MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

A Thesis for the Doctorate of Philosophy submitted by

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Important Note

The spelling throughout this thesis is American spelling, according to Funk and Wagnalls Dictionary. For example, the English "colour" is spelt "color" and "saviour" is spelt "savior".
PART I

THE CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY IN MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.
CHAPTER I

THE NEW INSIGHT OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

It is a very complex problem with which this discussion is confronted.

The doctrine of the person of Christ has always been a storm center of theology. The reasons for this are two especially. Christology—the doctrine of God become man—is bound always to acknowledge a large element of mystery, and mystery is exciting. The solution which is traditional, in the second place, is the wrong one; it has never satisfied men's minds, at bottom; they have always been uneasy about it, though they have quite generally believed they either were or must be satisfied by it; and the result has been a constant discussion and a constant turmoil between differing interpretations and interpreters.

Now comes psychology with new findings about human nature, a fresh insight into personality. What has it to say about the old but still-vexed problem?

There seems to be room for an attempt to answer this question from the viewpoint neither of the pure theologian—traditionally dogmatic—nor of the pure psychologist—presently and vociferously dogmatic—an attempt honestly to take the findings of psychology, where these seem to be assuredly true, and to see what can be made of them theologically, with an eye especially to the problems of Christology. The new insight of modern psychology makes a reconsideration of the old problems imperative. Darkness and befuddlement are never a happy condition. The mere promise of light, say, upon the validity or falsity of the two-nature doctrine formulated in the Creeds concerning Jesus is enough to justify
such a study as that upon which we are about to enter.

It becomes of interest to ask, what has modern psychology to say about the Christ of the Creeds, in whom two distinct natures, neither divided, nor separated, nor yet confused, or changed, are conceived to have unitedly functioned? Does psychology's new insight support the theological conception of a divine nature, with its own peculiar properties, and a human nature, with its own peculiar properties, entering as constituents into one personality? In fact, is the conception of personality in the Creeds reconcilable at all with the conception of personality in modern psychology? How far does psychology warrant our believing that the same individual was completely divine and at the same time completely human, both true God and true man? Is it consistent with the findings of psychology to have faith that God appeared among men in one humanly born?

These are not questions easy to answer. One must avoid a facile drawing of conclusions. But the responsibility of making a beginning of answering in the light of recent knowledge can not be shirked.

One cannot read even a tithe of modern psychological literature without meeting again and again the confident claim of the "new" psychologists that their findings necessitate a complete revision of the older conceptions of personality. Extravagant things are undoubtedly being said by some of them in this direction; but it is clear that they have largely substantiated their claim. Not only is it apparent that revision is necessary, but the form which that revision must take is in its broad outlines already marked out.

A rapid estimate of the nature and significance of the findings which constitute the new insight of modern psychology will
help to demonstrate this fact.

And first a brief statement of the position taken by the older psychology should explain much of the iconoclasm of some modern psychology. It was, we may remember, intolerably stiff and rectilinear, this older psychology. To recall even briefly its main features is to recognize its inadequacy as a science of consciousness. Though its whole preoccupation was with consciousness, and mainly with consciousness on its rational side, it failed to provide a key to more than the higher levels of mental function. The bases of mental activity were not understood, not even discerned. For this reason "the more dramatic aspects and elements of human nature", with which, as Dr. William Brown observes,¹ recent psychology has brought us into touch, were remote from the discussions of the older psychology. It was concerned mainly with "the notice the mind takes of its own operations".² The rational movements of the mind were held to be the chief elements in experience; feeling and volition were of secondary, even of minor, importance. Quite generally, before the 19th Century, the self was viewed statically, as functioning through such more or less abstract faculties as mind, will, instincts, conscience, and the like. These faculties were regarded as primary and irreducible properties of the person, which could be studied separately, since they were to a large extent separately motivated, and therefore operated as quasi-autonomous agencies or causes interacting within the person.

The overthrow of this early type of psychology was, in the first half of the 19th Century, brought about by Associationism, as developed from the principles laid down by Locke and Hume. But

¹Mind and Personality, p. 5. ²Locke's definition of introspection.
it was not till the closing decades of the century that the faculty psychology was quite laughed out of court. The "new" psychology of which the '90s spoke was one that was to have the benefit of the discoveries of biological science. It was experimental and physiological rather than philosophical, genetic rather than introspective. The present century opened with a fuller recognition of the true nature of human motives as rooted in innate tendencies and as powerfully influenced by the "subliminal" activities of the mind. Here a beginning of investigation and report was made by such men as William James, Baldwin, Stout, and Ward, and was carried much further by such differing psychologists as Janet, Freud, Jung, Durkheim, Rivers, Watson, McDougall, and others.

The thoughts feelings and actions of men had long been studied as sufficiently elemental to form the basic data of psychology; but it was now seen that underlying them, and more fundamental than they, were the principal human instincts and their characteristic emotional and conative impulses and tendencies. "We may say", McDougall submitted in an epoch-making introduction to social psychology, "that directly and indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or some habit derived from an instinct), every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained". He declared that the old psychologizing, in its introspective concern with the phenomena of consciousness, was "like the playing of 'Hamlet' with the Prince of Denmark left out, or like describing steam-engines while ignoring

\[1\text{Introduction to Social Psychology, p } 44\]
the fact of the presence and fundamental role of the fire or other source of heat. On every hand we hear it said that the static, descriptive, purely analytic psychology must give place to a dynamic, functional, voluntaristic view of mind".¹

Here, then, we have a new insight. An analysis of the mental processes does not allow us to rest content with a purely academic treatment of thought, feeling, and act as present to consciousness and determined by "reason". We are obliged to account for thought, feeling, and act themselves, and in so doing we discover that the driving power of all mental activity is found in deeply-rooted impulses seeking their satisfactions. These impulses are not always immediately present to consciousness, not always determined by reason. They lie deep within the mind and person; they form "the native bases of the mind".

The consequence of this insight has been a shift of emphasis from the rational to the emotional and volitional aspects of mental process; and this has involved a recasting of psychological material of the utmost importance in all modern thinking about personality. It is no longer held to be true that the cognitive process can ever be "disinterested". We have to deal, rather, with the purposeful and interested character of mental activity, both in its conscious and subconscious aspects. Not that there is always an exact or precise understanding of the ends sought; but all behavior, animal as well as human, makes for ends marked by satisfyingness, and away from states or situations limiting and restricting freedom in activity. At the roots of being are the impulses, wishes, desires, represented chiefly by the instincts; and the individual

¹Ibid, p 16.
seeks their satisfaction in his environment.

McDougall, of course, represents the more moderate of the new psychologists, and it is to the Freudian schools that we must turn for the really sweeping claims for the "new evidence". If the older psychology confined its interest to the "content of consciousness", the new psychology as represented by Freudianism, both in its original and derived forms, is to be described as finding its primary data in the phenomena of the subconscious, where the instinctive impulses are at work. They have found that the mind is no ordered storehouse of sensations, perceptions, ideas, and rational processes merely, but is rather a deep, mysterious sea, whose surface, which is all that appears to consciousness, is but a very small part of the whole; far more important are the profound, the hidden depths. They have made the discovery that a proposition like: "The psychic is the conscious", is a prejudice; that mental life stretches beyond the limits of consciousness; and, what is more, that the impulses play the most significant part in that mental life. ¹ And thus an English spokesman for psycho-analysis asserts with confidence that the mind's "most fundamental activities are non-rational and largely unconscious activities". ² Freud would enforce this statement by the addition that the whole activity of consciousness is rigidly determined by the subconscious movements of the instinctive desires or "wishes".

The psycho-analytic schools have opened our eyes to hitherto little known regions of the mind, and have made it necessary to include in any competent study of personality, besides an analysis of consciousness, an examination of the wealth of material

¹Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p 17 (Eng tr).
which has been gathered concerning the subconscious, the far from inert reservoir of deep biological cravings and vital impulses. Just what the subconscious is depends, no doubt, on the interpretation placed upon the evidence, but that the subconscious is a reality, and has a very great influence on all conscious processes, is surely beyond dispute.

Not least of the important new developments in psychology is the change of method of approach. Instead of proceeding from a consideration of the complex problems presented by certain higher forms of human activity, such as involve emotion and intelligence, the student of human nature—not without constant and grave danger of assuming that higher processes are fully explicable in terms of lower—proceeds from the simpler and more elemental to the more complex functions. This has led to the complete re-orientation of psychology. Animal and child psychology have been given a large role to play; and constant resort is being made to the epoch-making discoveries in abnormal psychology. The results, on the one hand, are a larger measure of understanding of the sources and springs of human conduct, and, on the other hand, the extravagant claims, that the explanation of normal psychology lies in the findings obtained when dealing with "the relatively simple" activities of the abnormal and insane, or "that there are no specific differences of kind, but only those of degree, between the reflex activities of the protozoa and the highest mental processes of men".¹

¹ See Stewart Paton, Human behavior, p 10.
ation to the study of the response of the whole organism to the "whole situation", they have developed the thesis that complex forms of response are not to be ascribed even to instincts, but to something far simpler and less psychic in character, namely, neural response to direct stimulus. \textit{Most} forms of response,\textsuperscript{*} they maintain, are to be approached as combinations of "conditioned reflexes", that is, the systems of physical reactions that the individual makes to his environment. Hence we are vaguely, if not vainly, beating the air when we postulate consciousness, since it gets us nowhere to do so. If there is any possibility, say the Behaviorists, of finally explaining mental acts as the highest product of harmoniously functioning reflexes, we give countenance to folly in overhastily assuming that there are such things as mind, or will, or imagination, or soul.

That we should demur to such claims as these is very ill-advised, to say the least, thinks Dr. John Watson.

"What is it," he asks, "that the psychologist can observe? Behavior, of course. But behavior on analysis is the separate systems of reactions that the individual makes to his environment. When we come to study the mechanics of such adjustment we find that they depend upon the integration of reflexes connecting the receptors with the muscles and glands".\textsuperscript{1}

And he goes on to demonstrate that thinking, willing, and feeling are purely and simply the integration of reflexes connecting the receptors with the muscles and glands.

We have here the ultimate accentuation of the objective method in psychology. Although Watson adds hastily that it should be emphasized that "objective psychology does not analyze such integrations to the bitter end except where the problem demands it" and that "concrete, whole activities are as important to the behavi-

\textsuperscript{1}Psychology from the Standpoint of the Behaviorist, p 13.
orist as to other psychologists", it may nevertheless be said that it is not a synoptic view of human personality which Behaviorism presents. It is personality regarded as "an individual's total assets and liabilities (actual and potential) on the reaction side", which means that the person is simply a receptor and reactor to stimuli, a very complex mechanism that is ultimately the plaything of the environment. Mind is ruled out. Reflex takes its place.

But if we build upon the point of view which is now being taken by leading physicists, that matter is an expression of Mind, we seem to reach far more adequate conclusions. An objective account of behavior does not account for the fact of behavior. To account for it, we predicate an inner spring of "vitality" or "impulse", a "will-to-live", without running any grave risk of demonstrable error, and assume that it is the expression of an ultimate Activeness or Creativeness. In short, if we presuppose that the universe, and man as part of that universe, are expressions of Personal Mind, we may believe that in any individual there is not only a tendency to react to stimulus in a more or less inherited manner, but an original activity which makes him creator as well as reactor.

This, at any rate, is the conclusion to which modern psychology tends. It is an insight that should be matter of rejoicing to all who give centrality to religious experience.

And now it will be asked, what is the conception of personality which emerges from all this fresh discovery?

The following pages are by way of an answer. One could wish for more in the nature of careful psychological formulations

\footnote{Ibid, p 347.}
on personality, on which to base oneself. Unfortunately it is early in the day and the literature is still meagre, though it may be described as vigorously emergent; but this involves our being put to formulating the findings on personality ourselves.

Our procedure therefore proves necessarily somewhat lengthy; it is to be hoped, also rewarding. We shall have to inquire, first, into the conception of personality in modern psychology, and ask briefly what its ultimate significance is. Then, we shall seek to trace, as briefly as that can be done, the conception of personality underlying the New Testament Christology and the Catholic Christological dogmas, with a special interest in the differences discernible between the earlier and the later views. This part of our study will terminate in a critical examination of the two-nature Christology in the light of psychology. Thereafter, in Parts III and IV, we shall undertake a large reconstructive task, in the endeavor to reach the more adequate Christology which has been the Christian need ever since scholasticism failed to interpret the Creeds satisfactorily to minds and hearts recreated by religious experience in Christ Jesus.
CHAPTER II
THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF PERSONALITY

It is helpful, to begin with, to summon up to the mind's eye such a figure of a man as commonly appears on the frontispiece of textbooks on physiology. When we first look at a figure of this kind, it strikes us as all body. Further reflection leads to a modification and enrichment of this impression. The psychologist will at once ideally reconstruct the relation of the figure to the moving world of sensuous experience: he will endow it with the capacities of cutaneous, motor, and organic sensations; taste, smell, sight, hearing, pleasure and pain; emotion; tactual, visual, and temporal perception, and so on. Unless he is a Behaviorist, he will go further than this, and will assert that, if the figure is to stand for a real human being, it must be conceived to represent the embodiment of a mind, responding to the unceasing urge of various sensations and instinctive processes, and yet transcending the merely impulsive by a continuous conceptual and ideational activity justifying the hypothesis of an inner self. We are to think of this self as active in cognition (thinking), affection (feeling), and conation (willing). Along with this personal activity in the present we are to mark the existence of memory of past time and prospective planning or looking forward to future time. Simultaneously, there is much not present to consciousness, the evidence of the existence of which is revealed in the phenomena of subconsciousness. In short, the self of the moment is seen to imply a larger self reaching retrospectively into past time, prospectively into future time, and down into the subconscious in present time, without the loss in the normal course of things of
continuity: the person throughout is one person.

In this brief summary we have drawn certain distinctions which are useful when we come to consider the preliminary question of the appropriate terminology. What do we mean by "Self"? By "Ego"? By "Personality"? The term Self will be used broadly, throughout the following discussion, as a general term for one who knows, feels, and wills, as subject in relation to object—the Self over against the Not-self. The Self known to self-consciousness in the experience of any particular moment, that is, the dominating aspect of the personality as known to self-consciousness, will go by the name Ego. As to the central term in our discussion, Personality, we disclaim at once any intention to fit it in with the common restriction of it to the usage whereby it means "that which constitutes efficiency or distinction of person". It is confusing also to regard Personality as being in the nature of a refined essence, or to adopt the too limited and partial definition which confines it to a system of social and ethical relations. It is far better to regard a Person as the synthesis or unity of individual processes and powers, containing potentialities yet unrealized in full. Person will accordingly be understood to mean the total Self, a self-determining entity persisting through change as the growing reality of what a man has been and now is, and that holds a promise of what he will be. Personality will refer, then, not primarily to the unity of the Ego or Self of any particular moment, but to the unity of the Self in its totality. This corresponds with G.F. Stout's definition of the total Self:

"Under the concept of the Self as expressed in the word 'I', is included in systematic unity the life-history of the individual, past, present, and future, as it appears to himself and
others; together with all its possible or imaginary developments.  

For practical purposes, it may suffice tentatively to adopt as a working definition this distinction: the Ego is the dominant aspect in the individual self present to self-consciousness at any given moment, while the Person is the individual self in the living and growing unity of all its states.

In considering further the nature of personality, it would seem wiser first to examine its constituent elements; and a practical view of the case suggests a simple division of these elements into two groups, as follows: (I) the physical elements; and (II) the mental or psychic elements, the latter in the following aspects: (1) the life-force, (2) the instincts, (3) the subconscious, (4) the sentiments and complexes, and (5) consciousness. These elements in their several aspects will need to be described seriatim in order to bring our problem properly before us.

I

The body is not in these days a neglected factor in the study of personality. The early Hebrews themselves could not have held a firmer conviction that the body is absolutely essential to the person than most psychologists today. Watson, the Behaviorist, does not exaggerate the prevalent view in asserting, "We must never lose sight of the fact that when a man reacts to even the most minute sensory stimulus, the whole body cooperates in the reaction, even if he only raises his finger or says 'red!'".

For the psychologist, however, the body is not in every part as important as it is for the physiologist. Much as the mental

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life is dependent on the normal functioning of the heart, lungs, digestive system, and so on, and powerfully though the nervous system is sometimes affected by the discharge of chemical substances by various organs and glands into the blood, mental process is primarily and directly associated with that portion of the central nervous system which is called the cerebral cortex and with the mid-brain at its base. It is true, of course, that if the nervous system does not function, the directing and controlling mechanism of the body has broken down, and the life of the bodily organism practically loses its significance for the psychologist; but, on the other hand, it may be urged that the psychologist is only indirectly concerned with the nervous activity which does not reach consciousness.

The cortex, the convoluted mantle of grey matter wrapping the brain, is the locus of true mental activity, and is concerned with the reception and transmission of messages coming in from sense-organs and going out to muscles and glands, and what might be called its own excitations. It has been compared to the exchange of a telephone system. The afferent (incoming) and efferent (outgoing) nerves are the branching wires of the system, the spinal cord the great conducting cable. The incoming messages arise from those parts of the body which are sensitive to specific stimuli, such as the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and finger-tips, and those parts more diffusely sensitive to warmth, cold, pressure, or movements of tissues and organs. When these messages arrive, the physiological processes set up by them in the cortex result in the transmission of an order through the efferent nerves to the motor and glandular systems, which then perform the required movements,
and the individual is seen to act in certain definite ways.

Objectively considered, this is all that can be said but to happen; nothing more is to be seen; from a subjective viewpoint, the process of reception and transmission of neural messages is generally accompanied by the individual's awareness that he is acting, thinking, and feeling in a particular manner.

It is, of course, to be remembered that all bodily movements are not directed by the cortex. The autonomic nervous system, especially its central portion, the sympathetic nervous system, though not actually dissociated from the higher centers of control in brain and spinal cord, nevertheless functions through very highly specialized forms of reflex action, and more or less automatically organizes the processes of the body with which it is principally concerned. These and all other reflex movements arise independently of the cortex; that is to say, they are not essentially conscious processes.

The physiology of reflex action has been closely studied in recent years. Simple reflex action is a matter of response to direct stimulus; but it may become what is technically called a "conditioned reflex", a response to indirect stimulus. Pavlov and other scientists have proved that if two stimuli are repeatedly present at the same time, only one of which is directly connected with a motor response, after an interval the originally unconnected stimulus will be sufficient by itself to call out the response. By the process of successive "conditioning" the reflex may be evoked by more than one substitute stimulus, until it becomes very complex. Enthusiastic observers of this fact (the Behaviorists) are now claiming that all behavior, whether of body or mind, may
be accounted for by the coordination of conditioned reflexes. The claim is very highly disputable; but a moment's reflection will enable us to see its truth element, that from the evolutionary viewpoint action is the oldest of our nervous functions.

Turning now to the structural features of the nervous system, we perceive that the unit of structure is the neurone or nerve cell. It consists of a central part or cell body with two branching threads stretching in opposite directions, the receiving thread (called the dendrite, because it is a branched structure with a minute arborescence of twigs) and the longer thread which conducts the stimulus away from the cell body, called the axone. The brush-like end of the dendrite interlaces, without structurally uniting, with the brush-like end of the axone of the neighboring neurone. The point where this "clasping" of neurones takes place is called a synapse. The neural impulses may by its means pass from one neurone to the next, and so travel in longer or shorter "arcs" between sense-organs, muscles, and glands in various parts of the body.

There are several things of great importance to the study of personality in the passing of currents of stimulation along these nerve paths. In the first place, such currents do not traverse the whole system at once or indefinitely, but follow more or less well-defined paths, and are converted into specific forms of energy. As we have just seen, neurones are functionally but not structurally united at the synapses. Nerve currents do not therefore run through a continuous structure of nerve fibre, but must have enough strength to leap from one neurone to another. The synapses vary in their readiness to allow impulses to pass through them.
Thus a current of stimulation finds its way barred in certain directions and facilitated in others. It is, in a word, obliged to traverse the nervous system in more or less controlled ways.

A second fact is the formation of nervous habits in accordance with the law of neural association. When a current of a chain of neurones, it lowers the stimulation passes through synaptic resistances to its re-passage. Thus certain kinds of nervous impulse are enabled readily and repeatedly to pass through certain groups of neurones which have been habituated to them.

The third fact is of more general significance still and brings us to the verge of the psychical aspect of these processes. It is thus recognized by Watson:

"No matter how minute the sense organ structure is which is stimulated, the impulse arising there can travel to the central system and produce a response of the whole organism which is entirely out of proportion to the actual energy applied at the sense organ".1

This disproportion between stimulus and response is a fact of primary importance. It is put with great force, in the form of an illustration, by McDougall:

"A man receives from a friend a telegram saying--'Your son is dead'. The physical agent to which the man reacts is a series of black marks on a piece of paper. The reaction outwardly considered as a series of bodily processes consists, perhaps, in a sudden, total, and final cessation of all those activities that constitute the outward signs of life; or in complete change of the whole course of the man's behavior throughout the rest of his life. And all this altered course of life, beginning perhaps with a series of activities that is completely novel and unprecedented in the course of his life, bears no direct relation whatever to the nature of the physical stimulus. The independence of the reaction on the nature of the physical impression is well brought out by the reflection that the omission of a single letter, namely, the first of the series (converting the statement into--'Our son is dead'), would have determined none of this long train of bodily effects, but merely the writing of a letter of condolence or the utterance of a conventional expression of regret; whereas, if the

telegram had been written in any one of a dozen foreign languages known to the recipient, or if the same meaning had been conveyed to him by means of auditory impressions or by any one of many different possible means of communication, the resulting behavior would have been the same in all cases, in spite of the great differences between the series of sense-impressions.¹

In commenting on this forceful illustration, Stout says:

"Plainly the stimulus does not of itself account for the resulting bodily behavior. Between stimulation of sense-organ and ensuing movements there must be intermediate conditions and processes of a very complex and systematic nature, which, so to speak, translate the impression into expression. This mediating agency is certainly, in part, psychical. There is a mind which experiences sensation."²

II

The objective psychologists would challenge Stout's interpretation, or at least his right as a psychologist to make such an interpretation; but let us recur to the simple distinction previously made, that, objectively considered, every mental act is a physiological process of reception and transmission of neural messages; but, subjectively considered, the same process is accompanied by the individual's awareness that he is acting, and thinking, and feeling in a particular manner: he is cognizant of himself as a soul, or a mind; he is self-conscious.

"Common sense"³ would seem to suggest that it is the business of psychology primarily to discover the laws underlying this subjective and inner experience.⁴ We begin, of course, with the fact that the physiological processes are the necessary condition of the psychical, and that have certain laws of a physical character which they must invariably follow, if a full

¹Body and Mind (5th ed) p 268. ²Op.cit. p 61. ³The hypothetical court of appeal, be it noted, of Behaviorism also; not to be lightly trusted, nor scorned. "Horse sense" has over and over proved its pragmatic value in science. ⁴See Drever, Instinct in Man, p 11.
normal life is to be the result, just as the musical score must conform to the laws of musical composition, if discord is not to be the result. But, to follow out the familiar illustration, no score can convey by itself the reality which bursts upon the hearer when the sounds corresponding to the written notes are drawn from a musical instrument. No more can the physiological patterns with any adequacy convey an idea of the psychical reality corresponding to them. The body must conform to physiological laws, and where these laws affect behavior psychology is concerned to know what they are; but the outward, physical process involved can never stand for the inward, psychic fact in the experience, as McDougall, in the illustration just quoted, has clearly shown.

So long as the state of our knowledge is what it is, we seem obliged, if we desire at all to arrive at a synoptic view of things, to adopt either the parallelistic or interactionistic position, that beyond the physiological aspects of experience there are psychical aspects which must be taken into account and be given the value of reality in themselves. At the same time we guard ourselves from the too-trustful realism which treats abstractions and figures of speech as if they were actual material entities, by remembering that all along we are dealing with facts which on their psychical side can only hypothetically be conceived. In the following account of certain aspects of the mental life, for example, we are dealing with abstractions; but they are abstractions from reality, and they express as much of the truth as it is possible for us to know at the present time. They are scientific hypotheses to which we give the value of reality.
1. The first constituent element of personality on the psychic side should answer to the question, what is the initial datum with which we begin? It is evident that any study of behavior which does not over-simplify its purview starts from the assumption of life persisting in and through change. To speak of minds, or of wills and feelings, or of egos, is to presuppose a fundamental urge to activity. Bergson has familiarized us with the hypothesis that behind all human experience there is an activity which is not equivalent to experience, but which determines experience; and this he calls the "life-impulse" or "elan vital", "the procreant urge of the world". It need scarcely be pointed out in these days of the overhauling of the biological dogmas which have ruled out anything in the nature of a "vital principle", that unless aliveness or activeness is the primary assumption upon which biology and physiology proceed, they cease to "make sense". Mechanism as a theory of existence here finds its incorrigible and insurmountable problem. "As J.S. Haldane quaintly puts it, 'a biologist feels it in his very bones' that he is dealing with living activity". 1 "Whether we will or no, we must appeal to some inner directing principle". 2 "We feel compelled to recognize the persistence of some originative impulse within the organism, which expresses itself in variation and mutation and in all kinds of creative effort and endeavor". 3 The study of the simplest organism confronts us with "the immanent purposiveness of living things", 4 "a developing tendency principle or tendency", 5 a vital energy marked by spontaneity and purposive character.

It is at least a clearly observable fact that every organism with which the biologist deals effects or seeks to effect with its environment what is essentially a dynamic and not a static relation: it seeks the fullest expression of its life-energy.

For psychology, this endeavor to sustain a dynamic relation with environment so as to allow the most satisfactory expression of the life-energy, is a necessary postulate, though not all psychologists are agreed as to whether the life-energy itself should be admitted as an empirical datum. It smacks too much of metaphysics for the stricter psychologists. Thus McDougall speaks with conscientious reserve when he says:

"When any creature strives toward an end or goal, it is because it possesses as an ultimate feature of its constitution what we can only call a disposition or latent tendency to strive towards that end, a conative disposition which is actualized or brought into operation by the perception (or other mode of cognition) of some object. Each organism is endowed, according to its species, with a certain number and variety of such conative dispositions as a part of its hereditary equipment for the battle of life; and in the course of life these may undergo certain modifications and differentiations.

"To attempt to give any further account of the nature of these conative dispositions would be to enter upon a province of metaphysical speculation, and is impossibly a task not demanded of psychology. I will only say in this connection that we may perhaps describe all living things as expressions or embodiments of what we may vaguely name, with Schopenhauer, will, or, with Bergson, the vital impulse (l'elan vital), or, more simply, life; and each specifically directed conative tendency we may regard as a differentiation of this fundamental will-to-live, conditioned by a conative disposition. At the standpoint of empirical science, we must accept these conative dispositions as ultimate facts, not capable of being analyzed or of being explained by being shown to be instances of any wider or more fundamental notion".1

In many respects, it is to be conceded, the concept of a creative life-energy is open to serious misconception and abuse. It may, for example, be hypostatized as a mysterious cosmic force entering the person from the outside, as though it were not

1 Social Psychology, p 361.
THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF PERSONALITY

a part of the organism itself. This drags physics into psychology, and the result is "to swamp the organism in its environment—to treat the living being simply as a network of pathways through which the energy of external nature takes its course, soaks in and soaks out again".¹ In effect this is to make the organism a mechanism, a mere machine without any purposiveness of its own. But "[a self-stoking, self-repairing, self-preservative, self-adjusting, self-increasing, self-reproducing machine] is only by an abuse of language spoken of as a machine at all".²

What we need to do is to keep clearly in view the organic nature of life-energy as in no sense an alien influx of vital force, but a distinctive property of "living matter". As far as each individual is concerned, the life-energy appears to be distinctly endo-psychic, in the form either of potential or kinetic energy.

Some psychologists seem misleadingly to differentiate the life-energy into specific forms, as though it were of different kinds. There is no satisfactory evidence for believing that there is a thought energy, or a digestive energy, or a sex energy as such; what we have is one energy diversely manifested, a single original creative power, or appetency, or will. Much confusion on this point has resulted from the fact that Freud has maintained, at least in his earlier works, that the life-energy (the libido) is principally sexual. The term libido has automatically become unsatisfactory in general usage, in spite of the broadening of its meaning (which, to do him justice, seems implicit in the work of Freud) by Jung to include all instinctive energy.³

¹Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, p 75-76. ²Ibid., quoting from J.A. Thomson. ³A technical term for the life-energy which is gaining currency among psychologists is hormē, a transliteration of the Greek word meaning "force, urgency, zeal". Like all new words it is still serving its apprenticeship for general favor.
What we are concerned with in this connection is to recognize two facts in particular. The first is that each organism has an original endowment (not to be thought of, however, as an indiminshable quantity) of life-energy. Metaphors, when too eagerly pressed unsatisfactory, have been freely used to give verisimilitude to this central vitality. It has been compared to a reservoir of energy upon which the organism draws for life-purposes. But this metaphor falsely distinguishes between the energy and the organism using it: the energy and the structure together form the organism. The Freudians have more plausibly, but with the same false implication, compared the life-force to a stream flowing along channels or water-courses. To this metaphor we shall recur later.

The second fact is that the life-energy normally reveals itself in a series of effectual responses to a concrete situation, but when for some reason the response is checked it appears as a formless or vague unrest.

"I am, for example, engaged in writing or reading, and presently begin to lose interest in my occupation, to feel vaguely bored or irritated, and ill at ease. After a time the gong announces dinner, and at once I realize what was the matter with me,—I wanted a meal. And now my impulsion is quite specific, and the appropriate reactions occur".1

2. The instincts are the center of modern psychological polemic. Much depends on how they are defined; for the definition of instinct is the touchstone by which psychologists are commonly judged and classified.

Our point of view here is the broader and not the narrower one. We think of instincts as innate propensities, following

1Brierley, Introduction to Psychology, p 44.
upon awareness of certain situations, to discharge the life-energy in reactions of a particular type. We follow McDougall in his famous and much-challenged definition: "We may define an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action". 1

This definition has been under constant fire from the objective psychologists. Following the biological tradition in general and Herbert Spencer in particular, the Behaviorists insist on limiting the concept of instinct to motor tendencies, each instinct appearing thus in the stark simplicity of "an hereditary pattern reaction, the separate elements of which are movements principally of the striped muscles". 2 An instinct so regarded is simply a kind of conditioned reflex; but is not this beside the mark? From McDougall's point of view (which we are following) the Behaviorists' definition "takes account only of the behavior or movements to which instincts give rise". 3

On the purely physiological side, of course, instincts can be described as pattern reactions, if sufficient allowance be made for their almost infinite complexity, as, for example, in the case of the parental or the constructive instinct. The instinct patterns in the nervous system at their simplest are neural arcs congenitally disposed by the lowering of synaptic resistances to facilitate the passage to the brain of specific sense-impressions which are there associated with equally specific impulses to act.

the whole process being accompanied by a predisposition to certain types of emotion. This physiological account of instinct, however, is quite inadequate from the subjective point of view. It utterly fails to give a description of the experience of the possessor of the instinct.

An instinct is properly a subject-object relation, a part of the individual's establishment of a dynamic relation with environment. The subject is excited by an object, experiences interest or emotion in regard to it, and feels a strong desire to act with reference to it in a more or less stereotyped manner, a desire to which it is most natural to yield at once and fully. True instinctive action is the result of complete yielding to the impulse following upon the subject's excitation by the object. Perhaps the most purely preserved instinctive reactions in adult man are those of flight and curiosity. We pass through a wood at night and hear a crackling of twigs in the underbrush; almost before we are aware of the sound itself, we react with catching of the breath, a convulsive shiver or reflexive leap backward, and perhaps an impulse of flight under the emotion of fear. Rivers has pointed out,¹ that the fear-impulse may take one of five forms, flight, aggression, manipulative activity (i.e. for circumvention), immobility, or collapse. In our case, however, the crackling of the underbrush, when more adequately perceived, may lead us after an instant or two to a resumption of self-control, or finally to curiosity as to the source of the sound. In other words, we inhibit the instinctive fear-reaction by an effort of control; or dissipate its urgency by fuller observation which passes over

¹ Instinct and the Unconscious, p. 53ff.
into an impulse of curiosity leading us toward instead of away from the exciting cause of the earlier fear-reaction. In any case, we are, on reflection, aware of having passed through a mental process involving three aspects or phases, the cognitive, the affective, and the conative. For the moment we were entirely dominated by them: we perceived a situation, we felt the sudden intensity of emotion, and desired to act in a certain way. The aroused instinct led not only to physiological behavior of the reflex type, but appeared in our psychical experience as an impulse charged with specific emotional energy.

The analysis of human experience by the social psychologists, who are bound by the nature of their subject to take a comprehensive view of the facts, has resulted in widespread agreement that the primary instincts are "the raw material out of which our lives and characters are built, the talents which are given us, useless in themselves, but useful in the purposes to which they may be devoted," the "dynamic forces which not only give strength to the passions but power to the will". As listed by McDougall, with what is acknowledged to be relative correctness, these primary instincts are, the instinct of flight, of repulsion, of curiosity, of pugnacity, of self-abasement, of self-assertion, of parenthood, of reproduction, of gregariousness, of acquisition, and of construction. To these we should probably add the instinct to sleep.

The characteristics of the instincts are thus conveniently given by Hadfield:

1 Hadfield, Psychology and Morals, p 15.
"(a) The instincts are inherited and not acquired. (b) Everyone, except the mentally deficient, has all the instincts. (c) Even when a special instinct seems excessively strong in any individual, say, the pugnacious or the acquisitive instinct, it is usually found that this preponderance of the instinct is due, not to its having been more strongly inherited, but to the fact that the instinct was more excessively developed in childhood. (d) Each instinct is directed towards a certain biological end: flight towards self-preservation; sex towards reproduction, etc. (e) These instincts, though latent at birth, are not all active then, but emerge and become dynamic at certain ages...when for its allotted span it actively dominates the conduct and determines the character.".

3. The "Unconscious" is hailed as the greatest discovery of the "new" psychology. Under the older name of sub-consciousness, however, it has long figured, though as it were only in the footnotes in the older psychology. It there represented the field of inattention, the outskirts of consciousness. The conservative view was therefore inclined to regard the subconscious as the relatively unimportant fringe of consciousness. We find this attitude reflected in the "Manual" of Stout, where in a long section on the distinction between attention and inattention it is thus dealt with:

"Let us call the totality of objects which are present to the mind at any one moment the 'field of consciousness'. Only part of this field is attended to; with the remainder we are not actively occupied. Thus the total field of consciousness is broadly divisible into two parts, the field of attention and the field of inattention...The field of consciousness normally embraces a central area of clearly apprehended objects and a marginal zone of objects which are apprehended indistinctly...An object is indistinct when it is not separately discerned. This is the case when it is apprehended only implicitly instead of explicitly...Such implicit awareness is called sub-consciousness as distinguished from clear or distinguishing consciousness".

But if the subconscious is not a wholly new discovery, it is for the first time being explored. The result is that it is

1 Op. cit. p 13  2 This is a confusing term when used inclusively of all that is "below the threshold of consciousness"; and when needing an inclusive term we shall hereafter use the term "subconscious". See infra, p 29, for further definition.  3 Manual of Psychology, p. 128 ff.
no longer given a place of relative unimportance in the mental life: it is accorded to be a major factor in the life history of any individual. There is even some inclination to reverse the judgment of the older psychology and regard consciousness as the relatively unimportant epiphenomenon of the subconscious.

The work of Freud, Jung, and Adler in the sphere of abnormal psychology has convinced them of their inability to account for the conduct of their patients without constant resort to the hypothesis of the subconscious; and they have left no room for doubt that the normal life of any individual is often beset with the phenomena of "sudden unaccountable impulse", conduct accounted for in retrospect by such exclamations as "I don't know why I acted like that", "inspiration", "dreams", extraordinary quirks of the memory, and the like; and a consideration of these compels us to reject the conservative "fringe of the mind" explanation as inadequate. The theory of the subconscious as framed by the "new" psychology seems better to fit the facts.

In the older view there was little or no allowance for a dynamic quality in subconsciousness. This judgment must be revised. That the subconscious is not composed of mere shelved elements of consciousness, but is a living whole charged with energy, is perhaps the most immediately startling discovery of the latest psychology. The elements of the subconscious are now known to influence each other, to cluster in related groups, to grow stronger or weaker with time and experience, and to have a sustained dynamic relation with consciousness. When thoughts, feelings, and wishes drop out of consciousness into the subconscious they do not lose their energy altogether, but continue in various degrees of living relatedness with other elements.
The subconscious is not, however, wholly of one piece. Certain hypothetical levels or divisions may be discerned. There is, first of all, the portion of the subconscious which went in the older psychology under the name of "marginal awareness". It is composed of those elements of experience which are not in consciousness because not the object of attention at the moment, but which, as easily within the recall of memory, are immediately accessible. This part of the subconscious has been called the fore-conscious; because it is the immediate background of consciousness, to which new impressions are referred and by which their relative importance is determined.

But there are parts of the subconscious which are not normally so accessible to consciousness. These elements are of two sorts: they may be normally difficult of access but not repressed, or they may be repressed and normally inaccessible. We shall call them respectively the primary unconscious and the secondary unconscious. The primary unconscious is principally constituted of the great primitive instincts and certain other elements which have much to do with conduct but are not immediately present at any time to consciousness. The secondary unconscious contains elements repressed during the experience of the individual himself. Most of it may have formerly been explicitly present to consciousness, but for some reason proved so painful or intolerable as to be "barred out" from consciousness; it thus tended to be permanently cut off from conscious life, unless it resumed communication indirectly or by subterfuge, as in dreams and neuroses.

It appears that the striking characteristic of the elements both of the primary and secondary unconscious is their largely affective quality. Rivers reminds us that "it has been found that experience which becomes unconscious through the agency of suppression either belongs definitely to the affective aspect of the mind or, when intellectual in character, has been suppressed on account of its association with affective elements."¹

Freud visualizes the subconscious by means of a figure of speech which he consistently applies to it. The mind is pictured as a building. "The unconscious system may therefore be compared to a large ante-room, in which the various mental excitations are crowding one upon another, like individual beings. Adjoining this is a second, smaller apartment, a sort of reception-room, in which consciousness resides. But on the threshold between the two there stands a personage with the office of door-keeper, who examines the various mental excitations, censors them, and denies them admittance to the reception-room when he disapproves of them. The excitations in the ante-chamber are not visible to consciousness, which of course is in the other room, so to begin with they remain unconscious. When they have been turned back by the door-keeper, they are 'incapable of becoming conscious'; we call them then repressed".²

"These crude hypotheses", as Freud himself calls them, are useful, if we are guard against the tendency to make a spiritual entity of the subconscious. The subconscious is necessarily described in figurative language, and Freud for one makes full use of this method of bringing it within the scope of discussion; but we must not lose sight of the actual facts of the case.

¹Op cit p 37 ²Intro. Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Eng Tr.; p 249
Every idea appearing in consciousness follows a certain brain path; it is physiologically conditioned, no matter what its nature may be, whether sordid or concerned with the spiritual realities. The subconscious is, in the simplest terms and objectively viewed, the whole mass of brain cells not excited to activity in consciousness by the full discharge of energy through them. In James's phrase, consciousness follows "the hot spot" among the brain cells. The rest of the brain is subconscious. Physiologically, then, the subconscious is conditioned by the state of the brain. This is true as well of the secondary unconscious as of the fore-conscious. In a way not clear, but somewhat more explicable from the psychic standpoint, energy is inhibited from certain brain paths, and the thought, feeling, or wish becomes deeply unconscious, and cannot be brought to consciousness without the breaking down of the barrier to the full and free inflow of energy.

We are speaking here of the mechanics, so to speak, of the subconscious. But what seems thus a system of associated brain paths, physiologically viewed, becomes a system of associated ideas, wishes, and feelings, psychically viewed. We have then groups of mental elements in certain combinations, according to certain laws of the mind. We shall need to consider the two kinds of such systems.

4. Every mental process is invariably qualified by the "apperceptive mass". The memory traces through which experience is put on record in the back-files of the mind form by association an extensive network of mental processes conditioning all subsequent mental development; so that the mind is not normally a loose and haphazardly thrown together or chaotically disorganized
collection of memory traces, but a more or less highly integrated structure of interconnected mental systems, each with their own particular quality.

It has been reserved for modern psychology to discover that this quality is affective in character. The popular way of recognizing the fact is to say, that in the course of experience a man builds up certain "convictions" or "prejudices". In other words, the systems of associated ideas in question have lost whatever apparent character they once had of being purely rational systems, and they have revealed what from the first they implicitly had, an affective tone: the convictions have become obviously settled or determined convictions, and the prejudices have become pet prejudices, not capable of being rationally overthrown without a violent agitation of the feelings.

In highly developed minds, it is perhaps possible for ideas to be organized into systems without much affective tone being perceptible; but though the affect be of low intensity, it is nevertheless there, either in the form of an associated feeling of satisfaction in the result, which is communicated to the system of ideas itself, or in the feeling of proud ownership: "This is my idea; this is part of me!" Even the most impartial and truth-revering scientist has to resist a feeling of personal affront, if his published treatises are attacked on however purely scientific grounds; and the attacking scientist has to repress the feelings of elation and pugnacity which tend to color the impersonally critical ideas which he seeks to bring forward.

These emotions tend to become attached no less to objects, situations, or persons in the environment. Thus an organized
system of emotional dispositions may be grouped about a person we love or scorn, or about a situation like golfing or fishing, or about a dreaded object like a group of dark trees in a lonely wood, or an appealing and heart-stirring thing like a sea-going ship. With the widening of experience the number of emotions involved tends to increase. A sailor boarding a schooner for the first time may feel disgust at her minor uglinesses and fear as to her seaworthiness; but on going ashore after he has sailed the seven seas in her, through sunshine and storm, he may feel the tenderness of a lover for her every plank, a vague fear for her safety in his absence, anger in her behalf at the owners who have ordered coal into her or at the seamen of a neighboring vessel who have made fun of her lines, elation and pride at being a member of her crew, and the desire to return quickly to her decks. Subsequent experience will only confirm him in these varied emotional ties.

A just and dispassionate study of the structure of the mind leads to the conclusion that it consists largely of these systems of emotional dispositions, each with its cognitive and conative elements. They appear in two forms: the sentiments and the complexes.

The sentiments are those emotional dispositions, organized about objects, situations, or persons in the environment, or about the self and various aspects of the self, which are consciously accepted by the individual, because acquired in the course of experience favorable to their formation. The typical sentiments are love and hate. "What is meant by saying that a man loves or hates another is that he is liable to experience any one of a
number of emotions and feelings on contemplating the other, the nature of the emotion depending on the situation of the other".  

A sentiment cannot be experienced in its totality at once; the special phase of it which enters consciousness depends on the circumstances of the moment. But as an organized whole it exists in the fore-conscious, and is very readily excited by anything that happens in consciousness.

This is particularly true of the noblest and greatest of the sentiments—the moral. They are built up about the ideals of justice, mercy, purity, truth, loyalty, altruism, and the like; and they are very much to the fore in the highest type of personality. When they reach a high development, whatever happens in consciousness is almost instantly referred to them, and they register their approval, disapproval, or long-suffering.

The difference between a sentiment and a complex is a difference in acceptability. A complex is any system of emotional dispositions, organized about objects, situations, persons, or the self, which is not acceptable to the individual, because experience has proved unfavorable to its formation, and which has therefore been banished from consciousness. The strongest complexes are generally organized about the sex- or ego-instincts. The form of expression which these instincts tend to take may conflict with the whole life-tendency or with the social environment of the individual, or both. The ostracizing of the interconnected emotional dispositions may follow; they will be pressed down out of consciousness into the secondary unconscious, and become complexes. The nature of a complex is determined by its dominant

1 McDougall, Intro. to Social Psychology, p. 123.
emotion or by the object or person by which it is obsessed. We thus have fear-, sex-, or inferiority complexes, or we have complexes about open spaces or about the ringing of bells.

5. As James Ward once remarked, the manifold ambiguities of the term consciousness are more or less of a scandal. Time has only increased the ambiguity. Some are for spelling consciousness with a big C and making a spiritual entity or "thing apart" of it—a "spook", suggests the Behaviorist. The latter would abolish it altogether, along with mind and soul; thus causing the wits to be busy with their joke that psychology first lost its soul, then it lost its mind, and now it has lost its consciousness.

Consciousness is, doubtless, elusive of definition.

To fix the point of our approach we shall first have to determine what we mean by the word "mental". It has been a good deal bandied about of late. In some quarters it is synonymous with "conscious", to its own great limitation; in others it is identified, or all but identified, with "subconscious", as though what we call consciousness is simply an infinitesimal part of the subconscious lighted up; and still others identify "mental" with "physical", in the conviction that the mind is the body in action, the name we give to what we observe when the physical processes are functioning.

All these identifications limit the term overmuch. We propose to take the ground that the mental processes are not only physiological on the objective side, but on the subjective side subconscious and effectually conscious, the subconscious processes being the living subsoil and repository of the conscious.
minds thus appear under three aspects, none of which can be left out of account, the physical, the subconscious, and the conscious.

Of these, in normal personality, the greatest is the conscious. It holds the key position in personality. It may be asked what we mean by it. Briefly, consciousness is awareness of what is happening within or without one. It appears under various modes, both in the apprehension of objects and in the various ways of reacting to them in desire, trust, repulsion, fear, and the like; it is not only awareness of present and immediate experience, but awareness also of what has happened and is about to happen. It is the overt thinking, feeling, and willing of the ego of the personality.

William James took a position for the efficacy of consciousness on grounds the validity of which have never been seriously shaken. Consciousness has survival value, argued he, else it would never have been evolved in the struggle for existence; and if it has survival value, it must have a definite function to perform in the mental life. In the first pages of his "Principles of Psychology" he endeavors to indicate what this function is. He finds the essential function of mental life to be selection, or choice. The distinction between intelligent and mechanical performance lies in the fact that the former results in actions toward a selected future end, and shows a choice of means. Iron filings attracted by a magnet have no alternative way of acting; but if you put a frog in water and hold an inverted jar or glass bell over it, it will try several times to rise through the glass to get air, and after repeated failures will take another course. This ability to take another course is the characteristic mark and criterion of
mentality. Later on in the first volume James adds, "Now the study of the phenomena of consciousness will show us that consciousness is at all times primarily a selecting agency. Whether we take it in the lowest sphere of sense, or in the highest of intellect, we find it always doing one thing, choosing one out of several of the materials so presented to its notice, emphasizing and accentuating that and suppressing as far as possible all the rest. The item emphasized is always in close connection with some interest felt by consciousness to be paramount at the time". 1

If this be true, then the interest in selection involves the existence of ends of desire. To take the case even of lower forms of life, consciousness "must everywhere prefer some of the sensations which it gets to others; and if it can remember these in their absence, however dimly, they must be ends of desire". 2 "Every actually existing consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a fighter for ends". 3

These are fundamental facts of experience which, it seems to us, cannot adequately be accounted for on any hypothesis short of efficient consciousness. Human beings behave as if they knew what they were doing. A recent writer puts the case in a nutshell.

"Behaviorism says that mental life is response to stimulus. Stimulus was too simple a word and the behaviorists substituted the word 'situation'.

"Now here is a situation around me this afternoon. It is Friday and I am to give a lecture tonight. I sit down to write the lecture. What am I doing? Am I responding to a situation that is really not present?...I don't write lectures merely because I have a habit of writing them. I also write lectures with this audience and this evening definitely in mind. That fact is something that does not exist in my library. This audience, this evening, and this event are hours ahead. It is not possible to explain my

1 Vol I, p.139  2 Ibid. p. 78.  3 Ibid. p. 141.
sitting there writing that lecture on any other hypothesis than that I was partly responding to a situation that did not exist and could not exist until seven hours afterwards.

"If an organism's behavior can only be explained by taking into account the fact that its behavior is a response to things which do not yet exist in the material world, and if one could not say that such behavior was adequate behavior unless he did take future events into account, then some sort of awareness or consciousness is necessary, if we are to give an account of much human conduct".1

The fact is thus apparent that as human beings we have that about us which can only adequately be described as a dynamic and creative capacity to know what we are about. As James maintained, we are, by virtue of the ability to select and choose, active and creative agents in the world. Much as the subconscious dominates our thinking, feeling, and willing, our acts are not compulsive. And this is possible, and could only be possible, if we possessed consciousness.

There is much that we could say about the nature and qualities of consciousness, but we must be content to note but one significant fact further. Though consciousness may be said to be partial, in the sense that it is not concerned with the whole situation but only selected aspects of it, it is always a unity. At any one moment it acts as a whole, contains in its ever-changing relatedness cognitive, affective, and conative elements, and is continuous with its preceding phases. No process is an isolated occurrence but is a phase of a complex whole, "possessing a peculiar kind of unity within itself and a peculiar distinctness from all else".2

We express this unity of consciousness by saying that it is the consciousness of a particular person. And this person

is not only a unit to the observer, but also a unit to himself. He refers to himself as "I". At any moment he knows that his self of the moment is his self of yesterday. There has been change, but not total change; what he was, he is; what he is, essentially he will remain. This, of course, is true only in the broadest sense. There will be further change—though, again, not total change. It may even be extensive change; yet all along the continuity of the future self with the present self will never be broken.

To understand all this, we shall have to study more closely the integration of personality.
CHAPTER III

THE INTEGRATION OF PERSONALITY.

In a sense no one is unified; we are often at cross purposes with ourselves; at times we do not know our own minds. But it is possible to take another view of the case, and, with the constituent elements of personality in view, to consider it little short of a miracle that the average man is as unified as he is. The workaday world has long adopted the rule of proceeding on the assumption that persons are unities. We can hold grudges on no other view; we can form attachments on no other. True; individual men are classed as more or less reliable in business and morals; but the absence of reliability is rarely set down to lack of unity within the person, unless such lack is transparently evident; it is usually set down, rather, to perversity, on the assumption that a man's conduct inevitably shows the consistency of inner unity of mind and purpose.

This is the popular recognition of the scientific fact that the constituent elements of personality are coordinated to a marvelous degree. A person expresses himself through a highly organized group of constituents, the physical elements which we have described: the muscles, glands, internal organs, nervous system, etc.; and the mental or psychic elements: the instincts, as a whole the sentiments and complexes, the subconscious, and the reality which exhibits itself in consciousness. There is a certain amount of disharmony between these elements, but their integration is such as to permit of self-consciousness and the realization of personal identity through change.
The manner in which the integration of the constituents of personality is achieved is a marvel to every scientific investigator. Let us construct an illustration.

I get into an automobile. The controls have already become a matter, as we say, of second nature. With thoughts concentrated almost entirely on the traffic behind me and my chances of swinging out from the kerb to the center of the street without collision, I start the engine and cause the car to move forward. Anyone who may have witnessed my preoccupation with the mechanism of the controls a month before would be astonished at my proficiency at this moment. In a few minutes I am gliding along in the open country. I have ceased to be concerned with the traffic, or even with the road before me: I am exulting in the glory of the scenery on a beautiful May morning. A car approaches; I am thinking again now of the road, the course the car is to take if I am to negotiate a successful passage; I slow down the car, while I cause it to swerve to one side. I nicely calculate the distance between my car and the other, and am on the way to passing successfully. Meanwhile, after the first swift estimate of distance, I cease to be occupied with the problem, because I am primarily conscious of the occupant of the other car, an acquaintance, whom I greet with a laughing shout or nod of the head. As soon as he is past, I revert to the task in hand. Am I late? I look at my watch, with one hand on the wheel. I must hurry. I do.

In this hurry, I have no time nor inclination to think of my behavior as a driver; but it must be evident to an observer
that my driving is an instance of most amazing coordination of
sense-organs, nervous system, muscles, and brain. Many of my move­
ments are of the nature of reflex action; multiplex stimuli have
caused muscular movements of the most complicated order, of which
these movements I have not been even remotely conscious; taken by themselves they
might look to be entirely compulsive, but they have been far from
haphazard; they have without a single lost motion contributed to
behavior that has been thoroughly consistent. The thousand and one
sense-impressions which might have given rise to movements hinder­
ing consistent behavior have been inhibited, and the impulses
appropriate to that behavior have all been facilitated. The integ­
ration of the physical processes has left nothing to be desired.

But my observable actions may be relatively insignificant;
they may form but a small part of a large endeavor extending over
days and weeks, even over years. I am in a hurry. I have taken
mental cognizance of a situation which has caused a heightening
of the tension of my feelings; I am emotionally stirred; and at once
I accelerate the motion of my car, translating into immediate
action my emotionally-toned realization of a certain state of af­
fairs. I am not aware of instinctive impulsion, but a keen obser­
ver would conclude that certain of my instincts must be directly
or indirectly involved. I may be hurrying because I am in love
(the observer would take mental note: "The sex instinct involved").
I may be a business man meeting an appointment ("Self-preservation,
acquisition, or construction"). I may be a football enthusiast
hurrying to a game ("Sentiment built up about the play tendency").
I may be a political leader on the way to address a public meeting
("Self-assertion"), or one of his henchmen wishing to ingratiate
myself by appearing at the meeting ("Submission, or perhaps, the sentiment of party-loyalty"). My behavior, again, may be morbid; I may be suffering from a state of exaltation following a long period of acute depression ("Hypo-mania due to the upsetting of the normal balance between the self-assertive and submissive impulses within the sentiment of self-regard"\(^1\)). I may be passing through a fugue, of which I shall later have no recollection; I may come to myself far away from home and be unable to account for finding myself there, because I have no memory of any journey nor any idea of an actual lapse of time (An unconscious impulse springing from a repressed desire for escape from an unhappy situation has caused the temporary displacement of the ego: the impulse of flight, repressed deeply, has broken loose and succeeded in repressing the ego for a time\(^1\)).

My behavior, then, is the result of motives in which the instincts are directly or indirectly involved. The instincts might seem in these direct and indirect ways to be controlling my behavior. But this is not strictly true. If they were in reality in the position of controlling factors, my behavior would not be consistent, because one instinct and then the other would be in control; there would be such an absence of integration within my person that I would not know what I was about. But it is evident that (except in the case that my behavior is morbid) I do know what I am about. My instincts are not my masters; they are the servants upon which I am relying. They are servants which quite willingly subserve my purpose. Indeed, what the feet and hands are to me physically, the instincts are to me psychically. I know that if I cut off my foot, I must forever hobble; similarly it means

\(^1\)McDougall, An Outline of Abnormal Psychology, p 357.
I amputate myself psychically if I repress the instinctive impulses. The instincts, won over to my purposes, take upon themselves without reluctance their share in the integrated activities of my person. But they must not be abused. If I abuse my hands, they flame out in protest. If my behavior is morbid, it is because I have abused these servants to the point of rebellion.

So that, if I am living normally, another person may observe that my instincts are not merely functioning well; they are integrated. They are not merely associated in one person, but brought into coordination, and given something more—direction. There is a self above them, or rather, in and through them, whose purposes they subserve, or ought to be subserving, if all is well.

But there's the rub. They may not be integrated into a harmoniously working group. I may not be living normally.

My behavior as a driver shows, as we have seen, a very high degree of integration physically; but it is less certain whether my behavior shows the same degree of psychic integration. If I am deeply in love, or if I am a business man absorbed in lovingly providing for my children, my personality may show a degree of integration such as is suggested by the recent definition of Dr. William Brown:

"We may conceive a mind as a system of interests, with emotional reactions, showing different degrees of unity in the systems of subordinate unities; these systems being incorporated in wider systems, and these wider systems again being incorporated in still wider systems, till at last one has a total system dominated by one all-satisfying interest".1

But if I am unhappily married and have repressed deeply into my secondary unconscious a still active desire to escape from

1 Mind and Personality, p 13.
the chafing bonds, or if my life-energy has been so inadequately directed that the equilibrium between the self-assertive and submissive impulses has been seriously disturbed, then the integration of my personality is incomplete: I am what James would call "a divided self".

This brings us squarely to some of the special phases of the problem of integration, in the interplay of the constituents of personality.

II

Integration depends largely on whether the life-energy is flowing freely,—in physiological terms that is to say, it depends on the unhindered reception and transmission of neural messages coming in from the sense-organs and going out to the muscles and glands, and on the free play of the excitations within the brain itself as the self directs them.

The Freudians have contributed a vast literature on this subject, much of it obviously tentative, but much also of great value. They have striven to give body, if we may so put it, to the conception of the life-energy (the libido, in their terminology) by considering it under the analogy of a stream of water flowing along a channel or bed. As Tansley puts it,1 "Water, originally possessing the potential energy of position, flows along a channel and does work: it either cuts its channel deeper, or it may be made, for instance, to turn a mill wheel. If the flow is dammed by an obstacle the water banks up behind the dam...If the obstacle cannot be removed by the accumulated energy of the banked-up water

1 The New Psychology, chapter on Psychic Energy, passim.
there is an overflow". It may then "either enter a pre-existing neighboring channel, which may lead it to the same mill by a different route, to another mill wheel, or in a different direction altogether: or cut a new channel for itself". Or it may do none of these things and simply spread out behind the obstacle and stagnate.

We must not press this useful analogy for the drive of energy in the direction of conation too far; its details are intriguing, and to that extent fallaciously satisfying; but as a picture of what takes place in the cortex during psychic activity it has its value. We assume that the discharge of purposive energy along the brain paths is accompanied under certain conditions by awareness, the awareness which we call consciousness; when blocked or inhibited for some reason, it remains untranslated into or unread by consciousness (i.e. it remains subconscious); and if it is constantly fed from behind, it either overcomes the inhibition which prevents its emergence into consciousness, or overflows into neighboring channels (thus, for example, exciting a complex or exhibiting itself in an oblique manner by a tic or other compulsive movement). We repeat, we assume from the evidence that such is the case, though the exact mode of the working of the energy is still obscure.

The analogy of the stream and its channels fails, however, at this point, that it does not do justice to the fact that the channels of the mind are living channels, and the larger the channels the more alive they are. In this connection four facts demand note.

First, these channels may be fatigued by too quickly or constantly recurring discharges of energy through them and react
less and less promptly and adequately.

Secondly, if energy has not been fully discharged through them for a period, they may develop an actual hunger for activity (like muscles not exercised: everyone has experienced the bodily hunger for exercise after long occupation at the desk or in a chair, a craving which is only to be appeased by a brisk walk in the open air or some other form of movement); and they may solicit, as it were, the diversion of energy into them. It seems to be normal for the instinctive channels to relish, or even in some obscure way to demand, activity. Witness the instincts of construction and gregariousness. The same may be said of the instinctively inspired sentiments. This is a fact of some importance, because the equilibrium of the mind is ultimately served by the hunger for activity generated in the greater mental processes. No major part of the mind suffers atrophy without protest and a measure of struggle for its existence; and when atrophy does take place, abnormality, slight or serious, is the inevitable result.

Thirdly, the channels of the mind may at first resist the passage of energy through them and then become habituated to such passage to the point of facilitation. This fact is of utmost psychological as well as biological significance. Integration of a high order would be impossible without it. The importance of habits (the facilitation of energy seeking specific conative expression) is evident in their definition. Viewed from the standpoint of behavior, they are relatively fixed modes of response to particular situations from which all superfluous movements have been eliminated so as to reduce them to their utmost simplicity. Their value in integrated activity lies in the ease with which they can be carried out sub-
consciously. We may easily become conscious of our habits by fixing attention upon them; but then, like as not, we may revert in confusion to the wasteful and bungling movements out of which they were evolved. Observe the debacle that overtakes the practiced golfer who has been relying correctly on his carefully built-up habits of play, until he suddenly finds himself attending to them painfully all over again, to the ruin of his temper and his playing style: he disintegrates as a golfer. Habits require the minimum of conscious attention, and the ego may concentrate on other matters without ceasing to function efficiently in the environment. His habits, to the great gain of integration, enable him to be active in one way consciously and in another subconsciously.¹

In the fourth place, if integration is imperfect, energy slips easily into certain channels and is caught into backwaters or stagnant pools, i.e. certain mental processes show a disproportionate vitality and are always making claims upon the attention of the ego. The problem of integration involved in this is the freeing of the life-energy from neural cul-de-sacs and what might almost be called hotbeds of sub-personal intrigue. As we shall see

¹ The place of habit is much in dispute at present, some psychologists insisting on the primacy of habit over instinct. The place given to habit in psychology depends, of course, on the definition of instinct. Perhaps the anti-instinct psychologists (to give them a name) are right in their contention that instinct should terminologically be confined to unmodified and unmodifiable reactions to certain given situations; but then some new name should be coined for the impulses and conative tendencies to which we have applied the term instinct in this discussion. The wider application of the term instinct is maintained throughout this discussion. It determines the place we give to habit as the labor-saving short-cuts of the instincts. The instincts are the "prime movers", the habits stereotyped reactions. The former are deeply implanted propensities to release driving force under certain circumstances; they are psychically felt impulses to act. The latter are "pattern reactions".
later, the life-energy is broadly at the service of the fully integrated person. It then flows along open channels (to recur to our analogy), with the minimum of let or hindrance, to the appropriate and selected conative centers. But in the imperfectly integrated person it is used up in the passionate wastage of psychic conflicts.

