THE THEORY OF THE KENOSIS AS BASED UPON THE NEW TESTAMENT.

by

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INTRODUCTION: The word Kenosis, which is a Greek word meaning "emptying", is derived from St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, where in Chapter II, verse 7, it is said that in assuming an earthly life, Christ Jesus emptied Himself εαυτῷ ἐκένωσεν (of the form of God).

In this passage the subject of the verb ἐκένωσεν is generally acknowledged to be the Son of God in His pre-existent state, and the action of exinanition involved to be a self-imposed limitation on the part of the Son of God - the Logos - to the capacity of man.

The Theory of the Kenosis, therefore, is not to be considered as purely speculative, but as finding its primary basis in an actual and unchallenged scriptural statement, and as forming an essential part of the teaching of the person of the Lord Jesus Christ. It has been questioned, indeed, whether a single passage should be made the foundation for "so ambitious a theological structure" as the Theory of the Kenosis. It can, however, be considered a justifiable contention, that although the term Kenosis is found only in Phil. II. 7, and although this passage is thus in a sense ἀναθεματισμὸς λεγόμενον, yet the Kenotic Theory has its deepest foundations in the New Testament itself and the presentation therein of the person of Jesus Christ. A parallel to Phil. II. 7 is found in 2 Cor. 8:9: "Who though He was rich became poor", and in John 1, 14, "The Word became flesh" (δ Νόιος σαρκίς εγενετο), where there is suggested a real self-exinanition on the part of the Logos in becoming man.

It is in fact on the data of the N. T. Scriptures as a whole that the Kenoticists base their views.

N.B. Various terms are employed to express the Kenosis: Exinanition; Depotentation; Periesiosis etc.
It will be the aim of this Thesis -
1. Briefly to set forth this Scriptural data as it relates to the Kenosis of the Pre-existent Son of God in becoming man.
2. To survey the views of the chief early writers on Christology as they deal with the limitations involved in an actual Incarnation.
3. To review the Kenotic ideas expressed from the Reformation to modern times.
4. To state and criticise the principal objections which have been raised against the Kenotic Theory, and
5. To set forth a constructive statement based on the New Testament as to the nature and extent of the Kenosis.

There have been various types of Kenotic Theory, but in general it may be stated that the idea conveyed by them is that in order to effect the great end of the Incarnation - the union of the Divine and human in one self-conscious personality, God, or more exactly, the Eternal Logos, or Son of God by an act of self-limitation denuded Himself of so much of His absolute power and glory as was compatible with the taking upon Himself a real and veritable human nature." A. B. Bruce says similarly in his great work: "The dominant idea of the Kenotic Christology is that in becoming incarnate and in order to make the Incarnation in its historical form possible, the eternal and pre-existent Logos reduced Himself to the rank and measure of humanity".

The latter explanation may be said to be the truer one, since the idea in the former definition of the union of the Divine and human in one self-conscious personality, gives, in the Kenoticist's mind, a loophole for an unnatural Dualism.
The Theory of the Kenosis has, since its systematic formulation, met with considerable opposition.

Many great theologians classify the various Kenotic views under one heading and roundly condemn them. Ritschl, for example, says - as we would expect from his general Christological attitude, rejecting as he does the personal pre-existence of Christ - "what is taught under the heading of the Kenosis of the Divine Logos is pure mythology."

Biedermann wrote that "the Kenotic theory needed a Kenosis of the understanding to believe it."

Dorner spoke of "the perplexing thicket of the thorny hypothesis of a Kenotic theory," and regarded "the whole apparatus of the supposed self-kenosis" as being unfruitful; while Professor Orr stated that the influence of most of the modern Kenotic theories was already "a thing of the past".

Most of the criticisms, however, are of an arbitrary nature, the Kenotic theory being summarily brushed aside, either because it does not harmonise with the critics' theological pre-suppositions or because it traverses views expressed in the Creeds or by the early fathers. Further, the principle of the theory is very often confounded with its expression.

That the influence of modern Kenotic theories is not "a thing of the past" is shown by works, published since this criticism was uttered, in which eminent theologians discuss and advocate the retention of at least a moderate Kenoticism.

In his work on the Person of Jesus Christ, Dr. H. R. Mackintosh states that "there is a strongly revived interest in what are known as the Kenotic theories of our Lord's Person."
Professor Garvie writes, "The study of the life of Jesus proves undoubtedly the Kenosis," while in "The Rule of Faith," Professor W. P. Paterson says that "the Kenotic theory in its moderate form seems to yield the only possible interpretation of the Person of Christ, provided we are to give weight to the religious considerations which demand the pre-existence of the Son of God, and also to give weight to the evidence of the evangelists who reported to us all that is known of Jesus Christ."

A few years before Principal Caird had written: "A profound element of truth underlies its logical inconsistencies, and the idea of God on which it is based appeals in a very real way to our moral and religious intuitions"; and, while Bruce in his classic work, "The Humiliation of Christ" does not openly support the Kenotic theory, he nevertheless states: "The various Kenotic theories have done one good service by insisting that no theory of Christ's person can be regarded as satisfactory which is not able to assign some meaning to their (the Kenoticists') watchword."

Even Dorner conceded: "There is no denying that the Christology of which Zinzendorf may be regarded as the forerunner, represents a truly religious trait, to wit, the desire to conceive the divine love as having become/like to, and intimately united with us as possible."

The New Testament Presentation of the Kenosis.

In the New Testament there may be said to flow four main streams of Christological doctrine, the Synoptic, the Johannine, the Pauline and the Hebraic. A brief examination of each of these will reveal the great truth, although expressed in different ways, of the humiliation and true humanity of the unique being called the Son of God.
The Synoptic View.

The general impression that we get from a study of the Synoptic Gospels - Matthew, Mark, and Luke, - is, that they differ only in detail, and that their presentation of the Person of Jesus Christ is practically homogeneous.

They wrote in their portraiture of a Being who was invested with extraordinary powers, yet who lived His life within the ambit of human experience, with limitations of power and knowledge.

I. In an examination of the Gospel presentation of the Person of Jesus Christ as a whole, one is aware of the much-stressed difference between the Synoptic and the Johannine records. It is evident, indeed, that the differences are real. There are wide divergencies in the record of the same events, there are omissions and additions on either side for which, on the basis of a strictly historical narrative, it would be difficult to give a satisfactory explanation. Furthermore, the Synoptists impress us with their simplicity of diction and narration and seem to emphasize the true humanity of Jesus, while the Gospel of St. John contains much that is mystic and symbolic, giving us also the impression of stressing the divinity of Jesus Christ. Yet after all the differences are nothing vital nor irreconcilable. Although the portrait is taken as it were from a different angle and a different altitude, it is that of the same unique Person - the Son of God, who is the Son of Man, and who, with the consciousness of a unique relationship to God and a divine mission on earth, lived, was tempted, suffered and died as a man.

N.B. I believe that the Jesus reminiscences to be found in the Gospel of John coincide to such a degree with the Synoptic portrait, taken as a whole that there is no need to emphasise them specially. A. Beissmann (Jesus. Paul. 38)

- N.B. Bensow (Die Lehre von der Kenose) endeavours to prove that Xτ. is presented by the Synoptists & John as "vere deus et vere homo"
"With all the differences of representation", says Burkitt, "it is true that the ideas of the Fourth Gospel are the ideas which animate the sayings of the Synoptic Gospels."

"The person of the Lord", wrote Westcott, "is as truly the centre of the teaching of the Synoptists as of the teaching of St. John." With this view agrees Dr. Rawlinson in his recent work on the New Testament. The main thesis of the writer (of the Fourth Gospel) is, that the Incarnation had actually happened and that Christ was an historical Person. The Gospel is rooted in history in the same sense in which the other Gospels are rooted in history, ... he (St. John) believes the episodes which he narrates to be episodes which had actually occurred.

II. It may be urged that in one important respect, as it affects the doctrine of the Kenosis, there is a difference between the Synoptic and Johannine records, viz.; the former does not speak of Christ as a pre-existent Being. It is true that the Pre-existence of Christ is not specifically stated in the Synoptics as it is in the other main presentations of Christ's Person in the New Testament, and yet it may rightly be contended that the absence of the distinctly stated fact is no proof that it was not believed in and actually implied.

"It is not conceded", says La Touche, "that there are no indications of our Lord's pre-existence in the Synoptic Gospels ... Pre-existence may not be the expression of Synoptic Christology. It is certainly the underlying thought."

With this idea of the pre-existence agrees J. Weiss, who argues that Mark's use of the titles Son of Man and Son of God proves the acceptance of the Pauline idea of Jesus as a man descended from Heaven.
So also Moffatt: "In the conception of "Son of Man", the idea of pre-existence was already implied in the Synoptic Christology." It has been urged, indeed, that in the uniqueness of Christ's relationship to the Father as Son and His expression of this relationship in certain Synoptic passages, the Pre-existence is taught, e.g.:

"The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many." (Matt. 20:28)

also in the incident at Christ's baptism, where the Divine voice speaks from Heaven confirming the unique Sonship:

"Thou art My beloved Son, in Thee I am well pleased."—(Luke III. 22); also in the Parable of the Vineyard and the husbandmen (Mark XII. 6) "Having therefore one Son, His well-beloved, He sent Him, saying 'They will reverence my Son', and again, in Mark XII. 27, where Christ confutes the Jews with the question: "David ... Himself called Him Lord, and whence is He then His Son?"

These references seem to be fairly conclusive as at least implying Christ's pre-existence, but in any case if these are not considered sufficiently specific, the Johannine, Pauline and Hebraic records can be justly taken as, in this respect, supplementary.

III. Uniquely Son of God as He was, the Synoptists present Jesus to us as a genuine member of the human race.

A real growth in bodily, mental and spiritual power is indicated in the first Gospels; e.g., we'read in Luke 2, 40, "And the child grew and waxed strong in spirit", and in 2, 52, "And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature and in favour with God and man."

At times, indeed, Christ is represented as displaying what seems to be a supernatural consciousness and knowledge. At the age of twelve, for example, He is found saying to His mother: "Wist ye not that I must be in my Father's house?" (Lc.II 49).
In Lc. V, He commands the disciples to let down the net for a miraculous draught of fishes. The incident of the ass's colt (Matt. 21.) suggests to some minds an unusual or supernatural prescience, as also the prediction of the fall of Jerusalem. (Lc. 19.) It has been contended in fact, that in the performance of miracles as well as in the manifestations of knowledge, there are clear evidences of the superhuman in the Incarnate Son of God.

This conclusion, however, is not universal, and it seems to be unquestionably true to the Scriptural presentation of Christ to say that these instances, or at least most of these unusual instances of power and knowledge find a parallel in the experiences of the prophets and the apostles, who at times reveal a pre-vision and manifest a control over visible elements which suggest the possession of powers more than human.

Christ's power, in fact, is definitely stated in Acts II, as emanating from God, the source of the prophet's power, "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God .... by mighty works and wonders and signs which God did by Him". This complete dependence on and subordination to the will of the Father is the teaching of the Synoptists, as we see, e.g. in His prayer at Gethsemane. Matt. 26, and in Luke V, where He is represented as casting out devils by the Spirit of God.

As an indication of Christ's true humanity many instances are provided which shew His actual ignorance of things. Surprise is displayed by Him at the attitude of His parents (Luke II.) as also at the lack of faith on the part of His disciples, "Why are ye so fearful? How is it that ye have no faith?" Mark IV. The prayer "if it be possible", (Matt. 26), is that of a weak surprised humanity; the consent "Not as I will",
was the prayer of the balanced and conscious self. The impulse of the temptation made Him swing as a pendulum does, but in that very moment conscience asserted itself."

He craves for and obtains Divine help in facing the Cross, (Lc. 22), "and there appeared .. an angel from heaven, strengthening Him". On the Cross itself he manifests all the physical weakness of a man in the throes of death, and there also His judgment seems to be deranged: "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" Mark 15.34.

"The agony indicating His amazement", says Adamson, "seems to imply something on which surprise concentrated all His powers, and which shut out, for the moment, every other consideration."

His ignorance of things, e.g., as to the exact time of His second Advent, is clearly stated in Mark 13, "Of that day ... knoweth no man ...no, neither the Son."

St. Augustine says of this passage that our Saviour had the knowledge and that He only withheld it, while Athanasius contended that Christ was ignorant as man, though not as God. This docetism, indeed, is characteristic of the early Fathers, but it finds no corroboration in the pages of the New Testament.

"The Gospels present us", writes Adamson, "with the conception of One whose life was lived in complete dependence upon and obedience to the Father's will; the keystone of His life is faith ... the limits of knowledge were only burst with the tomb."

The figure, then, which the Synoptists give to us is that of one who, unique Being as He was, was yet a man. He is shewn to have experienced all the limitations common to man, suffering hunger and weariness, the claims of appetite and the need for rest. He had human feelings and human passions. He is genuinely surprised and disappointed, genuinely tempted and humanly victorious.
"It is no colourless apparition of a being from another world, enveloped in a misty pretence of human nature (who appears to us), it is One who lives His life in the same way that we do."

IV. It is assuredly no ordinary man who appears to us from the Synoptic Gospels. At the outset of His work, John the Baptist speaks of Christ's superiority: "There cometh after me He that is mightier than I, the latchet of whose shoes I am not fit to stoop down and unloose." (Mark 1)

Christ Himself is conscious of this super-eminence, claiming to be the Messiah and the Son of God. He speaks of Himself also as the Son of Man, by which term He at least claims to represent humanity as no other human being can.

He asserts His power to forgive sins, while no confession of His own sin passes His lips. He is conceived and born of a virgin. He claims to speak in the name of God, His words being uttered in the tome of Divine authority and accepted as such by His followers. His life is set forth by Himself as the pattern for men; and His death, which He foretells, has such a power that through it men are to be reconciled to God.

Yet this glorious figure, this true Son of God, is a true Son of Man, and is shewn in these first three Gospels to have been in all points like unto His brethren, sin excepted.

He is not a phantom, but real flesh and blood, subject to all the laws and limitations of human nature; and under the care of, as also ever in dependence on the Father, guided and inspired by the Holy Spirit, He lives and develops in a truly human manner. Such is the picture of Jesus that we get from the pre-theological Synoptic Gospels, and in the main the picture closely resembles that of John.
11.

The Johannine Portrait.

"The Jesus whose portrait is (here) set before the readers", says Rawlinson, "is neither a lay figure nor a theological abstraction. If He is the only-begotten Son of God ... He is also emphatically true man."

"It is evident that when John was writing his own Gospel he had before him, if not the Synoptic Gospels as we have them now, at least the substance of them."

In this gospel John seldom gives a duplicate account of any passage in Christ's life which appeared in the other three gospels, and when he does so, as in the case of the feeding of the five thousand, it is in order to append to the account, some great lesson founded upon it by Christ, with which the Synoptic evangelists were unacquainted, or which it did not enter into their scope to set forth.

The differences between the two records are reconcilable, in a sense, if we consider the motif of the Fourth Gospel. John's interest in his account is more than historical. "The Fourth Gospel is interpretative and mystical, selective and deliberately doctrinal in its representation of our Lord."

The Evangelist has offered but a small selection out of a great store of incidents, his aim being to show that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God (20.31) and to utilize his material to that end. His account, however, of the life of Christ, His pre-existence, His miracles, His manhood, must be taken as essentially historical.

The Pre-existence is not merely implied; it is specifically stated, and stated as a historical fact. Christ is presented to us in the Prologue as the Word, the personal Being who was in the beginning with God, and was God. In John 17.5, Christ prays that the Father might glorify Him with the glory which He had "before the world was."
This pre-existent Word becomes incarnate - the Word became flesh. The Son of God lived a human life. "The fourth Gospel", says Mackenzie, "is an effort to show the Logos who is thoroughly conceived in the Prologue as an eternal, living, purposive and rational Being as He appeared in flesh, as He moved a man among men."

Dr. Moffatt thus examines the Prologue: "Phrase after phrase is carefully chosen to set aside some misconception of what Christ was as the true Logos. The Logos existed in the very beginning - not an inferior æon or emanation, subsequent to the original order of things as, e.g., the Valentinians taught; the Logos was in vital relation with God, ... with God in the very beginning of things in unrivalled supremacy. Through this Logos everything came into being, and apart from the Logos no existence came into being, - a side stroke at the Gnostic theories of creation. Then follows the work of the Logos within the created universe of men. Life ... was in the Logos as divine, and that Life was the Light of men. The Light shone in the darkness. He entered into the world - the world which came into being through Him.

He came to what was His own. The Logos became flesh docetic (instead of a phantom Jesus, as the Gnostic taught), and tarried among us, and we saw His glory - glory such as an only son has, who comes from His Father, full of grace and truth.

No one, (not even Moses), has ever seen God, but he has been unfolded by the only Divine One who lies (once more after His incarnate life on earth) upon the Father's breast."

There is no suggestion of a $\text{κεφωσις}$ κατὰ Κριψίν in the Fourth Gospel. Like the Johannine Epistles it is anti-docetic. As Swainson justly remarks, "in the early
Gentile Church and especially in Asia, it was the reality of our Lord's manhood that most needed emphasis, and stress is laid in this Gospel to an extent which is unparalleled in the Synoptics upon the susceptibility of Christ to purely physical and simple human experience."

In John we have the same person as in the Synoptists, only, as Nolloth says, it is "Christ transfigured."

Extraordinary claims are made by and for Him, all of which, we are justified in saying, have been confirmed by His life and by Christian experience.

He is conscious of Messiahship: "I that speak unto thee am He", 4.26. "Thou hast both seen Him and He it is that speaketh with thee." 9.37.

He realizes His Pre-existence: "Before Abraham was I am", 8.55. "Glorify Thou Me with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was." 17.5. This is clearly a knowledge of His unique and pre-temporal relation to the Father, yet, as Adamson suggests, this knowledge may be rightly said to have come to Him as a man, either in recognising His identity with the promised Messiah of the Scriptures or as a revelation (an influx of knowledge) from God.

He claims to be the Light of the World, the Way, the Life and the Truth for men; He performs great miracles; yet it is quite evident that no where in the Gospels, either in the Synoptists or in John, do we find that His incarnate life He possessed, or claimed to possess omnipotence, omniscience, or omnipresence, or that He exercises a power which was not derivative of the Father. The whole record is a verification of His own words:- "I can of myself do nothing." John V.30.

The fourth Gospel also is against the kind of Docetism which would make Christ a passionless Divine Being, merely making pretence of being human. The humanity of John's Christ is as genuine as that of the Synoptists. The Word of God lives a real human life under the limitations imposed by
time and by human conditions.

It is the Christ of John whom we find sitting weary by the well, asking for a drink of water from the Samaritan woman: IV. 6, who sheds tears at the grave of Lazarus: XI. 36, who is troubled in spirit: XII. 27, who confesses thirst on the Cross: XIX. 28.

It is a human Jesus whose history is presented to us by John; not that the divinity is unrecognised or denied, but that the Divine is beheld in the human.

It is thus seen in this short survey of the person of the incarnate Christ, that the four evangelists agree in their presentation of a unique Being who lived a real human life in a truly human manner.

"To ignore the human conditions of the historic life", says Dr. H. R. Mackintosh, "is to miss the contrast of earthly limitation and ascending majesty. It is also to miss the vast redeeming sacrifice of God, for these circumstances of self-abnegating limitation form the last and highest expression of the love wherewith the Father bowed down to bless us in His Son."
The Pauline View of the Kenosis.

The Pre-existence of Christ.

It cannot be said that any systematic view of the Pre-existence of our Lord has been developed by the Apostle, for the statements which he makes in his various Epistles in that regard are generally incidental and are not part of a drawn-out treatise on the subject. Nevertheless, although they are isolated these references are quite definite and unchallengeable, and must be considered as part of Paul's belief and view of the Person of Christ.

There is little doubt that Paul thought of a pre-existent Being emerging from the Father when he wrote Gal. IV. ἐκ νότος ἀναρχεῖον Θεόν ἐπεφέρεν τοῦ πρώτου,
Rom. VIII. 3: "God sending forth His own in the likeness of sinful flesh.

A more definite reference to the Pre-existence is made in the otherwise mystic passage, I. Cor. X. ἐκ νότος ἀναρχεῖον Θεόν ἐπεφέρεν τοῦ πρώτου, which speaks of "the Rock of which Israel drank, that Rock was Christ." In other passages the Pre-existence of Christ is explicitly asserted, e.g., in Phil. II. ἐκ νότος ἀναρχεῖον Θεόν ἐπεφέρεν τοῦ πρώτου, where the Apostle speaks of Christ "being in the form ὁ ἐκ νότος ἀναρχεῖον Θεόν ἐπεφέρεν τοῦ πρώτου", counting it "not a prize to be on an equality with God", and again as definitely in 2 Cor. VIII. ἐκ νότος ἀναρχεῖον Θεόν ἐπεφέρεν τοῦ πρώτου, where reference is made to Christ's surrender of possessed riches, becoming poor that men through His poverty might become rich; thus indicating the passage from a previous heavenly existence to the restrictions of an earthly life.

Equally convincing are the passages in which Christ is represented as mediating the creation of the world, e.g. Col. I. "The image of the Invisible God ... for by Him were all things created", and I. Cor. 8. "One Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things."

N.B. Bruce quotes Strauss as acknowledging that Paul is here teaching that Christ is one who, before His Incarnation lived in a divine glory, to which after His freely assumed state of humiliation was over, He returned. (Die kliche Glaubenslehre I.420)
Although Paul ascribes equality with God to Christ, yet in some real sense there is also eternal subordination to the Father.

"The name of God, although it applies with the most perfect right to the Saviour and is repeatedly given to Him in the Gospels, is especially ascribed to the Father in distinction from the Lord Jesus Christ." The Father is called "the God of our Lord Jesus Christ", but as Gasterzee says: "We can scarcely conceive of the Son being in turn spoken of as the God of the Father", Paul, in fact, says specifically: "the head of Christ is God."

In commenting on the subordination of Christ to the Father, Calvin says that this refers to Christ's humanity: but most theologians submit that a real and eternal subordination is taught.

For Paul the Incarnation of the Son of God was a real and voluntary one. He was born of a woman according to the flesh, Gal. IV. He "emptied Himself" and was made in the likeness of men - Phil. II. He lived, a man among men, "without sin". (2 Cor. V.)

He is spoken of in I.Cor.15.45 as "the last Adam", and it is evident that in Paul's mind there was a complete renunciation on Christ's part of His divine glory; that the Son of God had been in Heaven and that while He was on earth He was not in Heaven; that is to say, there is no room in Paul's teaching for a dual existence on the part of Christ. This renunciation is specifically set forth in the passage already quoted as indicating Christ's pre-existence:

"Though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor."

It is in the parallel passage, however, Phil.II. 5-8, a "passage of unchallenged authenticity" and "marked by epic fulness and dignity", as Lightfoot says, that we have the locus classicus of the Kenotic theory, in which, indeed, we have the primary basis for the teaching that the pre-exist-
ent Son of God assumed an earthly life with its limited power and knowledge.

This Philippian passage, in fact, is of such significance in its bearing upon the Theory of the Kenosis that it demands special exegesis: Phil. II. 5-8.

Exegesis of the 'locus classicus': Phil. II. 5-8.

It has already been stated that the Theory of the Kenosis does not rest on Phil. II. 5-8 alone. Its basis, as Professor Mackintosh and Dr. Forrest have pointed out, is found in a large number of scriptural passages, and in the general impression received from the study of the New Testament as a whole.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the Philippian passage is the corner stone of the foundation, and that if it had not been written another term than "Kenotic" would most probably have been applied to the theory of Divine limitation involved in the assumption of a human life.

The whole passage is undoubtedly Pauline. The verses, moreover, seem to contain the very heart of the Gospel message, setting forth all that for which the Kenoticists contend and indicating the full extent of that Divine love which made the supremest sacrifice possible for the sake of man, in adopting manhood in all its reality and integrity as a new form of life.

Phil. II. 5-8: "Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus, writes Paul and then proceeds:—

5... ἐν μορφῇ πέποντος ὑπάρχων σὺν ὑπάρχῳ ἐγενέσθαι τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἑξῆς, ἀλλὰ ἐχάρτων ἐκείνων μορφῆς δουλῆς λαμβάνων, ἐν ὑμετέρῳ ἀνθρώπῳ γενομένος, καὶ σφαῖρα ἐνεπείτεις ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων γένοιμος, ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων γενομένος ὑπήκοος μέχρι ταύτας, ταύτας ἀνθρώπου.
V. G: \( \Delta \nu \) = "who", and refers to the Pre-existent Christ. The Expositor's Greek Testament states that discussions as to whether this refers to the pre-existing or the historical Christ seem scarcely relevant to Paul's thought. For him his Lord's career was one and undivided.

Loofs, on the other hand, says emphatically, that the historic Christ - \( \chi\rho\epsilon\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma \varepsilon\gamma\zeta\alpha\rho\kappa\omicron\varsigma \) - is referred to. This agrees with Pelagian exegesis where the entire passage applies to the human Christ as the second Adam.

Most commentators, however, both ancient and modern, refer \( \Delta \nu \) to Christ in His pre-human state. "It is incorrect," writes Meyer, "to regard the incarnate historical Christ as subject." So Lightfoot and Vincent. Loofs gives a list of early fathers who took \( \Delta \nu \) as expressing pre-existence. Among them are Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Eusebius, Apollinarius and Athanasius.

\( \mu\iota\rho\sigma\phi\iota \iota \) = "form", - the concrete expression of the divine \( \varepsilon\omicron\omicron\beta\iota\alpha \). So Meyer and Vincent, the latter speaking of the "form" being equal to the essential nature and character of God. Lightfoot says that \( \mu\iota\rho\sigma\phi\iota \iota \) must apply to the attributes of the Godhead.

\( \iota\pi\delta\iota\chi\omega\nu \) = "subsisting" or "though He subsisted". "The word denotes prior existence". (Vincent). The time is that of pre-human existence. So Meyer, Lightfoot, and Cremer.

Gifford makes \( \iota\pi\delta\iota\chi\omega\nu = \chi\omega\nu \) and translates: "being or continuing to exist in the form of God", but Dr. Forrest opposes this interpretation and says that these two \( \mu\iota\rho\sigma\phi\iota \iota \) are not conceived as radically combined, but as radically contrasted ... so that \( \mu\iota\rho\sigma\phi\iota \iota \chi\omega\nu \) = \( \text{e}i\nu\alpha\iota \text{h} \alpha\omicron\delta\omicron\nu \) and denotes a past event. So also Bruce and Moulton and Geden. "The Apostle conceives the Incar-
nation under the aspect of an exchange of a divine form for a human form of being; so that as expositors we are not entitled to interpret the words "being in the form of God" as meaning "continuing to subsist in divine form."

(p. 20. Bruce, H. of X.)

εὐγνώσατε ἐνώπιον μέτα τοῦ τίτλου

= "counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God" (Vincent) - "did not set store on equality with God" (Moffatt). Meger gives an active sense to ἄρναμενον, as does Hofman, and makes it mean "robbing", "making booty". "Had He then thought", says Meger, (i.e., at the moment when the pre-existent Christ was on the point of coming into the world): "When I shall have come into the world, I will seize to myself by means of my equality with God power and dominion, etc.; then He would have acted the part of ἄρναμενον, ... to which, however, he did not consent, but to self-renunciation etc."

This view, however, is considered untenable by most commentators. Vincent states that although substantives ending in μός have usually an active sense, there are exceptions, as

"To take ἄρναμενον ... as meaning "robbery" says Lightfoot, "is to wrench it from its context, and destroy the force of the contrast between the prize to be retained at all hazards and the act of renunciation". The Kenosis signified a firm determination not to hold fast and selfishly cling to equality of state with God. (Bruce).

Τὸ ἐἶναι ἐκείνῳ ἐνώπιον μέτα τοῦ τίτλου = "existence in the way of equality" Vincent. Meger likewise explains: (1) ἐκείνῳ is adverbial = "in like manner". (2) τὸ ἐῖναι = existere.

Thus also Ellicot, Weiss and De Wette. Moulton and Geden translate down to this section: "Who although (formerly when He was ἅγγις in ἀναμνήσεις) He bore the form (in which He appeared to the inhabitants of Heaven) of God, yet did
not think that this quality with God was to be eagerly clung to or retained."

V. 7: ἀλλὰ ἐὰν ἔμεινεν ἐκένωσεν "but emptied Himself" - "stripped Himself of the insignia of majesty". (Lightfoot: Ep.Ph. 112)

Dr. Rawlinson, in his Bampton Lectures for 1926, states that the R.V. has translated ἐκείνῃ ἐκένωσεν too literally, and renders the passage - "made Himself of no account."

The vast majority of modern scholars, however, agree with the R.V. rendering, and the translation "emptied" seems to be in harmony with the interpretation of ἐκένωσεν both in Classic Literature and the Scriptures.

In their Concordance to the Greek Testament, Moulton and Geden give a list of places in which the word ἐκένωσεν and its correlatives are used, all suggesting the idea of "emptiness", "vacuity".

Thus Mark 12:\[\text{They sent Him away empty.}\]
also Luke I. 53; 20.10-11; Acts 4.25; I.Cor.15.10-14-58; 2 Cor. 6.1; Gal.II.2; Eph.V.6; Phil.II.16; Col.II.8; IThess.2 3.5; Jas. V.20.

Thus also ἐκείνῃ ἐκένωσεν: 1.Tim.VI.20; 2 Tim.2.16.
Also ἐκένωσεν: Rom.4.15: "Faith is made void."

Also ἐκένωσεν: 1 Cor.1.17; 9.15; II.Cor.9.3; Phil.II.7.

Also ἐκένωσεν: Ph.IL.3; "Vainglory".
and ἐκένωσεν: Gal.V.26; "Vain-glorious."

ἐκένωσεν is used from Homer down and is the Septuagint for ὄρος ὄρος = empty.

e.g. I. Property of Places; vessels etc. which contain nothing: Gen. 37.24; Judges 7.16.
Metaphorically: empty; vain; devoid; of truth: ἔλεος ἔλεος.

e.g. ἔλεος : Eph.5.6; ἀμαρτ. Col.2.8.

Property:

(2) Of men = 'empty-handed". ἑλπίζωτε κακός. Τί λάθη ἐκένωσεν: Gen. 31.41; Deut. 12.5; Luke 8.3
21.

Metaphorically: destitute of spiritual wealth; of one who boasts of his faith as a transcendent possession, yet is without the fruits of faith. James 2.20.

(3) Metaphorically: Of endeavours, labours, acts which result in nothing, "vain", "fruitless", "without effect", e.g.; ἐὰν ἔχεις ἐν ζωγραφίας. I Cor. 15.10; ἐὰν ἔχεις ἐν ζωγραφίας. I Cor. 15.58.

εἰς ἴτον = "in vain, to no purpose." 2 Cor. 6; Gal. 2.

Phil. III.16.

Κένω = (I) To empty, to make empty.
e.g. ἐὰν ἔχεις ἐκένωσεν (Phil. II.7) ὑπ' ὑπὸ τοῦ κενοὶ ὅσα ἄνως ὑπὸ τοῦ κενοῦ.)
i.e.; He laid aside equality with God, or the form of God.

(2) To make void: i.e. to deprive of force, render vain, useless, of no effect; (passive), Rom. 4.14; 1 Cor. 1.17.

(3) To make void, i.e., to cause a thing to be seen to be empty, hollow, false, eg. ἦ τὸ καθαρσιμὸν. 1 Cor. 9.15; and so often in Attic writings.

So also Cremer:

Κένω = "to make empty", "to empty".

1. Relatively, with genitive of contents, eg. Plat. Conv. 197º, also with the accusative Poll. II.62. (Κένω ὁ θαλάσσως)

2. Absolutely, either 'to empty' or 'to reduce to nothing' - the antithesis of θαλάσσων ῆνια; "so in Phil. II 7 by which is denoted the beginning of that act of Jesus Christ which in verse 8 is termed ἐξελεύσωσεν ἐὰντέσωσεν ἐὰντον.


1. Cor. XV.14.

ἀλλὰ ἐὰν ἔχεις ἐκένωσέν.

Lightfoot says that the emphatic position of ἐὰντέσωσεν Phil. III.111. suggests a voluntary self-imposed act. Likewise Meyer; the emphatically prefixed ἐὰντός is correlative to the likewise emphatic ἐπαγαμοῦν in v.6.

Augustine has this comment: "non amittens quod est, sed acquirens quod non habet". Meyer, however, contends that this is an
assumption on the part of Augustine - έκκενωτά means nothing but "exinanivit" (Vulgate).

"He emptied Himself of the μορφή δεόν - so Expositor's Greek Testament, also Alford.

Loofs says that there is certainly no doubt by this phrase Paul was expressing the same idea as in 2 Cor. 8. 9, although Loofs himself considers that both passages are ambiguous.

μορφή δεόν λαμψαρν: - "By taking the form of a slave", Lightfoot. "By "form" is evidently meant not the external resemblance only, but the characteristic attributes as in V.6.

The action of λαμψαρν is coincident with the action of έκκενωσεν (Lightfoot). "The more precise definition of the mode in which He emptied Himself:" (Meyer)

"This does not imply a change in the innermost basis of His personality": (Expositor's Gr. Test.)

γένοσι μετάφθασ: = "becoming", as opposed to ὑπαρξών, which is "being by nature." - "He entered into a new state of being", John I. 14, "and the Word became έγενετο flesh" έγενετο μορφαρτ = "similitude" (Lightfoot) likeness.

"Christ walked this earth in the real likeness of men", yet Paul feels that it does not express the whole of Christ's nature. - Expositor's Gr. Test.

σάρκι μορφαρτ. "Being found in fashion as a man". The opposition with verse 6 is between what He is in Himself and what He appeared in the eyes of men = "habitus" an external resemblance.

The words σάρκα μορφαρτ. and σάρκα of course do not suggest any doubt of Christ's real manhood. The fact of His sinlessness, in which he was distinguished from man, would justify such terms. "Inventus ut homo" (Vulgate) is the best interpretation of Paul's language. Harnack, however, considers that the language seems designed to exclude the notion of a real human personality.
ÆEPEL韦s ëбтшн = "Humbled Himself", so Vincent, who compares the expression with 2 Cor.11. - "Have I committed an offence in abasing myself". It is not synonymous with £κελνшв. It represents the action of the God-man. To make the subject of £κελνшв με λόγος (with Loops) would practically identify £κελνшв with £κελνшв. Dr. H. Kennedy, (Expositor Gr. Test.) translates: "Even as man He suffered great humiliation. "Unto death, the death of a cross".

Dr. Lightfoot's translation of the whole passage is as follows:- "Reflect in your own minds the mind of Christ Jesus. Be humble as He also was humble. Though existing before the worlds in the Eternal Godhead, yet He did not cling with avidity to the prerogatives of divine majesty, did not ambitiously display His equality with God, but divested Himself of the glories of Heaven and took upon Him the nature of a servant, assuming the likeness of men. Nor was this all. Having thus appeared as man in the fashion of man, He humbled Himself yet more and carried out His obedience even to dying (upon a Cross).

Here reference may be made to a passage in Chrysostom (Hom. VII in Phil.). This is practically a paraphrase of the verses in Paul's epistle, but it reveals the characteristic docetism of the early fathers.
"The Son of Man did not fear to descend from His dignity, for He thought not of His Godhead as needing to be jealously guarded; He did not dread being deprived either of His divine nature or of His (divine) honour and dignity. Wherefore He even put it (the latter) from Him, knowing well that He should resume it again; so He concealed it, not looking upon Himself as lowered thereby."

The κρίσις, however, suggested by Chrysostom is entirely absent from the classic Philippian passage. Four important points can be made as a result of this exposition of Phil. II.5-7,

1. The subject of the κρίσις was a self-conscious Being who had a pre-incarnate existence of God-equality.
2. In becoming incarnate, this Divine Pre-existent Being experienced a temporary change in His mode of Being, divesting Himself of powers formerly possessed, and becoming man lived a genuine human life.
3. The Act of Exinanition was voluntary.
4. Although He experienced a temporary change, it was the same Person in the incarnate life as in the pre-incarnate, only in the former He lived under limited human conditions.
The Hebraic View of the Kenosis.

In a comparison between the presentation of the Person of Jesus Christ in the Epistle of Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews there are evident remarkable similarities just as there are remarkable differences.

The differences, however, do not amount to contradictions and are due, in reality, just to difference of presentation and different thought forms. The Epistle to the Hebrews has been referred to as being "a systematic sketch of Christian Theology." This cannot be said of the letters of the Apostle Paul, transcendently clear and inspired as they are.

The similarities, on the other hand, are vital, in that both writers present to us the same pre-existent Being, the Son of God, through whom the world was created, who through love to men suffered a temporary change in His Eternal mode of being and became man, living on earth a truly human life.

As in Paul's Epistles, the Pre-existence of Christ is clearly set forth by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews: "Thou Lord in the beginning hast laid the foundations of the earth." Chap. I. 10.

In Chap. I. 2-3, we have a picture of Him who existed before the world was, "the effulgence of God's glory and the very image of His substance," who upheld all things by "the word of His power."

In Chap. I. 43, He is represented as being "greater than angels", (i.e. in His pre-temporal state); while in Chap. 2. 9, He is revealed as "being made a little lower than the angels, that He by the grace of God should taste death for every man."

The same thought is also expressed in Heb. X. 15, where the writer quotes from Ps. 40. 6-8, "Sacrifice and offering Thou wouldest not, but a body didst Thou prepare
for Me."

There is no docetism apparent in the Epistle to the Hebrews - no mere display or spectacular appearance on the part of this Divine Being. "He did not stop half-way", as Dr. Mackintosh puts it; "He did not take to Himself the nature of angels. He became a partaker of flesh and blood." 2.14.

"It behoved Him to be made like unto His brethren." 2.17.

Great stress is laid upon the reality of Christ's human experience. In fact the whole burden of the exhortation to his readers to labour and believe is based upon the writer's assurance that Christ the High Priest is able to sympathize and to succour, having passed through the same phases of human trial, although "absque peccato" 4.15.

Nothing could be more definite reveal the essential humanity of Christ in His dependence upon the Father than 5.7. "Who in the days of His flesh, when he had offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto Him that was able to save Him from death... was heard in that He feared".

There is nothing, also, in the New Testament more emphatic in its declaration of Christ's natural human growth with its implications of a limited power and knowledge than 5.8-9: "Though He were a Son yet learned He obedience by the things which he suffered, .. being made perfect."

