ALBRECHT, RITSCHL
AND THE
PROBLEM OF VALUE.

by
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The identification, or at least the relating, of the religious consciousness with the consciousness of worth or value, will probably be remembered as Albrecht Ritschl's great and lasting contribution to theology.

It might be argued, and argued with reason, that other thinkers have pointed in this direction, but Ritschl was - and felt he was - a pioneer in the field. He imagined himself as blazing a trail into an unexplored domain, and in the rich and fertile country of value, carving out a home and building an impregnable citadel for religion, in which religious knowledge might live and thrive and grow, undisturbed by the contentions of the world it had left behind. World knowledge might still live and flourish amid the crowded cities and amid mighty machines of the mechanical or scientific world, but in a new world Ritschl believed he was building for religion a "temple not made with hands, eternal in the heavens".

Like most pioneers, Ritschl did not realise the far-reaching implications and full significance of his discoveries. He was in a new world; he had left the mechanical world behind; that was sufficient for him. But he did not then see that the trees in this New World closely resembled the trees of the Old, and that the soil which he hoped would yield its increase in religious knowledge, was in few respects different from the soil he had left behind. Indeed, it might with justice be said that the very coals of his altar fires were brought, bright and warm, from parent altars. But Ritschl was oblivious to this and happy in his obliviousness.

However, the New World had been discovered; no one could doubt that, and whatever relation it might bear to the old, it was still evident that religious knowledge had a peculiar and intrinsic affinity to this new domain - the world of value. The substructure of theology, when examined, seemed best suited to explanation in terms of categories borrowed from the world of value.

Here then is the problem. What is the nature of this value substructure of theology to which Ritschl directed our attention? What is its composition? What is its extent and what are its boundaries? What is its connection with any other thing which we might term, in general, an
vi. PREFACE.

Element of knowledge? What, in a word, is its relationship with the world in which we live and move and have our being? This is the problem. This is the subject of our thesis.

It is first of all a primary concern to ask ourselves what we mean by value, and what are its claims to validity. (Chap.I.) Then following a brief historical introduction, (Chap.II.) the position of value in relation to theology shall be considered in a treatment of Ritschl's views in this regard. (Chaps.III.,IV., & V.) Then having presented the claims of value to recognition in the world, and having reviewed the intrinsic rapport of value and religious knowledge, it would be only fair to ask of the realm of natural knowledge what concessions it would be willing to make to these claims and demands. And thereupon the answer to this question being found to be not unharmonious with the claims and demands of religious knowledge, our task properly closes by pointing out how well and beautifully the lamb and the lion lie down together when the rights and claims of each are appreciated and recognised. (Chap.VI.)

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CHAPTER I.

THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

I. Fact and Value.
A preliminary definition of value may be brought out in juxtaposing judgments of fact and value: the former referring to existential or historical magnitudes and the latter referring to a peculiar relationship which an object has "for me". However this distinction is insufficient in that it robs value of any pertinency in a "real" world.

The insufficiency of this distinction can be made manifest by a comparison and analysis of various types of judgments.

The conclusion is that the boundary line between fact and value is not as clear as popular opinion supposes.

II. The problem of Value.
Hence emerges the problem of value - the problem of investigating the territory, bounds and limits of the sphere of value. The theory of value involves epistemology.

III. Importance of the Problem.
An assumption of value is, in intent at least, an assumption of pertinency or effectiveness in a "real" world. Value is part of our comprehension, and our comprehension would be limited - if it were even possible - without a recognition of value.

The "normative sciences" rest upon a value foundation. Biography and history is a matter of interpretation, hence is intimately bound up with value.

Political science and economics is in the same position and the conflict of rival theories illustrates how much each of these sciences suffers from the lack of a precise value standard.

Aesthetics, also, in so far as it lays claim to standards, rests upon a value foundation.

The close connection of ethics and value goes unquestioned.

Of all the branches of knowledge the philosophy of religion is most dependent upon a general theory of value. Religion seems to include practically all that the term "value" implies.

IV. The Crucial Nature of the Problem.
The problem is rendered critical by the general confession of the inadequacy of classic value standards to meet the conditions of modern life and modern knowledge.
V. Value as Subjective.

R.B. Perry in "A General Theory of Value", presents the case for a subjective estimate of value. He identifies value with interest and interest with bio-physical impulses. The field of value thus becomes as broad as life. His interpretation has the intention of robbing value of its teleological significance. The objection to such a view is that it discusses but one aspect of value - the "for me" aspect. The relationship of value to existence is ignored. Furthermore, in his effort to make the field of value co-extensive with the field of life he only superficially eliminates teleology. He eliminates teleology in the subjective sphere, but it creeps in in the cosmic sphere as the only explanation of interest in the subjective sphere. However, he has demonstrated that a value must have a relationship to an interest or purpose before it can be called "value. Value presupposes mind.

Professor Croce emphasises this. Even T.H. Green admits it. But it is important to note that the "for me" significance of value does not exhaust its meaning. This was the error of T. Hobbes and later of Von Ehrenfels. Bosanquet and Sorley have shown this very clearly. Values are considered valuable because they are values and not vice versa.

VI. Value as Objective.

Professor Laird, in "The Idea of Value", has much to say on this subject. Value presupposes a "logic" as the only basis of differentiation and discrimination. If so, then this logical element is the important element. If so, then value is part of the logical or reasonable universe. However, we must guard against the danger of ignoring the subjective reference. If value resides in the universe then the universe must be understood in terms of "appreciating mind". Hence the ultimate explanation of the universe is in terms of God. Value, thus, must be regarded as having a particularly significant connection with religion. Professor Hoeffding has given expression to this intimate connection. Hence it may be that religion will provide a clue to the ultimate nature of value and its historical-existential import. This is the matter which concerns us in a study of the man who first perceived the value implications of religion - A. Ritschl.
I. Kant.
The two Kantian proposition - the conditioned or categorical nature of the known world and the unconditioned or free nature of the moral will - have been fruitful in determining the trend of subsequent thought. In relation to the problem of value the second is the more important. The final and complete good is the good will. However, it should be observed that the good is, for Kant, conceptual - determined according to the laws of the moral will. For the problem of value, the relation of the laws of the moral will to the categories of the understanding is the crucial problem. Kant finds in the highest synthesis of the understanding, Ideas or Ideals, which approximate the principles of the practical reason. But he insists that this synthesis can never attain determination according to the categories of the understanding. However, the judgment binds these two realms together, and moral action assumed the identity of the two. This suggests that in practical life, the principles of the practical reason are determinative for all knowledge. Kant's concept of purpose confirms this. But Kant insists that the superiority of the moral principles can never reach determination in the understanding. Feeling, as the middle term between knowing and willing suggests that it might be regarded as a kind of comprehensive term harmonising the other two. Kant would not concede a feeling criterion of value - but the implied inference did not wait long to bear fruit among subsequent thinkers.

II. Schleiermacher.
In Schleiermacher the feeling member of the group of knowing, willing and feeling, assumed the foremost position. This feeling member is the religious principle. The problem arises as whether Schleiermacher regarded feeling and religion as co-extensive terms. Schleiermacher is indefinite, but in defining religious feeling he describes it as the feeling of absolute dependence, and he sets about deriving theological doctrines from this feeling of dependence.
This ambiguity but brings out the importance of this main problem of our thesis - the relation of feeling, or intuition, or religious consciousness, or value, to knowledge in general. 34.

Scheiermacher ignored this point and sought escape from the subjectivism of feeling in the historical revelation in Christ. 34.

III. Lotze.
In Lotze's thought, Kant's threefold distinction is considered as (i) the sphere of knowledge, (ii) the sphere of created spirits, (iii) the plan or general structure of the scheme. 35.

Lotze's emphasis upon the second of these makes him less careful than Kant in safeguarding the first. 35.

For him, knowledge does not attain validity upon its own right, but as the activity of ontological beings. 36.

His system is rescued from solipsism on the assumption that this activity does represent ultimate reality. 37.

Thus the moral will is pushed to the highest plane and the inference seems to be that it might be considered the means to the explanation of all things. 37.

Lotze does suggest this, but in developing his ethics backs down and retires behind Kantian distinctions. 39.

Value is thus relegated to the realm of feeling, and although Lotze struggled to give feeling a place in reality, did not succeed. The arguments against Schleiermacher could be used against him also. 39.

IV. Ritschl and his Predecessors.
Ritschl insisted that appearances are valid. His other main contention is that religious knowledge is distinct in kind from world knowledge or theoretical knowledge. With regard to the first of these he appeals to Lotze's epistemology. In support of the second he adopts Lötze's distinction of fact and value. 40.

With regard to the second it would appear that it is the heritage from Schleiermacher rather than from Lotze which is dominant. 41.

Indeed the theology of these two have many points in common - their common emphasis upon historical revelation and on the redeeming power of Christ, and the fellowship of the faithful. 41.

The Keynotes of Ritschl's theology are threefold:
I. The assumption of an epistemological premise;
II. The basing of religion upon value;
III. The appeal to an historical revelation.
These represent the subjects of the next three chapters. 41.
Ritschl's theology expresses a contradiction in that, on the one hand, he definitely repudiates any connection between philosophy and theology, and on the other, he bases his theology upon a philosophic assumption borrowed uncritically from Lotze. Lotze, by denying any reality outside the activity of apperceptive beings had suggested that we need not go beyond the "appearances" of things to find their validity. Ritschl accepted this view and uses it in theology to assume that we know God in his effects or activity. But Ritschl carries Lotze's conclusions further than permissible and practically declares the identity of knowing and being. Probably Ritschl did not see the significance of his epistemological position. His thought has been interpreted both as subjective idealism and naive realism. His purpose in relying upon an epistemological premise was twofold: to free theology from speculative metaphysics and the influence of philosophy generally; to establish theology upon a firm and sound basis that is an empirical and experimental basis. His theology may be considered from these two standpoints: I. The relation of theology to philosophy; II. Theology as a science.

I. Theology and Philosophy.
The driving impulse that dominated the Ritschlian theology was an opposition to speculative methods, especially of the Hegelian type which had reached such extremes in Baur and Strauss.

Against the speculative method Ritschl was experimental and inductive.

The errors in these traditional treatments he exposes by pointing out the logical fallacies in the philosophical positions underlying them. These positions are either Platonic or Kantian.

Both the Platonic and the Kantian epistemology involve the same error of separating the "thing" from its "appearances".

These errors are the result of abstractions. The idea of the perceived thing is given a validity apart from the act of perception. The idea then assumes a timeless and absolute character-it becomes metaphysical.

This is the error of materialism and pantheism as well.

The classical proofs for the existence of God—cosmological, teleological and ontological—involve the same error.
Ritschl goes farther than Kant in this respect. Kant argued on the basis of the distinction of the pure from the practical reason. Ritschl says that metaphysical ideas are empty memory pictures — 53.

But Ritschl is not consistent in maintaining this hostile attitude toward philosophy. — 55.

At times he gives to metaphysical ideas all the regulative significance that Kant recognised in them — 56.

At times he goes farther and suggests that perhaps the world may suggest the necessity of an ultimate cause — 56.

In his treatment of Kant's moral argument he is quite conciliatory toward philosophy. — — — — — — — — 57.

He insists upon the ultimate validity of the religious point of view even with regard to the world. — 57.

But then he shrinks from the implications of this viewpoint and falls back upon Kant's statement that such a viewpoint must be only a postulate of faith. This withdrawal is unwarranted by his argument. — — 58.

Ritschl's vagueness on this point is brought out in a consideration of doctrines which may be said to lie on the border between religious and world knowledge that is, (i.) the problem of Miracles: (ii.) the problem of the Divine purpose in history: (iii.) Comparative Religion. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 58.

i. Miracles.

Professors Denny and Orr quote Ritschl into a repudiation of miracles as an interference with the natural order. But Professor Garvie feels that he finds Ritschl more sympathetic to miracles. The fact of the matter is that Ritschl was not himself clear. — — — — — — — — 59.

ii. The Divine Purpose in History

Ritschl's treatment of this matter betrays the same indecision. On the one hand his effort to relate all moral purpose to the love of God revealed in the Christian community forbids him finding such a purpose anywhere else. On the other hand, he is forced to admit a religious meaning in pre-christian and un-christian moral striving. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 51.

iii. Comparative Religion.

At times he seems to deny worth to any faith not connected with the revelation in Christ. But then again he recognises the relative worth of all religions 62.

This general confusion in his thought in this regard is the result of the confusion in his thought generally regarding the respective spheres of religious and world knowledge. — — — — — — — — — — — 64.
matter of theology empirically in the observable
evidences of the activity of God on us, and in this
believes he is laying a scientific foundation.--- 65.
The significance of this is that the nature of God
is defined in terms of His activity with regard to us. 66.
As God is revealed to us in loving will, then the
full and complete determination of God is found within
that category.------------------------------- 66.
This loving will may be analysed into four qualities.
i. The object of love must be a person.
ii. Love is constant.
iii. It aims at the good of the loved.
iv. In it the aim and ends of the lover and loved are
identified. ----------- 67.
From this determination of God as love three proposit­
ions follow:
(1) The nature and destiny of human personality must be
related to this idea of love.
(2) The nature and attributes of God must all be subord­
inate to and explicable in terms of love. 66.
(3) The nature and purpose of the world, as God's creation
must be explicable in terms of love. --------- 67.

(1) Human personality in relation to the love of God.
The end purpose of God in reference to creation is
the creation of a world of spirits. 68.
The human race becomes the realisation of this Divine
purpose by virtue of its destiny in the Kingdom of God. 68.
The Kingdom of God may be regarded either as the end
purpose of God or the end of human striving. 68.
This characterised humanity in a twofold way: it gives it
a super-mundane character: it insures moral freedom. 69.

(2) The Nature and attributes of God in terms of love.
The righteousness, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipres­
ence, holiness and personality of God are explained in
terms of love. That is in terms of God's activity in
redeeming men. ------------------ 70.
This determination of God in terms of love is the
logical result of the exclusion of metaphysics. 71.
Consequently there is no place for the conception of
God as absolute. Ritschl repudiates this as an attribute
and declares with truth that his theology has no room
for such a term. -- --- 71.
But Ritschl then makes an unwarranted logical step.
He assumes that God's activity revealed in His loving
will exhausts the Divine nature, and implies that God
is to be identified with Loving-will. 72.
His logic here seems to be following the same course
he repudiated in his opponents. The "appearances" are
set apart from the experience in which they are found. 73.
The insufficiency of this conception is revealed in Ritschl's treatment of God's Providence. As the nature of God is identified with the principle of love then we are thrust back into a rigid determinism, because all one can say of the providential activity of God is that the process of events in the universe is one which we should believe expresses the principle of love. 73.

In such a scheme prayer becomes nought but a resignation of the self to the course of events, lightened only by the belief that this course is working out for the best. He has no place for petitionary prayer. 75.

This development of his position is a denial of the very idea of love from which he started. Ritschl throws the emphasis upon the act of loving and forgets both subject and object. 77.

(3) The nature of the world and the idea of love.

In considering the relation of the world to the divine will Ritschl courageously affirms that all creation is a means to the end purpose of God. 78.

The harmony between God's purpose and the world is here regarded as more than a belief inspired by faith. It is considered the necessary condition of the realisation of God's end purpose. 78.

This is his true theological position although he failed to conform much of his thinking to this idea. 79.

Ritschl's ambiguity in this regard is made clear by a preliminary consideration of the question of the relation of religion to world knowledge. 80.

The dependence of theology upon philosophy cannot be regarded as a valid theological starting point, as it binds theology up with tentative theories and conclusions. Theology must seek its subject matter and its proofs in its own sphere. 80.

However the very statement of the problem shows that there is a problem here. In as much as theology presents a Weltanschauung it brings the two spheres together. Indeed, as the Christian faith presents a particular Weltanschauung then it is probably related to a particular theory of knowledge. 81.

But this theory of knowledge springs from the demands of the subject matter of theology and should not be introduced as a presupposition. As a matter of fact Ritschl ignores his epistemological premise in making his really positive contributions to theology. 83.

The real basis of Ritschl's theology lies in his conception of value. 84.
Theology is distinct from philosophy not only in its repudiation of speculative metaphysics, but also by virtue of its peculiar subject matter, namely value judgments. There are three distinguishing characteristics of value: It is non-naturalistic in its independence of the course of natural events. It is practical in its relatedness to our personal interests: and as concerned with a personal good it is bound up with our willing feeling life. 

Ritschl's treatment of the problem is very meager considering the important place it has in his theology. The peculiar feature of his treatment is that he introduces value by declaring that all the judgments are, from the subjective side at least, value judgments, whether they be scientific, moral or religious.

This value character of knowledge arises from the function of interest in its acquisition. Interest is concerned in all attitudes and therefore with all knowledge.

Ritschl's position with regard to this is ambiguous. At times he appears to be declaring that feeling and value have a determinative place in all knowledge and then again to separate scientific knowledge sharply from value knowledge. But before pushing this question further it would be well to consider Ritschl's general position with respect to value.

Ritschl distinguished three groups of judgments within the sphere of value - scientific, moral and religious.

Moral and religious Value judgments have a common feature in their independence. That is, they are not bound up with the processes of natural knowledge. They exist on their own right.

They are distinguishable in that the first is concerned with a moral or worthy good and the second with our relation to the Power that is over the world.

However he recognises that the bond between them is very close and in Christianity they are always associated. They meet in the Kingdom of God which, on the one hand is the complete expression of God's end purpose, and on the other hand is the end of world moral striving on the part of moral persons. This suggests that the religious precedes the moral, but Ritschl insists upon keeping them independent and separate.

Scientific value judgments are dependent or concomitant. That is they are dependent, in their formation, on the nature of some external object.
However, he insists that they must not be called "disinterested", for there is always a feeling bound up with them. Indeed, he says such judgments are "guided" by feeling. What this means is very doubtful. 94.

His purpose in grouping scientific judgments under value judgments was to place theology on the same plane as the sciences. 94.

Otto Ritschl has entered into this problem more exhaustively and as he believes he is but carrying on the view of his father it would be well to refer to his book, "Uber Werturteile". 95.

He starts with an insistence upon the unity of the soul in all its functions and therefore upon the necessity of including willing and feeling with the knowing process. In all original elements these elements are united. When all are present we have a value judgment. Expressed in its highest and most original form it is the religious judgment. 95.

Scientific judgments arise from an artificial or cultivated ability of separating the functions of the soul. That is they become "disinterested". But in as much as both types of judgments are concerned with the same reality they have the same objectivity. 96.

His treatment is quite unsatisfactory in that he gives no valid idea of the relation of the two. Obviously it is not enough to prove that the value judgment is prior in historical development. The point is, how can value lay claim to the objective validity of the scientific judgment, or better still, to a superior objectivity. 97.

The views of Ritschl's other two disciples, Herrmann and Kaftan are no more satisfactory in this respect. Herrmann's view is borrowed directly from Kant. The interest of religion is concerned not with the world as determined by the categories of the theoretical reason but by the practical reason, i.e. by faith. This is the sphere of practical, therefore value references. Religious value is the ultimate reference point. But value and known reality need never be correlated. By initial predication he excludes all possibility of a reconciliation of world and religious knowledge. 97.

Kaftan seeks for the distinction of religious and scientific knowledge not in a distinction of faculties but in the nature of knowledge itself. There are, he asserts, judgments of fact and there are judgments of value. The first is about the nature of objects as such and the second is about their practical reference. This second form of the judgment is the subject matter of theology. In his treatment also the distinction of the two spheres is accepted as fundamental and the relating of the two is impossible. 100.
This problem of the relation of the two is of the utmost importance in a discussion of value. It involves more than the mere question of relatedness; it involves the claim of each to validity. The question which must be faced is: Does value make claim to objective reality? The world and religion must be united not only in the subject but in the sphere of objective knowledge. Thus the objectivity and validity of theology must be sought elsewhere than in the subjective sphere.

Max Scheibe has made this clear in his "Die Bedeutung der Werturteile fuer das religioese Erkennen". The "for me" significance of religious truth cannot be the primary one. Rather a religious truth is "for me" because it is first "for God". Ritschl's great error was that he did not distinguish this difference between "valuable" and "value".

That is, value is first resident in God's purpose. If so then creation, as the temporal realisation of this must be considered in reference to a value standard.

Finally, if religion be considered to be immediately concerned with God's purpose, and if theology be considered the exponent of religion, then theology must occupy the ultimate reference in the field of knowledge.

Consequently the relation of science and theology must be defined in such a way as to recognise the supremacy of the values of religion, not only in theology but also in science. The two fields are intimately related in as much as the revelation of God's purpose is related to the temporal processes in which it finds realisation. A conflict of the two fields can be the result only of imperfect knowledge in either or both.

CHAPTER V.

RELIGION AS REVELATION.

Ritschl's third premise is that we know God only in revelation. It represents a synthesis of the other two. It is objective as embodied in the historical Jesus. It is subjective in that it makes itself clear only to the eye of faith.

Four problems present themselves.

I. What does he mean by Revelation in general. Ritschl's exposition of the meaning of revelation is very inadequate. He accepts it as he accepted his other presuppositions, naively.
However he emphasises two characteristics; it is a peculiar non-natural phenomenon; it cannot be considered separable from faith. — — — — — — — — II3. From the former of these he maintains the "special" character of Jesus' work, and the distinction between religious knowledge and scientific proof. — — — — II3.

From the latter, he maintains the necessity of receiving the Christian revelation from within the Christian community as a valuable act of faith. — — II4.

This raises the matter of the historical testimony behind our faith. This may be considered in two spheres: the relation of revelation to the authority of scriptures: the relation of Christian revelation to extra-Christian revelation. — — — — — — — — — — — — — II5.

Ritschl uses far-reaching historical criticism in his treatment of the Bible. The authority of the Old Testament he rejects except for its value as an introduction to the New. His attitude toward scripture generally is that it is not a dogma of faith but rather a testimony of the faithful. — — — — — — — — — — — — — II5.

Ritschl has no place for comparative religion. His fundamental thesis is that everything must be interpreted in relation to the revelation in Christ. Consequently Christian dogmatics is not interested in extra-christian revelation. However he accepts historical development and recognises the comparative merits of extra-christian faiths, but shows no tendency to relate them to Christian revelation. — — — — — — — — — — — — — II6.

The impulse behind this attitude is his desire to separate theology from world knowledge. The result is that he does not face the real issues of revelation.

II. The objective or historical basis of Revelation.

The revelation in Christ has two characteristics: it is a revelation of God: it is historical. The person of Christ may be considered from these aspects — that is with respect to the religious and the ethical. — — II8.

From this viewpoint he hopes to overcome the paradoxes of the two nature controversy. That is, the discussion is transferred from a consideration of "nature" to "function" II8.

i. The Religious function.

Within the religious sphere Ritschl argues for the Divinity of Christ upon two bases: His divine mission: the perfection and finality of His revelation. — — — II9.

With respect to the former, Christ's Divinity is guaranteed by that which he revealed — the Kingdom of God. — — — — — — — — — — — — — II9.

With respect to the latter the perfection of Christ is authenticated by the perfection of the revelation. As the Christian community is the realisation of God's end purpose and loving will, then it is final. — — II0.
### ii. The Ethical Function

Christ's moral vocation was to fulfill God's will in founding the Kingdom of God. His ethical and religious functions are thus bound up in the same activity. The difference is in point of view - i.e. seeing it as His moral choice or seeing it as the will of God. - - I22.

With respect to His ethical function, Christ must be considered a moral agent consciously and freely taking up His task. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I22.

In virtue of His moral triumph in performing the will of God, He becomes Lord. This Lordship is the ultimate category which characterizes Him as a moral agent. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I23.

In the light of this concept of Lordship, the "offices" of Christ as prophet, priest and king, may be interpreted. They all express aspects of His Lordship. - - - I24.

This treatment of Christology tends to immerse the religious in the ethical, but has much in its favor. - I25.

### III. The Subjective Basis of Revelation

Ritschl's Christology interpreted the person of Christ in terms of His "practical" significance. He finds the validation of Christian revelation in its power in justification and reconciliation. - - - - - - - - - I25.

The result is it is explained in a "for me" relation. I26.

Thus the indispensable correlate of revelation is faith. Only the eye of faith can see the Christ and God are one. This suggested that Christ has the "religious value of God." We know Him by value judgments. - - - - - - - I28.

This identification of faith and revelation makes the "for me" nature of revelation the only considerable one. Revelation becomes a matter of value judgments - I28.

In his Christology this position results in his neglect or rejection of such doctrines as the Trinity, the pre-existence of Christ, and His post-resurrection exaltation. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I28.

The general result is to interpret the nature of Christ in terms of His activity. This is the same weakness which characterized his doctrine of God. He forgets that the "for me" significance is only one of the qualities of the Divine nature. - - - - - I30.

### IV. The Christian Community as the Kingdom of God.

The objective reference to which has appealed in all his doctrines is the Kingdom of God. - - - - - - - - - I32.

The Kingdom of God is the Divine end purpose for men as moral-religious beings, as distinct from natural creatures. Thus as religious judgments rise from this spiritual aspect of our nature they are always judgments from the viewpoint of the Kingdom. - - - I32.
In his booklet "Ueber Gewissen" Ritschl struggles with the subjective implications of his theology, and seeks an escape by saying that the self, apart from its association in the community of the faithful has no standards of conduct. That is, conscience, as the voice of the will, cannot speak with authority apart from its connection with the heritage of the Christian community. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 133.

Thus it would be almost impossible to overestimate the importance of the idea of the Kingdom of God in his theology. However Ritschl did not see its full importance in his thought. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 135.

He maintained that it was limited to the moral sphere. It is the universal moral union of men. - - - - - - - - - 136.

He endeavours to exclude the religious function from it by distinguishing between the Christian community and the church. But this distinction is obviously artificial. The two are co-extensive and exist inseparably. All the distinction amounts to is to describe the church as an aspect of the broader concept - the Christian community. 136.

The basis of the definition of the Christian community as moral is its association with the moral vocation of Christ. But unfortunately for this distinction, Ritschl tends to define the religious offices of Christ in terms of membership in the community of the faithful. Again and again he gives the concept a religious significance. 138.

However its moral aspects must be recognised. It binds each to a moral vocation in life, and it is the end of all moral striving. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 140.

But as the end of all moral striving it is valid as the will of God. That is, it is primarily religious. On many occasions Ritschl admits this. - - - - - - - - - 142.

In the same way it can be shown that the idea of the Kingdom has implications in the natural sphere. Vocation presupposes a material basis. Ritschl does not deny this. He also recognises that religious striving is concerned with certain goods or ends which must be explained in reference to the natural world. - - - - - - - - - 144.

Consequently the distinction between religious and world knowledge is not here sustained. The religious, moral and natural viewpoints are intimately concerned with the Idea of the Kingdom of God which has implications in each of these spheres. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 156.

A harmony of these view cannot be confined to the realm of faith. It must have an objective basis. Reality itself must substantiate it. - - - - - - - - - - 157.

Ritschl's doctrine of sin illustrates the necessity of bringing together the religious, the moral, and the natural in one viewpoint. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 157.
xxi. ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Sin, he treats wholly from the standpoint of the Christian community and at the same time recognises in it religious, moral, and natural factors. - - - - 157.

As religious, sin is opposition to religious trust in God. As moral, sin is directly related to the moral will. As natural, it is bound up with a specific world vocation. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 157.

The question arises as to the relation of the idea of the Kingdom of God to his general theological position. It does not fit into any of his three theses under which his theology has been discussed. It is as A.E. Garvie has said, a "regulative idea" - a metaphysical concept. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 148.

This definition of Christianity in terms of the Kingdom of God may enlist our sympathies providing the idea of the Kingdom is always held in dependence upon the revelation in Christ. This Ritschl fails to do. He tends to identify Christ with His revelation, and to explain revelation in terms of the Kingdom. He does not appear to see that the validity of the idea is guaranteed only by its dependence upon God as revealed in the person of Christ. - - - - - - - - I49.

CHAPTER VI.

SCIENCE, REALITY, AND RELIGION.

Philosophic mechanism has sought to embrace all creation in a monistic unity comprehended under fixed and rigid laws. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I54.

I. The Development of Mechanism.
When Copernicus shifted the frame of reference for all planetary movements from the earth to the fixed stars, he humbled the position of man and glorified the power of knowledge. This has been the impulse behind mechanism generally, and historical development through Brahe, Kepler, Gallileo, Bacon, Descartes and Hobbes but illustrates this tendency with increasing power. Man was divested of his prerogatives and the power of reason was triumphant. - - - - - - - - I54.

II. The Present Position of Science.
The triumph of mechanism carried the seeds of its own destruction in that it brought the focus of attention to the ultimate ontological element - the atom. - - I57.

The new age in science began when investigation was carried into the nature of the atom, and the electron, as a non- material element was postulated. - - - - I57.
Matter was de-materialised. The ontological unit became a non-material center of energy. - - - - - - - 158.

The Quantum theory rang the death knell of the old mechanism. This theory denies a quantitative mechanical relationship between the impulse affecting an atom and its reaction. The emission of energy of an atom is fixed at a certain quantum "h" or a multiple of it, whatever be the nature or violence of the stimulation. - - - - - - - 159.

The principle of Indeterminacy summarises these discoveries and definitely declares the unknowableness of atomic activity, from a mechanical viewpoint. This reacts upon our whole conception of law. Laws can no longer be regarded as absolute - they are but generalisations based upon statistical averages. - - - - - - - - 161.

The theory of relativity also repudiates the conception of "absolute" laws in that it denies the possibility of an "absolute" point of view. - - - - - - - - - - - 163.

Science then appears to be no longer certain of its basal postulates and assumptions. This position is not very different from the situation of the types of knowledge more precisely connected with value categories. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 163.

III. What is a Fact.
Science has no more intimate contact with facts as "an immediately given element of experience" than has value knowledge. Science speaks of "events" and "objects" but in so far as it avoids metaphysical ideas, does not call its subject matter "facts". - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 164.

Objects and events when defined are describable only as "Points of view", the object being different from an event in that it possesses "duration". In other words, they both involve an act of consciousness. - - - - - - - - 165.

IV. What are Laws of Science.
Professor Eddington distinguishes three classes of laws - Identical, Statistical, and Transcendental.
The Identical are the common laws of physics such as the law of gravitation. These laws are class concepts - categories for the explanation of events. They are principles according to which we systematise our knowledge. They have no immediate concern with ontological reality. They are in a sense "man-made forms" of apperception. - 166.

Statistical laws pertain to ontological reality, but in so far as they are group laws they do not determine individual activity. One must concede that "freedom of the will", if broadly enough extended might influence these laws. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 168.

Then there are the transcendental laws - the laws of atomic structure and activity. But in as much as the atom forbids "legalistic" definition transcendental laws have no real pertinency for the problems before us. - - - - - 169.
Another transcendental law is the law of entropy, and inasmuch as it suggests a final end for the universe raises the question of the whole matter of evolution - 169.

V. Evolution and Progress.
Evolution is more than change as it brings in the "new", and the new by very definition is mechanically inexplicable from the foregoing. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I70.
To have meaning it involves categories of value such as "better" and "higher". It involves progress. - - - - - I70.
Furthermore, evolution is comprehensible only in terms of purpose. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I71.
Thus the law of entropy as a scientific concept, has no claim to indicate final ends. To be sure, many scientists deny the absolute character of this law. - - I72.

VI. Science and Value.
Both value and scientific knowledge are one in recognising consciousness as the only door of entrance into the known and knowable world. The world is explicable only in terms of "mind". - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I73.
This does not make all knowledge "for me" in its character. But it suggests that human consciousness through which knowledge comes, is not foreign to the stuff of the universe. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I73.
Thus all reality may be called "value" - but not "valuable". That is, it is capable of interpretation only in terms of mind but it is not "for my mind" - - -
This is an important point as it is here that Ritschl went astray. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I75.

