D. R.

-Thesis-

The Religious Philosophy of Newman

-by-

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CHAPTER I.

Introduction

The following thesis, entitled "The Religious Philosophy of Newman," is submitted, after a period of special study and research in the Faculty of Divinity, to the Senatus of the University of Edinburgh with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

On the threshold of my task, I would offer a few words regarding the purpose, limits and methods of this thesis. It is my intention to concentrate my thought on the distinctive features and dominant factors of Newman's religious beliefs, rather than to dissipate my attention on a multitude of details. Newman's significance and value, his importance and influence, can be estimated with sufficient truth and justice without so elaborate a discussion as would tend to confuse and obscure. The treatment of the subject, therefore, will be in the nature of an exposition and a brief evaluation.

The purpose of the thesis determines its limits. Because a thesis of this kind must be short, more attention will be given to Newman's own writings than to writings about Newman. Only the real, vital issues will be distinguished and exhibited. Also, it does not lie within the scope of my design to enter into many
biographical and personal details. But the connection between Newman's religious philosophy and his personal history is so intimate that some account must be given, at least, of the main factors in his environment and the chief stages of his career.

The purpose also prescribes the method of the thesis. As far as possible I shall allow Newman to speak for himself. Instead of giving merely my own generalisations, I shall present not only Newman's own conclusions, but his conclusions expressed in his own way. For this reason, the thesis will contain a large number of quotations. Moreover, I aim at presenting this subject in as generous and sympathetic a spirit as possible. Although I have striven to recognize fully the claims of truth and justice, yet I would rather be charged with partiality than prejudice. As one of the most remarkable personages in the history of religious thought in England during the nineteenth century, Newman deserves to be justly and truly treated.

It is a mere truism to say that every man, no matter how profoundly he may influence his own and subsequent ages, is himself very much the product of the age in which he was born, and of the environment in which he grew up. Bearing this fact in mind, I shall now endeavour to indicate some of the main religious features of the England which constituted the background of Newman's youth.

The early nineteenth century found the Church of England in a very low state of morals and religion. Many evidences could be adduced to show the low opinion which even thoroughly good churchmen held of their duties, and the little that was expected of them even by religious men. Pluralities, and the non-residence of high Church
officials, were common. The lamp of true religion, which the Church was supposed to keep alight, was burning but dimly on its altars. A graphic description of the Church in the times immediately preceding the Oxford Movement is given by J. A. Froude. He says, "The average incumbent of sixty years ago (this was written in 1881) was a man of private fortune, the younger brother of the landlord, perhaps, and holding the family living; or it might be the landlord himself, his advowson being part of the estate. His professional duties were his services on Sundays, funerals and weddings on week-days, and visits when needed among the sick people. In other respects, he lived like his neighbours, distinguished from them only by a black coat and white neckcloth and greater watchfulness over his words and actions. He was generally a magistrate; he attended public meetings, and his education enabled him to take a leading part in country business." How easy it would be, under these circumstances, for the vast majority of the clergy to take lightly such of their responsibilities as they understood.

Within the English Church several varieties of religious thought and policy prevailed, all of which were characterized by the same unfitness to meet the new circumstances of the nineteenth century. The old Orthodox or High Church party, while it may have been "high and dry as a stranded vessel," had not ceased to be active, or even to exist. Two distinct groups can be distinguished within this party. One unit was composed of "Church and State" men who never tired of praising the establishment and pointing out the beneficial results which flowed from

1. Short Studies on Great Subjects, Vol. 4, p. 16.
it. To these, the name "High Churchmen" was specially given. The other group, while not despising the connection of Church and State, regarded the Church as, in essence, a purely spiritual organisation, and so, independent of the State in all matters relating to doctrine or spiritual authority. Church feeling was far stronger in this group than in the other. The title "Orthodox" belonged to this party. It is amongst these men that we discover the first waves of that great swell of theological thought which was curling toward the shores of the Anglican Church in the shape of the Oxford Movement. Many of the leading doctrines of the Tractarians are to be found in the writings of such men as Van Mildert, Horsley, Daubeny, Alexander Knox and Hugh James Rose.

The change which came about with the Oxford Movement was mainly a change in doctrinal emphasis and spiritual atmosphere. In particular, Knox may be regarded as a direct precursor and prophet of the Oxford Movement. He breathes an atmosphere and speaks a language very similar to that of the Tractarians.

On the other hand, there was the great Evangelical School which was undoubtedly the strongest spiritual force in the years immediately preceding the Oxford Movement. The vitality of the Evangelicals was due to the spiritual earnestness and activity of its leaders. They were very zealous in promoting the real, practical work of Christian piety and charity. "It had not been unfruitful, especially in public results. It had led Howard, and Elizabeth Fry to assail the brutalities of the prisons. It had led Clarkson and Wilberforce to overthrow the slave trade, and ultimately slavery itself. It created great Missionary
Evangelicals.¹ But Evangelicalism had its limitations, intellectual and otherwise. In particular, its life and activities in relation to the Church were not based on any theory about the Church as an institution which could afford a rallying ground for the defenders of it, or even be intelligible to outsiders, indifferent or hostile. While the Evangelicals were absolutely loyal to the Church of England, to its Liturgy and Articles, they were not keenly interested in problems of polity. They emphasized the bond of doctrine rather than the bond of fellowship.

Besides these two parties, the Evangelicals and the Orthodox, there was another group of men in the English Church that demands consideration. The men whose work we are now to examine flew no party banner and championed no closely defined system of doctrine. This group would have considered both the Evangelical and the Orthodox platform too narrow for them. They would not have agreed with the former in holding that there is but one visible Catholic Church, the sole representative of which, in England, was the Church of England; and they would not have concurred with the latter as to the narrow limits within which they could confine the "Gospel." In short, they were broader in their ideas than either of the other two parties. These men, however, did not form a party, nor did they develop any coherent and definite system of doctrine, with the result that there was no united action. But, as individuals, they exercised a wide influence. The chief names in this party are Richard Whately, Thomas Arnold and R. D. Hampden. These

liberal theologians had common ties in their sympathy with movements of reform both in Church and State, in their opposition to Tractarianism, and in their advocacy of free inquiry in theology.

Such was the internal conditions of the Established Church at the beginning of the century. Certain influences, however, were beginning to percolate in a diluted form into the body of this Church, and they were destined to bring about radical changes. These will now claim our attention.

When the new century dawned, France was occupying all the attention of England. The ardent sympathy which had been felt by many generous minds with the earlier efforts of France to throw off oppression had been followed by a violent reaction. It is possible to distinguish two main influences of the French Revolution upon English theological thought, although both of them were indirect. The first is the rise of a critical and negative temper of thought. In its earlier stages the French Revolution was a destructive movement. It embodied the spirit of violent revolt against law and order. It represented the protest of an individualism bent on asserting its own rights even at the cost of destroying the social fabric of the State or the religious structure of the Church. For ecclesiastical authority it had no respect; tradition it regarded merely as an encumbrance from a dead past. From such teaching as this there resulted a marked hostility in many quarters to the Church. It was as much an attack on privilege as an opposition to current theology. From this antagonism the Church reacted, and endeavoured by renewed activity to win the support of the masses. The Church awoke from her lethargy, and began to busy herself with removing
the abuses in her system and trying to increase her influence on national life. The second influence of the French Revolution was the birth of the democratic spirit. There sprang up an enthusiasm for humanity, and a sentiment of brotherhood. The justice of class distinctions was questioned. The people were demanding liberty and equality. The Church had to prepare to meet these new demands insofar as they affected her.

When these influences came to fruition, the Church discovered herself in a different position with regard to the State. No longer was the Church considered the natural ally of the State. The alienation between the two had grown so fast, and relations had become so strained, that it was believed by many that the Church as a national establishment was soon to cease. The cry began to be raised that the Church was in danger. In February, 1833, Lord Stanley's Irish Church Temporalities Bill, suppressing one half of the Irish Episcopate, was introduced into Parliament. This measure appeared to justify the gloomiest anticipations respecting the conduct of the Reform Parliament in dealing with the interests of religion. To some minds, indeed, it presented itself as only the natural consequences of the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828, of the passing of the Roman Catholic Emancipation Act in 1829, and of the great Reform Bill of 1831. For others, who recognized in those previous measures a political and social justice which could not be really hostile to the safety of the Church of Christ, this last proposal of Lord Stanley seemed a new departure in an irreligious direction. The Church was being treated just as though it were a department of the Civil Service in which it was desirable that the staff of clerks should be reduced. This, in fact, was the view -
purely Erastian - held in all seriousness by the men who now controlled public affairs. The Government had exhibited with cynical frankness the estimate which the modern state held of the sanctions, as well as of the possessions, of the Christian Church.

Another positive factor which influenced English life at this time was the spirit of Romanticism. The origin of Romanticism was a reaction against the over-dominance of classical standards in literature and art, and a protest against the intellectualism and rationalism of the eighteenth century. It was a plea for life, for freedom, for the claims of feeling and of the spiritual nature. While little place was found in rationalism for sentiment, passion, emotion, or the spontaneity of the creative imagination, Romanticism recognized the depth and largeness of human nature; it revived the spirit of wonder and the appreciation of the element of mystery in life; it laid stress upon the importance of the imagination; and it recognized the sense of sympathy between man and nature. Romanticism had a great influence both upon Newman and the Oxford Movement generally.

There remains one further characteristic of the religious thought of the nineteenth century to be considered, and that is, Liberalism. This was the most vital and subtle element of the religious world into which Newman was born. By Liberalism was meant "the tendencies of modern thought to destroy the basis of revealed religion and ultimately all that can be called religion." But let us hear Newman's own definition of it: "By Liberalism I mean false liberty of thought,...

1. Occasional Papers, R. W. Church, No. 11, p. 386.
upon matters in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore is out of place. Among such matters are first principles of whatever kind; and of these the most sacred and momentous are especially to be reckoned the truths of Revelation. Liberalism then is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word.\footnote{From the very first, and all through his life, Newman thought of this Liberalism as a danger for Christianity. Indeed, it may be said with truth that the one purpose which made a consistent unity of Newman's varied life experience was his resolve to champion the Revelation of Christ against every attack of Liberalism.}

This brief description of Newman's environment has been incorporated in this thesis in order that we may better comprehend his religious philosophy. No one could hope to understand Newman's mind and temper, his purposes and ideals, except by studying the past through which he has developed. The world has learned the lesson of the living continuity of all history. As one looks at the characteristics of Newman's early environment, he discovers the seed-plot of many of the ideas and movements which gave life and colour to his activities.

The main facts of Newman's life are so well known that it is not necessary here to repeat his story in detail. This brief outline is

\footnote{Apologia pro Vita Sua, J. H. Newman, p. 288.}
given in order that we may understand when, and under what circumstances,
his chief writings were produced. It was in London on February 21, 1801,
that John Henry Newman was born. His father's family has been said to be
partly of Jewish descent, but there is no evidence for the assertion.
His mother's family, Fourdrinier by name, was descended from French
Huguenots who left France on the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The
influence of his mother's fervent, though somewhat narrow, piety was
largely responsible for the formation in his childhood of that intense
conviction of the reality of the spiritual world which is one of his
distinguishing characteristics. As a boy, he was already a mystic.
Writing in the "Apologia" about his early life, he says: "I was brought
up from a child to take great delight in reading the Bible; but I had
no formed religious convictions till I was fifteen. Of course I had a
perfect knowledge of my Catechism.....When I was fifteen,.....a great
change of thought took place in me. I fell under the influences of a
definite Creed, and received into my intellect impressions of dogma,
which, through God's mercy, have never been effaced or obscured."¹ This
experience of a change in spiritual outlook Newman called his conversion.
In 1806 he was sent to a private school at Ealing, where he remained until
he went up to Trinity College, Oxford, in June, 1817. In 1821, he took
his B.A. degree. In 1827 he was elected to a fellowship at Oriel.

From the day Newman entered Oxford, his biography was really the
history of the personal influences that were poured in continually, and
sometimes unaccountably, upon his susceptible mind and heart. At first,

¹. Apologia, pp. 1-4.
the influence of his new associates, with Whately as the dominant force among them, seemed likely to lead him in a quite different direction from that which he ultimately took. They "called everything into question; they appealed to first principles, and disallowed authority as a judge in matters intellectual."¹ The abiding result of this intercourse was his liberation from the narrow, almost Calvinistic, theology of his youth, and the attainment of that breadth of sympathy which marked his later writings. The influence of Hurrell Froude was even more powerful. Newman says: "He taught me to look with admiration towards the Church of Rome, and in the same degree to dislike the Reformation. He fixed deep in me the idea of devotion to the Blessed Virgin, and he led me gradually to believe in the Real Presence."² ...."For myself, I cannot describe what I owe to him - as regards the intellectual principles, the philosophy of religion and morals."³ Keble managed to bring home to Newman truths which he had already learned from Butler. He taught him the principle that probability is the guide of life, and impressed on his mind the importance of the Sacramental System. "Everyone who is acquainted with Newman's works will remember how those two principles, first implanted by Butler, and then watered by Keble, grew till they cover with their branches and with their leaves and with their fruits the whole broad expanse of Newman's philosophical, ecclesiastical and religious writings."⁴

In 1824 Newman took orders in the Church of England, and was appointed

². Apologia, p. 25.
⁴. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
to the curacy of St. Clement's, Oxford. On his appointment in 1826 to a tutorship at Oriel, which, unlike the preceding generations of tutors, he regarded as involving a definite responsibility for the souls of his pupils, he resigned his curacy. In 1828 he was named vicar of St. Mary's, the University Church. After finishing his first serious piece of historical study - "The Arians of the Fourth Century" - in 1832, he set out for rest and refreshment in the company of Hurrell Froude. It was during this memorable Mediterranean journey that he came in contact, for the first time, with the Roman Catholic system in actual operation. When he was nearly dying of a fever in Sicily, Newman told his servant that he did not think he would die, for he believed that God had a work for him to do. The same sense of divine guidance is expressed in the hymn, "Lead, Kindly Light," which he wrote on his way homeward from Naples to Marseilles.

Newman reached England at a critical time for the Established Church. Ten bishoprics had been suppressed, and disestablishment seemed among the possibilities. Froude, Keble and Palmer had already resolved to write and associate in defence of the Church. The motive behind their activities was the belief that their Church was one of Apostolic descent, continuous life, supernatural endowment and divine authority. On July 14, 1833, Keble preached in St. Mary's his famous sermon on "National Apostasy," and from this time Newman dated the formal beginning of the Oxford Movement. Newman threw himself heartily into their plans. In December, the "Tracts for the Times" (1833-1841) began to come from the press. These were pamphlets of varying size, of uniformly academic rather than popular tone, intended to vindicate the continuity of the Church of England and the integrity of the Prayer Book. Dean Church describes the "Tracts" as "clear, brief, stern
appeals to conscience and reason, sparing of words, utterly without rhetoric, intense in purpose.¹ Soon Newman reached the height of his influence. In the Oxford of 1833 he was the central figure. Many writers have testified to the marvellous effect of his sermons in St. Mary's.

But presently arose the doubts as to his position which were to make the next five years a time of torture and uncertainty. Newman's studies in 1839 in the history of the Monophysite Controversy, followed by the impression of the parallel in the Donatist schism and St. Augustine's classic words - "securus judicat orbis terrarum," - set him questioning whether a localized national Church, cut off from antiquity on the one side, and on the other from the majority of Christians in the present day, could indeed be the body of Christ. He managed to put the doubts away from him, but, in his own phrase, "he who has seen a ghost, cannot be as if he had never seen it."² These doubts were bound to recur. In 1841 the famous Tract XC - "On Reserve in Communicating Religious Knowledge" - was published. In this Newman tried to prove that the Thirty-nine Articles need not bear the Anti-Roman sense popularly attributed to them. It caused intense excitement. A number of bishops condemned it in order to emphasize the Protestant character of the Church of England. In 1842 Newman took up his residence at Littlemore. He resigned the vicarage of St. Mary's in September, 1843. "From the end of 1841," he says, "I was on my death-bed, as regards my membership with the Anglican Church."³

¹ The Oxford Movement, R. W. Church, p. 97.
³ Ibid., p. 147.
Yet, until he was sure, he felt bound not to unsettle others, so he withdrew himself more and more into solitude, giving himself to prayer and study. In 1844 he resolved to write his "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine." In March, 1845, he resigned his fellowship. On October 9 of the same year, he was received into the Roman Catholic Communion by Father Dominic, an Italian Passionist, who was travelling in England.

In the following year, Newman went to Rome. After studying for a few months, he was ordained a priest on May 30, 1847. After considerable indecision as to what his future course should be, he joined the congregation of the Oratory founded by St. Philip Neri in the sixteenth century. The plan of a new Oratorian house in England was approved by the Pope. It was established at Edgbaston, a suburb of Birmingham, in January, 1848, with Newman as Superior. This was his home for the rest of his life, except for the Irish interlude. In 1850, he gave some notable lectures in London on "Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans." A few months later, he gave another series on "The Present Position of Catholics in England." This book, in his own opinion, was the best written of all his works. It was one of these lectures which involved him in the famous Achilli Trial.

One of the most important phases of his life is that connected with the establishment of a Roman Catholic University in Dublin. Newman was installed as Rector in 1854. The story is too long to tell in detail of how misunderstandings, and apparent lack of support from some of the Irish Bishops, made his position anything but comfortable. He was never at home in his new surroundings. At the end of 1858 he resigned his office.
and went back with relief to the quiet life of the Oratory. The one bright spot in this dark setting is the production of his brilliant lectures, "On the Idea of a University."

The next five years were years of discouragement and apparent failure. In a curious manner, the attack of Charles Kingsley led to his restoration to a wide popularity, not only among the members of his own Church, but in the English world at large. Newman felt that the only way of vindicating his own honour, and that of the whole Roman Catholic priesthood, was by giving a minute history of all the mental processes which had led him to change his allegiance. The result was the "Apologia Pro Vita Sua," which has often been called the greatest piece of autobiographical writing in the English language. Apart from the production of the "Apologia," the most interesting activity of this period in Newman's life was the attempt to establish a centre of Roman Catholic teaching in his still-loved Oxford. Manning and others, however, so opposed the scheme that ultimately it was abandoned. Since Newman's death, though, the principle for which he contended has been fully recognized.

In 1866, he began making notes for the work which he regarded as one of his most important - "An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent." The next four years were largely occupied with serious thought and correspondence touching the apparently approaching definition of Papal Infallibility at the Vatican Council of 1870. Newman's objection was not so much to the making of a definition as to the sort of definition which he felt was likely to be passed in haste, and under partisan pressure. When he saw the actual text of the decree, he was satisfied with its moderation. The controversy around this subject elicited his
clever pamphlet entitled, "A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk." In this he took occasion to disown some of the exaggerated conceptions of the Pope's position which he had deprecated at the Council.

In 1877, his old College at Oxford, Trinity, made him an Honourary Fellow. But a greater honour was in store for him. Leo XIII, who had become Pope in April, 1878, signified his intention of conferring a Cardinal's Hat upon the venerable English Oratorian. The actual creation took place on May 12. The words Newman spoke on this occasion are memorable as revealing the central principle of his life. "And, I rejoice to say, to one great mischief I have from the first opposed myself. For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the best of my powers the spirit of Liberalism in religion....the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed is as good as another....It is inconsistent with any recognition of any religion as true. It teaches that all are to be tolerated, for all are matters of opinion. Revealed religion is not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; not an objective fact, not miraculous; and it is the right of each individual to make it say just what strikes his fancy."¹ By a special grant, Newman continued his residence in England. His health grew increasingly feeble with advancing years. He died on August 11, 1890, and was buried at Rednal.

During his last years, Newman chose two mottoes on two different occasions. In 1879, when he received the Cardinal's Hat, he selected as the inscription for his shield the words, "Cor ad cor loquitur." When he designed his own monument and prepared his own epitaph, he chose

these appropriate words, "Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem." It has frequently been said of Newman that a remark in a sermon or essay - apparently made 'en passant' and quite incidentally - often contained what was most important in the whole thing. It is a fact that those influences which helped to change Newman's life, and that moral and mental power which he in turn exerted upon others, are an illustration of this first thought that "heart speaketh to heart." It is also profoundly true that as he developed his own religious belief, he advanced "from shadows and symbols unto truth." The present writer feels that these mottoes, seemingly chosen incidentally, point the way to the really fundamental elements of Newman's philosophy.
CHAPTER II.

On the Theory of Religious Knowledge

In order that we may correctly estimate the value of Newman's contribution to the theory of religious knowledge, it is necessary for us to remember the purpose which he had in mind. He did not set out to compose a scientific treatise on this subject. He was not attempting to give metaphysical and theological answers to the question - Can a man be certain of the truth of Christianity? Newman always felt that the answer to that query might be taken for granted. God can, and does, enable men to know His revelation. The problem which he set himself to solve was not one of possibility, but of fact. The fact is that Christians already assent to the divinely revealed truths which are known as Christianity. The great question for Newman was - What justifies that assent? How can men become certain of this revelation? How can the average man know that the so-called revelation is divine? Newman's answer to this question is found in his "Oxford University Sermons" and the "Grammar of Assent." In these books he does not attempt to prove that the teaching of Christ is divine. He is seeking "to find some ground for religious belief which should appeal to the ordinary man, and in particular to establish a basis for faith which should be permanent, and independent of the changing fashions of
apologetic." He was striving to prove that every Christian, acting according to right reason or human nature, can justly say, "That doctrine comes from God." This means that his work was not theological or metaphysical, but psychological. It was nothing more than an attempt to explain the process which in most men leads to the undoubted acceptance of Christ's message, and which accounts for such assent.

This problem presented itself to Newman as one of the most important religious issues of his day. As pointed out in the Introduction to this Thesis, Newman looked upon Liberalism as one of the dangerous enemies of organized religion. He especially feared the deep-seated rationalism which was evident in such liberal propositions as, "No religious tenet is important, unless reason shows it to be so," and, "No one can believe what he does not understand." Newman felt that those who accept such ideas must logically and necessarily drift upon the rocks of infidelity and scepticism. He frequently repeated the thought that Liberalism is but the half-way house to Atheism. This conviction coloured all his "Oxford University Sermons." As one reads them over to-day, he can see how they were "directed toward laying the proper intellectual and moral foundations in the minds and hearts of undergraduates against the inevitable day when they would find themselves face to face with that irreligious giant claiming to be the true Church of England."

In the face of this danger, Newman's problem became a terribly practical one. He felt a grave responsibility of forewarning and forearming the students of Oxford against the dangers which confronted them. Because

he felt souls were being lured into Rationalism, Newman threw the full influence of his powers and sympathies on the side of religion in order to reveal the snare. The development of this line of thought, begun in the "Oxford University Sermons," was completed in the "Grammar of Assent." The purpose of this latter book was to place a broad philosophical foundation under the theory which he had already partly defined in the former. The manner of treating the question this second time, though not in the form of sermons, differed little on the whole from his earlier method. It was easy, familiar and personal in its style. He was now writing for all Christians what he had formerly preached to the students at Oxford. With this purpose in mind, he went to work, and, by analysing his own mind and heart, and by exposing his own reasons for accepting Christianity as divine, he offered the world a personal solution for what appeared to him a disturbing problem.

As a starting point for our study, let it be stated that the root and core of Newman's thought is what he calls the "Illative Sense." His theory of a special Illative faculty is his greatest contribution to the principles of religious knowledge. It had furnished him with the means of revealing and defending the average man's method of reaching certitude in natural and revealed religion. It is the instrument whereby Newman establishes not how we can be certain, but how we are certain. It is true that we are certain of many concrete facts. "It is a law of our nature,...that we are certain on premisses which do not reach demonstration." How do we arrive at such an assent? The answer is that we reach certitude through the use of the Illative Sense.

The Illative Sense is that faculty of the human mind which leads to material certitude or simple assent in concrete things. It is "right judgment in ratiocination";¹ the "power of judging and concluding, when in its perfection";² the perfection or virtue of the ratiocinative faculty;³ "the reasoning faculty, as exercised by gifted, or by educated or otherwise well-prepared minds."⁴ The phrase, "well-prepared minds," might be aptly commented on by the following excerpt from the "Oxford University Sermons": "The experience of life contains abundant evidence that in practical matters, when their minds are really roused, men commonly are not bad reasoners. Men do not mistake when their interest is concerned. They have an instinctive sense in which direction their path lies towards it."⁵ The Illative Sense is "the power of spontaneous action in the human reason, whereby it draws its conclusions from premises of which it is only in part explicitly conscious, and judges those conclusions to be warranted."⁶ It acts by "that minute, continuous, experimental reasoning, which shows badly on paper, but which drifts silently into an overwhelming cumulus of proof, and, when our start is true, brings us on to a true result."⁷

It is very interesting to note that, in a letter composed when the first draft of the "Grammar of Assent" was nearly completed, Newman wrote to H. Wilberforce identifying the Illative Sense with Aristotle's ὑθυμία, or "prudence."⁸ In the "Grammar of Assent," however, he distinguishes

2. Ibid., p. 353.
3. Ibid., p. 345.
4. Ibid., p. 361.
5. Oxford University Sermons, p. 211.
8. Ibid., pp. 248-251.
them: the \( \psi \gamma \nu \rho \iota \sigma \varsigma \) bears only on \( \tau \alpha \ \omicron \rho \alpha \kappa \kappa \alpha \), i.e., "conduct," in contingent or concrete matters, while the Illative Sense is reserved to attaining "truth" in the same field.\(^1\) Toward the end of his life, in 1879, he again identified the two, but distinguished their respective, material objects. He said, "There is a faculty in the mind which I think I have called the inductive sense, which, when properly cultivated and used, answers to Aristotle's \( \psi \gamma \nu \rho \iota \sigma \varsigma \), its province being, not virtue, but the "inquisitio veri," which decides for us beyond any technical rules, when, how, etc. to pass from inference to assent, and when and under what circumstances, etc. etc. not."\(^2\) The Illative Sense is a branch of the architectonic faculty, or judgment in all concrete matters,\(^3\) or the "judicium prudentis viri," or prudence.\(^4\) Perhaps it should be noted that in this term Newman uses the word "sense" with a meaning parallel to our use of it in the expressions, "good sense," "common sense."\(^5\) It is essentially a rational faculty, not sensible.

This faculty of the mind is peculiarly personal, in that its direction and use rest completely in the individual. Sarolea says: "It is the personal equation in the province of moral sciences."\(^6\) Just as each individual acts according to his own conscience, or sense of duty; just as he judges in the fine arts by his own peculiar taste; just as he works in the useful arts by a sort of personal instinct or inspiration; so in passing judgment on the truth of concrete things, he is guided by his own Illative Sense. Newman quotes Aristotle's doctrine

4. Ibid., p. 517.
5. Ibid., p. 545.
that "no science of life, applicable to the case of an individual, has
been or can be written."\(^1\) In the same way, Newman would say that no
science of logic can be sufficient for determining every single truth.
Ethics supplies general rules for right living, which conscience must
apply to the particular case. So, too, logic can point out the general
direction of truth which the Illative Sense must observe in the concrete
problem before it. "It is the Illative Sense which analyses, which
selects, which classifies, which isolates or combines, which determines
the angle under which an object is to be considered, which calls in fresh
arguments where previous arguments are found wanting, which settles the
value of each particular argument, and the degree of probability of each
particular argument and the degree of probability of each particular
fact, and which finally gives the casting vote."\(^2\)

Newman holds that there is a separate "phronesis," or prudence,
for each virtue, for the "judgment, good sense, or tact which is con­
spicuous in a man's conduct in one subject-matter, is not necessarily
traceable in another.....A good man may make a bad king."\(^3\) Similarly,
talents in the professions vary. Because a lawyer is a good pleader,
it does not follow that he has equal ability in cross-examination. The
parallel may be continued to the fine and the useful arts. A poet is
not therefore a painter; an engineer is not necessarily an engraver.
Newman wonders "why ratiocination should be an exception to a general
law which attaches to the intellectual exercises of the mind; why it is
held to be commensurate with logical science; and why logic is made an

instrumental art sufficient for determining every sort of truth, while no one would dream of making any one formula, however generalized, a working rule at once for poetry, the art of medicine, and political warfare." There are, therefore, different Illative Senses in man according to the field in which he is seeking for concrete truth; different in history, chemistry, law, morals and religion.

As conscience tells us what to do, and what not to do in a particular case, so the Illative Sense bids us assent to a particular proposition as true, or withhold such assent. It is a fact that there is a rational faculty within us which unmistakably demands that particular acts be done, or avoided; and another which with equal authority demands that particular propositions be assented to, or not. That such demands are made on us is the everyday experience of every man. When we were born, we were equipped with such powers. We have as much right to complain that we have arms and not wings, as we have to desire another method of coming at the truth. "It is a general law that, whatever is found as a function or an attribute of any class of beings, or is natural to it, is in its substance suitable to it, and subserves its existence, and cannot be rightly regarded as a fault or enormity."2

"What is left to us but to take things as they are, and to resign ourselves to what we find? that is, instead of devising, what cannot be, some sufficient science of reasoning which may compel certitude in concrete conclusions, to confess that there is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony born to truth by the mind itself, and that this

phenomenon, perplexing as we may find it, is a normal and inevitable characteristic of the mental constitution of a being like man on a stage such as the world.¹

A further reason for accepting the Illative Sense's sanction of our assents in concrete cases, which was far more influential with Newman than mere submission to what we cannot change, is that God wills it. That law of our minds is one of God's laws of order in the universe. Hence, "for resignation to my destiny, I substitute a cheerful concurrence in an over-ruling Providence."²

The Illative Sense is, therefore, the natural criterion of the accuracy of an inference, our God-given warrant that assent is rightly elicited in favour of the particular proposition inferred. In its judgments, the individual is supreme, as in the judgments of conscience. He is "responsible to himself, nay, under circumstances, may be justified in opposing himself to the judgment of the whole world; though he uses rules to his great advantage, as far as they go, and is in consequence bound to use them."³ The Illative Sense "is a rule to itself, and appeals to no judgment beyond its own."⁴

Newman sums up his discussion of the nature of the Illative Sense by saying that: (a) Its exercise is one and the same in all concrete matters; e.g., law, chemistry, religion. We proceed as far as we can by the logic of language, "but we are obliged to supplement it by the more subtle and elastic logic of thought." (b) It is attached to definite subject matter; - an individual may possess it in history,

2. Ibid., p. 351.
3. Ibid., p. 353.
and not in religion. (c) Its method of reasoning is to proceed from a converging cumulation of what, in strict logical demonstration, can only be called probabilities, until it arrives at assent or material certitude. It employs a method similar to that used in the theory of limits in mathematics. (d) It is the ultimate test of truth and error in every class of concrete reasoning, whether in experimental science, historical research or theology.