The elementary truths that are yielded by a study of the passages in this epistle referring to the Kenosis of the Son of God and His real humanity may be put in the words of Bruce:

1. The service Christ came to render, His vocation as the Captain of Salvation or the Sanctifier, was such as to involve likeness to men in all possible respects both in
nature and experience; a likeness in nature as complete as if He were merely a human personality; a likeness in experience of temptation, and in general of subjection to the curse resting on man on account of sin, limited only by His personal sinlessness.

2. Christ's whole state of exinanition was not only worthy to be rewarded by a subsequent state of exaltation, but was in itself invested with moral sublimity and dignity, so that having in view the honour of the Saviour, we have no interest in minimising His experience of Humiliation, but on the contrary, are concerned to vindicate for that experience the utmost possible fulness, recognising no limit to the descent except that arising out of His sinlessness.

Bruce's words form a strong appreciation of the Kenotic conception of the author of this epistle, particularly in consideration of his (Bruce's) later criticism of the Kenotic theories.
Theories of the Kenosis up to the Reformation.

The Early Fathers: Among the early fathers there is, of course, no definite systematic attempt to set forth the nature and extent of the limitation involved in the Act of Incarnation, Christological ideas being naturally in a rudimentary state.

"That Jesus Christ was God who became one with us and has made us one with Himself, they (the primitive Christians) received without scientific thought of the tremendous mystery involved".

Many references, however, are made to the Divine sacrifice in foregoing the glories of the heavenly life, and made in such a way as to suggest a belief in a limitation of divine powers on the part of the Son of God in His incarnate life.

Bose, mystical cils. p. 78.

"All (the theories)" says Bruce, "have involved a more or less distinct recognition of the need of a Kenosis of some kind on the part of the Logos, in order that the truth of Christ's humanity may remain unimpaired." With most of the Fathers, however, the limitation became a $\text{K\epsilon\nu\sigma\iota\varsigma \ \text{K\alpha\tau\lambda\eta\varepsilon}}$.

Loofs confesses his conviction that no theologian of any standing in the early church ever adopted such a theory of the Kenosis of the Logos as would involve an actual supersession of His divine form of existence by the human - a real becoming - man, i.e., a transformation on the part of the Logos; while Harnack says that "no single outstanding early Church teacher really accepted the humanity in a perfectly unqualified sense."

As time advanced, in fact, an incurable Docetism began to prevail in which amid much inconsistency of language Christ is represented as being only apparently weak, apparently suffering, and apparently limited in knowledge.

The Gessian type of Kenotic theory which speaks of a
complete evacuation of the Divine nature and attributes including self-consciousness would undoubtedly have been rejected by writers after Clement of Alexandria.

That the Word of God had, or assumed, a new mode of existence in becoming incarnate, that in this new mode of being He suffered limitations, at least on His human side, that He thus really experienced pain and temptation, is as much a part of the teaching of most of the Fathers as it is of the Scriptures, but the idea of a real humiliation was nullified by docetic interpretations and in some cases by a glaring dualism amounting to sheer contradiction.

"In the course of time", says Selbie, "the halo appeared round His brow and He was presented to the gaze of His followers either in a form glorified, and far removed from every vestige of humanity, or else as an agonized and perpetually suffering martyr."

The former alternative applies particularly to the orthodox early fathers, so that we find them speaking of the Divine nature remaining unchanged and the human nature alone limited; i.e., there seems to be no true kenosis, but a mere addition to the Divine life - an idea which is totally at variance with the Scriptural presentation.

This, however, cannot be said of Clement of Rome, c.95, whose works reveal a close adherence to the New Testament picture of Christ. The depth of the mystery of the Incarnation probably had not presented itself to him, but in so far as he goes, he presents to us the real Christ of the Scriptures. To him Jesus Christ was the pre-existent Son of God who had exchanged His heavenly mode of existence for an earthly mode of existence. Thus in his First Epistle to the Corinthians - Chp. XVI. he speaks of "Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Sceptre of the majesty of God," and then proceeds to say that this pre-existent Being did not come in the pomp of pride or arrogance, although He might have done so, but in
a lowly condition, as the Holy Spirit had declared regard-
ing Him."

In the 2nd Epistle of Clement, (falsely ascribed -
but of very early date) we read - Chap. I.- "Brethren, it
is fitting that you should think of Jesus Christ as of God,
and as the Judge of the living and the dead; and in Chap.IX,
"Christ the Lord ... saved us, being first spirit, then ...
flesh."

Here there is the expressed belief in the exchange on
the part of One to whom is ascribed divine honours and being
of an Eternal or Heavenly mode of being, for an earthly life
and a human body. Christ became man.

It is observed by Prof. H. R. Mackintosh and Harnack
that among the early theologians there are two streams of
reflection visible: one dualistic, in which the Pre-existent
Son joined Himself to the man Jesus, and in which union the
latter is only the form and vehicle of Christ's spirit; the
other in which Christ is conceived as becoming man. The
latter is evidently Clement's view, as it is that of
Polycarp and Ignatius.

Polycarp in his Epistle to the Philippians ascribes
equal importance to Christ and God the Father. In Chap.II
he writes: "Him every spirit serves. He comes as the
Judge of the living and the dead;" and in Chap. XII. we
have this prayer: "May the God and Father of Our Lord Jesus
Christ and Jesus Christ Himself, who is the Son of God and
our everlasting High Priest, build you up in faith and
truth."

In the Epistle to the Ephesians, Ch.VII, he speaks of
"the coming of our Lord in flesh" and again: "everyone who
shall not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh
is anti-Christ;" In Chap. VIII he condemns those who denied
the testimony of the Cross to the true humanity of Jesus
Christ.
Ignatius: In the writings of Ignatius, C.110 A.D., to whom the Church owes a great debt for the strength of his Christological views, "we have a vivid presentation of the person of our Lord in His pre-historic and His historic life, as the Eternal Son of God, the mind of the Father and the Son of Mary; and who in His incarnate condition experienced a definite limitation of divine powers and lived a genuine human life.

"Our Physician", he writes, "is the only true God, the Lord of all, the Father and Begetter of the only begotten Son. We have also as a Physician, the Lord our God, Jesus the Christ, the only begotten Son, Word before time began, but who also became man."

"Being incorporeal, He was in the body, being impassible, He was in a passible body, being immortal, He was in a mortal body; being life, He became subject to corruption."

In the Epistle to the Magnesians Chap. XI, the asceity of the Father is suggested, the Son being represented as dependent upon the Father and the Spirit upon the Son.

Reference is made to the Incarnation and the reality of Christ's humanity in the Epistle to the Trallians: "Mary then did truly conceive a body which had Christ inhabiting it, and God the Word was truly born of the Virgin, having clothed Himself with a body of like passions with our own."

"He who forms all men in the womb was Himself really in the womb, and made for Himself a body of the seed of the Virgin, but without any intercourse of man."

To Ignatius, there is but one unbegotten Being, even the Father, and one only-begotten Son, who is God the Word. Christ is truly God and truly man and in such a conception He seems to find no contradiction.

"Christ's life was the human life of God."
In the Apostles Creed (c.130) — original form, we have the assertion of Christ Jesus, God's only Son, our Lord, who was born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary, was crucified and buried and who on the third day rose from the dead.

It is quite evidently the same person here throughout, whose pre-existence is implied in the "Only Son" and "born of the Holy Ghost", who experienced a real humanity, who suffered and who rose again from the dead. There is here no loophole for deistic ideas.

In the Shepherd of Hermas (c.140) "Similitudes", Chap. XII, we have the presentation of our Lord in His pre-existent and historic state under the figure of a rock and a gate. "The rock is old, and the gate is new". The Son of God is older than all His creatures, so that He was a fellow counsellor with the Father in His work of Creation; for this reason He is old, .... the gate was made new, that they who are to be saved by it might enter the Kingdom of God.

The ideas of Hermas are not clearly expressed, e.g., he seems to confuse the Logos and the Spirit in the incarnation. He writes: "God made the Holg Existent Spirit that created every creature to dwell in the flesh which he chose".

Dorner characterises his views as adoption, while others consider that he reflects a vague Monarchianism which comes near pure Ebionism. The chief point to note is, however, that the pre-existent Son of God is believed to have become (the gate was made new) a real man.

The Didache seems to lay greater stress on our Lord's divinity than upon His humanity, and substitutes "Hosanna to the God of David" for "Hosanna to the Son of David". The genuinely Christian character of this book has been called into question, and it has been doubted whether it could pass John's test of the spirits: the confession that
In the "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs", Christ is spoken of as "God in the form of man". "He who is without fault is given up for the transgressors, and the sinless dies for the godless."

Melito of Sardis speaks of the Divinity of Christ who was truly God the Word, true God existing before all ages; but while he thus acknowledges Christ's divinity, he is even more careful to safeguard the humanity of Christ. "He was possessed of soul and body", "He had a human nature like our own".

Up to the time of Justin Martyr we have the Christological views of early Fathers, but practically no systematic presentation of His person and Work is given until we come to the works of the early Greek Apologists of whom Justin Martyr is essentially the greatest. Here we have the beginning of Christian theology. Among the most important names of the Greek apologists are Aristides, Theophilus and Athenagoras, but it will suffice to set forth the Christological views of Justin as they depict the pre-existence of the Logos and His act of becoming man.

According to Justin the Logos is a product of the Father's will, though eternally immanent as a principle in God. The Logos, he said, came down from Heaven as a spirit and made Himself one with the flesh conceived of Mary; He was "body and Logos and soul". The pre-existence of the Divine Word and the human incarnation are thus clearly set forth.

In a passage suggestive of plurality in the Godhead, Justin writes: "Next to God we worship and love the Word, who is from the Unbegotten and ineffable God, since He also became man for our sakes." In his "Dialogue with Trypho", (quoting Ps.24) he says that "Christ is called both God and
Lord of Hosts by the Holy Spirit." In Apol. I. 63, we read: "The Word of God became man for the human race."

Every effort is made to show the genuineness of Christ's human life, and he adds, to discountenance any idea of unreality: "Jesus grew up like other men using the proper means of growth." Docetic tendencies are strongly resisted. The Logos was made man (\( \text{Logos} \rightarrow \text{man} \)).

The Epistle to Diognetus - called the "Pearl of Apologetic Literature" asserts the Deity and humanity of Christ. The Creator, it states, has sent to men not an angel or any other subordinate being, but the Artificer and Creator of the Universe Himself, by whom He made and ordered all things." He sent Him as a King sends His Son who is also a King: ... as God (object) He sent Him, and as a man unto man. In Chapter 9 it speaks of the iniquity of many being concealed in "One Righteous Man".

In the Epistle of Barnabas great stress is laid by the author on the Divinity and atoning work of our Lord. "Being Lord of all the world, He endured to suffer for us". It behoved Him to appear in the flesh that He might abolish death." There is, however, a tendency on the part of the writer to think of the advent of Jesus as a theophany rather than an Incarnation. He writes: "He appeared in the flesh; but he stops short of the apostolic "became flesh". The true humanity seems hardly grasped. It is even said that Jesus... was not the Son of Man, but the Son of God."

Irenaeus, the Bishop of Lyons, c.185 A.D., the great antagonist of Gnostic speculation, finds the form of faith in Apostolic teaching attested by Scripture and tradition. He is very practical and reveals a modern method of treatment in dealing with theological and Christological problems. The divine essence, he said, was inconceivable. Our knowledge of God was relative, and the language which we utter concerning Him can only be figurative.
Christ is the only begotten Son of God, the Logos, through whom God reveals Himself. He was forever with the Father.

The pre-existence of our Lord is plainly stated.

"The Word was with God from everlasting ... "neque semper coeistebas Deo seu proprium eius verbum"

"No man knows the mode of his generation - "quomodo ergo Filius prolatus a Patre est .... nemo novit."

This Divine Word, he says, was united with His creature and humbled Himself to take upon Him the infant state of man.

The Kenotic idea seems to be suggested in at least two passages:

"Well spake He ... who said that the immeasurable Father was Himself subject to measure in the Son, for the Son is the measure of the Father, since He also comprehends Him."

And: "For this cause the incomprehensible and boundless and invisible One made Himself seen and apprehended and comprehended."

These passages, indeed, are not isolated. The limitation of the Pre-existent Christ in the incarnate state is referred to many times by Irenæus, the assertions, however, losing their force by reason of the dualism and inconsistency of language manifest in his writings. Statements are made, in fact, which definitely express the presence of a latent divine power in the historic Christ.

When He was being tempted and crucified and dying, the Logos remained quiescent: (νῶς χασονίω τῶν λόγων) when he was overcoming and enduring and performing deeds of kindness and rising again and being taken up, the Logos aided the human nature (συγγενείων του αιωνίου)

The duality of an Eternal and temporal life is also taught by Irenæus, eg, in the statement that Christ
remained in the bosom of the Father even when upon earth -
"cum extra sum non sit, sed in sinu Patris exsistat."

In contrast to the dualism just noted we read:

"Christ was not one and Jesus another, but the Word of God-
was made Jesus Christ", and again, "nor did He truly re-
deeim us by His own blood, if He did not really become man,"
also, "He graciously poured Himself out that He might
gather us into the bosom of the Father."

Replying to the Valentinians, who contended that the
Word ... never came into the world and that He never be-
came incarnate or suffered, Irenæus quotes: "The Word was
made flesh and dwelt among us". He says again: "Our Lord
took up man into Himself... the Word being made man", and
"The Word of God ... becoming incarnate ... stooping low
even to death."

It is almost impossible to reconcile such clear
statements as these, revealing as they do the genuine in-
carnation and the unity of Christ, with the dualistic
utterances previously quoted or with such an idea as that
expressed in XIX.3: "The Word remaining quiescent that He
(Jesus) might be capable of being tempted, dishonoured and
crucified."

The idea of the quiescence of the Word during the
temation is a feature of modern Christology, but there
is no evidence of quiescence or χωρίον in the New
Testament, where we have one person presented to us, -
Jesus the Christ, the Son of God, who Himself as one
undivided Person was tempted, suffered and died.

Beren's view of the Kenosis was that God had subject-
ed Himself to the determination of finitude or of humanity;
His self-emptying was real and objective and the result
thereof was that God posited Himself as an actual man.
The humanity carries the divine within itself as its inner
essence; consequently the development of this humanity is
is its deification. Hippolytus objected that the mutation of God into man 
\[\text{\textmu} \varepsilon \tau \alpha \pi \zeta \sigma \iota \sigma \iota \iota \ \text{is the entire destruction of both.} \]
Dorner concludes that Beron secured for the humanity of Christ a dignity and importance such as the doctrine of the church was as yet far from attributing to it.

Hippolytus: the chief exponent of the modalistic form of Monarchianism advocated by Nostus, ascribes full Deity and pre-existence to our Lord in his "Treatise on Christ and Anti-Christ". The words in Rom. IX. 5, "God, blessed forever" are ascribed to Christ, and he speaks of "our Lord Jesus Christ, who is also God."

Endeavouring to avoid a duality, he says that "there are not .... two Gods, but as Light of Light, or water from a fountain, or as a ray from the sun."

This Divine Being assumed an earthly existence. According to the tradition of the Apostles, God the Word came down from heaven (and entered) into the Virgin Mary, not in mere appearance or by conversion (\[\text{\kappa} \alpha \tau \alpha \ \text{\varphi} \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \iota \alpha \ \text{\tau} \omicron \omicron \eta \gamma \nu \]) but in truth ... He became man. The Creator of all things incorporates with Himself a rational soul and a sensible (\[\text{\alpha} \iota \sigma \theta \eta \eta \iota \iota \kappa \alpha \omicron \]) body.

Nothing seems to be clearer or more emphatic than Hippolytus's statement as to the earthly condition of the Son of God:— "Though demonstrated as God, He does not refuse the conditions proper to Him as man, since He hungers and toils and thirsts in weariness, flees in fear and prays in trouble. He who as God has a sleepless nature, slumbers on a pillow."

We note, however, as with Irenæus, the desire to retain for Christ His continued existence with the Father while living on earth. "The Word of God ... sustained no concession in that aspect in which He is one with the Father, being made in no respect one with the flesh through the exinanition."

The same view is given in his statement that "He

N.B. Another reading has \[\text{\varepsilon} \nu \omicron \sigma \nu \] \ (propter unionem)
remained after His incarnation, according to His divine nature, God infinite." In spite of this dualism, however, he can speak of the "evacuation" of the divinity. An endeavour to explain the "dual existence" is made by an analogy: "As in us the power of thought that belongs by nature to the soul is brought to utterance by means of our bodily tongue without any change in itself, so too in the wondrous incarnation (σώμα τοῦ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς) of God in the omnipotent and all-creating energy of the entire deity (τοῦ θεοῦ καιρού) manifested without mutation in itself, by means of His perfectly holy flesh in the work which He wrought after a divine manner." The analogy, however, seems neither thoroughly scriptural nor adequate; since the scriptures represent not the entire deity as becoming incarnate, but God the Word, and the depth of the sacrifice is lessened if we are to think of the Son of God remaining the same after and during the Incarnation as before it.

The inconsistency of Hippolytus seems closely to approximate to pure contradictions.

The element of Docetism has been clearly marked in the writings of some of the early Fathers already reviewed, but it becomes most pronounced in Clement of Alexandria, who, in his desire to maintain the true divinity of our Lord, imperils the unity of His person and makes the manhood a mere simulacrum.

The Deity of Christ is clearly set forth. Christ is spoken of as God, who in a body of flesh was "numbered indeed as a man", but "concealed as to who He was".

In his "Exhortation to the Heathen" Chap. XI. the Lord is represented as clothing Himself with flesh, His pre-existence being expressed in "The Word Himself has come from Heaven",

In the Instructor, Chap. II, he writes: "Our Instructor is like His Father God, whose Son He is, sinless, blameless
and with a soul devoid of passion; God in the form of man, stainless, the minister of His Father's will, ... He is wholly free from human passions."

"The flesh which he assumed for our sakes was capable of suffering" - (a meaningless concession since the flesh per se is incapable of suffering).

In Strom.VII. we read: "He ate not for the sake of the body, which was kept together by a holy energy, but in order that it might not enter into the minds of those who were with Him to entertain a different opinion of Him; in like manner as certainly some afterwards supposed that He appeared in a phantasmal shape (Δακτερεος)." "But He was entirely impassible - ἀπαθής and inaccessible to any movement of feeling either of pleasure or pain."

"Though He received a body like our own, He trained it to a condition of impassibility so that He had no longer any need to eat and drink."

It is evident that Clement believed Christ to be a man in appearance only. His language is boldly docetic, and is clearly at variance with the scriptural teaching concerning the true manhood of Christ. If He remained impervious to suffering, temptation and death, He certainly did not bear our griefs or carry our sorrows. If there was no pain or limitation, where was the sacrifice?

The docetism of Clement is accounted for by Dr. Mackintosh on the ground that He had to assume the task of an apologist in a Neo-Platonic Age. "The Neo-Platonists were bent on a metaphysical cosmology, instead of, as in Tertullian and Origen, basing faith on historical realities. To Porphyry Christ was a pious sage who may well have risen to immortality after death, but whose place is distinctly beneath Pythagoras. Christ had thus to be set forth, not merely as the Saviour of the world, but as One in whom lay the treasures of wisdom and knowledge for men self that there
was a specifically Christian gnosis." These considerations give us partly to understand the docetism shewn by Clement, but they fail to justify his dualistic position or to give us a satisfactory portrait of the man Christ Jesus.

Tertullian c 200, the forerunner of Augustine has been termed the founder of Latin Theology. He was the first to use the name Trinity, and to declare that tri-personality pertains to the one God as He is in Himself. He speaks of "una substantia, tres personae".

The conception of the Trinity, Estlin Carpenter thinks, is presented in a surprisingly crude form. Bethune Baker, however, remarks: "It may fairly be said that the later developed doctrine of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ is to be found in Tertullian, and his importance in regard to the general doctrinal system of the Catholic Church cannot be over-estimated." Bethune Baker also considers that in attributing the characteristics of the God of the Old Testament to the Son who always represented God to man, Tertullian seems to conceive of a "kenotic" process, a limitation for the purpose of revelation dating from the first eg. (of it) in the creation of the universe and of man.

This idea we find in Origen and in modern writers like Walker with their theory of the "Eternal Kenosis".

In his teaching of the Incarnation, the genuine conviction of Tertullian, however, seems to be that it was not a metamorphosis, but an assumption of flesh, — not by a transfiguration and change of substance. The substances of flesh and spirit are conjoined. There is no confusion, but a conjunction of the human and the divine. This conception of Christ, in fact, as possessed of a rational human spirit, is the only one consistent with Tertullian's psychology, in which there is no possible distinction of soul and spirit. He is not afraid of paradoxes: "Natus est Dei filius; non pudet quia pudendum est ... sulpulus resurrexit; certum est quia impossibile."
The pre-existence and actual human experience of Christ are thus taught, but in the main Tertullian's conclusions, as revealed in 'Adv. Praxeas' and in "De Carnis Resurrectiones," shew the same docetism and 'extra-scripturam' speculations which mark the presentation of Christ in Irenaeus. "It is evident," says Estlin Carpenter, "that Tertullian constructed his Christology in complete independence of the actual life of Jesus."

In Origen, 185-254 we have the leading representative of the Alexandrian School and the determined opponent of Monarchianism.

In his great work "De Principiis," given to us chiefly through the translation of Rufinus, we move as in a world of modern thought. "Here," says Fisher, "we have the first example of a positive and sounded system of doctrine."

Origen does not attempt to solve every theological problem which presents itself. In many cases, indeed, he freely grants to others the liberty of dissent. He plants himself, however, on the rule of faith, his position being that nothing is to be received which is contrary to Scripture or to legitimate deductions from them. God, he believed, was incomprehensible - the neo-platonic conception of relativity being appropriated. The Mediator between God and the world through whom the world is made is the Logos. In the Logos are all the ideas which exist in an inscribed unity in the Father and are embodied in the Creation. The Logos is personal and without beginning, being eternally generated of God the Father - "aeterna ac sempiterna generatio."

The proposition $\sigma_\kappa k'$ $\epsilon \tau t\tau \kappa \varepsilon \iota \varepsilon \tau r$ is rejected.

The Deity of Christ is recognised, but with a difference. The Father, Origen says, is God with the article prefixed to the term - $\sigma \delta \omicron \omicron$, whereas the Son is God with the article omitted - $\sigma \delta \omicron \omicron$. The reliability of Rufinus is questioned by Rav£n. £174.
There is throughout Origen's writings a definite teaching of the Subordination of the Eternal Son to the Father. In his view of the Incarnate Son, Origen endeavours to avoid docetism, but does not succeed. Christ, he taught, had a human soul and was inseparably united with the Logos. The Incarnation, he considers, is the culminating point of the Divine Self-revelation. He speaks of the Son "se exinanians de æqualitate Patris."

To illustrate how the Incarnate Son is capable of revealing the Father, he introduces the analogy of the two statues.

Imagine (De Princ. I) a statue of such a size as to fill the whole world; its very magnitude would preclude its being seen. A small copy of it in the same material, however, would give us some idea of it. Similarly, as we could not have beheld the splendour of the pure light flowing from the divine majesty of the Logos, by his Kenosis he made it possible for us to look into His divine light."

The Kenosis is again referred to in the words:

(Because) He emptied Himself (\( \text{ἐκ νόσησις} \)) in coming down to us, therefore having emptied Himself, He proceeded to take again that of which He emptied Himself, such self-emptying having been a voluntary act", - and also in Contra Celsum IV.15, where Origen says of Christ:

"Originally in the form of God, ... He emptied Himself—\( \text{ἐκ νόσησις} \)."

Facing the difficulty of the conception as to how the creative and all-permeating Logos could gather Himself into

Du Bose adopts this thought: "The Logos is \( \text{θεός} \) not \( \text{θεός} \). He is the personal intelligence, will & energy of God, and is really or essentially God; but He is not so God as that the whole Godhead is expressed in nature or incarnate in Christ and humanity."
an earthly life, Origen held that the human soul of Jesus, which like all souls was pre-existent, became a mediating bond uniting the infinite Logos to finite flesh (substantiae animae inter Deum et carnem medians). Unlike other human souls, however, that of Jesus was pure and apart from the Incarnation in time, had become one spirit indissolubly with the Logos, the two being fused in a union that may be compared to a mass of iron glowing forever with a white heat.

In their unity they passed into a incontaminate human body born of a virgin. "Thus was constituted the God-man.

In the depiction of the earthly experience of Christ we discern Origen's docetism, "It was not the Word who suffered, but the body which the Word assumed, and the Logos still carried on His cosmic functions while living the incarnate life." "When the God-Word took upon Him a mortal body and a human soul, He did not undergo any change or transformation (ἀλλ’ ἀλλ’ ἄλλα) ... but remaining essentially (ὤσίς) the Word He is not affected by any of the things by which the body or the soul are affected.

In spite of this dualism, Origen professes to believe in a real self-examination and says that "Christ had to learn to stammer and speak like a child with infants."

Three points may be said to be stressed by Origen in his idea of Christ's incarnation:

1. The Divine condescension of the Eternal Son in becoming incarnate.
2. The real Kenosis involved in the Incarnation. The Eternal Son was born of a Virgin and experienced a real human development,
3. The capacitas humanae naturae divinae.

There are, however, conflicting statements in
Origen's presentation which make it hard for us to define his true position; but it is clear enough that the dualism which is expressed nullifies any idea in Origen's mind of a true kenosis on the part of the Son of God. We find

(1) What in the Person of Christ the human is joined to the divine and is ultimately absorbed into it,(2) The Infinite Word, according to Origen, could not be confined within a human body and soul. It must have acted everywhere. (3) There is manifest the usual tendency of the Fathers to docetism. The appearance of Christ was spectacular - He came that men might behold, copy and obey.

The evidences of humanity are clear enough, but they must be explained away, lest the presence of His human limitations cast a slur upon the infallibility of His divine authority.

The theory of the kenosis with Origen is thus, as Bethune Baker says, "little more than a veiling of the divine majesty which he expresses by it, and he goes far towards representing it as something quite external."

According to Sabellius the Trinity was economic, not essential - a Trinity of temporal manifestation, but not of eternal persons.

Patripassianism was avoided; it was not the Father, but a virtue or energy of the Father that was incarnate in Jesus Christ. A temporal, but not an external distinction was admitted between Father and Son. The Logos was eternally contained in the one Personality of the Godhead; but in time, in the temporal act of creation and incarnation, He became distinguished and was then called Son as begotten of the Father in those acts. In reality, however, He was still the Father, only distinguished from Him as a different manifestation of Himself from that in which He is Father and not Son. We can perceive how akin to these ideas are the semi-modalistic theories of W. N. Clarke and Dorner, Against the Sabellian heresy and tendencies the
Church erected the bulwark of the Eternal Generation.

In the actual incarnation the true humanity is denied. In place of the proper human soul of Christ, God Himself is supposed to have been substituted in one mode of His manifestation.

Paul of Samosata, c.269, the most pronounced representative of what has been termed Dynamic Monarchianism, held the view that the Logos dwelt in the man Jesus as Wisdom in the prophets, the difference being in degree, but not in kind. The entrance of the Logos, which took place at Baptism, is represented as being that of a quality or character, not of a person. The birth of Jesus of the Virgin Mary is granted, but His pre-existence is denied. The deity grew by gradual process out of the humanity

(ἐκ πρωκοπίης ἔδεσσαν γίνοντας θεός)

In Christ the union between God and man is represented as being morally complete, but it was a union not of substance, but of disposition ... through which God revealed Himself for the salvation of the race.

This Dynamic Monarchianism is quite evidently at variance with the scriptural teaching of the actual Incarnation in time of the personal pre-existent Son of God.

Arius, the "arch-heretic" of the 4th century, believed in the pre-existence of the Son of God, but contended that He was not unbegotten, He was a creature and changeable and as such He united Himself with a human body. In contrast to Origen, who assumed that the Logos was incapable of change, Arius attributed to Him the sensations of hunger and thirst, limitation of knowledge and mental anxiety. Arius seems to approach nearer to a unity in his conception of the Person of Christ than some of his more orthodox contemporaries, but in reality he creates a dualism. Moreover, the figure presented by him was without a human soul and wholly estranged from our experience.
Jesus was neither man nor God, but a being mid-way between the two. The entire position of Arius was false. As Dorner says, instead of asking how Christ, although God, could become man, he asks, how can Christ... be God, although man. His Christological standpoint is the humanity. He therefore inevitably fails to arrive at the Deity.

The Nicene Creed, 352, the first authoritative declaration of faith sanctioned by the representatives of the entire church is unequivocal in its statement as to the pre-existence of the One Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God. of the essence (οὐσία) of the Father (μορφή) of one substance with the Father; God of God ... who for our salvation came down (χαρακτερίστη) and was incarnate (ζωντανοὶ ζωῇ) and suffered (μεταμορφωθείς).

Against the Gnosticism of the day it expressed the immediate connection of the Father and Son and also the real human experience of the Son of God who became not only flesh, but also man, exposed to actual suffering and death.

In Athanasius 297-373 A.D. we find the great opponent of Arianism, declaring the Son to be of the same substance (μορφή) with the Father.

In his work 'De Incarnatione' he asks: Why was the Incarnation necessary, and gives as answer:

I. For man's restoration Sin had appeared and depriving man of the Logos, deprived him of the principle of life.

The Creative Logos, therefore, assumed a body capable of death, capable also of being an instrument of Restoration.

II. For the Revelation of God. Being very God ... the Son became liable to suffering and submitted to be put to death in the body. The Word disguised Himself by appearing in a body that He might as man transfer men to Himself, and persuade them by the works which He wrought that He was not
man, but also God.

The humiliation is considered as a fact, but no change was produced, for it was not physical defect, but the riches of His love which caused the humiliation. He says, in fact, "The flesh did not bring ignominy to the Logos, God forbid, but rather the former was glorified by the latter; nor when the Son who was in the form of God assumed the form of a slave did He suffer diminution of His Deity."

It is evident that in the view of Athanasius, the humanity of Christ consisted only in the flesh. Dr. Raven says that Athanasius frankly denies human soul to Christ, and that this makes him at one with Apollinarianism; while Dr. Rashdall claims that "from the point of view of later theology ... it cannot be too strongly asserted that Athanasius was an Apollinarian."

The fact is clear that the great fear of minimising the divinity of Christ and of running counter to the doctrine of God's unchangeableness seems to obsess nearly all the early writers. The idea of the human capacity for the Divine is as yet only implicit or vaguely expressed. Even later when the capacitas humanæ naturæ divinæ is expressed, there is no clear declaration of the Lord's true humanity, and thus there resulted an inconsistency in terminology and a prevailing Docetism which has affected theologians to the present time.

"The language used by Athanasius" says Raven, such as "Godhead veiled in flesh" etc., encouraged the reappearance of the barest Docetism.

A keen supporter of Athanasianism was found in Hilary Bishop of Poictiers. This prelate is noted for what Dr. H. R. Mackintosh calls "An impressionist view of the Incarnation, interpreted as akin to modern Kenotic theories, but whose influence on the course of thought is negligible". His views, however, have been considered to be of sufficient
importance to be set forth at length by Dormer and Dr. Gore, and in certain respect he seems to represent the ideas of some modern scholars. He certainly gives a fuller explanation of the limitation of the Logos than other early writers. In general he seems to affirm:

I. That in becoming Incarnate the Eternal Son abandoned the divine form and glory and retained His divine nature and power. "The renunciation (evacuatio) of the form does involve the abolition of the nature, for He who renounces Himself does not lose His own existence (non caret sese) and He who takes is still there". \(\text{Manet}\)

II. This abandonment was a real and voluntary self-emptying.

III. By Christ's human birth a nature was introduced into God, (nova natura in Deum illata) which was formerly not in God.

The Son received at Incarnation the "forma servilis". The "caro" acquired from Mary - the mass susceptible to the divine act of appropriation - was able to experience pain and change. The divine aspect, on the other hand, was indemutabilis; it can neither lose its dominion or its omniscience, nor can it fall away from nor lose itself. The Son remained the same and was constantly, by His own deed, and by His own will "in exinanitione".

IV. An important point is stressed, viz: that in the Incarnation "the divine nature rendered itself susceptible of the inter-susceptio of the humanity which should be appropriated". The doctrine of the susceptibility of the human nature for the divine is thus taught. It is not of foreign substance, like the body, but springs from God. Here, by "human nature", Hilary clearly means the soul. In his view the souls of men are defiled by entrance into the body. So also must it have happened to Christ if His body had not been conceived of the Holy Ghost.

V. According to Hilary, the humanity of Christ was raised
above weakness, pain and ignorance, save when He laid Himself open by a special act of will to their operation. He does not consider that he has exposed himself to the charge of setting forth an unreal manhood, for he explains that the necessity of pain never did pertain to the true idea of humanity, but merely to the form of humanity embodied in us.

The criticism that may justly be passed on Hilary's view of the Humiliation is that -

1. His exposition of the extent of the limitation is loosely set forth and his language is contradictory: his aim seems to be, in spite of all inconsistencies, to guard the impassibility of the Godhead, while recognising the scriptural statement of Christ's sufferings as real, although only in the 'caro' - the flesh. This creates an inevitable Dualism.

2. In regard to the humanity being raised above ignorance and pain, Hilary comes into conflict with the passages in Scripture which speak of Christ's actual ignorance and the true human development.

3. In stating that Christ exposed Himself to the operation of pain, etc., Hilary makes Christ merely an actor or impersonator, changing from one stage of being to another. This idea is contrary to the impression that we get from Scripture, which presents Christ to us as a unity, - the God-man - the Logos living the human life.

4. Attractivity seems to be presented to us in Hilary (I) The Logos Asarkos - living His eternal life. (2) The Logos Ensarkos -(Incarnate) without glory, but with Divine power. (3) The man Jesus, or the flesh which was capable of experiencing pain, with whom the Logos was united.

C.390. Gregory of Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa adhere to the doctrine of the two natures in Christ, but their use of such words as mixture (κατασχέσις) and compound (μιξήσις)
seem to be inconsistent with their belief. Gregory of Nazianzen suggests the Eutychian view when he says that in Christ the human is merged in the sea of the imperishable Deity, as a drop of vinegar is lost in the ocean. The human nature is thus taken up as a mere organ of the Logos - as the passive object of the divine transfiguring agency.

The 'progressive Incarnation' suggested in the thought of a growing unity in which the humanity comes fully to partake of the qualities of Godhead only after the passion or the Resurrection seems to be a valuable idea, but as with Dorner's theory there is the objection of the Dualism at the beginning of Christ's historic life, whereas the Scriptures present to us a unity throughout.
Apollinaris C.390, held the view that man consisted of body and soul and spirit ( \( \nu\sigma\upsilon\varsigma \) or \( \nu\nu\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\alpha \) )

This trichotomy he seems to have derived, not from Plato as many scholars have suggested but from St. Paul, who speaks of - spirit and soul and body ( \( \tau\delta \nu\nu\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\alpha \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \nu\upsilon\chi\nu \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \tau\delta \sigma\omega\mu\alpha \ ) 1. Thess. I.23.

In the Incarnation the Logos was considered to take the place of the \( \nu\nu\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\alpha \) in man.\(^x\) The Logos, according to Apollinaris, was not something alien to the human essence; in fact we must not say that in Christ were two essences - God and man. The statement that he had asserted a dualism was vehemently disputed by Apollinaris. There was one undivided Being. The declaration of St. John. I.14 "The Word became flesh", is literally interpreted by Apollinaris, yet he states: He is not man, though like man, for He is not consubstantial with man in the most important element. By declaring Christ to be one undivided Being, Apollinaris aimed at securing the complete unity of His person, without sacrificing His real Deity or representing Him with Paul of Samosata ... as a mere \( \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\mu\nu\rho\sigma\varsigma \) 

The fathers criticized Apollinaris from the soteriological point of view, objecting that that which was not assumed remained unhealed ( \( \tau\delta \ \alpha\pi\rho\delta\omega\gamma\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu\varsigma \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \delta\lambda\rho\alpha\varsigma\upsilon\varepsilon\tau\omicron\omicron\nu\ )

This criticism seems to reflect a mechanical means of salvation, although it is supported by Principal Caird.

Bruce says more succinctly that the radical error of Apollinaris was to confound sin with a human mind. Under the theory of Apollinaris Divine moral suffering becomes really excluded in temptation.

\( \times \) N.B. According to various scholars (eg. Dorner, Relton) Apollinaris believed the Logos to be the archetype of humanity. This, however, is disputed by Raven (Apollinarism 185).
Apollinarius certainly brought out by his theory of
the Logos being substituted for the human \( \mathcal{N} \), the
close relation of the divine and the human, but as Dr.
Mackintosh says, the Incarnation only meant taking possession of a mutilated humanity. There is no real union, but
as Principal John Caird expresses it, only the "union of a
maimed ... humanity with the divine". The humiliation
experienced by the Logos applied only to the \( \sigma \), i.e.,
the humanity. In so far, also, as His heavenly and
divine will repels it, suffering cannot affect Christ, it
only appears in proportion to the restraint and withdrawal of the divine will.

The Kenosis of Apollinarius, says Raven, is a union
and that union is a "Communicatio Idiomatum". "Apollinarian
Kenoticism held that Christ kept the consciousness of His
Deity throughout. While dwelling in human semblance on
earth, the Logos of God maintained likewise His divine
presence in all things"

By substituting a very ingenious distinction between
the unlimited self-limited aspects of the Godhead for the
more orthodox difference between the divine and human nature,
Apollinarius was able to account for the growth and affections and death of Christ and attach them to His divine personality while preserving the Godhead of the Son unimpaired.

It is evident, in spite of the championship of Dorner and
other modern scholars, that Apollinarius exposes himself
to the charges made against most of the early Fathers - of
dualism and docetism. There are two Beings in the Incarnate
Christ according to his own exposition and the Logos qua Logos remained impervious to suffering and death.

"Die Einheit der Person und die Gottheit Christi hatte
Apollinarius gewahrt, aber auf Kosten seiner Menschheit."

The debates which arose through the teaching of
Apollinarius resolved themselves into a contest between the
Alexandrian and the Antiochian schools of thought. The former pursued, and often with less moderation, the lines of thought marked out by Athanasius and the Cappadocians - (The Gregories and Basil).