VII. What is Reality.
It is "mind-stuff". - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I76.
Knowledge is then neither picking and choosing as we wish in an indifferent universe, nor is it an imprint on a passive mind. It is a meeting - a communion - of two minds. Man is to the universe what religious consciousness is to the person of the risen Christ. - - I77.
In other words, ontological reality must be considered in terms of personality. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I78.
All knowledge is value knowledge - when regarded in the light of needs and interests it is "valuable" - and when regarded in the light of categories and forms of apperception it yields natural knowledge. - - - - - I78.
Each type contributes its share toward a comprehension of reality but neither by itself presents or represents the ontologically ultimate. - - - - - - - - - - - - I79.
The religious consciousness does represent this final reality. It is then the supreme viewpoint, and to its viewpoint all knowledge must be regarded as subordinate and contributory. The religious Weltanschauung is ultimate.
CHAPTER I.

THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

I. "Fact" and "Value".

The meaning of value judgments has been brought out in a comparison of the two predications:

Christ died on the cross,
Christ died for me.

The first professes to be a judgment of fact. Its truth (or its falsity) lies in a historical reference, which is bound up with the temporal course of world-historical events. That is, its truth (or its falsity) rests upon a basis quite independent of the particular judgment which predicates the truth (or falsity) of the event. The validity of the second predication lies not so much in the objective and historical nature of the event, but rather in a peculiar relation which this historical event has to my moral-religious life. Whereas, the first judgment purports to be valid quite independent of any reference to the particular consciousness which makes the predication, the validity of the second posits a certain significance or "value" which the historical event has for me as an apperceiving or appreciating consciousness. Whereas the first judgment purports to be a clear judgment of fact the second is a judgment of value.

This distinction between judgments of fact and of value may be summarised into a statement which would define the respective sphere of each. Judgments of fact assert a validity for the objects of their predication independent of an apperceiving or appreciating consciousness; and any such reference to a consciousness is simply an added relation which in no way affects the validity of the predication itself. A value judgment, on the other hand, is directly related to consciousness and would be unintelligible without this reference. It is true that this reference to consciousness need not be tied down to an individual or particular consciousness, and it is quite possible to conceive of values whose validity rests upon a group consciousness (e.g. certain moral and social values) and it is even possible that we may speak of divine values, as values whose validity rests upon a Divine consciousness. Indeed, if all consciousness be considered as expressions of the Divine will, then it may be that all values rest ultimately on the Divine nature. But in any case the definition holds, that values are intelligible only in reference to an apperceptive or appreciative consciousness. To be a value is to be a value to or for someone, potentially or actually.
2. **THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.**

However, the formulation of this distinction between facts and values, betrays the insufficiency of this basis of discrimination. If the sphere of facts is the sphere of objective and "disinterested" investigation and knowledge; and if the sphere of value is the sphere of a special or superadded relation which these facts bear toward an apperceiving or appreciating consciousness which in no way bears on "factual" validity itself; then the Materialistic philosophers are on a very solid logical foundation when they relegate value to a supra-natural and "unknowable" realm, whose existence is bound up with the human imaginings, and whose reality, from the standpoint of knowledge is doubtful and probably unnecessary. On the other hand, if the sphere of values is the sphere of dependence upon, or reference to a mind, - human, group, or divine, - and if, as the Idealistic philosophers point out, this is the sphere of all reality, then Idealism is resting upon a very sound foundation in asserting that the realm of values is co-extensive with the realm of reality - in other words, that all reality is meaning or value.

Our initial distinction between facts and values has, thus carried us into a dilemma. The situation is simply this: either the sphere of known reality is complete without a reference to consciousness or it is not. If it is, values, as directly related to an apperceiving or appreciating consciousness, have no place in the world or universe which knowledge seeks to explain. If it is not, then a complete explanation of the nature of the world or universe must give recognition to the sphere of values. In the first case, furthermore, unless we bring in a further assumption of a dualistic universe of fact and value, each, by initial predication, excluding all "rapport" with the other, then values, denied a place in the world or universe comprehended in knowledge, are ipso fact, deprived of value. And if such a dualistic assumption is made it is difficult to see how this helps out the situation. The known world, being shut out, by initial predication, from any relationship with consciousness, values are eo ipso, correspondingly, debarred from having any fruitful intercourse with the known world. And this also is to deprive them of "value". The conclusion seems to be that the relationship between facts and values is not so easily defined as our initial predication assumed. Neither is the sphere of each as distinct and as exclusive of the other, as popular usage supposes.

The interpenetration of facts and values, in ordinary judgments, is easily made evident by a comparison of various types of judgments arranged in a serial order.
3. THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

i. Hydrogen is an element.
ii. The orange is sweet.
iii. The sunset is beautiful.
iv. Kindness is good.
v. God is love.
vi. God is the creator of the world.

The subjects of the first three judgments (viz. hydrogen, orange, and sunset) might be termed simple space-time objects or events. According to our preliminary distinction between fact and value they fall under the former category. However, the non-value nature of the predicates of the first three judgments (viz. element, sweet, and beautiful) is not so evident. The first (element) purports to be a predicate of hydrogen quite independent of the apprehension or the appreciation of the relationship; but the term itself, as expressing a certain way of conceiving the nature of hydrogen so as to render it intelligible in a rational system of knowledge, has a doubtful independence from value references. As a category of thought its independence from conscious processes is questionable. However, in the second predicate (sweet) the value reference is more evident. It is difficult to imagine sweetness apart from an apprehending or appreciating consciousness. Finally, in the third predicate (beautiful) we enter the sphere of "pure" value.

When we consider the fourth judgment we are dealing with a "pure judgment of value" - both subject and predicate are values. However, when we approach the next judgment we come again into a sphere not entirely covered by value categories as we have defined them. The subject (God) cannot be considered as dependent upon a reference to another consciousness for its validity. Indeed, such a reference would be a direct denial of His attribute of alsonuteness. But the predicate of the judgment (love) in as much as it is intelligible only in relation to an apprehending or appreciating consciousness, is a value.

In the last judgment (God is the creator of the world) we are dealing, as in the case of the first judgment with subject and predicate both of which claim a validity independent of any valuing consciousness; although the predicate in either case may not be completely separate from a value reference.

The conclusion seems to be that the boundary line between fact and value, instead of being clear and precise, as our initial predication suggested, is extremely indeterminate. Value is both bounded and permeated by the non-value; while non-value or "factual" reality has a doubtful independence of value references.

"There are four general types of subject matter whose
rival claims to be the objects of pure knowledge have to be disposed of or in some way accommodated to one another. At one pole are immediate sense-data, which are said to be the immediate, and accordingly the most certain, objects of knowledge of existence - the original material from which knowledge of nature must set out. At the other pole are mathematical and logical objects. Somewhere between them lie the objects of physical science - the objects of an elaborate technique of reflective inquiry. Then there are the objects of everyday experience, the concrete things of the world in which we live, and which from the standpoint of our practical affairs, our enjoyments and sufferings, form the world we live in. To common sense these are the most important if not the most real of all objects of knowledge. Recent philosophy has been increasingly occupied with the problems which grow out of the titles of these various kinds of objects to jurisdiction over the field of knowledge. From some point of view the pretensions of each seem to be supreme."

II. The Problem of Value.

The problem of value is to investigate into the essential feature of all the particular values with the purpose in view of developing a theory which will indicate the nature and extent of the sphere of value itself.

"No one will be disposed to deny that there is a common something in truth, goodness, legality, wealth, beauty and piety that distinguishes them from gravitation and chemical affinity. It is the express business of theory of value to discover what this something is; to define the genus, and discover the differentiae of the species."

In other words, the problem of value is to find what place values have in a rational universe and what relation value bears to "the objects of knowledge" in general, in this universe.

"The unexpressed assumption of all logic is that truth is better than untruth, and the postulate of all science and philosophy is that reality is of more value than appearances. This is simply a part of the general fact of the orientation of intellect toward value, the value-centric predicament. But that is not the real question at issue. It is not whether truth and existence have value but whether they are values. The real question is the relation of logical validity to value."

The problem of value is to find out what we mean by value and what authority we can find for our judgments of value.

1. J. Dewey - "The Quest for Certainty", p.187
Consequently, the theory of value involves more than a sorting and arranging of things we judge valuable according to certain categories, such as the good, the beautiful or the true. Before current and common ascriptions of value can be estimated or classified, the basis for this appreciation or classification must be firmly established, and this can be done only by showing the place occupied by value categories in the system of thought generally. It is not enough to discuss what things are good, beautiful or true, the important question is why we judge them so. Indeed before we have developed such a general theory of value, the distinctions commonly made between values, such as "value in use" and "value in exchange", or "extrinsic value" and "intrinsic value", beg the question in as much as they presume the valid distinction of these principles of classification. Obviously these distinctions must proceed from a theory of value and cannot themselves form a basis for the construction of such a theory.

The theory of value involves a theory of knowledge or epistemology, and in as much as epistemology is concerned with the relation of knowing and being, the theory of value cannot stop short of a theory of reality. In other words, if a value is to be given a validity beyond a subjective or individual caprice or fancy, which has no bearing upon reality, it must become an objective or authentic category of the judgment. To be an authentic standard for the judgment it must be bound up with a system of thought. Finally that this system of thought be valid it must be related to a theory of reality.

III. The Importance of the Problem.

It is little more than a commonplace to say that an ascription of value is an ascription of effectiveness. To ascribe value is to assume that the object valued has some effective pertinency to the world in which we live. The beauty of the sunset sky, for example, means more than a certain emotional attitude toward a natural phenomenon. It implies more than something added to the conception formed from the sense-data involved. The beauty of the sunset sky qualifies the entire conception of the sunset sky formed by the observer. The conception would not be the same without the aesthetic factors involved. The beauty is as much an element of my knowledge as the sense-data involved. Similarly, an ascription of goodness to an action is, at least, as much an element of my knowledge or comprehension of the action as any of the sense-data involved. Indeed, it might be no exaggeration to say that the moral value of an action is the very core of the comprehension of the action, and that no action can be properly comprehended, by moral beings at any rate, without such a value being fundamentally bound up with the comprehension.
Furthermore, it is but a process of abstraction which can separate sense-data generally from a value context. The smallest and most primitive process of sense-perception involves a selectivity at work in the choice of data. And in this selectivity the question of value is inextricably involved. That is to say that the effectiveness of a value pertains to a larger field than that of individual imagination or opinion. An ascription of value is an ascription of effectiveness or pertinency in the world comprehended by knowledge. If there has been any progress since the days of Protagoras in the validation of knowledge then value can claim a similar validity. Indeed, is it not this claim to effectiveness in a real world precisely what we mean by an ascription of value? To deprive value of effectiveness is to deprive it of "value". Common sense insists on this point. To be a value is to be valuable to or for someone or something. And also, to be valuable is to be effective in a world situation in which the valuing subject is involved. Values cannot be isolated from the known world. Value and epistemology are bound together, and any philosophy worthy of the name must recognize this. To be sure, it might not be too much to say that this relation of value to the objects of sense perception is the important problem of philosophy.

"It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that it (the problem of value) has altered the entire philosophical perspective. It is not merely for instance that every treatment on philosophy has now its specific chapters on values, not merely that idealism is being rewritten in an almost new language; it is rather still more that we have come to recognize that we miss the true inwardness of the epistemological problem itself unless we realize that it is but part of the problem of values."

The importance of the problem of value is manifest in a consideration of those studies or sciences which rest upon evident value premises - the so called normative sciences.

"Neither biography nor history is intelligible without reference to the value which guides the action of individuals or groups. The deciding feature of a career is usually the kind of values which appeal to the person concerned, and the degree of force with which they appeal to him, and his consistency and persistency in adhering to these values. The same thing applies to races and nations; the national life shows unity and purpose, not so much by wealth or power being possessed by the people or equally distributed among them, as by conformity of interest such that the same values appeal to all. It
matters not what this object valued may be. It may be economic prosperity or military power, or it may be an ideal of brotherhood or religious belief; but whatever it is, if it is shared by the mass of the people, they are united as a nation thereby, with a far greater cohesive force than any other factor, such as race or language, could provide. Thus in any consideration of the impulses that guide individual life or the pulses which mark the course of national or racial progress or degeneration, the question of values is the question of fundamental importance."

"The extra-legal implications of political science and jurisprudence are too familiar to require any proof. Underlying the question of the law as applied to a particular individual or act, is the question of the function of the law as a social institution. In what lies the difference between that of which the law takes cognisance and that of which conscience takes cognisance? To what ultimate principle is the judge to appeal in his interpretation of the law? Underlying the fact of sovereignty with its diverse organs and forms there is the question of the validity of sovereignty. Is the state a delegation of divine authority or an expression of the collective will, or merely a convenient instrument? These are questions which cannot be fairly answered without some such comprehensive survey as that which a general theory of value undertakes."

"The case of economics is peculiarly instructive. The branch of economics known as "economic theory" consists largely in the attempt to explain economic or exchange value as a derivative or mathematical function of value in use. It is an attempt to analyse the specifically economic values such as price or purchasing power into non-economic component values such as demands, wants, satisfactions, pleasures, and pains. The modern economist would be the first to admit that in this analysis he is handicapped by the lack of a comprehensive and impartial survey of these more primitive or fundamental categories. He must either borrow from common-sense an ambiguous category such as utility; or he must employ second hand an obsolescent doctrine such as the classic hedonism; or he must formulate a general theory of value for himself. Having in his extremity adopted the third alternative he has made important contributions toward such a general theory of value, but he is not fitted, either by his training or by the focus of his interest to perform such a task adequately."

Aesthetics may, up to a certain point disregard all considerations save those of beauty and taste. But certain claims made in its behalf inevitably raise more fundamental issues of which connoisseurship and sensibility alone do not

8. THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

qualify one to judge. Consider, for example, the agelong dispute over the relation of art to morals. The protagonist of art for art's sake is not discussing a question of beauty or taste. He is affirming something about the relations of beauty and taste to moral rectitude. Such a boundary dispute usually leads to claims of autonomy by both parties, or to rival claims of annexation in which morality is reduced to beauty or beauty to morality. It is fairly evident that the best solution of such a conflict is arbitration. There would be no conflict unless beauty and morality were both, in some sense, values; and when this common principle of value is made explicit it can readily be employed as a method of arranging their proper spheres.

The dependence of ethical theory upon value categories goes unquestioned. And this science—if science we call it—consequently suffers especially from the lack of acceptable value standards. The whole effort to define the "sumnum bonum" as the end of moral conduct is a struggle for universally valid value categories. Is the greatest good to be pleasure, happiness, perfection or blessedness? Not only does the definition of these terms involve the question of value but the respective claims of each for acceptance bases its appeal upon value standards. Indeed, values are so inextricably bound up with ethics that ethics has often assumed proprietorship of the whole field of values.

Of all branches of knowledge the philosophy of religion is most dependent upon a general theory of value and most confused for the lack of it. In some sense religion deals with the aggregate of all values, as their custodian or champion in the world at large. It deals with the hierarchy of all values in imputing supreme value to God, and in preferring "salvation" to worldly gain or physical pleasure. It deals with the transmutation of values in its function of consolation and compensation. And it creates new values through its use of symbols. It comprises both the individual value of conversion and the social value of worship. Through the institution of the church its claims rival those of the state, and through the institution of dogma its claims rival those of science. To correlate functions so diverse and so extensive, to embrace them within an activity that is in some sense one, is possible only in the light of a systematic review of all values. Indeed, it is apparent that religion, instead of being a single element, is a peculiar grouping or organisation that includes practically all that the term value implies.
IV. The Crucial Nature of the Problem.

However, it is not only in the fact that a value substratum underlies all the normative sciences that the problem of value attains its prominence in modern thought. The problem has become crucial in modern thought because this value foundation of so much of knowledge, has come up for criticism and re-examination in our modern age. No one at all alive to modern thought can fail to be aware that the implicit assumptions of the meaning, significance and value of all the institutions of social life are being questioned in many quarters. Our social heritage, the state, our economic, and industrial life, our moral standards, the church and religious sanctions have come up for examination and are found, in many cases, to be without an adequate foundation. Indeed, our whole conception of civilization and culture is, to-day, called upon to justify itself and is seeking for the wherewith to do it. This critical tendency of thought which has brought so much confusion in modern life, has culminated in the questioning of the entire concept of progress in which our culture expresses itself and of the entire scale or system on which that progress was predicated. Accordingly, it is no exaggeration to say that the problem of value is, today, the central and crucial problem of philosophy. Upon a solution of this problem hang the fundamental categories which underlie modern life.

V. Value as Subjective.

Professor R.B. Perry in his book "A General Theory of Value", considers value a function of interest. This turns the discussion from the nature of things we call valuable, whose number is legion, to the nature of interest, which, in his eyes is a definite psychological (i.e. bio-physical) phenomenon that may be examined at the various levels in which it manifests itself. If we take life interest-wise he maintains, the data and perplexities denoted by good and evil, right and wrong, better and worse, as grouped within the special fields of morality, art and religion, and kindred institutions, fall into place and form a comprehensive system. (p.126).

The sphere of interest is as broad as life and consequently value has a similar latitude. "It is characteristic of living mind to be for some things and against others. This is interest and that which is the object of interest is ipso facto invested with value." (p.15). "The judgment of value is the judgment about anything to the effect that interest is taken in it. It follows that in the judgment of value the object of interest is the index and the act of interest is the predicate. Thus peace possesses value or is the index of the judgment, Peace is good. (p.366). It is not necessary that peace should exist or that the question of its existence should be raised. -- - - The only
existent object in the case of the true judgment of value is the interest qualified by its objective." (p.267).

Professor Perry's view is definitely psycho-centric. However, the really distinctive feature in his view is that he tends to define psychology in terms of biology and biology, ultimately, in terms of physical categories. Interest, he maintains, is manifest in all the levels of life. From blind "tendencies" in the lower levels of life it rises to "prospective adjustments" in higher levels, which in their turn act as the stepping stone to true psychology. However, even in sub-human life the action seems to be explicable only in terms of a "governing impulse" or "propensity", (e.g. Koeler's apes). In man interest reaches its only true and clear expression. Here, in this level, "plans" and "dispositions" replace the "propensities" of the lower levels. (p.180).

Exactly what connection there is between these different levels Professor Perry does not explain. Exactly what connection there is between the "tendencies" of an insect to adjust itself to novel situations and the "dispositions" of men, who, he says, may rightly conclude that "their lives are not worth living unless their special interests, not merely biological existence, are fulfilled." (p.181), he does not make at all clear. Quite ignoring this problem he still naively considers interest, in all its levels, as composed of the same stuff, and that this stuff is open to study under bio-physical categories. Indeed, Professor Perry goes so far as to affirm that interest is but another name for instinct, or at least that interest is a name for some aspect of it. "We have come to the conclusion that interest and instinct are the same thing, save that instinct implies a further theory of inheritance." (p.227).

Upon this basis Professor Perry has no place for teleology in his theory of value. He does not deny the application of the word "purposive" to behaviour. Rather, he would extend the word to cover all activity in all levels of life. But he robs the word of any teleological significance. Life, he maintains, is not adaptive because purposive, but rather purposive because adaptive. That is, an action reveals itself as purposive only when the conditions which give rise to the action are understood. The total explanation of an action must lie in the bio-physical conditions which called the action into being. To admit teleology into the theory would be to deny the all-inclusiveness of the psychological or bio-physical approach.

Professor Perry's position in this matter is indeed,
II. THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

interesting. He does not deny that there is an objective in action. Rather he defines a judgment of value as interest qualified by its objective. (p. 367). This recognition implies that interest is not the only element in value, and that intellectual factors and the influence of the objective world generally must be taken into account. He does not deny this. "Interest is a peculiar intercourse between two systems, which we call the organism and its environment. This peculiar intercourse or rapport is, in fact, a function of all that affects either of these systems. --- Man's interest in the world is a function of the man and his world and all that the man and his world is in turn a function." But he then adds, "and being admitted it can henceforth be ignored. --- We shall deal primarily with the interactions of interests themselves, introducing outlying causes and conditions only when they are in direct conjunction with interest." (pp. 521-2).

The question which this confession immediately suggests is why Professor Perry termed his contribution to the study of value a "general" theory of value. He admittedly has confined his attention to but one aspect of it - the so-called subjective or psychological aspect. For example; in considering the nature of God he says, "The immediate value of God which arises from the love and admiration of man, is founded on the belief in his existence, but it makes no difference to this value whether the belief be true or not and whether therefore God exists or not." (p. 614). Now, with the limitation of his subject matter clearly before us we cannot object to this definition of the value of God. From the psychological point of view the belief in God has all its conditions fulfilled when it is defined in terms of the subjective states underlying the belief. The consideration of existence does not enter. Furthermore, if he wishes to define belief biophysically then belief in God can admit of an explanation in bio-physical terms. However, it must be recognized that he would be clearly overstepping his premises if he should claim that this bio-physical definition exhausted the subject matter, or that the psychological explanation satisfies all the conditions implied in belief. In other words, the value of God may rest on a larger foundation than the bio-physical and in this wider foundation the question of God's existence may be an integral part.

This is a point which ought to be kept clearly in mind for it is one which we shall meet again in the course of this thesis. In some cases, at least, the value of an object is inextricably bound up with the question of its existence. And in such cases the sphere of value clearly oversteps the sphere of particular interests. Thus I may be interested in an object and in making this statement I lay no claim of any dependence of the existence of the object-of-interest upon the interest involved. The object is one thing and the interest is another. It may be that the interest-in-the-object
12. THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

may be considered as an additional quality added to the object, in the same manner as the judgment, "The object is red", ascribes redness to it. But in this sense there is no evident value implication yet denoted in the judgment involved. The fact of interest in the object but raises the question of the nature of this interest as the fact of colour raises the question of the nature of the redness involved. But to call an object valuable is to assert that it satisfies conditions or fulfils certain conditions. Function and status in meeting conditions is a different matter from bare existence. Interest is one thing - value is another. There may be some close connection between them but they are quite definitely different subjects of study.

Again, it may be doubted that Professor Perry has been as successful in eliminating teleological considerations from his treatment as he wished. Ignoring the obvious difficulty of accounting for moral life and ethical principles upon any other basis, yet in those very spheres where Professor Perry is most sure of himself, it is not difficult to show that his very emphasis upon the physical explanation carries him back finally to a recognition of cosmic purpose. As Professor Laird points out,

"If, as seems undeniable, natural selection provides the context for biology, it would seem that we should not stop short at life any more than we should stop short of mind, - - If cats why not beetles, and if beetles why not potatoes and if potatoes why not magnets and filings. Magnets do concern filings and if it does not matter whether or not we are aware of our likings why should it matter whether or not there are any likings at all? If things are concerned with and take account of one another is that not enough? So far as I can see it is mere dogma that values are peculiarly characteristic either of men or of cats."

In other words, in order that the theory propounded by Professor Perry be made consistent, "interest" must be made cosmic, and interest as cosmic must include in its scope the trend of events in the cosmos, whether pan-psychically or as a general cosmic will. In either case we eventuate in teleology. Purpose, as Bergson holds, is either teleological or it is nothing, and any attempt to deprive it of such a character is self-destructive and robs it of much of its original meaning.

However, admitting that Professor Perry's view is inadequate as a general theory of value, it is possible to appreciate the contribution that he has made toward such a general theory. Professor Perry has demonstrated that the psychological element is at least an important element in value. All value is bound up with a valuing subject and includes as an indispensable requisite the interest or the "prospicient adjustment", or the purpose of the subject.

With whatever state of external conditions value may be bound or with whatever relations to these conditions the subject may stand, yet the fact still abides, as Professor Perry has clearly demonstrated, apart from a valuer there is no value; apart from appreciation there is no worth.

For example, moral perfection is of value, indeed it may well be said to be of supreme value. But the mere idea of moral perfection, apart from any realisation of it, or apart from moral perfection as the aim of moral life, cannot be said to be of value. The proposition, "Moral perfection has value", is really hypothetical. Moral perfection has value as realised or as realisable, or upon the assumption of being realised or realisable. But apart from this relation to moral life, moral perfection is merely a proposition of thought. Again, where would the beauty of the sunset be if there were no mind expressed in it, or no eye to see it. Even granting that there would be a certain arrangement of colours, who is there to say whether this arrangement would be beautiful or ugly? We are not here maintaining Signor Croce's thesis that art and aesthetics are but instances of expression, and the beauty rests in the eye of the beholder. But we are insisting that apart from some relation to, or apart from some meaning for, an apperceiving mind there could be no value. Even Francis Bacon recognises this in declaring that, "though we should first approach nature in a passive mood yet we do this only that we may know her moods that we may master her." And one as fond of the Absolute as T.H. Green could say, "Our ultimate standard of worth is an idea of personal worth; all other values are relations to values for or in a person."

At this point we must guard against the false logic which says that because all values are relative to persons then all values are personal, - are matters of opinion - are matters of taste; de gustibus non disputandum est. The logical processes involved in this false logical position are as old as Protagoras, but Hobbes has given them clear expression in relation to the problem of value in the famous fourth chapter of his "Leviathan".

"Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire: that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil."

Von Ehrenfels in his "System der Werttheorie" is the most modern exponent of this view.

"Each single value exists only for a definite subject; strictly speaking for a definite subject at a definite time. -,- - We do not desire things because we recognise

1. Novum Organum I: 68
2. Prolegomena to Ethics - sec.184
this mystical incomprehensible essence "value" in them, but we ascribe value to things because we desire them."

These views ignore the fact that in our judgments of value we, at least, assume that our values are more than "Matters of opinion". In the moral realm the very nerve and fibre of ethical principles is wrapped up in their universality and general validity. When I say that an act is good I believe that all people should recognise that acts of this nature, when seen from the viewpoint at which I see them, are good. We may say, "de gustibus non disputandum est", but the fact of the matter is that we do dispute over tastes. Indeed, matters of taste provide the most fruitful, if not the only, basis for disputes. We would not dispute if we did not implicitly accept a higher validation of value than individual opinion.

It may be conceded to these subjectivistic views, along with that of Professor Perry, that nothing has value which is not in some sort of a personal consciousness, but as Professor Bosanquet has pointed out in consideration of this very problem, "The question is not settled how much more than its given self at any moment such a consciousness may imply as the unit of value to which it belongs." In a word, in valuing truth, beauty, virtue and the like, we are valuing spiritual worlds at once objective and subjective and essentially continuous with greater worlds. Though given to and even in conscious minds they are not states of conscious minds."

Indeed it is a contradiction of the facts of experience to deny the objective validity of the moral order. Any such attempt would reduce to chaos the so-called normative sciences. It would rob us of the most important institutions which underlie our daily life. A purely naturalistic interpretation of value such as suggested by the views of Hobbes, Perry, and Von Ehrenfels defeats its own end in that it seeks in the sub- or infra-conscious the elements which make up value, and in consequence is compelled to find them ultimately (unless it shirks the logical implication of its predications) in the universe. That is, they seek the nature of value in the original complex and organic forces and tendencies which nature expresses. And if this be admitted then in these processes themselves must be found the causa sui of all the

2. Individuality and Value. - pp.312 & 306
3. See pages 6 - 8 incl. of this chapter.
tendencies, propensities, or dispositions which make up value. In other words, value is as essential and as original as any of the objects comprehended in knowledge. Value is bound up with the very nature of things. Value has as universal a validity as the order of nature, or the system of things which knowledge comprehends. Professor Sorely has developed this thought in his book "Moral Values and the Idea of God."

"Value should not be denied to any period or to any condition in life either of the individual or of the race. Each moment even may have its own value. And yet that value is never altogether independent; one moment is not a mere means to the next, but its value is connected systematically or organically with all the other moments in the individual's life; and the individual life in its value as well as in its causes and effects is connected with the life of the race. The connection is not merely instrumental; it is organic or systematic. Nature and the laws of nature are instruments for the realisation of values; in personal life the values are realised. But it is only a fragmentary value that is realised; at any moment its meaning and worth depend upon the purpose of the individual life to which it belongs. And the individual life itself and its values are also themselves fragmentary portions of a still larger whole. - - - Only in relation to such a system could the full meaning and full worth of the individual life and its values be understood."

Professor Urban in "The Intelligible Universe" expresses this same conclusion even more forcibly.

"If knowledge and teleological values, upon the acknowledgment of which knowledge rests, get their significance solely through their teleological relation to life; surely life itself must get its significance from absolute values which it embodies or realises, or knowledge itself loses all genuine significance, ceases to be genuine knowledge or bona fide logic in any sense of those terms."

Values are not valuable because we consider them valuable, but rather we consider them valuable because they are values. The development of our individual desires or tastes in this direction must be considered on the same level as the development of our logic or reason in any sphere. The possibility of progress or refinement in our concept of values resides in the same faith as our belief in the progress of thought.

1. p. I28
2. p. I48
16. THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

Generally, namely in the faith that the processes of our reason are not foreign to the stuff from which the world is made, - in the faith that there is a natural affinity between the mind and the truth it seeks. This is a presupposition of thought as old as Plato.

The objective or known world in which we live and move and have our being must be understood as providing a home for values as well as the subject matter of scientific study. The moral and the natural must be included in the same order of reality. And if this be so then, in order that a harmony be recognised in reality, the essential nature of value must also be included in the essential nature of reality. Now, value, as we have shown has a clear purposive character. This purposive character must therefore be admitted into the objective reference of value; that is, in the world order. Apart from this admission there could be no basis for the harmony of the moral and the natural. But if we do interpret the world as including purpose then we must ascribe purpose to the very ground of reality.

VI. Value as Objective.

Professor Laird in his book "The Idea of Value" has much to say of the objective validation of value. He maintains, as against Professor Perry, that the quest for a value standard in the realm of interest must inevitably end in failure, because interest, psychologically considered contains no basis for distinction. Such a view confines value to the realm of feelings and feelings are the same in quality for all kinds of value. (p.238) Any attempt to find a value standard in feeling implies an implicit recognition of a "more than feeling" to give a basis for any value discrimination. If so, then it is this "more than feeling" which must provide the key to value discrimination.

"Either our appreciative emotions themselves possess a certain discrimination and critical quality of rightness and appropriateness, or they depend upon and should be conformable to, an intellectual insight into the quality of value. In the first case they are not simply subjective or simply personal (that is, they imply either the second or mysticism) - - - In the second case the quality - - - so essential to moral and aesthetic determinations implies logic and insight." 1

In either case value must lie in some objective set of relations, - in something that is invariable. In other words we must concede to value as objective a status as we ascribe to the objects of sense perception generally. As Professor Sorley has expressed the matter:

"The appreciation of value is on the same level as

knowledge of things, their qualities and relations. We have no more reason for saying that value is relative because it is appreciated by us than we have for saying that facts are relative because they are apprehended by us. 

Professor Laird, however, goes rather farther than Professor Sorley in carrying out the implications of this predication.

"If colour, sound, and similar properties really belong to physical things it seems unnecessary to deny that beauty may also exist in things themselves. One man has an experience which he relishes. Another man has an experience which he dislikes. Even if these experiences have something, perhaps a good deal in common, the presumption surely is that the experiences as a whole are significantly different in the two cases. If the two men really have the same experience is it not overwhelmingly probable that they would agree in their likings and dislikings? And is there not a certain likelihood that they would agree about the value, which after critical reflection, each would attach to the common experience? In short, the same thing may very often affect different people differently. And different affections have, no doubt, different values. But this is no proof that the same affection may have different values."

Supposing then that certain values - let us say the values of natural selection - occur only when specific terms are in certain specific relations; it is thoroughly permissible to ascribe value absolutely to the complete and complex fact which is constituted by this relation, although it is not permissible to ascribe value absolutely to the separate members of the complex. The separate terms are complementary to one another and each of them thus regarded is logically incomplete. Thus carrots-in-relation-to-a-donkey might very well have an absolute relation even if donkey, on the one hand and carrots on the other hand has only relative value. Again, even if we admit that colours and smells are partially manufactured by our minds no one would go so far as to say that they are in our minds - that our mind has colours and smells. Thus we must regard appreciation in this sense as residing neither in minds nor in physical objects but in a certain joint product of both.
This joint product must be regarded as objectively valid; that is, as valid a part of the universe to which it belongs as either of its component parts.

