THE RELATION BETWEEN
THE PERSON OF CHRIST AND THE PRINCIPLE OF REDEMPTION

especially as propounded by
D.F. Strauss, A.E. Biedermann, and E.P.W. Troeltsch

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This thesis is a study of the relation of Jesus Christ to redemption. It is essentially an historical study with special reference to the positions of three representative nineteenth century German theologians, Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch. The thesis does not claim to be an exhaustive treatment of the doctrine of redemption or of the Person of Christ except as the two are related in the systems of these three thinkers. Only indirectly is it concerned with the history and theological expression of the doctrine of redemption in the Christian Church or with such Christological considerations as the Incarnation and Atonement of Christ. It is primarily a study of a specific problem, within a specific period of time, and as developed by a specific group of theologians.

Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch held a common position in separating the Person of Christ from the principle of redemption. They regarded redemption as a principle or eternal truth in its own right apart from the Person of Christ. As over against this position, this thesis takes its stand without apology upon the evangelical experience of the Church which knows only a Redeemer and nothing of a principle.

The first two chapters deal with the philosophical and theological tendencies in the nineteenth century as they bear upon the problem of person and principle. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters are devoted to detailed exposition of the positions of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch. Chapter six compares and contrasts these three positions. The concluding chapter opposes the principle interpretation of redemption with the Christian experience of the Redeemer.
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INTRODUCTION

Redemption lies at the very centre and core of religion. Without it man has no hope. It is the \textit{raison d'etre} of religion. It is the road that leads to God. However, this road, highway that it is, is marked with different and sometimes confusing signposts. As it is possible to reach a destination by different routes, so redemption, it would seem, may be approached from different directions and over different paths. Nearly every religion makes the claim to be a religion of redemption. Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Confucianism (if it is a religion), even Communism which is a substitute for religion, lay down definite programmes which must be followed if the desired goal is to be reached. We cannot here trace the devious and difficult paths to be followed. We are concerned with the Christian way of redemption. Christianity presents us with a straight thoroughfare, an unbroken avenue, a King's Highway. It makes the claim that all other roads lead astray and that the Gospel of Jesus Christ offers the only adequate redemption.

If redemption is the highway that leads to God, where can the pilgrim find it? Who or what is there to guide him along the way? How must he approach the portal? How can he be admitted? What, finally, must he do to be saved? This is the great question, it is the S.O.S. call of humanity.

Christian redemption is bound up with Jesus Christ. Any attempt to interpret Christianity without reference to Him must end in defeat. Whatever we do with Him, wherever we place Him, however we think of Him, we must at least take account of Him. The New Testament points to Him on every page. The Gospels are the/
the record of the good news which He heralded. The Epistles find their content in Him. Any attempt to interpret Christianity without Jesus Christ is impossible. Those who do not honour Him find it necessary, nevertheless, to deal with Him if only to explain Him away. This is not a point to be argued, it is a simple declaration of fact.

Though there is no disagreement that Jesus Christ is the centre of Christianity, there is wide disagreement among those who try to explain and interpret Him. "What think ye of Christ?" - this is the intrusive question which must be answered. It is the great watershed, the Continental Divide, that separates into two camps those who would answer this question.

The position of those who make Jesus Christ the object of faith and find redemption in His Person is the traditional evangelical view of the Church. To the question, "What must I do to be saved?" the answer is given, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ." Through Him and through Him alone is redemption possible. Man is a helpless sinner immeasurably separated from God by a gulf over which there is no bridge. Man is unable to produce, as the Westminster Confession says, "any spiritual good accompanying salvation." But once-and-for-all God, the Eternal, has entered human history in the Person of Jesus Christ, and through Him redemption is made effective. He does not only preach the Divine Word, He is the word. Redemption is not only illustrated in Him, He is the Redeemer.

On the other hand, there are those who regard Jesus Christ as the subject of faith and the exemplar of redemption. This/
This is the position of all liberal speculative theologies. Jesus Christ is not the Way, He is the way-shower. He is regarded with the greatest reverence and admiration and is given a unique place in Christianity as an index to faith and redemption, but it is not required that we have faith in Him. The idea or principle of redemption to which He gave expression in His life and teaching is the important consideration. Once we have received from Him the principles of Christianity, we can dispense with His Person. The argument is as follows: Humanity as a whole is ever progressing toward divinity; there is in every man the divine spark which needs but to be fanned into flame; to speak of a Redeemer or Mediator is to discredit humanity; Jesus, thus, becomes the first Christian, the first to tell us of God's true character, the first to illustrate what it means to be redeemed; He is the pathfinder, the pioneer of faith.

These two interpretations of redemption, the one emphasizing the Person of Christ and the other the principle of redemption have always had advocates in the Christian Church. There have been times when other issues submerged the doctrine of redemption, but whenever Christology came into focus, then redemption became a crucial matter. In the history of the early Church it was during the period of the great Christological Councils that this question reached a climax. From that time until the beginning of the nineteenth century there was practically no acute Christological controversy. It is true, there were outcroppings of the problem, advocates of old heresies, but in general the Church regarded her Christology as secure. With the advent of the nineteenth century, however/
however, the issue came again into the open, and the Christological controversy occupied the centre of the theological horizon. In the nineteenth century the greatest minds struggled with the issues between the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption, not since the fourth century had this subject been so crucial for theology.

This thesis is a study of this great subject. As the title suggests it is a study of the relation between the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption as set forth in the theology of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, all of whom were representative thinkers of the nineteenth century. It is not our purpose to prove that these men were the only ones or the greatest who dealt with this subject. Nor is any attempt made to connect these three names in a logical or historical sequence. They are, however, important names in the consideration of the problem of redemption.

Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch are chosen for specific reasons. They group themselves quite definitely on the side of the issue which emphasizes the principle of redemption, and yet they represent quite different approaches to the problem. They appear in this thesis, accordingly, as examples or illustrations of the theological position which gives a supreme place to the principle of redemption and a correspondingly inferior place to the Person of Christ.

Strauss is the leading representative of what may be called/
called the Mythical interpretation of the relation between the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption. According to Strauss, Jesus Christ, as we know Him from the New Testament records, was a good but disillusioned prophet. His followers were prone to exaggerate what He did and said because they wished to see in their Master the fulfilment of Old Testament messianic prophecies and promises. We cannot believe in Jesus Christ as the Redeemer, Strauss would say, but we find in His life and teaching various metaphysical ideas and principles which are eternally true. The principle of redemption is one of these ideas. Later in life Strauss repudiated this position and denied that Christianity contained eternal truths. He became a materialistic philosopher and found it necessary to substitute for Christianity scientific and mechanical law.

Biedermann represents what may be called the Symbolic theory. He agreed with Strauss's criticism of the life of Jesus, but he refused to accept Strauss's conclusions. Convinced that the Church had wrongly predicated of Jesus what was true only of humanity, Biedermann separated the Person of Christ from the principle of redemption but, nevertheless, insisted that the Person was a necessary support for the principle. Denying Jesus's efficacy as the Redeemer, Biedermann affirmed His significance in revealing and illustrating the principle. The clear cut distinction which he made between Person and principle in his earlier works is still evident in his last great book, but the clearness of the distinction gives way to a confusion of thought, and we find/
find Biedermann wrestling with his speculative theology in an attempt to show that, while separate, Person and principle are closely related.

Troeltsch is the outstanding illustration of what may be called the Relative theory. In Troeltsch's Christology, Jesus is a link in a prophetic chain which extends from Plato to Schleiermacher. As Redeemer, Jesus has but little significance, for, in the last analysis, God is the Redeemer, Jesus's importance for the Christian religion lies in the fact that He is the centre and symbol of the Christian cult and community. Redemption, as the knowledge of God's Will, is mediated through Christ only in so far as He is the revealer of God. Jesus is not absolute or unique. He is the incarnation of the metaphysical idea of God. Although He is an uplifting and vitalizing personality, He has no other part to play in redemption than that of showing us what God is like.

Before entering in fuller detail upon the analyses of these theological positions, it will be helpful first to trace the outlines of the philosophical and theological background of the nineteenth century from which Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch derived their common inheritance.
CHAPTER I

PHILOSOPHICAL TENDENCIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Two causes which gave rise to the development of the nineteenth century theology were the political events of the period and the systematic movement of philosophy. The Napoleonic Wars which threatened to destroy the kingdoms of Central Europe were in large measure responsible for the great wave of religious revival which swept over the country dissolving the smug complacency of creedal and ecclesiastical orthodoxy and nourishing a new personal approach to God. In those days of national humiliation many attributed the perils and misfortunes of their land to the Divine Judgment. On the other hand, the philosophical trend of the nineteenth century had a still more profound influence upon the theology of this period. To enter into the effect of the political status upon theology is not necessary, but it is necessary to review the philosophical situation.  

There is no definite break in philosophical thought between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Kant, who is generally recognized as the starting-point for a survey of nineteenth century thought, lived and wrote in the eighteenth century. It was not until the closing years of the century, however, that his critical works were given currency, and his influence was felt chiefly/  

1. Lichtenberger, History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century, pp.3,4,7; Hurst, History of Nationalism, pp.179ff.
 chiefly in the opening years of the nineteenth century.

Two main streams of philosophical thought in the eighteenth century from which Kant derived the impulse and incentive for a new system were the Rationalism of Leibnitz, especially as it had been modified in the philosophy of Wolff, and the Empiricism of the English philosophy as expressed especially in the works of Hume. Rationalism based its discussions of ultimate reality upon logical concepts. English Empiricism found the metaphysical touchstone in sensation. Kant was quite sure that neither held the truth. The Rationalism of logical concepts was reasonable enough but it was not in accord with experience. Empiricism, on the other hand, seemed to ally itself with experience, and in so doing severed its tie with reason. To find a solution to this antinomy was Kant's primary task. The "dogmatic slumber" from which he was awakened by Hume referred to the dogmatism of Empiricism, and, once awake, Kant saw that both Empiricism and Rationalism were essentially dogmatic. Nevertheless, Hume stimulated Kant in a negative way, for Kant's awakening led to a reaction against the philosophy of Hume. The Wolffian philosophy, too, except for the dualism of mind and matter which Kant carried over into his own thought, underwent a similar transformation.

How Kant attempted to solve the contradictions of Rationalism and Empiricism by means of the "critical" or "transcendental" philosophy does not lie within the province of this thesis. We are concerned with the development of nineteenth century philosophy only as it influenced the theology of the century/
century in regard to the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption. The above discussion of Rationalism and Empiricism, however, is not out of place, for the leading tenets of these schools were reproduced in the theology of the time. English Empiricism gave rise to the Deism of the eighteenth century, while Rationalism was itself both a philosophy and a theology. The main proposition of the Deists lay in the assertion that there is a "natural religion" at the heart of all religions. Special revelations are only the excess baggage with which natural religion has been encumbered throughout the ages. To separate the husk from the core in religion was the aim and purpose of the Deists. The Rationalists, on the other hand, accepted the creeds and doctrines of Christianity, but attempted to explain and reinterpret them in the light of reason alone. Anything not rationally conceived in Christianity must go by the board. Reason was the Procrustean bed upon which the Rationalists subjected Christianity.

At first associated with Rationalism but later separated from it was the Pietistic movement in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Pietism was essentially a protest against formalism and ecclesiastical authority, and in this protest it joined hands with Rationalism. Both fostered freedom in religion; both emphasized morality. Later as it countenanced separation from the world and conversion experiences, Pietism itself became conventionalized and broke with Rationalism.

The philosophy of the nineteenth century as formulated mainly by Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, became the foster-mother of the nineteenth century theology. It is necessary, therefore,
to deal with the thought of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel in order to make clear their contribution to theology especially as it influenced the particular problem which we have in view.

First of all, we deal with Immanuel Kant. Although Kant inherited from his mother a sympathetic appreciation of Pietism, it was not to last for long. In so far as Pietism took its stand against formalism, Kant was one of its most loyal adherents, but when it became sentimental and clothed its simple faith in dogmas and ceremonies, Kant not only lost interest in the movement, he became openly antagonistic to it.

During his early schooling at the Collegium Fridericianum, Pietism took the form of emotionalism and was so abhorrent to him that he refused to have anything to do with prayers or hymn-singing, an attitude which remained with him until his death. No doubt it was only the simple faith of his mother which kept him from turning away from all religion. We are told that he never attended church services, and that even in later life when his presence in church as Rector of the University was expected, he refused to enter the building after leading the academic procession to the doors.

Kant's education at the University included a few lecture courses on theology given by a boyhood friend, the pastor of his parents' church, Franz Albert Schulz. Whether Kant had a genuine interest in studying theology is doubtful. It seems rather that these courses were taken not because of any leaning toward/
toward theology, but because he wished to widen his cultural out­look and placate his pastor-friend who was growing alarmed at
Kant's rapid departure from the pietism of his youth.

When Kant stood in line for a professor's chair at the
University, Schulz refused to grant his approval until Kant satis­factorily answered the question, "Do you fear God with all your
heart?" The question itself shows the extent to which Kant had
drifted since his early Pietism. He apparently was able to answer
the question to the satisfaction of all for he was granted the
chair. The lectures which he heard under Schulz marked the
beginning and the end of his theological training. It is said
that when he came to write his main theological work, Die Religion
innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, his only source of in­formation for the traditional theology was an old copy of a
catechism which he had used as a child.¹

The ruling passion in Kant's life was not religious but
moral. His high ethical standards, his conception of life as
service, his honesty, and his unquenchable thirst for truth are
all admirable traits. As to Kant the man, it has been well said
that, "It is a highly estimable type of human character which here
meets us, but not a lovable one."²

The question which Kant set himself to answer in The
Critique of Pure Reason, his main philosophical work, was:
How/

¹. Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, edited by
T.M. Greene and H.H. Hudson, pp.xxiv-xxv.
². A. Paulsen, Immanuel Kant - his life and doctrine, p.54.
How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? In other words, where is true knowledge possible? In the three sections of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Aesthetic, the Analytic, and the Dialectic, Kant deals with the three stages of knowledge, perception, understanding, and reason. The Aesthetic, or perception stage, has to do with pure mathematics. The Analytic, or understanding stage, is concerned with physical science. Both offer synthetic a priori judgments. To the question, How is knowledge possible in mathematics, Kant answered that space and time are the a priori principles which render knowledge valid. In physical science, knowledge is possible because of the categories of the understanding which, like space and time, are also a priori principles. In the Aesthetic and Analytic, Kant's question was, How is knowledge possible? In the Dialectic, the question became, Is knowledge possible? The reason for this change lay in the subject matter of the Dialectic. Here he was concerned not with space and time or with physical science but with the ideas of the soul, the universe, and God. These ideas are outside the province of perception and understanding. They do not respond to space and time or to the categories of the understanding. Kant's thesis in the Dialectic is that knowledge is impossible where these three ideas occur.

The Cogito ergo sum of Descartes had no place in the epistemology of Kant. The soul is not an object of knowledge simply because it cannot fit into the moulds of space and time or into the categories of the understanding. It is possible to know the "empirical ego", the sensations and thoughts of the changing self,
self, but the "transcendental ego," the pure "I", remains aloof from the knowledge process. In like manner, the idea of a universe stands outside the pale of knowledge. When it is made an object of knowledge, "antinomies" are the result.

While not denying God, Kant declared that we cannot make God an object of knowledge, we cannot know Him. A God who is the sum total of reality, the ens realissimum, cannot be made the object of finite experience. In the traditional thought of the time three logical proofs for the existence of God were current. Kant showed that they were all fallacious. The ontological proof confused essence and existence. The cosmological proof uttered a logical fallacy in speaking of an uncaused cause. The physico-teleological proof, which attributed the design and beauty of the world to a Creator, was a mere assumption, for it may be that nature acts freely without the help of a Creator or Architect.

The argument of The Critique of Pure Reason demonstrated the limits and extent of knowledge. What is of immediate interest in this survey is the proposition that any knowledge of God is impossible. The refutation of the Nationalistic proofs for the existence of God showed that they do not prove what they were meant to prove. Kant had no other motive in so dealing with these arguments. He was not destroying in the spirit of an iconoclast, for he doubtless had in mind the moral argument for God's existence which he introduced in the subsequent Critique.

Kant's philosophy was further developed in the Critique of Practical Reason. After defining the part that reason plays in the knowledge process, Kant turned to the problem of the will, or/
or the Practical Reason as he called it. The moral law is a Categorical Imperative which, as universally valid reason, is a law unto itself, the basis of all morality. We are confronted with three postulates of the Practical Reason: the postulate of freedom, to say "I ought" demands the corollary "I can," thus the Categorical Imperative is the guarantee of freedom; the postulate of the immortality of the soul, since we can only approach the moral law in this life, the soul must be eternal; the postulate of the existence of God, the moral consciousness demands a harmony between moral worth and happiness, this harmony presupposes a God who will see that justice is done.

The contributions made by the Critique of Practical Reason are obvious enough. Pure reason gives way to practical reason. The Will becomes of paramount value; ethics takes the place of metaphysics. From the role of der Allzermalmende, the all-destroyer, in pulling down the rationalistic proofs for the existence of God, Kant adopted the role of a restorer and found in the moral law the only true basis for God's existence.

The Critique of Judgment forms a link between the other two Critiques. Between understanding and will comes judgment. But this Critique which is essentially a discussion of the beautiful and the sublime need not detain us in our survey of the philosophical-theological thought of Kant.

Kant's most comprehensive treatment of religion and theology is contained in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft which was published in 1793, eleven years before his death. It is the last work from his pen of any lasting value.
The book is an exposition of the relation between rational belief and the faith of the Christian Church. The first section, on the Radical Evil in man, was brought before the College of Censors in Berlin for examination. Although it seemed to stand outside the traditional exposition of the Lutheran and Reformed faiths, it passed the censors who justified their verdict saying that Kant's language would be understood only by the most erudite and therefore its influence would be harmless. The second section, on the conflict between the Good and Evil Principles, was banned at first, but Kant submitted the whole manuscript to the theological faculty of the University of Königsberg and succeeded in getting it printed there. Later Kant was advised to refrain from theologizing, and the university professors were prohibited from lecturing on the Religion.

The findings of the Critical philosophy concerning phenomena and noumena, things knowable and unknowable, the conception of knowledge, the refutation of the proofs for the existence of God, the moral argument for God, the immortality of the soul, and freedom form the background of the argument which is set forth in the Religion. The aim of the work itself was not to destroy or disparage the orthodox Christian faith, but to deal a death blow to the religion of reason and in so doing actually help to bring religion to the hearts of the people.

In this treatise Kant put forth his position concerning the Radical evil in man, a position which had lasting influence upon the thought of the theologians of the time. Emil Brunner is/
is willing to grant that Kant was the only one of the great modern thinkers to understand evil in the sense of a positive resistance of the will to the law of good. Evil in Kant, he says, lay at the very centre of the human personality, and in this respect Kant approached the Christian doctrine of sin.\(^1\) Professor Webb in his book on Kant calls this section "epoch-making" because it revived the doctrine of original sin which to the \textit{aufläührung} had always been a stumbling-block.\(^2\) Kant's notion of original sin, however, is not here stated as a doctrine or dogma of the Church, but as a necessary implication of morality. We note this in his description of the biblical account of the \textit{Fall}.\(^3\) The exegesis of the passage was unimportant for Kant. He was not concerned with what the writer had in view or what his religious convictions were. The important thing is the moral lesson which the story of the \textit{Fall} patently indicates, namely, that our perfect self is hampered and hindered by the Radical Evil which is a part of the human personality. We catch here the first glimpse of Kant's method in dealing with the doctrines of the Church.

In the second section of the \textit{Religion} Kant seems to deny what he had affirmed in the first part. Although the human personality has evil at its centre, it also has a good disposition. There is, therefore, in Kant's thought not only a total depravity but also a susceptibility to good. We are not created good, but we/

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we are created to be good. How the Radical Evil is overcome by the Good Principle or the good disposition is not discussed by Kant. Such a transaction is beyond the limits of reason alone.

This Good Principle, Kant goes on to show, is what we, as human personalities encumbered with Radical Evil, seek to elevate to the place of primacy in our lives. But where shall we look for this principle? What are its distinguishing characteristics? Kant answered these questions by pointing to the personification of the Good Principle in Mankind which is identified with the Person of Jesus Christ. "Mankind (rational earthly existence in general) in its complete perfection is that which alone can render a world the object of a divine decree and the end of creation....he (i.e. perfect mankind) is no created thing but His only-begotten Son.... Now it is our common duty as men to elevate ourselves to this ideal of moral perfection, that is, to this archetype of the moral disposition in all its purity - and for this the idea itself, which reason presents to us for our zealous emmulation, can give us power. But just because we are not the authors of this idea....it is more appropriate to say that this archetype has come down to us from heaven and has assumed our humanity....Such union with us may therefore be regarded as a state of humiliation of the Son of God if we represent to ourselves this godly-minded person, regarded as our archetype, as assuming sorrows in the fullest measure in order to further the world's good, though he himself is holy and therefore bound to endure no sufferings whatsoever." ¹ Jesus Christ and the ideal of

of mankind are synonymous. We have here the first suggestion of the separation of the Person of Christ from the principle of Christianity.

Man finds his redemption "through a practical faith in this Son of God."\(^1\) This does not mean that the object of faith is the historic Jesus, it is rather the "Ideal of humanity well-pleasing to God." In so far as this ideal is not of our own creation, we can speak of it as the Son of God. The ideal stands as a model of perfection toward which man must strive. The "archetype" which we must imitate lies within our reason. It may be there was a "truly godly-minded man" in history who, by his teaching, conduct, and suffering, was a perfect example of the Good Principle, but such a person would not necessarily influence us, since the Good Principle is to be sought in ourselves and not in any one else. "The elevation of such a holy person above all the frailties of human nature would rather, so far as we can see, hinder the adoption of the idea of such a person for our imitation....his distance from the natural man would then be so infinitely great that such a divine person could no longer be held up as an example to him."\(^2\)

Certain/

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2. *"*, p.57; Kant's argument continues on the line that redemption is more desirable when it is the result of one's own effort and will. Jesus Himself, we are told, when He spoke of His perfection and His relation to the Father was referring not to Himself but to the "disposition" which was in Him and which governed His life. To display this disposition objectively was, of course, impossible; it was seen through His teaching and conduct.
Certain difficulties in Kant's notion of a Good Principle did not escape him. How can man ever attain the goal of perfection if he is constantly striving against the Radical Evil? Kant's answer to this was, that man will be judged not by what he is or by what he has done but according to his disposition toward goodness. "This moral disposition which in all its purity (like unto the purity of the Son of God) the man has made his own - or, (if we personify this idea) this Son of God, Himself, bears as vicarious substitute the guilt of sin for him, and indeed for all who believe (practically) in Him; as saviour He renders satisfaction to supreme justice by His sufferings and death; and as advocate He makes it possible for men to hope to appear before their judge as justified."¹

Jesus Christ is for Kant the originator of a great idea, the Good Principle. He is the ideal of perfect manhood. As an abstract principle of perfection He has more meaning for us than as a Person. His moral ideal has been perpetuated in the Church and has served as the ideal for mankind. He was both human and divine. Human He was in his teaching and example; divine in His ambassadorship from heaven. In Him the Good Principle made its first full appearance, and thus He was made an example for all men who wished to leave their old lives behind and enter into a new and eternal life. The teachings which He set forth in parable and precept are convincing to all men through their own reason. Faith, therefore, must find its object not in this Person but in the/

¹. The Religion, pp.60-69.
the ideal of a humanity well-pleasing to God. Christ, says Brunner of Kant's Christology, "is the highest expression that can be imagined of a moral and religious being, no less, but also no more."¹ For this reason Kant is called the father of religious modernism because he separated the form of Christian doctrine from the content as it is expressed in the Person of Jesus Christ. Redemption for Kant was a matter of self-regeneration. It is the victory of the Good Principle over the Radical Evil. Man himself in the final analysis, is his own redeemer. Salvation is made possible when man adopts moral principles. God does not effect this salvation for any interference on His part would be a disavowal of man's liberty and freedom.

Religion, as such, really played but a small part in the moral system of Kant. Faith, in Kant's vocabulary, always means rational faith. Religion in Kant's own words is "the recognition of all duties as divine commands."² The emphasis is always upon morality. "Kant's religion", as Professor Pringle-Pattison has said, "is his ethic writ large."³

Richte is the link between Kant and Hegel. The Kantian philosophy, which was being discussed in all the German universities, was radically modified by Richte whose philosophy became the stepping stone in the development from the critical philosophy of/

². The Religion, p.142.
³. Pringle-Pattison, The Development from Kant to Hegel, p.110.
of Kant to the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. It is in this transition role that Fichte's importance in the study of nineteenth century thought lies. Although his system claimed to go beyond the limits set by Kant, his influence was short lived. We still read Kant, but Fichte's works are dismissed with a summary statement as we pass on to Hegel. But just because Fichte takes his position in the philosophical line of development, he becomes important as an index to the tendency of the period.

While there is little of interest in the life of Kant, Fichte's biography is the tale of an energetic and impulsive lover of life. We think of Kant as the quiet, self-contained, speculative philosopher; Fichte was not content to live with his philosophy, he was a man as well as a philosopher. Of the two Fichte is undoubtedly the more human and though not so great as Kant, he is more lovable.

Fichte's earliest writing on the subject of religion was a small fragment called *Aphorismen über Religion und Deismus*, 1790. The purpose of this essay was to clear up the controversy between philosophy and Christianity. This he attempted to do by relegating each subject to its proper field of enquiry. This study brought him for the first time into contact with the writings of Kant. He was so attracted by the logic and reasonableness of the *Critiques*, especially the *Critique of Practical Reason*, that he henceforth devoted his entire time in their exposition and development. Of this introduction to Kant, which as a sort of philosophical conversion marked a transition from the old to the new in his life and thinking, he writes to several friends with passionate/
passionate exultation. "I threw myself into philosophy," he writes, "and, as you know, into the Kantian. Here I found the remedy for all my evils, and joy enough to boot. The influence of this philosophy, and particularly the moral part of it (which however is unintelligible without previous study of the Critique of Pure Reason), upon the whole spiritual life, and particularly the revelation which it has caused in my own mode of thought, is indescribable." To another he wrote, "I have lived in a new world since I have read the Critique of Practical Reason. Principles which I believed were irrefragable, are refuted; things which I thought could never be proved, - as for example, the idea of absolute Freedom, of Duty, - are proved; and I am so much the happier. It is indescribable what respect for humanity, what power this system gives us." To his wife he wrote, "A circumstance which seemed the result of pure chance, led me to give myself up entirely to the study of the Kantian philosophy..... I have accepted a nobler morality, and instead of occupying myself with outward things, I employ myself more with my own being..... It is difficult beyond all conception, and stands much in the need of simplification."

Fichte felt that the best introduction to the personal friendship and advice of his philosophical hero would be to publish something to attract his attention. With this in view he wrote the Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung, 1793. There was some difficulty in getting it published; the theological faculty at Halle/

Halle objected to its contention: that no proof of the divinity of a revelation can be derived from an appeal to miracles occurring in connection with it, but that the question of its authenticity can be decided only by an examination of its contents. The dissenting censor, however, was replaced by another with more liberal leanings and the Kritik was printed. It was published anonymously, the editor neglecting to include Richte's name, and was at once seized upon as a work of Kant. The Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung even suggested in its review of the book that any one who had read a line of Kant could not but recognize these words as his. Kant himself informed the public whose work it was. The incident, rather than the book itself, placed Richte before the eyes of the thinking world, establishing his prestige and placing before him the chair of philosophy at Jena.

Kant had declared that the moral consciousness is the one necessary and universal absolute upon which thinking can depend. Richte took a step further and posited the ego as the only absolute. The Ego became Richte's chief concern in philosophy. The Ego is, however, not mere intellect or changelessness, it is activity and will. Moral obligation is the essence of the Ego. Its very existence supposes its activity, and this in turn responds, with free action, to duty. Thus the Ego, moral obligation, and freedom, become for Richte synonymous terms to express ultimate reality. Kant's discussion of freedom had a profound effect upon Richte with the result that moral freedom became his main principle. The chief end of man in Richte's catechism is to live morally.
To say all is Ego, or all is mind, was not new in philosophy; Bishop Berkeley had said as much some years before in England. But Fichte not only said there is nothing but Ego, he said there is only one Ego. We as finite creatures have no individuality outside of the absolute Ego, the image of which is impressed upon each of us in the form of duty. Such a theory must radically influence one's estimate of God. Thus Fichte conceived of God as the universal moral process, the Universal Ego. Since the essence of the Ego is to act freely and morally, God is the freely acting moral process in which the individual has a share and a responsibility.

Although Fichte did not trouble himself, as did Kant, with the idea of a Radical Evil (for evil was to Fichte no more than the inertia of the will), still he saw that man, no matter how hard he try, cannot realize the moral goal to which duty beckons him. But this does not give cause for despair, the true vocation of man lies in the increasing approximation to this goal, he cannot ask for more, he cannot do less. "The ultimate purpose of each individual man, as well as of all society, and consequently of all the labours of the Scholar in society, is the moral elevation of all men."¹

Fichte's ever recurring idea is that religion is as old as creation. He did not distinguish in essence between different kinds/

¹. The Vocation of the Scholar, p.192 in Smith's edition of Fichte, Vol.I.
kinds of religion, at heart they are all one, worshipping the same God.¹ In his younger days when he was faced with an invitation to become a pastor, he wrote, "I am neither of the Lutheran nor of the Reformed Church, but of the Christian."² Religion for Fichte is recognizing this earthly life as a counterpart or development toward the perfect Divine life. This life is not represented in outward forms and does not impose external conventions, it is insight and light into the "One True Life." Christianity is the highest expression of this relationship. The words of St. John, "I and the father are one," contain the Christian expression of this truth. The insight that religion gives enables us not only to see God, but to have and possess Him. We do not create Him, He is in us. We find Him by forsaking our earthly ways. By removing all earthly obstacles, God is able to stand at the centre of our being. He has never been elsewhere than at the centre though His place has been obscured. Man and God cannot be/

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1. Fichte at one time was charged with atheism and the controversy reached such a stage of disagreeableness that Fichte resigned his chair at Jena. He himself never agreed to the charge and was never convinced that he taught anything but the highest religion. He was well aware that he lived in an age of religious doubt and agnosticism, but he considered himself to stand on the other side taking up the weapons of truth against the scoffers. "I am not ignorant," he writes in The Way Toward the Blessed Life, p.409, "that in this age we can enter no circle at all numerous among the cultivated classes, in which there shall not be found some one in whom the mention of the name of Jesus, or the use of scriptural expressions, excites unpleasant feelings, and the suspicion that the speaker must be either a hypocrite or a fool." In such a situation we find Fichte daring to mention the name of Jesus and daring to use Scripture not as one of the "cultivated classes" and not as "a hypocrite or a fool."

2. Memoir, p.28.
be disunited. "Sublime and living Will," says fichte of God, "named by no name, compassed by no thought, I may well raise my soul to Thee, for Thou and I are not divided. Thy voice sounds within me, mine resounds in Thee; and all my thoughts, if they are but good and true, live in Thee also. In Thee, the Incomprehensible, I myself, and the world in which I live, become clearly comprehensible to me, all the secrets of my existence are laid open, and perfect harmony arises in my soul."¹

The Fourth Gospel best expresses this relation of man to God. Fichte's interpretation and acceptance of Christianity were based upon the truth contained in the words, "I and the Father are one." The Synoptics he regarded as teaching nothing more than morality.

When we come to fichte's treatment of the person of Christ, we find that he followed closely the thought of Kant. Whether or not he was impressed with the Religion, we do not know but at least his conclusions show a parallel trend. Questions as to the personality of Jesus, who He was and what He was, did not interest fichte. These are the questions with which Paul dealt who was concerned in making Jesus the Mediator of a New Covenant. The true Christian, says fichte, will know nothing about a New Covenant or a Mediator. There can be but one eternal relationship between man and God. In the Eternal we live and move and have our being. This relation makes a Mediator unnecessary and superfluous.

¹. Vocation of Man, p.463.
Jesus is the manifestation of the Divine. On the basis of this statement Fichte found agreement between his philosophy and Christianity. The historical person, however, is of no significance. An oft-quoted saying of Fichte's describes very well his conception of Christianity; "The Metaphysical only," he said, "and not the Historical, can give us blessedness."1 Fichte was so sure of this that he made bold to suggest that if Jesus were to return to earth to-day, He would be quite satisfied to find the metaphysical idea of Christianity in the minds of men. Certainly He would not look for the worship of Himself. Through the Person of Jesus the Eternal entered time; this is the significance of His Person. For this reason the Incarnation was a doctrine which readily appealed to him, but in idea only, not because of the historical person of Jesus. His contribution is great and we thank Him for it but He no longer contributes anything. We have the ideas, we do not need the originator of them. Jesus Christ, therefore, is not superior to humanity, He is humanity's exemplar. As we discover our tie with the Eternal we, like Christ, become Sons of God.

Redemption, then, is for Fichte in no way connected with the Person of Christ except as He manifests the principle of redemption. Man has need of no Mediator to forgive sin and present us faultless before the throne. Redemption is really an unnecessary conception in Fichte's thinking, for man is redeemed when he/

he knows that he is in God and God is in him. Man is his own Redeemer. Redemption is a necessary consequence of moral activity; man "must lay hold of it for himself, and with his own hands." 1

The philosophical movement begun in Kant and continued by Fichte found its logical conclusion in Hegel. 2 From the critical epistemology of Kant through the ethical exhortations of Fichte we come to the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. It was Hegel who gathered together the threads of his predecessors' philosophy and wove them into a system which revealed the familiar warp and woof but displayed an altogether new pattern. Kant had divided reality into phenomena and noumena, things knowable and unknowable. Fichte, dissatisfied/

1. The Way towards the Blessed Life, p.349.
2. It is true that the name of Schelling appears as an important step in the historical development from Fichte to Hegel, but for the present purpose it is unnecessary to include him in our survey. Actually there is a narrow margin of difference between Schelling and Hegel. Schelling was perhaps the discoverer of the germ of the Hegelian philosophy, but what he began Hegel finished. We speak of the Hegelian philosophy, but we seldom use the adjective Schellingian. The agreement between Schelling and Hegel quite obscures their disagreement. Schelling's philosophy cannot be called systematic. It is said that he changed his mind five times, and that his development is not so much evolution as revolution. He is more of a Romanticist than a philosopher; his gift is analogy not logic. The main contribution of Schelling lies in his endeavour to supplement Fichte's philosophy of the Ego with a philosophy of nature. The theory of Identity on which he hoped to reconcile these two propositions was the stumbling-block which caused Hegel to break with Schelling and develop his own system. Schelling's Identity, he said, was "the night in which all cows are black."
dissatisfied with this, had attempted to solve the dualism by emphasizing the ego. The Hegelian system claimed to be a higher synthesis in so far as it did not regard matter and mind, phenomena and noumena, the knowable and unknowable, as opposites in the manner of Kant and Fichte, but as necessary elements of a unified reason which he called the Absolute.

Hegel's aim was to define reality and knowledge in terms of this Absolute. He did not wish to be understood as creating the Absolute as though it were "fired from a pistol," but he hoped to show its origin and development and dialectically demonstrate that the Absolute contains all that is. To do this it must be shown how consciousness progresses and evolves from sensation to pure knowledge culminating in the recognition of the Absolute as the ultimate reality, not as an abstract identity in which opposites are merged, but as living spirit toward which all knowledge converges. Philosophy was for Hegel the science of this Absolute.

The method which Hegel used in his reconciliation of the Kantian opposites has been called Dialectic. At the centre of this method lies the thought that the world of experience is progressive. Hegel has often been credited with standing on the brink of the theory of evolution. He was the champion of the historical point of view. If we look at things as they really are, we must realize the importance and significance of their development. The Dialectic method has three stages, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. What at first seems to be true and final is recognized as a relative truth in the light of its opposite, both of which can then be reconciled into a larger whole.
The progression of this "yes," "no," and "both" is a zig-zag movement which pushes steadily onward toward the Absolute. It is the movement from the "everlasting nay" to the "everlasting yea." The Dialectic method is, therefore, a protest against one-sidedness and partiality. No particular item of reason or fact is ultimate, only the process is Absolute.

Hegel undertook the elaboration of these principles in his *Phanomenologie* later supplemented by the *Logic*. The *Encyclopaedia*, containing the *Philosophy of Nature* and the *Philosophy of Mind*, complete, with the *Logic*, the Dialectic triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. In the *Philosophy of Nature* the principles contained in the *Logic* are applied to the external world thus acting as the antithesis to the *Logic*. In the *Philosophy of Mind* the synthesis of the *Logic* and the *Philosophy of Nature* is effected through the Absolute. In all three, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, the Absolute is revealed in different but progressive stages. In the *Logic* it is as Being and Essence, in the *Philosophy of Nature* as matter and external forms, in the *Philosophy of Mind* as consciousness in art, morality, and religion.

When we come, more specifically, to Hegel's treatment of religion, we find him applying his philosophical principles against the Rationalism of the *Aufklärung* and in defence of Christianity which he regarded as being in harmony with his theory of the Absolute. In words reminiscent of *Richte*, Hegel denounced the religious tenor of his day. "It no longer gives our age any concern," he says, "that it knows nothing of God; on the contrary, it is regarded as a mark of the highest intelligence to hold that such knowledge/
knowledge is not even possible. What is laid down by the Christian religion as the supreme, absolute commandment, 'Ye shall know God,' is regarded as a piece of folly.¹

God is the only true reality for Hegel; religion is the only true and absolute knowledge. The object of the religious man is to come into contact with God. This union of the Infinite and the finite is the centre of the Hegelian conception of religion. God is not unknowable; he is, in fact, the only reality we do know. "Why should God not reveal Himself to us," Hegel asks,"if we earnestly seek the knowledge of Him?.....If the knowledge of God were kept from us in order that we should know the finite only, and not attain to the Infinite, God would be a jealous God, or God would become an empty name."² The Dialectic method which ends in a synthesis of two apparent opposites, a coincidentia oppositorum, underlies Hegel's conception of God and man. The Infinite and the finite are brought together into a larger reality, the Absolute. In the Oriental religions of the world, Hegel pointed out, stress is placed upon the Infinite. Greek religion put the accent on man. In Christianity these two extremes are brought together into a synthesis wherein God and man become a unity.

Christianity is the highest religion. "In it the universal/

universal spirit and the particular spirit, the infinite spirit and the finite spirit, are inseparably connected; it is their absolute identity which constitutes this religion and is its substance or content." Although man is by nature evil, he is also to be regarded as potentially good. Evil is no more than "Being-not-yet-spirit" which is eventually swallowed up in the Absolute. Hegel's method in dealing with Christianity was to subject the doctrines of the Church to his dialectic system. He found in this experiment that there was usually a grain of truth, oftentimes a fundamental principle, expressed in these doctrines. Of course, the doctrines were modified and subtracted of their historical content but in their application and intrinsic meaning they were retained. This led many to regard Hegel as the defender of Orthodoxy. Hegel, however, was not concerned with the doctrines as such but with the truths which they embodied. "Until theology is something more than a bare enumeration and compilation of these doctrines ab extra," he argued, "it has no right to the title of science."2

Hegel was quite insistent in placing Jesus Christ at the centre of Christianity. As the God-man, Jesus conveys to us the highest philosophical, as well as religious, principle - the union of the Infinite and the finite. The technical terms of the Church, such as the "divine and human natures in one person," are misleading and awkward, but they express the truth that is essential to

2. The Logic of Hegel, by Wallace, p.61.
an understanding of Christianity. Although Jesus is a figure in history, his real significance lies not in His life but in His spiritual manifestation. He represents the eternal history of spirit. "Make of Christ what you will exegetically, critically, historically.....the only real question is, What is the Idea or the Truth in and for itself?"¹

History for Hegel, says Brunner, "is merely a picture-book, whose text he knows without the aid of the pictures."² It is the Absolute drawn out through time. For this reason no single event in history is of any more importance than any other. Thus the historic Jesus loses his uniqueness; His worth lies in His testimony. This does not mean that Jesus is unimportant or insignificant in Christianity. On the contrary, He has the central place, not as Redeemer or Mediator, but as the first among men to realize the fundamental principle of Christianity. The Death of Christ means that He was the God-man. His manhood demanded that He die like other men; His Resurrection and Ascension reveal His divinity and union with God. "The death of Christ is in one aspect the death of a man, of a friend who met his death by violence, etc.; but then it is just this death which, when conceived of in a spiritual way, becomes the means of salvation and the central point of reconciliation."³ His Atonement is, moreover, not simply an individual affair; it is the individual expression of the universal/

¹. Philosophy of History, edited by Sibree, p.337.
universal principle of atonement. "The history of the atone­ment.....is not the history of one individual; on the contrary, it is God who accomplishes what is told in it; i.e., the view which it gives is that this history is the universal and absolute history, the history which is for itself."¹

The part that Christ plays in redemption was for Hegel, as for Kant and Fichte, purely exemplary. The principle of re­demption is separated from the Person of Christ. Christianity is made the supreme religion, but the historic Jesus fades into un­importance in the light of the truths which He taught and illus­trated. Redemption is a great ontological idea which applies to humanity as a whole. we are made partakers of redemption when we realize our kinship with God. There is no room, there is no need even, for a Redeemer or Mediator in Hegel's philosophy.

The movement of philosophy from Kant to Hegel provided the intellectual basis for the theology of the nineteenth century. Their speculative adventures into a new land of knowledge unearthed a priceless treasure upon which subsequent thinkers quickly relied. Their contributions to the thinking world became the common pro­perty of theologians. Their philosophical systems were the terminus a quo in which every theology, good and bad, found its beginning.

It is not to be supposed, however, that every theologian of/                                                                                     

of the nineteenth century made a deep and exhausting study of this philosophical movement in all its details. Philosophy and theology have much in common, but they are nonetheless two quite different sciences. The influence of philosophy upon theology was confined to general principles. It was the recognition of these general principles in the philosophy of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel that influenced the theologians. What the philosophers did was, "to discipline the mind, to perfect the methods and processes of our investigations, to habituate us to rigour and precision in our demonstrations, to elevate intelligence above the world of changing phenomena and transitory impressions, to learn to discern in all things their essence, their inner law, their genesis and progressive development, to embrace, connect, and co-ordinate everything in order to reach at one view a great, simple and fertile whole."¹

Kant's greatest contributions to the theological thought of the century lay in his separation of things knowable and unknowable, in his criticism of reason as a means of describing the divine, in his emphasis upon the authority of the moral conscience, and in his insistence that the truths of Christianity are eternal truths. Fichte's importance for the theological world is accounted for partly in his intermediate position between Kant and Hegel. Dissatisfied with the dualism of Kant, Fichte would regiment all things under the banner of the Ego. The religious life is for

¹. Lichtenberger, History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century, p.16.
Fichte essentially a moral life lived in the recognition that God and man are one. Hegel’s progressive synthesis of opposites, as an historical development leading to the Absolute, is his rich bequest to theology. The Infinite and finite are united into a higher synthesis than in either Kant or Fichte.

In the light of our problem, the relation between the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel had a profound influence. Of course, none of them was primarily concerned with the problem or doctrine of redemption per se. When they spoke of Christianity at all it was to show the harmony of its principles with those of their individual systems. Redemption for them was not a paramount concern except as they believed philosophy to be redemptive, and they were only secondarily interested in the Person of Christ. Yet they had a permanent effect upon the problem of redemption, for they opened the door which lead to a study of this problem.

Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, whom we are about to study in relation to the problem of redemption, found their point of departure in this philosophical movement. The philosophers pointed the way toward a deeper consideration of redemption, and as we look at the theology of the nineteenth century their influence in regard to redemption becomes obvious. Before turning to Strauss, who found in Hegel’s philosophy the impulse and incentive for his Leben Jesu, we must first look at the general development of the theology of the nineteenth century as it was influenced by Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, and as it developed for itself especially in regard to the problem of redemption.
CHAPTER II

THEOLOGICAL TENDENCIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In the preceding chapter we followed the movement of philosophy from Kant through Fichte to Hegel with special regard to its theological implications. We concluded that Kant, Fichte, and Hegel were primarily philosophers and, as such, only concerned with theology as it impinged upon their philosophy. Their contribution in disciplining the mind, in constructing logical systems of thought, and in defining the essence of things was eagerly received by the theologians. In a sense their contribution was indirect and negative for they were not interested in constructing a systematic theology. This task they left for the theologians. They opened the doors of philosophy a little wider and revealed new corridors of thought. They stood as sentinels and heralds outside these new avenues. It was the theological thinkers who passed through these portals and explored the beyond.

The main threads of the theological movement in the nineteenth century are all tied together and have a common source in the philosophical movement. This does not mean that before the time of Kant there was no theology, but the productive theological thought of this century began properly with the philosophical era of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. They gave to theology a new impetus.

In the study of the theology of this century, we find that there is no distinct line of development as in the philosophical movement. Schools and personalities overlap both in time and/
and in thought. A glance at the table of contents of any book on the subject will indicate what difficulty there is in classifying the trends. Whether we speak of the Old Schools, the New Orthodoxy, the Speculative School, the Radical School, the New Lutheranism, the School of Conciliation, the New Liberal Schools, and the Neo-Kantian Schools as does Lichtenberger; or of the Liberal and Mediating Theology, the Erlangen School, and the Modern Synthesis as does R.S. Franks, we can see that there is disagreement and liberty of interpretation. We cannot put our finger on any one man or any one school and say, "This is the theology of the nineteenth century." It was a period of ups and downs, of affirmations and negations, of radicalism and conservatism.

All the various schools and personalities involved in the theology of the century had at least one thing in common, and it is upon this touchstone that we must make our orientation as we look at the century. It was an era of Christological thought. "Who is Jesus Christ and what are we to think of Him?" This was the question which was uppermost in the minds of theologians. Professor H.R. Mackintosh declares that not since the fourth century had the Person and work of Jesus Christ been so much the centre and substance of theological thought. There is no trace in the theology of this period of the Christological lethargy of the seventeenth century which contented itself in the fixed doctrines of the Church.¹

Between/

¹ The Person of Jesus Christ, p.248.
Between the formalism of the seventeenth century and the Christological revival of the nineteenth century, the Rationalism of the intervening century had done much to smother under the blanket of reason any attempt at Christology. J.F. Röhr, a typical example of Rationalism, insisted that Christology be detached from theology. He was intolerant of anything he did not understand and Christology was to him thoroughly unintelligible. Taking his stand with Kant, Röhr emphasized the moral aspect of religion to the exclusion of everything else. Paulus, a contemporary of Röhr, attempted to write a life of Jesus after the postulates and principles of the Kantian philosophy. We are familiar with the results of this experiment. Paulus's treatment of the miracles contained in the Gospels explained them away with a rational twist leaving nothing but hallucinations and exaggerations in their place. Christology, therefore, had no place in the theology of Paulus. It is not surprising, therefore, to read that the theologians and preachers were often more interested in sports and agriculture than in theology. "The pulpit," says Hurst, "became the rostrum where the shepherdless masses were entertained with vague essays on such general terms as righteousness, human dignity, light, progress, truth, and right. The peasantry received frequent and laboured instructions on the raising of cattle, bees, and fruit. The poets of/

1. "That which the dogmatic language of the supernaturalists calls Christology forms no integral part of my system, for this consists indeed of a religion which Jesus taught, but not one of which He Himself could be the Object," Röhr in Briefe über den Rationalismus, p.36, quoted by Brunner, The Mediator, p.45.
of the day were publicly recited in the temples where the Reformers had preached. Theology was identified with morality, and Christology was deemed unimportant. The influence of Kant and Richte can be seen at work in this Rationalistic theology with its emphasis on reason and its assurance that religion can be equated with morality.