Let us now seek to understand what Newman describes as the "range" of the Illative Sense. Its influence is exercised throughout the entire process of real concrete ratiocination, in assuming first principles, in conducting the argument and in drawing conclusions. We shall look at these propositions one by one. (a) The Illative Sense assumes its first principles. First principles are "propositions with which we start in reasoning on any given subject-matter." They are the first elements of thought in all reasoning. Without them we can come to no conclusion. In themselves, however, they are not elementary truths prior to reasoning. They are really conclusions or abstractions from particular experiences. That is why they are notional. We call them self-evident "because they are evident in no other way." These first principles are numerous; still few of them are received universally. They vary with the persons who reason. We must have the right, when we please, of implicitly assuming definite propositions in the first start of a course of reasoning and of arbitrarily excluding others, or

2. Ibid., p. 60. 7. Ibid., pp. 269-70.
3. Ibid., p. 361. 8. Ibid., p. 60.
4. Ibid., p. 237.
5. Ibid., p. 65.
ruling them to be irrelevant or absurd. Else we cannot conduct an argument at all. This choice makes them very often personal; they constitute in general what we call our opinions and tastes.²

Such are the words with which Newman describes first principles in his "Grammar of Assent." It should be noted that he says they are the first elements in all reasoning, that is, in all explicit, verbal argument, in all formal logic; and he still holds that, in themselves, they are not elementary truths prior to reasoning. By this he means that the implicit action of the Illative Sense abstracts and generalizes from facts of experience to form notions, that is, general, abstract propositions. First principles are thus the little known sources of all knowledge. Because they are so intimately personal, logic cannot measure them. To Newman's mind, in them, therefore, "lies the whole problem of attaining to truth."³ If our first principles are right, our arguments, and hence our conclusions, are usually correct. That is what Newman means by saying that any difficulty in the investigation of truth "commonly lies in determining first principles, not in the arrangement of proofs."⁴ And it is those first principles "which are half the battle in the inference with which the reasoning is to terminate."⁵ It is these first principles which "constitute the difference between man and man; they characterize him. As determined by his first principles, such is his religion, his creed, his worship, his political

2. Ibid., p. 361.
3. Ibid., p. 259.
4. Ibid., p. 270.
5. Ibid., p. 361.
party, his character, except as far as adventitious circumstances interfere with their due and accurate development; they are, in short, the man."¹ This theory of first principles is not only the key to the personality of Newman, but it is also the kernel of his theory of the genesis of faith in the individual.

(b) The Illative Sense conducts the argument.² Instead of discussing this phase of the action of the Illative Sense in abstract terms, Newman shows, by an example, how able historians, in studies on prehistoric Greece and Rome, not only assume the point of view from which they severally treat the question, but also similarly assume their methods of choosing or discarding testimony, and the kinds of arguments which will be allowed to tell in the inquiry. It is evident that this choice depends on the intellectual complexion of the various writers. The result is to be expected. The men differ completely in their conclusion. When logic fails, they become personal, appealing to their own primary elements of thought and their Illative Sense, against the principle and judgment of others. With facts alone authors would come to no conclusion; it is the "tacit understandings," the assumed starting-points, the "critical feeling," the "antecedent reasonings," and such similar personal, collateral aids which are used by the Illative Sense, that make possible conclusions one way or another.

(c) The Illative Sense also draws the conclusions. It masses the body of proof which consists in an accumulation of converging probabilities, the only kind of arguments available in concrete matters,

and concludes by a simple assent which is also called "moral certitude." In the "Oxford University Sermons," Newman cites many cases in which, from the same data, different men come to different conclusions. It is explained by the use of the Illative Sense.

That Newman's theory of religious knowledge contains the germs of a true apologetic cannot be denied. He did succeed in showing the part which the "personal equation" must play in the ordinary man's attempt to arrive at certitude. To a certain extent, the weapon he forged against Liberalism was most effective. If ratiocination alone could lead us to certitude, certitude would be the monopoly of an intellectual élite, the possession of the most subtle dialecticians. A certain amount of leisure and the highest culture would be the antecedent conditions of knowing the truth. The enormous majority of mankind - the simple, the ignorant, the poor - would thus be doomed to uncertainty. As Newman has pointed out, however, the very opposite is the fact. It seems to be a universal experience that the greatest number of sceptics is found among the "intellectuals"; that the intellectual temperament, while not incompatible with religion, certainly is, to say the least, very frequently unfavourable to it. Sometimes the most robust faith is found amongst common people, and amongst those who reason least. It was among the scribes that Christ found His enemies, and among fishermen and tradesmen that He found His disciples. In the search for truth, reasoning has sometimes played a secondary or negative part. That is the meaning of Pascal's aphorism: "Le coeur a

ses raisons que la raison ne connait pas." By showing that a certainty which is based on probabilities is not necessarily less certain or convincing than a certainty which is founded on a demonstration universally accepted, and by showing men that conviction is a victory to which they can attain over doubts, difficulties and perplexities, Newman made religion more real and living to a large number of men, and to this extent he did a true interpretative and apologetic work.

One can say all this and still recognize that Newman's theory had distinct limitations. As one looks back on the Liberalism against which Newman fought so strongly, he cannot help but feel that it was not all bad. Along with the probabilities of danger, there were real possibilities of good. At the heart of Liberalism, there was a hatred of wrong, a love of justice, a desire for sweeter manners and purer laws, a purpose to create a wealthier, happier and freer state. An adequate apologetic for those times would have been one which sought to bring religion into that Liberalism - to make Liberalism religious. But Newman did not recognize the values that were latent there. To him, it was all evil. Change was in the air; he feared and hated it. He idealized the past, he disliked the present, and he trembled for the future. His only hope was in a return to the past, - to a past which, to a certain extent at least, existed in his own imagination. To justify this return, Newman appealed not so much to the Reason as to the Illative Sense. To the Liberals of that day, it seemed like an appeal to an extreme form of subjectivism. The Illative Sense could

1. Catholicism: Roman and Anglican, A. M. Fairbairn, p. 84.
be made to sanction the prejudices of any individual. A more adequate apologetic would have been one in which truth would have had the sanction not only of the Illative Sense, but also of Reason. It might not have appealed to all men, but it would have appealed to the whole man. Such an apologetic coming from a man of Newman's ability might have baptized the spirit of a rational and revolutionary age with the faith of Christ.¹

¹ Catholicism: Roman and Anglican, A. M. Fairbairn, Section 4, pp. 91-93.
CHAPTER III.

On the Psychology of Faith

No one can expect to understand Newman's psychology of faith unless he has, first of all, mastered his theory of the Illative Sense, - that power or faculty which enables the individual to possess material certitude in concrete things. Newman's next step is to show that faith is a real assent, and that, along with the knowledge which comes to us through our senses and our reason, it is one of the means whereby we have knowledge of that which is exterior to us. The commonest mode of knowing material things is through the senses. They are "the only instruments which we know to be granted to us for direct and immediate acquaintance with things external to us."¹ This means of arriving at knowledge is perfectly natural to us. We have no right to deny its validity. However, "our senses convey us but a little way out of ourselves....We must be interrupted by no simultaneous sounds to hear them; we must have light to see them; we can neither see, hear, nor touch things past or future."² As a supplement to this mode of knowing things, there is reason. Newman describes reason as "that faculty of the mind.....by which knowledge of things external to us, of beings, facts, and events, is attained

¹. Oxford University Sermons, p. 206.
². Ibid., p. 206.
beyond the range of sense."¹ "Reason, according to the simplest view of it, is the faculty of gaining knowledge without direct perception, or of ascertaining one thing by means of another."² "We reason, when we hold this by virtue of that."³ "By the exercise of Reason, indeed, is properly meant any process or act of the mind by which, from knowing one thing it advances on to know another."⁴ "Reasoning is a sort of substitute for sight,"⁵ and the senses in general. It is an indirect way of acquiring knowledge. We are as much warranted in feeling safe in its use as we are in the use of our senses. Both are means connatural to us.

According to Newman there is a third way of knowing truth. It is "faith," by which Newman means accepting a thing as true upon the word of another who knows. "Faith cometh by hearing." It is "reliance on the word of another."⁶ "It simply accepts testimony. As then testimony is distinct from experience, so is Faith from Reason."⁷ "It is an acceptance of things as real, which the senses do not convey, upon certain previous grounds; it is an instrument of indirect knowledge concerning things external to us, - the process being such as the following: 'I assent to this doctrine as true, because I have been taught it;' or, 'because superiors tell me so;' or, 'because good men think so;' or, 'because very different men think so;'......or, 'because persons whom I trust say that it was once guaranteed by miracles;' or, 'because one who is said to have wrought miracles......has taught it;'......or for

2. Ibid., p. 256.
all or some of these reasons together."¹ "To say, 'I do not understand a proposition, but I accept it on authority,'...is faith; it is not a direct assent to the proposition, still it is an assent to the authority which enunciates it."²

Faith, along with our senses and with reason, is an available means for gaining knowledge. Each one is valid, because each belongs to our nature, and each carries, therefore, the warrant of the Creator. Each mode has the function of enabling us to accomplish one of our greatest duties; namely, to search for truth, which is a necessary means to an ultimate end. If all truths come from one and the same source, God, then these truths cannot contradict one another.³ "Truth of any kind can but minister to truth."⁴ The first of these instruments of knowledge, the senses, leads directly to the knowledge of material things. It is reason and faith, especially divine faith, which lead us to the knowledge of the immaterial, and it seems to be a law in our attaining knowledge that the more desirable the object of knowledge in point of excellence, the weaker or more subtle is the evidence by which that knowledge is attested. Thus, the knowledge reached through the senses is the grossest, but also the clearest, while that attained through divine faith is the sublimest, but at the same time attained by the most intangible processes.⁵

Let us now seek to understand what Newman really means by faith.

2. Grammar of Assent, p. 43.
4. Ibid., p. 459.
He seems to use the term in two senses; (a) improper, or large; (b) proper, or strict. In its large sense, faith includes the reasoning process which precedes assenting to the truth on the word of another. In this wider meaning of the term are included, therefore, the motives of credibility; and faith thus considered is an exercise of the reason, inasmuch as it accepts a conclusion from virtually recognized premises. If reason is the faculty of gaining knowledge upon grounds given, an act or process of faith is an exercise of reason, as being an instrument of indirect knowledge concerning things external to us.\(^1\) In its strict sense, "faith is properly an assent, and an assent without doubt, or a certitude."\(^2\) This narrower meaning of the term denotes merely accepting propositions as true on the testimony of another. It embraces only assent to the words of a witness without including the motives of credibility which we have for receiving such testimony.

This strict or proper sense of the word seems to include two kinds of faith, human and divine, according as the witness is man or God. Human faith is the source of many of our ordinary informations. Newman describes their origin and our manner of holding them under the title, "Credence," in the "Grammar of Assent."\(^3\) Divine faith is the "acceptance of a divine message" or "submission of the intellect to mysteries."\(^4\) It is all this and more. In answer to the question, "What is faith?" meaning divine faith, Newman says: "It is assenting to a doctrine as true, which we do not see, which we cannot prove, because God says it is true, who cannot lie."\(^5\) "He who believes that God is true, and that

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1. Oxford University Sermons, p. 207.
2. Ibid., Preface, p. XVI.
this is His word, which He has committed to man, has no doubt at all. He is as certain that the doctrine taught is true, as that God is true; and he is certain because God is true, because God has spoken, not because he sees its truth or can prove its truth. That is, faith has two peculiarities; - it is most certain, decided, positive, immovable in its assent, and it gives this assent not because it sees with eye or sees with the reason, but because it receives the tidings from one who comes from God."¹

"Faith is, in its very nature, the acceptance of what our reason cannot reach, simply and absolutely upon testimony."² The principle of faith, as Newman sees it in the history of the Church, is "the absolute acceptance of the divine Word with an internal assent, in opposition to the informations, if such, of sight and reason."³

It is very interesting to notice Newman's conception of the material object of faith. In his mind, it consisted of all the truths made known to us by divine revelation. The words, revelation, 'depositum,' and dogma, are corollaries and are synonymous with the material object of faith.⁴ This material object comprises all revealed truths which are known explicitly, as well as those which are known only virtually, interpretatively or implicitly.⁵ As a Catholic, Newman expressed the comprehensiveness of the subject-matter of faith by the words, - "I believe what the Church proposes to be believed."⁶ This divine faith, however, has a material object, a field of truths, peculiar to itself.

3. The Development of Christian Doctrine, p. 325.
5. Grammar of Assent, p. 152.
Our senses and reason have limited fields of knowledge; their range extends to everything that can be known by our purely natural powers in both physical and intellectual spheres. Whatever may be included in the physical, mathematical and philosophical sciences, whose principles are within the scope of unaided human faculties, constitutes the field of sense and reason. The realm proper to faith is the supernatural; all that lies hopelessly beyond our merely human capabilities, — and which would remain unknown to us forever, had not God seen fit to reveal it, — constitutes our supernatural world. 1 "Revealed Religion, as such, is of the nature of a positive rule, implying, as it does, an addition, greater or less, to the religion of nature, and the disclosure of facts, which are thus disclosed, because otherwise not discoverable."2 "As the widest experience of life would not tend to remove the mysteriousness of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, so even the narrowest does not deprive us of the right of asserting it. Much knowledge and little knowledge leave us very much as we were, in a matter of this kind."3 "By the supernatural world is meant that still more marvellous and awful universe, of which the Creator Himself is the fullness, and which becomes known to us, not through our natural faculties, but by superadded and direct communication from Him."4 In Newman's mind, these supernatural truths were not only the formal object of our faith, but, in addition, they must be believed on God's word. "Faith, in its theological sense, includes a belief, not only in the thing believed, but also in the ground of believing; that is, not only belief in certain doctrines, but

1. Oxford University Sermons, pp. 16-36.
2. Ibid., p. 171.
3. Ibid., p. 299.
4. Idea of a University, p. 430.
belief in them expressly because God has revealed them.”¹ The reason for assenting to the divinely revealed truth is because God says it is true, and He cannot lie.² For example, a person believes that there are Three Persons in the one God, not because he can perceive it, nor because he can prove it, but because "God says so." That was the motive of Newman’s faith.

From what has been said in the preceding paragraphs, it will be seen that Newman’s conception of divine faith is adherence to a revealed truth on the word of God. According to Sylvester P. Juergens, who has made an extensive study of the problem, that Divine faith, as Newman thought of it, has five chief characteristics. It is an act of the intellect, free, supernatural, certain and real. These properties will be briefly explained.

(a) Faith is an act of the intellect. It is the "assent of the mind to God’s word."⁴ It is, however, a spontaneous assent, resembling more an intuition than a process of reasoning. Newman held this view of it both as an Anglican and as a Catholic. In the "Parochial and Plain Sermons," he says, "The Gospel is a manifestation, and therefore addressed to the eyes of our mind....We recognize objects by the eye at once....We know them when we see them, but scarcely till then."⁵ Faith, then, is "spiritual sight.” "Faith is the simple lifting of the mind to the Unseen God, without conscious reasoning or formal argument."⁶ As a Catholic, he was even more explicit. In the "Discourses to Mixed

2. Ibid., p. 100.
4. Lectures on Justification, p. 258.
Congregations," one frequently finds assertions like the following:- "It is not so much a process of inquiry as an instantaneous recognition, on which the mind believes." Faith is sight. He maintains that faith must be today what it was in the Apostles' day. "Immediate implicit submission of mind was, in the life-time of the Apostles, the only, the necessary token of faith." "This is what faith was in the time of the Apostles, as no one can deny; and what it was then, it must be now, else it ceases to be the same thing."

(b) The act of faith is free. It follows a command of the will which acts freely. The preambles of faith may prove to us with certainty the existence of God, His veracity and the fact that He has spoken. The truths themselves which God has revealed are not evident to reason. For example, it is not evident to reason that there are Three Persons in One God. In other words, the proper object of revelation cannot be demonstrated, in the strict sense of the word. Our mind, then, is never compelled to accept the revelation as true, as it is by the proposition,- "The whole is greater than any of its parts"; or, "The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles." The mind has what may be called physical liberty when it makes an act of faith. When we assent to the revealed truth, we do not do so because that truth is evident, as we do to axioms and demonstrations in Geometry, but because we know our assent is an advance toward our ultimate end. Our will must command the intellect to assent; otherwise, we should never believe. "Faith is

1. Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations, p. 263.
2. Ibid., p. 170.
3. Ibid., p. 197.
4. Ibid., p. 196.
submission to authority....subjecting reason to the word of God."¹ "Arguments for religion do not compel anyone to believe, just as arguments for good conduct do not compel anyone to obey. Obedience is the consequence of willing to obey, and faith is the consequence of willing to believe; we may see what is right, whether in matters of faith or obedience of ourselves, but we cannot will what is right without the grace of God."² "Faith requires an act of the will, and presupposes the due exercise of religious advantages."³

(c) The act of faith is supernatural. By this Newman means that it is the medium proportioned by divine grace to the supernatural end of man. The subject-matter of divine faith is supernatural because, as shown above, it can come only by a special revelation of God. The motive of divine faith is supernatural - it is God's word and veracity. God has spoken, and He always speaks the truth. And, above all, the means by which we conceive the objects of faith is supernatural. It is grace which enlightens the mind to grasp the motives of credibility preliminary to the act of faith proper. Its essential function is to bridge the gulf between the state of knowing that it is our duty to assent, and the state of actual faith. Faith is a gift of God. One may see he ought to believe, yet cannot. "Nature cannot see God;...grace is the sole means of seeing Him."⁴ "You ask, what it is you need, besides eyes, in order to see the truths of revelation. I will tell you at once; you need light. Not the keenest eyes can see in the dark. Now, though your mind be the eye, the grace of God is the light; and you will

2. Ibid., p. 225.
3. Idea of a University, p. 382.
as easily exercise your eyes in this sensible world without the sun, as you will be able to exercise your mind in the spiritual world without a parallel gift from without. ¹ In brief, Newman felt that the truths revealed, the motive for accepting them, the light that elevates our wills and intellects, and all the preliminary steps that lead to the last formal act of faith, are all supernatural.

(d) The act of faith is certain. While the subject-matter of divine faith may be obscure, the act itself is never uncertain. The unhesitating assent of such faith is due to the internal motive of belief; namely, the perfect, extrinsic evidence, the authority of God who speaks. God's word is infallible; hence an acceptance of it is certain in the highest sense of that word. On few points of his psychology of faith does Newman insist more than on certitude. "Faith is not a mere conviction in reason, it is a firm assent, it is a clear certainty greater than any other certainty; and this is wrought in the mind by the grace of God, and by it alone."²

(e) The act of faith is a "real" assent. It is an entirely personal and practical acceptance of truths which have been spoken by a personal God in whose presence we live. Christianity "speaks to us one by one, and it is received by us one by one, as the counterpart, so to say, of ourselves, and is real as we are real."³ Our assent to matters of faith is a vivid, vital assent, a personal knowledge, an imaginative apprehension and appropriation, a believing "as if I saw."⁴ We have a "real hold and habitual intuition of the objects of Revelation, which is

1. Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations, p. 171.
2. Ibid., p. 224.
4. Ibid., cf. pp. 98, 102, 140.
certitude under another name."¹ Such "Christian earnestness may be ruled by the world to be a perverseness or a delusion; but, as long as it exists, it will presuppose certitude as the very life which is to animate it."²

Up to the present I have sketched Newman's conception of the nature and properties of divine faith. It remains to be shown by what kind of process an ordinary man is led to accept Christianity as credible. Whenever Newman makes such an analysis, he always takes conscience as his starting-point. He says: "I must start from some first principle; - and that first principle, which I assume and shall not attempt to prove, is....that we have by nature a conscience."³ Every man has a conscience which tells him, more or less clearly, what is right and what is wrong. It commands him to do the right and avoid the evil, and then approves his good, and blames his evil, acts. The function of conscience is therefore double; - first, it distinguishes right from wrong; second, it commends and praises doing the one, or forbids and blames doing the other. The former office is that of the moral sense; the latter, that of the sense of duty. Newman insists on the existence and distinction of these two offices in a rightly balanced conscience.⁴ The moral sense is an original judgment, connatural with the human mind, which tells a man that certain acts are right and others wrong. It "brings with it no proof of its truth, and commands attention to it on its own authority." Hence,"all obedience to it is of the nature of Faith."⁵ The second function of conscience, that of the sense of duty, is the magisterial

2. Ibid., p. 239.
3. Ibid., p. 105.
4. Ibid., pp. 105-6.
dictate to do or to avoid a particular act on the point of being done, or
the judicial sanction of a completed act. Its command is as clear as an
internal voice, and so real and personal that it leads man spontaneously
and instinctively to refer it to a Being outside of himself, who is no
other than his Supreme Judge. Because of the nature and scope of its
commands, it impresses on him the image of a Judge who is not only su-
preme, holy, powerful, all-seeing and retributive, but one who is ever
present in the world round about and in the individual himself. That
Judge is God, and His voice shows quite clearly man's relation to Him-
self. "His voice within (men) witnesses to Him, and they believe His
own witness about Himself."¹ And thus as the moral sense becomes the
principle of Ethics, the sense of duty is the creative principle of
Religion.² The moral sense and the sense of duty, as has already been
stated, are aspects of one and the same conscience. They work in
harmony; they mutually aid and strengthen one another. The Supreme
Judge whom they make known to us is the Governor who imposed the laws
of the moral code on our nature. His voice within us, by implicit
threat and promise, commands certain things which are instinctively
approved by man, which receives the adherence of his moral sense and
judgment as right and good. As the very existence of this inner voice
leads to the knowledge of the being of its Master, so the quality of
that inner voice leads to the knowledge of the attributes of its Author.

From all this it will be seen that the real motive of credibility,
the decisive reason for accepting a revelation as divine, is, there-

fore, according to Newman, not so much the external evidence of Christianity, such as miracles, prophecies, etc., as the harmony of the chief doctrines of the new message with the inner, intimate suggestions, or teachings of conscience. The professed revelation must bring the remedy of man's disease; what it may bring besides, man, left to his own reason, could never divine, because he cannot fathom the depth of God's wisdom, goodness and will. That remedy, which an earnest seeker recognizes at once, is the doctrine of redemption, the restoration of himself to God's friendship. Any so-called divine message that brings such news will meet with instant sympathy and welcome from an honest searcher after God.

"It is almost a proverb, that persons believe what they wish to be true.\(^1\)

That is the motive that impels the great majority of men to accept Christianity as divine, and to maintain belief in it, whether those believers are mere children, poor uneducated peasants, or learned theologians; whether they are capable of expressing that motive or not; whether they can even recognize it or not. "Can it, indeed, be doubted that the great majority of those who have sincerely and deliberately given themselves to religion, who take it for their portion, and stake their happiness upon it, have done so, not on an examination of evidence, but from a spontaneous movement of their hearts towards it? They go out of themselves to meet Him who is unseen, and they discern Him in such symbols of Him as they find ready provided for them. Whether they examine afterwards the evidence on which their faith may be justified or not, or how far soever they do so, still their faith does not originate in the evidence, nor is it strong in proportion to their knowledge of the evidence;

\(^1\) Oxford University Sermons, p. 189.
but, though it may admit of being strengthened by such knowledge, yet it may be quite as strong without it as with it. They believe on grounds within themselves, not merely or mainly on the external testimony on which Religion comes to them. ¹ When a man is content that the pretended revelation answers to the need of his conscience, he asserts that it must come as it claims, from the same God who speaks first through his conscience.

Juergens has summed up Newman's psychology of faith in the following way: "The voice of conscience convinces man of the existence of its Master and His moral law. That same voice and the experiences of fellow-men similar to his own also teach a man that he and his fellows have been estranged from God. Fear of the Supreme Judge naturally results; also desire to come back into His favour. This longing puts man on the lookout for a sign from God whose providences prove Him to be fearfully just, on the one hand, but supremely good on the other. Expectation of some merciful intervention on God's part grows in every man who is loyal to conscience. Any message carrying on its face a note of reconciliation, the one great need of human nature as exposed by conscience, is apt to be taken as a truly divine signal. The message need have little supporting evidence beyond that. Trust that God will not deceive an honest searcher after reunion with Him, and consciousness of the duty that immediate action is demanded, make even little external evidence sufficient for an honest man. His intellect decides that it is credible that such a message is divine; also that it should be accepted. The will commands assent and the intellect in turn responds, 'I believe the Christian Gospel because it is divine.'² From what has been said, it will be

seen that this entire process is somewhat vague in any man who is on the trail of truth. It is for the most part implicit rather than explicit. It is the Illative Sense "interpreting the data of the religious conscience."¹ The average man would call it feeling, as he calls so many other implicit, practical certitudes whose subject-matter lies outside his mental horizon. But the fact that the whole process is accompanied by God's grace leads him to say that, "God is the Author and Finisher, as well as the Object of faith."

From these statements it will be evident that Newman's psychology of faith is open to the same criticism as his theory of religious knowledge. In making faith so independent of ratiocination, he underestimated the worth of formal reasoning. This does not mean that he implied that faith is necessarily contrary to formal reasoning, or that ratiocination occupies a negligible place in our religious life. In the "Apologia," Newman says: "I know that even the unaided reason, when correctly exercised, leads to a belief in God, in the immortality of the soul, and in a future retribution; but I am considering the faculty of reason actually and historically; and in this point of view, I do not think I am wrong in saying that its tendency is towards a simple unbelief in matters of religion."² This ought not to be the case, and it is only due to an abuse of ratiocination. For it must be agreed that nothing can be more fatal to our religious life than an intestine war between our higher faculties, or the suspicion that the facts and conclusions of our intellectual experience are contradicted or discredited by the facts and conclusions of our religious experience. As Sarolea so truly says,

"Ratiocination rightly exercised ought, by fixing its own limits, to remove one of the great impediments to a religious life. For it is only by a process of reasoning that those limits can be fixed. In the very act of self-limitation, ratiocination takes us to the threshold of religion, and restores the harmony between our several faculties."¹ And in addition to this, it is one of the functions of formal reasoning to put in a clearer light the mysterious, subconscious phenomena which constitute the data of our religious experience. It is the patient and searching analysis of these data, the weighing and classifying of them, which gives us the probabilities on which our faith is based. No doubt faith only can transform those possibilities into certainties. But without the intellectual process, the probabilities would not emerge into the region of consciousness, and our faith would degenerate into a blind and groping superstition.

CHAPTER IV.

On Belief in God

It will be evident from what has been said in the previous chapters that Newman could make no move towards a rational theism. A philosophy founded upon implicit, rather than explicit, reason, and built up around the Illative Sense must eliminate first principles and true universals. His theory practically prevents him from proving one thing from another, and from passing from data, by means of certain principles, to conclusions. When Newman comes to discuss the problem of Theism, he is consistent, and stands by his theory. The result is that he asserts that the knowledge of the Divine Being is not to be sought at the end of chains of reasoning at all, but in knowledge of fact. He believed it was possible to attain to a more vivid assent to the Being of God than that which is given merely to notions of the intellect. He felt that he could enter with a personal knowledge into the circle of truths which make up the great thought of God. He desired to believe as if he saw. Of all concrete facts, the eternal Being is the supreme; and Newman felt that assent to His being is not notional at all, but real.

It is perfectly evident, to any person who studies Newman's life, that in his own mind he was able to give a real assent to the being of God. This assent did not follow upon acts of inference, and other purely intellectual exercise. Any theist would admit, without difficulty, a rational assent about God. But such an admission is merely "an assent
to a large development of predicates, correlative to each other, or at least intimately connected together, drawn out as if on paper, as we might map a country which we had never seen, or construct mathematical tables, or master the methods of discovery of Newton or Davy, without being geographers, mathematicians, or chemists ourselves.¹ This does not describe Newman's apprehension of God, for he knew Him not merely as a notion, but as a reality. Writing about himself in the "Apologia," Newman says that when he was fifteen he rested in the thought of two, and two only, absolute and luminously self-evident beings, - himself and his Creator.² Another striking illustration of the persistence of this attitude towards God is found in one of the earliest Oxford sermons. "We begin, by degrees," he says, "to perceive that there are but two beings in the whole universe, our own soul, and the God who made it."³ These quotations are sufficient to show how real was Newman's knowledge of God, - as real as his own existence. The proposition that there is one personal and present God was held by him as a religious fact and reality.

But how is the real assent to the being of God obtained? In the same way as other real assents, namely, by immediate apprehension, in which operates not merely the intellect, but the whole personality. The vivid apprehension of the religious object "is independent of the written records of Revelation; it does not require any knowledge of Scripture, nor of the history or the teaching of the Catholic Church.