Thus from the point of view of logic, it is meaningless to say "we create values" or "values are personal". "The essential function of the judgment is never to create a new character but always to recognise a character already present." In the case of value judgments the reason of the circumstance may not come clearly into our estimate of the situation - we may be affected by valuable things on account of their value, without understanding the logic of the circumstance. "But anything which may truly be judged comes under the jurisdiction of the reason. That is to say it may be reflected upon in terms of principle, inference comparison and other processes that are appropriate to it. Standards of value, therefore, have the same objectivity as value itself has." The character of value or excellence, in short, is amenable to the laws of logic.

In other words, Professor Laird is maintaining that there is a "logic" to value and the standards or principles of valuing submit to the same kind of rational investigation as any other sphere of knowledge. "There must be a certain affinity or natural propinquity between objective values and the human soul. - - - Is it not possible to maintain that all excellent things have a certain rapport and elective affinity with one another, and that our minds themselves have a measure of excellence." Indeed, this is not a rash or unwarranted presupposition, for it is upon this same presupposition - the rapport or affinity of our mind to the order of world processes - that claim is made to validity in knowledge generally.

In summing up: Professor Laird finds value in the logic of the situation. The valueful situation which gives rise to a logic is a particular relationship - a relationship of a subject to an object, or of one object to another (if objects may be said to have appreciative qualities), or of the elements within a situation itself. In other words, value is as broad as meaning in its significance. The value judgment is expressed in terms or principles or standards which can claim the same validity or logical status as categories of thought generally.

2. - p.253
3. - p.317
With this attempt of Professor Laird's, to establish the objective validity of value and with the cogency of his arguments in support of this thesis, it is difficult to find a point of disagreement. Professor Laird has definitely and effectively rescued value from the egocentric predicament, and he has shown that value is made of the stuff of which the universe is made—or at least is made of some of the universe stuff. However, the reduction of value to logic, to which Professor Laird's conclusions point, seems to us unwarranted and unnecessary. That value has a logic may be conceded to Professor Laird's arguments; and that value, to be made explicit, needs to be clothed in the form of logic may be recognised, but that value is logic or that the essential thing in value is logic is a conclusion which does not follow from the premises which he has established. It carries us too near the territory of depersonated Absolute Idealism.

"If consciousness is to be generalised it must be explained in logical terms and when so defined it serves to explain the logical elements of experience and nothing more."¹

The point which we are anxious to maintain is that the stuff of the universe is personal or person and not logic. The Absolute is God, not Mind. That Professor Laird would be willing to admit this we will not deny, but his terminology has unfortunate historical associations which complicate the issue. In order that we may arrive at this conclusion Professor Laird's treatment may be supplemented by some further remarks.

Professor Perry has demonstrated that value and interest are inextricably bound together. To be a value is to be valuable to or for some person or thing. Carrots, for example as an abstract entity— if anything may truly be in such a relationless position— cannot be said to have value. They have merely "isness". But carrots in relation to a donkey or a housewife may well have value. Similarly, goodness as an abstract entity, cannot be said to have value. That is, good as conceived apart from the purpose of beings of some sort, or the possible purpose of beings of some sort, or of possible beings of some sort, cannot be said to have value. It merely is. Or again, harmony may consist in certain objective relations of colour or tone; but the value of harmony does not consist in these relations; it is a further predicate which characterises their presence.

The conclusion which follows is this: value is not merely the recognition of a relationship existing between

¹R.B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies" - p.176
THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

things; it resides not merely in a particular quality which things have in a particular situation; it is not a subject matter which we can isolate and study as we can isolate and study sounds and colours - this would reduce the "ought" to the "is" and would involve a confusion between the process by means of which we become aware of value and the value itself of which we are aware. The value of a thing or person (considered as the object of study) lies in the fact that it is valued, and any process of thought which seeks the nature of value by isolating it from a valuing subject ipso facto, renounces the essential element in value.

"Value is not an entity to be pointed out, it is a meaning to be acknowledged." 1

The truth underlying Professor Perry's position lies in this very fact. In all value there is an interested valuer. Professor Laird, because of his very anxiety to avoid the subjectivism involved in this predication tended to overlook this essential element in value. He, indeed, recognises that the sphere of value and the subject matter of study lies in a subject-object relationship, but his tendency to reduce value to logic divorces the object valued from that for which or to which it is valueful.

"Without the introduction of operational thinking we oscillate between a theory that, in order to save the objectivity of judgments of value, isolates them from experience and nature, and a theory that, in order to save their concrete and human significance reduces them to mere statements about our own feelings." 2

However, as has been shown, there is a logic to value. Value is made of the stuff of which the universe is made. To confine value to individual taste is to deprive the term of its meaning. The good, the beautiful, and the true must, in the long run, find a home in a universe with which they are congenial.

"A world's excellence must include its members, but must be of the nature of a greatness that goes beyond and sustains it. Without this objective validation of values, our values become but chimeras of the mind. We cannot think of an intuitive intelligence as creating values out of nothing, and out of all relation to a whole with determin- inant content. It, the supreme experience, whatever name we may give it, must be one with its world and not a creator out of nothing. Things are not teleological because they are purposed, but purposed because they are teleologic- al." 3

Professor Urban gives this point even clearer expression. "A wholly internal doctrine of finality cannot be carried out. Finality is external or it is nothing. The doctrine of immanent ends is in truth a very dangerous principle. We may indeed, use the expression in a negative way to protect our thought against an easy and limitless transcendence both in human life and in nature. But we may not use it to undermine all teleology, which it really does. The concept of purpose implies a value scale or system. The individual is always one among many and always sub-ordinate to a higher. Ends are immanent so long as we remain wholly within experience but any attempt to make these ends intelligible implies transcendence."  

The two propositions which we have advanced stand thus: value apart from a subject for which the value is pertinent or conceivable is incomprehensible; value to be real has its seat in a greater sphere than individual caprice - it has its home in the universe comprehended by knowledge. If both of these propositions are to be accepted the conclusion must follow that the ultimate validity of values lies in a universal or absolute valuer who gives them validity and meaning. This conclusion may be made more evident if approached from another angle; namely by establishing the converse of a statement we have already advanced. It has been maintained that purpose implies externality. Is it not equally true that externality (as comprehended by rational knowledge, at any rate) implies purpose or finality.  

The intellect is ultimately orientated toward value. To comprehend an object is to relate it to a system, and in this system the object stands intimately related to the conditions or agencies which brought it into existence or being; and the conditions or forces it is tending to produce. Indeed, it is only in relation to these general conditions that the object has definite meaning or reality. Now it is impossible, except by a process of abstraction, to consider these conditions apart from value. An object as the fulfilment of antecedent or concomitant conditions is the fulfilment of a value contained in the complex or conditions as a whole. Similarly, in relation to concomitant or subsequent conditions it realises a value which becomes evident in the meaning of the complex of conditions as a whole. The processes of description or definition cannot be separated from value categories.  

Now the meaning or value of anything (and therefore its nature) can be expressed only in terms of purpose and finality. Consequently, the ultimate origin, explanation or "sufficient
THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

reason" of anything requires that this element of purpose shall in some way be included in the notion of cause or effect. Thus, from the standpoint of knowledge, purpose must be considered an intrinsic part of the constitution of reality. And in order that we may claim an externality or transcendence for the processes of knowledge we must claim as well an external validity for purpose.

"The motions of the solar system, the curl of a wave, the curve of a cataract, the abruptness of a precipice, are appearances deeply rooted in the simplest material data, and yet for all we can see, as well meriting a presumption of teleological value as any object of consciousness." ¹

In other words, purpose must be considered as essential a part of the make-up of things as their physical properties.

The world is the condition both of the individual and his task. - - - A world's excellence must include its members, but must be of the nature of a greatness that goes beyond and sustains them. - - - The foundation of teleology - real individuality - in the universe is far too deeply laid to be explained by, still more, to be restricted to, the intervention of finite consciousness." ²

Purpose resides in the nature of the Universe. In Professor Bosanquet's terminology, its home is in the "Absolute", and has its meaning in terms of the completeness and perfection of the whole.

But this robs purpose and value of their personal and conscious reference. However we may make use of the weight of Professor Bosanquet's arguments without accepting this conclusion. He has demonstrated (as Professors Laird and Urban also have been anxious to confirm) that the element of transcendence in value is of the same logical validity as the element of transcendence in knowledge generally. There are not two absolutes - one of knowledge and the other of value. The same absolute must contain fact and value, the existential and the moral, being and purpose.

On the other hand Professor Bosanquet (and to a limited extent Professor Laird also) has ignored the other factor in their definition of value. This is the element which Professor Perry emphasises. Value apart from a subject for which the value is pertinent is inconceivable. This proposition can be equated with the position advanced above only by granting to the absolute a personal and conscious nature. That is, as we have said before, the ultimate validity of values lies in a universal or absolute valuer who gives them meaning and reality.

¹ Bosanquet. - Individuality and Value. - p.147
² ibid - pp. 26 & 152
"Only if we believe in the existence of mind for which the true moral ideal is already in some sense real, a mind which is the source of whatever is true in our moral judgments, can we rationally think of the moral ideal as no less real than the world itself. Only so can we believe in an absolute standard of right and wrong, which is as independent of this or that man's actual ideas and actual desires as the facts of material nature. — A moral idea can exist nowhere and nohow but in a mind; an absolute moral idea can exist only in a mind from which all reality is derived (or at least a mind by which all reality is controlled). Our moral ideal can only claim objective validity in so far as it can rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal externally existing in the mind of God." ⁴

"If we minimise phenomenal Nature's gift by denying that her beauty is intrinsic, as is form or colour, we must allow to ontal nature an intrinsic constitution such the minds can make beauty as well as nomic order out of it. And the more we magnify man's part in this making, phenomenalising and appreciating, the more motivation have we to believe that Nature comes to herself in man, has a significance for man which exists not for herself, and without man is a broken circle. Theologically expressed this is the belief that Nature is meaningless and valueless without God behind it and man in front; and it is what teleology in its comprehensiveness and the aesthetic argument in its particularity endeavour to establish." ²

A study of values leads us to the Absolute - that is, to the unified wholeness of all reality which contains within it the sufficient reason for all its parts - the same Absolute which stands as the validator of knowledge in general. And furthermore, this Absolute, from the standpoint of the requirements of the problem of value, must be regarded as purposively active Mind - a being best described by our word "God".

Value, then must be regarded as having a particularly significant connection with religion. Indeed, such a predication but epitomises the popular conception. To the average mind a discussion of values gives the intimation that religious categories will soon come openly into view.

"Religion, as we shall conceive it is the acceptance of a momentous possibility - the possibility namely that what

¹ H. Rashdall. - The Theory of Good and Evil. - vol.II. p.212
² F.R. Tennant. - Philosophical Theology. - Vol.II -p.90
THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

is highest in spirit is also deepest in nature, that the ideal and the real are at heart to some extent identified, not merely evanescently in our lives but enduringly in the universe itself. If this possibility were an actuality, if there truly were at the heart of nature something akin to our natures, a conserver and increaser of values, and if we could not only know this and act upon it, but really feel it, life would suddenly become radiant. For no longer should we be alien accidents in an indifferent world, uncharacterised by-products of the blindly whirling atoms; and no longer would the things that matter most be at the mercy of the things that matter least.¹

It is not necessary to assert that all values are religious nor that the feeling associated with all values is religious. This may be so, but certainly the connection is not generally clear nor directly evident. Professor Hoeffding in his "Philosophy of Religion" distinguishes three types of values. (pp.106-7) There is first the group of values connected with self-assertion - material values directed toward the preservation of life. Then there is the group which is at the opposite pole from these - "The values connected with the surrender to beings, circumstances, and tasks which point beyond the conditions of self-assertion." Neither of these groups, he claims are primarily religious. But either may become religious or either may point to a religious value. That is, "the feelings which are associated with the fate of these values in the struggle for existence, is the religious feeling." Thus, for example, the slice of bread which is on my plate has an undoubted material value for me. It satisfies my hunger and nourishes my body. But this value, as such, does not have a very clear religious significance. However, when I relate the value of this piece of bread to my welfare as a whole and consider it as a means to a certain destiny which I am fulfilling, then the piece of bread may have a definite religious value. When the connection of any particular value to reality as a whole becomes a subject of consideration then religion enters. Whether the lower values are religious without the religious implications being made explicit or whether the religious value enters in as a distinct order of value when the question of the fate or destiny of the value is raised, is a problem which will be faced later so need not be discussed here. However, it may be pointed out here, as Professor Hoeffding emphasises, that these religious values, whether primary or derivative may be experienced as ardently as any primary feeling. "They may become the central value for man; for the relation of value to reality is the most tense relation in which man is involved."

¹ W.P. Montague. - Belief Unbound. - pp. 6-7
Value has an undoubted close connection with religion and religion has an undoubted close connection with value. The study of the connection is one of extreme importance not only to the problems of value and theology, but to the problems of knowledge generally. If values, to be valid, must be both purposive and objective, this condition is met only in a supreme Valuer or Absolute Mind. Furthermore, as the sufficient reason of all values cannot be foreign to the sufficient reason of knowledge generally, the Absolute in either case must be the same. The Divine Mind, who is the creator and custodian of all goodness must also be regarded as the ground of the existing world. In other words, epistemology and value are not only bound up together but the common ground of the two is in a sphere which must be regarded as particularly religious. The suggestion is that religion may provide a clue to the solution of the problem.

With this in view, the task before us is to study the character of religion in its peculiar relation to the problem of value. And consequent upon this our task will conclude with an attempt to equate the conclusions reached in this study with the requirements of the epistemological problem, so that fact and value may lie at peace in the same universe, acknowledging the creating and sustaining power of the same God.

The first part of this task has been simplified by the work of Albrecht Ritschl, who first perceived the special "value" implications of religion and worked them out in a more or less complete system of theology. His theological thinking, thus provides a reasonable foundation for the study of the problem.
CHAPTER II.
ALBRECHT RITSCHL'S HISTORICAL PREDECESSORS.

I. Kant.

There are two propositions which have come from Kant's philosophic discussions which have been of the utmost importance in determining the trend of subsequent philosophical and theological thought. The first is the conditioned or categorical nature of the known world. The second is the unconditioned or free nature of the moral will. From the first proposition has developed the epistemological problem as we now understand it with the eternal task of identifying the things-as-known with things-as-they-are or things-in-themselves. However, in relation to theology and its problems it is the second of these propositions which is of the greater importance. Consequently it is in relation to this second statement that we shall consider Kant as a historical predecessor of Ritschl.

The one final, ultimate and complete good is, in the opinion of Kant, the good will. All other goods are qualified by condition and circumstance. Only the good will is unconditionally good. "

"Reason is compelled to give immediate assent that if there is to be in general a final purpose furnished a priori by Reason this can be no other than man (every rational being of the world) under moral laws. That which in man is ultimate value of the world and ultimate value of his nature is his good will. The whole world of nature has meaning or value only in relation to the good will. The existence of a reason that can be for itself the supreme law in the purposive sense (in other words, the existence of rational beings under moral laws) can therefore alone be thought as the final purpose of the being of the world."¹

However, it should be observed that the good is for Kant intrinsically and expressly conceptual. It is indeed a causality according to concepts. The good will is a rigid and inflexible determination according to moral laws. The good will is the rational will. It is a purposive activity toward a rational end definitely and specifically defined in moral categories. The good is accordingly substantial and existential, not merely adjectival or ideal. Its substance and its existence is its own rational nature, and its purposive ends are derived exclusively from itself. What is even more significant is that the substance and existence which characterise the good are noumenal in their nature. They represent the thing-in-itself. That is, the good will acts from the standpoint of the ultimate nature of things. It reveals the essence of reality, because it participates itself in that essence. From the wealth of its own nature it derives the standards of conduct and

¹ The Critique of Judgment. - p.380
and knows that they are ultimate, and from the power of its own volition it impels obedience and knows that this obedience alone is according to the rational nature of things. Insofar as conduct is moral it is rigidly conditioned by the dictates of the practical reason, and practical reason represents - indeed it is - noumenal reality. All conduct conforming with the nature of practical reason is conduct conforming with the nature of final and ultimate reality.

For the theory of value perhaps the most important problem in Kantian thought is the relation of the categories of the practical reason to the categories of the pure reason - of the noumenal to the phenomenal. If the rational will is the ultimate and only unqualified good then the existence or reality of anything (noumenal or phenomenal) is acceptable only in so far as it is related to or conformable with the dictates of this will - only insofar as it contributes to the realisation of that which the will represents.

However, for Kant, the good will is not the determining principle of all existence. Between the noumenal and the phenomenal there existed for him an impassible barrier. There could be no connection between the categories of the pure and the practical reason. They were different in kind. One group was concerned with morality the other with knowledge. To bring them together would be to make the moral world the determining factor in the real or knowable world. It would place the "ought" before the "is". It would imply a value interpretation of reality. Kant's rationalistic predilections would not permit him to come to this conclusion.

This is an important point and its importance merits a closer investigation of Kant's position with respect to it.

The highest synthesis of the theoretical reason, Kant finds in the ideas or ideals of the pure Reason. These ideas or ideals are the result of the systematising activity of the apperception striving to bring all experience under an ultimate unity. Accordingly, insofar as this systematic unity is a structure built above experience according to ideas not given in experience it can lay no claim to objective existence. It can never be anything else than a synthetic unity of the apperception. To claim it true for all reality is but to puff up our own ego large enough to mirror the universe. Hence ideas
or ideals of the pure Reason are simply regulative principles setting up the idea of a systematic unity — an idea or ideal which can never be completely realised in experience but which prevents the mind resting short of a complete unity.

"In the realm of cosmological ideas this process is carried even further. It sets before the mind an object that transcends the bounds of experience because it is absolutely complete in itself. What reason now demands is not merely a complete system of experience but a totality of reality comprehended within a single individual reality." 1. "It becomes for us the original being, the supreme being the being of beings, — — it is the presupposition of the existence of all finite beings; its predicates are unity, self-sufficiency, simplicity, eternity, — God." 2. But this does not prove the necessity of an object corresponding to it. It is simply an idea and the known world cannot be shown to guarantee its validity.

The crisis in Kant's thought, from the viewpoint of value, comes in the third Critique where the theoretical and practical reason are brought together in the judgment. The judgment lies between knowing and willing, and hence in some way mediates between the phenomenal and the noumenal. "In the family of the cognitive faculties there is a middle term between the understanding and reason. This is the judgment." 3.

"The judgment by its apriori principle for the judging of nature according to its possible particular laws, makes the supersensible substrate of nature (i.e. the noumenal) determinable by means of the intellectual faculty. But the reason by its practical apriori law determines it: and thus the judgment makes possible the transition from the realm of natural concepts to the concept of freedom." 4.

It seems from this statement of the case that in the act of judgment the theoretical faculty performs a kind of preliminary function subordinate to the concepts of the practical reason. And as Kant defines the judgment as "the faculty of thinking the particular contained in the universal" one is forced into the conclusion that the practical reason supplies the forms for the particular judgments. Or, in other words, the categories of the

1. Critique of the Judgment. - p.34
3. Critique of the Judgment. - p.14
4. ibid - p.40
practical reason are ultimate in the sphere of knowledge.

Kant’s conception of purpose but confirms this conclusion. The judgment, he claims, must be considered as purposive even in its lowest stages. In the lower levels of cognition, to be sure, this purpose is not very evident. It appears only as "the harmony of form with the cognitive faculties in order to unite the intuition with concepts for a cognition generally." That is, it is not yet teleological in its significance. But in the higher levels the problem of teleological purposiveness becomes acute. Inasmuch as the categories or ideas of the reflective judgment are not derived directly from experience, so purpose becomes specifically teleological, implying an activity of the subject in subsuming the particular under a voluntarily controlled standard or ideal. That is, in the highest levels of apperception, in the effort of the cognitive consciousness to attain to a complete unity of experience, a definite teleological purposiveness is discernible in the synthesis involved. In other words, the synthesis of the theoretical reason, is at this point brought into contact with the practical reason.

Evidently, the ideas of the pure reason, the ultimate presuppositions of experience, and the laws of the practical reason, come very near together. In the highest judgment they are all but equated. Indeed, it is upon the supposition of their identity that the judgment acts. Moral life proceeds on the assumption that this identity is valid. Furthermore, inasmuch as Kant identifies the moral will with the ultimate good, this unity of experience must be more than a presupposition - its connection with the good in moral striving makes it the basis of our comprehension of reality. Kant, at times, practically admits this. The moral law, he says - "is meant to have an influence over the first (synthesis of experience). The concept of freedom is meant to actualise in the world of sense, the purpose proposed by its laws, and consequently nature must be so thought that the conformity to law of its forms, at least, harmonises with the possibility of the purposes to be affected in accordance to the laws of freedom. There must therefore be a ground of unity of the supersensible which lies at the basis of nature with that which the concept of freedom practically contains." ¹

What Kant insists upon maintaining is that this unity can never attain "theoretically or practically to knowledge." ²

¹ Critique of the Judgment. - p.34
² ibid - pp. II-12
³ ibid - p.13.
Kant leaves philosophy in the dilemma of believing in a real which is unknowable and a knowable that cannot prove its reality. Indeed, upon an initial acceptance of Kant's division of the functions of "knowing" into knowing, willing and feeling, this conclusion is unavoidable. By his initial predication knowledge, which is but one function and the activity of one faculty cannot encompass all functions. Subsequent philosophy represents a struggle for a broader conception of the "knowing" of things.

Toward this broader conception, Kant, especially in his third Critique, has offered fruitful suggestions. Kant began his critical philosophy upon the distinction of the three human faculties - knowing, willing and feeling. His first Critique analysed the first of these, the second Critique analysed the second, and the inference is that the third Critique - the Critique of the Judgments - deals with the feeling aspect of personality. Also, Kant made the judgment the middle term between knowing and willing. The implication here is that it must be fundamental to the other two.

"The subjective element in a representation which cannot be an ingredient of cognition is the pleasure or pain which is bound up with it. - - - Similarly, the purposiveness which precedes the cognition of an object - - - is - - - that subjective element which cannot be an ingredient of cognition." 1

Here feeling appears almost as a test of validity.

However, this interpretation must not be pushed too far. Kant would never submit to a pleasure criterion of value. Indeed, he protests, "the universal validity of this pleasure - - - involves the concept of a law, for only on this concept of a law can the validity for those who estimate the object, be universal." 2 But the significance which Kant gave to feeling lies not so much in the precise meaning which Kant intended to give, but rather in the manner in which subsequent thinkers made use of his suggestions. Kant's suggestions undoubtedly provided a most fruitful soil upon which later philosophers and theologians raised remarkable things - ideas and views which would probably have made Kant shudder to consider.

1. Critique of the Judgments. - p. 30
2. Werke. - p. 241 - Vol. VII. (quoted from J. Meredith's translation of the Critique of the Judgments.)
II. Schleiermacher.

Schleiermacher made this inference the keynote of his thought. The judgment, which was the middle term between knowing and willing became in his thinking, definitely feeling. "Feeling, for Schleiermacher, was the middle term between knowledge and morality. "You will find that those moments in which you exercise power over things and impress yourself upon them form what you call your practical, or in the narrower sense of the word, your moral life; again, the contemplative moments be they few or many, in which things reproduce themselves in your intuition, you will doubtless call your scientific life. Can either series alone form a human life? Yet they are not identical. - - - As it stands with these two with respect to one another it must stand with the third (i.e. feeling or intuition) with respect to both." 1.

This feeling or intuition he further described as - "the holy wedlock of the universe with the incarnate reason for a creative and productive embrace. It is immediately raised above all error and misunderstanding. You lie directly on the bosom of the infinite world. In that moment you are its soul. - - - in this way every living original moment of your life is first received; among the rest it is the source of every religious emotion." 2.

Feeling is accordingly, the immediate or primary consciousness. It is that moment in experience before the elements become analysed into their parts - when the percept is seen as a unified whole. It might be termed pre-conscious, for the act of consciousness sunders it into its parts.

It is significant that in his early writings Schleiermacher used intuition and feeling more or less interchangeably. However, as his thought developed and crystallised, he tended to drop intuition from his vocabulary as involving cognitive inferences. Whichever term he used, the important question is whether he regarded feeling (or intuition) as the primary and immediate act of consciousness, of which knowing and willing were but aspects, or did he regard feeling (or intuition) as a third term that supplemented the other two, in the Kantian fashion?

1. On Religion. (tran. by J. Oman ) p.45
2. ibid p.43.
The dropping of the term intuition from his later writings and editions in favour of the simple word feeling, is an indication that he adopted the second of these alternatives. Indeed, his whole intellectual and emotional background would lead him to such a conclusion. The enemy he combated was rationalism and the obvious method of combating it was to oppose it — to deny its claims — to repudiate it from the sphere of religion in which he was interested. The weapon to accomplish this he found ready forged in Kant's Critiques. So he adopted the simple method of naively accepting the position maintained in the first two Critiques in order that he might maintain the independent validity of the feeling faculty. Science and morality are two fields — religion is a third. Each stands on its own rights and within its own sphere is ultimate.

"However high you go; though you pass from the laws to the universal lawgiver in whom is the unity of all things, though you allege that nature cannot be comprehended without God, I would still maintain that religion has nothing to do with this kind of knowledge and that quite apart from it its nature may be known." 1

The ideal and only possible union of these three elements, he said, is a frank recognition of the respective spheres of each.

"Only when piety takes its place alongside of science and practice (morality) as a necessary and indispensable third, as their natural counterpart, not less in worth and splendour than either, will the common field be altogether occupied and human nature on this side complete." 2

This third element in the nature of man, this middle term between knowing and willing, this feeling, Schleiermacher designates as the sphere of religion. The all-important question is the relation between feeling and religion. Are feeling and religion synonymous terms or are religious feelings a particular kind of feeling? Schleiermacher does not seem to be precise on this point. When driven into conflict with the rationalism of his day he takes refuge in feeling in general, and says:"There is no sensation that is not pious except it indicate some diseased and impaired state of life, the influence of which will not be confined to religion." 3 Generally speaking, in his discussion of the relative positions of knowing, willing and feeling, he uses religion and feeling interchangeably.

"Just because you do not acknowledge religion as the third (part of a complete nature) knowing and action are so much apart that you can discover no unity, but must believe that right knowing can be had without right acting and vice versa. -- If man is not one with the Eternal in the unity of intuition and feeling

1. On Religion. - p.38
2. ibid - p.38
3. ibid - p.46
which is immediate, he remains -- for ever apart."  

Here, obviously, the terms are interchangeable.

But when Schleiermacher deals specifically with the nature of religion, religion reveals itself as a special kind of feeling.

"Your feeling is piety insofar as it is the result of the operation of God in you by means of the operation of the world upon you."  

This peculiarly religious feeling he further defines as the feeling of absolute dependence.

"The immediate feeling of absolute dependence is presupposed and actually contained in every religious and Christian self-consciousness as the only way in which, in general, our own being and the infinite Being of God can be one in self-consciousness." Indeed, "the feeling of absolute dependence accordingly is not to be explained as an awareness of the world's existence, but only as an awareness of the existence of God, as the absolute undivided unity."  

This feeling of absolute dependence is the peculiar subject matter of theology. It is that common element in all religions which gives theology, as a science, a valid basis." It permits of analysis and this analysis gives us the subject matter of theological study. Consequently, upon this basis Schleiermacher sets out in his task of building up Christian dogma. The relation between God and the world; the attributes of God in relation to the world; and the constitution of the world as therein conceived in virtue of its dependence upon God; he derives in turn from this fundamental religious consciousness of absolute dependence. With respect to the first we know that the world is both created and sustained by God." With respect to the second, we can define eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience as the attributes of God, and "as only something special in which the feeling of absolute dependence is related to him." Finally, the "universality of the feeling of absolute dependence includes in itself the belief in an original perfection of the world -- both as a whole and with special respect to man in the world."  

Ignoring the problem of the possibility of deriving these doctrines from the feeling of absolute dependence, the question which more pressingly concerns us is the nature of the feeling of absolute dependence from which Schleiermacher imagines that all these doctrines could be derived. In the actual definition of his doctrines

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3. On Religion. - p.40  
4. Ibid - p.133  
5. Ibid - p.194 ff  
6. Ibid - p.45  
7. Ibid - p.142  
8. Ibid - p.233  
Schleiermacher tends to substitute the phrase "religious consciousness" for the more ambiguous word "feeling". The reason is obvious. If doctrines which have a cognitive import are to be derived from feeling then feeling itself must also have a peculiar cognitive import. Yet Schleiermacher would never admit any connection between the rational and the religious. Consequently his definition of terms always ended in confusion. Yet this very problem - the problem of the relation of the faculties is of peculiar and crucial importance in a theory of value. It is the same problem which will confront us in a discussion of Ritschl’s views, and its importance cannot be overestimated. If feeling is to be appropriated as the special sphere of theology then is the doctrinal expansion of this feeling basis to maintain its peculiar isolation from knowledge in general? Here lies the crucial problem. If value be substituted for feeling in this connection we have Ritschl’s thesis and Ritschl’s problem presented - the central problem which will concern us in the next chapters.

Schleiermacher, due to his ambiguous definition of the word "feeling" ignored the crucial point of the problem. He offered no standard whereby we might discriminate between religious feeling and feeling in general. To declare that religious feeling is the feeling of absolute dependence was to argue in a circle. The idea of God was presupposed as the object of the feeling, which in its turn was to determine the divine nature. We shall later see that this is the same vicious circle in which Ritschl found himself due to his maintenance of the thesis that we know God only in judgments of value.

Schleiermacher found an escape from the predicament by appealing to the historical figure of Christ as the guarantee of the validity of our feeling of dependence. In the Christian faith, he maintained, "everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth". The validity of our religious feelings as Christians, and the guarantee of their objective reference is embodied in the historical figure of Jesus. Our feelings are not merely our own private feelings but are the feelings of the Christian Church vouchsafed to it by the person of Christ, through regeneration and sanctification. The revelation of Christ, as embodied in the community of the faithful is thus the objective reference which assures the objective validity of our feeling of absolute dependence. This escape, we shall see was the same one adopted by Ritschl.

1 The Christian Faith. - p.52
2 ibid - pp. 471-8
Lotze does not differ from Kant, nor the Kantian tradition generally, in asserting the dependence of knowledge upon forms or categories of the understanding, and the superiority of moral principles to these forms or categories. Neither does he depart from the Kantian scheme in positing feeling or aesthetics as the middle term between knowledge and morality. Reality, Lotze maintained, has three fundamental aspects, none of which can be reduced to the other. There is, in the first place, the realm of nature determined for us or by us by absolute laws or categories of the understanding. There is, in the second place, the realm of created spirits, who, through moral striving, make an imprint upon the natural order. And, in the third place, there is the definite and specific plan according to which the elements of reality are brought together in order that a definite end might be realised by their action according to universal laws. Lotze, like Kant, assures us that the existence of the world involves all three and none can be considered as subordinate to the other. Consequently, his thought may be studied from the standpoint of each of these three propositions.

Lotze was not prepared to reduce the external world entirely to forms of apperception. The "onward march from Kant to Hegel" had shown him the threat of Absolute Idealism which lay at the end of this course. Lotze preferred to be a "critical realist". "His aim is to attain to a knowledge of that which transcends consciousness, of that which is independent of consciousness, of the truly objective and real, of things-in-themselves." ¹

However, the world of sense, the world of space and time, fared even worse in his hands than in Kant's. "Knowledge is but one species of reciprocal interaction, and the resultant of this cognitive collision between the mind and things is necessarily not an exact photograph of the outer world of reality, but coloured through and through by our knowing faculty." ² "Space and spatial relations are all of them the mere forms of our subjective intuition, and not applicable to the things or the relation of things which are the active causes of individual intuitions." ²² "The phenomena of an extended world exist only for the personal spirits and the entire view of the world which hovers before our consciousness is a product of our im-

¹ L. Staehlin. - Kant, Lotze, and A. Ritschl. - p.129
imagination playing mysteriously according to its own laws." ¹

Lotze, explains, however, that this does not shut us out from an "outside world". Rather it suggests by necessary inference that we do exist as part of a world of reality and that the qualities of this world may be known. He claims, that in this very activity of phenomenal knowing there is an approach to things-in-themselves. The legal order or rational nature of our knowledge reveals to us things which in the regular and mathematical order of their changes possess individuality. To discover in what the reality of the material world consists, it is therefore, necessary to consider our own deepest longings, highest endeavours, and most intense activities.

