WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE UNIVERSITY.

In Thank Pickhill's love.
followed and is revisited by
Principal Martin, and second in 1000 to Farrar. Fahrenheit
REVELATION.

An interpretation in the terms of modern conceptions of Personality.

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Ph. D.

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Notes. Owing to limitations of typewriter "capitals" are substituted for "italics."
CONTENTS.

FOREWORD.
The need for restating the case for revelation.

(I) Religion based on revelation.

(II) Ignoring of revelation, and the factors which have led to this condition.

(III) Elements which encourage us to undertake a restatement.

(IV) The problem focussed in Christ.

(V) Importance of finding a basis on which we can affirm revelation and promising ways of achieving this.

(VI) Limits and Nature of Thesis.

Pages I-9.

Section.I.
DEFINITION.

(I) Indicate sense in which we propose to use term.

(II) Disadvantage of limiting it to certain historical documents.

(III) Danger of too wide a connotation.

(IV) Distinction between revelation as experienced and as it is in total reality.

(V) Rothe's view.

(VI) Tentative use of term as equivalent to religious consciousness viewed as self-disclosure of God.

Pages 10-18.

Section.II.
THE PURPOSE OR END OF REVELATION.

(I) As communication of "ideas" or "doctrine". Scholasticism. Deism. Aufklarung. Lessing.

(II) Revolt in Schleiermacher. Overcarried.
(II)

(III) To give us knowledge of God. Knowledge of acquaintance. Can only be expressed in terms of personality and life.

Pages 19-27.

Section 3.

THE ORGAN OF REVELATION.

(I) Cannot limit channel through which revelation becomes ours to one of three aspects of consciousness.

(A) The attempt to limit it to Feeling or Intuition. Schleiermacher.

(B) The Will as Organ. Kant.

(C) The Intellect as Organ. Hegel.

Conclusion. Full personality is organ for apprehending revelation. Through myriad channels comes that which transcends our finitude.

Pages 28-45.

Section 4.

THE ABNORMAL IN REVELATION.

(I) Nature of revelation is such as to lead us to expect abnormality. This however is not its leading characteristic.

(II) Abnormality is a constituent but not criteria of revelation. Dr Mozley's position. Illustrate our position by:

(A) Prophecy.

(B) Miracles.

(C) Mysticism. (Catherine of Genoa).

Conclusion: Inexplicability is "elastic tape-measure" and cannot be used to discriminate between revelation and non-revelation.

Pages 46-62
(III)
Section 5.

REVELATION AND HISTORY.

(I) The objection that revelation is realm of "eternal and necessary", whilst history that of "accidental and relative".

(II) Revelation has nothing to fear from application of evolutionary method to history.

(III) Does the time come when revelation can dispense with history?

(IV) Revelation related to history by reason of its social character and through language.

(V) Scripture as history of a unique kind, not the norm but the mediator of revelation.

Pages 63-80.

Section 6.

THE TRUTH AND CRITERIA OF REVELATION.

(I) Some considerations as to nature of Knowledge leading up to position that revelation implies the interpenetration of Divine and human life.

(II) Theories which postulate complete disparity between content of revelation and knowledge.

(III) Knowledge as Genus subsuming many Species, each with its distinctive criteria. Justified in introducing alongside of intellectual criterion that of value.

(IV) The three criteria of revelation. Criticism of Ritschl's position. Illustration of their application. Value is not without standards.

Pages 81-109.

Section 7.

(See over).
(IV)

REVELATION AND PERSONALITY.
Some metaphysical considerations.

(I) The problem is that of forming a concept of
Ultimate Reality in which the Orders postulated by
revelation and science shall be harmonious.

(II) Inadequacy of Traditional proofs of existence
of God.

(III) Our knowledge of God is personal.
(A) Definition of Personality.
(B) Objections to ascribing personality to God.
(C) Advantages in defining revelation in terms of
personal relationship.

(IV) Our method, that of treating personality as in
relations with the Universe, and showing by the
elucidating of its transcendent nature that man
participates in the infinite life of God.

(V) There is an Order of Values, which is a Unity,
Revelation is this Order of Values conceived as personal,
as the Universal Spirit drawing us to Himself in Love.

(VI) Relate "values" and "existents", and express
results in terms of religion, showing how they imply
purpose on part of God and freedom on part of man.
The complement of the Scientific View.

Pages 110-150.

Section 8.
CHRIST AS THE FINAL REVELATION.

(I) Finality as demand of religious spirit.

(II) Objections to Finality. (a) Historic Method.
(b) Relativity.

(III) What we mean by Christ as final revelation.

(IV) A judgment of value, and problem is as to whether
we can attribute finality to any value and show
that in Christ this is realised.

(V) Proceed to do this, utilising the argument of
Troeltsch.
(VI) Relied on fact that value is an element of Reality. Faith in value no more irrational than faith in reason. Reached a finality which allows for progress and development.

Pages I51-I83.

Section.9.

REVELATION THROUGH INCARNATION.


(II) Incarnation not isolated fact, nor after-thought of God.

(A) Relation to Natural revelation. TEXAS XXXXXX

(B) Relation to previous revelation in history.

(II) Three recurring problems.
(A) The Nature of the Godhead which would permit of possibility of revelation. Inadequacy of Nicene symbol. Godhead as a Society?.

(B) Jesus as human and Divine. The Two Natures. Personality of Christ is a unity. What differentiates Him from us.

(C) Growth and development in Jesus. The antinomy between His life as an "achievement" and as "revelation". A perfect human development. Seek to solve antinomy by a study of personality as involving "identity" and "difference". Jesus was what He became.

(IV) The "annihilation of sin" but partially expresses the purpose of the Incarnation, which was the realisation of all value in a life of true fellowship with God and with all that He has made.

(V) If this the purpose of revelation, of which Incarnation the culmination, would appear to require Immortality for its achievement. Kant's argument.

(A) Not dependent on the present view of time-process.
(VI)

(B) The inconsistency of Bosanquet. Postulates "immortality of value" but not "immortality of individual." But value is such for personality, and INDIVIDUA SUBSTANTIA essential to it. A false monism.

(C) Truer monism will seek unity in which differences reconciled and not cancelled, unity of Love. The goal of revelation.

Pages 184-235.
FOREWORD.

Religion in the strict sense of the term is based on revelation. Whether we confine our attention to the study of Christianity or include within our survey the other great historical religions such as Judaism, Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Islam, we are confronted by the fact that religion claims to have its roots in a Divine manifestation. Positivism, or, as it has been called, the Religion of Humanity, would appear to be an exception to this rule; but it is questionable whether, in strict parlance, Positivism can be called a religion, and even were we to concede its claim to the name, its lifelessness and failure to secure for itself a standing in religious thought and life are such as to warrant us in ignoring it in the generalisation that we have made that religion is founded on revelation.

The bulk of modern religious literature is, however, strangely silent respecting it; it is either treated as a useless hypothesis, incapable of proof or disproof, or quietly ignored. Many factors have tended to produce this condition of things. (I) We are not quite so confident as formerly that a clean-cut line can be drawn between what is and what is not revelation. The task was much easier when revelation was identified with the Scriptures, which had to be accepted on authority; it was then possible to set it over against Reason as being both distinct from and superior to it. It is now generally recognised, however, that revelation includes more than
the Scriptures, and that it is by no means in necessary contradiction to Reason. The clean-cut line therefore disappears. But the process of eliminating clean-cut lines is not peculiar to the realm with which we are dealing; it may be seen in all the varied spheres of modern thought. It is no longer possible to draw such a line between Animate and Inanimate Nature, nor between Reason and Instinct, yet the characteristics of each are clear enough, even though in actual examples they tend to shade off into each other. Take an illustration from the everyday world; youth is not manhood, but the fact that we cannot just say in any particular case when the one passes into the other, does not justify us in ignoring the distinction between them. That we cannot clearly draw the line between revelation and non-revelation, in any particular case, does not warrant us in assuming that the distinction between them has disappeared.

(2) Another factor that has led to the ignoring of the revelational aspect of religion is that modern thought has made untenable the foundations on which revelation was supposed to rest. It has shattered what might be called the naive conception of the Bible as revealed truth, and undermined the traditional arguments for the existence of God to a degree that has weakened our confidence in them. It does not follow, however, that because our methods of formulating revelation have proved inadequate, that we must reject the notion; rather must we seek to express it
afresh in terms that will commend it to the thought of our age, and we shall probably discover that in the re-statement it will have acquired a richer content. (3). A third factor has been the remarkable success which has attended the efforts of those who have concentrated on the study of other aspects of religion. The triumphs of Anthropology and of the application of the Historical Method to the data of religion may be cited as examples. Special mention ought also to be made of the dominance of Psychology in the religious thought of modern times. There is, however, a very real danger of assuming that the psychological explanation of religious phenomena is the full explanation. It was this which led Boutroux speaking of the psychological method to say: "This method, if it succeeds, will sooner or later lead to the abolition of the fact itself...Contrary then, to the other sciences, which leave standing the things they explain, the one just mentioned has this remarkable property of destroying its object in the act of describing it, and of substituting itself for the facts, in proportion as it analyses them ". (Science and Religion. pp196,197). Boutroux has not stated the position with sufficient care, nevertheless he calls attention to a very real danger. On the one hand, it is not possible to isolate religious experience and deny to science the right to investigate it from its own particular angle: that is to say, whatever
appears in consciousness is material for Psychology.
On the other hand, a theology which limited itself to
the domain accessible to Science, would be deprived of
the right to any opinion concerning the universal validity
of its affirmations. To the psychologist, every mental
state is of interest as a mental state, but its full truth
and value lies outside his area and require tests other
than those which belong to his particular science. For
its purpose, Science abstracts a group of phenomena,
which possess common characteristics, and treats it as a
self-contained whole. This is a necessary procedure and
serves a useful end. To affirm however, that the conclusions
reached by this method exhaust the significance of the
phenomena is to ignore the element of "abstraction" in
the procedure by which they have been reached. Let us
suppose a world in which all are blind. To a few of these
men there comes the gift of sight, and they go to a wise
but blind psychologist, and relate their experiences of
opening the eyelids and looking out upon the world with
its far distances. "Ah", he says, "it is when you open
the eyelids that this happens, and when you close them,
it disappears; that which you think you see is to be
explained as being just a function of open eyelids".
They answer: "But it is real, what we see is not something
of ourselves, but something beyond". Now both are right
so far as they go. The psychologist without the experience of sight can get no further than the describing of a glorious experience as the function of some mental or physical state. We may say therefore that the dominance of religion by psychology cannot be permanent, inasmuch as the psychological interpretation of an experience is only one of the many that are possible and may be of least significance to the experient.

There are many new elements in modern thought which encourage us in the task of seeking to restate the problem of revelation.

(I) The chasm which Locke imagined to exist between SUBSTANCE and its QUALITIES, and the separation which Kant made between NOUMENA and PHENOMENA tend to disappear. It is becoming increasingly evident that there is nothing-apart-from-its-qualities, and that the distinction between noumena and phenomena, so far from being absolute, is of such a kind that we may describe phenomena as noumena imperfectly known. The disappearance of this chasm opens up great possibilities for the restatement of the metaphysical basis on which the affirmation of revelation rests.

(2) Another factor, worthy of our consideration, is, that most thinkers of the present day would admit that
subjectivity enters into all knowledge without invalidating its truth, and this compels us to restate the epistemological aspect of the problem. When we come to that stage in our discussion, we shall make it clear that subjectivity and objectivity enter into all experience, that even illusion presumes both subject and object, the distinction between illusion and fact being that in the former we have inadequately or inaccurately apprehended some portion of Reality. The epistemological problem therefore will be, not as to whether subjectivity enters into our apprehension of revelation, but as to whether such apprehension is true.

(3) A further consideration to which we shall have to give attention concerns the nature of Ultimate Reality and the many-sidedness of our ways of apprehending it. It is becoming generally recognised that Reality includes more than EXISTENTS, that is to say, that values, including ideal values that cannot be called existent, enter into Reality, and that cognition, limiting the use of the word to the rational aspect of our consciousness, is but one way of apprehending Reality. Knowledge is infinitely more than a mere generalisation of percepts; appreciation, equally with perception, is a passport to Reality. The beauty of a rose is not less real than the substance of its petals. In other words, value is and essential
constituent of Reality. But value is always value for a person or persons, and this leads us to take account of significant facts which have emerged with respect to the nature of personality, such as its unity, its individual and social character, and above all what we may call its IDEALITY, in which, as it seems to us, personality is in contact with the infinite personality of God.

For Christianity, the problem of revelation is focussed in Jesus Christ. To state the problem of the supreme revelation in terms of personality rather than substance relieves it of many of the antimonies by which it is beset and enables us to see in a much clearer way its relative and absolute aspects. The metaphysical terminology in vogue in the early days when Christianity was being formulated, is no longer adequate to express the living truth which it sought to conserve, and the deep and abiding facts with their eternal values demand a larger setting. Our thesis will therefore move from the general problems to a study of the Final revelation in Christ, and of its nature as being revelation by Incarnation. Our aim throughout will be to seek to restate our thoughts concerning revelation in terms of personality.

The importance of establishing a basis on which we can affirm the revelational character of religion must be obvious to those who think of it as being infinitely
more than man's highest thought, and who regard it as other than a somewhat vague hypothesis which more or less sustains man in his moral endeavours. If religion is to mean anything, it must be such that we may conceive of it as resting upon the self-manifestation of the Love that lies at the heart of Reality. The changed attitude of our modern thought, which gives to personality and values such vital significance, seems to open up a promising way of achieving this. The great mystery of revelation will always be with us, but many of the sharp antinomies which confront those who seek to relate it to the rest of experience would disappear, if they kept before them the fact that it is concerned with a personal relationship, and that the most helpful way of conceiving it is not in terms of substance but of personality.

It is impossible to survey the whole area of revelation, and it is necessary that some indication should be given of the limits within which we purpose to keep. Only outstanding problems will be discussed, and especially those on which, as it seems to us, light is thrown by the new orientation of thought to which reference has been made. Some things have been omitted which to many may seem of greater importance than those which have found a place in our discussion; all that I can plead is, that in some cases I feel I can add nothing to what has
been said by others, and in other cases certain things have been ignored as having little bearing on the problem with which we are here concerned. The thesis is in the nature of an apologetic, using the term in a very wide sense, and at the most can only be regarded as a contribution towards a subject whose limits are beyond human reach.
Section I. DEFINITION.

It is impracticable at the outset of our discussion to give a full definition of what we mean by revelation, and yet it is necessary that we should indicate in some way the sense in which we propose to use the term.

The word may be taken in the narrower sense as referring to a definite set of historical documents, which are to be accepted as authoritative in the matter of religious belief, as for example, the canonical books of the Scriptures with Protestants, and these plus the Apochrypha and Tradition by the Roman Catholics. Sabatier uses it in this sense when he says: The common starting point of both the Protestant and Catholic Dogmas of Authority is the notion of an external divine revelation, consisting in a doctrine or an institution decreed by God and supernaturally communicated to men as an external law to command the intelligence and the will" (The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit. p 183).

Thus to restrict the term has the merit of definiteness, but this is more than counterbalanced by disadvantages which are numerous and fairly obvious.

It is more than doubtful whether, in view of such factors as the application of the methods of Historical Criticism to the Scriptures, the growth of our knowledge concerning the formation of the Canon, and the
progress achieved in Anthropological research and in the study of Comparative Religion, such isolation can be justified. To ban the efforts of those who seek to apply to the Bible principles which have been found helpful in elucidating the sacred literature of other religions savours of obscurantism, and certainly conveys the impression that our attitude is one of fear rather than of faith. Further, thus to detach the Scriptures from the revelation which came to man before they were written, and from that which has been coming in ever-fuller measure since, is to purchase isolation at the cost of attenuating the significance of the vast religious experience through which they have been interpreted and enriched, and to surrender the inwardness of religion by making it to rest upon a written record rather than upon the continuous work of the Holy Spirit. The disadvantages of extending the term revelation to cover more than the Scriptures are infinitesimal as compared to the loss to religion through limiting it to these. The place which the Bible holds with respect to revelation will be dealt with in the section on Revelation and History, but, in the meantime, we may affirm that this widening of the connotation of the term by no means robs the Scriptures of their unique significance but tends to bring them into vital relationship with religious experience.
We have to be careful however not to make our definition so wide as to practically obliterate the dividing line between what is and what is not revelation. This fault is characteristic of Schleiermacher. He says: "What is revelation? Every original and new communication of the Universe to man is a revelation....every intuition and every original feeling proceeds from revelation. If nothing original has been generated in you, when it does come, it will be a revelation for you also, and I counsel you to weigh it well" (On Religion. Speeches to its cultured despisers. Tr by Oman. 1893. p 89). In one sense the definition is too narrow, inasmuch as it limits revelation to intuition and feeling, and in another sense it is too broad to be serviceable.

We may best define revelation by its relation to religion, as being its historical and experimental basis. It is that in the religious consciousness which we assign to a divine source. Such a definition carries with it an objective reference to something outside ourselves, which is not so much acquired as given, which is not the product of our highest thoughts or exalted feelings but their condition, which, in a word, bears the character of self-communication from God. This is not to affirm that it is un-mediated. It may be recognised that Nature, History, Feeling, Thought, and Conscience are all mediators,
but that which gives it its distinct character as revelation is that its ORIGO ET FONS is God.

Further, we have to distinguish between revelation as experienced by a particular individual or group of individuals and as it is in its total reality. The full significance of any revelation may not be apprehended by an individual or race. The experience through which we have knowledge of God is that of a reality distinct from and unexhausted in the experience as mine. Here as elsewhere the principle of development works and possesses two aspects. There is a progressive revelation on the part of God, and a progressive apprehension of it on our part. On the one hand, we cannot deny to God the freedom and initiative which we ourselves possess; there is no A PRIORI reason why He should not manifest Himself again and again, in varied ways, upon the plane of history. On the other hand, in these historic acts we are continually discovering a new content, and their full significance is never wholly ours. It was owing to the failure to make this distinction, i.e. between the full content of any revelation and our limited but progressive apprehension of it, that Sabatier became entangled in a subjectivism from which there was no escape. One of his three-fold criteria of revelation was that it must be "INTERIOR" (Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion. p. 56); that being so, his only way to get back to objectivity was by
affirming "that a vibration set up in a soul resounds in kindred souls.... thus the inner revelation becomes consistent and objective in history; it forms a chain, a continuous tradition, and becoming incarnate in each human generation, remains not only the richest of heritages but the most fecund of historical powers". It is a curious kind of objectivity that Sabatier gives us, consisting apparently of soul-vibrations crystallising into traditions. It appears to us that an historical fact, such as the Incarnation, possesses a much clearer right to be called "objective" than the feelings and emotions which it may have kindled in human hearts. The objectivity which Sabatier ascribes to inward feelings is quite other than that of the supernatural order which is necessary to affirm their character as revelation. The confusion arises from the application of the term "revelation" both to an historical fact and also to our limited apprehension of its significance. Any consistent theory of revelation must allow for this ambiguity.

Rothe gives us a view of revelation which, whilst it contains much that is valuable, cannot altogether be regarded as satisfactory. (An interesting summary of his theological position is to be found in "History of Christian Doctrine. pp 516-522). Speaking of revelation, he says: "Divine Revelation works on incessantly as the
The definition has the advantage over that of Sabatier's of bringing out the independence which revelation has of our apprehension of it. Moreover he makes it clear that there are not several orders of revelation such as Natural and Supernatural, Special and General, but only one. The fact that the supernatural is mediated through Nature does not make it other than supernatural with respect to its origin. The term "revelation" has often been used to denote truth communicated in an abnormal way as distinct from the knowledge of God obtained by natural means, but all our knowledge of God, through whatever medium it may have come to us, is from one ultimate source, namely, the revelation or disclosure which God makes of Himself. Rothe did good service by emphasising this unity of revelation, but his definition as given above is too broad to be serviceable. Let it be granted that it is not possible to make a clear-cut line between knowledge and religious knowledge; yet there is a distinction, and the particular problem with which we are concerned is the latter. To widen the issue but tends to confusion. Nor is it quite satisfactory to define revelation as being merely "the divine co-efficient, it is more than that, being the basis
of our religious knowledge; it is that self-manifestation of the Divine in history and experience from which we gather fuller and yet fuller satisfactions for our religious needs.

Rothe is also interesting inasmuch as he affirms that revelation has two sides. It is MANIFESTATION, the objective acts of God in Providence as it is concerned, in the old Dispensation, with the Hebrew people, and in the new with Christ, and INSPIRATION, an illumination of the mind for the interpretation of them. (See Fisher's History of Christian Doctrine). In criticism of this position we should say that no purpose seems to be served by using the word manifestation to express what is usually covered by the word revelation. The distinction however between revelation and inspiration is one which cannot be ignored. The latter is concerned with the process by which the content of revelation becomes ours; it is that purifying and quickening of the human spirit by which it is fitted to become the organ of the divine revelation. Sabatier provides us with an illustration of the confusion which results from the ignoring of this distinction when he writes: "Revelation may be said to consist of the creation, purification, and progressive clearness of the consciousness of God in man - in the individual and in the race" (Outlines of a Philos of Religion. p 35.). Here process
is confused with content. Inspiration is the divine equipment by which we are fitted to receive, interpret, or communicate the self-manifestation of God, which is revelation. The terms are often loosely employed as synonymous, but for the purpose of clear thinking it is better to keep them apart. Inspiration is the handmaid of revelation and confusion results when the maid is taken for the mistress.

We are now in a position to indicate the significance which the term "revelation will have for us in the study on which we have embarked. It will be used in a wider sense than that of the Scriptures. Its content will be the religious consciousness viewed as having its origin in the self-disclosure of God. Quickened by the Holy Spirit, we have learned and are learning to discern in various phases of individual experience and in certain events in history, (in a sense we may agree with Rothe and say, in the whole of experience and history), the outpouring of the light, love, and power of God, which are essential constituents of His nature. These manifestations have been of a kind that we can ascribe to no other source but Him. The pages that follow will be concerned with the problems which such a faith involves; with the arguments which may appear to invalidate it, the philosophic basis on which it rests,
the criteria by which we distinguish it as revelation, and with the position which we claim for Christ in it as centre and crown.

(2) C.P. Fisher. "Nature & Method of Revelation" Unwin. 1890

(3) C.P. Fisher. "History of Christian Doctrine" T&T Clark. 1908


Section 2...THE PURPOSE OR END OF REVELATION.

At this point we must give some consideration to the question of the purpose which revelation serves, or, to put it from another point of view, the end which it is designed to accomplish. Dr A.B Bruce has a very able treatise on this subject, entitled "The Chief End of Revelation," which presents very cogently the argument against the view which once was commonly held, that the chief end of revelation was to give us, in the form of historical and authoritative facts, certain doctrines concerning God, which the unaided reason was powerless to discover. Whilst the present writer agrees with his destructive criticism, he feels that the constructive part of the work is unsatisfactory.

A brief historical resume will enable us to set the problem in perspective. In the age of Scholasticism, revelation was regarded as giving information about God supplementary to that which was discoverable by reason. For example, Thomas Aquinas held that "Reason could demonstrate the Unity of God; Revelation alone could make known to us the Trinity of Persons therein", and the Schoolmen generally maintained that the Trinity, the Incarnation, and other specifically Christian doctrines must be accepted as revealed facts and beyond dispute. There was some division of opinion as to which side of
the line they had drawn between reason and revelation, certain doctrines occupied, most of them maintaining that reason could prove God and Immortality, though Duns Scotus took the opposite view and held that these could not logically be proved. They were all agreed however in regarding revelation, not as the whole of our consciousness of God, but as that portion of it which came to us, not through reason, but through certain unquestionable and definitive facts. Even Spinoza, in "Tractatus Theologico Politicus" (published 1670) maintains "that we may now disregard Paul's philosophy and theology, and attend only to the few elementary truths in the teaching of which the prophets, apostles, and Christ are all at one" (Bruce. Chief End of Revelation. p 34). Spinoza differed from the Schoolmen in making reason a criterion of revelation, but common to both there was this idea of revelation as consisting of a few elementary truths.

The next period to be considered is that in which fall the movements known in this country as Deism, and in Germany as the Aufklärung. These greatly exaggerated the powers of human reason and spoke as if "common sense" alone were infallible and omnipotent. They held that revelation was simply a republication of the Laws of Nature, and in so far as it claimed to be anything more than that, was a lie invented to give
authoritative sanction to the doctrines and practices of the Church. Prominent amongst the English Deists were Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Thomas Hobbes, John Toland, Anthony Collins, Woolston, Matthew Tindal, Shaftesbury, and Bolingbroke. Their views exhibited considerable differences, but characteristic of them all was this emphasis on the sufficiency of Nature and the power of reason to discover in it the necessary truths of religion. They erased the line which the Schoolmen had drawn between revelation and reason by subordinating the former to the latter. Their belief in a Deity stood in no need of a revelation inasmuch as it had for its sure foundation the argument from design. Their theories were built on the optimistic assumption that the world, on the whole, was very good, and in so far as there were minor imperfections here and there, all that was necessary was a little renovating. They believed in Immortality, not on the strength of any revelation concerning it, but because Nature suggests certain very apt analogies of it. On the Deistic theory there seemed to be no real necessity for revelation, and the most that it could do was to confirm the findings of man's intellectual genius. The superficial optimism of the Deist tended to minimise the stern facts of life which made revelation practically necessary. What is to be noted, however, is that the notion that revelation
consists of doctrine was the common ground of the Deists and of those who refuted them.

Turning now to the Aufklärung, let us glance at one of its most representative thinkers, Reimarus. From him came what was probably the most bitter attack on the traditional conception of revelation. This was embodied in the "Wolfenbüttel Fragments", published after the death of their author by Lessing. The method which Reimarus pursued was that of destroying the claim of the Bible to be revelation. He laid down two postulates, that if the Bible were a revelation, (1) It would be given in the form of a system of doctrine expressed in precise terms, and (2) That men of irreproachable character would be selected as the medium of communication. Now it must be granted, that if revelation be regarded as divinely communicated doctrine, it is by no means easy to answer the criticism of it as pat forward by this somewhat vulgar thinker.

Lessing himself is much more interesting than Reimarus. Although the instrument through which the work of the latter was given to the world, he differs essentially from him in tone and outlook. For whilst the former was bent on destroying the foundations on which revelation was supposed to rest, the latter was anxious to rehabilitate it on a basis not contrary to reason. This he seeks to do
in his book "The Education of the Human Race". His position is, that what education is to the individual, revelation is to the race. Education is revelation coming to the individual, and revelation is education which has come and is coming to the race. From this premise he proceeds to argue that revelation gives to man nothing which he might not educe from himself, but only accelerates the process and orders it. The Old Testament is the First Primer, and when its truths had become firmly established in reason, there came the Second Primer which is the New Testament, and the process of revelation still goes on. Lessing has a fine grasp of the progressive character of revelation, and brings out what is often overlooked, namely, the contribution made by the Ethnic Religions, but he has not broken free from what might be called the paedogogic conception of revelation. The Bible consists of two Primers, and what it reveals consists of "ideas" or doctrine. If that be granted, there is no inherent necessity for it, inasmuch as all that it accomplishes is to hurry-up things a little.

Now what our historical resume has shown is, that revelation rests on a very precarious foundation when it is conceived to be merely supernaturally-communicated doctrine, and is left open to attack from all sides. Yet it was on this assumption that the older school of apologists vainly sought to defend it. The
revolt against a theory of revelation which was indefensible was bound to come, and it came in the work of Schleiermacher and others. In them we witness the attempt to secure for revelation a firmer foundation by denying that its essential character is doctrinal. The revolt however appears to have over-carried. If revelation be not supernaturally-communicated doctrine, what is it? To this, Dr Bruce answers: "What if revelation consisted not so much in the communication of a body of truth as in the intimation of a gracious purpose"? (The Chief End of Revelation. p 25). But unless we are to purge the phrase of all rational significance and to leave it a barren subject lacking a predicate, we must recognise that "the intimation of a gracious purpose" has a cognitive content and therefore a doctrinal significance. To limit revelation to the mere intimation of a gracious purpose is to narrow its scope even more than did the Schoolmen. The purpose which revelation serves is to give us a saving knowledge of God, and that being so, it can neither be limited to nor separated from doctrine. To imagine that we have secured revelation against rationalistic attack by stripping it of doctrinal significance is a mistake, for that is to surrender an element in it from which it derives meaning and value. A theory which does not leave room for the revealing of God in His inner
social nature, in His cosmic activities, and in His relations with men only escapes criticism by becoming meaningless.