2. Apologia, p. 4.
It is independent of books."¹ It is parallel with the assent to the existence of the external world, of other personalities, and of self. There is, first of all, the rudimentary apprehension of the object itself, and then upon this follows what the process of experience contributes. Abstract reasoning is certainly to be reckoned among these interpretative processes, but it is given a secondary position. Apprehension is the foundation upon which doctrine may be built and superimposed, and the order cannot be reversed. Apprehension, however, is a personal matter, for "everyone who reasons, is his own centre; and no expedient for attaining a common measure of minds can reverse this truth....The sole and final judgment on the validity of an inference in concrete matter is committed to the personal action of the ratiocinative faculty."² It will be remembered that the perfection of this "personal action" is what Newman calls the Illative Sense.

Before going on to describe Newman's view of God and how it was obtained, I shall pause to consider what use he made of reason, as one of the factors of the Illative Sense, in its application to Theism. It contributes some notions and notional inferences. Of the so-called "proofs" of Natural Theology, Newman had no high opinion. He says, "I am far from denying the real force of the arguments in proof of a God, drawn from the general facts of human society and the course of history, but these do not warm me or enlighten me; they do not take away the winter of my desolation, or make the buds unfold and the leaves grow within me, and my moral being rejoice. The sight of the world is nothing else than the prophet's scroll, full of lamentations, and

¹. Grammar of Assent, p. 118.
². Ibid., p. 345.
mournings, and woe."

Regarding the Cosmological argument, Newman says, "It is to me a perplexity that grave authors seem to enunciate as an intuitive truth, that everything must have a cause." Belief in causation he considered to be nothing more than a presumption, that is, a notion, not an image, something which expresses what is abstract, not what is individual or from direct experience. If everything must have a cause, the voice of nature would tell false, "for why, in that case stop short at One who is Himself without cause? The assent which we give to the proposition, as a first principle, that nothing happens without a cause, is derived, in the first instance, from what we know of ourselves; and we argue analogically from what is within us to what is external to us." Newman finds an illustration of this in the experience of a child. "One of the first experiences of an infant is that of his willing and doing; and, as time goes on, one of the first temptations of the boy is to bring home to himself the fact of his sovereign arbitrary power, though it be at the price of waywardness, mischievousness, and disobedience. And when his parents, as antagonists of this wilfulness, begin to restrain him, and to bring his mind and conduct into shape, then he has a second set of experiences of cause and effect, and that upon a principle or rule. Thus the notion of causation is one of the first lessons which he learns from experience, that experience limiting it to agents possessed of intelligence and will." It is the notion of power com-

2. Grammar of Assent, p. 66.
3. Ibid., p. 60.
4. Ibid., p. 66.
5. Ibid., p. 66.
bined with a purpose and an end. Physical phenomena, as such, are without sense; and experience teaches us nothing about physical phenomena as causes. Accordingly, wherever the world is young, the movements and changes of physical nature have been and are spontaneously ascribed by its people to the presence and will of hidden agents, who haunt every part of it, the woods, the mountains and the streams, the air and the stars, for good or for evil. It is something like children who beat the ground after falling, thereby implying that what has bruised them has intelligence. By this process of reasoning, Newman came to the conclusion that the whole matter of belief in causation rests on the argument from analogy.

From a consideration of "cause" in nature, Newman was led on to consider the "order of nature." As he looked back in history, to the foundations of society, he found that a new aspect of the physical universe presented itself to the mind. "Since causation implies a sequence of acts in our own case, and our doing is always posterior, never contemporaneous or prior, to our willing, therefore, when we witness invariable antecedents and consequents, we call the former the cause of the latter, though intelligence is absent, from the analogy of external appearances. At length we go on to confuse causation with order, and, because we happen to have made a successful analysis of some complicated assemblage of phenomena, which experience has brought before us in the visible scene of things, and have reduced them to a tolerable dependence on each other, we call the ultimate points of this analysis, and the hypothetical facts in which the whole mass of phenomena is gathered up, by the name of causes, whereas they are really only the
formula under which those phenomena are conveniently represented.¹ For example, that all the particles of matter throughout the universe are attracted to each other with a force varying inversely with the square of their respective distances is a profound idea harmonizing the physical works of the Creator; but even could it be proved to be a universal fact, and also to be the actual cause of the movements of all bodies in the universe, still it would not be an experience any more than is the mythological doctrine of the presence of innumerable spirits in those same physical phenomena.

When the order of nature is thus explained as an ordinary succession of antecedents and consequents, it falls under the doctrine of general laws. This is another first principle or notion derived from experience and accepted with what Newman calls a presumption. By natural law he means the fact that things happen according to certain circumstances, and not without them and at random. This means that they happen in an order, and that there exists an order of nature. And so, by scientific analysis, we are led to the conclusion that phenomena, which seem so very different from each other, admit of being grouped together as modes of the operation of one hypothetical law, acting under varied circumstances. From this it is possible to advance to the general notion or first principle of the sovereignty of law throughout the universe. There are men, however, who go further than this and teach not only a general, but an invariable and inviolable and necessary uniformity, in the action of the laws of nature. They hold that everything is the result of some law or laws, and that exceptions are impossible. But

¹ Grammar of Assent, p. 67.
Newman could not see on what grounds of reason or experience they take up this position. "Our experience," he says, "rather is adverse to such a doctrine, for what concrete fact or phenomenon exactly repeats itself?"\(^1\) He feels that if a person takes it for granted that a phenomenon may exactly repeat itself, he is having recourse to an explanation that is not valid. Such a person is only assuming, and can never prove, that nature is necessarily uniform in all its manifestations. And so he comes to the conclusion that "the order of nature is not necessary, but general in its manifestations."\(^2\)

This leads Newman to observe that "as a cause implies a will, so order implies a purpose. Did we see flint celts, in their various receptacles all over Europe, scored always with certain special and characteristic marks, even though those marks had no assignable meaning or final cause whatever, we should take that very repetition, which indeed is the principle of order, to be a proof of intelligence. The agency then which has kept up and keeps up the general laws of nature, energizing at once in Sirius and on the earth, and on the earth in its primary period as well as in the nineteenth century, must be Mind, and nothing else, and Mind at least as wide and as enduring in its living action, as the immeasurable ages and spaces of the universe on which that agency has left its traces."\(^3\)

The above paragraphs indicate the value which Newman placed on two of the main rationalistic arguments for the Being of God. He felt that causation was merely a formula under which things were conveniently

1. Grammar of Assent, p. 70.
2. Ibid., p. 71.
3. Ibid., p. 72.
represented. But this convenience is so great that nearly all thinking people resort to it. Newman, however, disparaged the arguments because he felt that they could lead only to a notional assent. As for the argument from the Order of Nature, he accepted the fact as a maxim in the form that order proves intelligence. He seems to have had no place in his scheme of thought for the Ontological argument. No trace of it can be found in his writings. It may be that, with his keen intellectual insight, he realized that this argument assumes as already existing in the human mind the very knowledge of God's existence which it would derive from logical demonstration. While dealing with these so-called "proofs" of the Being of God, it is interesting to notice that Newman was suspicious of Paley's argument from Design. This was before the theory of evolution had suggested a weak point in the argument. In one of his letters, Newman says, "I have not insisted on the argument from design, because I am writing for the 19th Century, by which, as represented by its philosophers, design is not admitted as proved. And to tell the truth... I have been unable to see the logical force of the argument myself. I believe in design because I believe in God; not in a God because I see design.... Half the world knows nothing of the argument from design - and, when you have got it, you do not prove by it the moral attributes of God - except very faintly. Design teaches me power, skill, and goodness, not sanctity, not mercy, not a future judgment, which three are of the essence of religion."  

myself into the world of men, and there I see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress. The world seems simply to give the lie to that great truth, of which my whole being is so full (i.e., Belief in God); and the effect upon me is, in consequence, as a matter of necessity, as confusing as if it denied that I am in existence myself. If I looked into a mirror, and did not see my face, I should have the sort of feeling which actually comes upon me, when I look into this living busy world, and see no reflexion of its Creator."¹ When Newman considered "the world in its length and breadth, its various history, the many races of man, their starts, their fortunes, their mutual alienation, their conflicts; and then their ways, habits, governments, forms of worship; their enterprises, their aimless courses, their random achievements and acquirements, the impotent conclusion of long-standing facts, the tokens so faint and broken of a superintending design, the blind evolution of what turn out to be great powers or truths, the progress of things, as if from unreasoning elements, not towards final causes, the greatness and littleness of man, his far-reaching aims, his short duration, the curtain hung over his futurity, the disappointments of life....that condition of the whole race, so fearfully yet exactly described in the Apostle's words, 'having no hope and without God in the world,'"² there was inflicted upon his mind the sense of a profound mystery, which seemed beyond human solution. He found it impossible to cast into satisfactory logical expression his belief in God. He could make no move towards rational theism. He found it impossible

2. Ibid., pp. 241-2.
to associate God's presence with any sensible phenomena. In view of these facts, the question is raised in our minds, "How could Newman ever hold the thought of God as Theists entertain it?" This question leads me to the discussion of how Newman was able to give a real assent to the proposition that there is one God.

I have endeavoured to point out that Newman would make no attempt to prove the reasonableness of "belief in God." He considered that belief was not the result of argument, and so he did not argue. But Newman does lay the facts of human experience before us, and he indicates the conclusion at which they point. The proposition that there is one God is a truth which, he felt, every person is able, and ought, to acknowledge. He was not looking for what has been scornfully called "a clock-making divinity." The evidence of a contriving intellect in nature, of the adaptability of means to ends, weighed but little with him. He could see no morality in the constitution of things. The elements know nothing of good and evil. Along these roads it is only possible to arrive at a power adequate to the effects which we witness. Water will not rise higher than its source. The created world is finite, and can tell us nothing of an infinite Creator. And yet, Newman considers that everyone can give a real assent to the proposition that there is one God. The God to which he assents is not an "Anima mundi" merely, or God as an initial force, but God as the word is understood by the Theist and the Christian, a personal God, the author and sustainer of all things, the moral governor of the world. Newman considers that the root of this religious belief lies in the conscience and the sense of moral obligation. The principle from which he starts, and which he does not attempt to prove, is that by nature we have a conscience. "I assume,"

...
says Newman, "that conscience has a legitimate place among our mental acts; as really so, as the action of memory, of reasoning, of imagination, or as the sense of the beautiful; that, as there are objects which, when presented to the mind, cause it to feel grief, regret, joy, or desire, so there are things which excite in us approbation or blame, and which we in consequence call right or wrong; and which, experienced in ourselves, kindle in us that specific sense of pleasure or pain, which goes by the name of a good or bad conscience. This being taken for granted, I shall attempt to show that in this special feeling, which follows on the commission of what we call right or wrong, lie the materials for the real apprehension of a Divine Sovereign and Judge." Conscience, then, is the Theistic organ or faculty. As "we have our initial knowledge of the universe through sense, so do we in the first instance begin to learn about its Lord and God from conscience." Conscience does not repose on itself, but vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self, and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions, as is evidenced in that keen sense of obligation and responsibility which informs them. And hence it is that we are accustomed to speak of conscience as a voice, a term which we should never think of applying to the sense of the beautiful; and moreover a voice, or the echo of a voice, imperative and constraining, like no other dictate in the whole of our experience."

This brings me to one of Newman's main conclusions, that the presence of a moral sense in ourselves presumes a moral nature in the power which has called us into existence. "If, as is the case, we feel

2. Ibid., p. 63.
3. Ibid., p. 107.
responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same tearful broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight which follows on our receiving praise from a father, we certainly have within us the image of some person, to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away. These feelings in us are such as require for their exciting cause an intelligent being: we are not affectionate towards a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or dog; we have no remorse or compunction on breaking mere human law: yet, so it is, conscience excites all these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and on the other hand it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a resignation, and a hope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object to elicit. 'The wicked flees, when no one pursueth'; then why does he flee? whence his terror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine; and thus the phenomena of Conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive, and is the creative principle of religion, as the Moral Sense is the principle of ethics.”

As an illustration of Newman's conception of the growth of religious feeling, I shall add another extract from his writings. It is taken from the history of the mind of a child. "The child keenly understands that there is a difference between right and wrong; and when he has done what he believes to be wrong, he is conscious that he is offending One to whom he is amenable, whom he does not see, who sees him. His mind reaches forward with a strong presentiment to the thought of a Moral Governor, sovereign over him, mindful, and just. It comes to him like an impulse of nature to entertain it.

"It is my wish to take an ordinary child, but still one who is safe from influences destructive of his religious instincts. Supposing he has offended his parents, he will all alone and without effort, as if it were the most natural of acts, place himself in the presence of God, and beg of Him to set him right with them. Let us consider how much is contained in this simple act. First, it involves the impression on his mind of an unseen Being with whom he is in immediate relation, and that relation so familiar that he can address Him whenever he himself chooses; next, of One whose goodwill towards him he is assured of, and can take for granted — nay, who loves him better, and is nearer to him, than his parents; further, of One who can hear him, wherever he happens to be, and who can read his thoughts, for his prayer need not be vocal; lastly, of One who can effect a critical change in the state of feelings of others towards him. That is, we shall not be wrong in holding that this child has in his mind the image of an Invisible Being, who exercises a particular providence among us, who is present everywhere, who is heart-reading, heart-changing, ever-accessible, open to impetration.
What a strong and intimate vision of God must he have already attained, if, as I have supposed, an ordinary trouble of mind has the spontaneous effect of leading him for consolation and aid to Invisible Personal Power!"¹

Many quotations from Newman's writings might be given to indicate the importance he attaches to conscience in his theistic system. Brémond, in his book, "The Mystery of Newman," says that the "primacy of conscience" is the "grand principle upon which rests, in whole and in detail, the philosophy of Newman. All the rest presupposes or leads up to it."² In the Oxford University Sermons, Newman writes, "It is obvious that Conscience is the essential principle and sanction of Religion in the mind."³ In his answer to Gladstone concerning the dogma of Papal Infallibility, he says, "Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest in its blessings and anathemas, and, even though the eternal priesthood throughout the Church could cease to be, in it the sacerdotal principle would remain and would have a sway."⁴ And in the "Grammar of Assent" he says, "Our great internal teacher of religion is....our Conscience. Conscience is a personal guide, and I use it because I must use myself....Conscience is nearer to me than any other means of knowledge."⁵ I have given these quotations from writings about Newman and from different parts of his own works in order to illustrate how central is his doctrine of the conscience. His whole

religious edifice rests upon this foundation. For Newman, to listen to the voice of conscience is to hear directly the voice of God.

In adhering to the centrality of conscience, Newman may be reflecting the influence of that great Anglican Churchman and Christian Apologist, from whose teachings he learned so much, - Bishop Butler. There are some things Butler did once for all. One of these was his proof of the religious worth and work of conscience. The doctrine of the conscience was his real contribution to the philosophy of human nature. Following Butler's leadership, Newman built his Theistic structure upon this foundation. Indeed, so great is his dependence on Butler, that one of Newman's greatest critics - Dr. A. M. Fairbairn - has been led to say that "his fundamental principles are those of Butler; he reasons when he is gravest, fullest of conviction and most anxious to convince, in the methods and on the premises of the Analogy."¹

It has been pointed out by Caldecott that with reason reduced into impotence, and conscience presented predominantly as authoritative, and with all the range of personality expressly claimed, we might have expected Newman to give room for the love of beauty as a motive to religious belief, but he does not.² While discussing "Belief in God" in the "Grammar of Assent," Newman does bring up the matter of beauty only to oppose it. Conscience reaches forward to something beyond self, but the sense of the beautiful is simply for its own sake. We are accustomed to speak of conscience as a voice, a term which we would

1. Catholicism - Roman and Anglican, A. M. Fairbairn, p. 79.
never think of applying to the sense of the beautiful. He says, "As we have naturally a sense of the beautiful and graceful in nature and art, though tastes proverbially differ, so we have a sense of duty and obligation, whether we all associate it with the same certain actions in particular or not. Here, however, Taste and Conscience part company: for the sense of beautifulness....has no special relation to persons, but contemplates objects in themselves; conscience, on the other hand, is concerned with persons primarily, and with actions mainly as viewed in their doers."¹ It is a peculiar thing that a spiritual genius like Newman, with such keen intellectual insight, should have viewed beauty as pertaining to external objects chiefly. Beauty of character and soul, the pathos of suffering, and the emotions evoked by the drama of history, seemed to teach him nothing about God, and failed to bring him closer to the Supreme Being.

In several eloquent passages, Newman has described those distinguishing characteristics of the divine nature which were inseparable from his idea of God. He considered these attributes to be the basis and ground of His various manifestations to his creatures. He says: "As in the human frame there is a living principle, acting upon it and through it by means of volition, so, behind the veil of the visible universe, there is an invisible, intelligent Being, acting on and through it, as and when He will. Further, I mean that this invisible Agent is in no sense a soul of the world, after the analogy of human nature, but, on the contrary, is absolutely distinct from the world, as being its Creator, Upholder, Governor, and Sovereign Lord. Here we

¹ Grammar of Assent, p. 107.
are brought into the circle of doctrines which the idea of God embodies. I mean then by the Supreme Being, one who is simply self-dependent, and the only Being who is such; moreover, that He is without beginning or Eternal, and the only Eternal; that in consequence He has lived a whole eternity by Himself; and hence that He is all-sufficient, sufficient for His own blessedness, and all-blessed, and ever-blessed. Further, I mean a Being, who, having these prerogatives, has the Supreme Good, or rather is the Supreme Good, or has all the attributes of Good in infinite intenseness; all wisdom, all truth, all justice, all love, all holiness, all beauifulness; who is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent; ineffably one, absolutely perfect; and such, that what we do not know and cannot even imagine of Him, is far more wonderful than what we do and can. I mean One who is sovereign over His own will and actions, though always according to the eternal Rule of right and wrong, which is Himself. I mean, moreover, that He created all things out of nothing, and preserves them every moment, and could destroy them as easily as He made them; and that, in consequence, He is separated from them by an abyss, and is incommunicable in all His attributes. And further, He has stamped upon all things, in the hour of their creation, their respective natures, and has given them their work and mission and their length of days, greater or less, in their appointed place. I mean, too, that He is ever present with His works, one by one, and confronts everything He has made by His particular and most loving providence, and manifests Himself to each according to its needs; and has on rational beings imprinted the moral law, and given them power to obey it, imposing on them the duty of worship and service, searching and scanning them through and through
with His omniscient eye, and putting before them a present trial and a judgment to come."

Newman did not always teach the attributes of God in such an inclusive manner. Because he considered conscience to be the Theistic organ or faculty, therefore he listened for this internal voice, to tell him not only that God is, but what He is. Conscience suggested to him many things about God, but its most prominent teaching and its cardinal and distinguishing truth was that God was his Judge. In consequence, the special attribute under which conscience brought God before Newman, and to which he subordinated all other attributes, was that of justice - retributive justice. "We learn from its (i.e., conscience) informations to conceive of the Almighty, primarily, not as a God of Wisdom, of Knowledge, of Power, of Benevolence, but as a God of Judgment and Justice; as One, who, not simply for the good of the offender, but as an end good in itself, and as a principle of government, ordains that the offender should suffer for his offence. If it tells us anything at all of the characteristics of the Divine Mind, it certainly tells us this; and, considering that our shortcomings are far more frequent and important than our fulfilment of the duties enjoined upon us, and that of this point we are fully aware ourselves, it follows that the aspect under which Almighty God is presented to us by Nature, is (to use a figure) of one who is angry with us, and threatens evil."

This aspect of God influenced Newman's whole attitude towards religion. One result of this is that "he persistently put forward

1. Idea of a University, pp. 61-3.
works where Paul puts faith; and merit where Paul puts grace; and doubt and fear where Paul puts love and hope and full assurance.”¹ "Newman's Maker, and Lawgiver, and Judge was, all his days, far more self-luminous to Newman than his only Redeemer with His sin-cleansing blood and His sinner-justifying righteousness."² Anyone reading Newman's sermons cannot help noticing what a large place the "wrath of God" occupied in his preaching. He very early gives one the idea that God is acting with revenge toward men. His religion was largely one of fear. Mankind seemed incapable of spiritual progress. While the brain may be improved, the heart remains full of sin. The many will perish, and none but the few will escape God's judgment. One writer would account for Newman's religious fears by saying that he ascribed to Jesus of Nazareth such attributes as tended to destroy His humanity, and remove Him from our affections so that we need a second Mediator to reveal Jesus to us.³

There is another phase of Newman's Theism which calls for attention. "I came to the conclusion," he says, "that there was no medium, in true philosophy, between Atheism and Catholicity, and that a perfectly consistent mind, under those circumstances in which it finds itself here below, must embrace either the one or the other. And I hold this still: I am a Catholic by virtue of my believing in a God; and if I am asked why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe in myself, for I feel it impossible to believe in my own existence (and of that fact I am quite sure) without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as a Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience."⁴

2. Ibid., p. 104.
I have pointed out above how Newman developed his belief in God from his own conscience. It is not so easy to see just why his Theism should lead him to Catholicism in order that he might be saved from Atheism.

For me, the explanation is to be found in Newman's spiritual environment and intellectual characteristics. He felt that outside the Catholic Church things were tending to Atheism in one form or another. The Catholic Church loomed up on his horizon as the one "face to face antagonist" able to withstand and baffle the fierce energy of passion, and the all-corroding, all-dissolving scepticism of the intellect in religious inquiries.\(^1\) Atheism is latent in the nature of man, and especially in the reason, in spite of the inner voice of conscience. As a result of this attitude towards things, the conviction was born in Newman's mind that faith in God would not continue to live without Catholicism. The Church's infallibility seemed to be a provision adopted by the mercy of the Creator to preserve religion in the world.\(^2\)

His Theism, which needed conscience for its creation, needed Catholicism for its continuance. Conscience was an authoritative voice, a "magisterial dictate," speaking within him. It was but a short step, but a natural deduction, from this to an authoritative Church.

It is well known that Newman has been accused of being an intellectual sceptic because he took refuge in external authority for the foundations of his belief. It will be sufficient to point out one or two things which gave rise to this tendency, without entering into the details of the controversy. His Theism can make no claim to being

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2. Ibid., p. 245.
rationalistic. He believed that the reason, because it worked on wrong principles, deluded men into accepting a narrow range of belief quite inadequate to the variety and complexity of experience. He therefore confined reason to a secondary position, and marked off clearly defined limits for its operation. Those individuals, therefore, who look only to reason for this knowledge of God, find that Newman's teachings are sceptical.

On the other hand, Newman had a very real knowledge of God. No person can read his writings without realizing this. He himself was in possession of a religious belief in God, and in his "Grammar of Assent," he was trying to demonstrate to others the psychology of this belief. The sense of moral obligation is the source of religious knowledge. How far he succeeded in outlining a system which could win assent from other people, it has been the purpose of the present chapter to show. His belief in God may be individualistic; but insofar as it produces a true belief in God it is not sceptical. He worked to satisfy the demands of his own intellect. In exposing the workings of his own mind, he had an implicit conviction that all men were capable of making the same assent that he had made.

In conclusion, it is necessary to state that what Newman considered the intellect would do for Theism is dissimilar to ordinary Catholic teaching on this point. The Roman See requires consent to the validity of the intellectual testimony, and apparently Newman could not give a real assent to this testimony. Cardinal Manning said on this question: "The Vatican Council (of 1870) declared that the existence of God may be known with certitude by the reason of man through the works that He
this, he says, is the infallible light of the natural order. The question of Newman's attitude to ordinary Catholic teaching, like that of his scepticism, has been the centre of much controversy, which it is possible here merely to suggest. In the "Grammar of Assent," there is a note dealing with the "alternative, intellectually, between Atheism and Catholicism." In this note is to be found a letter from Mr. Lilley seeking to defend Newman from scepticism on the very point. Lilley refers to a few scattered expressions of defence by Newman towards the formal proofs on which the Being of God rests, and especially the argument derived from the witness of conscience. Dr. Barry, the Romanist Theologian, also appeals for a sympathetic reading of Newman's phraseology. But he has to confess "that the language is remarkably unlike that from our schools." A writer in "The Tablet" says, "Cardinal Newman's Grammar of Assent in no way represents the current and immemorial teaching of Catholic Philosophic Schools. The natural Theology of our schools is based frankly and wholly on the appeal to Reason." Newman himself states both in Note II. of the "Grammar of Assent," and in his reply to Dr. Fairbairn, that he did not understand himself to be opposing the official tradition. In view of the facts, it may seem to many people that this statement rests on a weak foundation. It should be taken as final, however, for Newman's writings have never received the "Anathema Sit" of the Roman Church.

2. Grammar of Assent, Note II., p. 495.
3. The Contemporary Review, 1885.
4. The Tablet, March 28, 1899.
5. The Contemporary Review, 1885.
CHAPTER V.

On Creeds and Dogmas

It is proposed, in this chapter, to examine Newman's Theory of Creeds and Dogmas, as it is found outlined and suggested in his various writings. The most important part of the chapter will be that dealing with "The Formation and Imposition of Creeds," which subject has been treated in Newman's book, "The Arians of the Fourth Century." His "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk" is helpful, for it reveals his attitude towards the dogma of Papal Infallibility. The "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine," while it is of importance in the treatment of this subject, will be considered separately in another chapter.

In Newman's novel, "Loss and Gain," he gives a hint of what he found in dogma that was so absolutely necessary to his religious life. Charles Reding, the hero of the book, is depicted as a religious-minded young man, eager for some credible and definite assurance of what he ought, or ought not, to believe. He is sure that there must be some final authority as to what has been revealed, but he is utterly confused by the conflict of views on the subject in the Anglican Church. "Wouldn't you be glad," says Reding to a college friend, "if St. Paul could come to life? I've often said to myself, 'Oh that I could ask St. Paul this or that.'" "But the Catholic Church isn't St. Paul quite, I guess," said Sheffield. "Certainly not; but supposing you did think it had the inspiration of an Apostle, as the Roman Catholics do, what a comfort it would be to know beyond all doubt what to believe about
God, and how to worship and please Him! I mean you said, 'I can't believe this or that'; now, you ought to have said, 'I can't believe the Pope has power to decide this or that.' If he had, you ought to believe it, whatever it is, and not to say, 'I can't believe.'

Here is to be seen the reflection of Newman's conception of the dogmas of the Church as a coherent system far above man's intellectual apprehension, which he is to believe as a matter of duty rather than for its fascinating or subduing power over his mind. While Reding is far indeed from being a duplicate of Newman, nevertheless I think the book does reveal the reasons why a person such as Newman would be gradually more and more repelled from the Anglican Communion, and drawn towards that which does lay down absolutely the dogmas which it expects its children to accept.

Newman, in discussing the history of his religious opinions, indicates what an important place dogma occupied in his spiritual history. He says, in the "Apologia," "When I was fifteen,...a great change of thought took place in me. I fell under the influences of a definite creed, and received into my intellect impressions of dogma, which, through God's mercy, have never been effaced or obscured." Further on in the same book he says, "From the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion: I know no other religion; religion, as a mere sentiment, is to me a dream and a mockery. As well can there be filial love without the fact of a father, as devotion without the fact of a Supreme Being. What I held in 1816, I held in 1833, and I hold in 1864. Please God, I shall hold it to the

2. Apologia, p. 4.
end. Even when I was under Dr. Whately's influence, I had no temptation to be less zealous for the great dogmas of the faith, and at various times I used to resist such trains of thought on his part as seemed to me (rightly or wrongly) to obscure them. From these quotations it is seen that dogma was the very essence of Newman's religion. Dogma was the skeleton, so to speak, around which the body of his religious and spiritual life was built up. For religion, as Newman conceived it, dogma was a fundamental principle. Hutton says that Newman in his writings "gave full expression to his confidence that dogma is the backbone of religion, and this he has always asserted with the utmost consistency and energy." Newman confronts the student of his life as a man who not only accepted the principle of dogma, but also as one who accepted in particular every dogma defined by the Church to which he owed his allegiance. The Edinburgh Review even went so far as to accuse him of being vitiated with the "idolatry of dogma."

It is proper, at this point, to raise the question, What did Newman mean by dogma? The word has been used hitherto without definition, but it is desirable, before going further, to arrive at a somewhat nearer determination of what the term meant to Newman. It is not possible, however, to go to Newman's writings and pick out a precise and exact definition of dogma. His metaphysics were not as sharply cut as crystals. His motive, in all his work, was purely religious, and in order to make his writings of use to the ordinary man he turned aside from philosophical definitions. But, in spite of this fact, I do think

1. Apologia, p. 49.
Newman has indicated very clearly what he meant by dogma. In the "Grammar of Assent," he says, "A dogma is a proposition; it stands for a notion or for a thing; and to believe it is to give the assent of the mind to it, as it stands for the one or for the other. To give a real assent to it is an act of religion; to give a notional, is a theological act. It is discerned, rested in, and appropriated as a reality, by the religious imagination; it is held as a truth, by the theological intellect.\(^1\) Again, in the sermon on "The Theory of Developments," he says, "Theological dogmas are propositions expressive of the judgments which the mind forms, or the impressions which it receives, of Revealed Truth. Revelation sets before it certain supernatural facts and actions, beings and principles; these make a certain impression or image upon it; and this impression spontaneously, or even necessarily, becomes the subject of reflection on the part of the mind itself, which proceeds to investigate it, and to draw it forth in successive and distinct sentences. Thus the Catholic doctrine of Original Sin, or of Sin after Baptism, or of the Eucharist, or of Justification, is but the expression of the inward belief of Catholics on these several points, formed upon an analysis of that belief.\(^2\)"

While these statements are not all that can be desired as an expression of Newman's conception of dogma, still I think they suggest certain fundamental characteristics which are to be found behind all his thoughts and writings on this matter. He applied the term "dogma" to the articles of the Christian faith which were authoritatively

2. Oxford University Sermons, p. 320.
ratified as expressing the belief and the binding creed of the Catholic Church. He sometimes uses the word in a wider, and in a narrower, sense. It is employed sometimes as being practically synonymous with doctrine. But doctrine is distinguishable from dogma, in Newman's writings, by the fact that the former does not imply any authoritative ratification. Thus, every dogma is a doctrine, but not every doctrine is a dogma. For example, in relation to the doctrine of Papal Infallibility, Newman points out that some would argue "that, though the historical evidence was sufficient for their own personal conviction, it was not sufficiently clear of difficulties to be made the ground of a Catholic dogma."¹

Ordinarily, dogma stood for those foundations of Christian doctrine which had obtained authoritative recognition by the Catholic Church.