In opposition to the Rationalists a group of so-called Supranaturalists endeavoured to make a place for revelation in theology. This they did by associating it with reason. The Bible was for the Supranaturalists, as for the Rationalists too, a collection of truths and eternal ideas which must become the ruling principles of the mind of man. They differed from the Rationalists in explaining the manner in which these truths have become apparent. The Rationalists said it was through reason alone; the Supranaturalists agreed with this but declared that reason is what it is just because it is the off-spring of revelation. Scripture and reason, therefore, are in essential agreement. But the Supranaturalists followed in the wake of the Rationalists as far as Christology was concerned. "The essential point," they said, "is to believe that Christ is more than we are, that He is better than we are, that He is not what we are."2

The contradictions and inconsistencies of Rationalism and Supranaturalism led some theologians, principally De Wette, to attempt a reconciliation of the two schools. De Wette, whom Lichtenberger/
Lichtenberger calls the Nathanael of modern theology, was instructed in the Kantian philosophy but felt that the key to understanding Christianity did not lie in philosophy. The Rationalistic explanation of miracles by Paulus convinced him that the basis of Christianity could not be rational. Supranaturalism, he felt, was no better, for its notion of revelation was too far removed from the spirit of the age. De Wette found shelter from this struggle of opposites in aesthetics. The religious sentiment, he concluded, is the vehicle which carries man to the Infinite. This sentiment is beyond the reach or scope of reason. Dogmas, therefore, become symbols of poetic truths. In later life, the sermons of Schleiermacher had a profound influence upon De Wette and he began to devote himself to preaching. He tried to reach the ordinary fold through a more positive statement of his theory of the religious sentiment, but his noble intentions were met with indifference. De Wette's genius lay in criticism not in systematic theology.

This background of conflicting theological movements, which seemed to get nowhere and which stifled the religion of the people by offering them a moral philosophy or an aesthetic was the point of departure for Schleiermacher, the initiator and renovator of modern German theology. Up until his appearance theology had been bridled with the bit of reason fashioned after the Kantian philosophy. Our problem concerning the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption was not as yet a vital issue in theology simply because Jesus Christ was shrouded in rational garments which covered/
covered over conflicting doctrines but which hid His Person. "With the advent of Schleiermacher a radical change took place in the theological thought of the nineteenth century. As in Rationalism so too in Schleiermacher, the Kantian philosophy was the starting-point, but it was no more than that. We said before that Kant opened the doors of philosophy to undiscovered corridors of truth which lay beyond his philosophy. Schleiermacher was the first to step over the threshold and begin the work of exploration. Others followed him; some penetrating further than he, and others not so far, but Schleiermacher carried the torch which enabled those who followed to see. Of all the corridors opened up for theological investigation the one which attracted most attention was the Person of Christ. It is down this path that we will follow the footsteps of the theological thinkers of the nineteenth century.

Schleiermacher has been called the father of modern theology. For the first time since the Reformation a brilliant theologian centred his whole theological system in the Person and work of Christ. Nearly two centuries of incredulity and indifference elapsed before there was heard a voice which called men back to the Person of Christ. The philosophical movement of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel had fostered this Christological apathy. Rationalism had been content to regard Christ as an ideal and an example. Any detailed discussion of His Person in relation to the doctrines of the Church was met with little sympathy. Schleiermacher stood at the turning of the ways deflecting the current of thought through channels/
channels long forgotten and unused.

The peculiar genius of Schleiermacher lay in the inspiration of selection rather than in originality. His theology is always eclectic, but is is not so much of a mixture as it is the apex of conflicting opinions. It has been said that he took both sides to every question. "Either or" was no challenge to him, his answer was always "both and." He was the great gatherer who gleaned stray bits of truth which fell from the hasty reapers who preceded him. Philip Schaff has said of Schleiermacher, "The sublime speculation of Plato, the calm pantheism of Spinoza, the keen criticism of Kant, the subjective idealism of Richte, the romantic poetry of Tieck and Schlegel, the bold neology of Semler, the sentimental piety of Zinzendorf, the stern supralapsarianism of Calvin, were all mastered by him." But it is just this eclecticism that has given Schleiermacher his place in modern theology. It is so broad, and in many points so vague, that it has been able to open its arms to all subsequent theologians. Its inconsistency has been the guarantee of its permanent influence, and although he denied the relevancy of the Old Testament and treated with indifference the doctrines of the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection and Ascension of Christ, he was regarded as a god-send by those who longed for a defender of the faith.

In separating himself from the Kantian morality, Schleiermacher made religion a thing sui generis. Religion is a response of a definite part of human personality, what Schleiermacher called the/

the schlechthiniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl, the feeling of absolute dependence. Religion is placed on a feeling, or psychological, basis; not a moral basis as in the Kantian philosophy or an intellectual basis as in the Hegelian philosophy. "I maintain," says Schleiermacher in the Reden, "that in all better souls piety springs necessarily by itself; that a province of its own in the mind belongs to it, in which it has unlimited sway."¹ "The true nature of religion," he said, "is ....immediate consciousness of the Deity as He is found in ourselves and in the world."² Man is thus born, as it were, with a religious capacity which in essence is the feeling of dependence on God. In the Epilogue to the Reden he concluded to the "cultured despisers of religion," to whom he addressed the speeches, "in the very type of religion, which in Christianity you so often despise, you are rooted with your whole knowing, doing, and being. You would see that you cannot get away from it, and that you seek in vain to imagine its destruction without the annihilation of all that you hold dearest and holiest in the world - your whole culture and mode of life, your art and science."³ While it is true that Schleiermacher did not fully develop his theory of absolute dependence in the Reden, the germ was there, as we can see by the above quotations. In the Glaubenslehre, he stated as a preliminary proposition that piety is neither knowing or doing but a feeling which in essence is the "consciousness/

Schleiermacher never rose to very great spiritual heights when he dealt with the conception of God. In the **Den God is spoken of as the Universe, the Infinite, the world-All; God is never described as a person. Schleiermacher laboured under the doctrine of Spinoza that "omnis determinatio est negatio." He felt that he could not ascribe to God any attributes, for to do so would be to limit Him. As a person, God is unknowable; all that we can say is that He is the cause of all things and the force which motivates all things. In this respect Schleiermacher never departed in his thinking from Kant. It has been said of Schleiermacher that he had no God but Christ and this is, in a sense, true. It is Jesus Christ that commanded his attention in the **Glaubenslehre, and in concentrating upon Him he neglected the doctrine of God.

Where Schleiermacher definitely transcended Kant was in refusing to accept the principle that man can redeem himself. The Radical Evil which infests men's souls is to be expunged, according to Kant, by his own efforts as he accepts the Good Principle which eventually effects his salvation. Schleiermacher referred redemption to an act of God which is a supernatural miracle like creation. In the final analysis it would seem that Schleiermacher conceived of man as sinful just in order that he might be redeemed.

In the **Glaubenslehre we come face to face with the Person of:

of Christ. The Reden had reserved a revered and respected place for Christ as a mediator but not as the Mediator. The Glaubenslehre marks a decided advance over Schleiermacher's previous writings, and here we find that Christianity is not merely the manifestation of an eternal idea, as in the Reden, but is "a monotheistic faith of the teleological type, and is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that everything in it is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth."¹ In this unequivocable language Jesus is regarded as the only Mediator and redemption is indissolubly connected with His Person.

Beginning with the Christian consciousness of redemption Schleiermacher worked backwards until he arrived at Jesus Christ, the agent of redemption, and from whom there issues the vitalizing power to overcome the world. Christ's efficacy lies ultimately in His sinlessness. He who was perfectly holy and free from sin was enabled to become perfectly God-conscious. But this sinless Christ is also the historic Jesus. Thus He is both an ideal and a Person. He is the Urbild, the Archetype, in which history and Person are combined. Jesus stands in God's mind as the terminus ad quem for humanity and as such He is human, but by His sinlessness He is also the Redeemer who saves humanity. Jesus Christ, then, is a man, but He is also Man in its entirety and perfection.

In so far as Christ is sinless, perfect, and the Urbild of humanity, He has power to raise all men to His level. This is/

¹ Glaubenslehre, sec.11.
is redemption. By becoming one of us, we become like Him. This is the secret of His Redeemership. Jesus's perfection has been communicated to us, "His consciousness having become," says Fairbairn, "as it were, communicable, transmissible, heritable. His character therefore is archetypal, the original of a type He not only created, but perpetuates."¹ When we experience redemption through union with Christ, the religious feeling becomes the guiding principle of life. "The Redeemer assumes believers into the power of His God-consciousness, and this is His redemptive activity."²

The abiding influence of Schleiermacher's Christology was due to two emphases: the declaration that Jesus was the Redeemer without whom there would be no redemption, and the proclamation that Jesus Christ, historic as well as divine, was the centre of Christianity. These two conclusions had a revolutionary effect upon Christological thought in the nineteenth century. They were the foci of the long debate which was carried on by subsequent thinkers concerning the Person of Christ and the principle of Redemption. For although Schleiermacher spoke with finality about Christ the Redeemer, he raised more questions than he solved. Is Christ alive in the world to-day? Or is it merely His spirit that redeems? Is redemption a present or future experience? Has Christ any significance for the individual or is His redemption to be referred to humanity as a whole? These questions were left by/

¹ A.M. Fairbairn, The Place of Christ in Modern Theology, p.227.
² Glaubenslehre, sec.100.
by Schleiermacher for others to answer. His main task was finished when he ordered theology to right-about-face and stand at attention before the Person of Christ.

The influence of Schleiermacher and Hegel found fertile soil in David Friedrich Strauss and the Tubingen School of criticism. It must be remembered that Schleiermacher and Hegel were contemporaries. While the one centred his theology around the Person of Christ, the other constructed a speculative philosophy which in theological terms had very little to do with the Person of Christ but had much to say about the idea of Christianity. Although he never ceased to be an Hegelian, Strauss became interested in Schleiermacher's lectures on the life of Christ and the central place given Him in the Glaubenslehre. This interest gave Strauss the impulse to write a Leben Jesu of his own. So tremendous was the impact of this life of Jesus on the theology of the day that Strauss devoted the rest of his life to further editions and elaborations of his so-called "mythical" theory.

The word "mythical" is not to be confused with what is false or untrue. It is a spiritual term used by Strauss in opposition to historical fact. The Leben Jesu took as its starting-point the theory that the records of the Gospels are the exaggerated wish-projections of Jesus's followers who thought they saw in Him the fulfilment of the Old Testament Messianic Prophecies. This does not mean that Jesus was a wilful impostor or that His disciples were scheming forgers. Strauss, for a time at least, had high/
high regard for the moral character of Jesus and he even admitted that the New Testament, although built on a mythical foundation, contains truths which have not only revolutionized society but which are worthy of perpetuation. But this is not the place to discuss Strauss in detail. We will see in the next chapter how he developed his theory and the conclusions to which he came regarding the Person of Christ and the doctrine of redemption. It is enough here to state his position and pass on to the historical influence of the mythical theory.

Strauss instituted the study of New Testament criticism. Rationalism and philosophical idealism had focused their attention upon the truth of Christianity. Schleiermacher had referred Christianity to its Founder. But no one so far had turned to the Bible itself. Strauss's mythical theory of the life of Jesus placed biblical history in doubt. Men began to question its reliability and authenticity. But Strauss did no more than to cast this doubt, he did not attempt to explain the sources of the Gospel records. This was to be the task of the Tübingen School of theologians who supplemented the Leben Jesu with a minute criticism of the old and new Testament records.

Bruno Bauer of Tübingen was the forerunner of this school. Directly after the appearance of Strauss's first Leben Jesu he published a life of Jesus himself which was in accord with the general position of Strauss but which set forth an entirely opposite interpretation of the Gospel narratives. Strauss had declared that the New Testament was an exaggerated modification of the Old Testament/
Testament superimposed upon the Person of Christ. Bauer insisted that the life of Jesus was the spontaneous invention of the Evangelists. Bauer was not sure that Jesus even lived, and if He did, He was simply an ordinary man living in the reign of the Emperor Hadrian. The teachings of Jesus were to him not at all original, they were not even reproductions of Old Testament precepts, they were common to all heathen religions. Christianity was not a development, according to Bauer, its inception was due to the spontaneous combustion of the inventive imagination of the Evangelists.1

Bauer's work would have received very little recognition, because of its obvious break with historical facts, had there not appeared from the same school a more exacting scholar in the person of R. C. Baur who furthered the interests of the critical school and gave them both credance and popularity. This he did through a more elaborate scrutiny of the Gospel records coupled with a philosophical insight into Hegelianism. Following in the footsteps of Strauss and Bauer he began with the life of Jesus, but he declared at the outset that the difficulty in constructing a picture of Jesus lay in the fact that there is no single portrait of Him in the New Testament, there are, in fact, three. Jesus is a Jew, a Gentile, and a combination of the two. Matthew, James, Peter, and Jude conceive of Jesus as a Jewish moralist with supernatural ability. Luke and Paul think of Him as the Incarnate God. John attempts to reconcile the two views and make of Jesus a Jewish Son of God who has come to save the world. In this formula we can/

can detect the influence of Hegel's dialectic.

Baur, however, did not give us a picture of Jesus. That, he claimed, is an impossible task. He gave his attention to the study of sources and tendencies in the New Testament and concluded that Paul is more important for Christianity than Jesus.¹ Baur was followed by a host of theologians who carried on this criticism of the New Testament records. The study of biblical documents was the great contribution of this school. Beginning with Strauss's Leben Jesu, or more accurately perhaps with Schleiermacher who confused the ideal and historic Jesus, these New Testament critics laboured hard and long in an attempt to segregate the Person of Christ from the superfluous encumbrances because of which the true Jesus had been hidden from sight. Although the Person of Christ was the centre of this Tübingen School, little was said about theology proper or the systematic aspects of theology. For the time the interest of the theological world was diverted from theology and dogmatic and was concentrated on the problem of the historicity of the Gospels and the life of Jesus.

As over against Strauss and the Tübingen School of criticism, there developed what has been called the Speculative School of Theology whose outstanding exponent was A.E. Biedermann of/ ¹

of Zurich. Strauss had created a school of theological thought which found its point of departure in the systems of Hegel and Schleiermacher. Hegel had tried to reconcile Christianity with his philosophy. Schleiermacher made religion a thing in itself and related Christianity with the Person of Christ. Strauss and the Tübingen School stood within the gap but did not attempt a reconciliation. They saw the value and truth of the Hegelian idealism and they realized the importance of Jesus for Christianity, but in their study of sources they found it difficult to say anything positive about Jesus or Christianity.

Carl Daub, one of the speculative theologians who preceded Biedermann, was the first important disciple of Hegel who attempted to strengthen the bond between Christianity and philosophy. His passion was for objective truth and thus for him the speculative standpoint was the only legitimate view to take. God is revealed to us in our reason as the Idea. The Person of Christ plays but little part in the Hegelianism of Daub. He has no Christology to speak of because for him the religion which Jesus taught is of far greater significance than Jesus Himself.¹

Daub's vague style and confused thought prevented his works from being widely accepted, but in his disciple, Marheineke, his theology came to a fuller and clearer expression. Marheineke was an ardent Hegelian who had no use for Schleiermacher's psychological

¹ Die dogmatische Theologie jetziger Zeit oder die Selbstsucht in der Wissenschaft des Glaubens und seiner Artikel, Heidelberg, 1833.
logical religion or for the reluctance of Strauss and the Tübingen School to associate their findings with Hegelianism. Marheineke's ambition was to demonstrate that the doctrines of the Church in all their fullness are in complete accord with the principles of Hegelianism. The historic Jesus is for Marheineke the realized idea of God in humanity. We see in His Person the union of divine and human, and so He shows us what redemption means. In attempting to abide by orthodox language and yet infuse the Hegelian terminology into his account, Marheineke constructed a hybrid Christianity which bore the characteristics of both but which was neither the one or the other.¹

Others followed Daub and Marheineke with various emphases and ramifications in the association of Hegelianism and Christianity. In the realm of Christology none applied himself with greater effort and forcefulness than Biedermann of Zurich. We will look at Biedermann's Christology in detail in another chapter; for the present it is sufficient to note that his system was reared on the separation of the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption. He followed Hegel in declaring the Absolute and the finite to be one, but he denied that philosophy and religion are the same thing. Unlike the Hegelians he insisted on taking account of the historic Jesus. But the Church, he claimed, has wrongly predicated of Him what is true only of humanity. The Person of Christ, therefore, is not superfluous or unimportant, for in Him the principle of Christianity/

¹ Die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als wissenschaft, Berlin, 1847.
Christianity was first realized and given currency. Biedermann represented a peculiar inconsistency in the Hegelianism which he adopted. He would like to have separated the historical Jesus from the idea of Christianity but his own personal belief kept creeping into his Hegelianism. In later life he showed evidences of breaking with his former principles and adopting a more orthodox explanation of Christianity.

Hegelianism did not stop with Biedermann, but its influence was felt less and less as time went on. Schleiermacher and the school of New Testament criticism increased in popularity as Hegelianism decreased. Thus we discover that in this stage of the theological development of the nineteenth century philosophy and theology begin to part company. The great philosophical movement in Kant, Fichte, and Hegel was never forgotten, to be sure, but theology began to stand on its own feet once again.

It is impossible to treat of the theology of the nineteenth century without mention of Dorner and Thomasius. Among other reasons we place these two theologians together because they were both influenced by Schleiermacher and Hegel and both felt the need of developing and improving ecclesiastical doctrines. Dorner inclined toward Schleiermacher and Thomasius toward Hegel. Dorner spoke on behalf of the Union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in Germany; Thomasius was the spokesman of the Lutheran Church. Dorner represented what is called the Vermittlungstheologie, or Mediating/
Mediating Theology; Thomasius's Christology was called the Kenotic theory. Both contributed to the Christological thought of the century.

Dorner began his Christology with the familiar declaration that man is imperfect and that perfect manhood is found only in Christ. He unites in His Person the essence of all men. This He is able to do because God and man are not mutually exclusive but reciprocal in their relationship. Such being the case it is only logical and necessary that there be a God-man who is not only the perfection of this union in thought but also in history. But just because Jesus is an historical individual He was subject to growth and development. It must be assumed, argued Dorner, that His consciousness of His relation to God was therefore the culmination of growth in that direction. The Incarnation does not exhibit Christ as the Son of God in a completed or final sense. It is rather to be thought of as a continuous, accumulative process. The Logos, according to Dorner was bestowed on Jesus, as Pfleiderer says, "in evergrowing measure."¹ This idea of a developing Christ who is nevertheless the Son of God and the Redeemer of men was a new departure for theology. It had been the practice to conceive of Christ as being perfectly God-conscious from His birth, but Dorner's view found a measure of evidence in the Gospel records.²

Thomasius set about to emphasize Christ's manhood. Whatever the Gospels show of Jesus, they show us a man among men.

How/

1. Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant, p.156.
How then, Thomasius asked, can this be explained in the light of His Divinity? The Logos, he said, at the Incarnation laid aside or "emptied" Himself of His Divinity in order to become man. Thomasius made a clear-cut distinction between the "relative" and "essential" attributes of God. The "relative" attributes, such as omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience, were limited in the historical manifestation of the Logos; but the "essential" attributes, such as love, truth, and holiness, were incarnated in Him from the beginning. This distinction he used to answer Dorner's criticism that the Kenotic theology negated the Divine Immutability.

The corollary proposition which Thomasius wished to proclaim was that in this self-limitation of the Logos we see the greatness of the Divine Sacrifice in the Person of Christ in whom the Logos relinquished His perfectability so that redemption is made possible through the assumption of the world's sin upon this Person. The historic person who lived among men and died for men is not to be confused with the Pre-existent Christ or the Exalted Christ. Thus, like Dorner, Thomasius conceived that from the time of His appearance on earth until the resumption of His former exalted state Jesus underwent a human growth and development.¹

Both Dorner and Thomasius attempted to answer a question which Schleiermacher had suggested but which he had not adequately treated.

treated, the question, How does God become man? Dorner answered that Christ was the human form of the Logos. Although the historic Jesus which we see in the Gospels presents to us a picture of a developing man, still the Logos had imbued perfectability into His human nature at the moment of His appearance on earth. Jesus was not perfect all at once, but He was perfect from stage to stage in His development toward complete perfection. Thomasius refused to believe with Dorner that the historic Jesus was the same person as the Pre-existing Christ or the Exalted Christ. If it were so, he asked, what significance would the Incarnation have? The emphasis of Thomasius is on the Divine Sacrifice which, he argued, necessitated the giving up of something, as the word sacrifice suggests. The Incarnation, therefore, marks the postponement of Christ's essential union with the Father in order that He may humble Himself among men, raising them up through His sacrifice, after which He returns once again to the throne of His Glory.

Next to Schleiermacher, the greatest name in the theological history of the nineteenth century is Ritschl. The impetus which Schleiermacher gave to theology in placing the Person of Christ at the centre of Christianity lay at the back of all Christological thinking up until the time of Ritschl. In Ritschl this impetus was gathered up and sent forth again with renewed power. Whereas the Person of Christ was for Schleiermacher the point of immediate contact in Christianity, the work of Christ, especially redemption/
redemption, was Ritschl's chief concern. The very title of his main work, Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, suggests this. While Schleiermacher's influence was profound, it was not immediate or exhaustive. Those, like Dorner and Thomasius, who wished to carry on Schleiermacher's unfinished work never followed his footsteps unswervingly. There was always an urge to graft the fruits of Schleiermacher's theology with the sober principles of Hegelianism. Although Schleiermacher did much to separate theology and philosophy, his followers could not forego the appeal of Hegelianism as the final test for Christian truth. It is not until we come to Ritschl that we find an attempt, like Schleiermacher's, to describe the Person of Christ without recourse to metaphysical patterns.

We must not think of Ritschl, however, as a mere throwback to the theology of Schleiermacher. The school of New Testament criticism intervened between the two, and as it was the outgrowth of the one, it influenced the other. The religious sentiment which played such an important part in Schleiermacher's theology is utterly lacking in Ritschl. Piety and sentiment were as much out of place in his thought as metaphysic. Schleiermacher's emphasis on "feeling" was regarded by Ritschl as Romantic subjectivism. While Rationalism and the speculative philosophy remained outside the sphere of Christianity simply because they refused to deal with such subjects as prayer and worship, subjects most surely important to the believer, the subjectivism of Schleiermacher ignored/

ignored the rooting of Christianity in history. Both natural theology and mysticism go by the board for Ritschl for neither are concerned with history or with morality. Neither give power, and this is what Ritschl found at the centre of Christianity. If we would know what Christianity is, we must go to the Christian believer. He, not the philosopher, can tell us what it means to be saved.

In his definition of Christianity, Ritschl noted two items: first, that Christianity is based upon redemption offered in Jesus Christ, and second, it is an ethical religion concerned primarily in establishing the Kingdom of God. The two are not distinctly separated in Ritschl's thought for his conception of Jesus's "vocation," a favourite Ritschlian word, is to found the Kingdom of God and with it to bring redemption to men. His definition of Christianity is given in a simile: "But Christianity, so to speak, resembles not a circle described from a single centre, but an ellipse which is determined by two foci (i.e. the religious conception of redemption, and the ethical conception of the Kingdom of God)."¹ This definition reminds us of Schleiermacher, but Ritschl went beyond Schleiermacher especially in the ethical emphasis.

Ritschl affirmed at the start that Christianity is a social religion. The Kingdom of God is social. For Schleiermacher the individual was of primary importance, but for Ritschl it/

¹. Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, III. p.11; E.T. p.11.
it is society. Just so did Schleiermacher fail, said Ritschl, in giving the doctrines of justification and reconciliation their true bearing. These doctrines are to be conceived in relation to society in both a religious and an ethical way. Ritschl's theory of redemption was the outcome of this relationship. For Schleiermacher redemption consisted in a relationship between God and man, but for Ritschl redemption was defined in terms of the Kingdom of God.

Ritschl based his consideration of the Person of Christ on what he calls werthurteile, or value-judgments. Knowledge, he said, is of two kinds, fact-judgments and value-judgments. Science is concerned with the former; religion with the latter. Facts are the result of examination and investigation. Values are the result of appreciation. The Christian thinks of Christ in terms of value-judgments. We are not interested in how Christ came into the world, but we are interested in His significance for us. As Professor Mackintosh says of Ritschl's Christology, "We see the divine quality of Christ's person in the Divine character of His work."¹ Such problems as the two-natures of Christ and the Virgin Birth have no significance in value-judgments. His Person can only be understood in the light of His work. The work of Christ is confined to the Kingdom of God. In perfecting the Kingdom of God, He not only reveals the Father but redeems man. Because of His/

¹. H.R. Mackintosh, The Person of Christ, p.279.
His work, therefore, the Person of Christ has the religious value of God and we are justified in speaking of Him as Divine.

Our knowledge of what Christ can do for man is derived from the experience of the Church. In the society of believers we enter into a relationship with Christ. Redemption is not mediated through the exercise of the intellect. We can never discover what salvation is, Ritschl declared, unless we live in the Christian community. He was not referring here to the Roman doctrine of the Church, but of how it comes about that we experience saving grace. The statements which Jesus made in regard to the forgiveness of sins are "completely intelligible only when we see how they are reflected in the consciousness of those who believe in Him, and how the members of the Christian community trace back their consciousness of pardon to the person and action and passion of Jesus."¹

The last important development in the theology of the nineteenth century is represented by Ernst Troeltsch and the Religio-historical School. The history of theological thought following upon Ritschl is similar in many respects to the history following Schleiermacher. The Ritschlian School is largely responsible for our present day theology and yet the disciples of Ritschl are so varied that they group themselves into what seem to

to be contradictory movements. Like Schleiermacher, Ritschl's great contribution was the stimulus which he gave to his followers. By opening up new problems the scope of theology was expanded. Those who still clung to the speculative theology were forced to take account of their principles anew. Those who rested complacently in the shelter of ecclesiasticism were compelled to give a restatement of their faith.

From Ritschl there flowed, as from a common source, two streams of theological thought. Starting with the emphasis laid down by Ritschl on the Person of Christ and the Kingdom of God these two tendencies were at first in agreement. In time, however, one tendency inclined toward the Person of Christ putting all its strength into a proclamation of Christianity's absoluteness and uniqueness; while the other found its touchstone in the Kingdom of God, declaring Christianity to be the best religion but not necessarily the final or absolute religion. To this second school of thought belonged Troeltsch. He was the leading exponent of the left wing Ritschlianism which was called the religionsgeschichtliche Schule, or the Religio-historical School. As the title of this school suggests the main concern of thinkers like Troeltsch was the study of the history of religions. This field had been neglected by Ritschl but ought not to be neglected any longer, they claimed. At a later stage we are to look more closely at the Christological position of Troeltsch, at present we can only note the main drift of his thought.

Troeltsch attached himself to Schleiermacher and Hegel
and thus reverted back once more to the attempted mediation of
the Speculative School which tried to reconcile Christianity with
Hegelianism. Troeltsch, however, is not unmindful of Ritschl and
hence his return to Hegelianism is modified and mollified by the
theology of Ritschl. Just as Ritschl returns to Schleiermacher
taking with him the thought of the intervening years, so Troeltsch
goes back to Schleiermacher and Hegel with the added influence of
the Speculative School and Ritschl.

The scientific method had a strong appeal for Troeltsch
and it is this method which he used in considering Christianity.
We must begin, he said, with the realization that Christianity is
a religion among many religions. Christianity is not the only
religion, nor does it contain the only revelation. Revelation
is a universal affair not confined to one religion or to one person
but to all religions. Because of this, Christianity takes its
place among the religions of the world in a relative and not in
a unique way. It may be the highest religion possible, it may
be the final religion, but this is to assume too much, we cannot
say more than that it is the highest religion we know to date.
Time and tide alone have the answer to its finality. But this is
not to depreciate Christianity, Troeltsch argued, it is sufficient
for our needs to-day and this is all we need to know.

Troeltsch had a deep and warm affection for Jesus Christ,
but his faith was never expressed in his theology. The Person of
Christ is always defined by him in the terms of religious hero and
genius. Jesus was a great religious personality. He was a pro-
phet/
phet and a revealer of God, but He is relative in so far as Christianity is relative. Nevertheless we are to think of Him as sufficient for our time. Faith in Him is the unifying bond of the Christian community. He is the centre of Christian worship and as such commands our faith in Him. What the future will bring is a mystery. Perhaps a new prophet will appear and render the revelation of Christ of no account.1

We have followed the thread of theological thought from Schleiermacher to Troeltsch with a specific problem and purpose in view. The relation between the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption is the main concern of this thesis. For that reason certain prominent names in the history of nineteenth century thought have been eliminated simply because they have little or no bearing on our problem. And in as much as we are concerned especially with Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, such schools of thought as the English theology of the Atonement have no connection in this historical survey.

The purpose in giving an historical sketch of theology has been to show the leading trends of Christological thought in the century which form the background of the particular systems we are about to examine.

All those who dealt with Christology in the nineteenth century were bent upon answering one question, "What think ye of Christ?"

Christ?" The century is an important one in the history of Christology just because it did think. It was not a sterile age, nowhere was there the spirit of lethargy or apathy that characterized the seventeenth century. Theology became gradually more and more dissatisfied with the dogmas of the Person of Christ and redemption. The impact of philosophy forced theology to rethink its doctrines. The authority of the Church ceased to be final in matters of theology. Theologians were not content with the old formalism. "What do these things mean?", was the question in the minds of all, and it was the question which theology had to face. In the field of Christology we note the outcome of this renewed vitality. We begin to hear about the Jesus of history in contrast to the doctrine of Christ. The study of the Bible is stimulated and from that study is reaped a deeper understanding of the Gospel which Jesus taught. The Fatherhood of God, the Kingdom of God, the meaning of sacrifice become the bywords of theology. It was not enough to say that Jesus is the only Son of God, the Redeemer of the world. Theology was forced to explain what is meant by these and kindred phrases.

In general we can see two tendencies in this century around which all thinking on the problem of the Person of Christ and His relation to redemption was focused. The one assigned to the Person of Christ, as the Redeemer, a uniqueness and absoluteness not to be confused or associated with other religions. The other tended to subtract from the Person of Christ a principle of redemption which in its own way is unique and absolute but which is/
is nevertheless a principle and not a person. It is this second
tendency in which we are primarily interested, and in Strauss,
Biedermann, and Troeltsch we will see how this position was main­
tained and developed.
CHAPTER III

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL POSITION OF DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS.

David Friedrich Strauss was born at Ludwigsburg, Württemberg, on January 27th., 1808. His father, a merchantman of moderate ability, held to an exacting orthodoxy in religion which resulted in an estrangement from his son after the publication of the famous Leben Jesu. This separation from his father caused Strauss considerable pain and anxiety. In his mother, however, he had a loving and sympathetic friend. She was a devout, simple-hearted woman whose religion was centred not in external forms, as was her husband's, but in a humble piety and an ardent love of nature. "I am only half her son," said Strauss, "and only half her worth."

The two opposite types of religion represented in his father and mother, in the one religion was separated from morality and in the other morality from religion, created a problem for Strauss, and he sought for a solution in the study of theology for which he showed an early aptitude. In 1821 he entered the lower seminary at Blaubeuren where he spent the next four years in elementary training in preparation for the university. Here he had as/

1. Ausgewählte Briefe, p.100 on the death of his father.
2. "Zum Andenken an meine gute Mutter," in Gesammelte Werke, Bd.I.
3. Ausgewählte Briefe, p.87; see also Zeller, D.F. Strauss in his Life and Writings, p.8.
as one of his teachers F.C. Baur who shortly was to become known as the leader of the Tübingen School of New Testament Criticism. We can gather from his letters to his friend and school-mate, Christian Marklin, something of the atmosphere of these early school days. The two boys were kindred spirits. They disliked the stern discipline and lack of freedom and were glad when the course at Blaubeuren was concluded.¹

In 1825 Strauss entered the theological department, known as the Stift, at the University of Tübingen. Here he spent five years, two in philosophy and philology and three in theology. During the first years Strauss and his friend Marklin were thrilled and enraptured with the philosophy of Schelling. Instead of participating in the usual Kneipes and student clubs they formed a literary circle where they discussed the poets and philosophers. During this romantic phase of his education, Strauss became interested for a short time in mesmerism and clairvoyancy. In the nearby hills there were tales of shepherds who had the power to heal the sick and divine the future. At the village of Weinsperg there lived the famous seeress of Prevorst and to her Strauss and Marklin once paid a visit. But the interest in spiritualism was short-lived and while he was yet at the university he wrote a paper proving that there was nothing in it which could not be explained in/

¹ Various letters in Ausgewählte Briefe; see also Zeller p.12, 18.
in a natural way.  

When he finished the university course, Strauss was for a period of nine months an assistant pastor in the village of Klein-Ingersheim. Here he not only ministered to the congregation but taught in the local school. His preaching gave him considerable anxiety of mind for he had become a Hegelian pantheist and, accordingly, he was disturbed to know what to preach. In his correspondence with Märklin he revealed his distress but claimed to have found a solution by emphasizing the intellectual content of the Bible in his sermons and ignoring as far as possible the historical husk in which the kernel of truth was wrapped.

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1. **Kritik der verschiedenen Ansichten über die Geistererscheinungen der Seherin von Prevorst.** In Mathilde Blind's "Memoir," The Old and the New Faith, p.xvii, there is the story that a friend of Strauss asked the seeress what she thought of Strauss's belief to which she answered, "it never could turn to unbelief." In later years Strauss held the prophecy up to his friend and said, "Either then I am not an unbeliever even to this day, or if I am, then it follows that your oracle was but a sham." See also Ziegler, D.F. Strauss, p.46, who suggests that this interest in spiritualism permanently influenced Strauss as is seen for example in his criticism of Schleiermacher's religious feeling as a theological apparition (Erscheinung); Also Zeller p.20 who describes the interest of Strauss in mesmerism as "one of the many pupa-changes through which thought passes."

2. Zeller p.29.

3. On this short ministry and the question of Begriff and Vorstellungen in preaching see Ausgewählte Briefe, pp.3,6,7; Ziegler p.70; Zeller p.35; cf. also in der alte und der neue Glaube, p.89; E.T. p.102, where Strauss declares that such subjects as the ascension and resurrection, miracles, healing, raising of the dead, casting out devils, are to be preached "symbolically" with a view to their moral application. But he decrives this "beating around the bush" (diese Umwege) and suggests that the moral application can be best taught by "going straight at it."
Strauss was not happy in his first and only charge because his chief interest at this time was in the philosophy of Hegel. He resigned his post and travelled to Berlin where Hegel was lecturing at the University. Soon after he arrived, Hegel died. Strauss heard the news as he was visiting Schleiermacher who was also lecturing at Berlin. It was a severe blow to Strauss for as he said to Schleiermacher, "It was on his account that I came to Berlin."¹ Schleiermacher and Strauss were not well suited as teacher and pupil. However, Strauss stayed in Berlin for a time and heard Schleiermacher's lectures. The lectures on the life of Jesus interested him immensely, but he felt that Schleiermacher had only gone half way in his treatment and he resolved to return to Tübingen, where he had been appointed a Repetent at the Stift, to "write a life of Jesus according to my own idea."² But this ambition was postponed for a time. When Strauss returned to Tübingen, he began to lecture on Hegel, and he was so successful that he would have relinquished his theological studies to join the philosophical faculty, but the combined opposition of both the philosophical and theological faculties drove him back to theology again. This turn of events induced him to reconsider his plan for a life of Jesus and within one year, 1835, at the age of twenty-seven, he published his epoch-making Leben Jesu.³

The/

¹ "Um seinetwillen war ich hierher gekommen." Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, p.70 says, "a certain want of tact, considering who his informant was." See also Zeller p.33; Ziegler p.94.
² Ziegler, p.102.
³ Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet, 2 vols., 1835.
The year 1835, says Otto Pfleiderer, marked "an era in our scientific knowledge of the biblical foundations of Christianity." The appearance of Strauss's Leben Jesu was followed by F.C. Baur's work on Paul, Ueber die sogennanten Pastoralbriefe des Apostels Paulus and Wilhelm Vatke's work on the Old Testament, Die Religion des Alten Testamentes nach den kanonischen Büchern entwickelt, all of which contained "the germs of the researches of our own day into the Old and New Testament writings."¹ Strauss's life of Jesus was constructed on an original idea. The Rationalists and the supranaturalists had written their lives of Jesus according to their different standards. Strauss took up an independent position and applied the idea of "myth" to the whole of the New Testament. The Person of Jesus, he argued, had been adorned by the loving fancy of his followers with the Old Testament prophecies and promises of the Messiah. With the mythical theory at hand Strauss succeeded in destroying all traces of the supernatural in the New Testament record of the life of Jesus.

The effect which the appearance of the Leben Jesu had upon theology was tremendous. Strauss became the most talked of writer of the day, but his success turned against him and he was removed from his position at Tübingen never again to occupy a chair in a university. He accepted for a short term a lectureship at the Lyceum in Ludwigsburg where he devoted his time in an effort to stem the ever-growing tide of criticism and ridicule that was poured/

¹ Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant, p.200.
poured forth upon him from all directions. The direct result of the Leben Jesu was chaos. Utterly unexpected, the mythical theory took the theological world by storm. No one was able to contradict Strauss with any real conviction. As Schweitzer says, "The fertilising rain brought up a crop of toad-stools."¹ The three points at which Strauss was most bitterly attacked were in regard to the relation of myth to miracle, the person of Christ, and the relation of John's Gospel to the Synoptics. Of these three the problem of the relation of myth to miracle attracted most attention. Three writers of the time contented themselves with satirical works on the lives of Luther, Napoleon, and Strauss himself showing how in a thousand years the history of these men would be but myths.²

When it seemed to Strauss that he was destined to theological ostracism, there came an invitation from the radical theological group of the University of Zurich asking him to take the chair of Ecclesiastical History and Dogmatics. Strauss accepted immediately but never set foot in a class-room. The conservatives of Zurich launched a campaign with the rallying cry, "Religion in danger," and a petition signed by 40,000 citizens was instrumental in urging the University to rescind the invitation. They granted Strauss an annual pension of 1000 francs for a position he never filled. Strauss harboured no bad feelings but was sorely annoyed at/

¹. Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, p.97.
². , p.112n. The writer of the mythical life of Luther signed himself "Dr. Casuar" which is the German word for "cassowary," "Strauss" being in German the word for "ostrich."
at being represented to the people as the arch-heretic of all time. 1

At the time of this Züriputsch in 1839 Strauss was busy defending his Leben Jesu. The storm of criticism which broke over his head gave him pause to take stock of his position and in the second and third editions of the Leben Jesu he made a few important concessions to his antagonists chiefly in acknowledging the moral and spiritual perfection of the character of Jesus. 2

"He was in those days," says Fairbairn, "caustically compared to a physician who rushed from his house, sword in hand, and assailed the people passing along the street; but who, taking fright at seeing so many done almost to death, retreated within doors, though only to rally forth the next moment, bandages in hand, to bind up his victims." 3 In the fourth edition, however, he removed all these concessions and held firmly to his original position. "My labour in this new edition," he said, "has chiefly consisted in whetting, as it were, my good sword, to free it from the notches made in it rather by my own grinding, than by the blows of my enemies. 4

In 1840 Strauss published his Glaubenslehre or system of dogmatics/

1. Ausgewählte Briefe, p.80,81; Ziegler p.288; Zeller p.66.
2. In the hope of re-establishing his prestige he wrote the pamphlet, Drei Streitschriften zur Vertheidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Theologie, 1838.
dogmatics, the full title of which was Die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft dargestellt. Originally the Leben Jesu was designed by Strauss to serve as a prologue for this work, but it developed so much as a treatise in its own right that he abandoned the Glaubenslehre for five years. The theme of this work is that the history of dogma is the best criticism of dogma. By showing the historical development of the doctrines of the Church from their biblical foundations to their downfall at the hands of modern philosophy, Strauss reinterpreted the ecclesiastical formulas in terms of intellectual concepts. The Glaubenslehre, however, was eclipsed by the romantic appeal of the Leben Jesu and was never taken very seriously.

Nearly/

1. Schweitzer p.70; Zeller p.36.
2. Glaubenslehre, 1840, i.x.71.
3. For a few months in the year 1848 Strauss entered the political ring at Frankfurt. But like most of his ventures this too ended in disaster. The cry "Religion in Danger" was raised again and Strauss was forced to resign. Strangely enough he changed from a radical to a conservative in political matters and thus received the censure of both parties. Mathilde Blind's "Memoir," p.xliv, contains an interesting quotation from a conversation of Strauss. "I felt oppressed," he said, "at seeing nearly every nation in Europe chained down by allied despotism of prince and priest. I studied long the nature of this oppression, and came to the conclusion that the chain which fettered mankind was rather inward than outward, and that without inward thraldom the outward would soon rust away. The inward chain I perceived to be superstition, and the form in which it binds the people of Europe is Christian Supernaturalism. So long as we accept religious control not based on reason, they will accept political control not based on reason." On Strauss's political views see also Lichtenberger, History of German Theology in the nineteenth century, p.336; and Zeller p.87.
Nearly thirty years after the appearance of the Leben Jesu Strauss published in 1864 a new life of Jesus. In the meantime Renan's Vie de Jésus had appeared and due to its popular appeal had received signal success in France. What Renan did for the French people, Strauss wished to do for the German people, and so the new life of Jesus was titled, Das Leben Jesu. Für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet. In this work Strauss claimed for himself the role of reformer. He centred his attention on the formation of the Gospel narratives. The result is a vague picture of Jesus who is a kind of Socrates blending the Hellenic and Jewish culture in His Person. The ultimate fact which the New Testament reveals, Strauss concluded, is an ideal Christ who is the ideal of humanity.¹

At the time of the publication of the new Leben Jesu the lectures of Schleiermacher on the life of Jesus appeared, forty years after they had been delivered. They had been withheld because of the incisive blow dealt theology by Strauss. Schleiermacher according to Strauss had nothing new to add concerning the life of Jesus and certainly he had no balm to heal the wounds which had already been made.²

Toward/

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2. See his Der Christus des Glaubens und der Jesus der Geschichte Eine Kritik des Schleiermacher'schen Lebens Jesu, 1865. Cf. the motto of Strauss given by Ziegler on the frontispiece of his biography, "Ich kann über niemand schreiben den ich nicht liebe." At this time Strauss delved into biographical writing and produced several excellent monographs on Larden, Schubert, Ulrich von Hutten, Reimarus, and Voltaire. These men were all more or less of a type bound together by a common aim - the freedom of thought and the supremacy of reason. The biographies lacked imaginative appreciation, however, and were often concerned more with ideas than personalities.
Toward the end of his life in 1872 Strauss took his pen in hand to write a final theological work which he called *Der alte und der neue Glaube. Ein Bekenntnis*. Once more assuming the role of reformer, he declared that he was representing thousands of souls who like himself had done with the old faith and had entered a new faith. The book set forth Strauss's final position in regard to theology and we see him here definitely swung over to philosophy, even to materialism. In 1874, two years after the appearance of this last work, Strauss died at Ludwigsburg, his native city.

The *Leben Jesu*, the book which made Strauss famous, was published in 1835. We are not concerned here with a minute or detailed examination of the contents or method of this book. That has already been done with skill and erudition so that another survey would be both presumptuous and supererogatory. In so far as the *Leben Jesu*, however, bears upon our problem of the relation of the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption some account, however summary, is in order. Our interest lies in the main tenets laid down by Strauss and not in the detailed working out of his theory. With this in mind, therefore, we will proceed to set forth those/

those elements of the Leben Jesu which have specific significance for our problem.

In the preface to the first edition which appeared in 1835, Strauss announced the aim and purpose of the book. It is time, he suggested, to put forth a new method for examining the New Testament records of the life of Jesus. The Rationalists and Supranaturalists have worked exhaustively in this field but they have worked at cross purposes. The Ancient Church held that the New Testament contained a history and that this history was supernatural. The Rationalists emphasized the historical aspect of the New Testament to the exclusion of its supernatural character while the reverse has been the case with the Supranaturalists. It is time, therefore, to dispense with these biased and one-sided approaches and consider the "mythical" theory of the life of Jesus. Whereas the Rationalists and Supranaturalists conducted their discussions according to the premises of their theological prejudices, Strauss claimed that he liberated his mind from religious and dogmatical presuppositions by means of his philosophical outlook. We are offered in the Leben Jesu an unbiased, unprejudiced, and thoroughly original examination of the life of Jesus as contained in the New Testament.

Strauss acknowledged that in some of his predecessors, mainly in Eichhorn, Paulus, Semler, Gehler, Schelling, and Bauer, the mythical theory had been employed before but chiefly in connection with the Old Testament. What they attempted in part, he attempted in whole by expanding the province of myth to include the/
the New Testament as well as the Old. He followed the general definition of myth as "the representation of an event or of an idea in a form which is historical, but, at the same time, characterized by the rich pictorial and imaginative mode of thought and expression of the primitive ages."\(^1\) But the phrase "of the primitive ages" (des Alterthums) was too limiting for Strauss. There are myths in the New Testament as well as in the Old. So in the New Testament, declared Strauss, we have the "evangelical mythus" which is a narrative dealing with Jesus disclosing not an historical fact but an idea. Such myths are due to two sources: the Old Testament promises and prophecies concerning the coming Messiah, and the belief among His followers that Jesus Himself was that Messiah. Upon these two propositions Strauss undertook to examine the Gospel narratives of the life of Jesus.\(^2\)

The mythical theory of the life of Jesus begins with John the Baptist. "We stand here," said Strauss, "upon purely mythical-poetical ground; the only historical reality which we can hold fast as positive matter of fact being this: the impression made by John the Baptist, by virtue of his ministry and his relation to Jesus, was so powerful as to lead to the subsequent glorification of his birth in connection with the birth of the Messiah in the Christian/

\(^1\) \textit{Leben Jesu}, I. p.34; E.T. p.53.
\(^2\) "", I. p.113; E.T. p.86.
Christian legend.  

When we come to the narratives of the birth of Jesus, we find a similar treatment based upon the Old Testament hope of a Messiah. The genealogies of the Gospels reveal no historical data but only the fact that Jesus's followers were so impressed with their Master that they did not hesitate to ascribe to Him the attributes of the Messiah who, according to the Old Testament, would be of Davidic descent.

The visit of Jesus to the Temple at the age of twelve years, His baptism, His relation to John the Baptist, and the temptation incident are all encrusted with myth. If we look to the Old Testament, Strauss held, we will discover with what accuracy and completeness the Messianic prophecies were interpreted by the early Christians as applying to Jesus Himself. In every instance the historical fades into the mythical. What remains is the conviction in the minds of the Evangelists that Jesus was the Messiah. Strauss did not accuse the writers of the Gospels of wilful forgery, nor did he denounce Jesus as a conscious impostor. It is one of the characteristics of a myth, which distinguishes it from a fable and a parable, that it is created in good faith.