The Antiochians moved in an opposite direction, their theology being essentially ethical in character. The freedom of the will holds a central place. Character presupposes at the foundation a free exercise of moral choice, and that which is true of men generally must be true equally of the man Christ Jesus.

The union of God and man must be of such a character that to the man is left liberty of action. God's union with men is one of fellowship, and the union with Jesus is such; the man (Jesus) advances in free ethical union with the Logos.

In the Nestorian controversy the differences of these two schools reached a climax. Nestorius objected to the term \( \theta\varepsilon\sigma\tau\omega\kappa\alpha\) as applied to Mary, his objection being based on the ground of ambiguity. He declared that she was mother either of the man Jesus or of Christ.

Nestorius preferred to use the word \( \chi\varphi\varepsilon\sigma\tau\omega\kappa\alpha\) He held that Mary bore a human being to whom the Logos joined Himself, but that He did not suffer or die. The union was called a habitation \( \varepsilon\nu\nu\sigma\varsigma\varsigma\); it was not a union of essence, but a reciprocal connection of human and divine attributes.

Nestorius denied the charge of dualism, and said that there was one Person, ( \( \pi\sigma\omega\mu\nu\alpha\nu\) ) and two hypostases.

Nestorius considered that to say God was born or that God suffered, as Cyril declared, was contrary to the distinction between God and man as to essence. By speaking thus a change of nature or mixture with another nature is imputed to the unchangeable God.
Nestorius practically reduces the Incarnation to an association of a Divine with a human person.

The chief opponent of Nestorianism is found in Cyril of Alexandria (376-444 A.D). Against the dualism of Nestorius he asserts a physical (or metaphysical) uniting of the two natures. God becomes man - \( \varepsilon \gamma \nu \nu \rho \eta \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \alpha \nu \iota \nu \sigma \tau \nu \sigma \phi \theta , \alpha \theta \omega \nu \). After the Incarnation there are two natures abstractly considered but in concrete reality but one - viz. the one incarnated nature of the divine Logos - \( \mu \alpha \nu \phi \iota \iota , \tau \omicron \upsilon \delta e \upsilon \nu \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \sigma \sigma \kappa \varsigma \kappa \omega \nu \iota \iota \upsilon \).

In opposing the Nestorian doctrine Cyril makes use of the Kenotic idea, "The only-begotten Word Himself ... came down and lowered Himself to a condition of self-repudiation (\( \kappa \alpha \iota \chi \varepsilon \epsilon \upsilon \upsilon \tau \nu \epsilon \iota \nu \zeta \epsilon \omega \nu \sigma \tau \nu \theta \)). Cyril contends that if the Logos merely assumed a man there was no kenosis of the Divine, but an exaltation of the human, which would find no support in Scripture. He emphasizes the words of John I.14: "The Word became flesh", and of Paul: 2 Cor. 8: "Being rich, He became poor", as revealing a real Kenosis.

There is a considerable amount of confusion and inconsistency about the teaching of Cyril. For example he shows a certain ambiguity in his use of the word unity making it appear (a) as an original unity which was constituted by the unchangeable Logos, (b) as a resultant unity issuing from the amalgamation of the two natures. The latter view seems to be the more typical.

There is also a contention for the Eternal existence of the Logos while in human form. "While visible and an infant and in swaddling clothes and still in the bosom of the virgin who bore Him, He was filling all creation as God, and was seated by the side of Him who begat Him".

Cyril's theory of a \( \varepsilon \nu \omega \sigma \zeta \iota \phi \upsilon \tau \kappa \iota \) of the two natures in Christ is not clearly distinguished from a \( \varepsilon \nu \omega \sigma \zeta \iota \phi \eta \kappa \iota \).
A monophysitic tendency also manifests itself in which the true manhood becomes non-existent, and the human nature only finds its personality in the Logos. Both Oriental and Alexandrian schools started from the assumption that a union such as is implied in assuming a man is not compatible with a completely human experience and therefore Cyril stresses the fact that God became man. "It has to be remembered", says Bruce, "that Cyril along with others of his school looked on the divine and human natures as two things so closely connected that they were one, an idea that revealed a similarity to the Lutheran doctrine "communicatio idiomatum".

Although the statement that God became man is emphasized, there is in reality no real man according to Cyril's presentation. The docetic spirit is shown in his statement that the Incarnate Christ "usefully pretended" not to know the day of judgment, and that in speaking of Himself as being ignorant Christ was 'economizing' or 'schematizing'. Cyril's **κυριαρχία**, in fact, resolves itself into a **σκυριαρχία**.

Eutychianism has been described as "Cyrillianism gone mad". Eutyches protested that he could find nothing in the Scriptures about two natures. There was only one nature. "God was born", "God died" were expressions indicative of his views. The body of Christ was not of the same nature (constative) with our human body.

The question has been raised whether Eutyches was substantially a heretic, or merely a bewildered formalist. Bright considers that Eutyches perceived the issues at stake and that he plainly negated the manhood as coexisting with Godhead in Christ. "He must be found wanting in regard to the truth that Christ, the Incarnate Son, admitted to be personally one and divine, took our humanity in its original completeness and thereby occupied a lower or human
sphere of being together with the higher or divine sphere in which he existed from Eternity.

As an outcome of the Eutychian heresy there was issued Leo's famous letter to Flavian in which the two natures of Christ were distinctly asserted: God was born "totus in suis, totus in nostris", (nostia except sin). He is true God and true man - qui ... verus est deus, idem verus est homo."

The pre-existence and abnegation of the Son is asserted, as also His earthly condition, which is shewn in His death as Son of God - filius hominis legitur descendisse de caelo ... filius dei crucifixus dicitur ac sepultus. The Kenosis is specifically mentioned - 'exinanitio illa'-, but no attempt is made to define the extent or character of the limitation which the "emptying" involved.

There is a rigid adherence in the letter to the idea of the Divine immutability which is secured by the unchangeableness of His loving will.

The Epistle of Leo was sanctioned by the Creed of Chalcedon, 451, which based itself upon Leo's views.

Christ is here declared to be "perfect in Godhead, the self-same perfect in Manhood; truly God and truly man; the self-same of a rational soul and body; co-essential with the Father according to the Godhead; the self-same co-essential with us according to the manhood; like us in all things, sin apart; before the ages begotten of the Father as to the Godhead, but in the last days the self-same for us and for our salvation (born) of Mary the Virgin mother of God (η ευγενής) as to the manhood; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only begotten; acknowledged in two natures, unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; ἀρσενικός, ἀνθρώπινος, ἀνθρώπινος ... the properties of each nature being preserved, and (both) concurring into one Person and one Hypostasis (substance)" ...
In spite of its assertion that "it is unlawful for anyone to present, write, compose, devise or teach to others any other creed", the above formula has in recent years been severely criticized and pronounced as most unsatisfactory.

"It is," says Principal Dykes, "but the bare skeleton of a dogma, in which one cannot readily recognise either the Jesus of the Gospels or the Christ of the Church's worship."

The humanity of Christ in this document is unreal. "It fails to recognise the ethical aspect of Christ's humanity as the unique archetype of manhood." Its phraseology is decidedly dualistic, the two natures being kept rigidly apart and the unity affirmed seems to be an effect without a cause - the humanity being reduced to a selfless organ of the Divine Word. "The formula of Chalcedon", says Temple, "is a confession of the bankruptcy of Greek patriotic theology". The contradiction of the co-existence of the two perfect natures in one Person is left unresolved and no account is offered of their union.

The Creed of Chalcedon naturally failed to produce an agreement among Christological disputants; the "crude assertion of the Deity and the Humanity in juxtaposition," being "unacceptable to the subtle Eastern mind." Thus for many years after the Council of Chalcedon there resulted much controversy which manifested itself in the doctrines of Monophysitism, Monotheletism, Adophtanism, etc.

Monophysitism expresses itself in three forms:

I. A change of the Divine nature into the human - \( \text{\textit{keywuky}} \) - thus the Valentinians.

II. A change of the human into the Divine - Unio magica - with Eutyches.

III. a partial transformation of both natures - "unio chemica"

In each of the forms which Monophysitism took there
was opposition to the affirmation of the Chalcedonian Creed in regard to the two natures being unconfused.

The early Monophysites had for their watchword the Cyrilian formula: One Incarnate Nature of the Divine Logos:

Later there came a division among the Monophysites; the Severians holding that the body of Christ prior to the Resurrection was corruptible and affirming their belief in one divine human subject who was limited in His knowledge,

The Julianists who contended that Christ's body was not corrupt, or susceptible of decay, the docetism of the age manifesting itself in the belief that suffering was experienced only when Christ willed to suffer.

Both parties rejected the idea of one Person being in two natures or that each nature had an independent activity.

The real service rendered by the Monophysite and Monothelite controversies lay in the fact that "they forced Church leaders to make more explicit exactly how much was contained in that complete manhood which the Logos assumed."

In the Council held at Constantinople, the triumph of the Cyrilian view was manifest. There it was asserted that Christ was one, and that the two natures were distinguishable only in theory. The Logos was declared to be man, but in the historic Christ there existed no human personality.

The sequel of Monophysitism was the theory of Monothelitism: the doctrine of one will (δύναμις) in Christ. Upon this view Honorius, Bishop of Rome set his seal of favour and agreed with Sergius patriarch of Constantinople, that Christ had wrought all things by a single Divine human energy. μία ἐξουσία ἐνεργεία.
A contribution to the Church's thought was made when Leontius of Byzantium propounded the doctrine of the Enhypostasia (ὁ υἱός ἐν ὑποστάσεις) — a nature which has its hypostasis in another) i.e., the human nature of Christ was not without hypostasis, but became hypostatic in the person of the Logos.

Modern scholars, however, have considered the similes which Leontius employed to establish his views as being defective; the criticism of Harnack being that "a pious Apollinarian monk would probably have been able to say with regard to the ὑποστασία ἡ σώματος ἡ ὑποστάσεις τοῦ λόγου: "Apollinarius says pretty much the same thing in somewhat more intelligent words." The idea of the Enhypostasis which was advanced as a via media between Nestorianism and Eutycheanism was incorporated by John of Damascus into his own work and the theory has received elaboration at the hands of Dr. Relton in his book "A Study in Christology".

In 680 the Council of Constantinople met and affirmed two natural wills and two natural operations in Christ without division, change, separation or confusion, the human will being invariably subject to the Divine. Once again the question as to how this doctrine of the two natures was reconcilable or consistent with the real humanity of Christ as presented in Christ was left in the air.

What this Christology handed over to the Church was not a finished result, but a problem — how "God Himself should have lived and walked here, a man like to us.

The last intellectual product of the Greek Church whose work was significant, and who according to Dorner, determined the church of the Middle ages was John of Damascus, c.754. This theologian held that the Logos assumed not a human being, but a potential human individual
a nature not yet developed into a person or hypostasis, "We hold," he said, "that there has been a union of two perfect natures, one Divine and one human ... by synthesis, that is, in subsistence, without change, or confusion, or alteration, or difference, or separation, and we confess that in two perfect natures there is but one subsistence of the Son of God Incarnate."

He uses the figure employed by Órigen and states that the two natures impenetrate each other like fire and iron, a process to which he gives the term "πείρα ἡμῶν ἔτησις." Two other expressions are prominent in his writings: ἐνθεωρεῖν, deifying of the humanity, and ὁδεικνύειν - appropriation of the Divine by the human. Two wills are taught but one "Willer". The relation of the Logos to the Passion was symbolized by a tree, on which the sun shines, being cut down by an axe; the axe fells the tree but does no harm to the sunbeam - a figure which is justly characterised by Bruce as a loose and inadequate comparison. The humanity of Christ appears a lifeless thing. The human will is simply the organ of the Divine will. "Christ's Deity is seen as loosely attached to His human nature, yet overbearing it, and reducing to little better than a phantom, the moral victories and pathetic conflicts of His earthly career."

"The Logos", as Dr. Mackintosh says, "is head on the mere trunk of humanity."

Thus far we can see that the Church in its doctrine and creeds regarding the Person of Jesus Christ failed in the main to reach a position satisfactory to the mind, or in accordance with the Scriptural portrait of the Lord. An incurable Docetism prevailed, and in the desire to retain the unimpaired Godhead of Christ the manhood suffered or became non-existent.

The tendency indeed became increasingly manifest as time went on.
"It can hardly be seriously denied", says Dr. Rashdol (Doctrine and Development 94) "that the picture that the 4th century formed to itself of the nature of Christ's personality was an unhistorical picture".

The historic Christ more and more disappeared from men's view and was superseded by a metaphysical Christ whose humanity was indeed acknowledged in word, but who lacked all the attributes of the humanity which we know.

While containing Kenotic language and ideas there is such a lack of true conviction and consistency in early Christology that modern scholars seem to be justified in accepting their views of the early fathers with at least a good deal of caution and reserve.

In the preceding account of Christological thought as it bears upon the Kenosis no mention has been made of the views of one who has been termed "the most authoritative teacher of his age", viz., Augustine - 354-430 A.D.

Although the above description is justified in general, Augustine is considered not to have displayed an original or creative mind. He set the questions which after ages sought to answer, e.g.: out of Christology and his conception of Jesus the Son of Man, as being the recipient of divine grace, the question arose whether the human Jesus was the Son of God by adoption, or through the unity of the person shared in the essential worship of the Deity.

In his later writings, Augustine seems to have held that the man Jesus has been conjoined with God the Logos in such a unity that it is the Son of God who is Son of Man, the same Son of Man who is Son of God.

Augustine taught that the connecting link between God and the world was the Logos in whom .. are the invisible grounds of all things created.

The distinction of persons within the Trinity is limited to their relation to one another. There is but
one substance, or essence and when we speak of "three persons" it is only because we lack words to express the distinction between the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost. "We say three persons (not that it may be so said) but that we may not keep silence"

Augustine dwells frequently on the voluntary humiliation of Christ in becoming incarnate. His view, however, of the depoentionation is, in part, extra-scriptural.

In dwelling upon the 'forma dei' and the 'forma servi' he practically makes 'form' equivalent to 'nature', and says in contrast to the Pauline conception of an abandonment by the Son of God of one form for the other,... 'non formam dei amittens, sed formam servi accipiens', as if merely an addition (and not a depoentionation) had been made.

It is difficult to get at his true conception of the Person of Christ, but it seems to be clear that he sets up a dualism. He speaks, for example, of the Son remaining indeed in His divinity and not withdrawing from the Father, nor in anything changed by the assumption of man -"manens quidem divinitate sua et non recedens a Patre nec in aliquo mutatus, assumendo tamen hominem."

"His theology", says Fairbairn, "was full of unreconciled antithesis, ... the dualism ... native to his soul was inherent in his system. The basis of his intellect was neo-Platonic, but the forms under and within which it worked were Manichean."

This dualism is decidedly manifest within the system of Augustine when he conceives of Godhead and manhood as self-evidently exclusive of each other, thus keeping the two natures apart. The manhood is thus seen to have an independent existence experiencing growth and progress, while Christ is present as one Person, man and God, just as man is flesh and spirit.

N.B. The Manichee believed the spirit alone to be good and real, the flesh altogether evil and devilish.
Medieval Ideas of the Kenosis.

The Theologians of the Middle Ages contributed little to Christology, but where they dwell upon His Person and work they reveal the dualism shewn by most of their forerunners. In the early parts of the Middle ages, in fact, in the absence of original authorship, compilations were made from the Fathers. Later scholastics set forth purely docetic views, e.g., Peter the Lombard, who said that in respect of His humanity Christ was nothing at all—"Christus secundum hominem non est persona, nec aliquid."

Adoptionism.

In 780 Elipandus, Bishop of Toledo, supported by Felix, Bishop of Urgellus, presented the theory that Christ was 'Son' in two senses: (1) He was Son of God in respect of His Divine nature, and (2) Son of God in respect of His humanity. This idea, indeed, differed little from the teaching of Augustine and other earlier 'orthodox' writers. It was really a reaction against the teaching that Christ was Son "natura non adoptione."

Stated in its simplest form the Adoptionist doctrine was that "while God is one Person it is possible to extend the idea of His divinity to other persons, - notably to Jesus Christ, who stood to Him in a peculiar relation."

It can at least be said of Adoptionism, that it revealed the inefficacy of the Chalcedonian Creed in its presentation of the two natures in Christ; for it proved that the 'two nature' doctrine could be held along with an impersonal view of Christ's manhood.

This, however, was inadequate to meet the demands of Soteriology which required a true humanity for the redemption of man, or the statements of Scripture which clearly set forth the genuine humanity of Christ.

"On the whole", says Du Bose, "there can be little doubt that the Adoptionist representation of the man
Christ Jesus as a limited and individual being like one of us did justify the charge ... that though they did not mean it their position led practically to a Nestorian two-fold personality of the Lord. It failed also to rise to the true conception of our Lord's manhood. Desiring to see in Him a humanity in all points like our own it made him only a particular and limited human being like ourselves, and not the universal and divine man,

The Scholastic era is represented by several great names, among which in its early stages are Anselm, Abelard and Bernard.

Anselm is considered to be the true father of Scholasticism. His great work was "Cur Deus Homo" and his great maxim, "Credo ut intelligam" - I believe that I may understand.

The Incarnation is regarded as an exaltation of the human, the Divine nature remaining unaltered. The Divine nature according to Anselm is impassible, and therefore could suffer no humiliation, but as the two natures were united in one Person, it followed that when God was said to suffer anything lowly or infirm, this must not be understood, according to the sublimity of the impassible nature, but according to the infirmity of the human substance. Therefore by the incarnation there was no humiliation, but human nature was exalted.

The ground of the Incarnation is found in the need of an Atonement for sin. Since man is the transgressor he must provide satisfaction. Here, however, is the paradox: "Man must, but he cannot". Hence there arises the necessity for the Deus-homo - the God-man.

Little stress is laid by Anselm on the sufferings of Christ. The merit of the humiliation lies in its capacity to procure forgiveness for the ill-deserving.

Anselm consistently reveals a docetism in his view
of the manhood of Christ. Even in infancy Christ cannot
be ignorant, for from the moment when he became man he
was always full of God and hence was never without His
power and wisdom.

In Abelard C.1115 and his moral view of reconciliation with God through Christ, it is love which provides the
basis of effectual intercession. The work of Christ,
including His suffering and death, is a manifestation of
divine love to the unworthy. Abelard, however, like
Anselm, is docetic in his presentation of Christ. The
manhood is obscure and impersonal.

The great opponent of Abelard's view of the Atone­
ment was Bernard of Clairvaux. In Bernard we have one who
is absorbed in the thought of the self-abasement and suffer­
ing of the Incarnate Jesus. The manhood of Christ to him
is a genuine thing. God is personally present in the
historic Jesus. "Cum nomine Jesum hominem misit... propono­
mitem et humilem corde ... eundemque deum omnipotentem".
Oosterzee quotes a beautiful passage from Bernard relating
to the Incarnation. "It had become evening and the day
was far spent. No angel any longer appeared, no prophet
any longer was heard. Only a faint light of Divine know­
ledge was still glimmering; unrighteousness had triumphed,
and the fire of love was quenched. The multitude and
abundance of earthly goods had caused the heavenly to be
entirely neglected and forgotten. But when thus the
spirit of the age was dominant, eternity broke in with its
light. The Word of the Father came, God sent His only­
begotten Son. O man be dumb before this infinite love
and rejoice in the great dignity to which thou art
restored!"

In Francis of Assisi we find one whose soul was
filled with the thought and love of the life and poverty
of Jesus. To dwell on His Humility, His self-denial, His
death on the Cross was the main source of comfort and happiness.

It is a remarkable instance of the inconsistency of the Schoolmen, as Fisher suggests, that while their views were marked by a definite docetism, the human nature being eclipsed by the divine, there should be such a devout contemplation of His human experiences.

In the third part of his great work Summa Theologiae Thomas Aquinas c. 1274 A.D. deals with the Person and Work of Christ as well as with the Sacraments and Eschatology, The trend of Thomas's thought is decidedly Augustinian. He conceives -

1. The Incarnation as being that of a Divine Person.
2. The human nature of Christ as being a recipient of Divine grace.
3. Christ in His humanity as the Head of the Church.

The human nature is thought of as being taken up into the Logos, the two natures as in the Chalcedon formula finding their unity in Him, the manhood, however, being non-existent. Thomas declares that from conception the person of the God-man is absolutely complete and perfected. Even in Christ's human nature there is a denial of ignorance, for the fulness of grace excluded ignorance as well as sin.

Christ knew all that is or will be, not, however, that which is possible. The forms of human knowledge and will are said to exist, but all is directed by the will of the Logos.

There seems to be much in Aquinas which refutes the charge of docetism, but in the main the criticism of Bruce is just:

1. "The Christ of Aquinas," he says, "is not our brother, not a man, but a ghastly simulacrum."
2. In many important respects Christ is not like man.
His material part is said to be perfectly formed from conception: and born without pain.

The soul of Jesus was without faith and hope, there being no necessity for them. He had a perfect vision of God. The gifts of knowledge which were made to Him as the recipient of Grace make the gulf wider still - He was both 'comprehensor' and 'viator'.

John Duns Scotus, the 'doctor mirabilis' (d.1308) is considered to have lacked the religious depth of Thomas, but to have betrayed a deeper appreciation of Christ's human experience, and there are hints at His limitations of knowledge as man. The dualism of his teaching, however, is marked by his sharp distinction between the two natures, and his assertion that "neither suffering nor merit could be predicated of the divine essence."

The humanity existed in the Logos as a limb is part of the individual.

It was the man alone, said Scotus, who 'became', not the Logos in any sense, for Deity cannot become that which is not eternal.

The presentation of Christ is similar in fact to that of the Fathers, and fails to give us the One Christ of the Gospels. The Word does not become flesh and there is no real suggestion of the great sacrifice made in the Incarnation.
Lutheran Kenoticism.

"With the Reformation", says Dr. Mackintosh, "especially with Luther, there came into the world a deeper understanding of the person of Christ than had prevailed since the apostolic age."

To Luther Christ the man is God. "I have no God. ... outside the flesh that lies in the bosom of the Virgin Mary."

In the Incarnation Luther perceived two things:

1. The attainment by God of what He had always longed for in His love, viz., humanity as His own form of existence.

2. The reception by Man of what he was made for, viz., Divinity, as the very content of His spiritual life; a union real and vital effected through two disparate yet kindred natures, coalesced for good and all in one single indivisible personality.

Some kind of a kenosis is involved in the Incarnation and a distinction is drawn by Luther between the Incarnation and the humiliation. The subject of the Kenosis, however, is not the Logos, for in becoming man the Logos lost nothing of His divine majesty. The real subject of the Kenosis is the God-man in respect of His human nature (secundum humanitatem) and the humiliation just consisted in the fact that while retaining possession of the Divine qualities which were conveyed to His humanity by His union with the Logos, He did not make habitual use of them. He usually dispensed with the Divine power, and it was only occasionally that they flashed through the veil.

There is an unreality about the whole conception of Christ's historic body. This is also revealed in the Formula of Concord (1577. A.D.) Art. VII - VIII, where the Lord's Supper and the two natures are set forth.
Therein the ubiquity of Christ's body is declared. His risen body fills all things and may therefore be recognised as interpenetrating the consecrated elements. "The Incarnation", says Curtis, "was evacuated of meaning. Interpenetration was the besetting sin of Lutheranism."

Christ, as God-man, willed to and did bear the servile form, but made no use of His majesty and divinity. Luther assumes that the Logos so limited Himself as to leave the humanity opportunity for true and actual growth. He says of Christ that He ate, drank, slept and worked; was weary, sad, joyous, wept and laughed; was hungry, thirsty and cold; sweated, talked and prayed. There was no difference between Him and other men, save that He was God and without sin.

Luther represented the Divine as entering into the humanity, not in its entire actuality all at once, but ever more and more according to the measure of human susceptibility. The two natures became so united that they cannot be considered apart.

"After 1536," says Dorner, "Luther approximated to the Swiss in his Christology by conceding the right of discriminating the two natures, more decidedly than he had previously done, accepting the scholastic 'communicatio idiomatum' instead of the earlier 'praedicationes identicae'.

Criticism: (1) Luther may be considered as having supplied his own age not with new dogmatic isées, but with new religious intuitions.

(2) The principle, however, on which his system is based is arbitrarily applied, viz., that the existence of two natures in one Person involves communication of attributes. The axiom 'finitum non capax infiniti' is set aside, and 'infinitum non capax finiti' is assumed as fixed.

Bruce remarks that a God letting Himself down to man's
level seems a grander thing than a God raising man to His own level.

(3) Lutheran Christology threatens with extinction the reality of Christ's human nature. "The epithet 'illocal'," says Bruce, "is mere logomachy." The distinction between the two kinds of presence is virtually a surrender of the theory.

(4) Luther's view of the Incarnation leaves no room for such a kenosis in the earthly life of Christ as shall satisfy the requirements of historical truth and the purpose of the Incarnation. The occult use of divine majesty yields no real state of humiliation.

(5) The state of Exinanition becomes an effect without a cause. Lutheranism acknowledges the veracity of the historical record in regard to the human birth and growth, but nullifies this acknowledgement by postulating the union of the Logos to a humanity endowed with divine attributes.

(6) Luther's Christology robs us of the Incarnation in deifying the Lord's humanity. The Lutheran Christ is an ideal, not an historical Person.

Akin to Luther's ideas are those of (1) Brenz and the Swabian School. Brenz held that in Christ's historic life He possessed all Divine attributes in their eternal significance not only according to His divine nature but in virtue of the 'communicatio idiomatum', also according to the human nature. He generally uses these powers, however, only in a hidden manner in respect of His human nature. Brenz held that the living Christ in His majesty governed heaven and earth while He yet lay dead in the Sepulchre. We thus see that Brenz retained the idea of the ubiquity of our Lord's humanity. Brenz's view of the use of Divine powers in a hidden manner is termed the "Kenosis of Concealment".- Κηνοσίας Κηνοσίας Κηνοσίας Κηνοσίας Κηνοσίας Κηνοσίας Κηνοσίας Κηνοσίας.
(2) Chemnitz and the Saxony School. According to Chemnitz and his school of thought Christ possessed all divine attributes in their eternal significance not only according to His Divine nature, but, in virtue of the 'communicatio idiomatum', also according to the human nature. He has, however, according to His human nature, renounced their use, excepting for those cases where he requires them for His Redemptive work. This is the "Kenosis of Use" - 

In contrast to the 'ubiquity' in Brenz's view of the Christ's manhood, Chemnitz held the 'multivolipresentsia', i.e., the power of being present at will simultaneously in many places.

Tübingen and Giessen Controversy.

"It was the controversy between the Tübingen and Giessen theologians (1616-27) that first brought the Lutheran problem regarding the Kenosis into the field of serious debate." The question was debated: Did the God-man in the days of His flesh actually renounce the use of Divine powers in respect of His humanity, or did He merely employ them secretly? The first view was held by the Giessen theologians who taught the - so Balthasar Mentzer (1627). The second view was that of the Tübingen theologians who taught the 

It is evident that the Tübingens were not in earnest in their advocating of the self-Exinanition, for they held that behind the growing, suffering man lay concealed an absolutely complete King. On the other hand, says Dorner, the Giessen Theory logically carried out passes into that of Tübingen.

XX. N.B. In Quenstedt, in whose hands the doctrine received fidal shape, the presence in the manhood of Christ of strictly divine powers had become a mere Potentiality. (Mack. 239. Note).
The premises common to both the Tübingen and Giessen schools of thought is the presupposition that the entire fulness of the divine majesty communicated itself to the humanity of Jesus in the very first moment of His life, and both accept the uninterrupted activity of the Logos, extra carnem, in the government of the world. All that they disagreed on was the question "What belongs to this fulness by which the God-manhood is constituted"?

The Reformed View of the Kenosis.

It can be said that in the main, the Reformed Christology abided by the Chalcedon Formula on early Church traditions. It is only in that we find the natures definitely distinguished as finite and infinite.

Calvin held that adoration and the power of redemption belong not only to the Logos but also to the God-man. Beza held the view: "finitum non capax infiniti".

The distinction between the Lutheran Christology and the Reformation lay in the fact that the former emphasized the majesty of Christ's humanity, while the latter emphasized its reality.

"A decided anti-docetic realism pervades the whole method of treating Christological subjects", says Schneckenburger. "Der entschiedenste antí-doketische Realismus beseelt die reformirte Betrachtungsweise".

Christ's oneness with man is stressed although He was 'absque peccato'.

Sinless and infallible, the Reformed theologians held that Christ grew in knowledge and holiness and power. The favourite figure employed to denote the obscuring of Christ's divinity while in the Incarnate state was the eclipse of the sun.

In contrast to the Lutheran view the Reformed theologians held that the Incarnation and the Exinanition
were practically one. There was not such a wide diversity of opinion with the Reformed as among the Lutheran theologians.

The subject of the *κένωσις* was with the former the *λησθείς αὐτῷ*, not the incarnate God-man, as with Luther.

Loofs quotes Zanchi as saying "Christus in assumpta forma sermose evacuavit omni suagloria, divina maiestate, omnipotentia, omnipresencia". The 'extra carmen' position of the fathers, however, was retained, Calvin holding that the Logos was 'totus extra Christum et totus in Christo'.

**Criticism.**

1. The Lutherans contended, and there seemed a certain appropriateness in the figure which they used, that according to Reformed Theology the two natures were simply glued together like two boards without any real communion.

As a counter to this criticism, it must be said that the authors of the "Admonitio Christiana" believed in a communion of the natures and did what they could to make that communion a reality. The divine and the human natures were considered as morally akin. Therefore the divine spirit can suffer all that holy love is capable of suffering. The wisdom and virtue of the humanity of Christ were wrought by the Logos through His spirit.

2. A semi-docetism manifested itself in that the doctrine of the Exinanition was only quasi. The standing phrase for the Kenosis was "occultatio", and the favourite illustration used, as we have seen, was the obscuration of the Sun by eclipse or cloud. It was an 'emptying' as to use and manifestation but not as to possession. (*kατὰ κτήσιν*).

3. The theory of the double life -"Extra Christum" and "in Christo" has been entertained by many theologians in all stages of Christian thought since sub-apostolic times,
but it creates an irreconcilable dualism and there seems to be no support for it in Scripture.

In the work of Michael Servetus, we find a system of thought which is pervaded by Pantheistic ideas, but in which he offers certain views which have found currency in modern times. According to Servetus the doctrine of an immanent Trinity is to be rejected. God is an indivisible essence. The Logos is impersonal, the image of the world which is ever present to God and of which the idea of Christ is the centre. The realization of this idea in a human person is the self-revelation of God in time.

Servetus believed in the miraculous birth of Christ, but His humanity is a divine substance fitted for the incorporation of the Logos and so for the manifestation of the Father. Apart from his pantheistic and impersonal views of the Trinity it can be said that Servetus reveals a true conception of the capacity of man in his ideal state to receive the divine.

In Socinianism (16th century) we have views which represent God as an individual, but inscrutable. We only know what He wills and what He reveals concerning His Will. God has revealed Himself through Christ who is presented as a man.

Socinus considered a combination of the divine and human natures to be impossible and therefore incredible. He concedes the Virgin birth, but contends that Christ was none the less human and is the Son of God only by adoption. The name of God was not to be withheld from Christ - as such indeed He was to be worshipped. The pre-existence of Christ formed no part of the system of Socinus, the Logos of John being considered impersonal. The Racovian Catechism (1605-9 A.D.) is regarded as the standard expression of Socinian doctrine.
In Sect. IV. Ch. I., the question is asked concerning the person of Christ: - "What are the things which I ought to know? " The answer is - "This one particular alone, that by nature He was truly man, a mortal man while He lived on earth, but now immortal ...."

"Was the Lord Jesus a mere or common man?" The answer is : "By no means: because, first, though by nature He was a man, He was nevertheless at the same time and even from His earliest origin the only-begotten Son of God, for being conceived of the Holy Spirit and born of a virgin .... He had no father besides God."

It is also stated that: Christ was ..."also God on account of the divine power which He displayed even while yet mortal", but later it is said: "If by the terms divine nature or substance I am to understand the essence of God, I do not acknowledge such a divine nature in Christ."

The Socinian presentation of the Person of Christ seems to be in part imaginary and in part anti-scriptural. No room is found for the God-man that the New Testament presents, or for the Eternal Son of God who as such had an equality of existence with God, and who in love to man took upon Himself an earth-form of existence.

The Socinian man is indeed only a man exalted to his highest level. There is little difference between the position of Socinus and that of the modern Unitarian. Socinianism in its emphasis on the manhood of Jesus has been considered as showing a great resemblance to the later theory of the Kenosis, but the differences are marked and fundamental, the chief of them being: (1) That Kenoticism postulates the personal pre-existence of the Son of God who became incarnate in Jesus Christ, (2) that this Act of Incarnation was one of free grace, and (3) that this Person although divesting Himself of Divine prerogatives was the Ego of the man Christ Jesus.
A definite expression if not a systematic statement of the Kenotic theory is found in the writings of Zinzendorf, the eminent Moravian, 1760 A.D., who indeed, has been called the father of Modern Kenoticism.

The Kenosis with Zinzendorf is absolute. The Son of God disengaged Himself from the work and activity of His proper Godhead when He had to enter and wished to enter into time (in die Zeit). Zinzendorf held:

1. That when the Son of God entered upon His incarnate life, the government of the world was delivered over to the Father.

2. Christ did not cease to be God, although a simple man, but His Godhead was for the most part hidden from Him.

3. He was ignorant and needed instruction. He experienced a true development as boy, youth and man. He was beset by doubts and fears.

4. He was guided into knowledge and truth by the Holy Spirit and learned obedience and wisdom, through suffering, prayer and submission.

According to Fried. Schleiermacher, 1768-1834, there is no religious necessity placed upon us which requires us to admit the pre-existence of Christ; neither are we required to deny that He had a human father. The personal pre-existence of the Logos, in fact, is not believed in. That which distinguishes Christ from other men is the absolute control in Him of the religious feeling - the sense of God. He is sinless, although not absolutely perfect, and He was subject to all the laws of human development. Although Christ is sinless, however, He is not regarded as being thereby robbed of identity with man. Indeed, it made Him the normal man, for sin is against the essence of man, who was made to be the home of God. The defects of Schleiermacher's presentation are due to his lack of adherence to
the Scriptural portrait of Jesus Christ. His Christ is not the Pre-existent Logos become flesh. A certain shadow also has been cast upon the genuine humanity of the sinless One. The humanity seems to be wholly passive and receptive while the moral conflict is excluded.

"A God possessed humanity is one thing, God manifest in the flesh is another."

In Horace Bushnell (U.S.A.) we have an original and suggestive thinker, who following hints derived from Schleiermacher sought to solve the problem of the Trinity by bringing forward the Sabellian hypothesis - that of a Trinity as solely a method of revelation. With this he connected a view that did not essentially differ from the Patripassian theory of the Person of Christ. In later years Bushnell advanced to the idea of God as a Triple Personality. Personality in the Deity, Bushnell considered, is to us incomprehensible. The Logos is the self-revealing faculty of the Deity. In Christ, God manifests Himself under the limitations of human life, thinking, feeling, suffering with us; but it is all, literally speaking, divine thought, divine emotion, even divine suffering.

The existence of a human spiritual nature, if not expressly denied, was held to be practically of no account. It was substantially the Apollinarian idea. There may be a human soul or that may be not (Xt. in Theol. p.96). All the experiences of Christ are the expressions of God. The human is at best a transparent glass through which we look directly into the heart of God. There is clearly no true man here.

Ritsch: In the Christology of Ritsch we find that the pre-existence of Christ is conceded, but that only in an ideal sense. He denies the Virgin birth.

The idea of Christ's uniqueness and glory as being grounded on His historic human activity and influence, and
ant on any transcendent basis or Logos doctrine is developed by Kitsch. The characteristics of Godhead in a human life are manifested in Christ, and thus He may be fittingly worshipped as the representative and revealer of God on earth. All attempts, however, to explain His 'becoming' from God or to ground His person in the essential nature of God must be surrendered. This would lead up to metaphysics, and the attempt to grasp the mysteries of ultimate being for which according to Kitsch our minds are incompetent.

The denial of the real personal pre-existence of Our Lord as presented in Scripture naturally denies the theory of the Kenosis.
Kenoticism of the 19th and 20th Centuries.

The modern doctrine of the Kenosis originated in the endeavour at once to maintain the Trinitarian doctrine of the early church and to do justice to the true humanity of Christ and the unity of His person. It has been termed "the most notable result of the Christological movement in modern theology".

The varieties of Kenotic theory are practically as many as its advocates, but in the main the idea with all is that the Divine nature of the Pre-existent Son of God underwent a change in the Incarnation which resulted (1) in the being contracted within the limits of humanity, and (2) in the suspense or absence of those Divine attributes whose presence and exercise are incompatible with a genuine human consciousness.

"The Kenosis is considered as a real surrender of the 'forma dei', thus assuming that the Logos or Son of God in order to become man actually renounced either wholly or in part the divine attributes."

In his article on the "Consciousness of Christ", D. Mackenzie shows that Kenoticism avoids on the one hand the pantheistic tendencies of Absolute Idealism, or such theories as those of Schleiermacher, and on the other hand the philosophical agnosticism which rules the movements derived from Kent. The features of modern Kenoticism are its fidelity to the Scriptural record, its definite doctrine of the Trinity and its strict adherence to the idea of the Personal Son of God who became incarnate.

From the metaphysical point of view it may be said that the modern Kenotic theory is the direct outcome of the modern emphasis upon consciousness and will as the seat of reality and personality, which has supplanted the older conception of matter, substance and nature as objective and independent realities. The Kenoticists main aim is, in
adhering to the letter and spirit of Scripture to analyse as a living process and to translate in its own terms that act by which the One Person - the Pre-existent Logos or Son of God lived on earth the divine human life.

19th Century.

The first full statement of Kenoticism was made by Gottfried Thomasius, 1802-75, who gave the doctrine its scientific foundations.

Luther's interpretation of Phil. II. 5-7 was set aside and the pre-existent Logos was made the subject of the Kenosis. The theory of Thomasius has been called the "Absolute Dualistic Type of Kenotic Theory".