III

In the consideration of such conflicts we come to grips with the greatest problem in integration, for here the instinctively motivated sentiments and complexes are the forces which are the chief protagonists. Trotter defines mental conflict as "the antagonism of two impulses which both have instincts behind them, and are both, as it were, intimate constituents in the personality".¹

The conflicts are of two kinds, conscious and faced, and unconscious and unfaced. The consciously faced conflict may assume any number of forms. It may be that between two sentiments, each having an honored place in the personal life, as, for example, the sentiment of patriotism in time of national stress and the sentiment of loyalty to Christian principles of peace and brotherhood. Or, in the very heart of the personal life, it may be a conflict between the sentiment of self-regard (the ego-instinct of Adler) and a consciously recognized but restrained complex organized about a difficult situation or about a strong rival personality, (the inferiority complex of Adler). It may be between a conative urge springing from an instinct (like that of sex) and the life-trend of the conscious self expressed in the moral sentiments (say, that of purity) or, in the absence of a highly developed

¹ Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, p 82.
sentiment for purity, in the gregarious wish to observe the social proprieties. The conflict may be the adolescent one between dependence on the parents for all of life's needs and striking out on one's own (the sphere of the operation of the Oedipus complex of Freud, to which he gives an exaggerated sexual significance, but which Miss Hinkle more moderately and accurately calls "the struggle between the childish inertia and nature's urge"). This conflict is repeated in many forms in maturity and old age, whenever a new departure in life calls for giving up the old accustomed ways.

A form of inner struggle is that between "head" and "heart", that is, between a consciously formed purpose in which the cognitive element has been pronounced and an initially vague impulse, which may reach a fair degree of definiteness, to take a course suggested by an affectively aroused sentiment which has risen in subconscious opposition. If the impulse to take another course is so vague and "unreasonable" as to excite the displeasure of the conscious self, it probably originates from a repressed complex.

This brings us to the type of conflict which is unconscious and unfaced. The conflict in such a case is completely endopsychic; it has its seat in the secondary unconscious, but shows itself outwardly in actions of a compulsive nature, emotional outbursts of an involuntary and inexplicable character, and obtrusions upon the conscious processes resulting in phantasies, obsessions, delusions, and other irrational symptoms. Thus a man may suffer from an unremitting fear of being seized from behind; when walking along the street he may feel impelled to look apprehensively over his shoulder, or when in the house may sit with his back to the

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1 Introduction to Jung's Psychology of the Unconscious, p xxiv.
wall. Analysis of his symptoms may lead to the recovery of a repressed boyhood experience, involving the stealing of a handful of peanuts from a grocery stand and being grabbed from behind by the grocer with such terrifying suddenness as to cause him to fall fainting to the ground. Out of such experiences psychoneuroses result, in their most distressing forms: e.g. anxiety neurosis, accompanied by tremor, sweating, distress of mind and terrifying dreams; conversion hysteria, in which physical symptoms like headache, backache, nervous indigestion and the like "substitute for the real mental or moral disorder; or neurasthenia, where constant fatigue betrays the fact of endo-psychic conflict so deeply repressed as to have no expression in consciousness.

But these are the morbid and unnatural forms assumed by conflict. More usually the inner struggle reveals itself in dreams. In a manner never understood before Freud made his epoch-making study of them, dreams reveal the content of the subconscious. The mind in sleep may be playing erratically among elements in the fore-conscious (in which case the dream will be in fairly close resemblance to actual life); but it is often the case that the dream is strange and unreal, and we puzzle our heads about its significance. It is more than likely, as the psycho-analytic investigators have conclusively shown, that the dream is then a reproduction of repressed material, in all the naked force of its affective tone, but otherwise assuming a disguised and symbolic form. It is a more or less neurotic protest which we have in such a dream against the inhibition which denies the repressed wish or impulse the direct expression it craves.

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1 A case described by McDougall in his Outline of Abnormal psychology, p 306.
The most pronounced form which conflict may take, that which most palpably points to something gravely wrong, is actual disintegration of the personality (or dissociation, in the technical phrase). It would be interesting to pursue this negative study of integration further. Much discussion, for example, has raged about the significance to be attached to the form of dissociation seen in dual personality. Have we here two souls, two really existent selves? Or is dissociation simply a splitting of consciousness, and the alternation of the split-off "personalities"? Without intending to make a final interpretation of the facts, we may say that the essence of the matter is, that several suppressed experiences or complexes of major importance have combined into a harmonious group having an independent activity of its own, the pooling of the powers and interests of the harmonizing elements having resulted in the form of an independent subconsciousness powerful enough to make its appearance in consciousness in the aspect of a new or second personality. But it is probable that the claim of co-conscious "personalities" to unbroken personal life is, in the words of Pratt, "due to an illusion of the memory. It is interesting to note that the only 'co-conscious selves' whose histories have been investigated, have originated out of 'complexes' or groups of feelings, ideas, and impulses within the central consciousness".\(^1\)

Conflict, then, is the constantly imminent danger threatening the course of the normal integration of personality. At its worst it brings with it the disintegration of the personality; at its best it is the recurrent problem whose solution may ultimately advance the integration of the person.

\(^1\)Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p 58.
IV

We may distinguish between the sound solution, favorable to the integrity of the person, and the makeshift solution which conceals the fact that the integrity of the person is only apparent.

When such conflicts as we have reviewed occur within the person, the strain, always accompanied by painful affect, must be eased, or, if possible, brought to an end, before the person can experience the sense of freedom which attests integration and adequate adjustment to environment. Ease of the strain is assisted by various makeshift arrangements.

First, if two sentiments which play a large part in the conscious life are thoroughly incompatible, they may be completely dissociated from each other by a process of alternate inhibition; when one dominates consciousness, the other is inhibited. This is the separation of the potentially inimical elements into what is known in psychology as "logic-tight compartments". A man may consciously or subconsciously resolve "not to mix religion and business" or "not to let his home-life have any relation to his illicit libertinism". Such a solution is obviously provisional, absolutely dependent upon the accidental circumstance of the two spheres of life involved not being confronted with each other in a single situation.

Secondly, if two impulses are in danger of sharp conflict, one or the other may be subjected to the old-fashioned treatment of/excused-for or justified by a series of arguments in its favor which help to conceal the true motives underlying it. Psychologically this is the process of "rationalization". That is to say, we rationalize about something by bringing forward "reasons
for it" which are really a form of special pleading. we may not, in fact we usually are not, aware of the full extent of the fallacy involved: so great is our anxiety to believe as we wish to believe that we subconsciously inhibit the emergence of the "other side" of the question. It is an amazingly common method of escape from a difficult situation. Some psychologists have brought forward strong evidence for believing that most of our adult reasoning about unpleasant facts or situations is of this kind. We put "the best construction on the facts". In other words, the facts are selected facts, and we build with them as though they were the only facts. By this method a man may justify himself to himself about many a questionable practice. "To drink heavily occasionally is only human; and besides one must keep one's friends and be sociable". Underhand tactics in sport may elicit the excuse: "The other side tried to do it". A soldier may rationalize about the altruism of warfare, a left-wing communist about the pusillanimity of pacifism, the mean man about the double-dealing of his underpaid employees, and so on. All this is a forestalling of acute conflict, but it is at the expense, obviously, of truth, and less obviously but no less really, of freedom. What we need to note here in particular as of importance to our later discussion is that rationalization is always related to some malady of the will, some malfeasance among the elements of the person, and that the inner scandal is hushed up by truth distortion, a putting of the best complexion on the matter.

An excellent illustration of this process occurs in Lockhart's "Life of Sir Walter Scott". The first part of that interesting biography contains an unfinished autobiographical
fragment by Sir Walter himself. He recounts his experience as a young lad in a Greek class:

"At the Greek class, I might have made a better figure, for Professor Dalzell maintained a great deal of authority, and was not only himself an admirable scholar, but was always deeply interested in the progress of his students. But here lay the villany. Almost all my companions who had left the High School at the same time with myself had acquired a smattering of Greek before they came to College. I, alas! had none; and finding myself far inferior to all my fellow-students, I could hit upon no better mode of vindicating my equality than by professing my contempt for the language, and my resolution not to learn it. A youth who died early, himself an excellent Greek scholar, saw my negligence and folly with pain, instead of contempt. He came to call on me in George's Square, and pointed out in the strongest terms the silliness of the conduct I had adopted, told me I was distinguished by the name of the Greek Blockhead, and exhorted me to redeem my reputation while it was called today. My stubborn pride received this advice with sulky civility; the birth of my mentor (whose name was Archibald, the son of an inn-keeper) did not, as I thought in my folly, authorize him to intrude upon me his advice. The other was not sharp-sighted, or his consciousness of a generous intention overcame his resentment. He offered me his daily and nightly assistance, and pledged himself to bring me forward with the foremost of my class. I felt some twinges of conscience, but they were unable to prevail over my pride and conceit. The poor lad left me more in sorrow than in anger, nor did we ever meet again. All hopes of my progress in the Greek were now over, insomuch that when we were required to write essays on the authors we had studied, I had the audacity to produce a composition in which I weighed Homer against Ariosto, and pronounced him wanting in the balance. I supported this heresy by a profusion of bad reading and flimsy argument. The wrath of the professor was extreme. He pronounced upon me the severe sentence—that dunce I was, and dunce was to remain."

Rationalization is doubtless the commonest form of affording relief to mental stress. Other methods are thus named in psychology: displacement, or substitution, the shifting of psychic energy from one object of desire or aversion to another, as when a man vents his unexpressed anger at a business associate on his wife and children at home; inversion, indirect expression by indulging an opposite tendency; reaction-formations, strengthening of tendencies the opposite of those repressed in order to safeguard oneself against the latter, a process evident in prudery.

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and fanaticism; projection: the reading of one's own defects into other people, in order to escape the pain of self-criticism.

The neurotic escape from conflict has already been described. It is essentially a form of civil war within the person in which one side fights under cover of night or by underground channels in subversive ways. The conscious self meanwhile is greatly affected by the struggle and is constantly confronted by situations which it is at a loss to account for, and before which the mental powers may finally break down.

At last, by this road, we arrive at a solution of the conflict that is not a solution even with the utmost stretch of language; there is insanity, or there is radical division of the personality between alternating or co-conscious groups of ideas, feelings, and impulses.

It is evident that none of these makeshift arrangements can serve the ends of perfect integration. What, then, is to be sought?

V

Before we answer this question directly we should perhaps take a moment for review of the formulations reached by the psycho-analysts. A brief account of the typical emphases of Freud, Adler, and Jung may assist us materially in forming a sound theory of the integration of personality.

Freud usually, and significantly, begins his discussions of psycho-analysis with an inquiry into what he terms the "psycho-logy of errors",--slips of the tongue and pen, mis-reading, mis-hearing, mislaying, and so on. It is clear, he declares, that these forms of error are not just chance. The President, for example,
blunderingly announces in his opening speech: "I declare the session closed". He has said the opposite of what he consciously intended; but his subconscious wish found expression. "The meaning and intention of this slip," says Freud, "is that he wants to close the session". A determined lady says pettishly, "He may eat and drink whatever I choose". This is as if she had said: 'He can eat and drink what he chooses, but what does it matter what he choose? It is for me to do the choosing!' We could easily linger among some other amusing instances which Freud provides; but let us rather note his conclusion of the matter: "I have already taken the liberty of pointing out that there is a deeply-rooted belief in psychic freedom and choice, that this belief is quite unscientific, and that it must give ground before the claims of a determinism which governs even mental life". Freud thus commits himself to complete acceptance of the idea of causality: every effect has its fully efficient cause. This is as well his conclusion on dreams as on errors. The final conviction is, that we are driven beings; that the primary elements in the psychic life are the instincts, the ego-instincts and the sex-instincts, the latter being much the more significant. The conduct of the normal person is largely sexually determined. At the basis of the mental processes is the appetitive or aversive "wish", which is itself the issue of the instinctively motivated endeavor to establish a dynamic relation with environment. The wish would always have its way, if it were not that between it and consciousness stands the "censor".

1 Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Eng. tr., p 31, 32. Van der Hoop, writing on the same subject, provides an especially good example of a slip: "A young man is engaged to a young lady of a somewhat angular character, with whom he is very much in love. He often calls her his angel, and thus describes her in a letter to a friend: 'My fiancee is a perfect angle'". Character and the Unconscious, p 33 (Eng. tr.) 2 0 p. cit. p 88.
Since the wish derives its vitality from the instincts, and man may be seen to be the vehicle of the sex and ego-instincts, a perfectly normal life is a free, unfettered moving out to objects under the instinctive desire. Freud would probably endorse the exhortation: Trust your nature; with your eyes open, obey the impulse; give your instincts expression, the highest expression if possible, but expression at least.

Adler apparently finds Freud's psychology deficient in emphasis on the coordinating something in personality that makes for integration of the instinctive processes. We have not only the libido of the instincts moving out to objects, but we have the ego, or subject, superior to the object; and the ego coordinates and gives direction to the instincts. The ego works back over the stream of instinctive tendencies and modifies them in the interests of the integrity and superiority of the ego subject; so that the supreme fact of experience in human psychology is not the sexual longing after the object, but the subject's craving for power over the object, the subject seeking power by the use of the instincts. Adler has every normal man saying to himself: "To thine own self be true!" The great difficulty in the human drama, pursuing like an evil fate, is the devastating sense of failure to reach the end in view of "complete masculinity" resulting in an inferiority complex and loss of power.

Jung stands somewhere between these two exponents, the one of the sex instincts, the other of the power instincts; for to him the libido is the power in all instincts, comparable to the élan vital of Bergson, and not narrowly sexual. The libido may be attached either to the subject or the object. If there is the type
of individual who is always turning from himself to the object (the extrovert), there is also the type returning from the object to himself (the introvert). The normal person is both extroverted and introverted, both at times object-centered and at times subject-centered, both craving to love and craving for power. The problem of integration is essentially the establishment of an equilibrium of forces between subject and object; and when consciousness fails, when there is a gap in the stream of the conscious content which enables the subject to deal adequately with the object, then the subconscious (or, as Jung uniformly calls it, the "unconscious") plays its vital part by filling up the gap with the help of phantasy or imagination (compensatory nature of the "unconscious"). This is not perfect adjustment of subject to object; but it is self-preservative. The "unconscious" therefore is a counter-poising agency; with its personal content of repressed and forgotten individual experience ("the personal unconscious") and its racial content ("the collective unconscious": inherited race experiences preserved in the form especially of symbols and primordial mythological images) it comes to the rescue of the distressed mind, and establishes a workable relation between subject and object.

We have in the writings of these three investigators three valuable contributions to the problem of integration:

1. The primary place of the instincts as modes for the expression of the inextinguishable cravings, desires, wishes, and impulses which underlie thought, feeling, and act.

2. The presence of something more elemental even than the instincts which makes for the coordination and direction of the instincts,--the self.
3. The necessity of the establishment of a satisfactory relation between the subject--the self--and the object--the environment--to which the instincts are the inherited modes of reaction.

VI

In formulating an adequate theory of integration, the fact with which we start is this last conclusion, the need of every living organism to effect with its environment a satisfactory relation. Such a relation is successful in proportion as it involves the experience of freedom in conative activity; and this in turn depends on coordination of the constituent elements of the organism so as to allow the consistent activity which is the basis of the experience of freedom.

The opposite of freedom in this sense is conflict. In conflict, the person is under the strain of choosing between alternatives. The strain between these alternatives--which is a strain making for disintegration--may be long or short, depending on the character of the struggle, but still more on the character of the struggler. If his personality is highly integrated, he may bring an end to the conflict by a decision between the alternatives which he is able to back up adequately afterwards. But every decision does not put an end to inner conflict: there may be no great degree of integration within the person.

The first step in integration, then, is the choice of an alternative, and it involves on the one hand inhibition, on the other action.

It involves inhibition of impulses not in harmony with the chosen alternative. The process of inhibition cannot be fully
accounted for physiologically, because we know almost nothing about that aspect of it. As a fact of everyday experience, it is the prevention of a thought, wish, or feeling from entering consciousness, and the endeavor, whose success apparently depends upon the diversion of the energy involved, to deprive it of further meaning and significance. If James is right in finding that the distinctive thing about mentality is "the pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment",\(^1\) successful inhibition—i.e. the selective restraint and withdrawal of interest or energy from certain thoughts, feelings, and wishes—is the necessary accompaniment of any attempt to achieve integrated activity. Order and effectiveness in our lives would be impossible without it.

Inhibition is closely allied with forgetting. In the case of a conflict or a choice of alternatives, a decision in one way or another will be followed by a forgetting of certain thoughts, feelings, and wishes. The forgetting will be a matter of course, and the ends of integration served, if the rejected alternative is deprived of vital significance.

But should the alternative be linked in some intimate manner with a sentiment or complex, or more important still, directly with a primitive instinct, the chances are that the process of "living it down" will be difficult. The rejected impulse will continue its activity in the subconscious, where the damage it is likely to effect may seriously impair integration. Especially is this likely to be the case if the impulse proves too vital for

easy handling, and repression is resorted to. Repression is the most crushing form of inhibition; it is the sudden and violent forcing back of an impulse out of consciousness and its banishment to the secondary unconscious. Its haste and violence preclude the withdrawal of interest or energy from it, because repression is always inhibition in toto, and the interest involved is regarded as too dangerous to be tolerated a single moment longer. The rejected and suppressed impulse will then retain the whole of its vitality, and may do much damage, by way of subconscious activity.

On the other hand, if a rejected impulse is accessible to consciousness, and is understood for what it is, its menace is usually not serious: it will either enjoy a belated triumph, or be finally forgotten with the withdrawal of interest and vitality from it.

How is the withdrawal of interest and vitality brought about? We begin to see that to be left behind as forgotten, the thing to be forgotten must lose its significance, that is to say, its energy must be "diverted" and sent into other channels. This brings us to the positive aspects of the problem.

The diversion of energy is somewhat of a mystery. It seems to follow upon the decisions of the conscious self but to be accomplished subconsciously. The manner of it is something like this. A man feels within him two strong impulses, one to love Jane, the other to love Joan. The conflict of these two impulses may be postponed by their separation into logic-tight compartments and their alternate indulgence. But suppose a final decision for one or the other love be required of him. He may decide to marry Jane. He should forget Joan. In this case the inhibition of love for
Joan may not be successful,—if after marrying Jane he thinks he loved Joan better. Such a misfortune would be in part due to his having failed to divert the energy of his love for Joan to his love for Jane. If he had accomplished within himself this diversion, he would now love Jane only and wonder why he had ever been attracted to Joan.

This would be simple diversion of energy from one impulse to another of the same kind. Diversion of energy from a lower to a higher impulse is the process now widely called "sublimation". An example may be cited. A man experiences a conflict between religion and "the flesh". Shall he continue to be a true minister of the Gospel or give way to "the lusts of the flesh"? He chooses to remain true to his calling. That means the inhibition of the gross desires which assail him. The inhibition is successful, because by intense devotion to and concentration upon service for the community to which he ministers, he brings about the diversion of the energy of the sex-instinct into the higher channel of love for the community. In the same manner a girl may become a head-nurse or a Y.W.C.A. leader with a highly integrated personality; her single-hearted devotion and great vitality testifying to the fact of a successful inhibition of the grosser forms of sex expression and the sublimation to higher ends of the energies thus denied their primitive course.

It is a question whether energy can be wholly diverted from the wonted course of the primitive instincts; but it can be diverted sufficiently to render such instincts relatively powerless to work any positive harm, or to manifest themselves in a crude or barbarous manner.
We have come far enough now to recognize the fact that the more important aspect of integration is not inhibition, but purposeful conation—action. Integration, in short, is coordination of the elements of personality for action. It is best advanced by expression of the energy of the person in the proper coordinated activities.

And here we come upon one of the primary facts about integrated personality—the fact that the subordinate unities of the person are organized for the serving of the central end or ends of the person. Of great significance is the coordination of the sentiments into a sort of hierarchy. The sentiments are not equally significant and have not the same degree of vitality. Some are clearly subordinated to others; they are there by sufferance, as it were, of the more powerful sentiments. The more powerful sentiments are on approximate parity in less highly integrated persons; but in highly organized personalities the parity gives way to the dominance of one supreme sentiment or interest. To illustrate, let us suppose a man to possess the following sentiments: the sentiment of friendship for his next-door neighbor, the sentiment of self-regard, the moral sentiments of love of justice and hatred of dishonesty. Now the fortunes of business put it in his power to enrich himself unjustly and dishonestly, but legally, at the expense of his neighbor. What does he do? If the moral sentiments of love of justice and hatred of dishonesty are strong enough, they will prevent the sentiment of self-regard from working up an impulsion toward selfishness and dishonesty. But if the impulse of self-assertion within the sentiment of self-regard is dominant within that sentiment, love of justice, and honesty,
and friendship will go by the board. The sentiment of self-regard will be the dominant member of a hierarchy of the sentiments, and will assert its particular interest at the moment, which in this case is enrichment at the expense of a neighbor.

Integration of personality proceeds by the successive subordination of all the sentiments and instinctive dispositions and tendencies to some one gradually or suddenly emerging dominant interest. The dominant interest may be self, or religion, or social welfare, or revenge, or revolution. The integration of the personalities of a socialist and an army officer may be equally complete, but the dominant interest will not be the same.

VII

We proceed now to a consideration of various aspects of the fully integrated personality. Space forbids anything exhaustive. Regard will be had only to significant instances of the interesting fact to which we are coming, namely, the manifoldness in unity of personality. We may enter immediately upon a few definitions, concerning which it is to be noted in advance that they are definitions not of "faculties" but of aspects of an indivisible whole. How are character, disposition, will, intellect, conscience, to be defined? Then, if these definitions are sufficiently representative to allow the drawing of general conclusions, what are our conclusions as to the nature of personality?

It is evident, to take the less novel definitions first, that a man's disposition is, psychologically, the sum of the constituents of his person viewed from the angle of the dominant interest manifest in them. If the impulse of affection is dominant,
a man's disposition is said to be loving, or affectionate and tender. McDougall lists the various instinctive impulses and the dispositions corresponding to them as follows:\(^1\)

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<tr>
<th>Instinctive Impulse</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Impulse of Anger....</td>
<td>Irascible or pugnacious</td>
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<td>Curiosity............</td>
<td>Curious, inquisitive, inquiring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear..................</td>
<td>Timid, cautious, or fearful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reproduction.........</td>
<td>Lustful or amorous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food-seeking.........</td>
<td>Gluttonous or greedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-assertion........</td>
<td>Vain, proud, conceited, showy, or ambitious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission...........</td>
<td>Humble, meek, submissive, docile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregariousness.......</td>
<td>Sociable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repulsion............</td>
<td>Fastidious or dainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition...........</td>
<td>Acquisitive, miserly, or thrifty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laughter..............</td>
<td>Merry, gay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distress.............</td>
<td>Complaining, tearful, dependent</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Character, as distinct from disposition, is to be defined as the sum of the constituents of personality viewed from the angle of their organization and quality. It has a certain persistency owing to strength of organization, a perceptible quality of abidingness and direction; it is the aspect of personality which stands out in consistent conduct. Whence Novalis was led to say: "Character is a completely fashioned will".

The Will is to be defined as the organized whole of the person in the aspect of willing; it is the whole of that integrated marvel, the self, deciding to act and acting. Hadfield puts it, "The character is the quality of the 'Self' and the will is its function".\(^2\) We prefer to put the fact thus: the will is the self functioning, while character is the quality of that functioning. We observe that the will is not a faculty or entity of a distinct and peculiar kind; it is the conative aspect of the whole self.

1Outline of Psychology, p 352. 2Psychology and Morals, p 69.
sort of *deus ex machina*, and volition a "bolt from the blue". But as modern psychology consistently holds, "the resolutions of the will are not 'bolts from the blue', of a nature unconnected with the lower or more primitive functions of the organism...It is the working of the conative impulses that spring from the instinctive dispositions, impulses working, not sporadically and in detachment from one another, but within a delicately balanced and more or less harmonious and unitary system".\(^1\) Brown has it: "When we speak of will we do not mean some superior faculty added on to the other faculties of the mind, organizing them, leading them on to victory or defeat; we mean by will the totality of the mind in its organization, and in its task of facing reality with a united or relatively united front".\(^2\)

Intellect, similarly, is not a superior added-on faculty; it is the whole person in the aspect of thinking. Every process occurring in consciousness is on the physiological side a result of the cooperation of the whole body; psychically it shows itself under three aspects, the cognitive, the affective and the conative. These three aspects are all present in every mental process. When a man is thinking ("using his intellect") every thought is accompanied by an undercurrent of more or less pronounced feeling and is carried forward by the will to think. The intimate relation of thought or imagination to feeling and will need scarcely be pointed out. Emotion may be roused to the highest pitch by certain thoughts. Consider now that emotion is the whole of the person in the aspect of feeling, and we face the conclusion that intellect, will, and emotion are not parts or portions of a divisible mind (for mind is

\(^1\)Outline of Psychology, p 446. \(^2\)Mind and Personality, p 135.
here the inclusive term), but aspects of an indivisible mind.

Of all the "faculties" conscience has always been held to be the most clearly and self-evidently distinguishable, as though it were an entity having an existence as a thing apart, something unique and God-given enabling its possessor to have immediate insight into right and wrong. But we are not justified in longer holding this view. Conscience too is not a faculty but a certain aspect of the entire self. It should be defined as the organized self reacting to the suggestions of the moral sentiments.¹ It is the ego agonizing about the better judgment adhered to by the moral sentiments and required by the ego-ideal growing out of these sentiments. Hadfield sets forth the nature of conscience in the following interesting distinction:

"So far as their purely psychological mechanisms are concerned, temptation and conscience are identical, for they both are the voice of suppressed desires...Temptation is the voice of the suppressed evil when good is dominant; conscience is the voice of the suppressed good when evil is dominant".²

But why place conscience in the region of suppressed mental elements? Its sphere of action is the fore-conscious, and its suggestions are constantly rising into consciousness. When a man's conscience "hurts" him, it must be allowed to be the voice of suppressed good; but that is conscience speaking post facto. Presumptively, a man may be said to refer something to his conscience before volition. He may protest against a prospective piece of business: "No, I can't do that: it is against my conscience". Which being interpreted means, that his moral sentiments, far from being suppressed, are aroused by the intended action, and

¹Freud here postulates a "censor"; but is both vague and mythological. ²Op. cit. p. 39.
are suggesting that it is "contrary to truth" or "contrary to fairness" or "contrary to honesty" or, more generally, "false to my true self".

Enough has been said to show that it cannot be emphasized too much that the faculty psychology is to be abandoned finally.

"Every living creature," says William Stern, "is a 'person' and not a 'thing'. A person, i.e. a whole, an undivided unity; not a 'thing', i.e. not simply a chance collection of elements, not a mechanical linking together of processes. 'IN-dividual' is no misnomer for what is indivisible indeed. The physical and psychic elements and processes to be found in him only owe their existence to the fact that they are component parts of the whole, and under the impelling life-force of an indivisible unity...There are no special processes confined to the memory or mind, any more than there is a self-contained digestion or circulation; they neither exist nor develop independently of each other, but are only different manifestations and activities of the united corporate life of the individual.

"All divisions inside the personality are relative only, mere abstractions--which however are requisite for certain purposes of consideration and treatment--all development of single functions is unfailingly dependent on the development of the whole".1

This conviction of the indivisible togetherness or unity of the psychic life--the life of the person as a whole--is perhaps the most significant conclusion of modern psychology. Philosophy and theology are alike affected by it. We shall later be concerned with some of its Christological implications.

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1 The Psychology of Early Childhood (Eng. tr.) p 52. Italicics in original.
CHAPTER IV
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

In considering the integration of personality we have been primarily concerned with the functioning together of the constituents of personality. The problem was essentially that of self-preservation, insofar as the achievement of integration is the prevention of disintegration. But self-preservation, the law of all organic life, is not the only matter of interest or vital importance in the life-history of the human individual. When we proceed from the empirical data supplied by an objective study of human nature to the whole life-history of the individual, we are confronted with the fact that the self which is preserved and maintained by integration is creatively active; the self is self-aware, constructs ideals of selfhood to be attained in the future, and enters upon a process of self-development and self-realization. This is an amazing finding, properly looked at and held up to view.

At the animal level we have the impulse of self-preservation in its purity, as the endeavor to maintain life at the status quo, to meet the needs of the moment, to protect the self from danger and difficulty. But on the human level we have the appearance of an impulse, perhaps originally springing from, but transcending mere self-preservation—an impulse manifesting itself in effort to pass beyond the status quo and to improve the conditions of existence so as to secure self-enhancement. It is this impulse of self-realization which distinguishes man most clearly from the animal.

I

We have seen that one of the primary assumptions of a synoptic psychology—an assumption drawn, however, from the
sphere of metaphysics—is that of the presence of something more fundamental or original in the human individual even than the instincts, namely, the power which coordinates and directs the instincts and their manifold tendencies—the essential person or self.

In the development of personality the self not only faces up to the instincts but to itself, its own reality. Indeed, the final stages of the development of personality are impossible without this self-awareness of the self. We may ask, therefore, how this consciousness of the self comes about. How does it arise, and what are its effects?

The young child is our most natural starting point. He is not at first self-conscious in the psychological sense; yet from the beginning he is constantly and energetically evincing himself, attesting his presence, demonstrating his existence as a living entity. He is a veritable dynamo of instinctive impulses and tendencies. No observer can doubt the existence in him of a well-spring of life-energy; he is so astonishingly active.

In this self-attestation we perceive, at first, that the desires and impulses concerned with the self are of greater variety and intensity than those concerned with objects outside the self. "The child's life-circle, of which his ego is the very center, extends at first only by slow degrees; at first he has to get a sure and firm footing before he is capable of entering into living relations with his environment and the strange aims it presents to him. Hence the desires and impulses that first develop are above all of an egoistic nature. They aim at the main-

tainance of the self: hence the wish for food, the longing for
healthy activity of the limbs, the impulse to aversion or attraction, the need of protection, help and tendance. Also they aim at further self-development: hence, above all, the play-instinct, the desire to know, the wish to learn and imitate, and at last the longing for importance and power.¹

It is quite evident at this early stage that the child in all his efforts and movements is a bundle of reflexes and instinctive impulses and little more. But there is scarcely anything beyond a hearty expression of and absorption in his own being. But with increasing vividness and actuality the objective world of things and persons is forced upon him. It draws nearer, as it were, and compels his attention by asserting its reality. He begins to see himself as one who desires and repels, consents and refuses, loves and hates, pursues and flees, accepts and rejects.

Standing out among his experiences with his physical environment, the world of inanimate things, are definite feelings of pleasure and pain. They are more or less intense, and they determine him to desire or to avoid certain situations and experiences. Far-reaching in their import, these incidents of pleasure and pain react upon the fundamental impulse of self-expression and self-attestation. Their effect is to heighten the awakening sense of individuality. This would seem to be especially true of the feelings of pain and dis-pleasure. But they are not sufficient to develop a true self-consciousness; for, if we try to imagine how far the idea of the self would develop in a normal individual, if it were possible for him to grow up from birth in a purely physical

¹ Wm. Stern, op. cit., p 472.
environment, deprived of both human and animal companionship, we must agree with McDougall, who makes the supposition, that

"It would seem that under these conditions he could achieve at best but a very rudimentary and crude idea of the self. It would be little more than a bodily self, which would be distinguished from other physical objects chiefly by its constant presence and by reason of the special interest that would attach to it as the seat of various pains".  

The greatest outside factor, therefore, in the growth of a child's self-consciousness is other persons, after they have begun to take on the individuality of definite presences about him, living and moving like himself. If the world of inanimate things constrains him, frightens him, and delights him, the world of animate persons, a system of other selves requiring individual recognition, confronts him with an ever-widening complex of relationships having the most direct influence upon his thoughts, feelings, and wishes.

In the face of these relationships, the alternatives which are present to the child are self-assertion (which is generally evident where conditions favor it) and submission. The wish to express himself and attest his importance, as well as to increase it, is the underlying impulse. Coincident with all this is the development of the sentiment of self-regard, with its alternations between ambition and submissiveness, corresponding to the two instinctive impulses of self-assertion and submission.

But self-assertion is under constant check. These other persons who constitute the social environment do certain things to him or for him which put him under constraint. They place a limitation upon his feeling of self-importance by proving in var-

1 Introduction to Social Psychology (19th ed) p 183.
ious ways their superiority in authority and power. They command him, prohibit him, compel him; they supply his needs, demonstrate affection for him, indulge and favor him. He realizes, dimly or clearly, that he is dependent upon them: when he is deprived of their company he is in terror and loneliness.

Most significant for the growth of his self-consciousness are the opinions these other persons hold of him, and particularly those which they openly express. He thinks of himself largely in which the terms/others think of him or say they think of him. He may easily look upon himself as incorrigible, if these other persons simply reiterate their saying that he is. On the other hand, wise nurture will draw out the aspiring young life toward the highest self-fulfillment.

These other persons, too, greatly extend the meaning of pleasure and pain by bringing to bear upon him rewards and punishments, approval and disapproval, praise and blame. He is sensitive to an increasing degree to these reactions on the part of others to his own movements, for he has come to look upon them as judgments upon his behavior, which he ponders in their application to himself, often rebelling at their apparent injustice, or exulting and expanding before their marks of favor.

An important result of the constant attention he pays to persons other than himself is that he tries to imitate them. This has a double effect: he partially succeeds and partially fails. The net upshot is a comparison of himself with others which adds to the content of his idea of himself.

He finally comes to see himself, as his development proceeds, as a person among other persons, a self in distinction
from other selves. He has come to sense his own capacities and limitations, to form his likes and dislikes, to adapt his behavior to what he thinks he is and what he thinks he would like to be. In short, he has developed aims, ideals. He has found channels for his striving. His self-development has begun.

II

This self-development is marked by certain incidents and processes. ¹

1. The increasing prominence of certain instincts. Some of the instincts are active from birth; others, though potentially present from the first, come fully into action later, with the ripening of conditions for their functioning. The most important of these lately-maturing instincts are those of reproduction (sex), parenthood, and construction. Acquisition may become a prominent motive, likewise. All of these instincts, especially the first mentioned, have the most pronounced effect upon development.

It is to be observed in passing that the self controls the response to the instinctive impulses ultimately, in the sense of yielding or resisting and inhibiting; but once yielding has taken place (as in falling in love) the instinct involved acquires tremendous power.

2. The formulation of ideals. Roughly this follows a parallel course with the growth of self-consciousness. The young child's ideals of self are colored by phantasy and the ideas associated with the play impulse. His untrammeled imagination must first play with the thought of the self and its future before ideational processes in the form of judgments drawn from larger

¹Only those incidents and processes which have a bearing on the later phases of our discussion are here described.
experience gradually dispel the day-dreams and illusions.

The process by which ideals for adult life emerge is not without its hazards. The self-phantasy of the child may be improperly furthered, and surround the growing life with unreality. Doting parents are often greatly to blame in this regard, because they encourage the egoistic phantasy of perfection and self-importance in the child. On the other hand, if the self-phantasy of the child is repressed as a whole by unfavorable experience, without being broken up, it may live on in the unconscious and actually cause melancholia or other neurotic symptoms in adult life.

With the growth of self-consciousness the mind of youth becomes the seat of high and often abstract ideals. This is especially true of the final stages of adolescence. Somewhat later the ideals find their level, and one great ideal for the self is chosen to take precedence over the the subsidiary ideals.

What determines the choice in this case? Psychologically, the key to the choice between ideals seems to be the wish of the whole person, in both conscious and subconscious aspects, to find the object or end of endeavor which promises the most complete self-fulfillment, the widest and fullest relationship with environment to meet the inner, dynamic need. This is really what underlies the child's wish to be a motorman, or soldier, or policeman. These folk seem more powerful and knowing than himself; he longs for the fuller life he feels they enjoy, and he therefore identifies himself with them, in order to satisfy the wish for superiority and completeness. Later on, with the realization of the limitations

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1Hence the appeal of religion at the period of adolescence. It promises self-fulfillment to the eager, aspiring self. The child Jesus in the Temple stands as the type of multitudes of children standing on life's frontiers, eager to go into the promised land and possess it.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

under which soldiers and policemen labor, the ego-ideal takes larger and higher forms, until the very highest ideals known to philosophy, ethics, and religion may be reached.

3. Effort and self-control. We have in ideals and their formulation, therefore, the expression of the indefeasible will-to-live, the fundamental hunger or interest, the essential aspiration which characterizes human life: this is the basic thing. The result is, of course, the translation of the ideal into its attainment in the process of effort.

Now no sort of effort—as the word itself implies—is without its peculiar difficulties and dangers. Environment, the objective world outside the self, imposes one set of obstructions and constraints, the inner world of inherited dispositions, instincts, and desires another. There is constant temptation to allow certain vehement divergent impulses to break up the integrated harmony of sustained effort, and so destroy the effort itself, or at least delay or hamper it. There arises, therefore, the urgent need of self-control, that is to say, such conscious and voluntary direction of the instinctive impulses as to secure the discharge of the life-energy through the channels chosen for it within the mind.

Self-control is, at first, very difficult, but as integration proceeds, and the energy of the deep-lying impulses and desires is given a place and function in the integrated whole, it becomes less and less difficult: the permanent "set" of the individual toward the ideal removes the strain.

4. Progression and regression. The development of the self "progresses" with effort and self-control. Integration ach-
ieved, the self moves forward to its ends; there is steady advance toward fullness and completeness of life. Psychologically this is due/direct and indirect expression of the lower (the sublimation) and the full expression of the higher instinctive impulses and tendencies. The instincts crave expression: in progression of the self toward completeness, the highest expression consistent with moral ideals is given to them, the result being the winning over of the instincts to the support of the individual's effort toward fulfillment of the life-purpose.

Regression follows upon arrest of the higher functions of the mind, so that the flow of vital energy is turned back to lower and older functions which had been rendered quiescent in the process of development. Freud (who, however, gives the whole process a sexual turn) compares regression to what happens to a stream whose main channel is blocked: the waters return to the old dried-up or little used channel carved out by the stream at an earlier time. When such regression, we observe, is of a pronounced character, the adult exhibits every sign of reversion to infantile behavior. He has gone backward.¹

5. Happiness and pain. Hadfield thus distinguishes between pleasure, joy, and happiness.

"Pleasure is the feeling tone which accompanies the emotional expression of any one instinct". "Joy is the affective tone which accompanies the expression of any one instinct in conformity with the sentiments of the self". "Happiness is the feeling tone we experience when all the instinctive emotions are

¹ In McDougall's metaphor, "just as the tree injured at the top puts out new buds below, so the nervous system, when the vital activities of its latest-organized parts are arrested, puts out new buds below, i.e., resumes or reanimates its infantile functions. In both cases there is new growth and activity on the lower, older plane". Outline of Abnormal Psychology, p 295.
expressed in harmony". "Why have moralists always looked upon pleasure with suspicion? It is with good reason, for in its very nature the pleasure in the exclusive expression of one instinct commonly means the suppression of others, whereas for happiness we need to have the full expression of all the instincts". "The happy man is he who finds in life a harmonized expression for all his instincts...these directed towards some common ideal such as living for his fellows, will make him infinitely happy".¹

These distinctions appear to be sound ones. They are framed somewhat narrowly, however, to cover only what might be called the subjective ground of pleasure, joy, and happiness. We need to broaden their application by recognizing that these emotional states have as well their objective cause. For example, joy is not wholly something we bring to a situation; the situation as well brings it to us; our instinctive need may be suddenly and unexpectedly met by circumstance; and our joy is a response. But with such broadening the distinctions so well drawn are only confirmed.

But to return to our point, we may conclude that the happy man is he who has harmonized his impulses by bringing them into the service of his ideals.

Pain, in contrast—we speak here of mental pain—arises when ideas, objects, or situations thwart the expression of or bring division among the life-impulses and desires. Psychic pain may take many forms: as anger, when the impulses are violently and disappointingly checked; disgust, when the check excites repulsion; sorrow, when it seems unnecessary and regrettable; grief, when it seems irremediable; remorse, when it is our own regretted doing, and so on. Common to all forms of pain is disturbance of the "set" of things, or thwarting of their tendency; psychically

this holds true especially of the greater impulses, the instincts, or any of the habitual forms of life-expression.

We shall have occasion to return to this fact later.

6. Belief and doubt. These might almost be called forms of pleasure and pain, so intimately are they bound up with the feelings.

When the full development of the ideational and conceptual processes—discrimination, apperception, association, memory, and so on—has been reached, the individual may be credited with a considerable body of experience upon which to base his reflections or from which as a base to issue on the explorations of reflective thought. As experience grows the developing mind finds itself possessed of certain convictions regarding its environment and its own place in that environment. These convictions are not the mind's own creation in the first instance; they are what experience imposes upon the mind. "The world is thus and so, because I have found it always to be thus and so"—such is the ground of belief. But there are gaps in knowledge; and these gaps must be filled in by inference and deduction: "Because I have found I must believe this is so, therefore I believe, without direct experience, that that is so, for the one leads me to believe the other. The one I know to be true, the other I cannot help believing therefore." Belief is pinning faith to whatever seems a necessary conclusion. Doubt, on the other hand, is the suspicion that our constructions upon experience, the beliefs growing out of our knowledge, are false.

And at once, when doubt arises, it becomes apparent that we are in distress. We perceive that belief is accompanied by an affective tone of satisfyingness; doubt is unpleasurable— we feel
upset about it. Here, too, we see how closely belief is bound up with a certain attitude of the whole person toward experience in which the affective element looms large—the attitude of trust. Doubt is mis-trust: there is no comfort in it.

What we need to note here is simply this: belief and doubt reflect the whole person (not the only) in the desire to know reality in its larger aspects. The timid and mistrustful venture as little as they dare beyond the immediate data of experience, their "I know"; the highly integrated, with greater boldness, eagerly grasp what they are constrained by their experience and their own nature to affirm, and they trust themselves to their "I believe".

Historically the latter are the creative influences in thought; they are the great, almost the only, discoverers of truth. That this should be the case is psychologically not surprising: we should expect it.

Certain it is, at any rate, that belief and trust are formative factors in development; doubt and mistrust mark periods of uncertainty, development halts.

Consider in this connection also

7. Intuition and inspiration. The adequacy for reaching truth of reliance solely on mistrustfully critical reasoning, from which feeling is ruled out as a vitiating element, is certainly psychologically questionable. From the standpoint of conscious discursive reasoning itself, Bergson is led to declare that the feeling-ful knowledge of intuition is nearer the truth/feeling-less knowledge of discursive reasoning. He would say that "the work of the philosopher here is somewhat like that of the artist, who
identifies himself with the object, 'putting himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy'. It is as if, when we approach nature by means of the intellect, a certain 'barrier' exists between nature and mind, which intuition breaks down through sympathetic communication.¹

Now psychology cries out upon any mystical interpretation of the phenomenon of intuition. Dr Drever puts the case for the psychologists fairly:

"What is intuition from the psychological point of view? Is it a way of knowing reality, different from other ways, and sui generis? That is apparently our first question. Introspection ought to be able to settle the matter once for all, so far as intuition describes a certain mode of experiencing. Intuition, we agree, is direct apprehension of some reality, of some real situation. Perception is also direct apprehension of a real object or situation. Is there any difference between the two? As ordinarily used, intuition certainly involves more than perception, as bare cognition. Intuition is always perception of that thing in particular, which at the particular moment is the one thing needed, and hence the peculiar 'satisfyingness', which is so characteristic of it...

"Intuition is then perception, but something more. That 'something more' is, however, nothing mystical or occult. It is merely a pronounced feeling element".²

It may be doubted, however, whether this is quite clear. We must carry the analysis somewhat further. What we discover then is this: Ordinary perception is immediate awareness or experience of objects, on the plane of consciousness; intuition is of the same immediate character, but it is in the first instance subconscious perception, the immediate awareness of the foreconscious, the notice of significant things which conscious attention has overlooked and is insensitive to, but which the subconscious by discernment through what the older psychology called "the region of marginal consciousness" has immediately grasped, and in a feelingful manner. If the opportunity offers, the perception emerges from the foreconscious into consciousness: which explains the

¹G.T.W. Patrick, Intro. to Philosophy, p 45. ²Instinct in Man, p 91.
related feeling which attends it, the "satisfyingness" of which Dr. Drever speaks. A simple example of intuition on the physical plane is the awareness of the bank cashier that the bank note in his hand is counterfeit; his intuition is correct, but he is not able to say how he arrived at it or exactly what the mark of good paper is. Intuition may be amazingly accurate; it may be an unerring grasp of reality, a glimpse of naked truth in all its simplicity and profundity; and this would seem to follow from the very manner by which the perception is arrived at.¹

Intuition plays no little part in the life and opinions of children. There are ample grounds for believing women are especially intuitive, and certainly also men of imagination, poets, mystics, and religious geniuses.

What is the difference between intuition thus viewed and inspiration? A man, ordinarily wearisome in public speech on a certain topic, suddenly outdoes himself on the subject, with inspiration. Other examples may be cited—bright ideas in bed in the morning; the struggle of a scientist with a problem which he has viewed carefully from all angles with painstaking thoroughness and concentration, only to give up its solution in scientific despair—a despair or resignation, however, which frees the mind to wander at its own will through the whole field of investigation, with the unexpected result that new light suddenly "breaks through", a light possibly the fore-gleam of a great discovery. The first observation which we make, is that intuition has an immediacy which differentiates it from delayed perception, that is to say, it is new insight resulting when a new perception—a fresh contact with reality—synthesizing...¹

¹Should mental telepathy ever be proven, it too, so the indications point, would be found to be immediate subconscious awareness emerging into consciousness.
with elements of the foreconscious which needed it to complete their own formulation, so to speak; or, again, it is new insight resulting from the free wandering of the mind in the foreconscious among former elements of consciousness never brought into proper association.

Dr. Varendonck in his book on the psychology of day-dreaming makes some interesting observations on this point. He finds that inspiration, even constructive scientific thinking, results very frequently from this free wandering of the mind round elements of experience. In free wandering of the mind there is absence of inhibition, as in sleep, accompanied by greater access to the memory. The process is entirely uncritical, there is no pausing or boggling at possible errors, as in directed thinking; but it does often result in a stumbling upon new ideas, not at all fantastic, but valid, "true", whatever the process by which they emerged.

8. Development of minor processes. Completeness demands a short note on the function in personality development of avocations, "hobbies", the various forms of diversion and amusement, and of poetry, art, and music. The fact is that effort along a single line is tiring enough to cause the chief mental processes involved periodically to seek rest and give the less hard-pushed processes a chance for activity. Since the latter have meanwhile developed a certain measure of activity-hunger, their functioning is attended by a feeling of pleasure and zest. A hobby is a good example of the mental phenomenon of "compensation", i.e. the activity of the mind in one direction to balance activity in another. After a day of hard mental work, the pursuit of a hobby in which work will
be entirely forgotten, comes as a welcome change. To cite a more complex example: a man lives a sedentary life, hedged in by the artificialities of convention; the whole side of his mind occupied with this unsatisfactory existence grows weary of the conscious and subconscious restraints; he revolts and becomes a traveler, even a "tramp", and finds great joy and vividness in the exercise of long-rested mental and instinctive processes. Hence, too, the advisability of summer vacations. Or, take the case of a man who is determined to get over the high hill, pauses for breath, and keenly enters into the beauties of the scene; he thus makes doubly sure the cooperation of all the processes of his person in his climbing: all the constituents of his person are active and assisting; at least there is no rebelling, since complete satisfaction is to be had upon the way, either of one kind or another.

9. Sin and psychic rebirth. Greatly daring, we introduce the word "sin" into our psychological discussion. It is anathema to many modern psychologists. The fact seems to be that the psychological attitude reflects the old Greek attitude toward sin.

"Partly it was that the Greeks had no real sense of sin. They regarded their offences as shortcomings and called them ἁμαρτίαι, 'bad shots'. Such things were bound to happen, and when they happened were best forgotten. Useless to spend thought and remorse on bad shots: it is best to go forward and improve the aim for the next time. But St. Paul departs from the path of righteousness are not shortcomings or misses or frailties or failures, but sins; and sin is something haunting, irreparable (except for Divine intervention), and, once committed, standing as 'all eternity's offence'".¹

The idea that sin is an offence against God is wild theologizing to a certain type of psychologist. The reason is almost self-evident: things are to be explained without

resort to the metaphysical postulate of a supervenient Deity. God has no role to play in pure psychology. His place is taken by determinism. There is no room for the doctrine of "sin".

But does psychology abolish in fact all moral responsibility? Is there no sense in which a man may be said to be free enough to sin?

The issue being up, we may as well face it. It is true, of course, that psychology is not interested in freedom as a subject of speculation. It is not even interested in whether the problem of freedom is soluble or insoluble on speculative grounds; its interest is wholly practical. But on these practical grounds we may be allowed to submit that the freedom of man can still be predicated, and in the only sense worth-while.

What it comes to is this. Psychology confirms the judgment that a condition of complete indeterminism would mean a state of world-madness, and does not deny that a rigid determinism, if patent, would be world-maddening. But we need accept neither horn of the dilemma. Where the self abdicates its function of control, we have determinism: the impulses drive and rule the divided personality. But wherever we have the marvel of integration, the living and growing unity which is self-determining personality, we have freedom. Loosely organized persons are relatively, and disintegrated persons are wholly, driven; we may apply to them with accuracy the deterministic phraseology, the language of efficient causation. But organized persons achieve emancipation from the sphere of efficient causation, the laws of mechanics in the world of things. They are not coerced but must be persuaded; they are not driven but must be drawn. One
speaks here of final causation, of attraction. The instinctive drive gives place to the tug of the ideal; what might have been an intolerable compulsion is now an interest; craving fulfills itself in creative effort in an experience of true freedom. In the measure, then, in which a man is not integrated, he is the driven victim of "the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to"; in the measure that he is integrated, he rises free. There is no self-defeat; he has chosen his goal, his end; the craving for self-fulfillment is being realized; his will is free, --self-determined, therefore free.

With these conclusions in mind, we may follow the useful classification of physical and psychic ills proposed by Dr. Hadfield. He distinguishes four main classes of disorder which may result from man's struggle with life: (1) organic diseases, whose cause is physical, (2) functional nervous disorders, with physical symptoms, whose origin lies in subconscious conflicts, (3) moral diseases, due to repressed complexes, whose symptoms are not physical but appear as disorders of moral conduct due to uncontrolled impulses, and (4) sins, which result from a deliberate and conscious choice of the self, and depend upon acceptance of a low ideal.

"There is a definite place in psychology," he says, "for the idea of sin, as distinct from moral disease. The man who deliberately embezzles, gets drunk, gives way to his temper, gratifies his passions, is in a different category from the kleptomaniac, the alcoholic, or the victim of perverted sexual or angry passion".¹

Sin, then, even for psychology, is a reality. It may be defined as the conscious espousal of low desires and aims by one free enough to choose deliberately. Subconsciously-determined yielding

to wrong impulse is moral disease, the malady of the broken self, the compulsive wrong-doing brought on by self-division and self-frustration through the morbidity of complexes.

The correction of both forms of moral delinquency is return to the ideal and power of self-realization, conformity to the inner craving for self-fulfillment and integration.

For the correction of moral disease, psycho-analysis supplies an admirable technique. The first step is analysis, the exposure and breaking up of the morbid condition into its elements; the second is re-association, the reconstruction of the mind, a structural reorganization; the third is sublimation, functional readjustment, the sending of the released energy into the new channels needing it.

The redemption of a man from sin requires a different treatment. Sin is on the conscious level. The whole man is involved, the whole man is responsible. And how are we to secure the redirection of a man's will to the highest ends? There is no help for it like that of religion: the man, if integrated on the level of sin, must be reborn.

To such a conclusion is psychology of its own will coming.

We are treading here on familiar ground, religiously. Psychology cannot in this sphere suggest any real improvement on religious practice: its corrections are minor. All it can do is to strive to put the experience in psychological terms.

Thus, rebirth may be put in terms of transference, that is, the attachment of the impulses and emotions released from old objects and sentiments to new objects, new sentiments, best of all, to a perfect personality. Again, it may be put in terms of
sublimation, of such reorganization of the self as will secure
the full expression of the moral sentiments, the bringing into
play of the forces of the whole person on the highest levels.
Negatively, rebirth is sacrifice. It is surrendering a part of
self to death, that new and fuller life may result. But it is
not sacrifice for sacrifice' sake. The sacrifice of asceticism
is not only bad religion but bad psychology so far as it means self-
mutilation. Sacrifice ix for rebirth is sacrifice for fuller life.
The consummation devoutly sought is ampler energy by integration
on higher lines, not the suppression of energy into what we have
already referred to as hot-beds of sub-personal intrigue.

This psychological description of sin and its over-
coming at least points in the right direction--theologically
speaking.

10. Introversion and extroversion. Integration will
not make all men alike. They all have the same instincts, the same
fundamental impulses; but they do not have them in the same meas-
ure or in the same quality. Hence self-fulfillment in different
men may take, or rather must take--so far we admit determinism--
different forms; integration will be structurally the same only
in the main; the life-urge runs through differing moulds. Men
therefore are liberal and conservative, stable and mercurial,
warm and cold, excitable and sluggish, buoyant and melancholic,
active and inert, and the like. At their best men of these types
are, like the poets, born; but some are made, even self-made.

The most satisfactory study of types in recent psycho-
logy is that of C.G. Jung in his book "Psychological Types". He
distinguishes between introverts and extroverts, those who are
object-centered and those who are subject- or self-centered. In Jung's own terminology, extroversion implies a certain identification of subject with object; introversion implies identification of object with subject. "The introverted type," says Jung, "is characterized by the fact that his libido is turned towards his own personality to a certain extent—he finds the unconditioned value within himself. The extroverted type has his own libido to a certain extent externally; he finds the unconditioned value outside himself. The introvert regards everything from the aspect of his own personality; the extrovert is dependent upon the value of his object".\(^1\) The opening paragraphs of Stout's "Manual of Psychology" happen to supply a felicitous illustration:

"Suppose that a man is wholly absorbed in watching the waves as they rush in upon the sea-shore, and in listening to the sound they make. In this total situation we distinguish three constituents: (1) the man who is watching and listening: this factor of the total situation is the Subject. (2) The movement and sound of the waves to which he is attending: this is the Object with which the subject is occupied at the moment. (3) The watching and listening, which are activities of the subject in relation to the object.

"Now, we have supposed that the man is wholly absorbed in attending to the movement and sound of the waves. This means that he is not attending to himself or to his own acts of watching and listening. He is preoccupied in attending to his object, and has therefore no attention to spare for himself and his own states and activities. In other words, his point of view is Objective...

"In our illustration the man himself may pass at any moment from the purely objective to the psychological point of view. If, for instance, someone breaks in upon his contemplation with the question, What are you doing? and if he turns round with a start and answers "I am watching the waves," he is no longer attending only to the waves, but also to himself, and his own states and actions. When a subject thus attends to himself and his own states and actions, he is said to be introspective; he does not merely look outwards, so to speak, at things, but turns inward upon himself".\(^2\)

Now Jung's extrovert is a man who \textit{habitually} looks outward at things, at objects; his introvert is a man who habitually turns inward upon himself. It is not claimed that men are all classifi-

\(^1\) Analytic Psychology, p.48 \quad \(^2\) Op. cit. pp. 1,2.
able into two distinct groups, the extroverted and the introverted, because it is quite evident, as in the illustration of Stout, that a man may be extroverted at one moment and introverted at another, or extroverted in some matters and in certain situations, and introverted in others. What is claimed, rather, is that men generally have a pronounced, even a constitutional, tendency either toward extroversion or toward introversion as their predominant mental attitude.

It may be seen that the extrovert is socially minded: he lives in and for the world, where he finds the reality which he seeks. The introvert is intellectual, introspective, absorbed in his subjective states, where he finds the reality of which he is in search.

The interesting conclusion is being now commonly drawn that the ideal mind would be at an equilibrium between these two attitudes, that is, not more extroverted than introverted, or more introverted than extroverted. It is pointed out that the greatest benefactors of the race, intellectually and socially, have been introverted, with the capacity of extroversion highly developed. We may have occasion to revert to this later.

Meanwhile there are a few ultimate questions before us.
CHAPTER V
PERSONALITY AND REALITY.

In this chapter we are stepping out of the bounds of psychology. It may be questioned whether we have justification in doing so. As psychologists, confined to what and hows, and immediate and not ultimate whys, we should, of course, have no justification. But as inquirers into the bearings of psychology upon the doctrine of the person of Christ we are justified in going so far as this, to approach philosophy with the findings of psychology, and to ask, What are the bearings of these findings on the ultimate questions of selfhood? What relation is there between the individual and ultimate Reality?

There need not be, and space forbids, any lingering among the absorbing problems which arise here. We must post our conclusions summarily. What we wish to do is simply to show where we stand in the matter, since our discussion would be incomplete without some attempt to indicate our position as to man's relation to God, as that is reached from the psychological side.

In no merely rhetorical sense we are here "in the valley of decision". It must be granted that the way is not all clear, that there are gaps in the facts. We are thrown back on intuitions, intimations, probabilities; and where these fail, upon William James's "right to believe", in the perfectly legitimate sense in which he took it. In any case, there is great need of patient hypothesis; and the construction of the facts which best accords with the total drift or meaning of experience has, we assume, the most warrant in claiming fidelity to reality.
We may be allowed to summarize, briefly, our findings so far. Analysis of the mental processes has convinced us that the intelligence shown in adaptive behavior is not to be explained in the simple terms of behavior, as that is objectively viewed in the still simpler terms of stimulus and response through reaction-arcs. We have been obliged to give the value of reality to thinking, feeling, and willing as experiences, psychically known to consciousness. But further analysis of such experiences has driven us beneath the mental processes themselves to elements even more fundamental in the mind and person; and these we have seen to be the conative tendencies, the desires, the impulses, the instinct-urges, deeply lying at the roots of being as the springs of mental and physical conduct and behavior. In their more fixed form in the instincts we have agreed with McDougall that they are the "prime movers" of all human activity.

Now, though some psychologists are anxious to stop here, we have found it necessary to return to the higher levels of personality and to recognize the presence of a coordinating and directing power of some kind. We have seen that not only are the physical constituents of the person brought into relations of integration, but the conative tendencies, the instincts, and the processes resulting from them, as well. In the measure that such psychic integration has been achieved, the person is marked by the qualities of stability and freedom which go with a strong or able personality.