It is interesting and instructive to compare Newman's ideas of dogma with those of Auguste Sabatier. "Dogma, in the strictest sense," says Sabatier, "is one or more doctrinal propositions which, in a religious society, and as the result of the decisions of the competent authority, have become the object of faith, and the rule of belief and practice."² Newman would agree with this definition, only the "religious society" he would be thinking of would be the Catholic Church, and the "competent authority" would be the definitions of the Vatican Council. Sabatier has shown, and I think Newman would agree, that there are three elements in dogma, - a religious element which springs from piety; an intellectual or philosophic element which supposes reflection and discussion; and an element of authority, which comes from the Church.³

³. Ibid., pp. 229-30.
Newman felt that dogma was the very essence of religion. He recognized the intellectual element in dogma, as will be seen from a consideration of the discussion of the formation and imposition of creeds. And he certainly bowed before the element of authority in dogma, for dogma, to Newman, was nothing more than doctrine which the Church had made law. Both men were very insistent with regard to the authoritative element. While most people would agree with the proposition that religion demands intellectual expression, there are a great many who think that this expression does not need to be in the exclusive and authoritative form of dogma. Religion may have a body of well-established truth, and yet be without dogma. The Unitarians, for example, have existed for many years without dogma, and yet they have both doctrine and worship. These two, Newman and Sabatier, might also be compared with regard to their attitude towards the development of doctrine. The latter took his stand as a pronounced evolutionist in dogma. He does state, however, that the "variability (of dogma) is not unlimited," but is "necessarily confined within limits which, while not easy to define theoretically, are none the less precise and fixed." Similarly Newman took his stand upon development in doctrine. Like Sabatier, he recognized that development must take place within certain definite limits. But Newman went further and was more precise than Sabatier in laying down the seven notes which enable a person to distinguish between a corruption and a true development.

Newman devoted a considerable amount of time and discussion to the problems centering around the "genesis of dogma." Speaking of the

early Christian Church, in his book, "The Arians of the Fourth Century," Newman says that the imposition of doctrinal tests upon the members became necessary in proportion as the cogency of the Apostolic Tradition was weakened by the lapse of time.\(^1\) In the early days of the Primitive Church, the knowledge of the Christian mysteries was accounted as a privilege, something to be eagerly coveted. It is hardly likely, therefore, that the reception of the mysteries would be considered as a "test," which implies a concession on the part of the recipient, and not as an advantage. The idea of disbelieving or criticising the great doctrines of the faith, from the nature of the case, would scarcely occur to the primitive Christians. These doctrines were the subject of an Apostolic Tradition; they were the very truths which had been lately revealed to mankind. They had been committed to the Church's keeping, and were dispensed by her, to those who sought them, as a favour. They were facts, not opinions. To come to the Church was all one with expressing a readiness to receive her teaching; to hesitate to believe, after coming for the sake of believing, would be an inconsistency too rare to require a special provision against the chance of it.

But the time soon came, however, when the teachings and traditions of the Early Church were attacked and corrupted by heretics and apostates. Because of its reverence for the sacred mysteries, and the refinement of its discipline, the primitive Fathers seemed defenceless before these attacks. The heretics insulted its silence, unsettled and seduced its members, and provoked it to argument. In consequence of this condition, an authoritative judgment upon the points in dispute was required.

1. The Arians of the Fourth Century, p. 133.
Under the circumstances, it was the duty of the rulers of the Church, at whatever sacrifice of their feelings, to discuss the subject in controversy fully and unreservedly, and to state their decisions openly. The only alternative was an unmanly non-interference and an arbitrary or treacherous prohibition of the discussion. To enjoin silence on perplexed inquirers is not to silence their thoughts, for serious minds naturally turn to the spiritual rulers for advice and relief, and are disappointed at the timidity, or irritated at the harshness, of those who refuse to lead a lawful inquiry which they cannot stifle. Such a course is most unwise as well as unfeeling, inasmuch as it throws the question in dispute upon other arbitrators; or rather, it is more commonly insincere, the traitorous act of those who care little for the questions in dispute, and are content that opinions which they profess to condemn should secretly prevail. For example, the Nicene Fathers might despair of reclaiming the Arian party, but they were bound to erect a witness for the truth, which would be a warning and a guide to all Christians, against the lying spirit which might be abroad in the Church. Under the circumstances, it would not have been sufficient to shut up the question in the words of Scripture, for the words of Scripture were the very subject under controversy. Some authoritative statement upon the points in dispute seemed necessary.

Newman says that in addition to this the mere text of Scripture is not calculated either to satisfy the intellect, or to ascertain the temper of those who profess to accept the Church's doctrine as their rule of faith.¹ Before the mind has been roused to reflection and

¹ The Arians of the Fourth Century,
inquisitiveness about its own acts and impressions, it acquiesces, if religiously trained, in that practical devotion to, and implicit acknowledg­ement of those sacred principles which Holy Scripture at once teaches and exemplifies. This is the faith of uneducated men, which is not the less philosophically correct, nor less acceptable to God, because it does not happen to be conceived in those precise statements which presuppose the action of the mind on its own sentiments and notions. But the faith of educated men is something very much different from that of uneducated men. As the mind is cultivated and expanded, it cannot refrain from the attempt to analyse the vision which influences the heart, and the object in which it centres; nor does it stop till it has in some sort succeeded in expressing in words what has all along been a principle both of the affections and of practical obedience. Thus the systematic doctrines of the Church may be considered as the shadow projected for the contemplation of the intellect; of the object of Scriptur­ally-informed piety; a representation economical, necessarily imperfect, as being exhibited in a foreign medium, and therefore involving apparent inconsistencies or mysteries; given to the Church by tradition contemporaneously with those Apostolic writings which are addressed more directly to the heart; kept in the background in the infancy of Christianity when faith and obedience were vigorous, and brought forward at a time when, reason being disproportionately developed, and aiming at sovereignty in the province of religion, its presence became necessary to expel an usurping idol from the house of God.¹

¹. The Arians of the Fourth Century, p. 145.
Newman felt that the only thing left to the Church was to speak out, and in this way to exclude error. However desirable it may be, the Church cannot restrain the rovings of the intellect, or silence its clamorous demand for a formal statement concerning the object of our worship. If, for example, Scripture bids us adore God, and adore His Son, our reason at once asks whether it does not follow that there are two Gods; and a system of doctrine becomes unavoidable, being framed, let it be observed, not with a view of explaining, but of arranging the inspired notices concerning the Supreme Being; of proving not a consistent, but a connected, sentiment. There the inquisitiveness of a pious mind rests, when it has pursued the subject into the mystery which is its limit. But this is not all. The intellectual expression of theological truth not only excludes heresy; it directly assists the acts of religious worship and obedience; fixing and stimulating the Christian Spirit in the same way that the knowledge of one God relieves and illuminates the perplexed conscience of the religious heathen. And thus, because the text of Scripture is addressed principally to the affections, and though they are definite according to the criterion of practical influence, they are vague and incomplete in the judgment of the intellect. Therefore, Creeds are important when used to tranquillize the mind.  

In the next place, Newman maintained that an assent to the text of Scripture is not sufficient for the purpose of Christian fellowship. As the sacred text was not intended to satisfy the intellect, neither was it given as a test of the religious temper which it forms, and of

1. The Arians of the Fourth Century, p. 146.
which it is an expression. Doubtless, no combination of words will ascertain a unity of sentiment in those who adopt them; but one form is more adapted for the purpose than another. Scripture is unsystematic, and its faith is scattered through its documents and is understood only when viewed as a whole. But the creeds aim at concentrating its general spirit, so as to give security to the Church, as far as it may be that the subscriber will take the peculiar view of it which alone is the true one. If this be the case, then how idle to suppose that to demand assent to a form of words, which happens to be scriptural, is therefore sufficient to effect an unanimity in faith and action. If the Church would be vigorous and influential, it must be decisive and plain-spoken in its doctrine, and must regard its faith rather as a character of mind than as a notion. To attempt comprehensions of opinion, amiable as the motive frequently is, is to mistake arrangements of words, which have no existence except on paper, for habits which are realities; and ingenious generalizations of discordant sentiments for that practical agreement which alone can lead to co-operation. We may indeed artificially classify light and darkness under one term or formula; but nature has her own fixed courses, and unites mankind by the sympathy of moral character, not by those forced resemblances which the imagination singles out at pleasure in the most promiscuous collection of materials. However plausible may be the veil thus thrown over heterogeneous doctrines, the flimsy artifice is disclosed as soon as the principles beneath it are called upon to move and act. Nor are these attempted comprehensions innocent; for, it being the interest of our enemies to weaken the Church, they have always gained a point when they have per-
suaded members of the Church to fraternize with those who, differing from the Church in essentials, yet happen, in the excursive range of opinion, somewhere to intersect that path of faith which centres in supreme and zealous devotion to the service of God.\(^1\)

In view of these conditions Newman felt that the Church was faced with the duty of imposing a creed upon its people. He took it for granted, as an independent fact, that there were no two opinions so contrary to each other but some form of words might be found vague enough to comprehend them both. He says, "The Pantheist will admit that there is a God, and the Humanitarian that Christ is God, if they are suffered to say so without explanation. But if this be so, it becomes the duty, as well as the evident policy of the Church, to interrogate them, before admitting them to her fellowship. If the Church be the pillar and ground of the truth, and bound to contend for the preservation of the faith once delivered to it; if we are answerable as ministers of Christ for the formation of one, and one only, character in the heart of man; and if the Scriptures are given us, as a means indeed towards that end, but inadequate to the office of interpreting themselves, except to such as live under the same Divine Influence which inspired them, and which is expressly sent down upon us that we may interpret them, - then, it is evidently our duty piously and cautiously to collect the sense of Scripture, and solemnly to promulgate it in such a form as is best suited, as far as it goes, to exclude the pride and unbelief of the world."\(^2\) The discharge of this office is to be under-

1. The Arians of the Fourth Century, pp. 147-8.
2. Ibid., p. 148.
taken by the collective illumination of the heads of the Church, and when innovations arise, they must discharge it to the best of their ability. Whether they succeed or fail, whether they have judged rightly or hastily of the necessity of this interposition; whether they devise their safeguard well or ill, draw the line of Church fellowship broadly or narrowly, countenance the profane reasoner, or cause the scrupulous to stumble; - to their Master they stand or fall, as in all other acts of duty; unquestionably the obligation to protect the faith rests with them.

There is one further thought in this connection which ought to be expressed. As one reads "The Arians of the Fourth Century," he discovers that, though it purports to be an historical treatise, it is in fact a revelation of Newman's own ideas concerning the Liberalism of his own day. He saw in the Alexandrian Church of the fourth century an almost exact parallel to the Anglican Church of his own day. The Arianizing Bishops of the fourth century presented a striking resemblance to the Protestant Bishops of 1830, and he and his friends, rising in revolt against the rationalizing tendencies of the Established Church - what were they but the modern successors of Athanasius or Basil, standing forth as the champion of Catholic truth.

This is the account which Newman gives of the abstract principles on which ecclesiastical confessions rest. In their practical adoption, they have been softened in two important respects. First, the creeds imposed have been compiled either from Apostolic traditions, or from primitive writings; so that in fact the Church has never been obliged literally to collect the sense of Scripture. Secondly, the test has
been used, not as a condition of communion, but of authority. As learning is not necessary for a private Christian, so neither is the full knowledge of the theological system. The clergy, and others in station, must be questioned as to their theological and doctrinal views. Newman felt that for the mass of the laity it would be enough if they did not set up such counter-statements of their own as would imply that they had systematized, and that erroneously.\(^1\)

A very interesting and informing correlative to this matter is to be found in the reasons which Newman gives for his reception of the dogma of Papal Infallibility. In his "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk," he deals with certain objections to this dogma, and he puts forth the arguments which weighed most heavily in its favour in his own mind. When Newman first saw the definition, he was pleased with its moderation. He said at that time, "The terms are vague and comprehensive; and, personally, I have no difficulty in admitting it. The question is, does it come to me with the authority of an Ecumenical Council?\(^2\)" Now, the "prima facie" argument was that it had that authority. "The Council was legitimately called; it was more largely attended than any Council before it; and innumerable prayers from the whole of Christendom, have preceded and attended it, and merited a happy issue of its proceedings."\(^3\) Had it not been for certain circumstances under which the Council made the definition, Newman would have received it at once.

One of the reasons why Newman might have suspended his judgment on the validity of the decree of the Vatican Council was the fact that ever

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1. The Arians of the Fourth Century, pp. 149-50.
3. Ibid., p. 301.
since the opening of the Council, there had been a strenuous opposition to the definition of the doctrine; and that, at the time when it was actually passed, more than eighty Fathers absented themselves from the Council, and would have nothing to do with its acts. About this matter Newman says, "Till better advised, nothing shall make me say that a mere majority in a Council, as opposed to a moral unanimity, in itself creates an obligation to receive its dogmatic decrees. This is a point of history and precedent, and of course on further examination I may find myself wrong in the view which I take of history and precedent; but I do not, cannot see, that a majority in the present Council can of itself rule its own sufficiency, without such external testimony."¹ But he admits that there are other means by which he could be brought under the obligation of receiving a doctrine as a dogma. They may be listed as follows:

(a) "If the definition is consistently received by the whole body of the faithful, as valid, or as the expression of a truth, then too it will claim our assent by the force of the great dictum, 'Securus judicat orbis terrarum.'"² By this broad principle all acts of the rulers of the Church are ratified.

(b) He would give his assent if it is clear "that there is a primitive and uninterrupted tradition, as of the divinity of our Lord; or where a high probability drawn from Scripture or Tradition is partially or probably confirmed by the Church. Thus a particular Catholic might be so nearly sure that the promise to Peter in Scripture proves

2. Ibid., p. 303.
that the infallibility of Peter is a necessary dogma, as only to be kept
from holding it as such by the absence of any judgment on the part of the
Church.\textsuperscript{1}

(c) "Or again, if nothing definitely sufficient from Scripture or
Tradition can be brought to contradict a definition, the fact of a
legitimate Superior having defined it, may be an obligation in conscience
to receive it with....assent."\textsuperscript{2} Newman confessed that ever since he
became a Catholic, he held the fact of Papal Infallibility as a matter of
theological opinion, and that he saw nothing in the definition which
necessarily contradicted Scripture, Tradition, or History.

(d) "And I confess," says Newman, "the fact that all along for so
many centuries the Head of the Church and Teacher of the faithful and
Vicar of Christ has been allowed by God to assert virtually his infal-
libility, is a great argument in favour of the validity of his claim."\textsuperscript{3}

(e) "Another ground for receiving the dogma, still not upon the
direct authority of the Council, or with acceptance of the validity of
its acts 'per se' is the consideration that our Merciful Lord would not
care so little for His elect people, the multitude of the faithful, as
to allow their visible Head, and such a large number of Bishops to lead
them into error, and an error so serious, if an error it be. This con-
sideration leads me to accept the doctrine as a dogma, indirectly indeed
from the Council, but not so much from a Council, as from the Pope and
a very large number of Bishops. The question is not whether they had a
right to impose, or even were right in imposing the dogma on the faith-

\textsuperscript{1} Certain Difficulties Felt By Anglicans in
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p. 304.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., p. 305.
ful; but whether, having done so, I have not an obligation to accept it, according to the maxim, 'Fieri non debuit, factum valet.'

Another main objection to the Vatican Council was founded upon its supposed neglect of history in the decision which its definition embodied. Newman answered this objection as follows: "For myself, I would simply confess that no doctrine of the Church can be rigorously proved by historical evidence; but at the same time that no doctrine can be simply disproved by it. Historical evidence reaches a certain way, more or less, towards a proof of the Catholic doctrines; often nearly the whole way; sometimes it goes only as far as to point in their direction; sometimes there is only an absence of evidence for a conclusion contrary to them; nay, sometimes there is an apparent leaning of the evidence to a contrary conclusion, which has to be explained; - in all cases there is a margin left for the exercise of faith in the word of the Church. He who believes the dogmas of the Church only because he has reasoned them out of History, is scarcely a Catholic. It is the Church's dogmatic use of History in which the Catholic believes; and she uses other information also, Scripture, tradition, the ecclesiastical sense, or ϕρόνημα, and a subtle ratiocinative power, which in its origin is a divine gift."

There is another side to this argument as Newman applied it. What has been said of history in relation to the formal definitions of the Church applies also to the exercises of ratiocination. Even as there are doctrines which lie beyond the direct evidence of history, so there are doctrines which transcend the discoveries of reason. These truths which

2. Ibid., pp. 312-13.
are called developments of Christian doctrine are not upon the surface of the Apostolic "depositum," — that is, the legacy of Revelation, — but from time to time are brought into form by theologians, and sometimes have been proposed to the faithful by the Church, as direct objects of faith. No Catholic would hold that they ought to be logically deduced in their fullness and exactness from the first centuries, but only this, — that, on the assumption of the Infallibility of the Church (which will overcome every objection except a contradiction in thought), there is nothing greatly to try the reason in such difficulties as occur in reconciling those evolved doctrines with the teachings of the ancient Fathers; such development being evidently the new form, explanation, transformation, or carrying out of what in substance was held from the first, what the Apostles said, but have not recorded in writing, or would necessarily have said under our circumstances, or if they had been asked, or in view of certain uprisings of error, and in that sense being really portions of the legacy of truth, of which the Church, in all her members, but especially in her hierarchy, is the divinely appointed trustee.¹ Such a conception of the evolution of doctrine brings us close to the matter dwelt upon in the next chapter. There Newman gives his seven tests by which it is possible to check up the process of converting a doctrine long existing in the Church into a dogma, and making it a portion of the Catholic Creed.

In Newman's own thought and practice there was no contrariety or antagonism between a dogmatic creed and vital religion. There are some people who urge that salvation consists not in believing the proposition

that there is a God, that there is a Saviour, that our Lord is God, that there is a Trinity, but in believing in God, in a Saviour, in a Sanctifier; and they object that such propositions are but a formal and human medium destroying all true reception of the Gospel, and making religion a matter of words, or of logic, instead of its having its seat in the heart. Speaking of people who raise such objections, Newman says, "They are right so far as this, that men can and sometimes do rest in the propositions themselves as expressing intellectual notions; they are wrong, when they maintain that men need do so or always do so. The propositions may and must be used, and can easily be used, as the expression of facts, not notions, and they are necessary to the mind in the same way that language is ever necessary for denoting facts, both for ourselves as individuals, and for our intercourse with others." ¹

These propositions are useful in their dogmatic aspect as ascertaining and making clear to us the truths on which the religious imagination has to rest. Knowledge must ever precede the exercise of the affections. We feel gratitude and love, we feel indignation and dislike, when we have the information actually put before us which is to kindle these several emotions. We love our parents as our parents when we know them to be our parents; we must know concerning God before we can feel love, fear, hope or trust towards Him. Devotion must have its objects; those objects, as being supernatural, when not presented to our senses by material symbols, must be set before the mind in propositions. The formula which embodies a dogma for the theologian readily suggests an object for the worshipper. It is in this way that devotion

¹. Grammar of Assent, p. 120.
falls back upon dogma.

In "The Arians of the Fourth Century," Newman illustrated what he found in the creeds and dogmas that made them really essential to the true apprehension of revelation. Speaking of the most sacred doctrines of his religion, he says, "I believe the most accurate consideration of the subject will lead us to acquiesce in the statement, as a general truth, that the doctrines in question have never been learned merely from Scripture. Surely the Sacred Volume was never intended....to teach us our creed; however certain it is that we can prove our creed from it, when it has once been taught us, and in spite of individual producible exceptions to the general rule. From the very first, that rule has been, as a matter of fact, that the Church should teach the truth, and then should appeal to Scripture in vindication of its own teaching. And from the first, it has ever been the error of heretics to neglect the information thus provided for them, and to attempt of themselves a work to which they are unequal, the eliciting a systematic doctrine from the scattered notices of the truth which Scripture contains.... The insufficiency of the mere private study of Holy Scripture for arriving at the exact and entire truth which Scripture really contains, is shown by the fact, that creeds and teachers have ever been divinely provided, and by the discordance of opinions which exists wherever those aids are thrown aside; as it is also shown by the very structure of the Bible itself."¹ The whole book from which the above quotation is taken seems to have been written to show that without the confession of certain intellectual truths and without a careful sifting of what these truths are, on the part of the Church, there is no possibility of the

¹. The Arians of the Fourth Century, pp. 50-1.
safe preservation of any divine revelation. It is not necessary to illustrate this fact by going into the Arian controversy as Newman outlined it. The Arians degraded Christ from the divinity so persistently asserted for Him in Scripture. The whole burden of Newman's book is to show that certain definitions are requisite in order to protect the notion that Christ at once is "of God" and "is God," without both of which it would be impossible to read His life and death at once truly and spiritually, and to give Him the love and worship which He claims.

There are a great many people who feel that dogma is essential to a proper understanding of revelation, but who also recognize that there is a danger of these dogmas superseding in men's minds the place that Divine Character should occupy. While it may be necessary for men to provide themselves with theological safeguards against error, they must never lose sight of the purpose of Christ's life and death and resurrection. If dogma is made to stand in the place of that to which it ought to be purely instrumental, it has failed in its purpose. Newman admits this when he says, "If I avow my belief, that freedom from symbols and articles is abstractedly the highest state of Christian communion, and the peculiar privilege of the primitive Church, it is not from any tenderness towards the proud impatience of control in which many exult, as in a virtue: but first, because technicality and formalism are, in their degree, inevitable results of public confessions of faith." This admission that "technicality and formalism" necessarily follow on dogmatic definition is important. Is it not conceivable that Newman realized that in drawing out and safeguarding the revelation, the Church might not infrequently have laid too much stress

1. The Arians of the Fourth Century, pp. 36-7.
on right conceptions, and too little on right attitude of will and emotion?

Newman was confronted with the objection that dogma checks investigation, antagonizes independence of thought and makes scientific theology impossible. He attempted to deal with this difficulty in his lectures on "University Subjects." In these lectures, especially the one called "Christianity and Scientific Investigation," he deprecated, and protested against, the needless antagonism which he sometimes found to exist between divines and the cultivation of the sciences generally. Protestants, more than others, have pointed out this difficulty with regard to the Catholic system. They think that the Church has no other method of putting down error than by the arm of force, or the prohibition of inquiry. In dealing with this matter, Newman says, "He who believes Revelation with that absolute faith which is the prerogative of a Catholic, is not the nervous creature who startles at every sudden sound, and is fluttered by every strange or novel appearance which meets his eyes. He has no sort of apprehension, he laughs at the idea, that anything can be discovered by any other scientific method, which can contradict any one of the dogmas of his religion. He knows full well that there is no science whatever, but, in the course of its extension, runs the risk of infringing, without any meaning of offence on its own part, the path of other sciences: and he knows also that, if there be any one science which, from its sovereign and unsailable position can calmly bear such unintentional collisions on the part of the children of earth, it is Theology." ¹ It is Newman's idea

¹ The Idea of a University, p. 466.
that there can be no discord between the true conclusions of science and
the dogmas of the Christian religion rightly understood. He also feels
that Catholic dogmas do not impede scientific investigation. It is no
shackle at all for the intellect to maintain inviolate the fundamental
principles of Christianity. Speaking of dogmas, he says, "Indeed, a
Catholic cannot put off his thought of them; and they as little impede
the movements of his intellect as the laws of physics impede his bodily
movements. The habitual apprehension of them has become a second nature
with him, as the laws of optics, hydrostatics, dynamics, are latent
conditions which he takes for granted in the use of his corporeal
organs." For these reasons he does not think that the scientific
investigator will come into collision with dogma.

But it may be urged that in the Catholic system beliefs are not
determined by private judgment. Behind the dogmas of the Church stands
the living bulwark of her Episcopate. It is true that behind dogmatic
beliefs Catholics recognize ecclesiastical authority. But, according
to Newman, this authority puts no restraint upon intellectual freedom,
provided the scientific investigator does not venture, because of his
investigations, upon any interpretation of Scripture, or upon other
conclusions in the matter or religion; nor teach even in his own
sciences religious paradoxes when he should be investigating and pro-
posing; or shock and scandalize, by his ideas, the popular mind. It
is never necessary for a scientific speculator or inquirer, in conduct-
ing his researches, "to be every moment adjusting his course by the
maxim of the schools or by popular traditions, or by those of any other

1. The Idea of a University, p. 471.
science distinct from his own, or to be ever narrowly watching what those external sciences have to say to him."¹ If a man of genius should happen to be an opponent of revealed truth, the Church will have nothing to do with him. But if his errors are those which are inseparable accidents of his system, or of his mind, and are spontaneously evolved, not per­tinaciously defended, then the function of the ecclesiastical authority is to give notice of his imperfections. As a Catholic, Newman held that God not only revealed a body of truth to mankind, but he also appointed a living authority - the Church - to uphold, teach and safeguard that body of divine truth, and to decide controversies. A Catholic is absolutely free in the prosecution of scientific research as long as he keeps within his own proper sphere. Scientists are limited by Catholic dogma and ecclesiastical authority only so far as may be necessary for safeguarding the truths of revelation.

As a link between this chapter and the next, it will be well to compare very briefly Newman and Harnack. Abbé Loisy has written about Newman as follows: "A large conception of the history of dogma and of Christian development, a conception truly scientific, in which all legitimate conclusions of historical criticism can find a shelter, had been formulated by a Catholic thinker long before certain Protestant publications which have made a stir in these latter days. Harnack's 'History of Dogma' is more learned than 'The Development of Christian Doctrine,' but how inferior it is to that essay in the general understanding of Christianity, with its varied life and the intimate connection which exists between all forms and all phases of that life."²

¹. The Idea of a University, pp. 473-4.
As this quotation suggests, Harnack's work was much more learned than Newman's. The former's "History of Dogma" was an epoch-making work. Both men, however, rested their investigations upon a fresh and independent study of the sources. They departed from the mechanism which had made the old treatises upon the history of doctrine formal and lifeless. Harnack, to a greater extent than Newman, realized how many influences other than theological had had a part in the formation of dogmas and the development of doctrine. Philosophy, worship, morals, development of Church government and the Canon, the common interests and passions of the age and of the individual participants, the reaction of modes of life and practice and of external circumstances on the history of thought - all these are seen to have a place in the working out of his thesis.

A difference in method may be observed in the works of these two men. Harnack considers that in its earliest origins Christian faith and the methods of Greek thought were so closely intermingled that much which is not essential to Christianity found its way into the resultant system. The pure moral enthusiasm of the early Christians in their endeavour to appropriate the world had been appropriated by the world in a far greater measure than its adherents knew. He says, "Dogma in its conception and development is a work of the Greek spirit on the soil of the Gospel."¹ The world perhaps was changed by Christianity, but Christianity itself had been changed in the process. In many ways it had departed from the standard of Christ and the Apostles. Its dogma

represented the influence of outside forces upon its thought. The same thing may be said for its organization. Newman came forward with the contention that one may face the facts of history quite frankly and yet see, amid all the changes in the Catholic Church, the permanence of Christ's message. He thought of Christianity as a distinctive and living idea possessing a group of living men. In these two factors are to be found the forces telling at once for essential permanence of the idea, and for the accidental change in its expression. The changes are but the necessary responses to the changing society around it and relate to the expression of the message, not to its essence. The Christian idea exhibits a combination of sameness of type with power of assimilation, and these, in their turn, afford proof that Christianity is a living idea corresponding to a reality. Newman considered that in each generation the guardians of dogma have maintained the message that has been handed down to them. But in order to do so, it was necessary to find some form of expression which would exclude the novel and false analysis of the heretic and innovator. Such are the fundamental reasons for the new definitions in every age.
CHAPTER VI.