We have spoken of the purpose of revelation as being to give us a knowledge of God. Professor James, however, has pointed out that there are two kinds of knowledge, and provided that we do not treat the distinction as absolute and seal each up in water-tight compartments, there is much to be said for it. He writes: "There are two kinds of knowledge broadly and practically distinguishable; we call them respectively KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUAINTANCE and KNOWLEDGE ABOUT. Most languages express the distinction; thus, noscere, scire; kennen, wissen; connaitre, savoir;... I know the colour of a pear when I see it and the flavour of a pear when I taste it... but ABOUT the inner nature of these facts or what makes them what they are I can say nothing at all. I cannot impart ACQUAINTANCE with them to anyone who has not already made it himself. I cannot DESCRIBE them, make a blind man guess what blue is like, or tell a philosopher in just what respect distance is just what it is, and differs from other forms of relation. At most I can say to my friends, Go to certain places and act in certain ways and these objects will probably come". (James. Principles of Psychology. Vol I. p 221). The distinction appears to be this, that KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUAINTANCE is the immediate and direct experience, whereas KNOWLEDGE
ABOUT is concerned with ideas and abstract thoughts. The latter is conceptual, descriptive, representative, communicable, and under it come all universals, scientific formulas, and the like. Now, which kind of knowledge does revelation give; is it the KNOWLEDGE ABOUT GOD or ACQUAINTANCE WITH GOD? The contention which is here put forward is that the knowledge which revelation is designed to give is of the latter type, but with this important proviso, that the distinction between the two types must not be extended so as to imply separation, otherwise we should be shut up to individualistic and subjective views of revelation. The fact is that the types are mutually involved and are never to be found in isolation. The phrase "KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUAINTANCE" appears to us to be better expressed by the word "experience", a word which does not confine us to the individualistic implications which James' phrase seems to bear, for experience is never a purely individual affair. It is not difficult to see how, if we press the distinction which he made to the point of absolute separation, revelation by a mediator becomes impossible; all that such a mediator could do would be to tell us to go to certain places and act in certain ways and the objects will probably come. What we contend for is, that it is not a matter of separation but of emphasis. The purpose of revelation is to give us
ACQUAINTANCE WITH GOD, that is, to bring us into personal and living fellowship with Him. It is therefore something bigger than either the communication of doctrine, or the intimation of a gracious purpose, and can only be fully expressed in terms of personality and life.
Bibliography. Section 2. (Page. 27.A.)


Section 3. THE ORGAN OF REVELATION.

The conclusion of our last section was that revelation must be interpreted in terms of life and personality, and we are now to consider some of the difficulties that have arisen through ignoring this and endeavouring to limit our apprehension of revelation to one aspect of our personality, abstracted from the rest. Until recent times, the mind was regarded as constituted by various faculties, the traditional classification of which was three-fold, namely, Emotional, Volitional, and Intellectual or Cognitive. The modern emphasis is on the unity of consciousness, and what were formerly regarded as separate faculties are now held to be but aspects of this unity. It is no longer possible to limit the channel through which revelation becomes ours to one of the three aspects of consciousness. Such a limitation tends to impoverish the content of revelation. It is here maintained that it is MYSELF as an entity that apprehends the knowledge of God, and that though some one aspect may be more prominent than another in mediating it, yet it is accepted as revelation by my personality and not by some aspect of it.

(A) Let us first of all examine the theory which would limit religious knowledge to Feeling or Intuition. The great name that comes to our mind in this connection is that of Schleiermacher (1768-1834). The contribution
which he made to religious thought has had an influence that is incalculable, and in so far as it was a protest against the barren abstractions of the theology of his time, a theology which ignored the subjective element in religion and the infinite variety and richness of the Christian experience, it was all to the good and sorely needed. Like most protests, however, it swung to the other extreme and lent itself to a subjectivity which seriously imperilled the idea of religion as founded on revelation. His position is most clearly stated in his work "On Religion - Speeches to its cultured Despisers", first published in 1799. He affirms: "The contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Eternal. Religion is to seek this and find it in all that lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all doing and suffering. It is to have life and to know life in immediate feeling, only as such an existence in the Infinite and Eternal" (Ibid. Tr by Oman.1893.p 36). He distinguishes morality from piety: the former shows itself as manipulating, as self-controlling, whilst the latter appears as a surrender, a submission to be moved by the whole that stands over against man (Ibid. p 37). He rules out the cognitive aspect of religion by affirming that "any effort to penetrate into the nature and substance
of things is no longer religion but seeks to be a science of some sort" (Ibid. p 49). Theology is thus sharply distinguished from religion. When we enquire as to where revelation comes in, he answers: "Every original and new communication of the Universe to man is a revelation", but qualifies this by giving as its criterion that the religious must "at least be conscious of his feelings as the immediate product of the Universe, for less would mean nothing. He must recognise something individual in them, something that cannot be imitated, something that guarantees the purity of their origin from his own heart" (Ibid. p 80).

Now it is to be noticed, that in making this last qualification, Schleiermacher is scarcely consistent with his own premises. For when he qualifies FEELING IN GENERAL by making it FEELING AS THE IMMEDIATE PRODUCT OF THE UNIVERSE AND RECOGNISED BY THE INDIVIDUAL AS SOMETHING INDIVIDUAL AND THAT CANNOT BE IMITATED, he has introduced a cognitive element, and it is no longer pure feeling. It has embarked on what he would call, the region of science, and has become "a theology of some sort". It is impossible to differentiate feeling in any way, or to delimit it, without bringing in the cognitive element which he supposed to be alien to religion.

Putting this aside, let us examine
Schleiermacher's position. Its strength lies in the fact that religion is put forward not as a theory but as an experience, direct and immediate in its nature: its weakness is that that experience is regarded as being limited to pure feeling. As Schleiermacher himself would admit, the feelings themselves demand to be understood by reference to the situations in which they arise and the part they play in the total adjustment process. When this process of unification and adjustment with other factors has been carried out, has the feeling deteriorated into something less than revelation? For example, is religion limited to that first fine feeling that thrilled us when we became conscious of Christ's call, and is it a less thing when we have coordinated it with the revelation of the New Testament Christ, and the religious experience of the Church? As a matter of fact, the feeling itself may develop in continuity and intensity by thus linking it up with the situation in which it arose and with the rest of experience. Pure feeling is evanescent, save as it acquires content of some kind; without that alloy, in time, it tends to disappear.

And this also requires to be said, that whilst the emotional aspect of our consciousness is very important as a means of religious insight or as the medium through which revelation is apprehended, it is not the only factor,
nor is it always first in respect of time. The contention of the activists that the will is a powerful factor cannot lightly be set aside. We find it expressed in the words of Our Lord, "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the teaching whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." Not only rapture but obedience is a necessary qualification for further insight, and nothing so extends the horizons of vision as faithfulness in the matter of duty. As food requires to be transformed into energy if appetite is to remain, so vision not translated into service chokes the channels through which further light may come. In severing the vital interrelatedness between religion and morality, Schleiermacher impoverished both.

In a similar way, it may be pointed out that the exercise of the intellect may lead to a closer and deeper fellowship with God, even though the way to this may be through the valley of doubt. A very powerful illustration may be found in the biography of Prof G.J Romanes. Intellectual pursuits such as those which fall within the ambit of Natural Science have tended to enlarge the area of revelation, and not, as some have supposed, to narrow it, and this is even more true of Philosophy. We are not denying that feeling enters into all revelation, but only that it is to be limited to this.
Religion cannot be reduced to a single phase of mental life, for in all consciousness the entire mind is involved. The abandonment of Faculty Psychology makes Schleiermacher's position untenable. Whilst any of the three aspects of consciousness—thought, feeling, or will—may be uppermost in religious experience, the others are not absent. It is WE who feel, and WE as conscious beings.

The tendency of Schleiermacher, as of all who unduly stress the element of feeling, is towards a Pantheism in which revelation as we understand it, that is, as based on a personal relationship between God and man, tends to become obliterated. This has often been repudiated by his followers, and whilst it may be admitted that he sought to guard his position in many ways, yet it cannot be denied that the drift of all theories which centre religion exclusively in feeling is in that direction. Over against thought and will, feeling is the element which destroys personal distinctions. The psychology of a crowd furnishes many apt illustrations of this. We are not therefore surprised when Schleiermacher affirms:

"Every form, every creature, every occurrence is an action of the Universe upon us, and religion is just the acceptance of each separate thing as a part of the whole, and of each limited thing as an exhibition of the Infinite." (Ibid. p 279). Such a theory leaves little room for
revelation in the sense given above, for the possibility of such lies in keeping clear the distinction between God, Man, and the Universe.

(B). Again, there are those who centre religion exclusively in the Will, who practically make it synonymous with moral activity. Such was Kant (1724-1804). His position with respect to the limits of knowledge will be discussed at a later stage, but what we are concerned with now is his emphasis on the primacy of the will in morality and religion. For it was Kant, who, by his distinction between the "practical" and the "theoretical" reason, gave the impulse to the movements which have stressed will rather than cognition as the basis of our religious knowledge. His position is all the more extraordinary when we recall his teaching about the nature and unity of human experience; his doctrine that all our human knowledge involves an interpretation of the data of our senses in the light of what he called the "unity of apperception". He held that all facts of which a human experience can obtain knowledge are known to us as the possible objects of an insight which we conceive to be virtually one, as the insight of our own truly knowing Self, the presupposed unity of which is the condition of all our knowledge. But he limits this unity to the realm of the theoretical
reason and passing to that of the practical reason he leaves it behind and lays exclusive stress on Will.

His position is as follows: "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will" (Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics. Abbot's trans. 1900. p 10). This Good Will belongs entirely to the realm of the practical reason: it owes nothing to experience, nor can experience confirm it. "Reason of itself, independent of all experience, ordains what ought to take place" (Ibid. p 29). This postulate is fundamental to Kant's position and on it he proceeds to build a series of affirmations with respect to Freedom, Immortality and God. The reasoning throughout suffers from the absolute dualism of the practical and theoretical reason.

For example, the freedom for which he argues amounts to no more than freedom from the chain of physical necessity, it is an idea barren of all content which stands over against the world of phenomena. At a later stage, in dealing with the metaphysical problem, we shall see that the postulate of freedom is essential for the reconciliation of existents and values, but the freedom there enunciated will not be of the abstract and unconditioned character which is to be found in Kant.
When he says we ought, therefore we can, arguing from his own premises, one fails to discover where the logical connection comes in. The sentence only possesses meaning as implying that a moral ideal carries with it, by virtue of the fact that it is an ideal, the possibility of its realisation, but such a moral ideal is distinct from the "categorical imperative" inasmuch as it possesses a content. A modern writer has summed up Kant's inconsistency with respect to the theory of freedom in these words: "Following out Kant's conception we arrive at an intelligible cause-Will, which we recognise to be free, and which may be the unconditioned condition of phenomena, but about which nothing more can be said. Here Kant's system seems to groan beneath the impossible burden of contradiction it attempts to carry" (Orchard, Mod Theories of Sin. p 33)

Kant's postulates of Immortality and God suffer in similar fashion from this dualism which allows no empirical content to the Good Will. As regards the first of these, his position is that an entire conformity of the will to the moral law is the supreme and the first and the foremost part of the highest good, and therefore necessary. Such conformity is nowhere to be found in the world of sense and can only be attained by a PROGRESSUS AD INFINITUM, hence the postulate of Immortality. Now in "The Critique of Pure Reason", he also gives an
argument for God and Immortality from the theoretical reason: "In the wisdom of a Supreme Being, and in the shortness of life, so inadequate to the development of the glorious powers of human nature, we may find equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal belief in the future life of a human soul" (Bohn's tr. pp 500f). He calls this however "doctrinal belief" and characterises it as "wanting in stability". To us the argument seems much more concrete and real than that derived from the practical reason, for in the latter both "will" and "moral law" are thought of as unconditioned by experience, and when closely analysed seem to evaporate into philosophic abstractions. In the closing section of our thesis it will be maintained that we may reasonably postulate Immortality for the realisation of the values implicit in revelation, but this is other than Kant's contention, inasmuch as it presumes that the transcendental sphere is not unrelated to the world of phenomena.

As regards the postulate "God", his position is that happiness as the agreement of Nature with Morality presupposes a cause of Nature, distinct from Nature, which contains within itself the ground of that connection, and thus arrives at the postulate of the COMPLETE good in which virtue and happiness coincide, which is identical with that of the existence of God. Here again, the
argument is seen to suffer from the same inherent dualism to which we have more than once referred. Kant fails to see that Morality functions in and through Nature, and he is therefore compelled to bring in an hypothesis to reconcile a dichotomy which does not really exist but which is the creation of his own theory.

The significance of the Kantian theory for religion may be illustrated by the following passage:

"Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognise Him as such; and so He says of Himself, "Why call ye ME (whom you see) good; none is good (the model of good) but God only (whom you do not see)?" (Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. p 30). The importance of this sentence is that it is the logical conclusion to which the Kantian theory leads. If Kant meant no more than that a man has the power to recognise the Highest when he sees it, that will be granted; it is indeed essential to the development of our argument. But the words and context show that he meant more than that, namely, that because Christ comes up to our ideal of moral perfection we call Him the Holy One of the Gospels. This must be strenuously denied. On the contrary it would be truer to say that it is because He transcends our ideals, disturbs, quickens, and transforms them, that we recognise in Him
the Holy One. Kant is quite logical here; if morality be divorced from experience then example counts for nought. On this basis revelation becomes impossible. The Holy One of the Gospels is such as fitting in with our ideal of moral perfection, and therefore our task is not to fit in our lives with the truth revealed in Him, but rather just to go on trying to realise the highest good, the conformity of the Will, which is free, to the Moral Law which is unconditioned.

Now Kant has this advantage over Schleiermacher that his system of thought is not open to the charge of subjectivism, and that it permits us to conceive of religion in terms of activity rather than submission. No theory of revelation can be satisfactory which does not allow for the activity of the consciousness in the apprehension of it. No doubt submission is an element in the process, but it is not the whole. To speak of active submission involves a paradox, but it is a kind of paradox which is by no means confined to the religious aspect of our life, but is peculiar to all personal relationships. From the religious point of view, both aspects are involved in that line of Tennyson's "Our wills are ours ... To make them Thine." In this stressing of the active side of religion, Kant rendered a very real service. He is
one with Schleiermacher, however, in denying any positive content to religion. That is a necessary deduction from his premise that the only absolute good is a Good Will. But a Good Will, as separated from cognitive and emotional factors, is a pure abstraction and meaningless. We cannot will that which we do not know, nor can will operate independently of desire. The will does not work in a vacuum. From the ethical point of view, his exclusive emphasis on the will cannot be justified, inasmuch as the noblest actions in history have been inspired not so much by Duty as by Love. Moreover it excludes from morality all intellectual values. If religion be, as Kant affirmed, simply regarding our duties as divine commands, it appears to be no more than morality sanctioned by the divine signature, and thus infinitely less than that which the religious experience of the ages has testified concerning it.

It is not surprising that Kant found no place in his system of thought for revelation. Whilst not repudiating revelation in general, he contended that there was no specific proof, and regarded it as an invention of man at a primitive level of Society, having its origin in the desire to reinforce moral sanctions. If the will is isolated from the rest of consciousness, and made supreme, it is difficult to see how any other conclusion
could be reached. Whatever gratitude may be due to Kant for the shattering blow which he levelled at both Dogmatism and Empiricism, it still remains true, that no satisfactory theory of revelation can be built on a basis which cleaves the consciousness of man, and makes exclusive in its validity the part which it has detached from the whole.

(C) Finally we come to those who emphasise the intellectual aspect of the mind as the organ of revelation. In our age the revolt against intellectualism is so pronounced that it will not be necessary to develop the argument at any great length. Von Hugel has expressed very tersely the grounds on which this revolt is based: "The Analytical Faculty seems habitually, instinctively, to labour at depersonalising all it touches, and thus continually to undermine and discrown the deeply personal work and world of the experimental forces of the soul. Indeed the thinking seems to be doing this necessarily, since by its very essence it begins and ends with laws, qualities, functions, and parts, with abstractions that at best can be but skeletons and empty forms of the real and the actual, and which of themselves tend to represent all Reality as something static not dynamic (The Mystical Element of Religion. Vol I. p 76).
Very typical of those who have limited religion to intellectual channels is Hegel (1770-1831). In a sense Hegel may be called a development and remoulding of Kant, but he goes beyond Kant and affirms that phenomena are reality. It is characteristic of him that he lays great stress on history, but it is history distorted to make it fit in with his theory. He holds that history is religion, it is the Absolute coming to self-consciousness through Thesis and Antithesis to Synthesis. All this is purely doctrinaire, it is a theoretic logic which springs not from the reasonableness of the material, but, so to speak, out of one's own head, and is then imposed on history. At times it would seem, according to Hegel, as if history were the object of revelation, but then, in his system, subject and object are so identified or so inextricably confused that it is difficult to disentangle them. The general trend of his thinking, however, is in the direction of obliterating personal distinctions, and therefore towards Pantheism. It seems impossible to find a place for revelation, in the sense in which we are using the term, in a system which defines religion as the consciousness of the finite being of its identity with the Infinite.

The revolt against intellectualism, however, stands in danger of ignoring the function of
reason as a source of religious insight. Unless reason be allowed to function, the content of revelation is necessarily limited to what comes through feeling or intuition, which, whilst they constitute one of the richest sources of our spiritual experience are at the same time the most capricious and whimsical elements in our personality. Even those abstract conceptions which are inadequate as a statement of the full and absolute truth of life may yet become a preparation for intuitions and experiences on a higher plane than any, which, apart from these, we could reach. Moreover, reasoning is by no means limited to this abstract species. It is only through reason that we can reach a synthetic view of all the factors that enter into experience, and see them as a cosmos and not a chaos. When we affirm of something that is given that it is revelation, there necessarily enters into that judgment the element of value; but the value of anything depends in some measure on its place in the system of which it forms a part; and if reason be indispensable as enabling us to discern the system of which any experience is but a part, it must have a real significance as an organ of revelation and cannot be ignored. It is only when it is emphasised in such a way as to imply that logical truth is full truth and the final arbiter in all problems that it stands condemned.
The position that we have now reached is, that to make anything less than the full personality the organ of revelation is to involve ourselves in great difficulties. In the apprehension of revelation, any of the three aspects of consciousness - feeling, will, or cognition - may predominate, yet they are all involved, and it is myself as an entity and not a part of me that lays hold on the Divine self-manifestation. Mr J.B Pratt has well expressed this point of view, when he says: "Religion presupposes always an object of some sort, and involves some sort of content; but it is itself a relatively active state of consciousness, which is not to be described in terms of the given, but as a subjective response to the given. Thus it is not to be confined to any one of the three traditional departments of the mind - knowing, feeling, and willing - but involves factors that belong to each of them" (The Religious Consciousness. pp 2f.). The significance of our findings will become apparent at a later stage when we come to show that revelation must be conceived in terms of Personality, that is, of a unity which involves but transcends the unity of consciousness, a unity which is many sided, including not only intellectual elements, but the sense of beauty, the mystic intuition, and that deep and unchangeable direction of will which we characterise as loyalty. To limit revelation to a particular
aspect of our personality is to narrow its meaning. Nothing human is alien to the divine, and through the myriad channels of our nature there comes the power, wisdom, and love which transcend our finitude. It may come through submission, through lying still, as the Psalmist puts it: "While I was musing, the fire burned"; or it may come through strenuous activity, but what is insisted upon is that it is revelation for a centre of consciousness, possesses value for such, is apprehended by such, and that to hypostatise some aspect of our being and make it the exclusive organ of revelation is a false abstractedness.
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Section 4. THE ABNORMAL IN REVELATION.

Our definition of revelation as the divine self-manifestation in history and experience naturally leads us to expect to find abnormal elements in revelation, understanding by this term, occurrences which cannot be fitted in with what is known as Natural Law. Natural Law however must be regarded not as something static, but as an ordered unity of knowledge to which additions are being continually made as the result of which it wears a changing and a growing aspect. It may be defined in the same way as Mr Pratt defines the religious consciousness, namely, as a subjective response to the given. It is the system or order under which man finds it possible and convenient to group phenomena. At this point, we may postulate that it is not an order which the mind imposes on Nature, but which is suggested to the mind by its contact with Nature. From the present point of view it may be recognised that it is an imperfect unity and that there are many factors at work in the universe which seem to fit but badly into the scheme which Nature has suggested to us. The finitude of man sets limits to the number of things which can be brought into that unity of ordered knowledge which is termed Natural Law, and we may assume that if he possessed wider powers of generalisation, many things which appear to be abnormal would be seen to be normal.
Phenomena may be classified according to an ascending scale, the lowest phase of which would be Matter, and the highest Spiritual Autonomy. The difficulty of generalising increases as we ascend the scale. It therefore follows that in the realm of Spiritual Autonomy, the number of facts which cannot be classified under Natural Law will be proportionately large. We should therefore expect to find in revelation much that is abnormal. It is, however, a mistaken notion to assume that the leading characteristic of revelation is abnormality, or to postulate that the Divine is the inexplicable or the inexplicable the Divine. The two are by no means coterminous. There are a multitude of inexplicable things which cannot be defined as revelation, events which have hitherto defied the endeavour to relate them to a cause, but which in themselves possess no distinctively religious significance; whilst, on the other hand, if revelation were purely inexplicable in character, it would be meaningless.

The position which we are to substantiate is, that whilst abnormality is a constituent of revelation, it is not its criterion. If it were so, it would indeed be on parlous ground inasmuch as the area of the abnormal is being constantly attenuated by the labours of Science and Philosophy. If revelation is to be limited to the residuum of their investigations, then religion must be
in permanent hostility to them, inasmuch as they are reducing the base on which it rests. Yet this was the position taken up by Dr Mozley in his Bampton Lectures, published under the title "Supernatural Religion", in which he maintained that "Revelation consists of a system of inscrutable mysteries, undiscoverable by reason and incomprehensible to reason, which therefore have no self-evidencing power, but can be accredited only by miraculous deeds wrought by the agents of revelation"

(Quoted. Bruce. Apologetics. p 162). Now if this were so, it would seem to follow that the revelation of yesterday may be non-revelation today owing to some discovery which has been made concerning its nature. A few generations ago, the eclipse of the Sun was assigned to the realm of the miraculous, and awakened in human hearts feelings of awe and reverence, being regarded as a manifestation of the Divine wrath towards man, but now the phenomena of the eclipse fit in with Natural Law, and it is possible to predict exactly when it will take place. On Dr Mozley's theory, those responsible for this discovery, have thereby lessened the area of revelation. Thus the area of revelation is thought of as being in inverse ratio to human progress and the most backward races of the earth are the possessors of a bigger revelation than the most enlightened. The issue of such a theory is obscurantism of the worst type.
The fact that so able a scholar can put forward this theory illustrates the necessity of arriving at some clear notion as to the place which the abnormal occupies in revelation. There are three outstanding modes along which the Divine self-manifestation has been made to us, namely, Prophecy, Miracles, and Mysticism, and we shall now deal with these, with the sole object of elucidating the significance of the abnormal in revelation.

(A) PROPHECY.

Prophecy is a characteristic of all religion, but our study will best attain its end by limiting ourselves to the type represented in the Old Testament. In the 8th century B.C. there appeared in Israel a group of men who proclaimed moral and religious truths of an excellence far and away beyond that of the period. They claimed to speak, not in their own name, but in the name of God, and often prefixed to their utterances "Thus saith the Lord". Their preaching exhibited a lofty ethical tone: they laid the emphasis on purity of motive and rightness of heart and brought their hearers face to face with the inwardness of moral and spiritual truth. In them the religion of Israel reached its high-water mark, for the quality of their utterances was far in advance of those who had preceded them, and if we except certain of the
Psalms, of those who followed them. On occasion, they ventured to make predictions, not all of them being actually fulfilled in history, but which, on the whole, showed a marvellous grasp of the realities of the historical situation. Many of their utterances have come down to us, and are held by Christians generally to be revelation.

But why so? Is it the mystery of their personality or the accuracy of their predictions that accredits their writings as being revelation? They may be described as abnormal, in the sense that they cannot be explained by their antecedents or their environment, that it is beyond the power of those who believe in a rigid historical continuity to tell us how such characters should appear at such a time, but this abnormality cannot be the proof that their message has revelation value, inasmuch as it is not the fact of abnormality but the kind of abnormality which decides that. All genius is abnormal, and yet there is a very real difference between genius and revelation; in the latter we postulate a givenness in a way which we do not in the former, and it is the right to postulate this givenness which is in question. If abnormality be the criterion, revelation becomes a species of genius. Nor can it be the case that the fulfilment of their forecasts of the future accredits the claim which they made to speak for God, for in that case, the greatest of
the prophets would be the one who had made the greatest number of accurate predictions.

Two reasons may be given for ascribing to the utterances of the prophets the character of revelation. They must be taken as complementary and as involving each other. (I) First of all, they form a vital link in the self-manifestation of God which culminated in Christ: they are part of a chain which at every point rises above historical continuity: their teachings were not annulled but fulfilled in Christ. We here make the assumption for which we shall have to give reasons later on, that in some sense the revelation in Christ was final, and that in the process which reached unto Him the prophets are an essential factor, and that this is one of the vital reasons why their words come to have for us the character of revelation. What gives them that place is not their genius but rather that they were in what we have come to recognise as the main stream of development.

But (2) secondly, what enables us to claim for the words of the prophets the character of revelation is their moral majesty and spiritual reality. In them there is that Eternal quality which commends them to us as the Word of God, a word uttered in time but for all time. Our personality is quickened in its deepest aspect by contact with them, and when they affirm "Thus saith the
Lord, we are confident that they were not adding the Divine signature to their own utterance, but stating a literal fact, which the deepest things in our spiritual nature recognises as true. It is not sufficient to answer that this is merely a subjective judgment, for subjectivity enters into all our judgments, and the question rather is as to whether it is true, that is, as to whether in making it we have adequately and accurately apprehended the facts. Such a question can be better solved by appreciation, than by logic. It is enough for us that a multitude, including men and women of the finest type of character have found in them the very Light of God, the motive and inspiration of their noblest deeds. Further than that we cannot and need not go.

We are now in a position to answer the question as to why we speak of the words of the prophets as revelation. They were abnormal and appeared in the world as men born out of due time; they possessed such a clear insight into the moral and spiritual basis of Society that they were able to predict the future with a great measure of accuracy; but it is not on these grounds that we ascribe to their utterances the character of revelation, but on the grounds of their intrinsic moral and spiritual worth, and of their place as essential factors in the historic process which culminated in Christ.
(B) MIRACLES.
The foregoing discussion has prepared the way, in some measure, for our understanding of the relation between miracles and revelation. It is not within the scope of our discussion to reason out the problem as to whether miracles are possible. For the purpose of our argument we assume that they are. Any other position involves the denial that any transcendental factor can enter the realm of Nature or experience, and the conception of the world as a closed circle. Such a position apart from any religious considerations is beset with grave difficulties from the scientific and philosophical side. A scientist-philosopher, Professor C Lloyd Morgan, in his Gifford Lectures on "Emergent Evolution," has put the case very fairly with respect to the new elements which enter into the Universe. He says: "But the orderly sequence, historically viewed, appears to present, from time to time, something genuinely new. Under what I here call 'emergent evolution', stress is laid on the incoming of the new. Salient examples are afforded in the advent of life, in the advent of reflective thought, and in the advent of reflective thought. But in the physical world emergence is no less exemplified in the advent of each kind of atom, and of each new kind of molecule" (Pub 1922. p I). It is true that on page 13 he rejects the notion that the new comes into
nature by a special insertion AB EXTRA, but the idea of "special insertion" is not necessary to maintain our position. If there be any doubt as to his attitude, the passage on page 36 dispels it: "For better or worse, while I hold that the proper attitude of naturalism is strictly agnostic, therewith I, for one, cannot rest content. For better or worse, I acknowledge God as the NISUS through whose activity emergents emerge, and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed. Such is my philosophic creed, supplementary to my scientific policy of interpretation." If Prof Morgan's position be accepted, the A PRIORI argument against miracles disappears. If it were true, it would make any doctrine of revelation untenable. It is an assumption however of a purely doctrinaire character and incapable of proof. Putting it on one side therefore, and postulating the possibility of miracles, we have to face the question as to whether these are to be regarded as the constituent elements of revelation, or as outside revelation, accrediting it as such. It is logically inadmissible to treat miracle as a constituent of revelation and the proof of it, for this involves us in a vicious circle of reasoning from miracles to revelation and vice versa.

Let us put the question in a concrete form and study it from the point of view of the miracles that are ascribed to Jesus; can we regard them as accrediting Him as the revealer of God? It is irrelevant at this point
to introduce the question of their moral and spiritual character, for what we are dealing with is their miraculousness. From this eviscerated point of view, all that the miracles of Jesus attest is that He possessed powers of an uncommon kind, but as to the source of these powers they tell us nothing. But it is the source of the powers that constitutes the character of the miracle as revelation or non-revelation, and as to that the purely miraculous tells us nothing. The miracles of Jesus, separated from the moral and spiritual significance which they possess, cannot acclaim Jesus as the revealer of God.