"Why should we not transform the assertion that only minds are real into the assertion that all that is real is mind; that thus things which seemed to our merely external observation as working blindly, suffering unconsciously, and being self-contradictory through their incomprehensible combination of selflessness and reality, are in fact better internally than they seem on the exterior - that they, too, exist not merely for others but also for themselves, and by this self-existence are capable of being after the fashion which we felt compelled to require of them, though hitherto without any hope that our requirement would be fulfilled." ²

Thus the real is made up of separate and independent existents.

"Self existence or selfhood is the only definition which expresses the essential content and worth of that which we from accidental and ill-chosen standpoints characterise formally as "Realness"." ³

All things are characterised by unity of character and activity. In other words all things are "minds", for we cannot conceive of a synthesis of consciousness nor activity without apperceptive behaviour.

"We may say - - - that in all notions of things - - - by which we introduce order and connection in our perceptions, what the mind in effect does is to copy the general features of its own nature and because it feels that itself and its reality subsist and are contained in them, it seeks to transfer them to external reality too, and to work them into it, as the only characteristic of true existence that it knows." ⁴

¹ H. Lotze. - Microcosmus. - Vo.II. pp.609-10.
² ibid-Vol.II. p.624.
³ ibid - Vol.II. p.645.
⁴ ibid - Vol.II. p.653.
Lotze rescues his thinking from solipsism - if rescue it he does - only upon the metaphysical assumption of the self-existence of that which is known in the cognitive processes. The basis for this assumption is a kind of pan-psychism which gives individuality - that is self-active mind existence - to all things.

"Either we ascribe to all things, as soon as they are assumed to "be", a reality outside ourselves, the most common characteristic of spiritual life - to wit, some form or other of "being for self", or else we must deny that there can be reality outside ourselves." ¹.

Lotze has striven to show that we come into touch with the reality of an object when our thought can give expression to the content of that object as being a systematic structure ruled by an authoritative principle. But we must go further. Thought, as purely formal or analytic, fails to grasp the meaning of the whole; it is unable to grasp the creative principle underlying its existence to which alone its reality can be referred. This intimate contact with reality can come only through the moral will - it can come only through faith.

"All apparent activity is only a system of contrivances by means of which this determinant world of phenomena as well as those determinate metaphysical habits for considering the world of phenomena, are called forth in order that the -- highest good may become for the spirit an object of enjoyment in all the multiplicity of forms possible to it." ².

"The objectivity of thought is saved in the last resort, by the faith that the good is also the most Real in the world and that therefore knowledge cannot be a meaningless play of appearances. -- All our conclusions concerning the real world rest upon the immediate confidence or faith which we repose in the universal validity of a certain postulate of thought which oversteps the limits of the special world of thought." ³.

Consequently, over and above the operation of our rational faculty with its power of comprehending the world according to rational categories, is the practical reason or the moral will, which is in immediate contact with reality and thus must be regarded as having higher and prior validity to the conclusions of the rational

¹. Lotze. - Outlines of Metaphysics. - p.141
². ibid. - p.92
processes.

"It is a true saying that God has ordered all things by measure and number but what He ordered was not measures and numbers themselves but that which deserved or required to possess them. -- - The meaning of the world is what comes first. -- - All those laws which can be designated by the common name of mathematical mechanics -- exist not in their own authority nor as a useless destiny to which reality is compelled to bow. They are to us such language as men can express the first consequences, which in the pursuit of its end, the living and active meaning of the world has lain at the foundation of all particular realities as a command embracing them all. We do not know this meaning in its fullness and therefore we cannot deduce it from what we can only attempt in one universal conviction to retrace to it."

Thus, above the knowing process is the active power of creative spirits; over the world as a system of rigid determination is the moral judgment of this order. And by the nature of the case, this moral judgment must stand first in point of order. That which makes the world a settled order, and that which renders it a cosmos is the plan of its being, or the end it realises, and this being and this end must be referred to a moral judgment, - to a value.

"In Lotze's hands the ontological argument changes into a great fundamental judgment of worth. It is only the good which has in itself the complete right to be, and this is recognised in a judgment or postulate of value which carries us beyond the merely intellectual region into the domain of feeling. -- - Here ethics and religion take their rise. Even for the work of knowledge proper this conception is fundamental; we are led to regard the universe as a consistent whole not by the demands of an uninterested understanding, but by the inspirations of a reason appreciative of worth."

Here Lotze comes to the fundamental question which Kant avoided and to which Schleiermacher offered such a feeble answer. What is the relation of the moral order - the sphere of value - to the natural order - the sphere of world knowledge? The development of Lotze's thought should, it would appear, suggest to him that the moral is the principle upon which all should be explained. His general method of arguing

1. Lotze. - Outlines of Metaphysics. - conclusion.
from the inference of the self forces him back to value as the basis of his thinking. Indeed, at times he seems to recognise this.

"In the concluding section of his treatise on metaphysics - the last book which he lived to write - Lotze repeats a dictum with which he had closed his first book - a book which bears the same title as the latest. 'The true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics', he asserts, 'I admit', he goes on to say, 'that the expression is not exact but I still feel certain of being on the right track when I seek in that which should be, the ground of that which is'. Unfortunately, Lotze never consistently applied this idea to his philosophical thinking.

Instead of developing an ethical metaphysics Lotze approached the problem in the Kantian manner - by introducing another faculty, that of feeling. Feelings, he said, were the media through which the idea of worth is introduced into the life of the soul. Thus value, instead of being the ultimate category of reality, is reduced to that particular sphere belonging to feeling. The world of value and the world of existence became in consequence quite distinct, and the opportunity of connecting them suggested by his great insight, was lost. Thus he declares -

"It is not what passes between two objects unconnected with us but what passes between each one of them and ourselves that constitutes the spring of our pleasure and pain, (and therefore of value). Either pleasure or pain may be awakened by any simple impression according as it disturbs the conditions or activities, the impulses and the habits of working which it encounters in us, and seeks to divert them from their natural direction." ¹

Lotze struggled to give these feelings a place in reality. He rejected the purely subjective characterisation of feeling. He insisted that our pleasure in things is not wholly particular, but like the judgment of truth and falsity it has a universal side and is a means of discovering an objective worth in things. While our judgments tell us what is true or false, our feelings tell us what is valuable for all, he declared. But obviously, the arguments that rose against Schleiermacher's attempt to lay a feeling basis for religious knowledge apply here with similar force. In undiscriminated and undiscriminative feeling there is no standard for the differentiation of values.

¹ W.R. Sorley. - op. cit. p.3
Ritschl's Predecessors.

IV. Ritschl and his Predecessors.

Ritschl shared the general Kantian tradition in his restriction of knowledge to phenomena. However he was unwilling to abide by the Neo-Kantian scepticism regarding the objective validation of knowledge. Knowledge is phenomenal he admits - but he insists that phenomena are valid and legitimate appearances of the real. Through the appearances we perceive the thing. In theology this dictum becomes - we know God in His appearances or through His revelations. This is his fundamental epistemological presupposition. However, just as insistently as he maintains this he declares that religious knowledge is distinct in kind from world or theoretical knowledge. For each of these theses he is indebted to Lotze, if not for their origin, at least for their proof. With regard to the first he accepts Lotze's theory of knowledge - or rather it, should be said, he accepts what he thought was Lotze's theory of knowledge. In support of the second he adopts Lotze's distinction between fact and value.

As the following chapter will be concerned with a treatment of Ritschl's epistemology, it would be well to reserve the discussion of his relation to Lotze in this respect until then. In any case, it was the second suggestion which Ritschl drew from Lotze's philosophy which proved the more important and fruitful in his theology.

Lotze had found in the faculty of judging according to worth something higher than the theoretical faculty. This gave rise to a dual outlook upon the world. There appeared to be a world determined by the "forms" of the apperception and a world determined by judgments of worth. They former must be regarded as existing for the latter. This inference from Lotze's philosophy Ritschl made the basis for a distinction between religious and world knowledge. Religious knowledge, he said, rests upon or takes its course in judgments of value in distinction from theoretical or factual judgments, and the "Weltanschauung" which arises from religious knowledge (value judgments) must be assumed the true and ultimate one. However, he adds, its reality must always be itself a value - or a matter of faith - and cannot be proved from the nature of worldly events, - i.e. from theoretical judgments.
RITSCHL'S PREDECESSORS.

It was not from Lotze alone that this suggestion came to Ritschl. We have shown already that if the word "value" were substituted for "feeling" in Schleiermacher's theology his position would approximate that of Ritschl. Indeed, generally, in his method and his attitude toward other modes of thinking, he was a direct logical predecessor of Ritschl. It is true that the terminology used by these theologians were very different. Ritschl repudiates the phrase "absolute dependence" as too negative in its meaning, and the word feeling as too subjective and mystical. His conception of the revelation in Christ, as embodied in the Christian community replaces the idea of a feeling of dependence as the source and subject matter of theological propositions. However, Ritschl in defining the place of the Christian in this heritage bequeathed by Christ, finds complete resignation of the individual will to the divine purpose as the essential element, and in this respect does not completely divorce himself from Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence. Ritschl does not make very much use of the word feeling. He uses the term "value", which, he hoped, by implying an objective reference, would overcome the subjectivism of Schleiermacher's thinking; and by its tangible or reasonable significance would do away with mysticism.

Apart from these rather important differences in the phrasing of key terms, there are many points of similarity between the views of Ritschl and Schleiermacher. Indeed, it was probably a deep consciousness of this which made Ritschl take such pains to separate his thought from that of his predecessor. Both theologians find the origin and objective validation of Christianity in historic revelation. They are as one in placing emphasis on the redeeming power of Christ as the heart of the Christian faith; and each views religion in terms of definite historical occurrences beginning in historical events and sustained through fellowship.

The assumption of an epistemological premise; the basing of religion upon value; and the appeal to an historic revelation, represent the keynotes of Ritschl's theology. In each of these Ritschl may be said to have borrowed from his predecessors but the development which these principles have, and their application to the problems of theology, are peculiar to himself. The epistemological premise which subsists his theology is, "We know things in their appearances." The value basis of theology he expresses by saying, "Religious knowledge takes its course in value judgments."
The historical reality of Christianity he finds in the revelation of God in Christ as sustained in and guaranteed by the Christian community of which Christ was the founder.

In his theology these three premises may be presented thus: -

1. We know God (the thing-in-itself) through His revelations of Himself (phenomenal appearances).
2. Religious knowledge takes its course in value judgments.
3. All Christian knowledge of God is in the revelation of Himself through His Son, Jesus.

In as much as his theological propositions group themselves around these three premises, his theology may well be considered in relation to them.
From the standpoint of the first he considers the relation of theology to philosophy.
From the standpoint of the second he considers the doctrine of God and the validity of religious knowledge in relation to knowledge in general.
From the standpoint of the third he considers the nature of the Christian faith in relation to the world in which we live.
Consequently, these three premises shall provide the titles of the following chapters.
Ritschl frankly accepted a philosophical assumption as the basis of his theology. He declared that the distinctive mark of his theology was this manner in which he identified the objects of knowledge - i.e. in the epistemology that he adopted. And he said, what distinguished his theology from that of his contemporaries was the different theory of knowledge which they accepted. He recognised three kinds of epistemology - Platonic, Kantian, and Lotzian. The first two, he explained, as subsuming the theological errors of his predecessors and contemporaries. The last, the true one - was the one upon which he built.

But in naive contradiction with this position we find Ritschl repudiating any connection between theology and metaphysics. He blames the historical connection of the two for all the evils which have troubled theology, and he declares that if the business of theology is to concern itself with the revelation in Christ, then it and philosophy travel two different and separate roads.

Why did this contradiction rise in his theology? Which view represents his true position? These questions can be answered only by examining this epistemological assumption which he borrowed from Lotze with the purpose in view of reaching some understanding of its relation to his theological position.

Lotze, in so far as he rescued his philosophisings from general scepticism, suggested that the very phenomena of our apperceptive activity were precisely what characterised the real. The logical consequences of this trend of thought are in solipsism, in that it explains the "things" as determinations of a subjective process. Lotze, as we have observed, sought to rescue his philosophy from this conclusion by denying any reality outside the apperceptive activity of minds, or outside of apperceiving minds. Thus apperceptive activity, far from being a subjective thing, is of the very essence of reality. It is what we mean by

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1. Theologie und Metaphysik. (hereafter termed T.u.M.) p.35
2. Justification and Reconciliation (hereafter termed J.& R.)
3. J.& R. - p.15-16
4. T.u.M. - pp.32 & 41
5. T.u.M. - pp.II-24
THEOLOGY AND WORLD KNOWLEDGE.

reality. In other words, Lotze suggests that reality must be conceived as, or in terms of, apperceptive minds. Without this synthesis of apperception there could not be that unity of phenomena which we characterise as an object.

Ritschl was quite willing to give unqualified endorsement to this view.

"Aber in dieser Eiinsicht ist jeder Theolog als wissenschaftlicher Mann genoethigt oder verpflichtet, nach einer bestimmten Theorie der Erkenntniss zu verfahren, deren er sich bewusst sein und deren Recht er nachweis- en muss."

In distinction from his opponents who followed other theories of knowledge Ritschıl declared that he accepted that proposed by Lotze.

He explains his theory of knowledge in what he believes to be close parallelism to that of Lotze. With complete approval he quotes from Lotze.

"'In the phenomena which undergo change in a limited space and in a definite order we cognise the Thing as the cause of the marks or characteristics which act upon us - as the end which these same marks subserve as a means - as the law of their constant change!'

Again, in elaboration of this view which he considers to present the conclusion of Lotze's thinking, he says:

"Denn vollstaendig erkennt Mann ein in sich selbst- aendiges Ding erst in seinen Qualitaeten, naemlich seinen Wirkungen auf unsere Wahrnehmungen und auf andere Dinge. Die Erscheinungen, welche in einem begrenzten Raumbilde in der immer gleichen Lagerung oder Reihenfolge, werden, fasst unsere Vorstellung zu der Einheit des Dinges zusammen nach der Analogic mit der erkennden Seele, welche in dem Wechsel ihrer entsprechenden Empfindungen sich als daurende Einheit fuehlt und erinnert."

He maintains that it is not necessary to assume a reality over and above this. This experiential process gives us an immediate contact with reality. That is, we know the Thing in its appearances. We know it as it appears to us in our perceptive and apperceptive activity.

However, it is to be doubted that this view expresses as close a parallelism to that of Lotze as Ritschıl believed. Lotze had frankly admitted the subjectivity of our knowledge, but had attempted to reinstate the

2. ibid - p.32.  
objectivity of our knowledge by giving to the forms or
categories of the apperceptive consciousness an ontol-
ogical significance. His system was rescued from solips-
ism upon the assumption of a metaphysical inference that
reality is made up of soul-like beings such as ourselves.
The basis of this assumption rests purely on an inference
drawn from our own apperceptive consciousness. Furthermore
it is only upon the assumption of this inference that
the phenomena of knowledge may be said to represent the
nature of Things-in-themselves.

But Ritschl's epistemological assumptions go consid-
erably beyond this position. His epistemology rests upon
the assumption that the relation between knowing and being
is immediate and certain, and that the existence of Things-
in-themselves, apart from this knowledge, is an unnecess-
ary, if not a vicious hypothesis. Now, the assumption that
the relation between knowing and being is both immediate
and certain presupposes a starting point either in naive
realism or in a prior identification of knowing and being.
His repudiation of Things-in-themselves apart from know-
ledge, suggests that he presumes the identification of
knowing and being. Indeed, in so far as he concerns
himself with philosophical discussion he seems to
presume generally the identity of knowing and being.
However, in his theology, the general presupposition
is rather a naive realism.

This confusion arises from the ambiguous nature
of his epistemological premise. Briefly stated, his
premise is that we know the thing in its appearances.
But so vague have been his applications of it that
his opponents have attacked him from the standpoint
both of naive realism and subjective idealism.
Pfleiderer, Lipsius, and Pfennigsdorf have described
his thinking as naive realism. Wegner, Staehlin, and
Luthard have described his system as subjective ideal-
ism. Indeed, it is very doubtful if Ritschl himself
could have explained clearly what he meant. The fact
of the matter is that he rather uncritically borrowed
from Lotze a certain philosophical premise and elab-
orated this premise to suit his own purposes without
a clear apprehension of the nature of the premise he
borrowed, nor a careful consideration of the issues
involved.

"One can not but feel that he was on unfamiliar
and uncongenial ground whenever he attempted to
deal with philosophical principles."  

1 A. E. Garvie. - The Ritschlian Theology. - p. 39
The purpose Ritschl had in view in thus relying upon a theory of knowledge is not difficult to see. He cherished the premise that we know things in their appearances as a point of departure of his theology from that of his predecessors and contemporaries, and as a solid ground upon which he could develop a theology independent of, and unassailable by, metaphysics. If we know God only in his "workings" and if these "workings" are valid indications of the nature of God, then the starting point of theology is not in the abstract nature of God as such, but rather in His attributes which are revealed to us in His "workings" upon us. His methodology, in intent at least, is inductive or empirical. He characterises other systems as deductive, implying and resting upon metaphysical presuppositions. He believed that his theology was different in methodology.

This difference in methodology permitted him, he believed, to drive a wedge between theology and philosophy. That is, by freeing theology from metaphysical speculation he hoped to put theology upon its own feet, and separate it completely from philosophy.

Furthermore, this premise had a positive value in the development of his thought. It permitted him to base theology upon a phenomenally revealed subject matter, which could be dealt with empirically (i.e., scientifically). Upon this basis, he hoped, theology could lay claim to the respect and the validity claimed by the sciences generally.

These two deduction from his epistemological premise, provide a fruitful basis for the study of his theological position in relation to world knowledge. Consequently, his position may be considered from the standpoint of -

I. his conception of the relation of theology to metaphysics.
II. his attempt to establish an empirical or scientific basis for theology.

I. Theology and Philosophy.

The driving impulse which dominated Ritschl's whole treatment of epistemology was his opposition to the speculative theology of his day. This
opposition was directed especially against the association theology with the Hegelian tradition. This association tended to identify the God of theology with the Absolute of philosophy. Consequent upon this, it revealed an undoubted tendency to subordinate Christian principles to metaphysical concepts, and to make philosophy the interpreter of the Christian faith. The excesses to which this affiliation of theology with philosophy led are illustrated in Strauss' "mythical" theory of the life of Christ and Baur's concept of the historical development of Christianity as a "tendency". In relation to such theories Ritschl is by no means unjust in declaring that -

"Das metaphysische Begriffsbestimmungen als die obersten Leitpunkte in der systematischen Theologie anwendet werden, ist erklärlich, wenn man deren Aufgabe so fasst, dass der Einklang der christlichen Offenbarung, beziehungsweise der christlichen Weltanschauung mit einer übergeordneten Gesamtanschauung von der Welt nachgewiesen werden soll, welche als die allgemeine und vernünftige reklamirt wird." ¹

In other words, the attitude of the Hegelians was justified only if theology were willing to accept a role subordinate to philosophy in the formulation of its highest conceptions.

Ritschl's reaction to this viewpoint was to invert the whole scheme. Practical religion, which the speculative school tended to regard as the "metaphysics of the common people", he raised to the position of supreme importance. Metaphysics, on the other hand, which the Hegelians had regarded as the true interpreter of religion, he declared to be, so far as theology was concerned, "empty memory pictures" of a real experience. The particular religious experience of believers which Hegel had related to metaphysics much as Kant related the synopsis of the imagination to the apriori synthesis of the apperception, Ritschl made the heart and center of the Christian faith. Against metaphysics he became empirical; against the deductive method he professed to rest theology upon practical experience; against philosophy he became scientific.

The traditional theologian, he complained, had been first philosophers and second theologians. Consequently the theological viewpoints of the traditional schools

¹ T.u.M. - p.24
have shared the uncertainties and the errors involved in the philosophical positions upon which they have been constructed. The weakness of the traditional theology has been that it was constructed upon a philosophical foundation. At the roots of theology were philosophical presuppositions. The philosophical presuppositions which underlie the traditional approaches, rest upon either of two types of epistemology - the Platonic or the Kantian.

"The first has arisen from Plato's impulse and has its home in scholasticism. So far as its influence extends one meets the representation that the "thing" indeed acts upon us through its changeable signs and excites our sensations and representations, but that the thing rests behind the signs as a unity of attributes which remains unchanged. The second form of epistemology has been produced by Kant in that he confined the knowledge of our understanding to the world of appearances, but declares unknowable the thing-in-itself or the things-in-themselves in the reciprocal changes of which also the changes in world of appearances have their origin." 1

The error in Plato's view, Ritschl affirms, is that he directs us to think of the "thing" apart from its particular appearances for us. When analysed the "thing" instead of representing a higher or truer form of being is shown to be but a general idea.

"In dem Masse aber als man einen Gattungsbegriff von jenem Schwanken in sich reinigt und auf feste und klare Umreise bringt, muss man sich davon uberzeugen, dass er nur ein Schattenbild er wirklichen Dinge in unserer Erinnerung ist, dem keine Wirklichkeit zukommt." - - - "Denn die Nachweisung, dass die Ideen nur verallgemeinerte Erinnerungsbilder sind, ist dahin zu ergaenzen, dass dieselben um so blasser und unbestimmeter, ja sogar schwankender in sich werden, je mehr Exemplare oder Unterarten Sie decken sollen." 2

Kant's view marks an advance on that of Plato in that he sees that such "things" cannot be known. But this view involves the same error in the postulate of "things" as metaphysical entities, existing apart from their signs or qualities. These two views, Ritschl believes, contain the errors of methodology inherent in traditional theology. Fundamentally they involve the same common error of separating the "thing" from its appearances.

1. J. & R. - p.18-19
2. T. u. M. - p.37
THEOLOGY AND WORLD KNOWLEDGE.

It would not be difficult to show that this exposition does not do justice to either Plato or Kant. The identification of Plato's "Ideas" with class concepts fails to appreciate the problem with which Plato was grappling; and the association of Kant's treatment with that of Plato ignores the epistemological problems with which Kant was concerned. However, the justice which he metes out to Kant and Plato does not vitally concern us at this point. The primary concern of this thesis is Ritschl's own views, and his estimate of philosophers and other theologians concerns us only in so far as it reflects his own views.

The false logic involved in these theories of knowledge adopted by his opponents, Ritschl feels himself able to explain.

"Denn vollständig erkennt man ein in sich selbständiges Ding erst in seinen Qualitäten, namentlich seinen Wirkungen auf unsere Wahrnehmungen und auf andere Dinge. Die Erscheinungen, welche in einem begrenzten Räumliche in der immer gleichen Lagerung oder Reihenfolge, und deren Veränderung in einer bestimmten Grenze und Ordnung wahrgenommen werden, fasst unsere Vorstellung zu der Einheit des Dinges zusammen nach der Analogie mit der erkennenden Seele, welche in dem Wechsel ihrer entsprechenden Empfindungen sich als dauernde Einheit fühlt und erinnert. Demgemäß ist das von uns vorgestellte Ding Insichselbstsein und wie die Seele sich als Ursache ihrer wechselnden Empfindungen unter dem Reize der Erscheinungen des Dinges behauptet, und sich in diesen Wahrnehmungen als Zweck ihrer selbst inne wird, so stellt sie auch finis sui vor. Demgemäß wird das isolirte Ding auch als Durchsichsein und Fuersichselbstsein gedacht aber enthebt das Ding aller besonderen Qualitäten. Es ist ein formeller Begriff ohne Inhalt. So geringfügig ist der Begriff des von Frank mit so grossem Gewichte als Gott proclamirten Absoluten!"

FOOTNOTE.
L. Staehlin and James Orr saw in this quotation an exposition of Ritschl's own view, and thus they used this quotation as a basis of an attack upon his theology. But A.E. Garvie has made it quite clear that Ritschl is here giving an account of the way in which he conceives the idea of the Absolute is formed, as defined by his opponents. The first part of the quotation, to be sure, expresses the view which Ritschl shares in common with all thinkers. But then he goes

1. L. Staehlin - op.cit.
2. J. Orr - The Ritschlian Theology.
These metaphysical ideas are then established as forms for the further determination of our ideas of knowledge. "Sie stellt die in dem erkennenden Geist des Menschen entspringenden Formen fest, in welchem derselbe Uberhaupt uber den Fluss der Empfindungen und Wahrnehmungen zu Fixierung von Objecten der Vorstellung fortschreitet." But as such, these ideas, by their very nature, are incapable of estimating the value of spiritual factors because they are not real forms of knowledge but only regulative norms. Their insufficiency is proven by the fact that the further they become isolated from experience, the emptier they are.

This is the fundamental error of Hegelianism. It assumes that the ideas of the reason can be determinant concepts in our contact with ontological reality. But all it succeeds in doing is to substitute empty memory pictures for vital things. The fallacy of this view is that it isolates the rational deductions of the reason from actual experience. It claims that the "law of the theoretical reason is the law of the human spirit in all its functions". For "as certainly as feeling and willing cannot be reduced to knowledge in representation, the latter is not justified in imposing its law on them."

1 T.u.M. - p.8
2 ibid - pp.34-36
3 J.& R. - p.200

FOOTNOTE (continued)
on to show how, upon the basis of these real and valid appearances, the metaphysicians built an abstract and unreal system of concepts, which they claim to represent ontological reality. Another passage may be quoted in which Ritschl expresses much the same idea and in which there can be no doubt of his meaning and intention.

That philosophy presents a shadow of a claim to determine the nature of spiritual reality, rests on the fact that a religious impulse has surrepticiously crept in, which, the philosophers ought to have distinguished from the cognitive methods they follow."

"For in all philosophic systems the affirmation of a supreme law of existence from which they undertake to deduce the world as a whole, is a departure from the strict application of the philosophic method and betrays itself as being quite as much an object of the intuitive imagination as God and the world are for the religious thought."* 

Materialists and pantheists in general share this same error.

"The opposition to Christianity which has been raised by Pantheism in its various modifications and by materialism arises likewise from the fact that a law of a particular realm of being is set up as the supreme law of all being, though the other forms of existence neither would nor could be explained by its means."*

Pantheism assumes that the world itself will reveal the cause of its own being and the nature of its laws. But world knowledge, as such, cannot reach to the highest law of the being of the world, for the simple reason that, in the attempt, it carries itself to empty abstractions. Even worse off is materialism.

"Besides sharing the same errors as pantheism it attempts to deduce the organic from what is mechanical, and similarly the more complex orders of being from those immediately below."*

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1. J. & R. - p. 207
2. ibid - p. 207
3. ibid - p. 208-9
4. ibid - p. 209

**FOOTNOTE (continued)**

beschrieben ist. Aber wenn man in der Analogie des gewöhnlichen Verständnisses und in der Richtung des Verfahrens Platons das Ding als eines Sein, oder als eignes, schafftlose Realität zu denken lehrt, dem man seine Beziehungen und seine bestimmten Eigenschaften zufällig und nachträglich anhaengt um auf jene Weise das Ding klar und fest zu setzen und es vor den Stören durch den Wechsel zu schütteln, der an ihm wahrgenommen wird, so lehrt man etwas, was nicht evident, und was nicht denkbar ist. Vielmehr leitet man hiermit zu einer Art von Vorstellen an, welches eine Ähnlichkeit mit dem Mythus hat. Dieser stellt Naturdinge als Träger geistigen Lebens vor." (T.u.M. - p. 64)
Christanity, in contradistinction from these forms of knowing—
"presents an element which transcends all merely secular knowledge, namely, the end and the means of blessedness of man. Whatever content may have been ascribed to this world blessedness, it expressly denotes a goal, the knowledge of which is unattainable by philosophy and the realisation of which cannot be secured by the natural means at the command of men, but depends on the positive character of Christianity."¹

"Wenn Gott in oder über der Welt die Macht ist, welche der Mensch verehrt weil sie sein geistiges Selbstgefuehl gegen die Hemmungen aus der Natur aufrecht erhaelt, so gehoert kein Gedank von Gott in die Metaphysik, da deren Erkenntnisse gleichgiltig gegen den Art- und Werthunterschied von Geist und Natur sind."²

Similarly Ritschl repudiates those classical proofs for the existence of God contained in the cosmological, teleological and ontological arguments. For example, with respect to the cosmological argument he says—
Das kosmologische Argument ist kein Beweis fuer das Dasein eines Gottes als Urhebers der Welt. Denn wenn man die Eihe der Dinge aus einen subjecktiven Massstab der Erkenntniss als geschlossene Reihe von Ursachen und Wirkungen oder als Ein Ganzes postulirt, so gelangt man in correctem Verfahren zu nichts anderem als zu der Erkenntniss dass Welt Eine Substanz ist."³

All these classical arguments in general involve the same error of carrying the ideas of the reason to a determining position with regard to the nature of the known.
"Now certainly", he affirms,"the Christian representation of God our Father, includes the representation of the first cause and final end as subordinate attributes; but posited as independent things, the conceptions of first cause and final end fail to transcend the conception of the world, therefore fall short of the Christian conception of God."⁴

In other words, the ideas of the reason, which as postulates of thought, appear to occupy a regulative position with relation to knowledge, can not in any respect be identified with the nature of God because these postulates apply only to the rational synthesis of knowledge.

¹ J.& R. - p.193
² T.U.M. - p.11
³ ibid - pp.36-7
⁴ J.& R. - p. 215
That there is a similarity between this attitude and that of Kant is evident. Many of Ritschl's arguments seem to be borrowed from Kant's Critiques. It may be true that Ritschl did not develop his arguments with anything that resembled the Kantian subtlety of logic. Indeed, he seems ill at ease and vague in his thinking whenever he undertakes a philosophical discussion. However both Kant and Ritschl are as one in declaring that the theoretical reason can never reach a determination of that which the religious or the practical consciousness reveals as God. And both men are equally anxious to dispose of any rational or "natural" knowledge of God.

However, the basis upon which each rejects the rational knowledge of God is quite different. Kant repudiates the pretensions of reason to reach a determination of the nature of God upon his distinction of the theoretical and the practical reason. His premise that the pure reason deals with the categories of the understanding alone, and that the practical reason acts from moral principles determined by the nature of reality itself, automatically, by initial predication, excludes a connection. The two groups could never come together because this initial distinction held them separate. To bring them together would be to repudiate the premise.

Ritschl's treatment rests upon no such subtle distinction. Ritschl rejected rational knowledge of God on the ground that the ideas of God and metaphysics generally, are empty memory pictures removed from experience and ipso facto divorced from reality. But obviously, to call the Ideas of the reason, empty memory pictures is to ignore the whole problem with which the second part of Kant's first Critique was concerned. It utterly forgets that these ideas - even if they could not claim an existential validity, yet are necessitated by the requirements of knowledge. Ritschl's method practically amounts to the affirmation that religious knowledge need not concern itself with metaphysics because the ultimate nature of things is clearly revealed in the perceptive or intuitive experience itself. Such an affirmation presupposes an epistemological basis of the most uncritical realism. Ritschl seems to assume that his premise "we know things in their appearances" justifies, on the one hand, the identification of the appearance and the "thing", and on the other hand, the identification of the "thing" with the immediate percept of actual experience. Such a position recalls Bishop Berkeley's exposition of Abstract ideas, and forgets that considerable progress had been made since Berkeley wrote his famous dissertation.

