained the same, but had that deed of treason not been done at all." Royce expresses his confidence that this idea of atonement is in agreement with the work of Christ as the theory of his atonement has existed sub-consciously in the feeling and expression of Christendom. But again he guards his attitude by saying, "in this discussion I am speaking of the purely human aspect of the idea of atonement."  

He then lays down the community's postulate of atonement in these words: "No baseness or cruelty of treason so deep or so tragic shall enter our human world, but that loyal love shall be able in due time to oppose to just that deed of treason its fitting deed of atonement."  

Now as to the result for the traitor whose treason is irrevocable, Royce uses this illustration of Joseph and his brethren: Joseph's deed does not wipe out the guilt of his brethren, but they stand in their community and hear this word of reconciliation: "You have been the indirect cause of a good that, by the grace and ingenuity of the community and its faithful servant, has now been

2. Ibid. pp. 318-321
3. Ibid. p. 322
created, while, but for your treason, this good could not have been created. Your sin cannot be cancelled. Nor are you in any wise the doers of the atoning deed. But the community welcomes you to its love again.\

Royce devotes one of his lectures in the second volume of the Problem of Christianity to Perception, Conception and Interpretation. In the face of the dual classification of our cognitive processes as Perception and Conception, Royce now stresses the third, Interpretation, maintaining thereby a triadic classification. While Kant, never maintained a triadic classification, he approached it in what he called the *Urtheilskraft.*

In his lecture on The Will to Interpret, Royce defines what he means by a "Community of Interpretation" in very simple terms. If you are ready to accept the services of some one as interpreter you already have the will to be interpreted. If there is some other one to whom this interpreter can interpret you, then this other one to whom the second one is able to act as interpreter has already willed that you should be interpreted to him and that the second one should be the interpreter. Then "we three - you, my neighbor, whose mind I would fain interpret, you, my kindly listener, to whom I address my interpretation, we three constitute a Community.*...Let us call it a Community of Interpretation."*

In Royce's profound lecture on The World of Interpretation his Community of Interpretation is simply expanded into a World of Interpretation. That which was local has now become Universal

2. cf. Royce, The Problem of Christianity, Vol. II, p. 120
3. Ibid. p. 211
and even cosmic. For his ideal World knows no limits.

We find ourselves standing among problems that are fragmentary and dissatisfying and we are hampered by the conflicts and antitheses of our present ideas. But we talk of the "real world" and by it we mean the "true interpretation" of our "problematic situation". What does this contrast mean? We want an interpretation. "But an interpretation is real only if the appropriate community is real, and is true only if that community reaches its goal." The real world is the interpretation of the antithesis and the solution of the problem. He concludes that if there is no real interpreter and no real community there is no real world.

We can see now that what Royce has been leading up to all along, in his second volume of The Problem of Christianity, which volume has been dealing with metaphysical foundations, is the identification of the Absolute with the Universal Community, and the displacement of the Absolute by it.

That question has been raised by leading philosophers. It will be our task in another chapter to show that he actually did this in The Problem of Christianity definitely and indubitably. And now in some emphatic words in the close of his last lecture we have a rather complete expression of what he set out in these Manchester College lectures to do. His purpose has been to show, what in his opinion, at least, gave warrant for the Christology of Paul, or of any other Christian leader, or for the Christological opinions of the historical church, or any one of its sects. This is his affirmation in closing, that, "the literal and historic

2. Ibid. pp. 268, 269, 270
Fact has always been this, that in some fashion and degree those who have thus believed in the being whom they have called Christ, were united in a community of the faithful, were in love with that community, were hopefully and practically devoted to the cause of the still invisible, but perfectly real and divine Universal Community, and were saved by the faith and the life which they thus expressed.¹

In the beginning, Royce stated that it was the purpose of his two volumes of The Problem of Christianity to explain and defend the thesis that, "We are saved, if at all, by devotion to the Community."² Over and over again, perhaps more than a hundred times, he has reminded us that there was no other means of salvation except as members of the Community.

But there is a very wide difference in the two statements here quoted. To be saved, and saved only by becoming a member of the Community, means one thing; but to be a member of the historic church which has always been a community where the faithful and devoted have gathered and expressed through such a brotherhood the life and faith that saved them, means quite another.

But now, we turn to the critical examination of some of his most important religious doctrines, as they were expounded in these later books of his life. Our summary is, we think sufficiently full to reveal the general course and conclusion of his teachings.

Chapter V - Critical Examination of Certain Leading Ideas in the Treatment of Christianity and Loyalty.

The question that is ever before us is that of the Foundation in Royce's philosophy for Christian Theism or the lack of such foundation. We have already found that, in our opinion, the Ideal Absolute as interpreted in the earlier writings and lectures of Royce was not consonant with Christian Theism as understood and expounded by its leading and recognized representatives. It left much to be desired before it could become a full and satisfactory doctrine of Christianity, harmonious with the mind of its founder. We are naturally anxious to know whether his later thought was in any important aspect different from his earlier thought on this main subject. He came to closer and closer grips with his subject until he grappled at first hand with The Problem of Christianity as he found it embodied in the Pauline epistles and involved in the life and spirit of the Pauline Churches. Did Royce come to this problem with the same conception of the Ideal Absolute that determined his position as set forth in his other books, such as The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, The Conception of God, and The World and the Individual? The answer to this question, and its bearing upon his religious position, we shall now try to discover.

I. The Beloved Community.

We have seen already that the Beloved Community, the Universal Community, and The Community of Interpretation, were one and the same. The Community for Royce was a Community of Perception, Conception, and Interpretation, where "the world is the process and the life of the Spirit and the Community." \(^1\)

But early in his first volume of The Problem of Christianity,  

he writes: "The thesis of this book is that the essence of Christianity as the Apostle Paul stated that essence, depends upon regarding the being which the early Christian Church believed itself to represent, and the being which I call in this book, the 'Beloved Community', as the source, through loyalty, of the salvation of man."¹

The above is the statement of one who has no positive thesis to offer in regard to the person of the founder of Christianity and has no hypothesis as to how the "Community" originated. But in this book the being which the early Church believed itself to represent and the being which this book calls the "Beloved Community" are the same.

He identifies Christ with the Community. This is in harmony with the entire conception and development of The World and the Individual, and Royce makes this clear in certain definite statements in The Problem of Christianity.

In the preface of his first volume he writes: "In spirit I believe my present book to be in essential harmony with the bases of the philosophical idealism set forth in various earlier volumes of my own, and especially in the work entitled "The World and the Individual."² After he has written two thirds of the second volume of The Problem of Christianity, he feels that it is necessary to assure us again of the same fact, and he observes again: "As a fact, I hold to all the essential features of these former attempts to state the case for idealism."³ His position here is the same as in the earlier books. But if this is so, then what about the World, the Logos, God and the Absolute,

² Ibid. p. X
of the earlier books. We think this question can be quickly and definitely answered from his own words. In his Sources of Religious Insight, he calls the community of all who have sought salvation through loyalty the Invisible Church. The Church which Paul designates as the "body of Christ" is the Beloved Community.

Is there any warrant, in fact, for the close identification that Royce gives in his doctrine of Christianity to God, and Christ, and the Church? They are closely joined in Christian experience, to be sure, but they are distinct in Christian thought. Each one holds its own important position in theology. But Royce brings them all together apparently into one identical conception in his doctrine of Christianity.

He says: "the Fourth Gospel identifies the Logos with the spirit of the community." Proceeding on this postulate, he makes this doctrine the central idea of his metaphysic of the community in the second volume of The Problem of Christianity. By what interpretation or manipulation of language can one understand that the Fourth Gospel identifies the Logos with the spirit of the community, until, first of all, it was "made flesh and dwelt among us" in a Person. One of the distinctive features on which Christian Theism at its best has always insisted, and never lost, is the teaching that it is the Gospel of a Person. This ancient landmark has been removed from its setting, and made to serve as the central stone of the arch for the Universal Community.

He teaches that this Community is the World or the World is the community. In summing up the meaning of a World of Interpretation through the Doctrine of Signs, he calls for an ideal society as the means of the interpretation of such a World and adds: "Not the Self, not the Logos, not the One, and not the Many, but the Community will be the ruling category of such a philosophy."^2

Further on in this same lecture on The Doctrine of Signs, he is still more explicit. He writes: "This essentially social universe, this community which we have now declared to be real, and to be, in fact, the sole and supreme reality,—this Absolute,—what does it call upon a reasonable being to do? What kind of a salvation does it offer him?"^3

He tells a supposed Greek Christian, highly cultured, who was a member of one of the Pauline Churches, and who was supposed to have returned to earth after his long absence, with the Christian ideas of that day: "Our doctrine of the World as a community, of the social life of the universe endlessly revealing the divine,—never wholly at any one time, but in the world's process, expresses in the form of the metaphysics of the community what you grasped through an intuition of faith."^4

By these statements it is clear that we are back again to the all-inclusive Absolute as we have learned it in his former lectures and our former studies. The finite selves, the Christ of the New Testament, the Logos, the Church as the body of Christ, the World, the Absolute, even the Holy Spirit,—are all identified with the Beloved or Universal Community.

2. Ibid. Vol. II. p. 281
The practical acknowledgement of the Spirit of the Universal and Beloved Community Royce recommends as the sufficient faith, he holds that this contains what is vital in Christianity and all else is accident. The core of Christianity is not to be found in the person of any individual founder or man. "Nor is the core to be found in the sayings of the founder, nor yet in the traditions of Christology." "But, it is to be found rather in the Spirit, the Beloved Community, the atoning deed, and the saving power of the loyal life." He declares that "There is nothing else under heaven whereby men can be saved, or have been saved," and that he is not teaching a new faith, but is sending men to the heart of all true faith.¹

We may need to be reminded again that by loyalty Royce means the thorough-going devotion of an individual to a community. Now, together with such loyalty he treats of The Problem of Christianity under three Christian ideas which he considers the essential ones. They are the Community, the Lost Individual, and the Atonement.