According to Thomasius's view of the Trinity, aseity (self-existence) is ascribed to the Father alone; the Son being thus subordinate to Him. The idea in the mind of Thomasius is thus to establish the possibility that the Son may be subject to mutation and growth and conformably to which he is considered, as opposed to the statement in the Chalcedon Creed.

In discussing the immutability of God Thomasius makes an important distinction between the essential or immanent attributes of Godhead, (immanenten göttlichen Eigenschaften), viz., truth, holiness and love (Wahrheit, Heiligkeit und Liebe) and 'external' attributes, omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience, which are relative to the world. The latter attributes are considered to be lacking in the historic Christ.

The Incarnation is thus regarded by Thomasius:
1. The Son of God assumes human nature in its integrity. He actually becomes man.
2. There is a real self-limitation and sacrifice on the part of the Son of God. He empties Himself as Paul expressed it in Phil. II. 5-7, - εαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν - and that of which He empties Himself is the μορφὴν ἐξουσίας.
as is shewn by the antithesis in \( \mu \rho \phi \eta \ \alpha \sigma \omicron \upsilon \nu \)
nevertheless, "Er bleibt seinem Wesen nach Gott, während er der \( \mu \rho \phi \eta \ \delta \sigma \omicron \upsilon \upsilon \) sich entaussert".

(3) Self destruction in God is not implied in the self-limitation. The motive of the Incarnation is Love and Love is the measure of its depths. The Kenosis of the Son of God was thus not merely Humiliation; it was also Revelation.

(4) The State of Humiliation in the Incarnate Son of God was not a state of helpless passivity, it was free and receptive. It was conceived by Thomasius as including a Potence - concentrated fulness. With Luther, Thomasius considered that there was no dual existence. The activity of the Son of God was entirely confined to the human sphere. The Logos reserved to Himself neither a special existence nor a special knowledge outside of the humanity. The manhood which resulted from the Incarnation was a genuine one. It was a divine human life, a divine human consciousness.

This new epoch making theory of Thomasius, concludes Bensow, may be summed up briefly under two headings:

(1) die \( \kappa \epsilon \upsilon \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma \) den praexisten Logos (nicht den Menschengedachten ...) zum Subjekt hat und als ein Moment der Menschwerdung zu betrachten ist, und [dass] (2) die Entausserung sich nicht bloss auf die mit gottlichen Eigenchaften begabte menschliche Natur, sondern auch, und zwar zunächst, auf die göttliche Natur selbst bezieht.

Among Kenotic presentations of the Thomasius type are those of König, Delitzsch and Kahnis.

The English representatives of the Thomaskan type of Kenotic thought is Principal Fairbairn, who expresses his views in his work: "Christ in Modern Theology."

"The Incarnation", says Fairbairn, "is more correctly spoken of as the Incarnation of the Word or the Son of God, rather than of God."
Although it concerned the Godhead, there is not an Incarnation of the Godhead, but only of the Son. The Son is held to be the ideal of the actual world which existed in Him before it was. He was the symbol of the created within the uncreated. In order that a manifestation of His ideal should be made in the forms of actual being, it was necessary that there should be a supreme renunciation.

This act is described as the Act of Kenosis - the emptying of Himself. This, says Fairbairn, is exactly the term we should expect to be used if the Incarnation was a reality. "It must have involved surrender, humiliation. There could be no real assumption of the nature, the form and the status of the created Son if those of the uncreated in all their integrity are retained."

The statement that the Incarnation, while it was of the Son, concerned the Godhead, carries with it this consequence; physical or external attributes are essential to God, but ethical or internal attributes relate to the Godhead. In other words, the external attributes of God are omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience, but the internal are truth and love. The external are under the command of the internal. Whatever then could be surrendered the ethical attributes and qualities could not.

The necessity of the Incarnation is also asserted by Fairbairn, as based upon soteriological grounds. Man's salvation can only be wrought by God. God, therefore, became incarnate and since it is not a necessity for all the members of the Godhead to retain the physical attributes of omnipotence etc. the Son of God empties Himself of these and assumes the form of servant, being made in the likeness of man. "The Word became Flesh".

Criticism: (1) In his article on the Kenosis in the Encyclopædia of Religion & Ethics, Loofs concedes that the view of Thomasius certainly secures the true humanity of
Jesus and the unity of His person, but says that "it certainly traverses the Immutability of God."

The criticism, however, seems to be a petitio principii. The Divine Immutability is hardly a subject upon whose exact meaning we can dogmatize. "It is a sword," says Dr. Mackintosh, "which we are apt to grasp by the blade."

On the view of Thomasius and Fairbairn it is only the internal attributes of the Godhead which are unchangeable and in a sense we have to concede the mutability or self-adaptability of God in respect of the so-called external attributes. Even in the creation and endowment of man with certain powers, in setting laws for the Universe, God has placed limitations upon His omnipotence and this seems of necessity to involve change. This limitation, however, is not considered by present day Kenotic writers as extending to an abandonment. The Divine relations of omnipotence and the like are as essential as righteousness and grace. Each is a necessary determination of God. We cannot think away the relative attributes of God without at the same time thinking away the relation. But this holds not of God merely, but of all subjects whatsoever. Dispersion into the colours of the spectrum is not essential to sunlight as such, but so soon as we use a prism this relative attribute of light cannot but appear."

(2) The modern Kenotic theory is condemned by Loofs in that it carries with it an air of presumption in venturing upon a construction which would have a meaning only if God's relation to the world or the Logos's relation to God, - His divine human consciousness could be grasped and analysed by the finite mind of man.

This criticism appears to be beside the point on the main issues in which the Kenoticists agree; for Kenoticism does not rest on speculation but on specific Scriptural
passages and the general Scriptural portrait of Christ which represent Him as the pre-existent Son of God become man.

Thomasius certainly goes beyond Scripture and revelation and enters into the sphere of speculation in endeavouring to set forth the method by which this great act of Divine sacrifice might have taken place, but to condemn Kenoticism for this, is to confound the principle with its exposition. The criticism of Loofs is only justified in so far as it applies to the speculations of Thomasius. There may have been an 'adjustment' of cosmic activities in the Trinity, but there is no indication in Scripture of what that 'adjustment' was.

(3) It is contended by Bruce that on the theory of Thomasius two life-centres are taught - the depotentiated Logos and the human soul; and that the human soul of Christ is degraded from a necessary constituent of the person to that of a personal ornament. It is questionable whether this criticism applies to the early presentation by Thomasius of the Person of the Incarnate Christ. The unity of Christ's Person is strongly emphasized; as also the essential one-ness of the divine human nature. The depotentiated Logos becomes man and his human nature or soul was not an additional but a constituent element in His Person.

In his later writings, however, it must be acknowledged that Thomasius accepted a human soul for Christ, although it did not interfere with the unity of His Person. Thomasius divided Manhood into two: the Ego and the Nature. Then there was a further sub-division of the Nature into the soul and body.

MENSCH.

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The criticism may justly be urged against the Thomasian view of the Kenosis that although his distinction between the attributes of God may be correct, the fact has no weight or application in regard to the Incarnation of the Logos. If Christ as one Person became man, passing through the ordinary stages of development from conception to consciousness and knowledge; it could no more be said of Him that as an unborn babe He was consciously and perfectly Holy, Loving and Truthful than that He was Omnipotent. He had to grow into Holiness through trial and suffering, and His Holiness, Love and Truth were humanly or divine-humanly gained.

If it be contended that these Divine ethical attributes existed in potency, this also might be said of the Omnipotence and Omniscience; which, indeed, is the position in general of the more modern Kenoticism.
The Gessian Theory of Kenosis.

This theory propounded by Wolfgang Friedrich Gess has been called the "Absolute Metamorphic Type" of Kenotic Theory and harshly termed by La Touche, "Incarnation by Divine Suicide".

In this view of the Incarnation, the self-depotentiation not only extends to immanent or ethical attributes, but is absolute. The Logos is regarded as having reduced Himself to the germ of a human soul and as suffering the extinction of His eternal self-consciousness to regain it.

In der Fleischwerdung hat sich der Sohn Gottes auch seines selbstbewusst-seins entaussert, um es erst auf dem allmähllichen Entfaltungswege einer Menschenseele wieder zu gewinnen.

In Jesus Christ an Ego of a divine nature became an Ego of human nature.

The Incarnation is considered by Gess as having three phases:

1. An outgoing from the Father.
2. A descent from Heaven.
3. As becoming flesh.

1. The Son of Man in becoming man lost the consciousness, and with the consciousness the activity, and with the activity the capacity to receive into Himself the influx of the Father's life, and to cause that instreaming life to flow forth from Himself again.

(2) The descent from Heaven resulted in a transition from a state of equality with God into a state of dependence. The chief Scriptural data for this belief is found in John. 16. 28, 17. 5, Phil. 2. 6-7, 2 Cor. 8. 9.

The Logos or Son of God experienced the extinction of His eternal self-consciousness; although retaining His Personality. "Das Ich des wortlichen Sohnes und das Ich des auf Erden lebenden Jesus ist dasselbe"
(3) The flesh became for the Logos a determining factor. According to God's creative decree, the life-development of the soul depends upon the development of the body.

(a) Christ's life at first was a natural life in which the Logos was subject to the power of the flesh - He was therefore subject to limitations of Knowledge and power. The possibility of Christ's sinning is entertained by Gess, although He was able not to sin, - potuit non peccare. "Gess thinks that he must answer this question (Can Jesus sin?) affirmatively because the Lord according to his opinion would otherwise not be a true man, would not have full equality with us whom He ... calls His brethren."

(b) Christ's Incarnate life became a personal life in which the Logos became self-conscious, and made the flesh subject to Himself. The 'morning twilight of His Knowledge' appeared when He was a boy of twelve years; the 'perfect day' had arrived by the time He went forth to commence His ministry.

(c) At the close of the human development the body of Christ's flesh became transformed into a glorious body and became fitted to be the perfect organ of the Logos once more restored to the fulness of divine life.

Gess' view of the Depotentiation rested in part upon his theory as to the origin of the soul. He accepted the Creationist theory - that each human soul is a fresh creation from God. He thus found an obvious way of accounting for the union of the Logos with the human body or seed of Jesus.

In regard to the consciousness of Christ Gess considered that there would be a deep instinct operative by which His mind would be guided through the Scriptures into a recognition of His Kinship with the Father. An idea suggestive of Sanday's subliminal theory is introduced when Gess speaks of the possibility of 'uprushes',

II. 308-309.

Ges. III. 369.

ensow. 294.
as it were, of His true essence into the field of consciousness.

At and after the Resurrection the full divine self-consciousness was assumed.

Godet.

In his "Commentary on St. John's Gospel" and in his "Biblical Studies", Godet openly professes himself to be an advocate of the Gessian view of the Incarnation.

Making John I. 14, the centre of his thought on the Kenosis he says: "the Creative Word to whom everything owes its existence, became a member of our humanity."

The term 'flesh', Godet held, on a comparison with Gen. VI. 3. "For that he (man) also is flesh", can by metonymy not only designate the body but our entire human being. Flesh may include the entire human person as in I. Thess. V. 23 - spirit, soul and body. Jesus speaks of His soul being troubled: John 12. 27. He groaned in the spirit. XI. 33, XIII. 21.

'Flesh' denotes not the visibility or corporeity of Jesus (as De Wette and Bain would suggest) but the completeness of Christ's human nature in virtue of which He could suffer or enjoy happiness, be tempted, struggle, learn, make progress, love and pray exactly as we do. In this contention Godet refers to Rom. 8. 3: "God sending His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh." - flesh here meaning humanity. The phrase ἐν κοσμοῖς ἐγενέτο, says Godet, would not have expressed the idea of the real Incarnation so exactly as σάρξ ἐγενέτο. It would have described Jesus as a determinate human personality. The word 'became' proved that the change goes to the very root of the mode of existence. It can only signify one thing, viz. that the divine subject entered into the human mode of being at the cost of renouncing His divine mode of being.
"The personal subject", continues Godet, "remained the same, but He exchanged the divine state for the human state and if at a later time He recovers His divine state, it is not by abandoning the human, but by exalting the latter to the height of the former."

The actual consciousness of Sonship which, says Godet, was the light of life, Christ allowed to be extinguished within Him, to retain only His inalienable personality. This filial consciousness and recognition of His unique relationship to God dated, so Godet held, from the beginning of His public ministry.

"Il faut ensuite", says Godet, "que le sujet divin consente à perdre pour un temps la conscience de lui-même comme tel. La conscience d'une relation .. particulière avec Dieu et le souvenir d'une vie antérieure à cette existence terrestre seraient incompatible avec l'état d'une véritable enfant et avec un développement réellement humain."

It is evident from Christ's prayers, continues Godet, that He did not possess Omnipotence in His own right; but by prayer He could obtain the use of omnipotence in the service of love. Otherwise He asked questions, struggled, believed, obeyed.

Christ was not omniscient, but He possessed a pre-eminent prophetic vision, as in the incident of the Samaritan woman. John 4:17-18.

He was also not omnipresent; further, His love, perfect as it was, was not divine love, which is immutable. Who will assert, asks Godet, that Jesus at twelve loved as He did upon the Cross? Perfect relatively, His love grew from day to day in intensity and extent. It was thus a truly human love. The gift of grace (Rom.V.15) is by one man, Jesus Christ. His holiness is also human, for it is realised every moment at the cost of struggle and through
renunciation of legitimate enjoyment and victory over the fear of pain. Thus He cries, John XII. 27, "Now is my soul troubled", and 17. 19 "for their sakes I sanctify myself."

Christ did not on earth possess the attributes which constitute the divine state and hence He can terminate His earthly career by claiming back again the glory which He had before this Incarnation: 17. 5 "Glorify Thou Me with Thine ownself with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was."

John's teaching, states Godet, is in respect of the Depotentiation in entire harmony with that of Paul in Phil.II. 5-8 and 2.Corr. 8. 9.

The fundamental feature in Gess's theory of the Kenosis is stressed in Godet's statement: "It was necessary that the Son of God should consent to lose for a time His self-consciousness as a divine subject."

The memory of a divine life anterior to His earthly existence would have been incompatible with the human state. John. p. 403.

Up to thirty years of age, Godet holds, Jesus did not know Himself, although perhaps dimly forecasting in the light of Scripture what He was in relation to God. At Baptism He knows Himself as Son. In referring to the internal relationships within the Trinity during the Incarnation, Godet held that the Father Himself exercised the functions of Creator and Preserver which He commonly exercises through the mediation of the Word.

The capacitas humanæ naturæ divinae is stressed by Godet:

1. The Logos descended to the level of man who was created in the image of God.

John. 398.  2. Man's receptivity for the divine was pre-eminent in Christ.

(3) Through His miraculous birth, the Logos, while entering
into humanity, reproduces not the type of a determinate heredity, but that of the race itself in its essence and generality.

(4) The true man is the God-man, and the highest aspiration of the Logos in His human life must have been to realise in Himself the participation of humanity in the divine state — this is the meaning of 'recovering His glory'.

"The entrance of a divine subject into the human state," Godet concludes, "does not contain anything contradictory."

The Kenoticism of Liebner is akin to that of Gess and Godet in that he does not recognise any human soul in Christ distinct from the Logos. The Trinity is regarded by Liebner as personal and social, its unity being found in self-communicating reciprocal love. In this Trinitarian process of reciprocal and unifying love the initiative is regarded as lying with the Father and in this respect there is a certain element of subordination in the relation of the Son to the Father. This element may be called the "Eternal Kenosis". This eternal element of Kenosis is the eternal possibility of Incarnation. In the Incarnation that Eternal Kenosis becomes temporal. This temporal Kenosis, in abstract language, may be defined as the Son of God entering into 'Becoming' (Worden), becoming a mere form to be gradually filled with divine contents.

The problem of Christology is to exhibit the process by which the Logos, - reduced to a form by becoming flesh,- becomes as a man progressively filled with divine contents. There was a true moral and intellectual development in Christ. He experienced temptation and achieved perfect holiness.

In considering the moral freedom of Christ a distinction is made between His formal and real freedom — the former consisting of liberty of choice and involving the
possibility of a wrong choice, the second in the free, not necessary doing of the good, excluding the possibility of sin. Liebner differs from Gess in treating the possibility of sinning involved in formal freedom as a mere abstraction in the case of Christ. He could be tempted but He could not sin. Here Liebner is at one with Bensow. This is the highest possible form of humanity (das gottmenschliche Urbild der Menschheit) - complete ethical infallibility.

In expounding his doctrine of the Logos entering into "Werden" Leibner says: In infancy the Logos had no self-consciousness, only the Divine-human Potency. The self-consciousness itself was divine-human. It took the form of presentiment with the boy of twelve. At Baptism He became fully acquainted with Himself.

The Incarnation was considered by Leibner as being destined to take place irrespective of sin. Sin affected the accidental conditions, but not the fact of Incarnation.

Christ receives everything in truly human activity from the Father and yet, at the same time, on the other hand, He is conscious of all as originally and essentially His own.

Criticism of the Gessian Type of Kenotic Theory.

The view of the Kenosis as put forth by Gess has been scathingly denounced by Biedermann as "pure mythology" which "required a Kenosis of the understanding to believe."

Bishop Gore contended that:

1. The theory was based upon an exaggerated and one-sided view of the phenomena of the Gospel,

2. There were strong considerations against absolute abandonment of the position and function of the Logos in the Blessed Trinity at the Incarnation.

Bruce held that the Gessian theory, while ensuring the reality of Christ's human experience imperils the end of the Incarnation - the redemption of sinners for which the Redeemer Himself must be free from sin.
There is little doubt that the theory of Gess and Godet in making the Kenosis a complete evacuation with extinction of consciousness is an extreme view of the limitations involved in the Incarnation; and that it presents to us an insoluble difficulty. Divine-Consciousness disappears and reappears. At Incarnation it is extinguished, at Baptism Christ has the consciousness of Sonship. There seems to be a hiatus here which is not bridged by the statement that there were 'upruses' of divine-consciousness or by the Creationist theory of the soul. Life for none of us in fact begins as a tabula rasa. It is evident that there must be a nexus between the Pre-existent and the human life and thus the theory of Leibner seems preferable when he speaks of the reduction to a 'Potentio' - the potency in the life - the seed in the Virgin Mary. In that embryo it could be said that there was not actual, but potential self-consciousness, and as that consciousness comes to an actuality in the ordinary individual, so it would happen in the case of the Son of God. As body and mind developed so pari passu as it were, there developed His self-consciousness, with the sense of a unique relationship to God and a conviction of His unique mission to the world.

In point of fact the term used by Gess and Godet - 'extinction' - does not seem in entire accordance with their exposition of the Kenosis. The former writes: "In the womb of Mary slumbered unconsciously the same essential nature (Wesenheit) which 34 years later presented itself a spotless offering to the Father. At the time of its slumbering there was already in it that indissoluble life, by virtue of which is fulfilled the High Priestly work and that power of one day knowing the Father, whom none besides knows (Matt.XI.27); but it knew not and knew not itself, yes, this unconscious slumbering nature was the same which before, as the Logos, was God with the Father, but it no longer was conscious of
itself." The whole language of this quotation suggests that Gess did not believe in an entire extinction of the Divine self-consciousness.

(2) The criticism of Bishop Gore seems to have little weight, for Gess and Godet appear to take a very full and comprehensive view of the Scriptural data in setting forth their theory and the retention by the Son of God of His eternal functions while in the Incarnate state receives no support from the Scriptural records.

(3) The justice of the argument of Bruce that Christ's impeccability is essential on soteriological grounds may be questioned; but there seems to be little doubt that on the Scriptural presentation of the Person of Christ there is full evidence of His inability to sin. He could be tempted, but could not fall, and this assertion does not militate against the reality of His manhood.

In a sense there is a parallel in ordinary human experience. It is commonly and justly said that under certain circumstances and trials, men of honour and courage cannot act ignobly or cowardly. This was true, though in a unique sense, of Jesus Christ.

(4) Gess, moreover, weakens his case in speculating upon the change wrought by the Kenosis in the Trinity both during the Incarnation, and as the result of the human glorified body of the risen Christ being carried into the life of God. This speculative reasoning is a feature of the work of Bensow, but it seems that we are here dealing with matters beyond our ken and outside the sphere of Revelation.

Ebrard (1851-52) held what is called the "Absolute semi-metamorphic theory. He agrees with Gess in the belief that the Logos took the place of a human soul. Ebrard's view of the Kenosis was that the Son of God gave up the eternal form and reduced Himself to a limited life-centre,
undergoing not a loss but rather a disguise of His divinity. Omnipotence remained, but in an applied form as manifested in the miracles. Omniscience also remained in the form by which He could see all that He wished to see. Omnipresence also remained as a power to transport Himself whither He would.

The Chalcedonian Formula of the "two natures in One Person" is accepted by Ebrard, but the natures in his mind were equivalent to the two aspects of the One divine-human person.

The criticism which may be passed on Ebrard is that on his theory there is no real depotentiation. There was always power latent in Christ, a power capable of being exercised at will. Since this was so the Kenosis amounts only to a concealment of power. It actually existed in Christ's Incarnate life.

The Scriptures are against any view which suggests that Christ possessed Omnipotence either actually or in an applied form. His works were performed and His life was lived under human conditions, in complete dependence upon the Father.

The theory of Ebrard, says Bruce, makes Christ neither God nor man, but more the former than the latter.
Martensen's View of the Kenosis - "The Theory of the Double Life" (Gore).

Thoroughly to understand Martensen's Christological attitude it is necessary to have a right conception of his general Theological position. This we find expressed in his view of the Divine Trinity and its essential constitution as set forth in his "Christian Dogmatics".

Martensen held that there were three centres of Revelation - three hypostases - in the one God; that each of these centres for itself, at the same time and in equal degree reveals the whole of God, the whole of Love, though each in a different way.

All the divine attributes are in the Father; all the divine attributes are in the Son, the Eternal Word, all the divine attributes are in the Holy Spirit. Each of these is the whole of love, though each in a different relation. God alone is able to reveal God as He is. God's very consciousness of Himself depends upon a trinitarian conception of the Godhead.

God, says Martensen, could only have from Eternity distinguished Himself from Himself as the Son .... as eternal self-consciousness, eternally making Himself His own object.

The Son, the Logos of the Father even before the manifestation in the flesh was and continued to be the Logos of the world, through whom the divine light shines into creation He has His life in the Father and also in the world.

In His pre-incarnate existence the Son of God regarded Himself as the One who is to come through history, preparing the conditions under which the revelation of His love can take place, and His Incarnation be effected. This Incarnation was historically accomplished in Jesus Christ who was born of the Virgin Mary.

In Martensen's view man was destined to bear the image of God and human nature was capable of becoming partaker of the divine nature.
This, however, does not explain the unique Personality of the Son of Man, for Mysticism holds the above theory, but takes for granted that every soul united with God is essentially the same as Christ.

The idea of the Incarnation of Christ, however, is not that of a soul united with God (umyo mystica), but that of a man in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.

We reach an understanding of the Incarnation only by starting with the conception of a Mediator between God and man, the redeeming Mediator whose destiny it was to restore the fellowship of the human race with God, a fellowship interrupted by Sin. This Mediator must be the true Adam setting forth human nature in its purity and susceptibility to God. At the same time He must reveal the depths of the divine love. God must be in Him, not merely relatively, but absolutely and fully. Thus Christ is the world redeeming Mediator who is to be conceived as holding a necessary and eternal relation to the Father and to mankind. Martensen held that although sin interrupted the fellowship of the human race with God, it was not Sin alone which was the ground of His revelation. Apart from sin the union of the human race with God is involved in the idea of the perfection of the world. If we recognise this then we are led back again to the Only-begotten One who appeared in the midst of the process of human development as the Incarnation of the divine nature and who by continuing to work through the medium of the new economy of creation which He inaugurated, is still the Mediator of the completion of the whole Kingdom and of every individual member thereof.

With Thomasius, Martensen says that this Self-revelation of God is also a Self-realisation. The Son of God is considered as coming into the full possession of His divine glory when He becomes the Son of Man.

In this central individual - the Second Adam -"the
fulness of the Godhead was originally and indissolubly enclosed in created nature as in a frame".

Considering the objection that the eternal and omnipresent One could not be born in the midst of time, Martensen gives expression to ideas which are suggestive of the Gessian view of the Incarnation. Birth in time, he states, is necessarily connected with the notion of a progress from unconsciousness to consciousness, of possibility to actuality, of a grain of sand and germ to ripe organisation; and any view of the God-man which is inconsistent with these conditions must be characterised as docetical.

The 'extinction' of Gess's theory becomes 'potentiality' in Martensen. When we say that the Divine Logos consented to be born we mean that He planted Himself as a possibility; that the fulness of the divine nature individualised itself under the form of the life of a single man in such a way that the entire sum of holy powers was involved therein. The holy thing Lc. I. 35 -το γεννημα του αυτου which was born of Mary, whilst advancing in years and becoming more and more conscious of itself as a human person became also in the same measure conscious of its Deity. In the measure in which the human nature grew and developed, in that measure did the divine nature also grow in it and His pre-existence become manifest to His consciousness.

Quoting Phil. II. 6-7, Martensen speaks of the Incarnation as an act of self-abasement. The Son of God humbled Himself. The Deity is considered as being possessed under the conditions imposed by a human individuality in the limited form of a human consciousness. He lived in humiliation and poverty because He had renounced that majestic glory by which, as the omnipresent Logos, He irradiates the whole creation. In spite, however, of Martensen's emphatic language as to the self-renunciation of the Logos a two-fold existence is postulated for the Son of God - a double life
in His world-creating and world completing activity.

As the pure Logos of Deity He works through the Kingdom of nature by His all-pervading presence. As the Christ He works through the Kingdom of God and Redemption and points back to His pre-existence. John. 8. 58, 17. In Christ we see very God, yet not the naked God, but "the fulness of Deity framed in the ring of humanity" - the divine attributes being embodied in the attributes of human nature, i.e. there is a communication of properties (communicatio idiomatum).

Instead of omnipresence, Martensen believed that we have a local presence, which reveals the Father - a view similar to that of Ebrard.

Instead of omniscience, we have the divinely human wisdom which reveals to babes the mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven. The sinlessness of Christ, which is freely acknowledged, is ascribed to the direct action of the Holy Spirit at conception; the birth being of a pure virgin without the connex of sinful human nature.

The genuine manhood of Christ is stressed. He lived in a body like our own and subject to the same wants. He was susceptible of the same pain and griefs. He had a body which was mortal.

In regard to Christ's knowledge, Martensen speaks of it as not being Omniscient, but perfect. The Knowledge which He possessed had an inward rather than an outward infinitude. It was infinite in depth, though not in range.

The Temptation which Christ experienced at maturity is conceived as a true one. "Potuit non peccare" and "potuit peccare" may be said to include each other. Christ is represented as having two wills, being "Duotheletic".

His power over nature is described by Martensen as by no means arbitrary or unlimited. It finds its bounds in the law of holiness and its exercise is controlled by His obedience to the Father's will.
At His Ascension Christ does not lay aside His humanity, but 'abides the Heavenly Adam'.

Criticism.

The presentation by Martensen of his view of the Deposition is at once both deeply reverent and inspiring. It is difficult, however, to concede the full justice of his view, and in spite of his brave attempt to be loyal to Scripture and to the accepted Creeds of the Church, he seems to be lacking in clearness and cogency of argument and self-consistency. It is, for example, difficult for the mind to conceive how there could be the real Kenosis which Martensen asserts, while the Logos retained His cosmic functions. The unity of the Person seems thus to be violated and there appears to be no scriptural ground for such a belief. It is true that the possibility has been conceded on a metaphysical basis of thought, but on the basis of the New Testament record there seems to be no justification for the duality. Christ makes repeated references to the existence of the Father as an 'entity', if we can reverently use the term, and also to the separate personal existence of the Holy Spirit, but there is no such reference to an 'alter ego' - the Logos extra Christum - existing at the same time in an unincarnate condition of being.

It is true that the belief in a dual existence was held by the early fathers, "cum extra eum non sit, sed in sinu Patris existat", but Loofs seems to be right in asserting that the modern theory of the Kenosis is consistent only on condition that it surrenders everything in the nature of an "extra carnem" theory.

Apart from the theory of the two-fold activity, however, the development of the self-consciousness pari passu with the growth of the human nature presents us with what seems to be the scriptural truth on this matter.

At times, Martensen's statements suggest a more real Kenosis than his theory of the dual existence would warrant.
He speaks, for example, of the "Divine Logos who was in the womb not as a self-conscious Ego, but as an unripe unborn child."; also of "the fulness of deity framed in the ring of humanity."

Critics agree that there is a lack of coherence and consistency in Martensen's view of the Incarnation and the idea of the contemporaneous dual activity of the Logos together with the theory of Duotheletism in the Incarnate Christ appear to be exotics in his scheme of thought. By advocating these two ideas he is forced into a duality which he himself condemns and rejects. An exacting review of his own Christological statement might have led him to a more consistent and thorough-going view of the Depotentiation.

Dorner, 1809-1894.

In opposition to modern Kenotic theories, although his own view is of the Kenotic type, Dorner held that the Incarnation was Gradual or Progressive, thus returning to the earlier views of Luther. There was a gradual impartation of the Logos to the man Jesus beginning with the miraculous conception and issuing in Christ's complete union with Him.

"There is no ground whatever why the divine-human unity which, beginning with the 'Unio naturarum' is, it is true never again dissolved, should be conceived of as absolutely complete and immoveable from the Beginning".

Reference is made by Dorner to the statement of Scotus that a union between the divine and human natures and personalities was possible. God and man are thought of as akin and through man's receptivity for God there is provided a real basis for the existence of Jesus the man as the adequate personal organ of Deity.

The unity was thus of God-humanity, the life was the divine-human life. This unity, however, was not complete from the beginning, but went on constantly growing and reproducing itself on the basis of the being (des Seins), nay
more, which continued to grow so long as the God-man was not completed. The result is a Divine-human consciousness.

The Logos who thus imparts Himself in a union with the man Jesus is not considered a Person in the same sense as the absolute God or as an individual man. There are, indeed, three Persons in the Godhead, but, says Dorner, we must not associate with the word 'person' the same idea that we are wont to associate with it to-day. 'Person' rather corresponds to 'principle', and the Logos is the eternal principle within the Godhead of "objectivation", - of freedom, movement and revelation, the Father being the principal basis of the Trinity. It is therefore not God in His absolute totality who has become incarnate, but God the Logos, or rather - and here comes the semi-Sabellian touch - God as Logos.

In the Incarnate state, Christ, says Dorner, had a true humanity which underwent a gradual process of growth as touching both knowledge and volition. Not merely has He a true humanity, as we have, but a humanity so constituted that when it has wholly become what it is capable of becoming, the Divine principle, which the evangelist calls the Logos, can dwell therein in His complete fulness and majesty. Therefore He is called not man merely, but also the "Son of Man".

John I. 14 -"the Word became flesh" is quoted by Dorner as the strongest expression for the actuality of the humanity of Jesus .... "a realization which is a revelation."

The universal capacitás humanæ naturæ for the Divine is not considered by Dorner as establishing our entire human affinity with Christ. The homoousia of His humanity with ours cannot exclude the uniqueness of the position of the humanity of Christ in the organism of the race.

In Christ, God as Logos has so united Himself with His humanity that He is the seat of absolute revelation. With Him is given the principal or central beginning of a new
humanity. Christ is more than Adam. He is the pneumatic archetypal Man.

Dorner at times gives expression to ideas which are suggestive of Sanday's 'subliminal consciousness' theory. "Within ourselves", he says, "there is a mysterious world of wealth of which we are not masters, but which show us what we should and could be."

In Christ the mysterious living basis is the Logos Himself. He is the \textit{\textup{πνευμα}} - the substratum of His Person. When the free self-conscious development began, then each of His acts of freedom opened new doors to his inward pleroma, until there ripened from the blossom of the Divine Child the fruit of the Divine human character, until the God-human potency was totally actualized, ethically and officially, and He could say "It is finished".

\textbf{Criticism.}

(1) The danger which Dorner sought to avert - of developing a tritheistic view of God - drove him to the other extreme and made him adopt what is practically a modalistic view of the Trinity. He speaks of Person as if it were merely a principle. It is "God as Logos" who is incarnate. The idea of the Scriptures, however, is that of a personal being one of a Trinity of Persons, who became man.

(2) In spite of his reiterated statements as to the one-ness of the Person of Christ, Dorner manifestly presents a dualism to us. The Logos seems to be one person, the man another. Even at the final stage of growth or earthly development, Christ is left only a man in perfect union with the Logos. Further, as Dr. Walker says, according to Scripture representations it is not with the Logos, but with the Father, that Jesus stands in spiritual relationship.

(3) Dorner has proved suggestive in the emphasis which he lays upon the affinity of the Divine and human natures. As a rule the early father and the Creeds place the natures
side by side as disparate and incommunicable; yet in the New Testament it is the affinity and not the disparateness which is stressed.

Man is made in the image of God. He is capable of receiving God's communications and of having fellowship with Him. The idea, however, is not worked out to its full issues. The Son of God does not really become man, in Dorner's theory, but lives alongside of him and ultimately absorbs him.

(4) Dorner's endeavours, indeed, to maintain a real human experience for Christ are abortive and his language is distinctly docetic. "In Christ man is God, God is man." The divine nature cannot suffer of itself, but it can lovingly participate in the humanity, together with which it has become a Person. Such expressions reveal a dualism. The suffering of sympathy is not the suffering of actual experience. On the basis of a complete unity of being, in fact, such language is intelligible.

(5) The gradual Incarnation theory of Dorner is considered by Dr. Mackintosh as being worthy of consideration; although the latter himself would give the theory a different interpretation. With Dorner the life of Christ starts with a dualism and then becomes a unity; in the thought of Mackintosh Christ is always a unity.

"The whole personality of Christ is not something given at the start by the existence side by side of the Divine and human natures, but something achieved by His life's action." This discounts the idea of a duality.

Summing up Dormer's exposition of the Trinity, Lichtenberger passes the drastic comment that "it is a vain jingling of formulae, a pure logomachy." "Dormer", he contends, "is a striking example of the radical impotence with which the mediating theology (Vermittlungstheologie) is struck, when it professes to reconcile modern thought with
the ecclesiastical dogmas, without abandoning a single one of these consecrated formulae."

The great defect in Bruce's monumental work, "The Humiliation of Christ" is, that no attempt is made to indicate the nature and extent of the limitation involved in the Incarnation. After his exposition and criticism of the various types of Kenotic theory Bruce comes to this conclusion: "On the whole, with every desire to give the Kenotic theory a fair and candid hearing, one cannot feel that there are difficulties connected with it which puzzle the mind and give the judgment pause." He advances no formulated theory of his own but suspends his judgment, adding that "we must be content to walk by faith and take care that no ambitions attempt to walk by sight rob (us) of any ordinal truth in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily"

His warning, however, pious and sincere as it may be, is clearly no indictment of the Theory of the Kenosis which basally is part of the teaching of the New Testament. If we believe that the Son of God came to earth and became man then it is evident that some form of Kenotic theory, relative or absolute, must be held.

Further, to couple the theory of the depotentiated Logos with the hypothesis of the "Double Life" and that of the "Gradual Incarnation", and sum them up as equally open to suspicion, and as theories from which we must stand aloof, is inconsistent and unfair, as the former is definitely scriptural and the two latter almost entirely speculative.

The certainties of the Christian faith cannot be disturbed if we aim at obtaining from the scriptural data, in the light of modern thought, the mode and degree of Kenosis undergone by the Son of God in His Incarnation.
Kenoticism of the 20th Century.

In spite of the contention of Ritschel, Dorner and others that Kenotic theories are unentertainable they have had, of recent years, many advocates. It has been felt that the opposition to Kenoticism has sometimes been founded on arguments with a purely metaphysical or false psychological basis, such as the idea of the unchangeability of God, the objection that the Kenosis deprives Christ of His Godhead, or the conception of the transcendental and concurrent existence of the Son of God.

These arguments, however, have generally vanished in the light of the counter-criticism with which they have been met, and thus there has been a decided advocacy of Kenoticism in the books of such modern writers as Gore, Forrest, Forsyth, Mackintosh and others.

A great sympathy has been shown for the Kenotic hypothesis in that it reveals:-
(2) An exalted conception of the nature of man and his capacity to receive the Divine nature.
(3) A close adherence to the facts of Scripture.
(4) A decided attempt to dispense with Docetism and to establish the unity of the Divine-human life of the Incarnate Christ.

There cannot be said to be perfect unanimity among modern Kenoticists in their exposition of Scripture as it bears upon the Person of Christ in His human experience, but it can be asserted that there is unity in at least three or four leading ideas:-
(1) That in order to become man the Pre-existent Son of God - the Personal Logos made an unspeakable surrender of some, if not all, of His divine prerogatives.
(2) That in becoming man He did not cease to be Divine; God was living His human life.
(3) He lived a genuine human life in continuous obedience to and dependence for power upon the will of God the Father.

(4) He had no dual external and temporal existence.

In his book, "A Study in Christology", Dr. Relton, while advocating the doctrine of the Emphypostasia - and in general opposing the Kenotic theory - he passes upon it a generous criticism and ascribes the leadership in modern Kenotic thought to prominent British theologians.

"Besides theories of Gess and Thomasius ... we have the later and far more valuable contributions of the British Kenotic theologians, who have presented this form of Christology with such a wealth of illustration, thoroughness of treatment and reverent restraint as to commend it to a wide circle of thoughtful men; and indeed we may say that the work of men like Bruce, Gore, Fairbairn, Forrest, W. L. Walker, P. J. Forsyth and others constitutes a solid and distinctive contribution to theological thought, and justifies the claim that the British school is pre-eminent in the field of Kenotic Christology."

This Christology seems to be just, and a consideration, therefore, of the Kenotic views of the above mentioned scholars will give the general modern Kenotic position.

A prominent place in modern Kenoticism must be given to Bishop Gore who first of all in his Bampton Lectures (1891) and later in his Dissertations (1899), "Belief in Christ" and "Can We Believe" (1926) has showed himself to be an ardent advocate of the Theory of the Kenosis.

In his Dissertations he considers the subject under:
2. The View of the Church, and
3. A constructive Statement.

(1) In studying the teaching of the New Testament, Dr. Gore shows that the pre-existence is definitely stated in St. John and implied in the Synoptics, e.g., inMatt. 20.3...
"The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto but to minister ..."