Looking at the problem from another point of view, let us suppose a case in which there had been brought to light information which took away from a particular incident in the life of Jesus the miraculous character which hitherto it had possessed, as for example, that the clay which Jesus put upon the eyes of the blind man had medicinal qualities, and that it was only the general ignorance of this that had led to this act of restoring sight being put down as a miracle; would the act of making the blind man see lose its character of revelation? It certainly would, if revelation were limited to the abnormal. The position is not relieved by the assumption that the residuum of miracles performed by Jesus, which remain unexplained, attest the character
of Jesus as revealer, and that on the strength of these we may ascribe the character of revelation to all His words and actions, for that is to make a part of His life to accredit the whole, and it is only by inference that we are able to give the value of revelation to those things in that life which He held in common with others.

So far from accrediting the function of Jesus as the revealer, His miracles gain credence through our conviction that He is such. It is the impression made upon us by His moral and spiritual character, and the fact that the miracles are in harmony with this, that is a prime factor in our belief in their historical reality. If an old document were discovered which related how Jesus had turned an innocent child into a ravenous wolf, we should reject it as absurd, not on the ground that it was too great a miracle to be believed, but that it belied the character of Jesus as the revealer of God.

Revelation is always supernatural in its origins, and as such, we may expect that sometimes it will be manifested in forms that are beyond our comprehension, but that which attests it cannot be the form which is incidental to its communication, but its essential character, which we are able to recognise as being God-like. It would be strange indeed if to Deity were denied the power, which we in some measure possess,
of initiative; it would be stranger still, if the only sign that He could give us of His presence were of the kind which violated the permanent order of the Universe. The assumption that miracles alone can authenticate revelation has its basis in a profound distrust of the human capacity to evaluate experience and discover within it the revelation of God; or perhaps it would be better to say that it arises from the lack of confidence in the reasoning powers of man. No-one will question the limitations of human reason, and there would be some justification for the position taken up by Dr Mozley, if we were limited to that in our apprehension of revelation, but that is not so. In apprehending anything as revelation, the judgment affirmed is that of the whole personality, and apart from our capacity to make this judgment, no miracle, by reason of its abnormal character, could authenticate anything as being a revelation of God. The words of Spinoza, on this point, are very apt: "You seem to take away the authority and value of miracles, whereby alone as nearly all Christians believe, the certainty of the Divine revelation can be established" writes Oldenberg to Spinoza, who replies: "As regards miracles, I am of the opinion that the revelation of God can be established only by the wisdom of the doctrine, not by miracles, or in other words, by ignorance" (Quoted, The Finality of the Christian Religion. G.B Foster. p119).
The third phase of religion which gives us the opportunity of studying the abnormal element in revelation is that of Mysticism. Many writers have been careful to point out that Mysticism in itself is not abnormal, but it is not denied that this element is often found associated with it. To a greater or less degree, it is characteristic of all religion. Dr Inge maintains that it has its root in the dim consciousness of the beyond, which is the raw material of all religion (Bampton Lectures on Christian Mysticism. 1899. p 5). We may take this further and point out that it possesses a double quality, being a revolt against the limitations of space and time, and a yearning for the fulness and the immediacy of the experience of the Divine. Whilst, in the form we know it, it is a comparatively late development, originating in a revolt against formalism and an excessive confidence in the powers of human reasoning in matters of religion, yet it has its counterpart in the "ecstasy" which is a part of primitive religion. In dealing with mystical phenomena, therefore, we are concerned with what is more than a merely accidental and temporary phase of religious experience.

The definitions of mysticism are so numerous and conflicting, that our task would be well-nigh
hopeless, if we were to attempt to survey the whole ground. However, we are fortunate in possessing a careful and critical study of a typical mystic, Catherine of Genoa (Fr Von Hugel. "The Mystical Element of Religion"), which admirably serves our purpose. Catherine believed that she had revelations from God, Divine self-disclosures of His nature, incapable of being expressed in language, and of which words served merely to give a faint symbolical representation. These revelations came to her, either when her body was in a state of coma or trance, or when, by a psychical discipline, she had excluded from her mind all thoughts concerning things temporal and spatial, and left, as it were, the wires clear to receive the message of the Eternal. Her life was characterised by a certain moral beauty, and she exhibited abnormal powers such as those of prediction.

Now Mysticism illustrates the tendency, which we have already criticised, to confine religion to mere feeling or intuition (See Section: "The Organ of Revelation"), but the problem for us at this point is a somewhat different one, namely, that of defining the relation between the abnormal element and revelation. Taking Von Hugel as our guide, we note, that in the case of Catherine, what was regarded by her contemporaries as substantiating her claim to be the recipient of revelation,
was just this abnormal element. He discusses her last mysterious illness and the consultation which the doctors had with respect to her: "But examining her and inspecting everything with great diligence, they finally concluded that such a case must be a supernatural and divine thing, since neither the pulse nor any of the secretions nor any other symptom showed any trace of infirmity" (Vol. I. p 211). Their position was that which was assumed by Dr Mozley with respect to miracles, namely, that abnormality accredits revelation. But Von Hugel proceeds to point out that the psycho-physical states, which were described by her physicians as "directly miraculous" would be classed by us as "explicable neural abnormalities" (Vol. II. p 3). So it would seem, that if the proof of Catherine's receptivity to revelation lay solely in these "directly miraculous" concomitants, then, in the light of fuller knowledge which can explain these, that proof is discredited.

We arrive at the same result by approaching the subject along another line, by noting that Von Hugel stresses the fact that Catherine possessed a "highly nervous, delicately poised, immensely sensitive and impressionable psycho-physical organism and temperament", which would have been her ruin had it not been controlled by other factors, a mind and will which were its equal, and a rich
historical, institutional religion (Vol I. p 220). This is merely saying that Catherine's abnormality furnished the means along which revelation was mediated, but that, if certain other factors had been absent, that which was mediated would have been at the furthest remove from revelation. That which was supposed to accredit Catherine as a seer, is thus seen to be neutral, and only becomes a means of communication with the Unseen when allied with other elements of an elevating type.

From this discussion of Prophecy, Miracles, and Mysticism, I trust that it has become clear, that abnormality, of itself, cannot accredit an experience as being revelation. Many experiences, even those of a religious character, which appear to have their origin in something or someone, extraneous to ourselves, an inexplicable source that can be none other than the Divine, may, on a closer analysis, be discerned as the product of our own mind. For example, the Christian Mystic feels that Christ or the Virgin Mary is present, whereas the Mahommedan Mystic never feels that. One would not go so far as to say: "In short, the mystical revelation can be traced down to the formal conditions, physiological and psychological, of the mystic himself...The mystic acquires his religious convictions precisely as his non-mystical
neighbour does, through tradition and instruction grown habitual, and reflective analysis. The mystic brings his theological beliefs to the mystical experience; he does not derive them from it" (Quoted by J.B.Pratt. "The Religious Consciousness" p 450). It holds however of the form in which the mystic seeks to express his experience.

The criteria of revelation have their basis in the fact that there is a kinship between God and man, by which he is able to discriminate between the things which are and which are not from Him. Inexplicability cannot be the criterion of revelation, inasmuch as its nature is to contract or expand, and therefore to employ it as such can only be compared with the use of an elastic tape measure. Abnormality may or may not be associated with revelation, but one thing is certain, it cannot be made the test to discriminate between what is and what is not revelation.
Bibliography. Section 4. (Page 62A.)


Section.5. REVELATION AND HISTORY.

We defined revelation as the self-manifestation of God in history and experience, and up to this point we have for the most part been concerned with its relations to the latter, but we must now carefully consider what position it occupies with reference to the former, namely, history. At the outset, we are confronted with an a priori objection to history being treated as the plane on which God’s self-manifestations may be made. We are told that the nature of revelation is such that it must be true under all conditions, in every time and place, and for all men. On the other hand, history appears to be the realm of the accidental and relative, that is to say, it possesses just those characteristics which constitute it not the medium but the antithesis of revelation. Lessing put the problem in its most uncompromising way when he asked as to whether that which is contingent and accidental could be the revelation of necessary and eternal truth (Vide. A Sabatier. "The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit". p 171). The problem is deep and fundamental. If we accept this antithesis between revelation and history as being absolute, it follows that not history alone but individual piety ceases to be a revelation of God, for the same qualities that unfit the one to be revelation are also found in the other. Unless we can resolve the antithesis, the issue is Deism.
The difficulty arises from the fact that NECESSARY AND ETERNAL and ACCIDENTAL AND CONTINGENT are construed as purely logical terms, and as such are exclusive of each other. Employing the same method with respect to individual experience, it is possible to affirm that God is INFINITE, man is FINITE, and taking the terms in their purely logical significance as being mutually exclusive, arrive at the position that the former cannot manifest Himself in and through the matter. Antitheses of this character require careful examination to see whether the terms which constitute them are not employed in a bigger sense than that of the merely logical. It is being recognised more and more that logical forms are inadequate to express all the facts of experience, especially those of a personal nature. The significance of aesthetic appreciation overflows any logical formula into which we may seek to compress it, and this is still more true of personal relationships such as friendship and love.

Employing the terms in a purely logical sense, revelation cannot be regarded as necessary and eternal truth set over against the contingency of other truths. Our view all the way through has been that it is to be regarded as a process, involving progressive self-manifestation on the part of God and progressive apprehension of its significance on the part of man.
If we use the terms "necessary and eternal" of revelation we do so not with the object of stating a logical proposition, but as an affirmation of the significance and value which it possesses, and similarly when we say that history is "contingent and accidental", we cannot mean that no necessary and eternal element abides in it, but only that it is the changing form through which the Eternal is expressed. The difficulty which Lessing imagined to be insurmountable vanishes when we scrutinise the terms which created it. In the method which we are following, namely, that of stating revelation in terms of a personal relationship between God and man, it follows that it cannot be regarded as a necessity lifted above all relations, nor can history be treated as the accumulation of chance happenings.

In seeking to define the relation between revelation and history, we cannot ignore the fact that the evolutionary method which predominates in Natural Science, is now being applied to historical phenomena. It is often assumed that the evolutionary method is necessarily committed to the theory that the universe is a self-enclosed order, that nothing new can enter into it, that its movement is but a self-unfolding of latent potentiality. If that standpoint be taken, it is certainly difficult to find a place for revelation as we understand it in a scheme of things
into which no "novelty" ever comes. Science, however, is by no means committed to this type of evolutionary theory, which rests, not on any particular evidence but on the presuppositions of its advocates. We have already noted (p p 53 f.) the position of the advocates of Emergent Evolution, who admit the incoming of the new in the sequence of natural events, and if that be granted, it would appear to follow that we cannot deny that the same kind of thing happens in historical phenomena. M. Bergson puts forward a theory known as dispersive evolution, in which the process of evolution is set forth as being not like that of a cannon-ball which follows one line, but like that of a shell, which bursts into fragments the moment it is fired off; and these fragments being, as it were, themselves shells, in their turn burst into other fragments, themselves in their turn destined to burst, and so on throughout the whole process (Vide F.B. Jevons. "The Idea of God in Early Religions". pp 123 ff.). Such a theory, whilst it emphasises an aspect of evolution which is constantly disregarded, namely, that its nature is not that of a uniform and unchanging progression in one direction, cannot be said to adequately represent the facts; but the point which we wish to stress is that it appears to allow room for a creative power which made the primary shell and which determines the directions
in which successive explosions shall take, and in that sense does not exclude the emergence of the new at every stage of the process.

What has led many historians to reject the idea that, from time to time, new elements enter in, has been the desire to rescue history from the realm of caprice and to constitute it an exact science. Their attitude is in the nature of a revolt against the exaggerations of those who believe in Divine interventions, and who can only discern revelation in occurrences which are extraordinary and miraculous. We have endeavoured to show, however, that those who seek to apply the evolutionary method to history are not committed to the point of view that the universe is a self-enclosed order; there is a theory of evolution, or to be more precise, many theories of evolution, which are not incompatible with the acceptance of revelation, nor with the recognition of the Order underlying history as being Providential. In fact, the word "evolution appears to possess a teleological significance. Further, we have to bear in mind, that those who believe in evolution are not committed to the idea that the rate of progress is constant. The birth of a genius has often meant a great leap forward in civilisation, and in a similar way there have been outstanding periods of deterioration. Revelation has
nothing to fear from the application of the evolutionary method to history, even to that sacred history on which it rests; our protest must be against the presuppositions of those, who, in order to give coherence to their scientific theories, over-ride the realm of fact.

Accepting the position that history is a medium of revelation, we have now to enquire as to whether, when the Divine idea, manifested on the plane of history, has established itself in the mind and conscience of the race, we cannot dispense with the history which mediated it. Lessing maintained that we could. He affirmed that the Old Testament was the First Primer, but every Primer has its day and is suitable only for a certain age; a better instruction must come and tear the exhausted Primer from the child’s hands. Christ came, and the result of His coming was the New Testament, which is the Second Primer, and Lessing suggests the possibility of a religion which will supersede Christianity and make the Second Primer worthless. ("The Education of the Human Race". Lessing). Can we, however, divorce revelation from history in this way? Leaving for discussion at a later point in our study the question of the finality of the revelation in Christ, we will try to state the case for the continuous dependence of revelation upon history.
First of all we note that Lessing views revelation as consisting of the communication of ideas from the Divine to the human mind. On that supposition, a strong case can be made out for the assertion that when once the idea has secured a firm foothold in the consciousness of man, the history which mediated it ceases to have significance. But revelation cannot be limited to the communication of ideas. Even if we accept Lessing's dictum "that what education is to the individual, revelation is to the race,...that education is revelation coming to the individual and revelation is education which has come and is yet coming to the race" (Ibid), we may still ask as to whether he rightly interprets education when he limits it to the communication of ideas. Surely, in education, there is the impact of the teacher's personality upon the child and not merely the transference of ideas: its aim is bigger than that of giving the child ideas and can only be expressed as the developing and maturing of his personality. If education involves this inter-penetration of personality, still more is it the case with revelation.

If that be so, we can see how historical fact holds not an accidental and temporal but an essential and eternal place in the Christian Revelation, and cannot be dispensed with as being merely the instrument for the communication of certain ideas, and which therefore
becomes of no further use when these are firmly entrenched in the human reason. On the contrary, revelation is a self-manifestation of God to human personality, by which He renews and develops the whole spiritual nature, fitting it for His fellowship and service; hence, the historical fact, so far from having merely an accidental and temporary significance, becomes a perennial fountain whose streams never run dry; or, to change the metaphor, we may say that history is the soil in which revelation is set, and to uproot it is to separate it from the source from which it derives its nourishment and continuous life.

One cannot study the working of any of the higher religions without realising that they represent a growing experience, mediated by great personalities, and maintained and carried forward by the movement of historic life. If, for example, we take Christianity, it must be admitted that the work of Christ, Paul, Augustine, and Luther cannot be reduced to certain abstract principles. Principles cannot be separated from personality, as the media of revelation, without attenuating it, and robbing the religious life of a source to which it returns again and again, as to a living fountain, to renew its vitality, and by which it secures a standard or norm to test the vagaries of thought, which, from time to time, put forward a claim to revelation which cannot be substantiated.
Before we pass on to consider the specific relation of the Christian Revelation to history, there are two considerations worthy of notice.

(I) Whilst revelation is often made through an individual, yet its significance is never merely for him; the recipient recognises that it is not only valid for himself, but has universal validity. Thus when A. Sabatier says: "It is nonsense to demand a criterion of evangelical revelation other than itself, i.e. than its own truth, beauty, and efficiency" (Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, p 56), and again, "Only one criterion is sufficient and infallible; every revelation must be able to repeat and continue itself as an actual revelation and an individual experience in your own consciousness" (Ibid. p 62), our answer must be, that what cannot have more than individual significance cannot be revelation. This becomes clear when we realise that there cannot be two contradictory revelations, mine and another's. Whilst therefore, we cannot ignore the emotional strength with which an idea enters into our consciousness as being revelation, nor its quality of permanence, nor its continuity with the rest of our experience, yet these are insufficient criteria if universal validity is its characteristic; for in that case, it must needs be related to the experience of others; that is, to history. And it is to be noted also, that it gains an increasing depth, strength, and clearness,
when it is rescued from its isolated position as the experience of an individual, and brought into contact with the experiences of others, as embodied in history.

(2) We have already noted that revelation has a cognitive aspect, that whilst it may begin with an undifferentiated feeling, if it is to continue, it must acquire cognitive significance. Revelation may not be knowledge in the common use of the term, but it is knowledge of some kind. It would be absurd to think that revelation and knowledge could exist side by side in the one consciousness without mutual interaction. The self, somehow, has to harmonise these two aspects. Now in the process of doing this, i.e. of differentiating the feeling continuum and relating it to the rest of consciousness, language undoubtedly plays a great part. Words are the means which we employ, often without being conscious that we are doing so, to find a MODUS VIVENDI between revelation and knowledge. But language is a product of history; thus when we use it to restore the harmony and unity of consciousness, we transcend the subjective and individual, and revelation becomes related to the history which language embodies.

We are now in a position to see the place which the Bible occupies as the progressive revelation of God. It only becomes intelligible when viewed as history, or, to be more
precise, as material for history. If treated as a primer of science, a text-book on ethics, or a manual on theology, its inadequacy is at one apparent. On any other theory than that the Bible is material for history, we are bound to be surprised at its contents. Its trivial details such as those given in the account of the building of the Temple, its defective morality as witnessed in the biographies of many of its heroes and heroines and in the fact that they did things at the Divine command which seem to us to be of an immoral character, and the fact that it contains no one system of doctrine expressed in precise and unmistakeable terms, and many other features, perplex us and will continue to do so, until we escape from the view that the revelation of the Bible consists of the communication of ideas, and realise that what it gives to us is the story of the action of God upon individuals and races, and especially His unique manifestation through Israel, culminating in the advent of One whom Christian faith recognises as the Son of God.

Viewing the Bible as history, the first characteristic that we note is its progressive nature, though by this we do not mean that from Genesis to Revelation we are given a constantly enlarging conception of God. As a matter of fact, many of the Psalms have a richer conception of God than that which we find in Malachi, and the Book of Revelation appears to many to
be much inferior to the Gospel according to John. Even if it were possible to arrange the contents of the Bible in perfect chronological order, we should not find that constant and continuous development, which certain types of evolutionary theories seem to demand. The evolution of Israel's faith was not in the nature of a mathematical progression. For example, the records of the prophets of the 8th century, B.C. reveal higher standards of religion than those contained in much of the literature of succeeding periods. The movement of the religion of Israel may be compared to the incoming of the tide: the waves advance and recede, periods of degeneration alternate with those of noble vision, but all the time the ocean rolls in, and high-tide is reached in the coming of the Son of God. It is in the light of this culmination of the movement that the Christian faith recognises the Bible as revelation. All this is in harmony with the view of revelation that we are putting forward, namely, that it consists of the interpenetration of personality, Divine and human. Personality implies development. A static conception of the Scriptures, in which there was no movement from heterogeneity to homogeneity, would be difficult to harmonise with this attempt to state revelation in terms of personality. The anthropomorphism, which characterises many of these writings, and which has often been the target for the shafts of those who prefer
intellectual abstractions to concrete realities, is but a crude attempt to express the essentially personal quality of revelation.

The Bible is history of a unique character, and this, not because its writers expressed truths which were peculiarly their own discovery, nor that they expressed them in a better way than as set forth by others. What makes the Bible unique as revelation is not the genius, not even the religious genius, of those who wrote it; in fact, it may be conceded that many of its passages have parallels in literature; but the Bible is revelation because it is the main stream of development, leading directly to that which Christian faith recognises as the highest and final revelation of God. Its supreme significance is not that it contains many gems of literature, but rather that it is the record of God's discipline and moulding of a race through many centuries, that through it, there should be manifested Him who was the effulgence of God's glory and the very image of His substance. In it we discern the march of events, from tribal morality to the beatitude concerning the pure in heart; from idolatry, through henotheism, to monotheism; from the anthropomorphic conception of God to that of God as the indwelling Spirit; from the thought of Him as Creator to that in which He
stands revealed as sacrificial and redemptive love; from
the image of One who was merely transcendent — upon whose
face no man could look and live — to that of Him as seeking
to win our fellowship through Grace and Forgiveness, and
calling us to the high privilege of being co-workers with
Him; from the revelation of His goodness, continuing the
good works of the parent in the child, to that of Immortality;
— with many turnings aside and many lapses, yet the
direction in which events move is towards Christ, who, as
the "end" is the interpreter of the movement. It is to
be noted that God acts in deed as well as in word; He not
only manifests Himself in the speeches of the prophets, but
in events. What more potent illustration of this than the
Jewish Exile, which led the nation to realise the inadequacy
of many of her religious beliefs, and brought her into
touch with a wider civilisation, especially that of
Babylon and Persia, from which she derived conceptions
that were to play no small part in the evolution of her
religion.

From this, it becomes apparent how intimate
are the relations between revelation and history. It is
fatal to think that we can dispense with the latter, for
that leaves revelation in mid-air, without support.
Revelation is a jewel with a fresh lustre for every age.
Perhaps, when the Eastern races give themselves to the
serious study of the Scriptures, they will discover in
them many a glint of the Divine Truth, which has escaped the Western mind. The motive which has prompted men to attempt the severance of revelation and history has been that they thought, by so doing, they were making religion more secure and giving it a foundation other than that of a history which was merely temporal and accidental. Our study has shown us, however, that history is never merely temporal and accidental. And further, whilst such a procedure frees religion from the dangers occasioned by historical investigation, it leaves it exposed to a far more subtle and serious danger, namely, that which arises from the vagaries of philosophical speculation. Apart from history, revelation becomes pure subjectivism, without norm or standard, and liable to be drained of its life-blood by parasitic superstition and a false individualism.

In what sense, however, can the Scriptures be said to give us a norm or standard of revelation? Certainly not in themselves, and apart from a present, living experience. To us, Lessing's contention is irrefutable, that, granting the historical character of the Biblical books, they could never of themselves give more than extreme probability, whereas faith requires certainty. We are bound to recognise, as he does, the heterogeneity between historic belief and religious faith, and to recognise the force of his exclamation: "When will one
cease to hang nothing less than all Eternity upon a spider's web" (Vide. G.B. Foster. "The Finality of the Christian Religion". p 82). The function of the Scriptures is not that of giving us certain ideas of God, which the reason of itself is powerless to discover, but rather that of introducing us to an historic personality. The Scriptures are not the supreme revelation, but the Christ of whom they speak, and the norm or standard is His personality, as evidenced by the Scriptures but not confined to them; as seen working itself out in the lives of individuals, and in the customs, laws, and institutions of our social life. The supreme revelation of Christ transcends that of the Scriptures, as the appearance of the flower differs from that of the stem on which it grew, but which, at the same time, is homogeneous with it in nature. Sabatier's distinction between the Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit is false, if taken as absolute, but it serves to emphasise the fact that when we speak of "the essence of Christianity", we must not confine ourselves to the beginnings, but must include in the term the experience of the Church and of all saints, in so far as this may be regarded as the unfolding of the significance of the Person of Christ as outlined in the Scriptures.

If the position which we have outlined be
accepted, one of the grave difficulties in the way of the acceptance of the Scriptures as revelation disappears. I refer to that which is created by the application of the canons of historical criticism to the Biblical literature, which has deleted many of its passages and fundamentally altered others. It is not surprising that the ordinary man finds himself in a quandary, and sometimes wonders whether he can trust the norm or standard. But if the Scriptures are taken, not as a norm lying outside other revelation and separable from it, but as an integral part of it; and if the supremacy we give to them is that of revealing the historical Christ, whose lineaments are not out of harmony with man's progressive apprehension of God in the ages which have followed, the difficulty is minimised, if it does not disappear. We need to bear in mind the words of Hermann Schultz: "Faith in the historical Christ does not at all involve deciding points of historical science, as for example, the problems with which the investigations of the life of Jesus have to deal. It is not at all a question of anything that scientific criticism could throw doubt upon, of anything merely past, but of an active personality that has stamped itself as living on the spiritual history of man, and whose reality as it is in itself, anyone can test by its effects, as
immediately as he can test the reality of the nature
that surrounds him and the relations in which he stands.

The position stated above makes the Scriptures not the norm, but the mediator of the supreme revelation, and yet leaves us with an objective Christ, whom religious faith acclaims as such. The Scriptures are not something given in an external fashion, but are themselves the outcome of religious experience; and thus when we say they cannot be the norm or standard of the Christian faith, we are not reducing that faith to subjectivity, but rescuing it from the subjectivity which such a position entails. We need always to keep before us the fact that it was not the Scriptures that made religion, but religion that made the Scriptures, and therefore they cannot be the ultimate source of knowledge and criterion of Christian faith and life. They but give us the first impressions of the supreme revelation of God, the final significance of which can only be perceived in the actual realisation of the end which it was designed to accomplish.
Bibliography. Section 5. (Page 80A.)


The position which we have sought to maintain is that revelation is a self-manifestation of God, which, to a greater or lesser degree can be apprehended by the Self, that is, not by some single phase of it - emotional, volitional, or cognitive - but by the Self as a whole. If that be granted, we are justified in describing the content of the revelation apprehended by uá as "knowledge of God". To call it knowledge means that it has certain features in common with knowledge in general; for example, it has a content which the mind can appropriate: whilst the words "of God" differentiate it from other knowledge by marking out the qualities which are peculiar to its nature. By reason of this double character, which links it to knowledge in general and yet distinguishes it from such, we may anticipate that its criteria will be in some respects similar to, and in others different from those which we apply to other realms of knowledge.

If we say that revelation is knowledge of some kind, it is incumbent on us to say what we mean by knowledge. It is no longer possible to hold the somewhat naive conception that knowledge is merely the cognition of things. The limits of knowledge were not generally recognised in the Greek Age, but, even then, Plotinus held that a knowledge of things, existing outside our
thought, is an absolute contradiction; that knowledge
is, in fact, but a self-cognition of thought. The final
blow at the NAIVE conception of knowledge was dealt by
Kant, who showed that in the apprehending of knowledge
the mind brings something with it, that it is active in
the process, and not merely a TABULA RASA on which sense-
impressions are recorded. The idea that knowledge consists
merely of an accumulation of "sensa", which are then
sorted out and arranged into a system by means of a
cognitive faculty, certain of the "sensa" being rejected as
false, inasmuch as they do not fit into the system, is no
longer tenable. On that basis, revelation could neither be
affirmed nor denied, and became solely a matter of
individual preference.

Eucken has a very illuminating sentence
to this effect: "Real knowledge is not an adjustment and
accumulation of impressions, starting from man and
directed towards human ends, but it is a penetration
into the real nature of things, and an inner expansion
through participation in a wider life" (The Life of
the Spirit". Tr F.L.Pogson. p 258). Without adopting
the philosophic standpoint of Eucken, one feels that
this definition does bring out the concrete character of
knowledge. On this basis we should define that knowledge
which is the content of revelation, as being the penetration
into the real nature of God, and an inner expansion through participation in the Infinite life.

The problems of Epistemology in general do not come within our scope. We assume that the mind's nature is to affirm truly of reality; otherwise we arrive at a universal scepticism, which is of a self-contradictory kind, for if there is not anything that we know, we cannot even affirm that we know that we do not know. Rejecting the fallacies of Hume, we take our stand on the inherent capacity of the Self to apprehend partially, but not thereby falsely, the meaning of the reality of which we form a part.

One characteristic of all knowledge is that the element of relationship enters into it, a relationship between an experiencing subject and an experienced object, though this must not be construed as though it implied "floating ideas" which linked subject and object together. We cannot know a thing-as-it-is-in-itself for the simple reason that there is no thing-in-itself to know. We cannot know God-as-He-is-in-Himself, for such a being never existed. When we affirm that all knowledge has in it this element of relationship, our position must be distinguished from that of Relativism (c/f "The Idea of God", Pattison, Ep II6), for we posit it as a characteristic of
knowledge whereas they speak of it as though it were its defect. To know things as they are in relationship is to know them truly; any other kind of knowledge would be in the nature of a false abstraction. We must abandon the idea, which is as theoretically unjustifiable as it is practically useless, that revelation gives us an idea of God-as-He-is-in-Himself as distinct from God as He-is-in-His-relationships.

It is often thought to be the case, that if it be conceded that relationship enters into all knowledge, it becomes merely subjective, and is to that extent untrustworthy. This position, however, cannot be sustained. To say that the only knowledge possible is the knowledge of a thing as it is for consciousness, cannot be taken to mean the denial of an objective world, nor, as applied to religion, the denial of God as object. It is a grave mistake to assume that objectivity consists of things outside ourselves, unrelated to consciousness, and incapable of being known. Professor Stout has defined the position with respect to perception, as follows: "External objects are cognised as existing independently of us, just as we exist independently of them...The external thing does not consist for us merely in the sensible features by which it is qualified. There must be something to which these sensory contents are referred
as attributes" (Groundwork of Psychology, p. 90). That is to say, there is, in perception, the implicit recognition of an object which is more than the \textit{maximes} qualities which hold our attention. Similarly with revelation; God exists, independently of our apprehension of Him, and is more than the content of the religious consciousness.