On the Philosophy of Development

"may be regarded either as the first of his Roman Catholic or as the
last of his Anglican productions. In point of time it was the latter;
in point of substance it was the former."\(^1\) Speaking of the last year
of this period, Newman says, "I had begun my Essay on the Development
of Doctrine in the beginning of 1845, and I was hard at it all through
the year till October. As I advanced, my difficulties so cleared away
that I ceased to speak of 'the Roman Catholics,' and boldly called them
Catholics. Before I got to the end, I resolved to be received, and the
book remains in the state in which it was then, unfinished."\(^2\)

The history of the idea of development is a very interesting one.
It must always be remembered that Newman's "Essay" represents the first
attempt in England to apply the idea of development formally to theology.
On the Continent, this idea had already received considerable prominence,
for it underlay the growth of the historical method. For example, the
ecclesiastical controversies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
had revealed the fact that the Catholicism of Trent was not the Catholi-
cism of the Ancient Church. Calvin had pointed out and argued that the
Reformed Belief was nearer the Fathers than the Roman Faith. Bellarmine
and Baronius, on the other hand, had strenuously affirmed that the new

Catholicism was the old Christianity. Petavius, the "father of Dogmatics," in his book, "De Theologicis Dogmatibus," made a large contribution to the idea of development. It is Fairbairn's opinion that the doctrines and illustrations of Petavius had a great influence on Newman. He showed that the Church watched and preserved the truth, whose pillar and ground she was, by timely definitions and developments. The trouble with his theory is that these developments might be translated into innovations, and then Catholic doctrine would be nothing but successful heresy. Jurien, from the Protestant viewpoint, developed this thought. Two positive principles were enunciated by Bossuet in his "Histoire des Variations." These were "que la foi ne varie pas dans la vraie Eglise et que la vérité venue de Dieu a d'abord sa perfection."¹

As time went on, the conception of order and progress in history became more explicit. In theological thought, therefore, the idea of development took on new forms. Joseph De Maistre was the chief exponent in France. His work took a political and social form. Loechner was the main representative in Germany, and his work took a philosophical and theological form. Newman alludes to the work of these two scholars, but in such a manner that we may conclude that he was not indebted to them for any of the ideas found in his "Essay." Speaking of his Doctrine of Development, he says: "The view on which it is written has at all times, perhaps, been implicitly adopted by theologians, and, I believe, has recently been illustrated by several distinguished writers of the continent, such as De Maistre and Loechner."² Storr refers to this

2. The Development of Christian Doctrine, p. 29.
matter as follows: "Moehler, in his 'Symbolism' (1832), a book strongly
coloured by the influence of Schelling and Hegel, had made use of the
conception in discussing the progress of Roman doctrine, and had dis­tin­guished between formal and substantial change, allowing only the former
in the history of the doctrinal developments of Rome. But, as will be
seen, his view of development was very different from Newman's, and his
treatment of the idea cannot compare in suggestiveness with that of the
latter."¹ In view of these facts, therefore, we may conclude that
Newman's "Essay" was distinctively his own, explicable through his own
history and the logical issue of the position he had assumed years before.
It is impossible to explain his theory by influence from without. His
work was original because it was largely the product of his own personal
religion and intellectual development.

In order to understand Newman's theory, it is necessary to have a
clear grasp of his object in writing the "Essay." He says himself that
the theory which the book propounds is "an hypothesis to account for a
difficulty."² He was seeking a solution for the difficulty "which lies
in the way of our using in controversy the testimony of our most natural
informant concerning the doctrine and worship of Christianity, viz. the
history of eighteen hundred years."³ He wanted something to vindicate
his life-long devotion to primitive Christianity. He was embarrassed by
the apparent variation and growth of doctrine when he consulted history
for the true idea of Christianity. He was seeking an answer to the
charge brought by Protestants that modern Roman doctrine was an innova-

1. The Development of English Theology, V. F. Storr, pp. 294-5.
3. Ibid., p. 29.
tion on the teaching of the primitive Church. Certain doctrines, such as the Trinity, Purgatory, and the Real Presence, must be explained. Unless they were explained, Newman felt that the Vincentian Canon, "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus," would have to be abandoned. Was Christianity really that system of belief which had been held everywhere always and by all? He was looking for a theory which would face the facts of history quite plainly, and yet be able to see, amid all the changes, the permanence of the Apostolic message. Was it possible for the fundamental principles to remain the same while the doctrines expanded? How could the Christianity of the nineteenth century be reconciled with that of the early Christians? It was to answer such questions and difficulties that Newman wrote his "Essay on Development." He was looking for a key which would enable him to harmonize the records and documents of the early and later Church.

The philosophy of Newman's writings goes much deeper than the theological controversy of the hour. He was applying the great principle of life as a test of truth in religion. "To live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often."¹ In a really living system there are changes which, far from being corruptions, are the natural response of a living, social body to changing conditions. New questions are asked; new answers given. But the new answers are but the fuller expression of the original genius of the system. Newman regards Christianity as an idea with many aspects which are successively elicited and exhibited in fresh opportunities, and as having, at the same time, its own dis-

¹ The Development of Christian Doctrine, p. 40.
tinctive and unique genius, which every aspect serves to illustrate. No one aspect is deep enough to exhaust the contents of this real idea; no one term or proposition will serve to define it. Christianity grows into a definite philosophy or system of belief only as the mind compares, contrasts, abstracts, generalizes, connects, adjusts and classifies.

He writes as follows: "The idea which represents an object or supposed object is commensurate with the sum total of its possible aspects, however they may vary in the separate consciousness of individuals; and in proportion to the variety of aspects under which it presents itself to various minds is its force and depth, and the argument for its reality. Ordinarily, an idea is not brought home to the intellect as objective except through this variety; like bodily substances, which are not apprehended except under the clothing of their properties and results, and which admit of being walked round, and surveyed on opposite sides, and in different perspectives, and in contrary lights, in evidence of their reality. And, as views of a material object may be taken from points so remote or so opposed, that they seem at first sight incompatible, and especially as their shadows will be disproportionate, or even monstrous, and yet all these anomalies will disappear and all these contrarieties be adjusted, on ascertaining the point of vision or the surface of projection in each case; so also all the aspects of an idea are capable of coalition, and of a resolution into the object to which it belongs; and the 'prima facie' dissimilitude of its aspects becomes, when explained, an argument for its substantiveness and integrity, and their multiplicity for its originality and power."¹

¹. The Development of Christian Doctrine, pp. 34-5.
Newman applies this view to our knowledge of material objects. He notes that, though we may rightly speak of them as objects, the object is known to us only in terms of such ideas as belong to our human intellects and senses, and we have no security that these are adequate to comprehend the full reality. He says: "It is a characteristic of our minds, that they cannot take an object in, which is submitted to them simply and integrally. We conceive by means of definition or description; whole objects do not create in the intellect whole ideas, but are, to use a mathematical phrase, thrown into series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other, and with more or less exactness approximating, as they accumulate, to a perfect image....We cannot teach except by aspects or views, which are not identical with the thing itself which we are teaching."¹ Our knowledge may be likened unto the knowledge of a race of men without sight. They would picture objects under ideas derived from touch, smell, hearing, and muscular sensations. This, of course, is an inadequate symbol of the world which men know by sight. "To speak to a blind man of light and colours, in terms proper to those phenomena, would be to mock him; we must use other media of information accommodated to his circumstances."² We all recognize that our world is not wholly conceivable to those who lack the sense of sight. Similarly, there may be a deeper knowledge of reality inconceivable to us which a further development of our intellectual and sense faculties might give. "Meanwhile we are allowed such an approximation to the

¹. The Development of Christian Doctrine, p. 55.
². Oxford University Sermons, p. 341.
truth as earthly images and figures may supply to us." 1 We conceive ex-
ternal nature in terms of our present senses, - its colours, shapes, 
scents and sounds. Our ideas of its objects are made up of the various 
aspects which these qualities represent. Yet they may be quite inade­
quate to the full reality. Newman suggests that the reality might be 
more truly known by other senses, as different from our present senses 
as they are from each other. 2 The Divine Mind only, the perfect intel-
ligence, can know the reality as it is in itself.

Newman's account of "The Development of Ideas" preceded his study 
of the development of an idea in history. They are two sides of the 
same process. History reveals the progress of an idea. It shows its 
influence on the minds of the multitude. By this action, it at once 
moulds the course of history and is itself modified by other ideas 
existing in those minds. Here one can see by observation and experiment 
how the various aspects reveal themselves gradually and successively 
to the community. It is useless, almost, to study the "Essay on Develop­-
ment" as mere history and controversy, and give little attention to the 
first chapters. These contain Newman's contribution to the philosophy 
of development, and deal with the evolution of thought in relation to an 
idea. I shall quote one paragraph from his "Essay" dealing with this 
matter.

"When an idea, whether real or not, is of a nature to arrest and 
possess the mind, it may be said to have life, that is, to live in the 
mind which is its recipient. Thus mathematical ideas, real as they are, 
can hardly properly be called living, at least ordinarily. But, when 

2. Ibid., p. 347.
some great enunciation, whether true or false, about human nature, or present good, or government, or duty, or religion, is carried forward into the public throng of men and draws attention, then it is not merely received passively in this or that form into many minds, but it becomes an active principle within them, leading them to an ever-new contemplation of itself, to an application of it in various directions, and a propagation of it on every side....Let one such idea get possession of the popular mind, or the mind of any portion of the community, and it is not difficult to understand what will be the result. At first men will not fully realize what it is that moves them, and will express and explain themselves inadequately. There will be a general agitation of thought, and an action of mind upon mind. There will be a time of confusion, when conceptions and misconceptions are in conflict, and it is uncertain whether anything is to come of the idea at all, or which view of it is to get the start of the others. New lights will be brought to bear upon the original statements of the doctrine put forward; judgments and aspects will accumulate. After a while some definite teaching emerges; and, as time proceeds, one view will be modified or expanded by another, and then combined with a third; till the idea to which these various aspects belong, will be to each mind separately what at first it was only to all together. It will be surveyed too in its relation to other doctrines or facts, to other natural laws or established customs, to the varying circumstances of times and places, to other religions, politics, philosophies, as the case may be. How it stands affected towards other systems, how it affects them, how far it may be made to combine with them, how far it tolerates them, when it inter-
feres with them, will be gradually wrought out. It will be interrogated and criticized by enemies, and defended by well-wishers. The multitude of opinions formed concerning it in these respects and many others will be collected, compared, sorted, sifted, selected, rejected, gradually attached to it, separated from it, in the minds of individuals and of the community. It will, in proportion to its native vigour and subtlety, introduce itself into the framework and details of social life, changing public opinion, and strengthening or undermining the foundations of established order. Thus in time it will have grown into an ethical code, or into a system of government, or into a theology, or into a ritual, according to its capabilities; and this body of thought, thus laboriously gained, will after all be little more than the proper representative of one idea, being in substance what that idea meant from the first, its complete image as seen in a combination of diversified aspects, with the suggestions and corrections of many minds, and the illustration of many experiences."

1. The nature of the argument contained in the above paragraph makes Newman's "Essay on Development" of permanent value. The book is more than a clever tract purporting to prove the truth of the later developments of Romanism. If Christianity is admitted to be a distinctive and living idea possessing a group of living men, then we are brought face to face with forces which are telling at once for the essential permanence of the idea and for the accidental change in its expression. It is possible to face the facts of history, and yet see, amid all the changes, the permanence of Christ's message. The changes are but the

1. The Development of Christian Doctrine, pp.36-38.
necessary responses to the changing society around it and relate to the expression, not to the essence, of the message.

If Newman had developed his thesis along this line, it would not have aroused so much controversy. When he turned aside to apply it to history we find him following a pathway along which many thinkers refuse to be led. As an example of this, let us examine, very briefly, the underlying assumptions which Newman made in applying his hypothesis to the facts before him. They are three in number.

(a) The first assumption is that developments of doctrine are but natural, and, as time goes on, are to be expected. He says: "If Christianity is a fact, and impresses an idea of itself on our minds and is a subject-matter of exercises of the reason, that idea will in course of time expand into a multitude of ideas, and aspects of ideas, connected and harmonious with one another, and in themselves determinate and immutable, as is the objective fact itself which is thus represented."¹ From this position, he argues that, in respect to the revealed doctrine given us from above in Christianity, and in consequence of its intellectual character, and as having passed through the minds of so many generations of men, and as applied by them to so many purposes, and as investigated so curiously as to its capabilities, implications and bearings, it could not but grow or develop, as time goes on, into a large theological system.

(b) His second assumption is that an infallible authority, which shall control the course of doctrinal developments, is to be expected. Some rule is necessary for arranging and authenticating the various expressions and results of the developing Christian doctrine. It is

¹. The Development of Christian Doctrine, p. 55.
probable that some means will be granted for ascertaining the legitimate and true developments of revelation. "This is the doctrine of the infallibility of the Church; for by infallibility I suppose is meant the power of deciding whether this, that, and a third, and any number of theological or ethical statements are true."\(^1\) Newman held that the essence of all religion is authority and obedience, and so he looked for an infallible authority. He thought this desire to be strong in all men. This led him on to say that "the common sense of mankind... feels that the very idea of revelation implies a present informant and guide, and that an infallible one."\(^2\) This authority must be an external one,\(^3\) having its seat outside the course of the development of which it is to be the judge, thus enabling it to exercise an impartial judgment.

(c) His third assumption is that the Roman developments of doctrine and ritual are the true and intended developments. He says: "I think few persons will deny the very strong presumption which exists, that, if there must be and are in fact developments in Christianity, the doctrines propounded by successive Popes and Councils, through so many ages, are they."\(^4\)

It would be comparatively easy, but it is hardly necessary, to criticize these presuppositions. With regard to the first, Newman gives no evidence to prove that a revelation once given will be secure from perversion and corruption. Owing to the imperfection of the human will and intelligence there must be, as knowledge advances, an inevitable

1. The Development of Christian Doctrine, pp. 78-79.
2. Ibid., p. 87.
3. Ibid., p. 78.
4. Ibid., p. 96.
admixture of truth with error. Wheat and tares grow together in the field of knowledge. The growth of religion does not differ in this respect from that of ordinary knowledge. The second assumption is the basis of Newman's whole argument. But the doctrine of infallibility is itself an example of a development. Its history shows a distinct evolution. Newman, however, makes the infallible authority external to the development. And so the development of doctrine takes place outside the region in which the ordinary forces of history operate, and the history of the Church is no longer a part of general history. With regard to the third assumption, it is, of course, impossible for Newman to maintain that the developments followed by Rome alone are valid. Here he is just begging the question. Considering the assumptions all together, it is perfectly evident that they contain beforehand almost everything that he wished to prove.

We have already considered Newman's conception of the method by which an idea develops in the community at large. Even amid minds, many of which are incompetent or prejudiced, an idea, if it is a real one, may be preserved and developed by a community which on the whole apprehends it truly and is possessed by it. It should be noticed, also, that it may be corrupted and become erroneous if false principles or principles inconsistent with the idea prevail in that community. Realizing this fact, Newman gives in his "Essay" certain tests which indicate whether the process is leading to a true exhibition of the idea, and not corrupting it. We shall briefly examine these seven "Notes" of a true development.

(1) **Preservation of Type.** This test is suggested by the analogy of physical growth. The type must be preserved, even as the type of the child is preserved, though altered and strengthened in the man. Newman illustrates this test by referring to the Church of the first three centuries, of the fourth, and of the fifth, and then asking his readers what form of Christianity most closely corresponds to the type so described. The identity which he finds between the Church still in communion with Rome and the Church of earlier ages is presented in three singularly vivid pictures in the course of the "Essay." In each case the parallel is drawn with rare beauty after the exhibition of a mass of facts. In the third, we find the closest and most detailed resemblance to the Roman Catholic Church of his own day.

After summarizing the position and characteristics of the fifth and sixth centuries, in which the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies flourished, he concludes thus: "If, then, there is now a form of Christianity such, that it extends throughout the world, though with varying measures of prominence or prosperity in separate places; - that it lies under the power of sovereigns and magistrates, in various ways alien to its faith; - that flourishing nations and great empires, professing or tolerating the Christian name, lie over against it as antagonists; - that schools of philosophy and learning are supporting theories, and following out conclusions, hostile to it, and establishing an exegetical system subversive of its Scriptures; - that it has lost whole Churches by schism, and is now opposed by powerful communions once part of itself; - that it has been altogether or almost driven from some countries; - that in others its line of teachers is overlaid, its
flocks oppressed, its Churches occupied, its property held by what may be called a duplicate succession; - that in others its members are degenerate and corrupt, and are surpassed in conscientiousness and in virtue, as in gifts of intellect, by the very heretics whom it condemns; - that heresies are rife and bishops negligent within its own pale; - and that amid its disorders and its fears there is but one Voice for whose decisions the people wait with trust, one Name and one See to which they look with hope, and that name Peter, and that see Rome; - such a religion is not unlike the Christianity of the fifth and sixth Centuries."¹

(2) **Continuity of Principles.** This is illustrated by the sense in which the principle of one language favours compound words while that of another does not. "A development, to be faithful, must retain both the doctrine and the principle with which it started."²

(3) **Its Power of Assimilation.** Just as a plant will grow luxuriously in one habitat by assimilating food from without and building it up into its own tissue, so, says Newman, has the Church shown a vigorous development by incorporating into itself the elements of truth scattered about in the world outside it. "An eclectic, conservative, assimilating, healing, moulding process, a unitive power, is of the essence, and a third test, of a faithful development."³

(4) **Logical Sequence.** Newman tells us that developments for the most part take place silently and unconsciously. But later on "logic is brought in to arrange and inculcate what no science was employed in gaining."⁴ If such subsequent analysis reveals a logical character in:

2. Ibid., p. 181.
3. Ibid., p. 186.
4. Ibid., p. 190.
the whole movement, then we may be sure that the development has been a true one.

(5) **Anticipation of its Future.** This implies the discovery in the earlier stages of a development of hints of what is found later. "Instances of a development which is to come, though vague and isolated, may occur from the very first, though a lapse of time may be necessary to bring them to perfection."1 Newman treats the cultus of the Virgin Mary as only one of the most remarkable developments of the Creed, where we have the anticipation in the account of the Annunciation and in the visit of Mary to Elisabeth as found in the early chapters of Luke's Gospel.

(6) **Conservative Action upon its Past.** "A true development, then, may be described as one which is conservative of the course of antecedent developments being really those antecedents and something besides them: it is an addition which illustrates, not obscures, corroborates, not corrects, the body of thought from which it proceeds; and this is its characteristic as contrasted with a corruption."2

(7) **Chronic Vigour.** "While ideas live in men's minds, they are ever enlarging into fuller development; they will not be stationary in their corruption any more than before it....Corruption cannot, therefore, be of long standing; and thus **duration** is another test of a faithful development."3

I have given this more or less detailed exposition of Newman's conception of the development of doctrine in order that I might bring

2. Ibid., p. 200.
3. Ibid., p. 203.
out clearly his view of the moulding of belief by the action of ideas, and his penetration of history. Any reader of the first part of his "Essay" is immediately struck by the originality of Newman's statements concerning the working power of ideas, the varied intellectual forms in which they find expression, and their power to use and assimilate elements taken from the world around. While maintaining, therefore, that much of his work—especially the philosophical conception of development—rests upon a permanent foundation, it is also necessary to admit that his "Essay" has certain grave defects. His conclusions are not the only ones that may be drawn from the foundation he has laid down. "It is possible to go a long way with him, and yet altogether decline to see with him the necessity for an infallible Church, or to find that infallibility concentrated in the Church of Rome."¹

Without going into many details, I shall point out some of the chief imperfections of Newman's theory. Newman makes it perfectly clear that he desires to distinguish between biological and logical evolution. He writes: "The development then of an idea is not like an investigation worked out on paper, in which each successive advance is a pure evolution from a foregoing, but it is carried on through and by means of communities of men and their leaders and guides; and it employs their minds as its instruments, and depends upon them, while it uses them."² There has been a difference of opinion as to whether or not he succeeded in making his theory biological. Fairbairn, speaking of the defects of the "Essay," pointed out that it was logical and abstract, not biological and historical and real. Tyrrell, on the other hand, in speaking of

². The Development of Christian Doctrine, p. 38.
Newman's thought on development, says, "It is one of biological rather than of dialectical development; organic rather than architectural."\(^1\)

It is the opinion of the present writer that Newman did not succeed in carrying out his original intention, and as a result of this, the logical features of the "Essay" overshadow the biological. Though he starts by considering Christianity as an idea or a spiritual force, he goes on to treat of it as an institution. The historical continuity of the Roman Church is substituted for the free evolution of the idea amid its surroundings. Rome fills his whole vision, and in order to account for his present position he naturally turns to a theory of logical evolution. If he had continued to interpret the "idea" as a spiritual agency or force, alive, operating on life, and affected by its environment, his "Essay" would have continued to be biological to the end. As it is, however, he uses historical formulae for the maintenance of a given thesis, not for the interpretation of history. He skilfully uses history to illustrate a theory which had been formed in independence of history.\(^2\) He accomplishes this by means of logical processes, not biological. A good illustration of this is found in the way he accounts for such things as Infant Baptism, the Veneration of the Virgin, and the Supremacy of the Pope. He is forced to maintain that these thoughts are found implicitly in the New Testament, and only become explicit in later Christianity. If Newman had been consistent with those thoughts of his which implied biological development, he would have accounted for these things by showing that the Roman Church.

2. Christ in Modern Theology, A. M. Fairbairn, p. 36.
has become what it is to a large extent by accepting and assimilating what was in no way involved in the Apostolic teaching of the Early Church.

Newman's theory of development has also been criticised for the reason that he does not begin the discussion of the development of doctrine at a point far enough back in the history of the Christian Church. The origin of Christianity is to be found in the person and teachings of Jesus Christ. Newman's starting-point is too late in the history of Christianity. He should have commenced his study of the development of doctrine at the proper beginning of Christianity - with Christ, and not at a time when the Church was fully formed and possessed of a complete ecclesiastical organization. Newman gives a picture of the created society rather than of the creative personality. We then see the truth of Mozley's suggestion that Newman moves somewhat uneasily when he is prosecuting his search into the pre-Nicene developments. "While he makes Nicene truth the development of something before it, he does not fairly face the result, that what was before it was not Nicene truth."¹ He began with a Church fully organized instead of going back to Christ, the real source.

In the third place Newman may be criticized for his inadequate treatment of the subject of corruption. He defines corruption as "the breaking up of life, preparatory to its termination. This resolution of a body into its component parts is the stage before its dissolution; it begins when life has reached its perfection, and it is the sequel, or rather the continuation, of that process towards perfection, being at the same time the reversal and undoing of what went before."² Corruption is distinguished from decay by two marks. It is of short

duration and is accompanied by energetic and vigorous dissolution. "It is true that decay, which is one form of corruption, is slow; but decay is a state in which there is no violent or vigorous action at all, whether of a conservative or a destructive character, the hostile influence being powerful enough to enfeeble the functions of life, but not to quicken its own process."¹ "Thus, while a corruption is distinguished from decay by its energetic action, it is distinguished from a development by its transitory character."²

One would think from these definitions that Newman would find it impossible to condemn all non-Roman developments. The fact of the matter is that Newman does not prove, but only assumes, that Rome alone is vigorous and progressive. Mozley, also, has pointed out that Newman has excluded from his notion of corruption just that form of it - the corruption of exaggeration - which characterizes the later Roman developments.³ It is possible to have a form of corruption in which the type or norm is preserved and yet overlaid with excesses and exaggerations. With a different definition of corruption, Newman's argument for the Roman Church would be destroyed.

Finally, it must be pointed out that the object of Newman's "Essay" was to work out an apologetic for the Roman Church, and not for the Church as a whole. Its end was a mere fraction or section of the collective organism, isolated from all the rest. His theory should have been used to explain Christianity as a whole, not just Catholicism.

In bringing this chapter to a close, it is necessary to indicate

1. The Development of Christian Doctrine, pp. 204-5.
2. Ibid., p. 205.
how Newman's "An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine" was received by the Roman Catholic Church. The "Essay" was published soon after he became a Catholic. Dr. Wiseman judged that it would be a more effective plea for the Catholic religion if it received no theological revision. Accordingly, the "Essay" was published as it stood.

The "Essay" was very soon being widely read. People were asking questions and raising objections to its argument on behalf of the Church. It also made a great impression on thinkers outside the Church. In 1846 Newman received the assurance of Archbishop Gillies, Vicar Apostolic and Archbishop of one of the Scottish districts, that the argument of his book had arrested the attention of Scottish thinkers. This was so encouraging to Newman that he desired to get his book recognized as orthodox Catholic apologetic. There was difficulty in accomplishing this, for no theologian from Rome read English. Newman's friend accordingly arranged to have it translated into French.

But all this while Americans were reading and being influenced by the "Essay." It was first introduced to the people of the United States by the Unitarians, who quoted it as evidence that the Trinitarian doctrine was not primitive, but was a development of the third century. An outcry followed, and a certain Dr. Brownson took the matter up in his review. Echoes of the controversy found their way to Rome. Further, the "Essay" - though finished when Newman was convinced of the truth of Catholicism, it was, strictly speaking, a work of his Anglican life - was not separated by the thinkers in Rome or in America from his other Anglican works written in the days when Rome was hateful to him. The

American outcry, therefore, prevented for the moment any calm discussion of the "Essay," and seems to have frightened the Romans.

Newman had discovered, however, that the all-important principle of development, "the fact that it was a 'vera causa,' was admitted by the Roman theologians." As a result of this, he determined not to press his views without Roman support. He at once took steps to let the Americans know that, at least in principle, his theory was accepted in Rome. He had found, with regard to the matter of development, that Father Perrone, the chief theological professor in Rome at that time, went in its general direction on lines with which he himself entirely concurred. Newman was anxious, therefore, to obtain the imprimatur of this theologian for his theory. Perrone criticized Newman's position. His main objection was confined to Newman's expression, "new dogmas," in place of "new definitions." In principle they agreed. Both held that the "deposit of the Faith," once for all committed to the Church, was so given that Christians were not explicitly conscious of all its intellectual implications which were subsequently defined. The "dogma" was given once for all, but its explication, which made it more distinctly understood by the faithful, was a matter of time.

Yet in the end it came about that while Newman understood, and claimed as in accord with his own thought, so many of the views of the ablest Roman professors, some of the most influential amongst them did not understand him, and hesitated to accept his teaching. His terminology was different from theirs. In their thinking they refused to go

2. Ibid., p. 184.
beyond a certain point. Such difficulties were perhaps inevitable, considering the extreme slowness of Rome to admit even novelty of expression in theology. In spite of these facts, however, his thoughts on this matter were accepted by the Catholic Church. In proof of this point the words of the Catholic Encyclopedia may be quoted: "The theory... is in perfect conformity with Catholic belief."¹

CHAPTER VII.

On Religion and Education

As Newman lived and moved and had his being in the world of education, it was natural that he should come face to face with the great educational problems of the hour. The chief difficulty for the religious thinkers of this period was to discover how Christians were to uphold the traditional theology, and yet be fully alive to the changed outlook wrought by science in a new age. This was caused by the fact that two ideals of education were competing, - "the denominational or ecclesiastical, which threatened to be obscurantist; and the undenominational or scientific, which threatened to be irreligious."¹ Science had been placed under a ban by the theologians, who instinctively felt that it was fatal to their speculations. Religious Educationalists, such as Newman, were looking for some system whereby faith would continue to be definite, yet compatible with breadth of view.

Newman's lectures on the scope and nature of University education were directed to emphasizing the defect underlying the constitution of certain Universities insofar as they excluded theology from the educational programme. These lectures purposed to point out that theology is indispensable in any scheme of general knowledge, such as a University professes to establish. He explains in his lectures what he means by theology. It is the science of the One God. It is "one idea unfolded in its just proportions, carried out upon an intelligible method,

and issuing in necessary and immutable results; understood indeed at one time and place better than at another; held here and there with more or less of inconsistency, but still, after all, in all times and places, where it is found, the evolution, not of half-a-dozen ideas, but of one."

Newman writes: "Theology, as I have described it, is no accident of particular minds, as are certain systems, for instance, of prophetical interpretation. It is not the sudden birth of a crisis, as the Lutheran or Wesleyan doctrine. It is not the splendid development of some uprising philosophy, as the Cartesian or Platonic. It is not the fashion of a season, as certain medical treatments may be considered. It has had a place, if not possession, in the intellectual world from time immemorial; it has been received by minds the most various, and in systems of religion the most hostile to each other. It has 'prima facie' claims upon us.... If ever there was a subject of thought, which had earned by prescription to be received among the studies of a University, and which could not be rejected except on the score of convicted imposture, as astrology or alchemy; if there be a science anywhere, which at least could claim not to be ignored, but to be entertained, and either distinctly accepted or distinctly reprobated, or rather, which cannot be passed over in a scheme of universal instruction, without involving a positive denial of its truth, it is this ancient, this far-spreading philosophy."\(^2\)

The leading idea in these lectures seems to be that, in a University, knowledge and enlargement of the mind are contemplated as an ultimate object. Neither professional skill, nor controversy on behalf of

1. The Idea of a University, p. 67.
2. Ibid., pp. 67-9.
religious conclusions is the primary object of a University, but the formation of educated minds and cultivated intelligences. For this object, theology, or the science of God, is indispensable. Newman felt that it would be better to have the presence of the Church as a safeguard and a purifying influence in the schools of learning than to exclude general literature from the education of a Catholic.

Ward has pointed out that Newman looked upon a University as an instrument, and a potent one, of apologetic. Newman stated in an unpublished address of 1858 that the reason which led him to take part in the establishment of the University was "the wish...to strengthen the defences, in a day of great danger, of the Christian religion."¹ The students of the University were to be enabled to look at modern research with a frank and unflinching eye as something quite compatible with Christian faith.

If Newman was to accomplish this part of his task, it was necessary for him, first of all, to bring home to those interested in the problems of education and religion, the full grounds there were for anticipating an age of unbelief, and to impress on them the urgent necessity of such a philosophy of religion as would satisfy earnest and inquiring minds, alive to the existing outlook. The word "agnostic" was not then in common use; yet the tendency this word expresses had long been noted by Newman.

He reveals his knowledge of this tendency in an address entitled "A Form of Infidelity of the Day." He says: "The teacher, then, whom I speak of, will discourse thus in his secret heart:- He will begin,

as many so far have done before him, by laying it down as if a position which approves itself to the reason, immediately that it is fairly examined, - which is of so axiomatic a character as to have a claim to be treated as a first principle, and is firm and steady enough to bear a large superstructure upon it, - that Religion is not the subject-matter of a science. 'You may have opinions in religion, you may have theories, you may have arguments, you may have probabilities; you may have anything but demonstration, and therefore you cannot have science. In mechanics you advance from sure premisses to sure conclusions; in optics you form your undeniable facts into system, arrive at general principles, and then again infallibly apply them: here you have Science. On the other hand, there is at present no real science of the weather, because you cannot get hold of facts and truths on which it depends; there is no science of the coming and going of epidemics; no science of the breaking out and the cessation of wars; no science of popular likings and dislikings, or of the fashions. It is not that these subject-matters are themselves incapable of science, but that, under existing circumstances, we are incapable of subjecting them to it. And so, in like manner,' says the philosopher in question, 'without denying that in the matter of religion some things are true and some things false, still we certainly are not in a position to determine the one or the other.'