The view of our Lord's consciousness is declared to be a harmonious one, although the strictly divine nature of Jesus is more emphatically taught in the Fourth Gospel than in the other three. Differences are really those of point of view and mark distinct stages of doctrinal development.

The Gospels clearly shew that although the conditions of our Lord's early childhood are veiled from us yet we are told that the child grew in favour with God and man, Luke II. 40-52. There was a real growth in mental apprehension and spiritual capacity as well as in bodily stature.

The consciousness of divine sonship, says Gore, is represented as co-existing with a really human development of life.

Christ receives as man the unction of the Holy Ghost. When He exercises His ministry, He bases His authority on the unction of the Spirit according to Isaiah's prophecy: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me". Luke IV. 18.

His endowment, in fact, was a gift of God to Him as a man. "By the Spirit of God He cast out devils." Luke V. 17.

St. John would teach us to see, at least in some miracles, a power dependent on the exercise of prayer, e.g., John XI. 41. "Father I thank Thee that Thou hast heard Me."

Dr. Gore stresses the infallibility and sinlessness of Christ as taught in the New Testament but adds that infallibility is not omniscience. "Christ taught only what He knew, and what He knew, He knew from the Father infallibly," but throughout His incarnate life He was under the Father's direction, being fully submissive and obedient and perfectly guided in the things concerning eternal life.

The supernatural knowledge and illumination which Christ displayed, as for example when He saw Nathanael under the fig tree, the knowledge which He had of the life of the
Samaritan woman, the discernment of the heart of Judas, John. 12. 27, 16. 4, is analogous if of higher quality to that which was vouchsafed to the prophets and apostles, e.g., 2 Kings. 6. 12: "Elisha . . . telleth the King of Israel the words that thou speakest in thy bed-chamber" and is not at variance with our Lord's limitation of knowledge.

Various experiences in Christ's life are pointed out as being inconsistent with practical omniscience:

(1) He manifests surprise at the unbelief of man. Mark. 6. 5, as also at the slowness of His disciples' faith. Mark.4. 40, "Why are ye fearful?"

He lived in constant exercise of prayer to God, e.g., Matt. 26. 39: "If it be possible, let this cup pass away from Me."

(2) Christ revealed a real ignorance of certain things, as for example in Mark 13. 32: "Of that day knoweth no one, not even . . . . the Son". "The eschatological discourses cannot be accepted as history written beforehand."

(3) His life was lived in complete dependence upon the Father. He accomplishes what the Father taught Him. John. 8. 28; "The Son can do nothing of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing." V. 19; "I spake not from Myself", 12. 49; "The words which Thou gavest Me I have given them". John. 17. 8.

Reference is made by Gore to the two "remarkable Kenotic passages": Phil. II. 5-7; and 2 Cor. 8. 9, and in reply to Dr. Temple, the answer is justly given that the phrases "self-emptying", "self-annulment", "self-beggary", are not his own, but St. Paul's.

Something which can also be so described was involved in the Incarnation.

Bishop Temple prefers the idea of the Incarnate Life being 'added' to the other work of God. (Xtus Veritas, 145)
Reference is also made to the Kenotic language used by the early fathers, e.g., Athanasius, with whom the Word is spoken of as identifying Himself with the humanity which He assumed.

Dr. Gore himself is a confessed adherent to the ipsissima verba of the 4th and 6th Councils. He acknowledges that "the great bulk of the language of ecclesiastical writers is against us", but explains the defectiveness of the theology of the fathers and schoolmen on the ground that:

(a) Their statements were based on an *a priori* assumption as to the effect of the Godhead on the manhood. It was the manhood alone, said the Fathers, which was limited in knowledge,

(b) Their philosophical categories were abstract and a *priori*.

(c) Accurate interpretation of the sacred text is a growth of modern times.

So far Dr. Gore is in harmony with the views of recent scholars who advocate a Kenosis in the Incarnation. It is, however, in his conception of the dual life - "the life at two centres" that the great defect is revealed in Gore's presentation and which prevents his view being classified as thoroughly "Kenotic". "There is no text," he says, "which directly suggests that the Incarnate Person during the period of His humiliation was still none the less in Heaven, i.e., in the fulfilment of His divine functions."

The Kenosis, in Dr. Gore's mind, seems to be the real abandonment of divine prerogative and attributes by the Eternal Son "within a certain sphere". The theology of St. John, St. Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews, so Dr. Gore thinks, leads us to believe that the Word belongs to the Eternal Life of God and is also the sustaining principle of all creation, thus: In Him all things consist - Col. 1:17; "upholding all things by the word of His power."
Referring to the latter text, Dr. Gore says that the writer must have believed the self-emptying in the one sphere to have been compatible with cosmic functions in another sphere; "nor has the Church found the abandonment of the cosmic functions even a conceivable hypothesis."

"Thus if we are asked the question can the functions in the Godhead and in the universe have been suspended by the Incarnation, we cannot but answer with the theologians of the church from Irenæus to Dr. Westcott that it is inconceivable."

This position is retaken by Dr. Gore in his recent book "Can We Believe", which, however, is slightly more agnostic. He says Gore, referring to Dr. Temple, cannot conceive our Lord ceasing to fulfil His cosmic functions during the period of the Incarnation. "There I quite agree with him ... I have always affirmed that the self-emptying prevailed only within the sphere of the Incarnate Life and within the period of the humiliation; outside of that we have no knowledge, but within that sphere it is required by the facts as recorded in the Gospels."

It is strange that Dr. Gore should be such a pronounced advocate of Kenoticism and yet fail to see the inconsistency of uniting his theory with a belief in Christ's exercise of 'extra carmem' functions. Opponents of the Kenotic theory have contended forcibly, and it seems justly, that it is only tenable on the renunciation of all activities outside the earthly life.

Arguments against the "two centres" theory have already been used in the criticism of Martensen's Christological position, but it may be added that conclusive answers have been given to this dualism from three points of view:

(1) "The Logos Incarnate has, 'ex hypothesi', no direct knowledge of the cosmic activities predicated of the Logos 'extra carmem'!" The great Kenotic texts imply that when He was Incarnate He was not Unincarnate.
(2) The New Testament data are insufficient for the purposes of such a theory. The Pauline and Hebrews passages quoted refer primarily to the historic and exalted Christ; nothing else can be assumed to be in view. John, 3.13; 6 ὑπὲρ ὑπὸ παντὸς; cannot be quoted in favour of the dualistic theory, for it is not found in the ancient M.S.S. On the contrary the New Testament abounds with data which indicate that Christ's life was confined to the Incarnate state, e.g., John VI.47: which speaks of the Son returning to Heaven, "where He was before" ὁ θεός ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ προτερον of John 16.28, "I came out from the Father".

(3) The theory of Bishop Gore is not only dualistic, but ditheistic. It has been urged that the cessation of the Incarnate Word from His universal activities must produce a cosmic chaos. "But a plea so dubious would seem to involve the far greater peril of so separating the Father from the Son in a cosmic reference as to endanger the monotheistic view of the Trinity and negative the "inseparabili trinitatis operatio", so memorably emphasised by Augustine. It is indeed pure a priori dogma.

"This is a matter," says Forrest, "with which we have nothing to do as interpreters of the historical revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Our sole duty is to form as fair and accurate an idea as we can of the incarnate life from the accounts contained in the Gospels. That is what the Kenotic theory claims to do. The New Testament ... makes it abundantly clear that He did not live this dual life from one conscious centre as the Incarnate Son".

This also Dr. Somerville: "I do not see that on this view we can believe in a Divine Personality as the principle of the personal life of Jesus Christ, since it is only outside of the latter and as extra-mundane that this Divine Person is conceived of as existing as He actually is or that we can affirm more of Christ if this theory be true than that
He possessed in an extraordinary measure that Spirit of God that is the principle of every true human personality. And in that case the union of the divine and the human in His person is not more than the supreme instance of the union that is normal of every true Christian; and to this the Christology of the Reformed Churches, it seems to me, inevitably come."

In the writing of Professor H. R. Mackintosh, Dr. D.W. Forrest and Principal P. T. Forsyth we seem to have the best presentation of a moderate yet real Kenotic Theory of the Incarnation based on actual scriptural data and expressed in the terms of modern thought. None of the writers gives a systematic view of the mode and extent of the Kenosis, but each agrees that there was a real depotentiation and sacrifice made on the part of the Pre-existent personal Logos, who entered into a genuine state of human existence free from all docetism and dualism.

The exposition of the Kenosis reflecting the view of Dr. Forrest is given in his books: "The Christ of History and Experience", and "The Authority of Christ".

(1) In a note, p. 98, of his "Authority of Christ", Forrest emphasises the fact that the Kenotic theory does not rest on a particular exegesis of the Philippian passage: \textit{\textit{ἐκ} ἑυματικός} Phil. II. 6. Nothing can be further from the fact. The Pauline expressions as to the self-emptying or self-impoverishment, e.g., 2 Cor. 8, only emphasise what the narratives of Christ's life suggest and their elimination would leave the problem as presented in the Gospels precisely where it was.

(2) Dr. Forrest disputes the view of Dr. Gifford that St. Paul in this controverted passage - Phil.II. 5-7, is writing with the technical exactness of a metaphysician. The only thing perfectly plain, says Forrest, is Paul's central and dominating conception of the incomparable self-denial which
Christ underwent in the assumption of humanity for our redemption.

(3) The Gospels put beyond dispute, both as regards the intellectual and moral side of Christ's personality, the genuineness of His human experience. Nothing could be more destructive, not only of the spiritual power, but of the very credibility of the Christian faith than to imply that His human nature was but the outer mask of His plenary Deity.

(4) The Chalcedon Creed is brought under review and adversely criticised, in that it exceeds its Scriptural warrant by stating not only the fact but the very method and conditions of Incarnation. It ascribes "Perfect Godhead" to the Incarnate Christ, but the Gospels do not justify this ascription. It was the Word made flesh, God the Son living under restricted conditions. The result of this determination to cleave to the Divinity of Christ (in the sense that He possessed all the properties of Godhead) at all costs, resulted in an ever-increasing tendency to the Divine views of His humanity.

(5) Dr. Forrest rightly refers to the danger of the patristic method of sharply distinguishing between the two natures. An irreconcilable dualism inevitably results.

We are acquainted with the docetism of the fathers, but it is as apparent in the views of many modern writers, e.g., "Our Lord appears in the Gospels as being finite in knowledge as touching His manhood and omniscient as touching His Godhead."; also "He possessed two knowledges, one universal, the other partial." Such language is, indeed, unintelligible.

Forrest quotes from Westcott, and shows that this method of interpretation is (1) Unscriptural, and (2) futile. (1) "If we take the Gospels as they stand they contain as indubitable proofs of the limitations of our Lord's thoughts as of His consciousness of Divine Sonship; and we are not more serving the interests of truth when we deny the former, than when we deny the latter."
In stressing the obviousness of the fact that Scripture records assign to Christ a place in humanity in a definite historical succession, Forrest shows that as Son of Man He had a relationship and connection with the Jewish people in their history. He was a child of Israel surrounded from childhood by influences of Jewish thought and life which specifically determined the form of His own intellectual and moral development. Behind all external conditions, says Forrest (thus agreeing with Gess and Godet) there lay Himself, His personality, but for His self-realisation He was as dependent as they on external conditions. This fact of His true humanity affects His general mental equipment. The idea that Christ as the Incarnate Son possessed every mental quality and acquisition may be dismissed as baseless, if we allow the portrait given in the Gospels to bear its own witness.

In regard to Christ's relation to the Old Testament, Forrest condemns the idea that by His statements Christ guaranteed the historicity of Old Testament incidents, and says that He merely took the incidents as they stood and as they were regarded by the men of His time, and turned them to spiritual uses.

With Bishop Gore, Forrest holds that the extraordinary knowledge of facts which Christ at times displayed—facts which could not come through ordinary human channels, is a characteristic of prophetic vision, as for example, Elisha's Knowledge of Gehazi's transaction with Naaman.

Dr. Forrest concedes that special illumination may have been vouchsafed to Christ at times, but adds, "no rendering will do justice to the Gospels which does not recognise plainly that ordinarily and normally Christ's knowledge of men and events came to Him through the usual media, and that even His most penetrative judgments were due to His spiritual insight working on the facts before Him. For example, "He knew all men" does not signify a
divine omniscience. It means that He read with unerring accuracy the character of every individual with whom He came into contact.

Christ's sinlessness is acknowledged by Forrest, but sinlessness does not mean that Christ's mind ceased to be a distinctive type of humanity, or that He did not have a definite individuality of His own. "He thought as well as spoke in the language of the people." As far as we know He was not a poet, or a scientist, nor had He the capacity of such.

An important point stressed by Dr. Forrest is that Christ's moral growth involved mental limitations. Temptation with ourselves is connected to a large extent with human ignorance. It was so with Christ, but He alone among men constantly stood in perfect relation to the Father, overcoming not by His foreknowledge, but by His trust. He was perfectly obedient, perfectly dependent; it was thus that He faced temptation and performed His miracles and exercised His unique supremacy over men. "Thinkest thou not that I cannot beseech my Father and He shall even now send me more than twelve legions of angels." Matt. 26.

The Chalcedonian assertion of the two natures in the One Person lends itself, Forrest thinks, to a duality, for it is the duality of the natures, not the unity of the Person, which is uppermost in our minds. Consequently the efforts of the Monophysites to reach a unity are comprehensible. Their fault lay in ignoring the humanity of Christ and thus never reaching a real Incarnation. To reach the unity of the Person we must start with the humanity and perceive in the human, the Divine.

x. This might be disputed by those who perceive the purest poetry in such language as "Consider the lilies how they grow etc."

xx. Forrest evidently just means here that the proof of the Kenosis is in the actual scripturally revealed manhood of Christ. There is no denial of His Pre-existent Personal existence.
Sabatier's sneer at Kenoticism as being "semi-pagan" and the Kenosis as being "Divine Suicide", is unjustifiable, for the limitation was not that of God in His absolute Being, but of the Eternal Son of God. Sabatier's attitude, indeed, is easily explained, for his purpose was to repudiate the Incarnation altogether as a ridiculous impossibility. To apprehend the true being of Christ, however, we must plainly recognise the limitations under which He lived and that these were the inseparable accompaniments of a historical Incarnation.

In Principal Forsyth's book: "The Person and Place of Jesus Christ", we have a view of the Kenosis which is very similar to that of Dr. Forrest.

The Incarnation is conceived of from the point of view of the Pre-existence, the Kenosis and the Plerosis of Christ. No stress is laid on the Virgin Birth, but Dr. Forsyth insists that if we relax the emphasis on the Virgin Birth we must increase it upon the Pre-existence, as St. Paul did.

Postulating therefore the Pre-existence of Christ, Forsyth contends that it does not seem possible to adjust this pre-existence to the historic Jesus without some doctrine of Kenosis. "We face in Christ", he says, "a Godhead self-reduced but real, whose infinite power took effect in self-humiliation; whose strength was perfected in weakness, who consented not to know with an ignorance divinely wise and who emptied Himself in virtue of His divine fulness"

We have in the Incarnation the whole perfect action of Godhead concentrated through one factor or hypothesis within it.

The inability of Christ to sin (non posse peccare) is affirmed, and it is added that "though the impossibility was there, He did not know of it."
Dr. Garvie gives assent to the argument here presented, that the actuality of sin must be excluded, and agrees that the exclusion does not render the humanity unreal.

The two-nature doctrine is practically set aside:

"Let us cease speaking of a nature as if it were an entity of two natures as though independent entities and let us think and speak of two modes of being." "The Son by an act of love's omnipotence set aside the style of God, and took the style of a servant, the mental manner of a man and the mode of moral action that marks human nature."

The self-consciousness of Christ is a growing one. As He grew in Personal consciousness He became conscious of Himself as the eternal Son of God, who had dispossessed Himself to be the Son of Man by a compendious moral act whereby a God, conscious of humanity, became a man equally conscious of Deity."

"He consented not to know and was mighty not to do", and it is evident that Dr. Forsyth here refers to the attitude of the Pre-existent Son before Incarnation.

With certain qualifications, Principal Garvie expresses himself as being at one with Dr. Forsyth's "powerful advocacy of the doctrine of the Kenosis."

Especially suggestive are the analogies which Dr. Forsyth employs for the better understanding of the Divine limitation, and these we give in full:

The first analogy refers to the familiar experience of reducing or obscuring the self-consciousness by a drug. The picture of an Oriental Court is presented with a foolish young Sultan and a venerable Vizier, wise, vigilant and devoted, amidst a ring of plotting pachas. As the Vizier sits next to his master at a feast, he observes a pinch of poison stealthily dropped into the imperial cup. He has heard some rumours of a conspiracy, and he
knows that poison. It means slow paralysis and a lingering death. In a moment he must decide; he takes the resolve. There is no other way. He challenges the King to a pledge in exchanged cups, and in due course he feels the consequence in the impaired powers with which he drags through a year or two of life. He lives thus till the ruler at last learns of his devotion, is stung to his feet by the sacrifice and shews his gratitude by such a change of life and a growth in royal worth as rewards his saviour's love for all it had borne.

The second analogy is that of a great musical genius who commits himself to a line of life which entails almost complete extinction of his native genius. Full of pity and sympathy for the people, he devotes himself to certain democratic associations and enterprises well knowing what would happen upon discovery. He is discovered and deported to Siberia, to an exile rigorous and remote. There, denied of his violin, he spends his life in loving fellowship with the lowliest toils and needs and in patient ministrations to a society which prison has debased. After a lifetime of this, the first brief years of artistic joy and fame might well seem to him at moments almost to belong to another life. All this experience and loss comes through a resolve taken clearly and gravely at a point in his spiritual life.

The third analogy is that of a student with an unusual faculty for philosophical study and metaphysics. For the sake of his family he leaves his study, and learning an unpleasant business, is absorbed in modern industrial conditions, restoring his family to prosperity. In due course he comes to forego more of what it was once his joy to know. Moral and sympathetic volition leads to a certain contraction of his consciousness. He has put himself (sich gesetzt) in a position where he is put upon. (gesetzt sein).

It is quite evident that these analogies are not fully
explanatory of the depotentiation experienced by our Lord in becoming man. Analogies at the best are only partial means of interpreting and arriving at the truth; but these analogies of Dr. Forsyth do seem to reach their point in showing that through a definite intention and act of will one may suffer temporary impoverishment and by so doing confer benefit upon one's fellowmen. As Forsyth himself puts it: "All this experience and loss comes through a resolve taken clearly and gravely at a point in the spiritual life."

The second analogy of the musical genius could be considered still more applicable to the experience of Christ if we imagined the young artist, his benign mission having been fulfilled, restored to that position where he could realise to the full the enjoyment of his musical powers.

Pictures like these, at all events, as Dr. Mackintosh says, render it less impossible for us to conceive the free act of God in Christ as He subdued Himself to the conditions of human life.

"In the province of moral realities, of knowledge at its highest, He who humbled Himself to the death of the Cross gained the name which is above every name."

In Dr. Mackintosh's book: "The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ", under the headings of the "Self-limitation and the Self-realisation of God in Christ" we have a view of the Incarnation which is characterised by the soundest thought and closest adherence to Scriptural data and which leans decidedly toward the Kenotic position.

A "strongly revised interest in Kenoticism" is referred to, the criticism which has been raised against it being considered as often irrelevant - confounding as it does the principle and the forms in which the principle may be applied.
The fact, indeed, that most Christological productions of recent years make some reference to the Kenotic theory, favourable or otherwise, is some indication that interest in the idea is at least not dead.

Dr. Mackintosh is able to associate himself with the Kenotic views of Forsyth and Forrest, and in part at least with Bishop Weston, who speaks of the 'Christ of the Gospels as the Son of God self-restrained in conditions of manhood', and again, "The law of self-restraint, self imposed before the act of Incarnation required of Him that He should taste of the unconsciousness or practical unconsciousness of the unborn child, and experience an Incarnation that necessitated that in the state of His Humiliation He should have no consciousness that His assumed human soul could not mediate."

The Kenotic conception is to Dr. Mackintosh one of great religious significance. "In some way God in Christ has brought His greatness down to the narrow measures of our life, becoming poor for our sake". This, indeed, is a scriptural truth, and has been accepted universally by the Christian consciousness. "It is natural", says Mackintosh, "to prefer a view which both conserves the vital religious interest in the self abnegating descent of God (Deus humilis) and adheres steadfastly to the concrete details of the historic record."

At one with Dr. Forrest and the decided trend of modern thought, a break with tradition is considered to be inevitable on the question of Christ's dual consciousness. "He became poor", as St. Paul says, and "the light is not enhanced if we have to conceive the idea that all the time He remained rich."

It is a most credible thought that God who is love should live beside us in "the form of one finite spirit", that His love might be revealed, and that men might thus be won to Him.
The obvious differences between the older and newer theories of Kenoticism are pointed out. The older Kenotic conceptions were often more speculative than scriptural and aimed at a minutely detailed explanation as to the process of Incarnation; modern Kenotic statements aim rather at a conception which shall be "as a key to unlock the problems of the higher life."

The discussion of the relation of the Divine and human in Christ is practically avoided by Dr. Mackintosh, but he pronounces against any view that would set up a Duality in Him. "Exactly how the Divine qualities in Christ were adjusted to the human lot we do not know, but... the truth of Godhead was His inmost being, while yet He was our brother in humanity."

Dr. Mackintosh rightly contends that it is presumptuous to dogmatize, "extra scripturam", as to the existence or activity of the Word or Son of God apart from the Incarnate life, for two reasons:

2. The assumption of the Word carrying on His cosmic functions "extra carnem" tends to ditheism. We know nothing of the existence of the Logos apart from, but synchronous with His reality in Jesus.

Four main points are stressed by Dr. Mackintosh as being implied in the Christian view of Jesus, and he justly contends that it is difficult to perceive how Kenoticism in some form is to be avoided by one who asserts them all, and at the same time aims at a reasoned Christology.

1. Christ is now Divine - the object of faith and worship.
2. In some sense His divinity is eternal and not the fruit of time. His pre-mundane being is therefore real and not merely ideal.
3. His life on earth was unquestionably human. Jesus was a man, a Jew of the first century, with a life localised in and restricted by a body organic to His self-consciousness.
He had limited power and knowledge. His moral nature was susceptible of growth and exposed to life-long temptations. His piety and personal religion was characterised by continuous dependence upon God. The life-divine in Him found expression through human faculty with a self-consciousness and activity mediated through His human nature.

4. We cannot predicate of Him two consciousnesses or two wills. The New Testament indicates nothing of the kind, nor indeed is it congruous with an intelligible psychology. The unity of His personal life is axiomatic.

Granted that Christ is God, the alternatives are practically reduced to three:

1. He acquired Godhead, - but this is pagan.
2. He carried eternal Deity unmodified into the sphere of time, - but this is unhistoric.
3. In Christ we are face to face with God, who in one of the distinguishable constituents of His Being came amongst us by a great act of self-abnegation.

The idea that a real Kenosis is a moral as well as a theological necessity is also emphasised by Dr. Mackintosh: "It was an ethically appealing act of God."

Concerning the objection to the Kenosis on the ground of God's immutability, Mackintosh well says that "sheer unchangeableness is an intellectual impossibility. It would involve the gravest ethical caprice". God then would be arbitrary and mechanical under all circumstances. "The immutability of God is His holy love and it is through this love that we have the great act of Sacrifice in "the self-renouncing, Self-retracting act of the Son's will."

For us men and our salvation it may well be that He committed Himself in one aspect of His personal being to a grade of experience qualified by change and development, thus stooping to conquer and permitting the conditions of manhood to prevail over His own freedom.
The same principle is applied to Omniscience and and Omnipotence which themselves must be morally conditioned.

While asserting that the question of an extra-mundane existence during the Incarnate life of Christ is beyond the scope of human proof and thought, Mackintosh maintains the one-ness of Christ with a life wholly restrained within the bounds of manhood. He says, in fact, "Outside the conditions imposed by the choice of life as man, the Son has no activity or knowledge."

The question of divine self-consciousness is considered, and Mackintosh concludes that it could only have been in mature manhood, perhaps intermittently, that Christ became aware of His divinity, which must have remained an object of faith to the very end. In a subsequent passage, the belief is expressed that "in high moments of visitation He knew Himself to be God conditioned in and by humanity."

On the thought of the capacity of the human to receive the divine, Dr. Mackintosh says that God and man are not definable as opposites and that time is susceptible of eternity. Given these two points, it will not seem incredible that there should have existed in Christ under conditions never again repeated "a gradual coalescence of life - Divine and human."

"If personal Godhead enters history it must be in virtue of its own omnipotent self-reduction, and in the historic Christ, living, dying, risen ... there is found a deepening and culminating synthesis within a single integrate life of the Divine - human factors to which faith bears equal witness,"

On the problem of the Divine Self-consciousness in Christ it seems more accurate to employ the analogy of our ordinary consciousness and to say, what is equally in accord with the limited Scriptural data which we possess, that the self-apprehension of Christ's true being and Divinity advanced as it were pari passu with His mental and spiritual growth. It was dim in childhood, but it was there, and it reached full assurance at maturity, although it was always humanely conceived, and had not the full content of the pre-mundane Divine consciousness. Certainly at the Baptism the words from Heaven: "This is My Beloved Son" seem to bring full corroboration, turning any doubt into an abiding certainty.
We can perceive in the expositions which have been given of the views of Professor Mackintosh, Dr. Forrest and Principal Forsyth that they are practically at one in so far as they deal with the same problems, and as no conclusion is reached except as it is based upon actual spiritual data, their theory of a real Kenosis seems incontrovertible. These three scholars, at all events, seem to be the leading British exponents of modern Kenoticism which holds that the Pre-existent Personal Son of God - the Logos - temporarily exchanged His eternal and heavenly mode of being for an earthly one, the result being a perfect unity - the man Christ Jesus.

The only leading German theologian of recent years who has dealt with the subject of the Kenosis systematically and thoroughly is Dr. Oscar Bensow, whose work "Die Lehre von der Kenose" published in 1903, still remains untranslated into English.

In the main the writer can be said to reach the same conclusions as the scholars whose views have just been considered.

After reviewing and criticising the theories of former Kenotic writers and finding traces of Kenoticism in the early fathers, Dr. Bensow makes a systematic presentation of the Kenosis in the 3rd Chapter of his book. In the first section he deals with the personal Pre-existence of the Son of God, the feasibility and the necessity of the Incarnation. In the 2nd Section there is a discussion on the possible changes in the mode of being of the Son of God, the development of power in the Incarnate state, the Self-consciousness of Christ. There is much, however, which is purely speculative in the discussion of the metamorphosis of the attributes. (Eigenschaften Gottes).

In the 3rd Section the writer deals with the life of the Incarnate man, the Birth and God-human development and
finally the Exaltation.

Dr. Bensow's argument is that in the Kenosis there was a *metamorphosis*. The Son of God exchanged one mode of being for another, and yet he endeavours to prove by copious extracts from Scripture that even when Incarnate, Christ was "Vere deus et vere homo" - true God and true man. We must assume, says Bensow, from our investigation:

1. dass wir eine *Κένωσις τοῦ λόγου* eine Entausserung des praexistenten Sohnes Gottes, welche sich in und mit der menschwerdung vollzieht... und

2. dass diese *Κένωσις* sich auf die μορφή, die existenzform oder seinsweise des Logos bezieht."

Bensow cleaves to the idea of the essential unity of the incarnate Christ. He continually asserts that there is no Logos outside the flesh. "Logos non extra carnem et caro non extra carnem."

Bensow expresses his almost entire agreement with the view of A. V. Oettingen (Dogmatik II. 2. S.102) that Christ developed in knowledge and power and that there was a gradual progress to a full and clear knowledge of His Messiahship and Divine Sonship.

The Kenotic views of Bensow are clearly stated when he confronts the question: Could Jesus sin? Could He fall? "Konnte Jesus fallen, konnte er sundigen?" Herein the writer differs from Gess who adhered to the theory of "potuit peccare", who held the view that the temptation becomes an empty illusion if we do not ascribe to the Lord the ability to sin.

Bensow meets this attitude by saying that if we confront the eventual realisation of this possibility and its consequences it really proves that this conception must include an apostasy of God from Himself, and with it an annihilation of God. From the impossibility of this conception we must again draw the conclusion: "A thing which
cannot become real cannot be possible." Hence non potuit peccare. We seem, concludes Bensow, to have to attribute both conceptions to the Lord, both the posse peccare as well as the non posse peccare. This is, however, impossible for indeed we cannot attribute $\text{A}$ and not $\text{A}$ to one subject simultaneously.

The temptations were real and not merely external. With Riehm, Bensow asserts that merely external temptations would be irreconcilable both with the $\gamma\alpha\tau\alpha\nu\nu\tau\alpha$ and the $\kappa\alpha\beta\iota\;\omicron\varsigma\epsilon\epsilon\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\nu\tau\alpha$ of Heb. 4:7. The Temptation must first have a point of contact somewhere in Him who is to be tempted, and secondly the prospective gain which is (deceptively) held forth in the temptation must be taken up in the mind of him who is to be tempted.

The point of contact in Jesus is found in His purpose to remain in a humble station, in the natural emotions and physical conditions which essentially (an sich) have no moral character, in the feelings of desire and repugnance, of pleasure and pain which Jesus felt, for example, Jesus' hunger in the Temptation on the Mount provided the Tempter with a point of contact. Similarly His desire to win man unto Him and for the Kingdom of God was a point of approach in the temptation urging Him to proclaim Himself as the Messiah by means of an outward visible miracle. This point of contact, however, is not to be considered as indicative of a sinful disposition, a propensity for evil in Christ. On the other hand the fact of sinlessness does not militate against His real manhood, for sin does not belong to the nature of man; it is indeed, thinks Bensow, actually a contradiction of real human nature. Because Christ was truly man He had the susceptibility for temptation, because He was truly God the temptation could not bring Him to fall.

"Weil er vere homo ist, hat er die Empfänglichkeit für die Versuchung, weil er vere Deus ist, konnte die Versuchung
Superficially considered, says Bensow, this is suggestive of exaggerated sophistry, because one seems compelled to object that if we deny the capability of sinning we thereby also annul the capability of being tempted and make the temptation an empty illusion. How superficial this view is, is shewn by the fact that in his objection two things are forgotten: viz.,

1. That in the Kenotic view we are not to accept any actual omniscience...no actual divine foreknowledge, no actual omnipotence, yea, no actual divine attribute in its eternal form (Ewigkeitsform) at all in the developing Jesus. The temptation, therefore, was not for Jesus a drama which He had previously read, all the details of which He previously knew, the result of which, He could, so to speak, look forward to with indifference.

2. Men overlook the suffering which the temptation involved for Jesus, an aspect which is nevertheless of the greatest importance. Because the flesh of Jesus provided the temptation and the Tempter a point of assailment, the Temptation was a reality even if He could not fall. The Temptation was real suffering, and because the Saviour suffered thus He can also be a High Priest who sympathizes with our infirmities. Heb. IV. 15.

Bensow here illustrates his view by an analogy:

A person travels on a difficult thorny road, which, however, is the only way that can bring him to the goal of his travels. Alongside of him he sees another road which seems delightful in the highest degree. To travel by this road appears to be a joy. But it is only a "Fata Morgana" One single step in this direction and the traveller would fall headlong down a precipice. He, however, does not take this step, for a mighty arm (the Divine-human love-purpose (Liebeswille) of the Saviour) keeps him back. The path of
suffering begins to burn under his feet, but he continues on his way. Just as the Fata Morgana of a spring makes the thirst of the desert traveller more burning, so it brings him an even more bitter suffering to mount the difficult road - the via dolorosa - in sight of the easier way.

If anyone holds me fast in the right way would I not experience it as a reality if another attempted to tear me away forcibly from this way? Surely I must experience his strong grip, his struggle as a suffering (to myself). It would be an incapability of temptation in this case only, viz: if a fixed wall were between me and the tempter so that he could not reach me at all.

A feature of Bensow's Theory of the Kenosis is that the self-imposed limitation extended to the Exalted State. X

"When we now finally turn to the Exaltation", he writes, "we must also here before all else emphasise that the Saviour remained "vere homo", and that our Christological principle 'Logos non extra carnem' thus has its full validity also in relation to the Exalted One. Correctly therefore does Gess say of Him who sits at God's right hand: "Through that which He adopted from Mary's flesh and blood His divine activity is mediated to us, even His own Divinity and His intercourse with the Father and the Spirit."

By virtue of its receptivity for God the human nature can also mediate the actual divine attributes in its glorified state. Thus the exalted Saviour is actually omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent, not, however, in the dominion of power, but in that of grace. "Nicht aber im regnum potentiae, sondern im regnum gratiae".

The activity of the Logos which has been changed into the activity of Christ always remains a Christ activity. Also the exalted Son of God exercises no Logos activity independent of the Christ activity, for this would again come into conflict with the principle: "The Logos does not exist outside the flesh". As Christ, however, He labours in the
Kingdom of Grace, labours ever to procure that this Kingdom will assimilate more and more of the Kingdom of Power. "We, therefore, do not wish to limit the high priestly intercession of Christ to believers." Already in His earthly prayer of Intercession, the Saviour does not pray only for His disciples, but also for those who are led to faith through the preaching of the disciples. (John 17:20). He prays - we may therefore say - in heaven for each person who is an object of the activity of the Holy Spirit; that is, since grace is universal, He prays for every person. He prays for those who do not believe in Him that they may come to faith, and He prays for those who believe that they may remain firm in their faith and increase. The realisation of this prayer occurs through the Holy Spirit which henceforth acts as the Spirit of Christ. The purpose of his prayer above, on the right hand of God, even as here on earth, remains the same - "that they all may be one, even as Thou Father art in Me and I in Thee, that they also may be in us; that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me." - John 17:21. As this prayer now of the Exalted Saviour is gradually realised through the activity of the Holy Spirit, so also the body of Christ His Church is gradually established. Eph. 4:12; Col. 1:24; The Head, however, cannot remain unaffected by the development of the body, and we must therefore say that Christ is ever yet living an historical life in and with His congregation. Bensow here from this point of view agrees with Martensen when he speaks of a growth even of the Exalted One.

"How long then will He develop?" We reply "As long as the Kingdom of Grace develops ... till the dispensation of Grace has absorbed (aufgenommen hat) the whole dispensation of power. He must reign till He has put all His enemies under His feet. 1 Cor.15:25. When, however, everything shall have been subjected to Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subjected to Him that did subject all things unto Him, that God may be all in all. 1 Cor. 15:28."
The Son had at the time of the Kenosis divested Himself of the Rule of Power in order to be King in the Kingdom of Grace. "Der Sohn hatte bei der Kenose die Krone des regnum potentiae abgelegt, um König im Reich der Gnade zu werden".

In the Humiliation He established this Kingdom; in the Exaltation He reigns in this Kingdom, and victoriously continues the work till the reign of Grace had absorbed the whole reign of Power; i.e., till the Reign of Grace has been realised.

He humbles Himself to be exalted, and He is exalted, not indeed in respect of His being, but in respect of His position in the world - to a glory which far excels His pre-mundane glory, for with the coming of the Kingdom of Glory the goal of God's loving will has been realised. When this has happened the Kenosis is ended, then the Upsosis (συμπληρώσεως) has been completed and the Three-fold God is all in all.

These quotations give the Kenotic position of Bensow and in spite of much that is speculative - especially in regard to the Divine attributes and the Kenosis in the Exaltation - the attitude taken is on Scriptural grounds. Bensow rejects the claim of having unveiled "the most holy mystery of the Person of Christ," believing indeed that it cannot be comprehended in the intellectual categories of human thought. What he desires to do is "to reject erroneous conceptions of the Person of Christ, and to fix as far as possible the picture of Christ as holy Scripture depicts it for us, and to show on what lines we must think if we are not to come into conflict with the postulate of faith - (Glaubens-postulat) One Christ, truly God and truly man.

In conclusion, he presents an analogy to illustrate his view of the Kenosis: A King rules over many countries and peoples. One people, however, has turned itself from Him and has now been conquered by the enemy and enslaved. The King desires to rescue this people; but the latter fears its rightful King and has sunk so far that it loves the chain because
of the carnal pleasures connected with it, and no more desires to be free. The King sends messengers to this people to call it back from the way of destruction; but the messengers are hated and killed. Urged by love and compassion the King, finally also sends His only-begotten Son. He renounces (legt) His crown, and in great humility comes to His people to store for their treason and to win the hearts of the unfortunate. He wants to deliver the people not only from the chain, but also from their love towards it. He knows that He would not be able to do this if He came as the King's Son. He therefore becomes a Beggar. It is, however, not merely a disguise; He really does become a Beggar. Love urges Him to it and He has the firm conviction that He will be able to save His people by this sacrifice and regain the renounced crown. Thus He has now become a beggar and of the King's Son nothing else remains, excepting that He is still always, according to His nature, the King's son, and there also remains His great royal love to His people. In his consciousness He knows Himself as the King's Son, but also as beggar, i.e., as a Prince who has become beggar and who has retained nothing of His royal dignity except His royal love.

Thus He comes to His people. The majority will not have anything to do with Him, but He nevertheless wins a small band to his side. And now He commences his work - the redemption of the treachery to the King, which causes Him the severest suffering. He is, however, victorious. He conquers the foe and the hatred of His people and wins their hearts even by his suffering. Thus a primarily small Kingdom establishes itself within the nation, the citizens of which desire to acknowledge Him and Him only as the King's Son and through Him the lawful King; citizens who again hope to receive the favour of the King by virtue of the redemption made for their treason, and who would rather suffer the very worst along with the King's son, than again bear the once loved chain, now, however, deemed a terrible disgrace.
He becomes King in this Kingdom which ever grows and at last encompasses the whole nation. Thus He again gains His renounced crown, but now He is more than merely King; He has become the saviour of His people. Around the royal crown of the Saviour the crown of thorns is entwined as a sign of His endless love.
The "Eternal Kenosis" View.

Principal Garvie and Dr. W. L. Walker both accept the Kenotic principle, but reject the interpretation adopted by modern Kenoticists, preferring to speak of the Eternal Kenosis in which the Son is for ever passing out of the Father and again returning to the bosom of God.