I see T.u.M. - p.37
It would be enlightening at this point to refer to a particular argument which Ritschl uses to dispose of the claims of metaphysics, in as much as this argument reveals the general inadequacy of his treatment of philosophical problems. In his "Theologie und Metaphysik" he affirms against Luthard that "if this alleged natural consciousness of God is to find its truth first by means of something else (i.e. if it involves religious conceptions also) then it has no truth in itself. It is itself a false doctrine of God. Nor is this natural theology to be reckoned a half truth until by the revelation of salvation it is completed to be the full truth. Alas, falsehood, on that account still clings to it for what is truth cannot be compounded out of two different halves."

That these conclusions involve a confusion of thought is evident on even a superficial examination. Upon the premise that speculative thought does not determine the nature of the Christian God, he concludes that it has, therefore, no concern with this God, and in consequence, by the very nature of the case must present a false conception. That it might represent a partial determination of the Divine Nature, he utterly fails to perceive. His general process of thought seems to be first to distinguish world and religious knowledge, then to affirm that what is distinguishable is separable, and finally to conclude that what is separable is isolated, if not opposed.

However, it would be totally unfair to condemn Ritschl's attitude because of his naive philosophical expositions. Ritschl, through these expositions, was but protesting against a certain trend of thought and was seeking to establish a certain position. His arguments in support of his purpose may be judged defective - but that does not totally devalue the position he was attempting to maintain. It but proves him an indifferent philosopher.

Ritschl saw that theology had been suffering and was suffering by the attempt of philosophers and theologians to fit theological propositions into philosophic categories. The trend of this process was to equate metaphysics and theology. Against this tendency Ritschl, very justly, protested. Metaphysical ideas, from the viewpoint of philosophy, represent the highest synthesis of the world of knowledge. They are the categories from which the world may be seen as a single and unified whole. Now, to identify these categories with religious concepts.
is, ipso facto, to involve the spiritual with the synthesis of rational knowledge. That is to say, the spiritual and the natural world would be placed under one method of treatment and be comprehensible under the same ideas or concepts. The fatal consequence of this viewpoint is that we could ascribe, upon this premise, no superiority of spirit over nature. They would both become substance and stand on the same level. Spiritual concepts are reduced to mechanical terms and God becomes but the embodiment of the ultimate synthesis of knowledge. When these philosophers - "einen Gedanken von Gott als Correlat ihrer philosophischen Beurtheilung der Welt im Allgemeinen aufstellen, aber einen Gedanken, welcher entweder den der Welt nicht ueberschreitet, oder nur die Idee der Welt darstellt, so sind sie zu dieser Auffassung in demselben Gesichtskreise disponirt, welchen die hellenische Religion einnimmt, indem sie die goettlichen Wesen mit der Naturwelt verflochten setzt. Daraus folgt, dass, wenn man als Christ die Bedingungen der religiösen Weltanschauung von denen einer metaphysischen Kosmologie zu unterscheiden vermag, man keine metaphysische Erkenntniss des Gottes zugestehen wird, an den man um seiner Seligkeit willen glaubt." 

But Ritschl is by no means consistent in maintaining this attitude of opposition to metaphysics. At times he gives to metaphysical ideas all the regulative significance that Kant recognised in them. He affirms their valid apriori nature in the determination of the object of knowledge. He insists only in a quite valid fashion that - "durch metaphysische Begriffe ein wertvollere Erkenntniss von Geistigen Groessen nicht erreicht wird." Indeed, at times he goes further than this, and is not altogether sure that the inference of an ultimate cause could not be made from the world. "A law (of the natural world) refers us back to a legislating and imposing spirit and will, and the moral order of the world implies a Creator Who lays down laws and governs according to a fixed purpose. But it is only a leap of the imagination, when the aesthetic effect upon our feeling of a law discerned in nature and history is thrown into objective form as the principle that every known law of reality is eo ipso the efficient force and sufficient ground of that which is real. Nor need we let ourselves be intimidated by the further assurance that it is a mark of a limited intelligence to demand an ordaining will as the prius

1 T.u.M. - p.II
2 ibid - p.8
3 ibid - p.9
of a law, and from that will to deduce likewise the active
the active force exhibited in the phenomena embraced by
the law." 4.

Here, evidently, Ritschl recognises that the world order need
not be altogether separated from religious knowledge. Philos­
ophy may not be able to reach a determination of the nature
of God but once assuming the nature of God and the religious
outlook then it may be seen that in the world "all things
work together for good"

"The possibility of both kinds of knowledge mingling or
again colliding lies in this, that they deal with the
same object, namely the world. Now we cannot rest con­
tent with the amiable conclusion that our Christian know­
ledge comprehends the world as a whole, while philosophy
fixes the special and universal laws of nature and spirit.
For with this task every philosophy likewise combines
the ambition to comprehend the universe under one supreme
law. And for Christian knowledge also one supreme law
is the form under which the world is comprehensible as
a whole under God. Even the thought of God which belongs
to religion, is employed in some way or other by every non-
materialistic philosophy. Thus no principle of discrimi­
ation is, at least provisionally, to be found in the object
with which they deal." 2.

The importance of this admission can not be overestimated
in view of some of Ritschl's other statements regarding
the relation of these two spheres.

In respect to this issue there is a noteworthy develop­
ment in Ritschl's thought between the first and the third
editions of his "Justification and Reconciliation".
His earliest edition was comparatively conciliatory toward
science. There are many evidences that he flirted with
scientific propositions to bolster up his theological
ideas. Otto Pfleiderer says that -

"in his early edition he recognised that a reliance on
value judgments was not a sufficient guarantee to escape
the well-known position of Feuerbach that the gods are
the "Fuesschwezen" invented by men out of their practical
need to find a supplement to their own powerlessness over
nature." 3.

Thus in his first edition he held the possibility and the
necessity of an independent proof of the existence of God
founded upon the general data of the human mind. Later,
a critical desire to make his theology consistent with his
position in relation to value and the opposition of his
opponents drove him toward an antagonistic position in
relation to all philosophic theology. While he continued
to acknowledge that there was a point of contact of

1. J. & R. - p.231
2. ibid - p.203
3. The Development of Theology. - p.185
Theology and philosophy in the common interest of each in the world, yet in his later position he would admit of no contact in between the two spheres in the subjective realm. This is a clear departure from his earlier position. In his first edition he had said -


Ritschl's conciliatory attitude toward world knowledge receives its clearest expression in his treatment of Kant's moral argument. Ritschl feels favourably disposed toward this argument in as much as in it -

"man opposes himself to the world of nature and secures his position in it or over it by faith in God." 1

According to Kant's argument as expounded by Ritschl, even science has to recognise as a reality, the moral life on the one hand and the cognitive or sensuous life on the other. It is forced, unless it abandon its endeavour to find a unity in all objects of knowledge, to seek some explanation of the relation between these two spheres. The Christian idea of God offers such an explanation, assuring, as it does, an ultimate correspondence between holiness and happiness - between character and circumstance. To bring its view of the world to completeness and unity, science, in its own interests, is under obligation to accept this idea of God. However, it cannot be claimed that the moral theistic argument, thus based on scientific necessity, adds anything to the reality of God beyond the necessity of thinking Him in order to explain certain relations of man to the world. Accordingly, the idea of man, Ritschl concludes, is only a conviction of faith. 3

Ritschl's comments on this argument are of the utmost importance. He declares that if a scientific proof of God is possible it must rest upon some understanding of the relation of science and religion.

1 C. Fabricius. Die Entwicklung in A. Ritschl's Theologie" -p.110
2 J.& R. - p.219
3 see J.& R. - pp. 219-21.
"What I mean by this is that besides the reality of nature, theoretical knowledge must recognise as given, the reality of spiritual life and the equal binding force of the special laws which obtain in each realm. With respect to this, theoretical cognition must simply accept the fact, that, while spiritual life is subject to the laws of mechanism so far as it is interwoven with nature, yet its special character as distinct from nature is signified by practical laws which declare spirit to be an end in itself. ——

And yet knowledge of the laws of our action is also theoretical knowledge for it is knowledge of the laws of spiritual life."

(He then adds two significant sentences)

"Now the impulse of knowing, of feeling and of aesthetic intuition, of will in general and its special application to society, and finally the impulse of religion in the general sense of the word, all concur to demonstrate that spiritual life is the end while nature is the means. This is the general law of spiritual life, the validity of which science must maintain if the special character of the spiritual realm of existence is not to be ignored."

Consequently it is likewise the task of cognition to seek for a law explaining the co-existence of these two heterogeneous orders of reality. Kant never succeeded in bringing them together, although he suggested a unity in faith in an all-controlling God. Ritschl seizes upon this idea and makes it a vital principle of explanation.

"As religion is the practical law of the spirit in accordance with which it sustains its fundamental character as an end in itself, —— and as this practical law attains its complete development in Christianity, —— then if we are to attempt to comprehend the ground and law of the co-existence of nature and spiritual life —— we must, to attain our end, acknowledge the Christian conception of God as the truth by which our knowledge of the universe is consummated. —— Nothing remains but to accept the Christian idea of God —— as an indispensable truth in order that we may find both the ground and the law of the real world in that Creative Will which includes as the final end of the world, the destination of mankind for the Kingdom of God."

In this discussion Ritschl lays the basis for a world outlook which will define the relation of science, philosophy and theology. He suggests that the religious viewpoint must be the ultimate one not only for theology but for world

2. Ibid - p.223.
THEOLOGY AND WORLD KNOWLEDGE.

knowledge as well. And in as much as Christianity is the completion and perfection of the religious outlook, then Christianity must be considered the highest point of reference for all knowledge - scientific, philosophic and theologic. "If now the creation and government of the world are accordingly to be conceived as the means whereby created spiritual beings - men - are formed into the Kingdom of God in the community of Christ, then the view of the world given in Christianity is the key to solve the problem of the world in general." 1

But then having laid claim to so much he relinquishes it all in summarising the moral argument. "To accept the idea of God in this way is, as Kant observes, practical faith and not an act of theoretical cognition. While therefore the Christian religion is thereby proved in harmony with reason it is always with the reservation that knowledge of God embodies itself in judgments which differ in kind from those of theoretical science." 2

The artificiality of this conclusion is evidenced by the fact that in the first edition of the book, when he was carried along by the force of the logical development of his thesis, and before controversy forced him to revise critically his statements, he concludes altogether differently. In the first edition of his book he says, "The acceptance of the idea of God is not a practical belief but an act of theoretical knowledge".

Indeed, this last minute return to the Kantian position in his later edition is altogether unwarranted on the part of Ritschl. Kant had based his distinction between religious and theoretical knowledge upon the distinction between the noumenal nature of moral principles and the phenomenal nature of theoretical knowledge. But Ritschl, in his philosophical heritage from Lotze, had denied the validity of this distinction. His premise was that the phenomenal and the noumenal were not distinct. Consequently there is no excuse for him here introducing an act of faith to unite the two, for he elsewhere claims that his epistemology, upon which his theology rests, binds the two together in the premise that we know things in their appearances.

As this is an important point in his theology and as it is especially important in a study of the nature of value it would be well to pursue the relation of these two tendencies further by a discussion of Ritschl's position in relation to problems, which, by lying on the borderline

2 Ibid - p.234-5.
between the natural and the spiritual, bring out more clearly Ritschl's position on this issue. Three problems may be studied.

i. Miracles.
ii. The Divine purpose in history.
iii. Comparative religion.

i. Miracles.

Professor Denny in his book "Studies in Theology" believes that he is doing full justice to the Ritschlian position when he says that it "rejects miracles altogether in any sense which gives it a hold on man's intelligence or a place in his creed". In support of this interpretation he quotes Ritschl as affirming that a belief in miracles must not be considered as involving an infracture on the "continuity of the whole world according to natural law" for "when certain records of miracles in biblical books appear to come into conflict with this rule it is neither a scientific task to remove this appearance or to establish it as a fact, nor is it a religious task to recognise these recorded events as divine actions against the laws of nature". Professor Orr averys further of Ritschl's views, that - "miracle is defined as an event or experience of God's presence or action for our help. But this is a 'value judgment' and does not imply any real departure from the ordinary course of nature. Miracle is a 'religious' not a 'scientific' notion. In any case faith has no interest in asserting the reality of occurrences which contravene the established order of the world."

The consequences of this attitude Professor Orr goes on to explain. "It cuts off the miraculous birth of Jesus at the one end of the history and His bodily resurrection at the other, and practically surrenders to a rationalistic criticism all the wonders of the ministry that lie between. -- The earthly life of Jesus closes for them (the Ritschlians) as for the ordinary anti-miraculous criticism, with the cross." *

If it be admitted that these critics have correctly interpreted the Ritschl position in saying that Ritschl denies that there is any naturalistic explanation or implication or consequence involved in a belief in miracles, then it must be conceded, that from a Christian standpoint at any rate, the criticism is fair. However, even though it may be easy to quote Ritschl into this position yet it may be questioned if, when the task is done, the criticism has done full justice to Ritschl's general stand in theology.

1. p.10
2. *from-Unterricht in der Christlichen Religion. p.15
3. op.cit. - p.91-2
4. *ibid - p.92
Ritschl does maintain that miracles, as religious acts, need not be reconciled with a scientific conception of nature in order that their religious value be appreciated. But whether he would maintain that they could not be so reconciled with science or that their existential nature is of no importance, is another question. This question is bound up with the greater question which will face us throughout his theology — What is the relation between the realm of faith and the order of nature?

Professor Orr concedes that Ritschl's position is by no means clear on this point. But he quotes him generally in a separation of the two spheres.

"in his first sketch of a Dogmatic (1853) he is already taking the ground that a miracle has its truth not for science but for religious experience. In the "Unterricht" on the other hand he speaks in a way which seems more satisfactory when he tells of the reawakening (Auferstehung) of Christ by the power of God in a manner thoroughly consistent with the demands of the Christian faith. (p.21) Yet the remarks on miracles on an earlier page, (p.14) repudiate the view of miracles which regards them as contravening the scientific assumption of a connection through natural law, of the whole world, and declares it to be no religious task to recognise recorded miracles as divine effects contrary to natural laws." ¹

Professor A.E. Garvie, as opposed to the interpretation of Professors Denny and Orr, is quite positive in expounding Ritschl's views in support of the validity of miracles in the natural world. All that the quotations adverse to this position prove, he declares, is that Ritschl refuses "to commit himself to any theory about the relation of miracles to the order of nature".² He finds support for this interpretation of Ritschl's view in many of Ritschl's statements.

"He (Ritschl) describes the Christian view of the world as of a 'teleological and especially miraculous character'; he shows the insufficiency of the mechanical view of the world which excludes purpose and miracles; lastly he claims that a teleological and in single features even a miraculous view of the world which corresponds with man's need of religion, which guarantees him his position as a spiritual and moral whole in his connection with nature and human society, is anything but irrational in comparison with the knowledge of nature and its laws." ³

¹ op.cit. - p.93.
² op.cit. - p.223.
³ ibid - p.224.
Indeed, Professor Garvie might have quoted Ritschl even more precisely in support of this position. On page 616 of Justification and Reconciliation, Ritschl claims -

"if now this (assertion of the independence of the scientific view of the world) issues in the further contention that the scientific view of the world can get along without the conception of end, and without the assumption of miracles, this is a self-delusion. Miracles, in the sense of effects which are not produced according to law, are assumed in every philosophical or scientific theory of the universe; for no such theory is without gaps; and these gaps are discernible whenever such effects are affirmed as not mediated by any known law."

The conclusion that one must draw from this discussion is that Ritschl's position on this point is obscure. Professors Denny and Orr on the one hand, and Professor Garvie on the other, receive justification in the theology of Ritschl for their diverse views regarding Ritschl's position. The fact of the matter was that Ritschl never faced, directly, the issue involved in the matter and consequently could not be expected to maintain a consistent position with respect to it. The point is the same one which has emerged before and which will emerge again and again in a consideration of Ritschl's views - the relation of the realm of faith to the order of nature, or as we have raised the problem in the beginning - the relation of value and fact.

ii. The Divine purpose in history.

Concerning the question of a divine purpose being revealed in history, Ritschl's thinking betrays the same wavering. On the one hand, his effort to relate all ethical and moral purpose to the love of God revealed in Christ forbids him finding such a purpose anywhere except in the Christian community. On the other hand, a repudiation of meaning to all pre-christian or extra-christian moral striving, is more than a sane theology could accept. In the first edition of his Justification and Reconciliation, Ritschl seemed to recognise Christianity as the completion and fulfillment of the promises contained in other moral religious systems. A comparison of the different editions reveals not only a change in thought in this regard, but also an indecision with regard to the problem generally. In the first edition he says -

"Der vollstaendige Begriffe von der christlichen Religion wird nich schon erreicht durch die geordnete Reproduktion des Gedankenkreises Christi, sondern erst durch die
Vergleichung desselben mit den andern Arten und Stufen der Religion. Erst aus diesem Verfahren der allgemeinen Religionswissenschaft kann die spezifische Eigentümlichkeit des Christentums ermittelt werden."

In the second and third edition of his book a small but important change is made.

"Der vollständige Begriffe von der christlichen Religion wird erreicht durch die Geordnete Reproduction des Gedankenkreises Christi und der Apostel und wird sichergestellt durch die Vergleichung desselben mit den andern Arten und Stufen der Religion. Erst mit Hinzuziehung der allgemeinen Religionsgeschichte kann die spezifische Eigentümlichkeit des Christentums ermittelt werden."  

As his theology developed Ritschl tended more and more to find Christ's redeeming power the sole carrier of moral and religious value. His claim that "all love of men springs according to the Christian representation out of the revelation of God in Christ" permitted him to see God's redeeming power only within the Christian community. That other religions had their contact with God he would not deny, but Christianity and Christian theology have no concern with such. These have a full and complete revelation in Christ - that is sufficient.

iii. Comparative religion.

This raises the third problem of comparative religion. Strictly speaking, Ritschl's theology could have no room for comparative religion. In his "Theology and Metaphysics" he affirms against the claims of Luthard a quotation which we have made use of before.

"If this alleged natural consciousness of God is to find its truth first by means of something else then it has no truth in itself. It is in itself a false doctrine of God. Nor is this natural theology to be reckoned a half truth until, by the revelation of salvation, it is completed to be the full truth. Alas, falsehood on that account still cleaves to it; for what is truth cannot be added together out of two halves."

The validity of the logical process involved in this argument might, as we have shown, be well questioned. It might not be so self-evident to everyone as it was to Ritschl, that just because truth comes to us through a medium it is therefore without truth. However, from his own standpoint Ritschl's...
position is well taken. It simply is this. If we can know God only in the revelation in Christ then it is a false method to seek an approach from any other angle.

It may be conceded to Ritschl that God cannot be truly and completely known except in Christ. But the conclusion that knowledge derived from any other source is false, does not logically follow. Accepting Christianity as the whole truth it does not follow that, therefore, other faiths contain no truth. Because a thing is not a whole or a perfectness it does not follow that it is utterly invalid or false. Indeed, Ritschl, in his calmer moments is willing to recognise a kinship between Christianity and the other religions.

"The observation and the comparison of the several historical religions from which the common conception is abstracted, teach that these are related to one another not as kinds, but at the same time, as stages. They exhibit an ever more rich and determinant manifestation of the chief features of religion."

"Das Christentum ist von dem Anspruch erfüllt die vollkommene Religion über den anderen Arten und Stufen der selben zu sein, welche dem Menschen dasjenige leistet, was in allen anderen Religionen zwar erstrebt wird, aber nur undeutlich oder unvollständig vorschweben."

However this does not involve Christian theology in a study of comparative religion. Indeed, from the standpoint of one religion, Ritschl insists, that it is impossible to judge others, "for we always judge from the standpoint of our own religion". Thus, from a Christian viewpoint one may look backward and see the other religions arranged in a serial order with Christianity at the top, yet from the standpoint of any of the other faiths it is impossible to see things in this light. One may look backward upon other religions - but in comparative religion as Ritschl sees it, it is impossible to look forward or beyond the particular faith in which we find ourselves. The viewpoint of the observer is always prejudiced.

This inability frankly to face the problem of comparative religion reveals a weakness in Ritschl's theology. He argues that any religion is ultimate from its own standpoint. Against it there can be no appeal, and with it there can be no comparison; for the theologian of any faith can never step outside of his own faith to see things from a comparative viewpoint. To admit a frank comparative standpoint would be to admit of a supra-religious basis for judgment. Ritschl's opposition to metaphysics forbade him to do this. But our whole missionary enterprise is based upon the assumption that Christianity can assert its

1. J. & R. - p.196
2. Unterricht etc. - Einleitung.
superiority, comparatively, to other faiths. Ritschl's theology gives no basis for this assumption.

The conclusion of the matter seems to be this. Ritschl's opposition to the Hegelian philosophical theology of his day led him to seek for a new basis for theology. He found this in the epistemological premise that "we know things in their appearances." He believed, relieved theology of any dependence upon speculative inferences. God is as we find Him revealed in our religious experience, modified and guided, of course, by religious revelation. Metaphysics, consequently, is not only useless, it is pernicious because it sets up an idea abstracted from reality as the eternal form of God.

However, this, he perceived, did not sever theology from all contact with philosophy. They both, he admitted, are concerned with the same object - the world. Therefore, the problem necessarily arises as to the comparative validity of their respective viewpoints with regard to this common object of interest. Which has the right to claim superior jurisdiction. Is the scientific or the religious "Weltanschauung" ultimate. The problem which Ritschl sought to avoid in the realm of epistemology by borrowing the naive presupposition that "we see things in their appearances", meets him here in a consideration of the relation between religion and the world comprehended by science. We have seen that he tended to assert the supremacy of the religious viewpoint but shrank from involving himself in the philosophical problems that this claim involved. He insisted on one thing - the independence of the religious outlook. Further than that he did not go.

The problem was too much for him. It is doubtful if he saw the full meaning of his position. His religious faith, on the one hand demanded that he assert the superiority of the religious outlook, but the task of imposing this superiority upon the causal nexus of world events caused him to waver between a frank acceptance of the Kantian distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal, and seeking shelter for religion by carving out for it a special field in reality. We shall see later that it was the latter of these alternatives which he adopted. In either case he could give no satisfactory explanation of the problems involved in Miracles, the Divine Influence in History, and Comparative Religion.
II. Theology as a Science.

Ritschl cherished for theology the apparent indifference to metaphysical speculation which he observed in the practical sciences. The scientists seemed to have before them a clear-cut subject matter bestowed on each science, directly and simply. And to Ritschl, the scientists seemed to be able to build with this subject matter much as a little boy builds intricate structures with carved wooden blocks.

Ritschl believed that in basing his theology upon the premise "we know God in His effects or His workings", he gave to theology what he envied in the practical sciences. Just as the practical sciences have a clear-cut subject matter before them, so theology has its precise subject matter in the manifest workings of God's will. And just as the practical sciences appeared to pursue an inductive or empirical method in the classification and the arranging of their subject matter, so should theology adopt a similar methodology in arranging its material.

"As theology has to do with the God revealed in Christ this is justified scientifically as the only practical form of the conception of God." 1

That the course of scientific investigation was not as clear sailing as a prima facie survey indicated, Ritschl like many people of fifty years ago, did not stop to consider. That the scientists have to struggle arduously with their subject matter, carving it out for themselves with a knife which closely resembles metaphysics, and that the apparently simple inductive arrangement of the subject matter concerned but covers a multitude of metaphysical assumptions, Ritschl had little or no inkling. Consequently he naively attempted to build a theology in the same manner, and the structure when completed revealed the surreptitious incursions of metaphysics, which is now frankly recognised in the sciences, but which Ritschl failed to see.

As fundamental in his statement of Christian doctrine Ritschl maintains -

"Die Gottheit Christi und die des heiligen Geistes in den Wirkungen und Zumuthungen erkennt werden welche sie auf die Glaubigen ausueben." 2

"The scientific proof for the truth of Christianity ought only to be sought in the line of thought already singled out by Spener, 'Wessoever willeth to do the will of God will know that the doctrine of Christ is True." 3

3 J. & R. - p.24-5.
Theology, as such, has no concern with anything over and above this, any more than the sciences are concerned with the metaphysical status of the subject matter they are seeking to understand through its revealed qualities. The God we know, Ritschl maintains, is the God with whom we have contact and experience. To speak of knowing anything more of God than this is to capitulate to philosophy and metaphysics, and to involve theology in the unsolvable and inconsequential problems of that manner of thinking.

The significance of this standpoint is that the focus of attention is turned from the abstract nature of God as existing eternal in the heavens as the ground and essence of His nature as known, to a study of the actual effects and operations of God upon the world, and especially upon the Christian consciousness and the Christian community generally. God has His personality and individuality for theology in that we see evidences of a personal active will operative on man and working toward the realisation of a purpose in creation.

"God's personal will, like any other force can be thought, as the cause of the effects only when acting in a definite direction. As Will God can be thought only as in conscious relation to the end which He Himself is. Nevertheless, this formal truth is inadequate to explain everything which is not God. It is inadequate therefore to explain the world. Unless it can be shown that and how the world is embraced in the personal end which God sets before Himself then even this analysis of the Divine will leads to nothing. We shall find that the conception of love, which is the key to the revelation of God in Christianity carries us past the difficulties which accompany that analysis."1

The full and complete determination of God is found in the idea of loving will, and in the idea of loving will is to be found the full and complete determination of God.

"He is either conceived of as love or simply not at all. If anyone thinks it necessary, after the analogy of human personality, to conceive God first as infinite Being and as indeterminate Will, of quiescent Character which may advance within itself to self-determination as love, what he conceives under these prefatory ideas is simply not God."2 Furthermore, it would be inadequate to try to define this love of God under current categories such as feeling or as will. It would be more proper to say that in Divine love, feeling and will are indissolubly intertwined.

"Love as feeling fulfills its nature when it excites the will; and love as will includes the feeling of the same. The conception of love therefore is completely expressed by combining both."3

The concept of God as love may be further defined by an analysis of love into its evident qualities, so as to bring out the meaning and significance of the word so used. Firstly, it is necessary that the objects which are loved should be of like nature to the subject which loves them—namely persons. To speak of love for animals or things, or of God's love for the world viewed as a cosmic process is absurd. God loves only persons and reveals his nature as love only to persons.

Secondly, love implies a will constant in its aim. If objects change we may have fancies, but we cannot have love.

Thirdly, love aims at the promotion of the other's personal end. This means more than Kant's categorical imperative commanding us always to treat persons as ends never as means. Kant's imperative is negative in its power. Love commands that we seek the good of others and strive to realise it.

"Love desires either to promote, to maintain, and through sympathetic interest to enjoy, the individuality of character acquired by the other, or to assist him in securing those blessings which are necessary to ensure the attainment of his personal will."*

Fourthly, and this fourth quality sums up the others, the will of the lover must take up the other's personal end and make it part of his own."*

The ends and ideals of others become an integral part of the ends and ideals of him who loves.

"The will is directed to the closest fellowship with another and to a common end."*

The adequacy or the inadequacy of this determination of the nature of God as loving will can be made manifest only by applying the proposition to the problems of theology. Three crucial problems may be suggested as best qualified to bring out the merits or weaknesses of Ritschl's viewpoint.

i. If the nature of God be fully determined in the concept of loving will then the nature and destiny of the human personality must also be given a full and complete explanation in relation to God's love.

ii. The nature and attributes of God Himself must all be subordinated to and explicable in terms of the concept of love.

iii. The nature and cause of the world must be explained in terms of love.

* see J. & R. - p.277.
* see ibid - p.277.
* see ibid - p.277.
* "ibid - p.277.
* ibid - p.277-8.
* "ibid - p.278.
i. The Nature and Destiny of Human Personality as explicable in terms of God's Love.

Ritschl maintains that the end purpose of God in reference to all His creating activity is the creating of a "world of spirits". This end purpose in creation reaches its completion in man. Man is the end purpose of God in creation. However, from this premise it cannot be argued that man is the realisation or has realised this end purpose. Ritschl insists that the end purpose is realised not in man as such - not in man as a natural creature - but rather in man as redeemed - as reborn into the Kingdom of God.

"In order to prove its kinship with God it would be necessary to conceive the human race as a unity in spite of its natural multiplicity, a unity which is other than its natural generic unity. The conception we are in search of is given in the idea of the Christian community, which makes the Kingdom of God its task." That is, the end of God in creation must be considered in relation to a community of spirits which identify this end purpose of God with their own moral striving. This end viewed either from the viewpoint of God's creative purpose or man's moral striving is the Kingdom of God. And this Kingdom of God is a Kingdom which acknowledges the ruling voice of love.

"The Kingdom of God then is the correlate of God's love in so far as it is the association of men for reciprocal and common action from the motive of love. And this does not mean merely that the individuals combined in the Kingdom of God are subject to Divine action as creatures and members of the natural world. It means besides that as possessed of moral freedom and in accordance with their spiritual constitution and destiny they stand in the line of that purpose which from our interpretation of love we have found to be the content of God's personal end." This conception makes the realisation of moral freedom possible.

"Freedom, to begin with, is the quality of self-determination by universal ideals. Nothing short of self-determination by universal ideals constitutes that capacity of the spirit which sets a limit to the propensities and their compulsion and thus makes itself known as a force opposed to them. If now the spirit determines itself uninterruptedly by a single end then as a power ruling over its individual impulses it is free."

Freedom therefore consists in self-determination by that end which by possessing the most universal content makes

1. see J. & R. - p.279.
2. ibid - p.280.
3. ibid - p.291.
4. ibid - p.292-3.
THEOLOGY AND WORLD KNOWLEDGE.

it possible to subordinate to it all the individual impulses and all moral aims which may be particular in their range. In other words, freedom is permanent self-determination by the good end, the standard of which is to be found in the law of universal love to man, or in Christian terminology permanent self-determination by the idea of the Kingdom of God as final end. The Kingdom of God moreover, is at the same time the end of the world in general: accordingly action which is guided by that end proves itself free in a positive or worldly sense likewise, in so far as it is controlled by the consciousness that all interaction between surrounding nature and one's own natural character is to be estimated solely as a means subservient to the agent. If now this action within the Kingdom of God be regarded in its completeness, i.e. viewed according to religious ideas, then the man who perceives himself to be free in the relations alluded to, must at the same time conceive himself as dependent on God throughout the whole range of his activity. For the Kingdom of God in which we come to know freedom experimentally being, as it is, the highest universal end by which our self-determination can be guided, is included as the object of Divine love in God's personal end; in other words, it is dependent upon God as a whole and therefore also in all particular relations which go to make up the whole.¹

Thus the Kingdom of God may be viewed from either of two aspects - as the end purpose of God in creation or as the end purpose of the moral striving of human spirits within the community of Christians. Or to express the same thing in other words, the Kingdom of God may be regarded as the end of the loving will of God or of man. That is, the end of the human individual, conceived as a spiritual being, can be identified with the final and complete expression of the loving will of God. The end purpose of each is the same - namely the Kingdom of God. "The idea of the Kingdom of God therefore gives a supramundane character to humanity as bound to Him; i.e. it both transcends and completes all the natural and particular motives which unite men together. Consequently the unity of the human race thus reached is so far akin to the unity of the Divine will that it may be seen as the object of Divine love. - - 'Herein is the love of God perfected that we love our brethren in the Kingdom of God.'" ²

¹see J.& R. - pp. 293-4.
²ibid - pp. 231-2.
In equating the Divine end purpose for man with the human moral end as realised in the Christian community, Ritschl does suggest that, at least provisionally, we can bring the problem of the value and destiny of the human personality down from the exalted realm of metaphysics to a practical basis, and in so doing strike a blow at metaphysical premises in theology, and perhaps open the way for a "scientific" study of theology. However, the problem is not so simple as this would indicate. The possibility of an exposition of human ideals upon a simple empirical basis, is a matter which requires more careful consideration, and had best be postponed to a later chapter.

ii. The Nature and Attributes of God as conceived and explained in Terms of Love.

Ritschl proposes to derive the attributes of God's nature from the concept of love.