Newman felt that such an attitude of mind as this was best counteracted, not by a formal reply, but by the concrete exhibition of a counter-ideal of the true philosophy of life and knowledge. This

1. The Idea of a University, p. 387.
counter-ideal could be embodied in the educational institutions. As
the agnostic ideal was fostered by the system followed in secular
institutions, informed by the spirit of the modern intellectual world,
so must its appeal be fostered by a really efficient Catholic University
animated by the spirit of Catholicism. The former excludes religion
from the lecture room as being concerned with the unknowable, and banishes
definite theology as tending to obscurantism. All its energies are con­
centrated on the advance of the positive sciences as the one inspiring
goal in the search for knowledge. Newman maintained that the ideal
Catholic University, on the other hand, would uphold and recognize the
Catholic Church - "the concrete representative of things invisible" -
and it would treat as unquestionable the relation of theological science
to reality, while, at the same time, it would be devoted to the secular
sciences, and its recognition of their independence in their own sphere
would be equally thorough and ungrudging.

In his first University Sermon at Dublin, he writes: "Some persons
will say that I am thinking of confining, distorting, and stunting the
growth of the intellect by ecclesiastical supervision. I have no such
thought. Nor have I any thought of a compromise, as if religion must
give up something, and science something. I wish the intellect to range
with the utmost freedom, and religion to enjoy an equal freedom; but
what I am stipulating for is, that they should be found in one and the
same place, and exemplified in the same persons. I want to destroy that
diversity of centres which puts everything into confusion by creating
a contrariety of influences. I wish the same spots and the same indi­
viduals to be at once oracles of philosophy and shrines of devotion....
I want the intellectual layman to be religious, and the devout ecclesiastic to be intellectual."¹

Once his work as Rector in Ireland had fairly begun, in lecture after lecture Newman set himself to delineate the ideal which should form the "genius loci" in a Catholic University. At the outset, there were certain obvious problems which he set himself to consider. How could a University be really the defender of a particular faith, yet the home of impartial research? How could Catholics be genuine men of science, following the scientific reason whithersoever it led them, yet uphold a theology which some of the ablest contemporaneous writers assailed in the name of science itself? How could it be Catholic, yet not sectarian; committed to definite views, yet sympathetic, as real cultivation makes men, with all genuine thought?

In his writings at this time, Newman urged that a real and accurate apprehension of the bearings of new speculation on revealed truth could be gained only by full and free discussion. Among the unlearned, such discussion might be excessively startling and dangerous. This prospect was in Newman's day immensely increased by the growth of the periodical press and of general reading among the uneducated. Hence the special value of a University - the residence exclusively of those devoted to learning. In the Middle Ages, the Universities had been the homes of those active minds whose business it was to meet contemporary speculation and scientific criticism, not by repressing it, but by the energetic sifting processes which ultimately resulted in the assimilation of what

was valuable and true in it. The gradual diminution almost to a vanishing point of this important function in the economy of the Church, the decay of the Catholic Universities and of the theological schools, appeared to Newman a most serious fact. It destroyed the normal opportunity for the safe exercise, among Catholic scholars, of that freedom of thought which he maintained to be, in its proper sphere, as essential to the development of a satisfying theology as was the principle of authority, - a freedom which had been so conspicuous in the formation within the Church of the great scholastic synthesis of knowledge. Newman had the inspiring ambition to do something towards restoring an arena for such free discussion which had, at the time he wrote, a new urgency for thinking minds.

Newman writes that a University "is the place to which a thousand schools make contributions; in which the intellect may safely range and speculate, sure to find its equal in some antagonist activity, and its judge in the tribunal of truth. It is a place where inquiry is pushed forward, and discoveries verified and perfected, and rashness rendered innocuous, and error exposed, by the collision of mind with mind, and knowledge with knowledge....Such is a University in its idea and in its purpose; such in good measure has it before now been in fact. Shall it ever be again? We are going forward in the strength of the Cross, under the patronage of the blessed Virgin, in the name of St. Patrick, to attempt it."¹

In his lecture on "Christianity and Physical Science," Newman deals

ostensibly with the suspicion so widely prevalent in the middle of the nineteenth century, that there "really is at bottom a certain contrariety between the declarations of religion and the results of physical inquiry."\(^1\)

Hence, irreligious minds were prophesying the disproof of revelation, and religious minds were jealous of the researches, and prejudiced against the discoveries, of science. Newman points out that the consequence of this is, "on the one side, a certain contempt of Theology; on the other, a disposition to undervalue, to deny, to ridicule, to discourage, and almost to denounce, the labours of the physiological, astronomical, or geological investigator."\(^2\)

Newman admits that such contrariety may exist between the views of certain representatives of theology and of science; yet he earnestly maintains that the true theologian who realizes the limits of his science, and the man of science who does not confuse speculation with genuine scientific investigation and proof, are in no danger of collision. Science proper might safely, in a Catholic University, claim all the freedom it needs without fear of opposing true theology.

The first ground on which the provisional freedom from theological interference is justified is, that the provinces of the two sciences are, for the most part, separate. The territory covered by deductive theology, is, as a rule, quite separate from that of physical science, and consequently does not interfere with its freedom. The chosen territory of theology, Newman explains, is not the visible, but the invisible. Theology "contemplates the world, not of matter, but of mind; the Supreme

\(^1\) The Idea of a University, p. 429.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 429.
Intelligence; souls and their destiny; conscience and duty; the past, present and future dealings of the Creator with the creature. "If, then, Theology be the philosophy of the supernatural world, and Science the philosophy of the natural, Theology and Science, whether in their respective ideas, or again in their own actual fields, on the whole, are incommunicable, incapable of collision and needing, at most to be connected, never to be reconciled."  

Another ground of separation Newman indicates quite plainly, though he does not state it so fully. When the visible world is, in exceptional cases, touched by the statements of sacred writers, these statements, if at first sight they seem to be opposed to facts ascertained by science, are eventually interpreted by theologians so as to accord with those facts. Newman gives, as instances, the opposition of certain divines or Scriptural grounds, to belief in the Antipodes when it was first broached, and again to the Copernican system. In both cases, the theological opposition was eventually withdrawn. He writes that "experience may variously guide and modify the deductions of Theology."  

Again he indicates the same conclusion when he speaks of the few cases where Holy Scripture does declare facts concerning the visible world, the territory belonging to science. For he singles out instances in which it was already evident, in 1855, that the more literal interpretations of the sacred documents in which revelation was contained were contrary to the conclusions of the scientific world or to the facts of history, and yet that the theologians had already seen clearly that they must accept those

1. The Idea of a University, p. 434.
2. Ibid., p. 431.
conclusions. He adds other cases in which the interpretation of early theologians has since been disproved. "It is true," he writes, "that Revelation has in one or two instances advanced beyond its chosen territory, which is the invisible world, in order to throw light upon the history of the material universe. Holy Scripture, it is perfectly true, does declare a few momentous facts, so few that they may be counted, of a physical character. It speaks of a process of formation out of chaos which occupied six days; it speaks of the firmament; of the sun and moon being created for the sake of the earth; of the earth being immovable."¹

In all such problems, the interpretations of theologians will eventually coincide with the true findings of scientists.

Newman's lecture on "Christianity and Scientific Investigation" is a fuller treatment of this subject on the same basis. In this lecture, he still more plainly advocates freedom of investigation and freedom of discussion for all the positive sciences, and for theology itself. When we realize the state of contemporary thought at the time, we are forced to acknowledge what a remarkable instance it is of wise foresight on Newman's part. Biblical criticism was not yet to the front. But the strictures on long received views of theologians from the point of view of the ethnologist, the historian, the representative of physical science, were in full course. The chronology of the Old Testament, the derivation of the human race from one stock, the universality of the Deluge and other such subjects were being fully discussed among the thinkers. The most conservative theologians, among Protestants as well as Catholics, were inclined to regard the new theories of the time as aggressions on theology to be repelled. Newman, on the contrary, saw very clearly that,

¹ The Idea of a University, p. 439.
whatever their incidental extravagances, they represented a fruitful activity, a real advance in the positive sciences, although they were doubtless used, by the type of scientist represented a few years later by Huxley and Tyndall, as weapons of attack on current theology.

The whole tendency of the lectures was to prevent theologians becoming obscurantists. It was obvious that if religious thinkers ceased to be on the alert, or to acquaint themselves with the general drift of contemporary science and thought, many absolutely antiquated opinions on the border-land between theology and the positive sciences would remain in the text-books. The result would gradually become serious, and bring with it the danger of something like a revolution in theology; for if obvious corrections were long neglected, or opposed by authority, the point would eventually come at which the normal powers of the gradual development in theology would not be equal to the situation, just as neglect of obvious remedies for a physical disorder may make necessary a dangerous operation which would otherwise have been avoided.

A Catholic University should allow all sciences, whether secular or religious, to develop provisionally without interference from outside. Temporary antagonisms in their conclusions should be patiently tolerated, and contradictions are to be expected in the natural course of things, because of the imperfections of human knowledge. A premature synthesis is deprecated as really, in spirit, unscientific, although it is what so many men of science imperiously demand. It is unscientific, for it leaves out of account the essentially progressive nature of the positive sciences, the temporary reign of unproved hypotheses which are on their trial. The theologian rightly holds to traditionary conclusions
until the road to their correction is unmistakably found. On the other hand, the time will come when the trend of science will be too clear on specific points to allow him to maintain positions tenable in pre-scientific days, by contradicting hypotheses which have come to be universally admitted and taught in the scientific schools.

The fundamental ideal of a University as the impartial representative of the sciences, including, but not dominated by, theology, is given in the following passage: "What an empire is in political history, such is a University in the sphere of philosophy and research. It is, as I have said, the high protecting power of all knowledge and science, of fact and principle, of inquiry and discovery, of experiment and speculation; it maps out the territory of the intellect, and sees that the boundaries of each province are religiously respected, and that there is neither encroachment nor surrender on any side. It acts as umpire between truth and truth, and, taking into account the nature and importance of each, assigns to all their due order of precedence. It maintains no one department of thought exclusively, however ample and noble; and it sacrifices none. It is deferential and loyal, according to their respective weight, to the claims of literature, of physical research, of history, of metaphysics, of theological science. It is impartial towards them all, and promotes each in its own place and for its own object."¹

The question of theological censorship entered less into the department of literature than into that of science. But the main lessons Newman urged in its regard were similar. He was equally emphatic in

¹ The Idea of a University, p. 459.
both departments as to the necessity of breadth of outlook for a truly liberal education. To identify Catholic education with the "hot-house" attitude would be to exclude the intellectual classes from the Church, — those very classes for which, in Newman's view, Catholicism, adequately interpreted, was the one sufficient antidote to agnosticism. Moreover, such a course might pervert the growth of strong men who would be strong apologists. It would close the mind instead of opening it. Newman, in his series of lectures to the School of Arts, disclaims the plan of forming an English Catholic literature as the exclusive intellectual food of Catholic minds. He rebuts the supposition that a University has only special concern with distinctively religious literature at all. "If by a Catholic Literature were meant nothing more or less than a religious literature, its writers would be mainly ecclesiastics; just as writers on Law are mainly lawyers, and writers on Medicine are mainly physicians or surgeons. And if this be so, a Catholic Literature is no object special to a University, unless a University is to be considered identical with a Seminary or a Theological School."¹ And if, moreover, the religious literature becomes controversial or polemical, it ceases to have the character which will enlist the sympathy of a cultivated layman.

Together with his protests against intellectual narrowness, whether in dealing with science or with literature — against fear of the human reason, or exclusion of the great classics — we have indications of two lines of thought tending in opposite directions, which he maintained with equal insistence. One was that although reason, rightly exercised,

¹. The Idea of a University, p. 296.
would in the long run justify belief in Theism and Catholic Christianity in the face of all difficulties, still in man as he exists, with his passions and with the constant presence of the visible world to bring forgetfulness of the invisible, a force stronger than his unaided intellect is needed to keep alive and vivid those first principles on which religious belief depends. And that force is supplied by the living Catholic Church. Secondly, while free discussion is essential in order to clear the issues in the complicated structure of human knowledge, the intellect of man has actually and historically a constant tendency to exceed its lawful limits and arrive at unbelief by reason of its failure in an impossible attempt. This tendency was Newman's old enemy, "religious liberalism," which he defined as "the exercise of thought on subjects on which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to a successful issue." 1 Here again the antidote was the controlling action of the Catholic Church in arresting speculation when it ran to excesses beyond the power of man's mental digestion. He recognized a value in the Church's repressive action, as he also recognized the necessity in its place of free discussion.

Newman deals with the first question in a lecture entitled, "A Form of Infidelity of the Day." This has already been considered above. He dealt with the second question in part of his farewell lecture, given in 1858. It was delivered in the School of Medicine after his final resignation from the Rectorship. "That great institution, then, the Catholic Church, has been set up by Divine Mercy, as a present, visible

antagonist, and the only possible antagonist, to sight and sense. Con-
science, reason, good feeling, the instincts of our moral nature, the
traditions of Faith, the conclusions and deductions of philosophical
Religion, are no match at all for the stubborn facts...which are the
foundation of physical...science. Gentlemen, if you feel, as you must
feel, the whisper of a law of moral truth within you, and the impulse
to believe, be sure there is nothing whatever on earth which can be the
sufficient champion of these sovereign authorities of your soul, which
can vindicate and preserve them to you, and make you loyal to them, but
the Catholic Church. You fear they will go, you see with dismay that
they are going, under the continual impression created on your mind by
the details of the material science to which you have devoted your lives.
It is so - I do not deny it; except under rare and happy circumstances,
go they will, unless you have Catholicism to back you up in keeping
faithful to them. The world is a rough antagonist of spiritual truth:
sometimes with mailed hand, sometimes with pertinacious logic, sometimes
with a storm of irresistible facts, it presses on against you. What it
says is true perhaps as far as it goes, but it is not the whole truth,
or the most important truth. These more important truths, which the
natural heart admits in their substance, though it cannot maintain, -
the being of a God, the certainty of future retribution, the claims of
the moral law, the reality of sin, the hope of supernatural help, - of
these the Church is in matter of fact the undaunted and the only defend-
er....She is ever the same, - ever young and vigorous, and ever overcoming
new errors with the old weapons....Catholicism is the strength of Religion,
as Science and System are the strength of Knowledge."

It can easily be seen that in these lectures entitled, "The Idea of a University," Newman is seeking to advance that work which, for thirty years, he had regarded as that to which he was specially called. In them he was attempting to show how an educated Catholic should bear himself toward the advancing tide of scientific and critical research. In these lectures, Newman has elaborated a theory so enlightened and far-seeing in certain respects, that it still serves as a guiding-light to all who would tread their way successfully through the multitude of conflicting and erroneous ideas which are associated with religion and education. Newman is to be praised for the clearness with which he saw that any attempt to exclude science from the field of studies, or only to admit it in theological fetters, was, when the time came for students to pass out into the world, to expose them, in an increased degree, to the very dangers from which it was desired to preserve them. If danger there was, and Newman realized the danger to the full, it was not to be overcome by ignoring it, but by meeting it fearlessly in the open field. If Newman laid stress on such things as intellectual culture, philosophic enlightenment and an unrestricted field for all branches of knowledge, provided theological studies had their place, it was not because he set a higher value on secular things in comparison with Divine truth, but because he did not wish the religious youths of his day to suffer from a serious and unnecessary disadvantage in their intercourse with their irreligious fellows. His policy and his attitude were alike dictated by a desire to advance the influence of his Church, a desire no less fervent, but far broader and fraught with far richer promise, than the policy, at once timid and suspicious, of those who opposed Newman's work of establishing a Catholic University in Ireland.
Chapter VIII.

On Living the Christian Life

An analysis of Newman's conception of what it means to live the Christian life must essentially be an analysis of his preaching from the pulpit of the Church of St. Mary-the-Virgin in Oxford. These sermons give the richest and most intense shades of expression of the peculiar character of his piety. It should be noticed, also, that these sermons in no small measure created and shaped the various forms of Tractarian piety. Like all deeply religious utterances, Newman's preaching is largely confined to the region which is the common spiritual home of all Christians. But by noticing the stronger emphasis which is laid on certain points, it is possible to pick out the distinctively characteristic parts.

Most witnesses agree in regarding the power of realizing the actuality of the spiritual world as the most prominent feature in Newman's sermons. This was partly due, no doubt, to his personal equipment. It is the poet and the literary artist, as much as the preacher, that we find speaking in a description like this: "To those who live by faith, everything they see speaks of that future world; the very glories of nature, the sun, moon, and stars, and the richness and the beauty of the earth, are as types and figures witnessing and teaching the invisible things of God. All that we see is destined one day to burst forth into a heavenly bloom, and to be transfigured into immortal glory. Heaven
at present is out of sight, but in due time, as snow melts and discovers what it lay upon, so will this visible creation fade away before those greater splendours which are behind it, and on which at present it depends. In that day shadows will retire, and the substance show itself. The sun will grow pale and be lost in the sky, but it will be before the radiance of Him whom it does but image, the Sun of Righteousness, with healing on His wings, who will come forth in visible form, as a bridegroom out of his chamber, while His perishable type decays. The stars which surround it will be replaced by Saints and Angels circling His throne. Above and below, the clouds of the air, the trees of the field, the waters of the great deep will be found impregnated with the forms of everlasting spirits, the servants of God which do His pleasure. And our own mortal bodies will then be found in like manner to contain within them an inner man, which will then receive its due proportions, as the soul's harmonious organ, instead of that gross mass of flesh and blood which sight and touch are sensible of. For this glorious manifestation the whole creation is at present in travail, earnestly desiring that it may be accomplished in its season."

This peculiar strength in his grasp of the invisible world, before the reality of which the visible disappears, is thus a distinguishing mark of Newman's personal religion. The earth and its beauty are only an earnest of a world beyond. "Even when it is gayest, with all its blossoms on, and shows most touchingly what lies hid in it, yet it is not enough. We know much more lies hid in it than we see. A world of

Saints and Angels, a glorious world, the palace of God, the mountain of
the Lord of Hosts, the heavenly Jerusalem, the throne of God and Christ,
all these wonders....lie hid in what we see....We know that what we see
is as a screen hiding from us God and Christ, and His Saints and Angels.
And we earnestly desire and pray for the dissolution of all that we see,
from our longing after that which we do not see."¹ Such is the mysterious
color of spiritual reality. All our thoughts and concepts are only
symbols, approximate expressions of a truth and a reality which go beyond
the possibilities of thought and speech. Before this reality, the
mightiness of which is beyond all imagination, men must tremble. When
the revealed Word and the pronouncements of science are in conflict, we
have not to make helpless attempts to harmonize the two, but we have
only to bow before the thought that what is presented to us in the realm
of nature, or in that of grace, though true in so complete a sense that
we do not venture to take anything from it, yet is only an indication,
useful for action, useful in its place "till the day break and the
shadows flee away," useful in such a way, that both one and the other
representation may at once be used, as two languages, as two separate
approximations towards the awful unknown Truth such as will not mislead
us in their respective provinces.²

Brilioth, in his book called "The Anglican Revival," says: "The
invisible world to Tractarian piety is above all mysterious and awful;
these two words contain the very fundamental note of its feeling, a
feeling of wonder and holy awe. Awfulness will meet us at every step

in our exposition; almost in every important document."¹ This is especially true of Newman. In one of his sermons he says, "To be a Christian is one of the most wondrous and awful gifts in the world. It is, in one sense, to be higher than Angel or Archangel. If we have any portion of an enlightened faith, we shall understand that our state, as members of Christ's Church, is full of mystery. What so mysterious as to be born, as we are, under God's wrath? What so mysterious as to be redeemed by the death of the Son of God made flesh? What so mysterious as to receive the virtue of that death one by one through Sacraments?"² This feeling of awfulness is not a consequence of dread of judgment, but a lively sense of the nearness and majesty of God, and to it must be assigned a high religious quality. Even though eschatological chords at times chime in, this feeling of holy awe in Newman has little in common with mere terror of the possibility of eternal damnation. It is in error that some have made this the predominant motive of his religious life.³ Brémont declares himself obliged, after a thorough study of Newman's sermons, to reject "la terreur" as the chief motive force in his religion.⁴

This way of looking at things has its application in Newman's attitude towards the doctrines of the Trinity, and of the Incarnation. That these things are mysterious is no objection to it, but rather the opposite. "It would be strange, indeed,. . .if any doctrine concerning God's infinite and eternal Nature were not mysterious. . . .That the sacred doctrine, then, of the Trinity in Unity is mysterious, is no objection

1. The Anglican Revival, V. Brilioth, p. 216.
to it, but rather the contrary."¹ "I consider that this mysteriousness
is, as far as it proves anything, a recommendation of the doctrine."²
There is no space to illustrate by quotations from Newman's sermons
these deep speculations on the eternal self-sufficient Being of the Three
in One. At times Newman can give wings to his words and thoughts and
cause the dogmas to live as it seldom has been done in modern times.³
This was especially true in his power of realizing the paradoxical in
the matter of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Perhaps it was because
this was nearer to the very centre of the piety of his life. Here
mystery comes nearer, because it is more real than in any other point.
"No earthly images can come up to the awful and gracious truth, that
God became the Son of Man — that the Word became flesh, and was born
of a woman. This ineffable mystery surpasses human words. No titles
of earth can Christ give to Himself, ever so lowly or mean, which will
fitly show us His condescension. His act and deed is too great even
for His own lips to utter it."⁴

One of the chief factors in Newman's religious life, and one which
made him so enthusiastically a spiritual man, was his conception of the
awful and gracious reality of the religious life as applied to the in-
dividual. Christian literature probably contains few more striking
presentations of the immortality of the individual soul than Newman's
sermon on "The Individuality of the Soul."⁵ It is the marvel of Divine
Providence that God can look to and care for each individual in the

1. Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. 6, p. 333.
2. Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 333.
3. Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 364ff.
4. Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 233.
5. Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 80.
endless stream of beings. As our Lord during His earthly life acted to everyone who came in His way with inimitable gentleness and consideration, the qualities that form the very perfection of friendliness among men, so God acts with each of us. "God beholds thee individually, whoever thou art. He 'calls thee by thy name.' He sees thee, and understands thee, as He made thee...He views thee in thy day of rejoicing, and thy day of sorrow. He sympathizes in thy hopes and thy temptations....He compasses thee round and bears thee in His arms....He notes thy very countenance, whether smiling or in tears, whether healthful or sickly. He looks tenderly upon thy hands and thy feet; He hears thy voice, the beating of thy heart, and thy very breathing. Thou dost not love thyself better than He loves thee. Thou canst not shrink from pain more than He dislikes thy bearing it....Thou art not only His creature....thou art man redeemed and sanctified, His adopted son, favoured with a portion of that glory and blessedness which flows from Him everlastingly unto the Only-begotten."¹

The motive of holiness had a central position in Newman's intense religious life. Newman's statement that Thomas Scott's dictum, "Holiness rather than peace," rang in his ears for a number of years, is enough to establish this fact. One of his earliest sermons bore the title, "Holiness Necessary for Future Blessedness."² The exercise and practice of holiness is a necessary condition of the attainment of salvation, because it alone makes us sharers in the world of eternity; it alone puts us in a position to enjoy its blessings. In the sermon mentioned

2. Apologia, p. 5.
above we find these words: "We see, then, that holiness, or inward separation from the world, is necessary to our admission into heaven because heaven...is not a place of happiness except to the holy."¹ It is interesting to notice that this motive of holiness seems to have played a large part in the career of one whose conversion from Protestantism to Catholicism has stirred the religious world of to-day almost as much as Newman'd did long ago. I refer to W. E. Orchard. In his autobiography of religious development, entitled "From Faith to Faith," he says, "When it is enquired anxiously if I am at peace, I want to reply with Newman's motto, 'Holiness before peace.'"²

Holiness, no doubt, depends on the fact that God planted the principle of holiness in the heart, but its growth and improvement depend on the good works in which it finds its expression. All acts of love and self-sacrifice, all prayers and spiritual exercises have as their first object to train the mind, to hallow the heart, and to prepare us for the future presence of God.³ Deeper experiences, however, soon showed Newman the insufficiency of self-discipline; though it is God's own work, it always remains incomplete upon earth, and the "holiest men have remains and stains of sin."⁴ But at the same time, the ideal of perfect holiness shines out with ever clearer brightness. "In heaven, sin will be utterly destroyed in every elect soul. We shall have no earthly wishes, no tendencies to disobedience or irreligion, no love of the world or the flesh, to draw us off from supreme devotion to God.

¹. Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. 1, p. 7.
². From Faith to Faith, W. E. Orchard, p.196.
⁴. Ibid., Vol. 7, p.188.
We shall have our Saviour's holiness fulfilled in us, and be able to love God without drawback or infirmity. That indeed will be a full reward of all our longings here, to praise and serve God eternally with a single and perfect heart in the midst of His temple. What a time that will be, when all will be perfected in us which at present is but feebly begun! Then we shall see how the Angels worship God. We shall see the calmness, the intenseness, the purity, of their worship. We shall see that awful sight, the Throne of God, and the Seraphim before and around it, crying, 'Holy!' There was scarcely need of the echo of Isaiah's call to make us realize that we are on a religious height, where all doctrine of works and all teaching of reward for moral actions are left far behind.

Newman's preaching of holiness reaches its highest point in a sermon, preached in 1845, on the Crucifixion: "Let us pray God to give us all graces; and while, in the first place, we pray that He would make us holy, really holy, let us also pray Him to give us the beauty of holiness, which consists in tender and eager affection towards our Lord and Saviour; which is, in the case of the Christian, what beauty of person is to the outward man, so that through God's mercy our souls may have, not strength and health only, but a sort of bloom and comeliness; and that as we grow older in body, we may, year by year, grow more youthful in spirit."  

It is of interest to find in Newman the thought of the parallelism between moral action and religious knowledge. It is possible also to trace the growth of this idea in his life from the Evangelical period.

2. Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 134.
onwards. Even in 1825, Newman expanded the view that he who obeys the command of Scripture is, by his docility and purity, better equipped than others to advance in religious truth, and that he who does so "may have an inward witness arising from obedience."\(^1\) Couched in this moderate form, the idea is just an exposition of our Lord's words, that he who does the will of his Father shall be able to judge of the doctrine. But in its completeness, we find the thought first in the proper High Anglican period of his life, when, after having passed through the Evangelical as well as the Liberal stages, and learnt to mistrust as subjective the determination both of feeling and reason, he believed he had found an objective criterion of truth and the reality of the object of faith. Obedience is the test of faith. It is insufficient to have merely the demonstration of feeling, and an inward conviction that one is saved. Doubtless, a certain quietness of mind and adjustment of feeling belong to the Christian's equipment. But in a sermon on I John 2:3, "Hereby do we know that we know Him if we keep His commandments," he says: "The Apostle does not insist upon it, as if it were sure to follow, if our hearts do but grow into these two chief objects, the view of God in Christ and the diligent aim to obey Him in our conduct."\(^2\) "The whole duty and work of a Christian is made up of these two parts, Faith and Obedience."\(^3\) And just at the time when Newman definitely turned his back on Liberalism, he urged the same idea of the overwhelming strength of the proof from obedience. "For ourselves, let us but obey God's voice in our hearts, and I will venture to say we shall have no doubts

1. Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. 8, p. 122.
practically formidable about the truth of Scripture. Find out the man
who strictly obeys the law within him, and yet is an unbeliever as regards
the Bible, and then it will be time enough to consider all that variety
of proof by which the truth of the Bible is confirmed to us....Our doubts,
if we have any, will be found to arise after disobedience....And if we
but obey God strictly, in time (through His blessing) faith will become
like sight." The parallelism between faith and conduct, which in the
last quoted passage takes the shape of an analogy between inward and
outward revelation, is further emphasized in connection with the anti-
intellectual attitude which appears, to some extent, in Newman's view
of the theory of knowledge, after his conversion from Liberalism.

