An Examination of

The Doctrine of the INNER LIGHT

in the APOLOGY of Rt. Barclay

by

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1931.

Degree conferred, 2d July, 1931.
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Historical Introduction. Experience and Doctrine.


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The Inner Light was an experience before it was a doctrine; and it is as an essay in the translation of the first into the second, that Barclay's work is to be regarded. The relations and reactions of doctrine and experience may be hard to define; and the absolute priority of either, impossible to establish. On the one hand, no experience, however fresh or transforming, comes to a wholly virgin mind; a mind without any preconceptions, habits of thought, judgments of value; in a word, without the elements, at least, of a doctrinal system. This is only to say that the new experience is the experience of a mind, and not the imprint of alien characters upon tabula rasa. On the other hand, it is of the essence of experience to make changes. It never leaves things as it finds them. And sometimes it happens, as here, that the change is revolutionary. Even if the new experience adds nothing to the sum of accepted truth, it yet presents it in a new light. What had been heard by the hearing of the ear, the eye now sees for itself, and what the eye has seen, the tongue renders, with a new note of conviction and authority.

It is not always, perhaps not often, that the tongue is equal to its office. If the poet confesses his inability to "utter the thoughts that arise in me," the prophet is at a
similar disadvantage, and if, following the prophet, the system-maker succeeds in reducing the experience to system, is not the very term "reducing" of ominous significance? The very words the prophet uses were coined by men for other purposes, - a debased coinage, "soiled by all ignoble use," and the terms and concepts of the system maker are not freshly quarried from the living rock, but are rather like stones, already hewn, taken from dilapidated and dismantled structures, and not quite congruous with their new abode. Not seldom, then, will an exercise of sympathetic imagination be required of the candid student, - a touch of intuition that carries him beyond the surface of his author's thought, and seats him at the centre of his author's heart. This is what we mean by distinguishing the experience from the doctrine that formulates it.

As applied to our present enterprise, it will prescribe the attitude with which we approach the study of Barclay's Apology. The Inner Light, we are assured, was a great and transforming experience, individually, and nationally, of far-reaching significance. The best expression it has received has not been in any intellectual form, - not even in the justly famous Apology, - but in the lives, the actions and the sufferings of a "peculiar people," whose surface peculiarities, if in some sense a reflection of the founder's idiosyncracies, are far more the index of a peculiar sincerity in serving Christ and taking up his cross.
The doctrine and experience of the Inner Light belong to that form of religion called mystical. The term Mysticism has perhaps been over-driven, variously applied at various times, and used to cover religious experience that are by no means akin. We shall not here attempt to define it, - but shall simply annex it, to indicate "the private inwardness and originality of the experience in which the soul is consciously one with God." As here used, it means religious experience in an intense and lively form. It may be expressed as the subjective knowledge of God, - i.e., God is known, as He is, as Subject, and not merely as Object, of consciousness. ("I live - yet not I, but Christ liveth in me").

To the mass of mankind, the mystical experience; the subjective knowledge of God, - is unknown or unrecognized, - God being with them when they know it not. Their knowledge is objective; - a knowledge less of God, than about Him. It is the knowledge of hearsay and instruction and authority - conveyed by tradition, upheld by institution, stated in creed, and vivified by cultus.

The relation of the mystic to the institution, of subjective to objective knowledge of God, is a variable quantity. It is certain that the subjective knowledge of God is not independent of the objective; and many mystics remain loyal servants of their church. But these relations are not seldom characterised by strain. The external authority is not always willing to cede its claims to the rights of internal. The tension is
visible in the case of the prophets; and, as Lange says, "in history, mysticism generally appears in reaction against the formula."

The Reformation was such a movement of revolt, and is to be primarily understood as "the victory of mysticism over scholasticism in the Western Church" (Lange). Its philosophical, theological, literary and (above all) political complications must not be allowed to conceal the fact that it was the outcome, before all else, of a religious need and claim.

But here again is seen that uncertain and wavering relation of the mystic to the institution which we have just referred to. The Reformation by no means broke entirely with the past. It took over from the Catholic system all the objective doctrines of Christianity. It retained in their entirety the ecumenical creeds. It was in soteriology that the issue with Rome was joined, - the need was, not to reject or revise the creeds, but how to get right with the God therein declared.

The way of salvation was found by a man who hacked his way through alone. Having found it for himself, he declared it to Europe, - the way of Justification by faith. This really means, the re-discovery of Christ, and of God in Christ. When Christ is truly discovered, it is as Christ-for-us, or rather, God in Christ for us, - to Whom, and to Whose approach, the sole response is faith. But this discovery, though truly
objective, is not objective only. No real knowledge of persons is wholly objective. Objective knowledge is impersonal, cool, dispassionate. No personal relations can be set up, or endure, on such terms. Real knowledge of a person is subjective as well as objective. It implies sympathy and intuition. My friend must be "in me," ere I can say I know him, and can call him friend. And so, eminently, of Christ. If Christ is, objectively, Christ for us; He is, subjectively, Christ in us. And He is not known even objectively apart from some degree of subjective knowledge, and so the apostle speaks of the revealing of God's Son "in me." He knows both sides of the relation. He knows he is objectively, "in Christ;" he feels that Christ is subjectively "in him." This is Pauline mysticism, - mysticism in the best sense.

The doctrine of Justification by Faith, rightly regarded, holds both these sides of the relation in due balance. Trouble begins when the two sides fall apart,

Thus, in relation to the Fact of Christ, there is a double danger, - that of a false objectivity and that of a false subjectivity. History reveals that neither danger was avoided. The Reformation experience maintained the just balance, and expressed it justly in the doctrine of Justification by faith. But the Reformation experience was not maintained: it fell apart in both directions. In the one, it became a new scholasticism; in the other, it became, in the worse sense, mystical. It is a development in the latter sense that we have before us.
Prior to the Reformation, in England, and in Europe, there was an abundance of mystical religion; and a mass of literature, accumulated during centuries, was ready for the religious revival when it should come. It is not doubtful, however, that influential as such mystical movements and writings may have been in stimulating the subjective, experimental side of piety, the fresh discovery and wide diffusion of the Scriptures far outweighed all other influences. The sacred volume had an immense vogue, and became a capital article of commerce. In England, from the beginning of the XVII century, its circulation was nation-wide. "The people became the people of a book, and that book, the Bible" (Green.)

This preoccupation with Scripture was part cause, and part effect, of the ecclesiastical situation. The divine right of kings being now denied, that of episcopacy went with it: the establishment was in the melting-pot. But it did not altogether melt. The old church tradition still held, in certain quarters, its ground. The Bible, if not able to supplant the tradition, at least controlled it. The Reform parties were two, - those who, not discarding tradition, were willing to surrender what Scripture forbade; and those, who were determined to allow nothing but what Scripture enjoined. With one, the Anglicans, it was a question of how much it was possible to save; with the others, the Puritans, of how little it was obligatory to retain. The latter gained an ascendancy, which proved to be impermanent. The abolition of prelacy (1643) and of the Prayer
Book (1645), registered the political supremacy of Presbytery, but did little to lodge the doctrines of Calvin or the polity of Geneva in the English heart. By the middle of the century, institutional religion in England was at its lowest ebb.

On the other hand, the interest in the doctrine rose to the highest pitch. The experience of Bunyan, a man of genius, but also a man of the people, is typical. Every man had the Bible in his hand, and the fear of Destruction in his heart; and the pages of the one were anxiously scanned to find a way of deliverance from the other. The scrutiny did not yield the assurance required. The oracles were conflicting, giving rise by turns to elation and despair. The voice of Scripture was equivocal; the incidence of threat and promise too uncertain. No authoritative decision could be given by a disrupted Church. An internal witness must speak. "You must cry mightily to be set down by the Holy Spirit in the Word." So "holy Mr. Gifford," Bunyan's pastor, and in this, holy Mr. Gifford was but re-echoing the testimony of Scripture itself.

The Bible purported to be itself the product of the Spirit. It recorded the utterances of "holy men of old who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost;" and it testified to the continued possibility of precisely such revelations as those which its pages recorded. The sublime figure of the prophet witnessed to the intimacy of God with men; and Moses, first of the line, was the man who had seen God, and spoken to Him as a friend. The NT shewed the same phenomenon, now democratised. Not
apostles only, and specially gifted men, but the commonalty of
the Christian Church, the least in the Kingdom of God, were
what they were by a birth of the Spirit and an unction from on
high. The confession of Christ as Lord, required by every
catechumen, was one that could only be given in and through
the Spirit. The fruits of life that accredited his profession,
were fruit of the Spirit. Not to have heard of the Spirit was
proof of not having received Christian baptism; not to be led
by the Spirit was to be as "a heathen man and a publican."

Such was the total impression derived from any earnest study
of the Scriptures, and to such study, seventeenth century
England was largely devoted. The rise of an emotional,
inspirational type of piety is thus easily understood. Tides
of feeling ran too strongly to be confined within any ecclesias-
tical or confessional barriers. Separatist sects multiplied
exceedingly. From the high Anglican, through the Presbyterians
and Independents to the Seekers, the Familists, the Ranters, -
the gamut may be said to have been complete.

It is towards these last bodies, who formed the Left Wing
of religious society, that our gaze must be specially diverted.

"There was" says Rufus Jones, (Stud.Myst.Relig.p.469.)
"in England, under the Commonwealth a real contagion of the
idea of God as indwelling." In the case of the Ranters, this
was held with no moral criterion to guard it. The Familists,
or Family of Love, insisted on the indwelling God as giving the
guarantee of a real righteousness, an actual (as distinguished
from a merely imputed holiness. The regenerate state was a real reversal of the Fall; it brought a man into "the same perfection of holiness which was in Adam before the Fall," and this state was attainable here and now. The Seekers were a body of people who were keenly alive to the present state of apostacy, and who believed it could only be ended by a divine interposition. They had left all visible churches and societies in despair, and wandered up and down "as doves without their mates." They associated with all like-minded, and used to meet, not formally or in set order, but they waited upon God in silence, and spoke only as "anything rose in anyone of their minds that they thought savoured of a divine spring" (Penn.) It is obvious how near in spirit to the later Society of Friends were those Seekers, waiting for the return of a lost Apostolic Age. It was among these that Fox found his best reception. He saw in them a "field white unto harvest;" and they, in him, the God-sent apostle of that restoration for which they had been waiting.

The experience of Fox, at once typical/creative, we must accordingly try to delineate.

George Fox was born in 1624, and died in 1690. He lived through an era of social and ecclesiastical upheaval; and saw to the end of mediaeval and the beginning of modern England;

He was of the people, - his family of the lower middle class, simple, comfortable, godfearing. From the age of 19, George
followed no occupation of wage or of profit; but had, from
some unknown source, a sufficiency for his own simple wants
and for charitable outlays. The family was "Church of England,"
which at that time varied in complexion, topographically, -
here, Laudian; here, Presbyterian; and here, Congregational.
His own minister was as it happened, Presbyterian, and was later
ejected for noncomformity.

As a child George was "taught how to walk to be kept pure.
When I came to eleven years of age I knew pureness and right­
eousness." His youthful acquaintances found that "if George
said Verily, there was no altering him."

A crisis arose in his 19th year. At a fair, with friends,
he was invited to drink. He thought it no harm, his friends
being "professors" (i.e. Church members.) But when they began
drinking healths, - a new custom, - George left them. He got no
sleep that night. Towards morning, a Voice spoke in his heart:
"Thou seest how young people go together into vanity, and old
people into the earth. Thou must forsake all, both young and
old, and keep out of all, and be a stranger to all." Thus,"at
the command of the Lord, I left my relations and brake off all
familiarity or friendship with young or old." The incident in
the inn was an apocalypse of prevailing depravity. Extrication
from an untoward generation was his urgent need.

His flight was also a search. "I fasted much, and walked
abroad in solitary places many days, and often took my Bible, and
sat in hollow trees and lonesome places, till night came on,
and frequently in the night walked mournfully abroad by myself, for I was a man of sorrows in the times of the Lord's first workings with me."

Things got worse. At first he would confer with ministers of the Establishment, preachers, and any who might be expected to be able to help. All to no purpose. Meantime it occasionally happened that he had "openings," glimpses, as through an open door, of another world, of truth and reality. As thus, that a christian was constituted not by church baptism, but by a new birth: and thus, that to be bred at Oxford or Cambridge was no sufficient qualification for a minister of Christ. Or thus, that God, who made the world, did not dwell in temples made with hands, but in people's hearts.

Trite as these "openings" seem to us, they were not so in XVII century England. They had to be discovered. They were in Scripture. Why had he to "discover" them? Plainly because Scripture could not render even the truths it contained. These must come round by an inner way. Nothing, even in Scripture, was a word of God to Fox which was not thus inly rendered, delivered to him, G.F., as freshly and immediately by the Holy Spirit, as it had been to the sacred writer.

These openings are still negative, what a Christian was not; what a minister of Christ was not; what a temple was not. The positive counterpart is known only as a necessity, not yet as an experience.

At last (1646) "When all my hopes were gone, so that I had
nothing outwardly to help me, nor could I tell what to do, then -
oh then I heard a Voice which said, "There is One, even Christ Jesus, that can speak to thy condition." And when I heard it, my heart did leap for joy. Then did the Lord gently lead me along, and did let me see His love, which was endless and eternal and surpasseth all the knowledge that men have in the natural state, or can get by history or books:"

His new experience must be given in his own words:-

"Now was I come up through the Flaming Sword into the Paradise of God. All things were new, and all the creation gave another smell unto me than before, beyond what words can utter. I knew nothing but pureness and innocency and righteousness, being renewed up into the image of God by Christ Jesus, so that, I say, I was come up to the state of Adam which he was in before he fell. The creation was opened to me, and it was shewed me how all things had their names given them, according to their nature and virtue. And I was at a stand in my mind, whether I should practise physic for the good of mankind, seeing the nature and virtues of the creatures were so opened to me by the Lord. But I was immediately taken up in spirit to see into another, or more stedfast state than Adam's in innocency even into a state in Christ Jesus that should never fall. And the Lord shewed me that such as were faithful to Him, in the power and light of Christ, should
come up into that state in which Adam was before he fell, in which the admirable works of the creation, and the virtues thereof, may be known through the openings of that Divine Word of wisdom and power by which they were made. Great things did the Lord lead me into, and wonderful depths were opened unto me, beyond what by words can be declared, but as people come into subjection to the Spirit of God and grow up in the image and power of the Almighty, they may receive the word of wisdom that opens all things and come to know the hidden unity in the Eternal Being."

Let us endeavour to determine the view of truth which Fox had now arrived at, and to the propagation of which he devoted 44 years of strenuous advocacy.

Human life can be lived on either of two planes, an earthly or a heavenly. On the earthly, all human life begins, and for the most part proceeds. Upon it, civilisation is built up. It is a realm of darkness, ignorance, lies, injustice, - in a word, of misery. Those who are not conscious of their misery are not therefore less miserable, - only more deluded. God's love "did let me see myself as I was without Him. And I saw all the world could do me no good: if I had had a king's diet, palace and attendance, all would have been as nothing --- And I saw professors, priests and people, were whole and at ease in that condition which was my misery."

Alongside this common heritage of depravity, and now part of
human nature at all, is "somewhat of God" in each man. It is the Light of Christ, and "everyone that believes in it comes out of condemnation, and comes to the Light of life; while those who hate it are condemned by it, whatever profession of faith they make."

This "somewhat of God," that is no part of human nature, becomes, in the believer, a new centre of personality. At first fragile and tender, it grows as a seed grows. And that mightily. For the "power" of it is indubitable. Fox had seen it triumph over howling mobs subduing them as raging waves die down. And when bodily agitations convulsed a whole meeting (whence "Quakers") it was a natural manifestation of the "power."

But its truest manifestation was in the moral sphere. The same Light that reveals corruption is the Power that redeems from it. Sinless, it lifts out of sin; it enables the believer to see to the end of all temptations. And this, in fact, was the ground of high offence taken by the Presbyterian divines, who would not hear that any "mere man since the Fall could perfectly keep the commandments of God." But then, Fox could never convince them that the believer was no "mere" man, he was an incarnation of the Spirit. And as this Light, Seed, Power of God was a principle of Sinlessness, so also was it of Infallibility.

These high claims of Perfectibility and Infallibility, made for the true believer, were subjected to a crucial test in Jas. Nayler's case. Jas. Nayler was an early Quaker preacher of undoubted sincerity and considerable gifts. But his vessel was not able to hold the strong wine of the new doctrine. He
overstressed the idea of incarnation, and allowed himself in a very public manner to receive quasi-divine honours. His case came up in Parliament, and a Committee of the House of Commons found him guilty of shocking blasphemy; and sentenced him to exemplary and barbarous punishment. (One is glad to add that Nayler's repentance was as deep as his offence. He re-established himself with his Friends, though with difficulty in "G.F's., case; and his dying testimony is widely famous and deservedly admired.)

The early days of militant Quakerism were marked, or marred, by extravagancies, such as nudity, wearing sackcloth, and so on. G.F. was himself not free of the taint. Yet he had a fundamental sanity and strength of judgment which kept such outbursts in check. He gave, indeed, a general approval to the giving of "signs," as these vagaries were called; but he provided a rule and a criterion for them. The rule was, Be careful not to run out of your measure of the Spirit. The criterion of any proposed demonstration was, that there should be "a cross in it," i.e., it ought to run counter to natural inclination.

His disapproval of Jas. Nayler's "sign" was due to his belief that "J.N." had transgressed both these canons. Fox had noticed some previous indications that Nayler was "running out into his own notions;" and also, there was something gratifying to the flesh in the honours he permitted to be paid him.
How do Fox's doctrines of Perfectibility and Infallibility come through such a test case as Nayler's? Fox would answer that it does not touch them. Had Nayler remained within the limits assigned him by the unerring Spirit, he would have been kept right.

These doctrines, then, of Perfection and Infallibility, have to be qualified by a third doctrine,—that of Measure: To each man his own measure of the Spirit. All men are not equal. Yet each within his own limit may be perfect. This commonsense doctrine of the Measure, manifestly provides for the institutions of Authority. The true Quaker doctrine is not subversive of Authority. Subjection to due authority does not do away with the need of inward guidance, in two directions: he needs it for the right performance of his service; and he needs it in order to choose his master. For his obedience is in no case unconditional or unreserved. His allegiance is maintained subject to a higher, and finally to the Highest. External authority is derivative and provisional, not absolute. Furthermore, it looks forward to its own supersession. The only authority a free man can freely recognise, is the authority that helps him to be more free,—the wise authority that makes him wise, the authority of law that makes him more just; the authority of strength to foster his weakness and make him strong. All true external authority is therefore serviceable, the highest Authority is Servant of all.
In trying to estimate the value of Fox's doctrine, we will not forget that he was a very great man, and his experience, a real discovery. It stood the test of a strong intelligence, and of a long life of arduous enterprise and bitter suffering. The character and calibre of the founder and of most of his colleagues, the widespread and immediate response to his message, and the highly honourable history of the Society during three testing centuries, all combine to give Fox's experience great and undoubted significance. We have, in fact, as much interest in trying to account for it as he had himself. And if we are not satisfied with the terms in which he stated it, it behoves us to find better, terms which shall be just to the experience itself, on the one hand; and congruous, on the other, with all that we hold as knowledge.

One thing seems plain, at the outset, viz., that Fox was by no means so independent of his own history and environment as he thought he was. We cannot deny him the virtue of originality. But, whatever meaning attaches to that term, it cannot be held to imply that the original is the underived, that it has no earthly history, no root in the soil of experience.

A typical test is provided by Fox's attitude to Scripture. From childhood, he was saturated with it. He arrived at no truth, and communicated none to others, which is not also found there. Yet he ever maintained that the truths he held were not derived from Scripture, but immediately from the Spirit. He
even claims that certain truths, thus immediately given, were not known by him, till afterwards, to be in Scripture at all. And, in general, his claim is supported by the fact that all England had the Bible; but he, G.F., had yet to discover and declare the truth. What are we to say to this?

The answer is given by reference to familiar laws of human thought, as illustrated in the processes of learning. The student is first faced with an opaque mass of truth, externally rendered, and with few if any apparent points of contact with his "apperceptive mass." He studies, thinks, returns to study, thinks again,—all to no seeming purpose. A period of Incubation succeeds to the stage of Preparation. And then in a happy moment of Illumination, the truth unfolds itself,—a gift, a heavenly visitant. This familiar process takes even startling forms occasionally, especially with minds of the "psychic" order,—minds in a high degree suggestible. Ideas harboured in other minds reappear, somehow, in theirs, coming whence they do not know. Fox's supersaturation with the Bible, and his association with the Separatist sects, supply the parentage of every single truth which he delivered to his age.

As regards the divine and supernatural source of his inspiration, we know that this was a question on which he held the strongest views. It was the question discussed between him and Cromwell, in one of their close and protracted interviews. The Protector argued that if, as Fox averred, the Light was given to every man, then it must be a natural Light. This Fox
would by no means allow. To yield this point would be to surrender every guarantee of its supremacy. It was of just such a principle of Human Nature that Butler was thinking when he cried, "Had it strength as it has right; had it power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world." It was this desideratum, this missing element of power, that Fox stood for. And the guarantee of its power lay in its divinity.

What are we to say to this?

Let us take our courage in both hands; let us venture into the dangerous field of analogy. Take the analogy of fire, as often used as a figure of the Holy Spirit. We commonly distinguish between the fire and the fuel. And they are distinguishable, for fuel can exist without fire. But fire cannot exist without fuel. For fire is fuel incandescent.

I venture to submit that in any work of the Spirit we have, as it were, fuel in an incandescent state. The fuel is human faculty - the heart of man; and it becomes "incandescent," under conditions ill-understood, and known better in their results than in their processes. But it is human fuel.

Probably the best statement of these results is given not by the theologian, but the poet. Wordsworth describes it in terms quite worthy to be compared with Fox's own classical description of his great hour, he tells of -
"that serene and blessed mood
In which the affections gently lead us on
Until, the breath of this corporeal frame,
And even the motion of the human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul;
While, with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy
We see into the life of things."

I do not stop to draw out this most significant parallel in detail. Just a word about the poet's use of "harmony." It is an inward harmony,—the accord and concord of all the inward elements. All,—emotional, perceptive, volitional— are present in powerful exercise. But there is not now, as at other, unhappy times, any dissonance whatever between them. The Soul is in a united state for once,—a Soul at peace with itself and all the world. The feelings are not jarred; nor is the reason left out, nor is the will dominating harshly. All is unity; and union is strength; and the strength is perceptive; and the result is Vision. The soul "sees into the life of things."

I am accordingly to suggest that this remarkable parallel goes far to suggest, or establish, the operation of a higher faculty of knowledge than the intellectual. It is as though Truth, Reality, itself personal, could not be embraced in its solidity ("thickness" Wm. James called it) by the intellect
alone,—or by anything less than the entire personality.

In Wordsworth's case we have the Poetic consciousness,—
the knowledge of reality on that side of it at which the poet
stands. In Fox's, we have the Religious consciousness,—the
knowledge of reality on that side of it at which the prophet
stands. Doubtless there is yet another,—that of the Philo-
sophic Vision— the aspect of reality on that side of it at
which the thinker stands. These several aspects of Beauty,
Love and Truth are aspects under which the same, sole Reality
appears to these different orders of mind; but only when the
mind knows its "serene and blessed mood." The truth is
luminous then, because the soul is aflame,—is fuel that has
become incandescent.

"All thoughts, all motions, all delights,
Whatever stirs this mortal frame,—
All are but ministers of Love,
And feed His sacred flame."

We conclude, then, that Fox's clear-cut distinction
between the natural and supernatural, the human and the divine
is not ultimate. We cannot it is true, simply identify the
two; but at least we may say of humanity that it is capax dei.
This, Fox too would say, and we are glad to agree with him.
But we contend that the human does not cease to be human in
becoming the bearer of the divine. Just as we can think of the
fuel without fire, so we can all too easily think of the human
apart from the divine. But the potency of divinity is in
humanity itself, as the potentiality of fire is in fuel. The fire is not a "somewhat" apart from the fuel.

I think this was Fox's actual experience, and that, in the light of this view, we can both understand and qualify what he says about Perfection and Infallibility. For I hold that Wordsworth's description of the illuminated state as a "mood," a "serene and blessed mood," is both more modest, and more true, than Fox's claim for it as a state or status (as of Adam before the Fall.) Fox's doctrine of Perfection and Infallibility is both true and helpful, if these high attributes are attached to moods that come and go, rather than to permanent states.

No true artist, whether of brush, or pen, or "trembling string," will ever relinquish the quest of either; they are the goal of his aspiration, the root of his "artist's melancholy." The touch that makes all perfect, the infallible stroke, the inevitable word (le mot juste), these are their unceasing quest, and these, at inspired moments, their rapturous achievement. But "the light that never was on sea or land, the consecration and the poet's dream" are not a sure or a permanent possession; are, rather, "like angels' visits, few, and far between."
The historical conditions above described,—the almost messianic expectancy of waiting, seeking multitudes; and the advent of the prophet of their dreams, resulted in a religious movement which, by the Restoration, made Fox the outstanding religious force in England, and put him at the head of perhaps 40,000 people out of a population of four or five millions.

The genius of Fox was not prophetic only, but practical. He was Rosebery's "practical mystic," and he bent his gifts of statemanship during the three latter decades (apart from apostolic missions furth of England) to the consolidation of the Society. A simple, but most effective type of organisation was evolved, giving form and channel to the spiritual energies evoked, utilising whatever gifts of leadership and ministry emerged, exciting and animating all with esprit de corps,—the self-consciousness of a body welded together for fellowship and service, with a faith and a mission for England and the world.

It was inevitable that such a consciousness should seek, sooner or later, to give reasoned expression to its distinctive principles. The necessity was not only urged from within, but forced on from without. The clergy were little inclined, and perhaps little qualified, to meet the stalwart "publishers of truth" face to face, and debate the point "beneath a tree."

Their training did not fit them for dealing effectively with
open air audiences, composed of the illiterate, to whose "condition" their illiterate opponents were so much better able to "speak". They retired accordingly, to their studies, and safe from rude interruption, prepared and launched their diatribes; and were answered in kind. But the time was opportune for a higher flight - it called for someone to carry the cause to the ultimate court of appeal, and to speak in terms to which the instructed mind of Europe might listen.

The call was answered by the publication, in Latin, at Amsterdam, in the year 1676, of Barclay's Apology, followed in 1678, by the author's translation into English. It took at once the place it has ever since held, of the classical exposition of the Quaker faith.

The author was Robt. Barclay, laird of Ury, near Stonehaven, Kincardineshire, Scotland. He was a young man of 27 when he finished it. It was a work to which he had dedicated some years of preparatory study, after his "convincement" as a lad of 18. By character, talent and learning, he was highly qualified for his task; and he had at his elbow George Keith, as able as himself and even more learned; from whose erudition the work takes, in a measure, its wealth of patristic reference.

The full title is: An Apology for the True Christian Divinity, as the same is held forth and preached by the People in scorn called Quakers. Being a Full Explanation and Vindication of their Principles and Doctrines, by many Arguments deduced from Scripture and Right Reason, and the Testimonies of
Famous Authors, both Ancient and Modern. With a Full Answer to the Strongest Objections usually made against them. By Robert Barclay.

The Apology is the elaboration of XV "Theses Theologicae," published some time previously. These had been addressed, with a few faithful words, "To the Clergy of what-sort-so-ever, unto whose hands these may come; but more particularly to the Doctors, Professors and Students of Divinity in the Universities and Schools of Great Britain, whether Prelatical, Presbyterian, or any other." The theses had attracted notice, favourable and otherwise; and this encouraged their author to explain and defend them more at large.

The Apology was apparently completed towards the end of 1675; for an Address, presenting it to Chas. II., is dated "From Ury, in my native country of Scotland, the 25th of the month called November, in the year 1675." This Address, like the shorter one presenting the Theses to the Clergy, is faithful. He reminds Charles of his troubled childhood, his father's fate, his own experience of exile and oppression, his bloodless restoration, "marvellous considering the strength of those that had possessed themselves of thy throne, and the terror they had inflicted upon foreign states." "God," he says, "hath done great things for thee ... There is no king in the world who can so experimentally testify of God's providence and goodness ... Thou hast tasted of prosperity and adversity; thou knowest what it is to be banished of thy native country, to be over-
ruled as well as to rule:— and being oppressed thou hast reason to know how hateful the oppressor is both to God and man etc., etc., The moral, Charles, is obvious!

The Apology, then, is the reasoned demonstration of the XV Theses Theologicae. The Theses, or Propositions, are arranged in logical sequence. The design is to show what the Inward Light is, how it operates in the redemption of fallen man, and how, once established in the believer's heart, it works outward into all his social relationships, alike in worship and in the conduct of life. It is a constitutive and also a regula­tive and all-determining principle. It constitutes the believer's and the church's experience, and regulates the forms of their activity. Thus it fully accounts for, and justifies, all that seems peculiar in the Society of Friends. But it is not, on that account, a sectarian principle. It is Christianity itself; and the measure of its novelty and strangeness is the measure in which the existing Churches have apostatized from the primitive standard,—to which the Quaker rule is, *sans phrase*, a return.