Jesus/

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1. Leben Jesu, I, p.155; E.T. p.107, Strauss refers to Gen. 18:11;15:8; Exod. 6:23, etc. to show how the early Christian writers invested their narratives with Old Testament ideas. The account of John the Baptist given by the Fourth Evangelist is discredited by Strauss who attributed the narratives of the Baptist, as also the narratives of Jesus, to the genius of the writer, Part II, Chap.1, sec.46.
Jesus became conscious of His Messiahship gradually and by degrees, according to Strauss. His use of the phrases "Son of Man" and "Son of God" were full of Messianic content and were used by Jesus as He became conscious of the fact that He was regarded as the Messiah by others. He began to interpret His mission and authority in terms of the Messianic hope. The prophecies of the Messiah's powers were transferred to Him. Strauss was quite ready to admit the greatness of many of Jesus's sayings. The Sermon on the Mount is an instance of His moral greatness, but the Evangelists have played fast and loose with the original setting of the Sermon and transformed it according to their own convenience.

As to the New Testament records of the miracles which Jesus performed, Strauss found no difficulty in confining them to the expected prowess of the coming Messiah. It was not only determined in the Old Testament that the Messiah would work miracles, it was even known what sort of miracles He would perform. Curing diseases, raising the dead, feeding multitudes, were all part and parcel of the miraculous mission of the Messiah, and it was to the Christian writers, therefore, no act of irreverence to ascribe such feats to Jesus. But Jesus was not only represented as performing miracles for others, He was Himself the object of some of the miracles. The Transfiguration, the Resurrection, and the Ascension, are also miracles invested with myth. It is only by means of the mythical/

mythical method, said Strauss, that these miracles can mean anything to us. The Rationalists, like Paulus, who endeavoured to explain the miracles rationally and historically, deprived them of their inward spiritual truths. The Supranaturalists, too, confused truth with fact. Only the mythical theory can reveal the intrinsic significance of a miracle.¹

The Gospel narratives of the Death and Resurrection of Jesus suggest that Jesus Himself was conscious of His fate and willingly set Himself to face the Cross as an expiatory sacrifice and offering. But, Strauss argued, these narratives were written after the death of Jesus and so give us no historical evidence for declaring His foreknowledge of His Death and Resurrection. The writers of the New Testament were blinded to the facts by their hopes. "As he who has looked at the sun," wrote Strauss, "long sees its image wherever he may turn his gaze; so they, blinded by their enthusiasm for the Messiah, saw him on every page of the only book they read, the Old Testament, and in the conviction that Jesus was the Messiah, founded in the genuine feeling that he had satisfied their deepest need - a conviction and a feeling which we also still honour - they laid hold on supports which have long been broken, and which can no longer be made tenable by the most zealous efforts of an exegesis which is behind the age."²

In such fashion did Strauss deal with the life of Jesus. From the birth of Jesus to His Death and Resurrection the mythical criticism/

criticism laid bare the poetic and imaginative folklore with which loving fancy had crowned the Person of Jesus. The mythopoeic instinct of the Christian writers is revealed on every page of the New Testament. The central figure of the Gospels, whom we thought was so well known, is but a shadowy phantom whose reality is, at most, questionable. The Leben Jesu is not a life of Jesus, we are left with no picture or portrait of the Master, it is a criticism of the life of Jesus which nearly succeeds in destroying that life altogether.

Strauss was not unconscious of the result of his Leben Jesu. There is no note in his criticism of joy at overturning the traditional tables of history. He is the arch-iconoclast critically, but he would also claim to be a reformer dogmatically. Thus it is that in an appendix to the Leben Jesu he attempts "to re-establish dogmatically that which has been destroyed critically." If the Leben Jesu is a negative work, this conclusive dogmatic statement is Strauss's positive contribution to Christological thought.

Neither the Supranaturalists nor the Rationalists gave anything positive in Christology, claimed Strauss. The one produced a blind faith unfounded on demonstration or criticism; the other, a reasoned faith which offered no basis for its origin or continuance. Nor did Schleiermacher succeed in his attempt to combine and transcend these two schools. His Christology was a/

a beautiful effort of thought, (Gewiss ist diese Christologie eine
sehr schöne Entwicklung), but he neither, on the one hand, left the
doctrines of the Church intact, nor, on the other, did he face up
to modern science.¹  Schleiermacher did not regard the Resurrec-
tion or the Ascension as essential parts of the Christian faith
and for this omission he deserved the censure of the orthodox
Church. Science branded him for associating the idea of humanity
in its perfection with the person of Christ.

The Christology of the Kantian philosophy must suffer
the fate of the Rationalists, Supranaturalists, and Schleiermacher.
It was Kant who wished to interpret the doctrines of the Church
symbolically. "It is humanity, or the rational part of this sys-
tem of things, in its entire moral perfection, that could alone
make a world the object of divine Providence, and the end of crea-
tion. This idea of a humanity well-pleasing to God, has existed
in God from all eternity."² This too was the view of Spinoza and
De Wette who claimed the reality of the idea of humanity without
reference to experience. But to the Church this view is empty
and lifeless, "instead of the riches of divine reality which faith
discovers in the history of Christ, it palmed upon us a collection
of empty ideas and ideals."³ Science too has a word to say to
Kant, and it is this: to "convert ideas simply into an obligatory
possibility, to which no reality corresponds, is in fact to
annihilate/

annihilate them."¹

In the face of these contradictory and insufficient systems of Christology, Strauss took his stand with the speculative position of Hegel. Only in the Hegelian philosophy, he concluded, can we satisfy the requirements both of the Church and of science. Hegel had said that God and man are essentially one. This being so, it followed that, since man realizes himself to be divine and that the Infinite is man, this truth must be expressed in an intelligible way, that is, "there must appear a human individual who is recognized as the visible God."² This is the God-man who, as far as He is God, is a worker of miracles and who, so far as He is a man, is subject to suffering and temptation and earthly existence. In dying upon the cross the God-man reveals His divine character because death is swallowed up in victory. His death is man's victory and in the cross man sees that God is reconciled to the world and that we are reconciled to God. The death of the God-man terminates his existence among men after which He becomes one with the Father, thus follow the Resurrection and Ascension. But having passed from view, the spirit of the God-man becomes common property and enters into the common consciousness of mankind.

In this fashion Strauss interpreted Christianity. By realizing the reciprocal relation between God and man, the conclusions of the Rationalists or supranaturalists or of Schleiermacher are made of no account for here at last is firm ground, the ground/

ground upon which both the Church and science stand. The Hegelian approach to orthodoxy, however, unlike the Supranaturalists, did not rest upon the historicity of the Gospel records but upon the truths which they contain. In the preface of the first edition of the Leben Jesu Strauss said, "The author is aware that the essence (den inneren Kern) of the Christian faith is perfectly independent of his criticism. The supernatural birth of Christ, His miracles, His Resurrection and ascension, remain eternal truths, whatever doubts may be cast on their reality as historical facts." These "eternal truths" (ewige Wahrheiten) make up the essence of Christianity and criticism has no dealing with them, but only with the covering in which they are represented. But this is not the same thing that Kant talked about for his "ideas" which existed as moral imperatives had no reference to reality.

The idea of the unity of the divine and human can have reality, suggested Strauss, without actually being manifested in a single historical person. For, as he says in an oft-quoted sentence, "This is indeed not the mode in which the Idea realizes itself; it is not want to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar, and be niggardly toward all others - to express itself perfectly in that one individual, and imperfectly in all the rest: it rather loves to distribute its riches among a multiplicity of exemplars which reciprocally complete each other - in the alternate appearance and suppression of a series of individuals." Thus, one man is/

is not the realization of the idea of the union of the divine and human, but mankind. Surely, Strauss thought, mankind is more real than a single individual and eternal incarnation is a truer idea than an incarnation limited in time.

In mankind Strauss found the key to the problem of Christology. What the Church had been accustomed to predicate of an individual, Strauss predicated of an idea, mankind, but an idea which was rooted in reality. "In an individual, a God-man, the properties and functions which the Church ascribes to Christ contradict themselves; in the idea of the race, they perfectly agree. Humanity (Die Menschheit) is the union of the two natures.....It is Humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven."¹ Faith, therefore, in this Christ leads to redemption just because the individual realizes that in participating in the divine life of humanity he is redeemed from the natural and sensuous life to the life of spirit. The historical form of Christology which represents the union of the divine and human in a single individual is an early stage of thought which is superseded by the stage which realizes that the historical form is but the presentation of the idea, and for this reason "the object of faith is completely changed; instead of a sensible, empirical fact, it has become a spiritual and divine idea, which has its confirmation no longer in history but in philosophy."² The Christological need of the age, according to Strauss, is the realization of the idea contained in the fact/ 

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². "" II, p.769; E.T. p.780.
fact. "A theology which, in its doctrines on the Christ, stops short at him as an individual, is not properly a theology, but a homily."¹

In the conclusion to this dogmatic appendix, Strauss asked the question, How can a minister versed in the critical and speculative theology remain a minister and not be considered a hypocrite either by himself or by his congregation? There are four courses open to such a minister. First, he can try to elevate the Church to his own position; but this is well-nigh impossible. Second, he can descend to the level of the Church; but here he must be a hypocrite. Third, he can forsake the ministry altogether; but this is a desperate and negative course of action. Fourth, he can preach in such a way as to lead his people from the historical to the spiritual; this is the only positive position to take.²

"We need not elaborate on Strauss's Christology as contained in the Leben Jesu. It is self-explanatory. The historical Jesus at the mercy of the mythical method is rendered unhistorical and unimportant as an individual, but the eternal truths which are embedded and expressed in his life are untouched by criticism, - they are the principles of Christianity. The conclusion to which Strauss came in his Leben Jesu is the Hegelian conclusion which asserts that Christianity conforms in principle with philosophy. If according to the Hegelian philosophy, history is/

is an ever-moving process from the finite to the Infinite, from nature to spirit, from the individual to the Absolute, then it is quite unreasonable to suppose, as does the Church, that in the person of a single individual the perfection and culmination of this slowly moving process was fully expressed. Perfection must come at the end of the process and not in the middle. Humanity is the God-man, not Jesus, the Nazarene.

Strauss's Glaubenslehre appeared in 1840. In his student days he had formulated a plan for a system of dogmatic which he hoped to carry out at a later date. It was to be his life work. His interpretation of the Christian faith was to be based upon the Hegelian philosophy which was for him in his younger days the final test of theology. While he was in Berlin, he became interested in Schleiermacher's lectures on the life of Jesus and determined to return to Tübingen to write for himself a life of Jesus which would go beyond the conclusions reached by Schleiermacher. The result of this ambition was the Leben Jesu of 1835 which we have just examined. Originally, however, the Leben Jesu was not meant by Strauss to appear separately as an individual work, but was to have formed the preface or foreword to the Glaubenslehre. That it did not so appear was due to the fact that the Leben Jesu became such an absorbing study in itself that it soon/

soon grew outside the bounds of a preface and appeared finally in two volumes. For the time Strauss was so engrossed in meeting the criticism directed against the Leben Jesu that he had neither the time nor the inclination to write the Glaubenslehre. The Zurich affair in 1839, however, acted as the impetus which set in motion the plan for the systematic theology which had long been in his mind. Strauss must have felt that theology had been his main antagonist at Zurich. At any rate the Glaubenslehre, which followed directly upon his failure at Zurich, was more negative and polemical, more vehement and aggressive than anything he had written so far. If theology had unseated him at Zurich, he now meant to unseat theology.

Just as the Leben Jesu had been a criticism of the narratives of the life of Jesus, the Glaubenslehre purported to be a criticism of the doctrines of the Christian faith. The method upon which Strauss proposed to examine the doctrines of the Church was a purely historical one. "The true criticism of dogma," he said, "is its history."¹ Hence, we find that the Glaubenslehre is more history than dogmatic. A survey of the historical development of the Christian doctrines, he held, would indicate the strength and weakness of the doctrines. Such a procedure is in line with pure objective criticism. "The subjective criticism of the individual," he said, "is a water-pipe which any lad can stop for a time; but criticism carried out in an objective way and with regard to the course of centuries rushes along like a torrent against/

against which all dams and sluices are of no account."¹

In the preface to the Glaubenslehre Strauss set forth his aim and purpose. He hoped to render to dogmatic theology a balance-sheet as an accounting house renders a financial report to a merchant. This balance-sheet will contain a survey of the condition and state of Dogmatic property. Such an account is of utmost importance, according to Strauss, because the theologians of his day were apt to disregard the intricacies of their systems. It had been the habit of theologians to estimate too lightly the critical and polemical deductions of theology for the past two centuries, and they had estimated too highly the results of the sentimental and romantic theology. These new departures had been regarded as unworked veins of gold in newly discovered mines, but Strauss warned that if these mines delude the expectations of those who mortgage their theology on their content, then the result for theology would be "an unavoidable bankruptcy" (ein Falliment unvermeidlich). This caveat which Strauss merely suggested in the preface became an actuality in the work itself.

The Glaubenslehre is divided into two unequal parts. The smaller part, the Apologetic, contains a critical discussion of the formal concepts of the Christian faith and the contradiction between faith and knowledge, religion and science. The larger part, the Dogmatic, contains the discussion of the essence of Christianity as contained in the Christian doctrines. If we place the Leben Jesu as a foreword to the Glaubenslehre, as it was originally intended/

¹. Glaubenslehre, I, x.71.
intended, we see that the whole would thus be divided into three parts, a traditional, a critical, and a dogmatic. Although this three-part plan was abandoned, it was retained in the Dogmatic section of the Glaubenslehre. According to the scheme and procedure of Protestant Dogmatic, Strauss took up one by one the following doctrines: existence, triune essence, the attributes of God, creation and the creatures, original sin and redemption, Providence and evil, sin and grace, the means of grace and the Church, eschatology and immortality. Each of these doctrines is discussed according to the three categories of the original plan. The traditional part deals with each doctrine according to its biblical formulation and its ecclesiastical statement in Patristic and Scholastic thought. The critical part demonstrates the dissolution of the ecclesiastical doctrines at the hands of Rationalism and Supranaturalism. The conclusion of this section forms the transition to the third part and contains the recast of the dogmas in the Glaubenslehre of Schleiermacher. The final or dogmatic part traces the speculative thinking in regard to the doctrines of the Church in their development from Kant to Hegel.

Doubtless the original plan of Strauss's Glaubenslehre was to conclude with a positive statement of Dogmatic based on the Hegelian assertion that Christianity is in harmony with the philosophy of the Absolute. But during the years that lay between the original plan and the actual book Strauss had modified somewhat his Hegelian standpoint. The reconciliation between Christianity and philosophy (Glauben und Wissen) which once appealed to Strauss was abandoned/
abandoned as inadequate. He was convinced, he said, that no reconciliation could be made. The man of faith must allow the philosopher to go his own way quietly. There must be no interference.

The positive result of the Glaubenslehre is the insistence upon philosophy and the modern Weltanschauung as the only guides to truth. Philosophy can give the mind and heart the same satisfaction that faith can. In regard to the conception of God, for example, this philosophical approach deprives God of personality in the sense that He is a single personality. We must think of Him as the Allpersonlichkeit. We must not try to personify the Absolute, we must conceive of it as it personifies itself. Thus the theistic conception of God is supplemented by a pantheistic view. The proper nouns of theology, God, Jesus Christ, the Sinner, the Believer, must make way for the common nouns, law, the human race, mankind.

When we come to the section on Christology in the Glaubenslehre, we find that Strauss repeated in word and thought what he concluded in the dogmatic appendix of the Leben Jesu. In the interim, however, between the two works Strauss had published a little essay on the transitory and abiding features of Christianity. In this essay he made two statements about the Person of Jesus which were in contradiction to the conclusion of the Leben Jesu.

1. Glaubenslehre, I, p.356. Strauss adds, "If the over-pious should succeed in excluding us from the Church we shall consider this to our advantage."
2. Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum, 1838.
Jesu. First, "Jesus represents," he said, "the highest point beyond which posterity cannot go;" and second, "Without His presence in the soul, no perfect piety is possible." In the Glaubenslehre these two concessions to the importance of the historical Jesus are rescinded. How can Jesus be the most perfect and exalted being in the whole of history? How can any one compare Him with every other person or hope to prophesy for the future? If such statements are based on the New Testament it must be remembered with what purposes the writers there glorified the Person of Jesus. It is the usual rule that there appears after the death of a pioneer a group of followers who carry on what they have inherited to a purer and more perfect realization. As to the consideration that Jesus is important for our piety, Strauss returned to the philosophical explanation of such incidents as the Passion and Death of Jesus to show that the historical fact can always be regarded as important and significant for us although we interest ourselves primarily with the eternal truths contained therein.

The Glaubenslehre reiterated in Christology what the Leben Jesu had affirmed five years before. The Christological problem is concerned not with the Jesus of history but with the Christ of faith. The attempt of Schleiermacher to postulate a sinless and absolutely perfect Christ is regarded by Strauss as an edifice built on the sand which cannot stand the daily erosion of criticism. The incarnation of God is involved in the idea of the God-man but not as a single individual. The God-man is not important as an historical occurrence (Vorgang). Mankind is the important thing in the Christian doctrine of the Person of Christ.

"Could/
"Could the species be realized fully in a single person," Strauss argued, "it would not bother to break itself up into a plurality of individuals, and to run through a course of development in time; but rather it would exist only in identity with that individual as a generic individual." The Church has predicated of the Person of Christ what was meant only for mankind, for, and here Strauss repeated his Leben Jesu, it is not the fashion for the Idea in manifesting itself to exhaust itself on one exemplar and be sparing with all others, to be perfectly revealed in one individual and to be imperfectly revealed in all the rest.

The attributes which the Church ascribed to Jesus contradict in a single individual, but they harmonize perfectly in the race. Humanity is the union of the two natures. For this reason we can say, said Strauss, that Humanity is the child of the visible mother, nature, and the invisible father, Spirit. It performs miracles because it is always becoming more and more Spirit and less and less confined by the limits of nature. It is without sin for its development in its entirety is pure and unsullied by the sins of individuals. It dies, rises, and ascends to heaven in so far as it is a process from nature to Spirit.

That Humanity is the God-man was not only Strauss's personal conviction, but he believed it to be the logical and legitimate conclusion of the Hegelian philosophy. The Glaubenslehre made no advance on the Leben Jesu in the matter of Christology and that/

1. Glaubenslehre, sec. 66.
2. II, p.740.
that is why, perhaps, it created very little comment in Germany when it appeared. Strauss was content in the Glaubenslehre to repeat the Christology of the Leben Jesu against which he claimed no one had yet spoken an intelligent word of criticism.

Twenty-nine years after the publication of the life of Jesus, which put Strauss in the theological forefront, there appeared under his name a new life of Jesus especially written for the German people. In the Leben Jesu of 1835 he had acknowledged that his work was intended only for trained minds, it was not meant for laymen but for theologians. Feeling the need of supplying the people with a popular, easily understandable edition, Strauss set to work to re-edit and revise his original life of Jesus adding to it the fruit of the years' researches.

A few months before the new Leben Jesu appeared, the Frenchman, Ernest Renan had startled and charmed his countrymen with a Vie de Jésus on a popular plan. Strauss welcomed this book, and although he was not in accord with many of its statements, he felt it to be worthy in its general principles and timely in offering to the French people a readable life of Jesus not based upon/

1. The Glaubenslehre was doomed to oblivion simply because it was overshadowed by the appeal of the Leben Jesu. Another contributing factor was the appearance at the same time of Ludwig Feuerbach's Das Wesen des Christenthums, 1841, which was more popular and radical than Strauss's Glaubenslehre.
upon the stereotyped scheme of orthodox theology. In the preface to the new life of Jesus, Strauss explained his wish to write a book as suitable for Germany as Renan's was for France.¹

Strauss dedicated this new work to his brother who died some time before the book appeared.² In this dedication he paid high tribute to his brother's steadfastness in time of physical pain and financial discouragement and his independent frame of mind which balked at organized religion. As such, his brother may be taken as a typical example of the German people to whom Strauss addressed his book.

The advance which the new life of Jesus made over the Leben Jesu of 1835 lay in the appropriation of the development of New Testament criticism during that interval. The main contribution of the first life of Jesus was the impetus given to the study of the New Testament records. This was the work and abiding merit of the Tübingen School under the able leadership of F.C. Baur, a former teacher of Strauss. Strauss claimed to have studied and examined the fruit of the Tübingen School of criticism and readily acknowledged his debt to its members, but the conclusion to which he came in regard to this school of thought was rather negative than positive. He was firmly convinced that "the Gospel criticism of the last twenty years has certainly somewhat run to seed."³

Taken/

1. Leben Jesu, p.xxi - "aber ein Buch für Deutsche geschrieben zu haben in dem vollen Sinne, wie er eines für Franzosen geschrieben hat, ist Alles was ich wünsche;" E.T., I, p.xviii.
2. Renan, it may be noted, dedicated his book to a deceased sister.
Taken all in all, the Tübingen school had demonstrated not what the history of the Gospels is, but what it is not. Whatever may be said of the Gospels, it was evident, Strauss maintained, that the elements of myth and unhistorical interpolations were many, and, if we would see the true history behind the Gospels, all supranaturalism must be excluded. The one point on which Strauss felt himself to be in agreement with Baur was on the date of the Fourth Gospel which was placed in the middle of the second century. Substantially, however, the new life of Jesus is a reproduction of the original Leben Jesu with an expanded definition of the word myth to include not only unconscious fabrication of narrative but even wilful forgery.

Strauss was aware that his new book would bring forth adverse criticism, but he likened himself to the Apostle Paul who, when rejected by the Jews, took his message to the Gentiles. Strauss did not think himself a destroyer or a revolutionary. He considered his mission to be in line with the tenets of the Reformation which liberated the minds of the people from the tyranny of ecclesiasticism. If the Protestant Church is to be made pure, the first step to be taken is the exclusion of miracle from religion. To distinguish between the eternal and transitory in Christianity - this was Strauss's aim, and the beginning was made by announcing that anything supernatural or mythical is transitory.

The plan of the book is quite simple. After an introductory chapter/

2. "" p.xix, - "Wer die Pfaffen aus der Kirche schaffen will, der muss erst das Wunder aus der Religion schaffen;" E.T. I. p.xvi.
chapter on the various lives of Jesus that have been written and a survey of the most recent discussions on New Testament criticism, we come to the first main part which offers an historical outline of the life of Jesus based upon the pure, unadulterated facts of the Gospels. The second part presents the mythical theory of the history of Jesus as a complement to the historical outline given in the first part and follows in substance the results of the earlier life of Jesus.

As to the historical outline of the life of Jesus, Strauss stated that the New Testament records give us only meagre facts as, for example, that Jesus was a man of Galilee whose father was a carpenter belonging to the lower classes, whose mother outlived him, and who had brothers and sisters. The records give us no more history than that about the origin of Jesus, anything further must be regarded as supranatural interpolations added by the over-zealous Evangelists. Jesus, we are told, was interested in the reports which he heard concerning the work of John the Baptist, and so it was only natural for Him to go to the Jordan where He submitted to the Baptism ceremony regarding it as a symbol of the confession of sins. Jesus and John are represented as kindred souls with a desire to make the Judaism of the day more vital. Strauss contended that Jesus's self-consciousness of His Messiahship was not apparent to Himself until after the death of John.

Strauss could find no historical basis for the Johannine portrait.

portrait of Jesus. Saturated with the Tübingen criticism, Strauss took every opportunity to disparage the Fourth Gospel. It would not be the characteristic of divinity, Strauss claimed, for Jesus to insist on His divine relationship with the Father. "When an enthusiastic Christian calls his Master, supposed to have been raised to heaven, the light of the world, when he says of him that he who has seen him has seen the Father, that is God himself, we excuse the faithful worshipper such extravagances. But when he goes so far as the fourth Evangelist, and puts the utterances of his own pious enthusiasm into the mouth of Jesus in the form of his own utterances about himself, he does him a very perilous service." ¹

The phrase "Son of Man" was regarded by Strauss as the title best describing the historical Jesus. "Son of God" was a phrase never used by Jesus Himself, although He accepted it on reservations when used by others of Him. Strauss doubted that the phrase "Son of Man" had any reference to Messiahship but believed that Jesus used it simply because He regarded Himself as a mortal man in the service of God charged with exalted tasks.² The fact that this phrase was not in current usage led Strauss to conclude that Jesus used the phrase simply because He was not yet conscious that He was the Messiah.

Strauss found the Gospel narratives which tell of Jesus's foreknowledge of His Death and Resurrection quite unhistorical

¹ Leben Jesu, p.201; E.T., I. p.273.
and unreliable. It is inexplicable, he thought, to imagine that an intelligent man like Jesus, who knew the name of His betrayer some time before the arrest, would allow him to continue in his society. The narratives which tell of the Last Supper are not to be taken literally. While Jesus distributed bread and wine to His disciples, as was His custom, He may have had an image of the breaking of His own body at the hands of His enemies. "He might in a spirit of foreboding assert to his disciples that the same thing would soon be done to him that he was then doing to the bread and wine, and that they might, as often as they partook together of bread and wine, think of him and what he was then saying to them."¹ From this foreboding Strauss suggested that it would be a simple step to imagining His Death a sacrificial offering for the sins of mankind.

The death on the cross was a real death, Strauss believed. It may be possible that Jesus did not die immediately but fell into a swoon from which He recovered in the cool cavern of the sepulchre, but Strauss was convinced of the real death of Jesus because there is no evidence for His resurrection! What the Gospels tell us of Jesus's appearances after death are wish-projections on the part of His followers, certainly they are not historical facts. So then if there is no historical record of His resurrection, He must have died on the cross since we hear no more of Him after that event.² Strauss was unwilling to accept the usual apologetic of theologians that/

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² M p.286; E.T., I. p.394.
that unless the Resurrection be regarded as fact, the rise of the Christian Church is unintelligible. Strauss admitted that the death of Jesus on the cross was a severe blow to the early Christians, but as they had conceived of Him as the Messiah they were able to overcome their sorrow and disappointment by conceiving of the Resurrection. This they were able to do "by the instrumentality of the mind, the power of imagination, and nervous excitement....His whole life was veiled in a shining cloud which continued to raise it more and more above the human element, but removed it in the same proportion from natural and historical truth."1

The second part of Strauss's new life of Jesus contained nothing new. The mythical history of the life of Jesus which he gives here is essentially a repetition of the Leben Jesu of 1835. As then, so now two considerations were responsible for the myths in the Gospel narratives: the promise of a Messiah and the conviction that Jesus was that Messiah. Around these two foci all the miraculous events of Jesus's life are swung so that there is left no trace of supranaturalism. This is done in a systematic way by dividing the life of Jesus into three parts: the early life, the public ministry, the passion and death. Each section is treated according to the myths contained in the Gospels.

By cleaning away the mythical appendages to the life of Jesus, Strauss came to the conclusion that there is but little left toward an historical outline of His life. It is, in fact,

a life shrouded in mystery and myth. There are few great men of whose history we have so unsatisfactory a knowledge as we have of that of Jesus.¹ Even Socrates and Shakespeare have left us fuller accounts of their lives than Jesus.

Strauss, however, did not conclude the new life of Jesus without a constructive note. It is the note he had struck before in the Leben Jesu of 1835, it is the note that lies at the heart of the Glaubenslehre. Although the historical Jesus fades into insignificance at the stroke of criticism, the eternal Christ remains as a timeless symbol of ideal humanity. Jesus as a person is of no historical value, but as an idea He is of the greatest value, for He is the exemplar of what is destined to be the goal of mankind. To have faith in the Jesus of the Gospels is to trust a figment of the imaginative genius of the Evangelists, but to have faith in the ideal Christ, this is the only true religion, the religion of humanity.² It is true that the Church and a large body of Christian believers hold this view to be nothing short of apostacy, a denial of all that Christianity has stood for throughout the ages, but Strauss contended that such a charge was due to a misunderstanding of the main principles of Christianity.

The idea of humanity, the ideal of human perfection, is an idea, according to Strauss, subject to development and evolution. At first it was but impurely and improperly conceived and only gradually has it become more intelligible. Jesus introduced new features/

features into this idea, and for His contributions mankind is ever in His debt, but He was not the first to make it the guiding principle of life nor will He be the last. The position of Strauss, therefore, "refers mankind for salvation to the ideal Christ, to that moral pattern in which the historical Jesus did indeed first bring to light many principal features, but which as an elementary principle as much belongs to the general endowment of our kind, as its improvement and perfection can only be the problem and the work of mankind in general."¹

There is, therefore, no advance made in Christology in the new life of Jesus over Strauss's previous works. The historical Jesus is but one among many and His importance lies in the idea which He manifested. Redemption is not made effective through the Person of Christ but through the idea of perfect humanity which He illustrated.

When Strauss was sixty-four years of age, he wrote a book containing his final position in theology and philosophy. This book was called Der alte und der neue Glaube. Ein Bekennnis. It is a last will and testament and as such is his final utterance on the subjects which had compelled his life-long attention. At the time of writing he was suffering from a fatal disease and doubtless was well aware that his days were numbered. "I have attained, nay/

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nay, overstepped the threshold of old age," he wrote. "Then it is that every earnest-minded man hears the whisper of an inner voice: 'Give an account of thy stewardship, for thou mayest be no longer steward.'" Strauss was not particularly interested in defending his stewardship. He denied that he had been an unjust one, though it might well be, he admitted, that he had been an unskilful one. His concern had never been to destroy the faith of any one, but to point the way to truth for those whose faith had already been destroyed.

Strauss delegated himself as the chairman of an oecumenical council of all those who had broken with the "old faith" of the Church and were seeking a "new faith" in a more cosmic-centred philosophy. In writing this "confession," therefore, he was writing not merely as an individual or giving mere personal opinions, he was acting as the spear-head of an innumerable multitude, Protestant and Catholic, who found the orthodox, and even the not-so-orthodox, theology irreconcilable with a philosophic view of life and the universe. This group was in the minority, Strauss was well aware, but it was an ever-growing movement and needed advice and encouragement. Strauss and his co-thinkers did not wish to establish a new Church, the time was not yet ripe for any concerted action like that, the present need was for clarification of the main principles upon which they took their stand.

The purpose of this book, then, was twofold: first, to consider in what respects Strauss and his followers were in disagreement/

greement with the old faith, and second, to set forth the principles of the new faith. These two divisions were further divided so that there were four considerations altogether to which Strauss devoted his attention. The first two dealt with the old faith and the last two with the new faith. The four considerations were put into interrogatory form, each one making a chapter of the book: first, "Are we still Christians?"; second, "Have we still a religion?"; third, "What is our conception of the universe?"; and fourth, "What is our rule of life?"

As to the first question, "Are we still Christians?", (Sind wir noch Christen?), Strauss answered with a categorical "No!" If Christianity has to do with New Testament records, the Person of Christ, the doctrines of the Church, and the sacraments, then it was obvious to Strauss that since none of these items was of any moment to him, Christianity was likewise no concern of his and the only possible answer to the question which he had posed was, "No, we are not Christians." In taking up one by one the propositions of the Apostles' Creed and dealing with them critically, Strauss was able to destroy every reason for holding to them. The Trinity is a mathematical enigma beyond the scope of human intelligence for, try as we will, we cannot make three equal one or one three. The life of Jesus, circumscribed as it is with mythology and supra-naturalism, is unhistorical and hence unimportant. The Atonement and the Resurrection of Jesus are imaginative creations. The principle that one man must die for all is unjust and to believe that such a death was an expiatory offering is to read more into the fact/
fact of Christ's Death than is in it. The Resurrection was a pure wish-projection and an hallucination on the part of the early Christians.¹

To the second question, "Have we still a religion?" (Haben wir noch Religion?), Strauss was not so unequivocal in his answer. It may be, he thought, that we have a religion depending on what we mean by the word. Religion, so far as it is a matter of prayer, sacrifice, sacrament, directed toward a personal God is an illusion. It is an early stage of human mentality, a foible of infantile intelligence, which eventually, as reason begins to command and guide, fades into obscurity altogether. The Christian idea of a personal God is transferred to a cosmic law upon which we are dependent. If any one wishes to think of this feeling of dependence as religious, he may as well do so, but Strauss personally declined to do so. It may be possible to show the same religious piety of adoration toward the universe as a mechanism as the Christian shows toward a personal God. We may have a religion, but it is of a materialistic order, certainly it is not Christianity.²

If the third question, "What is our conception of the universe?" (Wie begreifen wir die Welt?) had been considered first, the two questions we have just considered would have been unnecessary, for Strauss answered that his conception of the universe was pantheistic and materialistic and such a view of the universe is/

². " " " " " pp. 95-147; E.T. pp.108-168.
is hardly sustaining of any religion. Strauss had become enamoured of Darwin's theory of the struggle for existence. Upon the basis of this notion his view of the universe is described in terms of life, activity, development. Darwin was accepted by Strauss with open arms as a scientific colleague who, like himself, rejected miracle. The universe is devoid of anything like what the Christian calls Spirit, it is only matter in motion.¹

The fourth question, "What is our rule of life?" (wie ordnen wir unser Leben?), is answered in accordance with Strauss's previous discussions on humanity. The rule of life for the individual is to live according to the ideal of the species. The essence of morality lies in the realization that man is human and not merely natural and that all men are alike in their needs and wants. The life purpose of every individual is to conquer the lower nature in him, struggling always toward a higher level of existence. Struggling is the characteristic of mankind and for that reason there will be wars and rumours of wars for years to come. Strangely enough, the only form of government which met with Strauss's approval was absolute monarchy. As he grew more and more liberal and radical in his theological thinking, he became more and more conservative and orthodox in politics.²

We have dispensed with these four questions of Strauss in/

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¹ Der alte und der neue Glaube, pp.148-228; E.T. pp.169-38 (the E.T. of 1874 divides the book into two parts, the second of which begins a new pagination. This reference and the following one are the only ones to include the second part. Further pages refer to the first part).
² Der alte und der neue Glaube, pp.229-301; E.T. pp.39-123.
in summary fashion, but we wish now to return to the first question and examine what Strauss has to say there more in detail for this section is the most important as showing the final position taken by Strauss in Christology.

In order to answer the question, "Are we still Christians?", Strauss found it convenient to examine a succinct and comprehensive statement of what the Christian religion accepts as its guiding principles. He chose for his examination the Apostles' Creed. The pattern of this creed is the Trinity, - Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This idea was immediately rejected by Strauss who saw in it nothing but mystery and pettifogging. "It would seem," he said, "as if the more ignorant those old Christians were of all the facts of nature, the more brainforce they possessed for such like transcendental subtleties; for these kind of claims on their reasoning faculties, which simply paralyze ours to recognize, such as conceiving of three as one and one as three, were a trifle to them, nay, a favourite pursuit." ¹ Even Calvin condemned a man to death because he held contrary opinions about the Trinity. The doctrine for Strauss is not worthy of further consideration, it defies the human reason.

The first confession in the Apostles' Creed is treated by direct reference to the early chapters of Genesis which tell of the creation of the world and the fall of man from the state of grace. These chapters are treated by Strauss in all literalness and/

and because such a treatment reveals the inconsistency of the biblical records with the surest postulates of science, there is nothing in the first phrase of the creed to warrant the attention of a modern thinking person.

As to the second section of the Apostles' Creed—concerning the Person of Christ—Strauss began by saying that the words "the only begotten Son of God the Father" are quite unintelligible. That He was conceived by the Holy Spirit and born of a virgin can only be the results of the working of mythology. Strauss declared that similar myths in Greek literature "appear to us more felicitously invented than this Christian one."¹ The historical statement that Jesus suffered under Pontius Pilate presented Strauss with no ground for complaint, but the descent into Hell after the crucifixion is not even mentioned by the Evangelists and therefore he found it to be thoroughly unhistorical. The concern of the Gospel writers was in the Resurrection and yet even here we are not on sure ground for none of them was an eye-witness. The narratives of the Resurrection are "so impossible, in such direct antagonism to every law of nature, that it would require a testimony of tenfold reliability to be as much as discussed."² The ascent into Heaven is casually regarded by Strauss as impossible since the heavens contain not the throne of God but the constellations and planets. Future judgment of the world by Jesus is contrary to the day by day judgment which takes place in every individual.

1. Der alte und der neue Glaube, p.25; E.T. p.27.
2. p.25; E.T. p.27.
The Atonement, according to Strauss, harks back to the
days of Jewish sacrificial offerings. From the sacrifice of humans
the Jews had been gradually elevated to the sacrifice of animals.
In the Atonement, however, human sacrifice is revived. The Cross
was said to have had no mere moral effect, but its essential worth
lay in the change which it made upon God who, because of the Cross,
deigned to overlook man's past sinfulness and bestow upon him a
saving mercy. Strauss called this idea of atonement "a propitia-
tion by proxy" (einer stellvertretenden Genugthuung). "To punish
some one for another's transgression, to accept even the voluntary
suffering of the innocent and let the guilty escape scathless in
consequence, this, everybody admits now, is a barbarous action."¹
Such a conclusion led Strauss to say that it makes no difference
whether we think of Jesus as an ordinary man or as the Incarnation
of God if the Atonement itself is an impossibility and a monstros-
ity.

Strauss was quick to deal with the third section of the
Apostles' Creed. The work of the Holy Spirit which transmits the
redemption effected in Christ does so, according to the Church, on
the basis of faith alone and without reference to good works.
Strauss insisted that good works alone justify a man. The debate
over the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist evidences the
incomprehensibility of the sacrament. Baptism is all very well
for those who can secure it, but what of the countless number of
innocents/

¹. Der alte und der neue Glaube, p.29; E.T. p.31.
innocents to whom Baptism is not accessible? The resurrection of
the body has been a stumbling-block even to orthodoxy.

The first major attack against the confessions of the
ancient Church was led by Rationalism which offered a compromise
between the ancient creed and the modern spirit. The creed of
Rationalism declared that everything in the Bible is quite honest
but everything can be explained quite naturally. Jesus was no
"Son of God" to the Rationalists, as He was to the Ancient Church,
but neither was He an impostor. He was a good, honourable man,
full of love for God and His fellowman, and anxious to elevate the
moral and religious thought of His day.

In Schleiermacher the Rationalists' theory was supplanted
for a view of Christ based largely on the Fourth Gospel. Jesus
is once again, in the language of the Ancient Church, the union
of the divine and human but with a different emphasis. Christ is
historically unique, but He is also the ideal and type of humanity
and as such is perfectly sinless. Strauss cut Schleiermacher's
foundation from under him by pointing to the unreliable nature of
the Fourth Gospel and the contradiction involved in asserting that
Jesus though human was yet without sin. Schleiermacher's phrase
"God in Christ" was regarded by Strauss as no more than a phrase.

It was obvious, Strauss noted, that recent discussions
of Christianity centred around the person of its founder. This
was only natural and to be expected since religion depends upon
its founder. If Jesus is no more than a mere man, or if He is
an impostor, then Christianity loses its appeal. But this is
just/
just what happens according to Strauss. The Gospels are so contradictory and so obviously saturated with myth and wilful forgery that we find difficulty in salvaging even the most insignificant facts concerning the life of Jesus. "We cannot make sure," Strauss said, "of the sayings and teachings of Christ on any one point, whether we really have his own words and thoughts before us, or only such as later times found it convenient to ascribe to him."\(^1\)

The Gospel account of the Resurrection was "no case of pious deception, but all the more of self-deception.... Taken historically, i.e., comparing the immense effect of this belief with its absolute baselessness, the story of the resurrection of Jesus can only be called a world-wide deception."\(^2\) How then, Strauss asked, can this person continue to demand and command our respect and adoration? "A being of which I can only catch fitful glimpses, which remains obscure to me in essential respects, may, it is true, interest me as a problem for scientific investigation, but it must remain ineffectual as regards practical influence on my life..... a problem cannot be an object of worship, or a pattern by which to shape our lives."\(^3\) In fact, Jesus was really an enthusiast who was misled and deceived in his own plans and who, if we were to follow Him, would surely misdirect our lives. And even if we could overlook this aspect of the case, we cannot fail to discover that His greatest teachings were not peculiar to Him alone but find their/

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1. Der alte und der neue Glaube, p.58; E.T. p.66.
2. "World-wide deception" is the mollified English translation of the German "ein welthistorischer Humbug," p.73; E.T. p.82.
3. Der alte und der neue Glaube, p.79; E.T. p.90.
their parallels in many other religions.

If, then, we were to carry these conclusions into a Protestant Church and conduct a service in accordance with them, what would we have? The sermon would fearlessly denounce the birth, life, and death of Jesus as myths. Jesus would be neither Son of God or Redeemer. If from the sermon we turned to prayer, our petitions must not be directed toward Christ since He is a man and no more. The sacrament of baptism will have no meaning for us since we would have our children be men and not set aside as something special. The Lord's Supper might well remain as a fraternal banquet, but blood would be the last thing we should drink. In such manner Strauss illustrated the absurdity of Christianity. "My conviction, therefore, is," he concluded, "if we would not evade difficulties or put forced constructions upon them, if we would have our yea yea, and our nay nay, - in short, if we would speak as honest, upright men, we must acknowledge we are no longer Christians."

We have here to set forth in a few words the relation in which Strauss stood to our problem of the principle and Person in redemption. In placing under review his most important works we have endeavoured to indicate his Christological position as it developed from the Leben Jesu to Der alte und der neue Glaube, so that/

that here all that is needed is a gathering up of what has already been said.

From the very first Strauss separated the Person of Christ from redemption. The Christological implications of the Leben Jesu are obvious enough. By means of the mythical method of criticism he removed not only the miraculous and supernatural elements from the Gospel narratives, but even the Person of Jesus Christ Himself. If miracle is held to be untenable by the modern mind, then Christ, who is the greatest miracle of all, is likewise deprecated. But we must remember Strauss's positive statement in the appendix to the Leben Jesu where he attempted to re-establish the doctrines of Christianity on a dogmatic basis. This was done by accepting the Hegelian philosophy which identified the eternal truths of Christianity with the guiding principles of idealistic philosophy. To destroy the Gospel life of Jesus is not to destroy Christianity, for Hegelian philosophy does not need the guarantee of history. The greatest single truth which Christianity professes is the idea of the union of the divine and the human. Whereas the New Testament stresses this union in the Person of Jesus Himself, Strauss in following his Hegelian inheritance emphasized the "idea" of the union not in a single individual, for the idea would not so reveal itself, but in humanity at large. The Church has wrongly predicated of Jesus what is true only of divine humanity. It is humanity and not Christ who is the Redeemer. Redemption has nothing to do with the Person of Christ but with man's realization that he is participating in the life of the/
the race. The object of faith is the idea and not Jesus Christ. Perhaps in the person of Christ the idea of the union of the divine and the human first came into clear focus, but His contribution stops there. Jesus is the vehicle of the idea, not the idea itself. The principle of redemption remains an eternal truth, a philosophic idea, an abstract conception, not purely mental, as in the Kantian system, but rooted in the reality of humanity.

In the Glaubenslehre Strauss changed his premises but not his conclusions. The Hegelian reconciliation of theology and philosophy, of belief and knowledge, of religion and science, which formed the basis for his positive conclusion in the appendix of the Leben Jesu is rejected as untenable and inadequate. The eternal truths of Christianity upon which he laid the basis for a philosophic faith are of no value in themselves but only in so far as they are in accord with philosophy. Philosophy and theology are two distinct fields of enquiry, they must not interfere with one another. This deviation from the Hegelian standpoint, however, did not affect Strauss's Christology, and we find him repeating in the Glaubenslehre his maxims concerning the idea of divine humanity. In the Leben Jesu the principles of Christianity are placed in parallel with the propositions of Hegelianism and are thus given their worth and standing. In the Glaubenslehre the eternal truths of Christianity are worthy of our attention in so far as they are philosophical. If philosophy and theology are distinct and irreconcilable, as Strauss believed them to be, and if it is true that only in philosophy can man find the guiding principles of life, as Strauss firmly/
firmly held, then it follows that whatever is philosophical in Christianity is true and whatever is historical in Christianity is of no account. The idea of divine humanity is Christianity's greatest philosophical truth. The Person of Christ, as an historical Redeemer, fades into unimportance in the light of the idea of the union of the divine and the human. Christologically speaking Strauss did not change in the Glaubenslehre from his original position in separating the Person of Christ from the principle of redemption.

The Leben Jesu of 1864 was no more than a popular edition of the first Leben Jesu with the added weapon of the Tübingen School of criticism which Strauss used with disastrous effect upon the historical life of Jesus. Jesus emerged a figure of no historical importance whatsoever. His life is encrusted with such a covering of myth, both the intentional and unintentional fabrications of the Evangelists, that it is quite impossible to say who or what He was. Here again as in the Leben Jesu and the Glaubenslehre Strauss found his constructive policy in the idea of a divine humanity. Redemption is accomplished through the eternal Christ, not the historical Person.

In Der alte und der neue Glaube Strauss rejected the role of Christian reformer which he had claimed for himself heretofore. The very title of the book suggests that he has a new faith and has done with the old. It is true that he had long since abandoned the faith of the orthodox Church, but he persisted in holding to the principles of Christianity. Now he released his hold/
hold on everything that had been his support and stretched out his arms, frail and weak with age and with the cynicism born of rebuke, toward a new faith. This new faith finds its object not in the eternal truths of Christianity, not even in the idea of divine humanity, but in the biological and physical laws at work in the universe. The cycle is now complete. Strauss began as a liberal theologian, changed to a speculative philosopher, and ended as a materialistic scientist. The idea of humanity, the principle of redemption, the eternal truths of Christianity, are forgotten in the Darwinian law of the struggle for existence and the interplay of cosmic forces. To the question, "Are we still Christians?", Strauss can only answer an emphatic "No". The whole life of Jesus is a "world-wide deception," "ein welthistorischer Humbug." Jesus is not merely the unassuming prophet who was crowned with the expectations of the Jews, he was an ardent and arrant enthusiast, both self-deceived and deceiving. Religion is a puerile stage of intelligence which soon passes away when the cosmic significance of the universe breaks in upon man's consciousness. We can hardly ask Strauss what Christology he holds in his last book. There is none to speak of. Having passed from theology to philosophy, from idealism to materialism, he has passed from the realm of Christological considerations. Pantheistic materialism was the goal to which Strauss's thinking led him, and as he became more and more the scientist, he was less and less the theologian.
CHAPTER IV

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL POSITION OF ALOIS EMANUEL BIEDERMAN.

Biedermann was born on March 2, 1819 at Oberrieden, near Zurich, Switzerland. His father was a soldier who served with distinction in the Russian and English campaign against Napoleon. The father's physical courage, enthusiastic patriotism, his trust in God, and his love for his fellow men became the coveted inheritance of the son. Strauss, we remember, was deeply attached to his mother and wrote a little essay in her memory; Biedermann was ever mindful of his good father and in later life wrote a memoir "On the life of my father." In this essay he reviewed the various political activities of his father in Switzerland, Italy, and at Waterloo. "All who knew him," he wrote, "have borne him witness that he carried his name with dignity and honour, and this is the most precious legacy that he has left behind for me."  