We shall take up presently the discussion of these three ideas in the light of Royce's attitude toward the person and details of the life of the historic Jesus. But now let us discuss his position further in regard to the Universal Community. If Royce does supplant his earlier conception of the Absolute Self by the beloved Community in The Problem of Christianity, then his position does not coincide with the Christian Theist as he tried to make it coincide in his earlier books, notably in The Conception of God.²

Mary Whiton Calkins, one of his distinguished pupils, sought earnestly to prove that what Royce meant was not necessarily that a community is a self or a person, but that it behaves and is treated as if it were a person. But after she had sought to interpret the questionable statements in a way favorable to Christian Theism, Royce put the whole matter at rest by a letter which we have quoted before, and which ought to settle the entire question, since this letter was written to Miss Calkins definitely for the purpose of correcting her misunderstanding, and consequent misinterpretation of his doctrine in *The Problem of Christianity*.

He says: "for me at present, a genuinely and loyally united community which lives a coherent life, is, in a perfectly literal sense a person. Such a person for Paul, the Church of Christ was. On the other hand, any human individual person, in a perfectly literal sense is a community. The coherent life which includes past, present, and future, and holds them reasonably together, is the life of what I have called a Community of Interpretation."

In his view the Universal Community, the Church, the loyal company, then, is God, but is this the kind of God we can worship and adore? Is this the kind of God we need, to command our love, and reverence, and loyal service? Here is a God who awaits realization. He exists in idea, but with the Church and Community, and as equivalent to the Church and Community, he has yet to be created. He is an ideal challenge which waits yet to be realized, and is crying through the Church, saying: "Create Me."

Is this the Christian's God? Such a God, we submit, will neither satisfy the heart nor meet the demands of reason. The Christian's God is revealed in Jesus Christ, a Person like Himself. He is therefore a God to be loved, a God who has revealed himself to the loyal by the life and love of Jesus Christ who by his Incarnation, his Atonement, his teaching of the Kingdom and the Fatherhood of God, appeals to men to be reconciled to Him, and to be saved to the uttermost by the power of the Gospel. Such a God the Christian seeks and finds in Christ and such a God as this he worships and strives to obey.

II - The Rise of the Pauline Churches.

By his hypothesis of the essence of Christianity Royce virtually makes the Pauline Churches the founder of Christianity. Only in a formal and modest way, as to one who possibly supplied the scattered and uncertain materials for the structure, and whose nature and existence are too vague to draw out a definite opinion, does he give a place to Jesus of Nazareth. But one is moved to inquire, what vital impulse originated those Pauline Churches in the populous and influential centers of the Roman Empire in the face of constant danger and bitter persecution? If Paul himself found the essence of Christianity already in the Churches, realized that here was literally the body of Christ, and carried out into his missionary field the idea and the Spirit of those little communities, did he make a mistake when he traced it back and attributed it to a crucified and risen Redeemer who had become a life-giving Spirit?

Inadequate as Royce's ideas of loyalty and sin and atonement and salvation are, and we expect shortly to study these ideas, yet they never would have been even as full and as valuable as they are now,
and he never would have been able to gather up his fragment of traditional Christian doctrine, as he seems to fear his sketch of what he considers the essential Christian ideas will be called, if there had not been a group of Churches in the Roman Empire that were alive and alert with a consciousness of a new life and spirit, and this life and spirit had not come to the world to change individuals and bring them together into a brotherhood of love, his very doctrines would have simply been lacking both then and now. These groups had been blessed with an inner dynamic, and filled with a definite longing to serve one another. Paul himself nowhere by his teaching warrants the claim that the only way of salvation is through the community. On the contrary, he had just come out of a community that had left him wretched and undone. If loyalty to a community had saving significance, he had rendered loyalty in the highest. He tells us how after the straitest sect of the Jews' religion he had lived a Pharisee. But not even his devotion to his community beyond the measure of his brethren, brought him satisfaction and peace. And Paul himself certainly was not saved by the community. By the grace of God and through the power of Christ he called these religious communities into being. But it is significant that he taught them the way to salvation by giving them the benefit of his own personal experience and seeking to bring each individual into a relation with Christ similar to the one that he himself had gained.

And now we question out of hand, the interpretation given by Royce to Paul's teaching in the Seventh Chapter of Romans. Is Paul
actually dealing there with the conflict between individualism and collectivism? Is he describing the battle between the individual and social will? We believe that so far as he was hampered by the social will expressed by what he terms the "law", the individual will was right and the social will was wrong. But it was not his relations with his brethren or any rights of theirs, social or individual, that made him miserable. It was his failure to live up to the first and great commandment rather than the second. There was the moral law and he knew that law was good. He did not want to break it outwardly and he did not intend to, but he wanted to be in harmony with God. And it was in that oneness of spirit with God that he found peace and release. And his release was a personal one and through a Person and not through a community.

"For the law of the Spirit of Christ Jesus made me free from the law of sin and death." He goes on to tell that it is the indwelling Spirit of God that gives life and peace, and then he says, "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ he is none of his." However much Paul might have exalted the Church, and the Church is and was the recipient of the Spirit of Christ, salvation according to Paul was through a personal experience with a Person, Jesus Christ. We are saved through him. The Church is the Body of Christ, and to it the Spirit is given to quicken and purify and bless the Body, but not to obey it. The Spirit is in the Church and above the Church to teach and guide and control. The Spirit makes the community but the community neither dictates its coming or its going. He who said, "Where the Spirit of the Lord is there is 1. Romans. Chapters 1, 2.
Liberty" knew that the way to freedom both for the individual and the community was through obedience to the Spirit of Christ. And that is what he taught to men and Churches alike.

III - His Conception of Loyalty.

Royce defines loyalty as "the willing and thoroughgoing devotion of a self to a cause, when the cause is something which unites many selves in one, and which is therefore the interest of the community."¹ In this sense, there is no such thing as loyalty to an individual. It always reaches further than that. He explains that loyalty is social. You can be loyal to individuals only through the tie that binds them to other individuals. The cause which is the object of our loyalty has about it both the personal and the seemingly super-individual. This super-individual binds many individuals into one service. Take the loyalty of lovers as an instance. They are not merely loyal to each other, but they are loyal to their love and their union, and this is something more than either of them, and more than both of them, considered as separate individuals.²

The above is his definition at the beginning of his book, The Philosophy of Loyalty, but at the end, he proposes a new and more searching definition of loyalty in these words: "Loyalty is the will to manifest, so far as is possible, the Eternal, that is the conscious and superhuman unity of life in the form of the acts of an individual Self."³

One who reads this course of lectures beginning with this first definition of loyalty, and practically ending with the last, will see how loyalty starting with a very practical and familiar

2. cf. Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 25
3. Ibid. p. 357
application to two lovers, and through them to the immediate
circle to which they belong, with the added suggestion of a super-
individual aspect, has now risen to a centre in the eternal, which
means the Absolute, or all-inclusive Self. His doctrine of loyalty
like many of his other teachings meets with its chief difficulty
in his undue subordination of the finite individual to the Absolute
Self, or the Universal Community, which is only another name for
that Self, as it appears in The Problem of Christianity and his
other later books.

Let us see how he applies his doctrine of loyalty to the fact
of sin. His definition of sin in The World and the Individual
appears to be a very mild one. "Sin, then, is a deliberate for­
getting of what one already knows of God and the truth, while
my moral freedom is my freedom to hold by attention or forget by
inattention the Ought that I have present in consciousness."¹

Whether his definition of the meaning of sin grew more strict
and thorough in his own mind during the years that intervened be­
fore he wrote The Problem of Christianity, or whether this defini­
tion was intended to include the unpardonable sin, we do not know.
But, at any rate, it does not prepare us for the terrible verdict
pronounced upon the deliberate traitor who has betrayed his Cause.
He remands him to the "Hell of the Irrevocable" and writes "finis"
against his return.

Let us study now his treatment of the unpardonable sin. In
Royce's first volume of The Problem of Christianity he has a
lecture on Time and Guilt. He devotes that lecture to a discussion
of the nature of the unpardonable sin. His doctrine is that this

sin consists in the deliberate betrayal of the cause that one has chosen to serve, and that by doing this, he has brought upon himself the penalty of the hell of the irrevocable.

This cause has been chosen according to the light he then possessed as his own highest good, but he has deliberately betrayed it. This he considers the worst evil that one can inflict upon himself and his fellows in a world of distraction and disorder. This sin of disloyalty, according to his teaching is a social matter, just as loyalty itself is a social matter, and by it the traitor brings disaster and desolation to the social world, and the brotherhood to which he belonged. And this deed is irrevocable. Royce's language in which he states the result of this sin is very definite and expressive. "My guilt is as enduring as time." "By no deed of his own can he ever escape from that penalty which consists in his having introduced into the moral world the one evil which was, at that time, as great an evil as he could then, of his own will, introduce."

"Nothing that I myself can do will ever reconcile me to my own deed, so far as it was that treason."

Now Royce holds that his traitor is not wholly consigned to the hell of the irrevocable. His whole self is not consigned, "but his self as the doer of this deed." Royce even suggests that the traitor may hereafter become a saint, but so far as this one deed is concerned the fact of his treason will remain, and in relation to that one deed, he can never do anything in this world, or in any future world, that will make his character essentially different from that which was determined by that one deed of treason.¹

This is Royce's general argument as to the nature and penalty of the unpardonable sin. The position is both surprising and impossible. There is nothing in the Pauline Churches or the Pauline epistles to warrant such a doctrine. Paul taught a grace of God that was able to save to the uttermost all who came to God through Jesus Christ. He knew no sin which was not forgiven freely if the sinner came by the way of confession, repentance, and obedience to the law of Christ.

If Royce's God, or his Beloved Community, was not equal to the removal of the guilt and sin of the traitor, then such a God is limited, and he is not the God of the Gospels or the Pauline epistles. How can there be a saint in any world who carries his sainthood in one department of his being, and his unforgiven sin in another? How can he go on through the years of his life here, and in that world hereafter, with a part of himself, but not the whole of himself, living in the hell of the irrevocable? No sensible Theism can countenance such a theory. The trouble here is already apparent. It is due to the fixed and inflexible monism of the author. His definition of Religion, is "Religion (in these its highest forms) is the interpretation both of the Eternal and the spirit of loyalty through emotion, and through a fitting activity of the imagination."