The Fifteen Propositions succeed one another in unbroken order. Nevertheless they naturally fall into certain groups, into which, for purposes of closer study, they may be conveniently assorted. Thus, the first three deal with the subject of Divine Knowledge; and how it is acquired,—not by Scripture or any external means, but by immediate and inward revelations.
Propositions Four to Nine develop the actual operation of the principle in human experience, the experience of redemption. What has hitherto been regarded as a principle of knowledge, is now regarded as a principle of salvation. These two are not, however, separate operations, they are one and the same. For Knowledge of God is Salvation. To come to "know" God, is to come to be saved. The desperate need of man; the divine means for meeting it; and the unlimited prospects thereby opened out, are the theme of this group.

The first nine propositions, it will be seen, deal with the isolated individual. Prop. X to XIII have regard to the Christian in the fellowship of the church, its Ministry, Worship and Sacraments.

The last two propositions relate to the believer's life as a citizen in the world, his relation to the Civil Magistrate (Prop. XIV), and to the forms, ceremonies, recreations and usages of society generally, with particular reference to the Quaker attitude to judicial oaths, and to war (Prop. XV).

For the purposes of our investigation, accordingly, it will be convenient to divide the ground into these four fields:-

I. The Inner Light: the Principle of Revelation.
II. The Inner Light: the Principle of Redemption.
III. The Inner Light: the Principle of Christian (Fellowship.
IV. The Inner Light: the Principle of Social Conduct.
Part I.
Of Knowledge and the Way of Knowledge.

Chapter.

1. The First Proposition: assumes the supreme value of knowledge, and asserts the necessity of a right method. "True" and "false" knowledge. True knowledge distinguished from false, not so much in terms of ultimate content, as in terms of Source, Subject, Object and Outcome. True knowledge a function of Eternal Life, which it presupposes.

2. The Second Proposition: states the Way of Knowledge, by Inner Light. Analysis of the Proposition. Important topics raised for discussion in following chapters.

3. First topic: Is there a Revelation of God in Nature and History? Barclay's a priori argument (from the nature of God) that there is not. This refuted.


5. Third topic: Faith and the Word of God. Faith and the Word of God correlative. The Word is significant Fact. Fact is externally rendered to faith.

Chapter.

7. Fifth topic: Authority and the Inner Light. Infallibility and Certainty are not attributable to external Authority: do they attach to internal? Claim of infallibility dismissed. Certainty, as a subjective state, attainable; but not independently of external Authority.

8. The Scriptures. Barclay's relative depreciation: perhaps connected with his superficial description of their contents. What is the unity of Scripture? Scripture is History; and History is (not brute Fact but) Fact read in its significance. The inspiration of Scripture is the inspiration of its writers, enabling them to read the divine significance of Fact.
Prop. I: The Nature of True Knowledge.

The Proposition. "Seeing the height of all happiness is placed in the true knowledge of God ... the right understanding of (the) foundation and ground of (this) knowledge is... most necessary 'to be known in the first place.'"

The Argument. To acquire any art or science, we must first know how to go about it: and so with knowledge of divine things, we must first determine how that knowledge is to be acquired. Otherwise it is only too easy to miss the way at the beginning; and not very easy to go back and begin again. This is particularly true for the right knowledge of God. It springs out of great initial uneasiness, and if, by misdirection, this is relieved the wrong way, the false peace is not readily relinquished.

The inveteracy of false knowledge is illustrated by the Pharisees and Jewish Doctors; whereas the ignorant common people more readily became disciples. Conceit of wisdom is invincible. The devil's shrewd
device is to persuade men into wrong notions of the true God, rather than to lead them to deny God altogether. Thus while idolatry and superstition abound in the world, atheism is comparatively rare; and where it occurs, it is the product of wrong notions of God.

These things are not controverted, and require no further argument.

Remarks.

Barclay's object in this first proposition is merely to state the obvious necessity of ascertaining the true way of that divine knowledge in which, as all, he thinks, will agree, "the height of human happiness is placed." This apparently harmless statement, however, has not escaped criticism. T. Rees ("The Holy Spirit" 198) mentions it as one of "two defects" of Barclay's doctrine, that "it makes knowledge into the principal factor in salvation." This defect, if it is one, is at least not peculiar to Barclay. "The two main positions which have been taken up are by religious thinkers/ (i) that a knowledge of divine things is a condition of attaining the blessings promised in religion, and (ii) that this knowledge is itself a possession of great value" (Pat.Giff.309.) But apart altogether from the fact that Barclay's "defect" is thus widely shared, Rees' criticism labours under a strong suspicion of ambiguity. The ambiguity attaches to the use of the word "knowledge." Barclay is at constant
pains to make it clear that by "knowledge" he by no means understands what passes for knowledge in the schools. "We do distinguish," he says at the outset (Prop. ii. sect. i.), "betwixt the certain knowledge of God and the uncertain; betwixt the spiritual knowledge and the literal; the saving heart-knowledge, and the soaring, airy head-knowledge." These two, he says, are different in nature, are differently attained, and lead to very different results. Failure to notice this difference is inexcusable in the reader of Barclay. And Rees' criticism, in particular, falsely suggests that Barclay attributes importance to knowledge as commonly understood, whereas to such knowledge Barclay attributes less than no importance at all.

What then are we to understand by this "true" knowledge, in which is placed the height of happiness; and how is it to be discriminated from false?

It can hardly, to begin with, be distinguished from false knowledge by reference to its content. For as to its content, as a "sum of saving knowledge," Barclay has very little to say. It is, in fact, a question whether he would allow himself to use such a phrase as "sum of saving knowledge." Knowledge, for him, is life; and life cannot be summed. On the other hand, he is not aware,—he would by no means have admitted,—that the ultimate content and result of true knowledge was anywise different from what is contained in Scripture, or rendered by "right reason," or delivered in the ecumenical creeds. Of him it was
certainly true, what Edward Grubb says of the first generation of Friends,- that they "were never unwilling to set down, as occasion required, their Christian beliefs; and these statements usually ran on quite orthodox lines." Wherein, then, the distinction between "false" and "true" knowledge? Why all this pother about an Inward Light, if what it renders is no more, or other, than Scripture contains, and Reason attests, and the Creeds aver? The answer to that will appear as we go on. But we may so far anticipate as to say that true knowledge and false are like property, acquired honestly in the one case, and dishonestly in the other. The dishonest holder lacks a title; he has not got it from the right source in the right way. And so with the possessor of false knowledge. He has not acquired it rightly, and cannot use it profitably. His truths may be truths of Scripture, but they must not be simply lifted from Scripture. Scripture is not a source, but a product of truth. Real knowledge, then, is distinguished from unreal, not so much in ultimate content, as in the living Source from which it springs. Got in that way, it can certainly be accumulated, and become a "sum of saving knowledge;" but only to its possessor.

Further, I have said that Barclay would not have admitted that the sum of saving knowledge differed in any wise from the truths of Scripture and right Reason. It is worthy of notice, that however, for him, true knowledge may consist with a vast amount of doctrinal error, at least to begin with. Turks and Hindus, as superstitious Papists, mental defectives and (very expressly)
ignorant and illiterate persons,- victims, as these all are, "to the disadvantages and epidemical errors of their several sects or ages" - may yet all be the subjects of saving knowledge. They may have the living core of knowledge, however debased the content of their notional minds. We shall have later to investigate the nature of this living core. Suffice it now to indicate that it is of a nature that tends to grow. It exfoliates error. It waxes, and the other wanes. Thus Socrates, for example, by following the way of true knowledge, "became informed of the falsity of heathen gods." Similarly a Turk, by the same means, would come to learn "that Mahomet was an imposter." Thus, apparently, true knowledge, once implanted in even heathen hearts will of its nature advance, till it comes to cover the entire area of Christian truth and be indeed a "sum of saving knowledge."

Next, the nature of true knowledge may be defined by relation to the Subject of it. The subject of saving knowledge is, to begin with, always the "anxious enquirer." Thus we find Barclay describing him:-

"When a man first proposeth to himself the knowledge of God, from a sense of his own unworthiness, and from the great weariness of his mind, occasioned by the secret checks of his conscience, and the tender yet real glances of God's light upon his heart; the earnest desires he has to be redeemed from his present trouble, and the fervent breathings he has "to be eased of his disordered passions
and lusts, and to find quietness and peace in the certain knowledge of God, and in the assurance of his love and goodwill towards him, make his heart tender," etc. (Prop. I)

Barclay holds, it is plain, (with others of our own day) that divine truth does not reveal itself to the dispassionate theorist, or mere spectator of life, but only to one desperately in earnest. He would cordially have agreed with Wm. James (Var. 431.) who doubted "if the dispassionate contemplation of the universe, apart from inner unhappiness and need of deliverance, on the one hand, and mystical emotion on the other, would ever have resulted in religious philosophies such as we now possess." This sentence might well have been penned after reading the Apology. The sort of knowledge Barclay pursues is related to needs of a subjective and practical kind.

And as it begins on this practical level so it remains all through. The enquirer ceases to be the "anxious enquirer," but he remains a constant enquirer, waiting ever upon God. Only now, relieved from its burden of anxiety on his own account, his heart is at leisure to bear others' burdens. The "enquirer" has become "the witness." Such truth as he holds, is truth that he can witness to. If he says "Jesus is Lord," it is not a statement lifted out of the Bible; it is a personal confession, equivalent to "I know that Jesus is Lord." Hence is to be understood Barclay's otherwise harsh-seeming dictum, that spiritual truths in the mouths of unspiritual men are "lies," (Prop. II sedt. 6) This is justified only if spiritual truth is
to be known experimentally, and given forth in forma testis.

"True" knowledge then, consists of a given content, or sum of knowledge, held as a precious personal possession, and rendered, if uttered at all, as testimony.

In the next place, true knowledge may be defined in relation to its Object. Its Object is God, God Himself; and God less, perhaps, (at first at least) in His Nature, than in His Will; less in His qualities and attributes than in His action. (Deus loquens. Prop II. sect.8.) It is God-Redeemer that is known, but less as Redeemer (if I may say so), than as Redeeming. This, again, it will be seen, lifts the process of knowledge out of the theoretic sphere, and sets it on the plane of personal interrelations. Knowledge of this kind is not within the compass of intelligence merely. "Intelligence" (Baudouin) "is the mode of approach appropriate to crude matter; intuition, the mode appropriate to Life." We are dealing here with Life,—personal, active and purposive life,—when we are dealing with God. Such knowledge is beyond the range of intelligence. And the reason is plain: intelligence suffices for "objective" knowledge; but knowledge of persons is not merely objective. For persons are subjects, and must be known subjectively. Thus we speak of learning to know one's neighbour by "putting one's self in his place." It is, in its degree, a sort of transference of personality. Intuitively, by an act of sympathetic imagination, (or somehow) we get inside the object.
All this is eminently true of knowing God. A modern writer says that today we think of God as Subject, instead of, as the ancients did, as Substance. If therefore God is Subject, He cannot be known merely as Object. He must be known, somehow, as from the inside, subjectively. Barclay, it is true, has not been able entirely to rid himself of the category of Substance in speaking of God. But his real thought is deeper than his thought forms. And this truth, of God as Subject, and requiring to be known as such, is, I believe really what he is after. The knowledge of God which regards Him merely as Object is, for him, false knowledge. Barclay's error, I find, is on the other side. God is, for him, only too exclusively Subject. But the intuitive, is not independent of the discursive,— even dispassionate gaze of intelligence. In seeing into the "life of things," it doesn't lose sight of the "things" it sees into.

Finally, the "true" knowledge, thus distinguished from the "false," by reference to its Source, its Subject and its Object, is also to be distinguished by its Outcome. Here we see the significance of the equation Barclay draws between knowledge and happiness. Hence he can speak, as he proceeds to do, of the antithesis of knowledge as being, not ignorance, but misery. This is only possible because, for him, knowledge and happiness are convertible terms. Furthermore, both knowledge and happiness are equated with Eternal Life. Knowledge, then, is not just a means of salvation: it is salvation, in one of its aspects.
Another of its aspects, later to be considered, is holiness (righteousness, moral goodness). Thus knowledge takes its place alongside happiness and holiness, as one of the several phases of Eternal Life. These phases, it will be seen, correspond to the tri-partite nature of consciousness. Knowledge is the intellectual constituent; holiness, the volitional; happiness, the affective. These aspects, distinguishable by analysis, are, in fact, inseparable. Each presupposes the other, and all presuppose the unity of life in which they inhere. Thus knowledge is a function of life, and presupposes life. And the true knowledge of God is a function of Eternal Life, which it, too, presupposes.

In view of all this, we dismiss Rees' criticism as both unintelligent and misleading. Unintelligent, because it overlooks the distinction of false and true knowledge which Barclay so strongly emphasises. And misleading, since it suggests an intellectualism which Barclay unaffectedly disowns.

It would be premature, at this stage, to discuss Barclay's concept of knowledge further. It is largely, so far, only a negative conception. We have found what its Source is not; what its Subject is not; what its Object is not; and what its Outcome is not. In all these respects it is distinct from, and opposed to, false knowledge. It was necessary, and it suffices, to make this clear before going on to the next step,
viz., the way or method of knowledge. Whatever that way may ultimately be found to be, it will not be the way in which ordinary, intellectual knowledge is acquired, for on such knowledge Barclay places no value.

CHAPTER II.

The Second Proposition:
The Way of True Knowledge.

Together with Propositions Five and Six, this Second Proposition is the locus classicus for the doctrine of the Inner Light. Those affirm it as a principle of Salvation; this, as a
principle of Revelation. These are not, however, two principles, but one and the same. The way of knowledge is the way of salvation. The subject of knowledge is at the same time the subject of the redeeming process. In short, as we saw before, knowledge is a function of life. But though the experience of knowing is not really separable from the experience of salvation, the theory of each can be separately dealt with. And in this famous Second Proposition we have the theory of the Inner Light presented as the true and only way of divine knowledge.

The salient points of the thesis are these four:

1. No man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whom the Son revealeth Him.

   The revelation of the Son is in and by the Spirit.

   Therefore the Spirit's testimony is the sole means of revelation.

2. By the Spirit's revelations God hath manifested Himself all along, whether by outward voices or appearances, dreams, or inward, objective manifestations in the heart.

3. Such revelations were ever the formal object of the saint's faith, and continue to be, since the object of faith remains the same.

4. These inward revelations never contradict Scripture or right reason.
But, being selfevident, like the axioms of mathematics or logic, they are not to be subjected to the test of reason or Scripture, as to a more certain and noble rule or touchstone.

It will be evident that positions 1, 2 and 3 develop the theory of the Inner Light itself; while position 4 discusses its relation to external Authority. We shall accordingly follow that order in our discussion.

It will appear further, that 1 is of the nature of an a priori argument. It deals with the nature of God and of His relation to the World; and intends thereby to prove that God's Nature and relation to the world being what they are, no divine knowledge is attainable apart from inward and immediate revelations of the Spirit.

2 is an argument a posteriori, drawn from instances of divine and human intercourse recorded in Scripture. These, it is held, show that such intercourse has always proceeded by way of inward and immediate revelations.

3 is an argument based on the Nature and Object of Faith. Faith is reliance on the Word of God, a word inwardly and immediately given. And since faith is still today the same, its object (inward and immediate revelations) remains also the same.

These 3 positions we must examine in detail, when it will appear that important questions arise for decision in each case.
CHAPTER III.

THE WAY OF KNOWLEDGE.


Is there Revelation in Nature and History?

The thesis here is that there is no knowledge of the Father save through the Son; and none of the Son save through the Spirit, whose revelations are given inwardly and immediately to the spirit of man.

The argument proceeds thus: - (Prop. II. ad No. 4-6).

The nature of God is triune, - Father, Son and Spirit. "God the FATHER, infinite and most wise, is the foundation, root and spring of all operation, the infinite and incomprehensible fountain of life and motion."

"The Father hath wrought all things by His eternal WORD or Son, Jesus Christ, Who is Himself God; hath been in eternity with God; and in time hath partaken of the nature of man." Hence, "no creature hath access to the Father but in and by the Mediator Son."

Further, "there is no knowledge of the Son but by the SPIRIT" ... "In His outward manifestation, Christ revealed the Father to his disciples, when he testified for the truth, and approved himself faithful throughout. Being withdrawn as to the outward man, He doth teach man inwardly by His Spirit."

This argument we shall now review.
Barclay's doctrine of God the Father is one of sheer transcendence. The Father is "the infinite and incomprehensible" (not simply uncomprehended) "fountain of life and motion."

With this view we have no quarrel. If we care to pursue the analogy of "the fountain," then we must freely admit that the stream conveys no knowledge of its real origin. The tiny trickle in which the river begins, is not the veritable fountain. Tracing the stream to the well-head, we may say, Here the stream begins. But we know quite well that the spring is not the real origin of the stream. That is the universe. Omnia exsunt in mysterium. At the well, we only find ourselves on the threshold of the mystery out of which the stream emerges.

But this vague, nameless mysterium tremendum et fascinans takes form and body. There is then, in God transcendent, a principle of form, or determinateness. There could be no thought of transcendence, if transcendence were the whole story. Sheer transcendence is the negation of thought. The mysterium must condense to form the stream. This principle of form, or immanence, we name, with Barclay, the LOGOS.

The Logos is rational. It is also purposive and operative. It, cosmic, creative,—the means, as Barclay says, by which "the/
infinite and incomprehensible fountain of life and motion operates in the creatures."

This operation is conscious. The Spirit is the principle of Selfconsciousness in God. The Spirit, and the Spirit alone, knows the things of God. Whence, any human knowledge of the things of God, must be the impartation of the Spirit, and this impartation is inward and immediate. Such, in brief, is the Barclaian view, which we are now to examine. Our question takes the double form: (a) Whether, and in what sense, there is revelation of God in Nature; and (b) Whether, and in what sense, there is revelation in Man and man's history. These two we shall find to be not really separate questions; but the "hidden unity" may be thus separately approached.

(a) Revelation in Nature.

It will doubtless strike the reader as surprising that Barclay should affirm an operation of the Logos-Son in Nature, while denying that such operation is anything towards the purposes of a revelation. It remains surprising even when we remember (as in reading Barclay we always must) that the knowledge in question is "saving, certain and necessary;" it is knowledge of a Redeemer - God, and of His redemptive action, that is in question. Is it not, I say, surprising, that Barclay should say that God is operative in Nature without any trace of his redemptive purpose being therein discernible? Are we to say that God's operations in Nature are entirely apart from His
redemptive operations in man?

The classic distinction of natural and revealed theology proceeded on that assumption. It assumed that while a certain amount and kind of divine knowledge was derivable from Nature, yet it stopped short of a full and satisfactory provision for man's requirements, and was mercifully eked out by supernatural means. The distinction was held no less by those who believed that natural evidences were cogent, as far as they went (Vatican Council), than by those to whom they seemed dubious and inconclusive. It now seems pretty clear that the distinction rested on a falsely abstract view of "Nature."

For just as it is an abstraction (however useful for certain purposes) to separate Nature and Man, so it is ultimately an abstraction to set Nature, in its widest sense,—as inclusive of Man,—over against the "supernatural." For the term "supernatural," as used in this connection, is applied to certain occurrences of an abnormal kind. But these, however supernormal, are still occurrences within the field of experience. Just as well as "natural" happenings, they belong to the totality of the phenomenal. Our vision of Nature, therefore, must be extended to include the supernatural, if good grounds for its claim to recognition are forthcoming.

It is Nature, then, in this extended sense, that we are to interrogate regarding its availability for the purposes of revelation. Does it, or does it not, shew decipherable traces of Divine purpose and activity? This is not, of course, Barclay's
problem, since it is not his view of Nature. But it is ours. What shall we say about it?

The answer confessedly cannot be given in simple terms of Yes and No. It is manifestly a question of interpretation, and that implies the eye to see. In other words, it is a judgement of value, and implies a sense of value. Experience is strictly relative to the values cherished by the subject of experience. Of these, some are to be described as absolute, as final, as existing in their own right. They are in the proper sense divine. They are, in the measure of our holding them, our own. But they are objective too (Pringle-Pattison). They are of God. God is their seat and home. Where they are found, God is. Are they found in Nature?

The answer is, they both are and are not. Nature is not a flat, undifferentiated surface, upon which the mind can chalk out whatever figures it likes. It is endlessly varied, and not all its manifestations have equal significance. If we take an analogy from the artistic consciousness, we see the truth of that. The artist finds Beauty in Nature: finds it because it is there. But it is not equally manifest in all quarters. He finds some manifestations more, some less, significant. Yet that it is observable, as he dwells upon the most obviously significant, as his artistic sense develops, he finds significance in quarters where he did not find it before. He begins to see, or to adumbrate, a beauty and significance in the whole.

Similarly with the religious mind. It finds religious
values in nature: finds them because they are there. But, again, not equally, in all directions. Some phenomena it finds tremendously significant; these it is apt to call "supernatural." But once descried, they may be seen again and yet again. Commerce with the more significant leads on to clearer perception of the less. Until every common bush is "afire with God."

This view does justice, one would fain believe, to what is vital in Barclay's doctrine, while correcting its false subjectivity. On the one hand, Barclay is surely right in saying that a "scientific" view of nature (such as the theology of his day took for its purposes of "proof") yields no "certain saving knowledge of God." It might, or again it might not, reach a satisfactory conclusion regarding God's existence, or the soul's immortality. But what was that to the purpose of the man roused to "anxious enquiry?" He wanted to know how God was disposed to him; and what was to become of his immortal soul. These things he must know, with inward, homefelt certainty. But on the other hand, he could only know this, or anything else about God, as he found it in an experience which was, however significant, still off a piece (even though only potentially) with his total experience. And experience is experience of Nature, in its wide extension. For God is, for us, in the ultimate resort, our interpretation of the "nature of things."
(b) Revelation in History and in the historical Christ.

We turn now to a brief examination of this second question,—
the more brief since it will be seen to be only a special case
of the general question just examined.

Have we then a revelation of God in the historical Christ?
Barclay's answer is in the negative. Without wishing to dis-
parage the evangelical records in the least, he repeatedly and
emphatically relegates it to its place — an inferior place, as
belonging to what is at the best comforting and edifying history;
but only available for one who lives by the Inner Light, and
not indispensable for him.

But here Barclay would seem to be guilty of inconsistency.
For he says:—

"As his manifestation was sometimes outward, when he testi-
fied and witnessed for the truth in the world, and approved
himself faithful throughout, so being now withdrawn, as to
the outward man, he doth teach and instruct man inwardly
by his own Spirit." (II sect.6.)

This points back to Christ's earthly life, and avers that
Christ's life and teaching were a revelation of the Father to
the disciples. We simply ask, Has that revelation ceased?
Is it no longer available? It is not denied that Christ's
human life was not per se a revelation. It was no revelation
to the Pharisees. It became revelation to Peter, because
something more than "flesh and blood" revealed it. But the
vehicle of revelation was still flesh and blood. What Peter
saw, was seen by insight into what was before him. If the Spirit revealed anything to Peter it only served to shew him what was there,—what was in the Fact,—what the Fact really was, and that Fact remains,—"the same yesterday, today and for ever."

The real truth is that Barclay, and all that generation of the Friends, (whatever was the case later,) had their minds so saturated with Christian knowledge that they hardly realised where it came from. It was the air they breathed, and they were as little conscious of it as we are of the surrounding atmosphere. For them, in their sincerity and devotion, Christ had become "a second nature." They had but to look within, to find Him there. And they forgot, (in theory, though never in practice), the humble, historical path He trod, before He could find, in just such hearts as theirs, His home.
CHAPTER IV.

THE WAY OF KNOWLEDGE (continued).

2. Recorded Instances of Immediate Revelation.

The Prophetic Consciousness.

We next turn to Barclay's a posteriori argument, from instances abundantly afforded by Scripture of divine and human intercourse.

"By this revelation of the Spirit God hath manifested Himself all along, whether by outward voices and appearances, dreams or by inward objective manifestations in the heart." (Prop. II)

Here we have two forms of revelation, the first simple and direct, ("inward objective manifestations in the heart"); the second, complex and indirect, ("by voices, appearances, dreams etc"). Both are held to be of the nature of inward and immediate revelation. We shall examine these cases separately.

(a) Revelation by "inward objective manifestations in the heart."

This position is supported by reference to historical, or quasi-historical, Scripture instances.

"It is undeniable that God conversed with man from Adam to Moses by inward manifestations of the Spirit" (since of course no other means existed.) (II. sect. 7)

"Noah had not the writings or prophesyings of any going before him, not yet the concurrence of any church or people to
strengthen him." (Ps. 2. 1.)
The same for later times. In the Mosaic era the High Priest annually entered the Holy of holies, and conversed immediately with God. Many others enjoyed the same sort of fellowship. Indeed:-

"none were shut out who earnestly sought after it, and waited for it." (1 Tim. 2.)
The Psalmist enjoyed it ("Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit?"); and the prophets conspicuously;

"and that God revealed Himself under the New Testament, to wit, to the apostles, evangelists and primitive disciples, is confessed by all." (1 Tim. 2.)

and finally, a continuance of this intimacy is assured to all believers by Christ's promise of the Spirit.

Remarking on the above, its naiveté will be apparent. Not without a smile we read that such a prophecy as that of Isaiah 59. 12 - "I have put my words in thy mouth," or that of Jeremiah 31. 33 - "I will put my laws into their minds and write them in their hearts," is a proof of immediate revelation, since-

"no mention is made of any books or writings."
Similarly, it is held proven that the inward revelation is "objective," - i.e., not merely subjective "heightening of faculty to understand what was written." For -

"It is not said, 'The Spirit shall teach you to understand what has been written,' but 'It shall teach you all things.'"
The Spirit 'brings them to remembrance,' not 'helps me
to remember the objects brought from elsewhere.'" (I. n.)

The argument, it need not be said, was used in perfect good faith, and may have appeared cogent to many of his readers,- though one doubts if the argument *ex silentio* ("no mention is made of any books or writings," ) appeared more convincing in the XVII century than it does today.

We shall later have occasion to raise the question as to the bearings of Scripture testimony on the fact of divine and human intercourse. Meantime it will suffice to say regarding Barclay's Scriptural "proofs," that while Barclay is engaged to prove one thing, Scripture is concerned with quite another. Barclay is dealing with a question of process; Scripture, with/ result. To Barclay, "The Lord spake unto Moses saying - " is proof of how a communication was made - viz., inwardly and immediately. Scripture, on the other hand, is chiefly concerned with the substance of what said; not with the manner in which it was conveyed.

It may be convenient here to say a word about "immediacy."

Someone recently drew a distinction between "psychic immediacy" and "psychological immediacy" which may serve our turn. "Psychological immediacy" is really an absurd term, - for psychology is just the study of process; and immediacy is the negation of process. "Psychic" immediacy, again, is just another term for consciousness, which is always immediate, - i.e., conscious. Visual perception is a case in point. It is a
state of "psychic" immediacy. Yet as we know, it is not unmediated. Here, then, a mediate process issues in an immediate result. But this result gives no account of itself, or how it came about. Immediacy, then, attaches to what is given, leaving untouched the question of how it is given. The latter is Barclay's question; and to its answer, the Scriptures he adduces make no contribution.

And one thing more. For Barclay, it would seem, the question of immediacy, (as negation of process), has a close bearing on the question of value. One feels that if the psychological processes of a revelation were demonstrated, its value as a revelation would be, for him, destroyed. Its divine immediacy, uncontaminated by any earthly admixture, is its guarantee of divine value. For our part, we do not look for results of any kind, divine or otherwise, without processes. Nor is our criterion of the divine, the absence of human process. We evaluate the process from the result, not vice versa. If, therefore, immediacy of feeling ("psychic" immediacy) has nothing to say regarding origin; immediacy of process has nothing to say regarding value,- or indeed, regarding anything, since it is nothing in the world.

The Argument Resumed.

Resuming the argument (b), we have now to notice another class of Scripture instances,- viz.,

"External voices, appearances and dreams."
These might appear to be damaging exceptions to the rule of inward immediate revelations. Not so. They are merely "circumstantial and accidental" variations, which, so far from infringing the rule, really rest upon and establish it. For, such occasional theophanies were of dubious origin, not self-authenticating. They required a certificate of their genuineness, and this was given inwardly and immediately:

"What made the saints give credit to these visions? Certainly nothing else but the secret testimony of God's Spirit in their hearts...Abraham believed the angels: but who told him that these men were angels? We must not think that his faith was built upon his outward senses, but it proceeded from the secret persuasion of God's Spirit in his heart." (II. sect. 8)

These instances deserve our attention. Barclay claims that they are only in form exceptional, and really establish his rule. His readers will think, perhaps, that they rather demolish it.

On the face of them, they are not instances of inward revelation simpliciter. The apparitions convey a message, but they require to be accredited; and this attestation is given by inward revelation. Plainly, an alternative to simple, direct, inward communication has here been resorted to. "Accidentally" of course! But unfortunately, the infant, though only a little one, is none the less illegitimate. For Barclay's case is that inward revelation is the exclusive way of knowledge;
but here the exclusiveness of the rule is invaded. If once, or twice, why not many times? Why not normally, and always? For if vision, voice or dream can be thus inwardly attested, becoming thereby the vehicle of revelation, what is to hinder the giving of a similar certificate, say, to Scripture, or dogma, or to "a sunset-touch, a chorus-ending from Euripides," or to anything else in the world? And that is just the Authoritarian case.

We must, I think, press this point.