Thus the goodness of God as the general presupposition of everything is embraced in the specific attribute of the Divine Fatherhood; or in other words in the truth that He has revealed Himself to the Christian community as love.¹

The righteousness of God denotes -

"The manner in which God carries out His loving will in the redemption alike of humanity as a whole and of individual men."²

The eternity of God is guaranteed by the very fact that we are compelled to think God in that self-determination as love in which we actually do think Him; for the content of our thought would not be really God if we still posited something as prior in order to deduce from it His character as love. * Omnipotence, and omnipresence also submit to the determination of love.

"The religious recognition of the Divine omnipotence and omnipresence again always signifies that godly men may always rely upon the gracious presence of God because His world-creating and world-sustaining will is directed to the highest good of mankind. The idea of Divine omnipotence finds its logical completion in that of His wisdom, omniscience, and the help He gives to men according to circumstances and needs."³

Indeed, no other quality or term can be equated with this idea of love. It is the source from which all qualities flow.

¹ see Chap. V.
³ ibid - p. 296.
⁴ ibid - p. 283.
⁵ Unterricht - p. 16.
and the purpose in relation to which all qualities must be explained. Attempts to explain the nature of God in other terms are utterly insufficient. The adequate conception of God is contained in the conception of love.

God's personality itself must be considered in relation to this all-inclusive term. "Not even the recognition of the personality of God implies an independent knowledge of Him prior to His determination of Himself as the will to love, but merely gives us the appropriate form for this content. Personality is the form in which the idea of God is given in Revelation. - - - The content of the Divine will is to be deduced from the revealed reciprocal relations between the Christians and God and from no other." 1

This explanation of the qualities of God according to the concept of love is the natural result of Ritschl's exclusion of metaphysics from theology. If God is known only in His effects upon us and if His effects must be viewed as loving will, then all we can know of God falls within the concept of love. The character, determination and qualities of God must be conceived as expressions of this principle of love, and inversely, all qualities which refuse to conform to this principle are denied a place in religious knowledge. The concept of the Absolute, accordingly has no place in theology. "Das Absolute! Wie erhebend das Klingt! Ich erinnere mich nur noch dunkel, dass das Wort mich in meiner Jugend Beschaeftigt hat, als die Helejische Terminologie auch mich ihren Strudel zu siehen drohte. Es ist lange her, und das Wort ist mir in dem Masse fremd geworden, als ich keinen weitreichenden Gedanken in demselben bezeichnet finde. Denn worstlich bedeutet es das, was abgelost ist, was in keinen Beziehungen zu anderem steht." 2

Staehlin, in his book "Kant, Lotze, and Albrecht Ritschl" has shown that Ritschl's appeal to etymology for support of his position is here not valid. "In taking this view, he confounds the verbal-adjective absolutus with the participle of the same spelling. The word "absolute" in the sense in which it is used when we speak of the "absolute Being" or the "absolute Mind" corresponds to the adjective absolutus, not to the participle. The latter signifies that which is loosed, freed from, but not the "absolute". - - - The word "absolutus" in its adjectival use is connected with another sense of the verb, "absolvere" namely in the sense, "to accomplish" or "to complete", "that which is not dependent upon anything else", "the unconditioned". Ritschl himself employs the word in this very sense when he styles Christianity as the "absolutely ethical religion"." 3

However, it is doubtful whether Ritschl has a place for even this idea of the absolute in his theology. His insistent contention that we can know God only in His effects, comprehended under the idea of loving will, yields little room for any conception of an absolute.

It may be questioned whether Ritschl is consistent in his arguments which lead him to the position we have outlined. It may be that all our knowledge of God is mediated through His loving will, and indeed, it may be true that no other conception than love is, in any respect, adequate to encompass a description of the Divine nature. But that God is loving-will, and that we must conceive of God only in terms of his effects, seems rather an unwarranted conclusion. It would be well to examine more exhaustively the arguments which Ritschl uses to reach this conclusion.

Ritschl proceeds to define the nature of God as love by first defining the nature of love. Four qualities are evident, as we have shown. Love must have persons as its object. It is constant in its affection. It promotes the well-being of the person or persons loved. It identifies the end of those loved with its own end.

From this point he argues that since mankind (or more precisely, mankind within the Christian community) is the object of God's love, then God must be understood as a principle, firm in its purpose, which seeks to promote the welfare of the Christian community. Furthermore, as the end of the Christian community is His own end purpose then within the community may be seen the end purpose of God. Now this conclusion we are not prepared hastily to repudiate, although it certainly seems inadequately validated upon the epistemological presumption that we know things in their appearances. Yet in as much as Ritschl later validates this identification of the end purpose of God with the revelation in Christ as sustained by the Christian community, we may provisionally accept the conclusion here reached without acknowledging his arguments.

However, from this point on, his arguments and his conclusions are indeed, open to question. Having confirmed the validity of the revelation of God in the Christian community as an effect or appearance or phenomenon of God, and having previously, in his discussion of metaphysics, shown that no knowledge of God apart from this revelation is valid, he now concludes that

1 see - p. 67.
Theology has no concern with ought but these effects or appearances, and the nature of God, as understood by theology, must be understood in terms of God's revelation of Himself in the Christian community. In other words, he believes that the nature of God, as understood by theology, must be built up empirically from a study and arrangement of the data given in these appearances. In the practical operation of his viewpoint this attitude identifies God with the manifestations of Himself.

His logic here seems to be following the same course that he denounced so strongly in his opponents.

"Die Erscheinungen, welche in einem begrenzten Raumbilde in der immer gleichen Lagerung oder Reihenfolge, und deren Veränderung in einer bestimmten Grenze und Ordnung wahrgenommen werden, fasst unsere Vorstellung zu der Einheit des Dinges zusammen nach der Analogie mit der erkennenden Seele, welche in dem Wechsel ihrer entsprechenden Empfindungen sich als dauerende Einheit fühlte und erinnert. Demgemäss, ist das von uns vorgestellte Ding Insichselbstsein. Und wie die Seele sich als Ursache ihrer wechselnden Empfindungen unter dem Reiz der Erscheinungen des Dinges behauptet, und sich in diesen Wahrnehmungen als Zweck ihrer selbst inne wird, so stellt sie auch das isolirte Ding in seinen Merkmalen als causa sui und als finis sui vor. Demgemäss wird das isolirte Ding auch als Durchsichsein und Fuersichselbstsein gedacht." 1

This same error seems evident in Ritschl's own thought. The only difference is that whereas his opponents had isolated and concentrated upon the thing-divorced-from-its-particular-manifestations, Ritschl isolated and concentrated upon the appearance itself, and tried to give it as independent a validity as his opponents had sought for the things-in-themselves.

The insufficiency of this position is illustrated in a consideration of Ritschl's conception of God's Providence. If God is to be identified with loving will, and if loving will is to be effective in ushering in the Kingdom of God, through the Christian community, then it is impossible to conceive of God apart from His relation to mankind's striving toward this Kingdom. God as Being per se shares the fate of the philosophical Absolute.

But to identify God with the active principle of His love is to identify Him with the process through which this principle is realised. To express the same idea in other words: God as love wills the moral union of all

men in the Kingdom of God and to this end wills also the world as a means thereto. But if God is to be identified with the active principle of His loving will, then God is to be identified with His revelation of Himself, whether it be in the Christian community or in the world. This type of argument tends not only to depersonalise the nature of God but also to deprive Him of the valuable predicates of supra-human and supra-mundane power and attributes.

From Ritschl's point of view, all that Divine providence can mean is that through belief in the principle of love as the ultimate principle of explanation of all things we can be assured that as a matter of fact the principle of love has been and is operative in the determination of all things. Thus Ritschl defines Divine providence as faith in "His religious lordship over the world".

"For that unified view of the world, the ruling idea of which is that of the supramundane God who as our Father in Christ loves us and unites us in His Kingdom for the realisation of that destiny in which we see the final end of the world as well as the corresponding estimate of self, constitutes the realm within which come to be formed all such ideas as that all things and events in the world serve our good, because as children of God we are objects of His special care and help." 1

But this religious dominion of God in the world, he assures us, must not be taken in an actual or "empirical sense". It has to be taken "ideally" not technically. 2 In other words it must not be assumed to have any effective or practical power over natural events. It concerns merely the estimate which we have of these things in their relation to faith. To put the matter simply, a belief in providence is confined to a faith that the feeling of superiority over nature which we cherish in our spirits is ideally, but not practically, applicable to all nature.

"Faith in providence affirms the general truth of the Divine goodness not as a law of phenomena discovered inductively but as the personal conviction of each individual drawn from the nexus of the experiences he has made for himself." 3 "No one can alter the mechanical conditions of sensible existence as such, no one can create new organic species; each to secure his preservation within the system of the phenomenal world must submit to the laws of mechanism and of organism, laws which are valid once for all." 4 "The feeling which views life - - - in the light of Divine providence, is patience." 5

1 J. R. p. 617. 2 ibid p. 617. 3 ibid - p. 618. 4 ibid - p. 627.
In such a scheme prayer becomes but a resignation to the inevitable, lightened only by the faith that the inevitable is all for the best.

"In every religion prayer, or what is the equivalent to it, sacrifice, is originally the product and the proof of resolve to recognise his subjection to God."¹

"Prayer, in the Christian sense, is, on the one hand a special manifestation of faith in the fatherly providence of God which springs from reconciliation, and on the other hand, a special manifestation of the resolve to be humble."²

For prayer as petition, for prayer as a request for Divine intercession in the course of events, Ritschl has no place. He quotes Schleiermacher with approval.

"¹ The limitation of the conception (of prayer) to cases of petition directed to God is not in harmony with the original sense of προς θεόν in idea or in practice, at either stage of the religion of the Bible."³

"Das Bittgebet ist eine Abart des Dankgebetes."⁴

He recognises that "the discourses of Jesus on the subject are concerned almost exclusively with petitionary prayer and God's hearing of it". But he then goes on to say -

"against this are to be set two characteristic utterances of Paul. In the one (Phil. IV:6) he desires that in every petition their request should be laid before God with thanksgiving; further he gives with strong emphasis the precept (I. Thess. V: 16-18) 'Rejoice evermore; pray without ceasing; in everything give thanks'."⁵

From this Ritschl presumes to conclude -

"now these two utterances of Paul yield the conclusion that for the Christian church thanksgiving, as an acknowledgment of God, stands higher than petition,"(and furthermore)"that thanksgiving is not one species of prayer alongside of petition but rather the general form of prayer, while petition is merely a modification of thanksgiving to God."⁶

Having proceeded thus far in this remarkable argument, Ritschl finds it quite easy to affirm that in reconciliation with God we are so resigned to His will that we rejoice, even in distress and persecution with a joy that "leaves nothing to be asked for"; for "in joy we have no wishes, no intense desire for anything not yet attained".⁷ The inference is

²Ibid - p. 642.
³Ibid - p. 643.
⁴Unterricht - sec. 79.
⁵J. & R. - p. 643.
⁷Ibid - p. 644.
that a feeling of need which underlies petitionary prayer is an admission of an imperfect reconciliation. Ritschl says as much in endeavouring to excuse our lapses from this perfect bliss.

"It must be Confessed that this attitude of soul is not present at every moment even in the most sincerely pious. - - - - But if Christianity has true reconciliation to offer then joy must be recognised as the normal accom­paniment of humility and peace." Ritschl seems to forget that many of the great moments of prayer in the life of our Lord had as their basis a real need - even though His faith was burning high through the entire experience.

However, having thus established his position, Ritschl returns to the attack against petitionary prayer which he had recognised as playing such an important part in the gospels.

"Then more closely examined even the Lord's prayer is very far from being an example of one-sided petition." And he goes on to dispose of any petitionary elements by explaining them as aspects of thanksgiving. Even - "the petition for necessary food is rather an expression of thanks to God, if, on the one hand it be assumed that God is ready to grant the necessaries of life before we ask them (Mt. VI.:8) and on the other hand, that we earn what is needed for life by our own labour." If God is love then He will give us all that is good for us. Consequently to pray for ought else than what God would give us anyway is to presume on the goodness and omniscience of God. Granting this presupposition, prayer is the expression of humility and patience." In this exposition of prayer Ritschl seems to be ignoring the distinction between two things: the joy of standing in fellowship with God through reconciliation; (which is the basis of prayer as thanksgiving); and the feeling of want and insufficiency which proceeds from our attitude toward the world and which is actually increased and sharpened by our spiritual elevation (which is the basis of prayer as petition). For example: a vivid experience of sonship with God may fire us with a desire for service in His Kingdom; but then immediately upon this, and in a sense consequent upon it, may come that consciousness of the limitation of human effort. This feeling of helplessness and limitation is no indication of insufficiency of faith or imperfection of reconciliation; it springs from an awareness of human

1 J. & R. - p.644.
2 ibid - p.645.
3 ibid - pp.645-6.
insufficiency and a truly dutiful reliance upon and a turning to a higher source of strength than human power provides. The very heart of prayer is, on the one hand, a recognition of our own helplessness, and, on the other hand, a turning to and a reliance upon the omniscient and omnipotent power of a loving God. The major element in prayer is a recognition that things are not as they ought to be - neither in the heart and soul of the person praying nor in the world - and a faith that God can and may alter these things and better them.

Ritschl has nothing to say for such prayer. As Christians he reiterates, we must have faith in God's loving will, and consequent upon this a belief that this loving will is doing all it can, and that its doings are always for the best. Petition is then both vain and un filial. Furthermore, as Christians, we must believe that all things, even the tragedies of life, reveal the love of God in spite of evidences to the contrary. This belief is a matter of faith and faith alone. Evidences - empirical observations, have nothing to do with the matter. It can never be established scientifically, and in so far as theology is empirical, it cannot of any justification for petition drawn from natural effects in the world.

To summarise: unless one is a Christian, Ritschl affirms, one cannot see goodness in the course of natural events. And when one is a Christian one must believe that God's will and the course of world events flow in such perfect harmony that the thought of upsetting them by petition would be unthinkable. "All things work together for good to them that love God". But whether this belief is real or an illusion, whether the love of God is actually present in world matter, Ritschl declares we can never "know" as a matter of knowledge. In other words, Ritschl tries to encompass the attributes of God within His revealed will and thus leaves no room for any Divine transcendence of the natural order. No room is left for providence. No place is given for petitionary prayer.

It seems strange that Ritschl, beginning with a definition of God as love should have reached such a conclusion. His conclusion seems to be a denial of the very premise with which he started. It is a denial of the very meaning of love which he was careful to define.¹ That is, love involves a subject who seeks with constant devotion, the welfare of a personal object whose welfare he identifies

¹ see - p. 67.
THEOLOGY AND WORLD KNOWLEDGE.

with his own end. Love involves a person who loves and an object (another person) to whom this love is directed. Ritschl, after calling attention to this, focuses his attention upon the act of loving (God's revelation of Himself) and forgets that there is anything else. It is quite evident that an exposition of the nature of God which identifies His nature with His revelation of Himself can give but a partial and incomplete explanation of His being.

iii. The Nature and Cause of the World as explicable in Terms of Love.

Ritschl was by no means consistent in maintaining the identity of God with His appearances. At times a naive realism dominated his thought and permitted him to proceed on the assumption, not that appearances are to be identified with God, but only that we can assume the validity of these appearances because they are valid expressions of God's nature as such. In his treatment of the relation of the world to the loving will of God this idea seems to be dominant.

Here the world is regarded definitely as a means to an end purpose of a Being who, apart from the process of world events, guides them to His purposed end.

We may draw from the relation between the world of spirits and God's character of love a necessary conclusion regarding the origin of the world nature. If it be an essential part of God's personal end that He should create a multitude of spirits formed after His own kind and that He should bring them to perfection in order to manifest Himself to them as love, then the world of nature viewed in its separate formation as distinct from the world of men, cannot be viewed as a mere arbitrary appendix but must be regarded as a means to the Divine end. -- Nature therefore must likewise be explained from the Divine will in its self-given character of love."

In the discussion of this point, Ritschl regards the harmony of the order of natural events with the loving will of God as valid not only in the realm of faith, but also in the sphere of world knowledge. The perfect subordination of nature to God's end purpose is the necessary condition for the realisation of God's will for the world and for man. "The quality of love therefore serves, in general, to discover to us in God the ground and unity of nature and spirit and the law of their co-existence."1.

1. ibid - p.276.
And furthermore, this ground and unity can be conceived only when we regard God as a conscious will operating through nature to effect some purposed end.

"God's personal will, like any other force, can be thought as the cause of effects only when acting in a definite direction. As will, God can be thought only in conscious relation to the end which He Himself is. Nevertheless, this formal truth is inadequate to explain anything which is not God. It is inadequate therefore to explain the world. Unless it can be shown that and how the world is embraced in the personal end which God sets before Himself then even this analysis of the Divine will leads to nothing. We shall find that the conception of love which is the key to the revelation of God carries us past the difficulties which accompany this analysis." 1

"The whole universe therefore, considered thus as the precondition of the moral Kingdom of created spirits is throughout God's creation for this end." 2

Finally, it is impossible to explain the world apart from this conception of a conscious will operating through and in, the processes of nature, and working out some predetermined purpose.

"It is impossible to explain the world successfully either from the conception of universal substance or from that of an indeterminant will. Any attempt at such an explanation can succeed, only if we conceive the will of God, presupposed as the ground of the whole, as set in a certain direction, - God's will, permanent and certain of itself directed toward the realisation of the Kingdom of God as the ethical and supramundane unity of a multitude of souls formed for the sake of this end and the ground of everything whether multiplex or individual which serves as a means to its accomplishment. We must therefore conclude that God created in time the multiplicity of things which, as superior or inferior to each other, become causes and effects." 3

That this conclusion is incompatible with the treatment he gave the nature of God in dealing with the attributes of the Godhead, is evident. Here God's love is regarded as a creative, guiding, controlling force. There it was regarded as a subjective interpretation of the course of events, visualised through the eye of faith. Here, in general, is a recurrence of that same dual viewpoint which characterised his consideration of the relation of theology to philosophy.

THEOLOGY AND WORLD KNOWLEDGE.

However, we have here evidence of considerable progress in the establishment of a valid foundation for the nature of God, over his early epistemological treatment of the matter. The emphasis given to the all-comprehensiveness of the attribute of love, and the definition of love as involving a person loved and a person loving, points the way to a religious "Weltanschauung" which may be able to exist independent of his dubious philosophic presuppositions. God is He who wills; He is He who loves, and only by virtue of this nature does God attain (in our comprehension) personality and validity. This Ritschl perceives - but he fails to conform his theology consistently to this proposition.

It may be that Ritschl's emphasis upon the phenomenal, as a basis for theological propositions, represents a healthy reaction from rationalism, but as a theological doctrine it is fraught with as many weaknesses as the position he was attacking. If his preliminary epistemological position is to be interpreted as an equating of being and appearance (as his definition of the attributes of the Godhead indicated) it must be declared glaringly defective, as a sufficient theological foundation. On the other hand, if his epistemological premise is to be interpreted as naive realism, as much of his theology suggests, then he must be accused of ignoring, rather than presenting, a valid epistemological approach.

At this point something might be said regarding the general problem of the relation of theology to a philosophic premise. Although it is not necessary to come to a definite conclusion at this stage of the argument, yet, from the foregoing, certain conclusions are evident which must guide any solution of the problem. These might well be brought to mind.

The confusion into which Ritschl has involved himself by basing his theology upon an epistemological premise serves the purpose of showing the general inadequacy of such a dependence. Such a dependence must inevitably bind theology with a particular philosophic viewpoint. The consequence of Ritschl's dependence upon Lotze's epistemology is illustrative of any dependence upon philosophy. Every attack hurled against philosophy strikes at the very foundations of theology, and with the fall of the particular theory of knowledge assumed as the basis of theology, the theological structure so dependent, suffers also.
THEOLOGY AND WORLD KNOWLEDGE.

No philosophic system is above criticism. No theory of knowledge yet propounded can claim ultimate validity. Consequently, no theology dependent on philosophy can claim a higher validity than the philosophic structure which underlies it. It seems but a self-evident truth that if theology wishes to escape the uncertainty and provisional validity of a philosophic scheme, it must seek for the foundation principles of its structure in its own nature and not borrow them from philosophy.

"Die voraussetzung naemlich, die zu einer richtigen, sachgemaessen Erforschung und Darstellung des christlichen Glaubens noetig ist, ist nicht die, dass der Forschende den psychologischen Prozess verstehe, wie Vorstellungen in ihm entstehen, sondern die, dass er als Christ sich an seine Arbeit beugebe." (The only presupposition that is necessary) ist die fest Ueberzeugung von der absoluten Wahrheit des Christentums. - - An dam, was die christliche Gemeinde von Gott und goettlichen Dingen seit ihrer Gruendung erfahren hat und noch fortwaehrend erfahre, hat er den Massstab seiner Erkenntnis, und nicht in einer von aussen herangebrachten Theorie ueber die Art seines Erkenntnisvermoegens."  

Staehlin in his book previously mentioned takes the same position.

"Christianity, as personal fellowship between God and humanity, mediated through Christ, is for the theologian immediately certain truth; it is fixed and settled in virtue of the self-certitude which appertains to the Christian consciousness as such. What Christianity is or is not, is accordingly a question, the answer to which, cannot be made to depend on epistemological investigations."  

A.E. Garvie argues further -

"Just as a well trained mind will reason logically without adopting any theory of the syllogism — even so the objects of knowledge can be distinctly and correctly known by an intelligence that has been disciplined by gaining knowledge, without any acquaintance with any philosophic theory of knowledge."  

Obviously, the relation of theology to philosophy cannot be one of dependence. Theology, to maintain its validity, cannot borrow its principles from philosophy or science.

However, the problem raised by Ritschl is not so easily solved. The very fact that Ritschl resorted to a philosophic assumption when he was so anxious to establish the independ-

2. op.cit. - p.165.  
3. op.cit. - p.53.
ence of theology, indicates that the relation between theology and philosophy is not to be easily disposed of. Ritschl showed that the facts of Christian experience involve contact between man and his God. We know God, he affirmed, in our experience. But, as he then saw, he had here all the elements of the epistemological problem—the subject, the object and the knowing. Every affirmation of the Christian consciousness involves these same elements. The conclusion that theology involves some theory of their relation is inevitable. What is more, so far as our knowledge of God is concerned, theology assumes that Christian experience presents a particular solution of the problem, namely that we do know God in our experience—we do know the thing-in-itself—knowledge is not illusory. To put the matter simply, religion does present a Weltanschauung and it affirms that this Weltanschauung is ultimate.

That Ritschl recognised the supremacy of the religious outlook has already been shown. But his error lay in his inability to realise the significance of his position. Instead of affirming the ultimate validity of the religious outlook over philosophy and science, he fell back upon philosophy for a proof. He entrusted the ultimate interpretation of the world of experience to the logical consistency of a philosophic theory, when the facts of religious experience had already taught him that God through Christ has already given the true interpretation.

It may be admitted that, if a religious interpretation of the relation of God to the world is to be accepted, it will admit of philosophic proof; but Ritschl commits the logical fallacy of inverting the claim and declaring that a particular philosophic proof of the religious interpretation is the test of validity. The criticism of Steinbeck, Staehlin, and Garvie is not that they deny that the religious outlook does present an interpretation of the relation of God to the world which bears upon epistemology, but the point of their criticism is that the validity of the premises accepted in theology, does not rest upon the conclusions to which philosophy carries them.

"Der Philosoph gelangt zu einem Erkenntnissen auf Grund seiner natürliche-intellektuellen Erfahrung von den Dingen, der Theolog auf Grund seiner geistlich-sittlichen Erfahrung der Wiedergeburt und der dadurch gestifteten Gemeinschaft mit Gott. Es ist deshalb nicht richtig, diese Erkenntnis jener unterzuordnen, indem man eine philosophische Erkenntnis-Theorie in die Theologie herüber nimmt und nach diesem Prinzip den christlichen Glauben darstellt. -- Wenn est nun schon in der Philosophie keine allgemein anerkannte Erkenntnis-Theorie
THEOLOGY AND WORLD KNOWLEDGE.

That this was actually the case with Ritschl himself is suggested by the fact that his theology has survived the numerous repudiations of his philosophic assumptions. His own school believed itself quite loyal in its adherence to his teachings while rejecting his theory of knowledge. Herrman returned to a Kantian basis and Kaftan attempted to work out his theology entirely empirically.

* Ritschl selbst ist in seiner theologischen Arbeit nicht von philosophischen Grundsätzen ausgegangen, sondern seine Exigese, seine biblische Theologie und seine dogmengeschichtlichen Arbeiten waren der Ausgangspunkt seiner Theologie.*

The philosophic basis of his theology is really introduced supplementarily.

* Um nun der von der Wissenschaft abgelösten christlichen Glaubenssphäre etwas Licht und Orientierung zu verschaffen griff Ritschl eklektisch auf gut Glück nach einigen philosophischen Begriffen die von Nicht-hellenischen Denken auf den Markt gebracht waren und namentlich gefielen ihm einige Stellen bei Lotze, die er für seinen Hausbedarf verwendete.*

Otto Pfleiderer in his "Development of Theology" echoes this statement.

* We may conjecture that Ritschl did not make his theory of cognition the basis of his theology from the first but rather propounded it subsequently in its defense.*

The whole development of Ritschl's thought goes on quite oblivious to this concession he made to philosophy.

* Theology has performed its task when, guided by the Christian idea of God, it exhibits completely and clearly both as a whole and in particular the Christian view of the world and of human life together with the necessity which belongs to the independent relations between its component elements.*

Here he finds the basis of theology, not in philosophy, but in religious experience itself, and it does not require a very exhaustive study of his theology to come to the conclusion that this is the true basis of his dogmatic position. Furthermore, at times he even goes so far as to separate the two fields.

* It is incompetent for it (theology) to enter upon either

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2. p. 38
3. J. Wendland - A. Ritschl und seine Schüler - p.37
5. ibid - p.38.
THEOLOGY AND WORLD KNOWLEDGE.

a direct or an indirect proof of the Christian revelation by seeking to show that it agrees with some philosophical or juridical view of the world, for to such Christianity simply stands opposed. - - - The scientific proof for the truth of Christianity ought only to be sought in the line of thought already singled out by Spener, 'Whosoever willeth to do the will of God will know that the doctrine of Christ is true!' 1.

The fact of the matter is that Ritschl, as a theologian, should not have started with a philosophic assumption. He should have started with the subject matter of theology and reached his conclusions upon that basis alone. Accordingly his criticism of his opponents should have rested not on the basis of an insufficient or an erroneous epistemology but rather upon an insufficient or an erroneous theology. If a true theology involves a Weltanschauung and if a Weltanschauung implies a theory of knowledge, it may be justifiable to posit such a theory as an inference from a theological position. But to posit it as the basis of theology is to confuse the function both of philosophy and theology.

Consequently, it is scarcely fair to judge Ritschl's theological thinking from the standpoint of his epistemological premises. His theory of knowledge was, to the development of his theology, more of a shield taken up to ward off the attacks of his opponents, than an integral part of his theological position. A.E. Garvie goes so far as to say that it would have been better if Ritschl had ignored this epistemological question. He says that whereas the basis of Ritschl's theology rests on a very different distinction of the natural and the spiritual than that offered in his epistemology, "he should have left this severely alone as altogether insignificant and valueless for him as a theologian." 2.

This "different" distinction of the natural and the spiritual, to which Professor Garvie refers, is truly the distinctive and essential feature in Ritschl's thinking. Theology, he insisted, was separated from philosophy by virtue of a scientific empirical methodology. In turn theology is distinct from other sciences in that it deals with a peculiar subject matter, easily distinguishable from that of the other sciences, and existing peculiar to the religious viewpoint. This subject matter is contained in the sphere cut out for

1 op. cit. - p.74.
us by the action of God's loving will upon our spirits and upon the Christian community in general. This action on God's part appears to us as a particular kind of reality. It is that reality which guarantees the worth and the values of our spiritual nature.

"In every religion, what is sought with the help of super-human, spiritual power reverenced by man, is a solution of the contradiction in which man finds himself as both a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature." J.

"Religion is the spiritual instrument which man possesses to free himself from the natural conditions of his life." a.

This subject matter is objectively validated by the action of God's loving will which gives to it that objective guarantee such as the outside world offers to the subject matter of physics, chemistry, biology and psychology. This subject matter of religious knowledge, which gives theology a distinct and peculiar character and which permits the believer to see the loving will of God at work in the world, is the worth or value which is seen in the course of world events, and especially those events connected with the historical development of religion. Value is the keynote of Ritschl's thought. Value is the citadel of his theology. Value is the basis of his theological expositions. Consequently, it would be well to reserve further judgment on Ritschl's position until his theology has been considered from this viewpoint.


ibid - p. 174.
CHAPTER IV.

"EVERY COGNITION OF A RELIGIOUS SORT IS A DIRECT JUDGMENT OF VALUE."

The peculiar nature of the theological approach to an understanding of the world and an interpretation of world events, rests upon three distinctions in theological subject matter. These distinctions isolate the subject matter of theology from natural phenomena and define the peculiar "value" character of the subject of study.

i. Theology deals with a subject matter which does not submit to the categorical determination which characterises the matter of study of other sciences. The subject matter of theology is non-natural in the sense that it cannot be subordinated to the mechanistic principles and laws of the other sciences. In distinction from natural phenomena it is spiritual.

"Die religioese Weltanschauung ist in allen ihren Arten darauf gestellt, dass der menschliche Geist sich in irgend einem Grade von den ihm umgeben Erscheinungen und auf ihn eindringenden Wirkungen der Natur und Werth unterscheidet. Alle Religion ist Deutung des welchem Umfang immer erkannten Weltlaufs, und zwar in dem Sinne, das die erhabene Macht, welche in oder ueber derselben waltet, dem persoenlichen Geiste seinen Werth gegen die Hemmungen durch die Natur oder die Naturwirkungen der menschlichen Gesellschaft erhaelt oder bestaetigt." ¹

"In every religion, what is sought with the help of the superhuman spiritual power reverenced by man is a solution of the contradiction in which man finds himself as both a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature. For in the former role he is a part of nature, dependent upon it, subject to and confined by other things; but as a spirit he is moved by the impulse to maintain his independence against them. In this juncture religion springs up as faith in super-human spiritual powers by whose help the power which man possesses of himself is in some way supplemented and elevated into a unity of its own kind which is a match for the pressure of the natural world." ²

² J. & R. - p. 199.
ii. The subject matter of theology is intensely practical in its nature. It is always seen and evident in some valueful reference to our own spiritual nature. It cannot be conceived apart from a reference to the ends and final purposes of human striving and effort. It has a peculiar "for us" character.

"Knowledge of God can be demonstrated as religious knowledge only when He is conceived as securing to the believer such a position in the world as more than counterbalances its restrictions. Apart from this value judgment of faith there exists no knowledge of God worthy of this content. - - - The truth is - - we know the nature of God and Christ only in their worth for us." ¹

iii. This sphere of theological study is further distinguished from philosophy and science in that it is concerned with the feeling and willing aspects of our nature, as well as the cognitive.

"Now in order to elicit the distinction between the two (philosophy and religious knowledge) from the subjective side I recall the twofold manner in which the mind (Geist) further appropriates the sensations aroused in it. They are determined according to their value for the Ego by the feeling of pleasure of pain. Feeling is the basic function of mind in as much as in it the Ego is originally present to itself. In the feeling of pleasure or pain, the Ego directs whether a sensation, which touches the feeling of self, serves to heighten it or depress it. On the other hand, through an idea, the sensation is judged in respect of its cause, the nature of the latter and its connection with other causes; and by means of observation etc., the knowledge of things thus gained is extended until it becomes scientific." ²

These three aspects are summed up in Ritschl's famous definition of Christianity.