During the discussion certain striking facts have emerged, all pointing to the presence of a directing Self, or Subject, or
Soul—the spiritual within the physical in personality—and giving us our warrant in postulating the reality of such a Self or Soul, for example, the harmony or cooperation among the impulses within the person, the existence of whole for part and part for whole, the purposive nature of personality development; the effectuality of the self, its ability to do things, to achieve, to create; the fact that, judging from the presence in personality of conative impulses integrated so as to subserve adaptive behavior, to exercise selective response, and to follow out chosen life-purposes, the self is a power that can overcome obstacles and actually enjoy freedom as a dynamic factor in the world effectual in itself. We agree with Hoernlé that what seems required is

"A concept of mind as a focus or center of experiences of the universe—a 'subject' (in Hegel's sense of the term), not a substance; a new power, one might almost say, evolved in the world, endowed with the function of bringing past experience to bear on the interpretation of present data, of planning and guiding action in proportion to knowledge, of controlling desire and seeking new truth, of enjoying beauty, of loving and hating, of serving and fighting, of cooperating with its fellows and of persecuting them, of ascending, in short, to all the heights and falling to all the depths which men and women know to lie within the compass of human nature".¹

The self's own reality seems, therefore, as we see it, an inescapable conclusion, if all the facts are brought into reckoning. The objection that we can never distinguish the self or subject by itself smacks of the futilities of dialectic. In regarding the self or subject, the reality is neither before us nor behind us; it is ourselves. This fundamental logical difficulty should, however, prove no stumbling-block to the recognition of the self! The self cannot be seen; but it is revealed: it witnesses to itself in thinking, willing, and feeling, no less to its own self than to other selves.

II

It is not to be presumed, however, that the self is a self-subsistent, self-contained unit. The self or "perceived subject" (to recall the phrases of Bradley's great treatise on "Appearance and Reality") is not to be divided from the universe as a thing actually by itself--a substance having, as it were, a solid core detachable from its activities and qualities. The idea of Nature (whose reality we here assume) as real and complete in itself, and of man as equally self-contained, a pilgrim and a stranger from another world, must give place, along with the more recent theory of man as the unmeaning and casual product of matter, motion, and force, to a truer view. We are coming to the conclusion, indicated by many converging lines of evidence, in which modern physics plays no little part, that the physical universe is not independently existent anymore than mind is so; both are correlates of each other, and one considered apart from the other is in the end a misleading abstraction. As mind grown self-conscious, "man is organic to nature". The essential relatedness of man and the world, the former as the self-revelation of the latter, the latter as the objective ground of being of the former, is a deduction from human experience which seems forced upon us. Our conclusion is with H. Wildon Carr, and most ontological idealists, that "mind in abstraction from nature, nature in abstraction from mind, are insubstantial shadows". Wordsworth always stood for something of this sort. Witness the preface to the "Excursion".

"My voice proclaims
How exquisitely the individual mind
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less

Of the whole species to the external world
is fitted:—and how exquisitely, too—
Theme this but little heard of among men—
The external world is fitted to the mind;
And the creation (by no lower name
Can it be called) which they with blended might
Accomplish."

So that, individual though persons are, with something unique in
the constitution of personality not to be duplicated anywhere else
in the universe, we find it as impossible to interpret the person
in abstraction from the totality of things as it is impossible to
interpret any part of the person in abstraction from the whole.

III

There is then a most intimate relation between the physical world and the mind. We may inquire how far the latter may
know or cognitively relate itself to the former.

Since the days of Kant this problem has loomed large in
philosophy, haunted evermore by the schism introduced in nature
by the antithesis of phenomenon and noumenon. But the Kantian form
of the antithesis is, we see at last, a snare and a delusion, in-
sofar as the meaning of it is that the true nature of reality is
forever hidden from us. The chasm between appearance and reality
is not thus deep and wide. It seems possible on the basis of a
moderate realism to construct a theory that more successfully meets
the whole range of the facts, and that incidentally resolves the
phenomenalistic dilemma into something short of a sweeping scept-
icism, with a deduction to the effect that there are degrees of
clearness of perception which represent real and not illusory
approaches to the true apprehension of reality.

Assuming, to begin with, what extreme realism denies, the
relativity of perception and therefore of knowledge, we balance this apparent tendency back to the Kantian phenomenalism by the observed fact, of which we have had not a little evidence, that the ability to perceive things as they are varies with individual organization—in a word, with integration. To take a simple case, a creature with a rudimentary organ of vision can scarcely distinguish one object from another, and this imperfection gives place gradually to increasing visual competency with the evolution of the eye, until in man and the higher animals we have, presumably, the nearest approach to viewing the thing-in-itself to be found in the whole range of nature. The difference between the rudimentary and the human eye is one of complexity and delicacy of structure, but it is also one of fineness of adjustment to the ends of perception. In man, the difference between one man and another is no longer one of complexity and delicacy; at least the differences observable among the structural constituents are slight; the difference is almost wholly, save in cases of disease, one of fineness of adjustment, of integration, of coordination of parts to the functioning of the whole. Is it absurd to suppose that a high degree of integration makes a difference in the degree of direct relation to the object perceived? No more absurd than the position that things always appear as they are not, that reality will never be even approximately apprehended, as Kant reported—which is absurd on the face of it. More satisfactory by far is it to say with a recent writer, "However imperfect what we call our knowledge may be, I should contend that it is so far as it goes an apprehension of Reality: not merely an apprehension of something with which Reality puts us off, while remaining itself in-
accessible to us. 1

And yet at this point we are brought to a pause. Does integration suffice for apprehension of reality? We are asked if we are not aware that science has demonstrated that this solid and substantial world xxxxxxxxxx consists of extraordinarily minute protons and electrons, and that this is an aspect of reality which is beyond ordinary perception, however highly integrated? The gravity of the objection is to be conceded, but, with the recognition of a distinction that should be made, our argument remains good. The distinction is that between the raw material of reality and its finished forms, between matter in its elementary modes and matter in its organization. The organization of protons and electrons into stone and wood and cliff and sea is as important an aspect of reality as the protons and electrons themselves. To recall Aristotle's phraseology, the "form" is as much a reality as the "matter". Indeed, it must be said further that, if on the physical side of things protons and electrons are primarily important, on the psychical side their organization into forms is incomparably more important. Unorganized matter is dead matter; organized matter is the work of mind. We are in sight of the distinction made by B.H. Streeter in "Reality": protons and electrons are on the quantitative side of reality; their organization into forms is on the qualitative side.

It is this organizational or qualitative side of reality which is directly apprehensible to a high degree of integration.

The conclusion here is, that the trustworthiness of a man's cognition, when he faces reality in its psychically important (i.e., organizational) aspects, is in proportion to his physical and

1Webb, God and Personality, p. 95.
mental integration; and that the most highly integrated person, actively striving for self-realization, may be trusted to have entered into the most direct cognitive relations with reality, in its psychically important aspects.

IV

But this is an inadequate analysis of the total relation of the person to external reality. This is the cognitive aspect of it. We have still to deal with feeling and conation and their part in the apprehension of reality.

We saw in the last chapter that truth is served by the light thrown upon reality by the subconscious processes, in the form particularly of uprushes of intuition and inspiration. If our reasoning holds good at all, it is evident that feeling and conation are active participants in the search for truth and have an essential place and function to fill. We saw that the whole person, whether integrated or not, is concerned directly or indirectly in any act of cognition; but it is increasingly evident that a balance of all the powers of the person, cooperating directly together, and unitedly striving, is the condition of knowing the truth fully.

Now, rather abruptly, this leads us to a very significant conclusion. Where aspiration appears in human life—cognition, feeling, conation unitedly seeking one end—we have an experience transcending any onesidedly cognitive relation to reality, an experience to which the proper qualifying and defining adjective to apply is "religious". In such an experience we have an awareness of a relation of feeling and willing, as well as a relation of cognition, with a Something or a Someone in and through the
totality of things; it is an awareness, indeed, of a personal relation.

What are we to say to this fact? Is the essential activeness in man the urge of an Ultimate Activeness? Is the fundamental sensitiveness of man, his ability to feel and to experience, correlative with an Ultimate Sentience? Philosophers without number have reached out after Reality cognitively and reported back Mind in the universe, or they have reported Absolute Will, or, seeking still other terms, they have reported Life, or Absolute Self, or a Power Making for Righteousness, or Something Unknowable but evidently there. Are these all facets of the one shining truth, which God has diversely flashed upon many men? The temptation to think so is natural, but to do so would be perhaps too easy, too uncritical. Nevertheless, a true view of reality is inclusive, and we can say so much as this: that, a broad view of the facts, and looking into the heart of ultimate Reality, we may see it as Life, or see it as Reason, or as Goodness; but it is living Reason, it is active Goodness, it is intelligent Activity, moral Life.

How can we escape the conclusion that ultimate Reality, then, whatever else it is, or howsoever more it is, is personal? That finite persons live and move and have their being in an Absolute Person, and that the Absolute Person lives and moves in them? That if men are driven, they are driven of God; and if they are drawn, they are drawn of Him?

Here, if patient hypothesis be needed, we have the most patient of all hypotheses, an hypothesis which has endured through time in the faith of races and ages; and these have lived by it,
and found it good.

We suggest, therefore—with as good warrant as hypothesis can have—that, just as in individual persons the direction and coordination of energies is as elemental as the energies themselves, so in the universe the Absolute Self, coordinating and directing its elements, imparting and communicating Himself through them, is and has been eternally revealed in them; and, further, as the organizational aspects of reality are apprehensible on the physical side in cognition, so the totality of things is apprehensible, as a whole pervaded by one personal Spirit, by the self's projection of its whole being into the bosom and heart of the universal life. Selves apprehend the Self at the heart of things, because selves are ultimately real that God may give Himself to them for their fulfillment, and realize the fruition of Love in reciprocal personal communion of a Father of spirits with His spiritual children.

V

So far have we come: it must be admitted far beyond the normal limits of psychology; and it is not to our purpose to go further. Theology here takes up the burden.

The sole purpose which we have pursued in this chapter has been to inquire into the reality of personality and to determine, if possible, at what point personality touches ultimate reality; and this we have endeavored to do in the briefest and simplest terms, perhaps misleadingly brief and simple terms. Religious thought and faith, with their deep insight, which, in its living forms, science has not been able to impugn, even while it distrusts it, have always endowed the lines of communion we
have indicated with all the richness and value of a personal relation.

God, doubtless, transcends finite personality as music transcends the individual sounds which are its constituent elements; but in the self-communication of His life to persons His communion with them has always been, and must ever be, personal: is it not that He empties Himself that men may contain and know Him by faith?

Personality at its best and highest, then--this is to know God at the human deepest and truest.
PART II

THE PSYCHOLOGY UNDERLYING THE CATHOLIC CHRISTOLOGY.
CHAPTER VI
THE NEW TESTAMENT BEGINNINGS

The question we propose to ask ourselves in this part of our inquiry is, What is the conception of personality underlying the Catholic Christology? We turn first to the New Testament; and then we address ourselves to a speculative problem involving psychology in our passage from the glad faith of the New Testament that Jesus was God and man to the Church's speculation as to how Jesus was God and man. Faith precedes speculation, of course; and yet, we may remark, the speculative construction is often fore-shadowed in the earliest experience: men strive to understand what they are passing through, if only vaguely, and so arise the beginnings of theology.

In the New Testament we find the great creative faith, the central revolutionizing experience,—and the beginnings of speculation, the early attempt to understand.

Not that the testimony is reduced to order and form. The New Testament doctrine of the person of Christ is the richer for its diversity, which from another point of view may almost be regarded as the diffuseness of a very nearly inarticulate adoration. What is said does not contain all that is to be said. The person of our Lord is treated suggestively, not exhaustively; and we look in vain for an exposition of universally-agreed-upon doctrine. This is not properly a matter for regret. The very sense of mystery and wonder with which the records set forth the inner life of Jesus and the nature of His consciousness more convincingly testifies to the grace and power of His person, and brings us nearer to the truth about His personal impress upon
men, than any disingenuous fullness of detail from a particular point of view.

At least it is a many-sided testimony which the New Testament offers; the glimpses in it of the central figure to whom it bears so great a witness is from many angles.

Of the writers of the New Testament we may say with perfect accuracy that they speak differently of something they all feel alike about.

I

We must pass rapidly over the broad outlines of their interpretation of Jesus, their Christology. It is ground which has hitherto been thoroughly searched.

In the Synoptic Gospels and the Acts we have the substratum. There is no systematic exposition. The distinctive note is a breathless enthusiasm, not primarily a breath-taking dogma. "Neither in the self-disclosure of Jesus," Dr. Mackintosh observes, "nor in the faith of the disciples have we encountered anything which could even plausibly be described as a theory of incarnation, or of two natures hypostatically united in a single person". What we see, rather, is that the followers of Jesus were overwhelmingly impressed by two things: (1) that Jesus was truly human, and not Godhead merely clothed upon with flesh, and (2) that He was truly divine and could not have been tainted with sin.

He was human,—to the scandalized scribes and Pharisees, who saw Him at sinners' tables, all too human. No modern reader of the Synoptic Gospels will fail to body forth in his imagination

1 H.R. Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, p. 29.
the historic figure of Jesus of Nazareth as that of a true human being, entering with great vitality into the flux and change of everyday life. We need only recall the traditional points in the argument for His humanity to be convinced. He was truly born of a woman, so the Synoptics agree; grew, waxed strong, and "increased in wisdom and in stature, and in favor with God and man". As One who was truly in the flesh, He experienced the normal physical hunger and weariness. He needed and sought sleep. He thirsted and felt pain. He was so evidently another man among men that His enemies were led to revile Him facilely and intolerantly as a glutton and a wine-bibber. The members of His own family permitted themselves to be persuaded that He was "out of His mind" a normal man abnormally excited. The incensed Nazarenes exclaimed, "Is this not the son of the joiner? Is not his mother called Mary and his brothers James and Joseph and Simon and Judas?" But He was not everywhere regarded with distrust. He drew little children to Him by sheer lovingkindness visible in face and movement, and devoted women about Him; and it is no small part of the picture that this was in some measure due to His need of the stay and support of human companionship. Two places supremely witness to His need of sympathy: Bethany and Gethsemane. More examples need hardly be cited. Enough, that after-speculation found no triumphant way of resolving into a shadow the insoluble substance of these reports of the true humanity of Jesus. He was first known as a Man from Galilee; an extraordinary Man, speaking with authority and not as the scribes, and having knowledge of God's will and healing in His touch; a Man to follow.

Then those who followed came to see gradually that He was not to be put in any human category; He was more than human, though human indeed; He was God's Son, divinely empowered.

And so intuition effected a great series of additions to the early faith. Already in the Synoptics we have foregleams of what appears more clearly in Acts, and still more clearly in Paul's letters, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Johannine writings.

As to the Synoptics, theologically and popularly of central importance were the miracles. Still more significant were the evidences of a Messianic consciousness on the part of Jesus himself. Whatever be the final verdict as to the original meaning and setting of the terms "Son of Man" and "Messiah" and "the Christ", undoubtedly their connotation is that Jesus was conscious of a mission to redeem Israel—a mission to which He was called and consecrated by the Father Himself. Certainly, His followers, and the Church after them, made this their abiding interpretation of the facts. Matthew, anticipating the Church's judgment, caught up the word from the Old Testament, which embodies so keen a prophetic prefiguration, "Immanuel" (God-with-us); and there is no good reason to doubt its general truth as an interpretative summary of Jesus' own self-consciousness.

But the generic root of later speculation was the unequivocal testimony of the Synoptic Gospels that Jesus was "the Son of God". The phrase was in process of outgrowing its Old Testament meaning of a human person, or group of persons, near to God, or chosen, in the adoptionist sense; and suggested the idea of a

\[1\] Matt. 1:23.
supernatural being among men, a divine wonder-worker possessing wisdom and power suggesting supernatural origin. It is impossible, of course, to read out of the Synoptic Gospels a certain naive adoptionism, which, moreover, possesses the accent of primitiveness to authenticate it. But the Church was not far wrong in seeing side by side with this apotheosis Christology elements of another Christology that went far toward accomplishing its supercession.

Still, though soon afterwards the great philosophical inference was drawn, there was then nothing in the nature of an explicit Logos Christology.

The latter was more definitely led up to by Acts, with three convictions of the greatest after-consequence. These were, first, that Jesus is the risen Christ exalted to the right hand of God, that is, to transcendence; secondly, the exalted Savior is immanent by the Spirit in the hearts of all believers to save and sanctify them; and thirdly, "Jesus Christ is Lord of all".1

Paul took up his testimony at exactly this point. The Pauline letters interpret, from the vantage point of inner experience, the Living Lord, exalted to the right hand of the Father, and present also in men's lives. It takes no great penetration to see at once on reading Paul's letters that he was not preoccupied with the historical Jesus. Perhaps it would be fairer to say that it was the tendency of his clearly mystical temperament for him to take the historical Jesus for granted, and center his thought on the resurrected Savior. This tendency cannot be doubted, and though we are agreed that "Paul did not live in a vacuum; he lived in the primitive Christian society in which all that was

1Acts 10:36.
known of Jesus was current, and he could not, by the most sustained
and obstinate effort, have been as ignorant of Jesus as he is
sometimes represented to be; \(^1\) yet he contributes next to nothing
to the doctrine of the humanity of Christ.

What he does give expression to is the transcendent im-
plies of his Christian faith. "God's glory in the face of
Christ" \(^2\) is his matter of glorying. "In Christ God reconciled the
world to himself". \(^3\) The great light which Paul brought to the
Greeks was in his phrase "God in Christ" --a phrase which they could
easily accept as comprehensible and as infinitely good news, without
perceiving at first its Hebraic content. That content appears, we
note, in the strictly monotheistic emphasis Paul laid upon it--it is
"God in Christ". It was God's doing. "God sent forth his son". \(^4\) "God
is the head of Christ". \(^5\) But he was far from denying Christ's deity
in thus predicating His subordination. After all, it was "God in
Christ", in the exalted Lord, to whom all things are to be subjected,
through a heavenly campaign against the evil powers, until no op-
position remains; for His place is above the whole creation, at
God's right hand. \(^6\) To sum up the matter: "For us there is one God,
the Father from whom all comes, and for whom we exist; one Lord
Jesus Christ, by whom all exist, and by whom we exist". \(^7\)

From this it was but a step--though a long one--to the
conviction of the deity of Christ by eternal nature. The pre-
existence of Christ is fundamental to Paul's Christology. Exactly
whence did he derive this great implicate of his faith? It is
impossible to say. It seems certain that he did not first infer
it. The most reasonable view is tantalizingly indeterminate: it

\(^1\) Denney, Jesus and the Gospels, p 21. \(^2\) II Cor 4:6 \(^3\) II Cor 5:19
\(^4\) Gal 4:4 \(^5\) I Cor 15:24f; Eph 1:20f. \(^6\) I Cor 8: 6 \(^7\) I Cor 3:15
was "in the air" and "natural to the experience in Christ of communion with the Father", and Paul, with the other Christians, found confirmation of it in Proverbs and the apocryphal Wisdom literature. But whatever the origins of his belief, he no longer uses "Son of God" as a Messianic title simply; he uses it with a connotation according to which Christ is the Son by eternal nature. For the Son "is the likeness of the unseen God, born first before all the creation...all things have been created by him and for him; he is prior to all, and all coheres in him".¹

"Though he was divine by nature, he did not snatch at equality with God but emptied himself by taking the nature of a servant; born in human guise and appearing in human form, he humbly stooped in his obedience even to die, and to die upon the cross".²

All this is, to Paul, of the most extreme significance for the inner life of the Christian. For Christ is not aloof in transcendence and glory; He is immanent by faith. Here we catch the distinctive and original note of Paul's thinking about Jesus, struck from a faith rooted in experience since the time of his conversion. The phrases "in Christ" or "in the Lord" occur nearly twelve score times in his letters, and represent the central reality of his religious life, whence, as from a well-spring, he draws his spiritual feeling. For Paul, at least, nothing is more certain than that "Christ's presence among you" is "your hope of glory",³ and that "it is no longer I who live, Christ lives in me".⁴ And this is not mere lip-service and rhapsody. Christ fills his heart and guides his will. Christ looms above him, and moves within him, the one inexpungable fact and inexpressible joy

¹ Col 1:15-17. ² Ph 2:5-7. ³ Col 1:27. ⁴ Gal 2:20.
of his life. Not that his mysticism separates him from his fellows by any strangeness that sets him down unique and alone in an alien world; on the contrary, he is but one among many who are in Christ, one among many with whom he is knit together in fellowship in one mystical body. For Christ is the Head of a Body, "that is, of the church, in virtue of his primacy as the firstborn from the dead". 1

And here Paul rushes on to that great assurance of his faith: "For it was in him that the divine Fulness (\(\pi\lambda\gamma\rho\omicron\alpha\)) willed to settle without limit, and by him it willed to reconcile in his own person all on earth and in heaven alike, in a peace made by the blood of his cross". 2

Here Paul rests his case for Christ. Christ is all and in all ("everything and everywhere" 3); filled, as He is, with the divine Fulness. When the great missionary apostle asks for his beloved churches "the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God and the fellowship of the holy Spirit", 4 we cannot doubt the place within the Godhead which he thus assigns to Jesus, nor fail to perceive what name it is which leaps first to his lips.

The Epistle to the Hebrews marks a step beyond Paul in the direction of an all-round or comprehensive presentation of the person of Christ. Christ is human and divine; He is Prophet, Priest, and King. Of all the men of faith, He stands revealed as the greatest believer of all: we are charged to fix our eyes upon Him as "the pioneer and the perfection of faith--who, in order to reach his own appointed joy, steadily endured the cross, thinking nothing of its shame, and is now seated at the right hand of the throne of God". 5 There He is our Forerunner ("entered

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1 Col 1:18. 2 Col 1:19,20. 3 Col 3:11. 4 II Cor 13:14. 5 Heb 12:2.
for us in advance\(^1\) in perfect worship "behind the veil", for He is "designated by God high priest with the rank of Melchizedek\(^2\). As High Priest, He eternally makes efficacious the one true sacrifice, "his self-sacrifice",\(^3\) by "not taking any blood of goats and oxen but his own blood"\(^4\); and as King--for like Melchizedek He is king as well as priest--He has sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high.\(^5\)

To this place He is entitled by merit of His perfect manhood. It behoved Him in all things to be like His brethren. He was therefore "one who has been tempted in every respect like ourselves, yet without sinning".\(^6\) "Son though he was, he learned by all he suffered how to obey".\(^7\) From His birth as a member of the tribe of Judah to His crucifixion "outside the gate",\(^8\) He lived a perfect human life, in faith, trust, obedience, and patience in spite of the "hostility of sinful men".\(^9\)

But He is Prophet, Priest, and King no less by the inherent merit of eternal nature. In language reminiscent of, but not bodily taken over from, current Wisdom speculations, the epistle declares that God has "spoken to us by a Son--a Son whom He appointed heir of the universe, as it was by him that he created the world".\(^10\) And this Son "sustains the universe with his word of power...He is superior to the angels...the Firstborn... 'Let all God's angels worship him'".\(^11\)

By this interweaving of a conception of Christ which shows the influence of the Wisdom-Logos cosmologies with an uncompromising exposition of the manhood of Jesus, the epistle is the doctrinal predecessor of the more boldly speculative and

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more comprehensive Fourth Gospel. At this point, too, we begin to see the concept-origins of the two-nature Christology.

The Fourth Gospel is not only the most finished work of art in the New Testament, but it represents the last word in doctrinal development in the Bible as a whole. As a religious treatise it is amazingly competent, and as a devotional study just as amazingly able. Whether by design, or by the intuition of mystic experience—which is not improbable—or simply by the extraordinary equipoise of the writer, this Gospel may be seen from several viewpoints to be a reconciliation of antitheses, while, paradoxically enough, itself full of them. It combines the Synoptic and Pauline Christologies. The evangelist perhaps leaned toward the Pauline emphasis, but he sought to write a gospel that would find the living, subjectively experienced Lord of Paul in the historic, objectively experienced Jesus of the Synoptics. From the point of view of philosophy, the gospel appears as the reconciliation of two streams of thought—the Hebrew and the Greek, the ethical and the metaphysical, the moral and the mystical. It mediates between the Greek tendency even then issuing in Gnosticism, and the Hebrew tendency that took the form of Ebionism. In the sphere of piety, it meets the needs of both the mystical and literal-minded eschatologists. The Parousia, the Resurrection, and the Last Judgment are alike future events and present processes. "Truly, truly I tell you, he who listens to my word and believes on him who sent me has eternal life".¹

But the great service of the gospel was, and is, religious: it so presents the person of Jesus the Christ as to leave

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¹ Jno 5:24
no room for doubt that in Him the great antitheses of experience,--the antitheses of God and the World, Light and Darkness, Spirit and Flesh, the Infinite and the Finite--are bridged over at last.

We are not allowed to forget the man Jesus who was an objective personage in a world of objectively real persons and things. But the preference of the evangelist is for the present Christ of subjective experience. For all the evident stress on the humanity of Christ, the divinity of Jesus is the characteristic note of the gospel. Jesus Christ is above all things "the Son of God". He is the Son of God in the primitive sense of the early church, in the sense of being the "Messiah"; but, though the simpler Messianic significance is implicit, it is merged, even submerged, in a higher and more comprehensive meaning, a meaning of cosmic breadth and sweep. For appreciation of this fact the presuppositions underlying the Prologue must be taken into account.

The Prologue of the gospel, as a doctrinal statement, is the highest point reached in the New Testament. The persistence of its influence upon subsequent Christian thought is only equalled, perhaps, by the obstinacy of the historical-critical problems which it raises. The reason for its influence lies in its religious insight, made preternaturally keen by the discipline of authoritative faith and experience, into the heart of God, the Father; the problems it raises attach to the form given to the conceptions issuing from the insight. Where did John get his conception of the Logos? And how much did he mean by it? These are interesting questions; but they need not detain us. The answer

\[1\] See, for example, the striking phraseology of Jno 10:33.
is still to seek. The fact, meanwhile, lies patent, that he thought of Christ as the visible bodying forth of the unseen and eternal Father, the mode or form of manifestation a person of the love of the Father for men. Not altogether unaccountably, therefore—for Paul precedes him in the thought—he thinks of Christ as personally come from God, that is, from a state of preexistence; and connects Him not only with the work of redemption but with the creation of the world.

In the body of the gospel the Logos terminology of the Prologue disappears. But the same great presuppositions concerning the eternal Son of God remain. He is the only Son, and He remembers His pre-incarnate life, or at least the fact that He had a pre-incarnate life. This, and not His human experience, accounts for His knowledge of God, to Whom, therefore, He bears "true" witness: "He who comes from heaven...is testifying to what he has seen and heard". He alone truly knows God; and, what is more, not only are His words "the words of God", but He is Himself the Word; not only is He God's messenger and witness-bearer, but He is Himself that to which He bears witness. To know Him is to know to see Him is the Father. The Father is in Him, and He is in the Father; and to see the Father. Though of Himself He can do nothing, He sustains the closest filial relation with God, a relation unique and perfect.

Here, then, we come to the final issue of the whole matter, the inference for Greek as well as Hebrew upon the self-evidencing power of which the evangelist ventured his all. The Father and the Son do not love each other only: the world may

now see that through the Son the Father manifests and declares His love for men, and the Son shows His oneness with the Father by the same perfect love. "I am the good shepherd; a good shepherd lays down his own life for the sheep." If ever a gulf seemed fixed between God and man, spirit and flesh, it is there no longer: Eternal Love, sending His Son, has provided a Way, a Way of Truth that leads to Life. "Our faith is...conquest. Who is the world's conqueror but he who believes that Jesus is the Son of God?"

The Fourth Gospel is the climactic point of the Christology of the New Testament. If the Synoptic Gospels are the record of the reaction of Hebrew minds to the reality which apprehended them in Jesus, the question arises, Is John then to be grouped with the Hebrew minds of the New Testament, or is he more properly to be ranged with the Catholic Fathers? Much light on the place to be assigned to him is to be had from a consideration, to which we at once proceed, of the psychology underlying the New Testament writings.

II

In approaching the New Testament for insight into its underlying psychology, we must rid our minds of all modern presuppositions as to the nature and function of the elements of personality; otherwise we shall find ourselves not in the least prepared to understand it. We must also put to one side the psychological terminology to which we are used, and accept in its stead one which is as fluid as it is ancient, even where refinement of...

1 Jno 10:11 2 I John 5:4,5. 3 In making it clear that this psychology is to be spoken of as "underlying" the New Testament, we recognize the fact that the New Testament (and the Old Testament for that matter) has no psychology, strictly speaking; it is nowhere worked out.
The fact is that the Hebrew drew only vague lines of division within the personality. There was an absence of the attitude toward personality which involves any real dualism of soul and body. Though the universal tendency of the mind to objectify its concepts has led in certain passages of the Bible to an obscuration of this fact, and brought confusion to the minds of scholars who have seen fully developed dichotomous or trichotomous psychologies in them, it is today generally recognized that in Hebrew thought body and soul are aspects of one and the same reality. The body or flesh (\(\text{\textit{\textgamma\textupsilon\texttau\textupsilon\textsigmata\textnu\textrho\textomicron\textupsilon}\textepsilon}\)) is not regarded, either in the New Testament or the Old, as mere temporarily animated clay, nor is the soul (\(\text{\textit{\textupsilon\xi\nu\textupsilon\nu}\textupsilon\textupsilon}\)) pure naked spirit.

Not only are we compelled to rid our minds of our psychological terminology; but most of our ideas of human anatomy must be given up if we are even to approximate an understanding of this view of the facts. The Hebrews of both Old and New Testament times guessed very uncertainly, of course, at the true function of the heart: it was observed to beat while life lasted, high in youth, feebly in old age, and to cease beating at death; and the natural conclusion was that it had an important relation to sustain toward the inner life. That its primary function was to maintain a constant circulation of the blood through the arteries and veins was remote from their knowledge. They had not the most rudimentary idea of the nervous system; and the brain was thought to serve no apparent function except to play a purely passive role as "the marrow of the head". The body, therefore, seemed a far simpler organism than it appears to us today; its few elements being
easily enumerated: a marvelous skeleton, covered with muscles and sinews; an enclosure of vital organs, upon which the life of the whole person obviously depended; an outward wrapping or tight clothing of skin, which sealed within the fulness of life-giving blood; and finally the blood itself, regarded as the quintessence of living substance, whose movements were unknown but conceived to be instinct with life.

The question arises, where was the seat of consciousness thought to be? The answer may be put in this form: suppose one were to be unaware of the function of his brain, and without knowledge of his nervous system, and were to be asked to locate the seat of his consciousness; among the possible answers this might commend itself: "My consciousness is diffused throughout my whole body: my foot hurts if I step on a thorn, my arm wearies carrying a heavy weight. Within, when I am angered my heart beats heavily, when I am sick my bones are in pain, when I am among strangers my bowels yearn for my own people". In the absence of a conception of consciousness centered in one organ, such as the brain, each part of the body, including the peripheral sense organs, would come to be regarded as sharing in the common consciousness, or even as having a quasi-consciousness of its own. This was as a matter of fact the naive way in which the Hebrews commonly looked upon their own persons, the differentiation of constituent elements leading to the selection of four as the most important, the soul (נַפְשָׁ), the spirit (רוּ), the heart (לֶ), and the flesh (נַפְשָׁ).  

1As late as the 4th century A.D. Gregory of Nyssa (331-394) could still plausibly maintain against those who located the intellect in the brain, that it pervaded all parts of the body. See Rand, "The Classical Psychologists" p 125ff.
The "flesh" (the σάρξ of the New Testament) is neither in the Old or New Testament used exclusively with a physical reference. In the Old Testament it is sometimes regarded as psychically sensitive, suffering, shuddering, weary, sinning, rejoicing, and otherwise influenced by psychic states. Of the constituent elements of the person it is the least honorable; but not because it is thought to be by inference from its states inherently bad; it is least honorable simply because its physical nature involves its being ethically vulnerable and weak. It is per se, in fact, a morally neutral substance. Quite generally "the flesh" designates the physical side of man, or man from the human side, or even the whole man as a physical being and therefore weak and limited as contrasted with God. The basic fact to bear in mind is that in Hebrew thought the "flesh" is not regarded as inherently evil and sinful but on the contrary as capable of spiritual yearning.

In both Testaments the "heart" is the seat of the mind and will of men, or more exactly, the organ of thinking and willing. In Job the Hebrew for "men of understanding" is "men of heart" הער). The English translation of Luke 2:19: "Mary kept all these things and pondered them in her heart" (Moffat: "She treasured it all up and mused upon it") does not obscure the sense in which "heart" is used. The "heart" also is naturally enough thought to be the seat of the feelings. Emotions shake it. In general, it is a word of dignity and meaning for the inner, personal life as a whole, in the sum of its intellectual, volitional, and emotional aspects. "From within," said Jesus, "from the καρδια of man, the designs of evil come". The heart was the one organ of all think-

ing and of all willing as well as of all feeling. It was the meeting-place of all man's powers of mind and the starting point of all his activities. It was regarded as the store-house into which all sensations were received and the workshop from which all acts proceeded". 1

The two terms remaining, "soul" and "spirit", are psychologically the most important in the Bible. It is impossible within the limits of our space to go more than briefly into their interesting history as terms for the inmost psychic reality in man. In the Hebrew they both originally meant "breath", but with this distinction, that the one, יֵשָׂא (literally, "that which breathes") referred in most cases at first to respiration, the other, רוּחַ, 2 to the wind, and so by inference to the stronger emotions or passions which seem to sweep into the person as if from without. From the fact that deep breathing accompanied mental agitation, it was natural to associate the breath with the inner life. Both words therefore came to mean the soul or spirit of man; nor was the use of them merely metaphorical: "The breath is the life". 3

Though at first both words were used synonymously, a distinction between them gradually arose, corresponding somewhat to the distinction between them in their original meaning. "Soul" (nephesh) came to mean in general the sentient life-principle residing in heart and flesh as part of man's original endowment from birth, while because it originally "spirit" (ruach) doubtless meant wind, came to be more or less specialized as the proper term for the animating principle present in the soul through the in-breathing of the Divine Ruach, the

1 M. Scott Fletcher, "The Psychology of the New Testament" p 76. 2 Or נְשָׂא (nesshamah), but this word never played a great part in Hebrew thought. 3 H. W. Robinson, op. cit. p 37.
Spirit of God. "Spirit" was thus both a real part of the person and yet in a sense something in and not originally of the person. For, before the specialization of its meaning took place, it was the convenient means of indicating that, owing to the almost limitless accessibility of human nature to spirits good and evil, a man is sometimes "possessed". It was the virtue of the Hebrews that, whilst other peoples about them persisted in demonology and fetishism, they developed through time the confident belief that the powerful psycho-physical influences at work upon them were the manifestation of the power of the Spirit of Jahweh.

It may be said that in these vague conceptions the Hebrews verged upon at least two of the conceptions of modern psychology. The Hebrew found himself extremely "suggestible", open to the influences of certain supersensuous influences, and in yielding himself to them found his lower nature, too weak otherwise to stand on its own moral legs, "sublimated" into a higher and more spiritual form. All this seemed to take place below the threshold of awareness or consciousness; but its effects were immediately perceptible in the ethical aspirations and inspirations of the conscious life.

The conclusion to which we come after submitting these conceptions to examination is twofold: while "spirit" refers in general to the God-life in the soul and is thus a term with a higher meaning than "soul", which refers to the human soul-life, the distinction between the two terms is not such as to involve a real dualism of the divine and human; the meanings overlap too much for that: there is a kinship between the divine and human, so much is clearly evident; and we may consider that, taking man
as he is at the best, the divine and human are two aspects, the one from above, the other from below, of a unity. And if we compare the meanings of "heart" and "flesh" with those of "soul" and "spirit", we reach another important conclusion: that there is in native Hebrew thought no conception of an inherent and abiding dualism of matter and mind, flesh and spirit. The sort of dualism that does in some measure appear is purely ethical or moral, and then it is a dualism recognized to be something against nature, rather than of nature, since it results from the breaking up of a natural unity by alienation through sin. The fact may be thus expressed: if the "heart" be regarded as the central organ of the personal life, the "flesh" is the heart's outer self, the "soul" is the heart's inner self. This completes the description of man as he is in himself, or as he is by virtue of being a human person. But the "soul" must be considered in another connection: it is the nexus between the human and the divine, because it is the seat of the divine indwelling; it provides the manward part of the inner personal force or unifying and energizing entity of which "spirit" forms the Godward part. This is not to be taken as an exhaustive-ly considered rendering of the facts of experience, but as an attempt, betraying the impotence of language, to convey the belief that "spirit" and "flesh" are not disparate in kind, but differ simply in degree, the spiritual being the refinement of the physical somehow, and the physical being the lower and coarser form of the spiritual. But let us not do what the Hebrews did not do—import definition into what was elusive of definition. It is more accurate, if less clarifying, to say that, to the early Hebrew consciousness, all are members one of another, "flesh", "heart", 
"soul", and "spirit", in the sense of being phases from different points of view of one reality, the person. If the "flesh" sins, it is not because it is sinful by nature but because it is weak, as the phase of human personality farthest from the divine; if the "spirit" is strong, it is because it is that phase of personality most alive with the influences of the Divine Spirit.

This insistence on the fact that, as Fletcher aptly puts it, "'flesh' was living matter and 'soul' was embodied life or 'spirit'", accounts in great measure for the lack of difficulty in the minds of Jesus' disciples about His being the Son of God. To the Greeks who later reflected upon it, this was the major difficulty, not the cross of crucifixion, so truly "a stumbling-block to the Jews, 'sheer folly' to the Greeks". Hence the Greek with his conception of a dualism between matter and spirit that was of their nature, was supremely interested in the Incarnation, while the Hebrew, finding no difficulty in the self-communication of God to a man, strove to understand the humiliation of the crucifixion, and found the reason for the faith that was in him in the resurrection from the dead and the exaltation of the Savior to the right hand of God.

1. Though in the Synoptics we find the native Hebrew conceptions modified by their Greek dress, and influenced also by the relative abandonment by post-exilic writers of the anthropomorphic ideas of God, in favor of a heightened, though by no means exclusive, emphasis on Divine transcendence; nevertheless these Gospels mark, if anything, a return to the idea of God's nearness;

1M.Scott Fletcher, op.cit. p 114. 2I Cor 1:23.
and the belief in the accessibility of the person to Divine influence is an outstanding article of faith. God is sovereign, and touches man, or possesses him, with all the immediacy of personal contact. This is presupposed by the whole psychology of the New Testament, as well as by the clear teaching of Jesus. The traces we find in these writings of Hellenistic influence, in an occasional suggestion of disparity between God and man in kind, or of an inherent antithesis between flesh and spirit, are not the teaching of Jesus. It will be seen at once that His utterances exclude the idea of any deep-lying or fundamental opposition in nature between God and man, or spirit and flesh. It has been thought that Jesus recognized a dualism, or, at least, an antipathy, of flesh and spirit in the saying of Gethsemane: "Watch and pray, all of you, so that you may not slip into temptation. The spirit is eager, but the flesh is weak". But the descriptive adjectives sufficiently indicate that, in His thought, flesh and spirit are not utterly opposed in nature.

2. It is significant that Paul, though he was considerably indebted to Greek thought, took his psychology from the Old Testament. He did not incorporate it unchanged into his theology; his profoundly original mind wrought changes here too; but he remains for all that essentially and inalienably Hebraic. Witness his lack of difficulty about the reality of Jesus' body, to which he testifies on the one hand, and the sinlessness of Jesus, which he affirms emphatically, as is his wont, on the other. That Jesus could be sinless and yet possess a body of flesh and blood, did not appear to him incredible; but the philosophically minded Hel-

lenist opened wide his eyes.

However, when we take up Paul's teaching on the "natural" man (Moffat: "animate being") and the "spiritual" man, we see some divergence from the rather sanguine view of human nature in the Old Testament. Paul so far accentuates the difference between the "flesh" and the "spirit" as to use the language of dualism. It is as though he separated the corporeal and the spiritual spatially as well as logically, as entities of differing substance. To give against adequate expression to his feeling/sin in the flesh he uses a violent image: "Now those who belong to Christ have crucified the flesh".¹ Again, "Brothers, you were called to be free; only, do not make your freedom an opening for the flesh...I mean, lead the life of the Spirit; then you will never satisfy the passions of the flesh. For the passion of the flesh is against the Spirit, and the passion of the Spirit against the flesh--the two are at issue, so that you are not free to do as you please".² "The interests of the flesh mean death, the interests of the Spirit mean life and peace. For the interests of the flesh are hostile to God".³

We are not justified in arguing from the implications of this sturdy language to his theology as a whole, however; the reverse procedure must be adopted. A study of Paul's language even in its extreme form yields the conclusion that in setting flesh and spirit over against each other as hostile, he is doing a very natural thing: under the pressure of his self-criticism he objectifies (or personifies) the "flesh" as inimical to God,

and filled with every evil passion; but he does so without shar-
ing the Greek point of view that this sinfulness is so much more moral
than that it is of nature. The flesh may be regarded as hostile to God, because sin resides within it; while the spirit is life-giving, because it is of God, and hostile to sin. The flesh itself is not irremediable. It was through the fall of Adam, the first man, who in himself and originally was not bad, that sin and death entered into the flesh. So Paul does not despair of the flesh ("sown inglorious, it rises in glory"\textsuperscript{1}), even though he finds it necessary to keep clear the distinction between man as he is in himself (\textit{μυκτός}) and man as he is when the Spirit of God dwells within him (\textit{πνευματικός}). Through Christ Jesus operating through the Spirit in the inner man, we may gain the victory over sin and death in our members (i.e. the outer man, or the "flesh", whose corruptibility was Satan's opportunity) and thenceforth be alive to God.

This brings us to the point of recognizing the force of an acute distinction: "It is clear that Paul finds in man's physical nature the \textit{immediate} foe of the higher principle, though this does not, of course, prove that the flesh is the \textit{ultimate} enemy, as is implied when 'Hellenistic dualism' is ascribed to Paul".\textsuperscript{2} Hence we find that the distressed cry, "I am a creature of the flesh, in the thraldom of sin. I cannot understand my own actions; I do not act as I want to act; on the contrary, I do what I detest",\textsuperscript{3} is followed by the declaration, "It is not I who do the deed but sin that dwells within me".\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1}I Cor 15:43. \textsuperscript{2}H.W.Robinson, op.cit.p 115. \textsuperscript{3}Rom 7:14,15. \textsuperscript{4}Rom 7:17.
Such being his conception of human nature, what did Paul conceive to be the psychological constitution of Christ when He was yet in the flesh? To reach a conclusion we are compelled to move entirely by inferences drawn from scattered observations, and these do not take us very far, and certainly not at all in the direction of a two-nature Christology.

That Christ was in His earthly life psychologically constituted of flesh and spirit is our conclusion from the opening words of the Epistle to the Romans. The Son of God is there declared to be of the seed of David according to the flesh (κατὰ γάρ: Moffat renders it, "by natural descent"). Ethically He is characterized by "the Spirit of holiness", according to which He was "installed as Son of God with power...when he was raised from the dead". Not that Paul laid any great stress on the reality of the physical constitution of Christ; indeed his language sometimes is almost docetic, as in Romans 8:3: "God...by sending his own Son in the guise of sinful flesh, to deal with sin, condemned sin in the flesh" or in II Cor. 5:21: "For our sakes He (God) made him to be sin who himself knew nothing of sin, that in him we might become the righteousness of God". But in fact Paul was hardly conscious of a risk of obscuring the humanity of Christ. He would have been shocked at the suggestion that Christ's body was not real. It was one of his basal assumptions, something that went without saying. The kenotic passage in Phillipians is a better test of his real position. There Jesus is declared to have been divine by nature, but to have voluntarily limited Himself by appearing in form human form, taking the nature of a servant. Born in human guise, He entered into the life normal to a human
and, human to the uttermost, died upon the cross. Wherefore God has "raised him high and conferred on him a Name above all names". Farther we dare not press Paul's language. It is evident that the thought of Jesus as true man and true God; but he did not vex his head with any two-nature perplexity: it did not occur to him that there was matter here for that kind of perplexity.

3. The Epistle to the Hebrews shows, perhaps, more consciousness of a possible difficulty. Though the terminology is that of the Hebrew thinker, its use betrays contact with and consent to, as well as a measure of reaction from, Greek ways of thinking. We note two interesting emphases, one by way of recoil, the other by way of agreement.

The epistle insists, with unforgettable vividness, on the psychological identity of Christ with ourselves. It is laid down as admitting of no doubt that He resembled his fellowmen in every respect; He shared their flesh and blood and participated in their nature, suffering agonies and being tempted. Stress is even put on the exposure of Jesus to temptation not only from without but from within, through the inner conflict of flesh and spirit.¹

On the other hand, we note the assumption, natural to the identification of Jesus with the pre-existent Son or Logos, of the uniqueness of Jesus' psychological endowment. Jesus and the Divine Father are mutually accessible to each other. Jesus is in need of no mediatorial agencies. In this He differs from His brethren, who can have no such access to the Father without

¹Heb 5:7.
His mediation as High Priest and Pioneer of the faith.

4. The Fourth Gospel enters more fully into the unique personality of Jesus. In fact it has had more to do with the raising of the psychological problem of the two natures in Christ than any other writing of the New Testament. The evangelist does not speculate any more than the rest of the New Testament writers on the subject; but he draws nearer to the problem, without grappling with it, without realizing fully the nature of it.

The psychological terminology of the gospel is that of the writings preceding it. John reverts to the Pauline contrast between "flesh" and "spirit". In accordance with his fondness for antithesis, he imparts a certain sharpness to his language: "What gives life is the Spirit: flesh is of no avail at all".  

In the First Epistle we find the same thought: "The desire of the flesh...belongs not to the Father but to the world; and the world is passing away with its desire".  

Here John feels the Greek influence—was he not writing and speaking Greek, for one thing?—but he retains nevertheless, like Paul before him, the Jewish conviction. Intensified though the antithesis between God and the world appears, the contrast is not such as to suggest a hard and fast dualism of Spirit and Matter, like that of Greek philosophy; the contrast is still moral and spiritual; the moral opposition of God and man is the effect following upon the evil choices of the human will, not the consequence of difference in principle.

The gospel no doubt insists upon it that the world needs to be saved from sin and darkness; but note the phrasing of this thought:

\[1\text{Jno 6:63.} \quad 2\text{I Jno 2:16.}\]
the "works", or as Moffat has it, the "deeds", of the world are evil, not the world as it is in itself.\footnote{Jno 7:7} As Westcott puts it: "The relation of good and evil is not one which exists of necessity in the nature of things. The difference is not metaphysical, inherent in being, so that the existence of evil is involved in the existence of good; nor physical, as if there were an essential antagonism between matter and spirit; but moral, that is, recognized in the actual course of life, so that evil when present is known to be opposed to good".\footnote{The Epistles of John (3rd ed) p 40.}

All this John might have, but did not, apply specifically to the problem of the person of Christ. Though the human and divine are ordinarily regarded as through man's disobedience antithetic, they are constantly presented side by side in the Jesus of John without the problem whether they were one and the same in Him, or remained as two natures in parallelistic association, seeming to present itself. It is quite fruitless to put the question, How did John conceive of this union of the Logos with the human person? Mystically and practically, he was satisfied with the fact. After all, if despite some slight tendency to follow Greek leading he never lost his grasp upon the intuition that the opposition between the divine and human was moral, not that of substance, could he be said to be in the way of stumbling upon a two-nature difficulty?

Yet, though John never appears to have any trouble in concluding that one Person was both divine and human, he does a significant thing: he never allows his conception of the absolute-ness of the divinity of Jesus to become attenuated or obscured.
Without annuling the grounds of faith in the ultimate identity in essence of God and man, he allows Greek influence to carry him further in a dualistic direction than any other New Testament writer. When we place beside, "The Logos became flesh",\(^1\) the statement, "As the Father has life in himself, so too he has granted the Son to have life in himself";\(^2\) and compare both with, "The bread of God is what comes down from heaven and gives life to the world";\(^3\) the inference might well be that something more than a moral miracle took place when the Logos of God became incarnate in Jesus; the process is suggestive of an infusion of a higher and essentially foreign and material substance. It was natural for Greek modes of thought in some measure to have their way with John. We accept, but we must not over-stress, this fact, since after all he was simply trying to testify with all his strength to the uniqueness of Christ, that in Him was life that was the light of men—a life not ordinary, but absolute and eternal, the very life that is in God the Father.

Here the evangelist paused. But in going thus far he both raised an inherent problem and fixed an inevitable tendency. The problem had not long to await those who sought its solution. The tendency, not of his making, to resort to Greek philosophy for light on "the Faith", became the dominant motive in the theology of the Church after him. We shall find, among other things, that the psychological presuppositions of the New Testament, and of John himself, were then abandoned—inevitably, but, as it now appears, unfortunately.

\(^1\) Jno 1:14. \(^2\) 5:26. \(^3\) 6:33.
CHAPTER VII

THREE CENTURIES OF SPECULATION.

Doctrinally, as in many another way, the period of the Fathers is one of great and fascinating complexity. When the Graeco-Roman world entered the Church it brought new modes of thinking and a whole realm of new interests with it, which persisted, in various degrees of modification, along with the new faith. Of this process even so devoted and early a Christo-centrist as Ignatius is typical. The illustration is instructive. We find him in the very act of stoutly defending the Christian faith against the Graeco-Oriental dualism which was creeping into the Church, in the form of an incipient Gnosticism, himself laying such emphasis on the incorruptibility which Christ the physician of souls mediates, especially through the bread of the Sacrament, which is "the medicine of immortality, and the antidote that we should not die", 1 that we know at once of what race he is, just as we can fix the locality of some stranger by his strongly colored dialect. In this Ignatius represents for us the church of his time and forecasts the speculative developments of the future.

In what follows we will glance as little as possible at the metaphysics of Christological speculation. We refer the reader to the standard histories of doctrine for that. Our purpose is simply to see how the psychological problem of the union in Christ of two natures emerged and was treated. The Logos speculations attract our attention first.

The Logos speculations were the result of an intensely practical interest (later pursued for its own sake), that of presenting Christianity to the Greek world, not as the alternative but as the fulfillment, of its philosophy. This apologetic was startlingly successful. The Greek world was won over.

However, the earliest thorough-going effort to conform Greek philosophy to Christianity was disastrous to the latter: it issued in the about-face of trying to conform Christianity to Greek philosophy. One of the extraordinary, and yet, like many extraordinary things, one of the most natural, developments in the history of doctrine is this issuance of the earliest contact of Christianity with the Greek world in a hybrid form of thought that once reduced the Incarnation to an absurdity.

The Christology of the Gnostics (who brought about this development) was determined by their presuppositions. A Graeco-Oriental dualism of spirit and matter was the starting point. It involved the abandonment of the New Testament premises and the positing instead of an incomprehensible and supersensible, if holy, God, relegated because of His absolute distinction from matter to transcendence and quiescence as far as this world is concerned, and the further positing of divine powers or eons to make possible the government of the world by their forming the lines of communication between God and the world. It is important that we see this clearly. The creation of the world was conceived by different groups to have been the work either of an intermediate just Being (the Jehovah of the Old Testament) or of an evil and malevolent Being (the Old Testament Satan), undertaken in opposition to God's
wish, though by His sufferance, and therefore resulting in a forced union of the two incompatibles, spirit and matter, in the person of man. The body thus became the spirit's prison, redemption by Christ the freeing of the spiritual element from union with matter.

We have here a Platonic psychology clearly antithetic to the Hebrew. If the Hebrews derived both body and soul from God, the Creator, who had pronounced them "good", the Gnostics assumed the inherently evil nature of the body as a material element poles apart in nature from the soul, and therefore to be regarded as holding the soul in unnatural bondage. This dualism received treble emphasis when the more extreme, and arguing from their premises the more logical, Gnostics took the step of referring the creation of soul and body, in quite the Oriental fashion, to opposing aeities, the good God and the fallen eon, Satan, respectively.

The issue of all this when Christologically applied was heresy of a pronounced order. "By their insistence that matter was the handiwork of Satan the Gnostics reduced the Incarnation to an illusion. The Divine Man who could be touched with a feeling for human infirmity became a contradiction in ideas. His mission had not been to raise our human nature, but to annihilate it. His Gospel was not the glad tidings of redemption, but a call to warfare with all forms of the seen".¹ It is not difficult to understand why the Gnostics took over the Logos idea into their Christology. Their religious quest led straight to the belief that Christ was a heavenly eon, come from God. After that, their doctrine of the evil of matter drove them to deductions which virtually tore Christ psychologically in two. They denied John's assertion that

¹H.B. Workman, Christian Thought to the Reformation, p 72.
Jesus was the Christ. Jesus was the name for the human nature, but the true (or gnostic) Christ was only in Jesus (i.e. in and not of the flesh). The suffering on the cross made such a distinction seem necessary, for as impassible Deity, Christ could not be conceived to have suffered: it was Jesus who did so. This led to a great variety of views, all more or less docetic and generally characterized by an absence of historic sense and perspective. The view just outlined is substantially that of the moderates of the school of Basilides. In contrast to them were the Valentinians, who removed the psychological difficulty altogether by denying outright the reality of Christ's body: it was a psychical formation which only appeared to issue from the womb of Mary. Still more extreme was the view of Saturnilus, that the whole physical appearance of Christ was a phantasm: not only was He not born at all, but the story of His first thirty years on earth was to be regarded as a grossly misleading legend.

The logic of their dualism took the Gnostics out of the Church. That they did not prove a graver menace to the Church is due in the first instance to the writings of the conservatively minded Apologists. As distinguished from the Anti-Gnostic fathers, the Apologists were not directly occupied with preserving the Church from inward schism. Their main interest lay rather in presenting Christianity to the world at large as the perfect philosophy; yet their writings were incidentally corrective of the Gnostic heresy on a number of points of fundamental importance.

It cannot be said that they came to grips with the psychological aspects of the doctrine of the person of Christ. Still, they laid the groundwork for the Christological problem
of the 4th Century by making a beginning of orthodox speculation. The Gnostics had premised a Graeco-Oriental dualism of matter and spirit as the basis. The Apologists saved themselves from absurdity by remaining largely true to the Christian tradition. Briefly, their basic presuppositions were monotheistic and optimistic: God, they insisted, is the absolute Lord of the material world, which He moves and controls from above; evil therefore cannot be inherent in matter; matter is an indifferent substance, weak, perishable, and corruptible, but not by nature bad. The cosmos in consequence is not a forced union of incompatible elements (as in Gnosticism) but a world order permeated by reason and goodness.

Yet the Apologists could not see their way to thinking concretely and religiously about God. He was to them an abstract Being, with indefinite predicates, who could not be conceived to have directly created, much less to have actually Himself entered, the finite. The creator of the world whose activity within the finite is described in the Old Testament (the Apologists were sharply distinguished from the Gnostics in their acceptance of the Old Testament) is the Logos, the hypostatized Reason of God, and not God Himself.

The Logos "took shape" in Christ "and became man". In this conception of the Incarnation, which is very simply put, Christ is the Divine Teacher because He is the incarnate Reason of God. What was partially true of Moses and the prophets, and even of Socrates, has been perfectly true of Jesus Christ: the whole Logos has appeared in human form for the first time to teach and to reveal the will of God.

1 Justin Martyr, Apol, I,5.
Here the question of two natures does not as was one nature in a union of body and soul. As of God and the prevailing psychology, that He was Logos and \( \tau \) \( \omicron \) \( \alpha \) \( \omicron \) \( \kappa \) \( \omicron \) \( \nu \) \( \omicron \) the Logos took the place of the \( \tau \) \( \omicron \) \( \alpha \) \( \omicron \) \( \kappa \) \( \omicron \) \( \nu \) \( \omicron \) \( \omicron \) \( \omicron \) \( \omicron \) \( \kappa \) \( \omicron \) \( \nu \) (\( \tau \) \( \omicron \) \( \alpha \) \( \omicron \) \( \kappa \) \( \omicron \) \( \nu \) \( \omicron \) \( \omicron \) \( \omicron \) \( \omicron \) \( \kappa \) \( \omicron \) \( \nu \) \( \omicron \) \( \omicron \) \( \omicron \) \( \omicron \) \( \kappa \) \( \omicron \) \( \nu \) \( \omicron \) \( \omicron \) the physical, not the rational soul (\( \psi \) \( \omicron \) \( \chi \) \( \iota \), the physical, not the rational) animating soul. So "Christ became the whole rational being, the Logos in a humanity otherwise possessing constituents, a body endowed with sense-perceptions, reason and soul".  

The redemptive, reconciling work of Christ practically drops out of the picture. Christ teach. Here lies the weakness of the Apologists' It is not the whole of God who reveals Himself in the Logos, the depotentiated God who as God is supreme Deity".  

The Anti-Gnostic Fathers revised these reinstated the redemptive theme in Christianity, anticipated, in fact, practically all the dogma: of the later Church. Greatest among them, Irenaeus, before him, had a definitely Christo-centric position in the problem of redemption made him sensible logical errors of the Gnostics against whom he points out the similarity of interest (the redemptive) and make it the difference between them in the acute statement:  

"Since they (the Gnostics) started with a combination of opposing elements, and therefore of an original dualism, they saw in the empiric way adoption" in order to make it human; and this  

\(^1 \) Justin Martyr, Apol, II, 10. \(^2 \) Loofs, quoted by V, 20,4.
Here the question of two natures does not appear. There was one nature in a union of body and soul. As Justin put it, Christ was "body and Logos was soul"—which is to say, in accordance with the prevailing psychology, that He was Logos and animate body forming one person; the Logos took the place of the faculty of reason (τὸ λόγος) in a humanity otherwise possessing the normal constituents, a body endowed with sense-perceptions by virtue of an animating soul (ψυχή, the physical, not the rational, life-principle). So "Christ became the whole rational being, both body and reason and soul".¹

The redemptive, reconciling work of Christ meanwhile practically drops out of the picture. Christ came primarily to teach. Here lies the weakness of the Apologists' Christology. It is not the whole of God who reveals Himself in Christ, "but the Logos, the depotentiated God who as God is subordinate to the supreme Deity".²

The Anti-Gnostic Fathers revised these conceptions and reinstated the redemptive theme in Christianity. They clearly anticipated, in fact, practically all the dogmatic formulations of the later Church. Greatest among them, Irenaeus, like Ignatius before him, had a definitely Christo-centric theology. His absorption in the problem of redemption made him sensitive to the soteriological errors of the Gnostics against whom he was writing. Harnack points out the similarity of interest (the redemptive) but as well the difference between them in the acute statement:

"Since they (the Gnostics) started with the conception of an original dualism, they saw in the empiric world a faulty combination of opposing elements, and therefore recognized in the

¹ Justin Martyr, Apol, II, 10. ² Loofs, quoted by Harnack, History of Dogma, II, 228 n.
redemption by Christ the separation of what was unnaturally united. Irenaeus, on the contrary, who began with the idea of the absolute causality of God the Creator, saw in the empiric world faulty estrangements and separations, and therefore viewed the redemption by Christ as the reunion of things unnaturally separated.1

For Irenaeus, therefore, Christianity is reconciliation of God and man, grounded in the perfect love of God.

This faith is central in Irenaeus' Christology, such as it is, for it is nowhere clearly worked out. Though God is "indeed unknown to all who have been made by him...as regards His love, He is always known through Him by whose means He ordained all things... This is our Lord Jesus Christ, who in the last times was made a man among men, that He might join the end to the beginning, that is, man to God".2 In this passage the significant adverb "always" marks Irenaeus off from Gnostic and Apologist alike: God is and has been always known through the Son, who was not begotten in time, but is eternal by a mode of generation that is incomprehensible even to the mind of faith.

Bound up with this claim for Christ, that He was eternally and by essence God, was the claim that He was also true man. Both claims found their ground and consistency in the Greek soteriology of Irenaeus, the conception of redemption as primarily the restoration of human nature to divine "incorruptibility". On the one hand, Jesus must have been true and incorruptible God, of one essence with the Father, in order to reveal God to men and make it possible for men to become divine. On the other hand, this required as well that the incorruptible should become really human; and this Irenaeus claimed is what actually happened. Christ "by adoption" (this is a favorite expression) assumed human nature in order to

1 History of Dogma, II, 238. 2 Against Heresies, IV, 20,4.
immortalize it by endowing it with divine incorruptibility. His psychology, which bears a close resemblance to that of the New Testament, was here pressed into service. Incorruptibility is by the spirit, and spirit is blended with soul. "When the spirit here blended with the soul is united to God's handiwork (the flesh) the man is rendered spiritual and perfect because of the outpouring of the Spirit".  

"The perfect man consists in the commingling and the union of the soul receiving the spirit of the Father, and the admixture of that fleshly nature which was moulded after the image of God".  