With reference to these theophanies, Barclay says:—

"we must not stick to that which is circumstantially and accidentally so, but to that which is universally and substantially so."

But the whole question is precisely as to what is "universally and substantially so." Theophanies, Barclay means to say, are not universal, but only occasional. The reply is, that theophanies (presuming their occurrence) are not to be thus secluded in a class all by themselves. If admitted at all, they must take their place in "the nature of things." They will be recapitulated in the field of phenomena, as part of the experience. And if, as such, they can be the subject-matter of divine attestation, and the vehicle of divine instruction, it will be found impossible to deny the same function, in its degree, to any other part of that totality.
We cannot, however, dismiss Barclay's argument from Scripture instances so easily. We have admitted that there is an impressive volume of Scripture testimony to the fact of divine-human intercourse of some kind, whether mediate or direct. The consciousness of the Hebrew prophets is an important part of that testimony; and to it, as perhaps not in principle different, may be added that of the first Christians. Barclay links the experience of "apostles, evangelists and christian disciples," to that of the prophets. To the same effect, we find the modern Quaker, Ed. Grubb, claiming Quakerism as a "recovery of Hebrew prophetism;" and Wheeler Robinson describing the experience of the primitive Church as the "democratisation of the prophetic consciousness." Some brief examination of this consciousness would therefore seem to be called for,—particularly as we are here on much stronger ground historically, than when the question is of what happened to Noah.

And truly, if in rerum natura there is anything that can claim to be immediate revelation, the Hebrew prophets might be held to be the subjects of it,—the standing exordium of whose deliverances was, "The word of the Lord came to me." As regards this formula, it has been contended that in course of time it had become a mere convention, presupposing nothing more than the prophet's conviction that what he was about to say was God's truth. We cannot however be satisfied with this. For one thing, if in time the exordium became conventional, its
form points back to a time when it was, or was regarded as, something more. For another, we have in the case of Paul, a classical example, of first-rate historical importance, of the use of the formula (or its equivalent) in no mere conventional sense. Paul, besides, on certain occasions explicitly distinguishes between what he has "received of the Lord," and what he had excogitated by the normal exercise of his faculties,- in short, by common-sense. Here, then, the distinction is drawn explicitly between reason and revelation; and if only the apostle had been of a mind to tell us how the revelation was received, it would have had a perhaps important bearing on Barclay's theory. Unfortunately, as to the means and manner in which the communications came, the apostle is silent. Here again it is evident that the result, not the process, is the thing of moment.

What is not doubtful, however, is that Paul claimed to have received both his gospel and his commission without human intervention; and in this he seems to stand on common ground with the prophets of old, to whom "the word of the Lord came." The phrase seems to point to a distinctive mental condition,- the "prophetic state,"- characterised, not seldom, by absorption, rapture, trance, ecstasy and so on. This is a matter concerning which psychology will claim to have a say. For psychology, every mental state has a history. Even the feeling of immediacy is not, as we saw, unmediated. The train of association that issues in a sudden insuperable feeling of conviction or constraint,
has, in the subconscious region, its history. Emerging in abrupt, peremptory, authoritative shape, its unaccountability tends to be accredited to the "divine." Its "suddenness" endows it with mysterious attributes, with supernatural quality. It comes whence no one knows. And, surely, that is how the word of the LORD should come!

Such abnormalities are, however, by no means of the essence of the case. They belong, in Barclay's phrase (used in another connection) to "what is circumstantially and accidentally so, not to what is universally and substantially so." They are not of the core of the prophetic message; at best they are of the nature of attestation, gaining credence for a message in itself opaque or unwelcome, or for the prophet as its medium. If the message in early times derived weight, both with the prophet with his hearers, from the abnormal circumstances in which he received it, or from the rapture that characterised its delivery, in the later, purer stage the weight falls more on the message and less on its adventitious accompaniments. The influence of Christ and of Paul was quite manifestly exerted towards this end. Christ refused the demand for "signs" in authentication of His word. And Paul, while by no means disparaging ecstasy, sought to lead his churches to cultivate preferably those forms of utterance which appealed to the reasonable mind; and to ensue, most of all, that Charity which not only spoke, but was, the Truth. Truth in that form, he rightly held, was its own evidence, and made a universal appeal.
Abstracting then from the external and adventitious, how shall we express what was fundamental to the prophetic consciousness? Perhaps we might say that was given in such a formula as "I am the Lord thy God which brought thee up out of Egypt; go thou and" - do this, or say that. Three separate elements are here distinguishable. First, the prophet is faced with a situation in which something requires to be said or done. Second, there is the consciousness, inward and immediate, that the situation is charged with divine significance, - a duty or a truth stares him in the face, - he sees it in the situation; the situation speaks to him, calls to him with a voice which he knows to be the Voice of God. But thirdly, this Voice is not the voice of a stranger, - but of a God known in history, in the past of the people, - "the God of thy fathers." The prophet's mind is no tabula rasa; it is saturated with tradition, - a tradition mediated in normal ways of pious instruction. Within the field of that tradition, the new truth or duty enters and takes its place. No truth which could not be seen as lying within the perspective of the tradition, could ever hope for reception by the prophet's mind. For the prophet was "no innovator." (A.B. Davidson). A tradition, piously mediated, and assimilated by a mind of quick and sensitive perception; and a momentous situation calling these perceptive powers into highest exercise, what further account is needed, or can be given, of the prophetic consciousness, - and, mutatis mutandis, of the christian consciousness? Here the "tradition" is Christ.
And every "new" truth is but drawing out of an inexhaustible treasury,- the "unsearchable riches of Christ." Was not Mazzini right when he said, "Conscience and Tradition are the two wings of the soul, by which it reaches truth?"

Barclay's account of the matter ignores the tradition. But in so doing, he leaves no room for any growth in the knowledge of God. For if no knowledge of God is stored in the memory of the race, how can it be stored in the memory of the individual? If all that is of moment,- all that is real knowledge,- is given in the moment of revelation, what provision is here for advancing knowledge? What need for it? The believer lives "from hand to mouth." Advance requires memory. And if the believer's memory is to be trusted, why not tradition, the memory of the race? Barclay's doctrine, then, makes no sufficient provision for knowledge. It is not merely individualistic; it is atomistic. It rests on mere discrete moments of revelation. It is riddled with discontinuity.
CHAPTER V.
THE WAY OF KNOWLEDGE (continued)
3. Faith and the Word of God.

The third stage of Barclay's argument for inward revelations was concerned, it will be remembered, with the nature of Faith and its object. Barclay's position here is that faith in all ages is the same; its object is the Word of God; and this Word is inwardly rendered by the indwelling Spirit. These are his statements:

"Faith is a firm and certain belief of the mind........"
"The formal object of faith is the promise, word or testimony of God, speaking to the mind (Deus loquens) Deus loquens is the Holy Spirit.
By Him, "Christians are now to be led in the same manner as saints of old, and that, not merely subjectively, but by formal, objective manifestations of truth."

What, we ask, does Barclay understand by the "Word of God?"
And how is it inly rendered by the Spirit?

1. The Word of God we are to understand, in the first place, in its simple and natural sense, as anything God says to the soul,—any divine statement, promise or command. And faith, accordingly, is belief of the statement, or confidence in the promise, or obedience to the command.
The divine utterances are accepted "in good faith."

But the "Word" has larger, more mystical meanings for Barclay. Any particular "word" of God is but a "form" of The Word. (Hence his use of "formal," - a word of God is the "formal object of faith." i.e., the word in question is the particular form which, for the occasion, The Word assumes.) The Word in its largest sense = LOGOS = Christ. The Word inheres in every specific "word"; or, alternatively, each specific "word" partakes in the nature of The Word. Hence, for Barclay, every "word" of God is the Word of Christ, - the Word which is Christ. Consequently, every act of genuine faith is fundamentally faith in Christ. Without difficulty, he can think of the saints of old as "Christians" and also of "heathen" saints as Christian in reality. Everyone, in any age or place, who hears and believes a word of God is, implicitly or explicitly, a Christian; and all such faith is likewise, implicitly or explicitly, Christian. He is supported in this view by the apostle Paul, who wrote of the Church in the Wilderness, "they drank of the Rock which followed them ... and that Rock was Christ."

2. Thus far we can follow Barclay with agreement. Our difficulty begins with the second question, How is the Word of God rendered for faith? His answer is, by "inward, immediate, objective" revelation of the Spirit. The
Spirit alone knows the Word. By the Spirit alone it is conveyed. And since the locus of the Spirit is within, the revelation can only be from within.

But just here arises a difficulty. How can the Spirit communicate anything to the soul? For according to Barclay, a bridgeless gulf divides the divine from the human. He quotes the apostle's words about only the Spirit of a man knowing the things of a man; and only the Spirit of God knowing the things of God. This he amplifies as follows:-

"that is, that as nothing below the spirit of man (as the spirit of brutes, or any other creatures) can properly reach unto or comprehend the things of a man, as being of a nobler and higher nature, so neither can the spirit of man, or the natural man ... receive nor discern the things of God, or the things that are spiritual, as being also of a higher nature." (II sect. 6.)

This however appears to be an unfortunate analogy, for two reasons. In the first place, there is commonly no question of intercommunication of knowledge between man and the brutes, while such intercommunication between God and man is precisely the question here at issue. Hence the analogy fails. In the second place, where any measure of intercommunication between man and the brutes does occur (as in the case of domesticated animals) it proceeds on the
basis of something common to both,—some spark of intelligence in dog or horse, some community of interest, desire or affection, between the animal and its master. In other words, where no community exists, no intercommunication is possible. But where intercommunion exists, it argues some basis of intercourse. If therefore there is any question at all of man’s knowledge of divine things, some common measure between the human and the divine must be supposed. Barclay denies any common measure. He thereby renders divine knowledge impossible. He has created a gulf which he is unable to cross.

The reply of Barclay to this I think would be: There is here no question of any relation between the divine and the human. For the purposes of divine knowledge man is a nonentity,—an inchoate unorganised mass; a formless, lifeless thing. Into this dead mass, as an informing, organising principle, there must enter the Spirit of God. This Spirit, spark, seed of divine intelligence is the organic principle alike of knowledge and of life.

If this is indeed Barclay's real thought,—and later indications (Props IV. V. and VI.) will show that it is,—then what becomes of faith? There is no place for faith in such a theory. The language which Barclay uses to describe faith cannot be made to fit in with such a theory. When we say faith, we are full in face of personal relations—"I" and "Thou;" and the I is just as real as the Thou. Cor ad cor loquitur.
Revelation and faith are correlative; and both are personal processes. The Word is a reasonable entity; and faith is a "reasonable service." The statement, promise or command that evokes the response which is faith, must be intelligible to the recipient's mind, that implies the mind's faculty for recognizing truth. It must come with the coerciveness of truth to be received, or duty to be done, that implies the sense for sacred or absolute values. The truth perceived, the duty required, is activating; it is a summons; it calls for the venture of faith; the soul must "proceed upon it," that implies that the soul is not a hopeless ruin. All this, Barclay tacitly presupposes in what he says of faith. Here, accordingly, we are in agreement with him. Revelation and Faith are correlative. Faith's object is the Word of God.

Where we break with him is on the point of how the Word is rendered. We have seen his answer, by inward immediate revelation of the Spirit; and we have seen how inconclusive that answer is. It was not established by his Scripture references and examples. These were of more than doubtful historicity; and, in any case, indicated results, not processes. And now we find it is not borne out by what he has to say regarding faith. To what view ought we then to subscribe?

Our answer has been given in what we found as to Revelation in Nature and History. These, together, form what the poet calls "the mighty sum of things for ever speaking." Nature, in the wide extension we give to the term, is the Word of God.
All "words," including, very specially, the "Word made flesh," are special determinations of The Word. In these, Nature (the "nature of things") becomes significant, vocal, charged with meaning. Certainly, the Word must be interpreted, and certainly for its interpretation a faculty of soul is required. That faculty we do not call the "Inner Light". The Inner Light is not a faculty; it is a state. It presupposes faculty; but it presupposes also the external object. There must be a power to interpret the Word; there must also be a Word to be interpreted. The Inner Light is the state of soul that arises from the contact of these two, that condition, luminous and serene, that comes when the soul "sees into the life of things."
CHAPTER VI.

THE WAY OF KNOWLEDGE (continued).

4. The Holy Spirit.

We shall not have done full justice to Barclay's view till we have paid some attention to his argument concerning the Holy Spirit, (II. sects. 10-12.)

By far the largest and most impressive testimony of Scripture has reference to this subject. And Barclay rightly lays stress upon "the great and notable acts that have been performed by the Spirit in all ages."

"In short, what thing relating to the salvation of the soul, and to the life of the Christian, is rightly performed, or effectually obtained, without it?"

The Spirit's intromissions are inward and immediate.

"The Spirit of God leadeth, instructeth and teacheth every true Christian whatsoever is need-ful for him to know." and this, "immediately, objectively and continually."

This is done not merely "subjectively, by enlightening their understandings to understand and believe the Scriptures..."

"but by presenting (spiritual) truths by way of object..."

"For there be many truths which as applicable to particulars and individuals, and most needful to be known by them, are in no wise to be found in the Scripture."

The teaching of the Spirit is "no peculiar, extraordinary privilege, but that which is common to all the saints."
It is "a more certain touchstone ... to discern and try seducers by, than even the apostle's own writings." (1 John 2.27.

It does not seem desirable to follow Barclay along the tortuous ways of Scriptural "proof" for his doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Nor is exhaustive treatment of this great subject possible. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a brief statement designed to indicate our view of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the soul, and where, in particular, we think the Barclaian statement is, not so much wrong, as one-sided and incomplete.

Regulative for Christian thought must always be what we learn from Christ, and here, we must confess, the material for a verdict is not abundant. As far as the synoptic gospels are concerned, the general silence of Christ on this subject is rather remarkable. A possible and pregnant reason for this reticence will be supplied as we proceed. It is to the Johannine gospel, therefore, that we are compelled to turn. Two strains of thought are evident here. (i) That the Holy Spirit is Christ's alter ego (e.g., "I will come again") (ii) That "Holy Spirit was not yet given," while Christ was on earth; but remained a promise only. The Acts takes up this second strain and follows it on to its fulfilment at Pentecost.

The fact that "Holy Spirit was not yet given" might be held sufficient to explain the paucity of allusion to the Holy Spirit
in the Synoptics. Founding on this phrase in 'John,' Bp. Gore puts forward the view that, before Pentecost, it was the Logos, not the Spirit, that was active in the world and the church; the advent of the Spirit coinciding with the Pentecostal birth of the Christian Church, which then became the organ of the Holy Spirit. This seems to the present writer an ex parte statement, put forward, most likely, in a High Church interest. The simpler view is that Spirit was not yet given qua Spirit of Christ,—the distinctively "Holy"Spirit. But that the Spirit's earthly activity began at Pentecost, is unthinkable. Admittedly it entered on a new phase; that is all.

If, now, the relative silence of Christ regarding the Spirit does not favour the view that "Spirit was not yet given," silence what other explanation of that is forthcoming? A simple explanation lies in the other Johannine view, that Spirit was Christ's alter ego. It was because the Holy Spirit was so much a part of Himself,—of His deepest, inmost self, that Christ found little occasion to speak of Him objectively. His knowledge of the Spirit was part of His own self-consciousness,—it was of that "inside", subjective kind, which we have described as the truest, the only "true", knowledge of the Eternal Subject. Christ and the Spirit were not indeed identical, yet they were wholly one, with that oneness which constitutes personal intimacy, wherein the mutual intimates live each in the other's life—"I in Him; He in Me." This relation of the human Christ to the Spirit is typical,—regulative for thought, and the goal of Christian effort not if this is spiritually true, it ought to be a peculium of
theology; it will find witnesses among those who are not systematic theologians, but who are deeply versed in the secrets of man's spirit. We find Emerson, e.g., saying this:

"I conceive a man as always spoken to from behind, and unable to turn his head to look at the speaker. In all the millions who have heard the voice, none ever saw the face. As children in their play run behind each other, and seize one by the ears and make him walk before them, so is the Spirit our unseen pilot. That well known voice speaks in all languages, governs all men, and none ever can get a glimpse of its form. If the man will exactly obey it, it will adopt him, so that he shall not any longer separate it from himself in his thought; he shall seem to be it; he shall be it. If he listen with insatiable ears, richer and greater wisdom is taught him, the sound swells to a ravishing music, he is borne away as with a flood, he becomes careless of his food and of his house, he is a drinker of ideas, and leads a heavenly life."

Some such view of the Holy Spirit would seem to be required as a corrective of what may have appeared, in preceding pages, an "all too human" view of Revelation. The fact would seem to be that the process of revelation is susceptible of expression from two sides, - the human and the divine. In the foregoing pages it is taken on its human side. When we tried to define the prophetic consciousness more exactly, we found ourselves
speaking of a tradition; of a mind saturated in the tradition; and of a situation to which the prophets mind addressed itself. The matter is thus described in terms of human discovery, not as in essence different from similar efforts in other fields of human interest and achievement. If this is a sufficient description, then it is otiose to introduce another factor,—the divine Spirit. ("Entia non multiplicanda praeter necessitatem").

We have postulated a Logos-activity in nature (which later we shall define more precisely as in character redemptive). We have also postulated the prophetic soul. And we have spoken as if the interaction of these two sufficed to give the required result. There is, however, here a missing factor, to the presence of which the prophetic soul has given strong and unvarying witness,—the sense of Guidance and Control. Historically, it was the overpowering sense of this which created the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. And further, it is to be noticed that this testimony comes precisely from those who might be supposed to be less dependent on it. The pregnant situation, and the keen prophetic spirit, might be supposed able to divide the field between them. But it is just the prophetic soul that refuses to put in a claim to any credit for the result. It avows that it knows too well to whom the credit is due, and refers all to the Spirit.

The relations of the Son and Spirit are notoriously difficult to disentangle. (and the language of Scripture, and of the Apostle Paul in particular, does not help to extricate the
entanglement.) On the one hand we cannot suppose Christ the Son to have retired into inactivity. On the other, the doctrine of the Spirit seems to leave no room for Christ to work.

We may, however, safely think of Christ's exalted position as being still used to perpetuate His redemptive work, to carry forward that work in human society, and by the same means, viz., redemptive suffering. We are to see the continued activity of Christ in every example of suffering love, and patience, and injury sweetly borne. And we may think of all that as being the "lesson-book" in the hands of the Divine Teacher, the Spirit. He "takes of the things of Christ" - both the past things and the things still going on - "and shows them unto us;" shews them, mark you, not Himself. He hides Himself, sinks Himself in His holy task, willing we should forget the Teacher if only we learn the lesson. But as in all the best teaching, the Personality of the Teacher subtly imparts itself to the learner. As Emerson says, "He, (the learner), becomes It."

Can one say more?

A quotation from Pringle-Pattison may fitly end this discussion: He says (Theism p.32) "So natural is this process of divine education that it seems as if the new insight were wrested by man himself from the void and formless infinite, as if the new truth, the new ideal, were the creation of his own spirit. And he then bows down and worships himself as a god in a godless world. These however are but the two sides of the shield which may be opposed to each other to all eternity. All
moral and religious truth is won by the race for itself, in the sweat of its own moral experience, but not without the indwelling spirit of God."

"Not without the indwelling Spirit," - here Barclay is right. But also, not without the "outward," historical, redemptive activity that makes Nature significant, - that incarnates and reincarnates the Eternal Logos in quivering human flesh. How could Barclay forget that; and how could his "suffering Friends" allow him to forget it?

Testimonium Internum Spiritus Sancti.

A brief note, by way of appendix, may be added on this historic phrase. Reformation usage chiefly had regard to the Spirit's witness to the Scriptures. In theory, Scripture, simpliciter, was not the Word of God. To become such, a scripture had to reach to something within the reader which responded to it, and testified to it as an oracle of the living God. In Coleridge's familiar words, the particular Scripture "found" the reader, - got home to that deepest part of him where the sense of "the sacred" resided. This is our modern human way of putting it. The test. int. S.G. is the same thing, looked at and expressed from the other, the divine, side. It is possible to speak of man's "discovery" of God; or of God's "self-disclosure" to man; and probably impossible to delimit the two. The Interchanges of personality are very subtle. And there is no need to suppose that an exhaustive description of the process of divine knowledge can be given from either standpoint exclusively.
CHAPTER VII.

THE WAY OF KNOWLEDGE (continued.)

5. Authority, Infallibility and Certainty.

Having completed our investigation of the doctrine of the Inner Light in itself, we now proceed to examine its relations to outward Authority, and its pretensions to infallibility and certainty.

These matters are raised in the second Proposition.

These are Barclay's statements:-

"These divine inward revelations ... neither do nor can contradict the outward testimony of the Scriptures, or right and sound reason. Yet it will not follow that they are to be subjected to the test either of reason or Scripture as to a more noble or certain rule and touchstone. For this divine revelation is evident and clear of itself, forcing by its evidence and clearness, the well-disposed understanding to assent, irresistibly moving the same thereunto, even as the common principles of natural truths move and incline the mind to a natural assent: as, that the whole is greater than its part; or, that two contradictories can neither be both true or both false." (Prop.IIB.)

In brief, inward revelation has intrinsic authority, arising from its self-evidence, - a self-evidence such as the axioms of logic or mathematics possess. This renders it independent of
all external authority, with which, so far as legitimate, divine revelation has no quarrel. In other words, inward revelation is at all times willing to be tried by the deliverances of authority; but not to be subjected to them,—the truth being, as will appear, that the source of both kinds of authority is the same; but that inward revelation stands in a nearer relation to that source.

These positions are established polemically, in course of meeting objections to his doctrine. With his polemic we are not primarily concerned here. Yet it is not without its own interest, as throwing sidelights on the whole question of authority, its need and nature.

Thus Barclay supposes his opponent arguing thus: "Granted the existence (for the sake of argument) of such inward revelations as you advocate, a question arises as to their validity. History, both early, (Gnostics) and recent, (the Anabaptists of Munster) shows to what vagaries in thought, and to what excesses in practice, such inward revelations are apt to lead." Barclay's answer is to admit and disown the abuse of the doctrine; but to deny that its disuse is therefrom to be inferred. For if so, would his opponents be themselves in better case? Have not their principles too been abused? (Instances given, II,13.14) It is not in the nature of Inward revelation to lead to vagary and excess, any more than it is in the nature of Scripture, tradition or reason, to lead to the strife which history shows to have been constantly waged under these different banners.
And if the abuse of a principle does not necessarily flow from the principle, the principle is no wise compromised by the abuse. Further, the infallibility of a principle does not infer the infallibility of its adherents. And no presumption is therefore raised against the infallibility of inward revelation, by reason of the all-too-human frailty of its professed devotees.

This is good fence. But Barclay’s opponents mean to say that on their principle, human fallibility is overtly recognised, and carefully guarded against; the will, or caprice, or perversity of the individual is restrained; and the gathered wisdom of the past is placed at his disposal. But no such subventions are provided for him who turns away from these helps, and shoulders off these restraints, in sole and untramelled dependence on the light within. To this objection Barclay would reply that the Inward Light is its own sufficient safeguard, if only the subject waits upon it with pure intention. The inward light is clear, self-evident and infallible in itself; but it is not seen except by the man whose eye is single. As for the transgressor, external authority exists to deal with him.

Yes, says the opponent, but will the light be seen, even by the man whose eye is single?

To that, Barclay has the final rejoinder that if the Inward Light has no existence and no validity, it is so much the worse for the authoritarian. For, whatever be his principle of authority, — whether Scripture, tradition or reason, — it is not self-
authenticating, it requires certification from without itself. So that, in ultimate resort, all schools of authority are driven back to rely on the Spirit of God, - the Inner Light.

In brief, then, Barclay distinguishes internal and external authority, and recognizes the right of both. They both proceed from the same Spirit. But the outward authority stands at a long remove from its original source. Its original is divine; but its history human; and in the course of its history it has gathered up much of an entirely human character, and labours under the imperfections which attend every work of man. The internal authority, on the other hand, is pure and uncontaminated: it comes fresh from the divine mint.

This is the theory we are now to examine.

Barclay's claim of infallibility and self-evidence for the Inner Light is, if not subversive of External Authority, at least such as to relegate it to a region inferior to that in which the spiritual man is privileged and ought to live. He has, within, an authority whose deliverances are so clear, coercive and infallible, as to render him wholly independent of outward guidance or control. He can be certain both of what this Authority says, and that what it says is right.

Let us examine these claims of infallibility and certainty with a view to seeing whether they do displace external Authority.
[Of Certainty we may say it is a subjective, of Infallibility an objective attribute. In other words, certainty applies to the subject of knowledge; it is a subjective state, characterised as assurance of possessing truth, of being in touch with reality. Infallibility, again, attaches itself to the source whence truth emanates. In a word, infallibility belongs to the Authority; certainty to the subject of Authority.]

I.

As relating to an external Authority, infallibility cannot be substantiated. It has been claimed; it still is, in one august quarter, claimed. But the sober judgment of the generality of mankind is reflected in Iverach's verdict, "Infallibility, inerrancy, are not categories for men to use."

J. H. Leckie shows convincingly that so far from being a fact, it is not even a necessity; for all the purposes of external authority can be served without it. External authority is not final nor ultimate. It is provisional in its nature. Its position is that of trustee in behalf of heirs whose interests are its chief concern, and whose ultimate assumption of the estate is its goal. External authority must ever work towards its supersession by internal. ("He must increase; I must decrease") That end, the claim of infallibility is much more likely to stultify than to promote. For nothing could more tend to stifle criticism, and therewith the growth of judgment and responsibility, than to lean upon infallible authority.
Turning next to Certainty, as a mental state of the subject of external Authority, it is obvious that, here, certainty attaches primarily to the Authority itself, and only derivatively to what the Authority pronounces. I may be certain my medical adviser is competent and trustworthy, and only then, and mediate­ly, am I certain that what he says is right. The first certain­ty,— the certainty attaching to *prima veritas* — is intuitive; the second, inferential. As intuitive, it "sees in" to the physician's mind; and subjectively shares the physician's self­confidence,— in proof of which, one sees that doubt or hesitation on the doctor's part causes an immediate slump in the patient's confidence.

Such, then, appears to be the nature of Certainty, as relating to external Authority. It is a mental state of the subject, induced by the Authority itself, and reflecting the assurance which the Authority possesses, or successfully pretends to possess, of knowing the truth, or having the right to control. Such certainty is not, as said, a reasoned, but an intuitive state,— how slender, often, its rational grounds, is shown in (say) Balfour's "Foundations of Belief;" and how pathetically misplaced it often is, needs no enforcement here.

As far, therefore, as external Authority is concerned, we find no theoretical grounds for attributing either Infallibility or Certainty to it. Accordingly, if either could be claimed for an authority which is wholly inward, Barclay's somewhat "superior" attitude to the external would be justified. How
then does the matter stand in this quarter? He claims for the inward authority infallibility, as emanating from a source which is divine; and certainty, as that arises from the clear and coercive nature of its revelations. This claim we must probe.

II.

As to infallibility, the claim is based on two grounds. The first, a priori, is that revelations coming from a divine Source must be infallible. (II. sect. 13.) The second, a posteriori, is from experience:

"We can boldly affirm it from our certain and blessed experience. For this Spirit never deceived us, never acted nor moved us to anything that was amiss; but is clear and manifest in its revelations, which are evidently discerned by us, as we wait in that pure undefiled light of God (that proper and fit organ) in which they are received" (II. Sect. 13.)

But this high claim suffers some reduction, in as much as it is admitted that the infallible revelations are given to fallible subjects. And in point of fact, the early Quaker pretensions to infallibility, were noticeably abated after the desolating experience of Nayler. Hence we incline to think that the claim of infallibility is of the nature of an inference from the unexamined certainty with which the Friends believed themselves to be in immediate contact with the Spirit of God. Pronouncements emanating from that quarter could not but be
infallible. It was a pious opinion, based on the Certainty whose grounds we now proceed to explore.

Certainty, as we have indicated, is a subjective state, arising from the selfevidence and coerciveness of the truth or duty presented to the subject's mind. Selfevident must be the truth which the Subject cannot but believe; coercive the duty, which the subject feels he must do. Certainty is thus correlative to cogency and coerciveness.

Such cogency in the theoretical sphere is, we are led to understand, never absolute; always hypothetical. Its formula is, If A, then B. Certainty, here, arises from the selfevident cogency with which the existence of B is connected with that of A; which latter remains hypothetical.

Religious certainty will never rest satisfied with that. It will not present its "certainties" in a hypothetical form. If it does so, it is only rhetorically. "If God be for us, (none) can be against us," is a categorical assertion, cast, for rhetorical purposes, into hypothetical shape. If, therefore, theoretical certainty expresses itself in the formula, "If A, then B"; religious certainty attaches to the proposition that affirms A. Religious certainty therefore lives in another region than the theoretical. Agreeing with Iversach that "infallibility and inerrancy are not categories for men to use," J. H. Leckie yet says that to deny religious certainty would contradict the universal experience and testimony of the saints. With Dorner,
he calls it a "vital spiritual state." How is it attained?