In fact, all knowledge presupposes an object. This is the case even with respect to illusions. The difference between knowledge and illusion, is not that in the one case there is an object whilst in the other there is none, but rather a difference in the quality of knowing. The question is as to whether we have rightly and adequately apprehended a part of complex reality, or in other words, it is not a question of objectivity but of truth. The term "subjective" is often used to indicate that quality in an experience of which we cannot give others an adequate notion, the untransferrable and inexpressible element. There can be no doubt that this is very pronounced in the apprehension of revelation. On this ground, the argument of subjectivity has been employed to destroy the idea of revelation. But subjectivity and falsity are not synonymous terms, and the real question, as we have pointed out above, is the question of Truth. The subjective
With respect to knowledge in general, the question has often been raised as to how we get from our own minds to objective reality. If we accept the definition of Huxley (p. 82), this problem does not arise. There is no question of "getting to" something. The mind lives, moves, and has its being in reality, and what it moves from, in the progress of knowledge, is a reality that is only confusedly aware of itself and its environment, and what it moves to, is a clearer conception of both. A similar difficulty meets us with respect to revelation. If by revelation we meant "getting to something" which is outside and unrelated to ourselves, the task of defending it would be well-nigh hopeless. We can never justify revelation, save on the assumption, that "in God we live and move and have our being", and that revelation is not only an unfolding to us of the Divine nature but also of our own deepest and truest relations with it.

We have now to take a brief survey of theories which postulate a complete disparity between revelation and knowledge, and seek to lift the former above any criteria whatever. In the 2nd Century, A.D., we find one of the early apologists, Athenagoras, laying down the position that revelation is by faith, and that faith
is superior to knowledge. The prophets are regarded as passive instruments of revelation, as organs of the Spirit, who are moved upon as are the flute or the lyre (Fisher. History of Christian Doctrine. pp 64-73.).

This distinction between faith and knowledge is interesting, inasmuch as it is still authoritative in the Roman Catholic Church. It must be admitted that if we limit the word "knowledge" to those truths which can be logically demonstrated, then it follows that the deepest certainties in our religious experience fall outside it. But the point is as to whether we are justified in so limiting it. Our knowledge of God certain cannot be compressed into syllogistic forms, but that cannot mean that it has no right to be called knowledge. If any fact of experience possesses content, if it is anything more than an undifferentiated continuum of feeling, it thereby possesses the right to be classed as knowledge. To be able to say to an unbeliever: "I know; I cannot give you any reasons for what I know; the truth which I am uttering is in the nature of revelation, and belongs to a realm in which reason has no say;" is certainly to put religion beyond the power of criticism, but it seems to me to expose it to a much worse danger, namely, that that which is not revelation may be asserted as such, and if there be no
criteria, we are left without defence. Moreover, we have seen that the revelation which came in the prophets bore upon it the stamp of their diverse personalities, they were not the flute and the lyre on which the Spirit played, but active participants in conveying to us the "music" of God. The attempt to lift revelation beyond the reach of all criteria whereby it can be said to be such, is, in reality, to strip it of all content, and make it meaningless. Faith is not unrelated to knowledge, still less is it the antithesis of knowledge, it is a mode of apprehending the knowledge of God which transcends the power of human reason but is continuous with it.

It is obvious that the position of Athenagoras has affinities with that of Kant, though it must also be admitted that there are marked dissimilarities. The idea of revelation as being the impress of the Spirit on a subject who was passive would have been entirely repugnant to Kant. The likeness between the two lies in the fact that the "faith" of Athenagoras is substantially the "practical reason" of Kant. Since both lack content, they are to all intent, indistinguishable. We have already had occasion to deal with certain aspects of Kant's thought, and the only point we are now concerned with, is to show, that his separation between "noumena" and
"phenomena", whilst it does lift both Morality and Religion above all criteria, and therefore apparently secures it against all rational criticism, yet the real effect of doing this is to make both meaningless.

It seems to us, that Kant himself, at times, realises this and seeks to break through the dichotomy which his theory necessitated, as for example, when he introduces the maxim: "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, p 46). This is essentially at variance with the principle on which his system rests, that "nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good with qualification, except a Good Will".

A "barren" Good Will simply disappears when any content, even that of Universality, is introduced into it. Our position is that all knowledge, including the knowledge of God, is qualified and conditioned by our own mind, that it is "phenomena", that the absolute authority of the "moral law" and of revelation is not due to its position as lifted up above all relations, but rather to its intrinsic quality. To say that the "moral law" and revelation enter into the world of phenomena and appearance is not to deny their place in the world of noumena and reality, inasmuch as phenomena are but noumena imperfectly
apprehended, and appearance is our pathway to reality. The difficulty with Kant's argument is, that whilst he used it, not for the purpose of weakening our belief in God and the soul, but rather for the purpose of strengthening it against sceptical attacks, it can so easily be turned in the other direction; that is to say, it may be maintained that if we can know nothing but phenomena, we have no right to speak of any reality behind them, and thus it becomes the bulwark of agnosticism. There is a distinction between the "practical" and the "theoretical" reason, between knowledge and the knowledge of God, but it is a distinction within the unity of knowledge, and not the separation postulated by Kant.

We claim that it is possible to have a real knowledge of God, and that the way in which this comes to us is not that of an authoritative pronouncement by Him, upon which we are impotent to form a judgment, but by the way of experience, individual and social, and that our nature is such that we are capable of evaluating it. The problem moves down from Kant, through Lotze to Ritschl. When we come to state the criteria of revelation we shall see the importance of Ritschl's "Judgment of Value", but what we are emphasising here is that he, like Kant drew a clean-cut line between
different kinds of knowledge, i.e. between scientific and philosophical knowledge and religious knowledge, whereas our position is rather that they are two species under one genus. He treats them as two well-marked realms, between which there can be no collision, so long as each confines itself to its proper province. Our answer must be, that it is not possible for "faith" and "knowledge" to exist unrelated in the same consciousness, and that it is futile to strive to keep them, as it were, in water-tight compartments. There are no separate provinces in the consciousness any more than there are separate faculties in the mind: both faith and knowledge have a content for consciousness.

Another phase of this method of seeking to lift revelation above all criteria is seen in the attitude of those who maintain that the content of revelation is limited to certain historical facts, which are given authoritatively and are to be accepted on trust; such as the Bible, the Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection of Christ; and to certain inferences which may be legitimately drawn from these. Unwittingly Professor Peake stumbles into this position, when he says: "But the Gospel stands or falls by a series of facts in space and time, and by certain theological affirmations which it makes about these"(A.S.Peake. "The
Bible", p 471). In fairness to him, it ought to be pointed out that this quotation is scarcely consistent with other arguments in the same book, but the words do express the attitude of many. Our answer to this objection must be, that facts QUA facts, that is as unrelated to consciousness and devoid of cognitive, emotional, and volitional significance, simply do not exist. Given that significance, they become objects concerning which we may form judgments. The powers of human judgment may be over-rated, but, unless we have that power, the issue must be the nescience of Mansell (Metaphysicae". 1866. pp 382ff), or the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer ("First Principles"). In a way, I suppose the attitude of those who would limit revelation to certain historical facts and the inferences that may be drawn from such, does allow for the criterion of historicity, but historicity is only one of many criteria, and to treat it as though alone it possessed uncontestable authority cannot be justified. Any theory of revelation, which seeks to lift revelation out of the dust and turmoil of discussion, by ascribing to it an authority, upon which man has no right to form a judgment, does so at the cost of impoverishing its content by cutting it off from sources that enrich and vivify.
We now proceed to elucidate the position that knowledge is a genus, under which may be subsumed not two species, but many, and that these differences are such as to materially affect the form of the criteria which we employ to determine their validity. Knowledge is a unity which embraces and not excludes diversity, a unity which we reach not by ignoring and cancelling differences, but by taking them up in a higher synthesis. For example, phenomena may roughly be grouped under four headings: Matter, Life, Mind, and Spirit. But Life cannot be treated as separate from Matter, nor Mind as separate from both, nor Spirit as unrelated to the other three. Life is never found apart from Matter, nor Mind apart from Life, nor Spirit apart from Mind. In Life, however, as distinct from Matter, there is something new, so also in Mind as distinct from Life, and in Spirit as distinct from Mind, and this something new necessarily carries with it the inference of a new mode in our apprehension of it. The new factors require a new method to discern, order, and evaluate them. To eliminate these "novelties", or to imagine that we have done justice to them by giving them a name such as "epiphenomenon" and then treat them as though they did not count, is to be false to the primary source of all our knowledge, namely, experience. Each new factor must involve at any rate an adjustment in the
criteria which we apply to them.

Now revelation, which, regarded from the human standpoint as "knowledge of God", naturally falls under the highest of these categories, that of Spirit. The nearest analogy to our knowledge of God is the knowledge which comes through friendship. Its essential characteristic is that it is personal. There is similarity between the knower and the known; there is the element of responsiveness, mutual interaction, reciprocity; there is the fact that the relation between the subject and object is not in the nature of something static; the friendship remains firm and unbreakable, but it continually assumes new shapes. Moreover in the knowledge of a friend the emotional and volitional factors are very pronounced. Most of all, we note that in the knowledge of friendship, what we may call the element of "value" enters in as an essential and important factor. The most important thing in my knowledge of a friend is that he is my friend. Of course, this is but an analogy and must not be pushed to extremes; the differences between the knowledge which comes through friendship and that which comes through revelation must not be ignored in considering their similarities. It seems to us that the differences group themselves about the fact that in revelation God is immanent and transcendent
to a degree which is unknown in friendship. Despite these differences, we appear to be on safe ground in saying that the predominance of the emotional and volitional factors, the necessity of sympathy and love, the element of value, and the peculiar character of religious experience as being a participation in the life of God, are factors which cannot be ignored in determining the criteria of revelation, which will in consequence be different from those which we employ with respect to scientific knowledge.

The problem that faces us is this: when we affirm of an experience, whatever the nature of that which mediated it, this is a self-manifestation of God, flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but the Father in Heaven, what grounds have we for saying so? What shall determine whether our affirmation is true or false? Our contention is that the peculiar nature of this experience, which differentiates it from all others, necessitates criteria which are appropriate to its nature, that to employ the same criteria for revelation that we use in scientific procedure is as foolish as to try and see an amoeba through a telescope or to survey the heavens with a microscope.

Scientific criteria are predominantly intellectual. The goal of the intellect is the apprehension
of the whole universe as a nexus of relations. The generalisations of science are observations classified under logical forms. There are phenomena however which cannot be expressed in logical form, but of whose truth we have no doubt whatever. We affirm therefore, that intellectual truth, that is, the truth which is amenable to logical form, is is but one aspect of truth, and that experiences which may be said to outrun or overflow these forms are not therefore false. There must as a consequence be some criteria other than that of the intellect by which we can affirm these experiences as being true. Truth as distinguished from purely intellectual truth will take all factors into account.

I very much doubt whether any intense human experience can be expressed in syllogistic form. A lover's passion for his beloved outreaches all intellectual forms but we cannot brand it as false because it over-leaps the criteria of scientific procedure., nor in our desire to be scientific can we be false to experience and reduce it to something less than it is, i.e. to the sex-urge. What ground is there for saying that an experience like that of listening to an Oratorio of Handel's or being enthralled by one of Titain's masterpieces is a less efficient apprehension of reality than a logically-correct scientific formula or a
propagation in Euclid? Those who speak of truth as being limited to the intellectual forms of it, and characterise all other uses of the word as being metaphorical must find it difficult to say on what grounds we are debarred from applying the adjective "true" to such experiences as these.

Some of the deepest certainties of our being cannot be adequately expressed in the forms of the intellect, nay more, the moment an experience has been crystallised into the form of a proposition, it has lost something in the process; perhaps it has gained something also, but the only point that I want to make is that the proposition very inadequately expresses the experience, but is somewhat in the nature of an abstraction from it. If one were to catch a lark and put it in a cage, and note and classify its behaviour, one's observations would be true so far as they went, but not of the lark - only of the lark-in-the-cage. Not less true would be the experience of watching the lark soar aloft, filling the heavens with indescribable music. Or one may take an example from the realm of Art. A picture which aims at accurately reproducing a scene as it is would correspond to intellectual truth; it could be tested as to size, shape, colours, position, etc, but true Art as distinct from such copying has in it
a beauty which eludes all definition. As to whether a picture is a bit of true Art or no, cannot be settled by a faultless syllogism. Professor J.B. Baillie's main theme in his "Studies in Human Nature" is that truth, as used in the narrower sense, is but one way in which the mind seeks fulfilment, and that if "full truth" of mind is to be reached, it must be approached from all sides and not merely from one side of our nature. Perhaps enough has been said to justify us in introducing into our criteria of revelation a factor which is not strictly amenable to logical expression, namely that of value. The personal nature of revelation (see p. 94) is such that the criterion of value is an important one in elucidating the claim of any experience to be of the character of revelation. On the other hand, it seems to us that it cannot be the sole criterion, inasmuch as some of the content of revelation can be expressed in the logical forms with which the intellect is competent to deal. The reconciliation between value and intellectual truth constitutes a metaphysical problem, the solution of which is by no means easy, but in the succeeding section a suggestion which may be helpful in clearing the way to such a solution is put forward.

"Truth is the quality of knowing as it
performs efficiently its function, namely, that of apprehending Reality as it is" (L.A. Reid. "Knowledge and Truth", p 185). If knowledge were a copy of Reality, then truth would be the perfect correspondence between the two. But there is no such possibility - the only Reality with which we can deal is in knowledge, and therefore in any judgments we make we are limited to the constituents of knowledge itself, and cannot compare it with an absolute standard which lies outside itself. What we can do is to see that the criteria we employ are suitable to the nature of that to which it is applied, as a means of determining whether we have efficiently apprehended Reality. The affirmation of revelation implies that a certain portion of our experience is in the nature of a Divine self-communication, that its origin is not in ourselves but in a transcendent and immanent Reality, who is God, and that it is mediated to us through the fact that our life participates to a lesser or greater degree in the infinite life of God. The question is as to whether, in the apprehension of this experience as revelation, the knowing function has worked efficiently. It seems to us that the criteria by which this may be determined are 3 in number.

(I) The knowledge which revelation gives to us must be coherent with other knowledge in the same
individual consciousness. It is as true of the knowledge of God as it is of other knowledge, that an hypothesis has a fair chance of being true, if it fits in with other hypotheses in the realm of knowledge. This is but the affirmation that there cannot be in consciousness two Orders of Reality with no integrating principle to secure their harmony. It is unthinkable that God should reveal Himself along lines that contradict the rest of experience rather than along the lines of that experience. For example, the revelation mediated by Nature cannot be in permanent irreconcileability to that of the Bible, nor can the latter be in continuous and unresolvable contradiction to the immediate experience of the soul. This criterion needs to be employed with great care, for there is a profound truth in the sentence that God's ways are not our ways nor His thoughts our thoughts, that is to say, we are always limited by our finitude. It is one, however, which we cannot ignore. (This theory of coherence must be carefully distinguished from the epistemological theory of coherence, which asserts that the knowledge of things as they are for us must be like the things as they are in themselves. This is valueless, since we can never know things as they are in themselves, and have therefore no means of comparison). In connection with our criterion, the words of Butler are well worth pondering: "The Scheme of Providence,
the ways and works of God are too vast, of too large extent for our capacities. Yet, if a man were to walk by twilight, must he not follow his eyes as much as if he were to walk in broad day and clear sunshine? Or, if he were obliged to take a journey by night, would he not give heed to any light shining in the darkness, till the day should break and the day-star arise" (Sermon. "The Ignorance of Man").

(2) The knowledge which revelation gives must be coherent with history. This is but to supplement what has been said above, inasmuch as history may be described as the record of social experience. For example, revelation cannot contradict history; it cannot affirm a date for the creation of the world different from that which is established by historical records and remains. This must not be taken to mean that revelation cannot be embodied in myth and in inaccurate history, but rather that such myths and histories constitute the form rather than the essence of revelation. This criterion of coherence with history becomes of supreme importance, when considering the specific nature of the Christian Revelation. In some sense, we must hold that Christ is the final revelation, and therefore if our criterion is to stand, He who is the crown of all human experience, in whom there is summed up all that is truest and
most real in it; together with the historic facts of His Life, Death and Resurrection and the influences which have radiated from His Personality must be the criterion of revelation in a supreme sense.

(3) The third criterion is that which Ritschl emphasised, namely, that of value. It may be said that if Christ is the supreme criterion, no other is needed, but then it is very doubtful, whether apart from this judgment of value, we could establish the finality of Christ. As applied to revelation, this criterion may be expressed thus: revelation cannot contradict the deepest and most profound convictions at the centre of man's being. From the human side, religion has its origin in practical needs to which revelation is the Divine answer. The attitude of a thirsty man towards water is quite other than that of a scientist towards the rainbow. Discovering it, he drinks eagerly, and if a scientist were to come along and seek to stand between him and the satisfaction of his thirst, he would thrust him on one side; the scientific explanation would have to wait on the satisfaction of the felt need. Religion has this practical character, revelation being apprehended as that which answers to man's spiritual needs. Value therefore in this case becomes a criterion of great importance.
The weakness of Ritschl's position lay largely in this, that he took the affirmation of the judgment of value to involve the denial of all metaphysic. No doubt his theory was in vital antagonism to the traditional metaphysic, but that is not the same as saying that it was hostile to a metaphysic of any kind. In fact, so far is this from being the case, that a modern philosopher can speak of "Value as a Metaphysical Principle" (Hibbert Journal. Vol XXII. No I). By his repudiation of metaphysic, he clouded somewhat the fine contribution which he made to the question under discussion. This must not be allowed to deter us from appropriating what is helpful in it. For whilst it may be admitted that "value" is not the equivalent of "existence", yet it forms a very effective criterion which we can apply to revelation. For, if God be the highest we can know, and if revelation be His self-manifestation, it follows that any judgment we may make with respect to it will have to reckon with this element of value.

In brief, our criticism of Ritschl would be: (a) It is illegitimate to maintain that religion can afford to be indifferent to the Order postulated in the scientific explanation of the Universe, and equally so, to put values and facts in opposition and affirm that the former are decisive in all questions of religion. Both value and fact are component elements in
Ultimate Reality, and the task of philosophy is not that of denying either, but of showing their harmony. It is not to be presumed that Ritschl treated religious knowledge as other than factual, but he failed to recognise the possibility of an ideal harmony between the Two Orders, this largely being the consequence of his aversion to Metaphysic. (b) As against Ritschl, we must affirm that a value judgment is such for personality

(See "Justification and Reconciliation", pp 203-205). In any judgment of value, the Self is involved, and not merely certain phases of it, such as feeling or will. There is such a thing as intellectual value, and if value is to be employed as a criterion of revelation, it must be in the sense of personal value, that is, a value for the whole Self. (c) It must be clearly recognised that feeling cannot be the only criterion of revelation. The poet or artist may feel intensely that his work is not the product of human capacity, but that does not give to it the quality of revelation. For the individual, feeling is undoubtedly primary as a criterion of revelation. The secondary place which the rational aspect occupies with respect to the religion of the individual is well brought out in the sayings of Jesus: "Except ye turn and become as little children, ye shall in no wise enter into the Kingdom of Heaven" (Matt 18:13), "If any man willeth to do His will, he shall know of
the teaching whether it be of God, or whether I speak of Myself" (John 7/17), and in many passages of a similar character; yet those who imagine that it is exclusively so are strangely blind to the fact that the words "How think ye?" and "Consider" were often used by Him. It must be admitted, however, that the religious experience has an immediacy that rightly belongs to the realm of feeling and intuition and is rarely the outcome of the ratiocinative process. Man does not argue the proofs of God, and then, having formed a judgment, discover the vision. The vision comes first and the ratiocinative process begins in the endeavour to relate it to the rest of experience. All this shows the importance of the feeling element, but that it is not everything may be seen in that, in the light of patient analysis, a man may reject that which feeling had invested with the character of revelation, and pronounce it to be illusion. It cannot too strongly be insisted upon, that our use of the term "value" means personal value, and not merely value for some aspect of our personality. Theoretical as well as practical considerations enter into value, and that cannot be practically true which is theoretically false. In the main, however, we agree with Ritschl, and affirm that that which has no value for personality cannot be revelation.
We may illustrate the principles which we have been seeking to expound by reference to Jung's theory of the LIBIDO (Vide: "Is Christian Experience an Illusion"?. Balmforth. Ch VIII). Jung maintains that what we call revelation is not really so, but consists of phantastic forms produced by the unconscious activity of the LIBIDO, that is, as I understand him, from repressed complexes existing in the unconscious. If we apply our threefold criteria to this theory, we note first of all that it is not coherent with individual experience. That is not what an individual discovers in revelation. In certain cases the repressed complexes might produce the physical and mental conditions under which revelation appears, they cannot produce the thing itself. Moreover it is not coherent with history. On Jung's theory, the noblest characters in history were created by repressed complexes which mechanically operated to make them what they were. And finally we may note, that Jung interprets an experience only by its origin and takes no account of the factors which make it what it is, such as its value for personality. On these grounds we reject such a theory as manifestly absurd. This instance has been taken as an extreme illustration as to how Psychology may overstep its bounds. The Psychologist as such cannot pronounce on the validity of revelation, inasmuch as
the factors which constitute it such lie outside his
domain. He can give us the psychological truth about
any experience, even of the religious experience, but
that is only one aspect of it, which may be important or
unimportant, but which only constitutes a portion of
the full explanation. If that which man perceives as
being the self-manifestation of God is not inconsistent
with the criteria we have laid down; if, above all, it
immeasurably increases the value of his personality,
we see no reason to deny that he has rightly apprehended
the experience in judging it to be of the nature of
revelation.

In concluding this section, reference must
be made to an opinion which often finds expression,
that value is a nebulous, floating element and
is lacking in any definite standards. This is not
the case. For example, Aesthetic value has its
standards; otherwise Art would consist of nothing
more than the whimsical outpourings of the individual's
feelings, that somehow happened to produce a thing
which charmed and exalted those who beheld it. On
the contrary, Art has been well defined as "the
expression through sense of universal truth", and its
criteria may be enunciated as follows: "If the artist's
experience is such that he can put such very life
into the dead stuff of clay, or paint, or sound, or
movement, so that he who sees it and has perception acute enough feels again through the experience of the art-creation the universal impulses within him, then is the experience of beauty in both artist and aesthete a true experience, and its expression adequate" ("Knowledge and Truth". L.A. Reid. p 233). Applying this to the realm of religion, we may say, that if an experience be such, that he who experiences it, feels himself to be in contact with Him who is the object of all religion, whose nature may be said to be Absolute Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, in such a way that his life is thereby immeasurably developed and enriched, then, for him, that can be nothing other than revelation, whatever be the means, LIBIDO, or anything else, which have contributed to the result. If he can reproduce the experience in such a form of words or life as to awaken a similar experience in others, he may be doubly sure of the fact that it was that which he took it to be. The expression however will only more or less imperfectly convey the significance of the experience, but the experience itself is not invalidated by the inadequacy of the forms in which he may seek to express it, and if these be such that in those whose religious instincts have not been atrophied, it reproduces that experience of richer, wider life, then it has become revelation to them.
Our argument has led us to the position, that on purely epistemological grounds, no objection can be made to revelation as such. We have seen that the deep religious experiences of individuals and races are not cancelled by labelling them as subjective, that the question was not one of subjectivity but of truth. We extended the meaning of truth by showing that it included more than that which might be classed as intellectual, which was occupied with subsuming under logical forms the results of observation. The question that we have left undetermined is a metaphysical one and concerns the place which value has in Ultimate Reality. The problem is as to whether we can conceive of this as harmonising the two distinct Orders, those of value and existence, and a suggestion which may be helpful to this end will be set forth in the following section.

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Section 7. REVELATION AND PERSONALITY.
(Some metaphysical considerations).

The aversion to metaphysics, which is so characteristic of the religious thinking today, is to some extent, a revolt against a type of metaphysics which is discredited and outworn, and in so far as it is this, is justifiable. There are, however, two other factors which have contributed to this result. (a) First of all there are the triumphs which the Inductive Method has achieved in the realm of Science, which made it absolutely certain that it would be applied to religious phenomena. The results have been such as to suggest that along this line a greater and more certain advance might be made than by following the path of abstract reasoning. (b) And secondly, largely as the result of Kant's emphasis on the activity of the subject in the acquiring of "theoretical" knowledge, the experiencing self has become the fixed point, the centre of gravity, in our thinking. The psychology of religion is attracting more and more the attention of religious thinkers, inasmuch as in this region, they feel that they are on solid ground, in comparison with which the realm of metaphysics wears the aspect of mist and cloudland.

It is doubtful whether this condition of things can persist. Theology qua theology simply disappears, if it cannot pass beyond the analysis of
religious states and is confined to an examination of the subjective conditions under which religious phenomena come to be manifested. And what is true of theology is equally true of religion. What the religious man desires to know is not merely the conditions under which a certain experience came to him, but also as to whether it is trustworthy and real, and if so, why? He can never rest content to leave it an open question as to whether his religious experience is built upon revelation or upon the product of his own imagination. He will want to know whether it is to be viewed as self-manufactured or divinely-manifested. Unless revelation can be given a place in our conception of Ultimate Reality, it becomes meaningless, and if we retain it at all, it can only be on the understanding that it denotes not the source but the characteristics of religious experience. Ritschl exclaims: "The Absolute! How queer that sounds! I still faintly remember that I too busied myself with the word in the days of my youth, when the Hegelian terminology threatened to draw me into its vortex. That was long ago. In a measure, the word has grown strange to me. I found there was no far-reaching thought in it" (Vide. Foster. "The Finality of the Christian Religion. p 51). But an Absolute, in some sense, is a necessity of religious thought.
Revelation postulates the incoming of something from a realm of Reality other than that which constitutes the domain of Science. To refuse to face up to the difference which our belief in revelation makes with respect to our conceptions of Ultimate Reality savours somewhat of obscurantism. So far, in our discussion we have not sought to go beyond the psychological and epistemological, and there are those who would say that we cannot get beyond these. At anyrate, we must make the attempt, otherwise revelation becomes an unverifiable hypothesis, and as compared with the facts of the scientist's world, a pale and bloodless thing. We cannot rest content with that position, but must proceed to see if it is not possible to form a concept of Ultimate Reality, in which the Orders postulated by revelation and science shall be harmonious.

There are many ways of approaching the problem, which are far from satisfactory, as for example, that which sets out to find a proof for the existence of God. A brief survey of the forms which this has taken will enable us to see the futility of the proceeding.

(a) Let us first take what has come to be known as the Ontological Argument for the existence of God. It has been stated in many ways, but its essential characteristic
is to affirm that the IDEA of God necessarily involves His REALITY. It is not enough, in answer to this, to rely on cheap criticisms, similar to that which Kant made, that the idea of £100 in one's pocket is quite other than the reality, which really missed the whole point of Anselm's proof, which did not identify the idea of God with other ideas but discriminated it from them. The idea of God is of such a character, that is, it so far transcends other ideas, that it is not unreasonable to ascribe it to a Divine self-manifestation. The point at which the Ontological argument fails is not that which Kant imagined, but rather that it cannot give to us the God whom our religious nature craves, namely, a God with determinate qualities. Its logical issue is rather that of an ENS REALISSIMUM, a Being who is the sum of all Reality, rather than One adequate to be the object of religious faith.

(b) Similarly, the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God cannot be regarded as satisfactory. To arrive at the Uncaused by the affirmation that a REGRESSUS AD INFINITUM of causes is logically impossible, and then to label this "God", does not help one very much. The data on which the argument starts out are such as to preclude it from reaching its goal. Somewhere in the process the leap has to be taken from the caused
to the uncaused, and this logically is not justifiable. The bridge between the two is missing. At the most, its affirmation of God can only be regarded as a possible inference, not as a proof.

(c) Nor is the Teleological Argument altogether satisfactory, despite the fact that it has been much refined upon since Paley stated it in the simple terms of design. To Kant this was the least objectionable of the Theistic Proofs, and yet he saw the weakness of it, and his objection seems to us to apply to all forms of it which ignore the element of "value" and argue merely from things that "exist": "All that the argument from design can possibly prove is an ARCHITECT of the world, who is very much limited by the material on which he works" (Vide "Essay on Atheism"). Later, we shall develop an argument, which is teleological in its nature, but which differs from those we are now considering, inasmuch as it starts out from the universe as experienced by us, and brings in the postulate of a Divine purpose, namely, the creation of "value".