It must be noticed how asceticism set its mark upon Newman. Some
of his teachings regarding this phase of life even found a place in his
novel, "Loss and Gain." Celibacy seems to have stood out quite early
as a part of Newman's special vocation. It is well known that the
thought of monasticism appears from the very first in the Oxford Move-
ment. It seems to have had some part also in Newman's life. That his
establishment at Littlemore had a highly monastic stamp can hardly be
denied, in spite of Newman's attempt to explain the matter away, and
though its members did not bind themselves with vows. In his essay on
John Davison, Newman says, "Monastic bodies....have so essential a
portion and so exalted a place in Christian obedience....that they ful-
fil more of our Lord's precepts than any other set of men, and instead
of being 'one of the most violent perversions of religious doctrines,'
they are the nearest approach to the perfection of a Christian spirit." 2

1. Parochial and Plain Sermons,
2. Essays Critical and Historical,
Newman speaks in this manner as an answer to Davison who had been denying that the monastic principle is gregarious, co-operative, industrious, practical and productive. During his last years of uncertainty in the Anglican Church, when Newman made vain attempts to restrain disciples who drew out the consequences of his doctrine more quickly than he did himself, he then speaks of a monastery as the only means of keeping people together. He says, "Men want an outlet for their devotional and penitential feelings, and if we do not grant it, it is a dead certainty they will go where they can find it." ¹

An investigation of the ascetic motive in the preaching of Newman is necessary to comprehend his peculiar type of piety. As might be expected, one finds the point of view of religious discipline, the importance of asceticism as a practice in holiness and obedience, strongly emphasized. Newman formulates his thought clearly in a sermon on "The Yoke of Christ," which gives a summary of his ascetic preaching. "This is the especial object which is set before us, to become holy as He who has called us is holy, and to discipline and chasten ourselves in order that we may become so; and we may be quite sure, that unless we chasten ourselves, God will chasten us." ² It was no Pharisaic and professional holiness that Newman wished to attain. In his preaching one finds that it is above all as a means of purification of the mind and uplifting of the soul that asceticism is valued. He says, "A smooth and easy life, an uninterrupted enjoyment of the goods of Providence, full meals, soft raiment, well-furnished homes, the pleasures of sense, the feeling

¹. Newman's Correspondence with Keble and Others, p. 172.
². Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. 7, p. 110.
of security, the consciousness of wealth, - these, and the like, if we are not careful, choke up all the avenues of the soul, through which the light and breath of heaven might come to us. A hard life is, alas! no certain method of becoming spiritually minded, but it is one out of the means by which Almighty God makes us so. We must, at least at seasons, defraud ourselves of nature, if we would not be defrauded of grace."\(^1\)

Without such a serious preparation, every attempt to force our minds into a pious, loving and devotional temper leads to falseness and hypocrisy. On another occasion he speaks of renunciations as the weapons of Saints. "As health and exercise and regular diet are necessary to strength of the body, so an enfeebling and afflicting of the natural man, a chastising and afflicting of soul and body, are necessary to the exaltation of the soul."\(^2\) And Prayer and Fasting are the "wings of the soul," without which it cannot take its heavenward road.\(^3\) This must not be regarded as aiming at an ecstatic state; anything of the kind seems to have been foreign to Newman's sober character.

All Christian asceticism must obtain its proper nourishment and seek its deepest justification in the contemplation of the suffering Saviour. This applies to Newman's ascetic preaching. He again and again directs the thoughts of his hearers to the Crucified, and he can represent the contemplation of Christ's sufferings as the greatest help to growth in holiness.\(^4\) But the thought of the Cross in this connection has with Newman little more than the character of a theological "locus\(^5\)"

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2. Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 322.
3. Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 206.
4. Ibid., (Vol. 5, pp. 327-40.) (Vol. 6, p. 43.)
Pusey has a far more intense Cross mysticism. However, Newman was not quite strange to this, as is shown by such a passage as the following: "This is what it is to be one of Christ's little ones; to have that within us through which we can do all things; to be possessed by His presence as our life, our strength, our merit, our hope, our crown; to become in a wonderful way His members, the instruments, or visible form, or sacramental sign, of the One Invisible Ever-Present Son of God, mystically reiterating in each of us all the acts of His earthly life, His birth, consecration, fasting, temptation, conflicts, victories, sufferings, agony, passion, death, resurrection, and ascension."  

But the connection between the sufferings of Christ and the renunciations of the individual Christian come in here only as a part of a great mystical scheme.

There is another motive of all self-denial which is very characteristic of Newman. There is a series of passages in which he speaks of self-denial, of serious observation of religious duties, as a sign that one belongs to the company of the elect. How self-denial gets its special value as a pledge of election, a sign that one is set in the narrow way, appears in the conclusion of his sermon on "The Yoke of Christ": "If Almighty God moves any of us, so that we have high thoughts; if from reading Scripture or holy books we find that we can embrace views above the world; if it is given us to recognize the glory of Christ's kingdom, to discern its spiritual nature, to admire the life of saints, and to desire to imitate it; if we feel and understand that it is good to bear the yoke in our youth, good to be in trouble, good to be poor,

1. Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. 6, p. 3.
good to be in low estate, good to be despised; if in imagination we put ourselves at the feet of those mortified men of old time, who, after St. Paul's pattern, died daily, and knew no one after the flesh; if we feel all this, and are conscious we feel it; let us not boast—why? because of a surety such feelings are a pledge to us that God will in some way or other give them exercise....My brethren, count the cost; never does God give faith but He tries it; never does He implant the wish to sit on His right hand and on His left, but He fulfils it by making us wash our brethren's feet."

There is plain witness that the idea of predestination was an important factor in Newman's personal religion. We may recall, first, how his earliest religious crisis implanted in him the conviction that he, himself, was predestined to salvation. A stern utterance is also found in one of his poems describing the mystery of the elect, the "Hidden Ones," the unknown saints of God, the indistinguishable "chosen few":

"The remnant fruit of largely scatter'd grace, God sows in waste, to reap whom He foreknew Of man's cold race."

This conviction did not make Newman careless about pleasing God. His belief in his own predestination did not include the belief in the pre-ordaining of others to eternal death. The Fathers of the Birmingham Oratory who published "The Correspondence of Newman with Keble and Others," and who generally tried to explain away as far as possible all that pointed to Calvinistic influence on Newman, declared that the

2. Apologia, p. 4.
Calvinistic doctrine of predestination certainly was not one of those which he had made his own. But this assumption seems inconsistent with the passage in the "Apologia," and with other passages which are to be found in Newman's sermons. For example: "Few persons, comparatively speaking, would maintain that a man once in a state of grace cannot fall away; now here in like manner, it might be asked how can God at present love one whom He has appointed to everlasting punishment?" This seems to deny the doctrine of "perseverantia," but assumes rather that of "pre-destinatio ad mortem." A little later, in a sermon equally important for this theme, he writes, "His mercy is over all His works, and to no one does the word of life come but with the intent that he may live."

There is a close connection between the idea of predestination and the position so often indicated in Newman's teaching about the narrow way and the few who walk therein in contrast with the broad way which the many follow. It is by no means unique in the history of Christian Ethics that this idea has become the strongest motive to moral action, though it perhaps more often takes the shape of active life than asceticism. "I am suspicious of any religion that is a people's religion, or an age's religion," says Newman in a sermon entitled, "Self-Denial the Test of Religious Earnestness," and written in 1833. There must be something even now that separates the Christian from the multitude, and that is the self-denial taught us by the Saviour's words. Newman says: "We learn....that a vigorous self-denial is a chief duty, nay, that it

3. Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 258.
4. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 57.
may be considered the test whether we are Christ's disciples, whether we are living in a mere dream, which we mistake for Christian faith and obedience, or are really and truly awake, alive, living in the day, on our road heavenward.\(^1\) If your life does not give unsought opportunities to practise self-denial, "it is right then almost to find out for yourself daily self-denials."\(^2\) "Try yourself daily in little deeds, to prove that your faith is more than a deceit."\(^3\) That another thought lies behind that of mere self-discipline, and that self-denials have their greatest value, not as a sign of a subjective condition, but as the seal of election, is made plain by the explicit treatment of the theme, "Many Called, Few Chosen," delivered in a sermon preached four years later.\(^4\) In this sermon is to be found the most thorough explanation of the problem of predestination in Newman's teaching. He takes up the objections to the idea that it must breed indifference and self-security; it can only do this in combination with the doctrine of the individual's assurance of salvation.\(^5\) Without that, the fewness of the elect merely incites to a more zealous running of the course set before us. To an outside observer there seem to be everywhere so many men with good qualities, that he would rather believe that the elect are many. But this shows that God must measure from a different standard from that of the world. "It shows you, that if the chosen are few, there must be some particular belief necessary, or some particular line of conduct, or something else different from what the world supposes, in order to

1. Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. 1, p. 66.
2. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 69.
3. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 71.
4. Ibid., Vol. 5, No. 18.
5. Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 258.
account for this solemn declaration. It suggests to you that perchance
there must be a certain perfection, completeness, consistency, entireness
of obedience, for a man to be chosen, which most men miss in one point
or another. It suggests to you that there is a great difference between
being a hearer of the word and a doer; a well-wisher of the truth, or
an approver of good men or good actions, and a faithful servant of the
truth. It suggests to you that it is one thing to be in earnest, another
and higher to be 'rooted and grounded in love.' It suggests to you the
exceeding dangerousness of single sins, or particular bad habits. It
suggests to you the peril of riches, cares of this life, station, and
credit."

Another phase of Newman's piety which deserves attention is his
mysticism. We must not look for the actual occurrence of the word,
"mysticism," as the sure criterion of the mystical type of Newman's
piety in its deeper sense. We have already seen how Newman loved to
dwell on the thought of the infinite, mysterious depth of spiritual
reality, which could be only approximately expressed in the terms of
the world of sense. Even the expressions of Scripture become sym-
bolical to him. He knew that the Biblical conception of the world,
like the physical, is a "figure," a mystery, "a sacramental truth,"
under whose outward form the invisible gift of grace is rather con-
cealed than expressed. In one of his sermons - "Mysteries in Religion" -
he speaks of the two worlds as two languages or two separate approxi-
mations toward the awful unknown Truth, but advises the faithful to
keep "to the figure given us in Scripture....We will hold it as a

Mystery, or (what was anciently called) a Truth Sacramental; that is, a high invisible grace lodged in an outward form.  

But all this is not mysticism in the deeper sense. The chief aim of mystical piety is to lose itself in God, to let itself be carried away by the strong flood of the Divine, to sink in its sea. This yearning for the infinite is to be found in Newman. He realized the blessedness of mystical communion with God. He says, for example, that we have been brought into "that mysterious Presence of God which encompasses us, which is in us, and around us, which is in our heart, which enfolds us as though with a robe of light, hiding our scarred and discoloured souls from the sight of Divine Purity, and making them shining as the Angels; and which flows in upon us too by means of all forms of beauty and grace which this visible world contains."  

Newman's writings show how the idea of grace as quasi-physical or substantial prevails over the purely personal idea; how the thought of infused grace drives out the imputed. It is along this road that Newman found the broad way to the land of purely mystical communion with God. At almost every point where Newman is concerned with the indwelling of the Divine, he goes on to point to the Sacraments as a means for its attainment. The Sacraments are the channels through which God conveys gifts to us. In his sermon on "Baptism," he speaks of the Sacraments of the Church as the vehicles of spiritual power, in contrast to their Jewish prototypes; "and these its Mysteries are not mere outward signs, but (as it were) effluences of His grace developing themselves in ex-

2. Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 228-9.
ternal forms, as Angels might do when they appeared to men.\(^1\)

Though the lines of thought we have just followed lead directly to the idea of the Eucharist, we must first deal with the doctrine of Baptism. As one of the primary principles of his theory of Sacramentalism, Newman accepted Baptism as the vehicle of Justification. This idea played an important part in his own personal development, and his acceptance of the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration indicates his deflection from Evangelicalism. It was chiefly Hawkins who influenced him in this matter, strangely enough by putting into his hands a work of evangelical colour, "Treatise on Apostolical Preaching," by J. B. Sumner.\(^2\) One of the consequences of this doctrine that was most important to Newman's piety was the resulting view of sin after Baptism. Baptism alone imparts a fully effective forgiveness of sins. He who has stained the white robe of his Baptism can never entirely regain it. We must recall, in this connection, how Newman, on his "Anglican death-bed," when he had a keener eye for superficiality in many of his earlier associates, and when he demanded a stricter religion, saw the chief error in the neglect of the doctrine of post-baptismal sin. He felt there could be no good anywhere until this doctrine was recognized. But, in connection with this, there was a deepening of the purely sacramental idea of Baptism as a means to the indwelling of God and the infused Grace.

The Eucharistic teaching of the day did not greatly affect Newman. In 1838 he treats the subject in two sermons, but one feels that the theme did not especially inspire him. One, "The Gospel Feast,"\(^3\) puts

1. Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. 3, p. 278.
together Biblical passages which can be explained as types of the Eucharist, and adds to them a very true conclusion. In another, "The Eucharistic Presence," there is a very dry presentation of the correct doctrine of a presence of Christ, which is real without being corporal, thus rejecting Transubstantiation; while a typically Tractarian warning is added not to neglect this means of grace, for it may contain more than we now see in it. He says, "Let us fear, lest a real, though invisible work of power being vouchsafed to us, greater far than that of the loaves...we lose the benefit of it by disbelieving it."¹

The Sacramental view adopted by Newman was bound to be reflected in a higher importance being attached to Divine Service and Church architecture on the whole. Perhaps this had already been prepared for, and, in measure, directly produced by the Romantic temper which was one of the chief, though not the most essential, factors in the Oxford Movement. It is the Sacramental religion which becomes the motive for a new reverence for the forms of the Divine Service and its holy places, a motive which would soon show itself to have an intensity and a vehemence such as no aestheticism could have evoked.

In 1834 Newman preached on "The Good Part of Mary," and there he lamented that the age does not require "the entire system of tranquil devotion, holy meditation, freedom from worldly cares, which our Saviour praises in the case of Mary."² Two years later he spoke of "Reverence in Worship" as something that distinguishes the members of the Church, while "those who have separated from the Church of Christ" regard them-

¹. Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. 6, p. 145.
2. Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 332.
selves as having been "brought so near to God that they have no need to fear at all, or to put any restraint upon their words or thoughts when addressing Him....They have learnt to be familiar and free with sacred things, as it were, on principle."¹ He maintains that "we must keep in mind where we are, and then forms will come into our service naturally. We must in all respects act as if we saw God."²

The ordinances of the Church are to keep us watching and waiting. They are there to communicate to us experiences of that which lies on the other side of the thick veil which divides heaven and earth. "At times we seem to catch a glimpse of a Form which we shall hereafter see face to face. We approach, and in spite of the darkness, our hands, or our head, or our brow, or our lips become, as it were, sensible of the contact of something more than earthly. We know not where we are, but we have been bathing in water, and a voice tells us that it is blood. Or we have a mark signed upon our foreheads, and it spake of Calvary. Or we recollect a hand laid upon our heads, and surely it had the print of nails in it, and resembled His who with a touch gave sight to the blind and raised the dead. Or we have been eating and drinking; and it was not a dream surely, that One fed us from His wounded side, and renewed our nature by the heavenly meat He gave."³ The importance of Church architecture is to symbolize the true Spiritual Church, and most unhappy are they who, "while they have eyes to admire, admire them only for their beauty's sake, and the skill they exhibit; who regard them as works of art, not fruits of grace."⁴ Therefore it is only as an act

1. Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. 8, p. 6.
2. Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 8.
3. Ibid., Vol. 5, pp. 10-11.
4. Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 279.
of confession that it has value to decorate the Sanctuary. It is natural and suitable to the adornment of worship "to make the beauty of holiness visible." But "let us use visible things not to hide, but to remind us of things invisible." "May He in His mercy grant that our outward show does not outstrip our inward progress; that whatever gift, rare or beautiful, we introduce here, may be but a figure of inward beauty and unseen sanctity ornamenting our hearts. Hearts are the true shrine wherein Christ must dwell." And in 1842 Newman wrote that the literal bodily action of passing along the aisle, kneeling at the Altar and receiving the gift of eternal life in the form of Bread and Wine must be represented as the Christian's primary duty, a duty which many evade because they believe that the Blessed Sacrament binds them to live very much more strictly and thoughtfully than they do at present. Men are afraid of binding themselves to bear Christ's yoke. "But while the times wax old, and the colours of earth fade, and the voice of song is brought low, and all kindreds of the earth can but wail and lament, the sons of God lift up their heads, for their salvation draweth nigh. Nature fails, the sun shines not, and the moon is dim, the stars fall from heaven, and the foundations of the round world shake; but the Altar's light burns ever brighter; there are sights there which the many cannot see, and all above the tumults of earth the command is heard to show forth the Lord's death, and the promise that the Lord is coming." 

In concluding this chapter, I would point out that the eschatolo-

1. Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. 6, p. 304.
2. Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 312.
3. Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 294.
gical background of the religious thinker of Newman must not be overlooked. Newman expected a sudden Day of Judgment, even as he believed the world to have been suddenly created. Any thought of evolution in nature was foreign to Newman. "He began the world which we see, not from its first seeds and elements, but He created at once the herb and the fruit-tree perfect...not a gradual formation but a complete work."¹ The time between Christ's first and second coming has only a relative reality; before the Incarnation the stream of time flowed straight to the abyss, but then it altered its course and now flows parallel to it. "Christ, then, is ever at our doors...as we listen for a clock to strike, and at length it surprises us; as a crumbling arch hangs, we know not how, and is not safe to pass under; so creeps on this feeble weary world, and one day, before we know where we are, it will end."²  

1. Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. 6, p. 269.  
2. Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 241.
CHAPTER IX.

On the Ideal of the Church

One is surprised to find in the personal development of Newman that, with the publishing of the "Tracts for the Times," a single thought, which previously was only sporadic, was suddenly proclaimed as the saving truth above all others. This was the idea of Apostolic Succession. The condition of solidity in the administration of the Sacraments, and the only sure guarantee for the preservation of right doctrine, was found in this teaching. Newman had no difficulty in putting together a chain of Anglican witnesses, selected from different times, in order to prove the doctrine of Apostolic Succession. He writes in the "Apologia" that it was an otherwise little known Fellow of Oriel, W. James, who, about 1823, explained this doctrine to him during a walk around Christ Church Meadow. It was during his Evangelical period, and he says: "I recollect being somewhat impatient of the subject at the time." There is no trace of this idea having meant anything for Newman's religion before the Oxford Movement.

It seems as though it were strategic rather than religious reasons which gave the idea of Apostolical Succession its dominant place in Newman's conception of the Church in those days. An interesting witness of this is given by Newman himself in his later Roman period, when, in "Lectures on Difficulties of Anglicans," he emphasizes the fact that at the beginning of the movement of 1833 the leading idea was the inde-

1. Tracts for the Times, Ko. 74.
A refuge was sought in "successio apostolica" and all that goes with it, not only because these things were true and right, but in order to shake off the State. It was the political situation, therefore, - the necessity of finding a firm and unshakable foundation for a theory of the Church which could defy the assaults of the age - which made them catch at the principle of Apostolic Succession.

In Tract No. 11, called "The Visible Church," Newman puts together a series of texts in proof that there existed a visible, external Church, with well-defined offices and functions, in the time of the Apostles. But, as a rule, he leaves to others the explicit proof from Scripture which is required to convince the contemporary Church. He felt that Succession was an historical fact. He assures us in Tract No. 7 that the "Episcopal Church Apostolical" is a fact which scarcely needs to be further proved. "Every link in the chain is known from St. Peter to our present Metropolitan. Here, then, I only ask, looking at this plain fact by itself, is there not something of a divine providence in it? Can we conceive that this succession has been preserved, all over the world, amid many revolutions, through many centuries, for nothing?"

The schism from Rome caused no break, and continuity was preserved by the English Episcopate, though Rome's claim to dominance was rejected.

The proof of Apostolical Succession from probability also seems to have had great weight with Newman. He says, "Consider how natural is the doctrine of Succession. When an individual comes to me, claiming to speak in the name of the Most High, it is natural to ask him for his

2. Tract No. 15.
authority....In the case of the Catholic Church, the person referred to, i.e. the Bishop, has received it from a predecessor, and he from another, and so on, till we arrive at the Apostles themselves, and thence our Lord and Saviour....Lastly, the argument from Scripture is surely quite clear to those who honestly wish direction or practice. Christ promised He should be with His Apostles always, as ministers of His religion, even unto the end of the world. In one sense the Apostles were to be alive till He came again; but they all died at the natural time. Does it not follow that there are those now alive who represent them? 1 Newman devoted a special tract to the proof of probability; "On Arguing Concerning the Apostolical Succession." 2 He starts from Bishop Butler's principle of probability. He points out that if there be but a reasonable likelihood of our pleasing Christ more by keeping, than by not keeping, to the fellowship of the Apostolic ministry, this of course ought to be enough to lead those who think themselves moved to undertake the Sacred Office, to seek for a license to do so from it.

It is interesting to notice what part this doctrine occupied in Newman's preaching. In the actual series of the Tracts we find several attempts to preach "Successio." The most effective is Newman's Tract No. 10, "Heads of a Week-day Lecture Delivered to a Country Congregation in....shire." The time is just before Sts. Simon and Jude's Day, so the Apostolic theme is provided. The Apostles were like Christ in that they were His successors in His sufferings. The Apostles are dead, but just as a man lives in his heirs, so the Apostles live in their spiritual descendants, the Bishops. They are apostles to us, though in doctrine

1. Tract No. 7.
2. Tract No. 19.
they are bound by the words of the Apostles, and they suffer like them in imitation of Christ. In Tract No. 47, "The Visible Church," Newman points out that though Christ's overflowing mercy may work outside the Apostolic Church, nevertheless this working does not conflict with the placing of its fullness in a certain ordained society and ministry. It is surprising, however, to how small an extent the idea of Apostolical Succession left its traces behind in Newman's sermons. This seems to show how preponderantly this idea belongs to the polemic armory, not to the inner closet of living faith. At times, however, with rapturous eloquence, he can utilize this motive and give colour and life to it, as when he speaks of "The Visible Church an Encouragement to Faith."

Of Christ's Church he asks, "What is that Church but a pledge and proof of God's never-dying love and power from age to age? He set it up on the foundation of His Twelve Apostles, and promised that the gates of Hell should not prevail against it; and its presence among us is a proof of His power. The royal dynasty of the Apostles is far older than all the kingly families which are now on the earth. Every Bishop of the Church whom we behold, is a lineal descendant of St. Peter and St. Paul after the order of a spiritual birth; - a noble thought if we could realize it!" But it was only during the first period of Newman's life that the idea of succession could call forth something of real rapture, and could obtain a positive religious value. In Newman's sermons it is soon put aside by other and deeper, more intensely religious thought on the nature of the Church.

A bridge between the first years with their one-sided and perhaps

not fully considered proclamation of the Apostolic Succession as the rock, to which the Church had to take refuge in order to resist the storms of the age, and the later systematized conception of the Church, is formed by the two tracts by Newman that bear the famous name "Via Media," (Nos. 38 & 41), later printed together with "Lectures on the Propetheitical Office of the Church" with "Via Media" as the common title. In these tracts on the Via Media written in 1834, the prospective was widened; "successio apostolica" is here only one side of the conception of the Church which is on the point of being shaped. As soon as the first fierceness of controversy was toned down, the need of a broader foundation, a deepening of theory, came in. The object is in the main the same, to maintain the objective nature of the Church against the age's well-meant or malicious attempt at recasting. But it had to be widened to include the whole fabric of the Church; it had to affect preaching and doctrine as well as external ordinances.

As was before indicated, it was the polemic against Rome which gave rise to the most important attempt to systematize the Anglicanism of the Oxford Movement, to define the Via Media. This found expression in Newman's "Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church Viewed Relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism." It is in the nature of the case that the standpoint here maintained has not the fascination of originality. The aim of the author is not to find a new ground to stand on, but to fix firmly the old ground, which, even at the beginning of the 19th century, was maintained by the old-fashioned High Church party, and by the forerunners of Neo-Anglicanism. It is a question of formulating afresh the Classical Anglican theory of antiquity and of
the early Church as the highest court of appeal. The claim of succession is no longer put forward as an isolated fact, but it was proposed to restore it in a wider context whose guarantee and outward sign it originally designed to be. Now what takes the first place is not the Apostolic Commission, but the "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus."

This principle was old; what was new was the attempt to rest a whole system upon it. Would it succeed? "When we profess our Via Media, as the very truth of the Apostles, we seem to by-standers to be mere antiquarians, or pedants, amusing ourselves with illusions or learned subtleties, and unable to grapple with things as they are."

It is a question of making the theory a practical principle. The attempt is made in the first instance with regard to doctrine and preaching.

The main lines of the argument are partly familiar to us already. The Protestant is right in pointing to the Bible as the source of all revelation. But he is wrong when he makes the interpretation of the Bible an affair of the individual by rejecting tradition altogether. Is not Scripture itself tradition written down? What but tradition has handed it on to us and can guarantee its lofty origin? But tradition, on the other hand, is not what Romanists make of it. The proof of this can only be carried out on the basis of a thorough-going study of the primitive Church. To carry this proof to the conclusion that Rome has set aside the authority of antiquity is the first task of Newman's book. But the argument against "popular Protestantism" leads deeper to the very foundation principle. First comes the question of the relation between private judgment and the authority of the society.

Here, too, must a Via Media be found between extremes; the demand of Protestantism that the individual should have the right and the duty of himself examining and interpreting Scripture, on the one hand, and on the other the demand of Rome for unconditional submission to the society in everything; between, on the one side, a view of the Church as nothing but a collection of individuals, of whom some are God's witnesses in a higher degree than others, but taken all together never are or were anything but a collection of fallible men, and, on the other side, the maintenance by Romanists not merely of the authority but of the absolute infallibility of the Church. Via Media cannot bind the individual in every detail, but on the essential points where the Church's witness is unambiguous, as in respect to the Trinity, Incarnation and the like, the individual must submit. And he must employ all the means at his disposal to obtain the knowledge of God's will. Matters of primary importance are never discovered through a free examination, but follow upon authority in the instruction of parents and the teaching of the Church. Then the experiences of the moral life become helpful, as does the direct study of Scripture, only, however, as a witness of the Church and the moral experiences, and interpreted with their assistance. Last of all comes, but only for a few, the study of the early Church, and of common Christianity as a whole. ¹ So may the authority of the Church and the judgment of the individual be brought into harmony. The Church demands acceptance of the doctrine of the Apostles as an objective fact given by revelation, and leaves the individual free to form his views on the remaining points. The whole

¹. Via Media, Vol. 1, p. 266 ff.
problem thus centres on establishing the content of the doctrine of the 
Apostles. On the basis of Scripture alone no concord can be reached. 
Therefore other sources of knowledge must be called in, especially the 
early Church. But its importance lies not merely in the fact that it 
is a means of arriving at the real Apostolic doctrine, but rests chiefly 
on the fact that the Catholic Church, both according to the witness of 
the Creeds and of Scripture, has the promise of infallibility in matters 
of faith. But this held good only as long as it preserved its unity; 
it ceased in and with the Church's external divisions.

In many ways Newman's position may be regarded as typical of 
certain types of Anglicanism even to the present day. But beside this, 
and as a complement to it, we find here already a conception of tradition 
which points beyond the limits of the static idea. Beside the obligatory 
rules of faith, there is what might be called "Prophetic Tradition." 
Almighty God placed in the Church first Apostles; secondly Prophets. 
Apostles rule and preach; Prophets expound. Prophets or Doctors are 
the interpreters of revelation....This teaching is a vast system.... 
pervading the Church like an atmosphere, irregular in its shape, from 
its very profusion and exuberance....This Newman calls Prophetic 
Tradition, existing primarily in the bosom of the Church itself, and 
recorded in such measure as Providence has determined, in the writings 
of eminent men. It seems evident that here we are face to face with an 
idea of the Church which is capable of deepening the historical outlook, 
which opens wider perspectives than any purely static idea, which if 
extended in its full width to apply to all Christendom, not merely in 
its episcopal part, would give a grand outlook on the history of revela-
tion; but also that we have here the embryo of the process of thought which when completed was to appear in the "Idea of Development of Doctrine." The same tendency may also be traced in the attempt to draw a line between the authority of Scripture and that of Tradition, or rather the failure of this attempt. Certainly the definition which Newman's "Apologia" admits that he received from Hawkins is still laid down, i.e., that it is tradition which imparts doctrines, but it is Scripture which gives proof of them. But as, on the one hand, God's Word is not with Protestants limited to the Written Word, on the other the chief proof of the divine revelation of the Written Word is the witness of the oldest Church Fathers. He says, "If asked, then, how I know that the Bible contains all truth necessary to be believed in order to salvation, I simply reply with the first Homily, that the early Church so accounted it, that there is 'a Consent of Catholic Fathers' in its favour." This means that the chief barrier between Scripture and Tradition is broken down, and Scripture itself becomes in a measure part of Tradition. In this tendency to break through the static conception of the Church, we find the seed of an historical idea in a deeper sense than anything before used.

We shall never thoroughly understand Newman's conception of the Church unless we give some thought to his writings on Justification. In modern Church History, the doctrine of Justification has served as a real dividing line between the two forms of Christianity which are broadly termed Catholicism and Protestantism. Newman's "Lectures on

1. Apologia,
3. Ibid., p.284.
Justification," published in 1838, have not generally tempted students of his work to a close study, though they form one of the chief theological documents of the Oxford Movement. R. H. Hutton found the book "somewhat straw-chopping and dry."\(^1\) The book belongs to the golden age of Via Media, and hence fights definitely on a double front. It is as much against the Pope as against Luther. Newman draws freely from the resources of the early Church, and, if any form or system is visible in the background, it is perhaps that of St. Augustine. If we follow back the lines which now diverge so completely, we shall see that Newman seems to think that they are not at all irreconcilable, and that they really rest on the one-sided emphasis of a certain aspect, in itself correct, if viewed in connection with the other sides. This is discovered by reading the advertisement to the Third Edition. When in 1874 Newman re-edits this youthful work, it is significant that he can give an assurance that he still, in all essentials, holds the same doctrine, though he must recall a few points which conflict with the doctrines of the Council of Trent.