In 1837 Biedermann entered the University of Basle. His chief interest lay in theology. "So far as I can retrace my thoughts to my younger days," he wrote in his reminiscences, "I knew nothing other than to wish to study theology. It was not so much the pulpit that attracted me as the early impulse to search for the essence of religion (die Dinge der Religion), and with my reason to/

to bring it into clarity."¹ This ambitious frame of mind soon found its affinity in the Rationalism of the day. Later in his life as he looked back upon his early theological interests, he admitted that he was a "prosaic Rationalist."²

Biedermann was not content to remain a Rationalist, and, as a young student is wont to do, he began to pick and choose his theological teachers at random. Schleiermacher interested him greatly at first, but he felt that Schleiermacher did not give him what he wanted. Studies in literature and art took him to the works of Beyschlag, but he abandoned him soon for the study of philosophy. A crisis in his theological wanderings came when he read Strauss's Leben Jesu. Strauss acted as the liberator of his pent up energies, and as Hume had awakened Kant out of his dogmatic slumber, so Strauss roused Biedermann from his Rationalism and started him off on his speculative theology.³

In a rectoral address in 1875 on the subject, "Strauss and his importance for theology," Biedermann said, "From the beginning of my theological studies I have been indebted to Strauss before all others for inspiration and guidance, and I have felt from the first that none of my teachers or examples was so deeply and intimately connected with me as he."⁴ The influence of Strauss on/

². "Rationalism," he said, p.393, "was in my blood."
³. Biedermann said that his introduction to Strauss's writings was, "wie ein erfrischendes Baß," "Erinnerungen," p.387.
on Biedermann was twofold: he opened Biedermann's eyes in regard to exegetical-historical research, and, more impersonally, Strauss was the bridge over which Biedermann travelled to the Hegelian philosophy. The genius of Strauss, accord to Biedermann, lay in his critical faculty. Although his own thinking led him beyond Strauss, Biedermann was ever grateful for Strauss's influence and insisted that any form of liberal theology must enter into the critical inheritance bequeathed by Strauss before attempting to discharge the obligations which he left behind.

The professor in Basle who had an early influence on Biedermann's thinking was De Wette whose acute scholarship in the field of historical criticism complemented Biedermann's interest in Strauss. But De Wette's dogmatic system was regarded by Biedermann as unsatisfactory. "His theory of religion," he said, "which makes it possible for the soul to know divine truth, as it reveals itself in pious emotion, only in recourse to symbols and not also with the understanding, appears to me to place theology on a quite feeble and vague footing."¹ To meet this dogmatic deficiency in the theology of De Wette, Biedermann went to Berlin in 1839 to develop his idea of a theology which would take account of the understanding. In Berlin the Hegelian philosophy soon attracted him and he found in it the key to a speculative system which remained with him and opened for him the door toward a speculative theology.

Although/

Although Biedermann is generally regarded as an Hegelian, he was nevertheless dissatisfied with the \textit{a priori} dialectic of Hegelianism which seemed to him to lead to a sort of philosophic mythology. Only as philosophy is rooted in experience, Biedermann held, can there be a satisfactory theory of knowledge. Experience, psychologically determined, contains the true essence of philosophic knowledge, and likewise experience offers the correct reconciliation between Rationalism and Supranaturalism, between speculation and religion. However, Biedermann was essentially an Hegelian in the sense that whatever is real is rational, and in his own works, especially in his earlier contributions, he acknowledged his debt to Hegel by suggesting that his own position and that of Hegel in regard to religion are the same.\footnote{"Erinnerungen," p.398f, see also the \textit{Dogmatik} 1st ed. p.viii f., and 2nd ed. I, p.x; also his first essay \textit{Ueber die Personlich-keit Gottes}, 1842, in which he used Hegelian terminology}

Among his teachers at Berlin, Wilhelm Vatke influenced Biedermann most. The temper rather than the content of Vatke's thinking was what interested Biedermann. Vatke's book on the religion of the Old Testament\footnote{\textit{Die Religion des Alten Testamentes nach den kanonischen Büchern entwickelt}, 1835.} did for the Old Testament what Strauss's \textit{Leben Jesu} had done for the New Testament, it was the harbinger of a long and fruitful period of historical criticism. And like Strauss, Vatke was versed in the Hegelian ideology. It was the Hegelian approach toward the study of the Old Testament that endeared Biedermann/
Biedermann to Vatke. Vatke acted as a fitting supplement to Bie­
dermann's interest in Strauss, and after he left Berlin he kept in touch with his teacher confessing in a letter to him that, "Strauss has ploughed up the field of my theological consciousness, but because of this there has been a new sowing which is bringing forth more abundant fruit, so that I thank him for it and will always confess my debt to him aloud."¹ In grateful recognition of his teaching Biedermann dedicated his first important book to Vatke.

When he returned to Switzerland in 1843, Biedermann took a small church at Mönchenstein where he preached with considerable success. His ministry, however, was abandoned after the publication and warm reception of the book which he had dedicated to Vatke, Die freie Theologie oder Philosophie und Christenthum in Streit und Frieden, 1844. In this work Biedermann followed the formula of the younger Hegelian school in attempting a reconciliation between speculative philosophy and Christian theology. In making the human consciousness the only real, universal, and absolute Being, Biedermann came very near to the illusionary theory of religion held by Feuerbach. But Biedermann hoped to show how religion and doctrine might become essential in this philosophy and so, in accord with Vatke, he translated the essence of religion from the theoretical to the practical defining religion as "the practical self-consciousness of the Absolute."² By stressing the practical aspect of/
of consciousness he thought he had laid hold of a means of justify-
ing an intellectual freedom in theology. The Freie Theologie
occasioned a bitter fight in the Swiss Church among conservative
groups against which Biedermann stood his ground as the exponent
of the liberal movement.

In order to propagate his liberal views on ecclesiastical
freedom in theology, Biedermann, together with a few colleagues,
edited a periodical, Die Kirche der Gegenwart, which contained
articles of a liberal and speculative nature. The critical ten-
dency in Switzerland had heretofore been sporadic and unorganized,
now it centred around this publication of Biedermann and directed
its attack with greater vehemence and consistency. The following
titles among the many papers which Biedermann himself contributed
give an indication of the tone and temper of his views: "Esoteric
and Exoteric, or the Accommodation," "The Ghost of Pantheism,"
"This world and the world beyond." 1 In all these essays Bieder-
mann's aim was to answer the usual theological reproaches cast
against pantheism. His positive reconstruction of the pantheistic
principles attempted to establish the doctrine of God and the im-
mortality of the soul. Pantheism, he held, was misunderstood when
it was objected that it negated a doctrine of God or immortality.
Of great significance in view of his later dogmatic position was
another paper on the problem of the life of Jesus which appeared
in/

1. "Esoterisch und exoterisch oder die Akkomodation," (I,243ff);
"Das Gespenst des Pantheismus," (I,261ff); "Dieseits und
jenseits," (III,155ff).
In Biedermann's periodical. In this essay Biedermann sought to show the inadequacy of the conclusions to which Strauss came in his critical examination of the New Testament records. What Strauss failed to do was to excavate deep enough with his critical instruments. What Biedermann essayed to do was to indicate the "untouched principal" (der Grundstock des Kapitals) of the life of Jesus. As a banking house safeguards its loans and investments by means of a "capital" sum which is kept in reserve, so the life of Jesus is but the "interest" drawn and accumulated out of this "capital" which remains unaffected by the extravagance of criticism. This ultimate "capital" contains the eternal truths, the very essence of religion and Christianity.2

In 1850 Biedermann was called to a theological chair in the University of Zurich where he taught Theological Encyklopaedia and New Testament Introduction and succeeded in introducing into these subjects his views on dogmatic proper with which he was especially concerned and interested. At the same time he was instructor of religion in the upper classes of the Gymnasium and to justify/

2. Other essays appearing in Biedermann's periodical were: "Unsere junghegelsche Weltanschauung oder der sog. neueste Pantheismus," which appeared separately in 1849; a response to a work of Romang directed against the speculative school and entitled, "Der neueste Zyantheismus oder die junghegelische Weltanschauung nach ihren theoretischen Grundlagen und praktischen Konsequenzen," in which Biedermann furthered his pantheistic reconstruction begun in the Freie Theologie on the theory that speculative conceptions and Christian conceptions of immortality and salvation are in essential harmony.
justify his methods and opinions in the face of a charge made
against him, he wrote a little pamphlet setting forth his stand.¹

At this time also, Biedermann devoted much of his time
to the religious press and wrote several articles some in a pole-
mical vein and others of a literary nature. Whether his subject
had to do with the problem of philosophy and theology or with the
religious novel, Biedermann executed his task with a noble style
and a gracious tolerance which made his name respected in all sorts
of cultural circles. His interest in education never slackened
and for a number of years he belonged to the Board of Education in
Zurich, the largest in Switzerland. Although his interest in theo-
logy was centred more in speculation than in pastoral duties, he
retained to his death a willingness and eagerness to preach, especi-
ally in the country villages where the congregations were small
and untutored.

In 1869 Biedermann published his Dogmatik, the scientific
masterpiece of his life by which he is known to-day.² It was a
systematic construction of Christian theology built upon the Hegel-
ian philosophy. Agreeing in principle with the Hegelian distinc-
tions, Biedermann, however, did not admit that religion and the
religious idea are one and the same. This identification was to
him the failing point of both the Hegelian and the Straussian specu-
lation. Will and emotion must play a part in religion, Biedermann
argued, and so he defined religion as a mutual relation between God
and/

¹ Leitfaden für den Religionsunterricht an höheren Gymnasien.
² Christliche Dogmatik, 1869.
and man in which there is apparent both divine revelation and human faith. In Christianity this mutual relationship is expressed historically in the Person of Christ, this is what Biedermann called the "principle of Christianity." The Dogmatik is the most perfected expression of the speculative school of theology. It contains apologetic, biblical theology, history of dogma, symbolic, and doctrine. In denying the historicity of the Gospels with a critical acumen equalled only by Strauss, he held to the eternal truths which the Gospels illustrate and attempted to give the Christian doctrines eternal significance by emphasizing their intrinsic truths.

Although the Dogmatik consumed Biedermann's attention for the rest of his life (in 1884 he revised and re-edited it in two volumes), he found time to devote himself to the Swiss Reformed Church. Although he was the leading exponent of the speculative theology, he was intensely concerned with the practical exposition of theology in the Church as is shown by his frequent stands in village pulpits. When he first read Strauss's Der alte und der neue Glaube he was so disappointed and disgusted with the conclusions reached therein that he wrote to his friend Vatke, "I would give a finger of my right hand, if Strauss had not published that menacing book." This statement shows the strange mixture in Biedermann of a speculative turn of mind coupled with a deep disgust for rationalistic or materialistic theology. In a little essay on Heinrich/

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Heinrich Lang, a prominent pastor of the Swiss Church, Biedermann praised the work of the Swiss Church in preaching an historical Christianity in keeping with the best interests of a liberal theology. One of the most important of his short publications at this time was a speech made before the Swiss Society for Free Protestantism on the subject, *Unsere Stellung zu Christus*, 1882.

The second edition of the *Dogmatik*, published in two volumes in 1884, marked not only a revision of the original text but reorganized the schema of the contents. The original single volume contained three parts, a principal part on the problem of the essence of religion, an historical part on the doctrines of the Church, and a speculative part or the reconstruction of Christian theology. The second edition contained only two parts, the second of which contained the second and third parts of the first edition. In content the *Dogmatik* of 1884 did not differ radically from its predecessor although the conclusion to which Biedermann finally comes is a distinct step away from the speculative theology in the direction of the traditional Christian experience.

Shortly after the appearance of the first volume of the revised *Dogmatik*, Biedermann was stricken ill and died very suddenly on the 25th of January, 1885. He counteracted the pain of his last hours by quoting long passages of scripture and singing the hymns.

1. Leben Langs, 1876.
2. Other writings of the same character: *Die dringendsten Aufgaben der protestantischen Apologetik in der Gegenwart*, 1876; *Richtungen und Parteien*, 1880; essays on Lipsius, 1877; Pfleiderer, 1878, and Hartmann, 1882; and a final essay, *Eine Ehrenrettung*, 1884.
hymns of Paul Gerhardt. He repeated again and again the last
words of Jesus on the cross. A friend who stayed with him to the
end read him the words from the Epistle to the Romans, "For none
of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether
we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto
the Lord: whether we live therefore, or die, we are the Lord's."
Biedermann answered with great joyfulness, "Yes, that is fully and
totally my conviction." ¹

Biedermann is best known for his *Dogmatik*, but before
looking at that work we must consider first, quite briefly, one or
two other publications which indicate the direction of his thought
and lay the basis for his chief work. The *Freie Theologie* beckons
our attention first. ²

Biedermann referred to his *Freie Theologie* in later life
as a "rocket" (eine Rakete) which announced to the world the begin­
nning of a new mode of theological thinking which was to be known as
the speculative Theology. ³ By this he did not mean that he had
set forth something altogether new, for he freely acknowledged his
debt to both Hegel and Strauss, but the theological tendency of
which it was the herald was new. In this little book Biedermann
sought/

¹ Rom.14: 7-8; Oeri, *Persönliche Erinnerungen an Biedermann*, 1866,
quoted in the *Realencyklopadie fur protestantische Theologie
und Kirche*.
² *Die freie Theologie oder Philosophie und Christenthum in
Streit und Frieden*, 1844.
sought to demonstrate the compatibility of the speculative philosophy of Hegel with Christian theology by indicating the sphere and scope of each.

Philosophy is the relation of the thinker to thought, or of the Ego to the non-Ego. Religion too is the relation of the Ego to its universal being, but in religion it is the individual practical Ego and not the universal or absolute Ego. Religion, thus, is a sort of mirror which reflects the practical Ego to the Absolute and in turn reflects the Absolute to the finite subject. Religion is, said Biedermann, the "practical self-consciousness of the Absolute."¹ This means that religion, like philosophy, contains a theoretical aspect in so far as it is the consciousness of the Absolute, but this alone does not characterize religion, it must be referred to the practical self-consciousness. Further, the theoretical aspect of religion is idea not thought. But the mode in which religious ideas are represented is not religion. Religion at heart, its kernel, is a relationship the same as is philosophy. So Christianity is not any particular view of the world (this is a mode of the idea), but it is a relationship between the Infinite and finite in which man comes to realize his divinity and in which God assumes humanity. This relationship is set forth in the God-man, Jesus Christ, who as a mode of the religious idea is subject to history and criticism but whose religious kernel is universal and absolute. Thus, philosophy and theology, in so far as both contain a theoretical universal are in essential harmony.

This/

¹. Die freie Theologie, p.41.
This notion of religion as a "spiritual relationship in which the finite subject stands in regard to another subject, as to an Infinite which is called divine,"¹ led many to associate Biedermann with Feuerbach who took as his starting-point the definition, "Imagination is the essential organ of religion."² Both, it was felt, reduced the object of religion to the purely human level. But while this reduction led Feuerbach to an illusionary theory of religion, Biedermann was led toward establishing the Church as the essential fulfilment of his concept of religion. But in introducing the doctrines of the Church into religion, Biedermann acclaimed a free exercise of speculation as a guiding hand to hold them in check. In the final two chapters, therefore, on "Theology" and the "Church" an unlimited freedom of conscience is set up in regard to dogma and belief. Neither symbol nor the Bible, nor even the self-consciousness of Jesus, is allowed to stand over against the essence or kernel of religion which is known by speculative thinking alone.

For the most part the terminology and phraseology of the Freie Theologie is extremely difficult and is at times almost unintelligible. We need not bother here, however, with a detailed analysis of its content as its central principle is clear and it is that which has a bearing upon our problem. Although Biedermann has not much to say of the Person of Christ, he intimated the position which he developed fully in the Dogmatik, namely, that the Person/

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¹ Die freie Theologie, p.30.
² Ludwig Feuerbach, Sämtliche Werke, 1903, Bd.VII, p.244.
Person of Christ is an historical illustration of the definition of religion. As an historical individual, He is subject to such criticism as Strauss, for example, could bring against Him, but this is not to invalidate His significance. The kernel of religion (das innere »»esen der Religion) cannot be touched by criticism and since Jesus Christ represents this kernel neither can He be touched by criticism. There are then in Biedermann's early thinking two ways of looking at the God-man, as an historical individual and as a universal idea. It is a distinction that was already popular in nineteenth century theology. Hegel and Strauss had built their Christological thought upon it. Biedermann, it must be remembered, was only twenty-five years old when he wrote the Freie Theologie and at the time was wholly under the influence of Hegel and Strauss. It is not surprising, therefore, to find him in complete accord with their position in regard to the Person of Christ. It was not until he wrote the Dogmatik that his position was sufficiently unique to be distinguished from those of Hegel and Strauss.

Between the years 1850 and 1884 Biedermann issued a series of essays and lectures which had a wide theological influence.¹ These/

1. A.E. Biedermann, ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze, edited by J. Kradolfer. This selection contains 13 essays, one of which, "Unsere Stellung zu Christus," we will consider separately in the next section.
These "occasional" papers represent certain aspects of his thinking from the time of the Freie Theologie to the second edition of the Dogmatik, but they are an altogether different kind of writing than his two main dogmatic works. In the Freie Theologie and the Dogmatik Biedermann was always the cool, pondering, speculative thinker submerged in his metaphysical abstractions. He was always impersonal and formal. It is quite otherwise with these essays. Here we come into touch not only with Biedermann the philosopher, but with Biedermann the man. Instead of the stilted Hegelian terminology we are met with an informal style which frequently borders on conversation.

The first of the essays, "The Position and Problem of Philosophy in Theology," set out to develop three points: first, the relation of theology and philosophy to each other; second, the influence of philosophy upon theology; and third, the influence of the philosophical consciousness upon the theological personality. If, as Biedermann suggested, philosophy is the purest science and includes all thought, then theology too is a department of philosophy. "The science of religion," he said, "takes its stand quite within philosophy, but as its kernel and crown." The starting-point (der Ausgangspunkt) for historical theology is the Person of Christ. All that went before Him in biblical theology and in the general history of religion becomes meaningful only as an historical preparation.

2. " " " " " " " " " p.4.
preparation. The Christian Church based its foundation on faith in Him as the personal source of revelation. However, there is also the knowledge of (das Wissen) the Person of Christ which is also an historical starting-point for theology. But to gain this knowledge of the Christ such processes as historical research must be fully utilized. We cannot know Christ by merely accepting the picture of Him as given by the Evangelists, we must examine this picture carefully and critically in order to derive from it the essence which it contains. This is the great philosophical-theological task.

As the Person of Christ is the starting-point for historical theology, the system of Christian faith and life marks its logical conclusion (der Endpunkt). And as the Person of Christ necessarily becomes a philosophical problem, so too the theological doctrine of faith is philosophical through and through. If faith is the devotion of a finite personality to the eternal goal of life (Lebenswahrheit), which in Christ has been shown to be a redeeming fact, then it is philosophy which shows the way to this faith. It may be that a half-philosophy leads one away from God, but a whole-philosophy leads one to God, to a faith which carries within itself the power to overcome all doubts.¹

The greatest privilege and responsibility for the speculative theologian, according to Biedermann, is so to preach and teach that the youth of the day may be guided toward this philosophical faith. If any man fails to do this, let not philosophy be blamed/

blamed, let it suffice to say that he has failed in his task.

Biedermann concluded this essay with the Pauline text, "He that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged of no man."¹

The second essay, "The Unseen world of Primitive Peoples,"² is interesting in so far as it shows how wide was the scope of Biedermann's interests. He quoted from and alluded to the various religions of the world, Chinese, Hindu, American Indian, Roman, Greek, and referred frequently to the works of Homer, Hesiod, and Plato. His conclusions were three: first, that all primitive peoples conceived of a future life although it was always fashioned according to their own wishes and desires; second, the common view of a future world underlying the thought of all primitive peoples is that of a dream picture (ein Traumbild) which is primarily concerned with ghosts and shades; third, Christians derive their knowledge of the unseen world from the revelation of God in spirit.

Two essays, "The Religious Novel" and "The Religious Drama,"³ indicate the cultural appreciation of Biedermann. In the latter he suggested that the theme "fate" which appears in so many dramas, especially the Greek, is really God or Providence, and for that reason the drama is at its very roots religious. "If the fundamental problem of the drama is a religious one, the form of religious processes is a dramatic one, and the goal of both religion and drama is the same: Reconciliation (Versöhnung)."⁴

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1. I. Cor. 2:15.
Three biographical essays on Baur, Schleiermacher, and Strauss\(^1\) are literary achievements, but indicate also Biedermann's deep regard for each of his well-known predecessors. The essay on Baur was written a year after his death and contains a rather complete exposition of his views. The absence of criticism would indicate that Biedermann was in accord with the main principles of the founder of the Tübingen School of criticism. The essay on Schleiermacher was written on his one hundredth birthday. Here too Biedermann paid homage to "the regenerator of modern theology" as he called Schleiermacher.\(^2\) Biedermann acknowledged from the very first his debt to Strauss. What he admired most in Strauss was his critical ability, for the conclusions of the \textit{Leben Jesu} seemed to him to be inadequate.

An essay, "The Problems of Apologetic for the Present,"\(^3\) began with the question, "What shall be defended by Apologetic?" The ready answer was, "the Evangel of Christian salvation." But this answer, according to Biedermann, has a double connotation. Does it mean that Christianity is the salvation-truth (die Heils-wahrheit), or that the truth of Christianity is salvation? Is it the whole historical form of Christianity in doctrine and life, or its essence? Is it Christianity as the one universal Christian Church, or as the Protestant Church according to the old standards? It/

2. "F. Schleiermacher," p.188.
It is obvious to Biedermann that Apologetic can have no place in a Christianity in which faith decides its own content. "Apologetic has to clarify the essence of the Christian religion in the form of the religious principle which has been exemplified in mankind and for mankind in the religious personality of Jesus." The most urgent need of Apologetic is to concentrate all theological opinions upon the kernel of Christianity. What is this kernel? The kernel of Christianity is the relationship between the Infinite and the finite, between God and the world, a spiritual fact revealed in the religious personality of Jesus in whom the religious life of mankind is exemplified.

This essay on Apologetic was originally a lecture delivered to the annual assembly of the Swiss Reformed Preachers' Society of Zurich and so Biedermann's audience was composed of Rationalists, Supranaturalists, and Mediating theologians. If we are to have unity in the Church, spoke Biedermann, we must all concentrate on the kernel of religion (auf den Kern der Religion). Thus Apologetic will be an instrument in welding the different opinions of the Church into a unity. The two main divisive movements in the Church which Apologetic must meet are first, secularism and materialism, and second positivism and mythology. In conclusion Biedermann offered three caveats: first to concentrate on the kernel of religion; second, truthful and trustful appreciation of/

2. Biedermann called this relationship, "das Gotteskindschaftsverhältniss," p. 266.
of those who hold different points of view; and third, just treat-
ment for anti-Christian theories through the realization that they
may contain a bit of the truth.

These essays indicate the drift and tendency of Bieder-
mann's thought. We see that he was always in earnest. His passion
for truth, his zeal for unity, his tolerant sympathy of those who
opposed him in word and in thought are evident on every page. We
find in him the strange co-mingling of a speculative theology and
a warm Christian devotion.

In regard to the problem of redemption, it is evident
that he had a much deeper realization of what redemption is than
had Strauss. He was not satisfied with the critical conclusions
of mythology any more than he could accept the principles of mater-
ialism. Redemption for Biedermann was no mere speculative ab-
straction, no mere moral obligation, it lay at the very heart of
Christianity and was intelligible only through the Person of Christ.
His speculative turn of mind, however, would not let him rest with
a bland acceptance of the orthodox Christology. He felt that the
acknowledgment of the Person of Christ as the Redeemer was not
enough, knowledge of what He was and what He stood for determines
Christianity. So the principle, or essence, or kernel, of the
Person of Christ is ultimately the significant thing in Christian-
ity, but this cannot exist without the historical Person. We shall
see in the Dogmatik how Biedermann attempted to reconcile this
speculative separation of Person from principle with his inner
Christian/
Christian experience.

A lecture given by Biedermann in 1882 at a meeting of the Swiss Society for Liberal Protestantism entitled Unsere Stellung zu Christus,¹ indicates in an abbreviated form his Christological position. We give here a running paraphrase of the pertinent parts of the lecture.

Our position in regard to Christ, said Biedermann, is the most genuine touch-stone (der echteste Prüfstein) upon which opposite theological opinions may be brought together, and thus it is a fitting theme for a Church Assembly since unity is the Church’s fondest ideal. Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ - that is the original creed of the Christian community. But Christ at that time meant simply the fulfiller of the Jewish messianic prophecies. Through Christ, God would fulfil his promises to the children of Israel and a new Kingdom of God would be ushered in as the final goal for all men. That in the Person of Jesus this salvation and highest good were revealed for the world and really unlocked for mankind - this is the kernel of all Christian belief. But what this Jesus was as an historical personality, how He was the Christ, and wherein, therefore, this salvation and highest good were in Him, - all these considerations are more subtle than the mere statement that in the Person of Jesus there is redemption. He who sees Jesus/

¹. Printed separately by G. Reimar, Berlin, from which references are here made.
Jesus as the Christ, as far as he knows what that means, however scanty or however full of content his faith may be, has a right to be called a Christian. The judgment whether or not he belongs to the true congregation of Christ, the Kingdom of God on earth, what our ancestors called the 'Invisible Church,' that we shall leave to God who judges both more severely and more mildly, more justly and more graciously, than we judge one another.¹

Biedermann made it plain that he was speaking of the Church in its narrow and special sense as an historically determined community concerned with the cultivation of Christian belief in communal, devotional, and educational life. What is the bond of unity that holds this Church together and at the same time makes for freedom of conscience? It is our position in regard to Christ. But "Christ" is not merely a title of honour, or an external link that binds Christians together, it is the name given to One in whom there is true religion. In His life the true relation between God and man is revealed as a fact. In Him redemption becomes the highest good for the whole of mankind. This is no meagre residue of religion, as is held by those (like Strauss) who completely abandon religion. It is an affirmative appreciation in abbreviated form of those things wherein true religion consists. This appreciation is based on the religious life which was exemplified in the Jesus of history. In this way the kernel of religion is tied up with its historical representation. But just how true religion makes/
makes use of the historical person is a question of theory concerning which research is necessary and thus a diversity of opinions is possible. And this necessary diversity of opinions is also the essential freedom which is allowed any one who acknowledges the fact that Jesus is the Christ.¹

There are two main opinions of the Person of Christ. The one is the orthodox or positive opinion which regards Jesus as the very Son of God. The other is the liberal opinion which sees in Jesus the fulfiller and revealer of God's word. The liberal view acknowledges that Jesus is the Christ in this way: He reveals actually in His Person the divine determination of mankind, the true life that comes from God, the victory over the world, and therewith He has opened up for mankind the Kingdom of God which is made mankind's highest good. The orthodox view, however, claims that it alone recognizes that Jesus is the Christ, the Redeemer of the world. The liberal view, those of the orthodox hold, has only shown the way at the end of which, perhaps, the goal may lie, but now, as before, mankind remains severed from this goal by a gulf which it cannot itself bridge. To make of Jesus merely a prototype (Vorbild) is not to call Him Christ. The liberal view, on the other hand, holds that the orthodox view of redemption is a phantasy-drama whose beginning, middle, and end have meaning only as a picture of spiritual truth. How then, Biedermann asked, in the face of these two apparently contradictory views/

¹. Unsere Stellung zu Christus, pp.11-13.
views can there be a religious community with any sort of internal unity?¹

Formerly theologists liked to draw the fundamental contrast between the orthodox and the liberal Christologies by using the catchwords (Stickwörter) 'historical Christ' and 'Ideal Christ.' The true contrast, however, is deeper than this distinction. Is the Person of Christ the one who unlocks for mankind the secret of divinity and thus brings redemption? Or is the religion of Jesus, the inner life relationship in which Jesus stands to God, the revelation of God? Is Jesus Himself the God of our belief, He whom the doctrine of the Church has made really a divine Person transforming a human son of God (Gottessohn) into a God-Son (Gott-Sohn), is this One the revealed God of the Christian faith? Or is the one eternal God, as Jesus's personal religion reveals Him, the God of our belief, but thereby the Christ who in His religious life has opened up redemption for mankind? This is the true contrast between orthodox and liberal. Where can they be united?²

Orthodox and liberal come together not merely in an historical fact apart from its religious meaning, and not merely in a religious idea apart from whether or not the fact ever happened, but in the fact of the religious life of Jesus as the human revelation-source of divine life. (Jesus als des menschlichen Offenbarungsquells der göttlichen Lebenswahrheit für die Welt.) The orthodox who wishes to be true to the inheritance which has been given/

¹. Unsere Stellung zu Christus, pp.14-17.
². ibid., pp.18-20.
given him by his fathers, and the liberal whose creed is based on the Kingdom of God in the world as it has been revealed by Jesus, the Christ - both come together and stand hand in hand on the religious life of Jesus. ¹

How the orthodox view can reconcile the old miracle picture (Wunderbild) of Jesus with the modern Weltanschauung is a problem for its followers, added Biedermann. "What really separates the orthodox and the liberal is not an ecclesiastical problem but a difference of opinion in regard to science and history. If the orthodox view discharges its duties it will not only preach the Gospel of Jesus, the Christ, according to its standards, but it will honestly appreciate the efforts and the justification of the liberal view which works by its side."²

What we all need, Biedermann concluded, - liberals as well as orthodox - is to ponder the commandments contained in the old aphorism, 'in necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas.' In the early Christian Church some said, 'I am of Paul,' others 'I am of Apollos,' but it is to be hoped that orthodox and liberal may say with one voice, 'I am of Jesus Christ.'³

Biedermann's main theological work was the Dogmatik.⁴ The relation between the Freie Theologie and the Dogmatik is in some/

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1. Unsere Stellung zu Christus, pp.21-23.
2. " " " pp.24-33.
3. " " " pp.34-36.
some respects like the relation between Schleiermacher's *Reden* and his *Glaubenslehre*. Both the *Dogmatik* and the *Glaubenslehre* are the fruit of long years of thought, and, as in the *Glaubenslehre* Schleiermacher has broken with the Romanticism which characterized the *Reden*, Biedermann in the *Dogmatik* showed little relation to Feuerbach with whose system his *freie Theologie* was compared.¹

The *Dogmatik* is a systematic theology which takes as its starting-point the Hegelian dialectic and the Straussian criticism. The very structure of the book, even its table of contents, indicates its Hegelian character, for theoretical and philosophical considerations precede the sections on religion and theology. The sections dealing with the Gospel records of the life of Christ are reminiscent of Strauss's criticism. But Biedermann announced in the preface that although he fully acknowledged his debt to both Hegel and Strauss, he was not in the *Dogmatik* merely reproducing their findings.² In agreement with Hegel that the Infinite and finite are essentially one, Biedermann nevertheless denied that religion was no more than a lower level of philosophy. To show that religious faith possesses a rightful province of its own was the appendix which Biedermann wished to add to the dialectical formalism of the Hegelian system. If Hegel had only verged upon the true distinctions of philosophy and religion, Strauss had only gone half way with his critical method. Thus Biedermann claimed as/¹

as his task in the *Dogmatik* the completing of the Hegelian dialectic and the Straussian criticism.

The second edition of the *Dogmatik* included nearly the whole of the first edition, some sections as in Christology, for example, being left unchanged, but a philosophical section on the theory of knowledge was added and given an introductory place. Biedermann's theory of knowledge stands somewhere between Hegel's logical idealism and Spinoza's monistic parallelism. Biedermann distinguished sharply between ideal being and material being but insisted that the antithesis was nevertheless a unity. Whether Biedermann's theory of knowledge succeeded in laying a surer basis for the understanding of such problems as mind and matter, God and the world, we need not here enquire, for it suffices for our present purpose to notice that in the metaphysical introduction of the *Dogmatik* Biedermann tried to distinguish form from matter and yet maintain their essential unity, a metaphysical feat which he repeated again in the Christological section.¹

Biedermann hoped by means of the speculative theology to escape from the pantheism of Hegel, in whose system philosophy and theology were embraced as one, and from the dualism of Strauss who used philosophy to destroy theology. Biedermann's definitions, therefore/

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therefore, are usually double-edged; one part dealing with philosophy, the other with theology. To define the two so as to indicate their difference and yet to show their unity, was Bieder­mann's aim. Christianity is, therefore, to be defined with these two considerations in mind. On the one hand, it is to be re­ferred to the Person of Jesus and, on the other hand, to the religious personality which was illustrated in Jesus.¹ Biedermann was insistent, however, in maintaining that these two aspects were inseparable. "Christianity," he said, "is the religion of the divine Sonship (Gotteskinschaft) which has been actually revealed for mankind in Jesus, and at the same time (damit) it is the re­ligion of the Kingdom of God as the divine purpose of humanity which has been realized in this divine Sonship."² The important word in that definition for Biedermann is the damit. Christianity is both person and principle, and although it is the principle that denotes the essence of Christianity, it must not, nor can it be, separated from its historical expression.

Christian dogma, consequently, is the form which the principle of Christianity has assumed in its historical development. No single doctrine of the Christian Church contains the principle in toto, it is revealed only in the whole history of dogma.³ Therefore Biedermann turned to the history of Christian dogma to examine it in the light of the Christian principle. First passing under review/

1. Dogmatik, 1884, I, p.331.
review biblical theology and then the historical development of Christian doctrines, he came finally to the concluding section of the *Dogmatik* where he reconstructed the Christian doctrines on a speculative basis setting forth the principle of Christianity as well as its historical formulation. As this final section contains Siedermann's constructive Christological thought, we will turn to that now and present his leading declarations.

The historical development of Christian theology, he wrote, has shown the form which the religious faith of mankind has taken throughout the ages. This faith had its object in the religious personality of Jesus. Now it must be shown in a critical-speculative way what constitutes the kernel or principle of Christianity underlying the historical dogmas.¹ The religious principle which lay in the background of all Christian doctrines had its original historical expression in the God-Son relationship expressed in the religious personality of Jesus. In His Person the full revelation of God for mankind was disclosed. This revelation enabled a man, who lived in disharmony with God on account of sin, to eliminate the barrier between himself and redemption. The doctrines of the Christian Church are, accordingly, the attempts of Christians in every age to account for and express in language their religious faith in the Person of Christ.²

Where the Church fell into error in the matter of Christology was in identifying too closely the Christian principle with the/

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¹ Dogmatik, II, p.395.
² Dogmatik, II, p.403.
the personality of Jesus whose life was the revelation of this principle in history, but who was not the principle itself. The law of identification was the stumbling-block of doctrinal Christianity. A spiritual principle was described as a person. The historical result of this colossal error has led to two contradictory viewpoints: the one lays hold of the Person and Work of Christ as the main dogma of Christianity, and the other looks for the kernel of Christian faith in a principle which Christ illustrated. The former view leads to Rationalism and the latter to a speculative theology. Taking Kant as an exponent of the Rationalist's view, Biedermann denied that 'humanity, the ideal of moral perfection well-pleasing to God' was the same thing as the specific Christian principle contained in Christian dogma. But if Rationalism failed to discover the Christian principle, speculative Christologies thus far were also in error in identifying the essential relation of God to man with the religious problem found in Christology. The direct identification of the logical-metaphysical problem of the relation of divine and human essence with the specific religious problem of Christology is the fundamental error of all speculative Christology.  

Strauss had said that an idea, not a person, was the subject of Christology, not a Kantian unreality, but a concrete Idea of mankind as God-mankind. But, argued Biedermann, this Idea in Strauss's hands fluctuated between an abstract conception of the general/

2. II, p.433.
general essence of man and the concrete conception of the collection of all men, and the problem escaped from out of his hands. Strauss substituted God-mankind for God-man but that is no more than a 'neat rhetorical device.' To forget that there is in the Christological problem a distinct and specific "religious" Idea is to miss the real problem.¹

The doctrines of the Church are clearly dissolved, not solved, by both Rationalism and the usual form of speculative theology as is seen in Strauss. Schleiermacher, Biedermann pointed out, attempted to stand between the extremes of Christological thought in his day, but he concluded that Christology was primarily personal and only secondarily a principle. Biedermann dismissed Schleiermacher with an analogy describing him as a bridge over which theologians passed from Rationalism to orthodoxy and who, having reached the old familiar banks again, destroyed the bridge behind them.²

The expression 'principle', Biedermann insisted, is not meant to express an abstract subjective idea divorced from reality or manufactured by our own thinking, but rather it is in contrast to the ecclesiastical practice in Christology of identifying the Person of Christ with religious faith. The Christian principle must be regarded not as an abstraction but as essentially religious in content. The error of all previous speculative Christologies which/

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¹ Dogmatik, II, pp.434-437.
² " II, pp.438-442.
which emphasize the Idea of Christ's Person as it develops in human history has been this, that they do not see this Idea as a specifically religious one whose content is composed of the very essence of the religious personality of Jesus. They are accustomed to view the content of this Idea as a general metaphysical truth concerning the relation between the Absolute and the finite, or as a relation between the divine and the human. All this is not the Christological Idea itself for it has a specifically religious character. In order to see the Christian principle in its true light, the religious personality of Jesus must be accounted for. Thus, concluded Biedermann, we do not separate the principle from the Person nor do we identify them as does the Church.¹

The Christian principle revealed in the religious personality of Jesus is the underlying union between God and man. Län's self-conscious union with Absolute Spirit is the real union of divine and human. Absolute religious self-consciousness, therefore, is the only real God-mankind and is expressed in the communion of love between God and as Fatherhood on the side of God (die Vaterschaft Gottes) and as childhood on the side of man (die Kinderschaft des Menschen). The essence of love is the life of one within another, and in the absolute religious self-consciousness this love results in new life, it is the principle of redemption (das Erlösungsprincip), the causa efficiente, the elimination of the natural discord in which man finds himself and out of which he cannot/

cannot extricate himself by his own power. The absolute religious self-consciousness in religious thinking brings about a transition from the carnal self-consciousness to the true spiritual self-consciousness. In religious feeling it culminates in reconciliation. In religious willing it results in freedom.¹

The absolute religious self-consciousness finds its historical guarantee in the religious personality of Jesus. In Him we see His self-consciousness of the Kingdom of God as a relationship of love between God and man and as the aim and goal of all men. We see His messianic self-consciousness as He fulfilled the Old Testament prophecies. We see the creation of absolute ethical commandments out of His own self-consciousness as a member of God's Kingdom. We see His self-consciousness of the absolute worth of the Ego over against all the things of the world and of the relative worth of the latter. We see His self-consciousness of the love of the Father fulfilled in Him as the sin-redeeming grace of God for repentant sinners. We see His self-consciousness of His sacrificial death and absolute devotion of His being and life to God in founding the Kingdom of Divine Grace in the world.²

The relation of the historical Person of Jesus to the efficacy of the Christian principle, which has entered history with Him and depends historically upon Him, indeed the very significance of Jesus for the whole of Christianity, is no external and accidental relation but an inner and permanent one. Accidental and external it would be if this principle had stood merely in/

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in a doctrine newly brought forth by Jesus, or if its coming into history had received merely its indirect impulse from the Person of Jesus. But Jesus's personal religious life is the first instance of a principle realizing itself in a world-historical personality, and this fact is the key which unlocks for mankind the efficacy of the principle. Jesus - as the historical revelation of the principle of redemption - is the historical Redeemer.

Therefore, the Person of Jesus is for all time the world-historically guaranteed proto-type (das welthistorisch gewahrleistende Vorbild) of the efficacy of the principle of redemption.¹

The knowledge which we have of Jesus's revelation of Himself must be expressed in the form of declarations about Him, but not about His life which is an historical accident, but with regard to the principle of divine Sonship (das Princip der Gottes-kindschaft) revealed in Him. Only when ecclesiastical Christology is brought into accord with the Christian principle which is revealed in Jesus - but which is not to be confused with Jesus Himself - will it be correctly formulated. Not the historical personality as such, but the principle revealed in the personality is the main thing. For it is evident, Biedermann held, that there is truth in the orthodox phraseology. For example, the emphasis of the old Christologies on the divinity of Christ is a crude expression of the truth that the absoluteness of the spirit revealed in the self-consciousness of divine Sonship is the revelation of the/

the essence of Absolute Spirit. And the desire of the Church to emphasize the true manhood of Christ is an expression of the truth that the absolute religious self-consciousness of divine Sonship is nothing other than the true and full working out of the human essence. Thus the Chalcedon insistence on the inseparableness and unmixed unity of both natures in one man is the expression of the truth that in the absolute religious self-consciousness the absoluteness of Spirit and the finiteness of the individual are both quite distinguished and yet joined as one in the life-process of the self-consciousness.  

Moreover, Biedermann granted that the Church doctrine of the work of Christ illustrates the efficacy of the Christian principle. For example, the doctrine of the munus propheticum of Christ is an expression of the truth that in the absoluteness of the religious self-consciousness there is given the principle of all true religious knowledge for all future development, and indeed in such a way that the historical personality of Jesus in its definite historical setting is the exemplary illustration of this truth. The furtherance of the munus propheticum through the Holy Spirit in the Apostles and in the Christian community is the expression of the truth that the unfolding of religious knowledge from the Christian principle goes forth in no definitely historical form but in a continuous process of which only the principle itself is the absolute standard.  

1. Dogmatik, II, pp.593-595.
2. II, p.597.
The essence of the ecclesiastical doctrine of Christ's munus sacerdotale is the expression of the truth that the absoluteness of Spirit, at the same time as it becomes the religious self-consciousness of man, reveals itself as the power to remove the contradiction between man and his final goal. The historical sacrificial death of Jesus was the occasion for the rise of this religious impulse.¹

The doctrine of Christ's munus regium is the expression of the truth that the absoluteness of Spirit, revealing itself within the human self-consciousness, is the effective principle of the continuous domination of nature, and therewith of the glorification of humanity to a Kingdom of God. Of this the Person of Christ is the individual guaranteeing example, and Christianity is the general realization of this glorification as it fulfils itself by degrees in the history of the world.²

On the one hand, Biedermann concluded, if we centre everything in Jesus Christ as an historical person, there is lacking to this conception a very important thing - the very nerve of Christianity - the union of the divine and the human, the principle of redemption. To leave this out of consideration results in empty and inexact phrases which have currency only in the old formulations of Church doctrine. On the other hand, if we regard Christianity as an Idea only, then we have a Christianity devoid of personality and/

1. Dogmatik, II, pp.597-598.
2. " II, p.598.
and history, which is no more than the Old Testament legal religion, or we have a pantheistic view of the human spiritual process.¹

It is with this alternative proposition that Biedermann concluded his discussion of Christology in the *Dogmatik*. The fact that it is an alternative is indicative of his thinking on the subject, for he did not escape the inconsistency of trying to separate and yet unite the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption. On the one hand, he said, the Person of Christ, and on the other, the principle of redemption - the two alternatives are distinct, but, apart from each other, they lose their significance.

Strauss and Biedermann were both Hegelians. They started from the same preliminary suppositions and their systems were consistently Hegelian throughout. But there is this great difference, Strauss became less and less interested in Christianity and more and more concerned with materialistic philosophy, while the reverse is true of Biedermann. We see Biedermann struggling away from the pantheistic implications of Hegelianism toward a theistic Christianity. Biedermann wrote no last will or testimony, no *Bekenntnis*, as did Strauss, in order to answer negatively the question, "Are we still Christians?" His chief concern was to construct a system of theology which would be in accord with the faith of/

of the Christian believer.

There is a thread of development to be seen in Biedermann from his first publication to his last. For example, in the Freie Theologie he defined religion as "the spiritual relationship in which the finite subject stands in regard to another subject as to an Infinite which is called Divine." This early definition in the terminology of Feuerbach was developed further in the essay on "The Position and Problem of Philosophy in Theology" where he said, "Religion in its form and content, as in its belief and creed, does not reach outside the circle of human beings and therefore is comprehended by the self-conscious activity of the spirit. But religion claims for its content the character of supernaturalness for in it only can man raise himself from mere physical being to spirit." The first part of this definition might be from Feuerbach but not the second part which suggests a relationship to an unseen power, an elevation to something beyond and outside of man. In "The Unseen world of Primitive Peoples," Biedermann defined religion as "chiefly a mutual relationship between man and a something beyond." In the first edition of the Dogmatik, "Religion is a relation of man to God." In the essay on "Apologetic," Biedermann wrote, "In the spiritual life of man there stands a relationship/

4. Dogmatik, 1869, p.23.
relationship between finiteness and Infiniteness." 1 Finally, in
the second edition of the Dogmatik, "Religion is a personal eleva-
tion of the human 'I' to God." 2 Although all these definitions
are unmistakably influenced by Hegelianism, Biedermann was evidently
groping his way from philosophical abstractions to Christian theism.

In Christology we see the same movement away from specu-
lation in the direction of faith. In the Freie Theologie Jesus
Christ is a double entity, an historical man and a philosophical
idea. There is nothing here to distinguish Biedermann from Strauss.
In the essay on "The Position and Problem of Philosophy in Theo-
logy" the distinction between Person and principle is modified by
asserting that in Jesus the principle had its historical expression,
and, therefore, He is regarded as the starting-point for an under-
standing of the principle. In the first edition of the Dogmatik,
in the essay on "Apologetic", in the essay on "Our Position in
regard to Christ," and in the second edition of the Dogmatik, Bie-
dermann emphasized the religious personality of Jesus as the ex-
pression of the Christian principle. Thus, it can be seen,
Biedermann began with the explicit distinction between Person and
principle but concluded by trying to unite them into a living re-
lationship. Although the principle is the important concern of
Christianity for speculative theology, the Person of Christ is the
concrete form which the principle assumes in the faith-conscious-
ness of the Christian, and for that reason the principle is
unintelligible/

1. "Welches sind die dringendsten Aufgaben der protestantischen
Apologetik," p.265.
unintelligible and meaningless without the Person. To think of Christianity solely in terms of the Person of Christ is to neglect the principle of redemption, a vital nerve of Christianity; whereas to consider Christianity as a principle without a personal expression is to land in Judaistic legalism or pantheism.

Biedermann's task was a difficult one. He wished to separate Person and principle and yet he wished to unite them. Such a program did not lend itself readily to speculative theology. Dr. H.R. Mackintosh has said of Biedermann that he was like an acquaintance of Dr. Samuel Johnson who said, "Doctor, I too might have been a philosopher but somehow cheerfulness was always breaking in!" Biedermann might have been a philosopher, but Christianity was always breaking in!
CHAPTER V

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL POSITION OF ERNST TROELTSCH.

Ernst Peter Wilhelm Troeltsch was born on February 17th, 1865 in a little village near Augsburg, Germany. In the Gymnasium Troeltsch received the customary classical education and early made up his mind to study theology. He entered the University of Erlangen in 1885 and, in accordance with the custom prevalent among German students, he took part of his course also at Göttingen and at Berlin. The professors who interested him most were Frank, Ritschl, and Paul de Lagarde, and of these Ritschl had the most permanent effect upon his thought although he reacted against Ritschl's position later in life. Paul de Lagarde was perhaps the best liked of the three for it was to him that Troeltsch dedicated the second volume of his collected works.¹

In 1888 Troeltsch served for a short time as an assistant minister in a Lutheran church in Munich. The interest which his later writings indicate in Church affairs, practical, ecclesiastical, and theoretical, would suggest that this early pastorate made a profound impression upon him and one that remained with him throughout.