He has interpreted the Universal Community as the Eternal, and the Christian religion as the willing and thorough-going devotion of a self to a "perfectly real and divine Universal Community." The individual by the very nature of such a conception must be submerged into the heart of the Community. He is there as an identical part and expression of the will of the Absolute Self. Thus loyalty
becomes the great and important end in itself, and the self of the individual that is to be saved, is reduced, overshadowed and eclipsed. Royce lost the true object of loyalty when he ignored the historic claims of the real Founder of Christianity, and he emptied loyalty of its significance when he put aside the Christ as its true object of devotion.

We may now ask the question, To what was the Community loyal? "To itself", might be the answer. But where did it get the idea and the motive and the inspiration of its loyalty? The early Church did have at its heart the Christian ideas and ideals, but the early Church did not create itself. God created it by a spirit coming into the Community from above the Community, and by this means and in this way, the Visible Church arose, and because of the nature of its origin and life it was called by Paul the "Body of Christ". For it was created and quickened by One who was the God-man, and who was proved to be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead. The true loyalty that lived and triumphed in the Early Church rests, like the Atonement, on the doctrine of the Incarnation. And the source of its strength and confidence then, is the foundation of its hope still.

The language in which Royce expresses his idea of the traitor and the unpardonable sin is not only speculative but startling and even curious. He says: "in brief, by his own deed of treason, the traitor has consigned himself, not indeed his whole self, but his self as the doer of this deed, to what is called the hell of the irrevocable. All deeds are indeed irrevocable. But only the traitorous sin against the light is such that, in advance, the traitor's own free acceptance of a cause has stamped it with the
character of being what the own will had defined as his unpardonable sin. 1

All deeds are irrevocable. There is no doubt of this. But he is not discussing the deed but the traitor, and the condition to which the deed has brought him. Is the man irrevocable? Is he beyond the power of grace and forgiveness to restore? Royce says that his self as the doer of this deed is, but not his whole self. Is his self divided? Will not one half of his self stay where the other half is? Can we divide up the self in that way? This language makes clear the fallacy of his whole system, which fallacy we have already emphasized. By exalting loyalty as an end in itself and by making the Community identical with the Absolute, he has dwarfed the finite self and reduced it to a position of comparative unimportance. This defect has followed his doctrine from beginning to end.

According to Christian theology a composite society, such as the community is, cannot be a person, neither can a person be a composite society. If God is a person, if man is a person, then they are self-realizing, entelechies, ends in themselves. 2

And Christianity has its Person, its true object of loyalty, Jesus Christ, whom Christian theology recognizes as the real founder of the early Church, but by our author his historic claims are ignored. In former discussions we have seen that the evil contained in his all-inclusive Absolute was formidable and discouraging enough, but what are we to do with the guilt that no act of God or man can remove? Inasmuch as sin in general, as we see it, partakes so

frequently, more or less, of the nature of treachery, who are already in the hell of the irrevocable and who have escaped it?

Where is the warrant in Paul or anywhere in the New Testament for such a doctrine? Christian Theism has usually considered the unpardonable sin, not as an act of which an individual repented and asked to be forgiven, but as a state from which he had no disposition to escape. That which he had lost, he showed no desire to regain. Wherever men turned to Christ with all their hearts they were fully and freely forgiven. Certainly no other doctrine can be built upon the preaching and teaching of Paul which Royce seeks to interpret in The Problem of Christianity. It is interesting to note here that while Royce declares, "the guilt of a free act of betrayal is as enduring as time.\(^1\) on the contrary, we have this word from Edward Caird: "All evils and sorrows that belong to the development of the spiritual life -(and in a world which in its essence is spiritual this ultimately means all evils and sorrows whatever) contain in them 'the promise and potency' of a good, in which they are not merely compensated, but taken up and transcended. The wounds of the spirit can be healed, so that not even a scar remains".\(^2\) Our final critical examination will be that of the profound and difficult doctrine of the Atonement.

IV - His Doctrine of the Atonement.

Royce feels that the human aspect of our Christian idea of the atonement is based upon such motives that if there were no Christianity or Christians, the idea of atonement would have to be invented in order to fairly understand the higher levels of our moral

2. cf. E. Caird, Hegel, p. 217
existence. He sets for himself two limitations. He will give his chief attention to aspects of the atonement which he could expound just as readily where leaders of mankind had reached the higher levels of moral experience, but where Christianity and Christians were unknown. In the second place, he will discuss the question in connection with the problems of the lecture on "Time and Guilt" where he has considered the case of the "traitor".\(^1\)

He does not take up the problem of the atonement as between God and man, to any great degree, anywhere.\(^2\) He confines himself to its human aspects and works out his theory in its ethical and social applications in the moral world.

His discussion of this problem of atonement is in the first place a masterly psychological analysis of the traitor's violation of moral loyalty, which is his notion of the unpardonable sin, and in the second place, he endeavors to find some means of reconciling the community to its loss. For it has lost a faithful member and it has lost the ties that the traitor has destroyed.\(^3\) The community may forgive the traitor and receive him back to its heart, but there is no contribution that he can make that will render any atonement to the community.\(^4\)

Since this atonement cannot be wrought by the wrong-doer himself, it must be the work of the community, or of some innocent member of the community who has been faithful. He then lays down two conditions for the accomplishment of this reconciliation of the community. First, the faithful and suffering servant who incarnates the spirit of the community shall do a creative work

2. Ibid. pp. 304, 305
3. Ibid. pp. 303, 304
4. Ibid. p. 303
which includes a deed or deeds for which this identical treason afforded the opportunity, and secondly, "The world as transformed by this creative deed, is better than it would have been had all else remained the same, but had this deed of treason not been done at all."¹ No doubt the doctrine of the suffering servant here, whether it be one of the faithful members of the community, or the faithful community itself, has something of the spirit of the Fifty-Third Chapter of Isaiah; but Royce carries out his discussion on social and moral grounds. He gives us no metaphysical theory of the atonement between God and man. In a later chapter where we shall attempt a comparison between Royce's doctrine and that of two leading contemporary representatives of Absolute Idealism, we shall consider that phase of the doctrine which is almost wholly lacking in The Problem of Christianity.

As he promised at the beginning of his lecture on Atonement, his view of the subject as stated here is one which he might expound in communities where men had reached the higher levels of moral experience, whether there were any Christians in the world or not. He does not have any distinctly Christian view of the atonement. But how could he be expected to have? Paul's doctrine of the Community is that of the Church as the Body of Christ, the Community in mystical unity with its glorified Head. Independent of all theories ancient or modern, Christ's atonement, wrought through himself, is the very heart of the Gospel. But according to Royce, to use the words of B. W. Bacon: "the mystical body is everything and the Head of the body disappears from the plan of salvation altogether."²

². Of. Bacon, Royce's Interpretation of Christianity, Phil. Rev.
The atonement which Royce gives us, on the social and moral level, has value. No one would deny the terrible sin and guilt of the traitor, and faithfulness to duty and loyalty to the community is one of the great virtues of the world. No one could reasonably doubt the fearful damage wrought by any one who has chosen a cause to which he has sworn to give his life and service, and then has forsaken it, and broken the ties that bound him to the other members of the brotherhood of loyalty. Royce is right, too, in his doctrine that what affects the individual affects the community. There is no such thing as a mere individual. The very word 'individual' the very claim to individuality, presupposes a society to which the individual belongs.

Religion is social, and redemption is social, and atonement is social. But when all this is said, Christ is an end, man is an end, the individual is an end in himself, and whether man is condemned or redeemed, whether he is a traitor or not, he must not be lost in the community, even if the community were perfect.

Sin should bring its pain and remorse. It is to the praise and the hope of humanity that it does. But Christ's kingdom will not be established on earth, by consigning such parts of men's personality as lived in the traitorous deed, to the hell of the irrevocable.

It was Royce's all-consuming, all-inclusive community that robbed The Problem of Christianity of the Author and Source of atonement in its highest Christian and metaphysical aspect. Royce definitely rejects Harnack's view and the 'liberal' view of salvation through Christ on the ground of the Buddhistic doctrine that "the very form of the individual self is a necessary source of woe and of wrong."

Harnack proved himself a very able interpreter of Christianity from the 'liberal' orthodox standpoint, and few men of his generation were
as competent to answer the question, What is Christianity? For he was a ripe New Testament scholar. One should be slow to put his doctrine aside for a tenet of Buddhism with which it conflicts, or even for the "religion of Loyalty".¹

In our next chapter we shall make a comparison of the Religious position of Royce with the positions of two of his contemporary idealists. Their writings will show some doctrines thoroughly worked and presented from the standpoint of Absolute Idealism, which Royce ignored, or followed our but partially.

This present chapter finishes our direct criticism of Royce's position. It should be both interesting and instructive to have the next chapter of criticism by comparison. After that, a chapter on Royce's positive and permanent contributions to religious philosophy will conclude this study.

CHAPTER VI

COMPARISON OF ROYCE'S DOCTRINE WITH THE DOCTRINES OF THE CAIRDS.

Among the Absolute Idealists who were contemporary with Royce, two of the most able and outstanding were John and Edward Caird. Both of them were not only among the leading philosophers of Great Britain, but both of them were theologians of the first rank. Since they were philosophers of religion, as was Royce, and belonged to the same school of philosophy and the same generation, it may help us to understand Royce's position better if we compare it with the positions of these two brothers, who were both so able and distinguished in the same line, that it would be hard to say today which was the greater, the elder or the younger. We shall first compare Royce's doctrine with that of John Caird, the elder.

1 - On the Nature and Relation of God.

We are well acquainted with Royce's contention that my own individual self is a part of the Absolute Self, and that my will is an identical expression of the Infinite Will. The all-inclusive Absolute must contain all good and all evil.

A few definite statements on his doctrine of God will recall to us his main position on this question for the purpose of comparison. "You can quite properly define the Absolute as Thought... a thought whose ideas are not mere shadows, but have an aspect in which they are felt as well as meant....loved as well as conceived, willed as well as viewed. Such an Absolute Thought you can also call, in its wholeness a Self....God is known as thought fulfilled;
as experience absolutely organized, so as to have one ideal unity of meaning; as truth transparent to itself; as Life in absolute accordance with the idea; as self-hood eternally obtained."  

Again on this all-inclusive idea, we have the following:

"God's life includes in the organic total of one conscious eternal instant, all life, and so all goodness and evil."  