(d) Kant's own solution of the problem is far from satisfactory. He affirmed the existence of God on the ground that Virtue and Happiness belong to two different worldss, the former to the Intelligible, the latter to the Phenomenal; the Complete Good would
be the harmony of these; he therefore postulates God as the teleological ground of both worlds, guaranteeing the union of virtue and happiness, and therefore the realisation of the Complete Good. One doubts whether Kant intended this to be taken as a proof of the existence of God; if so, it is obviously unsatisfactory, inasmuch as it is built on certain abstractions from the Universe, namely virtue and happiness, all the rest of experience being ignored. By a similar method, taking the opposites of virtue and happiness, it would not be difficult to affirm that the power behind the universe must be malevolent. All that Kant's argument proves is, that to postulate God's existence solves an urgent ethical problem, namely, the disparity between virtue and happiness, and in that sense it may be regarded as one of the convergent lines of reasoning which make the existence of God seem probable.

(e) Finally, there is what has come to be known as the Historical Proof, an argument founded on CONSENSU GENTIUM. It begins with the fact that in the human family there is a widespread, if not a universal consciousness of God, and proceeds to argue that the source of this can be no other than God Himself. At first, it appears to be a very formidable argument, but a little consideration shows us the weaknesses inherent in it. For instance, to agree that there are Gods or God can be of little value unless there is some
measure of agreement as to what we mean by Gods or God. When stated in its crudest form, the Historical Proof makes shipwreck on the fact that the content of this universal religious consciousness ranges from the grossest materialism to the most refined spirituality. It can, however, be stated in a way which allows for this difference, which recognises the long stretch between the fetishism of a Bechuana chief and the spirituality of Thomas a' Kempis, and thus makes room for the idea of development. In this case, God is postulated to account for the developing spiritual experience of humanity; the long upward movement of the race would be meaningless, if there were no Reality corresponding to the idea of God, who initiated and directed it. Thus stated, the argument carries great weight, yet its inadequacy is apparent. It can never get us beyond the idea of a finite God, who has hitherto been able to secure progress for the human race, but who, for all that we know, may ultimately be baffled by the complexity of things.

As we survey this rapid summary of the Traditional Theistic Proofs, and note their inadequacy, we cannot be surprised that there has ensued a decided inclination to reject metaphysic and to content oneself with the scientific explanation of religious phenomena, leaving the question of their ultimate origin an open
one. It appears to be impossible to find a satisfactory proof, without surreptitiously introducing into the premises that which we set out to prove. The late Professor Pfleiderer expressed what many feel: "No-one now holds it to be possible to prove the world's existence from an abstract conception of God, or, from an abstract conception of the world, to reach by inference, a God who is separate from the world" (Gifford Lectures on "The Philosophy and Development of Religion. Vol I. p 137). The Theistic Proofs, even though they were found to be logically satisfactory, could not put the issue beyond doubt, for man is more than a rational being. In the hint given by Pfleiderer, we see where the weakness of the older metaphysic lay. It began by treating abstractions from Reality, as though they were the whole of Reality. To do this, and then to seek to relate our conclusions to religious experience, may be compared to building a chimney in the air and then fixing it upon the house. Metaphysic must begin where Psychology and History leave off, that is to say, it must start from the process of life.

Keeping this in mind, the task in front of us is not that of constructing a logical proof of the existence of God, but rather, of finding a concept which will make room for God, Man, and the World, and the relations existing between them. What follows
therefore, is not offered as a final solution of the metaphysic of revelation, but is in the nature of a suggestion indicating the line along which such seems possible.

We have seen that the best analogy for our knowledge of God is that which we have of a friend; it is more than that, but we cannot discover anything that approaches it so nearly. It is at anyrate PERSONAL knowledge, and an analysis of the characteristics of Personality will be helpful in explicating its nature.

The word "personality" is sometimes employed in other ways than that in which we propose to use it. For example, it has a definite significance as a term in Jurisprudence; and in common parlance, it is used to signify forcefulness of character. We describe a man of great personal gifts as a personality. These uses of the word are not altogether dissimilar to ours, but they must not be confused with it. We are to employ it to signify the unity, identity, and value of the self, viewed not in isolation, but in the wide range of all its relationships. Life is so infinitely complex, that to draw a clear line as to where, in individual cases, personality begins, is not possible, but the distinctive elements of the thing itself are by no means in doubt. A person is to be distinguished from a brute by two
things, (I) Rationality. He not only knows, but he knows that it is he who knows, (2) Self-determination; in some degree, at anyrate, his actions have this characteristic. He is able to remember and to anticipate, knows what has been and what is likely to be, and finds himself face to face with alternatives that necessitate choice. Moreover, whilst personality must not be identified with moral personality, the latter is essential to it. A person is conscious of a "categorical imperative", in obedience to which, his truest life is realised. Personality is the home of all values, intellectual, moral, and aesthetic. As regards man, it is finite and developing, but we are not justified in denying it to him on the ground that he does not possess it in all its fulness. Full personality would be the completion and not the contradiction of that which he now is. In its lowest form, it is the unity of psychical elements which constitute, or cohere in, an ego: it is immaterial to our argument which of these positions is assumed: in its highest expression it is the utmost to which man can reach, e.g. a completely self-determined nature would constitute the goal of moral personality. It is necessary, however, to stress the unity of the ego. From the psychological point of view, this is now taken for granted; the mind is not regarded as being made up
of faculties, one of which thinks, another feels, and a third wills, but as a unity of which thinking, feeling, and willing are aspects. The affirmation of this unity, which constitutes selfhood and individuality, and, as viewed in its relationships, personality, is fundamental to our argument.

The individual and social aspects of personality are well brought out in the definition which Boethius gives: "A person is the individual substance of a rational nature" (Vide. "God and Personality". C.C.J.Webb. p 47). The definition is inadequate inasmuch as personality is more than the possession of a rational nature, but the first half of it does mark out the fact that a person recognises himself as individual and unique, whilst the second makes it clear that this involves him in relationships with others. Personality is that oneness of the ego, through which a man's life has significance for himself, for others, and for God. The social aspect is the one which is most likely to be ignored, and therefore requires to be emphasised. We have travelled a long way from the position: "Each in his separate sphere of joy or pain Our hermit spirits live and move alone".

"We can no longer regard persons as like so many peas in a row. In thought, affection, and will we share
in the lives of others, and they in ours. We are persons not by reason of our isolation, but because we possess the power to transcend it". (See Lofthouse. "Ethics and Atonement". Chapter 9.)

In the theory which we are seeking to substantiate, revelation is thought of, not as a something coming to us AB EXTRA, and imprinting itself upon the mind, apart from any activity of the mind itself, but rather as a personal relationship, implying activity on God's part and ours. It is like the red of the rose not painted on it by the hand of the sun reaching forth to it from without, but developed from the nature of the rose itself, yet not without the influence of the sun. And just as there must be some affinity between the rose and the sun to make this possible, so revelation implies that within the human there is the capacity for the Divine. Just as with respect to two persons, mutual understanding is only possible on the supposition that language (I use the word in a very broad sense as including gesture, attitude, etc) has a similar meaning for both speaker and hearer, so revelation would be impossible apart from something which was common to God and man. The position we are taking is, that this something, which is common, can best be expressed by the word "personality".

The objections to ascribing personality to God are numerous and familiar. For example, Paulsen speaks of personality as being "THE FORM PECULIAR TO
HUMAN LIFE", and emphasises the words by putting them in italics. After defining it as "self-conscious and rational thought and volition", he goes on to affirm:"The difference between the human and the divine inner life must indeed be great and thorough-going, so great, that there can be no homogeneity at any point. Neither the volition nor the thought of the All-One, if we are at all permitted to speak of His volition and thought, can be grasped by us" ('Introd to Philosophy", pp 252 f). This argument, which is the most powerful that can be brought against ascribing personality to God, is by no means unanswerable. It will be freely admitted that there is a distinction between personality in God and man, but this must not be so extended as to mean absolute dissimilarity. Browning expressed it very finely:
"...progress, man's distinctive mark alone,
Not God's and not the beast's; God is, they are,
Man partly is, and wholly hopes to be"
(Death in the Desert.11 576/8).
The ethical attributes of God must have a richer and deeper meaning than the same qualities in man. Goodness in man is that which has come through a process of development, is derivative, and yet in the making, whilst in God it is originative and eternally complete. That, however, is not to deny that when we use the word "goodness" of God and of man, we mean it for the most
part, in the same sense. Lotze has a very powerful argument to the effect that in God alone is perfect personality to be found, whilst in all finite creatures there exists only a weak imitation of it; the finiteness of the finite is not a productive condition of personality but rather a hindering barrier to its development (Microcosmos, Bk X, Ch 4). We agree with this, providing we understand by "a weak imitation of it", that it is similar in the same sense that a child's first attempts to speak are an imitation of its mother's language. On the negative side, the affirmation of personality in God means that we reject the conception of Him which regards Him as mechanism; on the positive side, there are those qualities after which we are for ever reaching and which we recognise as constituting our personality: He possesses them in their fulness and perfection. If we accept Paulsen's argument that man is personal, God is other than personal, and that there can be no homogeneity at any point, revelation in the sense in which we understand the word is impossible.

Idealistic philosophy has always been strongly opposed to ascribing personality to God. Sometimes the argument has taken the form that to do so is to be guilty of an anthropomorphism, which is derogatory to our conception of God as the Absolute. But anthropomorphism may mean, either applying to God conceptions of what
is lowest and most limited in man, or, on the other hand, thinking of Him in the highest categories possible to the human understanding. It is in the latter sense that we use the term, and it is difficult to see how we can avoid doing so. We can no more think of God in terms which lie outside our understanding than we can express a philosophy in a language of which we are wholly ignorant. If we identify the Absolute, as Bradley does, with the Whole in which God, Man, and the Universe are included, then we cannot legitimately apply the term person to the Whole. But whilst such a Whole may have a meaning for philosophy, it has none for religion, since the latter postulates a God distinct, though not separate, from Man and the Universe. Further, if by God as Absolute, we mean that which is stripped of all attributes and taken out of all relations, such a God cannot be personal, but it also follows that we are plunged into nescience, for we can only know things in their relations. If we are asked to say what God is in Himself, apart from His relations with Man and the Universe, we cannot answer, for to attempt to do so, would be to speak of a God who never was.

When we say that God is perfect Wisdom, Power, and Love, however inadequate the expression may be, it is the only one of which we are capable, and it
implies His personality. Revelation is simply the unfolding of the significance of Him in whom we live and move and have our being; or better still, it is the enrichment of our life by participation in the wider life which is to be found in Him, and the process requires personal terms to express it. If we seek to affirm that God is supra-personal, we do not escape the difficulty, for, in so far as this is not meant as a denial of His personality, it is simply a mode of stating that which we have been enunciating; if it means more than this, it can only be a word invented to cover the confession of our ignorance of His nature.

Defining revelation in terms of personal relationship has three advantages: (1) It brings it into line with the actual history of religion in general, (2) with the historic facts of the Christian Faith, and (3) it enables us to think of God in His relation to man as being at once transcendent and immanent. As regards the first point, a modern writer has said: "All in all, the evolution of religion is to be witnessed where social integration is proceeding, most of all where custom is becoming reflective loyalty, where loyalty is coming to understand itself as love, (which particularises individuals), and where love asserts itself as demand for justice, (which is the recognition of persons as finalities
for thought and action; religion is the discovery of persons" (Coe. "Psychology of Religion". p 240).

As regards the second point, we cannot read the Bible without noting that its revelation is wholly conceived as personal. The anthropomorphism of the Old Testament writers was but a crude attempt to express the fact of the Divine Personality. Passing to the New Testament, we do not find God spoken of as "the Absolute", "the Infinite", "the power other than ourselves which makes for righteousness", but as the Father. It is obviously an advantage to begin our task with a conception which is in line with the evolution of religion in general, and with the historic facts in which the Christian finds the substratum of his religion.

But the advantage is still greater with respect to the third point. All genuine religion involves the paradox that God is the Divine majesty, separated from the true worshipper by vast immensities, and that He is equally the near, "closer than breathing, nearer than hands or feet". The doctrine of Immanence may be pushed to the extreme until it obliterates the distinction between God and His Creation: on the other hand, the doctrine of Transcendence may, in the same way, come to mean the absolute separation of God from His Creation. In both cases revelation becomes impossible, inasmuch as its essential quality is that of relationship, and anything which
destroys the relationship, also destroys the possibility of revelation. Our task therefore is that of stating transcendence and immanence in such a way that they shall not be mutually exclusive. If God is both, and not merely a hybrid, being partially the one and partially the other, we have got to find a concept under which their harmony may be subsumed. It is here that the idea of personality, expressing itself in Love, comes to our aid. Love is a union which transcends without obliterating the differences of individuals: it is Absolute and yet not unrelated: and whilst nowhere is there a fuller consciousness of the individuality of each and of the distinction from one another than in Love, yet, just here, in proportion to its depth, such mutual exclusiveness is cancelled. To state revelation in any other terms than those of personality, appears to involve us in the direst antinomies, i.e. in a Pantheism in which distinctions are ignored, or in a Deism in which relationship, Divine and human, is impossible; in either case, no room is left for revelation.

Assuming then that revelation is the finite personality participating in the infinite personality of God, and becoming enriched thereby, let us proceed to unfold the significance of this for the problem before us, bearing in mind that we are seeking to claim for revelation a place in the Ultimate Reality. The methods
pursued with this end in view have been various. For example, there was that, which finds little countenance in our times, of starting with certain abstractions, more or less axiomatic, and constructing from these a coherent system. Spinoza and Hegel are striking examples of this type. Another method may be illustrated by reference to a comparatively modern writer, A.W. Momerie, who, in his thesis on "Personality", begins with the argument that knowledgepresumes a thinking, feeling, willing subject, and thus arrives at the conception of human personality. He then analyses the nature of the Universe and finds in it evidences of mind and purpose, from which he draws the inference that it must be the expression of an infinite ego. This really does not get us any further than some of the arguments we have already considered, and it has this further disadvantage that it is singularly unconvincing to the pessimistic type of mind, which sees the Universe as irrational chaos.

The method which we are to pursue is quite different from this, inasmuch as we are to treat personality not as an abstraction, but as actually in relations with the Universe. As it is in itself, apart from such relations, it is unknowable. We begin therefore with an analysis of concrete human personality and not as viewed apart from the Universe in which it shares.
It is useless to seek for God anywhere save in human experience. Unless the finite is somehow within the Infinite, progressively sharing in His nature and life, the way to a satisfactory metaphysic seems barred. The reason for our belief in God must be sought in experience rather than in a very doubtful argument that the universe is a cosmos. The modern tendency to treat man as the measure of all things encourages us to approach the problem from this side. The question is really as to whether the nature of human personality is such as to support our belief that the finite life may and does participate in the Infinite life of God. If that could be sustained, whilst it would not prove any particular experience to be revelation, yet it would supply a sufficient metaphysical basis for our belief in revelation. The argument which follows seeks to elucidate THE TRANSCENDENT NATURE OF PERSONALITY.

(A) First of all we note that personality transcends its physical organism. It is now generally recognised that the brain does not and cannot explain the mind. The position that mind is a secretion of the brain as bile is a secretion of the liver, if ever it was meant seriously, is at any rate now untenable. The words of a modern scientist express very cogently the revulsion from such a view which has taken place:
"Matter is the vehicle of Mind, but it is dominated and transcended by it. It is quite credible that the whole and entire personality is never terrestrially manifest" (Lodge. "Life and Matter". p 123).

Further, we may note that in modern conceptions of personality, it is admitted that the Self is larger than that which finds expression in consciousness; that there is that in us which does not emerge into consciousness, what Hamilton described as "mental latency", Carpenter as "unconscious cerebration", and James as "subconscious or subliminal process". The terms in which these writers express their views point to a radical difference of opinion as to the nature of the facts, Carpenter, for example, assigning them to automatic activity of the nervous system and postulating that they are entirely physical in their nature - a position which would find little support amongst modern psychologists; but the point to note is that there is a general agreement as to the presence of facts which have a significance for the Self, but which lie under the threshold of consciousness. We must not, however, claim too much for the subconscious. The phenomena are undoubted, but there is no generally accepted theory as to their significance. It is possible that they consist of memories, which remain quiescent till brought into focus by some fresh stimulus; or of images, which,
whilst they did not come into the area of things attended to, yet left their mark upon the mind, and this, like invisible-ink marks which a chemical brings to light, only waited for the appropriate impulse in order to become manifest. It is a mistake to set down the sub-conscious as being necessarily higher in quality than the conscious, nor can Divine revelation be limited to this sphere. It is difficult to see why God should communicate with a split-off-complex rather than with man's conscious states. The factor of the "unconscious" can be used very effectively in the service of irreligion as well as of religion, a conspicuous example being Jung's treatment of religion as originating simply and solely in the repressed wish. Religious thinkers therefore ought to be very chary of basing their argument on a position that can be so easily turned against them. In this connection, all that we are justified in affirming, is the possibility of the Divine personality being in touch with the fount of our life at a depth beyond that which is revealed in consciousness.

(C) We are, however, on surer ground, when we turn to what, from our point of view, may be described as the most significant aspect of personality, namely, its IDEALITY. In consciousness, there is always the sense of an unrealised possibility, of a something
better than what has been achieved, of a standard to which we must aspire and by which we are judged. This "ideality" cannot be limited to the moral aspect of our life, for it is equally true of the intellectual and the aesthetic. The point that we are trying to make clear is, that in personality there is to be found a potential infinite. This can be illustrated from various angles.

(I) We may express it in this way: A person recognises himself as unique and individual, just because he is conscious of something beyond himself, an encompassing world, within which he and the things from which he distinguishes himself are included. This something beyond is potentially infinite, for, however he envisages it, he finds a more comprehensive unity in which it is embraced. The idea therefore of personality as self-enclosed gives way to that of personality with infinite outreaches.

(2) It is in the Moral realm that this ideality is most clearly to be seen. Apart from it, there could be no "ought" but only an "is". What enables us to use the word "ought" is that we are conscious of a standard, a something which is beyond us and yet which has a claim upon us. This standard cannot be identified with Law or Custom, inasmuch as by it, Law and Custom
are themselves judged. The Moral Ideal is inexplicable, except on the assumption that a real Moral Order stands over against us, in such a fashion as to compel us to realise that its imperatives are obligatory for us.

In "Outlines of a Philosophy of Life", Alban. G. Widgery remarks: "The approval of this experience as a moral good and the disapproval of that as a moral bad, depend on a peculiar capacity of the human mind, call it conscience, moral sense, moral consciousness, or what you will. That capacity is not adequately described as a judgment of mere reason or a play of mere feeling. These are individual experiences which are thus distinguished, but to express in theoretical terms just what in each instance is the basis of the judgment is not possible. This contention corresponds largely with the position of those writers who maintain that good is indefinable" p 179). So far as Psychology and Ethics go, he is right, but surely here is a basis which provides a foundation for a new metaphysic whose facts shall be in human experience, but whose pinnacles shall reach far beyond it.

(3) The position might be illustrated from the Aesthetic side. The artist is aware of a realm of Beauty, of which he feels that his loveliest dream is but a passing glimpse; he is aware of an infinite and harmonious whole, which stands over against that to
which he seeks to give expression.

(4) This ideality, however, finds its best example in the experiences of the Mystic. In "The Enneads", Plotinus writes: "Now often I am roused from the body to my true self, and emerge from all else and enter myself, and behold a marvellous beauty, and am particularly persuaded at the time that I belong to a better sphere, and live a supreme life, and become identical with the Godhead, and fast fixed therein attain its divine activity, having reached a plane above the intelligible realm; and then after this sojourn in the Godhead, I descend from the intelligible world to the plane of discursive thought. And after I have done so, I am at a loss to know how it is that I have so descended, and how my soul has entered into my body in view of the fact that she really is as her inmost nature was revealed and yet is in the body" (Vide. J.B.Pratt. "The Religious Consciousness". p 363). Expressed in the simplest way, we may say that Plotinus is speaking of the ideality which is in personality, and yet for ever beyond it; which, in moments of high emotional tension appears to be our own, but which is afterwards seen to be something yet to be achieved. It is interesting to note that in the experience of Plotinus, the aesthetic as well as the moral finds a place, and if he excludes the
rational element, it is because, in such an experience, this element is, as it were, necessarily secondary and in the background. The point to be emphasised is, that the very nature of personality is such as to imply an objective something or someone with whom, in its truest hours, it shares its life, whose height and depth are ever beyond it, and yet ever in some measure being realised, and which possesses in itself a timeless and eternal aspect. No satisfactory explanation of the presence of conscience, aesthetic ideals, and of all those elements in human experience, which are for ever beyond us and yet in some measure within us, can be given, which does not imply a metaphysical objective.

Professor James hinted at this when he maintained: "that disregarding the over-beliefs, and confining ourselves to what is common and generic, we have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self, through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience, which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true, so far as it goes" (See James. "Varieties of Religious Experience" p. 515). Where we differ with him is that he so often seems to limit these states to the sub-conscious. Emile Boutroux puts the position far more clearly when he says: "Is there for us, as conscious beings, besides
the individual life, a universal life, potentially and already in some measure real? Is our reflective and individual consciousness, according to which we are external to one another, an absolute reality, or a simple phenomenon, under which is concealed the universal interpenetration of souls within a unifying principle"? (International Journal of Ethics. XVIII. p 194). So far as I can see, there is nothing in this position which is inconsistent with those generalisations of human experience which we get from Science, and it certainly gives us a metaphysical basis for our conception of revelation and lifts it out of the realm of the subjective. It would appear that in this way, we reach a super-historical reality manifested in history and experience, eternal truth bursting through all the conflicts and mutations of time. It agrees with the conception which we emphasised (p 127.) that God is Love and that in man is the love which can respond, a conception which is absolutely necessary to the unfolding of the meaning of revelation in terms of personality. Those who deny this theory must give a reason adequate to account for the progressively ideal elements which are to be found in human personality.
The question that we now have to face is, as to what are the grounds on which we affirm that the presence of ideals is evidence, that in these, the finite Self is participating in the Infinite life of God. The quotations which we have made from James and Boutroux would appear to indicate that there is no objection from the psychological point of view to our acceptance of revelation as an hypothesis which tends to explain certain noticeable characteristics of personality. Further than that, I do not think Psychology can go, inasmuch as its scope is to deal with phenomena, whereas we are concerned with the ultimate significance, that is to say, with the meaning which these possess. It does not seem to us to be possible to prove revelation, using the word "prove" in the sense in which we should employ it in Natural Science. At this stage, the choice of one of two courses offers itself to us; (I) We may close the account by saying that we have gone as far as we can, that revelation is an hypothesis which explains more or less imperfectly the ideal elements in personality, and leave it at that, or (2) we can advance further and see what is our conception of Ultimate Reality into which the conclusions reached above would fit. In our judgment, to limit the search for Truth to the methods pursued by Natural Science savours somewhat of obscurantism. The nature of the
human mind is such that we are bound to follow the second course, and to advance into the realm of metaphysics. If the ground here is not quite so firm as that which we have been treading, it needs to be borne in mind that the higher forms of knowledge have not the same certainty as those which are beneath them; i.e. the facts with which biology has to deal are much less stable and more intricate than those of geology, and similarly with the relation of psychology to biology. We cannot allow this, therefore, to deter us from making the quest.

Lotze, in the concluding section of his treatise on Metaphysics wrote: "The true beginning of Metaphysics lies in ethics...I admit that the expression is not exact, but I still feel certain of being on the right track, when I seek in that which SHOULD BE the ground of that which IS". He appears not to have been quite satisfied with the term "ethics", and that for which he was groping would appear to be expressed better by "Value", of which moral values predominate, though they are by no means the only values. Following out this suggestion, we proceed to argue that Ultimate Reality is inclusive of "existents" and "values".

(4). First of all, we note that value, at least intrinsic value, is always value for a person, or persons. The values which we are in the habit of ascribing to material things are not values in the strict sense of
the term, but only instrumental. In dealing with value, therefore, we are dealing with that which only possesses meaning with reference to personality.

(B) Now values are an essential element of Reality. The Reality of a rainbow is not exhausted in the physical phenomena which Science describes; these constitute but one aspect of its significance for us; we must account the way in which it impressed us with a sense of beauty as being equally Real. The idea that the scientist describes for us the thing as it is, whilst the aesthete describes certain secondary qualities with which it impresses us, is untenable, for the thing is its qualities, and our sense of its beauty stands on an equal footing with our sense of the material constituents in it. It is not possible to sustain the position which Locke took up in drawing a distinction between a thing and its qualities. Not only primary and secondary qualities but also what Bosanquet would call "tertiary" qualities, that is, those qualities which induce appreciation, are inherent in and constitutive of the thing. We are acting in an arbitrary fashion when we seek to confine Reality to that aspect of things which constitutes the particular domain of Natural Science. The music of a Beethoven Sonata is as real as the wood and metal of the instrument on which it is played, and there is no
justification for denying either the Reality of the material things which constitute the organ or of the aesthetic qualities of the music by which we are enthralled.

All knowledge, religious or otherwise, includes this element of value. Included in our knowledge of anything is the idea of what I can do with it, and what expect from it. Professor Royce says somewhere that a man does not know a lion who can go up to it, and stroking its mane, say: "Nice little lion". We should therefore differ from the position taken up by G.B. Foster, when he says: "So when we speak of faith, when we confess faith, we do not just on that account speak the language of knowledge as science counts knowledge, FOR SUCH KNOWLEDGE LEAVES NO ROOM FOR THE SUBJECTIVE, THE HUMAN, THE PERSONAL" (The Finality of the Christian Religion. p 138). As a matter of fact, the subjective, the human, the personal, enter into all knowledge, and at the most, it can only be a question of degree. The following quotation will help to make this clear: "The selective interest, which we may fairly take as characteristic in some measure of all experience, leads to the remark that experience as a process may be further defined as a process of self-conservation, and so far justifies us in describing it as life or BIOS. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the objects of experience are not primarily objects of knowledge
but objects of conation i.e. of appetite and aversion. For though an object must be cognised before it can be liked or disliked, still it is to interesting objects that the subject mainly attends, and it is with these therefore that the subject acquires a closer and preciser acquaintance" (Ward. "Naturalism and Agnosticism." p 151). If we accept this position, and it seems to us to be incontestable, it becomes clear that general knowledge, which was supposed to rest on facts, as distinct from the value which these have for a person, is dependent on this "selective interest" which implies a consciousness of value. The idea, therefore, that scientific knowledge is of a kind from which all that is subjective, human, and personal have been eliminated simply will not hold. These enter into all knowledge, and if they are more prominent in the knowledge of God than in other realms, that is only what we should expect from the very nature of it.

(C) There are still those who would maintain, however, that our knowledge of a thing possesses an objectivity which is wanting in our knowledge of values, and therefore that the latter suffers from the defect of subjectivity. If by this is meant, that it is the individual that confers value, as for example, that an ideal only has value when it is recognised as such
by an individual, that is a proposition which cannot be sustained. The beauty of a picture is none the less real even though an inartistic person fails to appreciate it, nor is the reality of a moral ideal impugned, by reason of the fact that some choose to ignore it. We do not create values, but discover them. A judgment of value does not mean that I desire a certain object or that I am pleased with it, any more than that a judgment of sense-perception means that I have certain sensations. Possibly, it is by conative or affective experience that we arrive at a judgment of value, and in the same way a sensation may lead to a judgment of sense-perception. But in neither case does the origin constitute the meaning of the judgment. In both, there is the reference to something beyond the mental state of the subject, to a value which we apprehend or to an object which we perceive.

(D) Now, as we have seen, value always involves an ideal standard, and thus presumes an "order of values", even as in the case of things, laws presume a scientific order. But it would seem to be necessary, if our argument is to succeed, that we should be able to show that the order of values is a unity. This is not quite so easily accomplished as the task of showing the unity of the order which is the domain of science, inasmuch as the
former is of that spiritual quality which language is so inadequate to express, yet the task is by no means impossible.

Professor Sorley, in "Moral Values and the Idea of God", attempts it by first showing us the unity of the order of moral values and then subsuming all values under these. This is hardly satisfactory inasmuch as it involves confusion of thought to subsume all values under the order of moral values. We have no right to make the term "moral" inclusive of intellectual and aesthetic values. The solution appears to us to lie in this direction: all instrinsic, as distinct from instrumental, values may be classified under the three higher values: Truth, Beauty, Goodness. The problem then becomes that of discovering how these three groups may be regarded as a unity. What is there that is common to them, which is distinctive of their character as values, and which constitutes them as such? To that the answer would seem to be, their wholeness... each of the three orders of value are concerned with an inner coherence, harmony, and order. They are each attempts to express the wholeness of possible experience. Man as distinct from the Ultimate Reality is ever seeking union with it, and these three orders of values are the means through which he progressively realises it. The standard
of value therefore is that of unity with Ultimate Reality, a unity which conserves and yet transcends all difference, in a word, the unity of perfect Love.

It may be objected that the three orders of the higher values are not always consistent, as for example, that the aesthetic and the moral may be in conflict. This, however, can only be regarded as transient, inasmuch as in practice these contradictions are continually being overcome. They no more invalidate the unity of the order of value, than the clash of duties invalidates the moral order, or some inexplicable fact the rational order.