¹ A. von Harnack, "Rede am Sarpe Ernst Troeltschs," Berliner Tageblatt, 6 Feb., 1923, reprinted in Die Christliche Welt, 22 Feb., 1923; see also the "Vorwort" of Bd. I, Gesammelte Schriften.
throughout the years.¹

Troeltsch's academic career included four German universities. In 1891 he was made a lecturer (Privatdozent) at Göttingen where he had been a student a few years previously. In 1892 he became Professor Extraordinary at Bonn. The next year the University of Heidelberg invited him to accept a full professorship in systematic theology. Here he remained for twenty-one years lecturing and writing. Most of his works were published during his Heidelberg professorship and it is quite natural that he is often referred to simply as "Troeltsch of Heidelberg." In 1915 Troeltsch accepted a call to Berlin in the department of philosophy, a chair occupied not long before by Otto Pfleiderer. While at Berlin, Troeltsch lectured on the Philosophy of Religion, Ethics, Philosophy of Civilization, Introduction to Philosophy, History of Modern Philosophy, and Philosophy of History. On Feb. 1, 1923 while in the midst of his work Troeltsch died.²

Baron von Hügel, an intimate friend of Troeltsch for twenty-two years, tells on more than one occasion how deep and real was Troeltsch's personal religion. In a letter to von Hügel informing him of the birth of a son, Troeltsch said, "It is impossible to express how deep are the thanks I owe to God for this happiness. We/

¹ Consider for example such essays as, "Gewissensfreiheit," and "Die Mission in der modernen Welt," Ed. II, Gesammelte Schriften.
² See the "Introduction" to Troeltsch's Christian Thought by Baron von Hügel, p.xii f.; also Sleigh, The Sufficiency of Christianity, pp.21 ff.
We have indeed to take all things from His hand, even the heaviest, and can demand nothing, not even what may be most essential to our life. But when, after trouble, the free gift of God reaches the soul and tarries within it, it is easier to resign oneself thus fully into His hands."¹ Troeltsch, however, had a way of hiding his personal feelings, and it is only occasionally that an expression of his own faith strikes the printed page like a bolt from the blue in its suddenness and unexpectedness. In the preface to Protestantism and Progress he said that he had not attempted to set forth his religious convictions but had reserved their expression for another time. The occasion, however, never seemed to present itself, and Troeltsch's works remain for the most part objective and sometimes even skeptical.²

Those who knew Troeltsch as a teacher are emphatic in their praise of his method, vivacity, and originality. His breadth of scholarship and his wide outlook on life were so compelling that Kaftan could say that he represented an "epoch." Troeltsch gathered up all the loose threads of theological and philosophical thinking and wove them all together into his own eclectic and sometimes, it would seem, desultory thinking. In reflecting several of the tendencies of his age he was necessarily many-sided and even at times inconsistent. One of his own students tells how in the course of a lecture Troeltsch would suddenly stop and point out his/

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¹ Quoted by Sleigh, The Sufficiency of Christianity, p.23.
² Baron von Hügel, "Ernst Troeltsch," in The Times Literary Supplement, 29 March, 1923; Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress, p.x; von Hügel's "Introduction" to Troeltsch's Christian Thought.
his own errors and then reversing his field begin all over again. It has sometimes been said of Schleiermacher that he took both sides to every question, and the same might be said of Troeltsch. But it was not only in Germany that Troeltsch was regarded with esteem and admiration. A mutual respect was reciprocated between Troeltsch and theologians in both America and Britain. Returning from a visit to America in 1904 he wrote of his gracious reception and of his appreciative impressions. The fact that he was asked to deliver a series of lectures in England and Scotland shows the high place in which he was held in Britain, and there was a feeling of profound loss when his death prevented the personal delivery of the lectures. It is also worthy of mention that a protestant French scholar wrote an appreciative little essay on Troeltsch shortly before his death.

One reason for the warm affection in which Troeltsch was held by other lands than his own was his almost utter lack of the typical German spirit of nationalism. This was not due to an indifferentism to politics or a lack of patriotism, for Troeltsch had /

3. Vermeil, La Philosophie religieuse d'Ernst Troeltsch, 1921; it is interesting to note that Troeltsch had many friends among the Roman Catholics, e.g. von Hügel; Emil Spiess (Die Religionstheorie von Ernst Troeltsch, 1927); and Erich Frzywara ("Ernst Troeltsch," in Stimmender Zeit, 1923, Heft 105).
had served both at Heidelberg and at Berlin on public boards. It was the War and its aftermath that tempered Troeltsch's nationalism but made him at the same time somewhat melancholy. The shock of the War was responsible for the untimely deaths of his mother and father, and a brother-in-law had been killed after two weeks service on the western front. With this loss in mind he wrote, "The man is to be accounted happy whom death has released from the madness of this world."¹ Von Hügel tells us that Troeltsch felt keenly the isolation of his country from the rest of the world and remarked pathetically, "Man, thank God, possesses a second fatherland from which no one can cast him out."²

Troeltsch possessed an encyclopaedic mind. Like many of his compatriots he was constantly writing and publishing books, pamphlets, lectures. It may be that he wrote too much, and the mere bulk of his books may account for the fact that Troeltsch is seldom read in Germany to-day. He was equipped and ready to write on theology, philosophy, and history, or on any combination of the three. His thinking, however, seemed to drift away from theology toward philosophy and we find that nearly all his theological works were published before 1915, the year he went to Berlin to teach philosophy. But there is really no dividing line between theological and philosophical interests in Troeltsch for even when he was/

¹. Quoted by Sleigh, The Sufficiency of Christianity, p.23.
². "Introduction" to Troeltsch's Christian Thought, p.xvi; as an example of Troeltsch's international outlook cf. his essay "Die Mission in der modernen Welt," Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, p.783 ff. where his contrast of English and German missionary activities is decidedly in favour of the former.
was concerned with theology his thinking led him to philosophy and history.

As a philosopher Troeltsch exhibits the traits of eclecticism and inconsistency which characterize all his works. Reared in the Ritschlian mould he at once proclaimed the independence of philosophy and religion, but though they are very separate fields of enquiry, he held, their goals are the same, and so when the philosopher speaks of the Absolute he means the same thing by it as the theologian means by God.¹ Troeltsch did not take up a definite stand with any one philosopher or school. He was always the eclectic, gathering here and there, ready to turn from one to another. At first he seemed to be in line with Kant who offered, he felt, the only metaphysics on which the Christian faith might be based. But he was never a pure Kantian. Modifications of the Kantian epistemology in the philosophy of Lotze and Leibniz attracted him and he attempted to embrace what he needed from all three in order to establish the superiority of Christianity. Troeltsch vacillated in his philosophical tendencies from Ritschl back to Hegel and Schleiermacher and then the neo-Kantians, Rickert and Windelband, commanded his attention.²

Troeltsch’s abiding interest was history. In philosophy and theology and in the philosophy of religion it was the historical/

². Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, p.479; art. on "Kant" in Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics; Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. IV, p.3 where he says he never had a system of philosophy.
historical approach and method for which he strove. Von Harnack called Troeltsch the greatest philosopher of history in Germany since Hegel, and Troeltsch himself tells us that he studied theology as a student simply because, for one thing, it presented exciting historical problems. This absorbing interest in history soon led Troeltsch to dissatisfaction with Ritschianism. Ritschl, he felt, was in error on two points: in excluding metaphysics from theology, and in creating a wide gulf between Christianity and the world. Troeltsch's historical bias swung him away from Ritschl toward Schleiermacher by way of the historical methodology of Paul de Lagarde. The more Troeltsch reacted against Ritschl the more he turned toward Schleiermacher, and it is not surprising, therefore, to find that Troeltsch modelled his Glaubenslehre to a certain extent after Schleiermacher's. Troeltsch and Schleiermacher were alike in this, that they both attempted to construct a system of theology from the Christian consciousness, but the subjectivism to which Schleiermacher was prone, which Troeltsch regarded as the ultimate defect of his system, was modified in Troeltsch by his historical outlook.

Troeltsch finally found his place as the leading exponent of the so-called religionsgeschichtliche Schule, or the Religio-Historical School. Actually this was not a school in the usual sense but was the name ascribed to a certain group of thinkers, including/

1. Von Harnack, "Rede am Sarge Ernst Troeltschs," 22 Feb., 1923; Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. IV, p.3.
2. Bd. II, "Vorwort."
including such names as Bousset and Gunkel, who were primarily interested in the relation of Christianity to the other religions and whose aim was to demonstrate the relative truth of all religions as the incomplete expression of the absolute truth toward which all religions are striving.\(^1\) Ritschl had neglected this historical approach and his neglect was one of the reasons why Troeltsch broke with him. In the new movement Troeltsch felt that he had found a way of correcting Ritschl's short-comings. This way was the relative and historical approach to religion. Thus, Christianity becomes one of the religions. To regard the Christian revelation as stopping with the death of Jesus of Nazareth was to Troeltsch the greatest heresy. What must be discerned in the Christian revelation is its unending progressiveness in which normative trends alone are revealed.\(^2\)

Baron von Hügel notes with evident disappointment that Troeltsch's tendency was ever more and more away from established Christianity toward a relativism which Troeltsch himself admitted was "more radical" than anything he had previously held. "The change," says von Hügel, "has been mostly away from what.....we had in common - from the reality, helpfulness, indeed necessity of at least some tradition; from recognition that various spiritual facts exist and are apprehensible by us, before our act and habit/ 

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habit of faith; and from the perception that the fruits which follow and justify our act and habit of faith are, in part, visible to others, not to ourselves alone."¹

We hear in Troeltsch a strange, and even pathetic, discord arising from his natural piety and his theological relativism. "This faith in God and the ceaseless sense of the Spirit of Jesus," says von Hügel of Troeltsch, "evidently sprang from the very earliest impressions which a Christian home and an unusually gifted mother could not fail to produce in so reverent and hungry a soul as was his own."² The last lectures which he wrote for his proposed trip to Britain exhibit this dualism. Unlike Strauss who broke completely with his early faith, and unlike Biedermann who tried in his later years to unite his speculative theology with his Christian experience, Troeltsch found no solution to the contradictions between his faith and his philosophy. His sudden death terminated his efforts toward a harmonious system with the result that his works give the impression of incompleteness.

Troeltsch's genius lay in the field of historical investigation. History was for him the starting-point and the final authority/

¹. Von Hügel's "Introduction" to Troeltsch's Christian Thought, p.xv; see also T. Kaftan, Ernst Troeltsch, eine kritische Zeitstudie, 1912, p.55, who declares that Troeltsch was no theologian but rather a philosopher and an historian.
². Von Hügel in "Introduction" to Troeltsch's Christian Thought, p.xvii.
authority in theological matters. The single work by which he is best known and which shows him at his best is the *Sozialehren* where he develops his theory of history in treating of the development of the social teachings of the Christian Church from New Testament times down to the present day.

Troeltsch's philosophy of history is contained in *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*, 1922, the third volume of his collected works, which he published a few months before his death. In this work Troeltsch discussed the transition of history from science to philosophy. As a science history is comparable to other humanistic sciences such as anthropology, sociology, and ethnology. The science of history is concerned with the life and activities of man, both as an individual and as a group, as they are represented in the past, the present, and, in so far as they are predictable, in the future. Such a science is, therefore, not exact or precise as are the physical sciences, but it uncovers facts of another kind no less significant.¹

As soon as the science of history begins to ask questions concerning the value and meaning of its data, it becomes the philosophy of history.² Questions of the worth and significance of historical events, periods, movements, or personalities eventually lead to questions of metaphysics. History as science is a relative study dealing with data of relative importance, but history as philosophy passes over the relativism of scientific history and seeks...
seeks the absolute or absolutes which underlie and determine the course of human development.¹

Troeltsch's interest in history was confined particularly to Christianity. It was only natural that his deep interest in Protestantism should be coupled with his absorbing passion for history. In the examination of Protestantism, therefore, the historical method was applied in order to determine the norms or absolute standards which remain unchanged and unaffected in the historical development of Christianity. Troeltsch did not claim to be the first to employ the historical method in regard to Christianity. Adolf Harnack's book on the essence of Christianity had already attempted the same thing.² Troeltsch agreed with Harnack that the historical method was the only adequate method of determining the essence of Christianity, but he disagreed with Harnack's conclusion that the essence of Christianity lay in the message of Jesus. Alfred Loisy in his book L'Évangile et l'Église, 1892 attributed the essence of Christianity not to the Gospel but to the Church. Troeltsch had even less use for Loisy's conclusion and branded it as Roman Catholic dogmatism. Both theories were too simple, he said. Christianity is such a complex affair that a simple conclusion as to its essence is to be suspected. When one comes to consider Jesus, Paul, the Primitive Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Old and the New Protestantism/

1. Der Historismus und seine Probleme, pp.184,214-216,772.
2. Das Wesen des Christentums, 1900, Leipzig.
Protestantism, and such movements as the Quakers, etc., one can see how varied and diverse are the manifestations of Christianity in history. The only satisfactory conclusion according to Troeltsch was that each epoch of Christianity is an entity in itself and must be judged as such. The Soziallehren is an example of Troeltsch's conclusion for it attempts to discover the essence of Christianity in the various periods of Church history.¹

The full title of Troeltsch's famous historical sociological work is, *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*. It was published in 1912. An English translation appeared in two volumes in 1931, twenty years after the original German edition. This fact gives some indication of the importance of the book. In an introductory note to the English edition Charles Gore says that the book "stands beyond question without a rival, whether in thoroughness or in comprehensiveness, as an exposition of Christian life and thought in relation to contemporary social facts, ideas, and problems from the beginning of Christianity down to post-Reformation developments." Baron von Hügel, Troeltsch's intimate friend, calls the Soziallehren a "standard work."² Troeltsch defined his double task in the Foreword, "to make clear to myself both the ecclesiastical dogmatic tradition of Protestantism in its own historical sense, and the intellectual and practical situation of the present day in its true fundamental tendencies. Hence the double nature of my researches - the analysis of early Protestantism and the analysis of the modern world."³

3. *Soziallehren*, "Foreword."
the first chapter of the book deals with the early Church as it is related to the Gospel, Paul, and early Catholicism. The second chapter is on medieval Catholicism, and the third chapter, 538 pages in German, is on Protestantism. In the conclusion Troeltsch declared that there are certain abiding values in Christianity which will serve as eternal standards for social questions, such convictions as personalistic theism, Divine Love, the necessity of human inequalities, and Charity. But Troeltsch's conclusion was marked with the relativistic tenor of his philosophy of history, "Nowhere," he said, "does there exist an absolute Christian ethic, which only awaits discovery; all that we can do is to learn to control the world-situation in its successive phases just as the earlier Christian ethic did in its own way. There is no absolute ethical transformation of material nature or of human nature; all that does exist is a constant wrestling with the problems which they raise. Thus the Christian ethic of the present day and of the future will also only be an adjustment to the world-situation."¹

We are not particularly concerned with Troeltsch's historical method, however, or how he applied it to Christianity. We must let the above suffice as an indication of the drift of his thought in so far as it influenced his theology. We must now have a look at his general theological position. This is given us/

us most concretely in the Glaubenslehre published posthumously in 1925 from notes taken on his lectures at Heidelberg during the year 1911-1912. Troeltsch himself said that he could never get himself to write a dogmatic and that if any one wished to know his theology he could turn to the numerous articles which he had contributed to Schiele's encyclopaedia, Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.¹

Troeltsch's theology is based upon a double foundation, the historical elements in the Christian doctrines and the religious consciousness of contemporary Christianity. Revelation is, therefore, a living reality. It is not static, it did not stop with the New Testament, it is active to-day.² Like Schleiermacher, Troeltsch began with the religious consciousness of the Christian community and attempted to transcribe from it a Christian theology. But the subjectivism into which Schleiermacher slipped was avoided by Troeltsch because of his historical interests. He felt, however, that it was necessary to begin with the Christian consciousness because it is impossible to examine God in any direct way.³

The underlying continuity in Christianity, its kernel and essence, is the religious principle. "The expression 'principle'," he said, "was first heard in modern scientific religious thinking/¹

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thinking because it originated from modern psychology and the historical thought conditioned by it. It is nothing other than the conception of the fundamental impulse that lies behind individual psychological phenomena and facts, or of the fundamental force produced by them into a unified spiritual process recognizable by intuition and divination."¹ The principle is the inherent ideal of Christianity. It is the formula for the motivating force of Christianity. It is the expression of the continuity of Christianity which underlies all historical forms. The principle contains the essence of Christianity whose outward forms are different in different periods. One often speaks of a 'public spirit' or the 'spirit of an epoch or a movement' and this, Troeltsch said, is analogous to the Christian principle. Whether or not the word has been used, the Christian principle has been evident in many of the great theologies. Schleiermacher spoke of a Lebenszusammenhang, Lipsius of a Grundverhältnis, Hegel referred every religion to the underlying principle of the union of the finite with the Infinite, Biedermann demonstrated that the Christian principle illustrates the redeeming power of Christianity, Strauss saw the principle embodied in early biblical history.

The application of the Christian principle means the application of the historical-psychological method to religion in the place of the dogmatic method. But Troeltsch warned against a/

¹. art. "Prinzip, religiöses," in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.
a common misunderstanding here. The principle is not the same thing as religion. The principle does not redeem and bless, but the redeemed and blessed past can be represented in the principle. An examination of Christianity, therefore, in the light of its abiding principle will reveal the outlines which a modern dogmatic must assume.

The divisions of theology according to Troeltsch are in the main two: the exposition of the historical personalities of Christianity as to their religious and creative significance, and the exposition of present day religious and metaphysical beliefs, i.e. the Christian ideas of God, the world, man, redemption, and the life to come.  

The first section of dogmatic has to do with the Old Testament, the Person of Christ, and the subsequent history of the Church. The most important part of this section concerns the Person of Christ. The Old Testament derives its chief significance from the fact that it prepared the way to Christ, but the Old Testament itself reveals the religious principle in at least three ways. First, the Old Testament gives certain definite pictures of God's revelation, independent of Jesus's revelation, chiefly along the lines of monotheism. Second, the Old Testament reveals the fact that God's will is ethically determined. Third, the Old Testament prophets in their personalities and in their message have made/

1. Glaubenslehre, p.73.
made a lasting contribution to religious thinking.¹

The Person of Jesus is the distinguishing mark of Christianity. He can only be understood in connection with the Old Testament which preceded Him and the subsequent history of the Church which followed Him. He is not comparable to the founders of other religions simply because He is not only the founder but the centre and mediator of redemption.² The Person of Christ is to be distinguished from the principle of Christianity as did Strauss and Biedermann, but the Person and the principle are necessarily closely related. Without the historical Person, the principle would lose its effectiveness. He is not the object of faith, but He is the centre and symbol of the Christian community. He is the uplifting and vitalizing personality which the Christian places at the centre of his worship but who is not the object of that worship. He is, however, not absolute, He is the incarnation of the Christian idea of God and only in so far as He reveals God's loving forgiveness He can be called the Redeemer and Mediator.³

The history of the Christian Church is divided by Troeltsch into various periods: the Christianity of the Greek Catholic Church, the Roman Catholic Church, Old Protestantism, New Protestantism, and various mystical sects. In this succession there emerge great religious personalities like Paul, Augustine, and/

¹ Glaubenslehre, pp.97-100.
³ Glaubenslehre, pp.100 ff.; the section on the Person of Christ in the Glaubenslehre is, in the main, a repetition of Troeltsch's lecture, Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben, which we will consider in more detail later.
and Luther who owe their power and influence to the Person of Jesus and who help to explain and interpret Him.\(^1\)

The second section of the *Glaubenslehre* deals chiefly with the Christian ideas of God, the world, man, and redemption. We come to know God, according to Troeltsch, through the subjective consciousness of God's revelation in us. Thus the consciousness of the Christian community is the index whereby we interpret God.\(^2\) The conclusion to which we must come when we consider our consciousness of God's revelation in us is that the Christian conception of God is an ethical theism supremely illustrated in the idea of holiness.\(^3\) It was God's holiness that Jesus talked about and it is a holiness which makes demands upon us.\(^4\) There is nothing utilitarian about the Christian idea of holiness, we do not endeavour to be like God because it brings happiness. We must answer God's demand whether it brings happiness or not.\(^5\) In the same way, God as love has no reference to eudemonism. God's love is a form of love unknown to human relationships.\(^6\) God's character is to be interpreted through His love. Creation itself is the greatest expression of God's love, for by creating men and bringing them to Himself He shows His great love for us.\(^7\) This, however, does not mean that God must bring every man into fellowship with Him. We must/

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1. *Glaubenslehre*, pp. 118-121.
2. Ibid., pp. 131 ff.
3. Ibid., p. 184.
5. *Glaubenslehre*, pp. 205-212; Arts. "Gesetz" and "Theodizee".
7. Ibid., p. 221; Art. "Gnade."
must say with Calvin, Troeltsch held, that God is not obliged to save every one.¹

As to the Christian idea of the world, the first point to notice is that the world is an expression of God's creative activity. How the world came into existence is a question for science and not for theology.² The answer which the Christian gives to the question, "Has the world any meaning?", is given in terms of the world-governance and providence of God. It is an answer of faith not science, for to the Christian the meaning of the world lies in his fellowship with God.³

The Christian idea of man makes him part of the world and as such he is God's creature. Man is separated from God but is destined to come into fellowship with Him. Man's soul has an infinite worth, its likeness to God (Gottesebenbildlichkeit).⁴ There is in man the conflict between his lower and higher selves. The biblical account of man's original state and his fall from grace is a poetic illustration of this interaction of selves which historically has no significance but which is eternally true in principle. The same principle is at work in the Pauline opposition between the flesh and the spirit, and in the Platonic speculation on psyche, nous, and pneuma. The higher self, or the intelligible ego, is developed through ethical struggle and ultimately/

¹. art. "Frädestination."
². Glaubenslehre, pp.240-252.
³. ibid. pp.257-266.
ultimately culminates in fellowship with God. But this fellowship is never completed in this life. It is never fully realized. This state is reserved for the life to come. In the meantime we push on endeavouring to overcome the barriers that separate us from God. These barriers are the two-fold sins which separate us from God. Original sin is the inherent weakness, frailty, and limitation of human nature. The doctrine of original sin means little to the modern mind as a doctrine but the idea is still significant. Actual sin is the conscious opposition of man toward God. Guilt is just the realization that we are separated from God by sin, either original or actual, and guilt produces repentance.

The struggle of man toward the Kingdom of God as his ideal and the opposition of sin as the barrier to God create the scene of Christian history. The Old Testament is a record of this struggle and of the final overthrow of the opposition by the advent of a Messianic Kingdom. In the teaching of Jesus the coming of the Kingdom of God is the overthrow of sin. The Catholic Church pointed to the dominance of the Church as the overthrow of sin's opposition. Protestantism did not stress the Church as did Catholicism, but it retained many of the symbolic ideas of the triumph of the Kingdom of God. These are historic expressions of the philosophy of history which looks to the ultimate triumph of

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the Kingdom of God to be realized in the life to come.\(^1\)

The Christian doctrine of redemption brings the Christian ideas of God, the world, and man into a religious relationship. No doctrine in the history of the Christian Church has been treated so variously as redemption and yet no matter how it has been conceived it has always been present in some form. The underlying idea of redemption, God as loving and forgiving Grace, is the highest and tenderest revelation known to man.\(^2\) This notion of redemption distinguishes Christianity from the other religions of the world all of which, except for Mohammedanism and legalistic Judaism, are religions of redemption. In the Old Testament redemption is defined in terms of the restoration of Israel and the Messianic Kingdom. Jesus taught that redemption was personal surrender to God and membership in the Kingdom of God both temporally and eschatologically. Paul found redemption's meaning in the Death of Christ, but full redemption was to be achieved in the life to come. The Catholic Church followed Paul but declared that the merit of Christ's Death lay within the keeping of the Church and in the sacraments. Protestantism reacted against this ecclesiasticism and reverted to the Pauline doctrine until the Enlightenment when the whole idea of redemption became repugnant to the Rationalistic temper. Schleiermacher tried to restore redemption to its Pauline interpretation but this endeavour landed Protestantism in subjectivity.

Troeltsch/

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Troeltsch believed that redemption needed to be re-explained for the modern mind. The Death of Christ could not any longer be regarded as a vicarious sacrifice by modern thinking people. Such an interpretation of the Death of Christ is in direct opposition to modern ethics and to the modern conception of the historical Jesus. Any doctrine which legalizes the conception of God, making Him demand satisfaction, is untenable to-day and needs re-thinking.¹

According to Troeltsch redemption from man's standpoint is the perfection and sanctification of his personality brought about by his submission to God and his acceptance of God’s forgiving Grace. From the standpoint of God, from whom redemption is initiated, it is the reciprocal action of His creative Will enriched by the redeemed wills of those who have accepted His forgiveness. If God is loving and holy, then redemption is logically a necessity in the natural order of things. God, therefore, is the Redeemer since it is His Grace that reaches out to man offering him forgiveness and fellowship. In so far as Jesus reveals God as forgiving Grace and redeeming love, He is the Mediator of redemption. As the vehicle by which redemption is brought to us and as the symbol whereby it becomes intelligible to us, Jesus may be called the Redeemer. But although redemption is mediated through Jesus, by means of His revelation of God as forgiving Grace, it must be remembered that ultimately God is the Redeemer and that redemption is God's gift. Through Jesus's revelation of God, man is/

¹ Glaubenslehre, p.329.
is constrained to have faith in God which faith results in persistent ethical struggling toward fellowship with God. Final redemption, however, is not attained on earth but only in the life to come.¹ Troeltsch admitted that this view led to a sort of pantheistic union with God.²

Redemption was for Troeltsch a process within the human soul effected by God, a process from sin to fellowship with God. From the weaknesses and limitations of human nature, man is raised up out of his lower self and given membership in the Kingdom of God. Redemption, thus, is not concerned with a special act or an event in history such as the life or death of Jesus. Redemption is a present experience being realized in men's souls to-day even as yesterday. The Person of Christ plays a part in redemption commensurate with His revelation of God as forgiving Grace.³

In an article entitled, "Does the Historical Study of Religions Yield a Dogmatic Theology?," Professor H.R. Mackintosh places under review the method of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule as typified in Troeltsch to see if it can produce a thorough-going theology.⁴ In the light of Troeltsch's dogmatic position, which/

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which we have just considered in its summary form, this article may well serve as a sort of conclusion. Taking the three laws of the historical method, the law of criticism, the law of analogy, and the law of relativity, as given in one of Troeltsch's writings, Professor Mackintosh discusses the dogmatic consequences of Troeltsch's position and arrives at a negative answer to the title of his article.

In regard to the law of criticism it is held that history cannot give absolute information about past events. The law of probability precludes any attempt at absolute judgment. Such Gospel facts as the birth of Jesus and His final resurrection cannot be validated by historical science. All that can be said is that there is a probability that Jesus was born of a virgin in the manner stated and that He rose from the grave according to the Gospel account. But there is also the corollary possibility that He was not born of a virgin and that He did not rise from the grave. Professor Mackintosh readily admits that history as a science is governed by the law of criticism, but, he says, the Christian Gospel does not exist "in the pure vacuum of historical science." Although it has its roots deep in the soil of history, its branches are spread out into the free air of eternity. Christianity is not a dead religion, it is alive in the hearts and souls of men to-day just as it was in New Testament times. If Troeltsch's law of criticism is to rule out the data of history, then how is it

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a dogmatic possible?

The law of relativity attempts to level down all historical phenomena to the same plane. It is the historical series, the stream of events, the plane of development, that is the important thing in history. This law, accordingly, will deprive the Person of Christ of His uniqueness and make of Him one of the sons of God. Perhaps He is a religious hero, a genius of His own kind, but to make Him supreme or different from the rest of us is a blunt infraction of the law of relativity. It follows, therefore, Professor Mackintosh indicates, that any dogmatic based upon the Redeemer is rendered impossible.

The law of analogy enables the worker in comparative religions to assume that the human mind has been developing along the same lines everywhere and at every period of time. This law and the law of relativity go hand in hand. Particular facts and external expressions of various religions are ultimately overshadowed by universal principles. These principles have nothing to do with history, they are timeless symbols of thought. When Christianity is examined in the light of this law, it is found that those elements which had previously seemed to distinguish Christianity from the other religions are really borrowed elements dressed up in different forms. But such a theory, says Professor Mackintosh, degrades the Apostolic mind to an incredibly low level. A reading of the New Testament does not automatically suggest that its writers were plagiarists. On the contrary the New Testament invariably awes its readers by its life-giving power and its assurance of and conviction in the facts which it relates and most surely believes/
believes. If, therefore, the historical method has no use for Christianity as a distinct faith, how can it produce a dogmatic?

Professor Mackintosh's conclusion is simply that no dogmatic is possible where these three laws are in force. "With all their brilliant service to the cause of biblical exegesis," he says of Troeltsch and his school, "they are useless for the purposes of Christian theology." The pre-conceived framework against which Troeltsch would place Christianity does not permit him to go beyond the prolegomena to a Christian dogmatic. In the following sections on Troeltsch we will see these laws working themselves out, especially the law of relativity in connection with the Person of Christ and the absolute validity of Christianity.

Troeltsch's position in regard to the relation between the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption is set forth in a little lecture, Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben, delivered before the Swiss Christian Student Conference in Aaran in 1911. This lecture gives us, as the title states, Troeltsch's view of the significance of the historical Jesus for faith, and, compact though it is, it is the most comprehensive statement which Troeltsch ever made on the subject of Christology. Accordingly, it is of great importance for our subject.

Troeltsch was primarily interested in the historical Jesus but not in a critical way. What is, he was not interested in examining the Gospel records of the life of Jesus, his interest lay
lay in the significance or the normative worth of the historical person. Speculations as to whether or not Jesus ever lived did not appeal to Troeltsch in the least.¹ To say that Jesus never existed is a pure monstrosity (eine Ungeheuerlichkeit) and to deny that His teaching is knowable is surely an exaggeration (eine starke Uebertreibung).² The question that concerns modern theology is not so much about the historical Jesus but whether or not in the light of New Testament criticism Jesus can still be the norm for the Christian life.

Although Troeltsch refused to have commerce with any view of the historical Jesus which tended to regard the Gospel as myth, and although he held firmly to the main outline of Jesus's life and teaching, he nevertheless found it necessary to separate the historical Jesus from the principle of redemption. Redemption, he said, is not procured for all time by Christ, He is not unique in that way, redemption is from God, it is God who redeems each person in his own appointed time. And for this reason the Atonement is not valid for us today.³ Later on Troeltsch denied that he separated Person and principle and tried to make a case for their mutual relationship, but here he was definite in his assertion that redemption is not mediated through a God-man or a Church but through the practical knowledge of the inner will of God (Erlösung durch die praktische Erkenntnis des wahren innersten Willenwesens Gottes). God therefore is the redeemer and redemption is the/

2. p.4.
3. p.6.
the knowledge which we have of His Will.¹ This Troeltsch main­tained is his position, and it is, he believed, the position of the modern educated Christian.

To eliminate the historical Jesus from the mediation of redemption, Troeltsch realized, was a view that would not find favour with those who hold to the supernatural character of Jesus (die Ubermenschlichkeit Christi), nor with those who find in Christianity a deliverance of mankind from the bonds of sin through the suffering and death of a reconciling Christ whose life and death are decreed by God. Such a view has meaning only for those who rely upon historical criticism as the means of validating evangelical history and for those who define Christianity as that religion of redemption which mediates redemption through the ever new personal knowledge of God.²

However, Troeltsch did not wish to be misunderstood when he separated Person from principle, for ultimately the historical Jesus does play a part in redemption even if only indirectly. To speak of Christianity or the principle of Christianity, Troeltsch declared, is meaningless unless we connect these words and phrases with the historical Person of Christ. At the centre of Christianity there stands an historical person, this is the primary premise of any discussion on Christianity. Religion must have an historical person at its centre otherwise it becomes a mere metaphysic. The Christian cult or community could never exist without an/

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¹. Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, p.7
an historical corner-stone or rallying-point. Consequently the
cult and community, as the expressions of the Christian life,
demand an historical Jesus. We could not imagine a Christian
community founded or continued on mere doctrines, Troeltsch pointed
out. The illustration in Jesus Christ of what Christianity pur
ports to be is the central focus of the cult. The historical
Jesus, therefore, is the symbol of Christianity around which the
Christian community finds its gravity. Jesus as symbol (als des
Hauptes und Sammelpunktes der Gemeinde) is not, therefore, unreal
or mythical, His roots are embedded deep in the soil of history
and as such He is the historical Jesus.¹

It is around this word "symbol" that Troeltsch centred
his discussion of the historical Jesus. The mythical Jesus who
emerges from a mythical criticism of the New Testament is, perhaps,
logical in many ways and can be easily understood, but Troeltsch
firmly denied that such a person could be the centre (das Zentrum)
of belief. The Christian believer is not attracted by a mythical
figure of quasi-historical foundations, he demands a Jesus who
lived a life on earth and died a death on a cross and from whose
life and death there still issues forth a stream of living power.
In the historical Jesus this power is seen at its height. He is
the symbol of what Christianity can mean to the believer, but He
is not an unreal or metaphysical symbol, He is a real symbol be
cause He is historical. If Christianity were no more than a
principle/

¹. Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, p.30 f.
principle or an idea then the believer would find it difficult if not impossible to derive any vitalizing power, whereas the historical Jesus is the source of personal authority which the believer can tap and from which he can derive power. The spirit of Jesus can have no meaning unless there was a real Jesus.¹

Although the historical Jesus is the symbol of the Christian community, Troeltsch did not give him a unique place in history. It is difficult to divide time into B.C. and A.D., he held, for the modern educated mind finds it necessary to think in geological terms and not in religious terms. Jesus as symbol is important but Jesus as Person is not so important. As a person He is but a link in the chain of human destiny as are we all. As an individual Jesus does not stand out as unique in the history of the world. His significance and value are closely related to His forerunners and to the thought patterns which preceded Him. But not only is Jesus to be understood in the light of Greek philosophy and the Old Testament, He is also a part of the development which took place subsequent to His death, i.e. in Paul, Luther, Schleiermacher, etc. The whole history of the Christian religion beginning with the Old Testament and coming up to the present day is the frame against which Jesus must be placed if He is to be seen as He was and is. It is not unusual to hear theologians say that Jesus can best be studied by beginning with Old Testament thought, but it is quite a different thing to say, as did Troeltsch, that the whole line of development including even Luther and Schleiermacher/

¹ Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, pp.32-33.
macher is necessary in order to understand Jesus. This notion of Troeltsch's that Jesus must be regarded as a link in a chain is an indication of the relative significance which he assigned to the historical Jesus. Troeltsch was emphatic that Jesus is not the unique fact for belief.¹

The idea that Jesus is a link in a chain of prophetic revelation is a logical consequence of Troeltsch's definition of redemption as knowledge of the Will of God. The significance of Jesus does not lie in the realm of redemption but in the life of the Christian community. Jesus is significant because He is the support, centre, and symbol (Halt, Zentrum, und Symbol) of the religious life.² But Troeltsch warned against making this normative significance of Jesus a doctrine in itself, it is more than doctrine, more than moral law. Jesus is the type (das Bild) of a living, cultural, elevated, and strengthening personality whose personal aims we must imitate and whose practical teaching is worthy of present application. There is nothing in this personality which should be isolated into doctrine, just as the Person must not be isolated from the chain of prophetic development.³

Troeltsch's interest in the psychological and sociological approach to religion lay behind his insistence on the importance of Jesus for the Christian community. Jesus is not unique as a Redeemer/

¹. Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, pp.38-39; "Jesus wird ihr nicht die einzige für unsern Glauben bedeutsame geschichtliche Tatsache sein."
². Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, p.42.
³. Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, p.43.
Redeemer but as a rallying-point for the community. As an example of the importance of Jesus for the Christian community Troeltsch pointed to Schleiermacher and indicated how in the Reden which does not deal with the Christian community or cult Schleiermacher has little to say about the Person of Jesus, but in the Glaubenslehre, which is based on considerations of community and cult, the Person of Christ stands at the centre.\(^1\) Christianity was for Troeltsch essentially a social religion. Considerations of cult are of utmost importance and for this reason the Person of Christ as the centre of the religious life is also of utmost importance.

In a final paragraph or two Troeltsch dealt with the problem as to whether or not Christianity is the final religion, a religion for all time. Such a discussion is of course more or less meaningless, Troeltsch admitted. All that can be said is that it seems unlikely that a new religion will be developed during our present state of culture, but then of course no one can tell how long our present state of culture will endure. We can neither affirm nor deny the permanent value of Christianity or of Christ.\(^2\) For all we know, the future may bring forth another religion at whose centre there will be some one other than Christ.\(^3\)

The phrase 'God in Christ' can only mean for us that we worship in Jesus the highest available revelation of God, and that we make Him the rallying-point of our Christian life.\(^4\) The ultimate significance/

\(^1\) Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, p.45.
\(^2\) " p.49
\(^3\) " p.50.
\(^4\) " p.50.
The significance of Jesus lies in His revelation of God; this is His greatest work and because of it He is made the centre of Christian life. His Person need not be dogmatized, Nicean and Chalcedonian creeds can be dispensed with. We must not confuse Jesus with God or the symbol of the religious life with redemption. God is the only Redeemer and, if Jesus has anything to do with redemption at all, it is only indirectly and commensurate, not with His Person, but with the revelation of God which He brought to mankind.¹

Troeltsch's favourite phrase "cult and community" is the distinguishing mark of this lecture on the significance of the historical Jesus. The cult and the community are for Troeltsch the essentials of religion. Dogma and idea are of secondary importance, the cult and community are everything for they exhibit the living relationship which exists between man and God.² Thus the Person of Christ is significant in so far as He makes possible a more vital communion with God. Jesus is the revealer of God, but as such He is also the centre of the Christian life for it is in Him that the community acknowledges His revelation.

Unlike the Ritschlians, from whom he derived his theological impetus, Troeltsch was not willing to make Jesus the sole norm of Christianity. The historical law of relativity must come into play at this point and by means of it Jesus's place in the prophetic/  

¹. Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, p.51.  
². " " p.25.
prophetic development is directly linked with those who preceded and those who succeeded Him. This prophetic development is an unbroken chain and Jesus is but one of the connecting links. We may wish to glorify the Person of Christ with heroic adjectives but He must remain from first to last a link and nothing more. Jesus cannot be the sole norm for Christian faith just because He is subject to His own times and the milieu in which He lived. It follows too from Troeltsch's premises that although we know the general outline of Jesus's life and teaching we do not know everything about Him. Such questions as His messianic self-consciousness will never be fully answered due to our meagre knowledge of His own thoughts upon the subject. We cannot be true to the facts and maintain that Jesus is the sole standard of Christianity. We must remember that Jesus was conditioned by the thoughts and feelings of His own time and it is ridiculous to suppose that He can be an absolute norm for all times. On such questions as demonology, divorce, the immediacy of the Kingdom, and the Second Coming, Jesus showed Himself to be fallible and many of His pronouncements on these subjects are to be taken with moderate sobriety. In fact, Jesus was definitely impractical when He came to deal with sociological questions simply because His thinking was always on the religious plane.¹

We have only to read the New Testament, Troeltsch held, to discover that Jesus did not make Himself the absolute norm of faith/

¹. Cf. the Chapter on the Gospel in the Soziallehren.
faith, in fact it is quite clear, he said, that Jesus's every
teaching pointed to the Kingdom of God. This is the real absolute,
not the Person of Christ. It was natural and logical for the
early Christian community to transfer the absolute from the Kingdom
of God to the Person of Christ, but it was never Jesus's wish that
it be so.\(^1\)

Although it is necessary to see Jesus in connection with
His historical setting and to show Him His place among the prophets,
Troeltsch admitted that He is nevertheless the centre and symbol of
the ideals and aspirations of the Christian community and if this
does not make Him the sole norm of faith, He is at least the supreme
norm. In another connection, Troeltsch wrote, "Any sincere re-
ligious life that goes beyond the limits of a primitive form of
worship needs some sort of symbol, incarnation, or personal embodi-
ment of the realization of its ideal.....from communion with which
religious power pours out to it. Fundamentally the same thing is
true of the significance of Jesus for Christianity. He is the
incarnation of religious power, illuminated always anew by the cen-
turies, and whose heart-beat pulsates through the whole of Christen-
dom just as the vibration of a steamship's engine can be felt through
every part of the entire ship."\(^2\)

Jesus is not unique as a Redeemer, but He is the 'Zentrum'
of/

\(^1\) Cf. Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte,
pp.100-102; also the chapter on the Gospel in the Soziallehren.
\(^2\) "Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums," Bd. II, Gesammelte
Schriften, p.847.
of the Christian community. Around the idea of cult and community Jesus's significance must rest. It is impossible, Troeltsch held, to imagine communion with the Risen Lord, but it is not impossible to find in Him the criterion of the community's life.¹

Troeltsch's final word on Christology is contained in the first of a series of three lectures which he was scheduled to deliver in Great Britain. His death prevented him from delivering these lectures but as they had already been written in manuscript form they were published posthumously in 1923 under the title Christian Thought, Its History and Application. Only the first lecture, "The Place of Christianity among the World-Religions," interests us here. The other two, one on "Ethics and the Philosophy of History" and the other on "Politics, Patriotism, and Religion," have no bearing on our subject.

It is perhaps not quite correct to say that the lecture on "The Place of Christianity among the World-Religions" contains Troeltsch's final word on Christology for the lecture, as the title indicates, is primarily a study of the finality of Christianity and only indirectly a statement of Christology. It must be remembered that when Troeltsch wrote the lecture on the Geschichtlichkeit Jesu he was at the time a theological professor in Heidelberg/

berg, and that when he wrote this present lecture, some twelve years later, he was in the philosophy faculty at Berlin. If, therefore, Christianity is treated from a philosophical standpoint rather than a theological one, we know the reason. We say that this lecture is Troeltsch's final pronouncement on Christology not so much because of what he says in the lecture but of what he neglects to say. Troeltsch's views on Christology must be inferred from what he says about the absoluteness of Christianity. This may appear like taking an unfair advantage, like relying upon the argument from silence, but we hope that such is not the case. This lecture is Troeltsch's last word on Christianity, and, if it does not give his full views, it at least indicates the trend of his thought.

Baron von Hügel, who edited these final lectures of Troeltsch in their English form, points out in an introduction that since his Heidelberg professorship Troeltsch changed very radically in his theological thinking. In a word, this change was from theology to philosophy. In this connection we think of Strauss who became toward the end of his life a thorough-going materialist abandoning all his earlier theological interests. But Troeltsch, unlike Strauss, managed to retain a personal religious faith. While Strauss became more and more the iconoclast, Troeltsch endeavoured to remain constructive.

The first part of the lecture on "The Place of Christianity among the World-Religions" is a restatement of Troeltsch's earlier book, The Absolute Validity of Christianity.¹ Troeltsch stated/

stated that a reconsideration of the theme of this early book, which was the expression of a new philosophy of history for him, would form the major portion of his lecture. "To put it briefly," he said, "the central meaning of this book consists in a deep and vivid realisation of the clash between historical reflection and the determination of standards of truth and value."¹ This "clash" became a real challenge for Troeltsch at an early age partly because of his education along humanistic and historical lines and partly because he was eager to formulate for himself a satisfactory religious position. The "clash", however, became more marked and Troeltsch was disturbed to find a conflict between history and revelation. "It was largely out of this conflict, which was no hypothetical one, but a fact of my own practical experience, that my entire theoretical standpoint took its rise."² The study of history presents a disjointed picture of flux and relativity, while religion offers, or should offer, finality and certainty. Troeltsch's earlier book was an examination of the means whereby theology is able to defend itself against these difficulties.³

In the first book Troeltsch set forth the two fundamental concepts of theology which were held by most theologians to be sufficient means for guaranteeing the certainty and finality of Christianity. The first of these is the theory that Christian truth is substantiated by miracle. Troeltsch hastened to make clear/

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2. " " p.6.
clear what he meant by miracle. In this connection the word has nothing to do with the so-called "nature-miracles" which break or transcend natural law, but it refers to the miracle of conversion through the Christianity community and through communion with Jesus. "The Christian life may indeed be compared to an island in the midst of the stream of history, exposed to all the storms of secular life, and lured by all its wiles, yet constituting, in reality, a stronghold of experience of quite another order."¹ In other words Christianity has often been validated on the strength of the redemptive experience of men.

The second concept of theology which has been used to guarantee Christianity's validity is that view taken by Hegel which makes Christianity the very expression of religion. "Christianity, it is maintained, is not a particular religion, it is religion."² Christianity is the very essence of the spiritual life of man offering, as no other religion can, a spiritual path to salvation. Therefore, the whole history of religion is the best proof of the validity and finality of Christianity, it is not in opposition to Christianity, it is its proof.

Both these concepts, the one based on conversion and the other on Hegelianism, Troeltsch refused to accept as positive proofs for the final validity of Christianity. The concept of conversion or of miracle, he said, is really not miracle at all and/

2. p.11.
and it loses its worth when we begin to examine similar conversions among the non-Christian religions. As to the second concept, Troeltsch claimed that he had come to learn that the history of religion knows nothing of the common underlying essence of all the religions or of their merging or verging toward Christianity as the final and perfect expression of religion. "Christianity," he wrote, "is itself a theoretical abstraction. It presents no historical uniformity, but displays a different character in every age, and is, besides, split up into many different denominations, hence it can in no wise be represented as the finally attained unity and explanation of all that has gone before, such as religious speculation seeks. It is rather a particular, independent, historical principle, containing, similarly to the other principles, very diverse possibilities and tendencies." Troeltsch denied that all religions contain a common character or that they tend toward a common goal. He held that the distinguishing feature about religion is its Individuality. Religion is different at different times, in different places, and with different peoples. The principle of Individuality is more evident in the history of religions than the principle of conformity. "Thus the universal law of history consists precisely in this, that the Divine Reason, or the Divine Life, within history, constantly manifests itself in always-new and always-peculiar individualisations - and hence that its tendency is not towards unity or universality at all, but rather/  

rather towards the fulfilment of the highest potentialities of
each separate department of life. It is this law which, beyond
all else, makes it quite impossible to characterise Christianity
as the reconciliation and goal of all the forces of history, or
indeed to regard it as anything else than an historical individuality."¹

Having dispensed with these two usual proofs for the
validity of Christianity, Troeltsch set about in the constructive
part of his earlier book to find a means of guaranteeing the val-
idity of Christianity. This he found in the international char-
acter and spiritual outlook of Christianity. A study of the
religions of the world, a study in which Troeltsch was intensely
interested, reveals the narrow and provincial scope of all the
religions except Christianity. In Christianity "all limitation
to a particular race or nation is excluded on principle, and this
exclusion illustrates the purely human character of its religious
ideal, which appeals only to the simplest, the most general, the
most personal and spiritual needs of mankind. Moreover it does
not depend in any way upon human reflection or a laborious process
of reasoning, but upon an overwhelming manifestation of God in the
persons and lives of the great prophets. Thus it was not a theory
but a life - not a social order but a power."² Christianity's
claim to absoluteness, then, depends upon its conception of God.
"It possesses the highest claim to universality of all the religions,

². " " p.19.
for this its claim is based upon the deepest foundations, the nature of God and of man.\textsuperscript{1} In a word, Troeltsch laid the proof of Christianity's validity upon its lofty conception of God which was not static or confined as it is in the other religions of the world and which therefore develops and expands with the centuries meeting all the needs of mankind. "It is the highest and most spiritual revelation we know at all. It has the highest validity. Let that suffice."\textsuperscript{2}

Troeltsch confessed in his last lecture that in some ways he had gone beyond the conclusion reached in the earlier work. Practically he still held to his former position as to the validity of Christianity, but theoretically he modified his position. We are not surprised to find Troeltsch modifying his earlier views when we remember that in the meantime his \textit{Sozialelehren} and \textit{Der Historismus und seine Probleme} had appeared, both of which exhibit Troeltsch's thesis that Christianity as well as the history of social, ethical, aesthetic, and scientific ideas are best interpreted according to their individualizations during different periods, in different ways, and by different people. "The concept of Individuality," Troeltsch admitted, "impresses me more forcibly every day."\textsuperscript{3} For this reason he found it difficult to reconcile his former view of an absolutely valid and supreme Christianity with the concept of Individuality.