In Dr. Walker's book: "The Gospel of the Eternal", the Cross is taken as the distinctive symbol of the innermost being of Deity. The life of God, he says, is for ever the same life of self-sacrifice, because it is the life of perfect love. Love, as Professor Simpson says, must express itself in action. "God is constantly giving Himself in creation in order to find Himself again in those whom He has raised to participation in the Divine Life". "Perfect love is the source of God's continued self-giving in the boundless never-ceasing Creation - the motive of the eternal Kenosis in which it is founded, wherein the Highest is for ever going down to the lowest ... to return to Himself again in them as His sons."

The Incarnation is thus considered as:

1. A process of Divine self-realisation in human form - God and man in one person. It implies not a temporal, but an eternal Kenosis in God, and His self-realisation in the world, not as the result of physical prowess merely, but of an ethical development through the spirit. Dr. Walker considers that we do not require to affirm a physical miracle in the Virgin birth nor is it necessary to suppose that God or "a person in the Godhead" in one moment of time so emptied Himself of the Divine attributes or so put off the Divine 'form' ... as to be

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x The full unity of Christ with God was manifested in the sacrifice of the Cross. (Mt. Theism. 300).

xx "All Creation is a process of Kenosis."

(Prof. J. Simpson: "Man! and the Attainment of Immortality" p. 25.)
able to clothe Himself in human flesh. It is not necessary, continues Dr. Walker, were it possible to think of God as coming into the World-process at some definite point of time, as if from without and becoming Incarnate. The real incarnation can only be the result of a gradual progressive process of entrance into and self-expression in humanity.

(2) A distinction is made between the personal presence of God and His immanent presence. Before Christ, says Dr. Walker, it is only in impersonal form that God was in the world. Up till the Incarnation God as Son was immanent in the world as an Idea, but not as yet personally present in its life.

In presenting his view of the Incarnation Dr. Walker seeks to avoid two errors:

(1) The projection into the eternal Godhead of the historical person of Jesus Christ as a concrete individual.

(2) The denying of the pre-existence of the divine sonship in Christ.

In "The Spirit and the Incarnation" Walker speaks of God "in that aspect of His being that may be best described as Sonship" becoming incarnate in Jesus Christ, Christ thus having on one side of His nature not merely an ideal but a real pre-existence in God. "The Divine thought of the Creation" fully expresses itself; God gives Himself completely to man.

The possibility of the Incarnation becomes all the more apparent because there is no opposition between human and divine; since man is conceived in the image of God the human can become the manifestation of the Divine. Christ is God in human form and the human is akin to the divine; "thus there were not two natures, but one Nature in one Divine-human Person even that nature which was in the Eternal Son in whose image we are conceived, the Ideal of every man." "The Divine Immanence", however, "implies not a temporal but an Eternal Kenosis in God."
The thought of an Eternal Kenosis is also entertained by Principal Garvie in his book on "Inner Studies of the Life of Jesus". Here, indeed, the author agrees entirely with Dr. Walker in his view of the Kenosis as being necessarily involved in Creation.

Infinite power exercises itself in finite forces. Infinite wisdom is displayed and present in finite laws. Infinite truth communicates itself in the process of finite knowledge, ... Infinite grace humbles itself in the uplifting of the finite soul to God."

The Sonship in God is Kenosis. The Incarnation is not a solitary act of Divine humiliation, it is the highest stage in a process in which the infinite empties Himself in the finite. It is the culmination which reveals the mystery hidden in all the earlier stages. The earthly life of Christ thus becomes the crowning act of God's giving Himself to the world and man.

In his article on Jesus or Christ, (Hibbert Journal 1909) dwelling on the possibility in God of Kenosis, Dr. Garvie says "God can limit Himself to express or communicate Himself."

In another article he writes: "God's personal presence and moral character and gracious action can be adequately and directly expressed and communicated in a personality not necessarily endowed with omnipresence etc."

God is considered as so infinite and absolute that finitude and dependence are not an impossibility to Him in His self-manifestation and self-communication. Jesus can only be interpreted in fact as the Creative act of God in which this Kenotic principle in God, Word or Son, in His perfect reality entered as man into the world.

As with Dr. Walker, the divine principle of Kenosis is considered as being exercised completely and finding full expression in the Cross.

The idea is, of course, not a new one, being present with the early fathers. Leibner also (Christologie 1849) in his Trinitarian conception speaks of an eternal Kenosis, which, in the Incarnation, however, became temporal.
That in God, in His metaphysical capacity as in His ethical character, which is the source of the created finite existence was revealed and communicated in the self-sacrifice by which man is saved from his sin.

The pre-existence of Christ as believed in by St. Paul is declared to be proved by Phil. II. 5-7.

With Forrest and others, Dr. Garvie holds that the theory of the Kenosis does not depend for its existence on the famous passage in Philippians alone; but that it is suggested in many Scriptural passages: He quotes:

Rom. 8.5 - "God sending His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh."

Gal. 4.4 - "God sent forth His Son, born of a woman, born under the law."

2 Cor. 8.21 - "Him who knew no sin, He made to be sin."

Gal. 3.13 - "Christ having become a curse for us".

Heb. 2.14 - "Since then the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself in like manner, partook of the same."

8.18 - "In that He Himself hath suffered, being tempted, He is able to succour them that are tempted."

4.15 - "A High Priest ... in all points tempted like as we are, without sin."

5.18 - Though He were a Son, yet learned He obedience by the things which He suffered.

2 Cor. 8.9 - "Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might become rich."

John 1.14: Where the Kenosis is described in the words: "The Word was made flesh."

"The study of the facts of the life of Jesus proves undoubtedly the Kenosis".

Christ is represented as having none of the "metaphysical attributes"; omnipotence etc. "He learned by experience".
"To deny the limitation of Jesus' knowledge", says Garvie, "is to reduce the Incarnation to a mere semblance".

"The Kenosis of the Son of God in the Incarnation necessarily involved the limitation of His knowledge on all matters not directly relating to the fulfilment of His vocation."

Mark. 13. 32 is held to be a double proof of limitation.
(1) It is a confession of ignorance on Christ's part.
(2) It indicated Christ's surprise that God the Father had not revealed it to Him.

As another proof of Christ's limitation of knowledge, Garvie instances the call of Judas, which, he says, was made in good faith. "It would have been morally wrong to place another man in a position that involved not only possible moral peril, but certain moral ruin."

Referring to the Chalcedon Creed, Dr. Garvie contends that *aparēnous* forbids our thinking that the Incarnation made any difference in God or man, or involved any humiliation in the one, any exaltation in the other. Paul's words in Phil. II.7 έαυτόν ἐκένωσεν would, on the Chalcedon postulate, be rank error. "This is the static view of Greek philosophy, while the Scriptural and modern view is dynamic."

In spite, however, of Dr. Garvie's endorsement of Kenoticism, as indicative of the limitation of the Son of God in His earthly life, he would reject current Kenotic theories on the ground that:
(1) The use of the word *kenos* is too slender a basis for speculation.
(2) The theory of the depotentiation of the Logos is too high a speculation for us. We need to revise the conception of God assumed... so that the self-limitation necessarily involved in Incarnation shall not be depotentiation but self-fulfilment". By "Kenosis" God reaches "plerosis".
Criticism of the "Eternal Kenosis" View.

(1) The theory of the Eternal Kenosis is an attractive one and on metaphysical grounds there seems to be little reason for rejecting it. God in a sense necessarily limits Himself in creating; the infinite adapts Himself to the finite. In creating and endowing a being with powers such as those with which man is invested, there is necessarily self-limitation on the part of God, and it cannot be urged as a sound objection that Creation becomes thus a destructive force, for it is a self-imposed restriction on God's part, - a restriction whereby He habitually, as it were, realises Himself. At the best, however, there is much in the scheme of thought of Dr. Walker and Principal Garvie which is and must remain purely speculative, and which prevents its acceptance on the basis of Scriptural data and actual experience.

Dr. Walker's theory would indeed make the Incarnation a necessity, whereas Scripture regards it as an act of supreme and voluntary grace.

(2) It is as the above writers pass to the actual Incarnation of the Son of God that they develop theories, which, though still in a sense Kenotic, are not in harmony with modern Kenoticism in its view of a real depotentiation in time. "All of the theories must be rejected", says Garvie. There is, however, a decided inconsistency manifest in Dr. Garvie's writings. He recognises that the Kenosis does not depend only upon Phil. 2:5-7, and yet he rejects the idea of a real temporal Kenosis on the ground that "the use of the word Κένωσις is too slender a basis for speculation".

(3) The Theory of the Depotentiation is regarded as "too high a speculation for us". Accepting the Scriptural portrait and the Scriptural data, however, part of which he himself has set forth, as the definite ground and justification for the doctrine of the Kenosis, the term 'speculation' is not applicable.
(4) The Kenoticists along with Dr. Garvie and Dr. Walker affirm the Kenosis to be a Plerosis. God's self-revelation is His self-realisation.

(5) Dr. Walker's statement that up till the Incarnation God as son was immanent in the world as an Idea, but not as yet personally in its life, is not in harmony with distinct references to the personal pre-existence of the Son of God who became Incarnate, e.g.; John I.14; Phil.II.5-7; 2 Cor.8.9 etc.

It is evident that the Kenotic problem cannot find solution in a theory which holds that there was no temporal Plenos-is and only speaks of an eternal self-limitation. We may accept the idea that God is always limiting Himself in coming into contact with things and beings finite, but this does not obviate the great Scriptural doctrine that there was a definite particular act of Exinanition which involved a great sacrifice on the part of the Son of God. If we reject this, we reject the main plank of evangelical teaching, nay, the New Testament itself.

In the theory of these writers we have an unhappy reminder of the idea of Strauss, who, while denying the temporal Incarnation, asserts that the true Incarnation is the Incarnation of God from all Eternity, not an incarnation of a given moment, the true unity of God and man has the race as its realisation, not an individual. (Strauss. 1st Life of Jesus. III. 437-8)

The Kenotic view expressed by D. W. Simon in his "Reconciliation by Incarnation" is partly speculative and extra-Scriptural, and contains ideas similar to those expressed in Walker's timeless Kenosis theory; but his philosophy of Creation leads up to somewhat original views of the Kenosis in time of the Logos in Jesus Christ.

It is, says Simon, as God enters into the world and exercises His cosmic functions that He experiences some form of Kenosis. The emission of the energy by whose action on
matter the cosmos is being evolved ... is consciously and
freely controlled by God with constant and due regard to the
successive stages through which the cosmos passes in the
process of evolution. As soon, however, as the divine energy
either at the beginning or at the later stages, enters on its
cosmic work, it ceases to be under the direct control or
perhaps open to the immediate knowledge of God; not, says
Simon, because of a necessity imposed on God from without,
but in pursuance of His own idea and purpose. In other
words, "the divine energy undergoes a kind of Kenosis". This
latter relation of God to the world may be called His imman­
ence, the former His transcendence.

In his view of the Trinity, Simon endeavours to make
his conception harmonise with the Scriptural presentation.
God is a Trinity - Father, Spirit, Logos. The Father is in
a special sense the creator of the matter out of which the
cosmos is being evolved. The Person known as the Holy Spirit
is the intra-divine centre and extra-divine wielder of the
energy by which the cosmos is being evolved. The Person
known as the Logos, or Word, who as incarnate is designated
the Son of God, is the intra-divine centre of the activity by
which the cosmos idea is formed, and the extra-divine power
which informs or interweaves the complex of laws or idea with
the cosmic energy.

Affected to a certain extent by the semimodalism of
Dorner, Simon prefers to speak of the 'personific factors'
rather than the 'persons' of the Godhead. These 'personific
factors' he regards as distinct from each other; yet in a
true sense what one does, all do, - what all do, each does.
They are therefore referred to, alike in Scripture and in the
thought of the Church, as if certain of their functions and
activities were interchangeable.

In his conception of God and His relations to the world,
Simon's ideas seem to suggest a kind of semi-Pañhism.
earth to which man belongs is, he says, "a partial immateri-
lation of the Logos idea"

"The evolution of the cosmos by the Logos may be regard-
ed in fact as in some sense the reflex of an evolution in the
Logos."

These ideas lead up to the Kenosis which is involved in the
Incarnation, which Simon regards as the self-accommodation of
the Logos to the cosmos. This self-accommodation of the
Logos (i.e. to a consciously variable force) passes at a
certain point into self-limitation. "The self-emptying
taught in Phil. II. 5-7 is really a form of self-limitation."
The point is stressed that the very constitution of nature
places a restriction on the Divine powers as God comes into
contact with it - a restriction which is re-emphasised as
being not exactly objective or external, but which God has
placed upon Himself; seeing that it is He who has given nature
its formation and powers. God is thus in a sense not omnip-
potent -

(1) The Divine power is self-limited. God cannot regard
matter as though it were not matter, still less with regard to
matter, that it is mechanically or chemically combined, as if
it were not combined; still less with living beings as if they
did not exist, least of all with man as conscious or self-con-
trolled, i.e., as in a secondary sense a self-maker or self-
creator. Relatively to each of these and all other classes
of existence, God is limited. By His own volition and purpose
His freedom to act is bounded by them.

Simon rightly remarks in a note, that the earlier Pro-
testant theologians too often really ignored these facts or
contradicted them in obedience to an abstract doctrine of the
divine omnipotence and unchangeableness.

The fact of God's self-imposed limitation in regard to
dealings with man is specially emphasised. "The inner man
forms a sacred enclosure at whose entrance gate even the
Almighty God must knock - knock too in harmony with the laws of the personal life ere He can secure admittance". The thunderbolts of the 'Great Jove' must be laid aside when He would accomplish anything with this creature of His hand, this worm of the dust, "this Titan whom a moth can vanquish".

(2) The Divine knowledge is also self-limited. God does not Himself work everything that is worked, directly and immediately. Movements, changes, actions and reactions in the cosmos, the integrations and disintegrations which constitute the cosmic process - for the knowledge of these, God must depend, through His own purpose and constitution of them - on observation.

This is true, says Simon, in respect of men. If every product of the human will is known to God before it comes into existence, then its coming into existence must have been certain. But if anything is true, it is true that man is free; if he is not free, then all is "Maya". God, in fact, is the conclusion of Simon, does not know what man's attitude will be when confronted by a choice of action. This is self-limitation, almost self-humiliation.

Man is described as a kind of prophetic incarnation of God, the fulness of which was to be made in Jesus Christ. "Each of us is a veritable Logos-idea conceived and enfleshed by the over-shadowing power of the Spirit of God."

The ultimate necessity for the Incarnation is found in sin which becomes a limiting influence demanding further self-adaptation. "If the element of a real world imposed on God self-adaptation and self-limitation ..., in how much greater a degree will they be necessary when the same world has been disordered by sin."

If freedom imposed a certain limit on the divine knowledge ... would not sin of necessity involve a still further Kenosis or self-emptying? The Logos indeed could have withdrawn the "differentiating" idea by which man is
constituted what he is, and let the energy to which it gave limits and form flow back so to speak into the general stream of which it was a branch. Instead of this, God imposed on Himself still greater limitations and accommodations. He bore with men. He exercised patience.

Sin, says Dr. Simon, holds a prominent place as a cause for the Incarnation. It has introduced in some sense disorder into the life of God Himself. If man is considered as a differentiation of divine energy, the incarnation of the Logos-idea, then he is not something absolutely dissociated from or outside God. The entrance of disease into a branch must affect the stream out of which it flows. Not that we can injuriously affect the divine health, but we can and do cause God pain and sorrow. Thus there is a certain responsibility lying upon the Logos for the sin of the world, the emanation as it were of the Logos energy.

The extent of the Kenosis was this: the Logos still possessed divine powers in the Incarnate state, but He was not conscious of this power. The Kenosis was a self-limitation of consciousness of power.

The Person incarnate, further, is considered to be not Logos actuality, for He had become flesh. He had emptied Himself of the divine form, i.e., "of the specific divine consciousness." Nor was He man, for though He was essentially akin to man, He differed from man in nature, powers and intermittent consciousness no less than in His moral and spiritual character. He was God-man. "The Incarnate Logos is human, but was not and is not a man."

In accordance with the theory of partial kenosis of self-consciousness, Simon imagines that there were "mysterious upflashings from the veiled depths of His nature", compelling Him to utterances such as: "I and my Father are one". "Before Abraham was I am", and "many others which tremble on the very verge of a distinct affirmation of divinity."
"He was startled by strange inklings, dazzled by unearthly flashings and altogether agitated to bewilderment by the mystery of His own being."

The Son of God is considered as continuing His cosmic functions in the Eternal sphere. "Its suspense (i.e., of the cosmic activities) would have involved either the collapse of the world or the substitution of another divine creative and substantive mediator."

Through the human medium of His birth Christ is declared to be "posse peccare". The flesh which He took over from Mary His mother is considered as flesh laden with possibilities of evil as well as good - potentialities which were due to the sins of innumerable previous generations.

Christ's experience is held to be a truly human one, but His consciousness, in as much as He was essentially divine, must have been saturated with God to a degree which is not possible for man. He had an all-pervading sense of God, transcending what is possible to the holiest and grandest of men. Yet at the same time the veiling ... must necessarily have caused God to seem distinct from and transcendent to Himself. Christ's dependence upon the Father is expressed in that He recognised the Father as the source and giver of grace and light, and as He needed so He asked for it.

Criticism.

(1) A valuable contribution may be considered as being made to the Kenotic thought in the emphasis which Dr. Simon places upon the necessity of God's self-adaptation to His own Creation; and in the idea that God is voluntarily ignorant concerning man's action at the cross roads of decision is worthy of the deepest attention.

(2) Dr. Simon, however, goes outside Scriptural data when he places upon the Logos the responsibility for sin and the necessity for healing the breach caused through man's fall. It was of God's free will and grace that He sent the Logos,
it was through love that the Logos came. The thought of disharmony in the Trinity is unentertainable. Perfect Love and perfect unanimity of thought and action must ever prevail in the Godhead. The Scriptures lead us to believe that the whole Godhead shared in some way in the Incarnation, although it was the Logos who actually came in the flesh.

(3) The idea of the "strange inklings and unearthly flashings" lends itself to the criticism made against the subliminal consciousness theory of Dr. Sanday. There could have been no doubt in Christ's mind after the Baptism that He was in a unique sense the Son of God although the content of that knowledge was limited to His human condition, but the revelation must have come through the normal consciousness.

(4) The argument for the retention of the cosmic activities is purely a priori, and the contention that the world would 'collapse' apart from the continuance of the Logos's eternal functions is dealing with something beyond our ken.

(5) The statement that Christ is not a man, although human, is against the mass of Scriptural evidence and the Scriptural portrait of the One who being man was tempted in all points like unto ourselves.

(6) The Scriptural idea of the kenosis seems to extend beyond the mere loss of the consciousness of power. Such a theory implies that Christ was under a life-long delusion. The Son of God suffered a kenosis of His eternal form which most commentators make to include the divine attributes of omnipotence etc.

(7) The idea of the pre-existent Son of God being a "personific factor" is too suggestive of Modalism to meet the full presentation of Christ in Scripture as having an Eternal personal existence.
The Roman Catholic Conception of the Kenosis.

The Roman attitude to Kenoticism is that of direct opposition, its dogma adhering to the consensus of the early Church in its Western form.

In his article in the Hibbert Journal Supplement (1909) J. Rickaby, S.J., gives the 'catholic' conception of the kenosis when he says that the term does not mean that our Lord as man really was ignorant, fallible, weak, defenceless; on the contrary He had ever at His command all the wisdom and power of God ... to call upon as He wished. (i.e., there was only a δυνατός or partial δυνατός ηθικής).

When there was question of making display of Himself before mankind ordinarily, He would not. Kenosis in Him was the avoidance of anything showy on rare occasions, e.g., the Transfiguration. "It was the maintenance of an habitual incognito, so far as outward mien went." It was the keeping back of treasures of wisdom which He was not there and then prepared to lay out before the vulgar gaze, the terms of His mission to men not so requiring.

Again in a note, p. 138, it is said: "True by kenosis He surrendered Himself to suffering and agony, but not to helplessness. Any moment He could have flung suffering from Him, and that He was sorely tempted to do in the Garden. But ignorance is helplessness."

In stating the Roman Catholic position Dr. Loofs quotes from "The Kirchen Lexikon" (1901) XII. p. 178, where the "Kenosis" is spoken of as a Neo-Protestant theory and which continues: "even the overt denial of the hypostatic union is hardly a more mischievous attack upon the deity of Christ than this Kenosis which subverts the essential nature of God Himself; not unjustly has Eiedermann characterised this doctrine as a complete kenosis of the understanding."

Criticism.

(1) This denunciation of the theory of the Kenosis character-
istic of the arbitrary dogmatism of the Roman Catholic Church, but "abuse is not argument."

(2) The Roman Catholic position displays an avoidance of the main issues. In denying to Christ any real weakness or limitation of knowledge, it speaks as if He were always grown up or as if He had sprung from God fully developed - as Minerva from the brow of Jove instead of genuinely passing through all the stages of natural manhood, as the Scriptures reveal Him, from conception to maturity.

(3) The Roman conception just amounts to a Kenosis κατά κένωσιν or a κένωσις τῆς χρήσεως, a concealment or repression of powers actually possessed. This was, of course, the attitude of many of the early Fathers and medieval scholars; but it reveals all the errors which associate themselves with Docetism and Dualism.

(4) Christ is not represented in Scripture as being able to throw off weakness in His own strength. He was thoroughly dependent on the Father for all the sources of Divine knowledge and power. Even for the legions of angels at His disposal He has to pray to His Father. It was only thus that the unity of His being and His true manhood was conserved. Otherwise His prayers, His doubts, His anguish were so much play-acting.

(5) The Transfiguration was not a manifestation of the Father on Christ's behalf.
The Subliminal Consciousness Theory.

Various ideas suggestive of the divine subconsciousness in Christ are evident in writers before Dr. Sanday, for example, Dr. W. E. Carpenter, as far back as 1855, wrote of the processes of thought and feeling below the surface of the conscious life. William James also referred to the discovery that in some persons besides the ordinary modes of our experience, there may be forms of mental activity in memory, or reasoning, or emotion which proceed without their knowledge and only show themselves in their results. So also F. W. Myers, by whom Sanday seems to have been greatly influenced. Myers speaks of the 'supraliminal' and the 'subliminal'. "From time to time, through some access of energy, one or other of these sensations, thoughts and emotions makes its way above ... into full consciousness." The fullest exposition, however, of the idea, as it bears upon the Incarnation, has been made by Dr. Sanday in his "Christologies Ancient and Modern (1910).

In Sanday's endeavour to shew the possibility of the Incarnation of the Logos in man, he sets forth the view that the subconsciousness is a better medium for the Divine approach, and a fitter abode for the indwelling of the Divine nature than the conscious - the subconscious being "subtler, intenser, further reaching and more penetrating". The unconscious, he says, is the sphere within which the Divine and human coalesce. The human consciousness is, as it were, the narrow neck through which alone the divine could come to expression. The result of this expression is the Incarnate Divine-human being - Jesus Christ.

The conscious and the subconscious are so related as to be capable of continual intercommunication. There are "open chinks and crevices" in the mind through which there is a constant going and coming. "It appears to be the function of the subconscious and unconscious states to feed the conscious."
"There are incomings and outgoings which stretch away into infinity and in fact proceed from and are God Himself".

"It is something more than a mere metaphor," says Dr. Sanday, "when we describe the sub- and un-conscious states as more profound". Here, in fact, the Divine and the human blend. "The deepest truth of mysticism," he contends, "and of the states of which we have been speaking as mystical, belong not so much to the upper region of consciousness - the region of symptoms, manifestations, effects - as to the lower region of the unconscious."

**Criticism.**

The Subliminal Subconsciousness theory of Dr. Sanday, as explanatory of the Divine entrance into the human life, has met with much opposition from modern scholars.

"The question of the divine and human nature in one person," says Dr. Francis Patten, "is not solved by Dr. Sanday and the subliminal consciousness". Its adequacy has been criticised, not alone from the Theological, but also from the psycho-analytic point of view.

The following points indicate the chief arguments which are urged against it:

1. The theory postulates the superiority of the conscious, but to-day the least this is not proved. Psychology in fact classes the subconscious as a subordinate and auxiliary condition of the fully conscious. Dr. Mackintosh criticises the view from the ethical side and questions whether the subconscious has moral qualities of any kind. He concludes by saying that the subconscious has affinities rather with sleep, infant life, animal instinct; which suggests that it is of a character too humble and inarticulate for Dr. Sanday's greater purpose.

2. The idea that God can only approach us through the subconscious gives the inference that he is unknowable to the normal rational consciousness. The presentation, how-
ever, made of God by Scripture and Christian philosophy is to the effect that He is Love and Holiness existing in the form of Absolute Personality, and Love and Holiness are attributes which are ethical and rational. It is, indeed, only by the conscious self that these terms can normally be apprehended and understood. If the normal consciousness cannot appropriate these ideas, but must relegate them to the unconscious or the subconscious, then God must be considered as unknowable and unapproachable.

(3) The hypothesis, in fact, does not escape the charge of dualism made against the earlier teaching of the Church. Such expressions as the "Region of the psychic life", "the seat of the Divine" etc., indicate two separate spheres of existence. In order to reach the divine in Jesus we are supposed to quit the human sphere for that upper and other region of consciousness where Deity has its abode.

(4) It has been aptly asked: "What is the use of the conscious if the subconscious and unconscious can do better work and at much less cost?"

Dr. Iverach maintains that the conception is at best a negative one. It is simply metaphor and bad metaphor at that to speak of 'invasions', of 'rushes' and 'uprushes' from the lower world, and it is vain to ask for explanations of the ongoing of our mental life from what is supposed to have gone on in the subconscious self.

Instead of saying with Sanday that the function of the unconscious is to feed the conscious it would be more consistent with the facts to say that the unconscious and the subconscious are storehouses of products manufactured by consciousness and kept in "retentis" until they are needed. The basis of certainty and action, we might say, lie in consciousness.

(5) Finally it may be said that there is the difficulty which is not recognised by Dr. Sanday himself that
"subconscious self becomes the home not only of divine forces but of the baser elements of human nature. Here instincts long driven out of the higher nature still live a suppressed life; here old habits yet dog the powers of clearer resolve. Here also are the unconsidered trifles, the flotsam and jetsam deposited by little eddies out of the course of the main stream. Yet again others belong to dark sinister groups which coming together, we know not how, produce those sudden intrusions of evil thought, of unholy temper which sometimes disturb even lofty minds."
The Enhypostasia.

An attempt to get back to the position of the early fathers in the advocacy of the two Natures in One Person of Jesus Christ has been made by Dr. Relton in his book: "A Study in Christology".

It is acknowledged by Dr. Relton that his position manifests little advance beyond that of the Chalcedon Creed. He considers that the furthest point reached by ancient Christology in the solution of the historical person of Christ was the doctrine of the Enhypostasis, as this was put forth by Leontius of Byzantium and incorporated in the final formulation of Greek theology by John of Damascus.

The doctrine of the Enhypostasis teaches the Oneness of the Person of Christ and the two natures - the human and divine, for which a meeting place is found "through a deeper analysis of personality" - human and divine. The basis of the doctrine as set forth by Leontius and Relton, is, that the Divine Logos prior to the Incarnation already possessed everything needful to enable Him to live a truly human life. The Divine Logos was capable of being the Ego, not only of the Divine, but also of the human nature. "He was perfect man because He was perfect God."

There is much in Dr. Relton's book which is suggestive of modern Kenoticism, but a line of demarcation is made when he cleaves boldly to the dualism of the Chalcedon Creed - a dualism chiefly marked when he discusses the consciousness of Jesus. How could a single unique Divine self-consciousness be at once limited and unlimited? To this question Dr. Relton makes answer that the doctrine of the Enhypostasia allows for both of these facts but does not explain them.

N.B. The adjective ἐνυποστασιας was coined by Leontius to convey the idea of a human nature which not being personal independently in itself, found its personality in the Divine Logos.
An appeal is made instead to the Gospel portrait. "We point to the Incarnate Christ as One who lived a truly human and finite existence whilst at the same time transcending these limitations at will." "The Person of Christ", he says, "is the bankruptcy of Logic", but "the theory of the Enhypostasia is confirmed by an appeal to the Christ of history and experience". The Gospel data is appealed to as proving that the Incarnate Christ possessed a Divine and a limited consciousness. "However incredible or logically impossible such a phenomenon may appear, says Relton, "in the Person of Jesus Christ is revealed one whose consciousness was at once limited and unlimited, finite and circumscribed, yet infinite and uncircumscribed in its range, human and yet Divine, Divine and yet human."

If we say that it is intellectually inconceivable and historically impossible, the facts reprove us. "Faith can grasp it, the Gospels record it."

The ἐνθυποστασιας position of the Fathers is boldly taken up. "The Incarnate Christ had it always within His power to transcend the limitations which He had imposed upon Himself."

Criticism.

(1) From the Kenoticists' standpoint, the doctrine of the Enhypostasia seems to rise from false foundations. The Gospels do not record that the Incarnate Son of God was at the one time finite and infinite. No such demand as that He had at once a limited and an unlimited consciousness is made upon our credulity. We are driven into no such intellectual impasse. The New Testament records refer consistently to the limited human conditions under which Christ lived and they give the impression of the complete oneness of the Divine-human consciousness in Christ, just as the consciousness of the ordinary man is one. The very prayers of Christ to the Father suggest that He had temporarily surrendered His power to suit His earthly condition. "Ελόι, Ελοί, Σαβαθανάζ, reveal the depth to which that sacrifice went.
On the statement that Christ on earth always had an unlimited consciousness, there results either the conception of the infinite Logos plus the humanity or the complete perfection of the person of Jesus Christ at birth, i.e., there is no true accounting for the physical, mental and moral growth of the one being Jesus Christ.

The Kenoticists' view, on the other hand, is, that the Divine Consciousness in Christ, which must have been incomplete until the earthly life terminated, was of gradual growth. The potency was there at conception and developed with the rest of His divine-human powers. "May we not say with confidence that Jesus gradually became aware of His real personality?"

The tendency is, in estimating the unique powers possessed by Christ in His earthly career, to ignore the gifts bestowed by God upon the divine man, whose life was one of complete surrender to the Divine will. There is also the thought of the powers which such a pure and perfect humanity would possess naturally.

While sympathetic towards the Kenotic Christology, Dr. Relton sets it aside and states that in its eagerness to safeguard the reality of Christ's manhood and to emphasise the fact that He was an historical Person with a truly human mind moulded by the environment of Palestine etc., Kenoticism has tended to make us shut our eyes to the equally patent fact that this is but half a truth.

This criticism of Kenoticism hardly seems to be a fair estimate of its full position. To say that "it presents but half a truth", is to state but half the Kenotic theory. To stop at the half-truth would be sheer Ebonism. The Kenoticist, however, does not present a mere man to us, but the God-Man. Adherence to the historical records of the New Testament is indeed a recognised trait in Kenoticism, and in the New Testament it finds a person who had enjoyed equal honours
with God, but who laid these aside in becoming Incarnate. It holds, however, that the Incarnate Person did not lose his divinity in limiting Himself. The divinity only took a different form. The pre-existent Word becomes the God-Man, not less divine because human. The Son of God who had lived under eternal conditions now lives under human conditions, with limited power and knowledge.

(5) In speaking of the great truth enshrined in Apollinarian Christology, Dr. Relton concedes part of the Kenotic position. The key to the right interpretation of Christ's manhood, not only in its particular and historical, but also in its universal and absolute significance, is to be found in the fact that there exists in God Himself a human element and consequently Christ is the truth of every man; therefore the human and the Divine first reached a predestined goal in His Person. Humanity being ever imperfect reached its completeness only in Christ. Deity, as in its essence Love, being ever self-giving and self-sacrificing found its fullest expression in that act of humiliation and self-sacrifice which reached its climax at Calvary."

(6) The Enhypostasia, as propounded by Dr. Relton in his fine book, does not conserve for us the perfect One-ness of Christ and in postulating logical impossibilities, provides no lasting satisfaction to the mind.

The theologian is not content to leave the problem 'in the air' if he can confront it with a solution drawn from Scripture and human experience or analogy. It must be repeated that the idea of a person having at the same time a limited and unlimited single consciousness seems to be an intellectual contradiction. We might just as well say that Christ sinned and did not sin, that He was a Jew and not a Jew, that He lived and did not live.
Objections to the Kenotic Theory considered.

The objections to the various Kenotic theories, particularly one might say to the Gessian type of theory with its teaching of the loss by the Logos of self-consciousness, have been very pronounced and have manifested themselves in different ways, according to the Christological standpoint of the critic.

Kenoticism has been compared to the pagan stories of the gods. "It is mythology, not theology", says Loofs, (who adopts the idea that the Kenosis was the action of the Logos Ensarkos) "which is at the root of this theory". "No theologian of any standing in the early church (says the same writer) ever adopted such a theory of the \( \text{K} \text{\acute{e}} \text{\upsilon} \text{\omega} \text{\tau} \text{i} \text{\varsigma} \) of the Logos as would involve an actual supersession of His divine form of existence by the human and a real becoming man, i.e. a transformation on the part of the Logos."

Answers have already been given to these assertions in the statements -

1. That the theory of the Kenosis by the Logos Asarkos finds its roots in Scripture and not in mythology.
2. That the early fathers in their docetism fail to present to us the true Divine-man of the Scriptures, Christ Jesus.

In his book "The Christian View of God and the World", Professor Orr presents objections to the Kenotic theory, which indicate the views of many modern theologians. He says, "Notwithstanding the wide support which these theories have received, I cannot think that they will ever permanently commend themselves to the judgment of the church".

Dr. Orr considers that -

1. The Kenotic theories involve an impossibility, in as much as they ask us to believe in the temporary suspension of the consciousness and the cessation of all Divine functions by one of the persons of the Godhead.

In support of the 'dual activity' of the Logos in the
Eternal and temporal sphere? Orr appeals -

(a) To the Scriptures: "Are we not told", he asks, "that the Son of God upholdeth all things by the word of his power". "Is this relation to the universe not an essential one?" "Does not the Kenotic theory reduce it to one wholly unessential and contingent?"

(b) To the Analogy of Nature: "There is," says Orr, "an immanent presence of God in nature, but there is also a transcendent existence of God beyond nature." So, he considers, agreeing here with Bishop Gore, the Divine Son took upon Him our nature with its human limitations, but above and beyond that ... was "the vast over-soul of the Divine consciousness."

(c) To Psychology: Even human psychology, contends Dr. Orr, in making us more familiar than we were with the idea of different strata of consciousness in the same personal being, gives us a hint which need not be lost.

Dr. Orr concludes by saying that the sense of the Apostle's words seems sufficiently met by the lowly form of Christ's earthly manifestation - "He was despised and rejected of man, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief".

Answer: The objections above referred to hardly seem to be of sufficient force to overthrow the theory of the Kenosis as adopted by its modern exponents.

It has to be reasserted that the plea set up of the necessity for the presence of the Logos in the Eternal sphere to carry on His cosmic functions clearly creates a dualism and carries us into a realm of metaphysics where Scripture gives no enlightenment. It is at best an a priori assumption which has only pure dogmatism for its support. If there is anything indeed which the New Testament stresses it is the unity of the Person of Jesus Christ. Neither from Christ's lips nor from the pen of the New Testament writers is there an indication that as a person He was at the same time outside and inside the world, asarkos and ensarkos. In reply to Bishop Weston, who
held a similar theory, and who quoted in support of it the
passage already referred to in the Epistle to the Hebrews,
has been justly said: "The term Son mentioned here, as
scholars are virtually agreed, has reference primarily to the
historic and exalted Christ. Nothing else can be assumed to
be in view."

In regard to the "vast 'over-soul' of Christ's divine con­
sciousness", Dr. Walker rightly says: "The idea .. is difficult
to reconcile with the presentation of Christ in the Gospels and
impossible to harmonise with any conception of His true humanity
Furthermore according to the Scriptures, it was not the Logos,
but the Father who was the "over-soul" in relation to Christ.

On Scriptural grounds such Kenoticists as Bensow contend
that there is "no Logos outside the flesh", thus securing the
perfect one-ness of the Divine-human figure. "The Son of God
emptied Himself". "The Word became flesh". It is upon such
Scriptural data that Kenoticism bases its assertions.

It may justly be objected also that Orr's idea of the
cessation of the Incarnate Word from His universal activities,
producing a chaos, manifests a tendency to ditheism. It
suggests such a separation between Father and Son as would
endanger the "monotheistic view of the Trinity and negative the
'inseparabilis trinitatis operatio' of Augustine."

From the scriptural point of view, indeed, the fundamental
truth is that the world is upheld by God, not by a constituent
part of God. There are spheres of labour in which division of
labour is unmeaning. "We must simply confess that we know
nothing of an existence of the Logos apart from, but synchronous
with His reality in Jesus."

The reference by Dr. Orr to the subliminal consciousness,
or the different strata within the same individual, has no
application to the view of a Being who is considered as living
a complete life in the Eternal sphere and a complete life in
the human sphere. In any case the subliminal consciousness
theory is built on unstable foundations. In making the Kenosis merely the lowly condition in which Christ lived as a man, Dr. Orr robs the Incarnation of its deepest significance as an act of supreme Divine sacrifice.

The words ἐαυτὸν ἐκείνος ἑσέλθη and ἐστὰ ἐκένσεν in their reference to the conception and birth of the pre-existent Son of God into the world, are deprived of meaning, and the ἐκείνος, on Dr. Orr's explanation, becomes identical with the ἡμέρας which according to exact exegesis it is not.

A vigorous opposition to the Kenotic theory has been made by a number of Anglican theologians whose position may be said to be represented in "The Kenotic Theory", written by Dr. F. Hall, and who in endeavouring to set forth the orthodox view of the Incarnation denounces Kenoticism as "a modern theory inconsistent with the Faith and with Catholic consent, unscriptural, fallacious and dangerous."

Kenoticism is asserted to be inconsistent with the doctrine of the OEcumenical Councils and with all orthodox teaching.

"Remaining what He was, He took what He was not", expresses the consensus of all Christological schools that in any age have the reputation of Catholic orthodoxy."

"Catholic doctrine teaches .. that Jesus Christ on earth was possessed of the Intelligence of the Godhead."

The attitude of Dr. Hall is characteristic of many modern scholars who have revealed a blind determination to adhere at all costs to the teaching of the early fathers and the language of the various creeds, however docetic and inconsistent they may be, and this also in spite of the acknowledgement that "patristic exegesis is uncritical and sometimes dangerous."