Now Christ was flesh and soul made spiritual and perfect by the divine Spirit; in Him man was united to God. In Him God, "although beyond comprehension and boundless and invisible, rendered Himself visible, and comprehensible, that He might vivify those who receive and behold Him through faith".  

Yet the relation of the two natures in Christ is left undefined. Irenaeus on the whole rather avoided the problem. Perhaps he was not acutely aware of it. He is content to reiterate his faith that the divine-human Christ, who was born, suffered, and ascended, was one and the same person with the Word who created the world. As He was completely human, possessing not only a human body but a human soul, so He was completely divine. Although it is significant perhaps that in some respects the divine and human natures are regarded by Irenaeus as existing side by side in separation (when Irenaeus came to consider the historical details of the baptism, temptation, crucifixion, and death of Jesus he was driven to assume the quiescence or "resting" of the Logos-nature, and thus admit the Gnostic distinction between the

1 Against Heresies, V, 6, 1.  
2 Ibid  
3 Ibid IV, 20, 5.
Jesus patibilis and the Christ Ἰησοῦς the prevailing thought is that in Christ there was a perfect *blending* and communion of God and man; the human and divine were one and inseparable. In Jesus Christ we have one and the same person, truly God and truly man. This is the religious fact with which Irenaeus is supremely concerned and which he reverently shrinks from subjecting to a prying analysis.

Tertullian, his Western contemporary, was on this point, as on others, less inclined to hesitate. Somewhat fiery by nature, and gifted with a caustic wit, he made a stand against the Gnostics, the old enemies of the faith, and the Monarchians, the new enemies of faith; and in the process he permanently fixed the terminology of the West by his use of clear-cut phrases and definitions. This circumstance favored the acceptance of his doctrines in the practical West, though it set a certain limitation upon the range of subsequent thought by the very simplicity and finality of the terminology employed. Yet, thanks to his pioneer service in this respect, the West more rapidly crystallized its doctrine than the East, and was able to assume the function of arbiter in the Christological controversies. The importance of his contribution may be seen in the fact that he gave specific meaning and content to "person" (persona) and "substance" (substantia) as applied to the Godhead.¹ The language of the Creeds appears: the Godhead

¹ Persona is equivalent to the Greek hypostasis, but reached greater clearness of meaning in the Latin because of the Western social and legal associations of the word. Tertullian used the word in a philosophical sense, which made for a certain largeness of content, but he found its juristic associations valuable and clarifying as giving concreteness. To him persona as applied to the Godhead had something of the meaning of persona in legal transactions, i.e. the "party" to a legal transaction. If substantia (the Greek οὐσία) be granted to have a meaning similar to property, which was its usual legal connotation, it is evident that two or
is "one substance, three persons".

The identity, then, of the Son with the Father is expressed in terms of substance but not of personality. Tertullian describes himself as one who derives the Son "from no other source but from the substance of the Father".\(^1\) God, "the entire substance", is in the Logos-Son because the Son is of God, "a derivation and portion of the whole".\(^2\)

It follows that, since the Logos-Son became man, the relation of the spirit and flesh (the divine and human) in Christ is of greatest interest. The crucial points with Tertullian are, first, whether Christ was fully and completely human, and, second, whether there was a coalescence ("confusion") of or a distinction in character and function between the divine and human natures.

As to the first point, Tertullian was led to a conception, drawn on a background of Stoic psychology, which unhesitatingly assigned to Christ a complete human nature. Man is dual in composition, the two elements which enter into his constitution being body and soul; but in their interaction these two elements are in life inseparable: the afflictions of the body are felt by the soul, and the soul is the mover of the body. It seemed evident to Tertullian (following Stoic premises) that the soul, both as a vital and as a rational principle, pervades every part of the body in the

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three persons may together (in uno statu) possess one and the same substance or property between them; and it is equally possible that one and the same person may be in sole possession of two substances or properties. See Harnack, Hist. of Dogma, IV, 122ff., 145, and Bethune-Baker, Early Hist. of Christian Doctrine, p. 138ff. Harnack, however, exaggerates when he says, "Tertullian introduced legal terms... That this is what they were in his use of them, and not philosophical terms, is shown by the words themselves and the application made of them." What Tertullian did was to import philosophical meaning into legal terms, so that they could (and did) do service philosophically. ¹Adv. Prax. 4. ²Ibid 9.
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form of a very thin and mobile substance with the power of spontaneous movement; it is corporeal and has extension, and it has had its beginning with the body (traducianism). If Christ became man—and to be redeemer of men He must have been true man—He not only assumed a body, but also the vital and rational principle of the body, the soul. Tertullian's traducianism in particular and his dualistic materialism in general aided him in formulating this conception of the fully personal humanity of Christ.

He resolved the second point at issue with the aid of his doctrine of the spirit (νευρα). Man as such is animated (νευρικός) in virtue of συνεργαιταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεταισσεт}

1 Adv. Prax. 27.
the Samaritan woman, wept over Lazarus, was troubled even unto death; and at last actually died.\textsuperscript{1} We see in Christ therefore "plainly the twofold state, which was not confounded, but con­jointed (non confusum, sed conjunctum: a phrase of the utmost his­torical importance) in One Person--Jesus, God and Man."\textsuperscript{2}

This was getting very far indeed from the New Testament beginnings. Regrettably enough, the Church was finally to take her stand here, rather than at the starting point, in the faith holding to the essential consubstantiality of the Father of spirits and His spiritual children.

We come now to the classic expositions of the Logos doctrine by the Alexandrians, to an atmosphere of philosophic breadth and subtlety foreign to that which we have just been breathing, and to a view of Christianity as something of a "mystery" and a means of initiation into other-world truth.

Clement of Alexandria, starting with this intellectualist conception of the inner meaning of religion, developed what may be said to be a Logo-centric theology rather than a Christology. The Logos was everything to him, no less than the central theme and cardinal principle of science and religion. Never merely the spoken Word of God, but the active Divine Wisdom, the omni­present, sustaining Divine Reason, from eternity existing in and with the Father, the Logos created and finally entered the world.

But (and here is the scandal of it) Clement found it difficult to envisage the advent of the incorporeal Logos-soul (for so he conceived of it) into the prison-house of the body of flesh. So he asserted that the Logos became incarnate by assuming

\textsuperscript{1} Adv. Prax, 27 \textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
the character of man and fashioning Himself in flesh¹, yet remaining inaccessible to feeling. Says Clement: "In the case of the Savior, it were ludicrous to suppose that the body, as a body, demanded the necessary aids in order to its duration, for He ate, not for the sake of the body, which was kept together by a holy energy, but in order that it might not enter into the minds of those who were with Him to entertain a different opinion of Him; in like manner as certainly some afterwards supposed that He appeared in a phantasmal shape (δοκήσαντες). But He was entirely impassible (ἀναρεθησάντες); inaccessible to any movement of feeling—either pleasure or pain².

There is hardly a doctrine of two natures here. The humanity of Christ comes near to being unreal; but that such should be the inference was evidently not the intention of Clement, if we may judge from his psychology. This was Platonic; and its essence was the belief that every man is partly human and partly divine. The flesh is the dwelling place of the soul, which is dual in origin, though normally one in movement. Part of the soul is irrational (ψυχή ἀλογός), and is transmitted from parent to child as the emotional life-principle by which the physical life is sustained; the other part of the soul is rational (ψυχή λογική), and is the "breath of God" imparted to the animate soul, a reasoning principle akin to Divine Reason. Applying this psychology to Him, Christ is not different from men in possessing two natures; the difficulty there is the same as that which meets us in every man; the point of difference is to be sought in the fact that the whole of the Divine Reason, the Logos, was perfectly and fully

¹ Exhortation to the Heathen x, fin. ² Misc. VI, 9.
present in Christ, illuminating and virtually transfiguring His body.

It is evident that to Clement "the difference between human and divine is one of measure and degree, but not of kind".¹

These views underwent modification in the mind of Origen, who began with a keener sense of the opposition between spirit and matter, and therefore found the Incarnation a greater difficulty. He wove his Christology into an exceedingly large design, of which it may be said that perhaps no system of thought combines contradictions so convincingly without wholly reconciling them.

Like his predecessor's, Origen's thought is throughout determined by his conception of God as immutable, absolute Being, incorporeal, invisible, and unknowable but for the activities of the Logos. Not that God is so abstract as to possess only negative predicates: He possesses will and self-consciousness, and is above all good and loving. Hence it lies in His essence as by inner necessity to communicate or impart Himself. The channel of His self-revelation is the Logos, His perfect image, begotten of His own essence by eternal generation and not by division or separation in time. For, seeing that the immutable God must be immutable in His self-revealing, it is an error to set a beginning to the generation of the Son and to say there was a time when He came into being, for "His generation is as eternal, and everlasting, as the brilliancy which is produced from the sun".²

With this philosophical conception of the Logos to furnish his point of view, Origen found it, not unnaturally, a fact of staggering import that "that very Word of the Father, and that

very Wisdom of God, in which were created all things, visible and invisible, can be believed to have existed within the limits of that man who appeared in Judea; nay, that the Wisdom of God can have entered the womb of a woman, and have been born an infant, and have uttered wailings like the cry of little children! And that afterwards it should be related that He was greatly troubled, saying, "My soul is sorrowful, even unto death"; and that at last He was brought to the death which is accounted the most shameful among men, although He rose again on the third day. Since, then, we see in Him some things so human that they appear to differ in no respect from the common frailty of mortals, and some things so divine that they can appropriately belong to nothing else than to the divine and ineffable nature of Deity, the narrowness of human understanding can find no outlet...I think that it surpasses the power even of the holy apostles; nay, the explanation of that mystery may perhaps be beyond the grasp of the entire creation of celestial powers".¹

But Origen had a mind of the most amazing conceptual sweep, and if he did not attempt to explain the cause or ground of the Incarnation, he offered at least his considered opinion as to the process revealed in it. His explanation was of the most subtle kind, nicely calculated to meet the complex needs of the problem.

On its philosophical side this explanation began with a frank acceptance of a dualism of spirit and matter. The Logos, as unchangeable incorporeal spirit, could not unite with matter directly without suffering depotentiation, and yet it was necessary that in the Incarnation He should reside with full power in the person of a created man. As a matter of history, a real union of

¹ De Princ. II, 6, 2.
the Logos with a created man, Jesus, was effected, and in the highest possible degree made efficacious for human salvation. How, then, are we to conceive that this union was consummated?

Origen at this juncture resorted to his psychology. Like Clement, he was evidently a trichotomist. Man consists (and here he pointed out that he was using the terminology of Hebrew psychology, though we observe that this is the only real resemblance) of body, soul, and spirit. The soul is a "sensible and moveable" substance, "something intermediate between weak flesh and willing spirit".¹ It is the life-principle of the body, pre-created, "a kind of material spirit which is not subject to the law of God, nor can be so, because it has earthly wishes and bodily desires".² The spirit, on the contrary, the mind in man, the rational part of human nature, is the essential constituent of personality. It has fallen from its pre-existent state in the world of created spirits through not persevering in the good, for though divinely created and immortal it is self-determining. By way of punishment and for its moral discipline, God has caused it to be joined to a human body by means of union with the animating soul. Henceforth it must seek redemption by a return to the purity of its pre-existent state. This, which should be its normal aspiration, is explained by its fundamental kinship with the Divine.

With this psychology in view, Origen held that in the Incarnation the Logos did not immediately unite with a body, but became flesh through union with a human soul (not the animating soul). This soul was a created spirit which in its pre-existent

¹ De Princ. II, 8, 4. ² Ibid III, 4, 2.
state had always remained obedient to God and of one mind with
the Logos. "This substance of a soul, then, being intermediate
between God and the flesh—it being impossible for the nature of
God to intermingle with a body without an intermediate instrument—
the God-man is born, that substance being the intermediary to whose
nature it was not contrary to receive a body".¹ A union of this
kind, we see at once, did not require for its perfection the self-
limitation of the Logos, but rather—and this is significant—
the clinging of the self-determining human soul to the Logos. The
Logos in this manner could remain impassible and unchangeable as
before, and though present in full power in the human soul, continue
simultaneously wider contacts with all believing souls throughout
the cosmos. The change, as far as that was necessary, took place
in the human soul and body. As we read in the Gospels, the human
soul of Jesus passed through trouble and sorrow, hunger and thirst
(the Logos, as impassible, could have had no direct share in the
human struggle and suffering, since such struggle partook of the
nature of change and finitude), and gradually became transformed
and deified, while the body, virgin-born and unpolluted, underwent
transfiguration: the indwelling Logos caused it to become less and
less like the ordinary coarse human body and endowed it with the
capacity to assume semi-spiritual states. Finally, the human soul
and body (or person) were so far deified that "the Son of God is
named Jesus Christ and the Son of man",² and vice versa. After the
resurrection the whole man, completely fused with the Logos as
one pure Spirit, was received into the eternal Godhead as the
second person in the triune God.

¹De Princ. II, 6,3. ²Ibid. II, 6,3.
Harnack has said of this:

"In this conception one may be tempted to point out all possible 'heresies':--the conception of Jesus as a heavenly man--but all men are heavenly;--the Adoptionist ('Ebionite') Christology--but the Logos as a person stands behind it;--the conception of two Logoi, a personal and an impersonal; the Gnostic separation of Jesus and Christ; and Docetism. As a matter of fact Origen united all these ideas...This structure is so constituted that not a stone admits of being a hair's-breadth broader or narrower. There is only one conception that has been absolutely unemployed by Origen, the modalistic view;...otherwise he made use of all ideas about Christ that had been formed in the course of two hundred years."

He adds:

"We cannot, however, attribute to Origen a doctrine of two natures, but rather the notion of two subjects that became gradually amalgamated with each other".1

The disparate elements in Origen's Christology--it faced all ways--militated against its general acceptance; but one of its effects was of great importance: it made clear the fact that a satisfactory Christology must include as an essential postulate the doctrine that Christ Jesus was a real human being, personally constituted like his brethren, in body and soul.

II

The reaction of the Monarchian groups to the Logos speculations may be more briefly treated. Throughout these sought simplicity, concreteness, and objective, empirical reality, avoiding therefore philosophical abstractions and emphasizing historical and grammatical exegesis. Origen and Tertullian alike testify to their being in East and West "simple folk" moved by an uninstructed impulse to maintain the "monarchy" of God.

1. The Dynamic Monarchians, in accordance with their scientific preference for natural explanation, swept away at one stroke all appearance of polytheism by holding that the virgin-born

1 History of Dogma, II, 372.
Christ was merely a man (ψηλός ἄνθρωπος), who by virtue of perfect ethical development received at baptism the divine power (Δύναμις) and by the resurrection from the dead was ultimately adopted into the Godhead. These views made their appearance in Rome about A.D. 185-190, where they were taught by Theodotus, the Tanner, a man of culture and scientific interests from Byzantium; but they were regarded with great disfavor by the Roman Church, and about 195 A.D. Theodotus was excommunicated. In spite of the support of another Theodotus, called the Banker, and a certain Artemon, the Dynamic Monarchians in Rome dwindled away.

In the East the spread of these views was attended by heated controversy, in which leaders of the Church were involved. The greatest name on the Monarchian side is that of Paul of Samosata, metropolitan of Antioch, whose Christology is still the classic embodiment of one strand of genuine historical tradition. It is based on a revolt against the idea (which in the popular form became polytheistic and docetic) of the personal pre-existence of Christ as the Logos, coupled with the refusal, founded on Aristotelian premises, to regard the soul as in essential independence of the body. He saw in Jesus a man, whose constitution in body, soul, and spirit was psychologically that of other men. Jesus was born of the Virgin by the Holy Ghost, but as humanly born He was "from beneath" (Κάτωθεν). This is not to say He was sinful like other men, for God, through the Logos which He puts forth from Himself, endowed Him with grace "from above" (_AMDěv). "Jesus was a man, and the Logos inspired Him from above". All metaphysical refinements were removed, and the nature of deity was simply conceived: God is one individual person (Ἐν πρωτοκόλλου).
Within His Being the Son (Logos) and Spirit (Sophia) may be distinguished, not as personal powers or hypostases, but as impersonal attributes or qualities. "The Son is not the hypostasis of God, but in God Himself", as reason or wisdom is in the heart of man. Through the Logos (i.e. through the exercise of the quality of Divine Reason or Intellect) God has inspired Moses and the prophets, but above all (μᾶλλον καὶ διαφερόντες) Jesus, with whom the Logos united, not as Origen supposed in such a manner that one personal being existed in another, but in the manner of "conjunction through knowledge and communion" (συνάψεια κατὰ πάθησιν καὶ περιστασιών), so that the Logos wrought in Him "not in essence but in quality" (οὐκ οὐσιωδός ἀλλὰ κατὰ ποιήσεις), yet with such effect that, from the time of the anointing at baptism with the Spirit, Jesus became unique among men. His unity of disposition and will with the Father through love (not through "Nature", for what is attained by nature is void of merit) was perfect. The Father endowed Him with power to work signs and wonders, and because He remained without sin, He became the Savior and Redeemer of men, and has entered into a divine union with the Father which is eternal, since by death and resurrection and ascension it has been made indissoluble. Whence He may be called God.

In support of this position Paul defended before the Synod which condemned him the thesis that to say Jesus was the Son of God by nature, rather than by identity of will and disposition, was to posit two gods instead of one, and to destroy, in contravention of the explicit teaching of Jesus himself, the very basis of monotheism. The Savior was conjoined to God by unity and identity of will and activity with Him. He was divine because He loved and willed the divine. Paul had, in fact, the weight of the Synoptics on his
side, except insofar as he had adopted the now universally current metaphysical dualism and erected a distinction not of person only but of substance also between the Father and the Son. His opponents were driven to urge against him that argument of the non-plussed, that he was too perversely clever to speak truth. But he was unable to cope with the logic of events, which was against him. His condemnation was a foregone conclusion. The Eastern leaders sensed in his teaching a type of heresy gravely threatening the impoverishment of the devotional attitude of the Church toward Christ.

2. The Modalistic Monarchians are here in sharp contrast with their adoptionist brethren. Whereas the latter saved the monarchy of God by making the distinction between Father and Son one of nature as well as person, the former obtained the same end by doing just the opposite, by abolishing the distinction altogether and making the Father and Son one and the same in person as well as nature. The Logos conception was rigorously excluded. The defenders of orthodoxy, especially Tertullian and Hippolytus, immediately recognized in Modalism the more dangerous type of monarchianism. Perceiving the fact that if the Father and Son are to be regarded as one and the same subject, then the Father "suffered", they seized eagerly upon the nickname "Patripassians", and pressed the charge.

The doctrines of Noetus, the earliest leader, transcended the whole psychological difficulty of the person of Christ by the virtual denial that a problem existed. It was God the Father Himself who as Christ was born, suffered, and died. By an act of will, God passed from invisibility and impassibility to visibility and
passibility, that He might be the Redeemer. Father and Son are then simply names for two modes of one reality. In Noetus' own words: "If I now confess Christ as God, He clearly is the Father if He is God at all. Now Christ, who Himself is God, has suffered; hence the Father has suffered, for He was the Father".

Under the form of Sabellianism these doctrines had a fiery controversial history. The teachings of Sabellius seem to have been in essence (though we know little of him directly) a philosophical attack upon the Logos conception. Father, Son, and Spirit were the same same, three names for one and the same Being, or three energies in one hypostasis. This conception of the Godhead meant that Christ must be regarded as a transient phase of the one Deity (the ωτόνάτωρ). The first phase or form of manifestation (πρώτωνον) is that of the Father as Creator and Lawgiver; the second phase is that of the Son as Redeemer; and the third phase is that of the Holy Spirit. God is self-manifest, therefore, in three successive and passing modes of revelation. Hence Christ could have had no distinct existence as a self-contained person apart from the Son-Father, did not possess a human soul, and ceased as a form of manifestation after His ascension.

To modify the rigor of the logic of Sabellius, as his followers did, or as the evidence suggests that he himself did, by recognizing in Nature the Father's continuing energy, operating as the original Monas alongside the successive prosopopa of the Son and Spirit, served only to accentuate the difficulty. It was more consistent to assume, in accordance with Stoic premises, the existence of a transcendent Substance or Monas behind the Prosopopa or Trias, as the self-contained ground of being out of which
the prosopon were unfolded.

To speak of human psychology in this connection is to recognize its inapplicability to the person of Christ so conceived.

And yet this unacceptable reaction to the Logos Christology pointed to the real weaknesses of that Christology. The great merit of the Logos formula was that it assured the deity of the Son without exhausting the being or dissolving the personal unity of the Father; but the simple religious minds of the Church were unable to follow the abstruse windings of the argument. The living, breathing Redeemer of the Gospels had too palpably become a mysterious cosmical figure, a second, subordinate deity. The time had in fact come for a restatement of Christian doctrine from the point of view of redemption.

III

This restatement came through the Arian controversy, and appears in all its strength and weakness in the writings of Athanasius, who, without possessing the formative influence of a really creative mind, nevertheless crystallized the thought of his time by giving centrality, almost with obstinacy, to a single theological principle—the fact of the presence in and through Christ of the redeeming God and Father. As the foil to him—so we see it today—stood the philosophically-motivated Arius.

Arius was not a young man when in A.D. 318 he took issue with his bishop in Alexandria with a disclaimer that the Son was begotten of God by an act of generation. "The Son was created," he said; "there was a time when he was not". The fact that Alexander, his bishop, effected his deposition and excommunication did not
prevent the Eastern clergy from falling apart into two controversial
groups. The strife became appallingly divisive, and the Emperor
intervened. Private remonstrance having failed, Constantine called
an ecumenical council to settle the question at issue. In A.D. 325,
therefore, the leaders of the Church met at Nicaea, and with unex-
pected decisiveness condemned Arius and his doctrines.

Arius had gone to Nicaea confident of being able to es-
establish his interpretations. They seemed on the face of them to be
a triumphant reconciliation of Christian faith with the best relig-
ious thought of the pagan world, in terms of common sense. Many
Greek minds found it the most acceptable formulation yet made of
Christian theology. Certainly Arius could not be accused of anti-
Hellenism; his conception of God was so purely metaphysical as to
bear little resemblance to the teaching of Jesus at the same point.
God dwells apart from all change and finitude in inscrutability and
desireless holiness, "alone Ingenerate", "alone Unbegun". Obviously,
since His self-communication by generation cannot be conceived, He
can have had no Son in the strict sense, except through an act of
free will by creation out of nothing. When He willed the creation,
He "made the Son a beginning of things originated". "The Son did
not exist eternally; for, all things having come to be out of that
which was not...there was once a time when he was not". Moreover,
since fatherhood implies priority, the Son is subordinate. "Even if
he be styled God, yet is he not true God, but only by the partici-
pation of grace, even as all others". Thus on grace, the Son is capable of change, hence of sin, even though by His own
choice He remains, as historically He did remain, unchangeably good.

Faced at this point with the problem of the Incarnation,
Arius felt that, with the conception of a Logos capable of change, he had a key to the psychological problems raised by the Gospels. The Logos could and truly did assume human nature. But, since He was its principle of reason or rational soul, the body which He assumed was without a rational soul. His union with the body was effected through the agency of the irrational or animal soul.

In the person of the historical Christ, therefore, the Logos suffered, being imperfect and striving for perfection. He gradually became God by steady progress, through the bestowal of divine grace and the effort of His cooperating will. He is therefore to be adored as God.

In this Christology, which "so banished all mystery that the problems of Christology are child's play to any fairly intelligent outsider", we note two such striking contradictions as a doctrine of Sonship which contained in it the denial that any real sonship was possible, and a declaration that Christ's humanity was a fundamental assumption, coupled with the statement that He had no human soul. We note also certain dubious implications. By presupposing an absolute antithesis between the "create" and the "increate", and consequently declaring that in essence Christ was not true God, Arius not only denied the faith of Christianity that in the Jesus of history the redeeming God and Father Himself was present, but also concluded that the Son was not able to reveal the Father fully. "God is ineffable to His Son". Thus "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father" became an empty boast. Christ became a demi-god without a gospel, a revealing savior who could not savingly reveal.

1 H.R. Mackintosh, The Person of Christ, p 178.
It was this that Athanasius at once sensed in the Arian doctrine, and he spent his life fighting it hard in the interest of the soteriological elements of the Christian faith. This interest accounts for the thoroughness with which he countered every dangerous doctrine of Arius with one that insured the redemptive efficacy of the Incarnation. That he did not do this by calculation, from a purely academic standpoint, or on the basis of controversial necessity, but with all the honest force of personal conviction grounded in religious experience, is everywhere evident. His central thesis, already explicit in his tract, "On the Incarnation of the Word of God", written when he was but twenty years of age and before Arius divided the East with controversy, strikes at the heart of Arianism: "The Son was made man, that we might be made God, and He manifested Himself by a body, that we might receive the idea of the unseen Father".

Since his doctrines constitute a fairly accurate summary of the conclusions which the Church finally reached with regard to the person of Christ, we may best estimate their psychological significance if we set them down briefly.

1. The fact of the Incarnation is that God Himself has visited His people that He might redeem them. In His Son He has entered humanity.

2. The ground of the Incarnation is in the nature of God Himself. Though transcendent and self-sufficient as the incorporeal and invisible cause of all existences, He is in the world as a living and active Person, of whose ethical nature and qualities we may be in no doubt. When men fell by sin, and were deprived of the principle of life (incorruption) and of the knowledge of the
Divine, God, out of the unchanging goodness of His heart, sent His Son, the pre-existent Logos, to be "made man" so that we might be "made God".

3. The Son's function therefore is properly to be defined in terms of redemption rather than of creation. Athanasius here radically revised the conception of the Logos developed by Origen and the Apologists. God creates directly. The contrary argument is absurd. If God cannot create anything finite or material, how can He be conceived to have created a creaturely Creator?

4. This fundamental thought of the redemptive function of the Son determines Athanasius' conception of the nature of the Son. If the Son is to be a true mediator of redemption He must be co-eternally one with the Father, of one and the same essence with the Father. To think otherwise, and to see in the Son a creature who is morally changeable and without full knowledge of the Father, is to deny His saving power. The Son is begotten from the essence of the Father, as light from the sun, eternally, for "as the Father is always good by nature, so He is always generative by nature".1 Together with the Holy Spirit, the Father and the Son form one God, three hypostases really subsistent but not divided.

Now follow the psychological implicates.

5. The Son is, on the one hand, true God; on the other, He "became man and did not come into (or sojourn in) a man".2 He who is God in kind "takes a body of our kind", "from a spotless and stainless Virgin",3 that men might be turned again to incorruption. Men "with their eyes downward, as though sunk in the deep, were seeking God in the world of sense", so "the loving and gen-

1 Or. c. Ar.III,66. 2Ibid III, 30. 3 De Incar 8.
eral Savior of all, the Word of God, takes to Himself a body, and as man walks among men and meets the senses of men, halfway.\(^1\) In prosecuting His design, "He was not bound to His body, but rather was Himself wielding it, so that He was not only in it, but was in everything, and while external to the universe, abode in His Father only.\(^2\) At the same time, His body "by virtue of the union of the Word with it, was no longer subject to corruption, according to its own nature."\(^3\) In strict truth, as Athanasius taught elsewhere,\(^4\) the Word was impassible. It was \textit{max} the flesh, and not the Word, which thirsted or hungered, was ignorant or wept. There is a distinction between the actions and experiences pertaining to the Godhead and those which belong to the manhood. To return to the earlier writing, "When the theologians speak of Christ as eating and drinking and being born, remember that it is only the body as body that is born and nurtured with appropriate food, but that He who is present in the body is God the Logos. This language is applicable to Him since the body which eats and is born and suffers was the body not of any other but of the Lord, and because He became man it was but fitting to speak about Him as though about a man, that it may be proved that He has a body in reality and not in semblance."\(^5\) In this conception we see the typically Hellenic Christology. Not the manhood (which Athanasius in his earlier writings consistently designated the "body" or the "flesh") but the Godhead was the central reality in the person of Christ.

Nevertheless Godhead and manhood, the Word and the flesh, were truly united, though without confusion: the Word abode with

\(^1\) De Incar 15  \(^2\) Ibid 17  \(^3\) Ibid 20  \(^4\) Or. c. Ar. III, 64  \(^5\) De Incar 18, Trans. in Raven's "Apollinarianism".
the flesh and it became more and more penetrated with the Divine essence, "transcending by degrees human nature". As possessing an incorrupt body, Christ therefore could not have died of natural causes. He had to be put to death by others. But He wished with His body to pay the debt of death owing from all, so He did not prevent His being shamefully crucified. Risen again from the dead, He now quickens all men; what happened to His body happens to us by our incorporation with Him: we are restored to incorruption and made immortal.

This in brief is the doctrine of Athanasius. Its strength is the strength of well-placed emphasis, in accordance with true religious insight. Its weaknesses are those of the time and the age. Two of them may be mentioned as typical of the confusion of current thought and terminology. The first is that the important terms hypostasis and ousia are used synonymously. Not till the closing years of his life did Athanasius perceive any distinction between them. A second and graver weakness was the lack of clear understanding as to the nature of Christ's manhood. Athanasius was made to be, rather than was naturally, concerned to insist on the presence in Christ of a human soul. Throughout the greater period of his life he seems to have agreed generally with the theology of Apollinarius. He wrote as if the Word had taken the place of the human soul, and Christ were to be described most truly as God bearing flesh and not as God in an ordinary man. Consider the words, "The Son did not become different when He assumed flesh, but remaining the same, was veiled by it, putting on a body which came into existence and was made". Still, he

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1 Orat III, 53  
2 See the whole of sections 20-32 in De Icarn.  
3 Seen Orat III, 51,52.  
4 Orat II, 8.
apparently came at last to see, though it was far on in the century, that "it was not possible, when the Lord became man for us, that His body should be without intelligence; nor was the salvation effected in the Word himself a salvation of body only, but of soul also".¹

IV

Both the strength and the weakness of Athanasius' theology may be seen in the creed adopted by the Council of Nicaea in 325, and confirmed by the Council of Constantinople in 381, after more than fifty years of acrimonious debate, in which Athanasius, in spite of repeated exile at the hands of the temporarily ascendant Arian party, took a decisive and salutary part. Arianism found itself unable to hold the field; and when the Cappadocians succeeded in gaining currency for a distinction between hypostasis and ousia like that between the Latin persona and substantia, the creed of Nicaea finally won its way into favor.²

It will suffice for us here to quote from it the relevant passages and notice how the strong emphasis in the references to the Incarnation on the real humanity of Christ are a reference of implication not of explication: the human soul of Christ is implied, but no more.

"We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ the Son of God, begotten of the Father, only begotten (πουνευγ), that is from the essence of the Father, God from God, Light from Light, very God from very God, begotten not made, of one essence (διανοούσιαν) with the Father, by whom all things were made, both things in heaven and things in earth; who for us men and for our salvation came down, and was made flesh (σάρκωθεν), was made man (ἐνανθρωπησαντα), suffered, and rose again the third day, ascended to heaven and cometh to judge the quick and the dead...Those who say 'there was, when He was not', or that 'before He was begotten, He was not', and that 'He was made out of nothing', or who pretend that the Son of God

¹ Tome to the People of Antioch, 7. ²See Basil of Caesarea, Ep 214, sec 3.
is 'of another subsistence or essence (ἐκ ἑτέρου ὑποστάσεως η ὀυρίας; literally, 'out of another hypostasis or ousia: the terms are synonyms), or that He was 'a creature', or 'subject to change or conversion'—the Catholic Church anathematizes'.

If the psychological problem of the person of Christ does not figure here, unless by inference, it is because it had not yet become a burning issue. But after the dāgma of the identity in essence of the Father and the Son was established as the faith of Christendom, alert minds perceived that the relation of the divine to the human nature within the person of Christ had not yet been defined. At once the issue was raised.
CHAPTER VIII

CHALCEDON.

We may at once observe an important fact.

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\(^1\) Nestorius: The Bazaar of Heracleides, Eng.tr. by G.R.Driver and

LHodgson; see concluding pages.
thought. Much of the misunderstanding among theologians may be traced directly to this terminological chaos. For example, prosopon had been fairly on the way to being accepted as the proper term for the eternal and inherent distinctions or functional relations of the Godhead, when Sabellius adopted it for his conception of the three transient phases or passing modes of manifestation of the one God. Sabellius ruined the word by compromising associations, and the Greek theologians were inclined to abandon it to its unnatural fate. This meant that they must find another word to take its place. Unless they created an entirely new word, they must wrest an old one from its wonted use and make it do duty in new relations. Having no new word, they took an old one. The word was hypostasis, the natural equivalent, not of persona, with which it was linked, but of substantia, and in its primary meaning the complement of ousia. It had now to serve the new and pressing needs of theology in a new role. This was doing violence.

The use of these terms was necessary, of course, but certainly increased the difficulty of clearing the atmosphere in Christology, especially as the prevailing anthropology threw anything but a helpful light on the problem of the Incarnation. We have seen how naively the Hebrews looked upon their own persons as single indivisible entities—indivisible in fact, if not in thought—and we have concluded that the appearance in later Judaism of the idea of a permanent dualism of spirit and matter, and so of God and man, was a departure under Greek philosophical auspices to a position logically at odds with the racial belief that man as a unitary being of body and soul is the child of God, sustaining a relationship of ultimate identity in nature with Him. If dualism there was
in Hebrew thought, it was a dualism not of God and man, but of God and the world. God and man were at one ultimately, for they had in common between them the spirit; what estranged them and obscured their kinship was man's unnatural rebellion and disobedience, the breaking of the intimate bond.

The Greeks had a less assured feeling of such identity. It is true that they had all along been building, with an optimism remaining over from the beauty-loving Homeric religion of personified human qualities and aspects of nature, upon the racial belief in the natural divinity of man; and there is little doubt of the general truth of the estimate that where the Hebrew took life with great seriousness as ethically challenging and exacting, almost as if he were an alien in a world unspiritual, the Greek had a youthful and beauty-worshipping naivety, a natural love of life, and a habit of looking directly at and trusting the surface look of things, founded on a consciousness of oneness with nature. But it was just this that came to distress the Hellenic mind to the point of "failure of nerve" in the later periods of Greek thought. Man then appeared in the dubious light of being more nearly like nature than like God. So God-and-man dualism became at last the creed of the Greek, while the Hebrew, with his consciousness of kinship with God, continued to feel no doubt as to the ultimate justice and harmony of things, and bore heavily upon his conscience his sense of sin in giving way to actions which temporarily shattered that harmony.

The anthropology of the Fathers, after Irenaeus, was more and more influenced by the Greek dualism, and in the period

\[1\text{See Gilbert Murray's "Five Stages of Greek Religion".}\]
before Nicaea completely dominated by it. The movement of thought here was the reverse of the Hebrew. If, as has been frequently pointed out, the Jews argued from the experience of the grace of God to an interpretation of the world about them, the Fathers, following speculative Greek philosophy (Greek poetry from Homer to Sophocles to a side), followed a logical process of abstraction from the world about them to a God above it. Religiously the difference is this: the attitude of the Greeks was determined by the supposition that to find reality one must trust his reason or his reason-guided mysticism to find God out; the Hebrew attitude was determined by the faith that man is found of reality, because God is seeking him. Hebrew thought, therefore, issued in a conception of a God who is in the world as a personal force and power sustaining a moral relation to men, an essentially optimistic and fundamentally ethical faith; the thought of the Greeks issued in the dualistic conception of a God who was not of the world, to whom all the attributes of matter were to be denied, who was immutable, impassible, unknowable, in inaccessible transcendence, the spiritual substance and substratum of the cosmos at the farthest remove from matter,—a faith which was essentially pessimistic, but capable of becoming profoundly mystical. It is this Greek dualism, the postulating of a gulf, a deep and eternal antithesis between two ousiai, Godhead and manhood, that captured the minds of the Greek Fathers, and is chiefly responsible for their confusion of thought and their failure to reach a satisfactory metaphysical and psychological solution of the Christological problem. We shall see this more clearly as we proceed.
In the Creed of Nicaea the mode of the Incarnation was only vaguely suggested by the words, "One Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God...was made flesh, was made man". The nature of the humanity and its relation to the divine nature remained undefined. How should this relation be conceived? The answer obviously depended on the approach to the problem. The problem might be approached from the divine side, that is, from an a priori postulate as to the nature of deity, and one could then proceed deductively by theological method to the consideration of what kind of union between the divine and human nature would be possible or conceivable. Or one might approach the problem from the human side, on the basis of data supplied by a study of the Scripture records of the human life of Jesus, and proceed inductively by this historical and exegetic method to a consideration of the probable relation of the Godhead and manhood in Christ. Of these two approaches the first was typical of the Alexandrian school, which proclaimed Christ as the Word made flesh; the second characterized the school of Antioch, where Christ was regarded as a man who was God.

The unresolved differences between these schools became matter of violent controversy through the activities of an exponent of the first of these approaches, Apollinarius, bishop of Laodicea, the greatest thinker of his time and "the most lucid and unambiguous of all Greek theologians". Though he was all his life in what might be considered Antiochene territory, he was Platonic and not Aristotelian in sympathy, and had the same basic interests.  

1Raven "Apollinarianism", p 103. The following pages will show indebtedness to this splendid and scholarly work.
as his friend Athanasius. His fundamental postulate was the same as that of Origen—the immutability of deity—but he took issue with the great Alexandrian in its behalf. He found any Christology which assumed that Christ possessed a human soul (i.e. will, mind, or spirit) inconsistent with the immutability of deity. The human spirit is ethically free and changeable. It is inconceivable that the divine Word was identified with the whole nature of man and thus liable to the possibility of sin through the moral hazard of development. Christ must have been not only free from sin but free from the possibility of yielding to sin.

But there was another interest which Apollinarius took in this problem. Familiar as he was with the Antiochene methods of exegesis, he was greatly perturbed by their adoptionist tendency. The emphasis on the human life of Christ which grew out of the Antiochene distinction between the two natures seemed to him to carry with it an appallingly serious menace to the doctrine of Christ's divinity. He scorned to think of Christ as having "received" His divinity; all men may receive divinity for that matter, and "if he who receives God were very God, there would be many Gods, since many receive God". With great astuteness in dialectic he attacked the assumption that a perfect humanity could be conjoined to a perfect divinity. Two perfect entities (δύο ἄληχα) cannot by any shift of logic be one. "If God has been joined to man, the perfect to the perfect, there would be two (perfects), one by nature Son of God, the other added". Moreover, even should we grant that in Christ there were two minds, "two principles of mind and will cannot dwell together without one striving against the other". In such a con-

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1 Lietzmann, Fr. 83, Raven's tr. 2 Fr. 81 3 Fr. 2
ception it seemed to Apollinarius that the soteriological significance of Christ's life on earth was destroyed. If the humanity is not one with the deity, but is held in a mere juxtaposition that amounts to separation, how can Christ make us alive through the divine Spirit? Clearly, Christ could not have been a dual being; He was one person, "a body compacted with God", as the Gospel has it: "The Logos became flesh". What happened was that the Logos took the place of the human mind or spirit in the person of Christ, and was the ego of the personality. "Instead of a human center of personality such as there is in us, there was in Christ a heavenly mind".

In reaching this conclusion Apollinarius consistently applied to the problem the psychology of the times, by which man was conceived in the Platonic manner to be a trichotomy of body, soul (animating or unthinking soul—Ψυχή), and spirit (thinking soul, νους or Πνεῦμα). The animating soul is "from the world" and materially-conditioned; it is declared by Apollinarus, who was a traducian, to be transmitted from parent to child by procreation. But "the intellectual faculty is not from the world but from above". This is not to say, however, that the human mind or spirit is of the same nature as the divine Mind or Spirit. The human mind is by its essence a "self-determinating subject", endowed with free will, and is therefore by nature capable of change and hence of sin. It is also subject to limitations of knowledge, and normally proceeds from ignorance to truth.

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1 Lietzmann 2 Fr. 108 3 Pseudo-Athanasius, c. Apoll. 1.2. Raven (op.cit. p.232) finds this "almost certainly a genuine quotation from Apollinarius". It at least puts his conviction clearly.
4 Commentary on Ezekiel, quoted by Mai Nov. Patr. Biblioth. III, 90. 5 Fr. 150.
Neither the possibility of change nor of ignorance can be ascribed to the divine Christ. In Him the fallible human spirit or intelligence was replaced by the divine Logos, and He possessed a single perfect nature, divine-human. "As a person is one person, though made up of flesh and spirit, so is Christ one person, and one nature, with one energy and one will".1 "There is one nature of the Word of God incarnate" (μία φύσις τοῦ Λόγου ουκαρικής). 2 The union of God and man was so complete that there was a communicatio idiomatum, a transference of attributes, so that what belonged to the divinity belonged also to the humanity, and vice versa. Not that there was an actual inextricable confusion of the qualities of Godhead and manhood, for these remain two series of qualities in spite of their full and perfect union. In Christ there was indeed "a mixture of the human and divine like the union between fire and metal in molten iron". Yet "if the combination of iron (with fire) makes the iron itself look like fire and yet does not change its nature, so the union of God to the body causes no change in the body, although the body offers to those who can touch it the energy of the Godhead". 3 In all this the central conviction is that very God has entered humanity; the divine Word Himself condescended to be virgin-born and died upon the cross.

Apollinarius involved himself here in a difficulty which has assumed an acute form in modern theological speculation. If it was the Logos Himself who was enfleshed in Christ, how was it pos-

1 Fr. 151  2 #3, Lietzmann  3 Fr. 128. Recent studies have proved that Apollinarius must be acquitted of being a Monophysite in the later technical sense. Cf. his own statement concluding his De Unione: "The man who cannot understand what is peculiar to each in these united but distinct elements will fall into perplexity: he who recognizes the peculiarities and preserves the union will neither mistake the nature of the elements nor ignore their union" (Fr. 149; see Raven p 208ff., 225ff.)
sible for the infinite and immutable thus to have contracted to a span? How could God and man, two natural opposites, compose one person? Apollinarius replied that "enfleshment" meant limitation, which in the case of the Logos was of course "self-limitation". The divine Word emptied Himself and was found in fashion as a man: "God invisible changed in form by His visible body, God uncreate made manifest by a created limitation, self-limited in assuming the form of a servant, unlimited, unaltered, unimpaired in His divine essence". The unlimited Word refrained from the full use of His attributes.

And now He has abolished death. "The death of a mere man does not do away with death", but by the union of the Word with the flesh "His flesh makes us alive through the deity now become one essence with it, for the flesh is divine, having been joined to God." 

This is the gist of the teaching of Apollinarius. To enter upon the disputed and uncertain points of his theology is not to our purpose. Suffice it to conclude this summary with another. It is taken from one of the two books against Apollinarius which have been traditionally ascribed to Athanasius, but which are certainly by another or other hands. Raven calls it brief but brilliant as a summary, and the phraseology suggests that it must be based upon sayings of the great heretic.

"Instead of the inner man in us there was in Christ a heavenly mind: He used the form which veiled Him as His instrument; He could not have been a complete man, for where there is a complete man, there is sin: two complete entities cannot become one, else there will be in Christ the strife against sin which there is in us: there will be need for Him of purification like ours, if Christ has taken upon Himself the element that thinks and directs

1 Lietzmann, p 187, 188. 2 Fr 95 3 Fr 116
the flesh in us when He becomes man: rather He assumed the mindless, that He might be the mind in it and be wholly without taste of sin owing to the godlike and mindless nature of His flesh: for His flesh would not sin if that which guided the flesh or was the spring of His thought had not conceived the purpose of sin beforehand and did not work through the body the fulfillment of sin: whence Christ has displayed the newness of the flesh by His likeness to us, and each of us displays in himself the newness of his intellect through imitation and likeness and ceasing to sin: so Christ is conceived to be sinless".1

Apollinarius was uncompromising in the declaration of his theological position, and he drew attention as a schismatic. The Church began to sense danger. The docetism of his view was too pronounced even for the docetically inclined East. It was obvious that he had ceased to be in agreement with what was seen to be implied in the ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντος τοῦ θεοῦ ("was made man") of the Creed of Nicaea. Christ had assumed a mutilated, not a full, humanity. The Church began to answer back. If Christ did not possess a human spirit, then, in the words of Gregory of Nanzianzus, who offered the most acute criticism in the course of the Cappadocian attack, "that which He has not assumed He has not healed". Moreover—and more to the point in modern ears—the argument that the perfect cannot be joined with the perfect so as to make one person is open to the retort of Gregory: "Quite so, if you are looking at the question materially. Two bushels cannot be put into one bushel measure". But, when you are considering the Incarnation, "you are dealing with what is mental and incorporeal: my one personality contains soul and reason and mind and Holy Spirit".2

Here Gregory transcends at one bound—for one short moment—the circle of thought of his time. Apollinarius was thinking physically of spiritual reality. His Christology therefore, as it was bound to be, profoundly inadequate; and in 381, at the Council

1 C. Apoll, 1, 2. 2 Ep. 101.
of Constantinople, it was condemned. But the issue he raised was not disposed of, and could not be disposed of, by any mere resolute effort of suppression.

II

The most unequivocal opposition to Apollinarianism was voiced by the theologians of Antioch. Doubtless they felt the force of Apollinarius' intense eagerness to prove that in the single divine Person of his Christology all of human nature that was necessary for its ultimate deification had been taken up; but to them "this was a pious view which, as in the case ofModalism, flourished through defiance of fact."¹ For one thing, they considered it ran counter to Scripture: in the Gospels Jesus was true and complete man and not manhood accommodated and abridged to the indwelling deity.

Theodore of Mopsuestia, the greatest mind in the Antiochene group, took the two great doctrines of current theology, the immutability of deity and the freedom of the human will, and made the attempt to apply them consistently to the human life of Jesus as he found it set forth in the Gospels. He concluded that the union of the divine Word with the man Jesus could not have been one of essence, for God and man are two essences and God cannot be changed into man nor circumscribed by a body; nor could the union be one of "working" or energy, for as forth-going energy God is everywhere present; but the union, in accordance with the doctrine of the freedom of the human will, must have been one of moral fellowship and communion. This union was

unique on its human side in its free, sinless advance toward divine intimacy, its steady human progress toward the good, culminating in perfection, that is, in final exaltation to the divine. On its divine side, the union was that of the unchanging divine Word with a man. Christ, therefore, possessed in His one person two distinct natures, each perfect in themselves, united by a moral bond: a conclusion diametrically opposed to that of Apollinarius, to whose protest that this introduced the possibility of sinning into the person of Christ, Thedore replied: "If He did not receive a soul and if it was His godhead that conquered sin, then there is no possible advantage to us in what He did". To this view he added the corollary that in the conquering of sin the temptations of Christ were real and not "love of ostentation". "In assuming both flesh and soul He strove through each in behalf of each".

The central fact is, that Jesus was true man, in body, soul, and spirit. His early life was a history of moral development. He overcame every temptation by conscious moral union with the divine Logos. "He received at the first a soul that was constituted human and immortal and endowed with sense; and He raised it to immutability by the resurrection". By the disposition of perfect good will toward God, the indwelling of God in Him, the Son, was perfectly effected; and this indwelling was like, but not merely like, that which takes place in the case of the prophets, for "the indwelling of the divine Word by formation in the womb of a mother is not at all in truth an ordinary indwelling but extraordinary, inasmuch as we speak of two natures united and brought together in one person".

1 De Inc xv Fr 3 (Swete II,311). 2 Ibid 3 C.Apoll.iii,fr.10 (Swete II, p 317. 4 Swete II 307-8, from De Incar xiii, Fr 3.
"But it is being disputed with us," Theodore protested, "that if we speak of two perfect entities then we are committed to speaking of two Sons. But notice that in the Holy Scriptures one Son by Himself is spoken of, so we do not speak of two Sons, but rightly confess one Son, since the distinction of the natures ought necessarily to remain, and the unity of the person be preserved and not dissipated".\textsuperscript{1}

The Antiochene position somewhat unjustly came to be identified with Nestorius, who emerged as the champion of the two nature doctrine when Cyril of Alexandria precipitated him into violent controversy that rocked the entire East. Nestorius was a man of honest conviction, as the recently discovered "Bazaar of Heracleides" testifies; but on his elevation to the archbishopric of Constantinople in 428 he displayed an overzealous intention to purge the see of heresy. As a Biblicist, he found it hard to tolerate the increasing devotion offered to the Virgin Mary. He publicly lodged the protest already formulated by the Antiochene theologians against calling Mary "Mother of God" ($\Theta e\sigma \tau \eta \kappa o\varsigma$): she should be called "Mother of Christ" (\textit{Xpìστεύτηκας}), since, strictly speaking, she had given birth, not to the Logos, but to the human nature with which the Logos united. He denied "that God was born of a woman and that He was two or three months old, as though His own ousia were changed into the ousia of a man and He was born and became two or three months old".\textsuperscript{2} The eternal can have no beginning, and in His divinity Christ is eternal. "Our Lord Jesus Christ in His divinity is consubstantial with the Father and the creator of the blessed Mary, for He is maker of all. But in His manhood

\textsuperscript{1} De Inc. xii, Fr.2 (Swete II, 303-4). \textsuperscript{2}Bazaar of Heracleides, Driver and Hodgson, p 137.
he is the son of the blessed Mary".  

"He then who was born of Mary that bore Christ is the Son of God; but the Son is double in the natures: God and man".

The construction put upon these doctrines was that Nestorius refused to call Mary the Mother of God because he really denied the divinity of Christ. The clause "I say not that God was two or three months old", was understood to mean, "I will not give the name of God to one who was two or three months old," — a badly garbled version of the original. When this report of Nestorius' stand reached Alexandria, Cyril rushed eagerly to the attack.

The modern discovery of Nestorius' apologia, "The Bazaar of Heracleides", written in exile just before his death and preserved in a Syriac translation, has tended to absolve Nestorius of full responsibility for traditional "Nestorianism", i.e. the bare doctrine of two separate natures held together by a moral union. It has always been recognized that Nestorius laid more emphasis on the unity of the person of Christ than the Antiochene school as a whole, but on what logical grounds he did so has not until lately been clear. It now appears that he had the boldness to separate the natures because he had on other grounds a definite metaphysical theory of their union. It was central to his teaching that "Christ is indivisible in that He is Christ but double in that He is God and man... sole in the prosopon of the Son, dissimilar in the natures of the divinity and of the humanity". The significant phrase here is "sole in the prosopon of the Son". The unity of the Godhead and manhood in Christ is not a unity of ousia, the ousia being two and not one, nor a natural union (a unity according to ϕύσις: ἐν ψυχῇ.

1 Bazaar, p 390. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid 388.
for that would be a created and not a voluntary union. The unity is a union of \( \pi\rho\sigma\omega\nu\underline{\alpha}\nu\). Manhood and Godhead have one undivided appearance. "God became incarnate in the man through His own prosopon and made his prosopon His own prosopon".\(^1\) Nestorius thought of the prosopon as no mere outward surface look of a thing, but that external aspect of a thing which is a part of its reality as a thing, that which it cannot help looking like, the true outward sign of its inward state without which the inward state would never be manifest. Now, argued Nestorius, if two natures have one undivided appearance, one prosopon, they are one. We conclude that he did not intend to teach a bare moral union of the natures, though we can well understand how his too facile solution was either misunderstood or brushed aside as inadequate.\(^2\)

It is not to our purpose to enter into the sordid details of the Nestorian controversy. Politics and bribery had too large a part in Cyril's barren victory (really a playing into the hands of the Roman pontificate). But Cyril, it must not be overlooked, was nerved for the struggle by a profound interest in the soteriological issues at stake. Like Athanasius, he held through thick and thin to his conviction of the reality of the experience in Christ that "God became man in order that man might become God".\(^3\)

He tended strongly toward Apollinarianism, but he saw, or was made

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\(^1\) Bazaar, p.69. \(^2\) For a fine analysis of Nestorius' view and a very fair estimate of its fundamental artificiality, see Hodgson's criticism, the Bazaar, p 411-420. There is some resemblance between the view of Nestorius and a passage from Theodore of Mopsuestia (De Inc. Bk.VIII, Swete II, p.299) to which we are only beginning to apply the proper key: "When we distinguish the natures,"--we follow here the translation of Dr. Relton in A Study in Christology--"we maintain that the Nature of God the Word is perfect, perfect too the Person(?-\( \pi\rho\sigma\omega\nu\underline{\alpha}\nu\))--for it is not possible to speak of a distinct existence\((\underline{\pi}\sigma\tau\alpha\nu\nu\) which is impersonal(?-\( \underline{\pi}\rho\sigma\nu\underline{\alpha}\nu\underline{\alpha}\nu\))--perfect too the nature of the man; and the person likewise (\( \pi\rho\sigma\omega\nu\underline{\alpha}\nu\)). But when we look to the conjunction of the two, then we say that there is one person (?-\( \pi\rho\sigma\nu\underline{\alpha}\nu\underline{\alpha}\nu\)). "Person"here is a most unsatisfactory rendering of \( \pi\rho\sigma\omega\nu\underline{\alpha}\nu\).
to see, the weakness of the doctrine of a maimed humanity in Christ. The manhood was constituted, he argued, of body and rational soul (a complete human nature); but it was impersonal (ἀνυόστατος), not the humanity of an individual man, but a generic or universal humanity. The benefit of redemption is thus secured for the whole human race. If before the union of the divine and the human the two natures were distinct, in the union the humanity was by an "interchange of attributes" absorbed into the divinity, so that there was but "one nature of the divine Word enfleshed". Christ is thus one from two natures, not as Nestorius claimed, one in two natures: God became man and did not simply unite with a man. Cyril bravely faced the contradictory implications of this doctrine. The immutable Logos hungered and prayed. God suffered and was crucified—but, Cyril insisted, "according to the flesh" only, for "to have flesh" is not "to be flesh". Suffering, then, without suffering, the impassible and incorruptible Word of God agonized and died.¹

The condemnation and deposition of Nestorius took place at Ephesus in 433. In 444 Cyril died. The conflict, however, continued; and now it was a follower of Cyril who came under suspicion. Eutyches, venerable but opinionated, an archimandrate of a cloister near Constantinople, held strongly to the position that Christ was of one divine nature in the Incarnation and therefore not con-substantial with us according to the flesh, for the human nature had been wholly taken up, assimilated, by the Logos, so that the body was no longer of the same substance with ours, but changed into a divine substance.

¹ Under pressure Cyril later modified his earlier teaching by the inclusion of the statement that the two natures were unmixed.
The state of things had now become intolerable. The de-
position and excommunication of Eutyches, forthwith pronounced,
brought his appeal to Rome for redress. The answer of Leo was his
famous "Tome", supporting the district synod which had pronounced
the condemnation. Its key passage was the solemn statement: "For
the Catholic Church lives and grows by this faith—that in Christ
Jesus there is neither humanity without true divinity, nor divinity
without true humanity". "The properties of each nature," Leo de-
clared, "were preserved entire...Accordingly, there was born true
God in the entire and perfect nature of true man, complete in his
own properties, complete in ours". Further strife followed. The
Emperor, Theodosius II, was persuaded by Dioscurus, the unsorpu-
lous and violent successor of Cyril at Alexandria, to call a council.
It met at Ephesus, in 449, ignored the "Tome", deposed Flavian, who
had been Eutyches' archbishop, and restored Eutyches. Leo raged
at "the Robber Synod", only to be amazingly excommunicated at the
hands of the audacious Dioscurus. This bold stroke of the Alex-
andrian patriarch came suddenly to nothing. Theodosius died, and
his sister Pulcheria reversed his policy. Negotiations were opened
with Rome, and a great council was summoned to bring a final end
to the bitter and disgraceful controversy. It met at Chalcedon
on October 8, 451.

III

The number of bishops and legates attending the Council
of Chalcedon was the largest on record, some six hundred being
present. The sessions extended over four weeks, and were marked
by dramatic and vehement discussion. Flavian was declared to have
been unjustly deposed; Dioscurus was deprived of his see and exiled. After this preliminary clearing of the ground, the real business of the Council was entered upon. The documents admitted as of major importance were the Creed of Nicaea, the so-called Constantinopolitan Creed, two letters of Cyril, and the Tome of Leo. The Council took itself seriously. The extremists in doctrine were to be curbed. This was what Leo most desired. Not himself present, but represented by his legates, he succeeded in carrying the day for this middle course.

At the fifth session, on October 22, a carefully-framed formula, drawn up by a committee of bishops, was introduced and adopted. It strongly condemned alike the Eutychian and Nestorian teaching. It insisted against Nestorianism that He who was one person and one hypostasis, the only begotten God the Logos, was born of Mary the Virgin, bearer of God; and that the two natures were indivisibly and inseparably united. It declared against Eutychianism that the human nature remained after the Incarnation distinct from the divine nature, the peculiar property of each nature being preserved, without confusion and without change. The Council expressed it opposition to "those who seek to rend the mystery of the Incarnation into a duality of Sons, and excludes from participation in the holy rites (or from the sacred congregation) those who dare to say that the Godhead of the Only-begotten is capable of suffering. It sets itself against those who imagine a mixture or confusion in regard to the two natures of Christ, and drives away those who foolishly maintain that the form of a servant which was assumed from us is of heavenly essence or any other than ours; and it anathematizes those who fancy two
natures of the Lord before the union and imagine only one after the union".

Arraignment and condemnation over, the Council proceeded to definition. "Following, therefore, the holy Fathers, we confess and all teach with one accord one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, at once perfect (complete) in Godhead and perfect (complete) in manhood, truly God and truly man, and, further, of a reasonable soul and body (ἐκ ψυχῆς λοιπῆς καὶ σώματος); of one essence with the Father as regards his Godhead (ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί κατὰ τὴν θεότητα), and at the same time of one essence with us as regards his manhood (ὁμοόνουσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἑνὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα), like us in all respects, apart from sin; as regards his Godhead begotten of the Father before the ages, but yet as regards his manhood—one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, proclaimed in two natures (ἐν δύο φύσεισ), without confusion (ἀμφιχώρως), without change (ἀτρέπτως), without division (ἀδιαιρέτως), without separation (ἀκορύφως); the difference of the natures being in no way destroyed on account of the union, but rather the peculiar property of each nature (τῆς ἑκατέρας φύσεως) being preserved and concurring in one person and one hypostasis (εἰς ἕν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντριβούμενης) not as though parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Logos, Lord, Jesus Christ, even as the prophets from of old and the Lord Jesus Christ taught us concerning him, and the Creed of the Fathers has handed down to us".
CHAPTER IX

THE AFTERMATH.

It was hoped that the definition of Chalcedon would have the effect of uniting at least the moderates of the Church, and ultimately all parties. This hope seemed reasonable on the basis of the Council's via media formula. The definition of the Council, we can hardly escape seeing, "was not an innovation; it was an attempt to avoid two partial extremes. Nicaea rejected the mythological idea of a half-God. Chalcedon rejected the mythological idea of a half-man, and declared that Christ was truly God and truly man". But insofar as the hope of conciliation included the expectation that the Church would now enter an era of peace from inward conflict, it proved entirely illusory. The East became the scene of excited uprisings, which attained great violence in Egypt, Palestine and portions of Syria, where the followers of the Cyrillian Christology formed the bulk of the thinking membership of the churches.

I

The issue at first resolved itself into a contest between those who accepted the formula of Chalcedon, the Dyophysites: so-called because they upheld the duality of Christ, and the Monophysites, who, following Cyril and Eutyches, insisted upon the oneness of the nature of Christ. The distinguishing phrase of the Monophysites was that of Cyril: "the one nature of the Word en-fleshed". It appeared inconceivable to them that Christ should have possessed two self-contained natures (they equated "nature" and "person", and therefore held that "two natures" meant "two persons")

1 Cave, The Person of Christ, p. 120.
in one body. From their viewpoint, the Chalcedonian definition
and the Christology of Leo has espoused a pure Nestorianism.