\textit{Troeltsch/}

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Christian Thought}, p.20.
\textsuperscript{2} \textit{"}, \textit{"}, p.21.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{"}, \textit{"}, p.21.
Troeltsch wished to modify his earlier assertion that Christianity is the loftiest religion because in the meantime he had become more and more interested in the general history of religions and this study had convinced him of the relative significance of all religion and the importance of the concept of Individuality. "A study of the non-Christian religions," he said, "convinced me more and more that their naive claims to absolute validity are also genuinely such." Troeltsch, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that Christianity in its present form is a product of western civilization just as the other religions are the religious expressions of their civilizations. Just as Western civilization has imparted to and taken from Christianity so that we to-day, whether we are professing Christians or not, are surrounded on all sides of our every day lives by Christian influences, it follows that Christianity depends upon our continued civilization for its existence. Herein lies its validity. By means of Christianity we are what we are, and, therefore, if we would continue to be as we now are, Christianity must be for us the only valid and absolute religion. "We cannot live without a religion, yet the only religion that we can endure is Christianity, for Christianity has grown up with us and has become a part of our very being."  

Troeltsch, it must be remembered, was himself a deeply religious/

2. " " p.25.
religious man and he was not content to leave matters at such a low level, although theoretically that is where he was landed. Christianity, he said, could not be so influential nor could it be regarded as absolute unless it did contain at least the accent of ultimate truth. The experience of Christians is the only proof which can be offered that this is so, and, while this may not convince others, it is the ultimate guarantee of Christianity for those who believe. Troeltsch here reverted to the "miracle-apologetic" which he decried in his earlier book, but here he hastened to condition the Christian experience as a proof not of the validity of Christianity but merely as the individual's feeling or assurance that Christianity is valid.\(^1\) The redemptive experience cannot be made a universal proof simply because the devotees of other religions may have the same experience expressed in different ways. Just as the Christian feels that his experience is ultimate and absolute, so too may the Buddhist or Mohammedan feel.

Troeltsch's conclusion, that Christianity is absolute for Christians, has a practical bearing upon the question of foreign missions. We have mentioned before that Troeltsch was keenly interested in foreign missions, but in this last lecture we discover a considerable lessening of his zeal as a result of the application of his position in regard to the finality of Christianity. "Here we have to maintain," he said, "in accordance with all our conclusions hitherto, that directly religious missionary/

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missionary enterprise must stand in quite a different relation to
the great philosophical world-religions from that which it stands
to the crude heathenism of smaller tribes.\textsuperscript{1} Missions henceforth
should concern themselves with the latter, the lower religions,
and endeavour to cultivate Christianity in proportion as western
civilization is adopted. In dealing with the higher, more philo-
osophical religions, Christianity can hope for little more than
"spiritual wrestling." It is to the primitive peoples that
Troeltseh would confine missionary activity. Here lies the Chris-
tian missionary duty. But it is no simple matter that faces evan-
gelists because the other world-religions are in varying degrees
missionary-minded and they are out to do what Christianity proposes
to do among the heathen. This contact and competition is, however,
a good thing, according to Troeltseh, for although Christianity
cannot hope to absorb the great world-religions, a measure of
mutual agreement and understanding will arise which will doubtless
benefit all participants.\textsuperscript{2}

The course which Christianity will take in the future is
unpredictable. If Christianity is characterized by its individ-
ualizations, then it is impossible to say what the future will
bring. We are emerging upon a new era, Troeltseh maintained, and
Christianity must keep abreast of the times or it is lost. As it
develops and modifies itself in accordance with our changing civil-
ization it is ever new and its finality is unknown.\textsuperscript{3} If, Troeltseh
said/

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Christian Thought, p.28.
\item \textsuperscript{2} " " p.30.
\item \textsuperscript{3} " " p.31.
\end{itemize}
said, such a conclusion seems skeptical, he can only say that for himself as a Christian he believes that the religions of the world are "tending in the same direction, and that all seem impelled by an inner force to strive upward towards some unknown final height, where alone the ultimate unity and the final objective validity can lie."¹ Although this cannot be proven and although there is no theoretical ground for such a hope, it was nevertheless Troeltsch's conviction that it was so. It is on this personal note of experience that Troeltsch concluded his last lecture on Christianity.

Baron von Hügel, who knew Troeltsch and his writings as well as any one, tells us that he regretted to see Troeltsch moving farther and farther away from evangelical Christianity. This final lecture on "The Place of Christianity among the World-Religions" represents Troeltsch at his furthest departure from orthodoxy. There is, I think, a note of personal dissatisfaction in Troeltsch's own words and the mere repetition of the plea for his listeners not to think him skeptical would seem to imply that he himself was conscious of the possibility of such a charge being made. Other liberal thinkers have glorified in their skepticism. Strauss flung his materialistic challenge at the feet of Christianity with sneering defiance. But there is reason to suppose that Troeltsch did not take heart in the conclusions of his mind. He did not close his/

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¹ Christian Thought, p.32.
his lecture with a fan-fare of trumpets heralding the dawn of a new Christianity. There is no cutting-edge to his final words, no challenge, no warning. We gather that his hand is weary and that his theory has conquered his heart. On the one hand, we see a Troeltsch who theorized himself into relativism, and on the other hand, we hear him whispering his personal faith in the Absolute.¹

In none other of his writings did Troeltsch exhibit his two-sided character as in this lecture. After he reviewed his former position in which he abandoned the proof of personal experience as a guarantee of Christianity's validity, he nevertheless chose this very means as the only final proof. We cannot doubt that Troeltsch was a religious man, both his writings and his friends attest that fact, but his faith was locked up within him, a thing apart from his theories, and he never seemed to be able to express in words the faith he experienced. Unlike Strauss, who relinquished his faith for his philosophy, and unlike Biedermann, whose faith finally threatened his philosophy, Troeltsch remained inconsistent to the end, his faith triumphant on the personal side, his/

1. On the two-fold character of Troeltsch cf. von Hügel's saying, "The religious Troeltsch continually propels and warms us religiously, but the philosophical Troeltsch often, at the same time, draws us back and chills us philosophically," Essays and Addresses, lst. series, p.187; also Paul Mezger in Die Absoluteit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte, p.34 who says the same thing, "Der christliche Theologe Troeltsch lässt sich allzusehr imponieren von dem Religionsphilosoph Troeltsch." For expressions of Troeltsch's personal faith see Die Absoluteit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte, pp.103 ff.; "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, p.768; "Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums," Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, p.847.
his philosophy on the rational side.

Troeltsch's ultimate stand is that Christianity is relative. This is the answer which he gave to the title of the lecture, "The Place of Christianity among the world-Religions." Christianity's place is a relative one. This conclusion is a natural one resulting from the religio-historical method. In Die Absolutheit des Christentums Troeltsch pointed out that by "absolutheit" is usually meant the "best" and that to speak of Christianity as the absolute religion means that Christianity contains the best revelation of God. That Christianity does possess this "best" was the thesis of that book. In his last lecture, however, he hastened to modify his former position by reminding himself that "best" does not mean the "only" revelation. Other world-religions contain revelations which seem to approach, if not equal, the Christian revelation. Accordingly, when we speak of the absolute validity of Christianity it must be remembered that we speak only for ourselves. If we, as Christians, are convinced that Christianity is absolute, then it is all very well for us, but it must be realized that the Hindu and Buddhist have a right to feel the same way about their religions.

There is no final proof of Christianity's claim to absoluteness except for the individual. We cannot help but feel that Troeltsch could have said much more than he did about personal experience if he had not been tied to his historical method. In his little book on Protestantism and Progress,¹ Troeltsch gave the clue.

¹. English Translation in 1912.
clue to his method in the words, "this inquiry is only concerned to show the causal connexion between Protestantism and the modern world."¹ So, too, the Soziallehren is a majestic compendium of facts and theories relating Christianity with the social order, but as an expression of the Christian faith it is practically worthless. This is the necessary result of the historical method. It is interested in comparisons and evaluations but it is afraid to appeal to the Christian experience. There can be no absoluteness, no finality, no uniqueness about a Christianity that is merely one of the world-religions.

The interesting thing about Troeltsch's last lecture for our subject is the utter disregard of the Person of Christ. No where in this lecture does He appear. Even the teaching and example of Jesus are neglected. If Troeltsch had demonstrated the relative importance of the Person of Christ, we perhaps could understand what he was driving at, but it is almost incredible that no mention at all is made of Him.² It would be unfair and no doubt incorrect to infer that Jesus Christ plays no part in Christianity according to Troeltsch for we have his own testimony and that of his friends to disprove such a presumption. But it is true that in this historical study the Person of Christ has nothing to offer or contribute. What Christianity is without Jesus Christ may be of interest to the sociologist and historian, but for the Christian any/

¹. Protestantism and Progress, p.204.
². Only two quotations from Jesus are made in the whole book, pp.98 and 152, and these are not developed.
any attempt to explain and interpret his faith without reference to the fountain-head and corner-stone of that faith is a mere foible.

I do not think we can excuse Troeltsch's complete lack of consideration for the Person of Christ on the grounds that he was dealing with a purely historical inquiry. Without Jesus Christ Christianity may be one of the religions, it may not be better or even equal to the other world-religions, but if He is taken seriously, as the New Testament reveals Him, then it is impossible to disregard the unique, absolute, and final claim which Christianity makes, and that claim is Jesus Christ. As far as Troeltsch goes, he is right, but he does not go far enough. He only covers the external surfaces of Christianity, he never comes to grips with its source and centre.

If Christianity is a religion of redemption and if this is religion's distinguishing feature, as Troeltsch believed it to be, then something ought to be said of Him who claimed to be the Redeemer of all men. To avoid Him or to neglect Him will not help to interpret Christianity. Professor H.R. Mackintosh, in an article which we have already quoted, concludes his estimate of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule with the observation, "unless a theologian takes the specifically Christian attitude to Jesus - unless with the saints of every time he puts Jesus in the supreme place, a place that covers and determines everything in the relations of God and man - he is not a Christian theologian any more. That which he is building up is not Christianity, but something quite different."¹

¹. "Does the Historical Study of Religions Yield a Dogmatic Theology," p. 519.
CHAPTER VI

THE CHRISTOLOGY OF STRAUSS, BIEDERMAN, AND TROELTSCH COMPARRED AND CONTRASTED.

The common characteristic in the Christologies of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch is the separation between the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption. It is because of this separation that their names have been linked together in this thesis. We have followed in some detail the main streams and the lesser tributaries of their speculative positions and it is hoped that the foregoing exposition has revealed their singular affinity. To keep this separation in the forefront has been the main objective of the last three chapters. We have not been concerned with critical appreciation so much as with exposition in order that this one point, the separation of Person from principle, might stand out clearly and sharply. The "kernel" of their Christologies, to use one of their favourite words, has been sufficiently isolated, it is hoped, so that it may be examined more closely. First of all, we must state simply just what this kernel is and where it came from. Then we must show how Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch working in their own ways produced different Christologies which nevertheless contained a common nucleus.

"The Metaphysical only, and not the Historical, can give us Blessedness."! This oft-quoted saying of Fichte's may serve as/}

as an index to the underlying tie which bound Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch together in their general outlook on Christianity. Eternal truths were the stuff whereon Christianity was made, according to them, and to seek out and develop these truths constituted the task of the Christian theologian. The truths of Christianity have permanent significance. Once discovered and brought into the light of day they become eternal, unchangeable, freed of their historical associations and limitations. Truth is timeless and, therefore, non-historical. In Christianity truth has often been wrapped up in the ample folds of history but once the outer garments are removed the naked truths stand forth in all their pristine purity. The historical externals of Christianity may at times help to accentuate its significance or they may assist in displaying what might otherwise be regarded as bare abstractions, but at no time is the historical covering essential to an appreciation of the truths which it envelops. Historical events and eternal truths are two very distinct categories and if they are placed together they must not be regarded as coalescing. They remain distinct, just as water and oil when mixed do not form a solution but an emulsion. Christianity is such an emulsion in so far as it contains eternal truths and historical events, and no amount of doctrinal or creedal stirring can combine the two.

Redemption, accordingly, as one of the truths of Christianity, must be stripped of its historical setting if it is to have an eternal character. In the history of the Church redemption has always been associated with the Person of Christ. Creeds and councils have insisted that Jesus Christ is the Redeemer and that redemption/
redemption is mediated through His Person. This association was regarded by Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch as the Church's unpardonable sin, the unforgivable blunder, the unmitigated error. In making redemption depend upon the Person of Christ the Church confused time and eternity. It made it seem as if the principle of redemption were true and effective only in so far as it were concerned and bound up with the Person of Christ. Such a combination was unthinkable to Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch. It would be equivalent to saying that we can know nothing of the teachings of Deutero-Isaiah or of the Epistle to the Hebrews because we do not know who wrote them. It would be like saying that the laws of physics and chemistry cease to operate when we forget their discoverers. To undo the wrong committed by the Church ever since its inception and to set matters right once and for all in regard to the place of Jesus Christ in the Christian scheme of things was the task undertaken by such as Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch.

It was in the spirit of reformers, purifiers, restorers, that these three thinkers set about their task of correcting the Church on this important matter. If they were iconoclasts destroying the cherished beliefs of the ages, they took heart in the conviction that they were tearing down unnecessary scaffolding in order to reveal the true temple underneath. Strauss in his later age became definitely anti-Christian but in his earlier stages he repeatedly took his stand against those who charged him with atheism. Although Biedermann became more and more of a Christian, he was like Strauss charged with unbelief and nothing hurt him more. Troeltsch's/
Troeltsch's last lectures are punctuated with the plea for his hearers not to think him skeptical. All three were earnest and sincere in their ambition to wash away from the body of Christian truth the historical grime which had accumulated during the centuries. A note that is sounded again and again in the writings of these men is the need for a "modern" statement of the Christian truth. They were acutely conscious of the new vistas opened up by science and research. New horizons were beckoning men's minds, and if theology were to keep abreast of the advances made in the sciences, it must be fashioned anew in accordance with the contemporary mode. It was, therefore, as theological harbingers of a new era that Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch began their work.

The common Christological position taken by Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch came from a common inheritance. Something has already been said of the tendencies and currents of thought which moulded and shaped the theological patterns of the nineteenth century. We spoke of the influence of philosophy and politics, how the philosophers and the political temper of the times provided the fountain-source for nineteenth century theology. Having surveyed the theological systems of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch and having extracted the Christological nucleus common to all three, we are now in a position to see to better advantage wherein their theology owed its development to these contemporary influences.

First of all, the philosophical movement of the late eighteenth/
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries made a profound impression upon the thought of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch. The nineteenth century is generally regarded by itself because the figure of Immanuel Kant stands at the threshold of the century. Kant has been regarded as the terminus a quo for any consideration of nineteenth century thought. We need not here review the whole of Kant's philosophy but it will not be amiss to recall certain of his conclusions which had their influence upon theology. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant followed along in the wake of the scientific emphasis laid down by the Aufklärung, but in the matter of religion he denied that the ideas of God were rational ideas. The so-called rational proofs for the existence of God were, through his critical method, rendered untenable. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant demonstrated his powers as a moral philosopher and showed how it is possible for man to believe in freedom, immortality, and God. In the Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant came closest to dogmatic theology and dwelt at length about the doctrine of sin which he called the "radical evil in man" showing how this was an obstacle to man's attainment of moral perfection and happiness. The overcoming of this obstacle lay within the idea of a "humanity well-pleasing to God" which stands in the religious life as the ideal toward which man must strive. The moral struggle toward this "ideal of human perfection" is redemption. R.S. Franks sums up the Kantian theology in an admirable paragraph as follows: "As regards the religious doctrine of Kant in general, it is clear that he has carried the separation of Christian doctrine from the historic Christ even further than Steinbart. He is thus the/
the father of all Modernism, which, distinguishing between the Christ of faith and the Jesus of history, finds the doctrines of the Church profoundly true as ideas, though untrue if understood literally as referring to the historical Jesus."¹

The similarity between Kant and the writers we have been considering is patent. To find Christian doctrines true as ideas was the paramount ambition of them all. Kant himself by separating Person and principle began the Christological ball rolling. His chief work, however, lay in the realm of critical philosophy and he had neither the time nor the inclination to examine further the theological principles which he isolated. He has been regarded as the philosopher of Protestantism. "Kant is the guard," says Karl Heim, "on the frontier of the human mind, sternly restraining men within their proper limits."² The inheritance which Kant bequeathed to theology became the capital fund from which writers like Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch drew unreservedly.

Fichte, the second of the great philosophical triumvirate, carried on the work of Kant but in the main his theological position was very much in line with that of his predecessor. Fichte was not concerned with the problem of the radical evil in man, he contended that the struggle for the ideal was the main thing in life.

Fichte's/

Fichte's theology is shot through and through with morality. "Fichte thinks of himself," says Karl Heim, "as one who creates himself and looks on his own handiwork."¹ He had no more interest in the Person of Christ than Kant had. Jesus was the manifestation of the divine, this was His importance for the Christian religion, but as an historical person He fades into insignificance. Fichte's well-known dictum that only the metaphysical saves is the distinguishing characteristic of his position. If Jesus were to return to the earth to-day, Fichte said, He would be satisfied to learn that the ideas which He represented were still at the core of Christianity. Jesus Christ is not superior to Christianity, He is the exemplar of mankind and each one of us as we recognize our part in the divine programme become with Him Sons of God. Fichte's importance for nineteenth century theology lay in paving the way to Hegel who gathered up the threads of the Kantian and Fichtean theology and wove them into a new pattern.

The fundamental principle behind Hegelianism was the union of the Infinite and the finite, the coincidentia oppositorum. In Christology this principle came closer to orthodox Christianity than had the principles of either Kant or Fichte. Hegel saw in the Person of Christ the union of the Divine and human and thus the supreme illustration of his philosophical principle. Jesus Christ as the God-man is the historical example of the union of Infinite and finite. In Jesus the transcendence of God is obliterated and divine and human mingle as one. Here again, however, as in Kant and/

¹. Glaube und Denken, p.49; E.T. p.41.
and Fichte it is the idea which Jesus represents rather than Jesus Himself who is significant. Hegel's emphasis upon the Person of Christ as the union of the Infinite and finite was a decided step forward in Christology but ultimately the result was no greater than in Kant and Fichte, Jesus still remained apart from Christianity. Christian doctrines were transformed into Hegelian principles and this logically excluded the Person of Christ. Professor H.R. Mackintosh has given Hegel's Christology in a succinct form, he says: "It would be unfair to say that in this scheme Jesus is deprived of all importance, for He is held to have been the first to realise the great speculative principle for which the Christian religion stands. If not Himself the God-man, He first perceived that God and man are one. Thus far Hegel transcended the unhistorical naivété of the eighteenth century. But it is clear that, apart from this casual chronological relationship, Christian doctrine, in its revised and sublimated form, has no longer any particular connection with the historic Christ. Christianity receives absolute rank, but at the cost of its tie with history. For only the world-process as a whole, and no single point or person in it, can be the true manifestation of the Absolute."¹

Kant, Fichte, and Hegel all stressed the importance of metaphysical ideas in distinction from their historical setting, but Hegel added the appendix that in history the ideas of Christianity have been illustrated. In Christology Hegel's view was an advance over his predecessors in the direction of orthodoxy in so far as he regarded the Person of Christ as a necessary medium for/

¹ The Person of Jesus Christ, p.258.
for the understanding of the union of Infinite and finite. Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, like their philosophical forebearers, sought to emphasize the metaphysical ideas of Christianity apart from the historical Jesus. Strauss, like Kant, was willing to stake everything on the ideal of human perfection. Biedermann, like Fichte, toward the close of his life approached evangelical Christianity in attempting a closer relation between the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption. And Troeltsch, like Hegel, insisted upon the historical Jesus as the symbol of Christian truth. These parallels are not to be pressed too far, but they indicate the lines of development and the influences which the philosophers had upon the theologians. There is, at least, this parallel between the philosophers and the theologians, both separated the Person from the principle.  

The distinction which the nineteenth century philosophers made between Christianity as a system of ideas and its historical setting, a distinction which as we have seen Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch adopted, is the distinction between what Brunner calls "general revelation and special revelation," it is the distinction between ethic and evangel, it is, in short, the distinction between philosophy and theology. The attempt to erase this distinction proved to be too great a task for Strauss and he threw in his lot finally.

1. R.S. Franks says of Kant and Hegel that they may "Be viewed as having revived.....the Gnostic religion of redemption. Like the Gnostics, they have separated the Divine principle of re-
demption from the historic Jesus, but it is for them no trans-
finally with philosophy. Biedermann, too, was conscious of his failure and toward the end of his life tried to relinquish his hold upon philosophy in favour of theology. Troeltsch presents us with a strange inconsistency, of a system which grew more and more "radical," as he says, and of a man who retained to the end a devout personal faith. The philosophical movement begun in Kant impelled the theologians of the nineteenth century headlong into philosophical principles.

The great contribution which philosophy made to the theology of this century was the break which it helped to make with the strict formalism and rigid ecclesiasticism of the preceding centuries. Where the Church had been dormant, listless, and apathetic, the impetus of philosophy came sweeping in like a tidal-wave. Contented theologians and self-complacent pastors were roused to life and pushed to the wall. The Church was challenged as it had not been since the Reformation and if it was to persist with honour and dignity this challenge must be met. With one accord, as though summoned by the "last trump," churchmen sprang to the pulpit and lecture-platform to acquit themselves and their faith. Philosophy had broken through the barriers of conventionalized thinking and a new land had been discovered. He who refused to join the marching crusade was soon trampled underfoot and left behind forgotten. Once again the Person of Christ became the focus of attention as He had not been since the fourth century. To plead His cause, to redefine His significance, to set Him before the world in His true garments, this became the absorbing passion of nineteenth century theologians, and Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch were but three of/
of the many who had something new and startling to say. This stimulus to theological thinking provided by the philosophical movement in Kant, Fichte, and Hegel cannot be too much exaggerated. It was the motive power behind the century and its influence was, to use Lichtenberger's word, "immense."

From this early nineteenth century tree of knowledge, which was digging its roots deeper and deeper into the bedrock of science and philosophy, there emerged several budding offshoots. Of these the philosophy of history current at the beginning of the century was the most robust and influential. The philosophical movement was but one phase of the Enlightenment. Along with it in parallel strides ran the course of the physical sciences. Sir Isaac Newton in the early years of the eighteenth century had pointed a new direction for science with his law of gravitation. The discovery of the principle behind the falling apple suddenly transformed a chaos into a cosmos and scientists began to speak of a universe in the literal sense of the word. The Newtonian physics made men realize that the physical world was no longer a mere play-thing in the hands of an arbitrary Divine Will, but it was a realm of law and order in which chance and indeterminacy were meaningless terms. The principle governing the universe was the law of cause and effect. Like the hymn of Joseph Addison men began to sing about the "Spacious firmament on high" with its planets and constellations moving in perfect symmetry proclaiming "the hand that made us is divine." Some years later, in 1859, Charles Darwin incorporated/
incorporated this rule of physical science into his biological theories and the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, as the title of his epoch-making book reveals, regarded life in terms of physical and mechanical laws. In Scotland David Hume was working with Newtonian principles in the field of history. His Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding, 1748, set forth the thesis that the object of history was the discovery of the universal principles of human nature which at all times and in all places were to be subjected to the law of cause and effect. Hume's Essay on Miracles, in which he denied the possibility of the suspension or transcendence of natural law became a standard argument against supernaturalism. In Germany Lessing published his Education of the Human Race, 1780 with the thesis that as the individual progresses and develops through successive stages from childhood, to youth, to manhood, so, too, the race as a whole is a progressive developing process. Henri Bergson's idea of a "creative evolution" would have appealed to Lessing no doubt. In theology this idea had a pronounced effect upon the question of the validity of Christianity and the general impression which Lessing circulated was that Christianity belonged to an inferior childhood past beyond which the modern world in its manhood had outlived. Speaking of the relation of history to ideas Lessing denied that "contingent historical truths" were proofs of necessary truths of reason. The important point to notice about this position is that Lessing regarded historical events as "contingent," and in so defining history he set the tune which the nineteenth century was quick to adopt/
adopt as its theme-song. A contemporary of Lessing, Salomo Semler, working in the virgin soil of New Testament criticism which was soon to be so thoroughly ploughed up, showed the trend of the times by digging down into the roots of the creeds of the Church and showing how they are all the result of natural growth. Church history, he said, must be taken at one sweep for it is a development from first to last. All these thinkers, Newton, Hume, Lessing, Semler, and their host of contemporaries, were postulating a philosophy of history which had profound influence upon the theology of the nineteenth century. But the single name which had more to do with the idea of history as a development than all of these names together was the philosopher Hegel.

The Hegelian dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis was the logical expression of the physical law of cause and effect. The Darwinian phrases, natural selection, struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, were the biological expressions of Hegelianism. For Hegel history was a moving stream which rushed tempestuously on between banks of natural law. The Old Testament philosophy of history which looked up to a guiding Providence was either criticized as unscientific or completely ignored. History was no longer regarded as a perpendicular movement toward God or from God, but as a horizontal process in which God Himself was involved. If the Infinite and the finite are essentially one, then history is a unity, a flowing stream, a continuous process.¹

¹. The idea of development in the early nineteenth century seemed to imply also the idea of progress. History is advancing toward a blessed goal.
In theology this philosophy of history had direct bearing upon such problems as revelation, the person of Christ, and the finality of the Christian religion. Obviously, in a formula which excluded everything that did not conform to the process-principle, a divine revelation was out of the question except so far as God and His manifestations were revealed in the natural order of things. In the same way, a Christ who claimed to be the turning point in history could not be taken seriously by a philosophy which brooked no miracles, no favourites, no accidents in the course of history. Moreover, the Christian religion, although it may be considered as containing the best truths of mankind and of God, is not necessarily the final religion because in a universe where change and development rule who would dare pronounce final judgments even on religious questions. Redemption, therefore, is a process within the natural order. Emil Brunner describes the attitude taken by German idealism in regard to redemption thus: "The whole of the historical process is the history of redemption, of the growing Kingdom of God. Just as when some one wakes in the morning, between the first moment of waking and the state of being fully awake there is an infinite series of continuous stages of becoming awake, so the whole of history is an awakening of humanity, within which Christ is the 'moment' when humanity is fully awake. This 'moment' is called redemption, the Kingdom of God. But within this process there is no real change, all flows on evenly and without interruption. The state of non-redemption merges naturally into that of being redeemed."¹

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¹ The Mediator, p.87.
The philosophy of history which was a portion of the inheritance of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch had no interest in what Brunner called Einmaligkeit. The ideas of a "once-for-all" incarnation, redemption, and atonement were repugnant to the masculine view of history. Jesus may be defined with all the terms of heroic admiration and with all the phrases of reverent devotion, but to think of Him as a Mediator or Redeemer of a unique character accomplishing in His Person what is true only of the whole of humanity, this was too much to ask of a modern educated man, "it is treating humanity as a minor and stripping it of all its rights; it is intolerable."¹ Biedermann and Troeltsch, and Strauss in his earlier periods, were quite willing to regard the teaching of Jesus as of the greatest importance, even as a revelation from God, but Jesus Himself in their systems was not decisive and His teaching, worthy as it is, may justly be regarded as a general truth toward which the whole history of the race is moving. To say that history changed its direction with the coming of Christ was to oppose history, it was shutting one's eyes to the light of science. Jesus's rightful place as Troeltsch repeatedly urged, is as a link in the chain of religious prophets. The chain stretches back to Plato and forward to Schleiermacher. Jesus is somewhere in the middle but not central in the sense that He is unique or without parallel.

It is, accordingly, the task of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch to reinterpret and redefine Christian doctrines in the terms/

¹. The Mediator, p.115.
terms of this philosophy of history. There are grains of truth in all the Christian doctrines but these must be isolated from the rough husks of history. What the New Testament and the tradition of the Church has said of the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ and redemption by Him is metaphysically true apart from the Person. If redemption must be localized, then it must be in the race, the ideal of human perfection. Jesus was imperfect simply because He was a man and subject to His times just as we are, only the race is pure.¹

The great positive contribution of this philosophy of history was in the impulse which it gave to the historical examination of New Testament records. The principles of development and growth were applied to the content and form of the individual books of the New Testament with the result that our knowledge of the New Testament has been greatly enriched. The constructive conclusions which the critics reached may have been few and meagre, but there can be no doubt that they opened doors hitherto closed to the world and revealed chambers laden with treasures of information. The problems of dating the books of the New Testament and showing the inner developments and "tendencies" which gave rise to the Christian/

¹ The mathematics of such a proposition did not bother these thinkers. That the sum of unequals should yield an equal was thought reasonable enough. A story which has been told in a variety of forms illustrating this proposition is given by Professor H.R. Mackintosh in one of his lectures. He tells of a woman who made scones to sell at twopence although they cost her twopence halfpenny to make. When asked how she could make anything that way, she replied, "Only by selling a great number!"
ian faith became one of the most absorbing and revealing enterprises of the century. Of the three men we have examined it is especially to Strauss that much credit must go for the furthering of this criticism. His *Leben Jesu* was the lever which pried open the locked doors of tradition and legend allowing those who dared to penetrate the Holy of Holies in search of the historical Jesus.

It is not necessary to linger on the influence of this philosophy of history upon the systems of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch. They were three among the legion who regimented themselves under its banner. Others fell behind and others pushed further ahead but they stuck doggedly to their principles commanding the doctrines of the Church to surrender to a new regime. Strauss marched in the vanguard of New Testament criticism and if his alarums were too nervous and intimidating they nevertheless steeled men's minds to the oncoming attack and marshalled the scientific examination of the Scripture records through a rewarding campaign. Biedermann took up his place among the intelligence department. He was willing to let Strauss plunge on ahead while he devised means of rehabilitating the conquered territory. He was not content to leave it in its ruined condition as Strauss had delivered it, he wished to reorganize it and put it to work again for the good of the cause. Thus it was that while Strauss had routed the enemies of myth and superstition and brought the historical Jesus tied and bound before a critical tribunal, Biedermann, as one of the judges, was willing to plead His case and set Him at liberty provided He relinquished His hold upon His followers. Biedermann was a staunch defender of the principle which would separate/
separate the Person of Christ from what belonged rightfully to the whole of humanity. When victory seemed to be within their grasp and as the speculative movement swept on like the philosophy of history which it promulgated, Ritschl turned traitor and threatened the line of defences in various serious segments. Just as he was planning to reinstate the overthrown Person of Christ, the figure of Troeltsch could be seen arriving with belated re-enforcements. With the principle of "Individuality" as his chief weapon, he slashed his way through the traditional bulwark of historical Christianity and succeeded in isolating each particular division. The line of tradition was severely broken and the Person of Christ lost His authority and Kingship. He was now deprived of His leadership and must co-operate with His assistants as best He could. Christianity's claim to finality was beginning to look ridiculous. Its leader had been separated from His forces.

Aside from the philosophical movement and the philosophy of history current during the opening years of the nineteenth century, both of which made their mark upon the theological positions of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, the general spirit of the age, its tone and temper, its weltenschaumung, was influential in moulding theological thinking. A modern writer in contrasting the character of the Middle Ages with that of the Enlightenment says: "The humility, the self-distrust, the dependence upon supernatural powers, the submission to external authority, the subordination of time to eternity and of fact to symbol, the conviction of/
of the insignificance and meanness of the present life, the sombre sense of the sin of man and the evil of the world, the static interpretation of reality, the passive acceptance of existing conditions and the belief that amelioration can come only in another world beyond the grave, the dualism between God and man, heaven and earth, spirit and flesh, the ascetic renunciation of the world and its pleasures - all of which characterized the Middle Ages - were widely overcome, and men faced life with a new confidence in themselves, with a new recognition of human power and achievement, with a new appreciation of present values, and with a new conviction of the onward progress of the race in past and future.¹ What was it that contributed to this changed attitude toward life? What were the factors which broke down the old authorities and proclaimed a new freedom? We have already spoken of the philosophy and theory of history as they impinged upon theology but here we must deal with more general influences.

The political background of the nineteenth century furnishes some light upon the sudden shifting of emphases in theology. It is not necessary to dwell for any length upon the political situation of Germany at this period in order to understand the general currents of life. It is enough to keep in mind that the opening years of the century ushered in a cloud of gloom and discouragement which settled down over the whole of Germany. Napoleon was forging ahead in spite of every effort to stop him and it looked very/

very much like only a matter of time until Germany would be forced under an unwilling yoke. The self-complacency of the individual German states in previous years was suddenly turned to self-abasement and humiliation. Heretofore the freedom of the fatherland had been taken for granted. Now that it was seriously questioned, it was cherished and guarded with jealousy. Every day saw new defenders of the German nation taking their stand not only in the army but in all the walks of life, literature, art, music, and religion. The Napoleonic wars had stirred the conscience of the nation to a new height and a wave of race patriotism swept over the country dispelling the clouds of gloom and evoking the silver linings of hope and freedom.

After the overthrow of the French, Germany began a slow but steady reform in government. Prussia was the first state to adopt revolutionary measures in the matter of education and one by one the other states followed the example. Constitutionalism became the conversation and creed of political circles. Democracy and freedom were beginning to show themselves. The idea of a divine right of kings, the principle of a theocratic state, was forgotten in the passion for self-expression. The new freedom in theology which broke with the traditions of the past and established new modes of thinking is closely paralleled in the history of German politics.

In the economic realm the century was characterized by a like revolution. Feudalism and landed property gave way to individualism and competition. Commerce sprang into new life. With the advancement of science and engineering a new assurance of/
of power came to the German business man and merchant. Industrial centres grew up over night and a great migration from country to city took place.

The leadership of education which had formerly been in the sole keeping of the Church passed into the hands of the State. The village pastor who had divided his time between his church and the school was obliged to choose one or the other as education became more and more secularized. Ethics began to stand on its own feet without the support of religion. The categorical imperative of the Kantian philosophy was but the theoretical expression of the actual state of affairs. With the deepening sense of self-sufficiency the ideas of human depravity and sin were overshadowed and overlooked. A new philanthropy gripped the hearts of the people. The self-expression of the race became the rallying cry of the times.

In the literature of the early nineteenth century the voice of the people found expression. There is no better way to study the currents of thought in this period than to read the poems of Schiller and Goethe. These two artistic souls captivated the hearts and minds of Germany to an incredible extent. It has been said that Goethe has been honoured more than any other German. And their praise is still being sounded. One needs only to go to Weimar in the summer months and watch a countless procession of young and old paying tribute to their memory to realize the place they hold in the soul of the nation even to-day.

In Schiller and Goethe the Rationalism of the age lost all the narrow bitterness and hypocrisy with which it had been associated.
associated. Not that they ever reached a very high plane of Christian thinking, for they remained Nationalists themselves to the end, but they disowned the scoffers and scorners of religion who ridiculed anything traditional without knowing why or without offering anything constructive as a substitute. Lichtenberger, who devotes an entire chapter of his great book on the History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century to the Classical Literature, says of Schiller: "To the frivolous and materialistic tendencies of his time he opposed the beauty and moral grandeur of virtue. Fleeing from the lower levels and hewing out for itself a rough and solitary pathway through the rocks, the poetry of Schiller, without dreading the abysses which it skirts along, transports us to the summits of things."¹

The power of the poetry of Schiller and Goethe lay in the masculine virility of their philosophy. They were crusaders against all that tended to debase man. They reacted against any semblance of the doctrine of sin and human inability to rise above the tragedy of this world's life. Truly Pelagian in theology, they looked to the self-redemption of mankind through moral struggling. Religion is but a stage in the long process from the superstition of ecclesiastical dogmas to faith in the race. As Auguste Comte in France developed his theory that religion was a necessary step toward a higher religion, humanity, so too in the Classical Literature of the nineteenth century humanity became the author's God. Goethe's character Faust is the typical example of the ideal man.¹

¹ History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century, p.243.
man. He has an insatiable thirst for knowledge, and his faith lies in the creations of man not of God.

To an age which was rapidly becoming self-conscious of its own power, the works of Schiller and Goethe appealed more strongly than the doctrines of established orthodoxy. Especially among the youth was their cause championed. Free to pick and choose the best from all available systems of thought, eclecticism became the literary creed of the day. Man must work out his own salvation. He must realize that he is the captain of his soul and the master of his destiny.

The chief influence of the Classical Literature upon theology was the blunt disavowal of sin and the staunch assertion that man is sufficient unto himself. This same influence was felt in the philosophical movement and in the current philosophy of history. In the systems of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, and this applies to many others in the century, this Weltanschauung did much to discredit the Person of Christ. The idea of a Mediator or a Redeemer became unnecessary. If a man believes he can save himself, he can have no need, or even respect, for one who claims to offer salvation in His Person. At most Jesus must be regarded as an ideal symbol toward which the race is moving. He cannot be given a central place in the modern world where superstition and formal authorities have been pushed aside to make room for freedom of conscience and belief. As in H.G. Well's Invisible King the world must create for itself a new God not arising out of creeds and dogmas but arising out of man. God must join forces with struggling humanity. Religion must relinquish its place to society.

Although/
Although the theological result of the early nineteenth century weltanschauung was the separation of the Person of Christ from the principle of redemption, as we have seen in the systems of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, it must be said that in the realm of philanthropy this world-view had very definite and rewarding consequences. An age that puts the accent on morality, on action rather than faith, is often concerned with righting the lot of the oppressed and in making life bearable for all of mankind. Aside from the general outercroppings of this activist philosophy in the form of hospitals, charity work, slum-clearances, and improved race relationships, this was the age of expanding missionary activity. Within a period of ten years at the opening of the century missionary societies from Basle, Berlin, and Paris were pushing out into unknown lands to sunder the bonds of backward civilizations and to plant the seeds of modern western culture. Milton's Areopagitica written long before the nineteenth century had expressed the thought, "I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and seeks her adversary," and this became the practical philosophy of Germany. To sally out and meet adversaries of all kinds became the creed and doctrine of the land.

We have tried to show to some extent how the common position of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch in separating the Person of Christ from the principle of redemption was the theological expression of three factors, the trend of philosophy, the theory of history,
history, and the general outlook on life. But although Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch held a common view on the subject of redemption, nevertheless their systems have distinctive features which serve to set them apart from each other. Their systems are like concentric circles with a common centre but with circumferences of different dimensions. We must, therefore, strike out from the centre, their common viewpoint, and travel the various radii which lead to their particular circumferences. We will not repeat what has been said in the previous chapters but gather together the main threads which are tied directly to our problem of the relation of the Person of Christ to the principle of redemption.

We can arrive at some indication of the differences in the systems of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch by observing the men themselves, their lives, their personalities, for in some real sense a man's philosophy ultimately depends upon the kind of man he is. All three were theologians to begin with. Biedermann, however, was the only one of the three to remain a theologian to his death. Strauss later in his life repudiated all connection with the Church and with Christianity and shut himself up within the precincts of materialistic philosophy where he still attempted to observe the theological world but his outlook was too circumscribed by his environment. In his university days he lived and studied at the Stift in Tübingen which at the time was the theological seminary of Württemberg. His interests then were thoroughly theological/
theological and great hopes were laid for his career in the Church. Even after he was graduated, when he acted for a short time as a village pastor, his theological interests showed no signs of waning although he was finding it increasingly difficult to reconcile Gospel preaching with the Hegelianism with which he had become enamoured. The publication of his first Leben Jesu estranged Strauss from his father and made his home life unenviable. His mother never lost faith in him although it is obvious from his letters that she was not at all happy in his writings and the drift of his thinking. Toward the end of his life Strauss was confessedly not a Christian in even a broad sense. His last book, in fact, may be regarded as a polemic against Christianity.

Unlike Strauss who drifted further and further away from Christianity due to the ridicule and criticism of his works as well as to his own developing thinking, Biedermann lived more and more within the bounds of Christianity until at the time of his death he seemed ready to modify many of his former liberal conclusions. In another place we have reported the scene at his death-bed where his last words reveal his sincere, if groping, faith. And as the movement of their lives were in different directions, so too Biedermann's works witness to his increasing faith just/

1. Professor Karl Heim of Tübingen told me that many visitors to Tübingen interested in the atheistic movement in Russia seek out Strauss's old room and pay homage to his memory and the impetus which he is supposed to have given atheism. Other famous rooms in the Stift are those once occupied by Schelling and Hegel.
just as Strauss's indicate his decreasing faith. From the publication of the freie Theologie until the appearance of the second edition of the Dogmatik, Biedermann passed from strict speculative Hegelianism to something approaching evangelical Christianity. It is true that his Dogmatik is essentially speculative and Hegelian but it only needs comparison with some of his early works to show the positive trend in his thinking. In practice, too, Biedermann was a professing Christian. While preaching became to Strauss a stumbling-block which he could not overcome except by avoiding it altogether, Biedermann retained until his death an intense personal interest in the pulpit. His custom was to preach in the small village churches near his home in Zurich, and we are told that he acquitted himself with the same honour and dignity in humble villages as in his classroom. Biedermann was a zealous presbyter. The unity, the harmonious functioning of the Church, was one of his deepest concerns and on more than one occasion he commanded a central position in addressing assemblies of the Swiss Church. He was constantly in the Pauline phrase "endeavouring to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace."1 Although Strauss denied that he wished to begin a new Church, he emphatically avowed that he was through with the present one. Biedermann had no such desire and though he remained a liberal in theology he tried to strengthen his associations with the established Church.

Troeltsch's greatest works were executed while he was teaching theology at Heidelberg, but the last years of his life were

1. Eph. 4:3.
were spent in Berlin in the chair of philosophy. He may be com-
pared with Strauss, therefore, in that both turned to philosophy
in their latter days. But the comparison is not to be forced too
far because Troeltsch did not make the boast of scrapping theology
for philosophy as Strauss had done, he retained to the end his in-
terest in theological questions. But unlike Biedermann, Troeltsch
showed no deepening of the Christian experience. Troeltsch pre-
sents us with a "Janus-bifrons" who is both the philosopher and the
believer at one and the same time. This two-faced characteristic
is Troeltsch's great inconsistency and makes criticism of him pre-
carious. His own testimony, coupled with that of his friends,
bears witness to his personal faith. Yet his books never speak
that faith and we find personal references few and far between.
In his last published lectures there is a decided absence of any
appreciation for the Christian experience, and yet he urges his
hearers not to think him sceptical although he is admittedly becom-
ing more radical. Troeltsch, therefore, stands somewhere in between
Strauss and Biedermann for he refused to deny Christianity as Strauss
did and yet his personal faith found no expression in his works as
was the case with Biedermann. Even Troeltsch's early interest in
missions which shows his close connection with the Church is ser-
iously modified in his last lecture on Christianity in which
missions becomes a disheartening problem in the face of the re-
lativity of Christianity among the other world-religions.

Strauss died a militant antagonist to Christianity.
Biedermann shifted his speculative position toward his death and
by so doing seemed to usher in upon his soul a flood of light long
shaded/
shaded from him by his own devices. Troeltsch died suddenly in the midst of his work and we get the impression that his task was unfinished. Strauss died unhappy, at odds with the world. Bieder­
man, quite the reverse, met his Maker with calmness and joy. Troeltsch in his last writings was certainly not optimistic. All three changed the direction of their thinking, Strauss became more antagonistic to Christianity, Biedermann more susceptible to the evangelical tradition, and Troeltsch more radical and inconsistent.

A deep-seated distinction in Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch is revealed when their respective methods are examined. Different as they were in their lives and personalities, they were nevertheless bound together by a common Christological outlook. This common bond, however, was the result in each case of a distinctive method of approach. Strauss was always the critic working with varying degrees of success with the critical method. His Leben Jesu by which he is best known, is the best example of his criticism, but even in the Glaubenslehre he is intent on breaking down critically all historical doctrines, and in Der Alte und der neue Glaube his criticism finds its object in Christianity in general. Although he claimed for himself the role of reformer, he is always an iconoclast and if he has positive conclusions to offer they are minimized by the predominance of negative results. When we speak of the Leben Jesu we would do well to keep in mind the full title for it is not a "life" of Jesus so much as it is a life of Jesus "critically examined." The critical tools with which Strauss/
Strauss is a master of reason, common sense, logic, and Hegelianism. Facts are what make the world go round for Strauss; he will have nothing to do with superstition, tradition, myth, or legend. Anything that savours of the past is liable to be false or at least encrusted with unhistorical traditions. Like the barnacles that retard the speed of a boat, Strauss felt that sentimental fancy was retarding the progress of Christianity. To remove these unhistorical barnacles, at whatever cost, was Strauss's ambition and he chose the mythical method of criticism to do the job. Strauss was no mediocre critic; he was a master at the trade. His Leben Jesu reveals a stupendous knowledge of biblical facts and theories of interpretation. Details are piled up endlessly in the desire for thoroughness and exhaustiveness. His own critics, guided by a true instinct, tried to confute his conclusions, but in doing so they showed themselves terribly deficient in the critical method which Strauss used with such telling effect.

Biedermann was always the speculative theologian. He accepted Strauss's criticism of the Gospel records in toto but he balked at Strauss's dogmatic conclusions. Not a critic in the same way that Strauss was, Biedermann confined his task to the interpretation of the results of criticism. Taking his stand with the most liberal tendency in New Testament criticism, he resolved to organize their results into a Christian theology in the spirit of the times. Speculative theology is, therefore, Biedermann's special province. He, too, works with the tools of reason and Hegelianism but he uses them not so much to deface the past as to model and fashion a new structure for the present. Biedermann is primarily/
primarily constructive, although he passes through the stages of destruction on his way toward a higher level. If, as Strauss had shown, the historical Jesus was so wrapped up within the garments of myth as to be quite invisible, then something must be made of the mythical Jesus even if He be regarded as no more than a symbol or illustration of the Christian principle. With his eyes on the past Biedermann attempted to reconstruct Christianity by redefining the Christian doctrines in keeping with Strauss's results and in line with Hegelianism. In his later years, he realized the fallacy of his method. He saw that speculative theology and the evangelical experience make poor companions. This discovery was the point of departure for a new appreciation of Christianity. But essentially even to the end Biedermann was a speculative thinker and his final Dogmatik is still very much enslaved to Hegelianism.

Troeltsch was always the historian. He, too, like Biedermann, accepted Strauss's criticism and the further developments in that field since Strauss. And Troeltsch accepted the speculative theology of Biedermann. What Troeltsch found lacking in both Strauss and Biedermann was an appreciation of history. New Testament criticism will not tell us what Christianity is or was, nor will pure speculation. What is needed, Troeltsch insisted, was an examination of historical Christianity using the laws of historical research as a method. These laws are three: the law of criticism, the law of analogy, and the law of relativity. With these tools in his hands Troeltsch was able to reduce Christianity to probabilities and relativities. Dogmatic theology is not his strong point, in fact he refused to write a systematic theology. He/
He was an historian from first to last as his greatest works proclaim. Later his interest in history took him into the study of comparative religions where he furthered his method with considerable success. Christianity, however, became one of the religions. It is not final, at least we have no right to say so, all that we can say is that it suits us in our particular civilization. Historically considered, Christianity reveals distinct eras or periods in which principles are predominant. The true estimate, therefore, will realize that Christianity is a religion of moods and temperaments.