It seems to be attained in moments of intenser perception than usual. The various elements of the soul are wrought into unusual unity in presence of an object, or a situation, in which the soul's interests are deeply engaged. It is not a case of cool, dispassionate observation. Values are at stake which are as dear as life, or dearer. In presence of these, the soul is "broad awake." Illumination and certainty are not of the commonplace order. They are the fruit of rare hours of insight, which it is the task of faith to carry forward to fulfilment through days of gloom. But the question here is not, psychologically to discuss or account for the illuminative experience that results in religious certainty. Our question is to determine its relations to external authority. These we believe to be vital.

In the first place, we have spoken of "values" that are felt to be at stake,—values dear as life, or dearer. How have these come to be felt as values? This is precisely the disciplinary task of authority. Authority is the trustee of certain values; the guardian of a body of truths, the monitor of a system of duties, in which those values are enshrined. It is her task to impart a sense of these values to the subjects over whom she is placed.

In the second place, it is her task to preserve the system of truth or duty for which she stands, and to present it to pupil-minds in such wise that they may make it their own. It is
the task of inculcation,—a preparatory, but still absolutely necessary task.

This is all that external authority can do. But it is much, nay, indispensable. The subject of authority, as mere subject, is not yet a person. He will have attained personality, in measure, when he sees with his own eyes, feels with his own heart, and judges with his own mind. To that day, authority looks forward. When it has arrived, her work is done. Her pupil passes from her hands,—but only into the hands of another, higher, yet still external, authority.

Such, then, we conceive to be the necessary relations of external to internal authority. The soul is born and nursed in the shadow of external authority. It conveys to the soul its own values,—the soul is the seat of values, and the external authority provides the values by which the soul lives. Further, the authority holds, guards, and renders to the soul, the truths in which these values are enshrined. These truths are systematised by the authority. Some, but some only, of these truths the soul makes its own,—sees them with self-evident clearness. The rest, she takes upon trust, as belonging to the system, part of which the soul has verified, and more of which she hopes to verify in course of time.

This may seem a too-partial account of the matter,—it provides for the action of the authority upon the soul, but not for the reaction of the soul upon the authority. It makes no
provision for advancing knowledge - gives no place to the pioneer of new truth. But even so, the pioneer is himself the nursling of authority, and would be the last to forget his debt thereto. It is also to be remembered that the soul is not subjected to one authority, but to many. A son of the Church, today, is also (let us say) a student of science. He has to combine, in some sort, the truths rendered by both authorities; and the resultant is a new truth. With this, as his contribution, he returns to his authority, to have it authorised, received into the authoritative system, which it, in greater or less measure, transforms.

This is as far as we can meantime pursue the subject.
CHAPTER VIII.

The Scriptures.

It was inevitable that the apologist of the Inner Light should join issue with the upholders of Scripture. These represented very various schools; yet all agreed in looking to the Scriptures as the chief, if not the only, source of religious knowledge. None of them, Reformers, Romanists or Rationalists, held that Scripture, simpliciter, was the Word of God. All held that it required interpretation. The instrument of interpretation varied,—the light of reason, the Church's tradition, the internal testimony of the Spirit; but all agreed that the substance of revealed truth lay there, requiring only to be properly extracted. Hence a doctrine of inward revelation, deposing Scripture from the place of primacy, inevitably lay exposed to the allied attack of those who, though by no means mutual friends, were now united in hostility to it.

The Third Proposition accordingly sets forth Barclay's doctrine of Scripture.
The following are the salient points in his thesis:

(a) The Scriptures proceed from these revelations of the Spirit of God.

(b) "They contain -

(i) an historical account of the acts of God's people in divers ages; with many singular providences attending them.

(ii) a prophetical account of (things to come.)

(iii) a full and ample account of the chief principles and doctrines of Christ ... 

(c) "They are not the fountain, but only a declaration of the fountain.

"They are therefore not the principal ground of truth and knowledge; not yet the primary rule of faith and manners.

"Yet they are a subordinate rule, secondary to the first.

"By the Spirit within we can alone know them,—and they point beyond themselves to the Spirit as first and principal."

The proposition, it is apparent, is divisible into three parts. (a) states the Source of Scripture,—inward revelation. (b) the Contents. These are -

1. History (i.e., Historical books of O T; the Gospels and Acts.)

2. Prophecy (i.e. O T prophets and The Apocalypse.)
3. Doctrine (i.e. Psalms etc., of O T; and Epistles of N.T.) (c) indicates the Use and Value of the Scripture, as a subordinate rule, derived from the Spirit and requiring His help in reading it. The argument is directed to the establishment of this third point (c). Barclay yields nothing to his opponents in point of deference and honour to the Scripture - "the most excellent writings in the world." There is "a majesty in the style, a coherence of the parts, a good scope in the whole" worthy of their divine origin. But these are not discernible by the natural man. The use and value of the Scripture therefore depend on something other than the Scriptures themselves. Other considerations point the same way. The gospel in its character as a "new covenant," refuses submission to the bondage of the letter. Moreover, the generality of Scripture disqualifies it as a guide for particular cases. It tells me how I may be saved, it can't tell me that I am. It indicates that preachers are required, but it is unable to say whether I should be one. Again, access to the Scripture is denied to many, congenital idiots for example, or the victims of Papal concealment and priestly duplicity; or the truth is concealed under textual errors, mistranslation, or the imperfect transmission of MSS; the canon too, is uncertain, and in any case can only have been humanly determined. Are those, thus providentially denied access to the original Scriptures, to be regarded as thereby incapacitated, in whole or part, for salvation? The Scriptures are therefore to be valued as a comforting and
even "necessary" (sic) adjunct to the means of grace; the records of saints and martyrs they contain are inspiring; they are well fitted to arbitrate in controversy; and to correct the errors of backsliders. But, when all is said, they are not indispensable. He alone who has their inspiring Spirit can use them to profit; and with the Spirit, he can make shift without them.

Such is the gist of Barclay's argument; of which, on the whole, it would appear that, honorific references notwithstanding, the ultimate tendency must be to cheapen Scripture,—since "all can raise the flower now, for all have got the seed." This relative disparagement of the use and value of Scripture would seem to be naturally connected with his account of its content, which a brief examination will show to be very external. As to content, Scripture consists of (i) history, (ii) prophecy and (iii) gospel truths. But the distinction between (i) and (ii) is really a distinction without a difference. For Barclay, both are forms of history,—the one, written after the fact; the other, in Bp. Butler's phrase, "history written beforehand." This was of course the view then, and long after, current; perhaps, in certain quarters, current even yet. It rests on a supernatural view of authorship. For if prophecy is indeed "history written beforehand," its author must be more than human. And since the history (proper) relates the same order of facts as the prophetic (pre-
dicted) "history," it would seem reasonable to ascribe its authorship to the same supernatural source,—the more especially, because, included within the history, were "facts," (such as the Creation and Fall), which were inaccessible to unaided human research.

Barclay's third division of Scripture,—the "precious declarations of the gospel of Christ"—indicates a more or less miscellaneous collection of utterances of the Holy Spirit, given forth "at sundry times and divers manners," imparted to their human authors by inward, immediate revelation.

Speaking generally, we find there is a lack of unity in Barclay's account of Scripture and its contents. A unity of Source, he certainly asserts; but it is not the unity of an organising principle. What Barclay offers is a mélange of unassorted items,—"acts" and "providences," without organic unity,—the unity, say, of "drama," (Wheeler Robinson)—of great action proceeding under a controlling Hand, to a predestined end. He speaks, indeed, of "a majesty in the style, a coherence in the parts, and a good scope in the whole." This however is "not discernible by the natural man," which is doubtless the reason why he does nothing to make it apparent.

How, then, should we seek to supply this defect? Have we any unifying principle to suggest,—any formula to reduce the multiplicity of the scriptures to the rich simplicity of an organic whole? Let us see.

Beginning with Barclay's first division,—the historical
element. He connects the record of these discrete historical happenings with the Spirit, their Author, in a way which we find unreal. The scriptural writer is more than a mere "amanuensis of the Spirit." How much more?

At first sight, one might be inclined to think that for the simple recital of history no more is required than the historian's ordinary equipment with the spirit, and the material, of research. Thus, for example, Luke, addressing himself to the task of acquainting the "excellent Theophilus" with "the facts of our religion," seems to claim no more than a due degree of diligence and honesty in ascertaining and narrating the historical facts. Much the same may be said of Paul. Paul's task, it is true, was not the historian's; he even seems, quite in the style of Barclay, to disparage historical knowledge, as being a knowledge of Christ "after the flesh." Yet Paul yields to none in his insistence on the historicity of the facts on which his gospel is based. And yet, for his knowledge of these facts he claims no other source than the common tradition of the Church. When he does claim more, it is not the bare fact he is dealing with, but the fact in its spiritual significance. This he claims to have received "of the Lord."

Almost, therefore, it would seem that "inspiration" need not be claimed for the historical parts of Scripture.

This, however, would be a too hasty conclusion.

Never must it be forgotten that the sacred historian is writing what, for him, was "sacred" history. Even his
historical labours have an evangelistic purpose. With success, E.F. Scott has tried to show that an apologetic element (and that really means an evangelistic purpose) underlies the seemingly dispassionate synoptic narrative. Here then, if anywhere, is the sphere of inspiration. The facts, as brute facts, lay open to all,—to one man as to another,—to Josephus as to Luke. But in the one case they bear a significance which they have not in the other. In that significance the facts have their value. And the apparently dispassionate and objective narration is eloquent of the conviction that the facts do have this meaning, and only need to be fairly set forth, for this their true nature and significance to appear.

This view covers not merely the field of history proper; it embraces also the quasi-historical. With the naivety of their age, Scripture writers record as bona fide fact what we now call by other names. But if they recorded as fact what we call myth, folklore, or whatever else, it was still for the religious value of the asidistant facts that they recorded them. This value remains. The Creation narrative can still speak to the scientist. The Fall story is no mere myth to the man who knows that he has been the "Adam of his own soul."

This view extends not only to the prophetic literature, but even to the undeniable predictive element in that literature. The prophet may well have believed that he was inditing "history beforehand." But it was not as a feat of television he did it. It was still the significance of fact,—the religious meaning of
present fact, in motion towards a divine event which would vindicate faith,—that he was concerned with. And our interest in these predictive prophecies today is less in having seen them fulfilled, or in hoping yet to do so, than in the spiritual values they affirm,—and that, often, with a glowing and poetic ardour which has inexpugnably lodged them in the Christian heart.

Of Barclay's third division,—the "doctrines of Christ,"—we say the same. All are rooted in fact,—all are concerned with the Divine character and action, as the one is revealed, and the other proceeds, in the field of history. They record the "doings of the Lord."

Here then is the organic unity we find in Scripture,—the vital union of Fact and Meaning,—such union as makes the truth of history. For History is not just fact. Brute fact is no more than the staple of annals, of *memoires pour servir*. But History is Fact interpreted; seen to be informed with spirit and purpose; and interpreted by a spirit akin to its own.
Part II.

Of Salvation, its Need, its Means and its Outcome.

Chapter.

9. The "Natural Man": Barclay's genetic account of elements of human nature non-moral; require impregnation either by the good or by the evil "seed." The seed a foreign "substance." Whence the prepotency of the evil seed? Barclay has no answer, since he has no real place for the Fall, and denies Original Sin.

10. Total Depravity: twin basis of this doctrine, in Scripture and experience. Its basis not theoretical; a value-judgment of the religious order. The doctrine is its own refutation.

Original Sin: Sin a religious concept; relative to Grace. Original Sin, as reflected in the experience of the saints, is a deficient response to Grace. Roots of Sin, in Nature and Society. A problem of extrication.

11. Fifth and Sixth Propositions: develop the theory of the Universal saving Light. The Death of Christ the ultimate cause of salvation; the Inner Light, the proximate. The former is "procuring cause" of the latter. Both are absolutely universal. The Inner Light is a divine substance, indwelling in, but not part of, human nature. Its operation requires passivity of the subject. The religious interests at stake.

12. Criticism of above. 1. Category of Substance, or Seed, a case of hypostasis. What Barclay calls a substance is really a relation. The relation is redemptive.

2. The connexion of Christ's Death with the Seed an arbitrary assertion.

3. Barclay has no real place for the Cross.

13. Criticism (continued); must be conservative. The interests of Barclay are also ours: the divine initiative; the inwardness; and the universality of Redemption.
Chapter.

1. The initiative is divine. An objective Atonement is necessary. Sin costs. Forgiveness implies suffering.

2. The redemptive relation is personal in its terms; and cannot persist on an external footing. Christ is Subject; and cannot remain a mere object of consciousness.

3. Redemptive activity is absolutely universal. Christ's historical redemption only the supreme instance.

Note on "Grace and Nature"; relations of these are mutual. Illustration from the Prodigal.

14. Justification by Faith. Barclay's a "germ" theory, with no real place for forgiveness. It is opposed to the imputation theory. Both are false extremes; a true doctrine of Justification will bring both together. Christ is not savingly realised as "for us" except as He is also "in us"; but it is "Christ for us" Who is thus subjectively realised.

15. Perfection and Perseverance: sainthood a vital interest, both human and religious. Barclay's provision insufficient. Surreptitious introduction of the human element. This provides for a real, but interrupted, progress. The truth in Perseverance.

CHAPTER IX.

SIN.

1. The "Natural Man."

With the Fourth Proposition we pass to the subject of Redemption; and first of all, we envisage the situation requiring it. It is sufficiently desperate:
(a) "All Adam's posterity ... is fallen, degenerated and
dead; deprived of the sensation or feeling of this
inward testimony or seed of God; and is subject to
the nature, power and seed of the serpent, which he
soweth in men's hearts while they abide in this
natural and corrupted state; whence it comes that
not only their words and deeds, but all their imagina-
tions, as proceeding from this depraved and wicked
seed, are evil perpetually in the sight of God.

(b) "Man therefore, as he is in this state, can know nothing
aright; his thoughts and conceptions concerning
God and spiritual things ... are unprofitable both
to himself and others.

(c) "Nevertheless, this seed is not to be imputed to infants,
until by transgression they actually join themselves
therewith."

The topics that emerge for discussion are these three:-

(i) Fallen man in maturity; or, the question of "total
depravity."

(ii) Fallen man in infancy; or, the question of "original
sin."

(iii) The ministry of unregenerate men; or, the question of
"valid orders."

The last topic crops up rather oddly here, and is mentioned
only to be reserved for later treatment (Prop. X.)
Together, Topics (i) and (ii) comprise a genetic account of Sin.

Exposition.

At the outset, we notice the introduction of a significant new word,- "seed,"- applied both to the saving principle ("seed of God"), and to the principle of sin and ruin("seed of the serpent.") As applied to the saving principle, it is none other than our old acquaintance, the "Inner Light," under another name: what was formerly termed "Light" is now termed "Seed,"- a dynamic term. As we saw, and shall see again, this seed is aliquid dei,- "that of God in man;" and, by parity of reasoning, the evil seed falls to be regarded as aliquid diaboli. The underlying metaphor, in each case, is evidently that of procreation.

The seed, deriving in one case from God, in the other, from the devil, is a strictly foreign element, indwelling, but not inherent in human nature. The existence and indwelling of the two seeds are due in each case to a historical event,- in the one case, the sacrifice of Christ; in the other, the Fall of Adam; these two events are in counterpoise.

The seed requires a matrix. That is provided by nature, at the stage of infancy. The congenital elements are destitute of moral quality. As we shall see, Barclay explicitly denies the existence of any good thing in human nature as such. Man has "no inward will, faculty, light or power to follow that which is good, and make real progress towards heaven." By
parity of reasoning, is to be presumed (though Barclay does not take the trouble to say it) the non-existence of any innate power to follow evil. In short, the basal element, or ground of human nature, requires to be fecundated. Its role is pure passivity. By non-resistance to either influence, the good or evil seed is received. Conception follows: the hidden man of the heart develops, bearing the character of the seed whence it sprang. Hence is understood the absolute disparity between the "spiritual" and the "natural" man. Each is after its kind: the one wholly good; the other, altogether bad.

From this standpoint, all Barclay's distinctive positions stand forth clearly,—his thorough going miserabilism; his relation to the opposite schools of Augustine and Pelagius; and his repudiation of original sin (both idea and term), with its horrible corollary of infant damnation. At the same time, another thing also becomes clear,—viz., that Barclay has no satisfactory explanation to offer of the pre-potency of the evil seed. Why should the "serpent-seed" so invariably prevail? Why is human culpability universal? How comes the phrase "natural man," to carry the sinister significance it always bears in Barclay's pages, and indeed in common speech? To these questions Barclay offers no real answer.

Upon each of these topics we shall briefly animadvert.
And, first, as to what Rufus Jones has called Barclay's "miserabilism,"- his unrelieved pessimism regarding the condition of the natural man. Regarding this, there is no room for doubt, as a cursory glance at the proposition will show. A clearer statement of total depravity it would be impossible to find. Here Barclay's sympathies are with Augustine. The point at which he breaks with Augustine, - the culpability of infants, - he charitably ascribes to "the infirmity of Augustine's declining years" and "to the heat of his zeal" against Pelagius. The mention of these extenuating circumstances leads us to infer his sympathy with Augustine's main doctrine of depravity.

But if his disagreement with Augustine is to be regarded as "an affair of out posts," in the case of Pelagius the onset is an "attack in force." The Pelagian doctrine asserts the survival from the Fall, impaired perhaps, but not extinguished, of some measure of goodness in man.

We have seen how Barclay relates himself to this view: he denies, not the survival merely, but the original existence of "any good which Adam had belonging to his nature." And what Adam had not himself of course he could not propagate. The ground of human nature, which is all that can be passed on from sire to son, is a moral neutrum, - merely a matrix for the good or evil seed. This is all that infants possess. They are without "knowledge" (in Barclay's pregnant sense of the word) of good and evil: they are alive without the law (though how,
Barclay does not show,) and free from evil imputation.

If so, the question becomes acute, as to why this neutral state so invariably pawses over to the condition above described. The obvious answer to this would be,—the Fall. We shall give reasons to show that this answer is not available in Barclay's case. Beyond doubt, Barclay believed in the historicity of that he believed as the Fall,—or believed it. But/is his wont, he spiritualised the history; and the history thus spiritualised, lacks pith to support his argument.

His view of the Fall was this: it was a real historical event, whose effects were partly outward, but chiefly inward. Loss of Eden was assuredly an outward, material calamity. But the "mystical signification" of Eden's loss is the main affair, and its "mystical signification and true account" was loss of God's fellowship.

Now, it will be obvious that these outward and inward conditions are not equally heritable. Heritable certainly are the fallen fortunes of the house,—the thorns and briars of untamed nature. These, however, are but relative misfortunes, and can be measurably overcome. But in what sense is spiritual misfortune heritable? Not as regards the ground of human nature, for that, after, as before the Fall, remains morally neutral. Not, again, in the sense that, after the Fall, communion with God was impossible; for the burden of Barclay's, as of every gospel, is that it is possible. Well then, does the misfortune lie in the fact of exposure to the "power, nature and seed of
the serpent?" Yet the story shows that even in Paradise, Adam was not exempt from temptation. To all important intents, we must conclude the Fall has no vital significance for Barclay, as Moehler has shewn. Barclay accepted it for a fact; but it has no real place in his theory. And if its historicity should be doubted or disproved, Barclay's withers would be unwrung.

From our modern standpoint, this is all to the good. But, unfortunately for Barclay, it leaves him without a reply to the query. Why do all men sin? Should Barclay attempt to answer in these terms: "Have I not said that fallen man is deprived of the sense and feeling of God, and is, at the same time, subjected to the power, nature and seed of the serpent?" then we shall be compelled to anticipate a little, and confront Barclay with his (forthcoming) theory of the universality of the saving seed. The universality of the saving seed is the distinctive Quaker doctrine; yet here its absence is invoked to help Barclay out of his difficulty. We cannot allow Barclay to "have it both ways." Either the saving seed is present to fallen humanity, or it is not. If it is, how does he account for the prepotency of the evil seed? If it is not, what becomes of the Quaker peculium?

It seems, in fine, impossible to avoid the impression that Barclay unduly simplifies his problem. As he presents it, it might almost be reduced to algebraical terms: as thus:-
Let a = the ground of human nature.
" b = the seed of God.
" c = the serpent-seed.

Then ab = the "spiritual man;" and ac = the "natural man"
Such "bloodless categories" will never hold the rich and varied
contents of human nature.

CHAPTER X

SIN (continued).
Total Depravity and Original Sin.

Yet, when all is said in the way of criticism, there remains
something to be explained; and Barclay's doctrine, if it fails to
explain it, at least does not explain it away. The doctrine
of Total Depravity, like other doctrines that have commanded
wide assent, springs from a very real experience, of sin's
dominion, and man's distress. Further, a doctrine of salvation,
so transcending as the Christian Gospel, implies a desperate
need. Sit dignus vindice nodus. The doctrine of total
depravity at least satisfies this canon; for it presents "a
problem fit for a God." What shall we say about it?

Tentatively, we shall say that it derives from the Bible,
with some basis in experience.

(a) When I speak of its Biblical foundation, I am not to be
understood as implying that there is a single, consistent
doctrine of man in the Bible. What is here argued is, that
Biblical warrant for the darker view of human nature is very
easily secured. And that not merely from "proof texts"
(which indeed might be ranged on both sides) but from a certain Weltanschauung which was undoubtedly held by certain of the sacred writers, as well as by many of their devout readers in all ages. It regards man's mundane history as bounded by two dire events, - the Fall at the beginning, and the Apocalypse at the close. Each of these "events" supports, and is in turn supported by, the miserabilistic view of man and human life. The Fall-story leaves man to envisage himself as the natural object of Divine disapproval, and his labours as blighted by God's curse. The Apocalyptic view in turn, regards the kingdoms of this world as mere "provinces of the Kingdom of darkness." (the quotations here are from Paterson's Gifford Lectures p217). "destined to cataclysmic disappearance, and to be replaced by a Kingdom of God, either established above the clouds, or on a re-created earth." Thus the whole life of the race, as bounded by these two events, - a fall at the start, and a catastrophe at the close, - wears the aspect of "a hopeless experiment and an ignominious failure." It would not seem to be "moving on towards an issue worthy of the human genius, and of the divine power which set man his tasks and equipped him for their accomplishment."

This, I repeat, is not put forward as "the" Scriptural account of man's life; but only as one for which there is "Scriptural warrant." Confessedly, some such view prevailed in the early Church. It was authoritative for classic
theology; and its influence, in particular, was supreme in
the creative eras of Augustine and the Reformation.

(b) That leads us up to the second pillar of this doctrine,- its basis in experience.

The relations of doctrine and experience are reciprocal, and hard to disentangle. The truth in the present case may be, that misery gave birth both to the Fall-story and to the apocalyptic expectation; and that they, in turn, grew up to support their parent. What is certain, at any rate, is that if Augustine found the Fall-story ready to his hand, he brought to its interpretation a deep experience and penetrating psychological insight. To Apocalypse, again, Luther's experience of guilt and impotence gave a Significance which it had not even for those of his contemporaries who shared his apocalyptic presuppositions. And if we are to trust Paul's selfwitness,- as we surely must,- he too had known the Fall as part of his own life-story. It is therefore much rather in experience than in Scripture, that we are to look for the root of this doctrine. The forms which Biblical miserabilism assumes, may be no more substantial than the Brocken-shadow, monstrous, grotesque, spectral;- yet they have the man behind them whose shadow they are. Projections of a guilty conscience they may well be; yet the guilty conscience is real, and no shadow.
It is remarkable, for instance, how men so different, and historically so far apart, as Augustine and George Fox, found common ground in their view of depraved and fallen man. Both were "twice-born men." Both emerged from profound conflict into profound peace. And both, reviewing their former condition from the summit reached, passed upon it the self same verdict of total depravity. This is the more remarkable in view of the disparity of their moral experience. Unlike Augustine's "fine Confessions," the Journal of George Fox provides no material for a Byronic sneer. "At the age of 11," he says, "I knew pureness and righteousness." Fox's trouble was not an acute sense of positive transgression. It was rather an intense perception of the darkness, folly and hypocrisy of his generation, and of his own (albeit involuntary) implication with it. He was not at home in the world; and knew as yet no other home.

The important fact, for us now, is this,—that when at last "G.F." obtained deliverance, he figured his new condition as a reversal of the Fall. Plainly, an ineffable, unapproachable good had haunted these men's youthful minds, turning this world's good to "apples of Sodom" in their mouths. This supreme good they at length attained; and from the standpoint reached, they passed a "judgment of value" on their past history and experience. This judgment they expressed in terms of "total depravity."

But we cannot overlook the important point that, while yet
in a condition of dark and helpless bondage, these men still groaned under it. Had their depravity been as total as they declared it to be, they would not have groaned. They would not have felt it. They would have hugged their chains. Wordsworth speaks of "those high instincts before which our mortal nature doth tremble like a guilty thing surprised." In those high instincts he, perhaps rightly, finds "intimations of immortality." For our present purpose it is enough to point to their presence as the presupposition of guilty fear. From this point of view, the refutation of a doctrine of total depravity lies in the very fact of there being such a doctrine at all.

Barclay's argument, of course, is that these "high instincts" are not part of our "mortal nature." They are present to it; but not of it. They are non-human, supernatural; and confront the nature they condemn, as that which is "wholly other" than themselves. The divine, in short, and the human, are mutually exclusive. But a divine element that is universally present, is hardly to be distinguished from nature itself. And when Penn is found saying, It is natural to man to have a supernatural light, one feels that the question has come to be merely one of terms.

In the light of the fore-going, our verdict on the doctrine of total depravity would be, that it is a value-judgment of the religious, and not primarily of the ethical, order. There is good, real good, in men, short of that goodness which comes only
when the heart has wakened to a full sense of what the Love of God really is. In the joy of that discovery, and in the selfreproach that attends the consciousness of how little of its due such Love has hitherto received from us, our language is no longer measured and calm and balanced. It is the language of rapture on the one hand, and of execration on the other. ("I was a beast before Thee.") It expresses a truth of feeling rather than of fact. It is not the language which theology should use, or rather it is language which only a theology acutely aware of its presuppositions should use. Valid and objective in its own sphere, this judgment must not be oblivious of other values. They have their rights, which it is no good service to disparage.

Original Sin.

We have now seen the insuperable difficulty Barclay is under, of accounting for the universal prevalence of sin. He asserts the total depravity, by nature, of Adam's posterity. But he has not been able to explain the prepotency of the evil seed. His theory of the Fall will not account for it. And he will have nothing to say to the doctrine usually associated with it, and usually advanced in order to account for it, viz., Original Sin. Nature, in its ground, and as it presents itself to view at the stage of infancy, is a non-moral substance. It is as destitute of moral quality as the tree in which the sawfly lays its eggs. The seeds alike of good and evil, are
foreign to it. It awaits impregnation by either. And since 
Barclay denies to it any will or faculty of choice, it seems 
largely a matter of accident which will get in first.

What shall we say about Original Sin? That it is a theory, 
or hypothesis, advanced to account for the universal prevalency 
of sin. As much as "total depravity," it belongs not primarily 
to the moral sphere; but to the religious. Both of them 
describe states, not actions; and the judgment passed on both 
states is a value-judgment of the religious order.

My meaning is, that "Sin," as here used, whether as original, 
or at the stage of depravity, is really a religious rather than 
an ethical term. It is valid, that is, in the sphere constituted 
a specific 
by/activity of God, viz., His forth-going redemptive love. 
Sin is not so well or so clearly defined when regarded as "want 
of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God," as it 
is when regarded as want of response in kind to: God's redeeming 
love and grace. That is what I mean by saying that Sin is 
a properly religious, rather than moral concept. It is of 
course a moral idea and it will be impossible to draw a hard 
and fast line between sin, strictly so called, and moral evil. 
Yet one feels there is a difference, for even if defined in 
terms of law, it would sufficiently describe moral evil to 
define it as "want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the 
law,"- whereas sin requires the further specification of the law 
as "the law of God." With the words, "of God," we enter a 
different region, and very especially is this apparent when the
concept of God has the wealth of gracious meaning which it has for the Christian heart. Sin thus becomes defined in relation to Grace, as that which meets Grace with a deficient, no less than with a churlish, or defiant, response. Hence, among the saints the sense of sin is characteristically a confession of deficiency ("More love to Thee, O Christ!") and to them depravity seems to consist less in wrong actions than in a wrong attitude and state, an appalling callosity of soul in the presence of "love so amazing, so divine." In this sense of deficiency, a defect of nature, rather than of will, of which the saints are chiefly conscious, we may get a clue to Original Sin. (For has not the saint become again as a child?) It, then, consists in a primal callosity, or selfishness, rendering the soul impervious to the approaches of the love that would redeem.

The foot of this selfishness is in nature, with its primal urge towards self-preservation. But if its root is in nature, its nurse is society. Society is a congeries of groups, ranged in concentric circles, narrower and wider, round the self. Each of these groups has a moral unity, a moral character. There is the "group mind," the "group will," tending always to reproduce themselves in their constituent members; so that it is quite as true to say that the society or group is in the individual, as that the individual is in the society or group. The group mind and the group will tend to uniformity, a general level, a prevailing tone. This is never of the highest: it represents the average, l'homme moyen sensuel. The group
works to a level,—both ways, up and down. A group is always in a confederacy against its worst, and in a conspiracy against its best members.

This gives the individual the occasion of his moral struggle, and almost certain fall. His problem is one of extrication,—to shake himself free from one group, to find higher life in another.