The idea of creation involving a kenosis on God's part is summarily dismissed. "If valid it proves the untenable
conclusion that power to determine facts is self-destructive”

It may be said here, however, that this argument has little weight, for self-imposed reduction with a view to restoration of power cannot be called destruction. The Kenoticists affirm that the self-limitation of God in Creation and in the Incarnation is, indeed, a form of self-realisation.

Disregarding the fact that modern Kenoticists do not rest their theories on an isolated passage in Scripture, an effort is made to get rid of the Kenosis by reverting to the “Authorized” Version of Phil. II. 7. Instead of “He emptied Himself,” the verse is made to read, “making Himself of no reputation”, or as Dr. Hall paraphrases the passage: “Subsisting ever in the essence of God, Christ was not anxious about His state of equality with God, but reduced the impressiveness of His person by clothing Himself with the form of a servant.”

The phrase εἱστήκειν ἐκεινόσεϊ is considered to be "metaphorical".

There were two wills and two knowledges in Christ and thus Dr. Hall can acknowledge Christ’s human limitations, but there was no real kenosis involved or suggested in Phil. II. 5-7, the lesson to be learnt from the passage was that of unselfishness. An increase in wisdom is considered to be an example of the "communicatio idiomatum".

The "two knowledges" each obeyed their own laws, —"His human mind ever limited, although illuminated supernaturally to a unique extent, His Divine Knowledge was uninterrupted."

It will be seen from this short exposition of Dr. Hall’s view of the Depotentiation that he boldly exposes himself to the charge of a glaring dualism, and that the figure which he presents in his book seems to be inconceivable and unscriptural. It must be said, however, that the ideas which Dr. Hall sets forth reflect the opinions of many modern scholars. Much of the thought expressed by Dr. Hall is revealed, for example, in Dr. Powel’s treatment of the Incarnation. The latter also
speaks of two wills and two knowledges. The conclusion is not grasped that to regard Jesus as the subject of a double consciousness—a Divine and a human—makes the union of the two natures at best a purely formal one. The human really remains dissociated from the divine.

"To speak of Christ as omniscient in the Divine sphere and ignorant in the human, as filling all space on earth, while at the same time locally confined to one place, the subject of attributes that are disparate and naturally exclusive of one another is to use language to which no real meaning can be attached, and which certainly does not describe the Christ of the Gospels. But we are landed in this when we attempt to construe to our thought the fact of the Incarnation—starting with metaphysical postulates."

The attempted refutation of the Kenotic theory by Dr. Hall is, as we have said, illustrative of the attitude and the criticisms of modern anti-Kenoticists.

We may here set forth and answer the principal objections which Dr. Hall and his school have raised against the Kenotic theory.

It is said: (I) That the true divinity of Christ depends on His possession of all Divine attributes.

Answer: This statement seems to be an example of confused terminology, and in any case it is an a priori assumption. It is quite evident on the Scriptural presentation of Christ that He did not possess all the Divine attributes. Among the older Kenoticists, such as Thomasius, we have seen that there was a belief in the retention by Christ of the 'immanent' attributes, Love, Holiness, and Truth. Gess, on the other hand, believed in the depotentiation even of these; but all the Kenoticists believed and proved from Scripture that the attributes of Omnipotence, Omniscience and Omnipresence were not in the Incarnate Christ, i.e., there was a real Kenosis of Divine attributes.
(2) In spite, however, of the Deapotentialization, the portrait that we have in the Scriptures is of a divine-human Person, who lived a unique yet human life under limitations of knowledge and power. Yet this limitation does not inveigh against Christ's true divinity. If God can become man, if the Word became flesh, as the Scriptures assert, then it can truly be said that Omnipotence or the exercise of such is not essential to divinity. Christ is not less human because Divine, and no less Divine because human.

(II) It is urged as an objection to the Kenotic theory, that faith in revealed truth is nullified by the Kenoticists a-priori method of reasoning.

Answer: It can be safely asserted that this objection is a petitio principii. Indeed, it seems to be the traditional method which is a priori, e.g., we have the idea referred to already of the presence of the Logos in the Eternal sphere as being essential for the working of the universe. It must be conceded that the Kenoticists endeavour to deal faithfully with the facts and actual statements of the New Testament. This cannot be said to be an a priori method of investigation. Even Gess claims to have arrived at his conclusions by the study of the Scriptures, on which Hodge has passed the comment: "There is ground for the self-congratulation of the author. His book is far more Scriptural in its treatment of the subject than any other book of the same class with which we are acquainted."

(III) A third objection is that the manhood of Christ is disparaged in the emphasis which is placed on its likeness to ours.

The answer to this objection is that while the Kenotic theory asserts the reality of Christ's manhood, it also maintains His uniqueness. He was the God-man, the Son of God living the human life. Unlike man in his present state, Christ was without sin. Basing its ideas on the Scriptural statement that man was made in the image of God, Kenoticism
holds the capacitas humanae naturee divinae. To assert Christ's likeness to man in His ideal state is neither a dis-
paragement of His divinity nor of His humanity.

(IV) It is objected also that Kenoticism contains monophysitic implications.

Answer: There is a certain amount of truth in this state-
ment, but it cannot be counted as an indictment of Kenoticism that it seeks, in harmony with Scripture, to secure the complete Oneness of Christ. The Monophysitism of the early church, where there is a tendency to make the divine nature absorb the human nature, or which leaves us with an ordinary human being, is rightly avoided by modern advocates of the Kenotic theory. On the other hand the tendency towards dualism, such, for ex-
ample, as is found in the Chalcedon Creed, is escaped, and the unity - the oneness of the Divine-human nature in the One Person is asserted. Bensow can even say: "Vere deus et vere homo, abe doch unus Christus".

(V) Another objection is raised, viz: that the doctrine of the two simultaneous knowledges in Christ is nullified.

The answer seems to be - "and rightly so", since it is an unintelligible and unscriptural notion. A statement like the above, with its suggestion of a bald dualism, makes more compre-
prehensible the acceptance of pure Ebionism which seems to be preferable.

In answer to Powells's theory, Dr. Walker says: "This seems clearly to imply two distinct centres of consciousness, two egos, two persons in short. If Christ as omniscient com-
municates certain knowledge to, and withholds certain other items of knowledge from His human consciousness, we certainly seem to have two distinct consciousnesses - and the human Christ becomes unreal."

(VI) It is asserted that by the theory of the Kenosis the immutability of God is disparaged.

This is considered by many to be the chief argument
against the Kenotic theory.

In answer to this objection it must be said that the rigid immutability of God is an impossible idea. To give this attribute to God would be to make Him less than man - an adamantine rock on which the prayers and petitions of men were ever shattered. Such, however, is not the impression which we get of the Almighty God either in the Old or New Testament, nor is it the idea that we obtain through the events of human experience. We think of the changeless God as we think of the changeless Christ, "the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever" - immutable and inflexible only in His Love and Goodwill to the Creation which came from His hands.

In endowing men with the powers which He possesses God voluntarily lent Himself to change. He is open to persuasion and importunity. His immediate purpose, if not His ultimate purpose, can be altered, otherwise prayer has nought else but an entirely subjective force. It is quite credible that the prayer of man becomes a cause which enables God to adjust and re-adjust the mechanism of life.

In His continued dealings with and relation to the world of time and space with its limitations God lends Himself to change. It may truly be said that in this respect God has new experience. That which was determined or planned in Eternity is now achieved in time.

With Dorner we must so regard Divine immutability and vitality as one, that God may be living just by virtue of the fact which gives Him His inviolable immutability and conversely. "God", says Dorner, "has His immutability absolutely in His ethical essence, from which He cannot and will not fall away". "This immutability does not exclude, but includes motion, life, nay, historically regarding a changing action and relation of God to the changing world."

There must be something of mutability in the divine
thought and volition in His living relation to the world. God's ethical essence bears within itself His inviolable holy law and asserts His self-identity by an activity which is dissimilar and which accommodates itself to the necessity of the moment. Otherwise the relation between God and the world would be a lifeless and deistic one.

God's unchangeableness, indeed, is referred to many times in the Scriptures, e.g.: Numbers 23.19 "God is not a man that He should lie, neither the Son of Man that He should repent." The unchangeableness here asserted, however, is a moral unchangeableness. There is no passage in Scripture which represents God as a kind of immutable automaton.

On the other hand there are Scriptural passages which clearly indicate the mutability of God, e.g: Gen. 6.6 "It repented the Lord that He had made man." Psalms.106.45: "He remembered .. His covenant and repented according to the multitude of His mercies." Amos.7.3-6: "The Lord repented concerning this". "It shall not be", saith the Lord.

The repentance - change of purpose - indicated in these passages is "by virtue of and not in spite of His ethical identity"

Instead of the abstract lifeless theories which lead to absolute Deism, or Predestination, says Dorner, there is possible a living history of the deeds of God - the πολυμούχος σοφία θεοῦ - which conditions Him with full regard to freedom and the plurality of creaturely acts, yet without excluding the stability of the final end: Thus:

(1) New Divine acts are possible, like that of the revelation to Moses, like that in Christ and at Pentecost, like that in the regeneration of every individual Christian.

(2) Thus, too, room is left for the justification of the individual as a special act in time as a salutation from God to the soul.

(3) Thus also room is left for a living special providence, for a regard which includes every creature just as it is.
It is possible to see in the objective atonement by Christ not simply a relation of God to the world, so that the world, since Christ actually belongs to it, has not the same value to God, which it had before Christ came, but the realisation of the atonement for the world by Christ has a value to God which it did not actually have before Christ.

As Rothe says, for an actual hearing of prayer, room is only left, if God without detriment to, nay, by virtue of His ethical self-identity allows Himself to be conditioned by the constitution of the world and even by the creature who invokes Him. In His love to the world, God is all-sufficient and the Blessed. Beauty and harmony are everywhere the perfect form and realisation of the ethical, and the self-conscious and self-enjoying harmony of the ethical is Blessedness - not sheer rest but harmonious activity.

It is objected that on the Kenotic Theory the fulness of the Son's Godhead is interrupted and the doctrine of the Trinity violated, the internal relations of the Trinity, in fact, being nullified.

It may be answered that on the modern Kenotic view the divinity of the Son of God did not cease with the Incarnation. The Son in Eternity and in Time is dependent upon the Father.

The Self-limitation involved in the Incarnation was a Self-realisation.

To speak of "the nullification of the internal relations of the Trinity", it has already been said, suggests a priori reasoning. We are here dealing with things outside Knowledge and revelation. We cannot say what adjustment was made in the Trinity; all that we know on Scriptural data is, and it is only on this foundation that we are able to base our deductions, that the Pre-existent Son of God having equality with God, became Incarnate, and shared the limitations which adhere to man's condition in the flesh. "What Ritschl regards as an insuperable difficulty - the absence of certain divine
qualities - is simply essential to the personal advent of
God in time."

(VIII) Another argument raised as an objection is that the
Theory of the Kenosis prejudices the work of Christ as Redeem-
er and Revealer by conceiving Him as reduced in power and
knowledge. To acknowledge the justice of this objection is
(1) to accept an arbitrary theory of the atonement,
(2) to mar the reality of His humanity, and
(3) to violate the unity of His person.

We can only accept an Omnipotent Christ, unreduced in
power and knowledge by imagining the Infinite Logos with
undiminished might uniting Himself to the man Jesus. This
is practically what Dr. Hall would have us believe. But the
idea is dualistic, inconceivable and unscriptural. For the
Son of God to live a real human life, a reduction in power
was inevitable. The reduction, indeed, was an indication of
the greatness of the Divine Love and sacrifice, and thus we
have the depotentiated Son of God as perfect man, revealing
God to men by the beauty of a life which reflected and was
completed subordinate to and inspired by the Divine Will, and
which met infallibly the moral needs of men, and which by the
supreme sacrifice made upon the Cross manifested the depths
of the Divine love.

The self-emptying of the Son is thus seen to be a great
ethical fact by which is revealed the readiness of God to go
to the uttermost to reconcile man to Himself.
The Scriptural Presentation of the Divine Trinity -
in harmony with the Kenotic Theory.

In his work "The Humiliation of Christ", Dr. Bruce contends that the previous question to all Christological theories is the consideration as to whether the Church doctrine of the Trinity is scriptural or not. The contention implies that the lack of this consideration has given place to much erroneous and irrelevant speculation as to the person and work of Christ.

The view of Christ will, in fact, depend greatly on the view of God, and this applies specifically to the Theory of the Kenosis which places chief stress on the fact of the Self-sacrificing act of one of the members of the Divine-Trinity, the Son of God actually being the subject of the depotentiation.

On the view of the Kenosis such an act is impossible if we conceive of God in the Deistic sense, and it loses its significance if we conceive of God pantheistically.

Various theories have been promulgated at various times in the Church's history as to the structure of the Godhead, theories which have sometimes been intruded upon it from the realm of pure philosophy and which periodically have found recrudescence. Such are, for example:

(1) The speculative theories which are the products of a priori deduction. The Father here is the pure abstract idea, the Son being the element of 'particularity' in the idea and the Spirit the sublation of this in individuality. This Trinity has no existence prior to the world; it is simply potentiality and basis. Such is the conception of Hegel, but not being founded on scriptural statements, it cannot be accepted as a basis of Christological doctrine.

(2) There are Impersonal theories which are professedly founded on Scripture, but which present the idea of a Godhead...
in which there is a distinction of potencies and modes.
There is no Trinity of Persons or hypostases. Such is the
idea of Schelling and is akin to that expounded by W. N.
Clarke in his "Christian Theology". Dorner, also, in his
later view, writes of a Trinity of impersonal modes - 'momenta'
in the constitution of the One Divine Personality.

(3) There are, further, the Neo-3abellian Theories, as Dr.
Orr terms them, such as that of Ritschel, who says that we can
have no knowledge of absolute attributes of God as distinguis­
hed from those which are manifested in relation to the world,
and none of an essential Trinity or of the relations of Father
Son and Holy Ghost in the immanent sphere of the divine exist­
ence. Theology is considered to be under an obligation to
Philosophy; it cannot do its work without a theory of know­
ledge.

None of these theories, however, is acceptable to the
Christian mind which perceives in the Scriptures neither a
'Pantheistic' nor 'Deistic' presentation of the Deity, a God
neither impersonal nor unknowable, but a Triune God who is
truly personal, Loving and Good, who reveals Himself to and is
known of men, and whose desire is to make men one with Him
through the great sacrificial act of the Incarnation.

"In all the thought of the world the Christian doctrine
of the Trinity is not perhaps the complete and perfect, but
the only solution of these great and otherwise insuperable
difficulties." (which confront the holder of Patripassian
and Pantheistic views.)

Dr. Du Bose contends that the doctrine of the Trinity
is not the abstrusest of human speculations which the Greek
mind at its subtlest exhausted its ingenuity in devising.
"On the contrary if we could return to the simplicity and
intellectuality of its original meaning and intention, we
should find exactly the reverse." To begin with the Trinity
is primarily a fact and not a doctrine. "Long before there
was anything like a rational theology in the Church all Christians were simply and unreasoningly Trinitarian."

The conception of the Church, in fact, was of a Trinity consubstantial, co-eternal and co-equal in power. To each of the Persons the divine nature belongs in its plenitude and power.

Three distinct Persons seem to be presented to us in the Scriptures. This is evidently Paul's conception, - the expression eis ἡμός as indicating the unity of God, offering no contradiction to the idea of His personal Trinity. "The conception of self-sacrificing love," says Dr. Paterson, "appears to be out of place if all that was meant was that God manifested His attribute of wisdom in the person and life of Jesus Christ on earth." *While the Church identified the Logos Incarnate and pre-Incarnate with God ... it also distinguished Him from the Godhead as a whole. The Logos is ἡμός not ὁ ἡμός. He is the personal intelligence, will, energy of God and is really or essentially God." We have already encountered the same thought in Origen.

Thus also Dr. Loofs in setting forth the "orthodox conception" of the Trinity:-

This Eternal Son of God is another than the Father and the Holy Ghost. But these three persons or hypostases, as they are called, are of one substance, of one power, of one eternity. The diversity of 'persons' does not dissolve the unity of the Godhead. The Trinity or better, the "Triunity" is the one God. Nevertheless, so the orthodox doctrine affirms, only the second Person of the Holy Trinity became Incarnate, taking man's nature upon Himself in the womb of the Virgin Mary and of her substance."

It is contended by Dr. Paterson that this doctrine of a three-fold personality finds independent support in the implications of the moral attributes of God.
(1) The attribute of Holiness, for example, receives its full affirmation when we import into the Godhead a two-fold distinction, which is in contrast to the idea of a bare Theism, which contemplates complacently the perfection of His own infinite Being. "The divine Holiness", says Dr. Paterson, "acquires a new depth and sanctity when we conceive of the Godhead as involving a communion of Persons who reverently find, each in each, the plenitude of the Divine Being and attributes."

(2) This impression is deepened by the conception of the Divine attribute of Love. The infinite love of God carries with it the implication of the eternal existence of a second Being who was the "express image" of the Father. From this two-fold Personality or duality of Persons there is a not unnatural development into the conception of a Trinity of Persons. The highest level is reached in the reciprocal love of two persons, when there is a third personal life which is the object of their common love and devotion. There is naturally no definite Trinitarian distinction in the Scriptural presentation of God, yet there is more than a suggestion of such a distinction in the formula of benediction used by Paul, e.g.: Rom. I. 7; I.Cor.I. 3; II.Cor.I. 2; 13. 14; Eph. I. 2; and it is a notable fact, as Dr. Mackintosh says, that a fourth name is never added to the Holy Triad.

"The conception of the Greek fathers", says Dr. Paterson, "was that of the three τρόποι υπόστασις or modes of subsistence of the individual Godhead. This did not imply that there were three τρόποι or aspects of a bare unity or three ουσίαι which would imply three Gods; but all believed in μία ουσία ἐν τρισίν υποστάσεωι. One Being in three Hypostases or Personal modes - each with its characteristic properties and each necessary to the One Indivisible whole - neither a barren unity nor a
divided multiplicity."

"We believe", writes Oosterzee, "that in the Church doctrine of the Trinity is embodied a Plurality. If the edifice of this dogma is itself of later origin, the stones for its upbuilding are incontestably given in the very Word of Truth." Oosterzee conceives the life of each one of the three modes of existence in God as being self-conscious, free and Divine. The Son is in truth other than the Father, and again the Holy Ghost other than the Father and the Son. While this personal distinction exists, the same Divine nature is considered to be present in all; yet "that the unity of the Divine Essence is absolutely inseparable - this indeed is no doctrine of Athanasius and Nicæa alone, but expressly the doctrine of Jesus and the Apostles."

On the view then of modern 'orthodox' theologians there are three distinct persons in God - a distinction which is taken to be as real as between I and thou and he.

The scriptural facts are, says Hodge:

(a) The Father says 'I'; the Son says 'I'; the Spirit says 'I'.

(b) The Father says 'Thou' to the Son; the Son says 'Thou' to the Father, and in like manner the Father and the Son use the pronouns 'He' and 'Him' in reference to the Spirit.

(c) The Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father; the Spirit testifies of the Son.

The summation of these and kindred facts is expressed in the proposition: "The One Divine Being subsists in Three Persons - Father, Son and Spirit."

II. A personal or hypostatic pre-existence, therefore, may scripturally be asserted for the Son of God. It is this Personal Being, the second Person in the Trinity, who Paul declares, became the subject of the Kenosis. "It is a view

XN.B. Personality is something not in essence singular but plural. (Bethune Baker. Mod.Churchmen. Sept.11th,1921)
of vital importance to orthodox Christology", writes Loots, "that the historical Jesus is the pre-existent Son of God."

This is, in fact, the real terminus a quo for the consideration of the Kenotic theory. Once this pre-existence is conceded, and the complete identity of the pre-existent Person with the Incarnate Jesus Christ granted, then it is evident that the phenomenon can only be accounted for on the theory of a depotentiation, relative or absolute. To deny the Kenosis, indeed, is to deny the Incarnation itself.

It has been seen how the early Church deprived the Incarnation of its reality and significance by attributing to the Incarnate Son powers which He did not possess. In its desire to maintain the Deity of the Son of God it gave the world a manhood in Christ that was phantasmal and unreal, until controversy found a halting place in a hopeless dualism in the Creed of Chalcedon, with its statement that the two natures - Divine and human, were in Christ \( \text{aparatus} \) etc.

An attempt has been made in recent times, as we have seen, to reconcile modern thought to the ancient position and tradition, but on the author's own confession we are left with an insoluble problem and an irreconcilable Dualism.

The solution, or at least the best approach to a solution of the historical Person of Jesus Christ, seems, therefore, to lie in a theory which faces all the scriptural facts, and which, in the light of modern thought and human experience presents us with a Being in whom there is seen a perfect Unity, one personality, one consciousness, one knowledge, one will, one divine-human or divinely-human nature. The presentation of such a theory is the aim of modern Kenoticism.

It is to be noted that there are differences of presentation between the older forms of the Kenotic theory, as presented by Gess and others and the newer forms as manifested in the writings of Mackintosh and Forrest. Thus there is no attempt to dogmatise upon the activities of God while the Logos was incarnate.
This is a question which is considered as purely speculative and metaphysical and concerning which there is not sufficient scriptural data to form a right judgment. In a real sense, however, the Kenoticists inveigh against the idea of a concurrent Eternal and temporal existence on the part of Christ, on the ground that it interferes with the teaching of His perfect unity and the supreme sacrifice manifest in the Incarnation.

1. The first and supreme axiom upon which the Kenoticists base their theory is that the Personal pre-existent Son of God freely and temporarily divested Himself of the Divine form and of all or certain prerogatives attaching themselves to Deity, and became a real man.

This is at once the Incarnation and the Kenosis and here, rightly speaking, there is a break with Lutheranism, which holds that the Kenosis is the act of the God-man after Incarnation. The answer to the Lutheran contention that the Son of God, as the Scriptures assure us, came from an Eternal unlimited sphere into an earthly limited sphere of existence. It is on this point, indeed, that St. John dwells when he makes the denial that Christ came in the flesh an apostasy from Christianity. The word 'come' in the passage referred to indicates Christ's existence prior to His appearance in the flesh. "He who had filled heaven and earth confined Himself within the limits of a human body."

The subject of the Kenosis, then, was the Pre-existent Son of God - the Logos asarkos. The doctrine of Patripassianism which was condemned by the early church held the idea that it was God the Father that became incarnate. Against this, Christian orthodoxy teaches that it was the second Person in the Trinity who, surrendering His divine honours, actually became man.

On the actual mode of Christ's Incarnation, the Scriptures present to us the data of the conception and birth of the
God-man, by the operation of the Holy Ghost through the Virgin Mary, who becomes Χριστότοκος.

The story of the Incarnation in all its simple and lowly circumstances has been thought of by some as like nothing so much as "a tale of Eastern magic". On the other hand, great minds have found no contradiction in the record of such an event.

"So far from admitting any presumption against the Incarnation a priori," says Illingworth, "we contend that the natural human presumption points the other way. For we find the desire for union with God to lie at the very basis of our being; when once the story of the Incarnation has dawned upon the horizon, we recognise that under the conditions of the world of sin in which we live, nothing else could have so adequately satisfied the inmost inspiration. It must be so, because it so incomparably meets our need."

In similar terms writes a scholar of to-day: "That the Incarnation should have taken the form of a human life lived under ordinary conditions, causes me no difficulty. A perfect human character with human limitations is the only possible form of an Incarnation for the benefit of mankind."

These affirmations have an entire application to the Kenosis involved in the Incarnation. As we have seen, however, the Incarnation can be considered not alone in the light of Self-humiliation, in that the Divine dignity is lessened and the Divine Prerogatives surrendered, but as a Self-realisation and Self-revelation, in that God is manifest in the wonder of His love and goodness to men.

There is a revelation by God of Himself in His created world, in the workings of His providence; but it may be said that this revelation is but a faint glimmer of the light which streams to us from the manger of Bethlehem; for in the latter all the Divine perfections are, as it were, focussed in a central point. Here in the human birth and incarnate life of
His Son there is manifest the mighty love of God. John truly says: "Herein is love not that we loved God, but that He loved us and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins". The invisible becomes visible, the infinite becomes finite.

Thus writes Dr. Du Bose: "The hesitation and reluctance to see all-God and highest God, not only in the humanity but in the deepest human humiliation of Jesus Christ, is part of the disposition to measure exaltation by outward circumstances and conditions instead of by inward quality and character. We find it impossible to recognise or acknowledge God in the highest act of His highest attribute". "Is the act in which love becomes perfect a contradiction or a compromise of the Divine nature? Is God not God or least God in the moment in which He is most love? Where before Christ ... was or is love so love, or God so God?"

(2) Although the Deplantation of the Son of God at conception was real, yet according to the Kenotic interpretation of Scripture, it did not involve a loss of personality on His part. It was the same Person who had been in 'Heaven' and was now in the flesh.

"According to orthodox Christology", says Loofs, "the personal subject, the supreme I, of the historical Jesus is the second Person of the Holy Trinity." Thus also Dr. Sanday: "The Deity which rules the universe is in the last resort the same Deity which took human flesh - so much I believe."

As to how this continuity of Personal existence was preserved we have seen that Thomasius held the retention of the internal attributes by the Logos in the Incarnation, while Gess and Godet contended that while there was loss of self-consciousness, the Personality abided.

Neither theory has been free from adverse criticism. It has been urged that Personality without consciousness or potency of consciousness is inconceivable, while it is contended
against Thomasius that omnipotence is as essential an attribute of Godhead as the internal attribute of Love. The argument is thus put by Dr. H. R. Mackintosh: "God ceases to be God not merely when, as with Gess, there is self-renunciation actually of the Divine self-consciousness, but even when such qualities as omnipotence are parted with." "Still," he continues, "though not parted with attributes may be transposed. They may come to function in new ways, to assume new forms of activity, readjusted to the new condition of the subject.

It is possible to conceive the Son who has entered at love's behest on the region of growth and progression as now possessing all the qualities of Godhead in the form of concentrated potency rather than of full actuality \( \text{Σωματικός} \), rather than \( \text{ἐνεργεία} \). This estimate of the measure of depotentiation undergone by the Logos at Incarnation seems to represent the true position of modern Kenoticism. Complete extinction of self-consciousness appears to be an impossible idea if we are to aim at conserving the identity of Personality, for Personality becomes merely an empty term unless there is the content of self-consciousness or the potency of such.

To be consistent in maintaining the continuity of the Person of the Son of God in His Eternal and human life and yet to retain the Scriptural doctrine of a Kenosis, a bridge, as it were, must be postulated, connecting the temporal and the Eternal. This 'bridge' is found in the embryo to which the Logos reduced Himself, the potential divine-human force in the seed planted by the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary.

In the postulate of the oneness of the Incarnate Son of God the question asserts itself: Was the personality of this being human or divine? The orthodox position is that it was Divine, but it may be that the answer depends upon our interpretation of Personality.

Dr. Du Bose has shewn us that the idea of Personality may be conceived of in two senses: "If by personality we
mean the subject of a personal mode of being and acting; our Lord had no human personality; the \( \text{\textit{qvto\'s}} \) or 'He' was divine and not human. But if we mean the mode of being and acting of a personal subject then He had a human personality, because as man He was and acted personally in that mode which we call human."

On this reasoning, which seems to be sound and scriptural, it would appear correct to speak of the continuity of the Divine Person in the Incarnate life, but that the whole mode of that Incarnate life revealed a human personality, the distinction being that Person in this sense means the 'subject' of the life lived, and personality the continuous mode and product of that life.

It is in this sense also that Bethune Baker speaks when he says: "We must absolutely jettison the traditional doctrine that Christ's personality was not human but divine. To our modern categories of thought, such a statement is a denial of the Incarnation." "There is for us no such thing as a human nature apart from human personality; the distinction that He was man and not a man, while it has deep religious value, has ceased to be tenable". "The personality of Jesus is human; He is whole man even for Chalcedon; it is also Divine for Christian faith and consciousness in all ages." "The Word became flesh", and there is no doubt, as Godet says, that 'flesh' here is equivalent to man.

It has been contended that the theory of Jesus Christ being truly man is wrecked upon the belief in His birth of a Virgin. Such a belief, however, cannot be considered as containing an indictment against Christ's full humanity. We have no definite proof that the birth from a Virgin of any man, if that be considered possible, would interfere with his full humanity. The objection in any case is purely negative, and it may be said to be refuted by a consideration of the origin of man according to the Scriptural account. To deny humanity except to those who have been born according to the
ordinary course of nature would be to deny it to man's progenitor - Adam. Godet adds: "This would be true, even if we granted the Darwinian hypothesis, which taken in its utmost strictness still only applies to the body of man; not to his soul, unless, indeed, we are willing to give up in the case of man, the distinctive feature of his being - his moral freedom."

III. Having become man the Scriptures emphasise the unity of Christ by presenting to us a Being who had but one Consciousness and that Consciousness a human Consciousness even if it were of Divinity.

"The human consciousness of the Lord", says Sanday, "was entirely human ... only so much of the divine could be expressed as was capable of expression within the forms of humanity." "We must be strong to declare", writes another modern scholar, ".... that the consciousness of Jesus was a full human consciousness and that it was not supernatural or miraculous in any sense that can be attributed to a human consciousness."

This consciousness, however, though really human was unique among human consciousnesses. It contained conceptions of unique relationships to God the Father and to the world. This is evident by the titles which He assumes to Himself. He calls Himself the Son of Man (Οὗτος ἴδων Ἰησοῦς θεόν ἄνθρωπον), a title whose exact significance has long been the subject of controversy among Christian theologians. It seems clear, however, that by this term He at least meant that He recognised Himself as the Representative of the human race - "the second Adam" - as Paul terms it.

"I believe", says Sanday, "that He meant humanity as gathered up in Himself."

Christ also seems to have identified Himself with the Son of Man in Dan. VII.15, as inaugurating God's Kingdom on earth.
Bousset remarks: "He (Jesus) did not adopt its (the Son of Man) full content, including the ideas of pre-existence and of His own judgeship of the world; to Him the idea of the Son of Man meant only one thing - His return to glory."

This statement, however, quite evidently does not do full justice to Christ's conception of the term as He used it, as indicating His unique relationship to the Father and His own mission to the world.

(2) Christ had the consciousness of being the Son of God, and this again in a unique sense. We find Him accepting the term when it was used by Caiaphas and applying it thus to Himself. The phrase 'Son of God' was one of the titles of Messiah which Christ openly claimed to be. In using the title, therefore, Christ asserted at least a special relationship to the Father and a special relationship towards God's Kingdom, - the Kingdom of truth which was His own. This consciousness of a unique Sonship was undoubtedly a growing one, until it received the seal of Divine endorsement at His Baptism. The consciousness of Divine Sonship is clearly depicted by St. John in his Gospel but to what extent that consciousness went we have no exact knowledge. Can we not say, "He knew that, but not what of Divinity?" The fact was granted but not the full content of the fact.

(3) Christ is also conscious of a great mission - a mission which He Himself identifies with the Suffering Servant of Isa. III., and which He expresses in the well-known words:-

Mark X. 45: "The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto but to minister and to give His life a ransom for many." He is conscious of being the first man really to know God and to reveal Him to men - a consciousness which becomes intensified in the course of His earthly experience. This consciousness, however, in no way interferes with Christ's true humanity. His life was a life lived in complete dependence upon the Father as that of the ordinary man. The content of His
consciousness is rightly styled 'unique', but it is also
rightly termed 'human'.

The Scriptures further emphasise the unity of Christ's
person by presenting to us in Him a Being with one Nature,
i.e., there seems to be no ground for the deduction from the
New Testament writings of One who united in Himself two dis­
parate and distinct natures, as a building holds an upper and
a lower storey. There was but one Nature in Christ, and
that nature was a perfectly human nature, but since it was
the Divine Son of God who lived this human life and adopted
this human nature, the Church rightly speaks of the Divine-
human or the divinely-human nature. There is no indication
in the Scriptures of a process of unification or a continuing
division of the divine and the human in Christ. He was a
unity from Conception to Resurrection.

Baron von Hügel thus writes: "Jesus is declared to
hold in His human mind and will as much of God, of God pure
as human nature at its best, and when most completely super-
naturalised, can be made by God to hold, whilst remaining
genuine human nature still. ... He can thus be our Master
and our Model, our Refuge and our Rest."

It is certain, at all events, that the future thought
of the Christian Church will not be able to entertain the
idea of the two natures subsisting in Christ as the Chalcedon­
ian formula puts it: ἀνθρώπως, ἐνθρώπως ... etc.

Loofs truly says: "All learned Protestant theologians
of Germany ... really admit that the orthodox Christology
does not do sufficient justice to the truly human life of
Jesus, and that the orthodox doctrine of the two natures in
Christ cannot be retained in its traditional form."

The full integrity of our Lord's nature as human must be
affirmed with human reason, human will, human freedom and
human activity.
"Our Lord," writes Du Bose, "in His divine nature, prior to His Incarnation, subsisted and acted ἐν οἰκείᾳ θεοῦ after the mode of the divine being and activity. He was of one knowledge, power and majesty with the Father, and in a word, was a Divine Person. Our Lord in His human nature was and acted as a man after the human mode of acting and being. He was not omniscient, He was not omnipotent, He thought and knew and willed as a man and was a man in all those human activities which constitute human personality."

IV. "If we do not choose to deny that Christ was made a real man, we ought not to be ashamed to acknowledge that He voluntarily took upon Him everything that is inseparable from human nature. (Calvin).

The Kenotic Theory implies that having become man, the Son of God grew and developed as a man, being subject, except for the sense of sin, to the limitations of human nature.

"His life", as Godet puts it, "is the realisation of the normal development to which in principle every human being is called". This thought has, indeed, been emphasised by many Christian writers, but it has not always been faithfully pursued to its ultimate issues. The early Fathers particularly, as we have seen, spoke of Christ's true humanity, but their statements were made of none effect by their insistence on the two natures, and that on the divine side Christ had perfect knowledge; the limitations lay only on the human side.

There is, however, as we have asserted, no such false distinction in the New Testament. Jesus Christ is represented as a unique Being in that He had experienced a previous existence, in an Eternal sphere. He was unique as the Incarnate Son of God in His relationship to the Father and to men, and in His possession of unusual power and knowledge, but we are led to conclude from the Scriptural presentation that He possessed and used this power and knowledge as a man, and that they derived from the Father on whom He was completely dependent.
"However supernatural in its origin", says Oosterzee, "the Divine perfection of the Lord was displayed in a purely human manner. Divine is the power by which He calls forth life in the Kingdom of nature and of grace; but He manifests this in a truly human dependence on God His Father. Divine is the knowledge by which He fathoms that which is hidden and that which is future; but in a truly human manner does He display this in showing that in this state of humiliation, He does not at once and at all times perceive all things. Divine is the holiness with which He recognises, combats and overcomes the Prince of this world, but it stands before us as a purely human obedience, which in the fire of the severest temptation is developed to the highest degree. Divine is the Love with which He bears and embraces all, but it presents itself to us as a purely human friendship; it pours forth its grief in purely human tears of sorrow; it affords us the spectacle of the highest perfection of God in the pure garb of the highest human virtue."

No better evidence for this complete dependence of Christ upon the Father can be provided than in the record which, it is said so strongly emphasises the divinity of the Son of Man, viz. - the Gospel of St. John. Thus: Vth. Chapter, verse 19: "The Son can do nothing of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing, for what things soever He doeth, these the Son doeth in like manner."

v. 20: "For the Father loveth the Son and sheweth Him all things that Himself doeth."

v. 26: "For as the Father hath life in Himself so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself."

v. 27: "An He hath given Him authority to execute judgment, because He is the Son of Man."

v. 30: "I can of myself do nothing; as I hear I judge and my judgment is righteous, because I seek not mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me."
Verse 43: "I am come in my Father's name."

Chapter 8, verse 28: "I do nothing of Myself, but as the Father taught Me, I speak these things."

12:49: "The Father ... hath given Me commandment what I should say and what I should speak."

His seasons of prayer and communion with the Father are of themselves sufficient evidence of His human need and His entire dependence upon the Father's will.

Jesus, we are shown, as one undivided Person experienced true growth from birth, physically and mentally. He had human experiences whereby, for example, He attained a further stage of progress at 30 years of age than He had attained at 20 years. All kinds of evasions have been adopted to avoid this issue of a true development, but the acceptance of a true Incarnation involves its legitimate application. This growth came as with ordinary men by slow gradations. It almost seems, indeed, by Luke's emphatic statement, that the child Jesus grew in body and in mind, that He foresaw the attempt to make a phantom of Christ's manhood.

The simple story of Christ's true growth is in strong contrast to the Docetism of early traditions and in particular to the New Testament apocryphal writings.

The Greek classics speak to us of the infant Hercules, who as an infant in his cradle squeezed to death with his baby hands a pair of serpents which had been sent to kill him.

The stories of the New Testament apocrypha are no less thaumaturgic. Here we find Jesus the child turning other children into animals, making sparrows from clay and causing them to fly, throwing cloths into a dyer's vat, and bringing them out, each in the colour ordered. In the Gospel of Thomas there are recorded eighteen such miracles. Jesus kills a boy for jostling Him. He strikes His accusers with blindness; He confounds the schoolmaster Zaccheus with His knowledge. He heals those who had fallen under His curse.
He raises from the dead a boy fallen from the roof of a house. He makes corn which He sows to multiply; aids Joseph's carpentry by lengthening a piece of wood; cures James of a viper's bite and kills the viper, and so on. An account of similar miracles is given in the Gospel of Pseudo-Matthew and the Arabic Gospel of the Infancy.

There is nothing so unnatural or precocious as this recorded of the Infant Jesus by the evangelists. In fact, there was not, so far as we know, anything which would indicate the supernatural. He must learn His lessons at His mother's knee, and when we read of Him at the age of twelve years, with a dawning consciousness of His mission to men, it is not to give instruction, but to receive it from the Jewish Rabbis. It is possible that Mary may have spoken to Him while He was still a child, of His miraculous birth, but in all probability it was concealed from Him until maturer years, and for most of His youthful life He would think of Himself as the son of Joseph. The story that His childhood was clouded by sombre images of the thorny crown and the cross is but a legend. He would have the natural joys and hopes of a normal healthy boy. It would appear, indeed, as if our Lord had not even the advantages of many boys of His own day in regard to education - a suggestion that comes to us from the question of the Jews: "How knoweth this man letters having never learned?"