All that we contend for is, that value in its ideal significance, has this property of manifesting Reality in its wholeness, that is, as possessing inner coherence and harmony. Truth, Beauty, and Goodness ideally are one. But this unity itself has personal characteristics. Do we not speak of the Love of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, implying thereby the possibility of communion with them. It seems to us therefore that we are justified in affirming that our apprehension of intrinsic value is a yearning for union with and understanding of the beloved, who is near enough to be loved and far enough and lovely enough to whet desire.

In what position does revelation stand to this standard of value? It is this wholeness, conceived
as personal, seeking to transcend without cancelling the differences between us and Himself. Revelation is the affirmation that our strivings after wholeness are the work of the Universal Spirit drawing us in Love unto Himself.

Ultimate Reality must be conceived as a unity, but so far in our reasoning we have not reached this conception. The point at which we have arrived is that of two orders, each a unity in itself, the order of existents which falls within the domain of science and the order of values. We have sought to show that the latter is real, without in any way questioning the reality of the former. To leave these two aspects of Ultimate Reality unrelated would be to perpetuate the error of the Dualists who resolved Reality into matter and Spirit and left it at that, or the antinomy of the Practical and Theoretical Reason as enunciated by Kant. The crux of metaphysics is not that of proving the existence of God, but that of providing a concept of Ultimate Reality which shall include existents and values. Monism fails because it blurs the distinction, Pluralism because it leaves Reality a mass of unresolved contradictions, and Naturalism because it seeks to interpret in similar terms what are obviously distinct from each other. The only satisfactory
solution of the problem would seem to be along the lines of a Theism, which recognises the discordance between existents and values, but which discerns in the fact of "ideality", as implicit in personality, the impulse which makes for unity; in other words, the unity which Theism postulates is being progressively realised through persons apprehending values and translating them into existents.

Along any other line, the fact of Evil appears to present an insurmountable obstacle to any consistent theory of Ultimate Reality. Tragedy is as real as Truth, Beauty and Goodness, and cannot be set down as mere illusion, for the illusion itself would be evil. Nor is the difficulty overcome by the affirmation that there is more of good than evil. It is not the amount of evil, but the fact, that prevents us from arguing from an imperfect world to a God who is all-powerful, all-wise, and all good. In our judgment, the overcoming of evil constitutes a good without which the Infinite Good would be incomplete. It is in the facing of hazard and hardship that value is wrought out, and that the ideal becomes also existent. If it be said that evil when it has been conquered still remains evil, that the future cannot blot out the past, we deny that the future cannot affect the past. The first scene in a play may be
harrowing, and yet be transfigured by what follows.
It is no indictment of the world that evil and tragedy are the conditions under which its highest good may be wrought out. Surely that is the meaning of the Cross. The evil that sent Jesus to the Cross was none the less evil by reason of the fact that the Love which bore it transfigured it into ineffable glory.

The theory which we are seeking to develop postulates freedom, that is to say, self-determination on the part of man, and purpose on the part of God. The realm of existents witnesses to the ultimate Power behind the Universe, the realm of values to the ultimate Person whose purpose is being realised in it. Nor can the two be separated, for the Power which is manifested in existents and the Person who is manifested in all values is One, the ground of all Reality. The answer may be made that it is impossible to prove that the order of values implies Divine purpose, that it is open to anyone to regard this order as a mirage that lures us to expect great things only to disappoint us. We agree that in the scientific sense of the word, it is not possible to "prove" that the order of values is to be trusted, and yet it seems to us that the "ideal" nature of man by which he recognises values is as much to be trusted as the "intellectual" nature by which he infers rationality. Moreover those who deny this Divine
purpose have to reckon with an historical revelation which came in Jesus Christ, with a life that tasted tragedy to its bitter dregs and yet wrought out of it the unspeakable glory. To distrust our sense of value is not only to blot out all meaning from the universe, but to distort beyond recognition the significance of all that Christ said and did.

The argument as outlined above, although teleological in nature, differs from the older teleology which ignored the realm of values, and argued only from existents. Our argument has proceeded on the basis that metaphysic must begin, neither with man nor with the Universe, but with man in his relations with the Universe. The older form of teleology had to contend with the argument that the world was not the best of all possible worlds; our form of it does not imply that it is, but rather that it is a world fitted for the development of values, which are to be progressively realised by persons. We have advanced beyond Kant who postulated God as the ground for the reconciliation of Virtue and Happiness: we postulate Him as immanent and transcendent Love, whose purpose for the world is that man should realise values which could not be realised apart from the triumph over hazard and hardship, and in the light of whose purpose, the discordance between Ideal and Fact
may be interpreted. On this basis, revelation does not impinge on human freedom, being the supreme value, which becomes value for us, when chosen by us, and wrought into existence.

Let us seek to express the results in terms of religion. The all-embracing value which includes those of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, is Divine Love. The sum and substance of God’s revelation is Divine Love. Its purpose is to make us participants in that Love, through the unfolding of values which we are able to recognise as such. It preserves as only Love can, distinction within unity, its issue being not the one-ness of mystical absorption, but the unity which comprehends without destroying the individuality of the many. In the realm which is the domain of science, there is nothing that conflicts with this idea of purpose being wrought out through revelation. It seems to us, therefore, that in the theory, which we have sought to elucidate, we have a metaphysical basis, which leaves room for the idea of revelation as being God’s way of evolving and maturing human personality, and which permits us to regard it, not as the contradiction, but as the complement of science, endowing the things,
with which science deals, with instrumental values for
the realisation by human lives of the Divine Love,
which is the sum of all value.
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Section 8. CHRIST AS THE FINAL REVELATION.

Having defined revelation in the terms of personality as the relationship between God and man, the self-manifestation of the Divine realised by us on the plane of history and experience, we shall now seek to reconcile this position with the claim that is implicit in all Christian thinking, namely, that Christ is the Final revelation. The terms which we have so far employed would, on the surface, appear to be more consistent with an ever-progressive revelation, the finality of which would come rather at the end of the series than at the beginning. History and experience do not seem to possess those characteristics of stability and absoluteness which would lead us to discover anything in them of which we could predicate finality. The question as to the Finality of Christ opens up many problems in the realms of Theology, Comparative Religion, and Ethics, which go beyond the scope of our thesis, and although of great importance, for that reason, must be left untouched. All that we can attempt, at this point, is to seek to define the nature of the Final revelation in Christ, and to see how far it is compatible with the theories which appear to challenge it, such as those of Historic Method and Relativity, in a word, to give this aspect of finality a place in the development of our conception of revelation in terms of personality.
I think it may be taken for granted, that although finality may be interpreted in many ways, yet its affirmation, in one sense or another, is vital to Christianity. So far as the New Testament witness goes, there can be little doubt that this was the position which Christ claimed for Himself, and which was also claimed for Him by His immediate followers. It is difficult to see how Christianity could maintain itself or exercise an authoritative influence over human lives if that finality were undermined, and the claim of Christ were whittled down to that of being one of many prophets, or that of the highest and best yet revealed, but leaving it an open question as to whether He might not be succeeded by one greater than Himself. If it be said that other religions also claim finality for the prophets in whom they had their origin, the answer must be that this does not prove that the claim of any is invalid, but only that finality is a demand of the religious spirit. All that it necessitates is that we should examine the claims, and see how far and in what sense they can be sustained.

First of all, we must note, that if certain theories with respect to Historic Method are accepted, it is difficult to sustain the claim of Christ or any
other to finality. These theories affirm that finality must come, if anywhere, at the end of the series and not in the midst of it, that the final revelation must be last in time as well as fullest and best. This argument has a strong appeal, especially to those who are deeply imbued with the spirit of the Historic Method. If the limits of revelation are fixed by something that has to be accepted as final, it would seem as though we were introducing a barrier to progress, by inserting a static element in what is a developing process. The whole concept of finality appears to belong to that realm of dogmatic assertions which provokes the wrath of the scientific enquirer who discerns in such static concepts a menace to freedom of thought.

Let us carefully examine the argument put forward in the name of the Historic Method against the finality of any revelation. Amongst those who have held this view, Lessing appears as one of the pioneers. The acceptance of his argument as outlined in "The Education of the Human Race" would effectually shut out the claim to finality on the part of any positive or revealed religion. In fact, with him, revelation was but an auxilliary in the process by which Reason appropriated certain truths, and its function limited to speeding up the process and giving to mankind a little earlier, truths which, apart from revelation would have been
discovered later by our own unaided faculties. Thus the only finality is perfected Reason. The Jewish and Christian revelations were useful in their time, when the human race was in its spiritual minority; they were like the picture-blocks by means of which children can learn to spell, but which may be dispensed with when the mind has mastered the lesson. Lessing never used the term "Historic Method", but all through the little book to which we have referred above, his thinking is dominated by it. One may venture to say that it is impossible to read Lessing without realising how much religion in general owes to this method. For example, Lessing's argument was really a masterly answer to the Wolfenbüttel Fragments of Reimarus, (of which Lessing was editor), for the arguments which Reimarus directed against revelation lose all force, when it is viewed as an historic process. Further, the Historic Method has rendered incalculable service in the way of establishing the science of Comparative Religion, enabling us to see the measure of truth in religions other than our own, so that we no longer speak of the false religion of the heathen, but are impressed with the conviction that in no age and in no clime has God left Himself without a witness. A very significant admission on the part of Lessing is that he recognises the debt of the Old Testament
people to the wise Persians. Thus this principle not only saved the Bible for modern (critical) faith, but enabled us to do something like justice to the great ethnic religions by recognising that which was of real value in them. As we have seen, however, Lessing's argument was fundamentally unsound by reason of the fact that he misconceived the metaphor "Education" (See p 23).

But to dispose of Lessing is by no means to dispose of those who maintain that the application of the Historic Method makes the possibility of revelation untenable. It is now stated in other forms than those which were used by him. History is conceived as a development, a continuum in which there are no great gaps, and every event is regarded as the natural outcome of that which went before; its record is thought to be that of a series in which the more highly differentiated and perfect is to be found at the end nearest to ourselves. Without in any way slurring over the benefits that have accrued from the application of the Historic Method, we must affirm, however, that facts carefully observed and fairly interpreted must have first consideration and that we have no right to distort these in order to make fool-proof some theory into which they do not happen to fit. For example, I do not think that those who deny the finality of the revelation in Christ would be prepared
to say that progress since His time has been beyond rather than towards Him. Similar examples might be used from many sources to show that historical development has been something quite other than orderly, continuous, and necessary progress. A modern writer has warned us as to the limits of this theory: "Historic Method has its limitations. It is self-sufficient only within an area, which is indeed, tolerably extensive, but which does not embrace the Universe" ("The Foundations of Belief". A.J. Balfour. p 337).

Another form which the argument from Historic Method took may be illustrated from the well-known saying of Strauss: "The idea does not shake out its full content in a single exemplar" (Vide, "The Finality of the Christian Religion". Foster. p 38). If, when we speak of the finality of the revelation in Christ, we limit ourselves to the historical figure presented in the Gospels, the only reply that could be made to Strauss would be that in His case the exceptional happened. We are not, however, driven to such straits. The finality of the revelation in Christ is made through a personality, and must include not only the historical facts of the Gospels, but the sum-total of the influences which have flowed from Him, and which have found expression in individual experiences of His Grace,
In Institutions, and in ideals which have permeated the race. We may recognise the truth in Newman's theory of the development of Christianity, (without committing ourselves to the inferences which he made therefrom), that Christianity is the tree of which the Historical Christ of the New Testament is the seed. Strauss appears to think of a personality as that which has clean-cut boundaries - a thought which is totally at variance with modern conceptions of personality - and imagines that in the case of Christ, these are constituted by the record of the Gospels.

In view of the limitations which Lord Balfour suggests as being attached to the Historic Method, and of the fact that we now view personality as being potentially infinite in its outreaches, we feel justified in refusing to allow any inferences drawn from this method to constitute an A PRIORI objection to our approach to this problem of the finality of the revelation in Christ.

There is yet another phase of modern thought which appears to present an initial obstacle to any conception of finality and even to the idea of revelation itself, namely that which goes by the name of Relativity. In the realm of physical science, the discoveries of Albert
Einstein promise to effect as great a revolution as that which was brought about by the formulation of the Evolutionary theory. We are here concerned, however, not with Relativity as a mere scientific theory, but rather with its philosophic implications as affecting the basis of revelation and the finality which is essential to Christian life and thought.

Briefly expressed, this modern scientific theory affirms that our knowledge of all phenomena is purely relative, and that the medium of observation vitiates the result. For example, if the velocity of light is 300,000 kilometers a second, a clock at that distance would be to us a second slow. If we could approach the clock, travelling at the same rate as light, we should discover that the hands of the clock go forward two seconds for every second of our journey, and similarly, travelling away from the clock with the velocity of light, the hands would remain stationary. The ramifications of this theory are extraordinary, but it is the conclusion to which it leads that interests us, namely, that scientific knowledge can no longer be regarded as the sure and certain reality established beyond the shadow of a doubt, and true independently of the observer. As a writer has recently put it: "I think we are now in a position to deny with
confidence that we can have knowledge of reality in the material universe through any normal form of consciousness though we can, by means of assumptions of various kinds, construct hypotheses which serve well enough for all practical purposes" (Hibbert Journal. Vol XXI. No 1. p 59)

Hitherto the popular assumption has been that scientific knowledge possessed an objectivity and reality beyond all question, but it seems that now we are faced with a new position according to which it is relegated to the rank of subjectivity and appearance.

The above writer imagines that all this makes the problem of revelation a simple one, for what Relativity has done is "to confirm the traditional belief that the knowledge of God can be attained not by any process of reasoning but only by what we call Revelation. The limits of normal consciousness are defined more clearly than they have ever been defined before, and those limits are found to be extremely narrow, so narrow indeed that even its ethical code must be revealed "ab extra", if it is to satisfy" (Ibid. pp 62f).

In other words, we are invited to take refuge from the relativity and subjectivity of scientific knowledge in the absolute and objective knowledge of God given in revelation. This is indeed turning the tables on our quondam critics.
If this position could be accepted, our problem would be solved and the scientist would have to bow before the august prophet and confess: "I am ignorant; thou alone hast knowledge uncontaminated by the relative and the subjective". But the argument of the above mentioned writer breaks down for this reason that it is based on the assumption that there is an objectivity apart from its relation to a subject, that the real has a reality apart from its apprehension as such, that there is a truth-in-itself as distinct from a truth that is true-for-us. We have already had occasion, in our criticism of Kant (See pp 88-90) to rebut any such contention. All knowledge is a knowledge of things in relation: any other knowledge would not be knowledge at all for things exist in relation: to postulate a knowledge which is unrelated to a knowing subject is absurd. What the theory of Relativity does therefore is to make it scientifically certain that this kind of subjectivity enters into all knowledge. We must therefore reject the conclusion of this writer, that Relativity, by demonstrating the subjective and fallacious character of scientific knowledge has opened up a way to conceive of a kind of knowledge called revelation, which is clear of this defect.

But if all knowledge, including revelation,
is relative, in what sense can we speak of the revelation in Christ as being final? We simply cannot, if we assume that relativity and finality are mutually exclusive. It is an assumption, however, that is by no means axiomatic. We may take an example from the moral realm to make it clear that we are not justified in taking for granted this mutual exclusiveness. A duty is final for me, though the conditions which create it a duty are relative. Let any of the circumstances by which it is constituted a duty for me be varied, and it may cease to be duty, but, given the circumstances, it is absolute and final. The Finality of Christ cannot be a finality "in vacuo", but only such for conscious spiritual beings. We can therefore put aside this preliminary obstacle to our discussion; if it be brought in at all, it must be brought in as a factor in the argument and not as an initial barrier to our approach to it.

Let us clearly define what we mean by Christ as the final revelation, for the term is capable of many definitions and it is only by being clear at the outset that we can hope to make progress in the problem we are facing.

(I) The term may be taken as meaning that the record of Christ's life, death, and resurrection, including His teaching, is decisive in all moral and
spiritual problems, and that to it nothing can be added by way of explication or development. This theory is beset with many difficulties. In the first place, it claims for the New Testament record that which it does not claim for itself. We recall the words, all the more significant inasmuch as they occur in a passage which asserts the Finality of Christ: "I have yet many things to say to you but ye cannot bear them now" (John 16/12). How can that be final, in which many things are left unsaid? There are a multitude of problems peculiar to our age on which Jesus could not have spoken at that time, for His words would have been as unintelligible to His hearers as if He had uttered them in Twentieth Century English. Concerning these therefore, we are only left with a general guidance, which various minds will interpret differently. In the second place, such a theory has to deny the validity of Historical Criticism or is confronted by the fact that at any time its proof-texts may be disturbed. And last of all, it fails to do justice to our experience of the Holy Spirit. For these reasons we must reject it as unsatisfactory.

(2) Nor when we speak of the finality of Christ, do we mean that in Him the Absolute Personality of God came to earth. The record of His life shows us that He neither claimed nor demonstrated those attributes
of Omniscience, Omnipresence, and Omnipotence, which are usually ascribed to God. Moreover God Eternally is that which Jesus became through struggle and conflict. We are told that He GREW in stature and in wisdom and in favour with God and man, that He was PERFECTED through suffering. To affirm that Christ was the Absolute Personality of God **become Incarnate**, would appear to carry with it as a consequence the idea of a God who was not Omnipotent, a position which, to the present writer, seems to be irreconcilable with the tenets of a Christian Theism. Christ was an individual in a way which we cannot think of God as an individual without falling into the worst type of anthropomorphism.

(3) It is possible to distinguish three phases in the Personality of Christ, the Pre-existent, the Incarnate, and the Exalted. And the common error is to ignore the first and the last of these, and to limit the finality of the Christian revelation to the manifestation of His Incarnate Life. Such a limitation is very unsatisfactory. It is Christ's Personality, taken as a whole that is final, and as Harnack so finely expresses it: "It may be said that the more powerful the personality which a man possesses, and the more he takes hold of the inner life of others, the less can the sum total of what He is be known only by what he
himself says and does" ("What is Christianity", p 10). It seems to us that any theory of the Finality of Christ, which fails to take into account the Risen Christ and His continuous and progressive manifestation to the individual and the Church, through the Holy Spirit, is foredoomed to failure.

(4) It needs to be emphasised, however, that the personality whom we assert to be final, includes the historical Jesus. For whilst it is true that a powerful personality cannot be known merely by what he says and does, it is equally true that He cannot be known apart from these; they are the data by which we ideally construe the person. We are not justified in postulating an abstract and metaphysical conception of Christ's Personality, and then distorting the historic record to make it fit in with our theorizing. The Christ of Faith must be one with the Christ of History, and not a construction of our own mind at utter variance with it. If we assign a unique significance to the Person of Christ, it must be derived from the data, and not imported into it; it must be a judgment of which history and experience rather than any metaphysical presupposition form the basis. Whatever may be the limits of the Historic Method, we are compelled to use it up to a certain point, otherwise our faith becomes a mere affirmation.
incapable of being stated, let alone discussed. Our study of the Finality of Christ must therefore keep in view these two phases of His Personality, the record of the Gospels and the witness of the Church. To ignore the former is to lift revelation out of its historical setting and to leave it subject to individual caprice; whilst to ignore the latter is to take up a position which effectually bars the way to development and progress. It is the Christ of the Gospels and of the Church, interpreted to human hearts by the Holy Spirit, of whom we predicate finality.

(5) From all this, it follows, that the Finality of Christ must not be set forth in a way which tends to erect a barrier to religious progress and to quench the ardent search for fuller light. The word "final" may be used in the sense of being "complete" or as being "determinative". It is in the latter sense that we apply it to the Christian Revelation. The revelation of God can only be complete in the actualising of the far-off Divine event, towards which Creation moves, but in the midst of the process, as the nucleus which determines the form of a crystal, is Christ. The simile, however, but inadequately expresses what we mean, for Christ is not merely the "determinative", but the "goal" of the movement, and the revelation of God will be final in
the sense of being complete, in so far as the character of Christ has become universal in man.

Generally speaking, the finality of the revelation in Christ is accepted intuitively by the Christian believer; he feels that it has this character and more than that he does not ask. He finds in Christ that which satisfies the practical needs of life, and beyond that he has no desire to go. If asked to justify his position, he would probably answer, "I find it difficult to present in logical form my reasons for the belief, but one thing I know, that whereas I was blind, now I see". And yet finality of an objective kind is always implicit even in such an intuitive acceptance, and faith would receive a severe shock if it could be demonstrated that what had been accepted as coming from Christ was really the product of one's own thoughts and somewhat in the nature of a beneficent illusion. A medicine man who boldly proclaimed that it was not his physic but the imagination of the people who bought it that effected the cure, would soon be left without a patient, and a religion that could give no reasons in support of the affirmations of its immediate experience would soon be in the same perilous plight. Our deepest reasons for believing in the finality of the revelation in Christ
may, like our appreciation of a masterpiece in Art, lie beyond all expression in words, and yet in both cases some reasons can be given for our belief.

Our belief in the Finality of Christ is a judgment of value, but value includes intellectual elements and in no case can be confined to feeling and intuition. To make an affirmation, and follow it up by saying, "I can give no reason for the statement, and I am not anxious to discover any, I simply know that it is so, and you can take my word for it", is not a procedure which will commend itself to a thinking age. We must seek somehow to give expression to the intellectual element that enters into our value judgment that Christ is the final revelation of God to humanity.

One way of approach to this problem is to compare the various religions and demonstrate the inherent superiority of Christianity. We have nothing to fear from the application of such a method. As compared with Buddha, Christ came to offer us life and that more abundantly; as compared with Mahomet, it is only necessary to set side by side the stern monotheism of the Arabian prophet and the redemptive passion of Jesus to see how utterly the latter transcends the former. How insignificant is the word: "Allah is One and Mahomet is His prophet" compared with "God so loved the
World, that He sent His only begotten Son". It will not be denied that Islam owes something both to Judaism and Christianity, but supposing that this were not so and that Mahomet's teaching were original, the life and words of Jesus are as much superior to those of the Arabian prophet as Love is to Force, and Grace to Law. Christ towers supreme over all other religious teachers. Not even the fact that many or all of His sayings may be paralleled by quotations from other teachers can destroy this abiding sense of His greatness. The loveliest sentences in Wordsworth can be matched by quotations from very mediocre poets, but it was his genius to fuse them into the pure gold of poetry. Even so is it with the words of Jesus. And yet, the supremacy of Jesus does not rest upon His teaching, but upon His personality, of which this was but one manifestation, a personality which impressed itself upon those in touch with Him as being that of God, which has been the quickening impulse of civilisation and which today commends itself to us as being of infinite value.

The attempt to establish the Finality of Christ by this method of comparison seems to us to present difficulties which are by no means easy to surmount. For example, if we are to follow it, we must find some standard by which to judge. Mere comparison
apart from a standard which is capable of being justified cannot be distinguished from mere assertion. This difficulty however will meet us in the method which we ourselves propose to pursue, and will not prove insuperable. The real objection to the method of comparison is that it cannot prove the Finality but only the superiority of Christ over other religious teachers. To assert the former, we have got to go beyond the method of comparison and to show that Christ IS the standard itself.

Equally questionable is the assertion of finality on the ground that Christ meets all our needs. Using the words in the sense of needs of which we are conscious, these fluctuate, and therefore do not constitute a basis of sufficient stability on which to build the argument. The function of the final revelation would be to arouse needs that are latent. If, however, we qualify the word by some such adjective as deepest, highest, truest, this difficulty is met. But then, we have introduced the question of a standard, and the identity of Christ with this standard of value is all important.

It is with the aid of our conceptions of value that we can best envisage the problem before us. When we say that Christ is final, we are making a judgment of value. The affirmation has reference not to His place in the time series, but to the intrinsic
worth of His revelation. By it, we mean that Christ sums up in Himself all the values of the revelation which preceded Him, and becomes the creative nucleus of all possible revelation. A finality in any other sense than that of value would take us into a realm outside experience, in which neither affirmation nor denial can have validity. The question really is as to whether there is a final value, and that value identical with Christ.

It has often been said that the theories of Evolution and Historic Method prevent us from speaking of finalities, but that is true only of the exaggerated forms of these theories which carry their principles beyond the position that can be substantiated by facts. The idea of Evolution is not that of limitless change, it is not the equivalent of the old Greek notion of perpetual flux. In the Biological realm, species once developed are seen to persist in proportion to their power of adapting themselves to the changes of the world about them, and in man, where this power is almost unlimited, the species is virtually permanent. A.C. Bouquet has put the matter very fairly in the following quotation: "It does not follow that the recognition of the relative in history involves the conclusion that these great manifestations are all
temporal and doomed to disappear. We find no difficulty in regarding the great acquisitions of science, statecraft, art, social and religious life, as permanent. Endless progress, or rather, endless differentiation, is a conclusion without warrant, and only probable to those who have rejected all metaphysical conceptions of the transcendental background of history and any religious faith in the unity and reasonableness of Reality. Historical thought lends itself in no wise to this nihilism. On the contrary, there seems little reason to suppose that the future will show an immeasurable welter of religious productivity. It is much more likely that there will be development on the plateau we have already reached and a conflict between already existing forces as our civilisation continues" ("Is Christianity the Final Religion", p 205.).

The question may be asked: if Christianity is final, how stands it with respect to other revelations. Has all that has gone before to be taken as other-than-revelation. Such a position would be absurd, and if finality were to be defined in such a way as to necessitate this conclusion, commonsense would compel us to revise our position. If we speak of finality at all, it can only be as embracing the Relative rather than excluding it, as a value which takes up into itself all that is of
worth in what has gone before and in itself becomes the nucleus of unfolding values in the future. We can illustrate the principle from the process of Evolution. The first appearance of life in the Universe was final with reference to inanimate nature, similarly the first appearance of consciousness with reference to life, and so on; or if we accept Mr Lloyd Morgan's theory of Emergent Evolution, we may say that the NIBUS which links all the varied planes of existence is final with respect to any of them. A finality out of all relations is simply meaningless.

Is it possible to attribute to any value finality, and to say that in Christ this is realised? We contend that it is; that the final value must, by its very nature, be personality, and that the revelation of this final value was made in Christ, and is being progressively realised in the world and especially in the lives of those who believe on Him.

In developing this thought, though pursuing it along our own lines, we propose to utilise the argument enunciated by Troeltsch (Vide. "Is Christianity the Final Religion". A.C. Bouquet.). Troeltsch classifies the great ethical and spiritual religions into three groups, namely:
He then proceeds to rule out the last group on the ground that these constitute great philosophic attempts to construct a "rational" religion, but that such rational religions are always offshoots from the positive historical religions and are never possessed of any strong independent impulse. His next step is to stamp Judaism and Islam as at once inferior because of their legalism. Turning his attention to Brahmanism and Buddhism, he notes that whilst on their redemptive side they approach Christianity, yet the Brahman Deity is a cold abstraction and the Buddhist Deity mere blind chance, into line with which the soul comes, through breaking its will and nullifying its thought, and so is saved by being absorbed into its own nothingness. Christianity alone has revealed a living Godhead, which, whilst it is in act and will opposed to all mere appearances, and challenges the soul to sever itself from the world and unite itself with the Divine, nevertheless sends the soul back again into the world purified from sin and care, to work in the world for the building up of a Kingdom based on the infinite value of personality.
If we carefully analyse the argument given above with a view to discovering the principle of elimination which Troeltsch has employed, we shall discover it in the words: "the infinite value of personality". The revelation in Christ is supreme because it reveals and embodies this supreme value. Leaving Troeltsch at this point and developing our argument, we affirm that this revelation of "the infinite value of personality" is final in relation to all revelation which preceded it, and we may even go so far as to say that it emerged from it as life emerged from inanimate nature, but just as in life there was something new, containing within itself infinite potentialities, so with the revelation in Christ. We may go further and admit that the revelation which came in Christ is capable of development, but this is in the direction of the unfolding of the revelation and not away from it, even as life in its infinite variety of forms is not disassociated from its first appearance.

The revelation in Christ is final as the creative nucleus for the building up of a universal kingdom based on the infinite value of personality. Not all, however, would accept the standard that personality is the final value.

For example, Buddhism, Brahmanism, and all Pantheistic
modes of thought would repudiate such a contention. But the validity of the standard cannot be made to depend upon a general acceptance of it. That personality is the final value is ultimate, and the denial of it is really the denial of one's own existence and significance. It is the final value for life, in the same sense that Duty is final for the moral life; that is to say, just as the repudiation of the finality of Duty would produce moral chaos, so the repudiation of personality as the final value leads to nihilism. Life is simply a meaningless riddle, if it has no beginning nor end, or if these be viewed as nothingness; it only becomes intelligible when seen as the possibility of developing personality. The movements of our own times are all in the direction of recognising personality as possessing fundamental and decisive value, and it will be interesting to see how some of the Eastern races will reconcile the denial of personality as a religious ideal with the affirmation of its supreme worth in the sphere of politics. We conclude that it is impossible to express the highest value in terms that are other than personal, and therefore the denial of personality as the supreme value is the denial of all intrinsic value whatever.