The widest of these concentric circles is "the world." The world "lieth in sin,"—not as altogether morally bad; not as organising itself on the devilish principle of hating God; but on the sinful principle of "refusing all sacrifice for the good cause." In and of this sinful world we are, at the beginning. Adjustment to its demands; consent, tacit or avowed, to its actions;—complicity with its undisowned guilt,—this is the always repeated story of man's fall and depravity. A world lying under the guilt of dominion of sin,—a world within, and not merely without, the individual,—that is the situation. Extrication from this world,—that is the problem of sin; a problem fit for a redeeming God.
The Universal Saving Light.

The Fifth and Sixth Propositions are entitled, "Concerning Christ's Universal Redemption; and also the Saving Light whereby with every man is enlightened."

Barclay groups them together, as forming his complete account of Redemption and its means.

With these two propositions, equally famous with the Second, we are in full face of the second of Barclay's tasks. The first has been to describe the Way of Knowledge; the present, to set forth the Way of Life.

His main object here, of course, is to establish the Inner Light as saving principle: what precisely it is; how it is related to the Death of Christ; and how, to the nature and necessities of man. This task is pursued in part, directly; in part, polemically. Polemically, his emphasis on the universality of the Saving Light, leads him to insist (in face of the Predestinarians) on the universality of Christ's Death. For the latter is cause of the former; and the cause must be of a range no less extensive than the effect. But, again, he has a lance to break with those who, in the best Christian tradition, regard Christ's Death as universal, yet set practical limits to its efficacy, by insisting on the necessity of knowledge of the evangelical history. This, he holds, is Predestination in all but name; for if a believing acquaintance
with the facts is necessary, and if such acquaintance is, by
God's Providence, in any quarter withheld, that amounts to
practical reprobation; and it will be impossible to exonerate
God from responsibility for the issue. This question, of the
relation of the saving principle to the historical Christ, thus
polemically developed, is of crucial importance to Barclay; and
must be fully taken account of in any valuation of his theory.

But Barclay wages war in yet another field. His first
battle has raged round the connection of the saving principle
with Christ's death - an issue not distinctively Quaker. The
second great battle concerns the relation of the saving principle
to the nature and need of man. Here the field is now taken
in alliance with Augustine, (his former foe), against the
Pelagians, the semi-Pelagians, and their modern Socinian
successors. The question turns on the respective parts to be
assigned to Grace and Nature, in the application of the saving
principle to the needs of the case. The Pelagians, ignoring
the results of the Fall, considered that man had sufficient
native ability to satisfy the divine requirements. The Semi-
Pelagians did not deny the need of grace; but held that some
degree of human effort and deserving was a pre-requisite for its
reception. It was to these views that Augustine very properly
reacted, with his doctrine of predestination, and unshared supremacy,
of grace; but Augustine carried his point to a false extreme,
when he restricted the range of this grace by his theory of Pre-
destination.
All these errors, Barclay asserts, arose quite naturally from a misapprehension of the nature of grace and its communication,—the range in which it was distributed, and the manner in which it operated. By a true theory of the means whereby the benefits of Christ's death are communicated, these dissensions would be composed. Accordingly, from his polemic we turn, with him, to the task of exposition.

**Exposition of the Doctrine of the Saving Light.**
The positions laid down are these three:— (Prop. VI. sect. iv.)

1. God hath given to every man a certain day or time of visitation, during which it is possible for them to be saved.

2. For this end, God hath communicated to every man a measure of the light of his own Son.

3. In and by this Light, God calls, exhorts and strives with every man in order to save him, and will do so, unless resisted and refused.

These positions, thus briefly stated, are expanded in detail:—

(1) **The Day of Visitation.** (V. VI. sect. 17)

This phrase bears a wider and a narrower connotation. In its wider sense, it denotes the indefinite period within which the possibility of salvation remains open. It is not necessarily coterminous with life-time, but falls within lifetime, and varies in extent, in each case, "as the Lord sees meet."

Its narrower and special sense indicates those particular occasions (within that wider period) on which the soul receives
a call or exhortation, and is sensible that it is being striven with. Whether these occasions are few or many, whether the lifeperiod within which they fall is longer or shorter, in any event the doctrine of a day of visitation "sufficiently exonerateth God of every man's condemnation." And it is in the light of this truth that some, at least, of those Scriptures, which seem to carry Predestination, are to be read.


1. Agreeably to its manifold and diversified operations,—the fact being, that here we have the source of all that man knows of religion,—this principle is variously named. It is "a measure of the Light of God's Son;" "a measure of grace;" "a measure of the Spirit;" it is what Scripture calls "the seed of the Kingdom;" "the Word of God;" "the Light that makes all manifest;" "a little leaven;" "the gospel preached in every creature." Such terms, however, hardly describe its real nature, — which is essentially Divine. It is not, indeed, "the proper essence and nature of God, precisely taken;" for while this is not divisible, that is universally distributed; and while this is properly impassible, that is, in fact, "resisted, hurt, wounded, crucified and slain, by all the efforts and strength of men." "It is a spiritual, heavenly, invisible principle in which God, as Father, Son and Spirit, dwells." It is "vehiculum Dei, or the spiritual body of Christ, the flesh and blood of Christ, which came down from heaven," for all men's nourishment. "It is never separated from God or Christ, but wherever it is,
God and Christ are as wrapped up there-in." "This," says Barclay, "is that Christ Within, which we (Quakers) are so much heard to speak of."

2. The saving Light is Substance, not accident,—i.e., it can be in a man's heart as a holy substance, without conferring holiness on the heart which it inhabits. Having Christ within, (as all men have,) no wise infers that all are Christian. Hence Saving Light or Seed is to be regarded as a foreign body (a spiritual substance), which may be present without imparting any of its quality to the nature in which it is enclosed.

3. It is related to the Death of Christ as effect to cause. The historical sufferings of Christ are its indispensable antecedent. "Remission of sins is only in and by virtue of that most satisfactory sacrifice, and not otherwise." Christ's Death, therefore, remains the ultimate "efficient" cause of salvation; while the saving Light is the proximate. It is to be noted, however, that Christ's death operates as efficient cause, irrespective of any knowledge of its operation. Even a knowledge of the atoning Sacrifice, and still more a theory of the Atonement, is unnecessary. Just as natural causes operate with or without man's knowledge of them, so Christ's sacrifice has done and does it work, for men who know nothing of Christ's coming in the flesh. The case, in fact, is precisely parallel to the event of the Fall. Every son of Adam suffers from the Fall, though relatively few know the origin of their sufferings. In like manner, everyone benefits from Christ's sacrifice,—since
thereby the Saving Light inhabits him,—albeit he is ignorant of the source whence the Light has come to him. Such ignorance is, however, not allowable where the evangelical story has been divulged. Hearing demands belief; and to such belief, the Inward Light invariably impels. Damnation follows disbelief of the gospel,—not because it is unbelief; but because of the resistance to the Light which unbelief presupposes. "Belief of the history of Christ's outward appearance," while essential for those within hearing, is further "very comfortable" and edifying to such hearers as are led by the inward light. In short, "the history is comfortable and profitable with the mystery" (i.e. the inward light) "and never without it; but the mystery is, and may be, profitable, without the explicit and outward knowledge of the history." (This jingle of "history" and "mystery" seems to have been very current. Cp. Christian's talk with Ignorance in The Pilgrim's Progress.)

4. It is no part of man's nature, nor any relics of good surviving the Fall. On this point Barclay is most emphatic, as he knows how often the position has been either wilfully or unintentionally mistaken. And it must be confessed that it is hard to hold together, without confusion, the two ideas of the universal diffusion of the Light in man, and of its nature as yet alien to man's. (Recall Penn's dictum, It is natural to man to have a supernatural light.) But its maintenance is all-important for Barclay.

It is not reason. By reason, man can know the arts and
sciences, as animals can not. By reason, too, man may apprehend "in his brain, and in the notion," a knowledge of God and spiritual things. Such knowledge, however, was demonstrated (under Prop. ii.) not to be true or profitable, and is, in fact, at the root of the prevailing apostacy. Not that reason is of no value. On the contrary, it is indispensable in things natural; and even things spiritual, when subservient to the Light, it may be of great use, precisely as the animal principle is useful even for rational ends.

Likewise, it is not conscience. For conscience belongs to natural faculty, and may therefore be easily corrupted. It follows the judgment, and the judgment may be perverted; as in a Turk, whose convictions forbid wine, but permit concubinage; and whose conscience, accordingly, pricks him if he should taste strong drink, but allows him to add another wife without a qualm. This Light does what conscience cannot. It removes the blindness of judgment, and by rectifying judgment, rectifies conscience in consequence. Conscience, then, is to this Light, what a lanthorn is to a candle,—and excellent apparatus if only the candle be there. "It is then not to the natural conscience, but to the light of Christ in the conscience, that we commend men."

The final proof that it is no mere natural faculty is, that a healthy man is master of his faculties; and can exercise them at will. But this light and seed of God is not within his power,—"it moves, blows and strives with man as the Lord seeth
meet". A man must wait for it. It comes upon all at certain
times and seasons, "wherein it works powerfully upon the soul,
mightily tenders it, and breaks it." No man alive, Barclay is
confident, can honestly deny that he has been sensible, less
or more, of this experience.

(3) The operation of the Divine Light or Seed. (sects. 7 & 8).

The intention here is, by a careful description of the
Spirit's saving work, to shew "yet more manifestly how widely
we differ from all those that exalt a natural light or power
in man; and how our principle attributes all to the mere power,
Spirit, and grace of God." The opponents here in view are the
Pelagians, semi-Pelagians, Socinians and Arminians, who all,
in several degrees, maintain that the saving change is attribu­
tuable to self-effort.

The question Barclay conceives himself as having to face is
this: Assuming that two men have equal light and grace, and one
is saved, and the other not, is it not because one improves
the occasion, while the other fails to do so: is not then the
will the determining factor? The answer is, that, to begin
with at least, the one is saved because he passively submits
to be saved, while the other resists the saving force. All
the efficacy is provided by the divine dynamic; all that man
contributes is pure passivity. To such an inglorious rôle,
no merit attaches. The will, at the critical point, is in
complete abeyance. Afterwards, indeed, it is different. For
the will, like the rest of nature, is recreated, and so a man
comes to be a co-worker with grace, - which is the true meaning of Augustine's saying, He that made us without us, will not save us without us. But "the first step is not by man's working; but by his not contrary working."

The position is illustrated by figuring a man so heavily diseased, that he can contribute nothing to his recovery, save only a passive submission to the physician's treatment. As also by the case of entombed and stupefied miners, too prostrate to take any measures for their deliverance, (this against Socinians, Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians); and even unable to co-operate with the rescuers' efforts (this for "Jesuits and Arminians.") Prevenient grace must make men sensible of their need and misery; it must also give the pull which lifts them out of it, if only the pull is not withstood. Nor is the grace of God frustrated even in the latter case. For in either case it operates effectually, though to opposite ends, - precisely as the same act or operation of the sun "softens the wax and hardens the clay."

In certain specially selected cases (instance, the Apostle Paul) the operation of grace rises to the point of irresistibility. God permits no resistance. In this unquestionable fact lies all the truth there is in a doctrine of election or predetermination to life. The opposite doctrine, of reprobation, will be seen by a careful examination of Scripture, to apply only to those who have outlived "the day of visitation."

"Thus both the mercy and justice of God are established, and the will and strength of man are brought down and
rejected; his "condemnation is made to be of himself, and his salvation to depend on God only."

Such then is a true and faithful account of Barclay's theory of the Saving Inward Light. It is obvious that he is bent on conserving not only the "Quaker peculium" but certain great religious interests, imperilled in his day, and not too secure in our or any age. Such are, the Universality of Christ's Death; and of the saving forces liberated thereby; the operation of these saving forces outside the geographical bounds of Christendom; the inwardness of the change effected by them; and above all, the sovereignty and prevenience of Divine Grace. Any doctrine of salvation will prove ultimately acceptable and credible, only as it takes security for these inalienable demands. In these efforts, accordingly, Barclay enlists our full sympathy; and any worthy criticism will seek to be constructive, and will direct itself to conserving those ends which Barclay has in view, and to which he endeavours to point the way.

Accordingly our criticism, so far as destructive, will be directed to these points:

(i) The use of the category of "substance."

(ii) The arbitrary connection of the Sacrifice of Christ with the Seed.

(iii) Barclay's comparative indifference to the evangelical history.

On its conservative side, our criticism will endeavour to do
justice to the universality, inwardness and divineness of the Saving process.

These will be the burden of our next two chapters.
CHAPTER XII.

Criticism of the Fore-going.

(I) The category of substance.

We have seen that, in order to secure the exclusively supernatural and non-human character of the saving agency, Barclay has resort to the scholastic distinction of substance and accident. The Inner Light is a "holy thing,"- a "spiritual substance." To us, with our exacter notions of Spirit, such a phrase as "spiritual substance" seems a contradiction in terms. Spirit is Subject, not Substance. It might, indeed, be strongly argued that Barclay's use of substance is only figurative, illustrative and incidental. And certainly, a substance that "calls, exhorts and strives with" simple man, is endowed with a potency to which a substance can lay no claim. But I think it must be urged that Barclay's use of the term is more than incidental,- that it has a controlling influence on his view of the relations in which the saving agency stands to the nature of man. These relations, we hold, are personal. And when Barclay speaks of the Seed as "calling," "exhorting," and "striving," his thought is moving in the field of relations fully personal,- relations which do not subsist between a thing, or substance, and the subject upon which the thing acts. But, as will be seen, the relations which Barclay conceives actually to exist between the saving agency and the subject of salvation,
are not personal relations. One indeed, of the related terms is personal,—He "calls, exhorts and strives." But the other is not,—the personality of the subject of salvation is, at the critical moment, reduced to infra-personality. Reason, conscience, will,—all natural faculty whatever, are banished out of court; and the man is reduced as near as possible to the level of a thing, as the illustrations of a heavily diseased man, or an entombed stupefied miner, conclusively show. A sick man is a thing—for medicine to act upon. A stupefied individual is at the moment a material mass. And these are really the terms in which Barclay thinks of the subject of the saving process. He may speak as he will of the Seed as calling, exhorting and striving. But he makes no provision for the call to be heard, the exhortation to be responded to, or the striving to find any co-operation. His theory of nonresistance, and sheer passivity, reducing, as it does, to zero, the human term of the saving relation, is really self-contradictory. For such passivity is after all a form of action. Non-resistance to the "seed of God" implies a greater or less degree of resistance to the "seed of the serpent,"—implies, in short a "good will." The psychologist, in framing his "law of reversed effort," which prescribes passivity of a sort, knows quite well that if the will is for the moment put in abeyance, it is only by an act of will that this is done. What ever account, then, we give of the saving process, we must still view it as carried through within the sphere of personal
relations. And however we ascribe prevenience to God's grace, it will not act as a force which annuls, but one that succours and enhances, personality (Oman). A man is never more a person than when he is being saved. It was when the prodigal "came to himself," that the saving process was set in motion.

All things considered, we shall have, I think, to conclude that here is a case of false hypostasis. The attributes with which Barclay endows the Seed, or Substance,- viz., universality, inwardness, and superhumanity, really belong not to a substance, but to a relation, - the redemptive relation in which the soul to be redeemed stands to the God who redeems it.

(II) The connection of Christ's Sacrifice with the Saving Seed.

Beyond a doubt Barclay sincerely conceives himself, and those for whom he speaks, as standing in the great tradition that connects Redemption with Christ's Sacrifice. It is the ultimate cause of Redemption. Christ "tasted death for every man," - to that "satisfactory sacrifice" remission of sins is due; and by means of it, the necessary conditions of salvation are provided. These conditions are wrapt up in the Saving Seed,- which thus becomes the proximate, as Christ's Death is the ultimate, cause of salvation. The Seed is the "purchase of Christ's death."

These two - the Death and the Seed - being separate, Barclay is hard put to it to establish their connection. As a Christian he cannot ignore, much less deny, the connection of Christ's
death with man's salvation. As a Quaker, he is bound to establish the operation of the Seed to the same end. He can only maintain both, by making the Death the primary, and the Seed the secondary cause. But the nexus between the primary and secondary is only asserted; not shown to be necessary. Having put them asunder, he cannot join them together again.

This insuperable difficulty may well suggest to us the enquiry whether the two are really separate? We have found above that the Seed is not substance, but relation. What, then, if we now say that this saving relation is somehow constituted by the Sacrifice? Barclay says the presence of the seed in man makes man capax salutis. What, then, if we say that man's "capacity of salvation" consists in the redemptive relation in which he stands,—a relation constituted by the Sacrifice? Barclay speaks of the Seed as calling, exhorting, striving with man for his salvation. But surely these are the very activities which we ascribe to "Christ and Him crucified." Who calls, exhorts and strives, like Christ from the tree? And did He not say, "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto Me?"

(III) Barclay's attitude to the Evangelical History.

We have seen that Barclay devoutly believes in Christ's Death as the ground of salvation. It is a sacrifice,—a "satisfactory" sacrifice, necessary for the remission of sins. The point is not argued, since Barclay is not conscious of any
disagreement with his opponents here. He has no theory of the atonement to offer, least of all a "moral" theory. It is viewed as expiatory, and is regarded solely in its Godward aspect. It was the price of purchase paid (to God, presumably) to procure and distribute the saving seed. As a transaction between Christ and God, it lies outwith human competence, and largely outwith human knowledge. What really concerns man is the position in which he is placed, in consequence of the transaction; and that position is one and the same, whether he knows, or knows not, how it has come about. As Moehler justly says, the Death of Christ might, in this view, equally well have taken place in the planet Mars.

More than once Barclay adverts to the parallel which Christ's Sacrifice offers to the Fall. Each has its consequence, - in the one case, the propagation of the evil seed; in the other the propagation of the good seed. And in each case, the effect has no relation to knowledge of the cause. Multitudes suffer from Adam's Fall who know not to what their sufferings are due. And similarly, multitudes may be, and are, saved, without any historical knowledge of the source of their happiness.

A word as to this "parallel." The two events are not really in counterpoise, if only because the effects of the Fall are historically subsequent to the Fall; while the effects of the Sacrifice (so far as the pre-Christian era is concerned) antedate their cause, - surely an anomaly! Nothing could show more clearly Barclay's indifference to the history. That is not a "historical" fact, or at least is not considered in the
light of a historical fact, whose effects are antecedent to itself. One fears the conclusion is inevitable. We saw that in spite of Barclay's genuine belief in the Fall, he had no place to give it in his theory. The same must be said of his belief in the Cross! The further proof of this will appear when we come to consider Barclay's theory of Justification. That doctrine is the answer to the problem of forgiveness. To Barclay, forgiveness was no problem.

Some qualification of our verdict on Barclay's historical indifference, might seem called for, in view of the fact that he insists on the necessity of believing the history ubi declaratur. Moehler's rejoinder, that the necessity is not made evident, is not unanswerable (vide infra). And Moehler certainly goes too far when he argues that Barclay can nowise explain the enormous advance in the moral standard which the Christian era has witnessed. For Barclay really allows for this, by saying that, to the Christian, a knowledge of the history is very edifying. If it is so to the Christian individual, it is so to the Christian community also. And to the edification of the Church, the improvement of the world is, no doubt, measurably due.
CHAPTER XIII.

The Sovereignty of Grace

With a note on "Grace and Nature."

We have agreed that the values to be conserved are, the universality, inwardness, and divineness of the redemptive activity. If Barclay's scheme as a whole, appears somewhat artificial and doctrinaire, there are certain considerations to be set against that. There is, first, his largehearted, passionate, plea for the unrestricted scope of redemptive action, both in respect of its Cause (in the death of Christ), and in respect of the method and means by which Christ's benefits are communicated (by the Saving Light). His starting point is empirical, the universal diffusion of the Saving Light. From that he concludes to the universality of Christ's death. A universal result must have a universal cause. The result achieved, must have been the result intended. His plea for the universality of redemptive action will carry our sympathy.

Next is to be noted his emphasis on inwardness. A man becomes Christian, not by being called such (either by God or man), but by an inward, real and renovating process. To this, also, we agree.

And finally, the means by which this change is brought about, are wholly divine. Grace is sovereign, and prevenient and supreme. These three notes, universality, inwardness and
sovereignty of grace, are the key to his thought. They command our assent. A true account of the saving process will find room for all Barclay ultimately contends for.

1. The Initiative of Grace.

We start our enquiry where Barclay starts it,—with what he calls the Seed. By means of the seed, all men are "stated in a capacity of salvation." He regards the capacity as substantial: we have placed it in a relation; but, equally with Barclay, we hold that this relation is capacitating. He regards the Death of Christ as the producing cause of the Seed: we say that the redemptive relation, in which sinful man finds himself, is somehow constituted by Christ's sacrifice. Equally with Barclay, we hold this sacrifice to have a Godward or expiatory and objective side. But we do not with Barclay, say that the Godward side is averse from the manward side,—a transaction, so to say, on the other side of the moon. We say the two are essentially vis-a-vis. Barclay regards Christ-for-us as essentially another thing than Christ-in-us,—"Christ-for-us" may remain wholly out of sight, while "Christ-in-us" is doing His saving work. This we deny. It is the sight of Christ-for-us, which does the work in us. We might put it in this way. Barclay rightly recognises the objective side of reconciliation. He finds, or rather "makes," it necessary. But he is so concerned about the subjective side, that he "stresses and overstresses" it, thereby rendering insecure the ground on which he stands.
Leaving Barclay, for the moment, we ask what is the objective side of the redemptive relation? The objective term of the relation is, to begin with, God in act and attitude of forgiving. Now, what is forgiving? It is not simply "wiping off the slate." It is the moral act of one who does justice to the situation which sin has created. Sin forgiven is never simply sin forgotten - regarded as a thing of nought, dealt with by a wave of the hand, dissipated into thin air by some mental alchemy that leaves no trace of what it destroys. Sin has to be dealt with as a costly reality. Sin is something that someone always has to pay for. Our human experience leads us to associate it with tears and blood. It is at least as real as these. Its account is not to be squared without them. Forgiveness without suffering is an impertinence. "Without shedding of blood is no remission of sins."

The "objective theory" of the atonement rests on some recognition of this basal fact. And from that, it goes on to say that the One who most clearly recognises that, and most entirely "submits" to that, is God, God in Christ. Thus the divine term of the redemptive relation is constituted by the Sacrifice of Christ. To adopt Barclay's phrase, and adapt it to our present purpose, we say God is "stated in a capacity" to redeem by the Death of Christ. And by the same act, man is equally "stated in a capacity" to be redeemed. The redemptive relation is thus fully constituted; and both terms of it, the divine and the human, are vis-a-vis to one another. The
relation, be it noted, is objectively constituted, irrespective of the attitude of the human term. In this sense Barclay is justified in saying that the existence of the Seed does not depend on knowledge of its origin. The redemptive relation is not set up by man, and is independent of man's knowledge that it exists. Hence Barclay is also right in claiming that the Seed is wholly divine - i.e., the relation springs from a divine source, in the heart of a forgiving God. God's grace is prevenient.

2. The Inwardness of Grace.

But this redemptive relation in which man (however ignorantly) stands, *vis-a-vis* with God, remains a potentiality only, until the human term is activated to reciprocal response. The redemptive activity of God is baffled until man wakes to it. The redemptive activity, at first outward, wholly objective, must reach the subject somehow, must overcome the torpor in which the subject lies, must kindle the latent spark, and win for itself the response it yearns for. Here lies the interest of *inwardness*, for which Barclay is so justly concerned.

This desired objective, he clearly sees, is not obtained by any mere historical knowledge. It is not what God has done in the historical past, it is what God is doing now, in the living moment, that matters. That Christ has suffered, is historical fact; but the soul is not dealing with the fact that Christ suffered, it is dealing with the Christ Himself who suffered.
It is dealing not with "mere" objective fact, but with living Spirit. And the response is therefore not one of intelligence merely, but of the total personality; a response, in kind, to the advances made. This means that the relation cannot remain merely that of Subject and Object. Personal relations, as we have seen, cannot exist on that level. For the Object, in its real nature, is Subject; and must be known as such - i.e., subjectively. God in Christ must be and become, not only for us, but in us.

Barclay sees that clearly; but not the way to it. He treats the matter not as one of personal relations, but (one might almost say) as one of biological process. The metaphor of Seed overpowers him. A seed works biologically. Living itself, it takes up dead matter into itself to form living tissue. This nowise does justice to the redemptive relation, which is still a relation of two personal centres. The prevenience and sovereignty of God are nowise impinged upon by this view. The initiative remains God's. That initiative provides a homecall, and a welcome, and a home for the prodigal. But it is still for the prodigal to rise and go. This Barclay cannot allow. He reduces his prodigal not only to rags, but to paralysis.

3. The Universality of Grace.

We have seen with what particular and passionate emphasis he pleads for the absolutely universal range of Redemption and
its means. So much so, that he will not hear of any restriction of the redemptive influences by want of acquaintance with the evangelical history, thereby laying himself open to Moehler's jibe that the Crucifixion might just as well have transpired in Uranus or Mars. Yet not Moehler himself will contend, surely, that salvation is impossible beyond the bounds of Christendom. The picture of heathen dropping into hell, so many per minute, has ceased to be, what once it was, the staple of the missionary platform. But if so, and if salvation is real, on what terms is it to be attained by those prevented by untoward circumstance from hearing and embracing the gospel tidings?

We may dismiss such a phrase as "uncovenanted mercies," as being tantamount to a refusal to consider the question at all.

We must likewise deny, even more strongly, the theory that the heathen (if saved at all) are saved in a different way from the Christian. To suggest, for example, that "faith" is the Christian way of salvation, while some other way, as obedience, is the way for those outside, is to betray a very curious confusion of mind. For the raison d'être of the gospel is held to be the impossibility of a satisfactory obedience. Strange, therefore, if the heathen were left to find salvation by the way of obedience, when the gospel is built on the proved impracticability of that way!

We fall back on what we have said of the nature of God's redemptive activity, and of that activity as constituted by the Death of Christ.
Two questions thus arise: How can that become a universal activity which is restricted by historical and geographical conditions? And how can a fact elicit response, if the fact itself is unknown?

Our answer to both these questions is given by saying that while, sub specie aeternitatis, Christ's Sacrifice is sole and sufficient (on the principle that an Eternal Purpose is an Eternal Deed; what is purposed is "as good as done," it is, on the side of time, and in the field of history, only one, albeit the supreme, instance of a perpetual, pervasive, omnipresent and omni-active redemptive activity.

The proof of that is that there is nothing in Christ's earthly history and Passion which is not recognizably human. The traits it manifests are those of humanity at its best. If new in their range, their combination, their ideality, they are still what humanity feels, and has ever felt, to be most truly its own. They are not something superadded to humanity: they shew humanity to itself. What is this but to say again that God has never left Himself without a witness,—the witness, not of "rain and sun and fruitful seasons" merely, but of the Love that "suffers long and is kind,"—the Love which suffers and redeems?

In Christ, then, the real nature of redemptive activity is seen, working at full strength; but, once seen, it is recognizable and recognized as what is everywhere at work.

And if, working at full strength in and through the histori-
cal Christ, it evokes the "obedience of faith," it works always and everywhere, albeit in inferior strength, to the same result.

In Christendom, and out of it, it seeks the submission of the heart to what the heart feels to be divine. "I always knew God was like that!" exclaimed an African woman, as she heard the gospel for the first time.

We therefore say Barclay is right, when he says that a historical knowledge of Christ's sufferings is neither sufficient nor indispensable. Not sufficient, because the "obedience of faith" is more and other than acceptance of historical fact; and not indispensable, because that obedience is undoubtedly offered in unnumbered instances where the redemptive approach takes a form and guise other than evangelical. Barclay is right too (pace Moehler) when he says that belief in Christ is necessary ubi declaratur. For the call to the obedience of faith is most urgent where its tones are clearest,—to wit, in the gospel. Failure to respond to this call, provided such failure is not due to faulty presentation, is presumptive evidence that disobedience is due to perversity.

Additional Note on "Grace and Nature."

The following note is added in the hope of making the writer's position clearer,—viz., that Redemption stands in a real relation of persons, and not, as Barclay defines it, in the unrelated activity of a divine "substance."

The position here taken is that man's initiative and freedom
are presupposed in the gracious redemptive relation. If freedom to choose the right is entirely gone, the case is hopeless. Once "Ephraim is joined to his idols," he must be "let alone."

The case of the Prodigal is surely of crucial significance. The beginning of his reformation is when he "comes to himself." Mark you, he still has a "self" to come to. That personality has a will; "I will arise." He arises; goes; arrives. He falls in with the generous terms of his reception; puts aside the will to serve; adopts the will to be served. He passes on to the life of home and sonship, and all his future hangs on his adapting himself to the situation, as his elder brother had never done. At no point does he cease to be a person. He realises his personality in the blinding moment of self-revelation. This personality advances from stage to stage till at last we leave it on the threshold of fulfilment. Thus all is "of works."

But all is no less "of grace." When he comes to himself he realises himself as his father's son,—a gracious relation on which he thinks he may depend,—to some extent. With that attenuated conception of paternal grace he ventures forth. Grace meets and greets him royally, and ushers him into a realm of grace which is above all that he could ask or think. And it is in that realm of grace, ever more profoundly felt, that the future development of his personality proceeds.