Further:

"There is......at last, but one Self, organically, reflectively, consciously inclusive of all the selves, and so of all truth."  

We may add here one more observation: "The world is such stuff as ideas are made of. Thought possesses all things. But the world isn't unreal, it extends infinitely beyond our private consciousness, because it is the world of the universal mind."

Let us now bring together a few brief corresponding utterances of Principal Caird. "No object can be conceived as existing except in relation to a thinking subject.....In thinking myself, my own individual consciousness and an outward world of objects, I at the same time tacitly think or presuppose a higher, wider, more comprehensive thought or consciousness which embraces and is the unity of both."  

"The secret ground on which all finite intelligence rests is the consciousness of an Absolute Intelligence." "The thought which is the prior of all things is......a thought of self-consciousness which is beyond all individual selves, which is the unity of all individual selves and their objects, or all thinkers and all objects of thought." 

4. Ibid. p. 360  
6. Ibid. p. 120. 149
"Strictly speaking it is not we that think, but the universal reason that thinks in us."¹ "As in knowledge, we rise above the sphere of individual opinion into the universal life of intelligence, so, in the moral or practical life, we rise out of the sphere of individual impulse, of self-indulgence and self-assertion, into a sphere in which we will no ends but those that are common to all spiritual beings and enter into a life that is one with the universal and infinite will. In will as well as in intelligence, man's spiritual nature is the form of an infinite content; and there is nothing in the whole realm of being which it cannot claim as the means of its realization."²

At first glance, the quotations which we have made from Royce and Principal Caird would seem to indicate that their views on the relation of God to man and the world are all but identical. But a careful study of their own interpretations of their positions reveals the fact that their doctrines diverge rather widely. There is nothing in the doctrine of Principal Caird to support the hard and fast teaching of the fixed and arbitrary and almost mechanically defined Absolute which we find in Royce. In Royce the finite Self, is a part and a channel of the Absolute Self whether he will or no. He is an expression of the will of God in his most rebellious and atrocious act. True, he insists upon his freedom, but at the same time, that freedom is overruled in the interest of the main point, the all-consuming Absolute.

This is not true in the teaching of Principal Caird. He gives to the finite individual a wide field for choice and action. The

moving and moulding influence that at last controls man's relation with God is a principle that lifts him out of the sphere of individual opinion into the world of universal intelligence, and in the moral life we are lifted in the same way out of the life of impulse, appetite, and self assertion, into the life of the universal and infinite will. In other words we participate in the life of God as we qualify for that privilege and experience.

Every moral object in the universe, everything by which our moral development may be attained in the whole realm of being is ours, "All things are yours, whether things present or things to come". But these things belong to those who qualify by obedience to this principle of our moral nature that lifts us above the animal life into the life of the spirit. "All things work together for good to them that love God."

Nor does Principal Caird end here. By surrendering my will as this private and particular self, I have identified my life with the organic life of the world, but that life is limited and imperfect. He now admits that the ideal of an infinite life is one that we can endlessly approximate but never realize. Principal Caird everywhere argues that man is made in the image of God. He is therefore capable of likeness to God but he can never become God, for in the life of God there are no unrealized possibilities. God is all reality, and the only reality, while our finite existence is a continual becoming. Our ideal never reaches its actual, but spiritual perfection with us looks to the future. It is ever a distant goal. But here he makes his distinction between the moral and religious life. In our moral life when we compare our actual
with our true self we are always confronted with a division, we are conscious of the self that 'ought to be' in distinction from the self that is. By religion this division is removed. He defines religion as "the absolute self-surrender of the soul to God." By such a surrender we die to our former self and blend our entire will, and life and being with the will and life and being of the Infinite. The self has responded to the command: "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect!"¹

This does not mean that all imperfections are gone, but it does mean that we have renounced our former self and that we have put our whole will into our higher self which is one with God. Still, according to Principal Caird, this does not mean that this religious life can become one with the life of God in an absolute unification of the ideal and the real, "But wherever it is genuine, the principle of that life is present in it, and we may say that, though not extensively and exhaustively, it is intensively one with the life of God."

This language is evidently intentionally guarded. At the best, and in our highest accomplishments in the ideal life, Principal Caird teaches, not the identity of our will to begin with, but the identification of our will by our own act and choice with the will of God. He is willing then only to say that our life is "intensively" one with the life of God.²

The result which Royce would reach by assuming the immediate identity of the will and life of the finite self with the life of God, Principal Caird would realize through a spiritual principle.

². Ibid. p. 194
which impels the finite individual to a voluntary choice of the life of the Infinite. The finite self is identified with the Infinite Self, not by any necessity through the constitution of the universe, but by the conscious and willing surrender of the soul to God. He carefully guards the individuality of the finite actor and allows ample field for the exercise of the finite will.

In illustrating God's true relation to his children Principal Caird appeals to the same analogy which we used in a former chapter. He suggests that there may be something in God's nature that would remain unrevealed and unrealized if it were not for his relation to the world and to finite spirits created in his own image. Then he adds that the nearest human analogy by which we can conceive of God's relation to us is that of father to his children. The father's heart is actually revealed through the existence of his children. "And in the Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement, whatever else they mean, we find a sanction for the thought that in the nature of God there is a capacity of condescending love, of boundless pity and forgiveness, yes, with reverence be it said, of pain and sorrow and sacrifice for the salvation of finite souls, a capacity which has been, and could only be revealed and realized through the sorrow and sin of the world."¹

II - Sin and Self-Realization.

We have had Royce reducing the individual to the lowest terms and exalting loyalty and the community at the expense of the individual. We have come away from his two lectures in the first

volume of The Problem of Christianity, the one on Time and
Guilt, and the other on Atonement, with many misgivings and with
a feeling of tragedy and darkness. The complications that come
about through a guilt that cannot be eradicated but is as endur­
ing as time, that has been brought on by one who has been a traitor
to a cause to which he has sworn a deathless loyalty, together with
the condition in which it leaves him, and the community, and the
fact that the deed of some faithful servant by his own suffering
may compensate the community for what it has lost, but never can
extricate the guilty one from the hell of the irreparable—all these
considerations prepare one to hope that there is a better way. Let
us see what Principal Caird has to say on the question of sin and
self-realization.

He teaches that the essence of sin is not due to the fact that
man yields to his animal impulses and desires and indulges his
lower nature and seeks satisfactions that are base. If he were an
animal and only an animal, and had no consciousness nor desire for
a higher life, such indulgence would not be sinful. But the essence
of sin lies in the fact that he is trying to satisfy his infinitude
with that which is low and sensuous and selfish.¹ His boundless
capacity for the service of the spirit, for the good of mankind,
and the glory of God, is wasted in selfishness and degradation.
And sin does not end here, but to indulge the lower passions is
to dishonor the organs of the flesh and degrade them by using
them as a means of base satisfaction when they were intended to
be used for the higher life of the spirit. Sin perverts and vitiates
the whole nature of man.²

2. Ibid. Vol. II, pp. 71,72
Men may realize themselves through good or bad actions. We see here the result of the bad actions. They lead to degradation and submersion in selfishness and false returns. But how are we to know what are the good actions and how are we to find the true self-realization? We must turn aside from the private particular self and seek the universal and infinite self. That self is implied in the phrase "made in the image of God". Into all the needs and helpful relations of the family and society and country a man must enter, realizing himself in the ever expanding world, and most of all in the thought and feeling and will and service of him of whom all the life we see is only an imperfect manifestation.

But here again Principal Caird guards the life of the individual and would make it an end in itself. He says that by such self-realization it is not to be implied that the individual or personal self is to be swamped either in the organic life of the world or the life of the Infinite. In my absolute self-surrender to God I have said, "Your life is my life". The "my" remains and will not be obliterated. This life returns to me in abundance that is measured only by the proportion of the objects it embraces and the largeness of the circle to which it expands. He too calls attention to the figure in the New Testament of the living body and the members. There every member makes its contribution to the life and growth of the organic whole and retains its individuality. Here in this vast living organism where every member as a finite soul is at one with every other member and it knows and wills itself in relation to all, each member shares in the universal life of the other members and God, and all members contribute according to their place and office.
III - The Personality and Work of Christ.

We recall that Royce actually declined to express an opinion about any of the details of the person and life of Christ. It will be interesting now to discover the opinion of Principal Caird on the same question. Making allowance for any doubts that a reasonable criticism may cast upon any portion of the Gospel narratives, he accepts them in the main, as the history of a character who was indeed the Founder of Christianity, and the one who brought to us the ideal of moral perfection incarnate in a human personality.

He teaches that Christ speaks with the voice of eternal truth and righteousness and that his forgiveness of sin is identified with forgiveness from the Absolute source of right. Here we see the need of humanity, and that need is supplied in Christ. In him the righteousness we reverence and the forgiveness we need are united in one personality. He brings with him at once the justice that condemns our sin and the love that saves the sinner. He reveals to us the perfect moral ideal. But he is something more than an ideal of perpetuity and memory. He revealed and exemplified the absolute identification of the mind and will of God with the mind and will of man, and he has also given us an inward witness here and now, a spiritual presence which we can realize more profoundly than when men looked upon the face of Jesus. Principal Caird calls this spiritual presence "the inward witness to the presence of that redeeming, purifying, hallowing Spirit that was incarnate in him and that is still and forever living not only for us, but in us, and in all who open their spirits to its life-giving power."

2. Ibid. Vol. II, pp. 95, 96, 97
In what has just been said we have found Principal Caird coming near enough to the fact and doctrine of the Incarnation to discover what his actual position will be on that cardinal tenet of Christianity. Already we see how far separated he is from Royce on the nature of the person and work of Jesus. What he seeks as a complete condition of Incarnation, as the summum bonum of our finite spiritual union with God, is absolute identity of our mind and will with the mind and will of God. But we find in the best and holiest of men only a faint approximation to this identity. Once in the ages we have had this perfect reality.

According to the Christian conception there was an element in the life of Christ that differentiated it from the life of other men. He described it by the glory that he had with the rather before the world was. Hence in the life of Christ there was a principle that was not born in time. However it may be explained, it remains true that once this complete identification of the mind and will of man with the mind and will of God was realized on earth and amid earthly trials and struggles.