It is scarcely necessary to show that the revelation in Christ was for the purpose of
building up a kingdom based on the fact of the infinite value of personality. His teaching was such as to enable us to think of our relationship to God in terms that are personal rather than mechanical. It may be admitted that this conception was partially expressed in Judaism, with these characteristic differences, that, up to the time of Jeremiah it took the form of a relationship in which the unit was the nation and not the individual, and, in general, it was set forth in a legalistic form rather than in the tender and intimate way in which Jesus unfolded it. Jesus taught us to call God by that most august and yet most intimate of all names, Our Father in Heaven, and that not even the barriers of Sin could keep man back from the fellowship which the word "Father" implies, inasmuch as these were broken down by the free forgiveness offered by God in Himself. In so far as Judaism was the religion of the Torah and Islam that of the Koran, they are both lacking in this conception of free uninterrupted fellowship with God. The religion of Jesus is that of spiritual freedom in which alone the supreme value may be realised. Central to His teaching, there is the thought of God as forgiving redemptive Love, and Love is the highest attribute of personality. Judaism never rose to that conception of God as the fount of universal, unmerited
Grace and forgiving Love which found expression in the teaching of Jesus. He lifted finite values on to an infinite plane, and gave to that which was simply human a Divine significance.

The conception of the Fatherhood of God had for its correlate that of the Brotherhood of Man. Here the social aspect of personality appears. In Him men not only found the way to Peace with God, but the ideal of all human relationships. The recognition of the infinite value of personality is the only bond of social life, the universal truth in which mankind may discover its unity. With the recognition of that principle, each man becomes an end in himself and not the tool of an ecclesiastical system or of the State. Individuality and Sociality find their common ground in personality, and the teaching of Jesus is the reconciliation of these two, which are often thought to be mutually exclusive.

His revelation was that of redemption from this world, and yet it redeemed men from the world to send them back into the world to find in that which had hitherto been a drag and a snare, the means for the development which was implicit in such redemption. The infinite value of personality presumed immortality, but the life beyond was not viewed as a substitute for the life that now is, but rather as its ideal and inspiration.
As final revelation, it was made not merely in a word but in a life. The full significance of this will appear in the next section, but at this point it is necessary to point out that He came not to speak of redemption but to redeem. He spake that which He was. It is not merely by meditating on Christ's teaching that mankind finds its ideal and inward peace, but through personal fellowship with Him. His words are but an introduction to His Personality, to a communion with One whose significance for us is inexhaustible, who had many more things to say to mankind than could be said in the days when He sojourned amongst us as Incarnate Son of God. His Death meant the laying down of a life which expressed the Divine potentiality of the human, that, through His sacrifice, a Universal Kingdom based on the infinite value of personality might be reared. His resurrection was not, as some have said, the proof of the Divine "conservation of value", but rather God's pledge that the personal value realised in Christ was meant to be realised in all human lives.

As we have already pointed out, Christ's Personality is infinitely more than the revelation of it which we get in the New Testament. Every personality is greater than his biography, and the New Testament cannot even claim to be a biography of Christ, but
is rather in the nature of MEMORABILIA. Christ's Personality finds expression in the unity of believers, which is His body. The Christian Centuries therefore must bear their witness to Christ as the creative source of full, free, rich personality. History will, we think, bear us out when we say that no influence has been so great for the enrichment of personality on all sides as His.

It is on this ground that Christ realises in Himself and is creative of this highest of all possible values, that we claim finality for Him. Finality is not a metaphysical abstraction but a value. As shown in the previous section, to say that it is a value is not the same thing as affirming that it is subjective. The question is not one of subjective and objective, but of Truth. So far as we can judge, all intrinsic value was realised in Him, and through Him there has come the inspiration and guidance by which the infinite value of personality is being achieved. Therefore since we can conceive of nothing higher than personality, we affirm Christ as the final revelation, in whom all others find their consummation and their crown, the creative nucleus from Whom there comes the inspiration and direction which lead mankind to richer and fuller forms of personality.

It may be asked as to what right
we have to assume that personality will always and under all circumstances be the Highest Value. The objection may be made that our argument is too geocentric. Can we not picture other worlds than ours in which different conditions prevail? Or can we not picture a disruption of this world and the emergence of new conditions in which values will be fundamentally changed. As regards the latter form of the argument, we can but answer that it plunges us into the realm of sheer unbridled imagination. We only affirm the finality of Christ for the Universe that we know. As to how Christ could be final for all the fantasies which the imagination of man pleases to conjure up, we cannot say. As regards the former point of view we have to confess that the geocentric form of language is that which alone is known to us; but we may infer from our own experience that if there are other inhabited worlds than this, the Word which was manifested to us in the Son of God as Love, will be manifested to them in a way in which they can realise that they are not outside God's providence and redemption. We cannot argue, however, to the unknown. Our concern is with God's relation to those whom we know as persons, and to go beyond that is to pass into the realm of guesswork.

It appears to us, that those who think it to be possible to erect a logically-correct proof of the finality of the revelation in Christ, of a metaphysical
kind, which will establish it on its own basis and apart from all its complex relationships, are pursuing a quest similar to that of those who imagined that there was such an object as a thing-in-itself. We admit that in the method followed out by us, we have relied on a faith, namely, that values are an element of Reality, and that though values change, yet value as the expression of that which is of intrinsic worth to a person abides. A faith in Value is no more irrational than a faith in Reason. In both cases, at the last, our finitude brings us to the position where we have to make a choice, and all that we need concern ourselves about is that the faith we choose should not involve the conception of a fundamental dualism in the nature of Ultimate Reality.

When the finality of Christ is expressed, as we have sought to do, in terms of personality, room is allowed for our apprehension of it as a growing experience, that is to say, for progress and development. There is much to be said for the view that the "final" regarded as the "complete" revelation can only come at the end of the series, when the Personality of God and man shall be in spiritual accord. This appears to have been the view of Paul when he wrote: "And when all things have been subjected unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subjected unto Him, that God may be
all in all " (I.Cor.15/28.) But we have dealt with
finality as something other than completeness, as the
determinate of revelation, in whose light the age-long
course of revelation finds meaning, and as the goal
to which the process moves; its progress never having
been beyond Christ and, so far as we can judge, not
likely to be so. He is the great synthesis in whom the
antitheses of experience are harmonised, and the nature of
man's personality is such that he can imagine no ideal
which is not met in Him, and realised through Him.
(1) Balfour. "Foundations of Belief". (Esp Ch V.) Longman. 1895.

(2) A.C. Bouquet. "Is Christianity the Final Religion?". (Esp Ch V.) Macmillan. 1921.


(6) - Gore - "Lux Mundi". John Murray. 1904.


(10) "Revelation & Relativity". Hibbert Journal. XXI, I & XXI, 3.


Section. 9. REVELATION THROUGH INCARNATION.

Our consideration of the finality of the revelation in Christ naturally leads on to a study of the mode in which that revelation was made, namely, the Incarnation. The culmination of the process of self-manifestation on the part of God is expressed very finely by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews: "God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken to us in a Son, whom He appointed heir of all things, through whom also He made the worlds".

The word "Son" suggests a spiritual nature so united to God as to be a full expression of what He is to man. The final self-manifestation of God must, in some sense, be not a message, but His own advent in the form in which we could understand and appreciate. The nature of the Incarnation raises grave problems, many of which are beyond our power to solve, and reverent minds may be inclined to urge us to descend from such high realms of speculative thought, and to content ourselves with the fact alone. That, however, is not possible, inasmuch as a fact includes a meaning, there is no such thing as a bare fact, and the whole process of revelation becomes meaningless, unless we can view it as a unity of which this was the goal. Admitting that Faith
Our consideration of the finality of the revelation in Christ naturally leads on to a study of the mode in which that revelation was made, namely, the Incarnation. The culmination of the process of self-manifestation on the part of God is expressed very finely by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews: "God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken to us in a Son, whom He appointed heir of all things, through whom also He made the worlds". The word "Son" suggests a spiritual nature so united to God as to be a full expression of what He is to man. The final self-manifestation of God must, in some sense, be not a message, but His own advent in the form in which we could understand and appreciate. The nature of the Incarnation raises grave problems, many of which are beyond our power to solve, and reverent minds may be inclined to urge us to descend from such high realms of speculative thought, and to content ourselves with the fact alone. That, however, is not possible, inasmuch as a fact includes a meaning, there is no such thing as a bare fact, and the whole process of revelation becomes meaningless, unless we can view it as a unity of which this was the goal. Admitting that Faith
transcends Reason in the sense that our belief is always a bigger thing than we can give reasons for, and that the full significance of the most stupendous fact in history is not within our reach, yet it must also be granted that if the Incarnation were to contradict Reason, then, in loyalty to Truth we could no longer give to it a place in revelation.

Let us begin with the recognition of the fact that Christian Faith has always given to Jesus the position of "Incarnate Son of God". It is better to express it thus than to speak of Him as Incarnate God. The Father did not become Incarnate, nor the Holy Spirit, but the Son. In preserving the unity of the Godhead, we shall do well not to be unmindful of its distinctions. It must be obvious that there was in the Godhead that which could not find expression in Incarnation, as for example, Omnipotence, Omnipresence, and Omniscience. The nature of the Incarnation is such that it involves, in some way, the idea of a KENOSIS, and it must be apparent that the Godhead could not, in the absolute sense, accomplish that KENOSIS without incurring the risk that His purpose might be frustrated, and the World be left without a Deity and therefore without Hope.

But what was not possible to the Godhead as a whole might be possible to the Second Person in
it, that is, to Him in whom the Godhead realises its objectivity. It will be admitted that in respect to this question, we are moving in a realm crowded with difficulties, and that the language we use can, at the best, only be regarded as symbolic, yet to express the matter as we have done tends to make reasonable that, which, in its infinite depth, must ever be mystery and elude the full grasp of the finite mind. The Son of God, in becoming man, surrendered what might be called the external attributes of Omnipotence, Omnipresence, and Omniscience, that He might, under the limiting conditions of human nature, realise the internal attributes of Holiness and Love. It is for these reasons, that it seems to us that we do wisely to avoid speaking of God Incarnate, and to express the fact as being that of the Incarnation of the Son or the Word.

In the pages of the New Testament, Jesus is consistently set forth as the Incarnate Son of God. This truth is expressed in various forms, but is explicit throughout, being a characteristic of the Synoptic Gospels as of the Johannine, permeating all the Epistles, and finding emphatic enunciation in the Acts of the Apostles and in Revelation. It is not our purpose to sustain this argument in detail, inasmuch as the task has been done so well by many eminent scholars, as for
example: R.L. Ottley. ("The Doctrine of the Incarnation" pp 65-151.). All that we propose to do is to summarise the facts which point to Jesus as being Incarnate Son of God.

First of all, there is the witness of His self-consciousness as we can elicit it from the Gospels. The records reveal Him as One who was conscious of standing in a unique relationship to God. The question as to whether that uniqueness was in kind or degree is an idle and unprofitable one, the discussion of which usually ends in barren logomachies. The essential fact is His consciousness of this unique relationship. It appears in the authority with which He challenged existing standards and institutions (Matt 5/17-48); in the fact that He used, or accepted the use by others, of Messianic titles which seem to bear this significance, such as Son of God, Son of Man, Christ; in that He claimed the power to forgive sins; and in perhaps what is most significant of all, His sunlit sureness of God. Whilst His life and words revealed the sinfulness of sin in a way that no other has done, and whilst He taught His disciples to pray for forgiveness, yet, so far as we can judge, there was absent from His own life any consciousness of imperfection or sin. The only passage in the Gospels which bears even a suggestion of imperfection -
"Why callest thou me good, none is good save One, God" - (Luke 18/19), is certainly a very precarious foundation on which to erect a denial of His moral perfection, and all the more so, inasmuch as it is capable of being interpreted in a way which by no means carries this implication. When the Gospels have been sifted by the process of historical criticism, and all allowance has been made for the disturbing element of hero-worship in the mind of the writers, there still remains for us the figure of One who embodies the essentials of a life that is higher than any we have known, who actualised what in us is potential, and realised on the stage of history that which for us never gets beyond aspiration and endeavour.

The witness of His followers is equally emphatic. Their estimate of Him implies the Incarnation. They call Him "Lord", they link His name with that of God, and in His name they pray. Nothing is more significant than this, that whilst the ethical teaching of Jesus was so great and beautiful, yet it was not that, but rather His Death and Resurrection which they stressed. Central in their propaganda was the preaching of Him; they were not content to enunciate afresh ideas which they had received from Him, but bent all their efforts to the winning of those who should pledge their lives in
personal loyalty to Him.

Nor can we ignore the witness of History. The Church, through all the ages, has put the emphasis not on the ethical teaching of Jesus, but on the necessity of acknowledging His claim upon our lives. The Christian faith has claimed that what was to the Jew a pious hope has been actualised in the person of Jesus. Especially important in its bearing upon this question was the substitution of the Lord's Day for the Jewish Sabbath. To ignore the Person of Jesus, and seek to confine Christianity to the Sermon on the Mount, as is so often proposed, would only be possible by blinding ourselves to all that was most vital in the preaching of the early disciples and in the history of the Christian Church. Right at the heart of our faith is the conviction that, in some sense, Jesus was Incarnate Son of God, not merely a man who lifted himself to the highest moral achievement of the human race, not merely a teacher whose spiritual insight placed Him at the head of all others, but One who was sent, whose mission it was to reveal to mankind the very heart of God, the inmost essence of His being.

To this statement of the position certain objections may be made. We pass by those which are directed against the Virgin Birth, for the reason
that we do not consider that the doctrine of the Incarnation would be endangered, if the Virgin Birth were excluded from its consideration. It cannot be regarded as the proof of the Incarnation, for its own credibility depends to a large extent on our acknowledgement of the fact of the Incarnation.

It may be urged, however, that the Incarnation involves a miracle of so stupendous a character as to make it A PRIORI incredible. To this we may answer, that the facts of the life of Jesus, however interpreted, involve a stupendous miracle, and that if everything which involves miracle has to be given up, a great many things besides the Incarnation will have to be surrendered. We should do well to ask if the miracle involved is out of proportion to the task that it was designed to accomplish, namely, the breaking down of the barriers of Sin, which stand in the way of man's perfect fellowship with God. Further, if revelation be defined in the way that we are seeking to do, in terms of personality, does not the fact of miracle become antecedently probable, by reason of the fact that personality is the realm of self-determined action. The miracle of the Incarnation does not seem on the face of it to be more miraculous than the emergence of life in the world of matter.

A further objection to the Incarnation
is that which is based on the facts which the twin sciences of Anthropology and Comparative Religion have brought to light. It may take one of two forms. (a) It may be asserted that in other religions than Christianity there are ideas which approximate to the idea of the Incarnation, or (b) that the expectation of an Incarnation is well-nigh universal, and that it is not difficult to see how the early Christians came to put forward the idea that it was fulfilled in the person of their religious leader. Our reply to the first form of the objection is, that the supposed parallels, such as those derived from the Greek Mythologies and the Ancient Religions of India, are so palpably dissimilar to that free, ethical, redemptive act of God which found expression in the coming of Jesus, that it is a misnomer to call them parallels. With respect to the second form of the argument, does it follow that because there was a general expectation, there could be no historic fact which should fulfil it? On the contrary, it would appear from a study of history that God's revelations have come to those whose minds had been prepared by anticipation to receive them. Let it be granted that the general expectation creates the necessity for a very careful study of the historic accounts, yet it cannot be said to constitute an insuperable A PRIORI objection. It has been finely said that the Incarnation
was God's answer to the prayer of the ages, (Illingworth in "Lux Mundi"). There is one aspect of it which prevents us from affirming that the expectation created the fact, namely, that the latter so transcends the former in its moral grandeur and spiritual majesty.

We proceed as before to interpret the supreme act of God's self-manifestation on the plane of history, in terms of personality. One of the chief obstacles to a reasonable and consistent statement of the doctrine of the Incarnation has been that we have been obsessed with the terms of a metaphysic which inadequately interpret the facts as they present themselves to the modern mind. We are thinking of such terms as OUSIA or Substance, Person, Nature. Their persistence is largely to be accounted for in that they had a place in the historic creeds of Christendom. The question as to the position which must be assigned to the creeds in their relation to the great essentials is one on which there is considerable divergence of opinion, but it would be generally conceded that, viewing the matter from the historical point of view, they appear to circumscribe certain tracts of truth, rather than to express the fulness of the Christian message. They stand out as the landmarks of certainties which, in our time, may be better expressed in other terms. If it were not so, the
freedom of one age would become the task-master of its successor. This much needs to be said in justification of the attempt to restate the fact of the Incarnation in terms which find no place in the historic creeds and whose significance represent a comparatively modern phase of thought.

First of all it must be noted that the Incarnation is not an isolated fact, unrelated to the revelation which had preceded it and also to that which follows. All revelation is a unity, it is the progressive and consistent self-manifestation of the Divine Personality. The coming of Christ was not an after-thought of God in order to rectify a miscalculation which He had made in creating a world in which man was free, which freedom had been abused. Bishop Westcott referring to the passage "let us make man in our image, after our likeness", uses these words: "In this august declaration of God's purpose and God's work we have set before us, clear beyond controversy, the primal endowment and the final goal of humanity. We are taught that man received, received inalienably as man, a fitness for gaining through growth and discipline and continuous benediction, union with God. God's image was given to him that he might gain God's likeness. This original capacity of man was the measure of the love of God for His creature. Sin could
not increase it: nothing less than personal union with God could fulfil it. The fitness and the necessity of the Incarnation exist therefore, from the moment man was made." (Christus Consummator". p 104.). Apart altogether from sin, the union of the human race with God is involved in the idea of the perfection of the world. Christ is the creative Word through whom the Worlds were made and the historical act of Incarnation is a clearly marked area in the redemptive purpose of God. In Creation God was revealing Himself and the Redemption wrought through Christ was but a fulfilment of the promise of the revelation made in and through the Universe.

It follows therefore that the revelation in Christ is not the denial of Natural Revelation , if we may use a term which has singularly unfortunate associations, and which is a self-contradiction if employed as the antithesis of the Supernatural. The fact that the World in which we live has the power to awaken in our minds thoughts of One who stands above it as Creator, Administrator, or Moral Governor cannot be denied. Nature is more than a mirror which reflects back to man his own highest thoughts, it speaks of Another. Man's first gropings after the Infinite were undoubtedly prompted by the character of the world in which he found himself, with its marvellous powers of awakening
curiosity, wonder, fear, awe, and reverence. To say that Nature provoked the yearnings and aspirations which Christ alone can satisfy may be granted, but this must not be taken to mean that Nature is limited to stimulating the desire for revelation. On the contrary, a study of Primitive Religion tends to show that Nature, though in imperfect measure, revealed the Being who could meet man's religious gropings.

Nature, however, is inert, God is Spirit, and we are tempted to ask in what sense that which is so utterly dissimilar can become a self-manifestation of Deity. We might seek to escape this difficulty by postulating some form of Mentalism, Pan-psychism, or Idealism. The first of these may be illustrated by Lotze. (See "Microcosmus". Eng Tr. Especially Bks III-V and Book IX. Chs I-3). He treats things as having minds through which they possess a consciousness of their own being. He appears to have taken this line in order to substantiate the position that things were something for themselves (Vol II. pp 642-658). This is necessary inasmuch as, though we must recognise the activity of the mind in perception, yet to deny that there is anything other than the mind's activity would result in universal scepticism. But it is possible to affirm that there is something other than the mind's activity without having recourse to Lotze's theory (See pp 83-85).
The next step for Lotze to take was obviously that of developing the idea of a spiritual unity, along the line of Idealism. He was prevented from doing that, however, inasmuch as he held that consciousness centres in feeling, and that the consciousness belonging to one soul excludes from itself the consciousness belonging to another. Though postulating the "minds of things" he would not admit the "souls of things". Again and again he tries to erect a bridge between matter and spirit, as for example, when he sets forth the idea of mediation by means of IMPRESSIONS (Microcosmus. Bk II. Ch 3.), but he fails to do this, and leaves us with two worlds unrelated, a material world on the one side, in which no soul nor spirituality enters, and on the other side, a kingdom of souls, into which nothing of the reality of the material world can enter. Lotze failed because he sought to endow matter with properties which, obviously, it does not possess. He was led to do this through his conception of the material and the spiritual as being separate, the former being, as it were a layer on the top of the other. If one may use Prof. Morgan's word, he did not take into account the NISUS which unifies all the various grades of being. The objection which we have urged against Lotze's Mentalism applies equally to all forms of Pan-psychism. Nor is Idealism the way out of the
difficulty by which we are faced. It labours under the disadvantage of seeking to express by a common denominator things which are essentially different.

We therefore reject these theories and proceed on the basis that Man is organic to Nature, that is to say, Nature is nothing apart from the Self and the Self is nothing apart from Nature. As Emerson put it, "A man is a centre for nature, running out threads of relation through every thing, fluid and solid, material and elemental" ("Uses of Great Men"); Nature cannot be adequately studied apart from its inter-relations with personality. The scientist may imagine that his view of Nature is the truest, inasmuch as he has eliminated from his method all personal considerations, but what he really means by "personal considerations" would be better expressed by the word "prejudices". He may approach Nature with an open mind, but if he approached it with an empty mind, he could not discover its meaning. The scientific view of the world is not therefore as impersonal as at first sight it appears to be. Similarly with the aesthetic and moral view. Here the personal element is more pronounced, for both deal with values, and these have only significance for persons. It is because of this inter-relationship between Nature and Personality that
the former may become a revelation of God.

The antithesis between Nature and Spirit is due to our treating an abstraction from experience as though it were the whole. The concept of disembodied Spirit is not germane to Christian thinking. Paul, speaking of the change which occurs at death has no use for it; *he* says: "He giveth it a body as it pleased Him". It is really a legacy from Greek thought, being found both in Plato and Aristotle, their view of the Ultimate Reality being that it was Spirit as contrasted with the world of Matter (Hyle). Unless we can eliminate the idea that Matter and Spirit are antitheses, the idea of a revelation in Nature will have to be surrendered. Surely, however, Matter is not alien to Spirit, but that through which the latter expresses itself. It may be hostile to our immediate purposes, but even then, it is that in conflict with which we make our souls. The idea that Matter limits Spirit is only true within a restricted area, and the highest Personality would be one in whom the former was so subordinate to the latter as to be its perfect expression. We must be careful not to think of God as a mere artificer, and yet there is a sense in which we may say that just as every great picture and every exquisite song enshrines something of the personality of the artist and the musician, so the world of Nature has in it the
mark of the Personality of God.

The Incarnation is the supreme example of how Spirit and Matter are harmonised in personality. The difference between the revelation in Nature and that in Christ is not that the former is impersonal and the latter personal, but that the latter was made in the form in which the deepest intimacies alone can be expressed, in One who was fashioned in the likeness of man. As such, it was the consummation and interpretation of all that went before. Revelation is progressive in its nature, but this can best be expressed not as though it were layer added on layer, but as operating in similar fashion to the growth of spiritual life in an individual, where the new factors do not necessarily cancel the old, but take up and transfigure all that is of worth in them. The revelation in Nature is not cancelled but fulfilled by that which came in Christ. "The Christian revelation is not something which stands apart from nature, history, and the religious experience, complete in itself. It is something which realises itself through them, and whose full meaning becomes apparent only through the progressive apprehension in which they are determining factors" ("Christian Theology in Outline". W.Adams Brown. p 50.).

The Revelation in Christ imparts a
new significance to that which was given in Nature. More than that, it brings into play a new factor. We may express it thus: what the dawn of life was in the inanimate world, the coming of Christ was in the sphere of revelation. Let it be granted that the Incarnation was implicit in the first whisper that Nature breathed to man of a Divine Being away beyond himself, even as life was implicit in the matter in which it emerged, yet the emergence marks a new and distinctive era, and throws a flood of light on all that went before and opens out infinite possibilities for all that follows. The view which is here put forward is very different from that which was held by the Deists, namely, that revelation could only be a republication of the Laws of Nature. The revelation in Christ is the emergence of a new element, which enlarges and transfigures that which Nature gives, and which adds to it something new and of infinite worth.

The method which we are pursuing disposes of one of the stock arguments used for the purpose of denying the possibility of revelation, namely, that it contradicts the Uniformity of Nature. On our basis the Uniformity of Nature itself becomes a revelation of the consistency of God. But this uniformity must not be interpreted as though Nature were a self-enclosed order unrelated to personality. The latter rises above Nature and yet
is continuous with it. Any attempt therefore to treat Nature as a static entity whose meaning lies in itself, is inadequate, inasmuch as it ignores the possibilities inherent in Nature, and its fundamental inter-relatedness to personality. Nature is the groundwork of an immortal achievement and its full explanation is found not merely in the atoms which constitute it and the Laws which express the general characteristics of its operations but also in the coming of the Son of God in the form of man.

We now pass to a consideration of the revelation which came through Incarnation in its relation to the prior self-manifestation of God in History. There is a sense in which we can speak of all history as being a revelation of God. Whilst the revelation that came through the Jewish Race was the main stream which led unto Christ, yet we do well to recognise that many tributaries contributed to it. The exploration of our problem is, however, best carried out by keeping to the former. In Israel we see a Race chosen, disciplined, moulded by God to manifest His Holiness and Love to the World, and that from its loins, as it were, there should come the One who was to fully express to humanity the Divine Nature. If it be asked as to why Israel was chosen in preference to any other nation, our reply must be that ultimately the answer
lies hid in the inscrutable mysteries of God. Any suggestion of favouritism, however, disappears when we remember that the choice was not for privilege but for service.

Amongst the vicissitudes by which she was prepared for her great task, two are outstanding, namely, the sojourn in Egypt and the exile in Babylon. The work of archaeologists of the present century has unearthed records which throw considerable light upon those far-off periods and enable us to see some of those influences which contributed in no small measure to the evolution of the Religion of Israel. But no study of the historical conditions under which the process was wrought out can satisfactorily account for the appearance of the ethical monotheism which was the nation's distinctive contribution to humanity. It is in the personality of her Lawgivers, Priests, Judges and Prophets, pre-eminently in the last, that the explanation lies. It was not history, but what they discovered of God in History, that made Israel great. They themselves felt that the revelation which was theirs was no self-discovery, that it was the uncovering through them to the world of the great Divine purpose, and so far as we can judge, we should affirm that they did not err in postulating God as the source of their
message. This seems to be borne out by the fact that their message had meaning, not only for their own age, but for all the ages which have followed.

It is a mistaken notion, however, to think of the revelation as being conveyed mechanically, as water through a pipe, nor was it merely as a river which took on the colour of the bed over which it flowed. They were not mere clairvoyants. Such conceptions do less than justice to the personality of the great leaders of Israel. They were not mere instruments of revelation but participators in it. It was the issue of their free and ethically-conditioned fellowship with God, in which, in a measure, they were identified with His Holiness and Love. Thus, whilst their message was wholly theirs, it was also His. If such be the nature of revelation, it follows that it will vary in quality and intensity with the human capacity for fellowship with the Divine. The limitation of revelation was theirs and not God's. It was only His in so far as in His wisdom there lies the inexplicable mystery of Love which willed a world that should be united to Him of its own will and not through compulsion. The full revelation of God could only be made through One whose personality was in essential accord with Himself, in whom the spiritual personality which was potential in man was realised.
The revelation made to the prophets was not for their own personal advantage, but for the Society in which they moved. It was limited therefore not only by their capacities, but by the conditions of those for whom it was intended. This principle appears to us to hold not only of the revelation which came through the prophets but also of that which came in Christ, and for that reason we rejected the idea that the Christ, as limited to the New Testament, could be the final revelation, which must be that of the Christ of the Gospels interpreted to humanity by the Holy Spirit.

Here we may use Lessing's metaphor and point out how the teacher is limited at every stage by the capacities of the pupil. The alternative to this theory of a progressive revelation, dependent in some measure upon our capacities, is that of a mechanical kind, which would come to us bearing on it the undoubted signature of God, but in that case man's freedom would disappear, and the very end for which revelation was given, namely to bring man into freely conditioned fellowship with God would have been sacrificed.

We have already had occasion to note the progress made in Israel's religion (see pp 73-76), but before we pass on to study certain characteristics of the Incarnation which are relevant to the object we
have in view, we must take cogniscance of the fact that, running right through its Literature, there is what we might call the spirit of expectation, the Old Testament being not only the record of a revelation, but also of the yearnings and aspirations for a fuller revelation. It is beyond our scope to enter into the details of the Messianic hope, which is characteristic of Jewish thought from the early days of the monarchy right down to the time of Christ's coming, which assumed many forms varying from the basest and most materialistic longings for a national deliverer to the most sacrificial and intense yearnings for an ethical salvation; at one time being limited to the mere desire for a king of Davidic descent, and at other times reaching out after the advent of God Himself into the world. These hopes and anticipations are woven into the Old Testament writings in a remarkable way; they were the prayer of the ages, to which the coming of Jesus was the answer, though the answer infinitely transcended the prayer.