Thus the situation shows the perfect concurrence of grace and freedom, of "moral independence, and religious dependence."

Never can he say of his situation, This is my doing; this
I have wrought for myself. In the moment of forgiveness he stands absolutely dependent on his father. Is it to be forgiveness, or rejection? The word is his father's - the final "word without reply." Could grace be more absolute or unbought? And yet, if he did not stand there, the forgiving word could not be spoken. Could man's freedom and initiative be better rendered?

And similarly at every later stage. The house-hold-word is Grace: "Son thou art ever with me, and all that I have is thine." Here is fellowship, freedom and possession; the responsibility of possession and therewith the opportunity of "making good." "Grace reigns" - that, the saved man must and always will say. But it is not the whole story. If Grace reigns, it must have something to reign over. The father's joy is less in the exercise of grace than in the development of personality which grace fosters. It is a story of which human freedom and divine grace are the warp and the woof.

Freedom finds grace "waiting." But grace must "wait" the penitent's arrival.

Grace without freedom is like maternity without offspring; freedom without grace is a "bantling cast to the rocks."
CHAPTER XIV.

Justification by Faith.

Having dealt with the means and application of the redemp­tive forces, Barclay now proceeds, in the Seventh Proposition, to consider their immediate outcome - in Justification.

The salient points in the proposition are these:

"As many as resist not this light ... it becomes in them a holy birth, to wit, Jesus Christ formed within.

"Thus formed within and working His works in us, as we are sanctified so are we justified in the sight of God.

"(Justification) therefore is not by our works wrought in our will, nor yet by good works in themselves considered but by Christ who is ... the cause producing the effects in us."

As for the argument itself:

(i) A brief review of the Roman and Protestant doctrines shows that "they differ in specie rather than in genere," since, by neither "is justification placed in any inward renewing of the mind, or by virtue of any spiritual birth, or formation of Christ in them; but only by a bare application of the death and sufferings of Christ outwardly performed for them." (VII. sect. 2.)

(ii) Thereafter, a statement of his own doctrine, in
three positions, follows (VII. sect. 4.):-

i. The obedience, sufferings and death of Christ is that by which the soul obtains remission of sins, and is the procuring cause of that grace by whose inward working Christ comes to be formed inwardly.

ii. It is by this inward birth of Christ in man that man is made just, and therefore so accounted by God.

iii. Since good works follow as naturally from this birth as heat from fire, therefore they are of absolute necessity to justification, as causa sine qua non.

**Exposition.**

The Barclaiian doctrine of Justification can be briefly subsumed under these 4 heads:- (i) Christ for us; (ii) Christ in us; (iii) Christ formed within; and (iv) Christ working in and through us. Of these, (i) and (ii) relate to the antecedents of Justification, and (iv) to its outcome; while (iii) describes the state of Justification itself. But the state, its antecedents and consequences, are so necessarily interrelated, that a doctrine of Justification must embrace them all in one view:- (1) Christ for us. This imports a substitutionary, expiatory view of Christ's Sacrifice. It "qualified the wrath of God towards us; so that our former sins stand not in our
way, being by virtue of His most satisfactory sacrifice, removed and pardoned," - in short, the view of the Atonement known as "objective." (VII. sect. 3.)

(2) Christ in us. This is "the capacity of salvation a man is put in," through Christ's Death. Nor is it a merely nominal position; it is a real "capacity." It is "a measure of that power, virtue, spirit, life and grace that was in Christ Jesus," and it is "able to counterbalance, overcome and root out the evil seed wherewith we are naturally, as in the fall, leavened." It is not as yet more than a potentiality; but it is potential, - energy if only in static, not yet kinetic form.

(3) Christ formed within. Here we see "the capacity brought into act." We now "possess a real, true and inward redemption from sin," and are justified, in the sense of being made righteous, not merely declared so.

(4) Christ working within. The formation of Christ in us begets good works, as naturally as fruit grows on a tree.

Remarks.

This brief review should suffice to shew us where we stand. Barclay's is a doctrine of Sanctification rather than of Justification. He pointedly equates the two processes - "as we are sanctified, so are we justified," by Christ "being formed within, and working His works in us." It is one more example of what Jas. Orr called "the Germ Theory" of Justification; of which
his criticism is that "it is a favourite one with writers of a mystical and speculative tendency; but it manifestly shifts the ground from Christ for us to Christ in us, and treats objective reconciliation as unnecessary." "It is evident," says Orr further, "that on this hypothesis, the doctrine of forgiveness is retained only in name. The old man is not forgiven, and the new man needs no forgiveness. Between the two, forgiveness falls to the ground." This criticism, directed against Schleiermacher and his school, applies to Barclay, and is, I think, conclusive.

We know, of course, what Barclay would say to this. He would vehemently deny the accusation of "treating objective reconciliation as unnecessary." "Our former sins do not stand in our way, being by virtue of his most satisfactory sacrifice removed and pardoned." (VII. 3.) But how are we to know that "our former sins do not stand in our way" unless by knowing that they have been dealt with, and put away, in a manner befitting God? God is not "stated in a capacity" to forgive, until He is known to have the right to forgive. Forgiveness can be no arbitrary act,—the act of a sovereign exercising his nobile officium. God's forgiveness must be a right forgiveness. Its regenerative virtue depends on that. I am not to be forgiven by mere fiat. If forgiveness is to come home to me with cleansing force, it must itself be clean. A redeeming God must certainly be a forgiving God; but a forgiving God must also be a suffering God. I can only take forgiveness from hands that my sins have pierced.
Hence, no mere inward revelation, apart from knowledge of objective fact, can really meet the necessities of the case. Suppose God should inwardly assure me that my sins were forgiven, I should still have to ask Him, "by what right?" The inward testimony that Luther the monk had, was very far from reassuring! And if it be said that the great emancipating word, The just shall live by faith, came to him by inward testimony it must be remembered that the word, thus inwardly rendered, was not inwardly derived; and the faith it prescribed, had for its Object, a historical Figure and a historical Fact.

But if it is true that a "germ theory," like Barclay's, cannot sustain a doctrine of forgiveness, our sympathies are with him in his repudiation of a theory of sheer imputation. He may not be just to the Romanist doctrine, (Moehler says he is not); and he does not unite all Romanists and Protestants alike in one sweeping condemnation. But what he (rightly or wrongly) condemns in both is evident,—that Justification is "placed by neither in any inward renewing of the mind, or by virtue of any spiritual birth, or formation of Christ in them; but only by a bare application of the death and sufferings of Christ outwardly performed for them." (VII. sect 2.) It is the danger of antinomianism,—a danger apparent from the first, and all along,—that Barclay is out to guard against; and in this he represents a truly Christian interest.

The truth would seem to be that both the "germ" theory and
the theory of imputation (starkly stated), standing at opposite extremes, are not so much false, as partial and onesided. A true doctrine of Justification should seek to unite both in such a way as to show that they belong together. Such a doctrine we believe to be the Reformation doctrine of Justification by Faith. "Christ for us" is objective fact. But it is not really grasped without a spiritual movement which makes it a subjective experience. In its real nature, "Christ for us" is one of those facts of experience which cannot be apprehended entirely from the outside; but from the inside, from the standpoint of Christ, the subjective standpoint. This is the real meaning of faith, it is the intuition which sees the Fact of Christ from within. That spiritual movement makes the Subject-Object ours. We shall never properly believe in "Christ for us," except, and so far as, Christ is "in us." This swift intuitive glance which carries us to the heart of the truth, and makes it ours, is no mere intellectual or moral effort. It is an effort often beyond the range of the "wise and prudent," and yet within the compass of "babes." It is an abandonment to the Object which the pride of the Pharisee forbids; but which the Spirit of the contrite finds it easy to make.

In this view, the interests both of the imputationist and of the "germ" theorist are secured. The imputationist wants security and assurance. He feels he cannot remain at the mercy of fluctuating feelings. He must have solid rock to stand on. He has it here,—in the objective fact, of "Christ for us."
The fact is there,- not of his making. He can "bank on it."

But all the more that it is all-important for him, he must grasp it, and make it his own. This he cannot do so long as it remains a mere fact,- an object of experience. The very force of the term, "Christ for us," should teach Him he is not dealing with a Fact, but with a Person. And this he can do, only on personal terms of interrelationship - "I in Him, and He in me."

The "germ" theorist, in turn, is out for reality. Forgiveness, as mere acquittal, leaves him cold. It must come to him with guarantees both of its moral worth, and of its potentiality for a real regenerative advance. He has it here,- in the subjective fact, of "Christ in me." But this fact, too, is not of his making. It is rooted in objectivity. It is the Christ Who is "for" me, Who is the Christ that is "in" me. And He was "for me" before ever He was in me. Let him dig into that rich loam of fact. Let him seek to realise what Christ-for-me meant and means. And as the objective yields up its content, the Subject will take ever deeper hold of his being. He must look outward, if He is to know Christ within.

II.

We have dealt with the process of Justification only as it appears within Christendom. How does it act outside that field? This is a real question, to which Barclay has an answer, which, however, we have found unacceptable. Is there any provision for justification,- in the sense of a redemptive forgiveness,- out-
side the bounds of Christendom? The answer to that is two-fold. 

(1) The need of forgiveness exists, and is ministered to, outside the Christian field. To that, impressive testimony is given by the widespread resort to sacrifice, which is everywhere a feature of ethnic religions. Further, apart from religious institutions, the experience of forgiveness is sacramentally conveyed, through human channels, in the common intercourse of men. "To err is human; to forgive, divine," is a truth to which Christianity has given emphasis, not origin. 

(2) It is not contended that, outside Christendom, either the need or experience of forgiveness is met with in anything like the depth of meaning it has for Christian minds. The appearance of Christ raised both the need and its satisfaction to levels unknown before. Indeed it might almost be said that Christianity specialised in forgiveness. With justice, H.R. Mackintosh can say that forgiveness was the "new thing" about the gospel. The fresh exposure of sin which Christ made, has left an ineffaceable mark on ethical thought. The authority with which Christ "forgave sins" was what most arrested, not to say scandalised, His contemporaries. By a sure instinct, Christianity puts the Cross in the forefront. Its treatment of sin and forgiveness is radical, and has no real counterpart in ethnic religion.

III.

We must, finally, make some reference, however brief, to Barclay's doctrine of "good works." He places justification,
as we have seen, in an "inward birth" which "makes man just."
From this, good works inevitably follow, and hence are necessary
to justification, not as procuring, but as realising it. (Causa
sine qua non). Such works he will not call meritorious; yet
they are such as "God cannot but accept and reward." (VII. sect.4)

I think there is no school of thought that would be prepared
to deny this. Justification takes a man as he is, in abstraction
from what he has done or has failed to do. It regards his
personality rather than his actions. It views his personality
as not fully expressed in those bad actions of the part; but as
having potentialities of good which have not as yet found their
scope, and to the development of which, its redemptive efforts
are directed. A man is "created unto" good works by the redemp-
tive experience of forgiveness. So that, if good works do not
ensue, the redemptive action of justification is defeated and
falls to the ground.

The jealousy against good works, manifested in certain
quarters, is due, (where it is creditable,) to the desire of
magnify the freedom of grace in forgiving. But we must never
forget that what is forgiven is, not sins, but the sinner,—the
man himself. The individual, here, is the real. And a real
man cannot be dealt with abstractly, as if he were an algebraical
symbol of so many wrong actions done in the past. If symbol
at all, he is symbol of immense, though latent, potentialities,
which redemption may eventually raise to a throne. In short
you cannot see a man without taking a look forward. Justification takes the forward look. Only by false abstraction can justification by regarded as anything but an activity of the Love that "hopeth all things." It deals with a man who has a past, and a future. It is with the man, and not simply with his past, it deals.
CHAPTER XV.

Sanctification.

(i) Perfection.

Barclay's doctrine of Sanctification is, as we have seen, contained in his theory of Justification. Justification and Sanctification are equivalent terms. Justification is to "make just;" sanctification is to "make holy;" and holy and just mean the same thing. The doctrine is carried further in the next two Propositions (VIII and IX).

With the Eighth Proposition, ("concerning Perfection"), we advance to the question as to what limits, if any, are to be assigned to the possibilities of earthly growth in holiness.

The gist of the Proposition is as follows:-

"In whom this pure and holy birth is fully broughtforth, the body of sin and death comes to be crucified and removed ... So as not to obey any suggestions ... of the evil one; but to be free from actual sinning ... and in that respect perfect: yet doth this perfection admit of growth -

"and there remaineth always a possibility of sinning, where the mind doth not watchfully attend to the Lord."

The thesis here is that the man, renewed by the process above described, (and nowise as fallen or in his natural state), may attain a perfection which, while relative and admitting of growth, is at each stage complete. The possibility of lapse (not
necessarily fatal) is not excluded; but, on the other hand, Barclay will not deny (though modestly disclaiming personal experience of it) that a state of absolute impeccability (non posse peccare) is in this life attainable.

The argument is directed

(i) to shew "the absurdity of that doctrine that pleads for sin for term of life, even in the saints;"
(ii) To prove the doctrine of perfection from Scripture;
(iii) To meet objections.

**Remarks.**

Barclay's question is as to "how far Christ may prevail in us," - in other words, is there any limit assignable to the process of sanctification whose beginnings we have seen described? Barclay contends that there is none, short of absolute perfection, even within the term of life. Not that it is in its complete form at once attainable. It is a process. Its beginning is but a seed. But its growth, like the sprouting of a seed, may be relatively perfect at each stage. Sin may from the first cease to be actual; and the process may even advance till sin is no longer possible. Grounded in theory, perfection, in a relative degree, is confirmed by experience, - even by the author's measurably.

We lose no time in professing our lively interest in Barclay's question, and our sympathetic consideration of the answer he
The question is of vital religious, nay, human interest. It touches the very existence of sainthood; and sainthood is one of those values which even this rough world will "not willingly let die." The religious interest here is two-fold. There is first the consideration drawn from the nature of sainthood itself. For sainthood is just the impulse of perfection; how could it live, if its goal were a proven mirage? Sainthood, again, is militant: how could it fight, if victory, so far from being assured, were not so much as possible? R.L. Stevenson speaks somewhere of its being our earthly destiny to fail, and our earthly duty, to "fail cheerfully." This is good advice after the fact,—not before it. A man will fight with only half his heart, if he knows he is going to be beaten; and (if he is at all in earnest) he will "fail cheerfully," only if he hopes for better luck next time.

But there is another religious consideration,—this one drawn from the thought of God. To put it bluntly, what is God about, if He leaves His saint thus in the lurch? The saint never thinks for a moment that his "high emprise" is a self-chosen task. It is a vocation, a high calling. Before ever he started, he heard the call; and he knows he does not take the journey at his own charges. Shall we rule out beforehand the possibility of a completely successful partnership? Shall we deny the existence of human devotion on the one hand, and of divine faithfulness on the other; or set limits to what the union of both may accomplish, even here?
Not less than Barclay's own, therefore, is our interest in the question of Perfection; and our belief in its possibility. What we have to ask however, is what provision Barclay makes for its attainment?

The guarantee of Perfection is, says Barclay, Christ formed within. This Divine Power having once, seedlike, found a matrix, proceeds to draw upon the elements of nature, and transform them into its own living tissue. The elements, at the vital moment, were all in abeyance. Reason had no say; Conscience, no voice; volition, no function. But afterwards, a "will is raised up" to co-operate with the divine working; reason, informed from above, becomes serviceable, even for spiritual knowledge; and conscience, a lanthorn now provided with candle-flame, is no longer an erring, but/infallible guide. Let these functions remain true to the divine regulative principle, and the result will be, first, the flawless act, then, the holy habit, and finally, the character unalterably fixed in well doing.

This seems to go well, once it is started. But does Barclay really get it started? We have examined that question, and we have seen reason to set aside the Barclaiian theory. Hence, while we acknowledge that Barclay describes a real experience, we cannot admit that he accounts for it. And his description of the progress of the saint derives plausibility, just because the missing element is now surreptitiously introduced.
That missing element, in the case of Justification, we found to be Christ for us, as an object of consciousness. Christ for us was, for Barclay, over the hill, out of sight, "crucified in Mars." And we maintained that Christ is not in us, unless and until, Christ for us is an object of consciousness. He is never a "mere" object of consciousness. He must become Subject of consciousness, i.e., Christ in us. Yet even so, He does not cease to be object. And just as consciousness in general is activated and enriched by the objective world, so Christ in us is vitally related to Christ for us, and from that relation, is drawn all its richness and strength.

Barclay knows that by experience; but excludes it from his theory. Yet subtly he yields to the claims of fact, and by his recourse to the now renewed human faculties of knowledge and action (reason, conscience, will) he opens the door to the inlet of real experience.

Therewith, also, he surrenders the certainty of any sure, unwavering advance along the way of holiness. By no "high priori road" is that goal to be reached. By a road "uphill all the way," by feet that falter, with vision often dim, the progress of the pilgrim is made. But it is made. And the reverence accorded to the Christian hero even here, is but a distant echo of "trumpets on the other side."

(ii) Perseverance.

The Ninth Proposition, ("concerning Perseverance"), touches
the question, then gravely discussed, but now seldom raised, as to whether a man who has once been a saint can ever cease to be one.

This Proposition adds nothing to the theory of the Inner Light; but is here inserted by Barclay to show the Quaker position on this vexed question. He shows persuasively how the doctrine of the Inward Light fits in with Scripture, and satisfactorily blends what might otherwise be regarded as its equivocal testimony upon the point.

The three heads of the Proposition are:

1. God's grace is sufficient in each case, but is not irresistible.

2. It may be partially yielded to, and subsequently departed from.

3. Indefectibility is attainable.

The argument proceeds as follows:

The advocates of Perseverance read the Scriptures in the sense that grace inevitably prevails. For the reception at any time, of genuine grace at once registers its recipient among the elect.

The opponents of Perseverance have no difficulty in adducing scriptures importing warning and exhortation to those who are regarded as being in grace, but also in danger. Why those admonitions, they pertinently ask, if the danger is unreal?

Barclay argues for instability in the early, and for
stability in the later stages, and distributes the scriptural references accordingly.

With this common-sense conclusion the mind of Christendom now generally concurs. Hence the doctrine of Perseverance has ceased to be a living issue. But if, to the theorist, it has ceased to be even an academic question, to the Christian saint it is no question at all. It is one of faith's "blessed certainties." For he knows that "love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord;" and he knows that -

"Love is not love
That alters when it alteration finds,
Or bends with the remover, to remove."
Part III.

The Christian in Fellowship.

Chapter.

   1. is a quantitative conception, with some justification in fact.
   2. The utility of the gathered Church does not appear.
   3. Barclay's criticism harsh; yet relatively justified where the Church is made an object of faith.


19. The Sacraments: Right of the Sacramental in a religion of incarnation. Why only two sacraments? They reflect the objective and subjective sides of the redemptive relation.
CHAPTER XVI.

The Church.

From the consideration of the Inner Light in the Experience of the individual Barclay now turns to investigate the working of this principle in its social reference; and, first of all, in the "joint fellowship and communion" of the Church, or body of Christ. His treatment, it will be seen, still follows individualistic lines. It is still the experience of the individual, though "stated in fellowship," which he explores. He will show how the individual may become a minister of the Church; and what are the individual's experiences in the course of its worship. The first of these is the burden of the next proposition (x); but as he rightly feels it to be "somewhat preposterous" to speak of office in the Church, without premising somewhat as to the Church itself, he devotes a few rather cursory paragraphs to this topic. (X. sec. 2 & 5).

What Barclay says is by way of defining three separate senses in which the term may be used,—viz., the "Catholic"; the "gathered;" and the "apostate" Church.

1. The "Catholic" Church is composed of "all such as God hath called out (ek kaleo) of the world and worldly spirit, to walk in the Light and Life of His Son." These comprise both the living and those who have "passed into their heavenly mansions." Its members might be "outwardly strangers, and remote from those who profess Christ and
Christianity in words." They might be Turks, Jews and even blinded and superstitious "Christians;" yet being "upright in heart, aiming and labouring to be delivered from iniquity, and loving to follow righteousness, they have been enlivened by the Inner Light in their souls, and so secretly united to God."

This is the Catholic, and also, the "invisible" Church,—since it is nowhere gathered into a visible body, and its members are known only to God. Outside this Church there is, indeed, no salvation.

2. The "gathered" Church is composed of those members of the Catholic Church whose lives have been cast in gospel places. Among such, the testimony of the Spirit, given through Scripture or preaching; answers to the testimony of the Spirit within; so that belief and profession of faith necessarily follow. "Their hearts being united by the same love, and their understandings informed in the same truths," they gather to worship God, and to bear a joint testimony, and "suffer for the same." Through this fellowship of worship and suffering, they become as one family, watching over and caring for each others interests. Ideally, this is the "visible" church; but, unhappily, its visibility has been obscured since the apostles' days.

3. The "apostate" Church. The eclipse of the "gathered" church has been due to the intervening apostacy. Apostacy arises from two errors:—(i) insistence on the absolute necessity of outward profession and ritual initiation; and (ii) insistence that members and so qualified are, ought to be esteemed as being, real members,
irrespective of their inward state,—in other words, that outward profession and ritual initiation are necessary and sufficient. The root of the apostacy was the decay of inward life. The decay was gradual. The close of the ten persecutions ushered in the full tide of declension. A profession of Christianity, having ceased to be a reproach, became an avenue to preferment. It came to be a matter of birth and education, not of conversion and inward renewal. "Teachers and pastors became the companions of princes; and marshalled themselves in manifold orders and degrees." "And so the virtue, life, substance and kernel of the Christian religion came to be lost."

The Protestant Reformation has not retrieved the situation, through not being radical. It lopped the branches; but preserved the root. Protestant churches are national rather than spiritual; and make their infants members by the sprinkling of a little water. But of all the errors of the apostate church, the most grievous is an unspiritual ministry: with which matter he thereupon proceeds to deal.

Remarks.

Before following Barclay into the subject of the Ministry we shall weigh what has just been said of the Church in these three terms. And first we must remark it as significant that his reference to the Church is so slight,—merely introductory to what he has to say of the Ministry. This is far from consonant with the Church's consciousness of herself, as the Body and
Bride of Christ, the "fullness of Him that filleth all in all."

This, however, by the way.

(i) The "Catholic" Church.

This appears to be a merely quantitative term,— the aggregate of those who are, as Barclay holds, in a state of grace. As such, the dictum, "Extra Ecclesiam nulla Salus" is merely an identical proposition,—equivalent to saying that only those who are in a state of grace can be saved.

Yet even as quantitative, the conception is not without value:

(a) It answers to our conviction that, outside the membership of the Christian Church, and unaccustomed to use the stated means of grace, must be many of God's children, "not of this fold." They do God's will, and are therefore the "brothers and sisters and mothers" of the Lord. They belong, as Roman Catholics charitably say, "to the soul of the Church."

(b) It answers, in some degree, to the characteristics of the "Kingdom of God." This is certainly a vague and disputed term, whose relations to the Church of Christ have never been conclusively stated. The two, Church and Kingdom, have been regarded as identical,— as simply convertible terms; or, again, as expressing the same entity in different aspects and relations; or, once more, as related instrumentally as means and end; But exegetical questions apart, there is in all men's minds the inexpugnable idea of a secret union of good and honest hearts everywhere,— an
ideal union, not yet, but still to be, realised,—perhaps on
earth, ("when man to man the warl' ower etc.") but certainly in
heaven; yes, even here sporadically visible, as when a good
cause unites good men, if only for a time. This conviction
inspires the reformer; and his faith, if often sorely tried,
has not seldom been fully vindicated. To this conviction
Barclay's "Catholic" Church gives, if not a local habitation, at
least a name.

(c) Finally, it answers to what we believe of the work of the
Holy Spirit in the world. This, where it has not an explicitly
Christian form, has at least an implicitly Christian tendency
and effect. That effect is registered in what Barclay calls
the "Catholic" Church. The name may be justifiable or not.
But what it stands for is indubitably real.

(ii) The "gathered" Church.

On the basis of this diffuse and indefinite Kingdom of the
Spirit, arises the "Christian" Church, strictly so called. It
is, says Barclay, constituted of those who, already born of the
Spirit, hear and profess the gospel. To their Inner Light is
superadded the outward knowledge of the evangelical facts; and
these, once heard, they by an inward necessity receive. They
are those of honest and good heart, who receive the seed into
good soil.

Thus it appears that both an inward and an outward factor
are necessary to constitute a "gathered" Church. The inner is
supplied by the inward and immediate testimony of the Spirit;
the outer, by the same Spirit's testimony, either mediated by Scripture or by preaching ("the testimony of some of God's servants raised up for that end"). Barclay says that the inward and the outward testimonies will necessarily concur, since the same Spirit originates both. Here we would seem to have a quite unnecessary reduplication, reflecting seriously upon the utility of the Church. And certainly, if the Spirit can be relied upon inwardly and immediately to "bring all things to remembrance," then alike the reading and the preaching of the Word would seem to be gratuitous. But the very fact of association, and particularly the invariable reliance upon external means of grace, is sufficient proof that exclusively inward communications have never sufficed for human need.

Further, Barclay's assumption that the inner and the outer voices are always concurrent, is not borne out by the facts. The Scriptures are not univocal; and the prophets do not always hit the sense of the spiritual community. Some standard, or norm, is required to which the sometimes divergent deliverances of Scripture or prophet may be submitted. Such standards are a quite invariable feature of every "gathered" Church. Churches vary, not in the possession of Creeds, Confessions and other declarations; but only in the greater or less degree of articulation their Creeds have received, and also in the spirit in which they are conceived and in use to which they are put.

Crucial for every Church is the necessity of holding and
setting forth the truth "in love." This means that the nature of the truth held is such that it can only be true for those in whom the Holy Spirit is. To return to our oft-repeated theme, the Truth is not mere objective truth, and cannot be merely objectively held. It is truth as it is "in Jesus." It comes from the heart of Christ and cannot be grasped by those who are strangers to Him.

Thus we agree with Barclay as to the necessity of an inner and of an outer factor. But whereas he seems to regard them as duplicates, or, at best, as supplementary, we regard them as complementary,—as absolutely necessary to one another. And this means that the "gathered" Church has a double function,—that of instruction, and that of mutual edification in love. Her task of instruction is constant. Not only has she constantly to mint fresh coinage from the old dies; she has also to remould the dies themselves. Each new generation requires instruction in the ageless truth; but each new generation can only receive it in "its own tongue."

Her task of edification is no less continuous. It is to keep alight the fire of love, at which each may kindle his own torch. These two factors Barclay well knows to be necessary. He knows that "hearts must be united in the same love and understandings informed in the same truths." But if he found them both vigorously alive in his own communion, as he assuredly did, it was not because of his theory but in spite of it. It was
because the instinct of the community knew its own needs, and, regardless of theory, found its own way to supply them.

(iii) The "apostate" Church.

The apostacy which Barclay asserts, was assuredly in his day, and remains in ours, a fact to be deplored. The difference between the "Church of God," so gloriously spoken of in NT, and the Church that history knows, is the apostacy.

According to Barclay, the apostacy is not of yesterday, and not confined to Rome. It set in long before the era of the Western Schism. Already its virus was in the veins of those who fled the seat of infection, - the virus of "pride and covetousness and sensuality" (the "lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye and the pride of life")

His account of the causes of decline seems harsh, - more so to us, probably, than it appeared to the age of Milton and Salmasius. A more sympathetic and understanding account would reveal the difficulties and dangers of the developing Ecclesia, as well as the moral causes of her failure to surmount them.

The necessity of stating her Creed (even if only negatively, as Gore seems to think) in face of encroaching heresies, was one of these dangers. The institution of a hierarchy to safeguard the sacred deposit was another. Both necessities tended to a certain externalism, the effect of which was to transform the Church from an aid to faith into an object of faith. And since there is but One Object of faith, the displacement of that, and
the substitution of the other, was an injury to faith from which it has not yet recovered. Creed and polity are means, not ends. Materialism has been defined as taking means for ends. The apostacy may therefore be defined as the triumph of materialism. That the danger was there, we plainly see; that it was inevitable, we contend; that it was insurmountable, we deny; that it was not overcome, we admit. And that is the whole story of the apostacy.

But we cannot see that Barclay's way would have avoided the danger, since it is no other than the danger of living in the actual world. Barclay's is not the actual world, which he consistently disparages and vilifies. The Church has at least sought to serve the world she lives in. She has made her choice between service in the world, and "a fugitive and cloistered virtue." And if in serving she has stooped too low; if she has not touched pitch without defilement, the signs are not absent that she feels her shame; the hope is not extinguished that she will retrace her erring steps. But if she finds her way, it will not be Barclay's,- though it may well be in closer approach with Barclay's friends.
CHAPTER XVII.

The Ministry.

The salient points of Prop. X (freely rendered) are these:-

As by the light ... of God all true knowledge in things spiritual is received, ... so by the same ... every true minister of the gospel is ordained prepared and supplied in the work of the ministry; and ought to be led and ordered thereby both as to the place, persons and occasions of his ministry.

Having this authority, they may and ought to preach, though without human commission or literature, as, without this authority, they are but as deceivers.

As the gift was freely received, so they are to give it freely without hire or bargaining, far less for profit. Yet if called away from (their avocations) it may be lawful ... to receive such necessary temporals as are freely and cordially given by those to whom they have communicated spirituals.