It would seem that the language in which Principal Caird describes the Incarnation could hardly be stronger. He says: "It is the very central fact of our Christian faith that once for all it has been realized, and that in the person and life of Christ we can recognize a nature from which every dividing, disturbing element has passed away - a mind that was the pure medium of Infinite Intelligence, a heart that throbbed in perfect unison with Infinite love, a will that never vibrated by one faintest aberration from the Infinite Will, a human consciousness possessed and suffused by the very spirit and life of the Living God."

In such definite and emphatic terms he sets forth the fact and the nature of the Incarnation. When compared with what Royce gives us on the person of Christ, it forms a contrast indeed. This teaching, though its author was a conspicuous leader of progressive orthodoxy, is nevertheless sufficiently complete and exhaustive and definite to satisfy every reasonable conservative. His Christ is historic, perfect, one who brought with him a principle of life whose source and origin were in the eternal life of God. If we seek comparison here with Royce, there is none. Here is a positive doctrine on which Christian Theism insists, but which Royce does not have.

IV - On the Atonement.

A brief indication of Royce's Atonement would be the case of the traitor who has betrayed his Cause to which he had sworn complete and eternal allegiance, to which he had deliberately and willingly consecrated all his heart and soul and mind and strength, and then has just as deliberately proved false to his vow. The result is, that the traitor is consigned to the hell of the irrevocable, and no deed of his own, or from any quarter, can cancel his guilt. For him as an individual there is no atonement. He may be welcomed back to the Community which he has wronged, he may be forgiven by it, but its love will ever be the love for the member who has been a traitor. But now, some faithful and suffering servant of the Community may come with a creative deed so ingenuous and so devised, and answering so completely to the deed of the traitor, that the traitor's deed becomes the occasion and the opportunity of the atoning deed. This is the first condition, and the second is, "The world, as transformed
by this creative deed, is better than it would have been had all else remained the same, but had that deed of treason not been done at all." This theory of the atonement is ethical and social, but in the higher metaphysical sense, Royce has not worked out a theory of the atonement.

Now what have we in the doctrine of Principal Caird? He rejects some of the same theories of the Atonement that Royce rejects. It is probable that Royce and Principal Caird would both discard and discredit the "penal satisfaction" and "moral" theories of the Atonement with equal emphasis and warmth. But with these out of the way he turns from their unreality and fiction and arbitrary supposition, to seek for one that will do justice to the doctrine of "Justification by faith". He believes that there is a sense in which the essential principle of the life of Christ, with all its sorrow and sacrifice, its elevation and beauty, through faith, may become our own.

And now he comes to his theory, which might properly be called, we think, a vital theory of Atonement. Such a theory it would seem impossible for Royce to approve, so long as he held to the All in All of the Absolute, with its strict identification of wills and selves in the World Self. Christ in his atoning work is too definite and active an individual to harmonize with that all-inclusive individual self. Principal Caird's theory involves the mystic union. "I am crucified with Christ, etc." "That I may know him and the power of his resurrection and the fellowship of his suffering etc." Again: "he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves but unto him". But now our author draws the soul of man so near to Christ, blends the mind and will so completely with
His that the particular self becomes extinct and the very being is
lost in His. This result is wrought and sustained by a living
faith which brings the life of the believer to a condition where it
can be truly said that the life of the soul is "hid with Christ in
God."

For the rest, let his own words state his theory. "So close,
so nearly approaching to identification becomes this union with
Christ, that, not in a figure, but in a most real sense, we become
participants in the spirit and virtue of his life and death, sharers
in his condemnation of sin, in his divine sorrow and sacrifice, in his
sense of the misery and estrangement from God, and in his sense of
the joy and blessedness of reconciliation with the Father of Spirits."¹

We have traced the comparison between the doctrine of Royce and
the doctrine of Principal Caird through some of the most fundamental
ideas of the Christian faith, and in their final conception and
application of these ideas they are far apart. They separate
farther and farther the nearer they come to the vital work of re-
demption, and reconciliation, wrought in Jesus Christ.

Royce starts with an Absolute so inflexible and fixed that the
life, and will, and self, of the finite are already Identical with
the life and will and Self of the World Whole. From the very beginn-
ing his system is hampered by the absolute barrier that he puts
around it.

Principal Caird says: "Strictly speaking it is not we that
think, but the universal reason that thinks in us." But while with
him man is at home in God, he is always telling us that by religion he
is to make a self-surrender and identify his life and will with the
life and will of God. It is God's image in which he is made, and

pp. 230, 231, 232
likeness to God is the prize that he is to gain. But every encouragement is given for freedom, aspiration, and progress. Nowhere does Principal Caird limit freedom to accommodate his system. As an instance, let us take the following: "Religion is simply the return of the finite consciousness into union with the infinite, the reconciliation of the human spirit with the divine." Evidently to judge from his definition, Royce's conception of religion is quite different. They simply are not defining the same thing. Take now Royce's definition: "Religion (in these its highest forms) is the interpretation both of the Eternal and of the spirit of loyalty through emotion and a fitting activity of the imagination."

We cannot leave this comparison without one more observation. We give it just to show how this whole study has impressed us. Here is Principal Caird's doctrine of salvation through a Person in contra-distinction from Royce's salvation through a Community. "The Divine Spirit that was embodied in the life of Christ, and which realizes itself in every soul that yields itself to its transforming power, wherever it takes possession of human spirits, is in essence one and the same in all.....But as the words of Christ......speak of our union with himself and with each other as finding its type in nothing less than union with the Father; so they point to a time when every dividing element shall pass away, when every mind shall become the pure medium of the Divine Intelligence, every heart the organ of the Infinite Love, and when all souls shall have yielded themselves to Christ, suffused, pervaded in their inmost being by the same Divine Spirit, shall be "made perfect in one." Here we have salvation through a Person who
gathers individuals into union with himself and the Father as they yield themselves to Christ. It is Christ who saves, and makes men worthy members of communities here, and who finally makes them "perfect in one" hereafter.¹

V - Comparison with Some Teachings of Edward Caird.

The philosophical principles of Edward Caird were very much akin to those of his brother but they were by no means identical. While they were both Absolute Idealists, Edward Caird had the more liberal theology. Without dividing our treatment of Edward Caird's teaching into too many sections, we may note a few instances where he and Royce approach the same truth, sometimes in the same way, and as often in a different manner. And sometimes they are far enough apart to raise the whole question as to how the approach should be made, and what should be the answer or the solution to the problem.

I - On the Ideal Absolute.

First, it is clear that Edward Caird believed in an absolute unity which transcends the opposition of subject and object. He holds that this principle is the ultimate presupposition of our consciousness, and necessary to our rational life. This principle is God. The principle that binds in one "all thinking things, and all objects of thought" is the source of all knowledge and all beings that knew.²

Again, he tells us, "God....is a principle of unity in...an all-comprehending whole....akin to that which gives unity to our own existence as self-conscious beings."³

³ cf. E.Caird, The Evolution of Theology, I. p.33
Here we see the kinship of his theory to that of Royce, but now in our next quotation he guards individuality by weakening it, and he will not make the claim of full individuality for man. He says, "It becomes possible to think of man as 'a partaker in the divine nature', and, therefore, as a self-conscious and self-determining spirit, without gifting him with an Absolute individuality, which would cut him off from all union and communion with his fellow-creatures and with God."¹

And now Edward Caird candidly admits the difficulties confronting this theory and frankly places himself in about the position in which we found ourselves in regard to Royce. He adds further: "I do not deny that there are many difficulties in that view, difficulties with which I have not attempted to deal. But it seems to me this is the only line of thought which makes it possible to escape the opposite absurdities of an Individualism which dissolves the unity of the universe into atoms, and an abstract Monism which leaves no room for any real individuality either in God or man; not to speak of the still greater absurdity of holding both of these one-sided views at once."²

We have been not a little surprised to find Edward Caird here citing the very same reason for not accepting a highly monistic or "singularistic" system of Absolute Idealism, such as Royce's system is, the very same reason, we insist, which led us in our third chapter to reject it as not doing justice either to the individuality of God or man.

¹. cf. E. Caird, The Evolution of Religion, I. p. 84
². Ibid. Vol. II, p. 84
And not only does Edward Caird dismiss the theory of abstract Monism, but in his own theory he gifts man with something less than a complete individuality, and even with this modified view, he finds himself confronted with many difficulties with which he does not attempt to deal. Under the circumstances, we may not be able to discover with clearness the exact nature of his Ideal Absolute, but at any rate it was far away from Royce's Absolute.

Such words as the above, from one who was a thoroughgoing Absolute Idealist, would indicate how hard it was for those belonging to the same school of philosophy as Royce, to approve a system of highly monistic type. They could not do it, for the simple reason that it seemed to involve inevitable determinism and was fatal to the individualities of both God and man. In his Gifford Lectures on *The Evolution of Religion*, Edward Caird does not find it necessary to work out this phase of the subject any further.

2 - The History and Nature of Jesus.

We may refer briefly here to Edward Caird's view of the history and nature of Jesus. His use of New Testament Scripture is very full and comprehensive. He not only uses the Epistles of Paul but makes very large use of the Synoptic Gospels and the Gospel of John. He practically quotes the substance of the intercessory prayer of Jesus, and makes it the basis of his Christology.\(^1\)

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His thought through *The Evolution of Religion*, wherever he touches upon the nature and the work of Jesus, is that in him there was the principle which is the very life of God. Like his brother, Principal Caird, he holds again and again that Christ taught us that he "died to live."

He recognizes Jesus as human and divine, the Son of God, and the Messiah. But we are interested here in just two features more of his doctrine. One is the statement he makes in regard to the "Logos of God" in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel. We recall again that Royce in *The Problem of Christianity* made the being that the Early Church believed itself to represent, and the being that he calls the "Beloved Community" one and the same. On this subject Edward Caird reverses Royce completely. Edward Caird finds here the highest view of Jesus brought into direct combination with his earthly life. We have here the completed synthesis of the universal and the individual to which Christianity owes its great power. The author of the Fourth Gospel adopts this principle, 'the Logos of God,' a principle which has had its development through Hellenism as we have before tried to show. It is moreover a "principle which embraces all the existence of man and of the universe". But in the Prologue this principle is united with the personality of an individual living and acting under all the ordinary conditions of human life. And it was Christ who called forth the life of the Christian Community and it is Christ who gave it its intensity of life, and it, he who explains its rapid expansion. Christ was not the "Beloved Community". His life, and it alone, explains the existence of the "Beloved Community".
On this Edward Caird is clear. The author of the Fourth Gospel took the universal principle of the Logos and united it with a person, and it was that Person who gave the driving, expanding, saving power to the early Church.