"Christianity, then, is the monotheistic, completely spiritual and ethical religion, which based on the life of its Author as Redeemer and as Founder of the Kingdom of God, consists in the freedom of the children of God, involves the impulse to conduct from the motive of love, aims at the moral organization of mankind, and grounds blessedness on the relation of sonship with God, as well as on the Kingdom of God." ³

It is value which opens the way to a study of religion as thus defined. Value is non-natural in that it is not immediately bound up, for its determination, with the mechanistic process of natural events. It is intensely practical in that it is intrinsically related to our

RELIGION AND VALUE.

personal interests. Finally, as immediately concerned with conduct and moral life, it is closely connected with willing and feeling. Consequently, theology, as a science, is concerned with value as its subject matter. That is, it is concerned with a sphere which is not immediately bound up with the course of natural events, but which is rather directly related to an end willed by the individual as his practical goal and felt to be intrinsically valuable for him. Furthermore, as value is the subject matter of theology, then the judgment in which this subject matter is revealed is a "value judgment". Theology seeks its subject matter in value judgments. To express Ritschl's view in a sentence; religious knowledge takes its course in value judgments.

However, when we turn to Ritschl's treatment of the problem of value, the surprising thing about his attitude is that he never appears to be at great pains to define, clearly and definitely, this concept which he placed so prominently in his theology. Either he took for granted a particular definition without attempting to set it forth, or his general dislike of any philosophic discussion prejudiced his clear understanding and careful delineation of the problem. That the second of these is probably more correct will be made evident in studying Ritschl's views.

It must be remembered that Ritschl was much indebted to his predecessors – philosophic and theologic – for much of the foundation structure of his theology. It appears that in the matter of value, as in the matter of epistemology, he borrowed freely without understanding clearly, or seeking to understand, all the implications and consequences of the views he accepted. Consequently, it will be necessary to refresh our mind by referring again to chapter III. in order that we may understand the use that Ritschl makes of value in his theology.

As the foundation stone of his view, Ritschl refers us to Martin Luther's famous statement, that it is not enough that one believe that God is, or that Christ has suffered, but he must believe with his life's strength that God is to him a God of Holiness, that it was for him that Christ suffered, was crucified, died, and was raised again from the dead, and that He has borne his sins for him. Here is the very essence of Ritschl's opinion in the matter. However, as we have shown, it was Kant who first brought out the significance of value in philosophy. The question of the value of men and things in the world was for Kant the basic question of his whole
RELIGION AND VALUE.

world outlook. But it was Schleiermacher who first brought out the real theological implications of this. To Schleiermacher, Ritschl is probably indebted much more than he ever realised. In the emphasis which he gave the feeling element in value and in his whole tendency to see value in relation to the subjective outlook, Ritschl has borrowed more deeply than he knew.

From the complete subjectivism of this attitude Ritschl endeavours to rescue himself by seizing upon the moral quality which De Wette and especially Lotze ascribed to value. They had suggested that value is related to ends and purpose. Ritschl then, by the simple process of identifying the end purpose of God and man, makes value the point of union and thus the golden chain which unites God and man. This use which Ritschl ascribes to value makes it somewhat more religious than moral. In this he is in agreement with Schleiermacher. Religious value, for Ritschl, has its origin and receives its validity from Divine revelation. That this postulate equates the moral impulses of men with the word of God, Ritschl is not disposed to deny. He is quite willing that such an equation should take place - providing that the moral will of man be viewed from within the Christian community. This places the final point of reference on the revelation in Christ.

This is Ritschl's position in general. However the particular treatment which the problem of value receives in his thought demands a careful consideration.

Ritschl does not claim that all values are religious. The sphere of value he maintains is as broad as the sphere of the judgment. From the subjective point of view, at any rate, all judgments are judgments of value, whether they are scientific, moral or religious. Furthermore, in all judgments, scientific, moral and religious, there is a definite feeling tone, which cannot be explained away nor discarded when the subject of the judgment is considered.

"The two functions of spirit (knowing and willing) are always in operation simultaneously and always in some degree mutually related. - - In particular it must not be forgotten that all continuous cognition of the things which excite sensation is not only accompanied but likewise guided by feelings."  
And of the two Ritschl is not sure that the feeling is not more important than the cognition.

"Feeling is the basal function of the mind inasmuch as it the Ego is originally present to itself."  

1 J. & R. - p. 204-5.
2 ibid - p. 204.
This willing-feeling element in knowledge, Ritschl designates as interest. Interest can be explained by comparison with and in distinction from, love. Whereas love is our attitude toward persons, interest is our attitude toward objects. The difference is, that whereas love respects Kant's categorical imperative of regarding the end of other persons as an end in itself, interest seeks to make the perceived object a means to the end of a person.

All knowledge, scientific as well as religious, is not only accompanied but also "guided" by interest. "Without interest we do not trouble ourselves about anything."" ¹

That is, the willing-feeling attitude of the subject has an important part in the acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge is practical, it is cultivated because it is of interest, because of its worth, because of its value. There could be no such thing as "disinterested" knowledge. All knowledge is acquired through interest and guided in its acquisition by interest. In other words, all kinds of knowledge may be considered as kinds of value judgments.

However, in his explanation of value Ritschl does not affirm that he is equating the judgment of value with the judgments which give rise to world knowledge in such a way that the latter may be completely comprehended under the former. He is merely asserting that, so far as our judgments of reality are concerned, or so far as the processes of mind whereby we come to knowledge are concerned, value plays an essential part and is present in all judgments. He is insisting on the principle which he inherited from his Neo-kantian predecessors, that the soul is a unity in all its activity and one function cannot be separated from the others. Scientific knowledge has its feeling side and religious knowledge has its objective reference.

"The two functions of the spirit are always in operation simultaneously and always also in some degree mutually related. - - For, insofar as our attention is necessary to attain the end of knowledge, will, as representing the desire for accurate cognition, comes in between; the proximate cause of will however is feeling as expressing the consciousness that a thing or an activity is worth desiring or that something ought to be put away. Value judgments, therefore, are determinative in the case of all connected knowledge of the world, even when it is out in the most objective fashion."²

¹ J. & R. - p.204.
² ibid - p.204.
91. RELIGION AND VALUE.

Ritschl's aversion to the separation of the faculties of the mind or soul as a basis for disinterested religious and scientific knowledge must arouse the sympathy of most readers who are tired of the inadequacies of "faculty" psychology. With his insistence upon the "interested" nature of our knowing process there must also be agreement. For without interest, we indeed, know nothing. That is, so far as the judgment is concerned, a feeling element must be recognised. But Ritschl concludes his definition of the unity of the soul's function with the remark, "Value judgments are therefore determinative in the case of all connected knowledge of the world". If value is to be explained in terms of feeling, as Ritschl certainly indicates, then Ritschl is here maintaining that feeling determines the nature of our knowledge. In other words, feeling can no longer be regarded as that which accompanies a perception but must be posited as the determining cause of the perception. If this position is to be maintained, obviously, a more fundamental and revolutionary examination of knowledge must be given than his epistemology has suggested. But before carrying this point further it would be well to consider again Ritschl's complete exposition of the problem of value.

Ritschl distinguishes three groups of judgments within the sphere of value, corresponding to the three branches of knowledge. They are the scientific, the moral, and the religious. That there is a closer affinity between the last two than the first and last is evident, and so the classification raises two problems.

i. What is the nature and relation of moral and religious value judgments?

ii. What is the nature and relation of scientific and moral-religious value judgments?

i. Moral and religious value judgments both share the same quality of being independent. That is, the significance of the judgment for the judging person is not bound up with the natural or mechanical determination of the exterior object upon which the judgment is made. Or to express the idea more explicitly, the value reference in moral and religious value judgments is prior and conclusive within the sphere of morality and religion, and requires no naturalistic substantiation. However, it would be well to indicate, at this point, that Ritschl is by no means consistent in maintaining this rather difficult thesis. But that it is the interpretation that he usually accepts would follow from the expositions already given of his treatment of the qualities of the Godhead, the problem of miracles, and the problem of world history.
"Independent value judgments (i.e., moral and religious) are perceptions of moral ends or moral hindrances insofar as they excite moral pleasure or pain, or it may be set in motion the will to appropriate what is good or repel the opposite." 1

They exist within their own jurisdiction and find validity within their own sphere.

Both moral and religious judgments are independent, yet Ritschl says that they may be easily distinguished. The difference lies in this; moral judgments pertain to moral action in the quest for the good or in the fight against evil; religious value judgments pertain to the conditions of men in the world in so far as these conditions are viewed as controlled and regulated by a supra-human power.

"Der religiösen Betrachtungsweise ist es eigenheimlich, dass sie Gott als das Subject seiner Wirkungen und den Menschen und die Welt als das von Gott abhaengige Objeekt derselben Wirkungen auffasst. In der ethischen Betrachtungsweise dagegen ist der Mensch sich selbst als Subjekt sowohl seiner sittlichen als auch seiner religiösen Funktionen. Beide Auffassungen werden in dem empirischen christlichen Leben von dem Christen ausgeubt." 2

In other words, moral judgments are concerned with the realisation of end purposes in a temporal sphere, while religious judgments are directed to that eternal Source of all value - God - who guarantees to us the validity of, no only our own end purposes, but the end purpose of creation as a whole. Moral judgments are temporal; religious judgments are extra-temporal. Consequently, the moral and the religious must be regarded as distinct and it is quite possible to exercise a religious judgment of value quite independently of moral considerations. Indeed, historically -

"there exists religion which goes on without any relation whatever to the moral conduct of life. - - Besides, in many religions religious pleasure is of a purely natural kind and is independent of those conditions which lift religion above pleasure. For only at the higher stages do we find religion combined with the ethical conduct of life. - - For example, orgiastic worships represent contending natural feelings with extraordinary intensity and with abrupt changes in virtue of their recognition of the value which the identity of the Godhead with the vegetation as it decays and again revives, has for man who modifies his attitude toward the world of nature in sympathy with the Godhead he adores." 3

However, that there is some close connection between them he recognises both in classing them together as "independent", and in his recognition that the higher forms of religion have definite moral implications. Indeed, in Christianity he concedes that the -

"religious motive of ethical action lies here that the Kingdom of God which it is our task to realise represents also the highest good which God destines for us as our supra-mundane goal".

That is, in Christianity the Divine purpose and the moral end are brought together and identified in the Kingdom of God. But he offers no explanation of how or why this should be so. If the moral and the religious are to be brought together in the Kingdom of God, then this ultimate identity of the moral and religious would, by the nature of the case, suggest that the religious end, as the purpose of God in creation, is the ground and origin of the moral, as the end purpose of each individual. This assumption of the identity of the two spheres in the Kingdom of God necessitates the further assumption that the religious is in some way prior to the moral - it is that which makes the moral, moral, as distinct from a mere personal or natural desire.

But Ritschl has nothing to say on this matter. His primary concern is to separate religion from dependence upon world knowledge or natural phenomena. To offer some theory of the relation of the moral to the religious would be to suggest some theory of the relation of the religious to the temporal. Ritschl's constant fear of getting theology embroiled in philosophic and metaphysical problems forbade him considering this matter. His concern was to prove the independence of the religious from the moral - and having shown a basis for distinction he was content to rest with that and assume the distinction to be a separation.

His logic involves the same error that persists whenever he deals with any matter on the border line between philosophy and religion. Because he was able to distinguish the moral and the ethical he assumed them to be separate, and able to be considered as separate entities. Consequently, he believed himself able to discuss the religious independently of the moral. He forgot that the Divine end purpose, which it is the intimate concern of theology to study, is intrinsically involved with its moral expression in the Kingdom of God, the foundation of which must likewise be regarded as the moral vocation of Christ.

ii. Scientific value judgments, in distinction from moral-religious value judgments, are dependent or "concomitant" in their nature, and are "operative and necessary in all theoretic cognition as in all technical observation and combination". By this Ritschl must mean that in their formation the knowing process if guided or determined by an "objective" or "outside" reference which makes the judgment "dependent" upon this reference or formed "concomitant" with it. In another connection he defines this "outside" reference as the idea of a cause which when amplified by observation etc., the knowing of things thus gained is extended until it becomes scientific. However he insists that this type of judgment must not be called "disinterested". Even in them pleasure or pain must be present according as they succeed or fail.

The important question, obviously, is the one which has already been brought forward; what is the relation of feeling to the function of the judgment. Ritschl said, "scientific knowledge is accompanied or guided by a judgment affirming the worth of impartial knowledge gained by observation". But "accompanied by" and "guided by" express two quite different conceptions. The truth of the matter must rest with one or the other. Either feeling is a formative and determinative element in the function of the judgment or it is not. If it is not then there can really be no excuse for treating scientific judgments under the value category as Ritschl has defined it. If it is, then a whole wealth of epistemological problems face the proposition, of none of which Ritschl appears to be conscious.

Ritschl's purpose in insisting upon the grouping of scientific judgments under value judgments was probably prompted by his desire to have theology recognised on the same level as the practical sciences. And consequently, he would attain the end of having them recognised as having the same claim to validity. But obviously his whole argument in this respect is artificial, and he but succeeds in raising a multitude of issues which disparage his main and worth-while contentions.

Since some of Ritschl's disciples have had more to say on the subject of value, the place of value judgments in theology might be made more clear by considering the views of Otto Ritschl, Herrmann, and Kaftan.

1. J. & R. - pp.204-5.
2. see ibid - p.205
4. see - p.94.
Otto Ritschl, in his work "Ueber Werturteile", has entered more exhaustively into the relation of feeling to scientific or theoretic knowledge, and as he believed that in his exposition he was but sustaining his father's position with the weaknesses ironed out, his treatment of the problem is of special value.

Otto Ritschl insists that in both scientific and religious knowledge, the soul, in each moment that one of its functions (of knowing, willing and feeling) is operative, also, at the same time takes part with all its remaining activities. It may be that at one time the representation prevails, and at another time feeling, and at another time the striving or willing power, but all the while the dominant activity is always accompanied by a degree of both the others. The soul, in all its activity thus acts from this unified standpoint. What it perceives or does is related to a particular interest. In other words, the element of value is in all activity, and unless the apperceptive process takes place under artificial conditions involving abstractions, the value element is always clearly present.

Proof of this is evidenced to by (i.) the fact that people without training in abstraction naturally follow this method; (ii.) children, before education, think in terms of value: (iii.) Children learn to separate representation from willing and feeling with difficulty: (iv.) all people when they enjoy a full use of all their faculties (as in play) return to value judgments. Thinking in value judgments is thus the original and fundamental act of the human soul, and religion in finding its starting point in value judgments is merely relying upon what is fundamental in man - that is the unity of the soul.

Furthermore, the attitude which sums up this fundamental activity of the soul is one of undoubting confidence in the objects toward which the activity is directed. To use a modern term, it is one of naive realism. The spiritually normal man never ceases to trust and to hope, and if he is disappointed in a particular object of his affections he readily seeks another object. The fundamental character of a judgment of value is one of trust. This is also the fundamental character of religion. As Luther has expressed the matter in his greater catechism - Ein Gott heisset das, dazu man sich versehen soll alles Guten und zuflucht haben in all Noethen, also dass ein Gott haben nichts andres ist, denn ihm von Herzen trauen und glauben; wie ich oft gesagt habe, dass allein das Trauen und Glauben des Herzen macht beide, Gott und Abgott.

2. ibid - p.23.
Faith and God are necessary co-relates. This sums up the opinion of both Otto Ritschl and his father. Value accordingly is the feeling of certainty and assurance which accompanies a judgment in which all the activities of the soul are united. As religious, it directs itself upon God as the highest value and finds in Him perfect assurance or faith. God, thus, is for man the highest value and faith in God permits us to have assurance that lesser values are valid.

Otto Ritschl sets himself the task of providing for judgments of value an objective reality or validity equal to that accorded to theoretical judgments. The quibbling that troubled his father's treatment of the problem is here resolved into an admission that scientific judgments, qua scientific, are not concerned with the feeling that may be subjectively associated with them. However it is quite fallacious to assume, from this concession, that scientific judgments are superior to value judgments as referring to an existential reality as opposed to subjective states. Theoretical judgments have no more claim to the title of "existential judgments" than have value judgments.

Both types of judgments are concerned with the same reality, and if value judgments are subject to error so also are theoretical judgments. In either case the truth or falsity of the judgment rests on the same basis - the inadequate correspondence of the psychological representation with the reality comprehended. Indeed, if it be remembered that man naturally and originally thinks in terms of value and only under compulsion thinks in scientific terms, it would appear that value judgments have more of the freshness and truth of an immediate contact with reality than the scientific judgments, which suffer from their mediation through categories and laws. As a matter of fact, history clearly shows that scientific conclusions have been in a constant flux and subject to constant revisions, while on the other hand it may well be doubted whether the religious judgments, which do not make a pretense of being scientific, are so seriously affected by the course of investigation. The truth is that they have presented a more constant and valid - therefore more objective - norm than science has been able to present in its changing laws.

2. ibid - p.22.  
3. ibid - p.22.  
4. ibid - p.23.
However, this treatment of the problem does not bring us much nearer a solution of the relation of the two spheres of the judgment. It may be well and good to point out that the value judgment is logically and historically prior to the theoretical, but surely this provides no foundation for the claim of a superior validity for the value judgments, any more than the prattling of a child because it is prior to the reasoned discourse of an adult. Neither is it any more satisfactory to point to the error and mistakes of sciences as a disparagement of their validity. Science makes no claim to ultimate validity - but it does claim that it is progressively becoming valid and that it is progressively reaching a comprehensively valid understanding of the nature of the world. Otto Ritschl gives no basis for such a faith in the historical progression of value judgments.

The fact of the matter is that a satisfactory solution of the matter can never be looked for from the subjective standpoint alone. A psychological comparison of the two types of judgments with a view of finding the common and distinguishing elements in each can not provide a basis for the study of the comparative validity of each, unless this psychological comparison be first prefaced by a study of these elements themselves with a view of finding out their comparative utility in bringing the subject into a direct contact with reality. In other words, it is not enough to show that feeling is logically and historically prior to cognitive representation in the knowing process, the point is, what claim has feeling and cognitive representation to a knowledge of the world they seek to comprehend; and if they differ in methods, subject matter, and results, upon what basis can one claim a prior validity over the other.

Herrmann adopts a more positive, if not a more satisfactory attitude toward this problem. Apart from some slight modification, his views are out and out Kantian. Theoretical reason is concerned with the world as a causal nexus, conceived through and through in relation to the categories of the understanding.¹

"Fuer bloss erkennende Wesen ist die Wahrheit der Religion nicht vorhanden." ²

The practical reason, on the other hand, is concerned with the world as purposive. That is, in the realm of the practical reason we judge the world in reference to an end regarded as binding upon moral beings. This practical

¹ Die Religion im Verhaeltniss etc. - p.16.
² ibid - p.253.

Herrmann, however, is not willing to concede to metaphysics a complete independence from religious impulses. He tends to go somewhat further than did Kant in this respect. Metaphysical concepts, such as "soul", "things-per-se" "the world whole", etc. are built upon the practical motives of the soul to construct a unity out of the multiplicity of phenomena, - a unity which the endless diversity of natural events could never suggest as possible. Consequently, he claims, that the motive of metaphysics is carried back to a practical value impulse. It has its origin in the "Selbstgefühl" of men. "Es handelt sich dabei nicht mehr um die partiellose Auffassung des thatsächlich Gegebenen, sondern um das affectvolle Streben, die Anerkennung von Dedanken durchzuführen, deren Inhalt sich durch nichts legitimiren kann, als durch seinen Werth fuer uns."  

The subject matter of religious knowledge, in distinction from theoretical knowledge, is that it is concerned with those events to which a value is ascribed. Das Subjekt im Gefühl der Lust und Unlust ein Mittel besitzet, eine Ordnung der Werthe herzustellen, welche etwas ganz anderes besagt als die Ordnung der Vorstellungen in Bewusstsein. Indem jene in Werthurtheilen fixirt wird, so find die inneren Verhältnisse in einem solchen Werthurtheile und die Mittels theoretischen Erkennens voellig incommensurabel. Wir haben dabei nicht das Resultat eines vorstellbaren Geschehens vor uns, sondern ein Factum des Subjekts welches nur gesehen wird, wenn man nachführend selbst auf jenen Standpunkt tritt. Das vom Selbstgefühl bestimmte Bewusstsein sieht die Ordnung der Werthe, welche den eigenthümlichen Inhalt der Handlung bildet, der sie von allem anderen Geschehen specifische unterscheidet." *

1: op. cit. - p.86.
2: ibid - see pp.48-9.
3: ibid - p.66.
4: ibid - p.141.
The fidelity of these views to the Kantian heritage is rather doubtful. Herrmann certainly professes to make the moral will both the distinguishing point between world knowledge and religion and also the basis of religious knowledge. He insisted that the moral law is the beginning of religious thinking, for "the fundamental postulate of all knowledge is that there must be a God if a refractory world is not to overwhelm and annihilate the moral aspirations of men." But he insists also that the moral law is personal - it is personality, and this definition makes it easy for him to identify it with the Selbstgefühl. The source spring of religion he says in "Die Metaphysik in der Theologie", is the quest for the removal of the conflict between the hopes and the strivings of the personal spirit and the press of nature. The solution of the contradiction, he declares, is possible only by regarding the world, partially or totally, in a position of dependence on a deity favourable to us. Thus in Christianity the supra-mundane character of the highest good is combined with the thought of the Almighty God as Father.

In general, the views of Herrmann are not at such great variance with those of Ritschl as the professedly Kantian intention of his thought would indicate. The reason for this is to be sought, not only, in the fact that Herrmann called himself a disciple of Ritschl, but rather more in that Ritschl himself often deserted Lotze in favour of Kant, as we have had occasion to point out before. However, Herrmann did seek to remove his standard of value from the feeling determination, which so weakened Ritschl's exposition, by founding it upon the rationally determined moral will. The great difference between their views is to be seen in the relation they ascribe between the moral and the religious. Ritschl was anxious to separate them and although he was ambiguous as to the exact point of separation, insisted upon the independence of the religious judgment from moral considerations. Herrmann, to the contrary, sought in the moral a key to the religious insight.

Herrmann, no more than Ritschl, offers a solution of the great problem of value, - the relation of value to natural events. Herrmann is definitely Kantian in declaring that the theoretical is theoretical, and the moral is moral, and ne'er the twain shall meet. There

1 H.R. MacIntosh - op. cit. - p.143.
2 p.8.
can be no theoretical proof of moral assertion, neither can world knowledge infringe upon moral and religious matters. The theoretical receives its validity from rational categories, and the moral from the practical will. However, he adds that in the case of the moral, an addition to the moral will as the guarantee of validity, is offered by religious revelation. In Christianity, this revelation raises faith above the subjective experience and grounds it upon the person of Jesus and the relation of that Person to the ethical spirit of man.

Whereas Ritschl and Herrmann placed the emphasis upon the faculties of apperception in distinguishing theoretical and valueful knowledge, Kaftan seeks for the differentiating point in the nature of knowledge itself. The three faculties of the soul, in actual operation may be said to find expression in the twofold process of representation and feeling. These in turn, correspond in knowledge to theoretical and practical contact with reality. Theoretical knowledge proceeds from "Seinsurteile". These "Seinsurteile" express the objective fact of existence. Practical contact with reality takes the form of "Werturteile", which express our relation to these facts of existence. They concern our personal place in the world. All experience is thus covered by either or both of these two categories - fact and value.

Now as religion is intimately concerned with practical considerations, it rests upon value judgments. "Da sie (Religious Werturteile) im Unterschiede von allem eigentlichen Wissen auf diejenige Seite unseres geistigen Leben gehoert, wo Werte und nicht Thatsachen in letzter Instanz entscheiden." 1.

The religious and the moral are thus intimately related. They both are concerned with the "Gut" or the highest good. "Ein Gut heisst naemlich dem Menschen, was seinen Anspruch auf Leben befriedigt oder ihn in der Befriedigung desselben foerdert oder doch eine solche fuer die Zukunft in Aussicht stellt." 3.

Thus the starting point for both morality and religion is in the common need for a justification of man's spiritual claims of superiority over the world. God is thus the being who guarantees to us goodness and love in a world which so often appears to disregard, if not oppose, such principles. Without this thought of God and the manifestation of His power there could be no religion. 4.

1. Herrmann - op.cit. - p.399. 2. ibid. 3. ibid - p.44.
Thus religious judgments are value judgments concerning this relation of God to the order of events. The subject matter of religious knowledge is these judgments made concerning the relation of God to the world, just as existential matter is the subject of scientific study. But the two spheres are mutually exclusive. Natural knowledge is concerned with existence. Religious knowledge is concerned with the "for us" or value nature of existence.

The standard of truth in either case is also quite different. In world knowledge it depends upon categorical consistency. In religious knowledge, on the other hand - "ob seine Religion wahr ist das richtet sich vorzüglich darnach, ob sie das Gut, welches sie verheisst oder zu erstreben befiehlt, auch wirklich giebt, d.h. ob sie auf Offenbarung beruht. Diese ist das der Religion und folglich auf dem religioesen Glauben eigenthuemliche Mass der Wahrheit." *

However, upon religious judgments it is inevitable that a "Weltanschauung" be developed which has some bearing upon the pretensions of world knowledge when carried to its highest synthesis. Indeed, it is the business of religion to present just this complete view of the world which science, because of the limitations of its subject matter, is unable to do. In this sense religious knowledge presents the end and purpose for the pursuance of the different kinds of world knowledge. And if world knowledge attempts to present a Weltanschauung by means of a synthesis of the particular branches of knowledge it is plainly exceeding its jurisdiction and is encroaching upon the domain of religion. Indeed, in as much as it is concerned with sensuously perceived facts it cannot hope to present a valid world view. In attempting to do so it is entering the realm of value. No reconciliation of the two spheres is possible.

This view seems just as unsatisfactory and as ambiguous as those of Ritschl and Hermann. It could be only a naive understanding which would bind world knowledge down to sensuously perceived facts. Some of the present day mathematical scientists would not understand such a definition of the sphere of science. The whole structure of any science presupposes, as a substratum, laws and principles which intertwine the actual perception with the subject matter Kaftan reserves for value. One is reminded here of the famous medieval controversy over "universalia post rem" or "ante rem". Kaftan seems to identify the religious knowledge with the "universalia" and world knowledge.

* Kaftan - op.cit. - p.197.
with the "res". From such a starting point, a conclusion which would offer some hope of reconciling the two, is just as impossible as the medieval mind found it.

However, Kaftan's view marks an important departure from the position of Ritschl and Herrmann. Whereas they found value judgments as the elements of religious knowledge, Kaftan saw in value judgments but the raw material of religious knowledge. Religious knowledge, for him, is made up of theoretical propositions based on these value judgments as the subject matter. 1 This marks an important effort to step beyond the subjective sphere for a determination of religious validity. Feeling, which Ritschl made a standard of value and hence of religious knowledge, Kaftan regards much as a geologist does his rocks - as so much subject matter of study. He tends to regard religious value judgments as so much psychological data to be classified and built up, according to the empirical method of science. But, obviously, the futility of an attempt to sum up Christian truth in an empirical generalisation needs only to be pointed out to be recognised.

There has been one significant development which has characterised the efforts of Ritschl's disciples and successors to carry out his main thesis. That is, a persistent effort to escape from the subjective standard of feeling as a norm of value. Ritschl, himself, has played fast and loose with the word, feeling. Sometimes he defines feeling as one of the functions of the spirit and speaks of feeling "accompanying" action and knowing as though feeling were something independent of these and superimposed upon them. Then again feeling becomes the fundamental and original activity of the spirit - that which represents the true unity of the soul and portrays the true self. From this viewpoint he suggests that it has an active determining power in the acquisition and the forming of knowledge.

Otto Ritschl defines feeling in relation to value in such a way that he removes some of the uncertainty and ambiguity which accompanied his father's exposition. He declares that the distinguishing feature of a value judgment is the predominance of the feeling quality. He does insist that other elements may be present, for the soul acts with all its faculties in each of its activities. But what characterises value is the feeling element. In other words, a value judgment is one made in reference to the "for me" worth or significance of the particular object of the judgment.

1 op. cit. - p. 49.
The effect of this position is to tie the validity of value down to the validity of the psychological affectation of feeling. Otto Ritschl struggles against this admission by endeavouring to bolster up feeling as an original and fundamental act of judgment, but the conclusion is unavoidable. The ultimate proof of the validity of a judgment of value upon this basis can only be that the subject judging believes it valid. No appeal beyond the personal will to believe is admissible.

It is this conclusion that Herrmann and Kaftan sought to escape. Herrmann sought to associate value with the will rather than the feelings and by correlating religion with the moral, believed he had found a firm objective standard for value in the will determined by rigid moral categories. Kaftan was not content with this Kantian approach and considered the whole matter of feeling as so much raw material to be worked upon by the reflective reason and moulded into scientific form.

In view of what has been said in chapter I. upon this subject it is easy to see the limitations of the Ritschlian outlook. But it must be considered that this attempt of the Ritschlians marked the first appearance upon the stage of philosophy of the problem of value as we now understand it. Much has been said and written upon the subject since then. A wider comprehension of the magnitude and the diversified implications of the problem has now been reached. But when all is said and done the fact is that the great problem of value today is the same problem with which the Ritschlians struggled - how to establish the practical "for me" nature of value and at the same time to give to value an objective validity. Albrecht Ritschl and his son certainly led one to believe that the problem of value ought to be satisfied with an elaboration of the subjective or "for me" character of value, guided and guarded in religion, at any rate, by the Christian revelation in the community of the faithful.

But obviously, to give up an objective basis for religion is indeed to give up the validity - the very meaning - of religion.

"Nur in Subjekt, nicht im Gegenstande des Erkennens soll nach Ritschl und seiner Schule sich die Welt der Religion mit der Welt der Wissenschaft beruehren. Diese Trennung ist aber unmoglich solange man festhaelt, dass die Religion es nicht mit einer Traumwelt sondern mit einer thatsachlich existierenden Welt zu thun hat."

1 Wendland - op. cit. - p. 30.
"Der religioese Mensch will nicht bloss darueber Auskunft und Gewissheit haben, was er als religioes wertvoll anzusehen hat, sondern auch ob das was als religioes wertvoll zu betrachten ist, auch wirklich existiert; er will nicht bloss wissen wie die Welt vom religioesen Standpunkte aus zu beurteilen ist, sondern er will zugleich wissen, ob die Welt so beurtheilt werden darf, ob mit dieser Beurtheilung der Welt das objecktive Wesen derselben getroffen ist."\(^1\)

At this stage it would be premature to offer a theory of the relation of world knowledge and religious knowledge, but there are some statements in respect to this relation logically suggested by this discussion which will indicate the course that any solution of the problem must take.

The difference between world and religious knowledge cannot be that world knowledge is concerned with the nature and action of objects and religion solely with our attitude toward these objects. The realities with which both science and religion are concerned come together, not only in the subjective sphere of will and feeling, but they also meet in the object. Both kinds of knowledge are concerned with the one and the same reality. Their methods and their categorical presuppositions may be different, but unless one is prepared to start with a preliminary dualism, the postulate of a single world must underly all kinds of knowledge.

Max Scheibe, in his work to which reference has just been made, even though his point of view is generally sympathetic to the position of Ritschl, yet insists emphatically on this point.

"Wenn wir von dem Unterscheide zwischen materialer und geistiger sinnlicher und unsinnlicher Wirklichkeit reden, so meinen wir damit auch nicht zweierlei Sinn von Wirklichkeit, sondern nur verschiedene Arten, verschiedene Beschaffenheiten, verschiedene Weisen, in denen uns das Wirkliche zum Bewusstsein kommt."\(^2\)

"Denn durch Aufweis der Ursachen, durch der etwas geschiet, und durch den Nachweis, dass es durch bestimmte Ursachen hervorgerufen ist und nur durch diese hervorgerufen werden konnte, wird eine Zweckbestimmung derselben nicht ausgeschlossen; und dadurch, dass alles Geschehen in der Welt ...