These positions cover the four points, of (i) call and ordination; (ii) qualification; (iii) work, and (iv) maintenance; regarding all which his argument is as follows:-

As to (i) call and ordination - this is, like their Christian experience (which it presupposes) purely inward and spiritual, without any human intervention. The validity of orders
under the respective rules of Episcopacy, Presbytery and Independence is reviewed, and it is shown that, in these systems, at the best, an inward spiritual call and endowment are held to be but of the bene esse, not of the esse of the ministry; while at worst, it is contended that ministerial functions may be validly performed by one regularly ordained, who has yet no grace at all.

As to (ii) qualification, the chief and most necessary, is the power of the Spirit Who gave the call. Opponents state three requirements: viz., natural parts; acquired parts; and the grace of God. But this last, they hold, is not essential, the grace of orders being sufficient for the purpose. Presupposing as much of natural endowment as that a man is "not an idiot," Barclay says that school learning, occasionally useful, is more likely to be hurtful than not; while, as for the third, grace, it is absolutely essential, if for the Christian, then a fortiori for the minister, seeing that Spiritual instruction cannot be given by one who has not himself the Spirit. As for sacramental grace, its existence is denied. Then follows an examination of the usual curriculum in divinity,—the learned languages, the logic and philosophy and the school divinity,—the conclusion being that the devil has more language, logic, philosophy and school divinity than the best of them, yet remains the devil still. Per contra, of the powerful ministry of illiterate men, Barclay has the best evidence, in the effects it has wrought in his own soul.

As to (iii), the discharge of ministerial functions, the Spirit can be fully trusted to see to it that what is needful is
done decently and in order. Church government, so called, has been the occasion of as much tumult and bloodshed as the conquest of kingdoms is responsible for. "Orders" are forms and shadows, and for some of them no Scriptural name or precedent can be found. The various offices named in Scripture have behind them the one selfsame Spirit and power, and when this Spirit is given on any occasion, it ordains the recipient, there and then, for a service which is recognized by those present as genuinely inspired. This gift is not the monopoly of any man or class. It befalls according to God's free choice, and may authorize anyone, rich or poor, servant or master, young or old, yea, male or female. The NT names, (as prophets, apostles, etc.,) denominate not offices but operations of the Spirit, Who chooses now this individual, now that, as His instrument. The apostle today may be the prophet tomorrow, or may be reduced to the role of a submissive listener. The gift confers the office; the office infers the gift. Both go together, and both are temporary. This is not to say that there is none whose gift is not more permanently bestowed. The Spirit is thus found to endow some to a continuous ministry, of teaching or ruling as the case may be; whose ordination is to be recognized by the Church accordingly. What is denounced is the caste distinction of clergy and laity, and the assignation of individual Christians to this or that order, - a fruitful source of injury, - since it makes the ministry a profession, and opens the door to that pride and covetousness
and sensuality which we found to be the worm at the root of the apostate church. With a stout assertion of the right and freedom of women to minister as well as men, this part of the argument concludes.

As to (iv) Maintenance: The minister has a right to be maintained, and the people a duty to maintain him as far as necessary. The ad hoc minister is understood to have his own occupation, of which his ministry may be even a serious interruption. A "concern" may be laid on him involving prolonged absence from his business and family; and his and their necessities are a proper charge on the church in whose interest the mission is undertaken. Such support is not however to be enforced. It is a minister's duty to give "spirituals," and his right to receive "temporals." But his duty is not determined by any consideration of his right. A man must do his duty whether others do theirs or not. And if a forced maintenance is so is a superfluous, unlawful, as is pretty commonly admitted by those who, whether Papist or Protestant, exclaim against the clergy's excessive revenues. A true minister will not ask too much; nor is he likely to receive too little. That the church is apostate in this direction too, is reflected in the current saying, The Kirk is always greedy. We Quakers know this only too well. "I know myself," says Barclay, "a poor widow, that for the tithes of her geese, which amounted not to five shillings, was about four years kept in prison, thirty miles from her house."
"We are then," he concludes, "for a holy, spiritual, pure and living ministry, where the ministers are both called, qualified and ordered, actuated and influenced in all the steps of their ministry by the Spirit of God; which being wanting we judge they cease to be ministers of Christ."

Remarks.

In this Proposition, "Concerning the Ministry," we are dealing with a matter of form and polity; and there is a sentence of Barclay's which is very pertinent. "The form," he says, "is entailed to the substance, and not the substance to the form." This is unexceptionable; but, like a two edged sword, it cuts both ways. Barclay, too, has his "form," to which he is so wedded that he is apt to argue as if his form "entailed the substance." The truth is, that when the substance we are dealing with is life, the form of its manifestation is not one, but manifold. That this truth was hid from Barclay and the early Friends (and not least from their great leader), is not, perhaps, surprising; it was hid no less from their churchly opponents. It is less excusably, still today, below the horizon of many, in spite of the fact that ours is an age in which the study of life, its factors and evolving forms, has been ardently pursued, and to which the results of that study ought to be familiar.

It is perhaps too much to ask of our ecclesiastics that they should apply the lessons of Darwin's "Origin of Species" in the field of ecclesiastical polity. But it might reasonably be
expected that acquaintance with the phenomena of the Foreign Mission should have yielded instruction. For in that field, as not the same extent at home, the forces of fresh life are shaping for themselves new forms, adapted, by a necessity which is not logical, but vital, to the world in which they struggle for existence. The native Churches are finding that "substance entails form;" and yet, though the substance, there as here, is the same, the form is different.

In short, Church and Polity are not the same thing.

"Church" stands for a spiritual ideal entity, having no actual existence apart from polity of some kind; but yet not to be identified with polity, any more than spirit, because embodied, is therefore only a form of body.

"Polity" is a material thing, a matter of charters and documents, of laws and officers. It is embodied spirit; idea become fact; and only not material, because informed with spirit, and used by Spirit for spiritual ends.

Those who decry polity, as Barclay is inclined to do, are thinking of the "Church," and forgetting that the Church must incarnate herself in polity, and suffer thereby the kenosis that attends every form of incarnation,—since incarnation means living in a "lower degree of reality."

Those, again, who are all for polity, are really thinking of polity while speaking of "Church." They clothe their particular polity with the attributes of the Church. And since they rightly hold the Church to be one and indivisible, they
wrongly think their polity is the only Church there is.

Church and Polity are related as End and means. The End is one; the means, many. We must seek to reserve for life its multiplicity and freedom.

The esse of the Church is to be the vehicle of Christ. The aim of polity is to mediate Christ to an ever-changing world. The esse of the Church is unchangeably the same. Polity must change, if not with, yet for, the times. Polity belongs to things seen and temporal; the Church, to things unseen and eternal.

It is, surely, from this standpoint that questions concerning the ministry must be faced and met,—a regular clergy or a secular; free scope for various gifts; the ministry of women; stated or spontaneous forms and occasions of worship; free or liturgical prayer; music and so on. The Quaker ministry has undoubted rights; spontaneous utterance, its uses (and abuses); an unpaid ministry its own place and honour. But these, too, are but forms, which a living Church will know how to use, without restricting herself exclusively to them, or to any others.

Two questions, raised by Barclay, call for brief remark. The first, refers to an "educated ministry." With much of what Barclay says, we must have great sympathy. But with what lies at the root of his objection, we can have none at all. He objects to learning, because learning has reference to the outward; whereas he would recall us to the purely inward voice. This is
a mirage. No knowledge of any kind, saving or other, is to be derived save from commerce with objective fact,—in this case the Fact of Christ. We have seen reason to hold that this is no merely objective fact. Like every fact of the personal order, it must be inwardly, intuitively, subjectively apprehended. But it is objective too. And as such it takes its place in the objective world, and needs to be related to all that comes to us from that quarter. To be known as Subject, Christ must first be known as Object of Knowledge; and as such, must be integrated with the whole system of thought. The minister's learning need not be his most conspicuous quality. It may suffice if he himself is able to turn, and to direct others, to the sources and authorities of knowledge required upon occasion, and for special purposes.

The other question relates to "orders" and ordination. Is there a "grace of orders," in virtue of which a minister's functions may be effectively discharged, irrespective of his religious character and state, and without which, no matter how good a man he may be, the unordained can exercise no valid ministry? This question, in practice, mainly affects the administration of the Sacraments. (For as regards preaching, no church maintains that ordination is required, or is able, to make an effective preacher; and none would contend that effective preaching is to be expected from one who is himself a stranger to grace.) The question of "orders" must therefore be postponed
till the doctrine of Sacraments has been dealt with.

On the whole question of the relation of a minister's character to the effective discharge of his duty, the commonsense of mankind may fairly be said to have arrived at a conclusion. No man is fit to be a minister of the Church of God who cannot, in some degree, testify to an experience of God's grace. But the grace which he commends and conveys to his people, is a much greater thing than his experience of it. When he speaks, he speaks for the Church at large; and his words derive their weight from that fact. When he visits the sick and dying, he brings no mere personal sympathy to bear, but "the consolations of God," as these are known to, and made known by, the Church. He represents the Church. That gives his words and his presence a significance which they have not of their own,—a circumstance of which every faithful minister is aware, and for which he is often thankful.
CHAPTER XVIII.

Silent Worship.

Regarding worship, Prop. XI sets forth that:

All true worship is offered in the inward and immediate drawing of the Spirit, which is not limited to places, times nor persons; in its inward signification worship is continuous.

In its outward signification (prayers, praises and preachings) we ought not to do it when and where we will; but only as moved thereunto by the stirring and secret inspiration of God in our hearts.

Such stirring is never wanting where needful - of which God is the alone proper judge.

All other worship which man sets about in his own will and appointment, and can begin or end, do or leave undone, at his pleasure ... is but superstition, will-worship and abominable idolatry.

However it may have pleased God [in the past to distil true worship from these dead elements] they are now to be denied, rejected and separated from, in this day of His spiritual arising.

The subject of Worship Barclay treats at great length, interestingly, on the whole, and at times with strong feeling; but in
a style somewhat repetitious and diffuse. Instead therefore of
pursuing the argument closely along its tortuous course, we shall
endeavour rather to present an objective view of his theory,
stript of its polemic excrescences.

What he has to explain and justify, is the Silent Worship
of the Quakers, a form so remote from all that men are accustomed
to, and so admittedly hard for the "natural man" to receive,
that all the patience and candour of his readers, he pleads,
will be required to enable them to begin to understand it, and
perhaps, to practise it themselves.

He begins by seeking to remove certain misunderstandings:-

It will be necessary, to begin with, to keep in mind that
the worship of God in gospel times is quite different from the
legal worship of the O.T. No argument accordingly, against a
non-ritual worship is valid that is drawn from Jewish practice.

Also, it is a mistake to suppose that Quakers are either ad­
verse to the use of set times and places of worship, or inconsis­tant in resorting to them. Such appointments are an earthly
necessity. Moreover, they do not constitute worship, which is
a spiritual matter beyond man's control. Neither do they impart
any special sacredness to the times and places thus appropriated.
Such times and places are not more holy than others, only more
convenient. These considerations apply in particular to the
Sabbath day. What is solely objected to, is the appointment of
particular persons to do particular acts at a particular time,
since these appointments involve laboured and artificial pre-
paration, and their discharge takes no sufficient account of the officiant's state or the hearers' necessities at the moment.

And finally, while testifying against idolatry and will-worship, the Quakers are not concerned to deny the possibility of real worship even in such circumstances. Good, though misguided men are found in all communions; and the mercies of God are not restrained,—though not to be presumed upon,

These preliminaries premised, we now turn to study the Quaker procedure.

The gathering meets, then, by appointment at a given time and place. Its object is to wait upon God, or in other words, "to feel the Light and Life of God arising in the soul." To this end, silence is a needful prelude; but this "silence," not be it noted, is only a refraining from speech, it is a withdrawal of attention from the flow of one's own thoughts, a turning of the stript and naked soul towards God. This turning is never in vain: for God is there, at the soul's centre, waiting to be gracious. A tide of sweet refreshing feeling arises, cleansing, cheering and strengthening and comforting the soul with moral strength, and confirming it in the love of God; and not only so, but in thus making contact with God, the soul feels its unity with all others who sit where he sits. This tide of feeling may rise to the point of utterance in testimony, prayer or praise,—an utterance which "is witnessed to" (i.e., finds response) in the hearts of all present. It comes fresh
and free,—not as "conned and gathered stuff;" it is what the Spirit has inwardly and immediately given. Few meetings are altogether silent. But even those that are, if held in the true spirit, are refreshing and edifying. Some friends, nourished by this bread from heaven, grow to great stature, and are able to minister more or less constantly, and always with effect. But all, even the least practised, or apparently least equipped, are kept in mind that the Spirit may choose to employ them on any occasion, and must be ready to go as they are sent.

In these meetings a wonderful rapport of one and all is frequently experienced. The unspoken needs of the soul will be somehow felt as a common burden. The "condition" of each waiting soul is "spoken to," either inwardly or outwardly. This is the reality of communion. A busy and preoccupied man, coming into a good meeting, will often find himself at once lifted up to the higher level to which the spirit of the meeting has been raised. And per contra, a spiritual man coming into a cold meeting will sometimes, if not without travail of soul, raise it to his own level. Not only so, but rude intruders will often be seized with the terrors of conviction; while outsiders of gentler nature will be gentler won,—"of which," says Barclay:-"of which I myself, in part, am a true witness, who, not by strength of arguments, or by a particular disquisition of each doctrine, and conviction of my understanding thereby, came to receive and bear witness of the truth, but by being secretly reached by this life; for when I
came into the silent assemblies of God's people, I felt a secret power among them, which touched my heart, and as I gave way to it, I found the evil weakening in me, and the good raised up, and so I became thus knit, and united unto them, hungering more and more after the increase of power of this life, whereby I might feel myself perfectly redeemed. It must not however be supposed that all invariably proceeds quietly and smoothly. Apart from the unseemly interruptions of malicious invaders (among whom Barclay commemorates particularly the undergraduates of Oxford, Cambridge, Aberdeen and Edinburgh,—many of them divinity students—"the young fry of the ministry!") an inward and spiritual conflict is often undergone. The old nature is there in all, resisting the efforts made to chain him down. It is essential for the unity of all that he should be chained down in each. And the sense, often present, of a process still incomplete, a battle going on and victory not yet won, will give rise to an inward disturbance which may have even bodily manifestation in groans and tremblings, whence the name "Quakers," which though given in scorn we are not ashamed of.

Among other advantages which our meetings have is this before all,—that the devil can have no hand in them. Another is, that the rude interruptions we constantly suffer, such as have been referred to already, are not material. Any one of a thousand accidents would seriously disturb, if not prevent
altogether, the worship of the apostate Churches. From these our worship is immune. It can even be maintained in good measure in enforced separation.

In fine, our method ranks as a discovery, - or far rather a recovery, - of true Christian worship, enjoyed in primitive times, but lapsed and lost through the great apostacy. The discovery was made by those who made honest trial of established methods, but found in them no satisfaction for their weary and afflicted souls. Not even Scripture itself gave what they required; but, turning away and within, deaf to human voices, silencing even the last murmur of their own thoughts, and waiting only upon God, they found Him; - and one another.

Remarks.

It is impossible, one would think, for anyone to read wholly unmoved Barclay's account of the Quaker worship. It is couched in the vein of argument; by no means devoid of sarcasm and bitterness; yet it takes, at times, the melting tones of one speaking of things very dear, and at others, the fervour of the exponent of a great discovery.

In all probability Barclay will have readers who, if they cannot accept his theory, must envy his experience. For they know too well the frequent barrenness, the devastating tedium, of customary ordinances. Too much, it may be felt, is laid upon the officiating minister. His "gift" - if he has one - is not
equally felt throughout. Or his character drowns his doctrine. Or his mannerism intrudes upon his ministrations. Such things have been the staple of satire in all ages, not least in our own. Though, happily, that is by no means the whole story.

But is the Quaker meeting itself, in its actual form and conduct, exempt from drawbacks? "What mortal weariness," says Moehler, "what vacancy of mind, and dulness; what sickly fancies most of their members labour under, during the silence in their religious meetings, God knows, and every man may infer, who has acquired any knowledge on this subject." This witness is probably true in its measure.

On the whole, when we closely scrutinize the procedure, we cannot easily convince ourselves that it is so wholly "divine" as is made out. Barclay claims to have excluded the devil; he cannot exfurbate the flesh. The process of silence and waiting inevitably suggests hypnosis,—the state of extreme suggestibility induced by abstracting the mind from the flow of thought. This is not to say that there is no good use to be made of hypnosis, nor of the suggestibility it aims at. Quite the contrary. In fact, it is pretty certain that the first object of a religious gathering is just to produce the suggestible state; and in particular that the evangelistic meeting is "successful" or not, the just in proportion as its promoters have/means of this at command. As between the means adopted in the one case and in the other, it is largely a question of which is best adapted to reach
the end in view. In fact, it might be suggested that no exclusive choice should be made; but that the Christian Church should exercise a larger freedom in the use of means. In this connection it is significant that Otto recommends that a place should be found within the stated services of the Church, for a partial adoption of the Quaker form.

To Barclay, of course, such a course would be as the unlawful yoking of the ox and the ass. For it is of the essence of Public Worship, as statedly observed from distant ages, to be conducted by ordained officiants who are looked to to conduct the devotions (with or without book) and to supply the sermon (with or without a MS.) The two insurmountable objections to that, in Barclay's view, are the studied preparation beforehand, and the discharge of duty without the guarantee of any immediate influence of the Spirit on speaker and hearer. Both objections depend on a certain view of the Holy Spirit. Does the Spirit consent to work under law; and can the laws of His working be ascertained and taken advantage of? In particular, have minister and people the right to expect that the Spirit will observe the law of periodicity, and be available as certainly and regularly as the Sabbath comes round? Barclay would deny this. But it would assuredly by many be as vehemently affirmed. And certainly, it seems to involve an unduly restricted view of prayer and its possibilities, to deny that it can secure either a prepared minister or a waiting people on Sabbath. Our Lord found no
difficulty in associating himself with the synagogue worship of the Sabbath day. And whatever use He made of "silence" (and it was probably of greater use to Him than we commonly apprehend) it was neither practised by Himself nor imposed on his followers as a necessary prelude to utterance. The Spirit's aid would seem rather to be relied on, as equal to any emergency, even to providing the preacher with "supply of sermon!"

As for the preacher's state at the moment of discharging duty the same consideration seems to apply here also. In fact, a calm and humble reliance on the Spirit's faithfulness is needed precisely to save the preacher from that morbid introversion and anxious expiscation of "frames," which were so common in Barclay's age, and which manifest, and not too agreeable, traces are found in the journals and correspondence of our elder divines. The preacher's state is not the only consideration, even if his feelings gave, as they notoriously do not, a true index of it.state. Bunyan sometimes preached not less effectively when he preached "in the chains" and slew more Philistines when it seemed he must die with them.

And what applies to the preacher, applies mutatis mutandis to the hearer.

What is unsound in Barclay's teaching rests on what is untenable in his doctrine; while, happily, what is acceptable, remains when his theory is discarded. We discard, then, his doctrine of two metaphysical natures, the one wholly human and
bad, the other wholly pure and divine. We have no means of leaving the flesh behind us, and entering a region from which the devil is almost geographically excluded. It is true that, in coming to God, we are coming to One whose ways and thoughts are not as ours. Indeed we must be willing to leave our ways for God's, and have our thoughts brought into captivity to Christ's law. We must be still and know that He is God. And we must still look to the Spirit as our Teacher and Guide. But the means He uses are assuredly (even if not exclusively) human. As Abbé Huvelin said: "God, who might have created us directly, employs, for this work, our parents to whom He joins us by the tenderest ties. He could also save us directly, but He saves us, in fact, by means of certain souls, which have received the spiritual life before ourselves, and which communicate it to us, because they love us."
CHAPTER XIX.

The Sacraments.

Prop. XII. There is one baptism.

This baptism is a pure and spiritual thing, the baptism of Spirit and fire, by which we are buried with Christ, that being washed and purged from our sins, we may walk in newness of life.

Of this the baptism of John was but a figure, commanded for a time, and not to continue for ever.

Infant baptism is a mere tradition without either precept or practice of Scripture (to warrant it.)

After a few preliminary observations on the sacraments in general, the argument is directed to shew that Christian baptism is quite distinct from water baptism, as aiming at a sort of cleansing which water cannot accomplish. Water baptism was not supported by the example of Christ; nor is the command of Mt. 28.19 to be understood as baptism by water. Neither is it supported by the unvarying practice of the apostles, - Paul in particular seeming even to disparage it. If any regular practice of the apostles can be alleged, it shows no more than a concession to the weakness of early converts habituated to Jewish baptism; not were even apostles infallible, as their hesitant reception of Gentiles shows; and they certainly enjoined practices
(abstaining from "things strangled" etc.,) of a temporary kind.

The argument, of which these are the main conclusions, consists almost wholly of discussions of texts.

Prop. XIII. The communion of the body of Christ is inward and spiritual ... by which the inward man is daily nourished in the hearts of those in whom Christ dwells.

Of this the breaking of bread by Christ with his disciples was a figure, which even they who had the substance used in the church for a time, for the sake of the weak.

Abstaining from blood etc; washing the feet; anointing the sick with oil was commanded with no less authority and solemnity ... yet seeing they are but shadows of better things they cease in such as have obtained the substance.

The argument proceeds thus:-

The body and blood of Christ, to the eating and drinking of which eternal life is attached, is no other than the holy substance, vehiculum Dei, which we described fully in Prop. V. and VI. The consumption of this body and blood has no relation to the act of eating bread and drinking wine, which was a memorial instituted for the purpose of commemorating Christ's death at Jerusalem, until He should (spiritually) come into their hearts, after which no such ceremonial commemoration would be necessary.
As a matter of fact, the foot-washing was even more solemnly, and with greater particularity, enjoined than was the memorial feast.

Remarks.

Barclay's idea clearly is that the sacramental system, whether of the Catholic or Reformed Church, is a morbid development, due to the intrusion of the natural man on the domain of the spiritual. Such a development is clearly traceable in O.T., where the condescension of God in adapting the means of grace to human weakness was abused by gratuitous additions. Thus the object of the divine dispensation was thwarted. Its merely typical and pre-figurative intention was lost, in the idea that ritual itself was religion. The same development, due to the same cause, and conducing to the same mistaken view of ritual, is evident in the apostate Church of the Christian era. Rite becomes an end in itself: the shadow replaces the substance. And since no human inventions can command universal veneration, rites become a fruitful source of division.

We cannot lightly dismiss this view, which indeed has received support from the closer study of the sacred text (rendering dominical institution less certain); and also, from our larger knowledge of the Hellenistic influences under which the Catholic idea of the sacraments was shaped.

Barclay opens with a shrewd thrust. The name "sacrament" is not found in scripture, but was borrowed in an age of decadence
from the military heathen oath. If all parties would agree to drop the unscriptural term, and use in its place any other term having Scriptural precedent, they would at once see that the institution of two, and only two, sacraments is unwarranted. For what the sacraments, by definition, are supposed to do (as, to confer grace, or to signify grace, or to seal grace) is proposed and secured by other means, both specified and unspecified, as well.

In this trenchant style Barclay disposes of the sacramental idea, before passing on to Submit the two sacraments to particular enquiry. Before proceeding further, we may, therefore, pause to consider what exactly is the nature of a sacrament.

In the catholic view, the Sacraments, whether two or seven, take their place as elements integral to the entire system of religion. All true religion, nay, life itself, is sacramental. The Word must ever take Flesh, that it may dwell among us. Page Barclay, it is not Spirit alone we have to deal with; nor is "flesh" simply to be discarded and disclaimed. What our experience yields, is the inexplicable union of both, in a teleological system under which flesh is viewed as instrumental to Spirit. And it is because Christianity sets forth this view so clearly and completely,—it is because, in short, it is the religion of Incarnation,—that, as Harnack, Christianity is not so much a religion, as religion itself.
But this view, which seems, on the one hand, favourable to the maintenance and observance of the Sacraments, might seem no less, on the other, to threaten their position of privilege. For if all life, all religion, is organised on this sacramental basis, why two sacraments only, or seven, or indeed any specified number? If tradition is advanced, we should have to ask, What tradition? If dominical institution,- then why is not foot-washing admitted? If apostolic authority,- that is uncertain; it could also be pleaded for abstention ("I thank God I baptised none among you"); and it is not immune from criticism, as Barclay shows, in certain other important matters.

The question ultimately resolves itself, I think, into this: Is Grace so linked with Sacrament, that without it, Grace would be withheld? To answer that, we must first ask, What is Grace, and how is it mediated?

Grace is, first and always, the "grace of our Lord Jesus Christ"-i.e., the Divine Goodwill which seeks to establish and maintain the fellowship of Christ and the soul of man. A man is "in grace," when he is "in Christ," and Christ is "in him."

This is grace expressed in general terms. But grace has particular applications and determinations. It is relative to need, and is as particular and diversified as the needs it ministers to. It will be seen that the two sacraments of the Reformed Churches have reference to the first form of grace; the Roman 7, giving fuller recognition to the second.

And how, we ask, is grace mediated? It is mediated to faith.
Is faith always conscious? The answer to that cannot be simply given. Consciousness is a wide term, embracing degrees, shading down from the focal centre of clear consciousness to the peripheral regions where impression is slight and unattended to, if not wholly beyond attention. This last is the region of the subconscious, or even the unconscious, to which so much study is now given, and to which, on any showing, the motive forces are largely to be referred. What cannot be denied, however, is that the subconscious is not out of all relation to the conscious, the uncontrolled to the seat of control. The general attitude and direction of the mind still prescribes its limits.

For our present purpose that means that clear conscious faith determines the attitude of the soul to Christ, turns the camera of the mind, as it were, in His direction, so that the influences arriving on the soul, whether clear or subconscious, are still the influences of Christ. Consciously or unconsciously received, the accesses of grace are mediated to faith.

The sacraments of the Reformed Church are subservient to clear consciousness only. Those of the Roman Church take more account of the peripheral elements. This seems to account for what is true in the ex opere operato theory. It refuses to limit to clear consciousness and to intellectual processes, the accesses of divine grace.

The function of Sacraments in the process by which grace is mediated to faith, now begins to become clear. Their function is the arousal of faith. As Calvin says (Inst. iv.14) "A sacra-
ment is an external sign whereby God represents and testifies His good will to us, in order to sustain the weakness of our faith, which is so weak and exiguous that, unless it is under propped and buttressed, it is liable to waver and totter" (quot. by Pat. Giff. 422). This auxiliary function is eminently subserved by their simple, dramatic and suggestive form, constituting them a swift effective mode of appeal to minds and hearts of every calibre. In them, therefore, Christ is "represented, sealed and applied" to the believer, - because through them faith is strengthened to see and embrace the Redeemer.

This function, it is evident, is no exclusive prerogative of the sacrament. There is not "a grace of the sacrament," if by that is meant something given in, and by way of, it alone. Grace remains one and the same by whatever channel it flows. Rightly therefore the Reformers allowed no efficacy to the Sacrament which was not already in the Word; and rightly they forbade an administration in which the Word had no place - were it even only the "words of institution."

We have now briefly dealt with these topics, - the Sacramental idea, and its right within a spiritual religion; its relation to Grace on the one hand; and to Faith on the other. Some questions of detail remain for notice, - (i) Why two sacraments? (ii) Why one is administered to infants and (iii) why the other is not.
(i) Why two sacraments? The answer is simple. The Grace of Christ is a form of redemptive activity, and as such, addresses itself to the two supreme needs of the soul,—its deliverance (a) from the guilt, (b) from the power of sin. The Sacrament of Baptism addresses itself primarily to the supply of the first need; that of the Supper, to the second. The water of baptism indicates the need, and imparts the assurance, of cleansing, of forgiveness, pardon and acceptance. Hence it is administered once, and once only, in a Christian's life-time. For as true love, once declared, is not withdrawn, so the forgiving love of Christ, declared and sealed in baptism, needs no further declaration. Baptism does not give forgiveness, else it must often be repeated. It pledges once for all the forgiving love of Christ— it attaches itself to the idea of reconciliation, which, when once effected, is complete.

But if reconciliation is the act of a moment, the life of fellowship which it initiates, is continuous. Hence the significance of the bread of the communion-table, and of its frequent recurrence. The believer's need is that of strength—the Saviour's grace addresses itself to that need. The Christian must grow, and to grow he must be nourished. The needs of the soul, like that of the body, are recurrent and must be often supplied. Of all this the Supper is a lively representation. His body grows by food; his soul, by communion,—for "personality is the proper food of personality."

Thus the two sides of the redemptive relation,—its objective
("I in Him") and subjective ("He in me"), are fully and sufficiently represented in the two sacraments. Any more, only blurs the conception; any less, would not do the relation justice.

(ii) Next we touch the subject of Infant Baptism. Why is Baptism administered to infants and why only to the infants of members? The answer to this introduces the conception of the family, as applying both to the Church as a whole, and to the households it includes. The Church is a family. Is it also a family of families? The answer, assuredly, is yes. The existence of the family as an economic unit, is forcing itself ever more assertively on the minds of economists. It is the main and most urgent factor to be considered in any attempt to reach what is called the "standard of life." It is no less assertive in the sphere of religion. The Church cannot ignore the family, even if she would. What then is her attitude to the Christian household? Shall it be merely a hopeful and charitable expectation that the children of Christian parents shall ultimately "adopt" the religious views of their parents? It is that; but it is more. It is an objective declaration that the infants of Christian parents, infants whose personality is so to speak, in gremio, not as yet detached from the personality of the parents, are like their parents, "in Christ."