And now in the second place, Edward Caird gives a very wide place to the Scripture account of the nature and work of Jesus. He takes the 17th Chapter of John's Gospel and makes it the text of his religious creed. He teaches that in this chapter the principle of Christian mysticism receives its highest expression. "Holy Father, keep through Thine own name those that Thou hast given me that they may be one as we are, .....neither pray I for these alone, but for them also that shall believe through their word, that they may be one, as Thou Father art in me and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us." Here the divine life manifested in Christ is the life communicated to his disciples. Here we get the very heart of Edward Caird's interpretation of Christ and Christianity. His view of God and man, and Christ as the representative of both, is found in its completeness here.

"Christ is thus proclaimed to be the unique revelation of God, but only as the first-born of many brethren, the greatest of all the servants of humanity, the most perfect organ of that divine life for which man was made, in as much as he was made in the image of God." It was through Christ that the capacity of men to become sons of God was first clearly revealed in a ruling principle of life, lived under ordinary conditions. By his death, too, he proclaims his method and purpose to "draw all men" to himself. Edward Caird considers the death of the cross as a necessary

symbol of Christ's religion, which in breaking down all barriers between the highest and lowest, and removing all walls of separation between class and class, combined the deepest outward shame with the loftiest spiritual energy to which the soul of man can rise. 1

This may be said then, that Edward Caird holds that the universal principle of the life of God and humanity, the divine and the human, became incarnate in Jesus Christ. This was the meaning of the Logos doctrine, of the "Word made flesh".

Here was God, individually manifested, and manifested in one who lived and worked in perfect conformity to his will. Thus, the ideal became real and the real became ideal. So, Edward Caird comes to the following conclusion: "And, if it was the founder of Christianity who first realized in its full measure the truth which we philosophically express by saying that the consciousness of God is presupposed and implied in the consciousness of the world, and even more directly in the consciousness of self - and therefore a self-conscious being cannot know what he really is, and realize his good except in utter self-surrender to God, then there is a supreme reason why all generations of men should call him divine, not, indeed, as isolated from others, but as the 'firstborn of many brethren'." 2

By what has been said, we can see the high place that Edward Caird gave to the scripture narratives as a record of the earthly life and work of Jesus. We have with this, the important position Jesus himself occupies in his philosophy of religion, and

2. Ibid. Vol. II, p. 230
in the origin and development of the one Religion, Christianity, in which he exalts to first place among all religions, also, his interpretation of the Logos doctrine is intensely personal. It now appears how far he and Royce were apart on the more profound questions of Christianity.

In concluding this comparison, it may be said that it seems that Royce often held so tenaciously to the restrictions of his system, of the Ideal Absolute, that he sacrificed life and truth to the structure of dogma and the accuracy of definition.

He was the Apostle of an all-determining principle, and in the life of the cosmos he applied the principle with such results as might follow the operation. By this course, God and man and things suffered from his unbending law, and Royce himself became, to a great extent, the slave of his system, which did not leave room for a logical working out of the freedom of those who in finite and infinite relations must be free. What he claimed in theory, he was not able to accomplish in fact. His Ideal Absolute simply does not guarantee what he promises in its name. It defeats him in what he might otherwise perform. Here is the great distinction between him and the Cairds. They set for themselves the high task of interpreting religion. They are Absolute Idealists, but to their finished work, while that condition is influential and important, it is more or less relative to the end in view. And when occasion arose, Edward Caird could frankly acknowledge the difficulties which confronted him in his philosophic system, difficulties which he never worked out, but which he left behind him, while he proceeded with the main task of writing The Evolution of Religion. His brother, Principal Caird, was even less
dogmatic, so far as his philosophic system was concerned, though probably more conservative in religion; and he found scope and freedom within his system, or in spite of it, for all the fundamental ideas of the Christian faith, and for all other ideas upon which a reasonable conservative would insist. This seems to be, as we see it, the prime distinction between methods, which has had a decided influence in determining the different positions.
CHAPTER VII
SOME POSITIVE AND PERMANENT CONTRIBUTIONS.

We do not expect this chapter to be in the least sense exhaustive. It will be enough if at the end of this study we set down a few of the blessings that have flowed from a life that was devoted to public instruction and public welfare. The life of a college instructor can be broad or narrow, devoted almost selfishly to his chosen task, or large and fruitful, and self-sacrificing to the highest degree.

Royce had many classes. He did not limit himself to the required hours of teaching, but worked to the extent that his strength would permit. His journeys were long and many. He believed he had a message, and he felt himself straitened until his message was given, and his work was accomplished. We shall treat briefly a few of the subjects around which his life-work centered.

I - His Doctrine of God.

When Royce was born in 1855, men's ideas of God in the United States of America were primitive indeed. Many were essentially Deists. They believed that at a certain time, only a few thousand years ago, God had created the world and placed it under certain laws. Those laws have been operating ever since. God sits somewhere in serene and peaceful survey of all that he has made, but the laws he has set to work determine the destiny of his creation. Creation is finished and the machine, such as it is, will spin on until the end. Some believed that that consummation was coming soon. Others thought it was farther away, but
multitudes believed the life of the human race on earth would end in tragedy and ruin, like the story of the days of Noah and the people the flood. But what was probably the large majority of all believed in God who carried on much of his work through special providences. They accepted the uniformity of law in general, but in special emergencies they expected God to intervene by suspending laws or transcending them.

The churches believed in the literal and verbal inspiration of Scripture. The Bible writers became not only the channel of the spirit of God, but the very personality of the messenger was so possessed and controlled that he became the amanuensis of the Almighty, writing down the very words that came through him as an instrument, by God's dictation.

The mechanization of the authors of the books of the Bible was complete and all the words within the covers of the two Testaments were equally inspired, for they were the actual words of God himself which he had dictated through his servants.

One can hardly imagine a greater revolution of thought than that which was caused by the rise of the theory of evolution, followed as it was sure to be by the claims of historical criticism applied to the sacred documents and bringing into court the questions of authorship, inspiration, and the interpretation of the books in the light of their origin. It was only another step to the study of all religions, and the comparison of one with another, and then to the investigation of their foundations and beginnings, in the evolution of religion itself. The
way was open for a new definition of God, and a new interpretation of His being and nature. Royce stood at the beginning of a new scientific and theological era. John Stuart Mill died during Royce's university course. Darwin lived until the young student had returned from Germany and was teaching in his alma mater in Berkeley. Haeckel, Huxley, and Herbert Spencer, were all at the height of their influence and power in Royce's early days at Harvard. Then came his book, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, in 1885. It deals with God. It criticises the small conception and definition of God that men have had and that Royce has known only too well.

In his Ideal Absolute he proposes a God that he considers large enough for the expanding thought of the world and the expanding world in thought. The results of his tireless and indefatigable efforts carried through more than thirty years beyond this date, we have sought to show.

However much he may have succeeded or failed in his sublime effort, he was able, scholarly, industrious and brave. He was not afraid of the new world, nor of new departures in philosophy or theology. His work was not finished. It may never be finished, as he conceived it. His vision was so vast, and truth was so large and so impatient of limits and definitions, that it refused to be confined in the area he had fixed, and the home he had built for it. The old order was changing all the time for the liberal as well as the conservative.

Royce was too great an interpreter for the system he espoused. In the words of one of his personal friends: "Royce has tacitly
passed judgment upon his own system by constantly surpassing it. It is true that his whole work has a marked unity of purpose and movement, but it is the unity of a development that is too large to be self-fulfilled. 1 His fruitful philosophy of the world and the self and God had outrun the author while yet the author lived. That world of enlarging ideas, like the swelling and bursting buds on a spring morning, he found all around him, when he awoke to the call of the Absolute, amid the stirring young life of California. He followed the call of his heart, and sought in the philosophy of religion his field of service, and when his life was over, there had been a profound change in almost all the university centers. Men had exchanged the God of the Old Testament for the God of Jesus, and they had learned to test the inspiration of Scripture by its agreement or disagreement with the mind of the Master. The idea of God could no longer be expressed in the old ways. The word of Jesus concerning the new wine and the old wineskins, had been fulfilled. The old vessels in which men were accustomed to convey the truths of religion lay broken everywhere like the Greek language in which Paul tried to express thoughts and experiences that were too large and vital for the literary moulds which he was compelled to use them.

This change was largely due to the vision and the action of scholars like Royce, who saw through the new learning the promised land of the spirit, and greeted it at first from afar, but before their pilgrim journey had ended, they brought it nigh. A religion, to be a thing of power, must have God as large as the needs and aspirations of man. A small God means a low venture and a limited

quest. A God who calls on men for the impossible is the hope and the heart of the ideal.

"Man's reach must exceed his grasp,
Else what's a heaven for?"

And he who helps man's reach to exceed his grasp, more and more, is a benefactor of mankind. It is not from our agreement with the prophet, but from our confidence in his sincerity that we gain stimulation of our Souls. So Royce has led us through the fields of high values and white harvests. He enlarged men's ideas of God.

II - His Contribution to Loyalty.

Professor Royce's best known book is his Philosophy of Loyalty. It has been widely used as a text-book in the United States and has made a deep impression on the youth of the last twenty years. He performed an excellent service both in that volume and in several others in heading up loyalty into religion.

In this he reminds us very much of the Hebrew prophets in the crucial days of Israel's history. Their patriotism was religion. It was expressed in a spirit of loyalty to Jehovah who was believed to dwell between the cherubim. But the American in our scattered states and territories who had been born under almost any government in all the world knew the location and sacredness of no such Holy of Holies.

The book is filled with an interpretation of the spirit of loyalty as it actually touches and defines the religious life, together with an appeal to the citizens of the United States to exemplify the spirit of loyalty toward their government and one another.
He has one lecture on "Some American Problems and Their Relation To Loyalty."