The controversy dragged on through its various phases,
characterized on one hand by open revolt, and on the other by
attempts to reach a compromise formula that would do justice to
both sides. Among the Monophysites, the Julianists declared for a
transmuted, though not wholly absorbed, manhood in Christ, so that
the Godhead dominated at all points, condescending to suffer of
free will and not of natural necessity. The Severians moved fur­
ther toward the Chalcedonian position in granting that the Godhead
and manhood in Christ remained unmingled and distinguishable in
their characteristics, but rejected the Chalcedonian \( \pi \nu \delta \delta o \; \psi o \varepsilon \nu \),
because of its suggestion that there had existed in Christ a self-
contained and independent activity of the natures, as if He had
been a dual personality. The compromise formula, the {\text{Henoticon}},
put forward in the interests of imperial unity by the Emperor
Zeno in 482, unsuccessfully sought to reconcile the extremists by
an evasive tour de force avoiding all mention of two distinct
natures in the Chalcedonian sense, but insisting on the entire
one-ness of Christ, and condemning Nestorianism and Eutychianism
explicitly. So far did this formula fail that it led to a thirty-
five years breach with the offended Roman see.

Meanwhile time was on the side of the Creed of Chalce-
don. The necessity of accepting it as part of the authoritative
Christian tradition became increasingly evident. The question
then came to be essentially irenic:--in what sense was the for-
mula to be interpreted? From the point of view of the peace-
maker (and the imperial interests were for obvious reasons of this
persuasion) it was desirable that the West and East should be satisfied by an interpretation that would meet the needs of both. The Eastern need would only be met if this interpretation were given an approximately Cyrillian form. The West on the other hand would be satisfied by nothing less than the full recognition of the humanity of Christ.

The refinements of dialectic were called into requisition. Finally a resort to the metaphysic of Aristotle issued in the Christology of the learned Leontius of Byzantium (c. 485-543), who has prior right claims to being considered the Church's first scholastic theologian. His interpretation of the Creed of Chalcedon derived its cogency from the fact that, though he denied that there can be a θύσις άνωνόστατος (a nature altogether without hypostasis), there may be a θύσις ευνόστατος (a nature having its hypostasis in another). The human nature of Christ, he held, had no independent personality or self-contained being, as the Nestorians taught; yet it was not, as Cyril imagined, ανωνόστατος (without hypostasis); it was ευνόστατος, that is, it had its hypostasis in the Logos. In this view, it seemed possible that Christ possessed two distinct natures, but a single consciousness; and the extremes of holding out for a dual personality or of asserting a strictly impersonal manhood in Christ seemed alike avoided.

In 553 the Fifth Ecumenical Council met at Constantinople, and reaffirmed the formula of Chalcedon but read it in Cyril's sense, after the manner of the neo-orthodoxy of Leontius. It was a compromise, but it failed. The Monophysites were not reconciled, and the West, to say the least, was suspicious.

The controversy now entered upon a further phase. About
A.D. 630 a renewed effort was made to win over the Monophysites. Sergius, the patriarch of Constantinople, persuaded the Emperor Heraclius to issue a formula to the effect that Christ, though in two natures, had worked through one divine energy (συνεναδρικὴ ἐνεργεία). This conciliatory move had at first a favorable reception. The Theodosian sect among the Monophysites reunited with the Church. But when the new formula was referred to him for approval, Honorius, Bishop of Rome, sympathetically suggested a change, which was the occasion of much outcry; he suggested that for the unscriptural "energy" the word "will" be substituted: "we confess", he wrote, "one will of the Lord Jesus Christ". His emendation was accepted. But it savored so much of Eutychianism that the West burst out into indignant remonstrance, to which voices in the East were added. Imperial edicts excitedly forbidding further discussion having utterly failed, the Sixth Ecumenical Council was gathered at Constantinople in 680, and affirmed the dyothelite position, that in Christ there were "two natural wills" and "two natural energies" (or modes of operation), existing indivisibly, unchangeably, inseparably, and unconfusedly. "For just as His flesh is, and is said to be, the flesh of the Word, so also His human will is, and is said to be, proper to the Word...Just as His holy and spotless ensouled flesh was deified, yet not annihilated, so also His human will, though deified, was not annihilated". The human will was, however, not conceived to be independent of, but obedient to, the divine, so as to move or be moved with it.

Nothing was solved by this definition, of course. The insistence on two wills in Christ was the logical outcome of the current metaphysical dualism, but it reduced the Chalcedonian
definition to psychological jargon. Both dyothelite and monothelite were thenceforth to think of Christ in scholastic terms or not at all. The era of scholasticism had in fact set in.

II

Later on, in Lutheran and Calvinist, we see the recovery of vital touch with the historic Jesus; but, such is the ineluctable quality of certain deductions from certain premises, that the fresh return to speculation only resulted in the reassertion of the old fundamental tendencies toward Eutychianism and Nestorianism.

The Lutheran confessions reproduce the religious accent of Luther in their emphasis on finding in Jesus "God my Savior". Christ is God. "I have no God," cried Luther, "whether in heaven or earth, and I know of none, xxxxx outside the flesh that lies in the bosom of the Virgin Mary. For elsewhere God is utterly incomprehensible, but comprehensible in the flesh of Christ alone".

In the direct return to the New Testament, without the circuitous guidance of the ecclesiastical and scholastic interpretations, there flashed upon Luther and his immediate followers a new and vital experience of first-hand values which worked a complete transformation in their lives and thinking. They stood once more face to face with a near Person, who possessed one undivided and glorious divine-human personality. Man He was, but "this Man is God". They felt certainty that there is no impassable gulf fixed between finite and Infinite. Finitum est capax infiniti. We are not to set Godhead and manhood over against each other as mutually exclusive. In Jesus they formed one Person in a fusion and interchanging of the attributes of the natures, such that the manhood received and used the properties of the Godhead.
The Lutheran therefore was Cyrilian, and laid chief stress on the single consciousness in Jesus. There were two natures, and they must be allowed to have been disparate in a sense, yet not so as to prevent their being allied or kindred, so that they could coalesce really and permanently in one indivisible personality. This conception Lutheran scholasticism made theoretically conceivable by a distinction between the natures and their properties or attributes, whereby the former remain distinct, while the latter interchange without confusion (the Lutheran version of the communicatio idiomatum).

The Calvinist, on the other hand, followed Zwingli in his conception that we can only figuratively assert an interchange of attributes. The finite and the Infinite are not fused even in Christ: finitum non est capax infiniti. The Antiochene separation of the natures is to be presupposed, qualified as in the Creed of Chalcedon. There is indeed a sharp distinction between the human and the divine; and in Christ we are not to assume an interchange of the properties of the natures but rather to perceive an alternation of consciousness, now human, now divine. The infinite and the finite co-exist in a personal union, the Logos assuming the manhood, but without the manhood being deified out of recognition. Thus, if the Lutheran found the whole Logos present in Jesus, the Calvinist found the whole of the man Jesus in the Logos, and persisted in regarding Christ "as He regarded Himself—as the Son of Man, the Man of sorrows and acquainted with grief".¹

Both these Christologies, Lutheran and Reformed, were

¹ Bruce, Humiliation of Christ, 3rd ed., p 132.
far from invulnerable to the polemic of the Socinians, who so emphasized the absolute transcendence of the infinite God, that they could not see how He could be personally contained in a man, that is, depotentiated to finitude, even though that man be Jesus. To save the "monarchy of God" they felt driven to know in Jesus simply a man raised to divine honors as a consequence of His pure and perfect life.

The reply of both Lutheran and Calvinist to this criticism was the doctrine of the states of Christ, the drawing of a line of separation or contrast between the pre-incarnate and post-resurrection "form of God" and the earthly "form of a servant", that is, between the state of divine exaltation and power in the realm of the infinite and the state of human lowliness in the realm of the finite. The transcendent and infinite became the incarnate and lowly by a self-initiated humiliation, whether by partial obscuration or hiding of the divine glory (the theory known in theology as the kryptic) or by an actual self-emptying, a real self-deprivation or limitation (the kenotic theory). The problem is admittedly acute from any point of view; but the unrelied emphasis on the transcendence of God caused these Christologies to raise rather than to solve problems.

III

The new turn given to Christological discussion in modern times is due to certain sweeping changes in historical and philosophical theology. The revision of the older metaphysics of being by modern philosophy which has resulted in predicating immanence as well as transcendence of God has put the whole pro-
blem on another footing. The intuition that man has the capacity for Godlikeness through kinship with the Divine—a conception rooted in Hebrew experience as a basic article of faith—has been brought again to the fore by modern thought; and the wondrous mystery of the God-man is therefore more satisfactorily approached.

Another factor in modern discussion is the change introduced by the critical analysis of the concepts made use of by science and philosophy. Cause, space, time, matter, mind, force, energy, quantity, quality, law, and their allied terms, have been critically examined and re-defined. The physical and chemical terms so popular with the Greeks when they came to describe cosmic processes have been more and more distrusted. The universe is being conceived less in terms of matter, more in terms of mind and spirit—even in terms of faith and hope and love.

A third factor, with the most direct bearing on the re-opening of the Christological question, is historical criticism, which has poured a flood of new light on the historical Jesus. "Modern thought concerning the person of Christ", says William Adams Brown, "may be described as the effort, by means of a better philosophy, to do justice to the new facts concerning Jesus which historical criticism has brought to light".¹

In still more recent thought a fourth factor has made its appearance, and at the present time is exerting a very powerful influence on all the departments of theology. This is modern psychology. Its place is at the center of the field of modern interest. The effect of its new viewpoint upon Christology is strik-

¹ Outline of Christian Theology, p.337. For a concise and balanced analysis of the theories of kenosis, Dorner's theory of progressive incarnation and Rijschl's Werthurtheil interpretation see pp 337-343.
ingly evident in the present almost exclusive absorption in the consciousness of Jesus. The old point of departure from the consider-ation of the divinity—that is, the heaven-descended nature—of Christ has been largely abandoned for the approach from the consider-ation of His human consciousness. We are now at a very far remove from docetism. The fact that Jesus had a typical human experience and consciousness is no longer disputed, or merely verbally affirmed. The question resolves itself into an inquiry into the movements of Jesus' inner life, in the conviction that there the human nature—we prefer in these days to say the whole personality—of Christ was found of Reality; that is, that there if anywhere we find the evidence that He was Immanuel—God-with-us.
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CATHOLIC CHRISTOLOGY
IN THE LIGHT OF PSYCHOLOGY.

We return to the Christology of Chalcedon and its interpretation by the Catholic Church; and, looking back over the controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries, we note that the psychological problem—the relation of the natures—was throughout, as far as its logical form was concerned, largely unaffected by the philosophical postulates. The problem, no matter what the theologians said about the cosmological or soteriological relations and significance of Christ, always assumed the same form when they brought their speculations, so to speak, to earth, and asked themselves, "How did this pre-existent spiritual Being (Who is of the same essence with God, or Who is of like essence with God, Who is uncreated, or Who is created, etc., etc.) become man and have to do with the flesh?" Or, "How did this man unite with this Logos and transcend the flesh?" The answers were widely different as we have seen, but the problem obstinately remained an acute one, and the answers, whether docetic or adoptionist, always sat uneasy upon the minds, if not of those who had framed them, at least of those who studied them.

The psychological problem would not vanish with the metaphysical solution.

I

When the theologians came to look hard at Jesus in the light of the Gospels and as a man, their metaphysical presuppositions never seemed to remove, though to some of them they served to lighten, the problem of the person of Christ when He was upon
the earth. Questions assailed them something in this fashion.
As to the nature of Jesus of Nazareth, was He God become man (in
this case the solutions ranged from the assumption of a true hu-
manity to docetism); or was He man become God (adoptionism: moral
union); or was He incomplete God (Arianism); or was He incomplete
man (Apollinarianism); or did two essentially dissimilar natures
somehow coalesce and commingle and interchange their properties
so as to become one nature (Eutychianism); or did the disparate
natures take their place side by side in the human body without
commingling (traditional Nestorianism)? "Suggestions seem to have
been borrowed from physical analogies. A union of two physical
substances may be effected in various ways. We may suppose one to
be cut and fashioned so as to fit the other, as the handle is
accommodated to the head of an axe to form a single implement. We
may suppose that the two unite, as in chemical fusion, to create
a new substance. Or we may suppose that, as in processes of the
animal organism, one absorbs alien material into its own consti-
tution, and transforms it into the substance of its own frame. Fi-
ally, the two may simply be placed side by side; and, to use a
simile of Luther, may possess no more unity than two boards which
have been placed in juxtaposition".1 Any of these mechanical sug-
gestions were fundamentally unsatisfactory as explanations of a
spiritual and immaterial truth. The theologians had in fact reached
an impasse, and at Chalcedon really admitted defeat: the Creed they
accepted abandoned the problem with the statement, "The facts are
the facts: think them together, or think not at all".

Consider where they found themselves. If the actuality

of Christ's humanity were pressed hard, then His distinction from
the Father appeared greater than the soteriological postulates
would bear (Ebionism; Paul of Samosata). If the actuality of His
divinity were pressed, then His distinction from humanity became
greater than the soteriological postulates would bear (Sabellian-
ism, Gnosticism). On the other hand, if the actuality of the humani-
ty and the actuality of the divinity were alike pressed, then un-
thinkable relations between the two natures sprang to view: sep-
oration, change, confusion. Lurking in the background was a problem
that remained insistent and perplexing. If Christ was truly divine
He shared the nature of the divine in being beyond susceptibility
to suffering or corruption; but as man it is certain that He did
suffer and that He did die; and from the point of view of redemp-
tion, there could have been no atonement without real suffering and
death. The whole problem assumed still greater complexity when the
doctrine of the freedom of the will was considered. It was seen
that if the unity between the divine and the human natures was
"natural", it could not have been "voluntary", and then Christ
was not the moral representative of the human race. In Irenaeus'
language, there was then no "recapitulation".

It is time for us to see how far the Church had come
from the Hebrew faith that God and man are united as Father with
child by identity in essential nature. The unending perplexity
into which the Ante- and Post-Nicene Fathers were plunged is
clearly the result of the complete antithesis which was conceived
to exist between Godhead and manhood. This posed the ineluctable
problem—how could the unrelated and essentially unrelatable have
been in relation? Only in transcendence of the ordinary limits of
nature. The truth was that it was not possible on the basis of antithesis to provide a real or an actual union between the Godhead and the manhood in Christ. Equally, from a religious point of view it was disturbingly evident that the least tampering with either the Godhead or the manhood threatened immediately the denial that Christ could have been a true Mediator, or that there could be any real union between God and the Christian. Metaphysical refinements helped to gloss this fact over, but it was there; and only Neo-Platonic mysticism, imported by strong need into the devotional life of the Church, could transcend it.

II

In the dualistic assumption of the complete opposition in nature between Godhead and manhood we have, then, the key to the exigencies under which the psychology of the definition of Chalcedon labored. We are now in a position to examine that psychology more closely. We may ask ourselves the question, Of what elements was the person of Christ conceived to be constituted? And what was their inter-relation; that is, in the modern terms, how were they integrated so as to form one person?

The definition did not attempt to catalogue all the elements of Christ's person. We shall be disappointed if we look for anything exhaustive in the way of description. But what were at that time considered the main or distinguishing constituents of personality were mentioned, as follows:

1. A body (σώμα). This word was perhaps used instead of υἱός, because the latter term had in the course of long theological usage taken a meaning that suggested what is today associated with
"carnality". A less highly-colored word was needed and found in 
\(\sigma\alpha\nu\rho\alpha\), to convey the idea of the visible and tangible "organism".\(^1\) A more obvious fact is that \(\sigma\alpha\rho\xi\) frequently stood for body and animating soul \((\psi\omega\chi\rho\iota\gamma\)\) together as these were distinguished from spirit or mind; it was thus a blanket term for the "natural" man of Pauline theology, and therefore was not definite enough as compared with \(\sigma\alpha\nu\rho\alpha\), which never meant more than "physical organism", the visible and material aspect of a man's personality. For the rest, it is hardly significant for our discussion to go much into the current notions of what the body was. It will suffice to make note of the fact that the body was not then in itself of special interest to philosophers and thinkers. The tendency of the thought of the time was to look upon the body as such as rather a static and mechanical thing. Theologians encountered in the Old and New Testaments what must have seemed to them an astonishingly high estimate of the intrinsic worth of the body. But the philosophic traditions of Greece tended to obscure and modify this fact for them. When through the logic of events it fell to the theologians to reconcile, if they could, the Greek idea of the body as a prison of the soul and the Hebrew conception of the body as absolutely essential to the personality, they failed to see the inherent contradiction, and read the Hebrew words with Greek understandings. The evidence of this appears only indirectly in the formula of Chalcedon, however, where of course, the main interest of its framers in declaring that Christ had a body was simply to insist on the fact that He had a real and living body, and was therefore

\(^1\) This distinction is present even in the New Testament, where in Paul's writings \(\sigma\alpha\nu\rho\alpha\) "is colorless as compared to \(\sigma\alpha\rho\xi\). The latter almost always implies the bodily nature as we know it in experience", i.e. corrupted by sin. H.A.A. Kennedy, St. Paul's Conception of Last Things", p 146.
subject to its necessities while He was in it.

2. A rational soul (ψυχή λογική). The meaning of this phrase is that Christ had a human soul. Much controversy, as we have seen, lay behind it. We are to understand by it that not only was the soul of Christ the life-principle of His body (the animating ψυχή ἀλογος by which physical life is sustained) but that it was the reasoning-principle of His personality, considered from the human side. In short, He was complete and perfect man. We are not justified in importing into the word as here used what is meant by "soul" in modern terminology. As one picks his way carefully through the literature, he perceives that the Greeks, with the exception of Plato and his following, never quite achieved the emancipation of the ψυχή from the world. At first, as in Homer, it meant the pale ghost of the self, a sort of second self or image, which had no part in and was of no consequence to the conscious processes during life: it was a mere shade. But with the advent of philosophy the conception of the soul underwent a rapid development. As distinguished from Homer and the Attic tragedians, the philosophers identified the soul with the ordinary consciousness of waking life; but it was predominantly thought of as a material substance, very thin and mobile and able to initiate its own movements. It is Siebeck's judgment that: "For the Greeks, the soul is a product of the world, and the rational soul primarily exists to know the world as it is, and actively shape it; the soul was consequently the means to an end or ends assigned to it by the world. To the Christian, on the contrary, the world is a means to the end of salvation, which springs from the independent and characteristic nature of the soul; for him, accordingly, the soul is not a product
of the world, but a creation of the transcendent God, conceived after the analogy of the spirit. This distinction held good until the Greek world came over to Christianity, when confusion of thought resulted, which was at its height in the period before Chalcedon. On the whole, the definition's phrase, "of a rational soul and body", is Greek. The rational soul, the implication is, was a distinctive part of the manhood. In a sense it was a real existent apart from the body; but yet—and here there was no doubt—it was within the body and under the influence of physical processes and states. It belonged to a man, that is, to one man, to one individual, and was marked therefore with all the characteristics of individuality and humanity.

In saying that Christ possessed a rational soul, then, the definition of Chalcedon asserted with some definiteness that He was marked by these characteristics of true human individuality.

3. Perfect Godhead and perfect manhood, proclaimed in two natures (Τέλειον τον αυτῶν ἐν θεότητι καὶ τέλειον τον αυτῶν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι, ἐν δύο φύσεω). We have here the crucial phrases of the definition. It is evident that they were meant to have a specific and unambiguous content. What was this content? At the outset we are confronted with a measure of confusion. The sense in which "nature" (Φύσις) was to be taken was not fixed until Chalcedon. It stood generally for the natural qualities of a person or thing. It was thus at first equivalent in a loose way to both ἄνθρωπος and ὑπόστασις. Hence when the hesitation of thought as to the meaning of these

1 Quoted by H.W. Robinson in art. Soul (Christian) in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.
terms was at its height, Cyril of Alexandria used ψυχή as standing for the whole "personality", and not a special group of attributes. But this was only to add to the confusion, which scholars everywhere were endeavoring to allay; and so "nature" subsequently came to mean something less inclusive than "personality". It stood for a certain sum of properties within the person. Accordingly, in the person of Christ the sum of the divine properties were conceived to have formed the Godhead; the sum of the human properties were conceived to have formed the manhood. These natures were in their way individual, though not fully personal; they were complete and perfect, having a certain concreteness and independence. The words of the definition may be recalled: "As regards his Godhead begotten of the Father before the ages, but yet as regards his manhood...begotten in the last days of Mary the Virgin...proclaimed in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation, the difference of the natures being in no way destroyed on account of the union, but rather the peculiar property of each nature being preserved". The two natures were thus conceived to have a distinctive or characteristic quality; and, being regarded as having substantiality, were taken to be actual and real in and by themselves, apart from anything else.

4. Substance or essence \( (οὐσία \, \text{the definition puts it thus, ὄμοούσιον τῷ πατρί, ὄμοούσιον τῶν ἀντίων ἦλιν }) \). In our formula this means "that which is common to two or more particulars, the underlying essential element shared by two or more beings". This is not the place to inquire into the long and tortuous history of \( οὐσία \) as a technical term in theology and philosophy. We simply note that a great deal of the confusion which attended
its earlier use was due to its having often meant the characteristic quality by which a thing is given individuality, the true self of a particular person; it thus almost had the significance of "personality". But this use of the term was gradually dropped after Nicaea, and in the compound form in which it appears in the definition it usefully stands for the sameness of the essential being of God and Christ, as far as Godhead was concerned, and of Christ and men, as far as manhood was concerned. As the definition has it, "We confess...one...Lord Jesus Christ...of one essence with the Father as regards his Godhead, and at the same time of one essence with us as regards his manhood, in all respects like us, apart from sin".

We come now to the question of the integration of these elements in the person of Christ.

He was declared to be one person, one hypostasis (ἐἷς ἐπίσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν). The two natures in Christ formed one indivisible person; or, more exactly, they inhered in the person of the Logos, their bond of union. This was what was meant by the two words, πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις, used for greater emphasis in this one context. The former had been in disfavor for a long period because of its having been brought into disrepute by Sabellius. But it appears in our definition in immediate association with the word which had taken its place. Used thus together, these words reinforced each other, and spoke out more unambiguously than if either had stood alone. The general sense in which they are to be taken is "personality", conceived not in the modern sense, which would be too rich in content, but simply as the unifying spirit which holds the elements of the person to-
gether in an indivisible whole, or, more abstractly, the concretely real subsistence of an individual being in which the various elements cohere. As may easily be perceived, ὑπόστασις is the vaguer, the less specific term. It originally meant "anything set under", and hence "the real nature of a thing", a meaning which caused it to be bracketed with ὁνήμα. Later it was substantially equated with πρόσωπον, and then possessed a content midway between the excessively bare "aspect" and the highly-charged "person" of present day English usage. As applied to the Trinity it therefore could not be taken "to mean three separate individuals, as if the Holy Trinity were like three men; nor yet, on the other hand, must it be understood to denote three different aspects of the Godhead, as Sabellius taught". As C.C.J. Webb has shown, πρόσωπον suggests what ὑπόστασις does not, namely, a certain external concreteness, but also that the distinction between one person and another is "one of as superficial, perhaps of as temporary a character as that between different aspects the same man may wear on different occasions or the different parts he may take in different conversations". But whatever the difference in ordinary signification, both terms converged upon one point in the insistence of the definition that "we confess and teach with one accord one and the same Son...in two natures...concurring in one person and one hypostasis—not as though parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Logos."

III

This being the psychology in the definition, it is of the utmost importance that we recognize here two facts concerning these

1Encyclo. Relig. and Ethics, IX, p 326. 2God and Personality, p 40
elements of the person of Christ which we have just examined.

In the first place, with the exception of σώμα (body), these elements were originally abstractions. They convey but little positive information, and it is difficult for us to absolve them of vagueness. In studying Jesus, the Fathers quite rightly sought by analysis a better understanding of His person. In what terms was He to be described? In meeting the question, they did not err in finding that He showed Himself under two aspects; under one aspect he appeared truly, wonderfully human; under the other, amazingly, savingly divine. Not unnaturally they accustomed themselves to speaking of His manhood and His Godhead: they found these conceptions useful in giving intellectual form to the mystery of His person. The generic term used to tie these abstractions together, so to speak, was "nature". But nobody knew exactly what even it meant before Chalcedon. The same might be said of the other terms, ὄντα, ὑπόστασις, and ἐνέργεια.

But, in the second place, these terms did not remain abstractions. The Greeks were too inveterately prone to reduce everything to the concrete and materialistic in thought; so these terms all underwent a development of meaning: they acquired a larger content whereby they subsequently stood for actual properties within the person of Christ; properties which were conceived after physical analogies to be primary and irreducible agencies or causes, ultimate in their nature, and possessing a certain substantiality and separate existence.

It is exactly here that modern psychology must put in a strong demur. This is "faculty" psychology, and has not a leg to stand upon. As we have seen in our study of human personality, in
every act the person cognitively, affectively, conatively operates as a whole. It is gravely misleading to forget at any point in the study of personality that our terms for forces and qualities within the person are at most working abstractions; and however necessary they may be as abstractions, however dependent upon them we may be if we are to think at all, they are not to be erected into separable or independently real existences.

Though we may properly draw a distinction between person and nature, as one may draw a distinction between a substance and a quality, a substantive and an adjective, they are correlative terms descriptive of a single whole. A nature does not exist apart from a person anymore than a quality exists apart from a substance. Consider the following passages, which, though drawn from another sphere of discussion, are peculiarly relevant here:

"Qualities do not fly loose as abstract entities, and substance does not exist as an undetermined somewhat—a mere 'that'—to which they are afterwards attached. The idea of substance is the idea of the qualities as unified and systematized, and indicating, through this unity or system, the presence of a concrete individual. The two ideas, therefore, are in the strictest sense inseparable—the two aspects of every reality—its existence and its nature. Nothing exists except as qualitatively determined; and its existence as such and such an individual is, in fact, determined or constituted by the systematic unity of the qualities. But the scholastic tradition of the substance as a substratum—something in which the qualities inhere—suggests the notion that substance and qualities are two separate facts, the substance or 'support of accidents' being something behind the qualities, over and above them, a bit of reality stuff, so to speak, an atom or core of mere existence, on which the qualitative determinations are hung".¹

"It is no doubt in accordance with a law of thought that we refund the multiplicity of the qualities into the unity of the substance; but living thought, as it functions thus in actual experience, has no suspicion of the terrible impasse it is preparing for itself...It is only the bungling reflection of the philosopher that ignores the essential relativity of the two conceptions and substantiates the two aspects as two separate facts".²

The error here pointed out is exactly that of the definition of Chalcedon. Natures no more fly loose from persons, than qualities from substances; nor are person and nature in any single case to be substantiated as separate facts.

When we study come to the study of the person of Jesus, we speak at the peril of misconceiving Him psychologically, unless we recognize at every point, that what the Creeds refer to as the "two natures" are simply qualitative aspects of a concrete person. Certainly the Fathers are to be forgiven their error, because they were addressing themselves to an insuperable difficulty in their time, baffling their best thinking; the sharp metaphysical dualism to which they were committed, the complete opposition between the quasi-physical substances of Godhead and manhood, drove them relentlessly to the psychologically unintelligible adverbs of Chalcedon. Man had not capacity for the infinite, they thought.

There lies the root of the confusion. And what is the result? Let us see what Dr. Mackintosh has to say in the course of his keen criticism, unsparing and sympathetic at once in its dissection:

"The doctrine of the two natures, in its traditional form, imports into the life of Christ an incredible and thoroughgoing dualism. In place of that perfect unity which is felt in every impression of Him, the whole is bisected sharply with the fissure of distinction. Christ executed this as God, it is said, and suffered this as man. Now, this leaves a profoundly disappointing impression of unethical mystery and even, in a sense, duplicity... Always the result has been that deity and humanity in Christ are joined in ways so external that either may be contemplated and (so to speak) analyzed in abstraction from the other. It is an unquestioned merit in the ecclesiastical Christology that it brings out emphatically the basal oneness of Christ with God, insisting further that this oneness is, in ultimate character, mysterious; it is a grave fault, on the other hand, that it should so construe this mystery as to get wholly out of touch with the actualities of the New Testament. Briefly, the doctrine of the two natures, if taken seriously, gives us two abstractions instead of one reality,
two impotent halves in place of one living whole. It hypostatizes falsely two aspects of a single concrete life—aspects which are so indubitably real that apart from either the whole fact would be quite other than it is, yet not in themselves distinctly functioning substantialities which may be logically estimated or adjusted to each other, or combined in unspiritual modes.

"In the second place,...the ancient dogma proceeds on the definite assumption that, in both God and man, there exists a complex whole of attributes and qualities, which can be understood and spoken about as a 'nature' enjoying some kind of real being apart from the unifying or focal Ego; whereas nothing is more certain than that it is within personal experience, and only there, that all the varied factors of our human life—intellectual, moral, social—have any proper existence or reality. To put it frankly, when we abstract from personality—the spirit which gathers the manifold particulars into unity and suffuses each with the glow and intimacy of specifically conscious life—what we vaguely call 'human nature' is not human nature in the least. It is at most hypothetical raw material, which, if taken up into and shot through with self-consciousness, becomes an organic factor in real human experience, but in separation, as untenanted or by itself, it is no more human nature than hydrogen by itself is aquatic nature. We must not be tempted into the obvious mistake of regarding one element in a living unity as being the same thing outside the unity as within it".1

It will be perceived at once that psychology leads to no other conclusion than this; but let Dr. Mackintosh make the application.

"Now in tradition human nature is thus taken (even if it be only provisionally) as real apart from personality. According to the technical phrase, the manhood is anhypostatic. What constitutes the person is the Ego of the pre-existent Logos, who assumes into union with His own hypostasis that whole complex briefly described as 'human nature', conveying to it the properties of His divinity. Certain teachers of the Church, who felt keenly the unreal character of an impersonal humanity, strove to redress the balance by asserting that our Lord's manhood is personal separately or in its own right, with the unavoidable result that two personalities came only too plainly to be predicated of the one Christ...something we see quite well to be impossible.

"This dilemma, then—the Scylla of a duplex personality and the Charybdis of an impersonal manhood—has invariably proved fatal to the doctrine of two natures. If it takes Jesus' manhood seriously, it makes shipwreck on the notion of a double Self. If, on the other hand, it insists on the unity of the person, the unavoidable result is to abridge the integrity of the manhood and present a Figure whom it is difficult to identify with the Jesus of the Synoptic Gospels".2

1The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, p 294 2Ibid, p 296
not its ultimate purport—that God was man in Christ Jesus, and
that no doctrine is to be countenanced which denies in logic the
full measure of that perfect union—rather, what now leads and has
always led to confusion, indeed to age-long tension of mind, is its
scholastic realism, its hypostatization of abstractions, what the
psychologists call reifying the objects of thought.

It is natural in the process of reflective thinking to
ask what the nature of a thing is, and to rest in the answer that
the nature of any particular thing is the sum of the attributes
or qualities of that thing from a certain angle or point of view.
The nature of a stone is the sum of its qualities of hardness,
immobility, and the like. The nature of a man is his humanity. So
long as we hold fast to the fact that this nature is an abstraction,
we may safely employ it in our reasoning. But if we naively consider
it something more than an abstraction, and endow it with what in
our thought is a real existence, as if it were something material
and actual entering from the outside, as it were, into the unity
of the thing which it qualifies, and imparting itself to that
thing as its "nature", we involve ourselves in palpable fallacy.

We gain nothing—in fact, we fly in the face of patent
fact—in denying that this sort of realism runs through the formula
of Chalcedon. In any attempt to prove that the term "nature" is
employed only as an abstraction, with a formal and not a material
content, we have the unmistakable language of the definition itself
against us. One is certainly safe in saying that such phrases as
"proclaimed in two natures...the difference of the natures being
in no way destroyed on account of the union, but rather the pecul-
lar property of each nature being preserved", were applied to what
were conceived to be concretely real existences. The result was the fundamental dualism of which we have had such ample evidence, the division within the consciousness of Jesus to be resolved only at the cost of impersonalizing one or the other of the two natures, or as an alternative, of making both natures personal and splitting His consciousness in two between two indwelling personalities.

It takes no discernment to see that either course must in the nature of the case prove far too costly to be permanently satisfying to mind and heart.

IV

But, unless the untenable position taken at Chalcedon be abandoned, there is no escape from either course. An appeal to the history of doctrine entirely confirms this view.

It will be generally admitted that the great Catholic divines left the problem unsolved to be the heritage of the modern mind. Take so eminent an example as Anselm. In "Cur Deus Homo?" his position is determined by the Western interpretation of Chalcedon.

"The divine and human nature cannot be interchanged... nor mingled. If it could be that one nature should be changed into the other, the Person would be only God and not man, or only man and not God. Or, if they were mingled so that from two natures combined together some third nature should be formed (as from two individual animals of different species, male and female, a third is born which does not preserve the entire nature of either father or mother, but a combination of both) he would be neither man nor God".1

See, however, what this leads him to:

"We assert that the Divine nature is undoubtedly incapable of suffering, and cannot at all be humbled from its lofty estate, or toil in anything it wills to do. But we say that the Lord Jesus Christ was true God and true man, one Person in two natures, and

1 Book II, chap 7.
two natures in one Person. Wherefore, when we say that God suffers any humiliation or infirmity, we do not understand it of the loftiness of His impassible nature, but of the infirmity of His human substance which He assumed; and thus it is seen that there is no reasonable objection to our faith.¹

But there is objection to that faith; and the objection is, that it proposes, to say the least, a psychological abnormality. It is a verbal solution merely, to say "one Person" while really pinning faith upon a dual personality with a divided consciousness.

The Reformers did not do any better. In the Confession of Rochelle, prepared by Calvin and his pupil, De Chandieu, we read:

"We believe that in one person, that is, Jesus Christ, the two natures are actually and inseparably joined and united, and yet each remains in its proper character...the divine nature retaining its attributes...the human nature having its form, measure, and attributes".²

The Westminster Confession follows the same general conception exactly:

"Two whole, perfect and distinct natures, the Godhead and manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person".³ "Christ, in the work of mediation, acteth according to both natures; by each nature doing that which is proper to itself".⁴

The Lutherans began with far more satisfactory presuppositions as to the possibility of personal union between God and man. The Formula of Concord condemns the error of saying, "That it is only a phrase, and a certain mode of speaking, when it is said: God is man, and man is God; since divinity has nothing really common with humanity, and humanity nothing common with Deity".⁵ God and man are akin. The Formula has no difficulty therefore in declaring that the divine and human natures in Christ are personally united, and so completely that there are not two Christs but

¹Bk I, chap 8. ²Art xv. ³Chap VIII,2. ⁴VII,7. ⁵Art. VIII.
one and the same Son of God and Son of Man. Nevertheless, the ancient formulations are so brought in from the Greeds as to nullify the gains made. "Each nature retains its own essential attributes as such that cannot become the attributes of the other nature". It is expressly stated that their union in one person is of the most intimate character, not such a union "as the combination when two boards are glued together, where neither confers anything on the other nor receives anything from the other. But, rather, here is the highest communion which God truly has with the man" He has assumed. Yet further on we read: "Wherefore the Son of God has truly suffered for us, but according to the attribute of human nature, which he assumed into the unity of his divine person". And so on.

It becomes apparent that it is not religious experience, nor even theology as interpreting religious experience, which is here at fault: the fault is in the psychology, divorced as it is from life and made "according to measure" for theology. So long as the belief remains that it is psychologically possible for natures and attributes to exist apart, and in abstraction from persons, so long there will be confusion in Christology. The foundations for this belief have been swept away. Personality is not the sum, nor the result of the union, of separately real entities; its nature and attributes are aspects of, qualities characterizing, the central and dynamic single entity, the person. And if imperfect personality reveals itself under such diverse aspects as a baser nature and a better nature, or a lower will and a higher will, perfect personality is manifest through a single consciousness as one will in nature. The manifoldness of per-
sonality springs from its essential inner unity; its unity is not in the last analysis a synthesis won from manifoldness.

V

Surely it is not religious insight which is at fault in the greater part of recent Christological speculation; it is the psychological clothing in which that insight is bodied forth which has misled the earnest minds to which that insight has come. We see in many of the Christological treatises of the present century error, but truth struggling in the forms of error.

In Ottley's "Doctrine of the Incarnation", for example, the passage guarding "the reality, integrity, and permanence of that human nature which the Son of God by an act of infinite con-decension assumed" is followed by an erroneous insistence upon its having been impersonal:

"It subsisted in the Divine nature 'not existing as we exist, but, so to say, grafted on Him, or, as a garment in which He was clad'. It will be said that this doctrine is unintelligible and self-contradictory; that will is inconceivable apart from personality, and manhood incomplete, but the answer is that in some way it expresses facts of Christian consciousness which lie beyond analysis, nor can it be said to do violence to the profound mystery which encompasses the whole subject of personality".

And then in a footnote it is added:

"It has been suggested that the absence of human personality may correspond to the fact that our Lord had no human father; that 'while the plastic form of humanity is derived from the woman, personality is transmitted in some mysterious way from the father'".¹

It is a passage of great importance in an authoritative treatise, but there is in it almost a deliberate disregard of psychological, not to speak of biological, reality. The result is a readiness to come to unsatisfactory conclusions as to the

relations of the two natures:

"These considerations lead us to believe that there was occasionally at least a 'quiescence' of the Divine nature of Christ; in His temptation, in His endurance of suffering, in His passion, we must think that there was a real self-restraint of the 'beams of Deity'.".1

And yet it is contended that in His temptations "the victory of Christ is an ethical and real one"!

Bishop Weston's deeply religious and impressive "The One Christ" is a strong attempt to establish the single self-consciousness of Christ as God in manhood; but the psychological presuppositions of this central thesis are derived from the setting up of faculties within the person, and are to that extent fallacious. Thus:

"He (Christ) is the ego of the manhood: and a human will is an essential function of such an ego. But He is the ego of manhood because He is divine, and a divine will is an essential function of a divine person. So that the two wills of Christ must always be confessed".2 Then on the cross, "the vision of God was suddenly withdrawn from the soul of Jesus: and alone He entered the darkness. One by one the faculties of His manhood became inactive...Heart and mind alike failed Him...There remained to Him in action only His will".3

In much the same manner Bishop Gore has written:

"Now let it be granted that the phrase an 'impersonal manhood' is an unfortunate one. What it means is that there was no independent seat of personality in the manhood of Jesus, but that it found its personality in being taken by the Son...But the picture in the Gospels requires, as it seems to me, the recognition, in the background, of the two natures and the two wills. Here is a human will obedient to the Father. But only a human will? No; if so, there could have been no redemption...And the consciousness of Jesus, is it merely human? No; there is another element in it...Here are fundamentally two natures, a divine and a human--two wills or consciousnesses, a divine and a human; and these 'natures' are divine: only by a supreme act of divine sympathy the divine has so emptied itself of divine prerogatives as to be able to live and act in and through a human nature and human faculties".4

This faculty psychology will not do, however.

1Op cit, p 610 2P.169 3P.275 4Reconstruction of Belief, pp858-60
VI

But, it may be asked, is there no way of conserving the ancient dogma by psychologically re-interpreting it?

An attempt so to conserve it has recently been made, and should be touched upon. It is the revival of the doctrine of Enhypostasia. Leontius of Byzantium, it will be remembered, made the most successful scholastic attempt to interpret Chalcedon. The manhood, argued he, had its hypostasis in the person of the Logos.

Now Leontius' exposition of his famous doctrine shows a great deal of fresh insight. Although, in Dorner's words, he conceived mechanically of the union of the natures, as though they were inserted into each other, he saw that a "nature" is not a self-subsistent thing. He showed that in point of meaning "essence" is not the same as "essential"; in modern terms, the substantive is not the adjective. "Such are all qualities", he wrote, "both those called 'essential' and those called 'non-essential', none of which is an essence, i.e. a self-subsistent thing, but one which is always seen in connection with the essence, as color in the body or knowledge in the soul. So that the man who says, 'Nature (phusis) does not exist without hypostasis', speaks truth".1

But did Leontius follow his insight to its logical issue? Have his modern followers followed his insight to its logical issue? Let us see.

As to Leontius himself, he no sooner saw the implications of the fact that a "nature" presupposes a personality than he hastened to add that one may not argue from the fact of an invariable association of two things to their equivalence: a nature is 1Adv.N. et E, 1. 1277, D.f. Relton's translation (in A Study in Christology).
not equivalent to a personality; not being without hypostasis is not equivalent to being an hypostasis. "It is just as if a man were to say—and truly—that the body is not without form, and then go on to conclude that the form is the body. Hypostasis is nature, but nature is not hypostasis".\footnote{1} This is good dialectic; but we perceive that a fallacious assumption goes with it; and the assumption is this, that, while a nature never appears without an hypostasis, it appears as a separable thing, something real by itself, like a leaf that requires a tree for its existence, but itself shivers in the wind. But this is perhaps too dynamic a figure.

Nature is something an hypostasis assumes; and such is the real existence of a nature as a separate fact, that an hypostasis may have more than one nature, or having one nature may acquire another. So Christ had one hypostasis and two natures, because to His divine nature and hypostasis He added a human nature. To use Leontius' example, the argument was as if a man were to say, a form requires a body for it to exist, but two forms may get into one body.

Which may be very superior scholastic reasoning; but it leaves the facts of life to one side.

Dr. R.M. Relton, his chief modern follower, has the same object of rendering acceptable the whole of the Chalcedonian formula. He estimates the value of Leontius' doctrine in these terms:

"Leontius secures for the manhood an hypostasis; and thus saves it from being regarded as a mere series of attributes, or a mere accident of the Godhead. Although, according to this theory, the manhood has no independent personality of its own, and had, in fact, no existence at all before the Incarnation; nevertheless it becomes hypostatic in the Person of the Logos and receives its subsistence from Him. It thus reaches its completeness, and comes to self-consciousness in Him at every stage of its growth and development... According to the doctrine of Enhypostasia, what did the humanity lack in order to its perfection? The answer surely is 'Nothing'. And the reason is that the Logos brought to the humanity every element which it lacked, in order to make it complete. What were these elements? Certainly one was human personality, the most

\footnote{1}{Ibid.}"
distinctive and characteristic constituent of human nature, without which it could not be said to be human. But could the Logos, Who Himself possessed Divine Personality, give to the human nature He took human personality?"1

Dr. Relton answers, yes.

Now, we have two difficulties with this. The first is, that a nature is considered as so entirely able to function by itself that the Logos can "take" it as an entity real in itself. The second difficulty is, that the theory we have here is simply docetism. When Dr. Relton asks the question just quoted, and answers that Divine Personality contains within itself all that goes to make up what is human personality, we gladly agree with him in this long step forward; but when he goes on to posit that the Logos, in assuming human nature, contributed to it the human personality which it needed for its completion, we are compelled to ask in return: in that case did Christ the Logos assume more than the flesh and its physiological functions? If personality is, as we have been brought to view it, the living and growing unity of the total Self in all its attributes, there can be no attributes prior to and apart from personality, and no personality prior to and without attributes—there can be no nature hanging like a cloak in some spiritual wardrobe until a personality comes along and dons it. Nature and personality spring into being together. Personality is the quantitative reality of which its nature is the qualitative representation. The statement that the Logos gave to the human nature He "took" human personality is, on examination, nonsense, unless in this case we equate human nature with the human body and "veiled in flesh the Godhead see".

As a matter of fact, the whole attempt to conceive of

1A Study in Christology, p 90-91.
human nature as though it were a quantitative block of attributes added to other elements, in conjunction with which it forms Man, can proceed only by ignoring the fact that in approaching a perfect person, like Jesus, or any other person, we are dealing in dynamics, not statics. Any single quality of His person which we select for consideration is a quality of the whole, seen from a particular angle; and the whole is a living whole. To say that the manhood of Christ had a separate existence as something statically almost as real as a brick in a wall is to speak mythologically; while to say that it was without independent personality is to level with the left hand what the right hand has set up; it is to justify the remark, "The speech here is of ghosts and shades of the imagination, for the manhood is without any content whatsoever".

We are compelled on the basis of the conviction of His perfect manhood, to assert of Jesus that He was one person, with a single consciousness, and one will, in no way divided, His whole nature being from one aspect fully human, from another radiantly divine. This is the Gospel picture. "The self-consciousness of Jesus, as depicted in the evangelists, we may call Divine or human as we please; to express the whole truth we must call it both at once". His divinity and His humanity appear at once and together in every act.

To speak of two distinct natures in Christ—two wills or consciousnesses, a divine and a human—in one person, is to employ fictitious terms and erect a mythological Christology.

VII

Such is the psychological fallacy which underlies the definition of Chalcedon. We should bear in mind, of course,

1 H.R. Mackintosh, op. cit., p 294.
that it was the best view of the times. The times could not go further. It was all the insight then possible.

But that is just the point. If the philosophical or theological postulates were misleading (and we believe they were, insofar as they admitted an irreconcilable dualism of Godhead and manhood), the psychological postulates were mistaken to a grave degree.

What to do then? To begin with, we must return to the New Testament (whither psychology, which finds little there on the score of which it can pick a lasting quarrel, points us) and, with the aid of modern insight into the nature of personality, we ought to reconstruct our Christology. The old "faculty" conception of the person of Christ is no longer tenable; but the conception of His divinity, as of His humanity, is as tenable as ever. Nothing can touch the essential fact of it, that Jesus was "truly God and truly man". Nor is there need to conceive of this in terms of moral self-uplift crowned by apotheosis. The fact that God was in His Son reconciling the world to Himself stands and shall stand. We are not called upon to revise that fact, but simply to revise the construction put upon that fact.

The following essay in reconstruction is based upon the conviction that in these days of deeper and clearer insight into the nature of personality, the revising and reconstructing of the traditional Christology, at the points where it betrays the inadequacy of limited insight, may well be considered a religious as well as a theological duty.
PART III

THE APPROACH TO JESUS FROM PSYCHOLOGY
 CHAPTER XI

THE APPROACH TO JESUS FROM PSYCHOLOGY

Of all the special sciences, from mathematics to sociology, it would seem that psychology has the most direct contribution to make to religious thought. Its subject-matter insures its always remaining more nearly allied to theology than to the mathematical sciences. This statement would be met by some psychologists with a vigorous, if not a heated, denial. It is their special bugbear that this can be said; and they indulge a hope of removing the last doubt of those who question whether psychology can ever be made really scientific, by declaring for a purely objective study of human behavior in terms of stimulus and response. But the very vehemence, the much-shouting, involved in their reiterated disclaimer that psychology has "minds" to study, deepens the suspicion that there is an inconveniently large body of evidence to be explained away, and that, valuable though the contribution of the Behaviorists may ultimately prove, these meticulous scientists have come perilously near to pushing their excision of the so-called "mystical" hypotheses to the point of leaving psychology out of psychology. We conclude that the concept "mind" corresponds to a reality in the world of experience which must be taken into account.

Another group of psychologists admit mind and consciousness into their subject-matter, but see in psychology the final supercession of religion and religious theory. Freud even suggests that "metaphysics" will hereafter be known as "metapsychology".¹ Now this only shows that Freud cannot go very far in psychology.

¹ PsychoPathology of Everyday Life, Eng. tr., p 309.
without coming upon ground also covered by religious theory. There is indeed an intimate relation between the final conclusions of psychology and religion. Psychology is interested in the same experiences with which religious theory is concerned, the difference in method of approach being simply the familiar one, that where the former seeks merely to describe the latter seeks to interpret.

It seems difficult to persuade some psychologists, however, of the validity of the interpretation made for religion; dealing as they are with facts from the subjective side, or from the viewpoint of behavior, they are prone to think that when they have described the processes of religious faith they have exhausted the faith itself. "It is impossible," writes Mr. F.R. Barry, "to read any recent psychological literature without being faced by extremely disturbing questions in ethics, metaphysics and theology. Indeed, it may be that many of these books are more important and repaying for the sake of the questions they are bound to raise than for the positive results they achieve". But with insight and candor Mr. Barry adds, "I am convinced that it is superficial, and ultimately very bad philosophy, to regard psychology in its modern form as in any way an effective menace to the Christian interpretation of the Universe".¹ We think this a sound conclusion. Psychology is neither the substitute for religion nor even its most dangerous enemy. Impotent in itself to deal with ultimate questions in religion and philosophy, it plays a useful part as fact-gatherer for the metaphysician, the interpreter. The interpreter ought to be interested and grateful: there is light here.

¹ Christianity and Psychology, p 158.
Psychology, then, gathers but does not have any warrant in interpreting finally the facts about human nature. "The general principle to be applied here," says Dr. Drever, "is that psychology is no more concerned with the ultimate nature and meaning of reality than is any other science. All that psychology is concerned with, is the description and orderly arrangement, or scientific explanation, of the facts of experience from the inner or subjective side, and the relation of these facts of experience to the observed behavior of living organisms, but not at all with the ultimate meaning of these facts, or of experience, or of life". That is, we may be allowed to interpret, with our particular purpose in this discussion in mind, psychology is concerned with experience from the human side; psychology as such predicates no specifically divine agency. But let Dr. Drever resume: "On the other hand, the conclusions and the hypotheses of psychology, as of other sciences, necessarily furnish problems for philosophy. Philosophy must begin, as it were, where psychology leaves off".¹

It may be seen that this not only rebukes the psychologists who have strayed beyond the boundaries of their science, but leaves to philosophy, and theology with it, a very great responsibility. Both these departments of human thought are bound to respect the ascertained facts. Truth, from whatever source it comes, can only bring light, even though interpretations which have stood for centuries unchallenged are brought in question by it and made subject to correction and revision.

Now psychology seems to have brought forward newly-discovered truth. Philosophy and theology can only gain by its accep—

¹ Instinct in Man, p 11, 12.
tance and valid (as contrasted with the narrowly psychological and invalid) interpretation. It will not do, of course, to be too hasty in taking the word of psychology for it, that certain hypotheses have become proven facts; the findings must be carefully sifted and weighed; but when that has been done, the trustworthy data remaining shed a very helpful light on our theological problems.

We perceive that the doctrine of the person of Christ is particularly affected; and not for the worse. The approach from psychology is of exceptional value.

Such an approach is, first, the rather circumscribed endeavor to see what psychology can tell us about Jesus. It is giving proper weight to the assured findings of psychology. It should be noted that, properly, the question we put is not, as some doubtless would have it perhaps, What a priori considerations as to Jesus' humanity can we urge before applying psychology to Him, so far as such considerations will allow? If we are consistent in our adoption of the psychological approach, in the nature of the case we are bringing psychology to bear upon Jesus, not Jesus to bear upon psychology. We are not seeking to understand psychology better; we are seeking to understand Jesus better.

In the second place, our psychological approach is from the point of view of the humanity of Jesus. Since the aim of psychology is severely limited to giving us a more exact and scientific account of human nature, we are necessarily obliged to make our approach a human approach, or, in other words, an attempt to obtain a better understanding of the divine mystery of the person of Jesus from a study of His humanity.

The theological study of Jesus, in contrast, may legi—
timately attack the problem of His person from a preliminary considera-
ton of the nature of God as revealed to human experience and reason; it is not bound to approach by way of a study of hu-
mnity. The inherent nature of the question is such that either of these approaches may logically lead alike to the same result, alike make for the deepened conviction that in Jesus we have One who was divinely human, and humanly divine.

The Fathers grappled stoutly with the problems involved in a consideration of His divinity. They put the preliminary ques-
tion: What was the manner of the Son's coming in the flesh, Godhead being what it is? We have seen how representative Athanasius was of his age in his tenacious clinging to the faith that God became man that man might become divine, the supremely important question with him being, Did the Son of God come in Jesus? And his supremely satisfying faith was gathered from the assurance that the Son of God was, by the glorious grace of God, the Nazarene.

Thus the psychological approach to Jesus, in the day of the Fathers, was an attempt to provide as reasonable a view as possible of the human states and conditions assumed by the divine Logos. The human nature was reached through the divine nature; psychology adapted itself to the needs of theology, and risked no opinions without first obtaining the authorization and sanction of theology.

We should be clear that today psychology is severely limited to reaching the divine in Jesus through the human in Him; that it cannot operate from metaphysical presuppositions; though it may give itself with enthusiasm to an inquiry preparing the way for possible metaphysical deductions. The approach to Jesus from
psychology is an approach through a study of Jesus as He was, and the question of how He came to be does not obtrude itself. Psychology, therefore, in any application to Jesus grapples stoutly with the problem: What manner of person was Jesus, and what must have been His experience, human nature being what it is?

To put the matter in still another light, the theological approach to Jesus, as we find it in the Creeds, or as we find it today among certain theologians, is determined by the answer to the question, "What is God?" while the psychological approach is determined by the answer to the question, "What is man?"

This distinction is of great practical importance to our discussion. We find ourselves able to ask, with some hope of an unconfused answer, a number of pertinent questions, from the point of view of psychology, about the self-consciousness of Jesus, His character and disposition, His mind and will, His sinlessness and humility, His obedience and sacrifice, His griefs and joys. We shall not find ourselves obliged at the outset to support any presuppositions of a theological nature about His divinity, derived from kenotic or other points of view; but we may lead up to them, and reach theologically significant conclusions at the last. But this will require us, in Part IV, to pass beyond psychology.

Meanwhile, having made our position clear, we may proceed with more assurance of being understood.
CHAPTER XII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF JESUS' SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

In the main the Gospels present us with little data as to
the early development of Jesus. They are for the most part content
with a description of the activities of a fully self-conscious
Person. They make some note of the content of that consciousness;
they know little, apparently, of the manner by which that content
was acquired.

Luke is an exception in this particular. He may be said
to furnish us with the chief facts concerning the youth of Jesus
upon which we can base a reconstruction of the course of His devel-
opment. For where Matthew, Mark, and John contain some stray hints--
some of them valuable--Luke gives us information that has a direct
bearing upon Jesus' early years. By its aid we may find our way
to a reconstruction of the steps which must have marked His growth.

Here psychology is of the greatest assistance.

I

We begin with Luke's special contribution. His priceless
story of the "lost" boy in the Temple is as invaluable on psycho-
logical as on historical grounds; its clues are of major impor-
tance. Indeed it is the starting-point from which we may work back-
ward and forward over the years before the Baptism and Temptation.

The story is very simply related. "Every year his par-
ents used to travel to Jerusalem at the Passover festival; and
when he was twelve years old they went up as usual to the festival.
After spending the full number of days they came back, but the boy
Jesus stayed behind in Jerusalem. His parents did not know of
this; they supposed he was in the caravan and travelled on for a day, searching for him among their kinsfolk and acquaintances. Then, as they failed to find him, they came back to Jerusalem in search of him. Three days later they found him in the temple, seated among the teachers, listening to them and asking them questions, till all his hearers were amazed at the intelligence of his own answers. When his parents saw him they were astounded, and his mother said to him, 'My son, why have you behaved like this to us? Here have your father and I been looking for you anxiously!' 'Why did you look for me?' he said. 'Did you not know I had to be at my Father's house?' But they did not understand what he said'.

The authenticity of this story is in no danger of being called in question by psychology. Psychologically, it is just what we should expect.

We note three striking facts: (1) that, beyond any inkling that Joseph and Mary may have had of the fact, Jesus had begun to think for Himself and particularly feel for Himself, at the normal age for such individuation; (2) His adolescent enthusiasm led Him quite unconsciously to seek and to maintain His self-determination in the face of parental misunderstanding; and (3) Mary, with whom Joseph apparently was in agreement, was surprised and pained.

It does strike us as somewhat difficult of explanation that Jesus should have been so unconcerned about the return of His folks to Nazareth: He seems not to have realized that He was causing them the most intense anxiety.

But we have analogies in the history of genius which afford close parallels to this self-absorption. He was simply

\[ \text{Lk 2: 41-50.} \]
"rapt up", in the manner of deeply religious souls of every age, and no consideration of time and place affected His quest. Naively and whole-heartedly as a child, for such He still was, He gave himself up to the exploration of His deepening experience of God the Father. How naturally the words fall from His lips, "Did you not know I had to be at my Father's house?"

Some perplexity still remains. Joseph and Mary did not find Jesus until the third day. How and where did He spend all this time? Did He not "come to Himself" and discover He was lost? Was He not worried? Apparently not. Then, what we must assume is an awakening of the most unusual character. Far beyond the ordinary, Jesus was aware of the Divine Presence. He was utterly occupied by the quest of God. He desired with all the yearning of His young heart to know and understand the Father. So far, He had been satisfied in the main to know Him through the teaching of His mother, through the simple and genuine piety of Joseph, and through the lessons of the synagogue and history. But now He wanted to know Him for Himself, personally, vitally.

He could think of nothing else.

With this He began to show, all at once, so Mary thought, an unwonted abstraction and independence. She could not understand, she who had been all in all to her home and children, that Jesus was growing up, and had begun, without conscious self-assertion (so natural was the development) to require a measure of personal liberty and to exercise his undoubted right of self-determination.

To His own thought, it was apparent that He needed the Father in Heaven more than all things else in the world. With an influx of tense emotion, a tightening of the heart-strings, a pure
ardor, such as adolescence furnishes us many an example of, He resolved to do, first and always, God's will—always and first.

This, which was the crucial step toward emancipation from the ties of childhood, is what the journey to Jerusalem had done for Jesus.

II

Working back, now, from the Temple incident, we reach certain interesting conclusions concerning the home-life at Nazareth.

Jesus appears to have been a perfectly normal boy, and at the period when such a development is in order, he showed the first awakenings of the independence of manhood. The significance of this is very great. It may be laid down as a rule, that "independence of thought and action, enterprise, enthusiasm, and love of learning are the natural attributes of the child who has not been inhibited and mismanaged in early youth".¹

Was it really true, as we should expect from this, that Jesus' home-life was such as to allow a perfect development?

Here we strike difficulty. The Temple incident shows clearly that Joseph and Mary were unable to understand just what the significance was of Jesus' declaration. Mary felt pained indeed at Jesus' apparent callousness to her feelings. It is recorded that she kept Jesus' saying in her heart without understanding it—which, in this case, amounts to not understanding Him.

Later on, it was all to come to a heart-rending crisis. Joseph and his calming counsel were then gone from her: he had died perhaps some time before Jesus' ministry. Jesus had taken the place thus vacated as bread-winner and chief of the household. Then abruptly He had left His home for His hazardous ministry. Friends

¹Geraldine Coster, PsychoAnalysis for Normal People, p 215.
Friends and relatives harassed her with grave suspicions as to His sanity: He was out of His mind, He was under the power of Beelzebub or some other evil spirit. His brothers and sisters were of a like opinion. And so, at last, she determined to go in search of Him, and bring Him with her to the quiet and reasonable life from which His excitement had taken Him.

But, though at Capernaum she found Him, He had been driven by her importunity virtually to disown her; and she returned broken-hearted to Nazareth.

It is a pitiful story—for all its happy ending.

Now what are we to do with this fact—the rift between Mary and Jesus during the greater part of His ministry, if we may speak the truth frankly? Does it argue against Jesus having had in early childhood a perfect home-life?

One or other of two things must have been true. Mary was not an indifferent mother (so much is evident on the face of things) and either she was incompetent or the opposite. Now in the decision as to which she was, the psychological criterion to be applied is the subsequent history of Jesus, not the subsequent history of Mary. If His development through youth and early manhood was perfectly normal, then we are psychologically bound to hold that to the child-Jesus Mary was a perfect mother, unless the other conclusion is forced upon us. But it is not. No indication remains that Mary was not a good mother.

It is not at all impossible for Mary to have been a perfect mother, so long as Jesus was what little boys all the world over are, dependent little bundles of physical energy, healthy of body, and needing only the simplest mental nourishment, the mind
being in the normal course of things quite simply constituted all
the while. Such could have been her devotion to the perfect child
dependent upon her, that with a mother's accurate and sympathetic
intuition, she could foresee every danger, physical and psychic,
threatening his development, and protect Him from them. Nor would
this be all. Intuition surely endowed her with the mother-wit to
prepare her child for the future, to instruct Him in the arts of
living, to teach Him in her perfectly natural and adequate way
about God, man, and the world, not endeavoring, _malapropos_, and
as a man might, to give Him the strong meat of _Sarucee_ or _Essene_
or _Sribal_ teaching, but persevering rather in feeding Him upon
the milk of her own creed. 'In so doing, she imparted to Him the
pure essence of her religious faith and trust, a very living thing,
to her and to Him.