And the restriction of baptism to the infants of members is, further, connected with what was said above, of the Reformers'
refusal to separate Word and sacrament. Infants of Christian parents, the subjects of baptism, are subjects also of Christian instruction. Caution is taken of the parents that "the nurture and admonition of the Lord" will be subjoined to the administration of the rite. Where such guarantees cannot be given, the rite is properly withheld.

(iii) And why, finally, is one sacrament only administered? If baptism, why not also the Supper? The answer lies, it would seem, in the distinctive natures of the two ordinances,—the one, largely objective ("we in Christ") and the other, so largely subjective ("Christ in us"). The infant's life is largely objective. "The baby new to earth and sky ... hath never thought that This is I." Not till much later and only gradually, "rounds he to a separate mind," and attains a will which he can make Another's. The withholding of the right of the Table is also, no doubt, partly disciplinary and paedagogic. As the studious school boy is incited to progress by seeing the privileges of the Sixth Form; or the athletic spurred on by hope of achieving the school "cap," so the adolescent Christian's participation is deferred, not because he is held devoid of grace, but because his powers are trained, his intelligence aroused, and his desire excited, by the prospect of a step to be taken in which his free personality is felt to be involved.
These views of the Sacrament may seem loose and "low church," as compared not only with Sacramentarian views still so strongly urged, but even with those of the Reformers, to whom "sealing ordinances" meant so often terms of separation from their brethren. We may humbly think that we have learned something that was hid from our fathers. For us, "terms of communion" are not terms of separation. For as Fairbairn truly says, "particular churches do not break the unity of the Catholic Church visible, while their faith and love" - or, as we may here say, - their common participation in the Grace of Christ, - "constitute the unity of the invisible."
Part IV.

The Christian in Society.

Chapter.

20. Toleration: impossible to "ride the marches" between Authority and Freedom. A working com-prmise now reached in front-rank states. Social value of "conscientious objection."


22. Oaths and War. Former question practically settled; latter, not. Another case of conflict between Necessity and Freedom. War not intrinsically wrong.

Conclusion.
CHAPTER XX.

The Civil Magistrate.

Prop. XIV. God hath assumed to Himself the dominion of the conscience and can alone instruct and govern it.

(It is therefore unlawful for the civil magistrate) to force the conscience of others.

Provided always that conscience is not pretended in prejudice of the neighbour's rights, or (in action inimical to) human society, in which case impartial justice is to be administered.

This subject having been "of late years so largely and learnedly handled" is treated with brevity.

Conscience is a persuasion of the mind, following on a conviction of the understanding as to the "truth or falsity of anything." Its authority, though fallible, is supreme over a man's actions. The question here raised concerns a man's actions only in the sphere of religion,- i.e., practically, freedom of worship. Here liberty is claimed,- but only within the bounds of common morality ("the moral and perpetual statutes generally acknowledged by all Christians") and not at all to condone such excesses as those of the Anabaptists of Munster. The question of Church discipline is also saved; i.e., our question solely regards the proper direction of the force residing in civil magistracy. It is
denied that this force has application in the field of religious conviction and worship.

The reasons are:-(i) The magistrate as such has no qualification for judging. If even the chief members of the church had no commission to "lord it over the conscience" of their brethren, how much less the civil magistrate?

(ii) The pretended power of the magistrate is inconsistent with the nature of the gospel. God can be worshipped in spirit and truth only by a willing and persuaded people.

(iii) It is also contrary to reason and the law of nature. Reason cedes to reason, not to force.

The opposite view lands in absurdity. If magistrates have a right and duty to coerce religious freedom, they sin by omission if they do not persecute. The crimes of the Inquisition, the Huguenot wars, and the shame of Luther (in the matter of Carolostadius) and of Calvin (in that of Servetus) directly follow from this view.

The ground of persecution really lies in an unwillingness to suffer. Short of persecution, this unwillingness takes many forms, of evasion flight and concealment. The true spirit of suffering scorns all subterfuge. The Quakers have shown it now for 25 years, and their testimony is at least reaching the hearts of "their superiors."
Remarks.

Barclay's contention may be said to be in principle admitted by all states of the front rank. Where it is not yet a working policy, where religious conviction is oppressed, the offending party is less likely to be the magistrate than the priest, or, if the magistrate, then only as the tool of a priestly caste jealous of privilege. Wherever the issue between civil authority and religious freedom has been faced, and fought out, the settlement has been reached on the lines which Barclay prescribes. In other words, there is consensus that there is a region of human rights over which the civil authority has no jurisdiction; and any infringement of which is not conducive to those interests of law and order which the magistrate is specifically appointed to uphold.

The course of progress which has led to this result has been dual. On the one hand, the territory in which freedom holds sway has been more exactly defined, and more widely extended. On the other hand, the power wielded by the magistrate has shifted its seat. As someone has said, there are no subjects now, only citizens. The ruler holds power by consent of the governed, and that consent is not long to be relied upon unless it is free, - the fruit of conviction.

The consensus above noted takes the form of a rough practical agreement between both parties. The party of the one part agrees that in asserting his conscientious convictions he will be considerate of the rights of others. The party of the
other part agrees that one so acting shall have all reasonable liberty allowed him. Some such concordat between the rights of conscience and those of the civil authority is probably all that is to be looked for. No rigid demarcation of the marches is possible. It is a question of practical politics - a matter of tact, - the instinct to govern wisely.

Such provisional, ad hoc arrangements are of the nature of the case. For society is in a perpetual flux:... Institutions do not abide for ever. They begin; they grow; they decay and die. The laws that conserve them become obsolete, and so, unjust: summa lex becomes summa injuria. Among the corroding influences to which they are exposed is the criticism of conscience. The institution demands a service, a submission, - the service or submission she has always demanded, and always hitherto received. But today conscience can no longer give it. "Here I stand. I can no other." What then is to be done?

Society has learned (perhaps) to see in conscience, even in the inconvenient and stubborn form of conscientious objection, one of her greatest assets. She is quick to suspect the counterfeit, - is perhaps never quite sure she has the real thing before her till she sees it suffering. It is her coarse but effective rule of thumb. The discovery stirs her broad awake, - not in the sufferer's interest, but in her own. For she knows that the good that conscience has at heart is a social good - her own good. So that oppression of conscience is a social injury, suicidal.
Conscience, then, the Inner Light, is by no means unrelated to the outer world. What she pleads for in her own right is a social good. How comes it that a principle which, according to Barclay, has nothing to do with the "outward" should be so vitally related to the outer world? Barclay's theory is, that the coincidence is of God. We would not deny that it was of God, only that it is coincidence. For the good of the world is not secured by one who has not the world's good at heart; but by one who, looking at the world, sees it as Christ saw it, and gives himself for it as Christ did.
CHAPTER XXI.

Art and Life.

Prop XV. The chief end of religion is to redeem men from the spirit and vain conversation of the world and to lead into inward communion with God. Therefore all vain customs and habits of the world, both in word and deed, are to be rejected and forsaken. Abiding in the evangelical Spirit, the blessing of God attends on necessary action undertaken for outward sustenance.

Argument: The principles of true religion, hitherto traced in the fields of doctrine and worship, are now followed into the field of society and social intercourse. They prescribe in general a spirit of sobriety, gravity and godly fear, which commends itself to all the judicious; and this praise on the whole the Quakers have extorted, That they are a pure and clean people as to the outward conversation. But fidelity to these principles carries us beyond the range of what is generally approved by sober judges, into certain singularities of speech and behaviour, which, being of a conspicuous nature, have raised a strong animus against us; and of these some justification is now to be given.
Thus, we forswear all complimentary titles, phrases, postures and ceremonies; superfluities of dress and ornament; games, sports and dramatic representations; oaths, whether conversational or judicial; revenge and resistance to evil generally, and, very specially, War. In this, no levelling or communistic principles are at work. We recognise private property, degrees of rank and station, and the differences of manners, education, habiliment, victual, and so on, that naturally go with such distinctions. A man serves God according to his degree. What is solely condemned is the superfluous, the prodigal and the profuse, in each rank and relation.

Among these, are empty titles of honour, having no basis in moral worth, and all the worse in that they attribute worth where there is, or may be, none. They spring from the root of pride. The falsity of addressing an individual as You, instead of by the singular, Thou, arises from the same cause; as also, kneeling, bowing and uncovering the head in salutation. Such postures express a homage which is only due to God. Refraining from them in any case argues less incivility that does the treatment it exposes us to. As to vanity and superfluous in dress - clothes are a consequence of the fall; it is incongruous to take a delight in anything so originated. The uses of clothing are two - to cover nakedness; and to keep out the cold. Fashion consults not these, but other ends. Its vagaries are contrary to Scripture, - hard, then, it is, that
those who seek to follow Scripture is this matter should be condemned by those who make Scripture their (pretended) rule. Games, sports and plays come under the same condemnation - they differ in no respect from the amusements of the heathen. The need of recreation is not denied. But the necessary business of life is itself "a relaxation of the mind from the more serious duties; and if more is needed, there are innocent diversions to hand, such as visiting friends; reading history; sober discussion; gardening; mathematical studies, etc., etc. And even in these pursuits, the love of God mingles itself, just as, in human love, the image and influence of the beloved are never far away. As for swearing - both profane and judicial (particularly the last; for none would defend the first) it is Scripturally forbidden. It suggests a double standard of truth. If it is said, Paul swore ("Before God I lie not" etc) the answer is, this is not swearing; and if it is, the question is not what Paul did, but what Christ forbade. The experience of the Netherland States where the necessity of the oath has been these 100 years relaxed in the case of conscientious objectors, shows that the state has taken no prejudice thereby, but rather the reverse. Finally there is the matter of War, which also, like judicial oaths, is strangely upheld by professed followers of the Prince of Peace. The prohibition of oaths and of revenge was given at the same time, and history shows that in practice, both stand or fall together. The best antiquity discouraged swearing and resisted militarism. The modern admission of both is a
declension from the standards of a purer age. By us, accordingly, the refusal of both, as alike prohibited by eternal and unchangeable laws, has been revived. The prohibition of revenge and of war is so clear as to need no illustration to explain it.

How is it defended? By O.T. practice? We live by a higher law. As a natural right? But we live by supernatural, not natural standards. As a State right, though not a private one? But rulers are subject to Christ, even as individuals are. But since even Christian States and magistrates not come to the pure dispensation of the gospel,—since they are "in the mixture, and not in the patient suffering spirit" they are not yet able to bear this prohibition, and must be allowed to use arms for defence. But this concession to weakness cannot be extended to the true Christian.

Remarks.

Barclay's concluding proposition has regard to those peculiarities of the Quaker in Society which, whether trivial or important, were at least conspicuous enough to seize public attention from the first, and to incur the odium which all must expect who affect a singularity which, besides being odd, implies a censure upon prevailing standards. The mixture of the apparently trivial with the admittedly important,—the gravity with which it is argued to be sinful to say You instead of Thou—reminds one of Browning's Lazarus who was

"witless of the size, the sum, the value in proportion of all things, or whether it be little or be much."
The poet means to suggest the "transvaluation of values" consequent upon spiritual illumination. All things are freshly seen in the new light, and things big and little assume a new place in the scale of importance. This is what the poet suggests. His Lazarus, remaining sane, has been admitted to a higher order of reality, and his judgment of things conforms to surer standards of true value. It is also open to suggest that his Lazarus is the subject of a dislocation which has left him not more, but less, fit for the conduct of life. He is obsessed, the victim of an idée fixe. The same suggestion haunts the reader of Barclay's Fifteenth Proposition. The writer's judgment is felt to be warped. The conclusions, right or wrong, are those of a strong, but hardly a wholesome mind. The free play of life is unnaturally restricted. Things are not seen in their true relations; they are lifted out of the sphere to which they properly belong. These criticisms have been tacitly admitted by the slowly changing practice of the Society. The attitude to oaths and war remains what it was; the days and months are still named by their order in the calendar. But the predilection for Thee has disappeared with the broad-brimmed hat, the collarless coat, and the Quaker bonnet. Such traces as remain of these peculiarities are now regarded as merely survivals amiable/ due to conservative sentiment,—the fragrance of a now empty jar.

The reader's mixture of irritation and sympathy, his attitude now of agreement, now of doubt, and now again of dissent,
settles down to a conviction that Barclay is dealing with things belonging to two different spheres as if they belonged to one. It is another instance of the puritanical attitude to Art - of the standing conflict of Art and Morals.

Thus it will be obvious that much of what Barclay has to say about dress, and address; about manners generally; and particularly about sports and recreations, misses the mark, because these matters are treated as if they were serious questions of morals, whereas they belong to the sphere of Art. Not that it is contended that these spheres are unrelated, with nothing to say to each other. Our sympathy with the slogan, Art for Art's sake, is, to say the least, cool; and some at least of its results leave us not cold, but hot and indignant. The truth is, both are functions of life, and life is not lived in compartments. The artist is still a man, and a man is still a moralist; and unless, or until, his art expresses his morality, it has not succeeded in giving a full expression of the artist's personality. But still, as an artist, he is working under canons which morality has no commission to prescribe, and to a result which morality, though it may claim its say, could never reach. The Beautiful has its own raison d'être, and does not exist upon sufferance either of the Good or the True.

To this region of Art we must agree to assign in large measure those matters of speech, dress and behaviour which Barclay disposes of as matter of morals. Good taste will not offend morals, though it may pay scant regard to moral convention.
With this we dismiss those singularities of speech, and those
denials of ceremony, which modern Quakerism itself has so largely
discarded. There was a cosmopolitan breadth and sanity in the
apostle who could make himself a Jew to the Jew, a Greek to the
Greek, and all things to all men, and all with an eye to his
mission,—which early Quakerism was (quite understandably) with­
out.

This defect which we have pointed out is clearly seen in
Barclay's treatment of dress. It is a question, he holds, of
utility and morality only: we dress to cover our nakedness and
to keep out the cold. It was an expedient forced on by the Fall,
—a regrettable necessity, best briefly dealt with, and then
put out of mind. But we know now that dress is fundamentally an
artistic product. Protection and concealment are physical and
moral necessities; but an instinct no less primary, the instinct
of adornment, turns these necessities to glorious gain. That
is not the whole matter, of course; but no one who misses the
point, as Barclay, will be listened to now.

And similarly with games, sports, and plays. They are
different developments of the same root,—the instinct of play.
Games of skill and games of chance, feats of strength and bouts
of adventure, poetry, the drama,—the feigning of life,—all
have here their common inexpugnable root. They do not spring
from a moral, but from a mimetic, artistic, impulse; and
though they require to be moralised, they are not to be moralised
out of existence. The attempt to do so has often been made, and has, as often, failed. It is tragic that Puritanism has not yet come to terms with Art. When it does so, it will cease to be puritanical. For this is the "narrowness" of Puritanism, that it takes a part for the whole. It must come to see that Art springs from no different soil than that which gives rise to morality. Both are functions of Life.

But before leaving altogether the subject of Art, it is not irrelevant to raise the question of the attitude of Christ there­to, seeing it is in the name of Christ that Barfelay has spoken.

We have spoken as if Art and morality had equal rights, as if the development of both was necessary for a complete life. Is it possible to claim Christ in support of this view? Supreme Teacher as He was in the moral region, can we say as much regarding the artistic? Was His human nature limited on this side? And if so, does that relegate art to an inferior position, and justify its exclusion from the interests of a serious life?

A little consideration will, I believe, lead us to conclude that while the world of Art was by no means a sealed book to our Lord, it gave place to considerations even more imperious and absorbing. All is said, as I believe, when it is said that Art is Play. Now, there is a time and place for play in life - a necessary, but a limited time and place. And our Lord's time was short. He had serious work to do and but little time to do it in. It was His, not to live artistically, but dangerously; not to paint pictures, but to die.
And yet that saying about "not painting pictures" gives us pause. For did anyone ever paint so memorably as He? Are not some of His parables, though only reported, artistic gems of the purest water? And even that awful death, do not the closing scenes satisfy every canon of the truest art? Of the death of one, whom it were blasphemy itself to name in the same sentence with His name, it was written, "He nothing common did, or mean, upon that memorable scene." How true, yet how merely negative, are these, or any, words to describe our Lord's passion! Milton said it was necessary, in order to write a great poem, for the poet to be himself a great poem. And such, in every detail and aspect of His life and death and resurrection, was our Lord: a great Poem.

The "grace of our Lord Jesus Christ," does not the word carry with it an aesthetic **nuance**? Does not the impression of his life and words, passed on by the reporters, seem to embody an aesthetic element, which the reporters themselves may not have been fully conscious of? His love of Nature, and His eye for natural beauty, of these we are somehow sure. His love of children and his observation of children's play and these could not be in the heart of one to whom the world of art was an untravelled country. Christ was one who could have played, if he had had time, and His play would have been true artistry!

But He had no time. Work came first. And that puts Art in its place. "She is the second, not the first."
Art takes time, leisure, freedom. And that perhaps explains why the N.T., unlike the Old, has so little to say about Art. For the writers of N.T., the "time is short," The Christian must work, while it is called to-day.

For us, the horizons of life have widened. The realms of time and space have broadened immeasurably, and play - the play that Christ had no time for - has come into our lives, perhaps, nay certainly, too largely. Let this suffice for what we have to say about the relation of Christ to art, and to the art of living.
CHAPTER XXII.

Oaths and War.

When we turn to the subjects of Oaths and War (so expressly associated together by Barclay) we are in a different region altogether. We are away from Art, and into a field which Morality may claim as her own. Here Barclay is on his own ground,—that of a moralist,—and can be heard with the deference due to real authority. It is noticeable that his Society still maintains its constant testimony in these matters, and has not receded from the Barclaian standpoint here, as it has in the matters just discussed.

As regards the judicial oath, Barclay's contention is twofold: (i) the Christian must never take an oath. (ii) He ought not to be compelled by law to do so. As to the first point, Barclay's contention is weakened by his citation of the example of the Apostle Paul, who resorted on occasion to such a form of asseveration as, Before God I lie not. This, Barclay will not allow to be called taking oath. The difference, if there is one, is hardly distinguishable. It is the solemn asseveration of a simple fact — that the apostle is alive to the sense of an all-hearing God; as such, it is entirely proper and unobjectionable. The frequency, and suitability to the occasion, of such forms of expression, must be largely a matter of circumstance and good taste. What Barclay objects to, however, is manifestly the
legislative compulsion under which, on given occasions, the asseveration is exacted. In effect, it has the suggestion of a double standard,—that statements made on oath have an obligation to veracity which ordinary statements have not; that lying under oath is one thing, and lying without oath is another, and less heinous, offence. There is further the suggestion, which an upright self-respecting man might be expected to resent,—that he requires to be intimidated by supernatural sanctions telling into the truth. But one senses just a suspicion of pride here,—should a touch of resentment on the part of the upright man that he be suspected of sharing a common frailty. On the whole matter our judgment would be that an oath, in the sense of a solemn invocation of God's name, is not in principle wrong. It may be given spontaneously at any suitable time, and may therefore be exacted when occasion calls for it. But when a man gives sufficient guarantee, by known character or credible profession, that the terms of the oath are the terms of his witness,—being in fact the terms on which it is his invariable custom to speak,—the oath in set terms may be pretermitted. And when his objection to the oath is based on religious grounds,—such as his loyalty to Christ, and to Christ's teaching as he understands it,—then the oath not only may, but ought to be pretermitted. For the substance of the oath is conveyed in the very grounds alleged by way of objection. The sworn servant of Christ is so bound as no oath could bind him more.

And to this common-sense conclusion, the law of this land
has now arrived. The question accordingly is not a burning one.

But when we turn to the companion subject, of War, we are in the troubled atmosphere of a question still vexed and still, alas, unsettled. Here, too, the question is dual: (i) is war in any circumstances lawful? (ii) is it in any circumstances lawful for a Christian? Barclay's answer to the first in effect is that War is natural, and on the natural plane may be just and allowable; to the second, that the Christian does not live on the natural plane, and to him War is wrong and forbidden.

Object as we may to Barclay's sharp distinction between "natural" and "supernatural" we shall not find it easy, if indeed possible, either to ignore the existence of two orders of experience, or to strike the balance between them. The distinction between those two planes is not to be obliterated by discarding the term supernatural. Huxley's famous Romanes lecture is evidence of that. Huxley had no traffic, in terms, with the supernatural; but his distinction between the "cosmic order" on the one hand, and the "ethical order" on the other, introduces a diremption no less abrupt than did the distinction he discards.

Reduced to simple terms the distinction is that between what is, and what ought to be, - the actual and the ideal. These are not two separate worlds, for man lives in the sense of both. They are one world; for they are his world.

The two orders are not mutually impervious. The actual is the sphere of Necessity, determined by law. The ideal is
the sphere of Duty, actuated by the sense of law. Between acting under law, and under the sense of law, there is a whole diameter of being. But the diameter is the diameter of one globe,- man's globe. There are degrees of necessity. There are sequences apparently unalterable. These it is for man to master. He learns the way of things and finds that knowledge is power. He gets his way in the end. But often the end is long of coming.

A simple illustration occurs here of how these 2 spheres may interpenetrate. A man must eat,- here is the sphere of law, nature, necessity. He must also glorify God,- here is the sphere of duty and the ideal. The two have interpenetrated when he eats and drinks to the glory of God.

Approaching now the Subject of War, we find ourselves again in face of the two necessities of Nature and the Ideal. Existence is struggle. Struggle is a law of Nature. Peace, shall we say, the law of God. The peace we are after is not the cessation of struggle; for life is struggle. Struggle is life's unalterable law. What then is peace? Peace is not ceasing to struggle; it is striving together. When men learn to strive together, the two realms will have interpenetrated - What is, and what ought to be, will be identical.

Peace, being defined as striving together, is seen to be an incomplete statement of human good. For men might strive together for bad ends. If our fellowmen are seeking bad ends,
we must not join with, but oppose them. War is one form of opposition; non-resistance another. Non-resistance is badly named. It is really a powerful form of resistance. Passive resistance is not much better, for it is most active. But apart from any question of terms, the point at issue is, whether war is for the Christian a legitimate form of resistance. We are trying to argue the question on the bare point of principle - the principle of resistance to evil by armed force, uncomplicated by consideration of unjust wars, wars of conquest and aggression, and of the barbarities that attend all wars. These, no one could defend, at least, in cold blood. But is the use of force defensible on any terms?

The answer is, it depends on the end of which it is directed. The Christian end is not merely the frustration of evil but its conversion - not the mere overcoming of evil, but overcoming it with good - the change of mind and heart from evil into good and into co-operative striving for the good.

And just here we come upon a feature of Christian teaching which seems to conflict with its teaching about non-resistance., i.e., its teaching about judgment and doom. Apparently the divine resistance to evil has its limits,- the patience of God is at length exhausted, and the evil will, abandoned as hopeless, works its own destruction.

If this is indeed integral part of Christian truth, it means that the principle of nonresistance has limits. And if it
has limits why should they be ignored by men? It is no complete
answer to say Vengeance is mine; for if Divine justice admits
vengeance then human justice, which reflects it, must admit it too.

It is further arguable that the use of force is, not
inconceivably, calculated to reach the Christian end. To thrash
a bully may be to do his soul good. If it is objected that war
seeks not to convert but to exterminate men; the answer to that
is, that though the enemy nationals die, the nation persists
and is therefore to be fought as a potential friend.

Our conclusion is that War is not intrinsically wrong. It
is rooted in natural necessity. But like all natural necessity
it too may be turned to gain. The true antidote to war is not
refusal to fight; it is to cultivate the spirit to which war
is foreign - the spirit which takes away "the occasion of all
wars."
CONCLUSION.

We began our examination by saying that the Inner Light was experience before it was doctrine,- an experience, we were convinced, which was real and valuable, and one, to be respectfully treated, and if possible conserved. Our criticisms have been directed to this conservative purpose, and so far as negative and destructive, have been made under the idea that theory and experience, while distinguishable, are not so mutually independent that they are of no help or hindrance to each other. A wrong theory is in the long run detrimental to the experience it seeks to account for. And since the experience and concern, is a human, while the theory is a personal/sectarian, we can have no hesitation in sacrificing the one to save the other.

The question is whether the presuppositions of the theory are sufficient to account for the experience, and whether, if followed out, they would be sufficient to maintain it in vigorous existence. As a matter of fact the early promise of the Quaker movement has not been realised. Fox and his contemporaries certainly never anticipated that the outcome of the movement would be the addition of one more to the multitude of sects that form a species of undergrowth within the shadow of the mightier forest trees by which the Christian religion is represented to the world. They contemplated nothing less than an instauratio magna, a rebirth of Christianity in its pure original and catholic form. The replacement of that by a religious Society,
small in members and, however tenacious of life, and however respectable and respected, yet apparently incapable of further expansion, must have seemed, if they could have forseen it, a pitiful falling away from the splendid vision overhanging the horizon of their hopes.

If the movement then has side-stepped, something must be taken to account for it. It is not for us to do more than consider whether a cause contributory to this result may not lie in the theoretical errors of Barclay's classic formulation.

To go at once to what seems the radical error, we have found that to be in a false objectivity. Barclay is emphatic in his repudiation of mere subjectivity - spiritual influence is not limited to any mere subjective heightening of human faculty, the guarantees of its divine certainty are not thus to be gained. Truth must be objective, - given. But how? By immediate inward revelation, delivered like a letter or parcel at the subject's door.

That is what we mean by false objectivity. The Object is all-important; but it is sought for in the wrong quarter. For the true Object is found precisely in that quarter from which Barclay so pointedly averted his gaze,- viz., from "the Outward." From the soil of nature which Barclay unduly despised, the precious plant of knowledge must spring, if it is to grow at all. to maintain

We have tried throughout/ the view that Nature - in the large sense of the "nature of things"-is the field in which knowledge of God is to be reaped. We regard Nature as the
scene of an omnipresent gracious redemptive activity. This activity is not equally evident throughout. "Nature" is not a flat undifferentiated surface. It has points of greater significance. It has one point of supreme significance — viz., the redemptive Fact of Christ. This Fact in its redemptive meaning and virtue is interpretative of all the rest. Its meaning is the clue to the meaning of Nature. "God commendeth His love" therein, — i.e., we get a clear, straight, uninterrupted vision into the heart of reality. "Reality" and Nature mean to us the same thing. And the Cross of Christ unveils Reality. Standing there, with open eyes, we see into "the life of things." And beholding there the glory of the Lord, (i.e., His redemptive love and purpose), we are changed into the same image (i.e., are redeemed.)

This is so obviously true that Barclay is forced to admit it. The divine regenerative principle takes up into itself the elements of human nature, — reason, conscience, will, and uses them after their kind. Thereby the subject is adjusted properly to the outward world and can live the good life therein. Thus Barclay provides room for a real experience and for its gradual growth, and for the needful helps of education, of Scripture, of Church fellowship. But on his main principle it is not apparent how growth is possible, or helps to growth/needed. For if the spiritual man has already within him the source and fountain of truth and life, it does not appear why he should have recourse
to anything else. Accordingly, while Barclay admits the rights
and advantages of reason, he has only very grudging acknowledg-
ment to make of the value of education. While he honours
Scripture above all writings, he knows of something which
enables him to dispense with it. And while he prizes the pri-
vilege of Christian fellowship, the worshipper must abstract him-
self as far as may be from any sense of human contact, from the
flow of his own thoughts, must leave all that behind, must sink
into the "pure," and receive without earthly channel, the inflow
of truth and life direct from its divine source. Thus in com-
merce "alone with the Alone," he may receive something which,
"breathed into the air," and falling to the earth he knows not
where, he may "find again in the heart of a friend." All this
is an unreal account of a real experience; and a misdirection
of those who are seeking the way thereto.

How far the Barclaian theory really stifled the life of the
society and reduced the persuasiveness of its testimony to the
world, we have no present call to enquire. Our concern now is
with what is positive and valuable in the experience of the
Inner Light, as something to which the Christian and the Church
should serve themselves heirs.

In its real essence, then, we take it to be not the com-
munication of Truth or Life simpliciter,—but a luminous state
of mind resulting from true Vision into Fact. The use of the
term "vision" reminds us of the ambiguity attaching to the word. It may mean the faculty of sight, or it may mean the result of the exercise of the faculty. A similar ambiguity attaches to the Inner Light. It may mean the faculty of recognizing truth,—the sense of oughtness; or it may mean a positive enlightenment on a concrete problem of thought or action. The former is an unrealised, the latter a realised potentiality.

But the point is that in neither sense is it independent of the external-objective. If regarded as faculty, its development proceeds by exercise,—we learn to see by using our eyes. While if regarded as the psychic state resulting from the use of the faculty, that is reached by direction of the faculty upon the subject matter of experience. For the Christian mind there can be no question as to what this subject matter is, and where it is to be sought for. It is in the historic Fact of Christ.

But again we must reiterate that this historic fact cannot remain external. The Object is not merely Object. In its real and inmost nature it is Subject, and must be known as such. The relation of subject and object is reciprocal—"I in Him and He in me." When this relation is realised, it is by an inward spiritual movement and interchange. The Light of the World, has become my Inner Light.