Anyone who will take the time to study the lawlessness that is so common in our American life today will see that we have failed with vast populations in teaching them or infusing into them any apparent spirit of loyalty whatever. All the more do we need to apply Professor Royce's teachings to the lives of those who do not even know that such an author ever lived.

In this lecture to which we have referred he tells us that if we want to teach loyalty to masses such as the whole nation we must do three things:

(1) Aid them to keep their physical powers and possessions necessary to loyalty.
(2) Provide them with manifold opportunities to be loyal.
(3) Show them that loyalty is the best of human goods and that loyalty to loyalty is the real meaning of all loyalty.¹

With such an ideal of loyalty he easily and naturally concludes that Americans are sadly lacking in patriotism. The spirit of the people is divided and self-estranged and for its cure we need to get a new and wiser provincialism.²

He calls to mind the traditional patriotism of the Japanese and their devotion to the nation and the emperor. "For them their country is part of a religion."³

Royce then pleads for the increase of a wise provincialism in America as a correction for our ills. Such a provincialism he finds in the English village, the English country life, the

¹. Royce, Philosophy of Loyalty, Lect. V, p. 216
². Ibid. Lect. V, p. 245
³. Ibid. Lect. V, p. 235
Scotsman's love for his own native province. He finds such provincialism present also in Germany but lacking in France because of the extreme centralization of power and influence in Paris. He recommends a hearty growth of provincial ideals in the United States.¹

III - The Value and Mission of Sorrow.

In The Sources of Religious Insight, Royce has a rare and beautiful chapter on The Religious Mission of Sorrow. Sorrow is a source of religious insight and it appears as one of the most profound and transforming of all the sources. It brings with it no soft doctrine and it becomes the discipline of the world's saints and heroes.

In establishing the thesis that sorrow as an experience of ill is not always or wholly an experience that ought to be driven from the universe, he shows how large a place the bearing or overcoming of the burden of sorrow has had in the training to faith, courage and triumph of those who waxed mighty in the battle against wrong and oppression and affliction. He teaches that all the world's most practical guides to concrete living are witnesses to the importance of sorrow in our practical world.² There are sorrows that are idealized evils. They are interwoven with good. Such sources of grief are precious and if the sorrows where wholly removed, the courage, fidelity, self-possession, and peace, that arise out of these tribulations would also pass away.

As an abstract principle, the statement that 'Evil ought to be abolished' cannot be successfully defended. It is false; for

¹. Royce, Philosophy of Loyalty, Lect. V, pp. 246-247
². cf. Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight, p. 240
evil in the shape of sorrow may become a major means of edification, and lead on to a purified and heroic life. He tells us that the divine will is also made perfect through suffering, and then, he leads up to the profound doctrine of the Atonement.¹

We have elsewhere indicated that Royce had his own full share of sorrows. He was evidently teaching a lesson that he was himself learning day by day. He died in what was probably the year of his deepest sorrow. His joy and pride was the 'Beloved Community'. When his great life ended in 1916, the armies of the world were at each others throats, and the communities of the world were being torn asunder. Since that time, the thought of the community, and the effort to make the spirit of the community effective, has been a work of discouragement and attended with grief. His doctrine of the value and use of sorrow is in keeping with the view of the Master and the first disciples.

It is hard to learn that the thorn in the flesh may become a badge of royalty to the soul that is equal to this test of pain. To one who can accept the thorn and press it to his heart until the joy of obedience overcomes the consciousness of suffering, the legacy of sorrow is divine.

Truly, the lesson Royce gives us on the problem of sorrow calls for Atonement carried to its full limits, between God and man. But this task he failed to perform. His work in this chapter, however, is constructive and of high value.

¹ cf. Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight, pp. 253, 254
IV - His Community: A Redeeming Community.

Professor Royce has rendered us a great service in reclaiming for us an overlooked aspect of the atonement. We have shown that his atonement is only a segment of the whole doctrine. But it is a segment that calls for emphasis, and it is essentially Pauline, for Paul says, "Now I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and fill up on my part that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ in my flesh for his body's sake, which is the church." If Paul recognized himself as partaking of the sufferings of Christ whom he acknowledge as his own Redeemer and the Redeemer of the church, then those who hold with Professor Royce, that the redeemed community does in its turn become, in a very real sense, a redeeming community, are in agreement with the Pauline position.

To illustrate what we mean here and the extent to which Royce's position is true, attention is now called to a book by Professor D. Russell Scott of Congregational College, Edinburgh, entitled, *Christ, Sin and Redemption*. Professor Scott cites Ritschl as holding that the Church and not the individual is the primary subject of redemption. Ritschl bases his argument on the relation of Israel to God in the Old Testament and on certain passages in the New Testament, which, taken by themselves, would favor his position. But against this interpretation Professor Scott calls attention to the pronounced individualism of Jesus, and the supreme value which he placed on the individual soul. He contends that the first disciples were redeemed by the power of

1. Colossians 1:24
Christ's personality, but asks, "How was the redemption of the succeeding centuries achieved?"¹

This question leads immediately to the Church as a means of grace, and Professor Scott declares, "The Word is still communicated to us through a community that is flesh and blood — through men and women in whom Christ and his sacrificial love live, through whom he speaks and acts, who, themselves, redeemed by Christ, have become redeeming."² In this statement, as we shall see presently, Professor Scott stands in marked opposition to Professor Royce who holds that the community is the only true source and custodian of salvation, and that there is no salvation for the individual outside the community. Scott explains his position as follows: "It may be necessary at this point to say more definitely and frankly, what we mean. The idea of the redeemed community has become institutional and mechanical.

We know the watchword that goes back 1600 years, and is still heard today — Extra ecclesiam nulla salus, Outside the Church there is no salvation. We resent the whole process and the pretentious claims that arise out of it. The redeemed community is not an institution made by the decrees and counsels of men; it is made by the Living Spirit of Christ, and comprises every individual in whom that Spirit truly lives."

The important issues between Professor Scott and Professor Royce immediately appear. The watchword, "Outside the Church there is no salvation", which Professor Scott so emphatically rejects, Professor Royce enthusiastically accepts. Further, the Christ who in Professor Royce's Problem of Christianity is a dim

². Ibid. 1st Ed. Chap. VII, p. 224
figure, phantom, or shadow, seen through the mists of tradition in the background of the Pauline churches, is to Professor Scott a life-giving Spirit, redeeming individuals into the community or brotherhood, the living and active Redeemer of the brotherhood itself, and every individual that belongs to it. More than this, Professor Scott teaches that outside the community or church, "doubtless...there are not a few redeemed and redeeming personalities." One more quotation will make Professor Scott's position still clearer: "However much the community may grow in Christ, Christ will stand everlastingly supreme."

We see, then, that on the broad inclusiveness of redemption, which is not confined to the Church but flows through it and far beyond it, as well as on the supremacy of Jesus over the Church and men and all things human, Scott and Royce are far apart. But in one thing they are together, and that one thing we desire here to emphasize. Professor Scott is a minister and Biblical teacher and for Protestantism his advanced and unequivocal position is highly important and encouraging. In his great chapter in this book on "The Community Redeemed and Redeeming" he has impressed upon us a truth that has been grievously neglected in our Protestant Churches, with consequent poverty and death to our communities. He recalls, what we all know, that Jesus made himself known in the days of his flesh through flesh and blood. "It was not the Word that was powerful unto the saving of the soul nineteen hundred years ago; it was the Word made Flesh. The Christ required flesh and blood then; he requires them still today. It is through redeemed men and women, living in the flesh, that Jesus Christ is

Here the theologian and philosopher are together on the importance of "The Community Redeemed and Redeeming." It must be remembered that at the time Professor Noyce wrote his Problem of Christianity a great social wave was passing over the United States. The lessons of that great awakening were being taught in the schools, thundered from the pulpits, reflected in the political platforms, and permanently recorded in the more progressive and more just legislation of cities and states.

It was a natural reaction from an industrial, political social and even religious attitude, that had long favored the encroachment of the individual upon the rights of the community. A young nation had not guarded the better life and higher justice of the public. Cities, towns, and states had grown rapidly. Twenty nations of different language, sympathies, traditions, and religious faiths were often found in small cities not much larger than a village. Each of the little communities grew rapidly by accretion into a larger one. The churches, the social workers, even the philosophers had not taken stock of the wrong and danger of these conditions. There was another danger as great as any. Industrialism was all too ready to take advantage of any weakness through poverty or ignorance, or lack of sympathy, or lack of cohesion of the different groups, to pay lower wages, and in other ways to make itself the dictator of the entire situation.

With such broken communities, often comprising whole cities and states, such disjecta membra of human masses and classes,

the United States needed a prophetic voice like that of Royce to cry, *out of the depths*, but from the heart of her oldest university in behalf of the community. If the cry is heeded, the blessing of the nation, and especially of the Protestant churches, will be immeasurable. The various denominations that go under the name of Protestantism have lacked both understanding and sympathy. What they need to understand and prayerfully consider is that the community, the whole community of the city or state is divine and spiritual. It is true as Royce expresses it: "In the Kingdom you, and your enemy, and yonder stranger are one. For the Kingdom is the Community of God's beloved."

Of course, Biblical scholars interpret the Kingdom of God as being far wider than any church or all churches together. But we will not hold Royce here to the strictures of Biblical scholarship. It is his spirit that we approve. In our next quotation let his spirit fill our conception of the breadth and outreach of the Kingdom and see what it yields. He says: "Think of the closest unity of human souls that you know. Then conceive the Kingdom in terms of such love. When friends really join hands and hearts and lives it is not the mere collection of sundered organisms and of divided feeling and will that these friends view as their life. Their life, as friends, is the unity which, while above their own level, wins them to itself and gives them meaning. This unity is the vine. They are the branches. Now of such unity is the Kingdom of Heaven."¹

We may rest here from any severe or needless criticism. We may take these words in the true spirit of this great philosopher.

who confronted all problems religiously.

We may go further and take them in the spirit of the author of the vine and the branches and apply them to the whole community too long neglected. If his appeal is made familiar to the youth, and if it is reenforced by their parents through church and school, if it is preached at the same time from the pulpits, it will bring in a better spirit.

At the present time, in the year 1934, eighteen years after the voice of Royce has ceased to admonish us, we have become painfully aware of the danger of lawlessness and disloyalty. It is high time for us to learn like the Japanese patriot, and the Hebrew prophet, that true patriotism is a part of religion. What has been said here, will serve as a suggestion of the possible reach and value of Professor Royce's teaching of loyalty as religion.