Instinctively and intuitively, then, Mary must have been
the mother to meet His need. "We may infer that his home conditions
were as nearly as possible perfect—his relations with His mother,
with Joseph, and with the people of His village free from the avoid-
able thwartings and difficulties which hinder the natural devel-
opment of the ordinary child with ordinary parents".¹ And so He
reached adolescence without anything abnormal entering into His
mental constitution. _Mens sana in corpore sano._

Then when Mary ceased to do as well by Him, and obstructed
Him one way and another, so surely had the foundations been laid
for all His subsequent development, that her fall from perfection
could no longer avail to change Him.

What seems to have happened to Mary is this. She loved
Jesus with utter and passionate devotion; He was her perfect son,

¹Coster, op. cit. p 214.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF JESUS' SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

perfect from babyhood; and when at adolescence He took on the individuality and independence of a self-determining person, she could not reconcile herself to her "loss"—she had lost her baby. Thereafter, though she strained every nerve to maintain her sweet dominion over Him, He grew daily more and more beyond her understanding. She doubtless found great comfort after the Temple incident in His presence among her other sons in the carpenter shop; but when He left her at last to enter upon His ministry, she was broken-hearted and fearful.

This, of course, is largely hypothetical; but it affords a reasonable psychological view of the facts, considered from all sides. At any rate, we shall assume its general truth tentatively.

III

Proceeding, then, on the presumption of a perfectly normal development of the personality of Jesus, let us take note of certain conditioning factors in His environment, from the point of view of their influence upon Him.

First in time in its influence upon the content of His thinking was the home and its immediate surroundings in Nazareth. We have already considered the role that Mary played in His development, and we have yet to take a brief survey of other influences in His early home-life. Its physical aspects can be most easily reconstructed. "Nazareth", says Renan, "in the time of Jesus differed little perhaps from what it is today. We see the streets where He played when a child, in the stony paths or little crossways which separate the dwellings. Joseph's house doubtless much resembled those poor shops, lighted by the door, having for furni-
ture a mat, some cushions on the ground, one or two clay pots, and a painted chest. Some part of the property must have been set apart for the carpenter shop or shed, with its tools, its bench, and its boards and beams. Probably also, Joseph was a contractor for and builder of clay and stone walls and roofs, as well as a worker in wood and maker of yokes and plows.

It is not difficult to imagine the child Jesus returning from play in the narrow, stony streets, and standing on one side framing interested questions, or silent with very excess of absorbed attention, watching Joseph at his work.

Perhaps Christian literature generally has been deficient in appreciation of Joseph. He was the father of the home, and, if at all representative of his race, deeply and loyally devoted to his family. That he was wise, considerate, fore-thoughtful, full of lovingkindness and tender mercy, is a legitimate inference from the teaching of Jesus, permeated as it is by a constant exaltation of the role of fatherhood, human and Divine. Indeed, from the psychological standpoint, we are obliged to assume that Joseph was the best of fathers to Jesus.

And then, of course, Jesus shared in the minor burdens incident to the more or less tumultuous life of a large family. He was the eldest of five sons and at least two daughters. A happy, wholesome life it must have been! Certainly not stagnant. There were chores. He ran to the village fountain for water. He helped his younger brothers and sisters to work and play. We can see Him lead them out for their first toddling walks before the house. Surely there was sometimes dissent among all these children; but Mary and Joseph—and Jesus—played their part wisely, we may be-

1The Life of Jesus, (Everyman Library) p 43.
lieve; and in the just but kindly discipline of the home, they all learned the first principles of unselfishness, justice, cooperation; for we are told that Joseph was a "just" man, and tradition has always had it that Mary was true-hearted.

Through all the life and thought of that home, we note especially, there ran the spirit of religious faith and devotion. Mary and Joseph were devout, and the family circle was dominated by their religious interest. They went up every year at the time of the Passover to Jerusalem. After Jesus' death and resurrection, James, "our Lord's brother", became the leading figure in the church at Jerusalem. "And all this monotheistic experience was focussed," we are impressively told, "in the first religious duty enjoined upon the Jewish parent, namely, to teach the young, expanding child-mind, in its first stammering efforts after human speech, to repeat the great Shema. It was the first word of religion the little Jesus took upon His lips. It was fastened in the Mezuzoth to the door-post of His home. It was possibly stitched into the corners of His little robe. The blue thread of the zizith—the tassels on the robes of adults—called it constantly to mind. It was spoken sometimes at meal-hour. It was the morning and evening prayer in every Jewish home...Familiar as the 'Allah Akbar Islam' of the Muezzin's call to prayer from every Mohammedan minaret today, it was the great call to worship—Israel's Creed—with which every synagogue service was begun: 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One'.

What part the religious atmosphere of the home played in the life of Jesus it is impossible to compute; but its influence must have been of the greatest.

1J.A. Robertson, The Spiritual Pilgrimage of Jesus, p 27.
Nazareth was another great factor in the shaping of Jesus' inner life. It was, and still is, spite of long Mohammedan occupancy an attractive town; and, movingly, it is surrounded by scenery of great natural beauty. Nestled among vineyards and fig-trees, surrounded by hills, from certain of which one can catch a glimpse of the far Mediterranean, gleaming to the westward beyond thickly-wooded Mt. Carmel twenty miles away, having upon its northern horizon the snow-tipped peak of Hermon and to the east rounded Mt. Tabor, and to the south the Valley of Jezreel, Nazareth still stirs the soul. Renan's idyllic picture might well stand for Galilee on a bright sunny day. "A very green, shady, smiling district," he says, "...during the two months of March and April the country forms a carpet of flowers of an incomparable variety of colors. Delicate and lively turtle-doves, blue-birds so light that they rest on a blade of grass without bending it, crested larks which venture almost under the feet of the traveller, little river tortoises with mild and lively eyes, storks with grave and modest mien, laying aside all timidity, allow man to come quite near them, and seem almost to invite his approach".1

But these hills and the valley were perhaps even more stirring to the child Jesus because of their historical and legendary connections. All boys are alike in this, delighting above everything that can be told them in tales of ancient seers and heroes and battles long ago. It is only later in their thought-life that the "battles long ago" become associated, as in the poet's mind they are, with "old, unhappy, far-off things". Still, in Jesus' day the olden times were considered the happier ones, and the old heroes and prophets were daily quoted as "the only men who

could save us today if they would come back again from the dead”.

Can we doubt that Jesus, as a lad, was often on the hills about Nazareth, and that, if He had no one with Him to recite the ancient stories, He told them over again to Himself? And that as His eye passed over the valley and the slopes beyond, His imagination was kindled? Nothing so stirring as tradition-haunted places. Down the valley of Jezreel, across the plain of Esdraelon, had marched the great armies of antiquity, Nebuchadnezzar and his hosts among them, to and fro between Mesopotamia and Egypt. Of nearer interest to a Jewish lad were Mt. Gilboa, on the farther side of the valley, where Saul fell upon his own sword, and the hill of Moreh, where Gideon descended upon the hosts of Midian that “lay along in the valley like grasshoppers for multitude”, and the great wooded slopes of Mt. Carmel, the scene of Elijah’s most spectacular exploit and the place of his expected return to life and to the deliverance of his people. Looking at these hills, a youth of strong imagination could bring to life again the beloved figures of olden story, and almost see them moving down the hills to prophecy or battle,—see them to such purpose as to be filled with loyalty and self-dedication to the nation, and God behind all. For the teaching of home and synagogue would make it obvious that in the brave old leaders moving over the hills to battle and prophecy was God, the Maker of history and Sustainer of the race.

There were places, to the south and east especially, recalling almost contemporaneous events. These associations were less ideal—certainly to Jesus less moving—but more immediate and real than the associations of older times. Since the revolt of the Maccabees, there had been fruitless and bloody strife in the land.
In time, the zealot patriots, once numbering tens of thousands, were reduced to small scattered bands, driven into the mountain fastnesses, the caves and hiding-places of the hills, whence they issued on raids that only earned them the name of robbers and the condemnation of death at sight. Galilee was their last refuge. Surely at gossip-time, by fountain and gate, Jesus was made familiar with the fortunes of many a rebel leader of those desperate times. He must have listened with glowing eyes to the story of the most dangerous marauder of them all, Judah the Galilean, son of a famous zealot put to death by Herod. Near Sepphoris, only an hour's journey from Nazareth, as Klausner reminds us, he collected a large force of rebels, and assaulted the king's armoury, carrying away with him gold and weapons for his followers. Many in Galilee were attracted to his standard, and the revolt spread to great proportions before it was finally crushed by Varus and a Roman army. "And all this, it should be emphasized, happened only three or four years before the birth of Jesus".

There is no doubt of it that Jesus was greatly affected by this so nearly contemporaneous history. Just how, we shall presently seek to judge; meanwhile, we must take note of the apocalyptic ideas which these events lent color. The book of Daniel and that of Enoch were read and reread by enthusiastic patriots with all the extravagance of exaltation seeking interpretation for to meet its need. The time of deliverance, they thought, was come, and the Messiah was shortly to appear. So ran the widespread popular hope and secret expectation, fed upon dreams and perfervid visions of the Great Day, till the air was peopled with hosts about to come to the nation's deliverance.

1 Jesus of Nazareth, p 156  2 Ibid. p154-156.
Jesus heard people talking of these things. It is impossible to doubt that He was deeply moved. At times, perhaps, before it was within His child's capacity to reach His own conclusion, He was fired with the contagion of the ardor and faith which ran through these hopes. Indeed, it is held by scholars of the first rank that Jesus reached manhood with much the same ardor and faith to guide Him. Only now He had become the Son of Man who was to come in glory with the angels; He was to usher in the eschatological new era (before His disciples had reached the borders of Israel with their simple message: "Repent, for God's reign is near!") with its warring of the nations, and the darkening of sun and moon, and final judgment.

But is this where Jesus stood in this matter? As a child and growing youth, He could not have failed to observe the extremities to which the Jewish people had been reduced. The passion of His life came to be, to relieve their distress, to do what He could to bring light to their darkness, and help to their helplessness. But, to judge by the position He clearly took in the days of His ministry, He rejected the method of the zealot. He saw with clear eye and balanced judgment the foolishness and utter error of the headstrong course of such an one as Judah the Galilean. God was not taking that method to establish His way in the land.

The writer finds it hard to persuade himself that Jesus was less level-headed when He came to estimate the apocalyptic hope, infected as it was with a fever closely related to the fiery importunity of the zealots. The "Little Apocalypse" is so free a rendering of Jesus' original teaching as to leave the whole question of His real mind forever in doubt. Meanwhile, we have
the record elsewhere of the actual thought of Jesus come down to us undisguised; and we know it to be such, because it furnishes new elements to eschatology, stamped with the unmistakable mark of His own genius: the Kingdom is seed, it is leaven, here in potentiality but not in actuality. And are these elements not original, keen, and unimpeachable to this hour: such truth as we should expect to flash upon a superior mind?

Let us give Jesus the credit of His indubitable creative intelligence. He must be granted to have been able to distinguish between vagary and the verities. He was no wild-eyed ecstatic, ridden by a perfect passion of feeling and hope, until He espoused illusion.

We feel, therefore, that Jesus sympathized with both zealot and eschatologist, and wanted largely what they wanted; but He understood them, and characteristically modified their views, because (as our evidence will later go to show) it was of the essence of His nature never to be carried away by excess, and to have His feet upon the ground even while He was caught up to heaven in spirit.

This never-failing sanity we find, further, in His attitude to the Pharisees. He learned to know them when He learned to read and write. Possibly His intellectual training was in the tradition of the Pharisees, so far as that was possible in Nazareth. He did not go to a boy's school, such as was then the boast only of Jerusalem; He was, perhaps, partially instructed in the Torah at home, either by Joseph or Mary, in accordance with the command which every pious Jewish parent tried to carry out: "And thou shalt teach them to thy children"; for the rest, which may
have been the most of it, He received instruction at the syna-
agogue from the Hazzan, or local president. A bright boy, and
precocious, He came to know well, and largely from memory, the
Law and the Prophets (of the latter especially Isaiah), the Psalms,
and perhaps the Book of Enoch. The result was a command
of Scripture entitling Him later on to a hearing on the Sabbath
in the synagogue. His expositions were of extreme interest to the
Pharisees; indeed He never stood very far from the best of them
at any point; and yet, brought up in provincial Nazareth, close
to nature and in contact with the saving realities of daily labor,
He revolted from the Pharisaic legalism, the over-meticulous
attention to details of conduct, the dry and arid point-by-point
discussion degenerating sometimes to hypocritic cant. Why should
man be treated as though he were made for the Sabbath, when a
second thought only was necessary to show that the Sabbath was
made for man? The rift between Him and the Pharisaic attitude to
religion and life widened with time. For Jesus vitalized every-
thing He touched, and the Pharisees were tradition-bound.

On all these matters, then, we must acquit Jesus of
having had less than common sense. But He had more than common
sense. With true religious genius, He chose to make the finding
out and revelation of God, as God really is, His first aim and
purpose. That is not what men would call common sense. But He
knew that it had been the one thing needful for His own self-
fulfillment, and that it was what men most needed for the recon-
stituting of their own lives on the highest levels. To know God
truly was to be a changed creature. The reign of God in the hearts
of men would bring the new heavens and the new earth men yearned
for, and so blindly stood in the way of.

For Himself, He had found in His home-life and His environment that which He came supremely to want men to have a like experience of—the power of God working with Him toward His own highest self-development. Luke gives us just the bare and beautiful fact of it in the statement: "And the child grew and became strong; he was filled with wisdom, and the grace of God was on him". ¹

IV

Can this be put, reverently and carefully, into psychological terms?

Before we attempt to do so, let us take note again of the fact that psychology, in giving an account of a great human experience, does not therewith account for it. Psychology is no guide to origins; it merely analyzes processes.

Not necessarily derogatory, therefore, of Jesus' high calling and election, is the conclusion, that His development is psychologically to be described as a beautiful and natural unfolding of innate tendencies to thought and action.

The undergirding of Jesus' consciousness was an urge of inward power, the energy of innate forces moving from less to more, of which His intellectual activity formed the ultimate differentiation on the cognitive side, and His volitions as the consummating and completing decisions to act on the conative side, while the strong tonal quality of these processes, never wholly absent, though not always prominent, was due to basal feeling. He must be thought to have possessed, to begin with, the endowment of instincts and tendencies common to man. No one element was absent in whole

¹ Lk 2:40
or in part. To posit less or more is to make Him more—or less—true man than. There is no need for such a thesis to account for Him. The more natural explanation is here religiously to be preferred. And so we find that Jesus was not unique as far as the constituents of His person were concerned; He was unique—and here absolutely unique—in another way. His uniqueness lay in the manner in which the constituents of His person were coordinated and directed: it was, as the Church has long known, His personality which was unique. We marvel at the equilibrium in which He held the powers of His person, the absence of conflict within the person, which freed His energy from complications and entanglements of a wasteful psychic character and put it at His disposal for the highest possible uses.

Influences within and without the ordinary person lead to his more or less permanently tying up certain quantities of energy with processes concerned either with the conscious suppression or the subconscious repression of desires and motives having a detrimental or undesirable effect upon him. But with Jesus, His inner adjustments to His one purpose were perfect. We may safely say that all attempts to prove Him neurotic have broken down completely. The fact is that Jesus was at the opposite pole from a divided person (as the traditional theology, taken literally, and on the basis of its original metaphysical dualism, at bottom presupposes). On no other hypothesis than that He was unified within, individual in the original sense, can we reach a true psychological view of Him.

The unity of His person was a unity of full self-expression, not a negative exercise of will in divine abstention from,
or in suppression of, processes and interests thoroughly human. In some sense He did carry things before Him; but that was a consequence of His being Himself carried along by—shall we call it an inner divine urge?

Clearly, if He was human, we must accept the finding of psychology that every human consciousness develops through a controlled, but not through a self-originated, life-urge or fundamental aspiration. We are less rational than restless, until we rest in the good. We are innately sensitive to stimuli, which we involuntarily perceive, either consciously or subconsciously. Doubtless, when we are children our response to stimuli is largely involuntary, and we do what we do because we are what we are; and as we grow older and acquire self-consciousness and self-control, we control, with relative success, our responses to such stimuli, and we tend, as Aristotle teaches, to become what we repeatedly do. Yet, since few reach the highest stages of integration, most of us are for the most part swept on by the urges in us, without our being in thorough control.

But if Jesus was carried along in some sense, He was always in control: He was carried where He wished to be carried; and that was toward God. Possessed of all the constituents of human personality, yet in that personality unique, He grew, as by a disposition to perfect equilibrium and self-fulfillment, as a flower grows, into perfect boyhood and youth. He never di-

1 From the point of view of psychology—which is narrowed down to the human facts—the story of the Virgin birth means this: that Jesus was uniquely endowed for a life of perfectly integrated activity. This fact was apparent to His contemporaries, and they testified to it with the nearest approach to accuracy possible to them in that naive time. The psychologists here fixes what must be the irreducible minimum of truth in these stories; the man of faith may add, according to his faith, but not subtract.
verged from the perfectly normal in anything. He had no unnatural repressions, because His inhibitions were normal and successful. All the while, and as consequence of this, He lived, thought, and felt intensely.

V

We may now rapidly review the discoverable facts about the historic course of the development of Jesus' self-consciousness.

The temple incident was an awakening, but not a sudden one, and no extra-personal advent of grace need be inferred to account for it: the fulness of the time had come, and He was aware of God as the Reality within all things.

Then came the years-in-between, when He labored at the bench. It was not a time of arrested development; nor was it a hiding of divine power, a sort of biding of the time. It was a period of uninterrupted growth. Every instinct was coordinated with, and paid its tribute of energy to, the central master-passion of His life. God occupied first place in His life, and after God the need of His neighbors all about Him. One thinks in awe of so selfless a preoccupation.

It is stupid to think that the Baptism took Him unawares, and He went to the wilderness to think it out for the first time. The Baptism was not a conversion. The hours of Jesus at the bench, and on the hills in prayer, and in the synagogue on the Sabbath, were hours of preparation—not conscious preparation, perhaps, but adequate nevertheless—out of which there slowly grew a deep

1 We should beware of the exaggeration of supposing that Jesus never inhibited Himself, as G. Stanley Hall seems to do: "As a boy Jesus seems to have had no unrealized wishes...He was always ausgelassen, and acted, thought, felt, with abandon". Jesus the Christ in the Light of Psychology, Vol. I, p 55.
conviction of things needed to be said and done in His generation; He began to formulate to Himself a message for the times from God to men.

Did He never think of the Kingdom before, Who told of it so well when the people came together to hear Him preach? Did He never look into men's hearts before, Who understood so well what was in man when He appeared before them? Did He ponder ethical problems for the first time when He rose to speak? Had God never entered His life until His Baptism?

In the maturing years, surely, He was not idle; and when the day of dedication came, He was ready.

That was when John began to preach. Wholly stirred by that preaching, as it reached Him in Nazareth, He gave no detached sort of intellectual assent to it. Not a part of Him, but His whole person responded to the call of John, and He could not have prevented the response He made without doing the most extreme violence to the total trend of His inner mind. With strong emotion, He went down to Jordan, and was there baptized.

The familiar details of the story need hardly be recalled. Let us note the few facts needful. His baptism involved no repentance; it was self-dedication. The vision of the opened heavens and the descending dove was the flashing in upon Him of the tremendous, the startling intuition that God had chosen Him, that He as Messiah was at one with God, His Son. It was the first full awakening of His self-consciousness as the unique Messenger, called to reveal the good news of the love of God compassing His rule in the hearts of men; and with His perfect endowment, in this crisis of His spiritual history, He responded with exalted emotion. Not
bowed under a sense of sin, like many of those who were baptized on the same day with Him, but conscious to the exclusion of all else of affinity with God, and of an abounding, pulsing life within Him, a very well of power flowing outward, He knew Himself to be God's wholly.

Under powerful excitement He left the river-side and sought the solitude of the wilderness. He must think, for His heart almost failed Him; He must determine His relation to His old life in Nazareth, now that He had entered upon a new. And this was the temptation: to doubt His calling, and to do the easy things first. God had called Him, but to what? The methods were to be of His own choosing. Should He return to Nazareth and His craftsmanship, and let His message radiate from there? It would be the easier course, for Himself and His mother; He should not then cease to earn bread. He would be more modest—more comfortable—better-fed. Stones or bread—which? No, no; His was the stony way, not the way of loves. He must give Himself wholly to the people. The sense of what He had to tell them and to share with them, the prophetic sense, was strong within Him. But how was He to utter Himself, how share His vision and His faith? Spectacularly—by, as it were, leaping from the pinnacle of the Temple, so that men might witness God's choice of Him in the providential flight of angels to bear Him up? No, it must be no sensational course He must take, for the effect would be superficial and vain. It must be an effect of power, of conquering power. But power to what end? To a visible end, such as the zealots sought, or to a spiritual? The people would expect, even demand, many of them, a hot-headed zealotism. But the conclusion was a foregone one: He could not be untrue to Himself and the
verities of God.

Conscious of His calling and election, or, if you will, self-conscious as a Son of Man that He was to be also out of all men uniquely the Son of God, He put the wilderness behind Him, and began to preach, saying: "The time has now come, God's reign is near: repent and believe in the gospel".
CHAPTER XIII

THE VITALITY OF JESUS

"I must preach the glad news," Jesus told them who would detain Him in one place. "That is what I was sent to do". And from town to town He continued his unwearyed activity.\(^1\)

If our psychological theory of the integration and development of personality is even approximately correct, we should expect in Jesus the qualities of energy, enthusiasm, venturesomeness, joy, and high spirits—in short, vitality in all its forms. What evidence have we of such qualities in Jesus? Do the records support us in assuming that He was, psychologically considered, man at the best and highest—and strongest?

I

The most striking note of integration in human personality is a large fund of energy, a quality of tirelessness, a capacity for physical and mental exertion of great intensity.

Mark, the earliest Gospel, preeminently pictures Jesus as a man of power, energy, resource—infinit resource. "Repeatedly the author returns to the idea of the power that Jesus possessed".\(^2\) The fact that Mark had in mind particularly his thesis that Jesus possessed supernatural power, and the infinite resource of God Himself, should not obscure for us the fact which lies herein: that Jesus was an individual of so great personal force as to make this thesis not only credible but inevitable.

"It is striking to notice," says Peabody, "how often the word 'power' is applied in the New Testament to the influence of

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\(^{1}\)Luke 4:43  \(^{2}\)J.L.Ayre, The Christology of the Earliest Gospel,p 28
Jesus. 'The multitude glorified God,' says Matthew, 'who had given such power unto men'. 'The Kingdom of God comes with power,' says Mark. 'His word was with power,' says Luke. 'Thou hast given him power over all flesh,' says John. 'God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with power,' says the Book of Acts. 'The power of our Lord Jesus Christ,' says Paul'.

In part this power was power of person, a very impressive vitality.

If any one be in doubt as to the robust strength and energy of Jesus, let him read rapidly, first Mark, and then Matthew; he will be startled by the physical activity of Jesus in the first—the tireless going from one village or town to another, the absorption in healing and teaching, the pressing forward with work to be done—and the mental activity of Jesus in the second, amazing in its sweep, and range, and penetration, as though there were no intellectually cloudy moments, no obscuration of insight, no fatigue of mind.

Luke has succeeded in one vivid passage in communicating all this to us. "On he went, teaching from one town and village to another, as he made his way to Jerusalem...Just then some Pharisees came up to tell him, 'Get away from here, for Herod intends to kill you'. 'Go and tell that fox,' he replied, 'I cast out demons and perform cures today and to-morrow, and the third day I complete my task! But I must journey on, today, to-morrow, the next...

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1 Jesus Christ and the Christian Character, p 52. 2A differentiation between the Gospels from this angle appears. Taking Luke's statement concerning Jesus' development as the basis of comparison ("And Jesus increased in wisdom"—intellectually—"and in stature"—physically—"and in favor with God"—religiously—"and man"—socially), we have in Mark an emphasis on physical activity, in Matthew on intellectual, in Luke on social, and in John on divine.
day; it would never do for a prophet to perish except in Jerusalem!" Force, self-assurance, and irony (aspects of up-welling energy that has found direction and vent) are mingled in this statement of Jesus.

And if further evidence be needed we have it in the rigor of His demands on His disciples. What tremendous obligations, what duties demanding their all, He laid upon them! It was as if going to all lengths was a matter of course. But He did not spare Himself. The greatest human spirits are all like this in their rigor with themselves and others. Take just these two instances of His rigorous demands upon men. "Which of you," said He to His disciples, "with a servant out ploughing or shepherding, will say to him when he comes in from the field, 'Come at once and take your place at table'? Will the man not rather say to him, 'Get something ready for my supper; gird yourself and wait on me till I eat and drink; then you can eat and drink yourself'? Does he thank the servant for doing his bidding? Well, it is the same with you; when you have done all you are bidden, say 'We are but servants; we have only done our duty'". 2 "Then they journeyed to another village. And as they journeyed along the road...another man also said to him, 'I will follow you, Lord. But let me first say goodbye to my people at home'. Jesus said to him, 'No one is any use to the Reign of God who puts his hand to the plough and then looks behind him". 3

The Gospels reflect here and there the astonishment of the disciples at the energy and capacity of Jesus, and His, as it seemed, extravagant view of their energy and capacity. And when

1 Lk 13:32 2 Lk 17:7-10 3 Lk 9:56 f
they expressed doubt of their measuring up to His higher estimate of them, He used to chide them with such phrases as, "If you had faith the size of a grain of mustard-seed--!"  

II

And now we may consider that very human quality, His enthusiasm, the quality which the Fourth Evangelist gives us a report of when he notes parenthetically, "His disciples recalled the scripture saying, I am consumed with zeal for thy house".

To think at all upon such a topic as this in connection with any individual is indeed to lay stress upon his humanity. But it is so neglected a subject in the study of Jesus' personality, and forms so necessary a part of the psychological data, that we must give it some emphasis.

Seeley, in that still rewarding and from some aspects still unmatched study "Ecce Homo", lays not a little stress on the enthusiasm which Jesus awakened in His disciples--an enthusiasm which he finely defines as "a burning and consuming passion of benevolence, an energy of self-devotion, an aggressive ardor of love". Whether Jesus is to be understood to have Himself had this quality, Seeley has left us to assume.

Enthusiasm is a very attractive characteristic in any man; but it more than interests us in the great--it communicates itself to us. A divided person, not integrated psychologically, may show an enthusiasm which is sporadic, flowing in any direction; but in the fully integrated, unified person it is sustained and powerful.

It appears early in Jesus. One lingers over the narra-

1Lk 17:6  2Jno 2:17  3 Op cit p 203.
tive of the "lost" boy. What could have kept Him so wholly absorbed in the Temple, its services, and its teachers and leaders, except burning interest? We can visualize all over again the expectation, the idealization, the trust, the satisfaction that only partially alleviated the stress of His yearning. He quite pathetically revered and trusted the rabbis whom He questioned and who knew so much and were so close to reality, as He then thought.

The Baptism and Temptation indicated the same consuming earnestness. "The Spirit which took possession of Him at His baptism was the Spirit of zeal as well as power".\(^1\) And when He came from the wilderness and began to preach, it was not only the matter of His preaching, but the manner—the enthusiasm which He plainly showed—that captivated and won the attention of all who heard Him.

It is worth noting this: that people do not crowd about a man so that he cannot so much as eat, unless, in addition to energy, change of aspect, movement, originality, the quality of unexpectedness in word and deed, a visible enthusiasm. Not any more in the time of Jesus than in this did people heed a nerveless, placid preacher, however learned or truthful.

We have had too much of the sentimental bathos of Renan's portrait of the gentle and charming young rabbi, of whose preaching we are to think that it "was gentle and pleasing, breathing nature and the perfume of the fields".\(^2\) One shivers at the "infinite sweetness, vague poetry, and universal charm"\(^3\) of this young teacher, "who forgave everyone, provided they loved him".\(^4\) This is woefully to falsify the fact that Jesus' preaching was predomi-

nently challenging, urgent, searching. It was pervaded by a sus-
tained enthusiasm, the long but ever fresh zeal of the missionary.

The priests, as component members of the ecclesiastical aristocracy, were averse to prophetism, and feared and opposed enthusiasm; it was a quality which they had lost the power to share, and they instinctively sought to preserve their place and the in-
stitutions with which they were publicly identified by discrediting it: it was the power of Beelzebub; in strict truth they felt that it carried people beyond the sphere of their control. Espec-
ially since enthusiasm is an aspect of loyalty to a cause. And loyalty to a cause is very difficult to combat: it is hydra-headed.

And there could be little doubt of the effect upon old loyalties which the new loyalty to Jesus involved. "When Jesus sets before His disciples a hard, self-denying life, demanding that neither father, mother, children, houses nor lands should stand between them and their allegiance to His cause, ...He is a spirit-
ual Garibaldi saying to His little band of patriots: 'I promise you forced marches, short rations, bloody battles, wounds, imprisonment, and death--let him who loves home and fatherland follow Me' ...He represents a Cause to which He is utterly loyal, and His note is that of a great leader, when He says: Though exile from the synagogues, through trial before councils, through loss of property and family, through the baptism of blood that I shall be baptized with, follow Me".¹

III

Nor can we think of Jesus as being devoid of enterprise, a certain zest for adventure. We are being admonished in recent

¹Nosdick, Manhood of the Master, p 48 (English edition).
days by leaders in religious thought to cease from thinking one-sidedly and falsely of Jesus as the seated Teacher, the benched Judge, the throned Law-giver, and to find the secret of His primacy in his being inspiritingly "a poet and an adventurer". "Plato," writes Dr. Oman, "concerns himself mainly with safeguards, and Jesus wholly with venture." 1

If adventure is that form of venture into the unknown or unfamiliar which is a venture of faith and hope, yet trembles ever on the verge of tragedy; if it means the courageous plucking up of heart to dare greatly and joyously for ourselves and those coming after us; if it causes the pulse to leap; if it be entered upon because joy of life—perhaps the whole world's safety or happiness—hangs upon it; then Jesus cannot be denied His place as the greatest among the world's adventurers. He walked dauntlessly, without fear and without reproach, and every day, upon the very verge of tragedy, and snatched the unbelievable victory, hardly credible yet, for God and His righteousness, out of the defeat of indifference and misunderstanding.

When He stood upon the shore of Galilee and looked over the water at Peter and Andrew casting their nets, and at James and John in the boat with Zebedee, their father, and called them, so that they left all—did He issue His summons preremptorily, authoritatively? It is difficult to think so. The preremptory call would have cast a chill upon them. What they saw was One through whom they felt the lure of a great adventure, the challenge to dare and to dare greatly; and they caught the contagion of the Master's quest.

Full-flowing life such as was in Jesus would naturally

1In an article on "Christianity" in the new volumes of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
go out to the adventurous and difficult undertaking. Here we note the difference between Jesus, the venturer, and the scribes and Pharisees, who "sat in Moses' seat" and, sincerely enough, saw no good reason to stir out of it. Jesus' life moved outward freely to activity, to the largest aspiration, the highest ends; their's was cribb'd, cabin'd, and confin'd, moving behind barriers and within limits. His life was the free life, and His ethic the ethic of "the second mile": what limitless adventure lay in it! His teaching provided for embracing the maximum obligation, in the liberty of the spirit; He laid down no binding rules, like Mohamet, no regulations, like the Torah: He wished His followers to be as venturesome as He.

IV

He promised them joy—His joy.

On a previous page we saw that happiness is the accompaniment of the harmonization of the impulses: the happy man is he who has harmonized his impulses by bringing them into the service of his ideals.

Was Jesus happy?

It was once thought not; but what an incredible portrait of our Lord the devotion of past times has handed down to us! Incredible, because exaggerated and partial. Jesus was often tragically pained, as we shall see; but no one disputes in these days that we must not over-emphasize that aspect of His life and thought.

If happiness is the feeling tone accompanying the harmonious expression of the whole man (for such is the form the definition of Dr. Hadfield previously quoted takes when properly
broadened), then it accompanies the religious life, when that is at its best and highest; it is the reward of the service of love toward God and one's fellow-men. In the service of love the whole man is employed; every element in his being is used and called into activity.

There is good reason psychologically for denying happiness to the selfish man. Pleasure may be his, for he may derive it from the expression of any one instinct; joy may be his, for he may find that the expression of such an instinct is in conformity with the sentiments of the self.¹ But he cannot be really happy. It is virtually an impossibility to grow up in society without acquiring, at least in its rudimentary form, the moral sentiment of altruism. One may suppress its manifestations; but it is there. The consequence is that in self-love there is an inevitable self-division; all of the self is not harmoniously expressed; there is inward disquiet; the conscience hurts.

Religion, therefore, with its exalted ideals of service, is the only high-road to happiness. In the man who serves there is no inward disquiet. The sorrow he meets, as we shall see, is the bitterness which life contrives to put in his way or thrust upon him from without.

Of the happiness of Jesus the Gospels leave us in no doubt. Who can resist the radiancy of this passage in Luke: "The seventy came back with joy. 'Lord,' they said, 'the very daemons obey us in your name'. He said to them, 'Yes, I watched Satan fall from heaven like a flash of lightning. I have indeed given you the power of treading on serpents and scorpions and of trampling down all the power of the Enemy; nothing shall injure you'...He thrilled

¹ See supra, p 78.
with joy at that hour in the Holy Spirit, saying, 'I praise thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, for concealing this from the wise and learned and revealing it to the simple-minded'... Then turning to the disciples he said privately, 'Blessed are the eyes that see what you see'".1

We read in Mark: "As the disciples of John and of the Pharisees were observing a fast, people came and asked him, 'Why do John's disciples and the disciples of the Pharisees fast, and your disciples do not fast?" Now, who can resist the implication of a smile on Jesus' face, as He said to them: "Can friends at a wedding fast while the bridegroom is beside them? As long as they have the bridegroom beside them they cannot fast".2

By all the rules of common sense, why should His disciples fast—even on fast days? His way of life required no set times of fasting: fasting should be according to inner need. His Gospel was in great part a call to men to live in the freedom of the spirit; it was the enjoyment of a wedding feast. If John fasted with his disciples, it was because he had not learned to live freely and joyously, un-selfrepressing and trustful; he only foresaw judgment and terror, being divided within himself and fearful of condemnation.

But Jesus had drunk of the well of life; He knew the transforming power of trust, faith, love, hope, the freely-flowing life. Not that He sought happiness as an end; for it cannot then be found; but that, having chosen His way and walked therein, happiness followed; life was joy, and joy was good.

Jesus lived too dynamically to consent to artificiality,

1Lk 10:17-23. 2Mk 2:18,19.
even when it might prove a salutary discipline, as in fasting. He was not given to discipline for discipline's sake; He was no mere Stoic. The Gospels give us ample evidence of the fact that He had feelings; and when He had them, He expressed them. Nor was He a joy-denying ascetic. How often the wedding feast figures in His parables! He quite enjoyed them Himself. He sympathized with all innocent gladness. Let His love of little children convince us. "Then he put his arms around them," Mark tells us. He could put His arms around them: they let Him. What child ever submitted to the caress of a man of stern, unrelieved sadness? "He called a child," says Matthew, "and set it among them." He called it with smiles. How else?

Take note of the answer He made to the sour-faced Pharisees and scribes, when they complained: "He welcomes sinners and eats along with them!" It was a parable--the parable of the lost sheep, whose finding is thus announced by the shepherd, "Rejoice with me."

V

And this brings us naturally to the "spontaneous play of good humor" which characterized much of the speech of Jesus. Of course "He never jests as Socrates does"; but He is a master of the whimsical and the ludicrous. He sometimes uses a subtle sort of banter, very keen. And how He can caricature!

But it would be a sad error to regard Jesus as a humorist. His humor was not the staple element in His utterances at any time; it was, as a matter of fact, simply the recognition of the contrasting aspects of life revealed to His fundamental serious-

1Mk 10:16  2Matt 18:2  3Lk 15:1-6  4Posdick, op.cit. p 13
ness. After all, if we have regard to the advice He gives His disciples, "seriousness in observation; seriousness in reflection is what He teaches".\(^1\) He is always at heart earnest.

But we are perhaps less in danger of minimizing His seriousness than of minimizing His rapier-like wit, and the broad strokes of His humor.

Wit and humor are, of course, not the same. Freud has it that wit is from the subconscious, the semi-disguised revelation of what the subconscious thinks of things. This is true, insofar as wit is a form of intuition, the perception of contrasts, bursting out of a sudden, surprisingly. It is sometimes whimsical; always, in its true form, brilliant. In contrast, humor is the conscious recognition and exposition of the contrasts and incongruities of life. It is essentially serious.

What is perhaps the one clear instance of wit in Jesus figures among the most difficult passages in the Gospels. The difference of detail in the two accounts given in Mark and Matthew suggests that the original incident has been very imperfectly preserved. It is the case of the Syro-Phoenician woman, who came and fell at Jesus' feet, imploring Him to heal her daughter. With apparent hardness of heart, for He was Himself then passing through a period of emotional stress, He looked down at her, and gave utterance to a simile which flashed into His mind, embodying the Jewish or Jerusalemitic view of the relation of Jew and Gentile: "Let the children be satisfied first of all; it is not fair to take the children's bread and throw it to the dogs". But there was that in His voice which gave her encouragement to make the witty but

\(^1\) Glover, Jesus of History, p 86.
importunate reply: "No, sir, but under the table the dogs do pick
up the children's crumbs". At once and unreservedly Jesus showed
His appreciation and His true sympathy with her. He had meant
nothing unkind.

The humor of Jesus is not so unpremeditated. It is, indeed,
weighty with meaning. It is frequently satiric, for with the genius
of the true teacher He rendered His sayings unforgettable by a rich
humorous but hard-hitting hyperbole. What could be more fundament­
ally serious and yet more amusingly exaggerated than this: "How can
you say to your brother, 'Let me take out the splinter from your
eye', when there lies the plank in your own eye? You hypocrite! take
the plank out of your own eye first, and then you will see properly
how to take the splinter out of your brother's eye".

There is great geniality and slyness in, "No one lights
a lamp and hides it under a vessel or puts it below the bed: he puts
it on a stand". He likens His generation to children sitting in
the marketplace—but the laughter is near to tears.

A perfect example of irony, a broadside of telling banter,
concludes the parable of the dishonest steward:"For the children of
this world look further ahead in dealing with their own generation
than the children of Light. And I tell you, use mammon, dishonest as
it is, to make friends for yourselves, so that when you die, they
may welcome you to the eternal abodes!" A heavy-handed humor, this;
but it is the sort that is longest remembered, and Jesus, in speak­
ing to men, used it doubtless as effectively as He used parables.

But one can well believe that in private company, among
His disciples, in the homes of His friends, He revealed the joy of

1Mk 7:24-30; cf Matt 15:21-28 2Matt 7:3-5 3Lk 8:16 4Matt 11:16
5Lk 16:1-9
His soul in the great good humor of laughter. We catch just one glimpse of such a mood in the comparison He draws between the public estimate of John the Baptist and that same estimate of Himself. Bruce Barton has rendered the passage\(^1\) by a deft paraphrase. "'No man can expect to accomplish anything if he stands in terror of public opinion,' Jesus said in substance. 'People will talk against you no matter how you live or what you do. Look at John the Baptist. He came neither eating nor drinking, and they said he had a devil. I come both eating and drinking, and what do they call me? A wine-bibber and a gluttonous man!'"\(^2\)

It is an attractive suggestion that at this point Jesus broke into laughter. He charitably understood how well-meaning His critics were, yet how devoid of the sense of proportion. But if He laughed He did so without ill-will. He would think, "They, too, need my glad news!"

\(^1\)Matt 11:18,19; Lk 7:31,32.  \(^2\)The Man Nobody Knows, p 63.
CHAPTER XIV

AUTHORITY AND HUMILITY

We have had incidental evidence in plenty of the certitudes of Jesus: He, if any individual ever did, relied upon and gave unsparing expression to the truth as He saw it.

It is impossible adequately to reconstruct this side of His experience, both because the biographical material left to us is insufficient for the purpose, and because great personalities can never be given in a phrase; they so transcend description as to leave us ever straining after that "more" which is in them, present to our sense, as it were, but never to be laid hold of by the additive processes of character estimate. Nevertheless, we must strive to envisage as much as we can, and enrich ourselves, mentally and spiritually, thereby, as far as may be. On such a view, it would appear that Jesus was borne on through His life, and more especially through the days of His strenuous ministry, by a sense of being undergirded with power. Paradoxically, under one aspect, and not in a manner immediately apparent, this appeared in His humility; under the other, and more obviously, it appeared in the authority with which He spoke and acted.

I

For the best light upon the humility of Jesus we turn to some pages not directly concerned with Him in the writings of John Ruskin. Of the golden sayings of Ruskin that deserve perpetuation, the two paragraphs which follow should have the attention of every preacher and man of God.
"The greatest minds are marked by nothing more distinctly than an inconceivable humility, and acceptance of work or instruction in any form, and from any quarter. They will learn from everybody, and do anything that anybody asks them, so long as it involves only toil... But the point of quarrel, nevertheless, assuredly rises some day between the public and them, respecting some matter, not of humiliation, but of Fact. Your great man always at last comes to see something the public do not see. This something he will assuredly persist in asserting, whether with the tongue or pencil, to be as he sees it, not as they see it; and all the world in a heap on the other side, will not get him to say otherwise. Then, if the world objects to the saying, he may happen to get stoned or burnt for it, but that does not in the least matter to him; if the world has no particular objection to the saying, he may get leave to mutter it to himself till he dies, and be merely taken for an idiot; that also does not matter to him--mutter it he will, according to what he perceives to be fact;... while your mean man, though he will spit and scratch spiritedly at the public, while it does not attend to him, will bow to it for its clap in any direction, and say anything when he has got its ear, which he thinks will bring him another clap; and thus he and it go on smoothly together."

"I believe the first test of a truly great man is his humility. I do not mean, by humility, doubt of his own power, or hesitation in speaking his opinions; but a right understanding of the relation between what he can do and say, and the rest of the world's sayings and doings. All great men not only know their

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1 A Joy Forever, addenda to section 137.
business, but usually know that they know; only, they do not think much of themselves on that account. Arnolfo knows he can build a good dome at Florence; Albert Dürer writes calmly to one who had found fault with his work, 'It cannot be better done'; Sir Isaac Newton knows that he has worked out a problem or two that would have puzzled anybody else,—only they do not expect their fellow-men to fall down and worship them; they have a curious under-sense of powerlessness, feeling that the greatness is not in them, but through them; that they could not do or be anything else than God made them. And they see something Divine and God-made in every other man they meet, and are endlessly, foolishly, incredibly merciful.¹

Here we have the means of a very deep and searching insight into the prophetic consciousness. It is of the very essence of the self-estimate of Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and their fellow-prophets, to whose company we should admit Elijah and Moses, that it hinged on the conviction of their message to men being, not in them, but through them. The addresses they delivered to their countrymen were, in their own thought, very strong messages; they cried them out with inflexible doggedness and an absolute certitude; and we cannot to this day read any of them without feeling by contagion the exciting sense of power given for the pouring out of thought and word in a torrent of language, rushing to bear down resistance in stubborn minds and hearts. It is great speech greatly uttered. Yet not one of these inspired men once came with the appeal, "Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth: for I would speak". It is always and everywhere: "The Lord saith!"

¹ Modern Painters, Pt IV, Chap 16, sec 24. See also in this connection R.E. Speer, The Man Christ Jesus; Welsh, Classics of the Quest; and Fosdick, Manhood of the Master.
Now such a conviction is consistent with great power of life and authority of utterance. Jeremiah, who is in this the type of the rest, makes bold to reveal the Lord's commission: "There! I have put my words into your mouth". But those who possess such a conviction "do not think much of themselves on that account". The Word is through them. They have their power from Another.

We may see that this is the humility of Jesus.

"Why call me 'good'?' He said to the man who ran and knelt at His feet; "No one is good, no one but God". And John reports the saying, "I can do nothing of my own accord". Greater force had no man than Jesus; but it was the force which accompanies a true humility, a willingness to learn and to be commanded, a surrender of self. Matthew records this bit of intimate instruction to the disciples: "You are not the speakers, it is the Spirit of your Father that is speaking through you." He here gives voice to the truth concerning Himself. He stands witness to the fact that all things are of God; and one—even if he be the One—must pray. "Then he went forward a little and fell on his face praying, 'My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass me. Yet, not what I will but what thou wilt".

He knew that His power was God in Him and through Him. So He was always teaching men to be humble. "Blessed are the humble! they will inherit the earth". "Whoever humbles himself like this child, he is the greatest in the Realm of heaven". A favorite saying was this: "Whoever uplifts himself will be humbled, and whoever humbles himself shall be uplifted".

1Jer 1:9 (Moffat's tr) 2Jer 5:14 (Moff) 3Mk 10:18 4Jno 5:30 5Matt 10:20 6Matt 26:39 7Matt 5:5 8Matt 18:4 9Matt 23:11,12
of the parable of the Pharisee and the publican, and that of the
guests at the marriage feast, whose duty it is to take the lowest
place.

"Learn of me," He told His hearers, "for I am gentle and
humble in heart". 1

II

The humility of Jesus does not escape the discernment
of the evangelists; still less does His authoritativeness. The
latter was something obvious and unmistakable; it escaped no one;
and we are not left in doubt as to the fact. In Ruskin's language,
Jesus not only knew His business, but He knew that He knew it; and
He was not only right in His religious convictions, but knew that
He was right in them.

We find the note of authority in the very first utter­
ances after the Temptation. Jesus came from beyond 'Jordan, clad in
the simple garments of a peasant, but He commanded instant atten­
tion. He knew what He was about; His mien, His energy and earnest­
ness, the very tones of His voice, were strikingly authoritative:
men listened. They stood in the street; they turned and came to
Him. He entered Capernaum. "As soon as the sabbath came, he at
once began to teach in the synagogue; and they were astounded at
his teaching, for he taught them like an authority, not like the
scribes". 2

"The words 'as one that had authority'" writes Dr. Klaus­
nner, "show clearly that Jesus differed from the Scribes in that
they taught nothing of themselves but based themselves wholly on
Scripture, while he uttered just what arose out of his own heart

1Matt 11:29 2Mk 1:21
without this constant reference to the Scriptures".  

Jesus not only spoke authoritatively, but was authoritative in act. In the synagogue at Capernaum, for example, in the affair of the man with the withered hand, Jesus took His stand in the center of the throng with the decisiveness of a great personality. He spoke to the man with the voice of command: "Rise and come forward". The man obeyed. Then He asked, "Is it right to help or to hurt on the sabbath, to save or to kill?" The Pharisees were silent. "He said to them," says Matthew, "'Is there a man of you with one sheep, who will not catch hold of it and lift it out of a pit on the sabbath if it falls in?'" More silence. Glancing around Him with anger and vexation, He cried, "Stretch out your hand". The man stretched out his hand.  

Perhaps the most spectacular exercise of individual authority in all Jewish history is the cleansing of the Temple during Passion Week. It was very like Divine displeasure. Dr. Klausner (to quote this eminent Jewish scholar again) renders the incident in rather dovel, but, we think, accurate terms: "The people of Jerusalem must have accustomed themselves to the Temple trading: townsfolk do not, as a rule, excite themselves over such matters. But for those coming from outlying towns and villages it was a subject for indignation: and Jesus, above all, was provoked to anger. He recalled Jeremiah's bitter reproach: 'Is this house, which is called by my name, become a den of robbers in your eyes?'  

"On the third day, in the morning, Jesus and his disciples and many followers, came to Jerusalem; they entered the Temple,  

1Jesus of Nazareth, p 264  
2Mark 3:1-6; Matt 12:9-14.
and there Jesus, with the help of his followers and some of the people, drove out the traders from the Temple-Mount, threw down the tables of the money-changers, and the seat of them that sold doves, and 'suffered no man to carry any vessel through the Temple' ™

It was an act of "sheer force" and must have had some popular support to have been so successful, for the Sadducees and Scribes stood back thunderstruck.

Jesus showed His authority, His absolute self-assurance, as strikingly in the moral sphere. His oneness with the Father was the experimental fact that formed the heart of His self-consciousness. Out of it arose the claims of authority which He made on His own behalf and which His followers made for Him after His death and resurrection. In the Fourth Gospel they are of the most sweeping order, and include the claim of pre-existence. It may be questioned whether the historical Jesus spoke in this wise. It may even be questioned whether the claims preserved in the Synoptics are authentically reported. Historical criticism has had something to say, one way or another, about such of the more striking ones as: "Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words never" ™ "He who disowns Me before men will be disowned before the angels of God" ™; "All has been handed over to me by my Father: and no one knows the Son except the Father—nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son chooses to reveal him". ™ But the fact seems to remain that Jesus, in lofty assurance of soul, made the claim of a filial relation with God so real and close that He was possessed of the Father's mind and will with regard to men. And this mind and will He was concerned

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1Op cit p 314. 2Mk 13: 31 3Lk 12:9 4Matt 11: 27
to make known. It was His meditation by night and by day; He lived for it; He identified Himself with it. After reading the great passage from Isaiah:

"The Spirit of the Lord is upon me:

for he has consecrated me to preach the gospel to the poor,
he has sent me to proclaim release for captives
and recovery of sight for the blind,
to set free the oppressed,
to proclaim the Lord's year of favor",

he sat down and said calmly, "To-day, this scripture is fulfilled in your hearing". ⁰ Fulfilled in Me, he meant.

Two facts of great import appear in this connection.

The first is that Jesus assumed authority to forgive, or at least to declare the forgiveness of, sins. Whether He did the former, or just the latter, is a moot point, still debated by historians and theologians; but it is immaterial to our purpose to examine the arguments, because in either case, the procedure of Jesus was unprecedented, an exercise of authority of the most startling kind. If He forgave sin, He had the authority of God; if He declared the forgiveness of sin, in the circumstances in which He did declare it, He took the part of judge and pronounced authoritatively upon the evidence, with the utmost confidence in His knowledge of God's mind.

The second fact is the amazing freedom with which He handled the Law and the Prophets. "You have heard how it used to be said...but I tell you",--such is the familiar formula of the Sermon on the Mount. Small wonder that the people were astounded,

⁰Lk 4: 18-21
and that the Pharisees shouted, "Madness!"

But Jesus had a deeper insight into reality than His halting contemporaries. "He did not need to grope His way to moral and religious truth".¹ In His person He was able to penetrate to the heart of the reality in all things; and having humbly sought and learned the will of God, He made it known with all the weight of His manifestly great authority.

¹Garvie, Studies in the Mind of Jesus, p 199.
Modern psychology has stumbled upon the fact, that fundamental in every person is the inner tendency to equilibrium. The mind fights against its own unbalancing. The basic urge in man is to centripetal organization, not to centrifugal spending, of the personal powers. We should, therefore, expect to find in the integrated person the actuality of equilibrium, the quality of poise. And we do find it in the integrated person Whom we are studying. Jesus certainly had it.

It may be observed, in passing, that this, the remarkable mental balance of Jesus, displayed in an unhealthy-minded age slumping to decadence, is a fact which has withstood much vigorous assault successfully: the attacks made upon it recently have proved singularly unconvincing.

Perhaps doubt of the poise of Jesus is partly due to a misconception of its real nature. We should beware of the common error, the representation of poise as something characterizing an individual who is withdrawn from, or who in statuesque repose is above, the sphere of action. But poise is dynamic, not static. The poise of Jesus was not the white stolidity of a temple column in a world of storm, but the beautiful equi#poise of a speeding runner, moving cleanly to the goal. The runner dynamically maintains his balance at every swift step; if he loses this poise, this leaning forward of his body, he loses the race: it is the poise that wins as well as the pressing.

Poised even thus, Jesus pressed onward to His goal, using all His powers. At every juncture, in every situation, He
met His difficulties dynamically, He presented a perfect adjustment of His powers to their solution or surmounting. In the presence of a difficulty, He never knew panic or helplessness; rather, He understood its meaning and significance well, and adequately responded to the challenge it contained. Even in anger, He could not be said to overstep Himself; if He leaned over backward in diatribe, it was because adequate response to the situation demanded it. So one poises himself against a heavy gate—and the more ponderous the gate the more he leans over toward it—to make it swing wide upon its groaning hinges.

This poise of Jesus is worthy of special study.

I

It showed itself in His entire mental competence in any situation, His ability to fathom meanings without losing His footing or being surprised out of His self-possession, His never seeming to have been at a loss, except once, and then only momentarily only, when His agony on the cross was at its height, and the world grew black before His eyes.

Mind, says psychology, is given to see our way through life's difficulties and surprises to our goal: it is a means to an end. Even the man who makes the development of his mind an end, is obeying the deep urge to strive, to aspire; and his mind develops more by the striving than by what is put into it. Mind, therefore, is an instrument for dynamic adaptation of the self to its life-situation. Insofar as the ends of being are served, the mind is competent.

Now Jesus was intellectually endowed with supreme powers
for the attainment of His ends. His mental competency was that of
the highest genius. Not that He drew upon an intellectual treasury
stocked to overflowing with human learning. It was the quality
of His mind, its ability to relate itself directly to reality,
not the quantity of its stores of knowledge concerning matters
far afield, which brought Him to the truth.

To bring this clearly before us, we mark the following
characteristics which appeared in all His thinking.

1. Lucidity, clarity. Whatever else is denied to Him,
this cannot be denied: even Nietzsche must admit it. The parables
are in point: "never a trace in them of the prolix, the 'sloppy' or
the confused".1 His whole teaching bears the same character.

2. Profundity. The lucidity and clarity of His thought
was the mode in which the thought came; the thought itself was
profound, of inexhaustible significance, searching the depths,
a summation of the moral meanings of life, a marshalling of first
principles.

3. Acuteness in analysis. Jesus revealed in His thought
the ability to seize upon the relevant and the fundamental. He
could swiftly shear away the husk or shell and get to the kernel.
What initially amused and enduringly pained Him when He contemp-
lated the meticulousness of the scribes and Pharisees in debate,
their haggling over "mint, rue and every vegetable"2 was their
mistaking the relatively unimportant for the central and signi-
ficant: they were "filtering away the gnat and swallowing the
camel"3; they were so preoccupied in fixing upon the tithe they
owed on the tiniest item of garden produce as to "omit the weight-
ier matters of the law, justice and mercy and faithfulness"4.

1 Streeter, "Reality", p 203 2 Lk 11:42 3 Matt 23:24 4 Matt 23:23
They were analyzing at a tangent and not getting down below the surface to the heart of the matter. Their discussions had lost all vitality; but the world remembers the teaching of Jesus as the most vital public utterance known to history, because by unerring analysis, and distinguishing of relevant and irrelevant, He had arrived at the gist of the truth in things.

4. Inspired synthesis. Nowhere is Jesus' mental competence more clearly shown than in His generalizations. Analysis is possible to most careful thinkers: in time your single-minded scientist will be able to number and describe his "constituent elements". But it is probable that permanently valid synthesis requires religious experience or the essence of it. At all events the generalizations of Jesus stand to this day, and are apparently in their sphere absolute. Humanity has not attained to the standards He set, and as the years pass realizes more and more that no other standards will do, or that standards that commend themselves as valid are echoes of His: they are in His likeness.

5. Originality. It has sometimes been questioned whether Jesus possessed this quality. It is conceded that He was very zealous for the ethical principles which He proclaimed; but He came by them, it is said, by proving all things in His intellectual heritage and holding fast to that which was good. But this view of the case is far from just. There are original elements in Jesus' teaching; nowhere in Judaism do we find anything to correspond to the sense for history and progress in His Kingdom conception (unless we attack that conception tooth and nail, and hew away everything that is not to be found in Judaism); it must be granted that His use of parable is original; moreover, He gave a new turn to almost everything He took over from "the men of old" of whom He and His hearers alike knew. Partly this new
turn to things was the pith and point which He gave them; but far more it was the result of the creatively synthetic insight He had into reality. In the setting which He gave them old things became new. Above all, He marked His sayings with His own hallmark; He sent forth every bit of His teaching stamped unmistakably with His personality. J. Middleton Murry speaks truth in saying: "Nothing is more fatal, more contrary to the spirit of true history or true criticism, than to seek to subdue Jesus to the conceptions of his contemporaries. He used their conceptions to express His knowledge. That is the essence of originality.

6. Imagination. Simile, metaphor, hyperbole tread upon each other in Jesus' teaching. One needs only to read His parables to see how well, and with what homely efficacy, He thought and spoke in pictures. He was an artist and a poet—both: His poetry "the poetry of earth", vivid, simple, sincere; His artistry that of a master, deft, unwasteful, sure. We have seen nothing just like it.

7. Subtlety. He showed an almost incredible swiftness in realizing a situation, reading a character, or meeting and attack. His opponents were never able to best Him in argument, no matter how long and carefully prepared they were, no matter how suddenly they sprang their catch question. He saw through them and their question in a moment; He weighed the alternatives as swiftly; and answered with perfect poise but the most devastating effect.

"Well, then, give Caesar what belongs to Caesar, give God what belongs to God". "Where did the baptism of John come from? From heaven or from men?" "How can Satan cast out Satan?" "Have you
never read what David did?...The sabbath was made for man, not man for the sabbath".1 "At no moment in his career does the swift and subtle, yet strangely simple, genius of Jesus appear so evident as in his conflicts with his great and learned adversaries. The gesture of his mind, become the perfect instrument of his spirit, has the beauty of finality".2

8. Fidelity to reality. Streeter is thinking of Jesus when he says: "Intelligence shows itself in apprehending the exact nature of the particular problems with which the individual is himself called upon to deal; in seeing through the fog of contemporary sophism and misunderstanding; in detecting underlying principles which to most men are lost in a mass of detail or are obscured by accepted catchwords; in noticing the connection of things usually unrelated or the distinction of between things usually confused; in apprehending the importance of what others overlook or the relative unimportance of what they regard as central...If the test of intelligence is capacity 'to see the point', among those born of women Christ is not surpassed".3

This is putting well the chief quality of Jesus in thought--His amazingly swift apprehension of reality and His ability to give it expression in words true to the fact. When the whole of His perfectly integrated personality was engaged in the endeavor to know--and this is what His thinking was--He marched right up into the heart of the fact, with a surety that witnessed to His intellectual poise: consciousness and subconsciousness cooperating to find the truth; reason and intuition laboring together; all his powers converging upon one point.

We must postpone for later consideration the grounds for believing that He really apprehended reality, swiftly and unerringly. Meanwhile the manner of that apprehension is of extreme interest.

The intellectual activity of Jesus was a frank facing of reality with the whole person. As already pointed out, no intellectual activity is without its affective and conative elements. The affective and conative elements may be fairly submerged in the cognitive, but they are there. In Jesus no process was subjected to distortion or suppression; every process was allowed to fulfill its proper and valuable function.

Nor was His mind inwardly divided. He had no repressions, suffered from no complexes, was not torn by acute subconscious conflicts. The subconscious had nothing to hide. There was no subpersonal intrigue. No one could say He was divided against Himself. It was in a mind perfectly integrated that the conviction arose: "If a realm is divided against itself, that realm cannot stand: if a household is divided against itself, that household cannot stand". 2

Having no repressions, "He would be free from the inner causes of rationalizing"; He would not have reason, nor be under inward compulsion, not to look at the truth squarely. Moreover, He eagerly and dynamically sought knowledge, searched for truth; He projected His whole self into the midst of the universal life with the purpose of apprehending reality.

In this He was aided by the fact that, being inwardly harmonized, He had all His past experience available, when confronted with new situations. The subconscious in Him was not a storm center of frustrated impulses conspiring to master Him, by fair means or

1See supra, p.67 2Mk 3:24,25. 3Valentine, Modern Psychology and the Validity of Christian Experience, p 11
foul. There was nothing in His subconsciousness which was not accessible, more or less directly, to His consciousness, or which was balked from its own highest self-expression. He could put all of Himself into every thought, every act. So poised intellectually to see and understand, did He see dimly or clearly; was there anything that might be seen by a human individual hidden from His eyes?