The three methods represented by Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch became the foundations of three distinct schools of theology. In the case of Strauss it was the school of New Testament criticism. Biedermann stood at the head of those who followed Hegel closely, and the group became known as the Speculative School. Troeltsch has always been ranked as the leading exponent of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule. For one who is not interested in the intricacies of their methods or systems, Strauss is certainly the most appealing writer. His style is robust at all times. It moves with a swiftness which carries the reader on and on in spite of the results. Biedermann's style of presenting his case is marked with a monotonous logic so usual among Hegelians and if it does not appeal in the same way as Strauss's liquid criticism it is perhaps a more logical and philosophical style of writing. Of the three, Troeltsch is undoubtedly the most prolix. His sentences are often unintelligible even after repeated readings. Germans themselves find him difficult and often prefer to read the French translations/
translations of his works. He was a very prolific writer and the very length of the list of his writings may account in some measure for his stiff and glassy style.

In order to distinguish more sharply between the peculiar positions of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch it will be advisable to consider the particular emphases which they make. Bound together by a common Christological principle, they nevertheless accent and stress different points as they set about developing their main positions. We have already spoken of the emphases of the century which they had in common, we must now note some of their individual distinctions. In general their emphases depend upon their methods of approach. Strauss, as we have seen, used the mythical method of historical criticism and with this weapon at hand laid the emphasis upon the exposition of the traditional life of Jesus. His object was to clear the way for a philosophical faith based not upon the Church or the New Testament but upon the best tenets of morality and reason. By stressing the non-historicity of the Gospels he hoped to discredit all forms of complacent faith in an historical Jesus. Biedermann laid the accent of theology upon the redefinition of Christian doctrines in the light of Hegelianism. Both Strauss and Biedermann succeeded in separating the Person of Christ from the principle of redemption but each had his own way of doing so. Strauss's denial of Christianity and affirmation of a philosophical materialism was to Biedermann the result of misplaced emphasis. Biedermann's conclusions tended/
tended to reinstate Christianity by bringing it up to date. Troeltsch emphasized the historical approach to Christianity and demonstrated the Individuality of various periods of Christian history. In so doing he made Jesus relative, a link in a chain, and thus joined the ranks of Strauss and Biedermann in separating the Person from the principle.

In each of these three systems the person of Christ is treated differently. Although their conclusions verged toward a common idea, they differed as to the significance of Jesus. Strauss, from the first, saw in Jesus no more than a mythical figure of history. By this he did not mean that Jesus had never lived, but the history of the life which He is said to have lived has been forever lost to mankind. Due to the Messianic prophecies with which the minds of the Jews were enlivened and to the conviction that Jesus Himself was the fulfilment of these prophecies, the early Christian narratives of His life and work have been so sentimentalized and warped out of shape in order to fit the Messianic hopes that Jesus's real existence is unknown. So exhaustively did Strauss apply his method that Jesus emerged without character and without reality. In order to stem the flood of criticism which was poured upon him, Strauss tried to modify his position by showing that Jesus was nevertheless a man of high moral courage, a hero, a religious genius of tremendous proportions. But these emendations were short-lived. Strauss later struck them out and resorted to his original conviction that Jesus as an historical person is unknowable. Later in life, as he grew more and more philosophical, he began to carry his results still further. Up to this time he had/
had been content to show how the early narrators had been deceived into thinking that Jesus was the Messiah just as Jesus Himself was deceived into believing this. But now we find Strauss raining his torrents of criticism upon both the recordists and Jesus Himself for being deceivers as well as deceived. Myth is defined not only as the unintentional fabrication of truth but even wilful disregard for fact and history. Thus, Jesus in Strauss's final category is a self-deceived and deceiving impostor who has no right to command the faith, not even the respect and admiration, of any modern minded man.

Biedermann constantly acknowledged his debt to Strauss and accepted the mythical criticism of the life of Jesus, but the conclusion to which Strauss was driven, namely, to deprive the Person of Christ of any significance whatsoever, was the point of departure in Biedermann's Christology. We are told that Biedermann was sorely disappointed in Strauss's last book and his disappointment is an indication of a difference in emphasis. Even if Jesus's life is enveloped with myth, He is nevertheless important, nay in fact essential to Christianity. This was Biedermann's positive accent in Christology. The eternal truths of Christianity, of which redemption is one, depend for their guarantee upon the Person of Christ. In Him we see not only the metaphysical union of Infinite and finite, of Divine and human, as Strauss himself had once acknowledged, but He is the first to represent the principle of redemption in actual historical form. Without Him we would know nothing of the principle of redemption. He is the means whereby it has become intelligible and applicable. It matters little/
little to Biedermann what criticism does to the details of Christ's life on earth, He is, according to the Gospels, the human embodiment of redemption. It was this historical actuality that gave Christianity its driving force. To deprive it of the historical founder and guarantee is to cut its roots from the living source. But in spite of his insistence upon the importance of the Person of Christ for the principle of redemption, Biedermann was far from making Jesus the Redeemer. Just as the principle is worthless without the Person, so too the reverse is true. Without the principle idea the Person is a mere human agent whose work stopped at His death. To insure Christianity's permanency and finality the two, Person and principle, must ever be considered in their mutual relationship. This was Biedermann's final conclusion in Christology and it is marked with a strange inconsistency. Convinced of the value of the historical Person of Christ for redemption, he nevertheless refused to relinquish his hold upon Hegelianism and the result was a confusion of thought which was at once a dualism and a unity.

Troeltsch discovered that the significance of the historical Jesus lay in His relation to the Christian cult and community. Following upon the footsteps of Strauss and Biedermann, he separated the Person of Christ from the principle of redemption but at the same time found a category in which to place Jesus so that He became the centre of faith. In so far as He revealed the character of God, Jesus may be spoken of as the Redeemer, but Troeltsch insisted that ultimately God is the Redeemer, not Jesus Christ. But to neglect the historical Jesus is to neglect history,
and history shows that the Christian community has always placed its centre of support upon Jesus. The ideas and principles which He revealed are eternally true, as Strauss once held and as Biedermann always believed, but ideas and principles alone would never have created a Christian cult and community. They need a rallying-point for their life and this can only be found in the historical Jesus. For Troeltsch Jesus is more than an illustration of the principle of redemption, He is more than the guarantee of its efficacy, He is the head of the Christian community. Actually Jesus's significance is not related to redemption at all, except in a very indirect way, for redemption is knowledge of God's Will. If Jesus is not the Redeemer, He is, nevertheless, the corner-stone of the Christian's faith and as such is of eternal importance. The result of Troeltsch's position was the same as that of Strauss and Biedermann, the Person was separated from the principle. Each arrived at this common conclusion, but each regarded the Person of Christ differently.

As with the Person of Christ, so too with the doctrine of redemption, Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, although sharing a common conclusion, nevertheless represent three distinct conceptions. For all of them redemption was made effective through other means than the Person of Christ. Strauss's doctrine of redemption seldom makes an appearance simply because the Redeemer is an unhistorical person with no spiritual efficacy. But when he does speak of redemption it is always in terms of the race. Humanity is/
is being redeemed more and more as the years go by. With the aid of science and modern philosophy the race is gradually emerging from a state of imperfection toward a final ideal. The Christian doctrine of redemption, in so far as it is in accord with Hegelianism, is of value, but it stands on its own feet, as it were, without the support of the Person of Christ. Man's chief end in life is to realize that the Infinite is one with the finite, and that humanity is being redeemed slowly but surely. To take one's place in the development of the race and to share in the experience of the race is what we as individuals must do to be redeemed. For the individual, redemption is a moral striving and struggling to raise oneself from the depths of sensuous experience to a state of union with the Absolute. This union was not understood by Strauss in any mystical sense but as the realization of the union of Infinite and finite in the Hegelian sense.

Biedermann took his stand with Strauss in affirming that the Church has wrongly predicated of Jesus what is true only of the race. The attributes which tradition has ascribed to the Person of Christ really belong only to divine humanity. Jesus as an historical figure has no bearing upon redemption, which is a principle applying only to humanity as a whole. But Biedermann went beyond Strauss in validating the principle of redemption by the Person of Christ. The two are separate, yet they are mutually exclusive. This confusion and inconsistency in his system, especially in his last work, makes it extremely difficult to ascertain just what Biedermann did think about redemption. At one moment it seems to imply a relationship of love between God and man/
man and at another time it is so blurred with Hegelian terminology as to be almost unintelligible. However, we are safe in saying that whatever he thought of redemption it was always considered as man's own accomplishment, as the elevation of the human to the divine.

Troeltsch is more explicit than either Strauss or Biedermann in defining redemption. It is, he said, the knowledge which we have of the will of God. The emphasis in Troeltsch, as in Strauss and Biedermann, is placed upon man, not upon God. Redemption is what man knows, not what God does. Jesus reveals God, but only in so far as His revelation assists us in approaching God can He be called Redeemer. The main distinction between these three thinkers in regard to redemption is that for Strauss and Biedermann redemption is always considered as a moral process, while Troeltsch conceives of it as an intellectual process. But the distinctions vanish into unimportance in the light of their common view that redemption is a process initiated and promulgated by man himself. It is something that comes from below not from above. It is the striving and groaning of humanity toward the Kingdom of God.

In regard to the question of the finality of Christianity the difference of emphasis appears once more. In his early days, when he posed as a reformer, Strauss regarded the ideas exhibited in Christianity as eternally true and valid. Thus Christianity was for him secure until the end of time. It was the highest religion/
religion and the most valid. This opinion was not incompatible
with a critical view of the New Testament and a redefinition of
doctrine in Hegelian terminology because Christianity was to emerge
a timeless religion expressing eternal truth. In his later days, however, this optimistic hope for Christianity's future was undermined by Strauss's interest in materialistic philosophy. For eternal truths Strauss substituted mechanical and biological laws. In the end, Christianity was deprived of its validity and its future was regarded as problematical. Christianity as a religion may be quite good enough for the multitude of unthinking folk who wish to place authority in superstition and myth, but for the modern man Christianity is only a stupid sentimentalism. As Strauss called the Resurrection a colossal "humbug" so, too, is the whole of Christianity in his opinion. Science has shown the way toward light and that way leads beyond Christianity.

Biedermann, who became more and more the Christian, remained in the position which Strauss had formerly taken, namely, that Christianity as the embodiment of eternal truths is, therefore, a supreme and permanent religion for mankind. Actually he had but little to say on this question, but we can safely infer his mind. His interest in the Church would hardly have continued had he lost his faith in the future of Christianity.

Troeltsch more than the others concerned himself with this question. Although he says in one place that the problem is insoluble, he nevertheless hastens to make certain conjectures. His theory of history compelled him to reduce Christianity to its individual phases. As a whole it is unmanageable and unpredicatable. It can only be studied according to its individual outcroppings/
croppings at particular periods of time. His last lecture on Christianity gives his final utterance on the subject and it is quite pessimistic. Christianity, he says, is not better than the other world-religions. It is perhaps the best religion for us in our Western civilization, but it is going too far to say that it is better for the Chinese than Buddhism or for the Arab than Mohammedanism. The future of Christianity is therefore commensurate with the future of Western civilization.1

The distinctive features of the positions of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch become apparent in a negative way by considering some of the omissions which their systems reveal. We do not wish to put words into their mouths when they themselves preferred to be silent, nor do we wish to judge them by what they did not say. By omissions we have in mind the patent instances where they were obviously groping and feeling their way with hesitation and reserve. In this connection we think immediately of their common silence and reticence when they come to deal with the traditional beliefs of the past. Although they claimed to follow in the footsteps of the reformers, they nevertheless retained very little of the substance of the Reformation. They claimed to carry on.

1. Karl Heim of Tübingen regards "relativism" in Protestant theology - of the type which Troeltsch represented - as the foremost reason why a large number of Protestants have, in recent years, embraced Roman Catholicism; Spirit and Truth, p.16.
on the torch of liberty and freedom lighted in the sixteenth cen-
tury, but they were willing to neglect and pass over the results
and conclusions so dearly purchased. The nineteenth century, as
we have seen, was an age of self-assertion and as such was regarded
by every one as a new age, a transition age, the modern age. No
one would have suggested that the Kingdom of Heaven belonged to
the "poor in spirit," it was rather the reward of those who were
"hungering and thirsting after righteousness," of those who were
pushing on into uncharted realms. Humility was not considered a
virtue in the nineteenth century, it was in fact something to be
avoided like the humility of Uriah Heep in Dickens's David Copper-
field. With the spirit of modernity in the air there was little
attention paid to the spirit of antiquity. The Romantic Movement
was ostensibly a return to classical culture but rather than a re-
turn it was more of a re-interpretation of modern life with the
help of certain classical principles. In theology the past was
forgotten in the passion for the new. Theologians were not con-
scious of being "compassed about by a great cloud of witnesses."
They were pioneers of faith, they struck out upon new and unblazed
trails. The desire to get at the root of things, to explain the
mysteries of the universe resulted in blatant negligence of the
past.

Strauss's Leben Jesu is prefaced with the remark that
here is a new departure in methods of treating the life of Jesus.
The new departure is away from tradition and historical belief.
The Jesus of history has been obscured simply because He has been
bound up with past fancies. One of the indirect results of
Strauss's/
Strauss's criticism was the renewed encouragement which it gave to the break with the past. As though writing a life of Jesus for the first time in history, Strauss makes the biblical facts fall in line with his method. By subjecting the Gospel to his own Procrustean bed of criticism he is enabled to cut off the portions of historical tradition which extend beyond. Especially do we see Strauss's break with the past in his last book where the very title tells us much. To have done with the "Old Faith" and to usher in a "New Faith" - this is his final word to posterity. It is the new faith, the new methods, the new criticism, the new age, that appeal to Strauss.

Biedermann offers a contradiction to Strauss in that he has no wish to break with the underlying principles of Christian doctrine. Christianity must not go by the board, it must be re-defined in keeping with the new age. But Biedermann's appreciation for the past is little more than Strauss's and what he does hold to are metaphysical ideas and principles, not the historical tradition. Like Strauss, Biedermann was a typical product of the century. His desire was to fashion things anew and edit Christian doctrine in a new popular edition intelligent to all.

Troeltsch as the historian cannot be said to ignore the past as did Strauss and Biedermann. But his laws of history were such that he discovered nothing of final or eternal significance in the past. The principle of Individuality rendered the past a colossal grab-bag from which good things and bad things have emerged. No one age can be regarded as normative for another. The guiding principles of Christianity in the first century are not
the guiding principles now. The past cannot teach us the future just because there is no uniformity, no underlying essence, which we can isolate and use as a measuring stick. Although he loves to dwell in the past, Troeltsch nevertheless wants a Christianity which will appeal to the modern educated man. The past formulas and creeds are outworn and need to be replaced with new ones in the spirit of the times. We are passing into a "new age", Troeltsch says, and we must have a new Christianity.

More concretely we notice a break with the past in the treatment of the doctrine of God. Here Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch all seem to be groping in a semi-darkness. Their utterances sink to mere whispers at times and again their confusion brings forth a jumble of incoherent statements. Vague generalizations and philosophical abstractions occupy their minds. Again and again we can sense a strain of the Deism so popular but a few years before, or of the Pantheism and panlogism which characterized the thought of Rationalism.

Both Strauss and Biedermann are slaves to the Hegelian coincidentia oppositorum in which God descends from His high throne to meet mankind as it ascends from its earthly existence. In the union of divine and human a new element is formed which seems to bear no correspondence with its component parts. God is lost somehow in the union. His being is merged and mixed beyond recognition. The traditional view of a transcendent God is largely forgotten in the eagerness with which they make God join the movement of humanity. He is transcendent because He is the Absolute, the Infinite, the eternal goal toward which mankind is moving. The idea/
idea of the Fatherhood of God is either totally ignored or metaphysically interpreted as the union of the divine and human. The attributes of love, compassion, mercy, and tenderness are largely omitted in the Hegelian scheme. In his later years Strauss piled confusion upon confusion by substituting the workings of mechanical law for his idealistic philosophy. The heavens declare the glory of God and so, too, do the species where the laws of the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest hold sway.¹ Biedermann never went so far as Strauss and at times we find him speaking of the Fatherhood of God, but again he speaks of the Absolute in the Hegelian fashion and we can only conclude that he is groping in the darkness of his own imperfect conception.

Troeltsch's own personal faith reveals an appreciation for the Fatherhood of God but his writings are singularly devoid of his own faith. When he speaks of eschatology he admits that his view impinges on pantheism. Whether or not Troeltsch, as with Strauss and Biedermann, had an undeveloped doctrine of God because the Person of Christ meant so little to them, or whether they had no doctrine of the Person of Christ because the Fatherhood of God meant so little to them, it is not necessary to determine, one thing is sure and that is their reticence on the subject. There is/

1. Strauss ultimately concluded that modern science had completely destroyed the traditional views of transcendence and he is reported as having said sarcastically, "Die Wohnungsnot ist für Gott eingetreten;" quoted by Karl Heim in Glaube und Denken, p.40; the English translation suggests (p.31n) that the retort be translated, "The housing-problem has now arisen in the case of God!"
is a Danish fable which tells of a spider spinning its web near the floor in order to catch more insects but it unwittingly cut the suspending thread in its enthusiasm and the whole web fell into the dust. Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch cut their systems away from a personal conception of God.¹

It has already been mentioned that the spirit of the times was away from anything that tended to debase or degrade man's natural powers. This attitude resulted in a break with the traditional doctrine of sin. To Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch the biblical account of the Fall of man was not the felix culpa it was to Augustine, who called it blessed just because it was the means which led to salvation in Christ. It was a baseless degradation of human nature to think that it was unable to help itself. God created man in His own image and as such man must be regarded as potentially divine. Human nature is essentially good. It does not wait for salvation statically, it redeems itself through its own effort and will. "I ought therefore I can" was the categorical imperative of the nineteenth century. Sin is no more than moral lethargy, weakness, ignorance. It can be overcome by struggling and by keeping the ideal of human perfection ever before the eyes.

Emil Brunner has indicted the nineteenth century for its/

¹ A further illustration of their groping might be drawn from what they have to say about revelation. The distinction which Brunner makes in The Mediator between "special revelation" and "general revelation" did not present itself to their minds. They always speak of revelation in a general sense.
its watered-down conception of sin.¹ Sin as an essential element in personality is never the idea in this century. Sin is always regarded in the plural as certain acts committed, it is never regarded as part of the constitutional nature of man. Truly Pelagian in this respect, Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch pass over the doctrine of sin with hurried steps as they march toward the conviction that man is essentially good. They were wont to speak of man's divinity, not his depravity.

As a final instance of their break with the past and of their halting and reserved convictions we may point to the lack of interest shown by Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch in the doctrine of the Atonement. For them to be silent on this point is to be expected as the natural consequence of their common view of the Person of Christ. A theology which has little use for a loving Father and a Divine Son can have but little to say of an Atonement. Strauss was willing enough in his formative years to rationalize the metaphysics of the Atonement but he concluded that the idea that God must be satisfied for the sin of mankind by the death of a single individual was as unworthy of Christianity as it was unintelligible. To Biedermann the Atonement is never more than pure Hegelianism, Christ's office of Priest being interpreted as the union of divine and human. Troeltsch thinks the idea of atonement is out of touch with modern thinking. The theological positions of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, in the final analysis/
analysis, are stripped of the doctrines which we expect to find in any Christian system. There is a limit to such stripping and there is a danger. There is a lesson to be learned from the vanishing cat in Alice in Wonderland - we must be careful to preserve more than a feline grin in theology.

Although the differences which we have enumerated in Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch help us to interpret and appreciate their systems as a whole, still through the varying light and shade of these differences there shines, like a penetrating searchlight, the common bond which united them together, namely, the separation of the Person of Christ from redemption. This common principle was not confined to these three men alone. We have seen how it was expressed in the Rationalism which preceded them. Nor was it to die when they died. It became one of the main tenets of liberal theology and found its way into the theologies of a myriad of thinkers living in the four corners of the world.

The separation of Person and principle is not unknown in the twentieth century in our own day. Adolf Harnack helped to popularize the notion in his famous lectures in Berlin on Das Wesen des Christentums, 1900, the English translation of which caused considerable stir among English speaking theologians. A typical sentence from these lectures reads, "The Gospel, as Jesus proclaimed it, has to do with the Father only, and not with the Son."1 Speaking of/

1. What is Christianity, p.144.
of Harnack's Christology a modern commentator says, "A mere glance at his conception of the Person of Christ is sufficient to reveal the chasm that separates even Harnack from the full and complete faith of the Catholic Church. There is no Godhead of Christ in any real sense, and in Christ's mind it means no more than the Divine element that is revealed in the uniqueness of His humanity. There is no atonement or redemption by His death and no absolute claim on Christ's part on the love, worship, and homage of man as His supreme Lord and Master."¹ Harnack is often credited with being a forerunner of the twentieth century in theology, but, as we can see, he really harks back to the nineteenth century and there is a deal of truth in Brunner's contention that through Harnack theology returns once again to Rationalism.²

The liberal theology of which Harnack was a leading exponent spread rapidly in Germany and then to America where it found a very acceptable soil. We are not finished hearing in America of the distinction between the religion which Jesus taught and the religion of which He is the object. Eminent preachers throughout America have made this distinction popular. The movement as a whole was branded as Humanism, but unlike other movements of the same name, of which the Reformation itself was one, this American variety contended in a fashion very reminiscent of the nineteenth century that man is able to work out his own salvation. A renewed interest/

interest in psychology was one of the consequences of this move­ment. A study of the human personality, its inhibitions and com­plexes in many cases superseded the interest in the evangelical tradition. A typical statement from the Humanists, reminding us of Strauss and Troeltsch, is the following from a popular writer: "Religion draws its sustenance from the deep soil of accumulated social experience, and from the wide-spreading roots of individual inheritance and impressionability. The subtle, powerful influ­ences of imitation, suggestion, and subconscious habits operate in religion, giving it stability and intensity."¹ From the fluid pen of Julian Huxley comes these words: "The pursuit of the religious life is seen to resemble the pursuit of scientific truth or artistic expression, as one of the highest of human activities, success in which comes partly from native gifts, partly from early training and surroundings, partly from sheer chance, and partly from personal efforts."² In one of the most popular of the books produced by this movement, Walter Lippmann's Preface to Morals, we read an account of the ringing down of the curtain upon the drama of re­velation. "To many who were in the audience," he writes, "it is now evident that they have seen a play, a magnificent play, one of the most sublime ever created by the human imagination, but nevertheless a play, and not a literal account of human destiny. They know it was a play. They have lingered long enough to see the scene-shifters at work. The painted drop is half rolled up; some of/ 

². Huxley, Julian, Religion without Revelation, pp.53-54.
of the turrets of the celestial city can still be seen, and part
of the choir of angels. But behind them, plainly visible, are
the struts and gears which held in place what under a gentler light
looked like the boundaries of the universe. They are only human
fears and human hopes, and bits of antique science and half-forgotten
history, and symbols here and there of experiences through which
some in each generation pass."¹

The characteristics of the so-called Humanistic movement
are unmistakably parallel to the guiding principles of Strauss,
Biedermann, and Troeltsch. We see the same appeal for the scient-
tific outlook, the avoidance of anything tinged with emotionalism
or traditional fancy, and the conviction that man can work out his
own redemption by way of moral and social reform.

It was not until a few years ago that this liberal theo-
logy so popular in the nineteenth century was met with any real
opposition. In the so-called Barthian Theology of Crisis liberal
theology came up against a formidable foe, and to-day it is evident
that the pendulum has swung back once more in the direction of the
evangelical tradition of the Church. The insistent demand of the
new movement in theology is on the sin of man and the sovereign
Grace of God through the Person of Jesus Christ.

But liberalism goes on and, strangely enough, it is in
Germany that it is finding new roots once again in the German
Christian Movement (die deutschglaubige Bewegung). Once again the
divine/

divine potentialities of man are being extolled to the skies and the glory of the race is taking the place of the religion of redemption. The National Socialist ideology under the Third Reich is emphasizing the divinity of the German race and nation. Such a book as Alfred Rosenberg's *Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts*, is a typical expression of this movement. A single sentence will reveal its temper and tone. "To-day a new faith has arisen: - the blood-myth, the belief that to fight for the Blood is to fight for the divine in man; the belief - embodied with a vision that leaves no possibility for doubt - that the Nordic Blood presents that mystery by which the ancient sacraments are superseded and transcended."¹ In a speech to a group of young boys and girls gathered for a sports competition, a German youth leader in reply to the question, "Is German Faith Atheistic?", said, "Our faith is God; our Church is the German home; our congregation is the German people; our priest is every race-conscious German; our Bible is the Germanic soul and its imperishable works; our sacraments are work, struggle, and love; our creed runs: Blood and honour!"²

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2. Busso Löwe in *Junge Kirche*, Dritter Jahrgang 1935, heft 10, p.477; from the mass of literature which this latest Bewegung has occasioned we may mention Karl Barth's brochure *Theologische Existenz heute*, München, 1933, in which he sets forth his reasons for rejecting the movement; a more general study of the whole question of *Deutschglaube* is discussed in Kurt Hutten's *Christus oder Deutschglaube*, Stuttgart, 1935.
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to indicate the basic reasons why the common position of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch - i.e., the separation of the Person of Christ from the principle of redemption - cannot be maintained in the interests of an evangelical Christianity. Thus far a minimum of adverse criticism has been levelled against their systems. In setting forth their peculiarities as well as their similarities and in tracing the determining forces in the philosophy and theology of the century on which they constructed their Christologies, an effort has been made to expound rather than criticize. It is the task of this chapter, therefore, to come face to face with their common Christological position and to demonstrate wherein the separation of Person from principle is in error.

There are various ways in which the Christological position of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch may be criticized. It may be criticized from the standpoint of present day theological thinking, or it may be criticized in the light of the New Testament and the witness throughout the centuries of professing Christians. That there are other methods is not denied, but at least these two methods of approach are possible. It is upon the latter method, the teaching of the New Testament and the witness of believing Christians,
Christians, that Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch can be best criticized. But present day theology has much to say about the typical nineteenth century position and to neglect the modern verdict is to pass by an important piece of incriminating evidence. In summary fashion, therefore, it will be well to consider some of the criticisms which present day thinkers bring against Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch.

In the foregoing discussion considerable stress has been laid upon the philosophers in order to indicate the great influence which philosophy had upon theology. The nineteenth century had as one of its characteristics the close affinity of philosophical and theological thought. In a word, theology of the type represented by Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch was enslaved to philosophy. The ambition of Strauss and Biedermann was to bring the whole doctrine of Christian truth into harmony with Hegelianism. Troeltsch, though not an ardent Hegelian, nevertheless insisted upon a metaphysical basis for Christianity as the guarantee of its reality. For these three theologians, and for scores of others who followed in their footsteps, theology was a sort of handmaid to philosophy.

The two outstanding thinkers in the nineteenth century who claimed that they separated theology from philosophy were Schleiermacher and Ritschl. Schleiermacher in the beginning of the first edition of his \textit{Glaubenslehre} declared that he had excluded philosophy from his system, and section three of the third edition contained a similar declaration. "The piety which forms the/
the basis of all ecclesiastical communions is, considered purely in itself, neither a Knowing nor a Doing, but a modification of reeling, or of immediate self-consciousness." The words "Knowing" and "Doing" were directed specifically at Kant and Fichte. But Schleiermacher with all his good intentions was not without a philosophical inheritance, nor was his theology completely non-philosophical. Emil Brunner, who calls Schleiermacher "the only really great theologian of the past century," has pointed out that Schleiermacher was far from realizing his boast to have excluded philosophy from theology.¹

What Schleiermacher hoped to do to the philosophy of Kant and Fichte, but which he failed to do according to Brunner, Ritschl hoped to do to Hegelianism. Ritschl's primary task was to put Christianity on its feet and free it from the bonds of Hegelianism. But if Schleiermacher failed to exclude philosophy from his theology, so too did Ritschl. It is true that he denied the charge that he "like Kant in his Religion within the limits of Reason alone makes religion a subordinate appendix to morals," but he was nevertheless a Kantian in his insistence upon the ethical character of Christianity.² And although he said sarcastically of Hegelianism, "Das Absolute! wie erhebend das klingt!," he was not totally devoid of philosophical leanings, and his whole system of Wurdurteile was a sort of philosophy in itself.³

The/  

³. Theologie und Metaphysik, p.18.
The point as to whether or not Schleiermacher and Mitschl were exceptions in the nineteenth century in their attitude toward the relation of philosophy and theology may perhaps be argued, but in the new theology, the so-called Barthian movement, they are grouped without apology with their contemporaries who endeavored to harmonize theology and philosophy. And it is against this tendency of the nineteenth century that present day theology directs much of its attack. One of its outstanding features is the decided departure away from philosophy, away from the "anthroposophical movement," as Karl Heim calls it. Of course, thinkers like Karl Barth and Emil Brunner never deny that the intellect is necessary for theologizing. "The observer is not in a position," says Barth, "to offer the sacrifice of the intellect as little as he can jump away from his own shadow." Even Luther and Calvin, he goes on to say, had their Platonic tendencies, and Kierkegaard's anti-Hegelianism was itself a philosophical dialectic. But the emphasis with Barth is to subordinate the systematic and logical expressions of philosophy to theology. Even Karl Heim of Tübingen, who is frequently regarded as the systematic philosopher of the Barthian theology and who attempts like Troeltsch to lay a metaphysical basis for Christianity, concludes his book, Glaube und Denken, with the non-philosophical declaration, "We stand before One Who is not to/
to be reached directly by any inference from given reality. We stand before the 'Unknown God'... Paul was come to bear witness concerning a Leader who could show the way, as none other than He could, to this great Unknown."¹ The philosophical quest - these writers claim - should not be merely academic but "existential."

The point which present day theology makes is not that philosophy is unnecessary, but that it is not final in the matter of revelation. Emil Brunner, for example, admits that he has a strong personal interest in metaphysical questions and occasionally likes to "put in his own oar," but he goes on to say that "philosophical wars and rumours of war" have no significance for the Christian faith. "When I said that Christian faith, or, to speak more concretely, the Christian theologian is only indirectly interested in questions of metaphysics and philosophy of religion, I did not mean that they are of no importance. They are as important and interesting as anything that concerns the nature of man. Indeed, as touching the centre of man, they have a specific importance. But from the point of view of Christian faith, they have significance only for the knowledge of man, not for the knowledge of God. According to faith's own assertion, Christian knowledge of God has a different source and a different content."² Philosophy can only go so far toward the Divine and then it must stop. If it persists in trying to ascend heights to which faith alone can attain, it does so in vain, like the child who reaches for the moon. "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy/

². The Word and the World, p.16 f.
philosophy and vain deceit,"¹ Paul warned, and this is the caveat which modern theology sounds. "While philosophy has been able to weaken a religion," says Professor W.P. Patterson, "it has never been able to make one."² The insistence of present day theology as over against the theology represented by Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch is that reason and revelation are not to be equated. No longer, as in the nineteenth century, is there felt to be a need to vindicate the Christian faith by philosophy.³

The present day movement away from philosophical theology is but one point at which the nineteenth century systems of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch may be criticized. Modern theology has exposed other vulnerable spots in the theology of the last century, as for example in regard to the problem of the philosophy of history. The nineteenth century was essentially an optimistic century. Self-assurance, placidity, and confidence were the ear-marks of its thinking. Theology was concerned with the divine potentialities of man. If any asked, "How can I find God?" - there were a variety of ready answers. No one would have suggested that the road from man to God was an unbridged gulf. The Hegelian theory of horizontal history became the creed of a century which learned to base its arguments on evolution and progress. The imago Dei is latent/

2. Rule of Faith, p.343.
3. Toward the end of his life Biedermann moved in this direction but he never completely arrived at a definite conviction in regard to the matter. Cf. also Kant's Opus Postumum which rejected the moral argument for God's existence and vaguely pointed the way toward a theism.
latent in every man and to awake to his divine apprenticeship became the life task of every man.

In more modern times, however, due largely to the wide acceptance of the Barthian theology and to the recent findings of the new psychology, the nineteenth century Weltanschauung has seemed singularly out of date. The self-confidence of the last century has been exchanged for a more realistic, if less optimistic, view of man and the world. Brunner compares this self-sufficient attitude to the story of Robinson Crusoe which, he says, is the story of a man's endeavour to live a completely independent life discovering all truth by and for himself.¹ The present day theology admonishes a new anthropology which places the accent on man's sin, on his failures, on his innate limitations. We speak to-day quite freely about "complexes," "reflexes," "inhibitions," and "repressions," words which to a nineteenth century theologian would have been not only meaningless but unworthy of man's high dignity. Those who speak disparagingly of the new theology think they do it harm by pointing out that its emphasis on the dark side of life is but a return to Calvin's doctrine of total depravity. But this is just the note which needs sounding these days, according to our latest theologians, our most learned psychologists, and our most popular fiction writers. There is no wish to return to the faint-hearted pussilanimitas of the Middle Ages, but there is a need to return to the realization that all men suffer a "sickness unto death."

¹ The Word and the World, p. 90.
death," to use Kierkegaard's phrase.  

The modern trend away from the easy optimism of the last century can be dated rather exactly for it was initiated by the humiliation of the World War. We have already noticed that the War had a profound effect upon the thinking of Troeltsch, but, in his case, rather than driving him to a more realistic view of life it depressed him almost beyond hope and he became sullen and pessimistic. Troeltsch, perhaps, died too soon to revise his Weltanschauung in the light of the War's aftermath. It is to the theologians of the post-war era to whom the deepening sense of failure came like a bomb scattering the self-assurance and confidence of the nineteenth century into a million pieces. Karl Barth, for example, speaks of the years which followed the War as a disease which spread over Europe like a plague. "A perplexity," he says, "extends over the whole range of human endeavour, present and future. It is a perplexity felt by man simply by virtue of his being a man, and has nothing to do with his being moral or immoral, spiritual or worldly, Godly or ungodly. Man cannot escape his human-ness, and human-ness means limitation, finitude, creaturehood, separation from God." And Emil Brunner makes the same confession. "We live," he says, "and yet we do not live. We are living beings. We have part in the life of the world which biology ascribes for us. We possess vitality: we are a ripple on the stream/

1. See Karl Heim's *Spirit and Truth*, pp.116-118.
2. Cf. the change which the first lecture in *Christian Thought* makes over *Die Absolutheit des Christentums*.
stream of the *élan vital*: the wonderful yet mysterious force which we call life holds us in its grip. But we observe that this vitality means not only life: it also means death. One does not have to be a sophist or cynic to call this life a desperate and vain struggle of the will-to-live against a must-die. Vain, I say, because in the end death remains victorious over life.1

This attitude in present day theology which sees life as a "perplexity" and a "vain struggle" is paralleled in other fields as, for example, in our post-war literature and our so-called new psychology. As one illustration of the former, the Russian, Dostoievsky, is a case in point. The impression which one receives in reading his novels is that the world is sick and that the natural man is a sorry creature, anything but divine. The only hope for man lies in his release from this mortal coil at death. Redemption becomes a possibility only after a descent has been made into the bottomless pit of despair. In contrast to Biedermann's definition of religion as an elevation of the human "I" to God the newer thinking denies unequivocally that man can raise himself at all, and affirms that religion is really a descent, a going-down, to the very depths where man stands helpless before the presence of God. In the Reformation phrase, used in regard to Christ's Person, *Finitum capax infiniti*, Barth would insert a *non* and speak in Kierkegaard's language of the infinite qualitative difference between God and man.

The point need not be laboured that present day theology moves away from the whole tenor of the nineteenth century. It balks at Schleiermacher's confusions and stoutly repudiates Hegel's coincidentia oppositorum. Of the former, Barth has said, "With all due respect to the genius of Schleiermacher I cannot consider him a good teacher in the realm of theology, because, so far as I can see, he is disastrously dim-sighted in regard to the fact that man as man is not only in need, but beyond all hope of saving himself; that the whole so-called religion, and not least the Christian religion, shares in this need, and that one cannot speak of God simply by speaking of man in a loud voice."¹ The clear cut distinction which characterizes this present day theology is between religion and revelation and it is Emil Brunner especially who has urged this distinction to great lengths.² Religion is always a movement, and a vain one, from man to God; revelation is always a movement from God to man. Such a distinction sounds strangely out of place in the systems of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, and the modern insistence upon it indicates how far present day theology has moved away from the nineteenth century.³

There is still one more important instance of the trend of present day theology away from the standards of the nineteenth century/

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2. Cf. The Mediator.
3. Something perhaps ought to be said of Barth's theory of Urgeschichte and Endgeschichte, of history above history. But suffice it to say that it is against such a relative theory of history as Troeltsch fostered. It attempts to reach an absolute which transcends history, i.e. revelation. History for Barth is from beneath, revelation is from above.
century and that is in regard to New Testament criticism. In this connection it is Strauss, rather than Biedermann or Troeltsch, who stands out most sharply against the present tendency. The so-called "mythical" method of New Testament criticism inaugurated by Strauss has largely done its work and is to-day regarded rather as a necessary step in the history of criticism than as a challenging position. It is true that Strauss has his representatives to-day in such thinkers as Jensen, the reknown German Assyriologist who would explain all things by his "Gilgamesh Epic;" Kalthoff who explains Christianity on social and economic grounds; the American, W.B. Smith who developed a pre-Christian cult of a Divine Jesus; the Englishman, J.M. Robertson, a staunch supporter of the Rationalist Press.1 But the modern mythical criticism has not the currency to-day that it had in the nineteenth century, it does not upset the whole field of theological thinking. To-day the interest in New Testament criticism is religious, not historical, in the sense that documents, texts, and dates are of paramount concern. The nineteenth century was occupied in a "Battle of the books" and, as Professor Saintsbury has said, "It has been the mission of the nineteenth century to prove that everybody's work was written by some one else, and it will not be the most useless task of the twentieth to betake itself to more profitable enquiries."2

The results of Strauss's criticism and that of the Tübingen School which he initiated are largely discredited to-day. The nineteenth/

nineteenth century attempt to relegate most of the New Testament books to the middle of the second century stands in blatant contradiction with modern conclusions which place nearly every New Testament document, except perhaps for John's Gospel and Second Peter, well within that margin and some scholars like Harnack even put the synoptic Gospels at 65 A.D., a date which would have seemed ridiculously early to Strauss. Baur's four genuine Pauline epistles have now been increased to nine even among radical critics. At any rate, the interest to-day seems to be more in their relationship than in their authenticity and date. Maurice Jones says of the present century, "The pertinent enquiry is no longer 'Who wrote the books, and when were they written?' but 'What do the books contain, and what is the true meaning of that content?' The present age is essentially concerned with ideas, and with the problem of personality possibly even more than with ideas. 'Personality' may in truth be described as the key to the religious spirit of the age. In the matter, therefore, of the interpretation of the New Testament it is a question of 'personality' as revealed in Jesus Christ that is of supreme significance. The 'storm-centre' of the twentieth-century criticism is no longer the books of the New Testament as such, but the Person of Christ as represented and taught in the books." 1

The new attitude toward New Testament criticism is illustrated in the writings of such thinkers as Barth and Brunner. They give full acceptance to the criticism of the New Testament and deny that/  

that it can harm or alter in any essential the Absolute Word of
God. They see the right and the need for criticism and in this
respect they show how far away they are from the charge often made
against them that their theology is but a quickened Fundamentalism.
Brunner has made plain this position. He says, "Fundamentalism
conflicts with science because it is not truly Christian.....the
principles of true Christianity and of true criticism are identical
......Fundamentalism errs by insisting on rigidity and finality of
form, which, through lack of critical insight, it assumes to be
essential to its existence......He who identifies the letters and
words of Scripture with the Word of God has never truly understood
the Word of God - he knows not what constitutes a revelation."¹
In fact, Brunner himself confessed that he was something of a radi-
cal in matters of criticism. Barth gives criticism full reign in
saying, "Christian Churches and theology must let historism say
its say out, in order that, when it has said what with full right
it has to say about the Biblical text, the Church and theology may
go on their own feet and say the other, the altogether other thing,
that no longer is it devout men who are speaking but God's own
voice is being heard."² For Strauss and the nineteenth century in
general criticism was tantamount to the destruction of cherished
beliefs, and Strauss's own rejection of Christianity in favour of
a materialism is a tragic illustration of this conviction. But to
Brunner/

¹. The Theology of Crisis, pp.14,18,19,41.
². Dogmatik, I, p.386.
Brunner, for example, faith is quite compatible with criticism. "Historical criticism," he says, has indeed freed us for ever from the conception of the unity which was the fruit of the theory of the Verbal Inspiration of the Scriptures. It is not the letter of Scripture which is the same in the Old and the New Testament, but the Word, the Word of God, and indeed in a manner which differentiates the whole Bible, in principle and categorically, from all other forms of religious literature. The God who speaks to us in the Bible speaks to us nowhere else. The Christian religion does not only assert the unity, but the exclusive unity of the revelation contained in the Scriptures. This Word of God is the Word of Jesus Christ in the Old Testament as well as in the New, the Word which is reality in Jesus Christ.\(^1\)

Doubtless in many other respects it could be shown that the newer theology has repudiated, in the main, the most surely believed tenets of the nineteenth century theology as represented in Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch. Much water has run under the theological bridges since their day, and, if rapids and whirlpools still ruffle the current, the stream is a steadier one than it was in the last century for its strength is not drained so much by irrelevant tributaries. But the stream rushing on toward the open sea is sweeping over new country and the wide nineteenth century banks have given way to the regulating break-waters of the present day. No longer does theology flood over into the fields of philosophy as it once did, no longer does it idle along with an air/

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\(^1\) The Mediator, p.172 f.; cf. The Word and the world, pp.83 ff.
air of optimistic tranquility. The theology of crisis has man-
oeuvred the meandering stream of nineteenth century thought through
the spill-way and by freeing it of its excess burden has directed
its course through the rock-hewn channel of the Word of God.

The criticism of present day theology, only a small taste
of which has been given here, is not the sole means, nor the best
means, by which the positions of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch
may be judged and found wanting. By indicating the difference in
direction between nineteenth century thinking and the modern day
the general theological tenets of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch
may be considered untenable, but it remains to deal more particular-
ly with the relation of Person to principle and while modern theo-
logy has something to say about this it will serve our purpose
better to turn to the New Testament itself. We do not create
Christianity anew, we must seek it in its records.

The standard of judgement by which the common Christology
of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch must be criticized is the
New Testament. What is the plain teaching of the New Testament
in regard to the relation of the Person of Christ to the principle
of redemption? This is the decisive question, and the answer we
give will decide the place which Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch
must be given. The relation of Person to principle is, in the
first instance, not so much a speculative problem as an historical
one. What is the plain teaching of the New Testament on this
subject?/
subject?

The central theme of the New Testament teaching on redemption is that Jesus Christ is the Mediator of God's saving grace and is, accordingly, the Redeemer. From the speculative Christologies of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch with their talk of myth, principle, and symbol we turn to the New Testament and find the simple formula that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself.”¹ In this proclamation the whole of the New Testament unites as with one voice declaring that in Christ redemption is made effective. No matter what the conclusions of biblical criticism may be, and no matter what the specific purpose of the individual writers may have been, the basic teaching of the New Testament is centred clearly and absolutely in the salvation wrought by Jesus Christ. "Jesus is Lord!" - this confession of the early Christians is written on every page of the New Testament. In his latest book, Jesus der Herr, Professor Karl Heim of Tübingen writes, "If we had not been reared from youth in the language and phraseology of the New Testament, if rather we were to discover this book anew, the fact would strike us more sharply than is now the case that the New Testament, in spite of all its varieties of dogma, presents a common impression, namely the fact that here there speak to us men who have renounced their right to self-determination and have placed their lives in the hand of another who, even after His death, they are convinced will be with them all/

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¹. 2 Cor. 5:19.
all their days unto the end of the world." ¹

There is no separation of Person and principle either in fact or in theory in the New Testament. The two are a unity in Scripture. If the Gospels are examined it will be discovered that Jesus Himself claimed to be the Mediator, the Redeemer, the Saviour, and the Apostolic writings represent the confirmed belief in Jesus's witness to Himself. The New Testament, apart from Jesus's own claims, teaches that redemption comes through Him. The plain teaching of the New Testament has nothing to say about Strauss's mythical Jesus, or about Biedermann's principle of redemption, or about Troeltsch's symbol of community life. The plain teaching of the New Testament is that only God can save, yet Jesus saves.

That Jesus is Redeemer and Saviour is written in bold letters upon the pages of the New Testament. The very name Jesus is considered by the first Evangelist as a portent that "he shall save his people from their sins," ² and the fourth Gospel explains His very existence "that the world through him might be saved." ³ Redemption is never described as a principle or as an eternal truth apart from the Person of Christ. In Him "we have redemption through his blood" ⁴ not through His example or His illustration of what it means to be redeemed. He Himself in His own Person redeems.

Redemption/

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1. Jesus Der Herr, p.54 f. This book does not claim to be a Glaubenslehre but seeks to make plain the great "Either-Or." Either Jesus Christ is merely a great personality of the dead past - or He is the Living Lord; either we must put our trust in Him - or vehemently reject Him.
Redemption cannot be achieved by striving toward ethical perfection, it is something given, as Paul says, "not according to our works"¹ but through the grace of God in Jesus Christ "who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works."² And the emphasis in the New Testament on Christ's redeeming work is put upon the Cross. It was the Death and Resurrection of Christ which, although disturbing the Apostles's hope (Lk. 24:20,21) and proving to be a stumbling-block to the Jews and foolishness to the Greeks (I cor. 1:23), were regarded as the guarantees of redemption. The Cross is for the Apostles not the "colossal humbug" which it was to Strauss but the "power of God."³ By means of the Cross Jesus was able "to taste death for every man"⁴ and it is in this sure knowledge that the Apostle writes, "Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your vain conversation received by tradition from your fathers; but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot."⁵ Redemption in the New Testament is not to be reached, therefore, by the struggling ascent of man toward higher ideals but by the descent of God in Christ even to death on the Cross.

The New Testament writers were not concerned with a doctrine of/

¹ 2 Tim. 1:9.
². Tit. 2:14.
³. I Cor. 1:18.
⁵. I Pet. 1:18,19.
of redemption simply because they knew from first-hand experience what Jesus had done for them. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Christology of the Apostles is always a simple, even a vague and undeveloped, statement of fact. They never theorize about Christ or His power to redeem. The nineteenth century idea that redemption can be achieved by man's own efforts would have been ridiculous to the New Testament writers whose new found faith was centred solely in their experience of Jesus's loving and saving Person. Nor is the idea of Jesus's example as teacher, prophet, or religious genius, so common in the nineteenth century, given much place in New Testament Christology. Peter in the early chapters of Acts speaks of Jesus of Nazareth who by miracles and signs showed Himself approved by God, but he scarcely mentions Jesus the teacher. It was the Death and Resurrection of Christ which formed the main parts of Peter's Christology. Even Paul, who has been branded as the greatest theologian of Christianity, did not undertake a systematic delineation of Christ's Person or work. For Paul, as for the Disciples, the knowledge of Christ's saving power was ultimately expressed in His Person. It is the exalted Christ which commands Paul's attention, but not in a metaphysical sense which would deprive His Person of humanity or historicity. The exalted Lord is also the Jesus "of the seed of David according to the flesh."¹ Nor is the exalted Christ far removed from us. "I am crucified with Christ," says Paul, "nevertheless I live; yet not/ 

¹. Rom. 1:3.
not I, but Christ liveth in me." ¹ Whether or not this is Christ-mysticism, what Paul definitely proclaims is the inwardness of faith in Christ as the Redeemer.