V - His Founding of Immortality

How about Immortality? This subject is met with in different places in his discussions and it is everywhere affirmed with deep insight and unshaken confidence. To be sure, he refuses to claim immortality for every member of the human family, but his arguments for immortality as a reality are clear, cogent and convincing.

In his Ingersoll Lecture, which is devoted wholly to this subject, we find him bringing into brief outline and statement the arguments that appear on the same subject in The Conception of God, and in the first volume of The World and the Individual.

The arguments of the Ingersoll Lecture must appeal to any one who has lost loved ones, and whose soul longs for such sense and completion of life as will unravel the snarls of existence, and
satisfy the reason of those who would fain agree with Tennyson when he sings:

"My own dim life should teach me this,  
That life shall live for evermore,  
Else earth is darkness at the core,  
And dust and ashes all that is."

Royce stresses the fact that the individual is a unique being. There can exist no other one of his type. We can define man but if we undertake to define the essence of a man, that mysterious something which makes him different from all other men, we are not able to describe it. Definitions are universal, while individuality is elusive and mysterious. This evasive and baffling quality is ever the object of the persistent and endless quest of history, biography and legend.

There is no adequate definition of Abraham Lincoln. In just so far as he and other men are unique, they cannot be defined. The vague and the typical we know, but we cannot tell what it is that is unique until we are able to explain why and how it is, that there can be no other man of his type, for he alone is his own type.

Browning sets forth this experience in a masterly way in one of his lyrics:

"Yet the day wears,  
And door succeeds door;  
I try the fresh fortune-  
Range the wide house from the wing to the center-  
Still the same chance! She goes out as I enter!"

His search will be endless! The person pursued is an individual and, therefore, one that no finite search will ever overtake or understand.

1. Cf. Royce, The Conception of Immortality, pp. 7, 8, 9,  
2. Ibid. p. 17  
3. Ibid. pp. 20, 21  
4. Ibid. pp. 27, 28
The lover may use all the words at his command to describe his beloved, he may succeed in presenting every noble quality except precisely the thing that makes her unique; and the reason why he loves her is because of that very uniqueness which he fails to describe. In his supreme effort he has only described a type. She may truthfully retort, "You might have said all this to any other woman who merely happened to please you."¹

The individual expresses a purpose. It has a uniqueness that no thought or experience can express. But this purpose that it expresses satisfies the will. The will rests content with it and will have no other. So Royce concludes here as elsewhere that so far as this world contains real individuals it is a teleological world. He holds that we must define the reality of things in terms of purpose.²

We are incomplete in possession, in knowledge, and in meaning. We are ever seeking an object that is beyond us. That incompleteness of our present self-expression of our meaning, he holds, "is then the sole warrant that you have for asserting that there is a world beyond you."³

In God who is the only whole and primary individual our lives interpenetrate without losing their contrasts or their freedom. For this reason then, in this realm which the divine life loves and chooses for the fulfillment of its own purpose, "your friend's life glows with just that unique portion of the divine will that no other life in all the world expresses."⁴

And here where knowledge recognizes no diversity except on

¹ cf. Royce, The Conception of Immortality, pp. 34, 35
² Ibid. pp. 30, 31
³ Ibid. pp. 59
⁴ Ibid. p. 68
the ground of identity and where the Absolute life and its world form one unique whole, but where the Will seeks that which is different from all other objects, the individual, Royce, declares the claim of Knowledge and Will are reconciled.¹

He is here arguing for Immortality in terms of his theory, that we may not be able to accept at their face value, but when we make an allowance for what we have declined to accept, there is still a valid and persuasive argument for immortality. We do not by our seeking find the true individuals in the world of our human sense and thought. Since they do not belong to this world, we have in this very fact the proof that at the present moment they belong to a higher world. The very fact that they cannot here be found is a proof of their immortality.²

These lives that are here only objects of pursuit, attain their individuality in a life continuous with our human life. We do not know how far beyond our disappointed human consciousness this final individuality may be.³ Refusing as a philosopher to go further into what he terms the occult, Royce, assures us that our various meanings, whatever the fortunes and vicissitudes, will come to what we and God together will regard as our unique place and our relationship to other individuals, and to the "all inclusive individual, God himself."⁴

Royce expresses himself again registering a certain advance upon his views which he gave in the Conception of God, The World and the Individual and the Ingersoll Lecture, which was entitled The Conception of Immortality. Reference is now made to the fifth essay in William James and Other Essays. The fifth essay in this

1. cf. Royce, The Conception of Immortality, pp. 68, 69
2. Ibid. pp. 73, 74
3. Ibid. pp. 75, 76
4. Ibid. p. 80
book published in 1911, is entitled, Immortality.

It might reasonably occasion some surprise to find him dis-
cussing this subject so often. But in a time when so many people
were willing to content themselves with a corporate immortality,
and he satisfied with the condition of George Eliot's "Choir
Invisible" it was not only encouraging, but reassuring to have
one who had thought widely and profoundly, take an unequivocal
position on so vital a theme.

Edward Caird said of his brother, Principal Caird, who also
brought his rare knowledge and deep sympathy and consummate ability
to the discussion of this same problem, that: "In later years, he
thought much on the question of immortality:......but the only
evidence for it that seemed to him of any real value, was that
derived from the spiritual view of the nature of reality and from
the goodness that must belong to a God who is a Spirit."¹

We do not know how much these same considerations appealed
to Royce, but at the end of the 19th century we find him setting
out his arguments for immortality in three of his publications,
and a dozen years later he reverts to this subject again and writes
and delivers a new essay before a group of ministers.²

His argument there is that all our wills are an expression
of the Infinite Will and if I die, and cease, it will be because
that will which is now expressed in my consciousness and will con-
tinue to be expressed forevermore in some consciousness "can then
look back on my personal life as an expression no longer needed."³

He teaches that an explicit personality is one that shows

2. cf. Royce, William James and other Essays, pp. 257, 298
3. Ibid. p. 275
Itself through deeds. It has a coherent ideal, an ideal that is active, significant and calls for further temporal expression through deeds. Such a personality demands a future in which it will discover what it is really seeking and where it will come into unity with its own will.¹

His link with God is in his discontent with his own personality. He holds that God is dissatisfied in any finite individual just in so far as he is only partially expressed in him. God must be satisfied. His will must express somewhere God's satisfaction. He argues: "As an ethical personality I have an insatiable need for an opportunity to find, to define, and accomplish my individual and unique duty."

He concludes that my life cannot become a fact that is wholly past unless the time comes when it is "superfluous for the further temporal expression of the meaning of the whole world life."²

Royce's theory of Philosophy may not be ours, and there may be arguments for immortality that would appeal to us with greater force, but the interest and effort which he gave to the subject, the arguments which he did present which grew naturally out of his philosophy, above all, the conviction of immortality that evidently increased until the end of his life - these facts and considerations carry tremendous weight in favor of that hope which took such a firm and lasting hold upon his life and thought. Whatever may be one's philosophy or religion, whatever his fears or difficulties, even if his conviction of immortality be as bright and as cheerful as noonday, he will find himself indebted to Royce, if he reads all his...

¹. cf. Royce, William James and Other Essays, p. 293
². Ibid. 296, 297
arguments on that theme. His utterance on this profound subject has doubtless strengthened many and will help to hearten and sustain many more. It holds an important place among his positive and permanent contributions.

 VI - A Soul and Its Quest.

The highest and finest contribution made by Royce was not his writings but himself. Just as he taught others to look for a world of reason and meaning beyond the conditions of time, and sense, and strivings, and sorrow, and disappointment, so those who knew him, and those who read his books, are impressed with the deep earnestness, ability, industry, genuineness, and devotion, of this leading American representative of the Ideal Absolute.

Somewhere in Dr. T.T. Munger's biography of Horace Bushnell he tells about "God's Way with a Soul". That is a thought that is germane to our present study and to the subject of this examination. The contribution of a teacher, or a leader, consists only partially in the materials that he is able to gather, or the ideas he may successfully originate. We are always seeking after the character and genuineness of the man himself.

Royce was born in a small town, in an obscure valley in California, on the western slope of the Sierra Nevada Range. The people about him cared little for higher education, or the subjects in which he was destined to become an international leader and authority.

But he so shaped his life, and followed his star, that he moved forward from his earliest years to such scholarly attainments, and massive and constructive thinking, as would have been remarkable
in one whose advantages were the best, but such triumphant accomplishments, by a student of his beginnings, were truly astonishing.

It is probable that in the year 1890, when he was thoroughly rooted and highly appreciated at Harvard University, and when he had gained a commanding position in scholarly circles throughout the country, he was the most distinguished native son that California had so far produced. By that time, to use the words of Professor Palmer of Harvard, "Josiah Royce was one of the glories of the three universities - California, Johns Hopkins, Harvard."¹

He combined in himself the qualities of the man of wide and growing culture and those of the investigator of tireless and exhaustive scholarship and the teacher of inspiration and appeal, and to these qualities he added a heart of friendship that was never outstripped by the progress of his brain. He taught his country loyalty, and was himself a leading example of the "Loyalty to Loyalty" which he promulgated and interpreted. Certain chapters in his books treat of the office and value of sorrow. Of sorrow, ill-health, and even persecution, he had his share. But through all his tribulations, he pursued his way until the end, with courage and cheerfulness and loyalty to that sovereign Person whose nature he had expounded, as he understood it, in his system of the all-embracing Absolute.

He had encouraged the better life of the Community. He had sought to draw together the scattered fragments of his native land into a common and cooperative unity of the spirit. He had given

¹ Barrett, Contemporary Idealism in America. p. 3
himself without stint for the larger community of the world.

He passed at a time when the issue of the World War was doubt­ful. Germany had been the land of his spiritual birth, and her part in the war wounded him deeply. He died in 1916. But he proved his unfailing courage and his indomitable spirit by writing some of his strongest books during the last four years of his life, after his body had been enfeebled by a serious illness.

We have followed his discussion of The Conception of Immortality in our preceding pages. No doubt, he who had preached to others was borne up by the assurances of his own message, when the time of his departure had come.
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