The Gospels, representing truth in its aspect of light flashing in upon the sound mind through the eye, put this experience of Jesus in His own words, (we choose the version of the physician, Luke): "Your eye is the lamp of the body: when your eye is sound, then your whole body has light, but if your eye is diseased, then your body is darkened. (Look! perhaps your very light is dark.) So if your whole body has light, without any corner of it in darkness, it will be lit up entirely, as when a lamp lights you with its rays". The Greek phrase for "sound eye" (ό ὁφθαλμός ἁπλός) is in this context, like many similar Greek phrases, hard to translate. The soundness of the eye is not merely a physical soundness but a moral single-mindedness, a sincerity that is generous and frank— it is the well-ordered, and, if we may use the modern word, the correctly focussed or integrated eye, physically and psychically. Similarly, the "diseased eye" (πονηρός) is not merely physically mal-adjusted, but morally corrupted, evil, wicked, selfish.

We may apply this passage forthwith to Jesus Himself. In part it explains the high value He set upon single-mindedness, simplicity of life. The Matthean version of this saying is, in

1Lk 11:34-36; cf. Matt 6:22, 23.
fact, immediately followed by the notable law of the religious life: "No one can serve two masters". The law is applicable to more choices than one. The secret of successful living is the choice of the highest, and single-minded devotion and adjustment of oneself to it. Provided one has this singleness of mind, he may enter into life, this life, freely, heartily. Complete loyalty to one mastering purpose may know no confusion: it carries with it accomplished fact of mental poise.

9. The poise of the mind of Jesus, finally, is evident in the even balance He maintained between introversion and extroversion. To recall the discussions of a previous page, extroversion implies a certain identification of subject with object (and thus a movement of the person outward to the object, as in sympathy or hero-worship) and introversion implies identification of object with subject (the object is swallowed up in the subject, as in daydreaming or introspection). In the former case, feeling is predominant; in the latter case, intellectual activity. The extrovert is socially-minded, and lives in and for the world; the introvert is absorbed in his own subjective states, and lives in and for the thoughts he has.

Jesus was at poise between these two attitudes; or, rather, He balanced His periods of introversion with periods of the most complete extroversion. The quality of His thought bears the marks of introversion; the form of His thought is due to extroversion. In prayer He was introverted, in public life extroverted. Within, He had the peace which the world cannot take away; but He was habitually turning outward to share it with the world. The thirty years of preparation were perhaps predominantly a period of
self-communion; His ministry was predominantly a period of living in and for the world: He brought out of His store treasures new and old, and ventured all for their acceptance and appropriation by men.

"Let us confess," says Keim, in other terms than these we have been using, "that humanity can elsewhere hardly show this even balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces".¹

II

The poise of Jesus was evident also in the adequacy of His volitional response. In each situation He knew what to do. He moved swiftly and easily from one decision to another.

On the side of activity, this showed itself in His leadership, His fearlessness; on the side of passivity, in His self-possession and patience.

Jesus rated highly in His followers the qualities of firmness and resolution. Though Peter lacked somewhat the requisite firmness, he was so energetic, so full of resolutions, that he enjoyed the special favor of the Master. At least he was not slack.

The teaching of Jesus is one constant challenge to aspire, to choose the best, to will the highest. He seemed to be always expecting one to go the full length, to leave houses and families, without looking back. He commended the "sensible virgins", whose prudence consisted chiefly in fore-sight and preparedness; He told more than one parable that set forth the excellence of a good servant's industry and competence; He even placed a value on being importunate: it at least indicated purposiveness. He abominated cheap talk behind which was nothing but irresolution:

¹Jesus of Nazareth, vol I, p 445 (German ed)
"The scribes and Pharisees sit on the seat of Moses; so do whatever they tell you, obey them, but do not do as they do. They talk but they do not act".1

In His own firmness and resolution Jesus displayed the central seriousness of purpose and indomitability of His nature. The essential and original aspiration at the root of His being was given full expression. Nothing could cause Him to trim or equivocate or hedge. He was steadily persistent; He would summon up all His powers in the presence of obstacles, and go on alone, if no one cared to follow (compare the striking statement of Mark: "They were on the way up to Jerusalem, Jesus walking in front of them: the disciples were in dismay and the company who followed were afraid"2); because His desire to get on with the work the Father had given Him to do was a consuming passion, running through all His nights and days.

His will was not divided, not part of His personality functioning; it was His whole personality in the endeavor to act, a personality fixed upon one end, tending to one purposed achievement.

Hence, His leadership, His authority in any company.

Even the scribes who came down from Jerusalem found themselves swallowed up in the crowds that followed Him. And when He ceased speaking, and threaded the company, on His way to the next towns, He went on ahead; so it was down all the roads of Palestine; so it was when at the last He went up to Jerusalem. It was not that He demanded a petty priority of position and led twelve deluded disciples about; it was that He was morally and spiritually too

1Matt 23:2,3. 2Mk 10:32
great for His times. He was breaking with tradition to walk a new
way. We find therefore that people cried out: "'What is this?'
It's new teaching with authority behind it!"1 "We never saw the
like of it!"2 Then as the break with old ways became more pro-
nounced: "Why do your disciples not follow the traditions of the
elders?"3 and "Why do you eat and drink with taxgatherers and
sinners?"4 and "Why do John's disciples and the disciples of the
Pharisees fast, and your disciples do not fast?"5

The replies that Jesus made to such questions as these
exhibit His perfect fearlessness. To break with tradition is one
thing; to be checked for it by the authorities, with severe and
pointed questioning, and yet to go on breaking with tradition,
with all the world beginning to frown upon such presumption, is
quite another. But Jesus never lost His poise; He knew what He
was about; He was not doing what authority sanctioned and society
expected; He was looking at the traditions with keen eyes and a
wholesome sanity, and He was setting out to free the religion
imprisoned in them from narrowness and dry-rot—to accomplish
its fulfillment by breaking away its bonds and giving it new life
and scope. "Do not imagine", He said, "I have come to destroy the
Law or the prophets; I have not come to destroy but to fulfill".6
But mark that this is almost immediately followed by the astound-
ing utterance: "You have heard how the men of old were told...
but I tell you".7 He would have the people of God realize their
destiny by--rebirth! Nothing less. Judaism must find its life--
by losing it!

It was inevitable that so radical a proposal should set

1Mk 1:27 2Mk 2:12 3Mk 7:5 4Lk 5:30 5Mk 2:18 6Matt 5:17
7Matt 5:21, 27, 33, etc.
the authorities at Jerusalem by the ears. The storm began to rise. Jesus had sown the wind; it became certain that He would reap the whirlwind. But His poise remained unbroken. He faced the brewing tempest calmly and fearlessly, with indomitable masterfulness.

We here see the passive side of His volitional response, the defensive aspect of His determination. In the height of opposition He kept what Seeley calls "this repose in greatness". He was self-possessed. Not that He masked His feelings: He had nothing to hide; but no one could keep Him from being always Himself. He was always counselling others not to be afraid, but to have confidence, to trust and to have courage.

He was also patient—biding the time till it was ripe. But whether in patience and self-possession, or in forthrightness and fearlessness, He showed the same strength of purpose and passion of loyalty: He willed the highest from first to last, with the unshaken poise of resolution.

III

There is a third aspect under which the poise of Jesus is revealed. It is His emotional balance.

The Gospels over and over again, in spite of occasional attempts to conceal it, betray the fact that Jesus lived a rich emotional life. It is true that they do not go as far as the Epistle to the Hebrews in its insistence on bitter cries and tears and godly fear; but then we catch them mitigating and subduing the evidences of emotion. The earliest gospel is the frankest in speaking out.

1 Ecce Homo p 38
Mark describes the emotions of Jesus in such direct phrases as these: "So he stretched his hand out in pity and touched him"; "then he sent him off at once with the stern charge"; "then glancing round him in anger and vexation...he told the man"; "he charged them strictly and severely"; "he was astonished at their lack of faith"; "out of pity for them...he proceeded to teach them at length"; "'I am sorry for the crowd'"; "now the Pharisees...started to argue. But he sighed in spirit"; "Jesus was angry"; "Jesus looked at him and loved him"; "he began to feel appalled and agitated" and said "'My heart is sad, sad even to death'".1

Emotion is frequently implied in such passages as these (but a few among many): "Then in the early morning, long before daylight, he got up and went away to a lonely spot...Simon and his companions hunted him out...but he said to them, 'Let us go somewhere else'"2; "Peter took him and began to reprove him, but he turned...and...reproved Peter"3; "and he called his disciples and said to them, 'I tell you truly, this poor widow has put in more than all who have put their money into the treasury'".4

Matthew prefers to elide some of these indications of emotion; but had we only his gospel to go by, we should still have to assume a wealth of deep feeling in Jesus. The diatribe against the Pharisees might seem, if torn from its context and lifted bodily out of its historical setting, to presuppose an excess of emotion.

Jesus would not have been normal without feeling: an emotionless person is psychologically inconceivable, a fiction.

1 Mk 1:35-38; 2 Mk 1:41; 1:44; 3:5; 3:12; 6:6; 6:34; 8:2; 8:12; 10:14; 10:21; 14:33f. 2 Mk 1:35-38 3 Mk 8:33 4 Mk 12:43.
We should have to assume from the fact alone that He was a human being, that He was constantly moved with feeling.

But let us not allow our emphasis upon the affective side of Jesus' self-expression to confuse us as to His essential poise with it all. *Note, first, the perfect naturalness and inevitableness of His emotion, given time, place, and the causal circumstances. Recall, in the second place, that repression of emotion destroys poise as much as exaggeration of it. A natural expression of feeling—by which we mean an adequate expression—is the normal thing.*

But a third observation is in order. The emotional balance of Jesus sprang in large part from the fact that His feelings ran in no vicious circles. He had none of the pronounced introvert's worry about himself; He did not brood upon wrongs, and nurse resentments; He lived in freedom from anxiety, letting the morrow take care of itself, possessing an inward peace, a trust in life and in God, that survived every shock.

Certainly, to go one step further, He was not given to a sentimentalist cultivation of feeling for its own sake. He gave His attention to the task in hand, and feeling came spontaneously, as the quality of experience natural to His activity, and flowing from it. One cannot read, say, the Gospel of Mark, without being struck by an entire absence of any dwelling by Jesus upon His own subjective states of mind. His ministry was marked by a looking steadily outward upon men and toward God—and little looking inward. To find ourselves, said He, we must forget ourselves, lose ourselves in loyalty to the Cause. He would not have our inner experience made the object of special cultivation; He would have
the will of God done, and the experience would come of itself. As a recent writer puts it:

"The prevalent tendency to introspection, to the cultivation or analysis of religious states of mind, is a gross misrepresentation of Christianity. Indeed, the atmosphere we breathe today in circles which are occupied with religion, might almost be called fundamentally irreligious. It is all concerned with ourselves and not with God. But nothing could be easily imagined more remote from the outlook of our Lord. In His religion there is no trace of this. The deep, calm certainty of His God-experience (and what else can religious experience validly mean?) has no touch of this feverish emotionalism. The nearest approach to a definition of the real meaning of religion that can be gathered from His teaching is, that religion is doing the will of God".1

The cure of sentimentalism is action. William James was of opinion that, after a concert that rouses his feelings to their height, the theater-goer should tie his emotions immediately to some action that will give healthy expression in practical deed. Certainly Jesus literally ran away from the emotional crowds that pressed upon him. In the strongest terms He deprecated loyalty to Him rooted in sentimentalism: "It is not everyone who says to me 'Lord, Lord!', who will get into the Realm of heaven, but he who does the will of my Father in heaven". Observe, now, what closely follows: "Now, everyone who listens to these words of mine and acts upon them will be like a sensible man".2

Men were to love one another, not love their love of one another; men were to love God, not love their love of God.

To sum up, then, Jesus' emotions were balanced, healthy. He had rich, wholesome feelings. He was not given to the stoical absurdity of throttling them, anymore than He was given to the sentimental absurdity of coddling them. We have not His opinion of the uprooting of emotion in Essenism; but we may believe that He was saved from any leaning toward it by the intuition that it

1Barry, Christianity and Psychology, p 134  2Matt 7:21-24.
was the false way to live—psychologically foolhardy and ethically barren of good. When one of the foremost of modern psychologists decries the lack of psychological insight among the earlier moralists, which "led to such doctrines as that of certain Stoics, to the effect that the wise and good man should seek to eradicate the emotions from his bosom; or that of Kant, to the effect that the wise and good man should be free from desire"; and puts these views aside as "quaint notions"; we should have no hesitation in exempting Jesus from the charge.

He was too poised to espouse so foolish a program.
CHAPTER XVI

THE SINLESS ONE

It is an old, and valid, claim—though we will not stress it—that the moral consciousness which could evolve a philosophy of religion and a system of ethics so obviously the last refuge and final hope of an elsewise distracted humanity, demands a place in the category of perfection.

We have already noted the absence in Jesus of worry about Himself, and we recall the remark of Goguel, that "a personality of this depth and ethical intensity, had he felt conscious of sin in even the slightest degree, would have been overwhelmed by feelings of poignant and consuming grief". Jesus, so far as we know, and as we are in no wise driven to suspect, did not pass through the experiences of remorse, repentance, and conversion, central in the lives of such spiritual geniuses as St. Paul, Augustine, Luther, and Wesley. We may hold that the silence of the records on the point weighs heavily for the absence in Jesus of a consciousness of sin.

The Synoptists, it is true, do not explicitly make the claim of sinlessness for Jesus. Certainly there is nothing in them corresponding to the direct challenge of John 8:46, "Which of you can convict me of sin?" Instead we have the authentic utterance (surely not invented) of Jesus replying to His questioner: "Why call me 'good'? No one is good, no one but God".

But this sounds more formidable than it really is. We perceive that this saying is not relevant, if we are seeking evidence of a consciousness of sin in Jesus; to be relevant it would

1 From a reference to Goguel by H.R. Mackintosh, op. cit, p 36
2 Mk 10:18
need the independent support of other statements carrying the explicit implication of a sense of sin. Apart from such support, it must be read as a confession of human limitation, in the spirit of humility.

This brings us to our first conclusion as to the nature of the sinlessness of Jesus: within the limitations of human personality, Jesus sinlessly fulfilled all righteousness.

This position must be justified by a further consideration of its grounds.

I

And, first, as to what may be called the psychological starting point.

Psychology is not concerned with the ultimate questions of right and wrong; sinlessness is to it simply perfect functioning of the personality. "No sin means no waste of energy", for example.¹ The starting point is therefore the ascertainment of the degree of harmony within the person.

We have examined the grounds for believing that Jesus passed through an adequately guided childhood. His early training was such as to secure a perfect unfolding of innate tendencies and capacities. At each period of his growth, He was without the inner maladjustments seen, for example, in the torturing fears of childhood and its accompanying repressions. He grew as naturally and perfectly as a flower of the field, the life within Him lifting freely to its consummation. He was one with the natural urge of which Lowell speaks in the opening stanzas of "Sir Launfal".

¹T.W.Pym, Psychology and the Christian Life, p 89.
No primary instincts were repressed and thus driven to mutiny. On the other hand, certainly the instincts were not rampant; they were controlled, by the inhibition of their lower expression, and the direction of their energies into the highest possible channels of activity.

If it be asked how this could have been, psychology is at a loss for an answer: it is confined to this rather barren recital of the fact. How exactly Shakespeare was Shakespeare is a like mystery; and there are everlasting mysteries like Little Francis, and "To a Skylark" and the "Gettysburg Address" and Joan of Arc.

Psychology must leave the how of the sinlessness of Jesus to theology, but itself insists on the inner harmony in the person of Jesus, a poise of all His powers, like the poise of a bird in flight or of a runner running a race.

Beginning here, psychology goes on to see, that springing from this perfection of integration set to motion inexhaustible, there was in Him a fund of extraordinary energy, the ability to extend the self almost indefinitely in the performance of a task—in a word, life, freely-flowing, abundant life, only inadequately conveyed to our comprehension in the terms of "vitality" and "passion for the good".

Here we should not let our average consciousness stand in our minds as the measure of His. The approximate measure of the power in Him is the life-passion of genius, to the great average mass of us a mysterious thing, and beyond our comprehension in its qualitative aspects. "We know very little," says G. Stanley Hall, "of the norms of sanity for superior souls, and they often
seem to need and to use with great advantage experiences that to weaklings, children, and the commonalty would be dangerous, but that in them are signs of life superabounding. Genius amounts almost to mania, in that it shows a fixing of the whole self upon one object, complete integration along one line, and consequent hyper-capacity for action.

This is precisely what shocked the Nazarenes and the friends and relatives of Jesus. They crowded into the house of Mary to warn her, and took aside Jesus' brethren to din in their ears the horrible suspicion, that Jesus was beside himself. His vitality and passion were more than their faith in a neighbor could bear. They found him insufferably quick and strong—"flighty", they had it.

They could not accustom themselves to Jesus' non-hesitancy in action. His vitality was always translating itself into action. He could choose quickly and go on without looking back. He was not "a house divided against itself". Decision may have been painful—the decisions of the Temptation, involving as they did the giving up of the life of the home, certainly must have been—but they were nonetheless unhesitatingly entered upon.

"It lies deep down," says Mr. Barry, "in the core of Our Lord's teaching that nobody can serve two masters. In that brief and haunting sentence He laid bare half the problems of psychology—and gave the key to His own blameless life.

The fact here is that Jesus drew a line of almost absolute distinction between right and wrong; and what He thought was right He always did, and what He thought was wrong He did not

1 Jesus the Christ in the Light of Psychology, Vol I, p 172.
2 Christianity and Psychology, p 71
do. Unhesitatingly, when choice was His, He chose the right, no matter what the decision involved. It became Him, He knew, to fulfill all righteousness: "Come now, this is how we should fulfill all our duty to God".\(^1\) His constant passion was to do the right, as God gave Him to see the right. He never deviated from this way of life.

He was sinless, then.\(^2\)

II

And of a pure conscience.

Like any other human individual, Jesus found, when He acted in anything, that (for him) only those activities which were accorded by an inward feeling or judgment to be right were right; and so He gave this inward feeling or judgment priority in determining His decisions; He never failed to abide by its suggestions. Whence there was this difference between Him and the mass of men: His conscience never "hurt" Him.

We have already declined to regard the conscience as a mysterious sixth sense or specially God-given faculty, located in the breast or brain, and sitting in judgment, prospectively or in retrospect, upon every action. Conscience is the response of the whole self to the values created by the moral sentiments. Acts already committed which are out of harmony with the moral sentiments produce in them uneasiness—the conscience hurts. Prospective actions accordant with, or contrary to, the moral sentiments have either their help or hindrance—the man has a conscience.

\(^1\)Matt 3:15  \(^2\) The sinlessness of Jesus, obviously, was not a sinlessness apparent to every observer. It was sinlessness for Himself, an inwardly determined choice of the best possible course, when alternatives might involve apparent harshness, the appearance of cruelty (as when He turned away His mother at Capernaum) or of fanaticism, what seemed to the by-stander His unaccountable behavior. Nor was it the sinlessness possible to omniscient deity, but innocence of conscious espousal of low aims. (See supra, p 87).
in the matter, we say.

Now temptations are suggestions to act, rising from within or from without, in a manner contrary to the moral sentiments. These suggestions are sometimes amazingly subtle, but they all tend to wrong-doing, to the abusing of the body, or the shackling of the will with the chains of evil habit, or the erecting of an abomination of desolation in the mind, or the effecting of something ruinous to one's fellows. In the simplest terms, temptation follows the presence of a suggestion (it may be auto- or hetero-suggestion) looking toward acceptance of the lower aims and motives within the range of personal choice.

No one doubts that Jesus was subject to temptation; but there is a strong tendency in some quarters, where the petitio principii has priority even over the evidence, to subtract from the temptations of Jesus every element of struggle and hazard, and while granting that they had the form of real moral crises, denying that there could have been any real peril. But if psychology is to choose between the non potuit peccare and the potuit non peccare alternatives, it unhesitatingly chooses the latter. The words of Philip Schaff may be recalled: "His sinlessness was at first only the relative sinlessness of Adam before the Fall; which implies the necessity of trial and temptation, and the peccability, or possibility of sinning. Had He been endowed from the start with absolute impeccability, or with the impossibility of sinning, He could not be true man, nor our model for imitation: His holiness instead of being His own self-acquired act and inherent merit, would be an accidental or outward gift, and His temptation an unreal show...Christ's relative sinlessness became absolute sin-
lessness by His own moral act, or the right use of His freedom in perfect active and passive obedience to God. In other words, Christ's original possibility of not sinning, which includes the opposite possibility of sinning but excludes the actuality of sin, was unfolded into the impossibility of sinning, which can not sin because it will not.¹

In answering the question, could Jesus sin, could He choose the lower alternative instead of the higher, psychology says: He could but did not,—which is the bare, heartening fact.

It is impossible to conceive a real human person, with all the instincts inherent in His nature, not subject to temptation. In the case of Jesus, as in that if the finer types of men and women, who seem innately shielded from temptations to sin grossly, subconscious inhibition of the carnal impulses prevented the more crass temptations from entering His consciousness. Nevertheless all the subtler, more insidious temptations, springing from the lower impulses, assailed Him continually. The temptations in the wilderness after His baptism were the major trials of His life, we may believe; but thereafter, as Luke keenly discerns,² He was tempted constantly: every alternative presented to Him contained within it the temptation to choose the lower course, or as Jesus would put it, to do His own rather than God's will, i.e. to do the things suggested by His unsublimated nature rather than to do the things which were ideally or divinely right.

There was perhaps this difference between the great temptations of the wilderness and those which subsequently came to Him. Whereas the former were not resolved without long meditation, fast-

¹The Person of Christ, p 31, 32. ²Lk 4:13
ing, and prayer, the latter were swiftly faced and brought to an issue. This immediacy of decision is well brought out by a recent writer on the subject: "The method of His thought in face of such temptation is exactly illustrated in the twelfth chapter of St. John's Gospel. Dr. Moffat's translation gives it most clearly: 'My soul is now disquieted. What am I to say?' In the first sentence, probably a quotation from His Scriptures, Jesus gives expression to a sense of foreboding or depression; this idea is in the second sentence immediately challenged; it is not allowed to become a part of Himself. 'What am I to say?' 'Father save me from this hour?' i.e. 'Shall I say--Father save me?' 'Shall I in so doing regard the prospect as unbearable? Shall I contemplate the future as something that I have not the strength to endure?' And then He gives His answer, thereby fixing His mind and will in the right direction: 'Nay, it is something else that has brought me to this hour. I will say "Father, glorify thy name."' He rejects His own disquietude as a dominant idea in His mind and puts in its place the thought of the majesty and power of God the Father.\(^1\)

The Fourth Evangelist undoubtedly here correctly represents the typical way in which Jesus met temptation. Alternatives presented themselves; He rapidly estimated them intellectually and by reference to His moral sentiments; His conscience having registered its judgment, He immediately chose the higher alternative.

III

But even this is not an adequate rendering of the manner by which Jesus maintained Himself sinless. The emphasis so far has

\(^1\)Pym, op.cit, p 91
been on the fact that He \textbf{would not}, and in that sense \textbf{could not}, sin. But this is stressing the negative aspects of Jesus' sinlessness: it is said, He \textbf{would not}. Which brings us to saying that the more satisfactory way of putting the fact is, that He could not sin, because He would do right: there were other things that He was about. His sinlessness was the underside of His righteousness. "It may be", writes Dr. Mackintosh, "that we speak too much of Jesus' conflict, forgetting that His was a goodness altogether radiant, victorious".\(^1\)

When we look into His life we find there a hunger and a thirst for the good, almost unbelievably strong. It gave Him immunity from taint of evil. Among the publicans and sinners (whom the Pharisees avoided with doubled aversion—for fear of a moral as well as a ceremonial taint) He was conscious of such consecrated vitality and strength of pure purpose, that He knew He walked scatheless.

In His teaching, as a consequence, He always struck the positive note. Seldom do we find Him saying "Don't". Rather, He would picture the man worthy of life eternal and say, "Then \textit{gå} and do the same".\(^2\) He was always offering a richer, fuller life; He pointed out to them the bigger things they could and should live for. Compare the teaching of John the Baptist with that of Jesus. John "urged men to expel darkness. The other said, 'Get light, get plenty of light', and the heart that is flooded with light will have no problem of darkness".\(^3\) It was His own experience which here took embodiment in Jesus' teaching.

In part His sinlessness was the result of the negative process of inhibition; far more it was the result of the positive \(\text{Kingdom, p157}\)
THE SINLESS ONE

process of the fulfillment of His ideals by the sublimation of all His impulses. Inadequate the language is (and all purely psychological description is smitten with a certain poverty of phraseology and conception) but this aspect of the sinlessness of Jesus deserves closer study.

Suppose we are dealing with one of the primary instincts, which is seeking expression, because the well-defined hereditary predispositions are at work. If it be the sex-instinct (to take an example), it is possible for any normally constituted individual to treat it in three different ways. It is possible to give it no expression at all: that would be repression at its completest, and it would set civil war within the person in motion. Again, it could be given direct expression, through courtship, marriage, and home-building. This would be the normal, and on the whole the most immediately salutary, course. But the third course might be chosen; the instinct could be given indirect expression; it could be sublimated. Such a course involves on the one hand inhibition of the impulse to give direct expression to the instinct; and on the other hand, satisfaction of the instinct by the employment of its energy and interest in a related but higher type of activity. By this means, the inhibited impulse to give the instinct direct expression is robbed of its strength, even of its potency, by the drawing off of its energy into the sublimated channels.

Some psychologists are here wont to speak of sacrifice. It is well said; for inhibition is sacrifice, just as sublimation is, psychologically considered, the way of salvation. We have here, then, salvation by sacrifice, self-realization through self-surrender (surrender of part of the self), and in the words of
Jesus, expressing an intuition formed out of His own experience, the losing of one's life to find it.

"His teaching," says Mr. Wray, "is always calling men to transcend the lower levels and climb to the spiritual heights. 'Ye have heard it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery; but I say unto you, Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery already with her in his heart'. The sex instinct is not to be held to justify a low morality. Exactly; Jesus knew that one can reach the fullest psychic health only by a high morality--by the losing of one's lower to find one's higher life. Sublimation is the way of the saints. There is a great deal of this in the difficult saying concerning eunuchs. In that rather cryptic utterance, Jesus refers to those who have sacrificed the mating impulse to an intense love for humanity, and have found that the love of men has adequately compensated for the unrealized joys of home, and wife and children: they are, as it were, lost to physical fatherhood. But, although it was sometimes His custom to put the challenge to renunciation with severity, as when He said: "If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother, and wife and children, and brothers and sisters, aye and his own life, he cannot be a disciple of mine", Jesus took a very sane view of the general practicability of celibacy: "Let anyone practice it for whom it is practicable," He said.

What happened in His own case--if we are to give a serious psychological account of His sinlessness--was that He used all the native energy of His person, the "interests" which are the chief manifestation of the instincts, by harnessing them as a

1 The New Psychology and the Gospel, p 23. 2 Lk 14:26 3 Matt 19:12
coordinate whole to the central passion and purpose of His life. They were all expressed (for they are an inseparable part of human nature, and all to be redeemed), but in a sublimated form; so that they did not disrupt the inner harmony of His nature by rebellion.

Mr. Barry thinks the sublimation of the instincts can be put in Christian terms. "We should start, there is little doubt," he says, "from the frank admission that what for psychology is the 'sex-instinct' is for us the creative love of God". By means of this instinct, re-directed to the highest ends, we may express ourselves to the glory of God and the relief of man's estate. "I do not feel the slightest hesitation," he continues, "in claiming that in principle and essence this was the method adopted by Our Lord". Mr. Barry then examines the instinct of pugnacity, "perhaps the most violently destructive and anti-social of all our impulses", even when transferred from the individual and enlisted in the service of the group. It lies at the basis of all wars. "But again Christianity supplies the need. It offers the adventure of the Kingdom. Our Lord loved 'fighters'...And all through his— by thousands of men and women have taken service under Him as 'Captain', sublimating their combative impulses in perilous enterprises and dauntless loyalty for the sake of the Kingdom which is to come".

The whole of the 'natural' or 'instinctive' man may thus be lifted to the highest levels of Christian living. Salvation is, psychologically, complete sublimation.

As One who was truly human, Jesus possessed the same endowments, had the same instincts, felt the same impulses (quan-
titatively, of course, not qualitatively) as the rest of human kind. More adequate language (such as so fitly clothes the same thought in devotional literature) psychology does not have, than that which we employ in saying, that Jesus brought His instincts into harmony with the march of His self-fulfillment, by their sublimation. In the less technical terms of religious thought, He realized Himself through sacrifice; He lost His life to find it.

The sublimation of the 'natural' man in Him was apparently not attended with the difficulty which the ordinary man meets. Inhibition was so without terror for Him, even in major crises, that He used to put the law of sacrifice in strong terms: "If your right eye is a hindrance to you, pluck it out and throw it away... and if your right hand is a hindrance to you, cut it off and throw it away: better for you to lose one of your members than to have all your body thrown into Gehenna". Through this extremely vivid imagery we seem to discern the simple warning: do not fall into the hell of self-division; bring about your own inner unity, even with the boldest of measures: lose your lower life to find your higher, by sacrificing the one to obtain the other.

McDougall (with relative correctness, as previously pointed out) lists as primary at least eleven instincts. Should we blink our eyes in panic to the fact that Jesus had all these? He had them all; but, taken up into His purpose, they became changed, they underwent metamorphosis. It is not to our purpose to examine them one by one, with a prying curiosity (which would in any case be above satisfaction) in their application to Jesus' inner life; but we may be allowed to observe that devotion to

1Matt 5:29, 30  2See supra p 26.
God and the Kingdom found place, yea, need, for them all. So, then, to review the apparent fact rapidly, the instinct of flight from danger was, as often happens in courageous men, transformed into fearless meeting of menace, in whatever form it showed itself; repulsion became constructive criticism, tinged at times with indignation, again with humor; curiosity issued in knowledge, the love of truth; pugnacity was transmuted into magnificent aggressiveness in behalf of the good; self-abasement and self-assertion appeared as humility and authority; acquisition was expressed in "storing up treasures in heaven" and the winning of souls to God; construction had full play in the Kingdom-conception; and last, but not least, we see in Him creative love for God and man, the generosity of perfect friendship, the passing tenderness for little children, and good will toward the unthankful and the evil. "In almost every case," Miss Coster declares, "His mighty works are prompted by an emotion of love and pity. The sex instinct is shown as completely sublimated into a passion of love for humanity. It is neither repressed, as some would have us believe, nor yet weakened and attenuated... There is no greater tale of passion and chivalry in all the annals of the human race than that set forth in the gospels."  

IV

The objection may be raised, that this is perhaps true, but it is certainly not the whole of the truth. That is to be granted. Manifestly the psychological explanation falls short. The higher cannot be explained fully in terms of the lower. Ordinary human experience cannot be the measure of that which is, to

1Psycho-Analysis for Normal People, p 224.
say the least of it, above the ordinary.

In the contemplation of the character of Jesus our minds vainly strive to compass the whole of the mystery; that will always be true, so long as we cannot put yard-stick and plumb-line to Ultimate Reality. Nevertheless it is the duty we owe ourselves (for we would have the mind, the purpose, the will of Jesus in us) to try to understand Him in the dim ways open to us. Psychology offers itself as the bringer of some small light. We have used it—we trust with no over-estimation of its value—yet we stand in awe of before the mystery of the grace of God that remains.
"The wonderful thing about Jesus," writes Lynn Harold Hough, "as we move back into His own life from the flashing penetration of His sentences regarding the lilies and Solomon, lies just in the fact that He restored to men the direct gaze. He did not look at life through media of selfishness and ambition and pride, which distort the brain, He looked straight at beauty for the sake of beauty. Beauty lost nothing because it bloomed in some remote and sequestered spot. Beauty gained nothing because it gleamed above a throne. It was to be loved and understood for its own sake. And because He brought this direct gaze to the task of seeing, Jesus was able to find in lilies what no one had found before."¹

If Jesus was what we have so far found Him to be, this is what we should expect; but, since looking straight at beauty for its own sake is not characteristic of the typical Jew, ascription of such an attitude to Jesus is in some need of defence.

Was Jesus so Greek as this in His attitude toward nature?

¹The Christian Century (Chicago), Sept 8, 1927, p 1041.
looking through Nature, really. The Greek and the Jew typify these two attitudes.

Your typical Greek, before he was captivated by the Ionian philosophers, had that gift which Dr. Hough ascribes to Jesus, of looking at the world about him with a direct gaze. He saw Nature naked, without importing into her complex spiritual significances, or believing that all the vivid beauty of tree and field was just a veil hiding the unseen reality. He saw in Nature the same ultimate fact that he saw in himself. "Man is the measure of all things,"—and Nature is that upon which the measure is laid.

The gods came forth from Nature, from Mother Earth; they were deified aspects of the visible, tangible universe. This is what so attracts some of the jaded, tired spirits of today. The principal charm, we are told, of the Greek religion was "its cult of visible beauty, its deification of nature, its beautiful and joyous ritual."1 Father Zeus stood over against Nature in a dualistic relation, and he would not outlast her. Nature was the great final resting place as she was the first mother of life. There are in early Greek religion "gods enough; but they are not original beings with independent powers. They are the shadows of the man who made them, called them into existence to patronize the actions of their creator, to utter the words which he puts into their mouths, to smile to order at his faults and virtues with benignant and unfaltering complacency".2

So the early Greek looked through the gods at Nature—until Nature no more sufficed as an ultimate reality, and there came a "failure of nerve".3 This was the first reaction to the

1Zielinski, The Religion of Greece, p 210  
3See Gilbert Murray, Five Stages of Greek Religion, chap IV
world about him which the Greek registered. It was an outlook, certainly, that the philosophers wholly revised and changed; and Plato truly never shared it; but there it is.

It is the very antithesis of the Hebrew faith, we immediately perceive. Among all the ancients the Jews were least given to the deliberate contemplation of Nature in order to enjoy its beauty. 1 "Although there is appeal to the wonder and majesty of Nature as God's work, in order to humble man, and although the glory of God in the natural world and His joy in it owe nothing to man, it is no exaggeration to say that the Old Testament regards Nature, in the last resort, simply as the arena for the moral issues of human life." 2 In the Psalter, for example, "the conception of kindly mother-nature holds no great place in the thought of its writers. For the desert was at the men's door: and God made the desert, a land of barrenness and of death". 3 Job is a typically Jewish poem. One must go far to find a greater wealth of natural description than we find in Job; line upon powerful line of it hits off with incomparable vividness the aspects which Nature presents to the discerning eye. But there is no study of still life; it is Nature dynamic, alive, in sublime movement.

And why? Because it is just the living veil that hides the lineaments of the unseen living God behind and within all.

The Jew felt through Nature to God.

Sometimes, elsewhere in the Old Testament, we find the eye delighting in beauty for itself, as though it were ultimate fact. Thus, in Proverbs:

"A wise reproof laid on a willing hearer
is like a golden apple
laid on silver network."

or

"Honor conferred upon a fool
is like a bag of gems
laid on a heap of stones"

show an appreciation of the beauty and fitness of things as things. But this is Wisdom literature, and Greek culture, come east, was a real factor. Then there is the Song of Songs; but it is curiously introspective; there is almost complete identification of all objects, all beautiful objects, with the subject; the aspects of Nature but serve to illustrate the unconditioned value that lies within. There is a haunting bit of poetry in Isaiah.

"Who are these flying like a cloud,
lke doves into their cotes?
'Tis ships that gather here to me,
ships of Tartessus in the van".

But it is from the song of Zion Redeemed, the Holy One of Israel is behind all.

So it goes. "The Judaean did not cherish filial feelings for the great mother--Earth"; there were to him but two ultimate realities, when all was said--God and the soul; all else was to pass away as the grass of the field which vanishes in fervent heat.

The Jew was in his deepest and most determinative moods introverted; the Greek was in the main extroverted. "The Jew has ever sought the divine within himself. He has ever been a subjectivist...It will be found that the Greek sought perfection outside himself, and had to answer to the senses about the objective..."

We see how far subjectivism dominated Jewish thought when we

1Prov 25:11 2Prov 26:8 3Is 60:8,9 4Zielinski, op.cit. p 212. Note that the reference is to the Judaean as against the Galilean
remember that it was forbidden to make any image of the Deity, or of the visible universe. The Greek gloried in his sculptural art.\textsuperscript{1}

The Greek looked outward, the Jew inward.

II

Jesus reconciled in Himself the Greek and Jewish attitudes toward Nature. God was the transcendent reality in all things, and all things were a reality in God. And so beauty was a thing to delight in.

But let us not press the distinction hard. It would not be safe. It is better to say that Jesus was a lover of Nature from Galilee.

Renan has done a service in pointing out the contrast between the eye for Nature in Judaea and that in Galilee. There was an absence of love of Nature at Jerusalem for a good geographical reason; but Galilee was not so placed. "The saddest country in the world is perhaps the region round about Jerusalem," Renan asserts; and draws the conclusion, that "the North alone has made Christianity; Jerusalem, on the contrary, is the true home of that obstinate Judaism which, founded by the Pharisees, and fixed by the Talmud, has traversed the Middle Ages and come down to us. A beautiful external nature tended to produce a much less austere spirit—a spirit less sharply monotheistic, if I may use the expression—which imprinted a charming and idyllic character on all the dreams of Galilee.\textsuperscript{2}

The language is in need of modification, and so is the meaning; but there is truth in the exaggeration. Beautiful Galilee drew eyes to itself, and comforted the heart.

\textsuperscript{1}Sir Leon Levison in The Scots Observer, June 11, 1927, p 13
\textsuperscript{2}Sp. cit. p 63
At all events Jesus loved His native hills. He never wearied of the hill-top vistas and mountain-side solitudes. The valleys and water-courses drew Him too. There He found the lily, blooming suddenly in the spring, after the long rains, in exquisite coloring, that out-gloried Solomon in all the splendor of his robes. But no aspect of Nature failed to interest and intrigue Him. He had seen the fox issue from its hole, the songster seek its nest. The wild birds lived the quick, toil-less life of the open fields, and wanted not; He used to contemplate them with a poet's sympathy, and a turning of His thought to restless, faithless human kind, wearily laboring to gather grain in barns and store-houses, as though the glad, free life of faith were no reality, but every day a grim piece of business. Not that He did not feel for the husbandman. He describes how the husbandman sows his seed. He rejoices in grain full in the ear. "It is with the Realm of God as when a man has sown seed on earth; he sleeps at night and rises by day, and the seed sprouts and shoots up--he knows not how. (For the earth bears crops by itself, the blade first, the ear of corn next, and then the grain full in the ear.)"\(^1\)

Mark the parenthesis: the earth bears crops by itself. There is no giving God less room in the process here; but it seems a Galilean note, this.

Undeniably Galilean is the note of His teaching. We have illustrations from the cornfield, the vineyard, the sheep-fold; from sowing and harvesting, from the growing of grapes: a whole pleasant countryside is recreated. We hear of serpents, scorpions, wolves, and that "wherever the body lies, there will the vultures gather."\(^2\)

\(^{1}\)Mk 4:26-28 \(^{2}\)Matt 24:28
Sheep played a great part in His thought. He had watched them in every phase of their poignantly dependent life. He knew every movement of the hen spreading her wings above her chicks. The camel, the kid, the ox, and the calf were other creatures well-known to Him.

He had perhaps taken His turn with His brothers in the garden. There are numerous allusions to the vine, the fig, grain, the grass of the field, thorns, tares. "Do men gather grapes from thorns or figs from thistles?" He asks. Beside the swollen streams in the spring He had often stood, where, later, He was to watch the reed shaken by the wind. He had been in waterless places. All His allusions are "natural and spontaneous; they hardly ever appear to be literary. They are the language of a country man, speaking to country men." More than that, they are the language of "natural piety". The wonder of things thrilled Him.

III

It is interesting to see how much more Jesus was delighted with the world about Him than Paul was. Jesus maintained a balance between the look inward and the look outward; He had an appreciative eye for the objective world. But Paul was a subjectivist, a Jew of the Jews.

"In the Epistles of Paul," says Peabody, "one finds hardly an allusion to the familiar and homely aspects of the world of nature. We hear the distant sound of cosmic tragedies, the groaning and travailing of creation; but of the birds and lilies, the seed and harvest, the lake and the fish, the vines and the

1Matt 7:16  2Headlam, Life and Teaching of Jesus the Christ, p 103
cattle, Paul takes no account. He is a man of the city. His figures of speech are of the market-place, the athletic contests, the military career. The mind of Jesus, on the other hand, is most at home in the country". ¹

Paul indeed gives us not one shread of description for beauty's sake.

Of course, Jesus' eye did not stop at nature. God, sovereign and fatherly, was to be known in and through it all. Of this He was before all else aware, and lived and died believing it to be the one great, soul-absorbing truth in things. But He was a poet, too. A poet sees significances in things when he is looking at them.

Jesus certainly had an eye upon the lilies, as Paul did not, and perhaps could not, have an eye upon them. But He had not so much of the Greek spirit as to be well content if He saw just beauty without meanings. He saw the beauty and the meanings both. He was able, in the phrases of Dr. Hough, "to find in lilies what no one else had found before".

IV

If the question be raised, therefore, was Jesus a weltbejaher or a weltverneiner? we reply at once: He was at home on the earth. He loved the green fields and the broad hills. He was so far from feeling distrust when He looked upon them, that He said: "Now if God so clothes the grass of the field, which blooms to-day and is thrown to-morrow into the furnace, will He not much more clothe you? O men, how little you trust Him!" ²

Live gladly and unanxiously on the earth, said He.

¹Christ and the Christian Character, p 60 ²Matt 6:30
CHAPTER XVIII

JESUS AND MEN

When Jesus answered the scribe, who questioned Him as to the chief of all the commands: "You must love the Lord your God with your whole heart, with your whole soul, with your whole mind, and with your whole strength...You must love your neighbor as yourself",¹ He not only gave men an epitome of the Christian law of life, but furnished the measure of the passion of His own life. Heart, soul, mind, strength—the whole man, with all the native impulses and powers of human personality—were dedicated in Him to God and man. So absolute a sublimation from first to last of all the human powers is not elsewhere to be found.

By what took place in His own person, He led His disciples to see how one who looks upon the multitudes and sees in them brother and sister and mother—the human family of his adoption—may accomplish a real self-transcendence through self-sharing, and find himself in casting himself away.

Certain it is that Jesus Himself utterly loved men.

I

We have abundant evidence of it in His teaching. How interested He was in every human incident in life around Him! How skilfully He reproduced the common sights of field and town in parable and metaphor, touching men's need!

Through Him comes a rich, full glimpse into the life and manners of the Galilean country-side. We see the children playing in the streets, the men standing idle in the market-place,

¹Mk 12:28-31
the women sweeping the houses; the farmers at sowing, reaping, and
garnering; women grinding together; the heating of the oven; the
leaven permeating the lump; the sparrows in the market-place sold
for a farthing; patches on old clothes; new wine in old bottles;
shepherds looking for their sheep; the friend, with a guest arriv­
ing late at night, and no food in the house, going to his neighbor
for a loaf; the wedding feast in all its aspects, the nervousness
of the host, the excuses of the false friends, the ceremony of
the feast, the virgins waiting for the bride-groom's coming;
the servants waiting at night with lanterns for their master to
return from the banquet; the beggar lying at the gate of the rich
man; the laborers at work in the vineyard; the house-hold slave,
after working hard all day in the fields, preparing his master's
supper before he can get a bite of his own; the wastrel tending
swine; the sons reluctant to do their stint in the vineyard; the
purple and fine linen of the rich; the travelling Samaritan; and
many and many another detail, lighting up a whole social order.

All this testifies—if testimony be needed—to the keen,
interested observation of Jesus. "He knew all men," says the Fourth
Evangelist, "and required no evidence from anyone about human nat­
ure; well did he know what was in human nature". His heart yearned
over men, because He loved them, felt for them, saw them in their
need and in their shame, as He saw them in their potencies and in
their hunger and thirst after goodness.

II

His love is better revealed in His life even than in His
teaching. Centuries of Christian meditation have failed to exhaust

\[Jno\, 2:25\]
its significance. Nothing indeed has so drawn men to Him as this infinitude of devotion and sympathy in His heart.

A sketch cannot do any true love justice, but perhaps still another attempt to appraise the height and depth of His love may be of value, from this angle: the power and yearning of it, because He had as a man among men a nature so rich, so warm, so creatively helpful, as to make Him the wisest brother men have ever had. True; the love in Him was God loving men (Paul's "God's love in Christ Jesus our Lord" is a permanently valid insight); but it was also Jesus, the human individual, loving His brethren; and if we dwell upon the human warmth and richness of it, we shall be able to fetch Him up before our imagination as really as we may those compassionate men, Little Francis and Lincoln, who were more truly human than a thousand other great figures of history. Neither Lincoln nor Francis can be understood apart from the constant reference of all their words and deeds to their central passion for dealing kindly—their compassion toward man and beast. The special quality of their lives, which we name Christlikeness, would never have been possible without such brotherliness.

But a greater than Francis or Lincoln is here. Many and many a note in Jesus' teaching reveals an unvarying kindliness, a very passion of chivalry, toward men. As an essay in unconscious self-portraiture, giving the whole of the fact, where is the equal of the parable of the Good Samaritan? In it Jesus describes Himself. It throws a very searching light into His warm heart. Many other instances of self-revelation leap to mind. His description of God as "kind to the ungrateful and the evil" is an insight gathered from His own generous nature. Very touching is the fellow-feeling
in the Lukan version of the Beatitudes.

"Blessed are you poor!

Blessed are you who hunger to-day!"

It is direct address, full of understanding of the great primitive longings in the lives of the poor and untutored.

It is matchless tenderness which we have in the sorrowful utterance, "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem! slaying the prophets and stoning those who have been sent to you! How often I would fain have gathered your children as a fowl gathers her brood under her wings! But you would not have it!"\(^1\)

The point is this: we do not see the real Jesus until we see Him plunging into the world with love in His heart. It is well that He found a place for love, a need for it. Everywhere there was disclosed to His keen eye the appalling need of men for guidance.

"He walked down a street; and the scene of misery and sin came upon Him with pressure; He could not pass by, as we do, and fail to note what we do not wish to think of...He sits with His disciples at a meal,--the men whom He loved,--He watches them, He listens to them. Peter, James, John, one after the other becomes a call to Him. They need redemption; they need far more than they dream; they need God".\(^2\)

It is a true insight that Jesus puts His gospel into family terms—the terms that convey most clearly love's intimatest relationships: God is our father, men are all brethren, and it is as in a home: each individual is of infinite value, and the relationships between man and man are indissoluble, "so that no man's sin can utterly free\(^3\) from being brother to him as much as I can".

Jesus loved His brethren.

1. We see it in His consideration for His disciples. Mark has preserved a precious instance. The Twelve had just returned from street preaching in the villages. They were tired. "And he said to them, 'Come away to some lonely spot and get a little rest' (for there were many people coming and going, and they could get no time even to eat')."  

This was not an isolated instance. Jesus had a genius for friendship, in which He has been equalled by none of His followers. Not only did He wish to give His weary disciples a breathing space upon some quiet hillside, but He coveted the intimacy of private conversation. You cannot "toss your soul out to the crowd"; something prevents, some inner prudence retracts; but you can open your heart to your intimates. To stand before a crowd is to be tense, in a suble way apprehensive; to be seated among friends is to relax your defences and to let thought take you where it will.

It is a condensed way of putting it which Mark has: "then he went up the hillside and summoned the men he wanted, and they went to him. He appointed twelve to be with him"; 2 but the unstudied language is very revealing in its simplicity. He "wanted" them, and they were to be "with him". A few sentences farther on He is to be seen pointing in the first instance to them, and saying, "There are my mother and my brothers!"  

2. But He was looking also at a crowd, when He said it. His heart yearned to crowds. When He saw a large crowd, "out of pity for them, as they were like sheep without a shepherd, he proceeded to teach them at length". 3 Had He written His spiritual

1 Mk 6:31  2 Mk 3:13,14  3 Mk 6:34
autobiography, He might have anticipated the poet’s insight into the need of the crowds—

"Bound who should conquer, slaves who should be kings—"

Hearing their one hope with an empty wonder,Sadly contented with a show of things;

"Then with a rush the intolerable craving shivers throughout me like a trumpet call—Oh, to save these, to perish for their saving,Die for their life, be offered for them all".

Not that He did not sometimes avoid crowds. He sometimes ran away from them. He had to protect himself against their impor-
tunity, their excessive emotionalism, the vehemence of their self-
seeking, the emptiness of their curiosity. Mark contains extra-
ordinary glimpses of eager crowds. "Indeed the whole town was
gathered at the door"; "a large number at once gathered, till there was no more room for them, even at the door"; "so he told his disciples to have a small boat ready; it was to prevent him being crushed"; "once more...a huge crowd gathered around him". And so it went. Luke tells us that on one occasion "the crowd was gathering in its thousands till they trod on one another".

But this was a distressing popularity. There was as little leisure to teach as to eat. The crowds sought healing; the appetite was physical not spiritual. "The result was that Jesus could no longer enter any town openly; he stayed outside in lonely places, and people came to him from every quarter—and then at length there was a falling away of the first avid interest, and He had opportunity for real human contacts.

Yet even while He was in flight He had the same compassion

1Mk 1:33 2Mk 2:2 3Mk 3:9 4Mk 3:20 5Mk 4:1 6Lk 12:1
as when He faced the crowd: "I am sorry for the crowd", 1 He would say. As Dr. Glover has pointed out, 2 Jesus was markedly sensitive to the idea of crowd hunger; and we presume it was a consciousness not only of physical hunger—though that had a strong appeal—but of that hunger and thirst of the spirit in the shepherdless, which no true man can see unmoved.

One can but dimly feel what He must have felt—the very agony of desire to enlighten, the yearning of love to lead, when "all the crowd came to him and he taught them". 3 "And people brought him all their sick...he healed them all". 4

And then He never saw merely the mass, rather always the individuals. To look over the heads of a crowd and sense their mass is more terrifying than poignant; but to look at a crowd and see folks, is to have one's heart-strings caught at. There is a vast difference in achievement between the orator with eye fixed above the heads of the crowd and the lover of the multitudes pouring his heart out as he looks into the uplifted faces and the raised eyes. So when Jesus spoke to, or even when He walked through, the crowds, He always saw faces, men, certain groups, clear-cut and typical.

3. He saw, and loved, the children. They represented to Him the trustful living of life, unhindered by doubt and fear, the freely-flowing vitality, the happiness and zest, which is \textit{to mark life in the Kingdom}. Then children are single-minded and without snobishness:--a \textit{rich man's boy will as heartily play, if allowed, with the gutter-snipe as anyone. "I tell you truly"}, said Jesus, "whoever will not submit to the Reign of God like a child

\begin{footnotesize}
1 \textit{Mk} 8:1,2 \quad 20 \textit{cit, p 121 ff.} \quad 3 \textit{Mk} 2:13 \quad 4 \textit{Matt} 4:24
\end{footnotesize}
will never get in it at all"\(^1\); "unless you turn and become like children, you will never get in".\(^2\)

So He loved them. His tenderness—the love which leaped out to children at sight—is the beautiful thing in the story of the healing of Jairus' little girl. When He stood by the bed on which the child lay, He first took the small hand in His own, and then said (we have His own Aramaic, the very vowels that crossed His lips in "Talitha koum")—"Get up, darling",\(^3\) a very wonderful glimpse. J.A. Findlay, who so translates this tender phrase, remarks, "The beautiful Aramaic words give an endearing touch to the story, and bring us very near to the heart of Jesus".\(^4\) They do indeed.

Mark abounds in these revealing phrases, especially where children are concerned. A little child, he lets us see, lighted up an hour of tragic gloom. Jesus and the disciples were passing through Galilee. They had begun the last journey to Jerusalem. Jesus was meditating upon death. He told them that when He was come to Jerusalem He would be killed. "But they did not understand what he said, and they were afraid to ask him what he meant."

"Then they reached Capharnhum." Jesus, who had gone on ahead, in His great loneliness, led the way indoors; and then He turned upon His disciples and asked them, "What were you arguing about on the road?" He had been too absorbed to hear. But it was sad, a pitiful arguing they had been at. "So he sat down and called the twelve. 'If anyone wants to be first,' he said to them, 'he must be last of all and the servant of all'. Then he took a little child"—the power He had to attract children is witness to

\(^1\)Mk 10:15 \(^2\)Matt 18:3 \(^3\)Mk 5:41 \(^4\)Jesus as They Saw Him, p 30.
His having their spirit—and set it among them, with His arms about it. He was sitting with the child on His knee,—Dr. Glover has it, "in the crook of His arm". Certainly, we see, He had "a way" with children. They used to come near, and He would put His hands on them and bless them. Their delighted mothers would be standing by.

4. He would have none of your making slaves and pawns of women because they were women. His attitude toward them has altered their position in the world. He has given them a new and higher status. He has both freed them and protected them against the selfishness of men.

Stern words are these. When the Pharisees came up to tempt him. They asked, 'Is it right to divorce one's wife for any reason?' He replied, 'Have you never read that He who created them male and female from the beginning said, hence a man shall leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife, and the pair shall be one flesh? So they are no longer two, but one flesh. What God has joined, then, man must not separate'; and when they cited Moses upon separation-notices, He said, "I tell you, whoever divorces his wife, except for unchastity, and marries another woman, commits adultery".

It is true the Jews have always loved their homes and families; but Jesus broke down class barriers to show his sympathy for women outside the family circle, on the streets and in strange places. He never showed Paul's antipathy—the patriarchal insistence of elders in the gate that women should take the seats of least honor and content themselves with meek silence.

He made friends with them. Luke has it that they were

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1Up cit, p 132 2Mk 9:30-37; 10:13-16 3Matt 19:3-9; cf the still more stringent version in Mk 10:2-12
active among His disciples. "He was accompanied by the twelve
and by some women who had been healed of evil spirits and illnesses,
Mary called Magdalene (out of whom seven demons had been driven),
Joanna the wife of Chuza the chancellor of Herod, Susanna, and a
number of others, who ministered to Him of their means". When
we admit this detail to our conception of Him, Jesus, the friend,
grows upon us.

5. His heart ran out to the poor. It was partly because
He had Himself, and in the time of his ministry more than than at
any time, known the pinch of poverty, its hunger and want; but more
because real hardship of the body is to the less robust deprivation
of mind and spirit as well.

we may believe that His sympathy was almost physical.
"He was brought up," Mr. Shepherd reminds us, "in a house consisting
of one room. In the days of his ministry He went about with nowhere
to lay His head...At the time of his death his belongings amounted
to the garments He wore...His very grave was borrowed".

In His preaching of the Kingdom He commanded His disciples
to heal and comfort the poor and distressed, and He was always
emphasizing the duty and opportunity of going out into the byways
to bring in the outcast and destitute, whether in body or spirit.
The prophets displayed fury and John the Baptist severity, where
Jesus showed commiseration and mercy. The prophets were wont to
let it appear that they were calling out the righteous from among
the sinners; but Jesus felt distaste for the self-approbation
of the righteous. He clashed early with them. "When some scribes
of the Pharisees saw he was eating with sinners and taxgathers

1Lk 8:1-3  2The Humanism of Jesus, p 238
they said to his disciples, 'Why does he eat and drink with tax-gatherers and sinners?' Jesus said to them, "I have not come to call just men but sinners".  

6. So He was not censorious with sinners. He dealt understandingly with them. He was sent to call them, to lift them up and change them.

This is not to rob His attitude of severity. To those who deliberately chose evil, who consciously espoused low desires and aims and made friends with the mammon of unrighteousness, He was not outwardly sympathetic—He was challenging. "Repent!" He cried.

Where the choice of evil was too subtle for the ordinary eye, where it was spiritual pride and haughtiness, the solemn straining away of a gnat when a very camel of unrighteousness was being swallowed, He pronounced the terrible judgment—"Hypocrites!"

But there are degrees of sin and therewith degrees of responsibility. And once the least glimmer of aspiration to better things showed in a sinner's eyes, He was wholly and wonderfully helpful and brotherly. It made no difference then who it was—they were friends at once. He would as freely go into the house of a taxgatherer as into that of Simon the Pharisee.

That led to scandal, of course. It followed Him to the last days in Jerusalem, where He made this shattering answer to it: "A man had two sons. He went to the first and said, 'Son, go and work in the vineyard to-day'; he replied, 'I will go, sir', but he did not go. The man went to the second son and said the same to him; he replied, 'I will not,' but afterwards he changed.

\[^{1}Mk 2:13-17\]
his mind and did go. Which of the two did the will of the father?"
Wondering perhaps at the tenor of the question, the accusers of Jesus answered, "The last"; whereupon Jesus brought down upon them His full weight, in saying, "I tell you truly, the taxgatherers and harlots are going into the Realm of God before you". ¹ A most crushing retort.

Very precious is the story of the dinner at the house of Simon the Pharisee. Jesus had been asked to dinner, and was reclining at the table, when a woman of the town came in. Finding that He was there, she ran and brought an alabaster flask of perfume, and went in where He was. She was deeply affected. She stood behind Him at His feet in tears. She did not weep aloud, but the tears welled out of her eyes in great hurrying drops and fell upon His feet and wetted them; so she knelt down and "wiped them with the hair of her head, pressed kisses on them, and anointed them with perfume", all oblivious of the gaping company, in the intensity of remorse and shame. Jesus saw the working of Simon's face. Simon was thinking with understandable prudery--it was an extraordinary happening--"It's awful, it's awful! How can he bear it? If she should do that to me, what would the people think? Is he out of his senses? If he were a true prophet he would know what sort of woman this is who is touching him,--and would have nothing to do with her."

Jesus said with deep feeling, "Simon, I have something to say to you."

"Say on, teacher".

"There was a money-lender who had two debtors; one owed him fifty pounds, the other five. As they were unable to pay, he

¹Matt 21:28-32
freely forgave them both. Tell me, now, which of them will love him most?"

"I suppose the man who had most forgiven."

"Precisely". Then turning to the woman he continued, "You see this woman?... I tell you, many as her sins are, they are forgiven, for her love is great".¹

As He had a way with children, so too He had a way with sinners. Not that He was free-and-easy, taking sin lightly, as of little account, but that He possessed such an intensity of sympathy and interest out of a heart of pure love as to draw sinners to Him. The poor woman had known she had gone wrong; the Pharisees would remind her of that, and would set up bars and doors to her coming within speaking distance. The moment she began to perceive what manner of man Jesus was, she realized that He possessed the strength which she lacked, the strength she had lost and wished she had back again, and which she knew He could help her to exert once more. She tore away her love from its old associations and fixed it upon Him, who was the physician of her soul; and He had brought unity back into her life, strength, purity, peace. And what is more, she knew that there was something eternal in His nature, something free from any earthiness. He was a Savior come from God; and He was her Savior, "because through His attitude she once for all knew that God was on her side, and... there was laid down at the foundations of her life that initial certainty of His pardoning love which opened to her the gates of righteousness".²

Jesus looked down at her with perfect friendship, an

¹Lk 7:36-50 ²The Christian Experience of Forgiveness, p 94, by H.R. Mackintosh.
understanding forgiving all. It was such an act as we might think of Wesley or Lincoln steeling himself to, but natural to Jesus as the free movement of His whole being. He said, "Your faith has saved you; go in peace".

III

This prepares us for understanding how the love of Jesus appeared under at least three aspects.

1. The first of these aspects is good-will--never-failing good-will. The more we study the life of Jesus the more it strikes us that good-will held the primacy among all His social qualities. Never was there anyone more free from conventional prejudices.

"Give Caesar what belongs to Caesar--"1 "A Samaritan traveller... felt pity---Go and do the same".2 "I tell you, I have never met faith like this anywhere even in Israel".3 "But the taxgatherer--I tell you, he went home accepted by God rather than the other".4 "Zacchaeus, come down at once, for I must stay at your house to-day".5 He befriended every sort of man. If you love only those who love you," said He, "what reward do you get for that? do not the very taxgatherers do as much? And if you salute only your friends, what is special about that?"6

He dignified this overflowing good-will with the name of "love". And was He not right? Good-will is the warmest human love in its purest aspect; it is love at perfection. When we seek a solid foundation upon which to build affectionate human relationships, we can dispense with such states as passion, craving for entire possession, infatuation, lyricism, and other powerful intellectual and emotional states; but we cannot dispense with good-

1Lk 20:25 2Lk 10:33 3Lk 7:9 4Lk 18:13 5Lk 19:5 6Matt 5:46,47
will. People, marrying on the basis of passionate feeling, repent at leisure, because they cannot nourish good-will for each other. It is a hollow friendship that has another basis. For good-will is love's finest fruit and deepest root--the very essence of love.