The New Testament exhibits an Apostolic licence in formulating a Christology. Doctrines are subordinated to the experience of redemption in Christ. The New Testament minds may be likened to a prison through which the one white light of Jesus Christ passed and was broken up into different colours. The Epistle to the Hebrews, with all its critical and exegetical problems, makes it plain that Christ's Person is the guarantee of His Mediatorship. The Johannine Christology, with its disturbing Logos doctrine, nevertheless declares that Christ is the measure of all things. Differing in their accounts, the New Testament writers are in agreement that in Jesus and in Him alone is there redemption. Jesus Himself had not formally taught a doctrine of His Person and work. In regard to His saving mission there are but two explicit references. At one time He said, "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." ² Whatever the words "ransom" and "many" imply, it is clear from this passage that Jesus regarded His mission as the Redeemer to involve His death. In the other instance which reveals His own consciousness of His mission, He said, "This is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many." ³ The giving up of His life was the guarantee of the new covenant in which redemption was/

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2. Mk. 10:45.
was to be made effective. It was the simple formula, Jesus saves, upon which the Apostles based their Christologies. It was not a conviction adopted from or fostered by Judaism or contemporary thought, it was a unique experience to which they were compelled to witness. There are, no doubt, various speculative theories possible as to how Christ saves, the Apostles themselves differed here, but the one point on which there was general agreement is that Christ does save.

Person and principle are never separated in the New Testament. Redemption is a meaningless term in the New Testament apart from Christ, and Christ is always regarded as somehow one with God. To say with Strauss that Christ and His Disciples were disillusioned is to ignore the potent power which the New Testament reveals, as for example, in the missionary activities of the early Apostles. This power was the gift of Christ. To say with Biedermann that Christ inaugurated the principle of redemption which can now be freed of His Person, is to fly in the face of the Pauline Christology which definitely relates redemption with the Redeemer. Or to say with Troeltsch that God is ultimately the Redeemer and that Jesus's only value lies in the unifying power which He gave to the early Christian community, is to forget Christ's own witness to His mission and the fact that the Christian community owed its existence to its faith in Christ as the Redeemer, not merely as the symbol of life. Unless, therefore, we are to ignore the plain teaching of the New Testament, Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch are in serious error in separating Person from principle. If they have not the Gospel at the foundations of their systems, and/
and the Gospel is essentially the good news that God is in Christ reconciling the world, then their systems scarcely deserve to be called Christian. What they construct is something altogether different from Christian theology. It may bear resemblances to the Gospel, it may even use the Gospel vocabulary, but that it is not the Gospel is certainly obvious.

The New Testament faith in Jesus Christ as the Redeemer which lay at the heart of its vague and groping Christologies is confirmed in the first century writings of the Apostolic Fathers. The fact that thinkers like Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and Polycarp reiterated the firm conviction of the New Testament is significant in the face of the contentions made by Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch. Strauss held that the New Testament writers had been led astray in their accounts of the life and work of Jesus because of the hopes and promises of the Old Testament. Not only this, but he held toward the end of his life that Jesus Himself as well as His narrators had been radically disillusioned. Now it is conceivable that this should have been the case were it not for the fact of history. If Christianity had terminated with the death of Christ, if there had been no Christian Church, then Strauss's interpretation would perhaps be conceivable. But the historical situation is quite otherwise. History shows us that Christianity grew by leaps and bounds, that early Christians were enabled to turn
"the world upside down." Christians did not cease to exist when Christ was crucified, in fact through the witness of the Apostles multitudes confessed their faith in Him as their Redeemer. To stand with Strauss is to ignore the early history of the Church and to discredit the intelligence and sincerity of an ever-increasing multitude of followers.

In the writings of the Apostolic Fathers it is plain that redemption was defined, as in the New Testament, with reference to the Person of Christ. Again and again in these first century documents there appears the straightforward declaration that in Christ alone is there salvation. Strauss's theory does not seem to jibe with the facts. It speaks of disillusionment and unfulfilled promises; they speak of redemption and the glory that is in Christ. In the so-called Second Epistle of Clement, an ancient homily whose real author is unknown, the opening words express the conviction of an early Christian. "Brethren," it reads, "we ought so to think of Jesus Christ, as of God, as of the Judge of quick and dead......For He had mercy on us, and in His compassion saved us, having beheld in us much error and perdition, even when we had no hope of salvation, save that which came from Him. For He called us, when we were not, and from not being He willed us to be." Or consider, for example, the oft-quoted confession of Polycarp when he was asked to renounce his faith in Christ: "Fourscore and six years have I been His servant, and He hath done me no wrong. How then/

2. Lightfoot, Apostolic Fathers, p.86.
then can I blaspheme my King who saved me?"\(^1\) Or as another illustration take these words from Clement's Epistle to the Corinthians: "We, having been called through His will in Christ Jesus, are not justified through ourselves or through our own wisdom or understanding or piety or works which we wrought in holiness of heart, but through faith, whereby the Almighty God justified all men that have been from the beginning; to whom be the glory for ever and ever. Amen."\(^2\)

Do these utterances support Strauss's notion that the early Christians were disillusioned? Do these confessions of faith suggest that they were originated as rationalizations of unfulfilled hopes? Or rather do we not see here a joyous conviction, a sure knowledge, that new life has come to these men through Jesus Christ? These writers would have laughed at Strauss's criticism and pointed to their own lives as proof of what they believed. These early Christians were able to upset the world not because they had discovered eternal truths or a principle of redemption but because they themselves knew that their lives had been changed through no personal merit but only through the grace of God in Christ.

Biedermann's repeated, if inconsistent, attempt to separate and yet unite the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption stands over against the Apostolic Fathers as a speculative hypothesis opposes a firm belief. Willing to admit that it was Jesus/

\(^1\) Lightfoot, Apostolic Fathers, p.206.
\(^2\) " " p.70.
Jesus who first gave the principle of redemption its intelligence and its currency, Biedermann nevertheless insisted that we do wrongly to predicate of Jesus what was meant only for divine mankind. The principle once delivered exists in its own right without the support of the Person. In the face of such writings as are attributed to the Apostolic Fathers what he suggests is decidedly counter to what was by them most surely believed. Just as the New Testament is devoid of any separation of Person from principle so too the Apostolic Fathers insist that redemption comes from the Redeemer. "Let us fix our eyes," says Clement, "on the blood of Christ and understand how precious it is unto His Father, because being shed for our salvation it won for the whole world the grace of repentance."\(^1\) Here is Biedermann's principle of redemption made available to mankind, but not without the Person of Christ whose "blood", i.e. whose life on earth and death on the Cross, is the means of redemption, not only the guarantee and illustration. It is not the principle which these writers seek, but the Person. "Him I seek," says Ignatius writing to the Romans, "who died on our behalf; Him I desire, who rose again."\(^2\) Or as the same writer says in writing to the Smyrnaens, "I have perceived that ye are established in faith immovable, being as it were nailed on the cross of the Lord Jesus Christ, in flesh and in spirit, and firmly grounded in love in the blood of Christ, fully persuaded as touching our Lord that He is truly of the race of David according to the flesh,/

\(^1\) Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*, p.60.
\(^2\) Ibid., p.151.
flesh, but Son of God by the Divine will and power."¹ There is no separation of Person and principle here. Salvation is grounded in the Person and to seek to loose Him from redemption is a meaningless enterprise to which the Apostolic Fathers gave no thought simply because it was unthinkable.

If we place Troeltsch's insistence that Jesus has nothing to do with redemption but derives His whole significance from the fact that Christians have made Him the symbol and centre of the community over against the teaching of the Apostolic Fathers, the same contradiction appears as in the case of Strauss and Biedermann. In the first place, Troeltsch's separation of the Person of Christ from redemption is as unthinkable as is Biedermann's in the light of the Apostolic Fathers. To define redemption as our knowledge of God's Will is not to define it as the early Christians experienced it. True, redemption did bring about a new knowledge of the Will of God, but redemption was never defined by them in human or intellectual terms but always with regard to the Redeemer, Jesus Christ. "This then," reads the Second Epistle of Clement, "is our reward, if verily we shall confess Him through whom we were saved."² Troeltsch's theory that Christ was the rallying-point of the early Christian community is in line with the Apostolic Fathers until he begins to emphasize the sociological character of Christianity to the exclusion of the Person of Christ. These early Christians did centre their life in the Person of Christ but not merely as a symbol, He/

¹ Lightfoot, Apostolic Fathers, p.156.
² " " p.87.
He was to them a living reality who had redeemed them from a dead existence to a new creature-hood. "Ye are stones of a temple," says Ignatius to the Ephesians, "which were prepared beforehand for a building of God the Father, being hoisted up to the heights through the engine of Jesus Christ, which is the Cross, and using for a rope the Holy Spirit; while your faith is your windlass, and love is the way that leadeth up to God." ¹ Here is Troeltsch's Christian society but it is brought into being, it is "hoisted up", through Jesus Christ - who is no mere symbol or principle of cohesion, He is the very "engine" which makes it possible and without whom it would cease to be. Writing to the Magnesians, Ignatius says, "Be ye salted in Him, that none among you grow putrid, seeing that by your savour ye shall be proved. It is monstrous to talk of Jesus Christ and to practise Judaism." ² To be salted in Him, this is the secret of the Christian community.

The criticism of Strauss, the speculation of Biedermann, and the sociology of Troeltsch stand in a disjointed relationship to the writings of the Apostolic Fathers. The disillusionment and short-sightedness with which the early Christians are charged are conclusions of a later day and age and are not discernible in the records themselves. Over against the cold speculation of our nineteenth century thinkers place this jubilant declaration found in the Epistle to Diognetus: "In whom was it possible for us lawless and ungodly men to have been justified, save only in the Son of/

¹ Lightfoot, Apostolic Fathers, p.139.
of God? O the sweet exchange, O the inscrutable creation, O the unexpected benefits; that the iniquity of many should be concealed in One Righteous Man, and the righteousness of One should justify many that are iniquitous!"\(^1\) Could Strauss, Biedermann, or Troeltsch deny that the writer of these words had found the secret of redemption?

The plain teaching of the New Testament, which speaks always of Jesus Christ the Redeemer and never of a principle of redemption, is confirmed not only in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers but in the continuing experience of the Christian Church. The testimony of Christians throughout the centuries has been in line with the teaching of the New Testament.

Throughout the Christological centuries there were many controversies and heresies in regard to the Person of Christ, but any divergency from the New Testament was not to separate the Person from the principle but was concerned chiefly with the interpretation of the Person. Driving a straight and oftentimes narrow wedge between the conflicting Christologies of the fourth century and later, the Church drafted its great Creeds, its confessions of faith, all of which made it clear that in Jesus Christ and only in Him is there redemption. Coming up to the Reformation era, which was not essentially concerned with Christology, the New Testament teaching /

\(^1\) Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*, p. 508 f.
teaching on redemption was kept intact and if the preceding centuries had forgotten that Jesus Christ was the Redeemer the Reformers brought it to the consciousness of the Church once again with renewed emphasis. It was not until the nineteenth century that the separation of Person and principle had any wide-spread effect upon the general trend of the Church's thinking. The common Christological position of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch was no doubt incipient in many of the tendencies of earlier centuries, as in Arianism, Socinianism, and Deism to take three widely separated illustrations, but until the nineteenth century the Church was in general agreement that Jesus Christ was the only Mediator without whom redemption, not to say Christianity itself, was unthinkable.

It is possible to trace the New Testament faith, as opposed to the separation of Person from principle as represented in Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, in the experiences of Christians who, though they may be separated by a span of centuries or even by a continent, are as one in affirming with the Disciples and Apostles that redemption is mediated through Jesus Christ. History offers a wide choice of illustrations, but we will confine ourselves to three: Augustine, Sadhu Sundar Singh, and Kagawa. This selection is quite arbitrary, it is made in order to show that the Christian experience of those who declare that they know what redemption means is the same for the fifth century as for the twentieth, the same for the Hindu as for the Japanese. All three are alike in so far as they experienced a definite conversion to Christianity and for that reason what they have to say about redemption is particularly significant in the light of the theories of Strauss, Biedermann,
Augustine, who is regarded not only as the greatest of the Apostolic Fathers but the spiritual father of the Reformation, bridges the centuries from the early Church to modern times. It is not too rash a thing to say that he has influenced all systems of Christian thought. Catholics, Protestants, Rationalists have admitted him to be the greatest of the Church Fathers. Every great thinker since his day has referred to him in some way or another. We need not here attempt to determine wherein Augustine's genius lay, but the impetus and spiritual passion which he bequeathed to subsequent Christian thinking lay certainly to a large degree in the personal authority with which he spoke and wrote. Christian thinkers everywhere at all times have acquiesced to his personal experience.

Whether or not Augustine in his youth was such an immoral scoundrel as we have been led to believe is an open question, but it is certainly undeniable that he experienced a right-about-face conversion which translated him from the quest for truth in Manichaeism and Neo-Platonism to a deep conviction in the Christian faith. The *Confessions*, the classic which contains the history of his life up to the time when he became a Christian, is not so much an acknowledgment of sin as it is an expression of praise and thanksgiving for a new found faith. Troubled by his inconsistency in holding to high ethical ideals and yet living a life far below his aspirations, Augustine suddenly solved his problem when one day as he was walking in a garden he heard the voice of a child say,
say, "Tolle lege, tolle lege". He interpreted this to refer to the Scriptures and as he opened the New Testament his eyes fell upon the Pauline text, "Let us walk honestly, as in the day; not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying. But put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, to fulfill the lusts thereof." ¹ From this time on his whole life was changed and he was enabled to overcome the temptations and difficulties with which his life had been burdened. Augustine's conversion in the year 386 A.D. was but the same sort of experience which from Paul to the present day has been the common experience of countless Christian men and women.

Augustine's thought is characterized by a deep mystical piety which is the expression of a living relationship with God. The oft-quoted sentence, "Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te" ² sets the tenor of the Confessions and expresses the great joy which this discovery gave him. This is no speculative union with the Absolute in the Hegelian sense but a living relationship with a living God. Augustine, like all Christians who attempt to explain their faith, did not attribute his redemption to his own efforts but solely to the grace of God. "I sought a way of acquiring strength to enjoy Thee," he says, "but I found it not until I embraced that 'Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus,' 'who is over all God blessed forever' calling me." ³ Only God through Jesus Christ is able to redeem./

1. Rom. 13:13-14; Confessions, VIII, 12.
2. Confessions, I, 1.
redeem. Man alone is utterly lost and when God redeems a man through Christ he will say as did Augustine, "My whole hope is only in Thy exceeding great mercy."¹

Although much of Augustine's thinking in regard to the Person of Christ was coloured by the thinking of his day, one point is clear and that is that Jesus Christ is the only Mediator between God and man and the only Redeemer. In the Enchiridion, a little handbook of Christianity, he says of sin "It cannot be pardoned and blotted out except through the mediator between God and man, the man, Christ Jesus."² Christ's Cross is the sign that sin has been remitted, - it matters not whether Augustine interpreted Christ's Atonement as a sacrifice to God or as a ransom to the Devil. Conscious of the torment and ubiquity of sin Augustine was convinced that "no one, no, not one, has been delivered, or is being delivered, or ever will be delivered, except by the grace of the Redeemer."³ There is no suggestion in Augustine of a principle of redemption which might be subtracted from the Person of Christ. Man himself or even the ideal of human perfection is as nothing without the sovereign grace of God in Christ. To strive upward toward the ideal of union with the Infinite, as Hegel later advised, would have seemed ridiculous to Augustine who regarded redemption as the gift of God not to be achieved but to be accepted.

Augustine's experience stands in direct opposition to the common position /

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2. Enchiridion, 48.
3. Original Sin, 34.
position of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch. Between the mythical criticism of Strauss, the speculative theology of Biedermann, the relativistic sociology of Troeltsch, and the personal faith of Augustine, there exists a chasm so deep and clearly defined that one is forced to take sides and say, "This side is right; that side is wrong." To one who reads in Augustine's words his own experience, so that the great Church Father seems to speak not of himself but for all who have come to the knowledge of God in Christ, the logical abstractions and rational tenets of the nineteenth century seem but sounding brass or tinkling cymbals. What can myth and disillusion mean to such as share Augustine's experience? What can the separation of Person from principle mean to a man who humbly acknowledges that his conversion from a worse to a better life, from death to life indeed, from darkness to light, from ignorance to knowledge, has been brought about by Jesus Christ? And what does it mean to speak of a Jesus who is a link in a prophetic chain and who derives His significance solely from His connection with the Christian community to one who speaks of Jesus and God in the same breath?

The difference between Augustine and Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch is the difference of extremes of which there can be no coincidentia oppositorum. It is the difference between the experiential and the speculative approach. While Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch went to great lengths to buttress their positions with hard and fast arguments, with logic, common-sense, and reason, Augustine simply stated in the simplest language possible his experience of saving grace. He did not try to prove it, he did.
did not even appeal to common-sense, he knew what he had experienced through the Person of Christ and that knowledge was for him the surest thing in life. Eternal truths, principles, historical tendencies, all these which concerned the nineteenth century are left out of Augustine's vocabulary and experience. The one point on which he concentrated all his thinking was Jesus Christ the only Mediator between God and man.

To turn from Augustine to Sadhu Sundar Singh is to pass from the Ancient Church to the twentieth century, from the Roman Empire to India. But the differences in time, country, and race are offset by the same evangelical experience which characterizes these two names. The Sadhu might be compared with the great Church Father in many respects. They shared a common conversion experience from which they dated their spiritual existence; their experience led to a mystical piety rooted in a living relationship with God through Jesus Christ; they attributed their Christian faith unequivocally to the almighty love of God who through the Son had brought them from a state of sin to divine adoption.

In his little book, With and without Christ, Sadhu Sundar Singh gives an account of his life in India, his rearing in the Hindu religion, his spiritual problems, and his conversion to Christianity with its subsequent joy and comfort. In all this we are reminded of Augustine's Confessions not only because the content is very much the same but even little things, like the influence of their mothers, are strikingly parallel. Just as Augustine continued to hunger and thirst after truth and peace although Cicero and Manichaeism interested him for a time, so, too, the Sadhu/
Sadhu found little consolation in the Hindu Shastras and Sanskrit scriptures. "I was disappointed", he says, "I could not find anywhere that spiritual food for which I hungered, and in this state of unrest I remained until I found the Living Christ."¹

Sadhu Sundar Singh, disappointed with his Hindu teachers, went to the American Presbyterian Mission school at Rampur but he found no immediate solution to his queries there and, in fact, became quite antagonistic to Christianity. From Rampur he went to Sanewal to the Government school and it was while studying there that he was converted. His own account of this experience is fascinating and arresting. "I got up at three in the morning," he says, "and after bathing, I prayed that if there was a God at all He would reveal Himself to me, and show me the way of salvation, and end this unrest of my soul. I firmly made up my mind that, if this prayer was not answered, I would before daylight go down to the railway, and place my head on the line before the incoming train. I remained till about half-past four praying and waiting and expecting to see Krishna, or Buddha, or some other avatar of the Hindu religion; they appeared not, but a light was shining in the room. I opened the door to see where it came from, but all was dark outside. I returned inside, and the light increased in intensity and took the form of a globe of light above the ground, and in this light there appeared, not the form I expected, but the Living Christ whom I had counted as dead. To all eternity I shall never/

¹. *With and without Christ*, p.96.
never forget His glorious and loving face, nor the few words which He spoke: 'Why do you persecute me? See, I have died on the Cross for you and for the whole world.' These words were burned into my heart as by lightning, and I fell on the ground before Him. My heart was filled with inexpressible joy and peace, and my whole life was entirely changed. Then the old Sundar Singh died and a new Sundar Singh, to serve the Living Christ, was born.1

As he concludes his little "book, the Sadhu confesses that "Without Christ I was like a fish out of water, or like a bird in the water. With Christ I am in the ocean of Love, and while in the world, am in heaven."2 It was the reality of the Living Christ in his life which made all the difference to Sundar Singh. He was no theological professor, no Hegelian dialectician, he never argues, he proclaims and declares. "The proof of the power and presence of the Living Christ is found," he says, "not in this world's philosophy and imperfect logic, but in the lives and experiences of true Christians."3 He himself is one of the best proofs because surely he was a true Christian. But the Sadhu claimed no monopoly on his experience. He was aware that what had happened to him had happened to countless others like himself. As we read our own thoughts between the lines of the Confessions of Augustine, so, too, we group ourselves with those who share in the Sadhu's experience. The Sadhu never set himself apart as an exception. He regarded himself as one among a multitude of all kinds/

1. With and without Christ, p.100 f.
2. " " " p.129.
3. " " " p.viii.
kinds of beings who have come to know God through Jesus Christ. "Scientists and philosophers who believe in evolution," says the Sadhu, "speak of the survival of the fittest by natural selection. Here is, however, another greater fact, proved by the changed lives of millions, that in divine selection there is the survival of the unfit (i.e. sinners). Drunkards, adulterers, murderers, robbers, have been lifted up from the depths of sin and misery and have received a new life of peace and joy. This is the salvation which is obtained through Jesus Christ, who came into the world to save sinners."¹

Sadhu Sundar Singh, like the Disciples and Apostles, like the Apostolic Fathers, and like Augustine, referred his Christian faith not to any principle or idea of Christianity apart from Christ but to Jesus Christ Himself, the author of salvation. Conscious of his own inability to rise to any heights, the Sadhu realized that if he were to enjoy peace and joy it would not be because he had sought them but because they had been given to him. "On account of sin, the conscience becomes numb and the will is made weak and powerless. In such a condition, a man, seeing death and danger ahead, is unable to escape them - so helpless is he - even though he has a strong desire to do so."² Only through Christ can a man be saved from hopeless despair to radiant peace. "Christianity," says the Sadhu, "is Christ Himself, Who said, 'I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life' (Jn. xiv. 6). This cannot be said about/

¹ Reality and Religion, p.63.
² " " " p.69 f.
about any other religion. They are based on ceremonies and teachings, but Christianity is based on the living Christ Himself, who is with us for ever. Christ gave His followers no word written by His own hand, for the reason that He Himself was always to be with them, nay, in them, and to carry on His work through them."¹

Sadhu Sundar Singh takes his place along with Augustine as another illustration from a different century and a different race of the Christian experience which, as opposed to the speculative theology of the nineteenth century, bases redemption on the Person of Christ. It now remains to speak of one other example, Toyohiko Kagawa of Japan.

Kagawa is without doubt the leading Christian social worker in the world to-day. American journalists like to tag him as "Japan's No.1 Christian," but the description is perhaps too confining for he does not belong to Japan alone but to the whole world. Like Augustine and Sadhu Sundar Singh he illustrates the Christian experience which opposes the speculative theorizing of the nineteenth century. In other respects he differs widely from the great Church Father and the Sadhu. Augustine was driven to monasticism and meditation, Sundar Singh found his Christian faith driving him to the four corners of the globe preaching and witnessing to the power of Christ, but Kagawa interprets his experience in terms of social service work, his Christianity takes him to the slums.

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¹. The Search after Reality, p. 59.
The memory of his childhood is a haunting nightmare to Kagawa. He was denied the love and care which a child is heir to because he was an unwanted child. His disagreeable family life forced him to live by himself and little by little his thoughts and dreams became insoluble questions for which he could find no adequate answers. "There is nothing to do but to drift with the clouds and be driven by the rain," he laments. "Oh, that the thunders would roll and the rain descend in torrents! Or that the ship of life would suddenly sink and I could go down with it in peace."¹ Despair and disappointment came to the young Kagawa in heavy measure. He was profoundly affected by evidences of oppression and poverty which he saw on every hand. The misery and hardships of the poorer people of Japan became his own suffering but he felt utterly helpless to alleviate their lot.

Just when life seemed to have resolved itself into a baffling perplexity out of which there was no avenue of escape, Kagawa came under the influence of Christian missionaries. In their home he discovered the love and affection, the gentleness and tenderness, the comradeship and congeniality, which he had been so long denied. But more than these things he heard for the first time the words of the New Testament and listened to the missionaries' witness to the saving love and power of Jesus Christ. Kagawa's conversion was not so sudden as was Augustine's or Sundar Singh's, it was perhaps not so intense, but it was nevertheless real/

¹. William Axling, Kagawa, p.28.
real and permanent. His biographer tells the story how one of his missionary friends talked to him out in the open one day saying to the sad Japanese, "Look at the sky, look at the sun, let your tears evaporate and then we will laugh." They did laugh and for the first time in his life a heavy load seemed to slip from Kagawa's shoulders. He read the words of Jesus which run, "Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow" and the passage so impressed him that he finally fell to his knees and prayed, "O God, make me like Christ." From this time on life was worth living. He deserted the camps of despair and volunteered his services in the lists of those who fight for Christ. To be a Christian meant one thing surely, that he must live as much like Christ as he could. To minister and not be ministered unto became his battle-cry as he sallied forth among the slums to deal with the old problems in a new way and with a new power.

There is no need to enter here into the well-nigh miraculous work which Kagawa has done and is still doing among Japan's poor. From a despised and persecuted street-preacher he has become the most outstanding of modern social workers whose name is revered and loved by an ever-increasing multitude and whose services, though once regarded as hostile, have been commandeered on more than one occasion by the Japanese government. He who found it difficult to speak his own mind and heart because of persecution and opposition has been the mouthpiece of the working classes who claim him as their liberator. Stricken with various ailments, totally/

totally blind in one eye and partially blind in the other, often starved and half frozen, he has been at death's door frequently, but so robust is his will-to-live and so indomitable his spirit that in spite of physical handicaps he has lived on to pursue his life's work. The Western world is just beginning to hear of Kagawa's work in Japan. The Christian service which he has been rendering is just beginning to find its echo in other parts of the world, and there is every reason to believe that we shall hear more and more of "Japan's No.1 Christian."

But Kagawa is primarily a Christian and only secondarily a socialist. His work among the poor is the outcome of his Christian experience. To love Christ means for him to love all of mankind and to serve it as the Master Himself did. Social readjustments must be Christ-centred. "The Christian in Kagawa overshadows the Socialist," says his biographer. "The follower of the Nazarene in him takes precedence over the advocate of economic reform. The prophet in his soul is Christian, capitalized and written in letters of light. Of all the emotions which race through his finely strung personality, the passion to make Christ known and adventurously incarnate His life is uppermost and controlling. He is the flaming apostle of the Kingdom."

For Kagawa the standard by which all phases of life must be judged is Christ. He repudiates denominations and conventional restrictions and preaches a Christ who can be understood by the common man. Emphasizing the Cross with its redeeming sacrifice

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1. Kagawa, p.129.
he has at hand a powerful social weapon. But Kagawa's Christianity is no merely social programme, he bases everything upon the Person of Christ who as a living reality gives power and efficiency to social readjustments. He has never become lost in his social reconstruction or allowed the Gospel to fade in importance, it is always the primary consideration, the heart and soul of his social work. "If we do not discount the Gospel," he says, "but take it seriously and live it adventurously, we will be able to do far more than Russian communism ever dreams of doing in building a better world."¹ And again he makes the same declaration, "The Gospel of Christ is for society as well as for the individual. Unless Christ is made the centre of the social movement, the world is doomed."² "The formula," he says, for the Kingdom of God, "is the Golden Rule plus the blood of Christ. The blood of Christ is circulating all the time and every where. It goes into every festering place, every weak place, every place of need. It goes with healing, restoring, and upbuilding power into every phase of life, both for the individual and for society."³

Kagawa calls himself "Christ's fool!" because he is the laughing stock of countless who have no use for his Christianity. But he delights in their mockery for he knows that fool though he be, he is Christ's fool, and if it seem to some that his life has been wasted, "tied up to society's rubbish-heap," he is unconcerned because he does his Master's work.⁴ If Kagawa were no more than a/

2. " p.141.
4. " p.84.
a social worker, his name would be highly revered but he would be likened in kind, if not in degree, with other social workers.

Kagawa's social work is distinguished because it is Christian. He places his life in touch with Christ and it is only through His power that he has been able to do what he has done. Kagawa would be the last to claim that he himself has accomplished wonders in Japan. He would refer all his work, as well as his life, to the love of God in Jesus Christ. Christianity is for him no mere principle separable from Christ, it is Christ Himself who makes Christianity a power in the world for good.

Kagawa has nothing in common with Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch who speculate and theorize about Christ. "He who delights in theorizing would better steer clear of Jesus," he says. Parallelizing the mystical experience of union with a Living Christ, Kagawa takes his stand with Augustine and Sundar Singh against all that would dethrone Christ from His rightful place by the Father.

When the experiences of such Christians as Augustine, Sundar Singh, and Kagawa are opposed to the speculative Christologies of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch several distinct differences emerge in the contrast. That the Christian experience of the former is rooted in the Person of Christ, while that of the latter is concerned with a principle apart from the Person, is the greatest difference, this is already patent. But there are one or two further/

1. Kagawa, p.149.
further points worth mentioning.

The positions of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch are seen to lack the sense of sin which characterizes the experiences of Augustine, Sundar Singh, and Kagawa. The nineteenth century avoidance of the fact of sin has been considered above, but in connection with the experiences of these three great Christians that avoidance is put into prominent relief. The nineteenth century attempt to skip over sin, to define it as moral lethargy, or to regard it as a lower stage of existence from which man by his own efforts can extricate himself, these definitions have no place in the Christian experience. Sin for the Christian is a very real thing. For Augustine it was the one big problem for which philosophy had no solution. For Kagawa it was an irresistible force which worked for misery and wretchedness. The Christian experience thinks not so much about sins in the plural as about sin in the singular. Sin is a part of human personality, a "radical evil," as Kant said. But the Christian experience not only has a deep sense of sin but a sure knowledge that sin can be forgiven through Christ, not through moral struggling as the nineteenth century urged, but only through Christ, the Forgiver.

Further, the nineteenth century Christology appears a very hopeless, uninspiring thing in the light of the power and radiance which spring spontaneously from the Christian experience. We have followed the lives of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch and discovered that each of them in varying degrees verged toward a pessimism and despair. Strauss could find no inspiration in his myths or eternal truths and eventually landed in materialism where/
where he found rational laws but no comfort for his soul. Biedermann on his deathbed, as it were, began too late to see that his principle of Christianity was a poor, emasculated thing. The last lectures of Troeltsch exhibit a pessimistic attitude which sees things as they are but sees no hope of improvement. But the Christian experience is rooted in the Gospel of hope, "But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name."¹ Doubtless, Micah's definition of religion, "to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God,"² would have appealed to the nineteenth century temper, but God's requirement and man's meeting of it are two very different things. Duty and deed do not always go hand in hand, and if the nineteenth century had high hopes and good intentions it lacked energy and power, the means of attaining high hopes and good intentions. Augustine, Sundar Singh, Kagawa, - these names spell joy and hope and unlimited power. Augustine felt compelled to publish abroad the glad tidings which he had received. When Sundar Singh became a Christian he travelled around the world preaching the Gospel, and his message of joy and peace took him into forbidden territory where he went gladly but from whence he never returned. Kagawa, the great social worker, illuminates his work with the Gospel of hope.

Moreover, the Christian experience which Augustine, Sundar Singh. and Kagawa represent, is not something abnormal or without/

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1. John 1:12.
without the reach of the poorest or commonest person, while the positions of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch were based upon definite philosophical and speculative principles for which the ordinary person has no affinity. Neither Augustine, nor Sundar Singh, nor Kagawa would have claimed for himself the epithet "religious genius". They felt that the experience which they had of a Living Christ was also the experience of countless others. Their faith was not in any way better or more real than the faith of the most obscure Christian. But we cannot imagine Strauss, Biedermann, or Troeltsch as representatives of the faith of the common man. We cannot picture an uneducated and untutored pilgrim coming to Strauss for the words of salvation. First, he would have to be grounded in the mythical criticism and then in Hegelianism! Professor Karl Heim of Tübingen in a sermon on the text, "What must I do to be saved?" points out that Paul and Silas did not bother the guard of the prison with questions of doctrine but gave him a simple straightforward answer, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ." A sinner at the eleventh hour may be saved. No one can claim a monopoly on the Christian experience - not even the theologians. The Christian experience is open to all, to the student and to the peasant, to the rich and to the poor, to the oriental and to the Anglo-Saxon.

2. Other differences which are evident in the contrast between the evangelical experience and the speculative theology of the nineteenth century are: the utter lack in the latter of the sense of awe and mystery, and the neglect of worship.
The Christian experience which has its source in the Person of Christ may be illustrated further in the great hymns of the Church. Christianity is a singing religion. Christians have taken to heart Paul's words, "Let the word of Christ dwell in you richly in all wisdom; teaching and admonishing one another in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, singing with grace in your hearts to the Lord."¹ There has grown up through the centuries a tremendous library of sacred songs which bear witness to the Christian faith. If the experience of Augustine, Sundar Singh, and Kagawa are symptomatic of the experiences of thousands of Christians the world over, so, too, the great hymns of the Church find a ready response within the hearts of countless multitudes. No other religion can claim so many poets or so many musicians as Christianity. From the Magnificat of Mary down to the present day the Christian faith has been sung without ceasing. From the reference in Pliny's letter to the Emperor Trajan that Christians whom he watched sang a praise to Christ as God, Christianity has sung its way into the hearts and lives of men.

This is not the place to make a survey of hymnology, but a look at some of the great hymns of the Church will reveal several points of interest for our problem. It will reveal that the Christian experience is not confined to any one hymn-writer, or to any one century, or to any one nation. The universal and timeless character of the Christian experience can be no more fully illustrated than in the hymnary of the Church.

From/

¹. Col. 3:16.
From the long list of early Greek and Latin hymns by such as Gregorius Nazianzenus, Anatolius, Bernard of Cluny, and Bernard of Clairvaux, we may select the well-known hymn by the last mentioned, De Nomine Jesu, which is best known in the translation of the Rev. Edward Caswall. The first stanza reads:

"Jesus, the very thought of thee
With sweetness fills my breast;
But sweeter far thy face to see
And in thy presence rest."

In passing from ancient times to Reformation times, we come face to face with Luther who exerted as much influence through his hymns as through his translation of the Bible. Ein feste Burg is Luther's best known hymn, in fact it is often called simply, "Luther's hymn." The second stanza is of special significance:

"Did we in our own strength confide,
Our striving would be losing;
Were not the right man on our side,
The man of God's own choosing.
Dost ask who that may be?
Christ Jesus, it is he;
Lord Sabaoth is his name,
From age to age the same,
And he must win the battle."

This faith in Christ as the only Mediator and Redeemer is the theme of many a Reformation hymn. The name of Paul Gerhardt brings to mind such well-known hymns as, "Since Jesus is my friend" and "All my heart this night rejoices." Count von Zinzendorf gave us, "Jesus, still lead on" and "Jesus thy blood and righteousness." Carl Johann Spitta of the nineteenth century stands in strange contrast to the speculative theologies of his time.
Consider a few lines of his *O Jesu meine Sonne*:

"I know no life divided,  
0 Lord of life, from thee:  
In thee is life provided  
For all mankind and me;  
I know no death, 0 Jesus,  
Because I live in thee;  
Thy death it is that frees us  
From death eternally."

The field of English hymnody is so broad and spacious that it is difficult to make an effective short-cut. But surely the great hymn of Isaac Watts, "The Wondrous Cross," deserves mention in the shortest account of hymnology. There are those who readily pronounce this hymn as the greatest in the English language. Others, not so decisive, put it on a par with Toplady's "Rock of Ages."

If Watts was the father of English hymnody, Charles Wesley was its greatest and most prolific contributor. He wrote over six thousand hymns. The one which is by common consent his best reads:

"Jesus! lover of my soul,  
Let me to thy bosom fly  
While the billows near me roll,  
While the tempest still is high;  
Hide me, O my Saviour, hide,  
Till the storm of life is past;  
Safe into the haven guide;  
Oh, receive my soul at last!"

We cannot pass by Charles Wesley without mentioning two other hymns which reveal a like experience, they are, "Oh, for a thousand tongues to sing" and "I know that my Redeemer lives."

On the fringe of the nineteenth century, in the closing years/
years of the Enlightenment, William Cowper sent forth his evangelical hymns which were sung eagerly by many who were wearied with the heartless Deism. The one that is best known and which has received much criticism by modern liberals who feel that the language is obsolete, is:

"There is a fountain filled with blood,
   Drawn from Immanuel's veins;
   And sinners plunged beneath the flood,
   Lose all their guilty stains."

Among the many women hymn-writers the name of Charlotte Elliott stands foremost. There is an interesting story which lies behind the inspiration for what has been called the greatest evangelistic hymn in the English language, "Just as I am." The hymn is the poetic expression of her new found faith in Christ, and the words have been seized upon by countless others who like her did not know how to come to Christ.

"Just as I am, without one plea
   But that thy blood was shed for me,
   And that thou bid'st me come to thee,
   O Lamb of God, I come!"

The English nineteenth century Oxford Movement found its hymnist in John Keble whose "Evening Hymn" is one of the favourites today:

"Sun of my soul, thou Saviour dear,
   It is not night if thou be near:
   O may no earthborn cloud arise
   To hide thee from thy servants' eyes."

In America perhaps the greatest hymn writer of the last century was Ray Palmer. Among his many hymns, the best loved of all/
all is "My faith looks up to thee," but a close second choice is "Jesus, thou Joy of loving hearts."

One of the most popular of all hymn-writers, if we are to judge by the number of his hymns included in many different hymnals, is Horatius Bonar of Edinburgh. Two of his famous hymns are, "I lay my sins on Jesus" and "I heard the voice of Jesus say."

The hymnal is the poetic expression of the Christian experience. The hymns quoted above are alike in their reference to Jesus Christ. There is in the hymnaries of the world no distinction between Person and principle which characterized the nineteenth century. The followers of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch were never inspired to hymn their faith. No one ever wrote a hymn about the principle of redemption. No one would think of singing, "O Principle of Redemption, my faith looks up to thee!" The speculative theologies of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch do not lend themselves to song, they remain within the boundaries of the intellect, they never enter the heart. It is the Christian experience in a Living Christ which makes the hymnal possible, and in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it was oftentimes the hymnal rather than the preaching which kept the Church alive.

The attempt has been made to show that the common Christological position of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch stands in contradiction to the teaching of the New Testament, the Apostolic Fathers, and the experience of the Christian Church throughout the centuries. Rather than separating the Person of Christ from the principle/
principle of redemption, the Christian Church has consistently centred its doctrine of redemption in the Person of the Redeemer. If we were to reduce the teaching of the New Testament on the subject of redemption, as well as the experience of Christians in all ages, to a least common denominator, it would be this: redemption is always defined in terms of a personal relationship. Whether we look to the New Testament, or to Augustine, or to the hymnal, we see that redemption moves on a personal plane. It is this word "personal" which serves ultimately as the index which distinguishes between the Christological position of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch and the traditional experience of the Church.

The principle idea by which Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch wished to define redemption is, in the final analysis, an intellectual idea, it is impersonal. In the realm of science we see this principle idea illustrated in discoveries which are useful and valuable apart from their discoverers. We switch an electric button a dozen times a day without thinking of Thomas Edison. We ride on trains unconscious of the name of James Watt. Once revealed, scientific inventions and discoveries are forever true regardless of the person responsible for initiating them. In the world of art the principle idea is illustrated in a painting, for example, by an unknown artist. One has only to watch the great throngs of tourists who make their pilgrimages to the world's art galleries to realize that such things as paintings have beauty and truth in themselves without the aid of the artist's name. Or in music, it is quite possible to enjoy a great symphony without the slightest knowledge of the composer or director. In literature too,
too, the principle idea is manifest. The age-old Shakespearean-Bacon controversy really means nothing as far as our appreciation of Hamlet or The Merchant of Venice is concerned. But religion is something quite different from science, art, or literature. Religion can only be described in personal relationships, it is not intellectualism or aestheticism.

"The Christian message," says Professor H.R. Mackintosh, "is concerned not with a number of things but with one comprehensive and infinitely precious gift of salvation, i.e. fellowship with God; and while this includes a variety of aspects, it is above all a spiritual unity."¹ It is through this idea of fellowship, this personal relationship, that Christianity must be understood, for this is how it is experienced. The response which the Christian makes to Christ is the sort of response which one loved one makes to another. It is to be understood only on its personal plane. Love cannot be separated from lovers and examined dispassionately under the microscope. It is bound up with the persons who experience its power. It is not always logical or intelligible, but it is nevertheless very real. We do not speak of a principle of love or a principle of friendship, nor can we speak correctly about a principle of redemption. The New Testament never speaks of redemption apart from its personal revelation. Paul does not say,

¹. H.R. Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness, p.5; cf. also The Originality of the Christian Message, p.5 for the same definition of Christianity; also such a book as Herrmann's Communion with God which defines Christianity as "a communion of the soul with the living God through the mediation of Christ," p.7.
say, "I live, yet not I, but the principle of redemption within me!" John does not say that eternal life is to know God and the principle of redemption which He has given us! It is the personal relationship that distinguishes the New Testament teaching on redemption. "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." 1 Professor John Baillie in his book, The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity, dwelling for some pages on the fellowship of the early Christian community finds the source and centre of this fellowship in the Person of Christ. "Jesus of Nazareth is the explanation of it all!," he writes. "The new spirit was just His spirit. The new outlook was His outlook. The 'Way' was His way. And that ἀγάπη which was the substance of the fellowship, what else was it but the temper that was in Him in the days of His flesh?" And he goes on to say that the Christian community did not regard Jesus merely as an example or illustration of their fellowship with one another and with God but that He Himself had imparted this fellowship and through Him it continued to enliven his followers. "The truth," says Professor Baillie, "had originally come to them not through abstract thinking but through contact with a living personality, and they felt that not all the thinking they would ever be able to do could exhaust its many-sided richness and depth." 2

A study of Paul's epistles leads to an understanding of the

1. Jn. 3:16.
2. The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity, p.55 f.
the depth of this personal relationship. In recent years the accent of Paul's religion has been placed on his familiar phrase "in Christ." In his book, A Man in Christ, Mr. James S. Stewart brushes aside the usual complicated and intricate systems of Paulinism and makes this phrase the corner-stone of Paul's thought. "The heart of Paul's religion," he says, "is union with Christ. This, more than any other conception - more than justification, more than sanctification, more even than reconciliation - is the key which unlocks the secrets of his soul."¹ And as typical of Paul's thought he quotes such texts as, "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me;" "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus;" "He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit."²

There is no necessity for a detailed exegesis of Paul's phrase "in Christ" in order to understand that it signifies a personal relationship. Nor is the question as to whether Paul's Christology is little short of mysticism a pressing one. Obviously Paul's mysticism is to be distinguished sharply from what Herrmann calls the "piety of mysticism" or what Professor Mackintosh terms "an unbridled and capricious mysticism" which steps beyond the Person of Christ and finds union with God without His mediation.³ Nor need anything be said about Paul's relation to his contemporary Philo which might imply that the phrase "in Christ" was to be understood/

¹. James S. Stewart, A Man in Christ, p.147.
². Gal. 2:20; Rom. 8:1; I Cor. 6:17.
understood in the pantheistic thought patterns of Alexandria. In
Paul's thought there is no "overriding" by Christ of man's person-
ality, to use Stewart's word.¹ Leaving aside all the controver-
sial problems of exegesis and interpretation, the one indelible
impression which this phrase makes is that Paul was thinking of
His own Christian experience in personal terms. To be "in Christ"
was not for Paul to follow a principle, but to love, trust, and
serve his Redeemer. "'Christ in me' means something quite differ-
ent from the weight of an impossible ideal, something far more
glorious than the oppression of a pattern for ever beyond all imi-
tation. 'Christ in me' means Christ bearing me along from within,
Christ the motive-power that carries me on, Christ giving my whole
life a wonderful poise and life, and turning every burden into
wings."² Christ was for Paul something more than an ideal. Human
genius and perfection do not readily attract, they rather repel.
It is like an amateur composer who comes home after hearing a
Beethoven symphony and tears his own score to bits. If Christ is
only an example, we are undone. How can we become like Him with-
out His help?

Paul's thought on union with Christ is double-edged.
Just because this idea of union can be explained only in personal
terms there must be two sides to the idea, and so Paul divides his
thinking on the grace of God, His gift in Christ to us, and man's
faith,/

¹. A Man in Christ, p.166.
². p.169.
faith, the response to this gift. "By grace are ye saved through
faith,"¹ this is the double-edged truth which Paul declared.
Whatever faith may be, it certainly depends upon a personal re-
lationship. "Faith as a conviction of the unseen," says Stewart,
"as a confidence in the promises of God, as an acceptance of the
historic facts of the Gospel, and as an epitome of the Christian
religion - such are some of the different shades of meaning which
the word bears in Paul's epistles. But the characteristic Pauline
conception comes into view only when faith is seen as utter self-
abandonment to the God revealed in Jesus Christ. It is faith
which begets the deepest and most intimate of all personal experi-
ences - the mystical union of the believer and his Lord."² This
is the sort of faith revealed in the Gospels where we see Jesus
drawing men and women and little children to Him in love and
fellowship. "Whom say ye that I am?" - this is not a theological
question but a personal question which can be answered only by
those who are in fellowship with the Master.

Union with Christ was for Paul no lifeless metaphysical
principle but a personal relationship which not only revealed to
him what he might become but gave him the power to achieve the goal
so that he could say, "I can do all things through Christ which
strengtheneth me."³ It is this power, this resevoir of spiritual
energy, which characterizes Paul. And it is the lack of this
that/

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¹ Eph. 2:8.
² A Man in Christ, p.182.
³ Phil. 4:13.
that characterizes the nineteenth century. From Kant's insistence upon morality and the ideal of human perfection down through the century there was a felt need for the power to reach the goal. What a shallow, lifeless faith beside the energetic, passionate faith of Paul. And not only of Paul, but of all Christians.

What Dr. Glover has said of the early Christians is no less true of modern Christians. "The Christian 'outlived' the pagan," he says, "'out-died him', and 'out-thought' him. He came into the world and lived a great deal better than the pagan; he beat him hollow in living."¹

The conclusion of this thesis cannot go beyond Paul's thought of union with Christ. It is the personal element in Christianity which makes it a religion of redemption and not just another legalism or logos philosophy. What Christianity is apart from Jesus Christ the Redeemer may be of interest to the speculative theologian but it cannot concern the Christian believer who is a Christian because of what Christ has done for him. Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, for all their logical and critical niceties, seem to be far from the Christian centre of gravity.

"It is useless," says Professor John Baillie, "to hope that a body of principles can ever do for men what the Gospel story has done for them. Words, words - we grow so weary of them! The world, we/

we feel, is too full of talk, too full of good advice! But we thank God that once at least the word was made flesh and dwelt among us and we beheld its glory!"¹ In the Christian experience Jesus Christ is the Redeemer, nothing whatever is known of a principle of redemption, and it is only through identification or union with Christ by faith that Jesus can be called Redeemer.

¹. The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity, p.74.
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