Of the two main lines, one is described by the formula of Justification by Faith; the other by that of Justification by Obedience. The Anglican Via Media goes between the two. Its formula is Justification by Baptism. That this, and not faith, is the primary instrument of Justification, is maintained against the Lutheran doctrine, which is also faulty in that it maintains that the faith which justifies imparts its gift without the exercise or even the presence of love.\(^2\) The second

2. Lectures on Justification, p. 29.
main line, that of Obedience, is not faulty like the first; it is only incomplete; and only when it is present in a one-sided way, as in the later Roman Church, to which the inward renewal revealed in obedience is the "unica formalis causa" of Justification, is it in conflict with the Anglican position. In its main features it is true. The Scripture proof of this doctrine need not, as with the Protestant, be derived merely from one or two books, but can be based on the unanimous witness of both Testaments. What the Psalmist longs after and the Prophets promise, and the Apostles announce as given by Almighty God, is one and the same, the capacity of serving God acceptably, or the gift of righteousness; not a shadow, but a substance; not a name, but a power; not an imputation, but an inward work. This doctrine also has behind it the whole witness of the Christian Church. It is a real, intelligible and practical doctrine, while the Lutheran is a novelty which has only three centuries behind it, and properly is a return to Judaism in that it offers shadows and promises in the place of reality. Reputed justification was the gift of the law; but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. Away then with this modern, this private, this arbitrary, this tyrannical system which, promising liberty, conspires against it; which abolishes sacraments to introduce barren and dead ordinances; and for the real participation of Christ and justification through His Spirit would, at the very marriage feast, feed us on shells and husks, who hunger and thirst after righteousness. Newman's idea was that the doctrine of Justification as taught by Continental Protestantism was false; the Roman was incomplete, but it was completed by

1. Lectures on Justification, p. 37.
The third, fourth and fifth lectures are devoted to making clear the conception of justification according to Newman's view. First he allows that the word contains the idea of counting righteous, but includes making righteous, an imparting of righteousness and holiness. This declaration of righteousness precedes the actual making righteous and the process of sanctification. So far there is truth in the forensic mode of thought, because justification is in one of its essential points an acquittal instead of a condemnation of the sinner before God's tribunal. It is a free forgiveness for Christ's sake. But this point is insolubly mingled with another, the assurance of holiness for the future. God deals with us as already righteous in that He anticipates the coming development which will finally make us perfect in His sight. In this sense, imputed righteousness is correct. This is how St. Paul's words, about faith being imputed as righteousness, are explained. "Faith is the element of all perfection; he who begins with faith, will end in unspotted and entire holiness....He who believes has not yet perfect righteousness and unblameableness, but he has the first fruits of it." 3

But it is plain that justification and salvation to Newman do not depend in the first instance on the free grace of forgiveness, but on the work of sanctification. The state of salvation, it is said in a sermon specially illuminating in this context, is "a state of holiness; not one in which we may be pardoned, but in which we are obedient." 4

1. Lectures on Justification, p. 70.
2. Ibid., p. 74.
4. Ibid., p. 184.
Through sin, men fall from this state. One, therefore, cannot speak of a justified sinner. "If he is justified and accepted, he has ceased to be a sinner. The Gospel only knows of justified saints; if a saint sins, he ceases to be justified and becomes a condemned sinner."\(^1\) This standpoint, which Newman supports by a reference to the Apostles' description of the early Church, leads him to classify sins, significantly enough, as sins of weakness, which do not involve the loss of the state of grace, and greater sins, which cannot exist along with faith in a man. This is to some extent a reproduction of the history of penitential discipline in the early Church.

The fundamental idea is, of course, that imputed righteousness is only one side, one mode of regarding the real active righteousness. The same process, according as one has its active or passive side in view, may be called justifying or imputing holiness. "Surely it is a strange paradox to say that a thing is not because He says it is....and the glory of His pronouncing us righteous lies in His leaving us unrighteous."\(^2\) God's imputing of righteousness has a creative power. "Justification is an announcement or fiat of Almighty God, which breaks upon the gloom of our natural state as the Creative Word upon Chaos....It declares the soul righteous, and in that declaration, on the one hand, conveys pardon for its past sins, and on the other, makes it actually righteous."\(^3\) It must also be remembered that it does not diminish our guilt because He gives us a mere acquittal. He must also give us "intrinsic righteousness."

2. Lectures on Justification, p. 78.
3. Ibid., p. 83.
This is the very pith of the matter. Justification consists in a something, a quality, a substance, which comes into and changes a man, and makes him acceptable. The justifying word thus conveys the Spirit, and the Spirit makes our works "pleasing" and "acceptable" to God, and "acceptableness is righteousness; so that the justified are just, really just, in degree indeed more or less, but really so far as this, — that their obedience has in it a gracious quality, which the obedience of unregenerate man has not."¹ This is the proper gift of justification, the entrance into and presence in the soul of the Holy Ghost. To become thus the temple of the Holy Ghost must involve a recreation, a raising out of a state of nature to a state of grace, and this must bear fruit in holiness and obedience. "As a light placed in a room pours out its rays on all sides, so the presence of the Holy Ghost imbues us with life, strength, holiness, love, acceptableness, righteousness."² But the presence of the Spirit is only a form or means of the presence of Christ; it is the Spirit which makes Him present in us, and adapts Christ's work to us. "Christ, then, is our righteousness, by dwelling in us by the Spirit; He justifies us by entering into us....This is really and truly our justification, not faith, not holiness, not a mere imputation; but through God's mercy, the very Presence of Christ."³

This way of thinking opens the gate to sacramental mysticism; it is the sacraments which impart this Presence of Christ. They are, therefore, the means of our justification. This happens first in Baptism, but, "as Holy Communion conveys a more awful presence of God than Holy

1. Lectures on Justification, p. 91.
3. Lectures on Justification, p. 150.
Baptism, so must it be the instrument of a higher justification.\(^1\) The Sacrament is "a grafting invisibly into the body of Christ, a mysterious union with Him and a fellowship in all the grace and blessedness which is hidden in Him....The Almighty Father, looking on us, sees not us, but this Sacred Presence, even His dearly-beloved Son spiritually manifested in us."\(^2\) Justification, therefore, is produced not by a mere gazing on the Cross, as the Israelites gazed on the brazen serpent in the wilderness, nor by confidence that the suffering of Christ guarantees once for all the salvation of the individual, but the Cross must be raised in us, and made present in us through the Spirit.\(^3\) In this thought of the mystic presence of Christ, mediated through the Sacraments, Newman sees a safeguard, not only against the Protestant confidence that the outward atonement is imputed to the believer, but also against the Roman tendency to a doctrine of merit, a tendency to view the influences of grace, not as the operation of a living God, but as something to bargain about, and buy, and traffic with, as if religion were not an approach to things above us, but a commerce with our own equals concerning things we can master. So we cannot speak of a "justitia inhaerens," as if it were ours by nature, but only of a "justitia ahaerens," which is sustained in us by external means. For to what can we point as the condition of our justification? Not to anything of our own, whether our faith, or our holiness, but to the Glorious Shekinah of the Word Incarnate as to the true wedding-garment in which the soul must be dressed.\(^4\) It is, therefore, not only the

1. Lectures on Justification, p. 152.
2. Ibid., pp. 160-1.
3. Ibid., pp. 174-5.
4. Ibid., p. 190.
Cross and its atoning death that we must appropriate in an inward way, but Christ Himself who will be present in us as the Crucified, but still more as the Risen and Glorified Lord. This thought of the Incarnate God-head dwelling in us causes a living faith to rise out of the fetters of dogmatic formulae, and creates a classical expression of the religious content of Sacramental Mysticism.

There is one more phase of Newman's conception of the Church which must be considered. It is his emphasis upon the note of holiness. A partial consideration of this matter has already been given in the previous chapter. This desire for holiness was perhaps the deepest and strongest of those impulses which led Newman to leave the Anglican Church and join the Roman. In his defence of the Anglican Church, he is driven back from the earlier position to maintain the note of holiness as the most essential, really the one thing essential for a Church. In his "Letter to the Bishop of Oxford," for a moment everything else pales before the radiancy of holiness, and he stretches out the hand of brotherhood to everyone, in whatever Church he may be, who has this characteristic. He says; "It is sanctity of heart and conduct which commends us to God. If we be holy, all will go well with us....Sanctity is the great Note of the Church. If the Established Church of Scotland has this Note, I will hope all good things of it; if the Roman Church in Ireland has it not, I can hope no good of it. And in like manner, in our own Church, I will unite with all persons as brethren, who have this Note, without any distinction of party."¹

Gradually the conviction is borne in upon Newman's mind, that it is the Roman Church, and not the Anglican, which reproduces, continues,

and completes the Holy Church of primitive times. Let us note what one of Newman's most intimate friends says about this matter. "Form after form was tried by him, the Christianity of Evangelicalism, the Christianity of Whately, the Christianity of Hawkins, the Christianity of Keble and Pusey; it was all very well, but it was not the Christianity of the New Testament and of the first ages. He wrote the 'Church of the Fathers' to show they were not merely evidences of religion, but really living men; that they could and did live as they taught, and what was there like the New Testament or even the first ages now? Alas! there was nothing completely like them; but of all unlike things, the Church of England with its 'smug parsons,' and pony carriages for their wives and daughters, seemed to him the most unlike: more unlike than the great unreformed Roman Church, with its strange, unscriptural doctrines, and its undeniable crimes, and its alliance, wherever it could, with the world. But at least the Roman Church had not only preserved, but maintained at full strength through the centuries to our day two things of which the New Testament was full, and which are characteristic of it - devotion and self-sacrifice....Devotion and sacrifice, prayer and self-denying charity, in one word sanctity, are at once on the surface of the New Testament and interwoven with its substance. He recoiled from a representation of the religion of the New Testament which to his eyes was without them. He turned to where, in spite of every other disadvantage, he thought he found them....It could not and it did not escape him, that the Roman Church, with all the good things which it had, was, as a whole, as unlike the Church of the New Testament and of the first ages as the English. He recognized it frankly, and built up a great theory to
account for the fact....But what won his heart and enthusiasm was one thing; what justified itself to his intellect was another. And it was the reproduction, partial, as it might be, yet real and characteristic, in the Roman Church of the life and ways of the New Testament, which was the irresistible attraction that tore him from the associations and affections of half a lifetime. ¹

This passage from Dean Church's writings is valuable in helping us to understand Newman's "Ideal of the Church." If Dean Church is right in saying that "what won his heart and enthusiasm was one thing; what justified itself to his intellect was another," then it would seem that that which is purely intellectual and systematic had never in Newman's eyes more than an accessory value, and that his true life was entirely moral and that his successive doctrines were always, so to speak, a function of his conscience. ² His decision to join the Roman Catholic Church looks like the heroic act of a man who thinks he has found a Church which is mistress of holiness, and who feels that, in joining her membership, he is entering the communion of saints.

In concluding this chapter, may I quote from one of Newman's letters which will give his own ripe and settled opinion on the point we have been discussing, and which will tell us what he found in the Roman Church which he did not find in the Anglican. "In the time of the early Roman Empire, when Christianity arose, it arose with a certain definite ethical system....Next, I have a clear perception, clearer and clearer as my own experience of existing religions increases, and such

2. The Mystery of Newman, H. Brémond, p. 344.
as everyone will share with me, who carefully examines the matter, that this ethical system....is the living principle also of present Catholicism, and not of any form of Protestantism whatever - living, both as to its essential life, and also as being its vigorous motive power; both because without it Catholicism would soon go out, and because through it Catholicism makes itself manifest and is recognized.

"Outward circumstances, or conditions of its presence, may change or not, the Pope may be a sovereign one day or a subject another;..... there might be no devotions to the Blessed Virgin formerly, they may be superabundant of late; the Holy Eucharist might be a bare commemoration in the first century, and is a sacrifice in the nineteenth;.... but I say, even supposing there have been changes in doctrine and polity, still the ethos of the Catholic Church is what it was of old time, and whatever and whoever quarrels with Catholicism now, quarrels virtually, and would have quarrelled, if alive 1800 years ago, with the Christianity of the Apostles and Evangelists."¹

CHAPTER X.

On the Permanent Value of Newman's Apologetic

In bringing to a conclusion this appreciation of Newman's Religious Philosophy, I should like to quote again the famous maxim of St. Augustine: "Securus judicat orbis terrarum." This phrase, the force of which Newman felt to be such a crushing blow to Anglo-Catholicism, may be fairly applied to Newman himself in estimating his worth as a writer and thinker.

It should be remembered that not a few of those who have written about Newman have been so affected by the charm of his personality that they have over-estimated his worth. One of the reasons why writers have been inclined to magnify Newman's ability is to be found in his multifariousness. "He is at once a religious leader, a preacher, a father confessor, a religious philosopher, an historian, a theologian and a poet - even a novelist."¹ While all this is true, it must never be allowed to obscure our judgment as we strive to estimate the permanent value of Newman's apologetic.

As a religious writer, Newman has long ago been assigned his place. It is amongst the highest. Doubtless there are great writers who make a more universal appeal, whose message is more readily apprehended of the multitude; but nowhere can one find another author who speaks in accents of such rare distinction to those who have ears to hear. One of his

¹. Last Lectures, W. Ward, p. 6.
most recent biographers says; "It was not for nothing that Newman devoted himself to music in his youth. Above his words, or stealing through them, comes the sound of music, now faint and far-off, now loud and near; now the plaintive, passionate appeal of a solitary violin, pathetic and forlorn, now the majestic harmonies of the full orchestra. The words address themselves to the intellect; the music which comes from the subtle, instinctive choice of those words and their arrangement in the sentence, appeals directly to the heart."\(^1\) Surely this music is the secret of the charm which is exerted upon every heart by such a prose writer as Newman.

As a religious leader, Newman won for himself an exalted position. His powers as a controversialist were exerted on behalf of causes near and dear to his heart; causes whose greatness is the measure of his own. As he was not the originator of the Oxford Movement, so neither was he the sole agent in its activities. In one of his letters, (July 1835), he says, "A flame seems arising in so many places as to show no mortal incendiary is at work."\(^2\) Of all the flames kindled by this supernatural incendiary, Newman was the brightest and hottest. His secession in 1845 may have seemed at the time as if the fire were going out; but in the event it did not do so. The flame continued to burn and spread until all phases of religious life in England had been quickened by its glow and warmth. Today, one hundred years after the initiation of the Oxford Movement, the abiding influence of Newman's leadership is more generally recognized than at any time in the past. The con-

sequences of the Oxford Movement are apparent to all. It has helped to bring about a restoration of decency and order in public worship; the introduction into certain Anglican Churches of the confessional fashioned very much on the Roman model; the restoration of religious orders in the Church of England; the insistence on the spiritual independence of the Church, and so on. In the development of these ideas, Newman played his part.

But perhaps the very fact that Newman was great as a religious writer and leader was a barrier to his achieving true greatness as a religious philosopher. Both as a writer and leader he is seen using his great powers to strengthen the forces of the Church, rather than to elucidate the philosophical principles upon which it rests. In the Anglican Church, as well as in the Roman, his primary object was to work for the well-being of the Church, to extend its influence, and to meet the objections which made many reject its claims. In this work of strengthening the existing supports of belief, he saw that, as a matter of experience, religion is best kindled and intensified not by arguments, but by appeals. This appeal must be made through a man's conscience, his affections and his imagination. This could best be done through that indefinable power - personal influence. To a remarkable extent, Newman possessed this power. It was this force of personal influence which made him one of the outstanding leaders of his generation. Because of this gift of personality, he was able to gain the love of his fellows, and to communicate to them his own visions of Christianity, and his own passionate convictions. He had the gift of instilling in them not dry, formal, theoretical arguments, but the living processes of mind through
which he himself had passed. All his views were presented through the pictorial medium of his own mind. This intense subjectivity, while it contains the secret of his success as a religious leader and writer, also contains the reason why his work as a religious philosopher has not received wider recognition. In spite of this fact, he did do some creative thinking in the realm of religious philosophy. It is, therefore, quite true for Wilfrid Ward to say "that some of the most interesting modern theories were first outlined by Newman quite distinctly though in unscientific language."¹ Let us now proceed to notice the specific contribution which he made to the philosophy of religion.

(a) His Anticipation of Subconscious Reasoning.

The investigation of the subconscious levels of the mind is one of the developments of modern psychology which has excited general interest. Writing over thirty years ago, William James pronounced this to be the most important step forward that had occurred in psychology in his time. His description of the phenomena was that there exists beyond the field of consciousness, or subliminally, a set of memories, thoughts, or feelings which are extra marginal and outside of the primary consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious acts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs.² It seems to me that Newman, in his theory of Implicit or Unconscious Reasoning and the Illative Sense has made a genuine contribution to this study of the subconscious. It is true, of course, that he did not distinguish all the divisions of the subconscious with their characteristic data.

But he did recognize the operation of subconscious processes of reasoning in the practical emergencies of life. A good illustration of this is furnished by the decisions which are sometimes made by a great general.\(^1\)

His previous experiences have left their mark on his mind and imparted wisdom to him. He cannot adequately formulate their details, because he has largely forgotten them. That is, they have become subconscious.

When the need arises, however, the general is able rapidly to draw conclusions as to the dispositions and plans of the enemy, which he will rightly act upon. Again and again he is justified by the event. But it is likely enough that, even given time for the fullest reflection, he could not express half the reasons which determine his conclusions. In such an instance, it is the subconscious process of reasoning which really counts. In one sense, the subconscious is something like a storehouse. It is a sort of repository upon which the individual draws for information and direction. In another sense, the subconscious is something like a workshop in which mental processes are carried out.\(^2\)

Newman's Implicit Reason is very similar to this inside workshop. In contrast with Explicit Reason, it is a sort of secondary system of self-consciousness endowed with volition and intelligence. Newman found that the Implicit Reason produced results in the conscious field which he could not own as the result of any rational process, while yet they had the marks of being the product of a train of thought, or of a sustained effort of will. The decision, in the oft-quoted words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, "is delivered, like a pre-paid parcel, laid at the door of consciousness, like a foundling in a basket." In the inner workshop of the mind, the

Implicit Reason is the working population, so to speak, producing the results. As has already been shown, this is the same subject which Newman pursued more formally and with great variety of illustration in his "Grammar of Assent."

(b) His Anticipation of Pragmatism.

What is meant by pragmatism is thus summarized by William James:

"Thought in movement has for its only conceivable motive the attainment of belief, or thought at rest. Only when our thought about a subject has found its rest in belief can our action on the subject firmly and safely begin. Beliefs, in short, are rules for action; and the whole function of thinking is but one step in the production of active habits. If there were any part of a thought that made no difference in the thought's practical consequences, then that part would be no proper element of the thought's significance....Our conception of these practical consequences is for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance...."

Wilfrid Ward quotes a letter from Professor Schiller to himself, in which he says: "I recognize that Newman was one of the forerunners and anticipators of pragmatism, and that he discovered in a quite original and independent manner the great discrepancy there is between the actual course of human reasoning and the description of it in the logical textbooks." This statement is verified when we come to examine Newman's writings, for he was not only keenly alive to the truth of pragmatism, but he also guarded himself against the exaggerations contained in this idea. At a comparatively early period in his career,

2. Last Lectures, W. Ward, p. 86.
in his famous letters on "The Tamworth Reading Room," Newman dealt strongly on the pragmatist's initial plea that life is for action, and that action presupposes belief. "Man is born for action. Action flows not from inferences, but from impressions, - not from reasonings, but from Faith." Along this line he argued for a generous faith prompted largely by the practical instinct, and in excess of formal proof. He says: "Life is not long enough for a religion of inferences; we shall never have done beginning, if we determine to begin with proof. We shall ever be laying our foundations; we shall turn theology into evidences, and divines into textuaries. We shall never get at our first principles. Resolve to believe nothing, and you must prove your proofs and analyze your elements, sinking further and further, and finding 'in the lowest depth a lower deep,' till you come to the broad bosom of scepticism. I would rather be bound to defend the reasonableness of assuming that Christianity is true, than to demonstrate a moral governance from the physical world. Life is for action. If we insist on proofs for everything, we shall never come to action; to act, you must assume, and that assumption is faith." These are the principles, as every one knows, which Newman applied to his own life and beliefs.

(c) His Application of the Evolutionary Idea to Religious Dogma.

As Newman's Theory of Development has already been discussed, it is not necessary to give much further consideration to the matter. One of the things which should be noticed, however, is the influence which Newman's writings on Development have had upon the momentous problems of "Modernism." There are some leaders of the Modernist Movement in

1. Discussions and Arguments, p. 304.  
2. Ibid., p. 295.
the Catholic Church, such as Abbé Loisy, who claim that Newman is nothing less than the father of the Modernists, and the initiator of the movement. If this interpretation is legitimate, then, through a strange irony of fate, Newman has become the inspirer of the most formidable Catholic rebellion since the days of Luther and Calvin. The question is, Does such an affiliation exist? Would Newman himself have recognized his own thoughts in the new doctrines? Dr. Sarolea, in his biography of Newman, has a most enlightening chapter in which he seeks to answer these very questions.¹

According to Dr. Sarolea, one of the elements of Modernism is the acceptance of the principle of variation and development as opposed to the principle of immutability; it applies to theology the Darwinian doctrine of evolution, being equally opposed to revolution and reaction. The Modernists assert that the Church, being a living organism, must obey the laws of all living organisms. To live is to change; it is to adapt oneself to the needs of the times and of the surroundings. And the more strenuous the life is, the more rapid must be the changes. New problems arise, along with new doctrines and new institutions, new habits and new traditions. The relations between the Church and State cannot be the same under an ancient monarchy and under a modern republic. Catholic teaching cannot be the same in the Middle Ages, when the clergy had a monopoly of all science and met with no opposition, and in contemporary society, when education is general and compulsory, and where many scientists seem hostile to the Church. Ecclesiastical discipline

cannot be the same in a community where passive obedience is the rule, and in a community where universal suffrage is supreme. To a new situation there must correspond new duties; new needs must create new organs, and give rise to new principles. The Modernists assert that Newman has provided the Church with such an organ. He has been the first to accustom the Catholic thought to a new conception, so different from the conception of immutability, and to apply to theology the methods of biology.

It must be pointed out that Newman does not give to the word "development" the vague and elastic meaning which it possesses in biology. He is very careful to distinguish development from adaptation and from variation in the Darwinian sense. The development of a dogma is merely the unfolding of possibilities and consequences contained in the premisses. Although Newman repeatedly used the analogy of organic development, it should be remembered that his conception of development is more of a logical process than an organic growth. The relation between the undeveloped dogma and its unfolding is the relation between an implicit and an explicit statement. Therefore it is not historically true to assert that Newman is the Darwin of theology. On the other hand, the Modernists would reply that Newman has thrown into general circulation, and has covered with the authority of his name, a magic word which has implied a new method of research. Newman's "Essay" has provided Catholic Apologetics with a working hypothesis, and with a temporary means of escape from the rigidity of scholastic dogma, rather than with a new philosophic principle. The theory of development has thus become the "Open Sesame" to unlock all the secret gates of the old theology. It may be true that the disciples have gone far
beyond the master, and that the master would have disavowed them. The point to be remembered is that Newman has been the initiator, and the significance of his writings must be appreciated not merely through what they actually contain, but through the influence they have exerted.

One of the religious philosophers with whom Newman frequently has been compared is Pascal. Especially is this true in France. "For the last ten years the younger generation have turned away from the problem of Pascal, and have given their allegiance to Cardinal Newman; and today, even in France, the influence of Newman on the elite of Roman Catholicism is certainly stronger and deeper than the influence of Pascal."¹ By comparing their works, one will be able, in a more accurate way, to assign Newman his rightful place in religious philosophy. The differences between them serve only to deepen the resemblances. One was a Professional Churchman; the other a layman. The religious experience of Pascal was a revolution; that of Newman an evolution. The life of the first was short and tragic; that of the second was long and serene. The religious philosophy of the Frenchman is embodied in one short volume of scattered thoughts; that of the Englishman is found in the many carefully prepared volumes that he wrote. These differences, however, are more apparent than real, and when the two men are studied together, they are seen to have fundamentally the same intellectual and religious temperaments. Both have the same universality and diversity of mental gifts, the same combination of contradictory qualities, the same fundamental originality. To each of these writers, religion is a disposition of the soul, a fact

of experience. Religious truth is not established by the ratiocinative faculties; it is proved and realized by our lives. Each of them bases the truth of religion on the interpretation and analysis of psychological experience. Each insists on the subjective and individual aspect, rather than on the ecclesiastical, or political and social aspects. And so Dr. Sarolea eloquently says: "The influence of both writers proves beyond contest that several generations instinctively and independently have read the same meaning into their works. Both have turned religious thought into new and deeper channels; they have raised the moral temperature of those who have come under their spell. Consciously, they have no doubt worked in the cause of Roman Catholicism in the strict sense of the word, but their influence has exceeded the limits of their Church; they have been, and continue to be, the delight alike of Catholics and Protestants, of believers and sceptics, - and thus, unconsciously, and above all, they have worked in the cause of that wider Catholicism which includes all those who believe in the Kingdom of God, and who strive to realize it in their lives and hearts."

Another interesting and profitable comparison might be made between Newman and Ritschl. While Newman was writing and working in England, Ritschl was exerting his influence on Germany. It is a comparatively easy matter to discover similar lines of thought running through the writings of these men. It was Ritschl's aim to present Christian thought as its own sufficient foundation. He sought to secure for religion a domain within the sphere of feeling and practical judgment into which theoretical reason could not intrude. The aim of Newman's work was to

withdraw religion and the proofs of it from the region of reason into the realm of conscience and imagination. To both men religion was a very practical matter. The truth contained in the words of Jesus, "He that willeth to do my will, he shall know of the doctrine," was very real to each of them. Ritschl tried to keep theology independent of philosophy, and free from all contamination of metaphysics in order that he might bring it within the realm of experience. Newman, while not turning aside from the way of the philosopher, did avoid philosophic terms and expressions in all his writings. Both men denied the competence of reason to reach an adequate or assumed idea of God. While Newman held no high opinion of the proofs of God, Ritschl rejected them as inadequate, for they yielded only a world substance and a world soul. The two men were in unison in their attempt to promote piety, to satisfy spiritual wants and to further the practical work of the Church. Both inaugurated movements that were intensely sincere and alive.

One of the aspects of Ritschl's theology which has attracted great attention is his teaching with respect to value-judgments. Mozley describes them as a means of understanding aright given phenomena.\(^1\) They are a means of arriving at truth. Value-judgments do not float in the air unconnected with any solid reality. They are a means of approaching the given facts of life by a method of judgment which differs from other methods of judging only in starting from a function of the personality different from that which forms the groundwork of philosophical judgments. They are the assertion of the personal element in all knowledge, and a protest against excessive intellectualism. They mean

\(^1\) Ritschlianism, J. K. Mozley.
that in theology, knowledge must be a matter of personal conviction arising from individual experience.

This is very similar to Newman's Illative Sense. Newman was trying to show that in any theory touching the human personality, it is impossible to eliminate the personal equation. The Illative Sense is the personal element and individual judgment in the province of religion and morals. The Illative Sense analyses, selects, classifies and combines. It determines the angle under which an object is to be considered. It is the Illative Sense which settles the value on each particular fact, and which finally gives the casting vote in any decision of the mind. The Illative Sense, like Ritschl's value-judgments, is used for arriving at truth, and involves the whole nature or personality, and can never adequately be translated into terms of the intellect.

Another of Ritschl's main contentions was that it is impossible to understand the spiritual life as a whole by means of the logical determinations of the subject. Religious truth depends not on intellectual arguments, but on the direct experience of man as a spiritual being. Newman also contended that the spiritual eye alone can see spiritual things. "The religious mind sees much which is invisible to the irreligious mind. They have not the same evidence before them."¹ The sceptic may be perfectly honest in the conclusion which he draws; but the prior question arises whether his inability to see in the facts the deeper significance which the believer sees in them may not be due to his failure in the past to train his moral and religious sense. What Newman is emphasizing is that both believer and unbeliever form their different opinions under the hidden influence of antecedent convictions.

This again shows the effect of the personal equation, or Illative Sense, in all religious inquiry.

If the points of agreement between Newman and Ritschl are striking, so also are the differences. In many respects the two men pursued different ends by the same means. Some people say the same thing by the use of different words. Others, again, use almost the same words, but mean a different thing. The comparison between Newman and Ritschl is of this latter kind. Value-judging for Ritschl had as its ground of operation the Christian revelation, where the human spirit was confronted by Christ. He found certainty in Christ. Newman, on the other hand, was confronted in revelation by the Catholic Church. He also was seeking for certainty, but his theory of the Illative Sense gave him only probability. Instead of appealing to objective certainty, as it is found in Christ, as Ritschl did, Newman appealed to the authority of the Church to guarantee the truth of his religious beliefs. Ritschl's theory of value-judgments led to his condemnation of ecclesiastical dogma. He felt that the ecclesiastical dogmas of the Catholics were advantageous to the Church rather than profitable to faith. Newman, on the other hand, found in dogma the essence of revelation, and he made it the backbone of his religion.

In closing, may I recall again Newman's great purpose. His chief concern was to assist his fellow-men to reach certitude in the high matters of religious faith. As one reviews the religious history of last century, he is forced to admit that there was scarcely a man, living at that time in England, who could rival Newman in the single-ness, the devotion, the steadfastness and the nobility of his main
effort in life. One can say this, even though he cannot accept for himself Newman's conception of the Church of Christ. That, of course, has nothing to do with an accurate appraisal of Newman's work. What is perfectly clear to everyone who sympathetically studies Newman's life, is that, from the beginning to the end of his career, he was filled with a fervent love for God, a deep appreciation of the worth of the Christian revelation, and a steadfast resolve to devote the whole force of a singularly powerful and intense character to the endeavour to deepen the religious life of his fellow-men. He treated the difficulties of faith in his own way. He devoted the extraordinary learning, genius and ardour of his long life, with the most perfect singleness of purpose, to the battle with these difficulties. If any man ever succeeded in anything, Newman succeeded in convincing his fellows that, as far as he himself was concerned, the true key to the enigmas of life is God's revelation of Himself through His Church. The depth and luminosity of his conviction have been such that many a groping soul has found in them the "Kindly Light" that leads him through the gloom.
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