The key to the teaching of Jesus about love is just this entire good-will. "You have heard the saying, 'You must love your neighbor and hate your enemy'. But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you". Maintain your good-will in spite of everything. Wish no one evil. "You must be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect". Does God ever fail in good will? God is love. Does He ever wish, or do to, men evil? His good will--though justice modifies its expression--is toward even the ungrateful and the evil: "He sends rain on the just and the unjust".¹

Jesus never fails in this quality. He hated sin--and how He excoriated it!--but loved the sinner: His good-will, like the Father's, was freely extended to all.

One thinks of Lincoln's easy good nature and refusal to hate. "You have more of that feeling of personal resentment than I have," he once gently declared; and then he added something Jesus would never have said: "Perhaps I have too little of it".

2. The second aspect of the love of Jesus, and growing out of the first, is His readiness to forgive. Palpably, an unforgiving spirit cannot exist with unfailing good-will; and the teaching on the point is emphatic. No one can expect the forgiveness of God, He constantly repeated, who has not forgiven his brothers. In Luke's version of the Lord's Prayer, the forgiving

¹Matt 5:43-48
spirit expresses itself forcibly: "Forgive us our sins, for we forgive everyone who has offended us".\(^1\)

It is a memorable passage in Matthew where Peter asks, "How often is my brother to sin against me and be forgiven? Up to seven times?" "Seven times?" exclaims Jesus. "I say seventy times seven!" Upon this follows the parable of the unforgiving servant, and its stark conclusion: "In hot anger his master handed him over to the torturers, till he should pay him all the debt. My father will do the same to you unless you each forgive your brother from the heart".\(^2\) All of which is in illustration of the earlier text: "For if you forgive men their trespasses, then your heavenly Father will forgive you; but if you do not forgive men, your Father will not forgive your trespasses either".\(^3\)

Jesus believed in the gospel of forgiveness. He was Himself the forgiving spirit incarnate. It was of His own practice He was speaking, when He earnestly counselled His disciples: "Whenever"—note the force of the word—"whenever you stand up to pray, if you have anything against anybody"—note the force of that too—"forgive him".\(^4\) And though He was "classed among the criminals"\(^5\) and hung up on the cross, to be laughed at and derided with the insufferable jocularity of malice triumphant, He did not cease to bear good-will and forgive, with the heart-felt cry to God, "They do not know what they are doing".

But not only did He forgive personal affront to Himself, but He declared the forgiveness of sin to others. He would look into a man's face and say with confidence and deep joy, which revolutionized the whole outlook in the twinkling of an eye: "Courage!

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\(^1\)Lk 11:2-4 \(^2\)Matt 18:21-35 \(^3\)Matt 6:14,15 \(^4\)Mk 11:25 \(^5\)Lk 22:37
your sins are forgiven!" It was a most amazing thing to do. "Blasphemy!" shrieked the Pharisees. But Jesus was a physician of souls, and well as a bringer of good tidings and the bearer of divine power. He was not taking liberties with God when He wrought a complete change in a man by removing with one cheering assurance, which was also truth, the uncertainty and doubt that still inhibited new life in the joy of sonship with the Father. To say "Your sins are forgiven" was to say to a sick soul, "Live gladly, positively; nothing stands in the way now". It meant everything to be told that.

It is significant that the declaration of forgiveness so often was the immediate preparation for healing of mind and body.

3. And this brings us to a third aspect, closely related to the other two, under which the love of Jesus appeared. The good-will of Jesus for men translated itself immediately into a sense of obligation to them: He had to help them. "He went about doing good, and", said Peter to the household of Cornelius, specifying by what manner of doing good He was especially known, "curing all who were harassed by the devil; for God was with him". 1

The miracles of Jesus--we mean here those only which are comprehended in His relations with men--are so fundamental and essential a part of the Gospel record as to provide insuperable obstacles to their elision. They have been the cause of much honest perplexity and painful doubt. Some scholars have been for dismissing them as "legend", because they have resisted all efforts at explanation. Others have been vehement for their retention, for the same reason. Both groups, it seems, are both wrong and right. The miracles of healing should be retained, as events occurring within,

1 Acts 10:38.
and not outside, the natural order.

This is a very notable thing for the modern religious mind. The credit for it is largely due to modern discovery, especially in the realm of psychology; but psychology has neither the taste for trustworthy investigation in this field, nor competence to pronounce final judgment. Much remains to be done; and what we set down here will assuredly need revision. But it is a beginning.

We need to keep in mind two important qualifications upon our insight, which in the nature of the case can never be wholly removed and which leave us after all our explanation still faced with mystery. The first qualification is well put by J. Middleton Murry. "We moderns," he says, "can with difficulty conceive a world where faith is active. But faith was one of the prime elements in the world in which Jesus lived. Between that world and ours is all the vast difference which lies between a world which expects 'miracles' and a world which does not". ¹

The second qualification lies in our inability to classify Jesus Himself. He is in His own person our greatest miracle. Never has anyone been so perfectly integrated upon the basis of an immediate relation to God. God was the focus upon which all His powers were fixed; and He believed with absolute assurance that God had chosen and empowered Him. Who can say at this date, and in our different time, just what He was and was not able to do for sick souls in sick bodies?

Now, though we may believe the miracles were not really, but only in appearance, derogations of natural laws; that Jesus discovered uses for His power beyond the range of less highly

¹ Life of Jesus, p 63
organized personalities; and that these uses for His power were extraordinary but not supernatural in character; nevertheless, the very phraseology we which we are put in so saying is an acknowledgment of a residuum of mystery. Klausner is always cautious about saying too much; but he too is brought to the conclusion that the force which Jesus displayed in effecting cures "comprises some secret, some mystical element, still not properly studied by the ordinary psychologists and physicians and scientists, who are conversant only with the laws of nature so far determined by science".  

This must be acknowledged; and all the more willingly acknowledged, now that so much that was formerly mysterious has yielded to study and inquiry.

The first thing to note about the miracles is that their invariable condition was faith. The testimony of the evangelists is unanimous that incredulity made miracles impossible. Mark says flatly of Nazareth: "There he could not do any miracle, beyond laying his hands on a few sick and curing them. He was astonished at their lack of faith".  

When He saw faith He found no difficulty in effecting cure. He would say simply, "Be cleansed" or, after the cure was effected, pronounce the judgment, "Your faith has made you well". If He found faith as yet weak, He took various means to render it strong. He would declare the sufferer's sins forgiven, in virtue of his penitence; or would require a preliminary act, such as rising and coming forward, or going and showing oneself to the priests. Again, He would perform the preliminary act Himself. Luke has a vigorous phrase, "Then Jesus took hold of the man and

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1Op cit, p 270 2Mk 6:5,6 3See Mk 1:41 and 5:34 4Mk 2:5 5Mk 3:3 6Lk 17:14
cured him". Elsewhere, we see Him taking a deaf man who stammered aside from the crowd by himself, or putting spittle upon a blind man's eyes, or eliciting faith by asking, "What do you want me to do to you?" or "Do you believe I can do this?"; and so on.

We are beginning to see that we have never done justice to the remarkable utterance of Jesus about the primary importance of belief, the sheer power of living faith. "So I tell you", He said to Peter, "whatever you pray for and ask, believe you have got it and you shall have it". This sentence (whose substance is reproduced and implied throughout the Gospels) contains, we think, Jesus' view of the miracles. According to their faith was it done to them. A distressed father cried out in behalf of his boy, "If you can do anything, do help us, do have pity on us". Jesus said to him, '"If you can'! Anything can be done for one who believes'.

It is just at this point that psychology takes the keenest interest in the healing methods of Jesus. Some recent writers are satisfied that the psychotherapy of the New Nancy School is just a rediscovery of the methods of Jesus. There is some resemblance, but difference, too, as will soon be evident. A common use of "suggestion" is to be freely granted. "If you suggest to yourself that you can, you can" is of the same order for psychology (though not for religion) as "Believe you have got it and you shall have it". Like Coué, Jesus did not address Himself to the sick will; He appealed to the imagination and awakened faith. Under His gaze the sick man ceased to think himself sick; he saw himself well. The debility, which accompanies loss of confidence, vanished. There was an inrush of power turning weakness into strength.

1 Mk 14:4 2 Mk 7:32f. 3 Mk 8:23 4 Mk 10:51 5 Mk 9:28 6 Mk 11:24; cf Matt 21:22 7 Mk 9:22,23
So that when the command came, as in one instance it did, "Stretch out your hand", the sick man stretched it out, "and it was quite restored, as sound as the other".¹

This sounds very simple—too simple, at first sight. But the power of suggestion in the cure of disease is proved up to the hilt by modern psychologists. The range of organic disease is seen to be far less wide than it used to be supposed. Dr. Hadfield, in his illuminating essay in "The Spirit", has shown us how mental pain tends to express itself in terms of physical injury, and takes the form of apparently physical, but really functional, diseases. The will is too "infirm" to bring about a cure, because there is an insuperable obstacle to its full exercise, and that is "the belief that the thing attempted is impossible".² Only faith and confidence can bring back strength. There must be a functional readjustment of the impulses, a reorganization of the psyche, before the will can regain its unity. If that happens, the physical symptoms of disease disappear.

But, when recognizing the use Jesus made of suggestion—and there is no doubt that with venturesome reliance upon His un­failing intuition He did make use of it—the qualification which must be made is this: His whole emphasis, as the New Nancy School's is not, was upon moral regeneration. Physical and moral rebirth went together. He did not stimulate in people a pleasant im­agination about themselves; He took the imagination as a means to penetrate to the will. Perhaps the New Nancy School does not mean strictly to set the will and the imagination over against each other in a dualistic relation, in which the imagination maintains

¹Matt 12: 13 ²The Spirit, p 86
the upper hand. The phraseology is unfortunate, however. What happens before cure takes place, we observe, is not that the will and the imagination are in conflict; but that the will is divided between two imaginations, two suggestions; and what is needed is the unification of the will by the acceptance of the right and the rejection of the wrong suggestion.¹

However that may be, Jesus sought the recreation of the will, the reorganization of the whole man, that he might act, and act for good and not for evil.

The assumption is gratuitous that He healed any and every one who came in His way. "Very rarely," says Mr. Pym, and we must assent, "can we suppose from the accounts of His ministry that He healed all who needed it in any one crowd or in any one place; those who were not healed were not themselves in the state of mind which would put recovery within their reach".²

To recall here the distinction between sin and moral disease previously made, it may be presumed that where the patient was still in a sinful state it was requisite that he should be converted before he could be healed; but that where he was the victim of moral disease, as in the case of insanity or perversion, Jesus neither blamed him nor told him to exert his will: he was "sick" and Jesus made every effort to heal him.³

Have we a key in all this to the healing miracles of Jesus? We believe that it is the beginning of understanding. That is to say, the process by which Jesus brought about healing is being disclosed.

Meanwhile the moral personality behind the process

¹See Barry, op cit., chapter on Suggestion and Will. ²Op cit p 105 ³See Hadfield, Psychology and Morals, p 3,4
appears as wonderful as ever. For Jesus grows the greater in our
eyes as we perceive under what limitations He did His greatest
works. We have no cause to be alarmed at the conclusion that
"inevitably He must have approached the mind and souls of men and
women according to the laws by which God made them."¹ We see
Him creatively availing Himself of every human resource, and
accomplishing the miraculous, not outside of, but within the
realm of natural law. Our wonder is not diminished as we watch
Him.

¹ Barry, op. cit., p 100
CHAPTER XIX
THE MAN OF SORROWS

The conclusion has already emerged in the course of this discussion, that Jesus was happy, and that this happiness sprang psychically from His being perfectly co-ordinated inwardly to His life-purpose of doing the will of God among and for men. But when that is said, all is not said. He was never able to enjoy the perfect bliss which might have been His. He was not in heaven, nor among saints. That made a difference.

I

The happiness He should have known, men took from Him. The Church has correctly divined that the words of Isaiah apply to Jesus. "He was despised and shunned by men," and—could it be otherwise then?—"a man of pain".1

On a previous page2 we distinguished between happiness and the various forms of pain. Pain arises, we saw, when ideas, objects, or situations thwart the expression of, or bring division among, the life-impulses and desires. "Common to all forms of pain", we concluded, "is disturbance of the 'set' of things, or thwarting of their tendency; psychically this holds true especially of the greater impulses, the instincts, and any of the habitual forms of life-expression".

On this showing, Jesus must have known pain of spirit. He was set upon winning men to God, and thus bringing in the Kingdom. All His human powers, down to the last impulse, were coordinated to this end; and His life ran freely, with the utmost vi-

1Isa. 53:3  2See supra, p 79
ality and passion, in the direction of His purpose. But He suffered a check—many checks. As His ministry proceeded, signs of defeat multiplied. The opposition grew stronger. He had to struggle, more and more grimly; strive, less and less joyously. In the end His heart was heavy. "And when he saw the city, as he approached, he wept over it, saying, 'Would that you too knew even to-day on what your peace depends!'"\^1

One cannot resist the conviction that Jesus was happiest when He began His ministry. He had, in the days when He first preached and first called His disciples, a hopefulness in act and zest in speech that excited a vast popular interest.

But even then He met disappointment. The popular interest appalled Him by its spiritual obtuseness, its vehemence of self-seeking. The crowds heard Him gladly—a moment; and then looked greedily for more wonders. He slipped away from them whenever He saw that this appetite for the marvelous threatened the swallowing up of His message. And when His parables went all unrecognized as great spiritual and ethical lessons, He thought with deepening grief of the words of Isaiah. The people were hearing without learning. "In their case", He confided to His disciples, "the prophecy of Isaiah is being fulfilled:

"You will hear and hear but never understand,
you will see and see but never perceive.
For the heart of this people is obtuse,
their ears are heavy of hearing,
their eyes they have closed".\(^2\)

The whole desire of Jesus was to move on in His work from less to more; but the crowds fell away, the interest waned, or took

\(^1\text{Lk }19:42\quad ^2\text{Matt }13:13\  f.\)
the form of disparagement and active antagonism; till He seemed to be moving from more to less.

On a broad view, had there been response to Him, and an evident widening of the circle of those reborn into the Realm of God, He would have been supremely happy to the end, so far as the work He was doing was concerned; but there was little response, and what response there was lessened. In heaven or among saints there would have been no worry for Him; but He was on earth among ignorant men and sinners, who tragically misunderstood Him.

It all came to a climax on the cross. The disciples had fled. The Romans had tired laughing at Him. The Jews had fiercely hissed and cursed, having taken Him for a fool—and a dangerous fool at that, which was worse. His family had never understood Him. He was thought to be possessed by Beelzebub to be the people's enemy. All men seemed alienated from Him. In that hour He worried about it, till His heart broke and He died prematurely, with a great cry.

It comes to this: He did not agonize when He looked God-ward or inward; He did not worry about God or Himself; but He did worry about men.

II

He worried about men because they were impervious to the call of God by Him; but He also suffered because He could not look upon their sin and shame without feeling their distress and misery Himself. He accomplished in Himself the last and most complete act of sympathy, the identification of His life with their's.

When He saw children at their innocent play, or shared
with bride and groom the wedding feast, this self-identification with men was the source of deep joy. He used to be thrilled with happiness among His disciples. But the ultimate actualities of life, of human life, as He passed through it, could not but cause Him as much pain as joy; it may well be, indeed, that "His self-identification with men was for the most part a sorrowing with them."  

If to this day we can feel for Mary in her heart-break and bewilderment at Capernaum, hearing Jesus answering His own question, "Who are my mother and my brothers?" with words that turned her away in agony—how much more did Jesus feel for her? As He watched her going away, His heart must have been shattered within Him, in the agony of His own sympathy and self-identification with her.

"I am sorry for the crowd" He would often say; and it would be no conventional expression of passing regret; it would be the voice of one who felt acutely their shepherdlessness, their blindness of heart and woe. Out of such sympathy must have emerged the matchless invitation: "Come to me, all who are burdened!"

III

He was a sad man, too, in that He was a lonely man. Consider that loneliness was His inevitable lot, because the real nature of His life and thought was past men's understanding. It is a commonplace that to be great is to be misunderstood. It was so with Him. Particularly, this meant that He had no understanding friend to whom He could speak His whole mind, meet with the full response. He had to be forever teaching and instructing; but there was no one who could answer Him, matching creative thought.

with creative thought. That was loneliness indeed for Him.

It may be urged that His disciples were always with Him; and that He was, if the records are trustworthy, dependent on them. He took Peter, James, and John with Him up the Mount of Transfiguration, where they were "by themselves alone". Even more apparent is the dependence upon human companionship which appears in the narrative of the garden agony. "Then they came to a place called Gethsemane, and he told his disciples, 'Sit here till I pray'. But—he could not be alone now, even in prayer—"he took Peter and James and John along with him". Recoiling from the tension of His critical hour, He turned to His disciples to see if they sympathized. They were asleep! He found Himself poignantly alone; and, naturally enough, disappointment is in the question with which He roused Peter: "Are you sleeping, Simon? Could you not watch for a single hour?"

His disciples surely mitigated His loneliness—but how often they disappointed Him! They were short-sighted and undiscerning, woefully self-absorbed. "Nothing so tires the patience of a sculptor as instruments that break in his hand or prove too coarse to express his meaning. The disciples have frankly left on record the fact that they were such instruments in the hands of Jesus". So, though He delighted in the companionship of His disciples, the deepest things in His life were for Himself alone.

Therefore He moved among men, with a loneliness that had an ache in it, for which there was no appeasement. The experience in His twelfth year in the Temple was never again repeated, in that never again could He sit under the tutelage of the minds of His

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1Mk 9:2 2Mk 14:32 f. 3Fosdick, Manhood of the Master, p 61
time. He grew to be too great for them.

IV

We see the loneliness and sadness of Jesus most in the set face which He turned at the last toward Jerusalem.

Here, too, the disciples failed Him. They could not see, they did not understand, why He should meditate the necessity of a last and ultimate sacrifice. "God forbid," cried Peter, remonstrating in his bluff way, "This must not be".¹ But Jesus was not to be seduced from His purpose. How could He turn back?

There are some things which can never be fully and satisfactorily explained; but we know somehow that they had to be. They were in the counsel of God. So here. We cannot determine just what made Jesus go up to Jerusalem. We can proffer some surmises; we can cite some undisputed facts; but we can never arrive at the whole truth. But we somehow feel it had to be, and that it was the most characteristic thing that Jesus ever did. If He had not gone up to Jerusalem, He had not been Jesus—that is all.

In so concluding we rely upon our intuition rather than our reason—which is probably just what Jesus did in the first place.

We observe two things especially. First, that Jesus was living wholly for the work He had in hand, living for it in such a manner that He could not live without it. It was His preoccupation by night and day. The fact that it was not rooted in self-love but in love for others made its claim upon Him not weaker, but stronger. Psychologically stated, all His life-energy was flowing in one direction; obstacles but heightened His de—

¹Matt 17:22
termination, because the need of His message was all the more evident then. His will was determined by His disposition, not His disposition by His will. He did not go up to Jerusalem by forcing Himself to it (though there is a sense in which this was true); rather, He went up because He would have been false to His disposition if He had not gone.

Moreover, in the second place, His judgment approved. He could have remained in the North; but that would have meant slow defeat. He would not suffer that, even in beloved Galilee; He would--He must--storm the heights of Jerusalem, and utter His truth there, though He should find "all the world in a heap on the other side,"--utter it stanchly, staring straight into the face of death, and make men hear, and make men remember. Should He do less than Jeremiah and Amos before Him?

It came to be that He could not abide the thought of a gradually dwindling following in the provinces, a declension of influence in the remote villages; He must go up to the capital, and make Himself heard by all the world. He must speak out unforgettably before it was too late.

This, there could be no doubt, was God's will for Him (we recall His rebuke to Peter: "Get behind me, you Satan! Your outlook is not God's but man's"¹); and this was what would best meet the needs of men. Having so determined to do God's will and meet men's need (two aspects of one and the same redemptive fact) could He turn back? He had already said, "No one is any use to the Reign of God who puts his hand to the plough and then looks behind him".²

If His disciples were to be consistent and loyal, so must He be--

¹Mk 8:33 ²Lk 9:62
He the more, since He was, in the terms of later reflection, "the Pioneer of their salvation by suffering". 1

He was accustomed to count the cost of His enterprises 2; but it was concerning this very point that a last great temptation came upon Him. The tragic pain and suffering to which His resolute course was leading Him seemed from some aspects uncalled for.

Must He drink of so bitter a cup? "And as he began to feel appalled and agitated, he said to them, 'My heart is sad, sad even to death; stay here and watch!' Then he went forward a little and fell to the earth, praying that the hour might pass away from him, if possible". 2

"Suppose," Bruce Barton boldly suggests, "He had said to Himself: 'I have delivered my message faithfully, and it is no use. Judas has already gone to bring the soldiers; they will be here in half an hour. Why should I stay and die? It is only eighteen miles to Jericho, bright moonlight, and downhill all the way. Our friend Zaccheus will be glad to see us. We can reach his house by daylight, rest to-morrow, cross the Jordan, and do useful work the rest of our lives. The disciples can fish; I can open a carpenter shop, and teach in a quiet way. I have done everything that could be expected of me. Why not?" 3 We have no warrant for thinking that the temptation took so common and flat a form as this; but if any one of us in such a place had had such thoughts as these, who could have blamed us?

But whatever Jesus may have thought, He found strength for the terrible ordeal in prayer. He rose from His knees, with drawn face, but sublime poise. He was living out His own teaching.

1 Heb 2:10  2 Mk 14:33-35  3 The Man Nobody Knows, p 176
"I tell you, my friends," He had said, "have no fear of those who kill the body but after that can do no more."  

V  

But we do an injustice to the nature of Jesus' joy, if we conclude that it could be wholly taken from Him by men and circumstances. Men, it is true, succeeded in bringing the bitterest travail into His soul. They rejected and despised Him. They involved Him in apparent defeat. On the cross of His shame they brought such a massive weight of hatred to bear upon Him, that even God seemed to have averted His face. "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" was what He then cried—the most heart-broken utterance in all history.  

That was a cry of doubt, but of a doubt tragically entering into the hitherto inviolate seat of confidence and trust; it was misgiving the blacker for moving like a cloud across the steadfast shining of His happiness.  

After all, whatever men might do, Jesus was too great for them. They could not reach and shatter the central peace of His soul. They could not make Him weep for Himself, though they wrung tears from Him. They were for them.  

It is a noble and a touching thing to hear Him in the Johannine account of the Last Supper saying, "I have told you this, that my joy may be within you and your joy complete...If the world hates you, remember it hated me first. If you belonged to the world, the world would love what it owned...I have told you all this to keep you from being repelled...You will be sorrowful, but then your sorrow will be changed into joy...Your heart will rejoice—with a

1Lk 12:4
joy that no one can take from you". 1

Is not this a surprising declaration for a Man of Sorrow?

Sad it is that such joy should have been brought to sorrow at all.

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1Jno 15:11, 18, 19; 16:1, 20, 22.
PART IV

BEYOND PSYCHOLOGY
Once more we are passing beyond the limits of psychology, and yet not absolutely. In making a theological beginning where psychology ends, we set our conclusions against a psychological background.

It may be objected, however, that we have no need to press beyond psychology at all, that psychology makes room for religious belief, and that the relation between Jesus and God may be treated from the standpoint of pure psychology. This is to be conceded; but we are prepared to reduce God, as a pure psychology requires, to a subjective idea entering into human experience and unrelated, as far as psychology can see, to any objective reality.¹ This discussion is already committed to the view that at the point where personality touches reality in its ultimate aspects it meets personal Spirit, God, the transcendent personality immortal in all things. The result is this, that having laid the psychological foundation, we are building upon it a super-structure resting upon, but not actually of it.

I

Yet in the study of the relation between Jesus and God, it becomes necessary first to determine the psychological base.

In a former chapter the conclusion was, that "as the organizational aspects of reality are apprehensible on the physical

¹Thus G. Stanley Hall holds as a psychologist that "unknown to others and with no realization of what was involved in it, Jesus had naively and unconsciously (as great genius works), already found through a pure, simple, guileless life, and by self-communion and meditation, an inner way to the highest or the divine. In the language of the piety of his day rather than of psychology, he had found God." Jesus the Christ in the Light of Psychology, Vol II, p 377
side in cognition, so the totality of things is apprehensible, as a whole pervaded by one personal Spirit, by the self's projection of its whole being into the bosom and heart of the universal life. ¹

This is going far beyond psychology, but psychology has furnished the starting point. God is not to be found other than by aspiration, the seeking with the whole of the integrated self. To experience one must seek experience, meet it, put oneself in the way of it. A rock on the hillside yearns for nothing and experiences nothing. In the sphere of human personality the indifferent and lazy experience least. One may experience the force of a river by taking a ferry; but not as directly as if one were to row himself across it; while to leap into it and swim it would be the most direct experience of all. In quite the same way, we may know God by degrees. He is only to be known fully by the whole self plunging into life.

And perfectly only by the best and highest personality. This, it may be recalled, was another of our conclusions. "The most highly integrated person, actively striving for self-realization, may be trusted to have entered into the most direct cognitive relations with reality, in its maximally psychically important aspects."² Again, "personality at its best and highest,—this is to know God at the human deepest and truest."³

The grounds for these conclusions have been sufficiently indicated, and we may now draw one of the chief inferences of this study. It is this. Because of his perfect integration along religious lines (i.e. along the lines of a search with the whole self for ultimate reality) Jesus knew, and has revealed to us,

¹Supra, p 101 ²Supra, p 99 ³Supra, p 102
God, as God may most directly and vitally be known to human experience.

This conclusion coincides with the findings of a recent study of the bearings of psychology upon the validity of Christian experience, and especially of the experience of Jesus. Says Mr. Valentine: "Whatever by being affirmed conduces to the perfection of personality; or whatever perfect personality is constrained by its own nature to affirm, must be the truth of reality...The fullest and most authoritative truth is that discovered by the most perfect manhood. The moral and spiritual perfection of Jesus Christ, is, therefore, the guarantee of the truthfulness of His revelation of God...Jesus Christ, being free from all inner causes of rationalizing, and having the most highly developed human nature, is the most trustworthy authority on the nature of God".1

It is to be wished that Mr. Valentine, in the body of his book, had developed the positive as well as the negative aspects of this conception. One gathers the impression that moral and spiritual perfection is understood to follow the absence of the inner causes of rationalizing (repressions, complexes, obsessions, and the like). But the absence of these factors in truth-distortion does not guarantee possession of truth nor assure the presence of the aspiration which alone leads to truth. The emphasis in the last sentence quoted should fall, not, as Mr. Valentine's seems to do, upon freedom from all inner causes of rationalizing, but upon the possession of the most highly developed human nature.

This is where the emphasis of this study falls. Jesus was human personality at the best and highest. There was in Him a never-failing aspiration and striving for direct relation with

1 Modern Psychology and the Validity of Christian Experience, p21,22
He assumed His existence. Everyone's faith He never once stopped to set as existence of God. It is even doubtful for Him to do so. The question with men, but, what kind of a God is God, and 

Now nothing in Jesus' who assurance of what God was about, it constituted the basis of His author men asked Him to expound the purportingly. He knew.

It is very intimate, this God was much more to Him than the owes a morning and an evening prayer. His communion with God exceeded any at the age of twelve the Father in His mother. Mary found it inexplicable it troubled her mother-heart.

Too facile and easy a concept as this should be avoided. This was "not a vague unanalyzable feel content similar to our experience intercourse with any finite individual was even more than that. This unique with the mind and spirit of God went, like the intermittent contact; might adapt Bengel's beautiful and; closing days of the Master's life—and say that throughout the entire
He was consciously dwelling in the soul of God”.1

With all His capacities, all His impulses coordinated to the one end, and because of His eagerness, His intentness, His intelligence, the brilliance and vitality of His powers, which were more than those of the highest order of genius, Jesus made certain discoveries about ultimate reality which from that day to this have borne the stamp of absolute truth. We speak of a tremendous and moving experience when we say that Jesus, in projecting His whole person into the heart of things, found nothing to correspond to a soul-less mechanism or purblind vital force; He found underneath the Everlasting Arms, He apprehended a loving and holy Father. "Believe me," the Fourth Evangelist hears Him saying—and who shrinks now from the sublime intuition?—"I am in the Father and the Father is in me".2

He communicated to men as much of His experience as human speech could carry and human ears lay hold of. On the cognitive side, His experience determined the content of His teaching; on the affective side, it appeared in His warmth, His zeal, the passion of His utter loyalty, His sense of dependence upon God, His thankfulness, His joy; on the conative side, it manifested itself in His love of God and of men, and His untiring exertion in the fulfilling of God's will.

But there was as well something incommunicable about things in it. Two things His life convey to us a sense of sheer unutterability. He seems to have spoken of both; but perhaps when He expressed Himself about them, what He said was too high for His disciples' understanding; perhaps, and it is rather more likely

1J.A.Robertson, The Spiritual Pilgrimage of Jesus, p 13,14. 2Jno14:11
that this should be the major factor, adequate words were wanting. Of these two high matters, one is Jesus' sense of being uniquely God's Son. Out of all men He stood nearest the Father, He knew God most clearly. He had been called and chosen, as the prophets had been called and chosen. Yet He felt Himself more than a prophet. If we halt and stumble at so extraordinary a conviction, let us remember Ruskin's veracious judgment, that the truly great man is not characterized by a doubt of his own powers; for he knows, and is strengthened by his knowledge, that his greatness is not in him but through him. How he knows this, he would not be able to explain; that he knows it is fact enough. And so with Jesus. We get no glimpse of how He knew Himself the Son of God in so absolutely unique a sense; but He took measures toward letting His disciples infer that He knew it. He recounted to them, for example, His hearing the voice from heaven saying at His baptism, "Thou art my Son, the Beloved, in thee is my delight"."1

The other matter is his sense of mission to men from the Father. Just what His use of the terms "Messiah" and "Son of Man" was we shall never perhaps know; but that is not of the greatest importance. Both terms were more or less accidental and fugitive phraseology. What is important, and absolutely beyond doubt, is that He knew He was "sent". God had commissioned Him to establish His Kingdom, His reign in the hearts of men. As with Amos, so with Jesus: God "took" Him.

Hence He could chose twelve men to follow Him. He could preach and teach and heal with authority. He could say with perfect grace and self-mastery: "Come to me all you who are laboring

1 MK 1:11
and burdened, and I will refresh you', 1 and "You have heard... but
I tell you", 2 and "Son, your sins are forgiven". 3

He was in the counsels of God.

III

It remains to take note of certain aspects of His filial experience.

There is, to begin with, His trust.

Jesus trusted experience, where Buddha distrusted it. Confucius rather shrank from the world and its tragedies, not because of ethical opposition to it, but because there was no energy or interest—no trust in life's processes—in his faith. Jesus had the conqueror's spirit; He relished life's adventure—He trusted the life that was in Him. If it were a matter of choice between the interpretation of life which we find in Schopenhauer’s pessimism and Browning’s optimistic "God's in His heaven", the weight of Jesus' testimony would undoubtedly be with Browning, though He would certainly qualify Browning’s song by the observation that it contains an ultimate, not an immediately self-evident, truth.

When He looked inward upon Himself, as in the temptations in the wilderness, what was of vital importance in the determination of His decisions was His trust in His own nature. The impulses which He shared with men, the great primary instincts which were so elementary in His person, were in themselves neither good nor bad; but because He had achieved their sublimation for His life's task, He trusted them.

It is just as evident that He would have endorsed the

1 Matt 11:28 2 Matt 5, passim 3 Mk 2:5
conviction of Paul that all things work together for good to them that love God. He trusted the trend of the universal life. He looked with loving and unanxious eye upon natural processes, believing them to be within the large intent of God's benevolent purpose.

His trust was thus founded upon His religious experience. Feeling played a great part in it. In this He was thoroughly Jewish. The Greeks defined knowledge as a discovery of the intellect; but the Jews were not inclined so to narrow the definition. "Knowledge," Dr. E. F. Scott observes, "in the Hebrew use of the term, is more than intellectual activity. It contains elements of a moral and religious nature, and when God Himself is the object of knowledge, these become predominant. To 'know the Lord', in the language of the psalmists and prophets, is to trust God, to serve Him, to enter into harmony with His eternal will and purpose." Knowledge is thus to the Hebrew an achievement of the whole trusting personality at grips with life.

This is the manner of a child's learning. No child learns with the intellect only (nor any man either, as we have seen). He knows and trusts his mother long before he has intellectual intelligence of her. Why he so unerringly surrenders himself to his mother, he knows afterwards. There may have been some reference to this self-abandonment to life with trust in Jesus commendation of the child-heart.

There was in Jesus' own attitude the same sort of surrender; He trusted Himself to the aspiration, the inner surge of life, that bore Him to the Father. It led Him to knowledge of the

1The Fourth Gospel, p 371
jssus and God

Father, and to trustful tranquillity of mind. Dr. Cairns makes a true conflation of texts is saying, "Jesus said that no one ever trusted God enough, and that was the source of all the sin and tragedy".1 Certain it is that He had no fear, and knew no despair. "Have no fear, only believe," He would say; "have faith in God!"2 He knew that such reliance would not only be well-placed but have a most amazing effect upon men; it would so re-orientate their whole selves, so bring about a freely-flowing life on the highest levels, as to make new men, saved persons, of them. Trust God, yield to the inner divine aspiration carrying one to the highest, He said in effect; concentrate on that, and you shall know what life and joy and peace are.3

IV

Nowhere was the trust of Jesus more evident than in His prayer-life.

We have only to look into the records to see that He prayed constantly. After the first great day at Capernaum, when the whole town was gathered at the door and the folk shocked Him by their "pagan" absorption in the body and its needs, He stole away in the early morning to a lonely spot, and there Peter and his companions found Him praying.4 Before He chose His disciples "he went off to the hillside to pray" and "spent the whole night in prayer to God".5 Nor was His prayer always in secret, though it was always an individual matter between God and Him. "Thrilled with joy at that hour", when the disciples returned from their missionary tour, He spontaneously broke out into a prayer of thanksgiving.6 The spirit manifest in crowds often drove Him "up

1Quoted by Glover, Jesus of History, p 110 2Mk 5:36;11:22
3Matt 6:30-33 4Mk 1:33-37 5Lk 6:12,13. 6Lk 10:21
the hill to pray". The crowds troubled Him, really; and just before He asked the abrupt question which brought Peter's great confession, "Who do the crowds say I am?", He was "praying by himself" with His disciples near Him. The Transfiguration was the direct consequence of ardent prayer,—a most vivid picture it is.

But no reference to the prayers of Jesus is more significant perhaps than this: "He was praying at a certain place, and when he stopped one of his disciples said to him, 'Lord, teach us to pray'". What a revealing touch this is! We see the eyes of the disciples all turned in silent fellow-feeling to the kneeling figure, observing the passion which shook the whole frame, and the peace and confidence that came to the earnest face. Perhaps the words were faintly audible. The blessedness of it struck them. Wistfully they yearned to pray like that.

Then follows a collection of most interesting passages on prayer. We gather here and elsewhere in the Gospels, notably in the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew, that Jesus did a good deal of teaching about prayer. Above everything, prayer must be an act of trust, an expression of faith. One has the impulse to rub one's eyes in astonishment in reading over again that tremendous assurance, "Whatever you pray for and ask, believe you have got it and you shall have it". Commentators have never known just what to do with this. Perhaps Jesus used deliberate hyperbole; perhaps His disciples exaggerated the application of what He actually did say. Perhaps what He really said was, "When you pray for a spiritual gift, believe you have got it and you shall have it". Psycho-

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1Mk 6:46 2Lk 9:18 3Lk 9:29 4Lk 11:1 5Mk 11:24 6Cf Lk 11:13b
logically this would be a defensible thesis. But we need not worry about the original form of the saying here. All that we need to see now is clear: prayer should express faith and trust. There are other marks of true prayer. It should be single-minded and single-hearted, simple and earnest. Jesus indicted the Pharisees for offering "long, unreal prayers". His own prayers may sometimes have been long, but they were never unreal. And never by rote, like the prayers of the pagans, who "suppose they will be heard the more they say". But one should be patient, persistent, even strenuous. One must "seek": "the seeker finds"; one must "ask": the importunate widow was heard; one must "knock": the friend at midnight is befriended. The spirit and practice of Jesus breathe through these injunctions, it is apparent. Very important is it that prayer should be permeated with good-will and forgiveness. Without these unresentful dispositions in the praying-heart, forgiveness cannot be had of God.

Jesus is here letting us see Himself at prayer.

And, lastly, the world must drop away, if prayer is to be real. Prayer is secret, a matter between God and oneself alone, in the final issue, let its form be what it may. In His own experience Jesus found the quiet hours upon the hillsides absolutely essential, indispensable. He could not have carried on without them. They were the periods when the balance of His life was redressed, when God refreshed Him, when He gathered strength.

This fact provides us with the verbal paradox: He was a lonely man, lonely to the degree of poignancy; but He found perhaps His deepest Joy alone with God.

1Matt 12:40 2Matt 6:7 3Matt 7:8 4Lk 18:1 f 5Lk 11:5 f 6Matt 6:14 and elsewhere.
The reason for this is, that when Jesus, as man, inti-
mately communed with the Father, He was the recipient of grace.

Grace has a double character, religiously viewed. On
the one hand, it is "the freeness of the divine love, which is not
won by any merit of the creature;" on the other hand, it is a
strengthening experience of life and joy in the person of the
believing child of God, bringing as its complement an enhancement
of the personality.

Psychology seizes upon the latter phase of grace as the
essence of it. The conception of grace arises from the experience
of power, says the psychologist, and is the interpretation a man
puts upon his own strength generated by integration on religious
lines. The freeness and fulness of the love of God in the soul is
a subjective experience consequent on release and sublimation of
energy; its cause is organization of the person round a new center--
the idea of God and His righteousness. It is highly beneficial and
salutary as an experience; but it partakes of the nature of il-
lusion. The poet devotes himself to the Spirit of Poesy in the
same way; only the power generated in him by his single-minded
loyalty is not called grace but genius.

This is, of course, the only interpretation open to a
pure psychology, severely limited as it is to present processes.
A synoptic view of the whole field of life reveals its inadequacy.
It is only correct as far as it goes.

To go further to the full truth: God is behind all pheno-
mena as the ground of all being. He communtes with His spiritual

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1Wm Adams Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p 110
children, loves them, and draws them on to Himself. Integration, therefore, serves simply to prepare the individual to be found of God: there is a divine Person communicating Himself, a Father of Lights giving Himself without stint or limit to those who know and contain Him by faith, and wooing and persuading all others.

Grace, then, in its human aspect, is the inner gathering of power and life; but on the divine side, it is God freely bestowing His love upon men and winning from them the response in their own persons of gratitude and humility in a life of power.

If Jesus was human personality at the best and highest, when He entered into life He encountered the ultimate Reality behind phenomena; that is to say, He found and was found of God. Then all the powers of His person were gathered in their strength, touched by the finger of God.

"He, reflecting God's bright glory and stamped with God's own character...is superior to the angels...For to what angel did God ever say,

\[ \text{Thou art my son,} \]
\[ \text{to-day have I become thy father}? \]

\[ ^1 \text{Heb. 1:3 ff} \]
"When we see Jesus as He is presented to us in the gospels," wrote Dr. Denney, with penetrating psychological insight, "we see a life which is at one with God. All the problems which distract and baffle us are solved here. There is no quarrel with the conditions of existence. There is no discontent, or querulousness, or rebellion. There is no radical inconsistency, no humbling division of the soul against itself. There is no distrust of God, no estrangement from Him, no sin...It is our life that we see in Jesus, but we see it in its truth and as it ought to be, a life in God, wholly at one with Him".¹

This, Dr. Denney proceeded to show, is the basis of the reconciling and atoning work of Jesus.

One recalls immediately the words of Paul: "There is a new creation whenever a man comes to be in Christ...It is all the doing of God who has reconciled me to himself through Christ".²

It is but a step from this to the conviction, growing originally not out of speculation but out of experience, that God appeared on earth in the person of Jesus: there was such identity of will between God and Jesus that we may forthwith proclaim Jesus in the language of the Old Testament and with those of the Faith: "Immanuel--God is with us!"

Once seen in all its relations, this inference is irresistible.

¹The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation, p 9,10.
I

It is an inference that the earliest Christians drew from the nature of Jesus' personality and activity. He was too great to fit into the ordinary human categories. Such was the intuition, confirmed by reflection, which rose in the minds of His followers after His death.

That Jesus was a creative personality of this sort has recently been denied on both psychological and historical grounds. Freud dismisses the Jesus of Christian story as a mythical figure; Jung sees the original historical event wholly overlaid and transvaluated by the reconstructions of creative phantasy. In some quarters historical criticism has reached the conclusion that Jesus the Jew was taken up by contemporary cults and became a totally new figure as the Christ of theology. Common to all these views is the assumption that the Christ of faith is the master-work of creative religious imagination.

But it is not a good case, even on the most liberal of presumptions. Disguised in some sense though He appears to us, and however uncertain we must always remain as to the precise value to be placed on many of the passages in the Gospels, there is no ground--there is certainly, after all the critical labor, no decisive reason--for giving up the faith of the Christian church from its beginning, that Jesus was "the creator rather than the creature of Christian experience". He is not a transvaluated value, but a transvaluator of values, the greatest personality in human history, such a person as in His own time could change men with a word or look, morally and physically, and in all times since has

1 Totem and Taboo. 2 The Psychology of the Unconscious. 3 Wm Adams Brown, op cit, p 330
exerted the most transfiguring influence the world has known. So far did He rise above His own age as to be sacrificed to its inertia.

II

There is no need to labor the point. It is clear that in the experience of men, from that time to this, Jesus has been the means whereby God has reconciled the world to Himself. Paul has not misrepresented the Christian faith in the great phrases: "I am certain neither death nor life, neither angels nor principalities, neither the present nor the future, no powers of the Height or of the Depth, nor anything else in all creation will be able to part us from God's love in Christ Jesus our Lord"; and there is a pregnant saying of his elsewhere exalting "the knowledge of God's glory in the face of Christ".

The whole New Testament radiates with this faith. Consider the striking passage in the Fourth Gospel: "'Lord' said Philip 'let us see the Father; that is all we want'. Jesus said to him, 'Philip, have I been with you all this time, and yet you do not understand me? He who has seen me has seen the Father. What do you mean by saying, "Let us see the Father"? Do you not believe I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The words I speak to you all I do not speak of my own accord; it is the Father who remains ever in me who is performing his own deeds".

Which is as clear and simple a statement of the faith that God is seen in Jesus as Christian literature contains. The thought of God had become inseparable from the figure of Jesus. Not that Jesus is all of God, but that God is like Jesus, Jesus is so much of God as may be manifest to the eyes of men. Nor was

1Rom 8:38,39  2II Cor 4:6  3Jno 14:8-10
any ditheism meant. The faith of the New Testament was still mono-
theistic: there is one God—the God who is to be known in Jesus.

We discern here a great, simple, and earnest faith. It
is no less profound than it is rapturous. It breathes vitality, such
that there are times when one regrets that the eager minds of the
Church, beginning with Paul, could not rest until they had given
it a cosmic setting. The metaphysical interpretations marked a
"falling off".

First, the jubilant intuition of the early Church,
that God could and did meet with men in a man, went down before
the dualism that conceived God and man to be substantially and
really unlike. The Incarnation straightway became a mystery past
all finding out. Salvation came to be conceived as the resistance
of one's own nature, because one must thoroughly distrust and
disown it. Grace must be had from God to transcend and triumph
over it. Christ, therefore, took human nature to transfigure and
deify it. The atonement meant the virtual dissolution of human
nature, not its fulfillment. Christ had come to destroy, not to
fulfill, the nature of man.

But with all the blundering and manifest absurdity to
which these now discredited presuppositions led, somehow the great
vital and central fact could not be wholly obscured. Christ, so
far as men yielded Him their faith, had "the values of God" for
them, and wrought with the power of God in them. Experience testi-
fied beyond any doubting that He could save them to the utter-
most.

This is the religious fact of atonement in Christ that
has come down to us, and to which we are constrained to bear our
own testimony. He is still the revealer of God in His own person. Through Him we are, as He was, at one with God. We acknowledge His moral authority over life and conduct; and His death is effectual for reconciliation and atonement. "It is the mercy of God in relation to our sins which we see in Him, and His presence and work on earth are a Divine gift, a Divine visitation. He is the gift of God to men, not the offering of men to God, and God gives Himself to us in and with Him".¹

III

We say it with sincere conviction—He is the gift of God to men, not the offering of men to God. But how?

The Greeks were not long in seeing, besides the fulfillment in Jesus of the Messianic hope of a Saviour, the fulfillment of philosophic expectation. As the mediator of salvation Christ was the Logos of the philosophers.

Must we now discard this designation? Is there any sense, consistent with the assured findings of psychology, in which Jesus was the Logos and part of the three-fold self-manifestation of God?

In the recent volume edited by Sir James Marchant, on the future of Christianity, Dean W.R. Matthews argues for a Christology in other terms than those of Greek philosophy, since the latter implies a dualistic separation of the divine and human natures. He sets forth an interesting sketch of a new and more adequate Christology. He begins with the fact, that although "in human personality and the values which it creates and sustains

¹Denney, The Death of Christ, p 317.
we may clearly discern the supreme product of the evolutionary process", no person is wholly explicable on evolutionary lines, because in personality we assuredly have a manifestation of the transcendent element implicit in all evolution. In Jesus "the creative life which we may discern working through all the course of evolution" overcame the limitations it had hitherto met and reached complete expression.1

This is putting the Logos Christology in modern terms. It is a step in the right direction. Just as the old Logos Christology found in Jesus the fulfillment of philosophical expectation, so this new Christology finds in Him the fulfillment of the modern scientific expectation.

But, as may be seen, this view is hardly reconcilable with the older one that Christ came to earth from a state of pre-existent consciousness. This may be felt to be a serious difficulty. No doubt we here stand, not ethically, but metaphysically, at the cross-roads. The present writer feels the difficulty of the choice, but he finds himself led to take the position implied (for him at least) in Dean Matthew's outline. The position comes to something like this.

In the act of religious faith (for faith is act as well as thought and feeling) God is known as the ultimate Reality personally creative throughout the universe, and this by a threefold self-manifestation. He is, first, an absolute Person, the ultimate source of all life and being, whose nature it is to create. In this aspect He would be past finding out, were it not that under a second aspect He is eternally revealing Himself in

1The Future of Christianity, p 122, 123.
the creation and in the experience of men, and under a third aspect 

Himself eternally giving, in life and love by a process of self-impertation.

It is this experimentally known fact that is expressed in the 

Christian doctrine of the Trinity.¹

It is with the second aspect of God's self-manifesta-

tion that we are here concerned. The Greeks, in their ready com-

prehension of the intellectual and rational elements in life and 

the world, grasped early and speculated much upon the Thought and 

Purpose of God in creation. Unwilling as they were to think of 

God as at labor in the finite, they postulated the forth-going 

of His Reason to create and sustain the finite universe and to 

reveal Him to men. In this manner arose, as we have seen, the 

speculations concerning the Logos of God.

We have also seen how the Man of Nazareth was identi-

fied with the creative divine Word or Reason, and how this led to 

the stupendous implication that in a state of pre-existence as the 

Son of God He has created the worlds and eternally revealed the 

Father.

The difficulty about this was that, while on the one 

hand the Logos conception contained too vital a truth to be denied, 

on the other it carried the direct implication of ditheism (and

¹That in so saying we are by no means innovating, no one has 

more clearly shown than Dr. Rashdall in his little volume "Jesus 

Human and Divine". He says: "In St. Augustine, and still more dis-

tinctly in St. Thomas Aquinas and the Schoolmen generally, it 

becomes evident that nothing is left of the older conception of 

Christ as a distinct God which is found in Justin and the earlier 

Fathers. The Logos now becomes not a separate mind, but a dis-

tinguishable activity of the one and only Divine Mind. The Son 

is the Wisdom of God, as the Father is His Power and the Holy 

Spirit Ghost His Love, and the three constitute 'One Mind" (p 

24,25). In St. Augustine's exposition of the Trinity in terms of 

Memory, Wisdom, and Will or Love "the love of the Father for the 

Son is the Holy Ghost" (p 62). Thomas Aquinas treats of the Trin-

ity in the same way.
when the self-impartation of God in the Spirit was added, of tri-
theism) into the Godhead, inasmuch as there were conceived to be
two (and then three) centers of self-consciousness in the Deity.
The difficulty was grappled with at Nicaea, where God was declared
to be one God, Father, Son, and Spirit. As discussion proceeded,
the terminology became fixed. God is one substance, in Whom there
are three hypostases.

At this point modern interpretation is apt to err. Hypo-
stasis is not equivalent to the modern word "personality". Something
far less, far paler is meant. The Trinitarian formula of the 5th
Century had little ethical, far more a mystical connotation.
Reason is not expected to comprehend the mystery. God is one, but
in Him are perceived three subsistences, three principles of
individuation in three distinguishable activities.

But we already see that the Greek terminology is highly
speculative, that it has moved from the experimental basis with
which Christianity started. It is better, therefore, to do with-
out it as much as possible, if we can at the same time conserve
the truth which it stands.

The truth for which it stands is this: God is eternal
creative Love. In a continuing process through nature and history,
by a three-fold self-manifestation He has been eternally revealing
and imparting Himself. The Incarnation was the culmination of a
long process. In the fulness of time He revealed and imparted
Himself by and through Jesus of Nazareth, by a gift of Himself to
men. He became man for us and our salvation. "The creative life
working through all the course of evolution" was manifest as the
Power and Wisdom and Love of God, become self-conscious in human
personality.
This is the Divine fact in the Incarnation. Let us see what the human fact is.

IV

We have come back again to psychology. The representative character of Jesus as true man stands out in a strong, clear light.

Our study of the personality of Jesus has convinced us that He was true man in respect to the constituents of His person. Throughout His youth and during the brief period of His ministry, He displayed every human quality, albeit in perfection; and no one quality was really absent, at any time. The conative tendencies, the desires, the impulses, the instinct urges deeply lying at the roots of being as the springs of mental and physical conduct and behavior,—all these we found within the mind and person of Jesus. Where He differed from other men, we saw, was in the integration of these constituents—in the perfection of His person. He uniformly and unfailingly chose to coordinate and direct all His powers to the highest ends. Perfect harmony and cooperation obtained within His person. He was without sin.

And so, we concluded, He found and was found of God.

One further step have we taken: not only was He found of God, but He was one with God.

But this simple affirmation is not enough to satisfy the questioning mind. Just how, it is asked, is the self-revelation of God to man effected? And since Jesus is the center of discussion, just how did Jesus know and become one with God? Can psychology, with its knowledge of human perceiving and knowing,
throw any light, however feeble, upon the process?

We begin with the fact that the physical aspects of reality are apprehensible by cognition through the avenues of sense; but that when ultimate reality is to be known, the whole of the person must function together, if the quest of truth is to be successful. Ideally, therefore, only a perfect personality can know reality in its ultimate aspects. All the personal forces aid each other. Consciousness and subconsciousness cooperate. What one aspect of the personality is aware of, all aspects are aware of, in the sense that the whole person appropriates these findings, consciously or subconsciously, and they are available for the whole self.

Suppose now that a perfect personality is engaged in conversation with a friend. What happens? Consciousness is concentrated upon the knowing of the other's mind and declaring of one's own mind. But meanwhile the avenues of subconscious perception are all open. Conscious attention is focussed upon a certain limited number of things, but there is a large field of marginal reference; there are overtones of the friend's voice, and visible tell-tale details of behavior which go unnoticed by consciousness, but are duly noticed subconsciously.

Now these subconscious perceptions, it is clear, are what go to make up intuition. In the ordinary person they may not be that perfect functioning together of consciousness and subconsciousness to make such perceptions a factor in the quest of truth; but in the perfectly integrated personality intuitions are constantly supplementing the more deliberate findings of

1See supra, p 81
consciousness. So that when a perfect personality is in conversation with a friend, the latter is speaking with more than his voice; as the conversation proceeds he is revealing far more than any written record of his words would convey. He may be trying to hide certain aspects of himself from his interlocutor's eyes. But he is unsuccessful. Intuition has completely modified the conclusions to which consciousness alone might have led the perfect person with whom he is speaking. He is not hiding anything; he is being read like an open book.

This is just an illustration, but it throws some light on our problem. Suppose we change the characters in our conversation. Let the perfect personality be Jesus, and the friend be God. God is seeking to make himself fully known through the world, and through life and experience.

If God is there to be known, when Jesus, in whom we see the perfection of moral consciousness, was seeking God, His whole person being active in a projection of Himself into the heart of the universal life, He then apprehended the Father's presence and will. Consciousness was intensely active in an awareness by thought and feeling of the nearness of the Father communicating Himself; and at the same time, into the area of conscious attention there came an uprush of intuitions, from the subconscious, confirming and enriching the findings of consciousness. God then made known

1Some recent writers introduce here the hypothesis of a super-consciousness operating through the subconscious upon consciousness. It is not reasonable surely to assume that nothing more comes out of the subconscious than is already there or than goes into it from consciousness. Shall we then posit a super-consciousness making its impact upon the subconscious, and producing there a new synthesis of its elements, a new truth? This phraseology is very well, if properly guarded; but the tendency has been to use these terms as though they referred to distinct entities, rather than mere aspects of mental process. This was Dr. Sanday's error (Christologies Ancient and Modern), using the phraseology of F.W.H. Myers.
His mind. Jesus understood the Divine intent, the will of God for Him and for men.

And--here lies His perfection--He completely identified Himself with that will, with "a perfect obedience,--an obedience not merely to Divine law, but to God Himself."¹

If this be so, then the insight of John must go unchallenged; "I and my Father are one"²; "he who has seen me has seen the Father"³. Jesus is God.

If will is the whole self in action, the entire personality moving to its ends, then to identify one's will completely with another's is to be one with that other completely. "If we are inspired by Christian faith to affirm that Jesus Christ is identical with God in will--a Will manifested in His achievement--we have reached a point beyond which no advance is possible," Dr. Mackintosh declares; "for in ethical terms, the highest terms available, we have affirmed His ontological unity with God in a sense generically different from that which is predicable of man as man".⁴

A moment's reflection upon our psychological findings will help us to yield our assent to this. Identity of will, if complete, is identity of being, in the last and final resort.

We can follow Dr. Mackintosh further. A unity of substance is under this view less complete and less satisfying to faith.⁵ If behind all will and thought there exists in God a mysterious

¹Ullmann, The Sinlessness of Jesus, p 61 (Eng tr). ²Jno 10:30 ³Jno 14:9 ⁴The Person of Jesus Christ, p 304 ⁵In fact the idea of "substance" is inadequate in any case. In every sphere of thought it is being rejected as a "static" conception which must give place to the dynamic conceptions of activity and personality.
incognizable substance, not to be described in terms familiar to
human experience, but representing the point through which the
threads of cosmic relations pass, and constituting the inmost es-
source of the Divine life, then indeed the oneness of Christ with
God is after all only relative. But the supposition is mistaken.
There is in the universe nothing more real than will, the living
energy of spirit; nothing more concrete and actual, whether it be
in God or man. It is the last home and sanctuary of essential
being*.1

There is indeed no more comprehensive way of putting
the faith that in the person of Jesus the God of heaven and earth
appeared in the flesh, than to declare that Jesus so surrendered
Himself to the Father, that when He went into action God went into
action as well and in the same movement, because God and Jesus
willed the same act.

That all this can be an acceptable phrasing of the
reality of the Incarnation to some minds in the Church is hardly
to be anticipated. Bishop Gore, for example, with the admirable
spirit that pervades his writings, has already taken issue with
Dr. Mackintosh on the two passages just quoted. The definitions
of the Councils, "considered rightly as primarily negative", are
to him the only phraseology possible.2

But there is from our point of view a real need of re-
casting the very phraseology which Bishop Gore finds such need
of retaining. The Gospels did not use such language, and modern
psychology cannot use such language. If we consult the Gospels,
we perceive that, viewed entirely from the standpoint of religious

1 Op. cit. p 113 ff 2The Reconstruction of Belief, p 861
need and requirement as these are to be adequately met, the identity of will \textit{with} of man with God is regarded as full and sufficient redemption. The whole purport of the life of Jesus is to be gathered in the statement that He sought to win men to the doing of God's will. Men were to be redeemed by the organization of their personalities around one high and divine purpose.

The New Testament knows, also, no higher terms than these for the putting of the significance of Jesus' life for men. In His life among men, Jesus, so the Synoptists discern, was at one with God by identity of will. Even the Fourth Evangelist finds and uses no higher terms than those expressing complete identification of the Son's with the Father's purpose. "My food is to do the will of him that sent me, and to accomplish his work".\(^1\) The great words "He who has seen me has seen the Father" are followed closely by the explanatory sentences: "The words I speak to you all I do not speak of my own accord; it is the Father who remains ever in me, who is performing his own deeds. Believe me, I am in the Father and the Father is in me".\(^2\) That is to say, God is accomplishing His will through Me, and this constitutes our unity of being. Observe how very striking is this passage: "This is why my Father loves me, because I lay down my life...I have my Father's orders for this. I and my Father are one--".\(^3\)

VI

In all this we have found no need of the Chalcedonian distinction of the "natures". The reason is patent: we are not operating with the presupposition of a complete antithesis between Godhead and manhood. We do not hold that "divine" and "hu-

\(^1\)Jno 4:34 \(^2\)14:10,11 \(^3\)10:17 f
are mutually exclusive terms. Rather, we have assumed that it has always been part of God's nature that He should "be made man", and that man has reached his own ideal self-fulfillment in Jesus, who was "one with the Father".

There is here no inherent reason why we must see in Jesus an "unconfused" and "unchanged" divine nature inseparably and indivisibly united, with an "unconfused" and "unchanged" human nature. We labor no longer under the exigencies of so hard and fast a distinction. Jesus, identifying His will with the Father's, did not cease to be man, albeit He was man at the highest and best. His nature (we write the word, of course, in the singular) was in its native aspect human, while from the point of view of a true faith, in its fulness and perfection it was divine. This is the simple fact, whose profundity at the same time staggered and amazes us, Jesus is God-with-us!

It was not the work of man Himself. Dorner rightly holds it error to accept the easy alternative of humanism. There is a fatal weakness in the Greek view of apotheosis; we may characterize such self-worship as "the would-be production of the Divine from out of ourselves, the treating it as something to be brought forth in and out of ourselves, instead of being, on the contrary, something to be received by us, and which is to be brought forth by God condescending to us".¹

The Divine life in men is given. God's self-disclosure waits only upon the self-surrender of men to Him in trust, when He will draw them on to their self-fulfillment by His grace and

¹Doctrine of the Person of Christ, Vol I, p 9 (Eng tr).
truth and love, freely bestowed.

In Jesus, the incarnate Son of God, we see the consummation of all the long desire of God, man sharing the supernatural life of his Father, the Father fully manifest in man His child.

Not that all of God can ever appear under the limitations of human personality in time and space: here there must be a Divine kenosis; but that God "in His love and desire to spread His life abroad—giving others to share in it—going out from Himself—becoming, as it were, the seed or principle of the world"—finds Himself spiritually and really "in His human sons and daughters", and fully in Jesus.

And so—

"If He, the wisest, the best, the holiest of men, the greatest teacher and benefactor of the race,—acknowledged as such by the common consent of the civilized world,—declares Himself one with the Father, and so identifies Himself in will and aim, in essence and attributes, with the infinite God, to an extent and in a sense as no man could do for a moment, without blasphemy or insanity, and if He receives the divine adoration from His own disciples, how can we, in logical consistency, as well as in harmony with the moral and religious instincts of our nature, refuse to fall down before Him, and, with Thomas, to exclaim from the depths of our soul: "MY LORD AND MY GOD"?"
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