Our concern is not to expound the theology of the Incarnation, but rather to see the place which it holds as revelation, and to note how when restated in the terms of modern conceptions of personality, many of its problems and difficulties may be met.
In connection with the great historic fact which lies at the heart of our Christian Faith, there are three problems which recur again and again. The first has reference to the nature of the Godhead, the second to the relation of the Divine and Human in Jesus, and the third has to do with the fact that in His incarnate life there is evidence of real growth and development. A Philosophy of the Incarnation lies beyond our scope, but we believe that the trend of much present-day thought tends to relieve the great antinomies which gather round this subject.

(A) Let us first seek to discover what the nature of the Godhead must be to permit of the possibility of the Incarnation. The final formulation of the Nicene theology rested on the basis of the symbol \( \delta \mu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron 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4th Century onwards, are now singularly inept to express that which they were designed to conserve. We cannot rest content to state our problem in words whose meaning oscillates between abstract "substance" and concrete "individual being", between "person" and "attribute". The problem urgently demands a restatement which shall be based not on such ambiguous and somewhat impersonal terms as $\omega \tau \iota \alpha$ and $\iota \pi \circ \tau \alpha \iota \varsigma$ but upon some fairly well-defined term which tends to bring out clearly the personal nature of the relations involved. It will not be denied that much work has still to be done in the way of defining the concept "personality", but we would contend that even now it is sufficiently clear to be of some service in elucidating our problem.

We have seen that personality is essentially social in its nature (See pp 120 f.), that whilst it has for its centre, to use the term of Boethius, an "INDIVIDUA SUBSTANTIA", yet it is infinite in the potentiality of its outreaches. This social character of personality may be illustrated by the fact that in Jurisprudence, an incorporated society such as a Trade Union is treated as a unity and designated a "person" in respect to its legal standing. It will be granted that there is a real difference between the personality of a society and that of an individual, but that the term is thus used
is a significant recognition of its social characteristics.

Can we think of the Godhead as a society of which Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are component members? It appears to us to be fraught with danger to use the term unguardedly, not the least of which is that it tends to turn the doctrine of the Trinity into Tritheism. There is however an intimate society which, in its IDEAL SIGNIFICANCE, tends to help us in conceiving of a unity which is perfect and yet which preserves the personality of each of its components, without blending, but as being One in Love - we refer to the ideal expressed in Marriage. We are speaking of it, not with respect to its physical or actual realisation, but purely as an ideal, which, if realised, would express a personality including and yet transcending all difference, literally one and yet each component part having its distinct function. We admit the imperfections of the analogy, which are largely to be set down to the material aspects of such a union, but if we can get our minds clear of these associations, is there not something in it which gives us, as it were, a glimpse of the relationship existing between the Father and the Son? Do not the words of Jesus such as "no one cometh unto the Father but by Me", "I am in the Father and the Father in Me", begin to glow with meaning when thus interpreted?
There is always a danger of Erotism creeping in when these analogies are employed and Mysticism has often erred in this respect, especially in defining not the relations of the Father and Son, but those of Christ and the believer, and yet we suggest that the Mystics were right in interpreting the deepest of spiritual truths along the line, which alone can suggest, even though it be through a very imperfect analogy, the unity which transcends without cancelling all difference.

If the nature of the Godhead be thus conceived in terms that are personal, the unity of revelation will be found in the "Word" or "Son", manifested in Creation, in Providence, in History, and in the life and message of great creative personalities such as the prophets, and finally allying Himself with the form which constituted the Crown of His Creation, Humanity, that without destroying its essential nature as free personality, He might bring to perfection that which His Love had created. We speak in finite terms of that which is Infinite, finding in things created the symbols of the Uncreated, but that is the only language that we know. To use abstractions to get us over the difficulty does not bring us any nearer to the heart of Eternal Reality. It may be that what we are seeking to express in terms which postulate Time
as Real could be better conceived as an Eternal process in the heart of the Godhead, but the attempt to accomplish this through stripping terms of all the significance which they have for us but leads to a barren abstraction, the creation of our own habits of thought, as far removed from Reality as it is possible to be, and for all practical purposes signifying no more than a confession of nescience. A comparison of the thoughts here outlined with those set forth in the monumental work of Athanasius (Ottley. Ibid. pp 344-361) will reveal some differences of emphasis; i.e. he makes the Incarnation dependent entirely on the fact of Sin whereas we find it implicit in Creation, and his statement of it is not expressed in such personal terms as we have used, yet the fundamental agreements will be found to be much greater than the differences.

When the unity of revelation is thus set forth as having its basis in the Son's creative and redemptive work, the strongest objections that can be raised against the possibility of the Incarnation tend to disappear. If, in essence, the revelation in Christ be the completion and not the antithesis of that which is given to us in Nature, Providence, History, and in the spiritual genius of great creative personalities,
then many of the arguments directed against it, which seemed to carry great weight, are seen to be ULTRA VIRES. It cannot be said that it is more difficult for the Godhead to reveal Himself through that which is likest to His Nature than through material things. As we have pointed out, it is ultimately a faith in Value, which is as worthy of trust as Reason, that gives us confidence to believe in revelation at all, but assuming that there is such a fact as revelation, there is nothing irrational in that the "Word" or "Son" should become Incarnate. The real objection probably rests on a pessimistic view of human nature and is to a large extent temperamental but surely man at his basest is infinitely above the material through which his personality is realised.

(B). Our second problem is concerned with Jesus as Divine and human. Here again we have to confess the inadequacy of finite thought to comprehend all the meaning of these great fundamentals of our Faith, and recall the words of Lord Balfour, in which he reminds us that the Incarnation is one of those mysteries "which, unless it were too vast for intellectual comprehension, would surely be too narrow for our spiritual needs" (The Foundations of Belief . p 259). And yet, if the subject is to be lifted out of sheer unintelligible mysticism, it is necessary to frame some
intellectual mould in which it shall find its most fitting expression.

The Traditional mould was that of Two Natures $\delta\upsilon\omicron\phi\upsilon\omicron\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ in One Person $\mu\iota\iota\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron\sigma\tau\alpha\omicron\varsigma$.

We have already had occasion to notice the ambiguity attached to $\rho\omicron\sigma\tau\alpha\omicron\varsigma$ and the other term $\delta\upsilon\omicron\phi\upsilon\omicron\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ suffers equally from this fault. In the discussion which led up to and was focussed in the Council at Chalcedon, (451 A.D.) and which by no means ended with the decision of that Council, this lack of well-defined terms was the root of much misunderstanding and one cannot read the history of these controversies without realising how inadequate the terms employed were to express the truth which it was sought to conserve, namely, the Divine-human significance of Our Lord, the importance of which for Christian Theology and Life cannot be over-estimated. It is our consciousness of the inadequacy of the traditional symbols which provocative us to seek a more adequate form for the expression of an essential truth.

We begin with the conception of the personality of Christ as being a unity. Personality cannot be first this and then that, first human and then Divine, for lacking the characteristic of identity, it ceases to be personality at all. Even the Logos-theory of Philo, which has so many affinities with the doctrine of the
Incarnation, suffers from this defect - the Logos hangs in mid-air, neither God nor man - and its acceptance would make any idea of a real Incarnation impossible. If Jesus is to be recognised as a personality at all, and not as a hybrid oscillating between God and man, this identity must be granted. If we could regard as being practically the equivalent of personality - we doubt very much whether this is justifiable - then so far we should be occupying the same ground as the Traditional theory.

It is the πρόσωπον that give us most difficulty. Sometimes the Two Natures were likened to the two distinct substances combined in man, namely, the material or mortal substance and the immaterial or immortal. But the simile fails for this reason, that neither soul nor body of itself constitutes a perfect nature; neither apart from the other has any meaning for personality. Weaker still is the simile which seeks to express the distinction and unity of the Two Natures by the figure of the heat of red-hot iron. It appears to us that we shall better conserve the essential truth for which the Creeds have stood by eliminating the term of controversy, confining our attention to the one and undivided Personality of the Incarnate, and noting the differentia which distinguish Him from ourselves.
The Two-Nature theory so easily develops into the idea of duplex personality.

The following quotation from Dr Denney puts the position very clearly: "The formula of two natures in one person does not adequately reproduce the impression that He makes. He is all one—that is the very strongest conviction that we have...All that is Divine in Him is human, all that is human is Divine. He is not separately, or even distinctly, Son of God and Son of Man, but the Son of man who is the Son of God" (Bampton Lectures, pp 265 ff). The nature of Jesus is best expressed, not as Divine and human, but as Divine-human. This is not to fall into the error of Philo and make Him a sort of hybrid, for in his theory, God and man were regarded as essentially diverse, whilst in ours they are treated as essentially akin. Apart from kinship between God and man, the idea of the Incarnation cannot be entertained. Dr Fairbairn had in view this thought when he wrote: "God is, as it were, the Eternal possibility of being incarnated, Man the permanent capability of Incarnation" ("Christ in Modern Theology", p 473). Receptivity for God must be the completion and not the contradiction of human personality. Jesus must be perfect man in being Son of God. All this fits in with that which we have had occasion to stress, namely,
that personality is never merely human, that by its "IDEALITY" it is potentially infinite. (See pp 131 ff).

There is a sense in which we may say that man is potentially Divine-human. Does this mean therefore that when we say that Christ as Incarnate is Divine-human, that we bring Him down, as it were, to our level? Surely not, for we affirm that our potentiality is mediated through Him, and is only in process of realisation. Moreover our affirmation is limited to the INCARNATE LIFE of Our Lord, and makes no attempt to deal with His metaphysical one-ness with God as UNCREATED. We are simply concerned here with the nature of Him who took our flesh, and we affirm that He was Divine-human, realising in an actual life the ideal and potency of man. We have already pointed out that the Incarnation implies a KENOSIS of some kind, but our conception of this KENOSIS would be that it is not limited to the Incarnation but is involved in the whole process of revelation.

Our restatement of the problem along lines which imply that personality as an indivisible unity, enables us to see the inadequacy of those views of Christ which have qualified His Sonship by an adjective, as for example, those which have maintained that He was merely ETHICAL Son of God. Ethical Sonship carries with
it the implication of Sonship in the full personal sense, inasmuch as it is impossible to separate one aspect of personality from its inter-dependent factors and then ascribe reality to that alone. To do this would be to reduce it to a meaningless abstraction.

We do not contend that in the foregoing, we have elucidated the great mystery of the Incarnation, but only that we have stated it in terms which avoid many of the antinomies by which it is beset. We may admit that the idea of the kinship of God and man and the common factor in the Two Natures can be expressed without having recourse to the conception of personality which we have employed. Irenaeus, in an age which knew nothing of these conceptions of the unitary nature of personality and its characteristic IDEALITY, held to an idea of the Incarnation which is singularly modern and not unlike that which we have been seeking to express. All that we contend for is that these conceptions of personality are most helpful in elucidating the problems connected with the affirmation of Two Natures in Christ, and preferrable to many other, as for example, that which Irenaeus himself employs: "A mixture...without confusion" ( "Adv Haer. IV. 20, 4.)

(C) So far, we have been concerned to set forth revelation as a process, analagous in some
respects to that of Evolution, operative in Creation, and finding its climax in the taking of our flesh by the Son of God, this "final" stage of revelation being involved, as it were, in every stage of the process. It must be obvious that revelation through incarnation could not have been made until human nature had reached a standard which was sufficient to make such effective to accomplish the Divine purpose. But we are now to emphasise that the Incarnation itself is set forth in terms which imply growth and development in the personal life of Jesus.

In saying this, we are undoubtedly in line with the portraiture of Jesus which is to be found in the New Testament. He is there depicted as One who grew in wisdom and stature, in favour with God and man, who was tempted on all points like as we are, who was made perfect through suffering; there were things apparently concerning which He could not speak with authority such as the time for the day of judgment, and there are occasions on which He manifests real surprise. On the other hand we frankly recognise His wonderful gift of prevision (Mark 9/31. 10/30.F.), His deep insight into the inner lives and possibilities of those amongst whom He moved, and the amazing clarity of His moral consciousness. It is the former class of facts, however,
that constitute our great difficulty, inasmuch as they imply development and growth in Jesus, which apparently seem to be inconsistent with our faith that from the first He was the Incarnate Son of God. The theory that His growth was merely EXHIBITIVE will not hold. When Cyril of Alexandria says that Our Lord PRETENDS not to know the day of judgment (Vide. "The Doctrine of the Incarnation". Ottley. p 620), both our head and our heart repudiate such a suggestion. A pretence of that kind would have made Jesus not the revealer but the concealer, and would have been so utterly unlike Him that we have no hesitation in declining to seek to escape from our problem in this way. Our position is rather that taken by Bishop Weston: "as God self-conscious in manhood, He is not at birth perfect in the sense of complete attainment; but only in the popular sense of being free from sin and from the lack of anything necessary to Him at the stage of life in which He was" (Vide. "The Person of Christ". Mackintosh. p 493). If the Incarnation is to be real, the human personality of Jesus must be real, and human personality implies growth, the realising of value through conflict with existence, the translating of potentiality into actuality. There is thus a sense in which we can speak of Him as becoming the Incarnate Son of God. Personality
grows by experience, and the personality of the Christ nailed to the Cross must have been different in some ways from that of the babe in the manger. It is not possible to assume that such vital experiences as the Baptism, the Transfiguration, and Gethsemane had left no mark upon His personality. Putting the matter from another angle, we may say that if Christ is to satisfy the demands of the religious spirit, His life must be an achievement and not an exhibition. On the other hand, if it be only an achievement, then it is not the revelation of the Infinite Love of God, but rather of the heights to which human nature can reach. This is the antinomy by which we are beset. The older way of approaching the problem, i.e. in terms of SUBSTANCE, leads us to a cul-de-sac, and it is only by keeping constantly before us the essentially personal character of the relations which we are seeking to comprehend, that we can hope to grasp in some measure that which, in its fulness, must ever be beyond us.

In "The Person of Christ", Professor Mackintosh has set forth four positions which may be taken as implicit in the completely Christian view of Jesus (pp 469. (In what follows I am largely indebted to this work, but my position differs somewhat in detail from his, and I do not know that he works out the idea of
Identity and Difference as being implicit in personality).

(1) Christ is now Divine, as being the object of faith and worship.

(2) In some personal sense, His Divinity is eternal, not the fruit of time.

(3) His life on earth was unequivocally human.

(4) The unity of His personal life is axiomatic.

It is impossible to maintain these four positions without implying a theory of KANOSIS. They can only be regarded as self-consistent by the thought that He who was rich, for our sakes, became poor. If such self-limitation seems incomprehensible, we are reminded that it is not without analogies, more or less complete, in human life. "We are constantly limiting our actually present knowledge without altering our personal identity" (Ibid. p 474). The richest human personality is that which possesses this power of self-limitation in the highest degree. The fact therefore that there is no perfect human analogy to the Divine limitation in the Incarnation is due, if we may use Lotze's phrase, to the fact that in us personality is not complete, that it is but a weak imitation of the full personality which is to be found in God.

The real objection to the idea of the self-limitation of God is often, at bottom, nothing more than a protest against the static and mechanical forms in which it has been set forth. For example, it has
been portrayed as the abandonment by the Godhead of certain attributes, whilst others are retained. From the modern psychological point of view, this is absurd. Attributes are an essential part of personality, and we cannot cleave personality in two without destroying the whole. The KENOSIS cannot mean the shedding of attributes, but rather their transfiguration through Love. Modern psychology suggests a very pertinent illustration in its theory of the sublimation of instincts, as for example, the instinct for motherhood which, unable to find honourable expression, is sublimated and becomes the passion to nurse and heal the sick and afflicted. Again, one has to admit the imperfection of the analogy, but does it not in some measure enable us to see that personality is not the static and immoveable thing which some have conceived it to be, that it possesses infinite possibilities for experiment and adventure, possibilities all the more numerous as the personality is of the highest type, and one is entitled to ask as to how we can deny to God that which is implicit in our own personal life.

Dr Mackintosh develops the idea that as Incarnate Son of God, Jesus possessed the qualities of Godhead in the form of potency rather than full actuality, as Ἰς rather than Ἰς (Ibid. p 477). On our theory that personality in God
is similar to that in man, save that it is originative, and that what we are seeking to become, He is, this theory of Dr Mackintosh would allow for a perfect human development in the life of Jesus.

But then we have not as yet solved our antinomy, how that which was human achievement could be the revelation of the Infinite Love of God. It seems to me that we are greatly helped in facing this by a study of personality as involving identity and difference. Personality preserves its identity amidst change. In the stream of consciousness, past, present, and future are distinguished. Let it be admitted that the memory image varies with the growth of the person, and also, that as regards the future, the actualities will differ somewhat from the anticipations, yet through all these changes, the self persists and retains its identity. Tastes, habits, and beliefs come and go, and there may even be a radical change of character as in conversion, but amidst the changes, something persists, the subject of these variations preserves its identity. The fact of dual personality does not cut across this theory of an identity that persists in and is continuous throughout the changes. L.T.Hobhouse remarks concerning this: "But the germ of this sort of madness is in all of us. If we could carry psycho-physical research far enough,
we should presumably find an ultimate unity in which even these extreme differences come together" ("Mind in Evolution" p 339). Human personality consists of something given, which becomes ours by being worked out. We may see this in the fact that often what seems to us to be achievement is really a gift. The contention that we sustain is this, that Jesus was what He became, that the Godhead which He worked out in achievement was implicit in Him from the beginning, that the growth and development of His personality was a making explicit, through a life self-limited by human conditions, of what was already implicit, that He evolved that which was involved in His very being. In the sense of attainment, He could not be at birth that which He became through spiritual struggle and victory. This, however, must not be taken to mean that as a Babe He was not Son of God, but only that as a babe this was yet to be realised in a life which should be obedient at every point to the Will of God. It is not only in Christ but also in us that something persists despite innumerable changes. Apart from this conception of personality as inclusive of identity and difference, it is difficult to express eternally the fact that Jesus was that which He became.
In the work to which we have already referred, Professor Mackintosh argues that the Incarnation of God in Christ is remedial in aim (pp 440-443). So far as we can interpret his words, he would seem to maintain that this is its only purpose. The arguments used to support the position, however, are by no means conclusive as to this, and we could adopt most of them without in any way impairing our own view, which is, that the Incarnation, in common with all revelation, has for its object the realising of all intrinsic value. We admit that sin is the chief obstacle to the accomplishment of this end, and that it is possible to so extend the connotation of the word "sin" as to make it the sole contradiction of "value", but such a procedure leads to confusion of thought and can scarcely be justified. Moreover that can scarcely be the position taken by Dr Mackintosh inasmuch as it is the ethical aspect of sin on which he lays almost exclusive emphasis. Whilst granting that the supreme significance of the Incarnation was ethical, we should contend that as revelation it was designed to realise all aesthetic as well as all moral values. History bears us out in this by showing the incalculable influence which it has exercised in the realm of Art. Ugliness as well as sin must be abhorrent to God. Further, whilst Lessing's metaphor of "education" as
applied to revelation was misconceived, yet it contained this truth that God cannot be content with anything less than the full development of all man's potentialities. It seems to us that the phrase "the annihilation of sin" is very inadequate to express the wealth of life which was to be the issue of all revelation. To say that the aim of revelation includes more than the annihilation of sin is not "to minimise the awful gravity of sin" nor "to impair the adoring sense of adoring wonder with which forgiven men contemplate the miracle of Divine love".

A restatement of the doctrine of sin in terms that are consistent with the unitary nature of personality is sorely needed. As expressed by Hegel, sin becomes no more than the middle term of a triad which partakes of the nature of a logical necessity - innocence, sin, virtue; in Schleiermacher, it is merely a subjective consciousness, the negative of the feeling for God; whilst in Kant it is confined to Will. Dr Orchard's reconstruction (Modern Theories of Sin. pp 107-157), is not altogether satisfactory, yet it has the merit of drawing our attention to the fact that the real problem is not that of sin conceived as an abstraction but as it forms part of experience, in other words, the problem is centred in our sense of sin. The revelation
in Christ intensifies this sense of sin, and reveals the Divine forgiving love which can transfigure it, so that, as Bishop Temple says: "Both sin and the pain it brings are part of the process by which finite man learns that only in union with the infinite, and in the fellowship with all else that is finite resulting from that union, can anything good be reached" ("Mens Creatrix" p 361). In the Christ, man discovers, in no impersonal way, what he was meant to be and what he is, and at the same time the forgiving love which seeks, through sacrifice reaching down to the lowest depths, to win human hearts to a free fellowship with Himself. In Christ therefore two streams meet, the Divine light which intensifies the significance of sin and the Divine love which cancels it. One finds an interesting analogy, which must not, however be pressed too far, in the method of the psycho-analyst who brings suppressed and unconscious yearnings to the surface and then as it were drains them away.

It is difficult to see how God could deal with this sense of sin and use it for lifting man into Holy fellowship with Himself by any other mode of revelation than the Incarnation, without making man into the mere puppet of His purpose. To quote Bishop Temple once more: "The kind of power that God exerted in the
world before the birth of Christ was not enough. Not only events but hearts and wills must be ruled. So the Love was made known in an intelligible form through Life and Death, so that omnipotence should be complete, and, by the responding love called forth, the free allegiance of hearts and wills be won. By Power and by Love God would deliver us from Pride, which is the one poison of the soul, and bring us into union with Himself" (Ibid 362.f.). The very method which we have chosen to set forth the idea of revelation is the only one which makes room for the inclusion of the infinitely rich and varied content of the Incarnate life of the Son of God, in a way which makes its appeal to all that is highest and best in human nature. The attempts made to express the truth of the Incarnation in the language of the older metaphysics gave to us a picture that was singularly remote from the historic Jesus as portrayed in the New Testament. It etherealised Him in such a way as to make Him unrecognisable and so wrapped Him up in the coverlets of its own terminology that mankind failed to hear His voice. To reinterpret the facts on which Faith rests in terms of personality is to bring us once again into vital touch with the Jesus of history and experience.

Again and again, in the course of our study we have had occasion to refer to the social aspect
of personality and to its infinite outreaches. The aim of revelation, therefore, which has been defined as the realisation of all intrinsic value may be expressed in the concrete terms of religion as the Kingdom of God. How utterly inadequate the term "annihilation of sin" is to express the fulness of the aim of revelation is well brought out when we study its social implications. The yearning of man is for a vision of Divine love which can transfigure the sense of sin into the stairway to the achievement of a full and true life of fellowship with God and with all that He has made.

We are inclined to think that it is the theological bias with which the New Testament is approached that has led us to conceive of revelation as being solely the annihilation of sin. We think of such passages as "I am come that ye might have life, and have it more abundantly", or we take such parables as those of the Prodigal Son and the Lost Sheep, or that other parable of the house left empty into which the devils returned in increased numbers, and it seems to us that some bigger term than the "annihilation of sin" is required to interpret these. Moreover it seems to us an error to use terms which even bear the semblance of reducing the significance of the revealed Love to what is merely negative, and therefore better
to express the aim as being that of the realisation of all positive value.

There is one aspect of the Incarnation which is relevant to our problem and which cannot be overlooked, namely, that it made possible the advent of the Spirit. Apart from such a manifestation of God as that which appeared in the coming of His Son, it is difficult to see how man could have been made aware of the personal indwelling of that Spirit in the heart. This must not be taken to mean that the significance of the Incarnation ceased with the coming of the Spirit. What the Spirit does is to take of the things of Christ and reveal them to us. The Incarnation itself brought into being the light through which in ever-deepening measure we can explore the wonder, the majesty, and the all sufficiency of the life which took our flesh and fought our battles, and for our sakes was nailed to the Cross.

In his book "Christ in Modern Theology", Dr Fairbairn has this passage: "One of the things time has made most obvious to me is this: that of all the persons that have contributed to the shaping of the character which is destiny, the mightiest was that of an obscure man who died years before I was born. But his daughter was my mother, and the daughter so loved
and revered the father, so remembered his saying; so understood his mind, so believed in the faith that ruled and guided him, that she had no higher thought for her son than to make him such a man as her father had been. And so, invisible as he was, he became the real parent of the spirit and the character of the man who now writes this book. And if God is to become the real Father of man, and man the real son of God, then all the energies and loves and ideals of the unseen Paternity must be incarnated and organised in a visible sonship, that they may become creative of a mankind which shall realise the filial ideal. It is through the one God-man that the many become men of God. The nature that is in all men akin to Deity becomes in Christ a nature in personal union with the Deity, and the UNIO PERSONALIS which is peculiar to Him, is the basis of the UNIO MYSTICA which is possible to all" (p.475) It seems to us that only in some such way as that which Fairbairn chose, namely, by keeping strictly to the quality of the subject in hand as being that of personal relationship, can the fulness of that revelation which we have not hesitated to describe as "final" be set forth.
If the aim of revelation is that of enabling man to realise all value, then this would seem to require Immortality for its consummation. In apprehending revelation and its values, we are always conscious of a value which transcends that which we are able to appropriate. The ideal aspect of our personality is ever whispering to us of things that are yet far off, creating as it were desires and aspirations which the brevity of life and the fierceness of its struggle prevent us from reaching. The argument which we are seeking to formulate is really an extension of Kant's; he contended that man's complete good, namely, the reconciliation of virtue and happiness, entitled us to postulate faith in immortality, whereas our position goes further and affirms immortality as necessary for the realisation of all value.

The faith in Immortality is not necessarily dependent on the fact that the "time-process" as it appears to us must necessarily be the same as seen SUB SPECIE AETERNITATIS. It is quite possible that what appears to us as "time" may better be interpreted as "qualitative difference in Ultimate Reality". In memory, anticipation, and appreciation, we ourselves transcend time relations, although it is never mere transcendence, that is to say, we cannot altogether think ourselves out of them. The point that we are making,
is that any new interpretation of what appears to us to be time-process would not invalidate the postulate of Immortality as being necessary for the completion of that which is implicit in the process of revelation. Unless in some experience we can actualise the values which revelation has made clear to us, the whole thing becomes a mockery and we may even come to think of it as mere illusion.

Bosanquet (The Value and Destiny of the Individual) deals with this problem - the whole book is concerned with it, but especially chapters VIII - X), and postulates the "immortality of value" but rejects the idea of the "immortality of the individual". This is all the more surprising in view of the fact that he constantly makes use of Keats' phrase and speaks of the universe as being "the vale of soul-making". He says, in explanation of this: "Perhaps it is just in the making that souls have their value" (p.68.). But if souls are made only to be absorbed again into the soul of God, it strikes us as rather a meaningless process. It would appear to be inconsistent to maintain the immortality of value and yet to deny the immortality of persons, inasmuch as value is meaningless apart from the fact that it is value for persons, and as we have seen from our definition of personality, the "INDIVIDUA SUBSTANTIA" is essential
to the conception of it. The idea of personality embraces both the particular and the universal, and if Bosanquet's position were maintained, God would be left a subject without an object, and so far as we can judge, this cannot be differentiated from nothingness. We may reasonably ask as to why the infinite should not exist in and through the finite, and the value realised by the finite retain its character as both particular and universal. If Bosanquet's position be maintained, it follows that the criterion which we employed to define the finality of the Christian Revelation (as for example against Buddhism), namely, that of personality, was not applicable. Bosanquet, in his eagerness to exclude anything which would imperil the monistic view of things, has scarcely done justice to the fact that Eternal Value includes Eternal Individuality, that the one-ness is not a barren but an inclusive unity.

A truer monism will seek to find a unity in which the differences are reconciled and not cancelled. That which is the goal of revelation unifies value without cancelling individuality; it is not the unity of number, inasmuch as we reject Bosanquet's position that God alone is truly individual, nor is it the unity of a society or college; it is something deeper, the unity of Love, in which differences are transcended and yet
retain their unique individual quality. The ultimate unity is this, that God shares His Love with those whom He has made in His likeness.

The goal of revelation, of which, Nature, Prophecy, and our partial glimpses of the revelation in Christ are but so many forecasts, is that of a redeemed Universe, in which value and existence shall be unified in the completion of God's great purpose; when Love which was the final revelation of God in Christ shall have produced in human hearts the Love that can respond perfectly and unbrokenly, when it shall be apprehended not as the mere intimation of a gracious purpose, but as an accomplished fact in our experience. The incompleteness of revelation, or, shall we say, of our apprehension of it, is the postulate though not the proof, that life will reach its goal in a larger and richer environment. "That death is not the end of the individual life is guaranteed by the Christian revelation of the love of God. Love is always of individuals, and God who made men for Himself will not let them merely pass out of existence through the failure of their physical strength" ("Mens Creatrix". p 349.) Included in the revelation of God is the Resurrection which is something more than the proof of the Divine conservation of values, as Höffding would express it,
but must rather be conceived as God's pledge that
the unrealised values, of which we have dreamed but
not realised shall be ours through Him. And so, we
are sustained by the same thought as that in which Paul
found comfort and strength: "I press on, if so be
that I may apprehend that for which I was apprehended
in Christ Jesus".
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