This would seem to indicate that Jesus received His education chiefly from His mother's lips, and through a diligent private search for knowledge and truth, being throughout under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

It is not detrimental to His manhood to say that by reason of His purity of soul and His surrender to His Father's will, He was led by the Divine Spirit into paths of the highest wisdom and knowledge for these paths are accessible to all self-surrendered souls.

The strongest Scriptural proof of Christ's ignorance is
found in Luke II. 52: "And Jesus advanced in wisdom and stature and in favour with God and men."

"This argument", says Adamson, "rests not on words or emotions, but upon a great regulative principle."

"Christ's knowledge was the knowledge of His time. Under any other conditions, His task would have become impossible, even life itself unbearable." Progress, it is evident, was not made by magic leaps as it were. Knowledge does not come instantaneously, but gradually and unceasingly; it was thus that the whole man developed.

"His feeling", says Oosterzee, "grew in delicacy, depth and force; His will in pureness, firmness and elasticity, His whole life, in a word, in inner harmony and perfection." "He learned obedience by the things which He suffered."

Divine prerogatives had been surrendered, and in His incarnate existence Christ is no longer Almighty. Great marvels are enacted, wondrous words are spoken, but all is done within the circuit of a human life which is fully dependent on and derives its power from God the Father.

The omnipresence which was His as Logos Asarkos is surrendered. Christ cannot be in two places at once. Thus Martha says: "If Thou hadst been here my brother had not died". His Incarnate presence was localized. He speaks of Himself as having come forth from and going to the Father.

The classic scriptural reference to Christ's limited knowledge is Mark, 13. 32, where Christ Himself says: "Of that day and that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father." There are, however, many other incidents and tests which reveal a similar ignorance: There is, e.g., the choice of His disciples. In choosing Judas we have every reason to believe that it was done in the belief that he was a worthy and capable man. It is an abhorrent thought that Christ should have elected a man to a position, the acceptance of which was known to involve destruction.
The following passages from Scripture may be taken as indicating Christ's limitations of knowledge. His leading of the disciples into a storm and falling asleep. Matt. 8.23. Sending the disciples into a storm and then coming to their relief. Mark. 4.35. This was quite evidently not a pre-arranged 'show'. His astonishment at finding the disciples asleep. Matt. 26.40. His wonder at the faith of the centurion. Matt. 8.10; and at the unbelief of the Jews in His own district. Mark. 6.6. He has to be told of the illness of Peter's mother, although in the same house, Mark. 12341. He expected fruit on the barren fig-tree: - lest haply He might find anything thereon. Mark. 11.13.

Dr. Adamson quotes instances of what may be termed "Scriptural" knowledge, but which he describes as "an influx of knowledge to a special end." Such are -

(1) Christ's knowledge of Nathanael under the fig-tree. John. 1.45.
(2) His acquaintance with phases in the life of the Woman of Samaria. 4.17-18.
(3) His knowledge of the shoal of fishes. Luke 5.5.
(4) His knowledge of the death of Lazarus. John. XI.
(6) The finding of the upper room for the Passover.

Adamson thinks that these are evidently Christ's own words; there is no trace of a "post-eventum" description. There can be little doubt that special impartations of knowledge were made to that soul which was at one with the will of the Father, yet, as Adamson says, this imparted knowledge differs only in degree from that which prophets of old displayed. The keystone of Christ's whole life was faith.
Instances of apparent supernatural knowledge are also given by Dr. Adamson, but are described as 'generic knowledge by means of principle.'

(1) He knew what was in man. John. II. 23-25. Here Jesus is shewn to have had a comprehensive and thorough-going view of human nature. His deep and clear knowledge was the result of gradual attainment of settled convictions as experience widened and ripened. "He sat for thirty years with His eyes wide open as the world passed by."

(2) Thus too with the statement in Luke VI. 7-8: "Jesus knew the Pharisees' thoughts."

(3) By natural means also He must have acquired the knowledge revealed in John 5. 26 in regard to the infirm man at Bethesda: "Jesus knew that He had been a long time in that case."

(4) Also in Matt. 19. 1 where He straightway addresses Zaccheus by name.

Christ being a subject of growth in His whole being would find His knowledge becoming increasingly clear and great, although while life lasted and until the cry of agony upon the Cross, the knowledge was limited and human.

"A careful study of these passages (dealing with Εἰδον and γνάωνσκεν ) seems to show beyond doubt that the knowledge of Christ, so far as it was the discernment of the innermost meaning of that which was from time to time presented to Him, and in so far as it was an understanding of the nature of things as they are, has its analogue with human powers. His knowledge appears to be truly the knowledge of the Son of Man, and not merely the knowledge of the divine Word, though at each moment, in each connection it was, in virtue of His perfect humanity, relatively complete.

Scripture is wholly free from that Docetism - that teaching of an illusory manhood of Christ which both within the Church and without it, tends to destroy the historic character of the Gospel."
This fact of a limited knowledge in Christ cannot be counted detrimental to His Divine honour and authority, but it is the honour and authority of the divine Son of God exercised under human conditions.

Thus Dr. Moberley says: "The Incarnate man never leaves His Incarnation. God is always in all things God as man. He no more ceases to be God under methods and conditions essentially human, than under those essentially human methods and conditions He ceases to be man ..... There are not two existences either of or within the Incarnate side by side with one another. It is all Divine, it is all human too."

A few years ago Canon Liddon could write in his Bampton Lectures: "Christ's single Personality has two spheres of existence: in the one it is all-blessed, undying and omniscient, in the other it meets with pain of mind and body, with actual death and with a corresponding liability to a limitation of knowledge."

Such a dualistic conception of two concurrent knowledges, one limited and the other unlimited would meet with little favour from the majority of theologians to-day. Christ's knowledge was as human as His needs. He lacked and sought food. His body demanded rest, solitude and sleep. An angel comes to strengthen Him for the last great test of life. Just as human were His quest for and accession of knowledge.

Without doubt Christ would have the characteristics of His human origin and environment. He would have the very physiognomy of the Jew. His religious training would be along Jewish lines. He was steeped in the Jewish scriptures, and He had an intense love for His countrymen and His country. Yet swayed by the love of God within Him, charged with the true outlook and spirit of the humanitarian, it is clear that He remained unbound by Jewish exclusiveness, but revealed a breadth of mind and a conception of the claims and needs of men which proclaimed Him to be indeed the Son of Man - the
universal man.

V. Divine Personality does not assume a mode of existence alien to its own in sharing the life of man. (Garvie: Christian Certainty and Modern Perplexity: p. 164.)

"The (Kenosis) must be viewed throughout ethically, as the act of a Being akin to man in that which is most distinctive of moral personality, viz.: self-determining will and sacrifice.

The possibility of the Incarnation and the accompanying Depotentiation is to be found in the capacity of the human to receive the Divine. The tendency on the part of many theologians of the early Church was to emphasise the idea of the disparity of the human and the divine nature and to create an unbridgeable gulf between God and man. This emphasis reached its climax in the assertion of the Chalcedon formula, that in Christ the two natures existed unconfused.

We have seen that Hilary among early church writers had a better grasp of the true affinity between God and man than his contemporaries when he spoke of the Divine nature rendering itself susceptible of the humanity which should be appropriated. He conceived of the human nature - without sin - as springing from God. The lead of Hilary, however, has not been universally followed, and throughout the subsequent history of the church in spite of the many references, both in the Old Testament and the New Testament to man's kinship with God, there have been scholars who have been insistent in maintaining the idea of an impassable division between them.

The Scriptures lay great stress on man's affinity with His Creator. Thus we read that God said: 'Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness.' "And God created man in His own image" - an image which we are led to believe, was not altogether destroyed, though marred by sin.

By 'image' we must believe that the Scriptures mean that there was reflected in man the Divine vital essence - the
personality of God. Man became a rational, self-conscious being.

The New Testament is more emphatic in its statements in this respect than the Old Testament. The redeemed become partakers of the Divine nature: Ἰησοῦς Κυρίων ἐγέρθης.

The disciples of Christ are the children of the Highest:

"As many as have received Him to them gave He right to become children of God. (τέκνα θεοῦ.)"

"Beloved now are we the children of God and it is not manifest what we shall be. We know that if He shall be manifest, we shall be like Him."

Paul speaks of those who are led by the Spirit of God as being the "sons of God" (υἱῶν θεοῦ.

In such passages as these we have scriptural justification for the belief in man's affinity with God and for the idea that God could become man. Not that created man even at his highest stage of development could rise to the fulness of God, but that God or the Son of God could descend to the fulness of man and after His human life assume again the Divine fulness. "It is absolutely indubitable that all that we see in Christ which is glorious and Divine is destined to be at the same time the heritage of all His people."

The distinction between the human nature and the divine nature is in a certain sense unreal. One does not lend oneself to the charge of anthropomorphism in asserting that God thinks and loves, is patient, kind and long-suffering, but this also we can assert of men or of the best of men. It is of such elements that both human nature and divine nature are constituted. The difference is that God possesses them ilimitably, and thus we can say in a true sense, that the difference is only one of degree, and the idea of a "becoming man" by the Divine Son of God no longer becomes incredible.

A life in the flesh necessarily involves a surrender of the possession of the attributes of ilimitable knowledge, power
and love. These are possessed humanly and there infinitely. The conception of a dual knowledge and a dual nature is entirely unnecessary and unscriptural.

The thought of the affinity of the Divine and the human is not confined merely to Jewish and Christian conceptions of God and man. It is met with in the writings of the ancient Greeks and Romans. It was the teaching of Plato. In the third century B.C., the physician Aratus of Alicia, in a scientific poem called "Phenomena", sang thus: "Jove's presence fills all space, upholds this ball; all need his aid; his power sustains us all, for we his offspring are."

The same idea has found expression in the Hymn of the Stoic Cleanthes quoted by St. Paul in Acts 17:26-28.

"Εκ σου γὰρ γενωμένα, ἠθεὶ μὴν πάντως ἀληθῶς
μενον ἐστι ζωῆς τε καὶ ἐργεῖ δυνη, ἐπὶ γαῖαν.

"We are thy children, we alone of all
On earth's broad ways that wander to and fro
Bearing thine image wheresoe'er we go".

This conception of affinity, however, is not used by Dr. Relton as an argument for the possibility of the Son of God becoming complete man. On the contrary he protests that Christian thought cannot ever abandon the Chalcedonian dualism, and contends that "it must continue to recognise a generic difference between the human and divine natures." This, however, seems to deny the reality and even the possibility of a true Incarnation. The Word would have to be regarded as not "becoming" flesh, as the Scriptures state, but as "assuming" flesh - a mere addition of manhood to His Eternal Infinite Person. Such is not the conception that we derive from the Scriptural record, whose testimony concerning the great Sacrifice made in the Incarnation, the condescension and the humiliation, can only be interpreted by the actual fact of a change in the mode of being of the Divine Son - a real act of
Kenosis in becoming man.

Between the Creator, qua Creator, and the creature, qua creature, there is and must ever be a real distinction; but in the Incarnation we have the phenomenon of the Infinite Creator temporarily surrendering His infiniteness and becoming finite, that is, the barrier of infiniteness is temporarily removed; we have a divine Being living completely under human conditions.

This does not break down for ever the essential and eternal distinction between God and man or lead us to pure Pantheism. The Incarnation, in fact, was but a temporary phase in the life of the Son of God and the human life that was lived was unique in that it was the life of a pre-existent being with a developing consciousness of a special relationship to God and the world, while man must ever remain a limited being dependent upon God as the source of his life and power. Christ's life on earth, indeed, was in a sense different from that of His fellows, but to state this as a fact is not to utter anything derogatory to His true manhood, for one man differs from another man. Christ's life was man's life lifted to its highest powers, but it was nevertheless human.

"The distinctive note struck by those who assert the two natures in Christ," says Dr. Paterson, "is of the infinitude of the Divine and the finitude of the human," but if it be a truth that man is contrasted with God as the finite with the infinite, it is a truth of equal importance that man is made in the Divine image and that it is his destiny to be a part-taker of the divine nature.

It might therefore seem to be truer and not less in harmony with Scripture to affirm that in Christ there was one Nature or at least one mode of being, viz.; a humanity which was divine because it exhibited all that humanity was destined to be in union with God, and also a divinity which was human
in that it was manifested only in so far as was possible within the limitations of a human experience. "In Him", says Stevens, "for the first time we see humanity at its climax."

In the 'make-up' of man, indeed, there are elements to which limitations can scarcely be set. 'Mind', 'spirit', 'imagination', 'life' itself - these cannot be bought within the categories of space, or be subject to measurement. The word 'finite' has little application to them. They are akin to that which is in God Himself.

"Man is not God, but there are capacities unfolded and unfolding in human nature which are essentially Divine."

This truth is also stressed by Dr. Fringle-Pattison: "In the conditions of the highest human life we have access as nowhere else to the inmost nature of the divine. "God manifest in the flesh" is a more profound philosophical truth that the loftiest flight of speculation that out-saars all predicates and for the greater glory of God declares Him unknowable."

Scripture represents Christ not alone as the Divine Son of God sub specie humanitatis, but as man at his highest and best. Christ was different from other men, but "difference does not mean separation or opposition".

"Jesus does not represent some isolated type", states Bovon, "but the religious man in the perfect balance of his powers. Christ reveals in His person the most spiritual life to which humanity could attain."

"Man is the "offspring" of God" as Paul assures us, and human consciousness and achievement give the affirmation to the Scriptural statement. We are God's kin. Since this is so, and it becomes the less incredible that the Logos of God should be able to divest Himself of His eternal divine prerogatives of omnipotence and omniscience and spend a life in the flesh subject to temporal conditions and human limitations.
Stevens well asks, "If God and man are not different in kind, but like in kind, then why should not perfect humanity be the truest expression of divinity?"

VI.

It follows that in establishing the complete unity of Christ in His earthly life, His one consciousness, His one will, His one knowledge, and further the fact that there was no Logos outside the flesh, that Kenoticism cuts itself off from the dualism of the past and the present.

The technical statement of early creeds of the two natures in Christ may have served its purpose for the time, but it frankly leads to an irrational impasse where modern Christological thought cannot be content to stay. "The Church at Chalcedon", says Bishop Temple, "virtually gave up the attempt to understand while refusing to sacrifice either part of its apparently contradictory belief."

The dualistic conception of the two natures in Christ leads to the idea of the two distinct spheres of consciousness. Two experiences are suggested as finding their unity in the one Person, but the conception is utterly beyond the power of reason to grasp. It is sheer 'logomachy'.

That this is so, that there could not be two consciousnesses unified in Christ is shown by the bold dualism of the Church in deciding for the two wills and the rejection of the idea of one divine-human activity (διαυγόνυ ἑνέτειρα) as conceived by Dionysius the Areopagite in the 6th Century.

Both ideas - that of the two ununified parallel consciousnesses, and that of the two consciousnesses as unified in Christ's Person, must be rejected, for they definitely interfere with the unity of His Being. "The idea of two streams of consciousness in the one Person, one filled with the content of an infinite intelligence, and the other with the content of a finite intelligence involves a psychological impossibility. The same conclusion must be reached in
considering the dualism of the Logos living at the same time in the flesh and out of the flesh. There are neither rational nor scriptural grounds for thus violating the unity of Christ as we know Him in His human incarnate life. Absurdity reaches its nadir in the statements of some German divines that when Christ hung on the Cross, He was also ruling in Athens, that in the midst of the desolation expressed by His cry: "My God, my God why hast Thou forsaken me", He was conducting the eclipse which testified to Nature's sympathy with His decease.

"The gospel evidences of the limitations of Christ's power", as Dr. Carpenter says, "strip such contradictions of all semblance of reality."

There is no doubt that the blind adherence of succeeding generations to some of the contradictory decrees of the early church has hindered a true apprehension of the real nature and person of the Incarnate Christ. Of late years, however, we have been brought face to face as the disciples of old with the real man Jesus Christ, not less divine because human, not less human because divine.

To stop the idea of an unconfused existence of two natures, two consciousnesses, two wills in one Person seems to suggest nothing less that intellectual paralysis.

Schweitzer hardly exaggerates when he says: "When at Chalcedon the West overcame the East, its doctrine of the two natures dissolved the unity of the Person, and thereby cut off the last possibility of a return to the historical Jesus. The self-contradiction was elevated into a law. But the manhood was so far admitted as to preserve in appearance the rights of history. Thus by a deception the formula kept the life prisoner, and prevented the leading spirits of the Reformation from grasping the idea of a return to the historical Jesus. This dogma had first to be shattered before men could even grasp the thought of His existence."
That the historical Jesus is something different from the Jesus Christ of the two natures seems to us now self-evident. We can at the present day scarcely imagine the long agony in which the historical view of the life of Jesus came to birth. And when He was once more recalled to life, He was still, like Lazarus of old, bound hand and foot with grave-clothes - the grave-clothes of the dogma of the Dual Nature."

Many modern scholars of the Church appear to be dissatisfied with the terminology of the ancient creeds just because of this incomprehensible Dualism. Thus Dr. Raven trenchantly remarks: "If it is only the language of the creeds that we criticize there need be no fatal barrier in the way of their acceptance, but unfortunately ... the objections to the orthodox position are less superficial, less easy to answer than this.

We cannot accept, we could not be profited by a theory of Incarnation which represents Christ as looking down from the serene atmosphere of Heaven upon Himself as He assumes the guise of a man on earth. We should destroy the reality of His struggle against sin, we should sacrifice the value of His life and death, if we thought of Him as an actor whose true self was untouched by the events of the dramas in which He chose to play a part.

If He never knew the limitations under which we labour; if He never knew the fierceness of a life and death conflict with evil; if He never suffered the despair which was more bitter than bodily torment; if, in fact, He was never man, then He is of no use to us." To say that He shared our griefs and sorrows only in name would be a refinement of cruel irony, and yet that is the corollary from the belief held by so many modern theologians of a double sphere of consciousness in Christ. Our hynology is here so often in fault in expressing the concurrent Eternal and temporal life. The babe embraced in the arms of Mary is represented as being at the
same time consciously embracing in His eternal arms the entire universe. He is at once reigning on the Cross of Calvary and on the throne of heaven. These statements Dr. Raven characterizes as "pious antitheses".

With Bishop Weston we must hold -

1. That Christ must be one.
2. That He had a single consciousness.
3. That He never leaves the level upon which men and women at their best can move and act.

Only thus shall we realize for ourselves Christ's full significance and uniqueness, for "it is when we have dared to set aside all that is exotic and unnatural from our portrait of Him, to equate His experience with ours and to estimate His triumphs in the light of our failures that the wonder of Him becomes plain."

VII. Although the Son of God experienced a real Kenosis in becoming man and was subject to the limitations natural to man, yet, according to the Scriptural presentations of His person He was free from sin.

It is this phenomenon, indeed, which constitutes the essential difference between the Incarnate Christ as man and all other men, although here again it must be asserted that this freedom from sin in no way interferes with His real humanity. We have a high Priest who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners. His sinlessness has, as it were, two aspects. First, He appears before us with a purity from sinful taint manifestly insured by His birth as the Son of God from Mary, through the power of the Holy Spirit.

In answering an objection that the taint of sin might be conveyed through the mother alone, Dr. Sanday says that "this would hold good if the other factor in the process were purely negative - if it meant only the absence of something human and not the presence of something Divine." Secondly, The Incarnate Christ manifests a holiness that was achieved through the vict-
orious conquest over temptations which came to Him in His human experience.

Much has been written concerning the phenomenon of the sinlessness of Christ, and age-long discussion has arisen concerning its exact nature. Some writers have argued that He was not able to sin - non potuit peccare, others that He was able not to sin, - potuit non peccare, and there are still others who have believed that He was able to sin - potuit peccare, while being kept or keeping Himself free from all actual wrong-doing.

Martensen with other scholars held that the first two - non 'potuit peccare' and 'potuit non peccare' - were inclusive of each other. The same has been said of the second and the third. It has been contended that however terrible the temptation, although there was a liability to fall there was always the power to keep from falling.

Among modern theologians, Dr. Da Bose, in emphasizing the humanity of Christ has asserted the belief that an essential feature of that humanity is the "possibilitas peccandi". He considers, however, that a perfect and completed human holiness might be defined to be a "possibilitas peccandi" converted by personal faith and obedience into a "non possibilitas peccandi", - formal freedom lost in real freedom.

Dr. William Smith reflected the view of the majority of orthodox thinkers sixty years ago when he wrote: "It - the Temptation was the trial of one who could not possibly have fallen. This makes a complete conception of the temptation impossible for minds wherein temptation is always associated with the possibility of sin."

To-day opinions among orthodox theologians are more divided. Thus Dr. Raven says: "If He was unable to sin, then it is no merit to have resisted temptation," while Bensow, as we have seen, holds that while Christ was liable to temptation, He was not able to fall. His argument seems to be sound, viz.,
that if we consider who it is that has become man, the Son of God living His human life, in the last issue we are forced to conclude that whatever the temptation to sin, He was able to overcome it. It was impossible for Him to fall. Potuit non peccare and non potuit peccare seem to be inclusive.

But, it has been asked, how could a human being be sinless, or how could a sinless being be tempted by evil? In answer we may take the view of Dr. Wm. Smith and contend that it is impossible for ordinary human minds to conceive such phenomena; or it may be considered as within the power of the human mind and experience to provide an answer: Thus Dr. Digges la Touche:—

"It has been urged that we are not in a position to pass judgment on the sinlessness of a fellow creature since our moral sense is perverted; we are of sinful stock. It is like blind men pronouncing upon the visual powers of one who is alleged to see. There is an element of truth in this, but after all we are not completely blind. We have a true conception of the difference between right and wrong — we can exercise value judgments. We can discern scales and stages in spiritual character, and our appreciation intensifies as the grades become higher, until we are blinded by the excess of light in the character of Christ,— but in our blindness we know that here is perfect holiness." These words are sound, in spite of the uniqueness of Christ's person, we have some means of estimating it, and understanding His temptable sinlessness by the analogies of human experience and a clear understanding of the historical figure presented to us in the Scriptural record.

It must be emphasised that the Incarnate Son of God experienced genuine temptation. It is true that the Temptation on the Mount is not presented as involving an intense inward conflict, but apart from the brevity of the account and
the subtlety and power of the temptation, it is evident that
the preparation for the temptation was dire and strenuous and
that the trial experienced was terribly real.

In the latter phases of His life's work, however, when
the last great tests are to be applied, there is certain evi­
dence of mental turmoil and spiritual stress. "Now is my soul
troubled, and what shall I say?" Yet even here, strong as are
the forces of evil which assault His soul, once He is convinced
of the path which He should tread, there is no hesitation at
the sacrifice or the rightful choice. "Nevertheless not my
will, but thine be done."

The sinlessness of Christ, as we have seen, can be looked
at from two sides. There was the sinlessness of the Incarnate
Logos, i.e., the freedom from evil taint and evil tendency,
and there was the sinlessness of the life as it was actually
lived. The former is given, the latter achieved. Christ
was sinless and holy in the latter sense of the term in the
only possible human way, by being confronted with the alterna­
tives of right and wrong and by choosing always the right; by
the recognition of and obedience to the Will of God the Father,
by faith, obedience and suffering.

"The sinlessness of Jesus" says Stevens, "was something
more than innocence, it was fulness, - positive perfection of
life; His holiness was no cloistered virtue."

If we grant with Godet and others that sin is no necess­
ary element of human nature, then this phenomenon of "not sin­
ning" cannot be considered as in itself a superhuman factor in
the life of Christ. It was an outcome in part of His entire
adherence to the will of God. "His faith", as Holtzmann says,
"is in no wise, as it must be in the case of so many of His
followers, acquired by conflict with error, or begotten amid
the storms of despair, it rests as sunshine upon a vast and
peaceful sea."

Although, however, there was always triumph, yet there
was always real conflict in Christ's achievement of holiness. If we ask how this could be so when there was no susceptibility to sin in Him, the answer can be made that in human nature there are certain tendencies which cannot be considered sinful per se, but which may come into contact with our sense of the highest and noblest line of decision and action, the desire for quietness and meditation, for example, time for cultivating special gifts, the love of music and art in their highest and best forms, the fear of pain and the desire to avoid it. It is when these legitimate desires and natural fears clash with the call of duty, with the deep needs of men, and with the will of God, that the struggle begins, the intensity of it so often lying in the agonizing uncertainty as to what is the call of duty, the real need of men, the true will of God.

In Christ with His human limitations the contest with temptation was as severe as with other men, while there may have been, indeed, we can say there must have been subtle and terrible forms of temptation presented to Him as a sinless man, of which we as sinful have no conception.

Thus writes Oosterzee: "We feel that His temptation on earth must have been infinitely more severe; His conflict against sin, infinitely more fierce than of any other son of Adam. For it lies in the nature of the case that with the very possession of the highest gifts and powers is united the severest temptation to their arbitrary use, and that in the moral domain too, the highest mountains border on the deepest abysses."

We may picture such a temptation as is referred to above, i.e., where there is a real test but no sinful susceptibility,—in the incident where at twelve years of age, Jesus finds Himself in the Temple, the sanctuary of Israel's hope and history. The thought of the child Samuel would probably come to Him, and like the son of Hannah, He would perhaps have a great longing to make God's temple His home, but the voice of duty calls and
He goes down with His parents to Nazareth and there becomes subject to them.

In Holman Hunt's painting, Joseph and Mary are seen by Jesus, who rises to salute them and allows himself to be drawn from the seance, but with a far-away look in His eyes, while there is a natural aureole formed by the light on His golden hair.

Whether subjective or objective the Temptation in the Wilderness must have been a real one to Christ, from whose lips undoubtedly the record of it must have come.

He is beset by hunger. Here, indeed, is a real trial where the desire is natural and legitimate, but in response to the demand of submission to the Will of God expressed in His own conscience, He sets aside His own needs and subordinates Himself to the higher issue.

Thus also in that hour of spiritual conflict when the path which He has to tread is not clear and He cries: "Now is my soul troubled and what shall I say? Father, save Me from this hour." Here is perplexity and sore spiritual stress. But when the enlightenment comes and the Divine Spirit makes plain the way there is no hesitation but an instantaneous response; "Father glorify Thy name".

At Gethsemane also, when with all its force the fear of the terrible, and to us mysterious trial to be faced at Calvary presses upon Him, He pleads: "Let this cup pass from Me." It is the natural shrinking from the fearful unknown, and the shameful known - the physical agony, the exquisite spiritual anguish to be endured; but once recognising the irrevocable purpose of God, He consents to tread the tragic thorny road. "Thy will, not mine be done."

Christ's sinlessness is as real as His temptation and humanity. Whether we look at his character from the standpoint of His own consciousness, the testimony of His friends and biographers, or the impression made upon His enemies, all
the evidence goes to convince us that He was without sin.

Christ Himself has no consciousness of wrongdoing.

"The Lord Jesus stands before the world as one whose self-consciousness was free from the least suspicion of moral guilt and failure to attain at every moment of His earthly existence the highest possible standard of moral holiness."

"Whom of you convicteth Me of sin?" is the challenge which He issues to the Jews. He never at any time makes confession of culpability, He never asks for forgiveness, but He forgives sin. He never prays with His followers, although He prays for them.

"Jesus forgives sin", says Barth, "and this not in the name of God, but from His own perfect authority which He emphatically asserts before the Pharisees and proves it by healing the man sick of the palsy."

"He who with incomparable keenness", writes Beyschlag, "has pursued sin into the inmost recesses of the heart found no shadow of guilt even in the most critical hours of His life, arising in His own heart to transform the countenance of the Heavenly Father into the countenance of a Judge."

This experience, this consciousness of rectitude, is all the more remarkable when we remember the pain which wrongdoing has excited in the best of men. The purest and the noblest are those that are least satisfied with their own spiritual attainment and who mourn most earnestly over the delinquencies of the past. Paul calls himself "the chief of sinners." There is no language approximating to this from the lips of Christ.

"There was that in Him from the first", says Dr. Mackintosh, "which offered a completely effective resistance to the corrupt influence of environment, obviated the disturbance of His perfect spiritual growth and secured the inner fount of subsequent feeling and will from all defilement. Hence when
the infant Christ woke up gradually into clear ethical experience it was with a nature, untainted, immaculate, nowise handicapped from the very outset by seeds of evil already germinating in the soil of character." In the light of this consciousness in Christ of making no deflection from the right, we must suppose in Him either an unparalleled self-deception, or an insensate pride, or else accept His convictions and His attitude as those of Truth itself.

"We must deny His moral sincerity and sensibility if we admit that He had sinned, however little, in the passed years of His youth."

There is indeed not only a consciousness of past and present integrity, but such a confidence of an ability to overcome evil in any form that we can only predicate of Him that He was not capable of sinning. "I do always the will of My Father", seems to have not only a present, but a future significance.

"He rose to that exalted point of moral self-consciousness", says Keim, "where despite the anguish of the individual conflicts, no paralysing dread of failure in His moral task any longer hindered and obscured His fellowship with God."

This self-consciousness in Christ of perfect obedience to the law of righteousness and the will of God finds corroboration from the Father at Baptism: "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." This testimony comes also at other solemn moments in Christ's life. We might well ask if God could be pleased with One whom He exalted to His right hand and yet whose earthly life was sullied by sin. The Divine words are conclusive proof to those who read this testimony in the light of their own limitations, and their own consciousness of sin.

There is further testimony to Christ's sinlessness from the mouths and writing of His own disciples who had observed His life from the beginning, and who had entered into that
close intimacy of every-day life which so readily finds or imagines faults.

Thus Peter says of Him that "He did no sin", and refers to Him as a "Lamb without blemish and without spot", "the Holy One of God."

Paul writes: "Him who knew no sin, He (God) made to be sin on our behalf that we might become the righteousness of God in Him."

John refers to His implicit sinlessness, He was manifested to take away sins and in Him is no sin.

The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews concludes: "We have not a High Priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but one that hath been in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin," and with this may be compared a similar reference: "For such a High Priest became us, holy, guileless, undefiled, separate from sinners."

With these expressions which assert an innate purity and an achieved holiness in Christ, there can be combined those statements which by their tremendous implications assert a claim to complete freedom from the power and influence of evil. Such are: "I am the Light of the World". "I am the Way, the Truth and the Life." "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father".

Such claims as these can only be justified by the conviction of a perfectly sinless human life, the hope and the glory of man, the mirror of Holiness and Truth. Even the centurion cries: "Certainly this was a righteous man."

It is true that the claim of Christ's sinlessness has been challenged. Assertions have been made that certain events in the history of His life indicate a lack of love and self-control. It is said that the language used by the boy Jesus to His mother: "Wist ye not that I must be in my Father's house," suggest a certain precociousness, if not actual presumption. It is urged also that the words which
were addressed to Mary at the wedding feast at Cana of Galilee: "Woman what have I to do with thee," indicate a harshness and roughness of disposition not in harmony with perfect sympathy and filial love. It must be answered, however, that any idea of cruel intention on the part of Christ, seeing Him as we do in the larger aspect of His all-loving, all-gracious life must be rejected. The tone in which the words were uttered, the spirit by which they were prompted, the look which accompanied them, these are hidden from us, but we may rest assured that they were in full harmony with a heart and life of perfect love.

It has been asserted, also, that Christ Himself disclaims perfect Holiness in the answer given to the rich young ruler: "None is good save one, that is God."

These words, however, cannot be used to force the idea of a confession of sin on Christ's part. He is, as it were, putting Himself aside for the moment, and is challenging the young man's easy use of holy terms.

It is, indeed, contended by some writers that He is actually identifying Himself with God. On the other hand, many assert that Christ is here really disclaiming the absolute goodness which belongs to God. In any case it is not an utterance on which to base a charge against the perfect goodness of Christ's earthly life.

The driving of the money-changers out of the temple provides no better charge against Christ's sinlessness than it would against the perfection of the Father Himself. It was a case of most righteous zeal against those who had violated the holy sanctuary. It was the act of one who was consciously God's Son, with the cause of God to safeguard at all costs. It was an act, indeed, emanating from the sense of conscious though derived authority. It is in this sense also that we must consider the incident which excited so greatly the
resentment of Professor Huxley - the destruction of the swine at Gadara.

All the reasons which prompted Christ to respond to the request of the evil spirits, taking the incident literally, we do not know. It has been urged that the Incarnate Son of God, the creator of all things, had the right to do what He liked with His creatures, although this standpoint is hardly a justifiable contention against the charge of injustice to the owners of the swine. It is possible that the herd, to Christ's knowledge, may have been hopelessly infected with some dangerous disease. In this case destruction would have been a wise and merciful act.

In the last issue, however, the best answer must be that an isolated incident like this cannot interfere with the definite impression made upon us by a larger study of the New Testament record of Christ's perfect human goodness.

In regard to the incident of the withering of the figtree, it is not at all essential to consider it as an act of caprice or vindictiveness on the part of Christ. His disappointment was undoubtedly genuine, but the tree was evidently worthless, and by His act exercised through that power derived from complete adherence to the Father's will, He was enabled the more forcibly to convey a spiritual lesson to His disciples and to illustrate by the decay of the useless tree, the approaching judgment upon a guilty nation.

The sinlessness of Jesus Christ can indeed be considered as a real human sinlessness, - a positive holiness which was won through complete and lasting obedience to the Will of God, - the spring of His strength and inspiration. Truly and sincerely does He say: "As My Father taught Me, I speak these things." "I speak and act only as I see and hear of My Father." "The Father which sent Me He hath given Me a commandment what I should say and what I should speak."

It was also the sinlessness of the Son of God, but of
that Son of God living His human earthly life. Like other
men He must learn and fight and conquer to become perfect in
holiness; and thus right to the end He confronted and vanquish-
ed the forces of evil to which He, as the Divine-man, was
exposed.

N.B. The question of Christ's relation to Sin was a subject
of much discussion among the ancient Fathers, some holding that
He was not able to sin, others that He assumed our sinful
humanity and thus confronted the temptations common to man.

So Gregory of Nyssa writes: "For we say that God .. was
blended with human nature like a sun, as it were, making His
dwelling in a murky cave," and though He took our "filth" upon
Himself yet He is not Himself defiled by the pollution, but in
His own self, He purifies the filth.

The fullest answer among the Fathers to the question:
"How can Christ be complete man and without sin?" was made by
Athanasius to the Apollinarian objection: "If He assumed
human nature entire, then assuredly He had human thoughts."
But it is impossible that in human thoughts there should not
be sin. How then will Christ be without sin?" The answer
given on the 'orthodox' side was, first: that God is not the
maker of thoughts which lead to sin, and that Christ attached to
Himself only what He Himself had made. Adam was created
rational by nature, free in thought without experience of evil,
knowing only what was good. He was capable of falling into
sin, but was endowed with power to withstand it, and in fact
had been free from it. It was the Devil who sowed in the
rational and intellectual nature of man thoughts leading to
sin, and so established in man's nature both a law of sin and
death as reigning through sinful action. Thus it became
impossible for that nature having sinned voluntarily and in-
curred condemnation to death, to recall itself to freedom.
Therefore the Son of God assumed this inward nature of man,
not of part of it only, but the whole of it (for sin was not a part of it - but only a disposition infused by the Devil) and by His own absolute sinlessness emancipated man's nature henceforward from sin."

As to the objection of the Apollinarists that the intellectual nature of man was incapable of sinning, Athanasius answered that sin is not the essence of manhood, and that the victory was won through the human nature which had once been defeated. Jesus went through every form of temptation because He assumed all those things that had experience of temptation, and it was not with the Godhead, which He knew not, but with man whom He had so long seduced, against whom He had ever since directed His operations, that the Devil engaged in warfare and finding in Him no token of the old seed sown in man was defeated. It was the form of man as at first created, flesh without carnal desires and human thoughts that the Word restored or renewed in Himself. The Will belonged to the Godhead only.

This Athanasian answer seems to be conclusive enough against the Apollinarian objections although it is marked by the ascription of a docetic humanity to Christ. The human nature is assumed. We look in vain for the real 'becoming man' which the Scriptures record. It was not alone the sinless manhood which was tempted, as Athanasius would suggest, but the whole Christ in His divine-human being.

Our study of the Kenosis is at an end. We have traced the doctrine as it is set forth in the Scriptural account of the life of Christ in so far as the Pre-existent Son of God is revealed as emptying Himself of the Divine form and Divine prerogatives and living a genuine human life. We have seen that the Incarnation involved an absolute or relative depotentiation. The views of the early Christian writers have been
given and it has been shewn that although the Kenosis is often suggested and the genuine humanity of Christ asserted, yet that the early views of the Person of our Lord were pervaded generally with a docetic spirit. The mediaeval scholars are revealed as being similarly affected in their portraiture of Christ. Lutheran and Reformed views fail to give us the real human Christ of the Gospels. The beginnings of modern Kenoticism are shewn to have originated with Zinzendorf while its first systematic presentation is given in the writings of Gottfried Thomasius.

More recent Kenotic views have been dealt with, objections to the Theory have been considered and an attempt has been made to state, not on a metaphysical basis of presentation, but on the scriptural estimate of Christ's real manhood, the extent of the Kenosis undergone. Here we have seen that glorious, Pre-existent personal Being exchanging the life of Heaven and the infinite divine prerogatives for a life of deprivation, disquiet and suffering in the midst of a sinful world.

We have seen that this Divine Person lived a genuine unified human life from conception to death, that He was limited in power and knowledge, that He developed in body and mind, that He suffered pain and grief, experienced anxiety, perplexity and real temptation, and that thus He passed to the Cross. Yet through all this human experience there is no halting in His allegiance to His conception of the Divine purpose. Suffering is endured, doubts are combated, temptations are overcome. There is no deviation from the commandments which His Father gives to Him. There is no shrinking except from sin; until the work is complete and He can cry: "It is finished," conscious of having perfectly fulfilled the will of God the Father, and the task entrusted to Him.

Here we feel, in the shame, the horror and the suffering of the Cross that the Humiliation of Christ reaches its nadir.
Bensow, as we have seen, would have us consider the Kenosis as not terminated at the death and Resurrection, but as continuing in the Exaltation. We cannot, however, follow him in his speculations.

The exaltation, indeed, is an indispensable link in the chain of His redemptive work, but it is the experience of Him who now suffers no human limitations but "sits on the right of Majesty on high;" "far above all rule and authority and power and dominion and every name that is named not only in this world, but in that which is to come."
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