\(^1\) M. Scheibe - Die Bedeutung der Werturteile fuer das religioese Erkennen - pp.42-3.
\(^2\) ibid - p.63.
in einem notwendigen fausalen Zusammenhang steht, wird nicht aufgehoben, dass diese Geschehen ein Zweckmaessiges, ein der Verwirklichung eines bestimmten Zwecks, eines hochsten Gutes dienliches ist. Auf der anderen Seite hat die Zweckbestimmung einer Handlung nicht die Unmoeglichkeit zur Folge, dass diese Handlung sich als ursachlich Geschehen auffassen, als in notwendigem Kausalzusammenhang mit anderem stehend sich betrachten liess. "Beide Betrachtungen koennen aber nicht bloss vereint werden sondern sie muessen es, das sie sich gegenseitig zur Ergaenzung dienen und sich gegenseitig fordern." 1.

The various "Arten", "Beschaffenheit" and "Weise" in which this single reality comes to our consciousness in world and religious knowledge, Scheibe shows to have a categorical and representative character.


"Erloesung von den Schranken der Endlichkeit und Stillung seiner Sehnsucht nach vollkommener Glueckseligkeit, nach den Bedingungen der Befriedigung dessen was er in sich als Forderung und als unmittelbar zu seinem Selbst gehoerend entdeckt, nach die Herstellung dessen was ihm wertvoll ist, dies sucht und findet der Mensch in der Religion. Dies sind die Normen, nach denen der Mensch dasjenige beurteilt, was religioes wertvoll ist. -- Im Kampf ist Welt und Ich, und nur in Gott ist Frieden." 3.

However, this concern of religion with the striving, willing spirit of man does not prevent religion from presenting a Weltanschauung, and an interpretation of world

1. op.cit - pp. 78-9.
2. ibid - pp. 54-5.
3. ibid - pp. 34-5.
events, which claims just as ultimate a validity as that claimed by world knowledge in general.

"Dasselbe Gebiet, derselbe Gegenstand, naemlich das Transcendente der Sinnerwahrnehmung und des Selbstbewusstseins, oder das der durch die Sinneswahrnehmung uns gegebenen Welt und dem Selbstbewusstsein zu Grunde liegende Seiende ist einerseits Object der wissenschaftlichen, andererseits Object der religioesen, Erkenntnis."¹

And if this be so, then religion, in as much as it is concerned with ends, purposes and creation as a whole, has a more ultimate contact with the nature of the transcendent, and thus, in a very real sense, can claim that it alone can provide a proper and a true basis for a final Weltanschauung. Indeed, as it is the concern of religion to deal with ends, purposes and creation as a whole, then in a very real sense religion alone can provide a proper and a true basis for the construction of such a Weltanschauung.

"Wenn eine Lehre der Naturwissenschaft der Religion widerstreitet, so ist sie sicherlich kein Ergebnis strenger Wissenschaft sondern durch eine Ueberschreitung der letzteren gezogenen Grenzen zustande gekommen."²

Consequently, the concern and interest of theology is not bound up with the subjective sphere of the individual consciousness and its particular experiences alone; it is concerned with a religious world outlook - a religious Weltanschauung. Furthermore, if this absolute and transcendent reference is omitted in any theological system, the conception of God must be, by the very nature of the case, "unvollkommen und inadaequat".³

"Wenn wir dagegen vom religioesen Standpunkte aus sagen dass im Absoluten ein, fuer uns allerdings nicht vorstellbarer, Grund vorhanden sei, infolgedessen wir Gott als geistiges Wesen als sittliche Persoenlichkeit, als Liebe zu fahren bekommen, so bietet zu dieser Aussage der Begriff des Absoluten kein Hindernis."⁴

This exposition of Scheibe's views bears out what has already been said on the subject of value, and points out the conclusion which a discussion of the matter must reach - even though this conclusion carry us somewhat beyond Scheibe's own opinions. That the saving grace of God, as revealed to us in Christ, has a "for me" value must be recognised. But the value of this revelation is not primarily that I esteem

¹ op.cit - p.58.  ² ibid - p.79.  ³ ibid - p.71.  ⁴ ibid - p.71.
it valuable for my salvation: its primary reference is not in its "value for me" character. Rather it is valuable for me only because it is first and foremost an expression of God's redeeming love. Unless value first sustain this objective reference it would cease to be valuable for me.

"Wenn ich sage: Gott ist die Liebe, so meine ich damit nicht bloss, dass ich Gott als Liebe zu erfahren bekomme, oder dass Gott fuer mich diese Bedeutung hat, sondern ich will damit die Erkenntnis ausdruecken das es eine objecktive Qualitaet des oetlichen Wirkens gebe, in der es begruendet liegt, dass ich ihn als die Liebe zu erfahren bekomme."1.

If we may distinguish this objective nature of value from its subjective character, by distinguishing between the two terms "value" - as refering to the former, and "valuable" - as refering to the latter, then we could say that Ritschl's error lay in not distinguishing value from valuable. By considering the matter from the subjective point of view he was led to consider value only in respect to the particular "value judgment" in which the "value" became "valuable" for me.

A more concrete example will make this point clear. This pen with which I write is valuable for me. Apart from its "for me" or "for some one else" reference, it cannot be said to represent a value at all. It is valuable because it is an instrument in serving my ends, or if it were in the possession of some one else, in serving their personal ends. It is "valuable" but it cannot be considered a "value" in the sense we use the term. On the other hand the "human race as a whole" or the "Christian community as an entity" are not valuables for me in the same manner. They have, it is true, supplied me with a cultural and religious background and a degree of education, and in these respects they share in the character of my pen. But there is another character which they possess which makes them quite different from my pen. They are valuable to me not because I judge them valuable or merely because they serve my personal ends, but rather, in so far as I am a member of the human race and the Christian community, they determine whether my judgments themselves are valuable or not. I cannot condemn the human race as such or the Christian community as such - I but condemn myself. They are a value standard for me as well as being valuable to me. Consequently, to consider them only from the standpoint of their "for me" reference is, ipso facto,

to deny their true value. They are valuable for me only because I first share their nature, only because I find in them a standard.

Similarly, the "love" of God is certainly a value for me. I cannot conceive of a greater value. But in the manner we have defined the terms it cannot be said to be a "valuable" for me. To make such a claim would be to identify its value with my judgment of its valuableness for me. Such a process is an inversion of the proper order, for as a value to me it is a value over which I may form a judgment of valuableness with respect to my purposes, but it is not a value which I set up by my own judgment.

"Man hat Religion veil die Religion zuerst ihn hat." ¹

From this it follows that the values of religion, in as much as their being is logically prior to my judgment concerning them and in as much as the personal reference depends upon this prior value and not vice versa, are primarily and essentially objective. The subjective reference follows as a logical consequence (epistemologically speaking) and cannot be said to be the primary consideration. In as much as I am a recipient of God's love, and in as much as I participate in His end purpose (which is to establish His Kingdom of love on earth) then this value becomes a valuable for me - it becomes subjective. But it becomes subjective only upon the presupposition that its objective reference is primary.

"God cannot be conceived as a means towards man's ends as making man's ends His own; but man must be conceived as a means towards God's ends, but not merely as a means but as a means in such a sense that he fulfils his own ends in realising God's. The world cannot be thought as having a more immediate relation to man than God so that he can be thought as falling back on his relation to God when he fails to find satisfaction in the world. The conception is altogether too subjective and utilitarian." ²

"If the idea of God is nothing more than a "Hilfsbegriff", as Ritschl's theory implies, then union with God is not something, without which man is essentially inadequate to his idea, but a mere necessity of his unfortunate situation in the world." ³

Furthermore, if value has its primary reference in God's purpose (that is, in the loving will of God in the realisation of His Kingdom on earth) then value must be inherent in that which God employs as a means to the realisation of His Kingdom -

that is, in the world itself, which as subject to God must be conformed with His purpose. The conclusion is unavoidable. The "for God's purpose" reference must be applied to the nature of the world, to the course of natural events, and to the phenomena of knowledge. The value reference of reality is more than the outcome of an act of faith, as Ritschl at times suggested, it is inherent in the very nature of reality and must reveal itself to a valid investigation of its nature.

"Die Gotteserkenntnis ist demnach der Mittelpunkt alles wissenschaftlichen Erkennens und verhältn sich zu aller Einzelerkenntnis in der Wissenschaft wie das Zentrum zur Peripherie." ¹

This is the truth that Lotze grasped when he said in the concluding section of his treatise on metaphysics, "the true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics". But unfortunately he did not develop this idea in his philosophy. It would have involved a reconsideration of his entire philosophic outlook, and value, instead of being treated as a supplement to reality, and as relative only to the feeling willing activity of the apperceptive subject, would have been recognised as the basis for the explanation of natural phenomena. Also, Ritschl's initial predication that religious knowledge proceeds upon value judgments is fundamentally an endeavour to give expression to this same idea. But his treatment was unfortunate in that he threw the whole emphasis upon the act of judgment in which the "value" becomes "valuable for me!"

The precise relation of the spheres of science and religion could be indicated only upon a more fundamental investigation of the meaning and epistemological significance of the postulates and findings of science, but the general principles of this relationship are here evident. Theology may be regarded as an interpretation of the universe from the viewpoint of the Divine purpose which has created and creates the universe for a definite end, and which sustains it and leads it toward this goal. In Christian theology this purpose is finally and perfectly revealed in Christ. Science (of which philosophy, in so far as it is secular in its function, may be regarded as the ultimate interpreter) presents an interpretation of this same universe from the point of view of a rationalistic, or intellectual or theoretical observation of the processes in which this ultimate purpose is realised.

¹ Wendland - op. cit. - p.30.
If these two premises be conceded then the inevitable conclusion is that the field of world knowledge generally, falls inside that of religious insight. The religious insight alone can claim to present an ultimate "Weltanschauung". World knowledge presents a particular point of view— a view relative to the place, time and general circumstance of the observers. It does not follow from this that the religious point of view must always be right and the scientific always wrong if they meet in opposition. Error in interpreting the Divine purpose is just as possible as in elaborating a law or a principle or a category to cover natural observation. Neither can afford to be dogmatic upon matters of interpretation. Neither need feel ashamed to present its findings, at least provisionally, as a true insight into the nature of reality.
CHAPTER V.

"WE KNOW GOD ONLY BY REVELATION".1

Behind the subjectivism of Ritschl's theological premise that "religious knowledge takes its course in value judgments", is his epistemological premise that "we know "things" in their appearances". His epistemological premise he considered as a guarantee, in some way, of the judgments upon which religious knowledge is based. The two premises were meant to be correlative in some way. The epistemological premise was an objective statement of the same problem which in the realm of the subjective judgments gave rise to his value premise. Value judgments are thus the practical consequence of the epistemological premise, when this premise is viewed from the standpoint of the subject. That is, from the subjective point of view, the appearances, which represent a valid counterpart of the "thing", are comprehended as value - i.e. in their "for me" significance.

In some respects this presentation carries us back to the case as presented by Kant after he had finished his first two Critiques. However Kant had then advanced his third Critique as a suggestion that in the judgments there is a common meeting place of the two spheres. Ritschl, in his anxiety to preserve the "value" character of the judgments, and in an effort to draw a hard and fast line between the theoretical and the valueful, could not approach the problem in the same manner. In the epistemological sphere he became committed to the rather hopeless separation of the "thing" and its "appearance" - the "object" and its phenomenal "operations" upon our senses. In the subjective sphere this same attitude committed him to an equally hopeless separation of the "world as known" from its "subjective" or "value" significance.

Ritschl offers a solution for this mix-up by advancing a third premise, which by presenting a common ground between the "thing" and its "appearance" and the "object" and its "for me" significance, he hoped would solve the difficulty. This third premise is, "We know God only by revelation".

When all is said and done, this premise presents his truly positive contribution to theology, and it is upon this premise that he really proceeds to develop his theological doctrines.


II2. RELIGION AS REVELATION.

Christi stehenden Glaubigen dar zulegen."

Revelation is objective in that it is a revelation of God - it is a valid phenomenon or appearance of the transcendent "Thing". Revelation is subjective in that it is a revelation which only a believer can understand, and the understanding of it is intrinsically bound up with the weal or woe of the believer - it has a "for me" significance. The objective reference is the historical person of Christ as revealed in the New Testament writings. The subjective reference is the faith of the individual Christian in this historical revelation as a "value" for him.

But Ritschl is insistent in maintaining that it is not to the individual as an individual that the revelation is truly valid. Rather, it is for the individual as a member of the Christian community. "We are able to know and understand God, sin, conversion, and eternal life, in the Christian sense, only so far as we consciously and intentionally reckon ourselves members of the community which Christ founded." ¹

Thus, in the final reference, it is to the Christian community that one must turn to find the meeting place of the objective and subjective factors of revelation. "These two conceptions - the revelation in Christ and the Christian community form the focus points of his theological expositions. Christianity, so to speak, resembles not a circle described around a single center but an ellipse which is determined by two foci - the person of Jesus and the Christian community." ²

Consequently there are four natural divisions in which a discussion of Ritschl's doctrine of revelation might fall.

I. What does he mean by revelation in general?
II. What is the objective or historical basis of revelation?
III. What is the subjective or practical reference in revelation?
IV. What does he mean by the Christian community?

I. Revelation in general.

Considering the important place that revelation plays in his theology, Ritschl's definition and explanation of it is extremely weak. Like his other philosophic

¹ Wendland - op. cit. - p. 34.
² J. & R. - p. 4.
³ ibid - p. II.
and theological premises, it is accepted as a matter of fact. It, like the others, is the presupposition on which he built, and he did not feel it the concern or interest of theology to advance a theory of its nature or origin. Such a concern and interest smacked too much of metaphysics for his liking. As he had trustfully leaned upon Lotzian epistemology and had naively posited a value determination of the judgment, so he credulously begins his Christology with the premise of the fact of revelation. Revelation is, and that sufficed him. But how it came to be -

"how Christ came to be the unique Being he was, and have the spiritual equipment for His vocation He possessed - how He grew into that knowledge of God and His purpose and into that unity of will with God which He manifested through what means, under what psychological conditions, within what limitations, God communicated Himself to Him - all these are questions which it (his theology) declines to discuss".

As Ritschl himself expresses it:

"How the person of Christ came to be what it is and to possess the ethical and religious value which it does, is no object of theological investigation because the problem transcends every kind of investigation." 1

However, he does insist upon two features of revelation which he considers fundamental.

i. Revelation, in the Christian sense, is a peculiar and special phenomenon, quite different and distinct from the objects of world knowledge, and which centers in the historical Jesus.

ii. Revelation is inseparable from the Christian conscious­ness of believers; it is inseparable from faith.

"Den vornehmsten Grundsatz Ritschls finden wir in der Verknuepfung folgender Formeln: der Offenbarungswerth Christi ist der Erkenntnisgrund fuer alle Aufgaben der Theologie, und die authentische und erschoepfende Erkennt­nis der religioesen Bedeutung Jesu ist daran gebunden, dass man sich in die von ihm gestiftete Gemeinde gerade insofern einrechtnet als dieselbe ueberzeugt ist, die Suendenvergebung als seine eigenthuemliche Wirkung empfangen zu haben." 2

i. In insisting upon the first of these two characters of revelation, he maintains the special character of the work teaching, and vocation of Jesus. Speciality and revelation he closely relates.

"The speciality of the spot at which a god has ordained that he shall be adored, the speciality of the times at

which the gods move through the land and summon their worshippers to celebrate their festivals, the speciality of the choice of Israel by the Lord of all nations - in short, speciality is the element which impels men to grasp the different aspects of religion and combine them practically in worship."

Professor Orr says of Ritschl's conception of revelation - "revelation generally, it is held, does not consist in a sum of doctrines or even of facts but is associated with any event which produces in us a vivid immediate realisation of the presence and working of God". "It has nothing to do with questions of genuineness and authenticity of books, with arguments from miracles and prophecy, with supports from natural theology, in short with external evidences". This definition of Ritschl's doctrine of revelation seems quite fair. For Ritschl, the subject matter and validity of the Christian revelation need not go beyond the sphere of revelation itself for proof. To be revealed is both to be an object of Christian experience and to be a valid object.

ii. In insisting upon the inseparability of revelation from faith, Ritschl finds the sufficient proof of revelation in the faith of the Christian community itself. Apart from the faith of the community proof is superfluous for in faith its proof is already complete. The proof of revelation can only lie in the fact that "the Christian ideal of life and no other satisfies the claim of the human spirit to a knowledge of things". A disinterested or scientific proof is absurd and impossible. Revelation and faith are inseparable correlates. Thus the dependence of revelation upon faith is closely related to the special and peculiar nature of revelation as an object of knowledge.

Revelation, for Ritschl, is a peculiarly religious conception and by a religious conception is meant that it has its value and its validity apart from and independent of natural or scientific knowledge. The relation of a Christian to his God - "comprises none save purely spiritual relations and the attitude of a Christian to his God in faith is a purely spiritual function which, as such, can be exercised without any sensible actions whatever being essential to it!"

\[2\] Orr - op. cit. - pp. 89 & 94.
\[3\] J. & R. - p. 25.
\[4\] Ibid - p. 140.
RELIGION AS REVELATION.

Precisely what Ritschl means by such an expression it is difficult to say, but generally speaking, he appears to be contending for the position he maintained in his exposition of value judgments, namely, that value is not dependent upon the natural determination of its object but resides in something intrinsically personal.

This emphasis upon faith as a necessary correlate of revelation causes Ritschl to minimise the significance of historical testimony. His propositions, when actually applied, tends to interpret revelation in terms of faith rather than faith in terms of revelation. This tendency is, of course, a direct result of his anxiety to refer all religious judgments to a value standard in relation to the weal or woe of the judging person.

Ritschl's attitude toward Holy Scriptures is significant in that it is illustrative of his attitude toward revelation in general. The important place which he gave to revelation would cause one to expect that the Biblical narratives would form the basis for the objective validation of the Christian faith. But the necessity of relating all his theological positions to the weal or woe of persons forbade him appealing to such an impersonal standard as the Bible to be the final arbiter in the matter. We do not believe in Christ because of Biblical testimonies, he declares, but rather we accept the Biblical testimonies as valid because we first believe in Christ.

"It is -- a false assumption that a uniform doctrine of the Godhead of Christ can be exegetically constructed from the New Testament. Strictly speaking the content of the New Testament books is not doctrine at all. Least of all can we discover in Christ's own words a doctrine of His Godhead. There, indeed, it is not to be expected. For the thought of Christ's Godhead is never other than the expression of that unique acknowledgment and appreciation which the Christian community yields to its Founder. "

"The material of the theological doctrines is to be sought not so much directly in the words of Christ as in the correlative representations of the original consciousness of the community. It would be a mistaken purism were any one, in this respect, to prefer the less developed statements of Jesus to the forms of apostolic thought." ²

The value of the New Testament, he believed, was to be sought, not in any theory of inspiration, but rather in

¹ J. & R. - p. 400.
² ibid - p. 3.
the fact that it is a "perfect monument of the beginning of Christianity". That is, the New Testament is a valid testimony of the faith of the early Christian community and as such preserves the faith of apostolic days for our own instruction. Its supreme value lies in this very fact alone, that is is a valid record of the first Christian community.¹

The value of the Old Testament is that it is an aid in the interpretation and understanding of the New. "The theological importance of the Old Testament consists in this; that from it the historical presuppositions of the Christian revelation are rightly understood."² In this manner it helps us, not only to understand the New but also permits us to check up on foreign influences that might creep into New Testament writings. It is a guide to the interpretation of the New Testament. But Ritschl does not push the implications of this proposition very far.

With respect to this problem of the authority of the scriptures Fabricius, in "Die Entwicklung in A. Ritschls Theologie von 1874 bis 1889", point out an increased emphasis upon the faith of the believers as against Biblical authority between the first and last editions of his "Justification and Reconciliation". In IA. (first edition) wird ein freier Biblizmus als dogmatischer Grundsatz ausgesprochen demgegenübert die Anlehnung an den symbolischen Lehrbegriff, der wichtige biblische Lehren ausser Geltung gesetzt hat, als Verengung, ja als Knechtschaft erscheint. In 2.3A. hingegen wird gegenüber pietistischer Willkuer die Regelung des Schriftbeweises durch die Heisordnung der Reformation vorgeschrieben, die in ihren Bekenntnisschriften vorliegt."³

The difficulty which faces such a view as Ritschl is maintaining is to justify the superiority and finality of the Christian revelation as a matter of comparative religion. If the basis of religious knowledge is revelation and if revelation is to be interpreted in terms of faith, then there is no reason for saying that the revelation in the Christian religion is superior to that in Buddhist religion. The problem of comparative religion was always a stumbling block to Ritschl. His anxiety to separate religious knowledge from world knowledge drove him to recognise the revelation character of religious knowledge in all stages

¹. see J.& R. - pp.II-13 and Unterricht - p.2
². Unterricht - pp.IO-II.
³. p.I2I.
RELIGION AS REVELATION.

of religious development among all peoples. "Revelation -- forms the organic center of every connected religious view of the world. This factor too appears with various modifications at the various stages of religion --. No idea of religion complete after its own order can be formed if the characteristic of revelation which belongs to it is either denied or even merely set aside as inadequate." On the other hand, in order to guarantee the Christian revelation he seems to assume that in Christianity is the only true revelation. This contradiction is never reconciled in his theology, for, to be sure, a reconciliation could have been brought about only by a reconsideration of many of his premises.

The facts of comparative religion he recognises: that Christ came in the "fulness of time" he is willing to admit: but his contention is, that a Christian theologian, qua Christian, is not concerned with such problems. His task is to reveal the nature of the Christian faith as it is expressed in the work of Christ in founding the Christian community. It is only from the viewpoint of a Christian that Christian theology permits exposition; and for a Christian, this viewpoint -- this Weltanschauung -- is dependent upon one source alone and that is the revelation in Christ.

That this position represents a healthy reaction from the speculative methods of contemporary schools of theology, may be granted. That the Christian revelation is ultimate is fundamental to an appreciation of the Christian faith. To deny this is to deny Christianity. But the demand for primacy and perfection of the Christian revelation does not involve, as Ritschl assumed, a repudiation of the study of comparative religion and historical development as valuable aids in the comprehension of Christian truth. It demands only that these problems be considered from a Christian viewpoint. Neither does it demand a repudiation of the assistance offered by the theoretical reason in bringing world knowledge into relationship with Christian revelation. It only demands that Christian revelation be not made dependent upon any theories advanced by philosophy. In other words, Christianity does not deny that God may reveal Himself in natural processes and that a study of these processes may lead one to God. It only insists that such "natural" revelation be reconciled to the revelation in Christ and appreciated from that standpoint. Christianity does not demand an exclusive prerogative

1 J. & R. - pp. 201-2.
II. The Objective Nature of Revelation.

By thus defining the nature of Christ, Ritschl resolves the old "two nature" controversy into a "two aspect" matter. He repudiates the traditional method of beginning with "the Divine nature with all the attributes of God, especially omnipotence and omniscience", and from thence estimating the relation of the Divine and human attributes in the person of Jesus. He maintains that from such a consideration of the nature of Christ nothing tangible can be reached. It is but the old quest for the "thing-in-itself".

"What Christ is in virtue of His eternal destiny, and what the influence is which He exerts on us because of His exaltation to God would be wholly beyond our ken if we

1Unterricht - introduction.
RELIGION AND REVELATION.

did not also experience the effects of the same in His historical existence in time." 1

"The co-relation of Christ with God His Father, is not a scientific explanation. And as a theologian one ought to know that the fruitless clutching after such explanations only serves to obscure the recognition of Christ as the perfect revelation of God." 2

The Divinity of Christ, His relationship with God and His specific religious function, can be comprehended only in the light of His actions which reveal this Divinity to us. Consequently, His Divinity and His humanity, His teleological purpose and His vocational life, His religious identity with God and His ethical-moral freedom, must be studied and understood from the standpoint of His historical activity in founding the Christian community. Whether Ritschl's manner of presenting the eternal problem of the two natures of Christ offers a solution, can be seen only when his treatment of the matter is considered from each of these aspects with a view of testing the adequacy of his presentation.

i. Christ's religious function.

Within the religious sphere Ritschl argues for the Divinity of Christ upon two bases: (a) His divine mission in founding the Kingdom of God: (b) His perfect and final revelation of God.

(a) His Divine mission.

Ritschl maintains that since Christ is the agent of God's loving will in founding the Christian community, as the means to man's salvation, then the purpose of God on earth must be understood and accepted by men, by first accepting the revelation through which this salvation in the Kingdom is offered.

"The harmony with God and likeness to Him, which the Kingdom of God must maintain in order to be understood as the objective of God's love, attaches to the said Kingdom only in so far as it is called into being by the Son of God and bows to Him as its Lord. In other words, it is on the Son of God that, in the first place, the Father's love falls and only for His sake on the community of which He is Lord. Moreover, if these relations are eternally involved in God's will of love, it follows from the recognition of this fact that the special significance Christ has for us is by no means exhausted in our appreciation of Him as a revelation conditioned by time. On the contrary, it is implied that as Founder and Lord of the Kingdom of God, Christ


2. Ibid - p. 452.
is as much the object of God's eternal knowledge and will as is the moral unification of mankind which is made possible through Him and whose prototype He is. He is Himself the prototype of that life of love and elevation above worldly motive which forms the distinguishing characteristic of the Kingdom of God; - - - If therefore the Kingdom of God as the correlate of the Divine self-end is the eternal object of the love of God, this is so because Christ, as the prototype and inspiring force of that union of the many in one, in other words as the Head and Lord of the Kingdom of God, is the eternal object of the love of God so that in this special form the Kingdom of God is present eternally to the Divine knowledge and will while its individual members are objects of the knowledge of God in them."

"It follows therefore, that as the historical Author of this communion of men with God and with each other, Christ is necessarily unique in His own order. For if a second could be produced who really was on a level with Christ in grace and truth, in world-conquering patience, in scope alike of purpose and of achievement he could yet stand in historical dependence upon Christ and therefore logically would be subordinate to Him. Hence as compared with those who succeeded Him in the realisation of the Kingdom of God, the fact that His end was the self-end of God, has for Him quite a different meaning. - - The figure of Christ cannot be understood at all unless it is in His original and distinguishing characteristic that He finds His own personal end in the self-end of God." *

(4) Christ as the perfect and final revelation.

"There is yet another reason why the person of Christ maintains its place in the Christian view of the world. Christ founds His religion with the claim that He brings the perfect revelation of God so that beyond what He brings no further revelation is conceivable or is to be looked for. Whoever therefore has a part in the religion of Christ, in the way Christ Himself intended, cannot do other than regard Christ as the bearer of the final revelation of God." 3

In this sense, the person of Christ must be regarded as the perfect embodiment (so far as the temporal world would permit) of the Divine purpose, and the work of Christ and His saving gospel must be regarded as the "Word" of God.

2 ibid - pp. 465-6.
3 ibid - p. 388 (see also Unterricht - sec. 22.)
This divine function of the person of Christ has the important implication for theology that in Him can be found a true likeness of God.

"That Christ overcomes His fate, reveals to us in Him the Creator of the world; that He endures the indignities which He had not deserved of course, for the good of men, reveals in Him the Creator, the Wise Ruler, the gracious Protector of the world; finally that He does not withhold His benefits from the unthankful and unbelieving, that He prays for those who crucify Him proves His connection with the perfect God who bestows His favours on the evil and the good." 1

This is the sense in which the famous saying in John 17:4 must be interpreted, 'I glory Thee on earth, having accomplished the work which Thou hast given me to do'. And -

"John, in seeking to realise the impression made on his own kind, of the worth of Christ's life as a whole, was in a position to construct a new formula which implies that Christ was more than an instrument of Divine revelation. His faith in the Divine worth of Christ expresses itself in his judgment with regard to Him, that the Divine revelation is a human person - 'the word became flesh'. 2

However Ritschl insists that this identity of Christ with the "Word" of God makes Him more than an aspect or agent of the Divine Will. He claims that these characteristics as revealed by Christ are comprehensible only by recognising the personality of Christ - that is, His moral freedom. To say that in Christ the "Word" becomes flesh expresses only half the truth. A true comprehension of Christ can be formed only in recognising His free moral will.

"It is not the mere fact of dying that determines the value of Christ's death as a sacrifice; but what renders this issue of His life significant for others is His willing acceptance of the death inflicted upon Him - as a dispensation of God and the highest proof of His faithfulness to His vocation." 3

"Even in the Johanine prologue, after presenting the Divine word as the form and the human individual as the material of the revelation in Christ, the point of view is reversed and in the human personality as form, we are asked to recognise substance, grace and truth. Nor is this method accidental or arbitrary, for in the first place it corresponds to the self-manifestation of Christ in His words and actions; that is to say, to the historical reality." 4

1 J.& R. - p.416.  
2 ibid - p.436.  
3 ibid - p.477.  
4 ibid - p.438.
"If we regard Christ as a mechanism (of the Divine will) we do not only do away with the distinction between Christ and nature but we give the lie to our own experience of His spiritual personality. While therefore our religious judgment is to the effect that God is not merely with Him but in Him that His characteristic activities are the activities of God, that His love to men as the motive of all His conduct is identical with the love of God, yet we are compelled to alternate this judgment with others which express the ethical independence of Christ under the category of human freedom." 1

"A scientific apprehension of the relation expresses in the religious view of Christ appears to be attainable, therefore, only on the assumption that we have grasped the historical manifestation of Christ under the form of the human Ego, that is, have viewed it in the light of its inherent unity as judged by ethical laws." 2

ii. The Ethical Vocation of Christ.

Whether we regard the life of Christ from the standpoint of His religious purpose (i.e. His relationship with God) or in the light of His ethical vocation (i.e. His moral task in founding the Kingdom of God), we see in Him the same qualities. From the religious standpoint He is seen to be the revelation of God - the "Word" become flesh. From the ethical viewpoint He is seen to be a perfect man - the founder of an ethical community, and the leader of those within it. These two aspects of His nature present no contradiction. Indeed, they may be easily correlated when we consider that the Kingdom of God, which represents the end purpose of God for all creation and the end purpose also of historical revelation, is the same Kingdom which Christ took it upon Himself to found as His ethical vocation.

Consequently, from this standpoint Ritschl is logically able to consider the "manhood of the Master" without any disparagement of His divine nature. Furthermore, in fulfilling His vocational task Christ is more than an agent of God; He is a free moral agent consciously choosing His own moral ends.

"In the idea of God as the final goal of all things lies the reason why Jesus recognises as binding upon Himself, for God's sake, the widest conceivable aim of moral effort, namely the union of mankind through love; while in the idea of God as the author of the world lies the reason why Jesus, for His own personal end,repudiates every motive that is individual, worldly, and therefore less than divine. - - By making the aim of His own life

the aim of mankind, who are to be called into the fellow-
ship of His community, He is before all else the Founder
of a religion and the Redeemer of men from the dominion
of the world."¹

That is, the Lordship of Christ is expressed both in His
activity in founding the community of the faithful, and
in His redemptive value for the personal life.

In relation to the fellowship of the faithful, Christ
stands as the Founder and Redeemer. By virtue of His
obedience to the will of God in carrying our God's end
purpose in the Kingdom, Christ is historically the Founder
of the fellowship; and as exercising this function
according to the will of God He is Lord and Saviour.

"This obedience toward God is the specific form of
that Lordship which He both acquires and exercises
over men."²

By virtue of the perfection of His ethical service in His
obedience, Christ represents the archetype man beyond
whom we can not by any imagination picture a more perfect,
and who, therefore, stands before us as the one and only
way to salvation.

"Thus what in the historically complete figure of Christ
we recognise to be the real worth of His existence,
gains for ourselves, through the uniqueness of the
phenomenon and its normative bearing upon our own
religious and ethical destiny, the worth of an abiding
rule since we, at the same time, discover that only
through the impulse and direction we receive from Him
is it possible for us to enter into His relation to
God and to the world."³

Furthermore, Ritschl declares that by virtue of His
redemptive Lordship, we, by participating in the fellow-
ship of Christ take the rank of sons of God (Mt.27:26)
and are received into the same relation to God in which
Christ stands to His Father (Jn.27:21-23).*

This Lordship of Christ expresses the ultimate
category under which we may conceive of Him as a moral
being. It sums up and includes all His historical life
and redemptive work in so far as they are pertinent to
the life of the believing Christian. The Lordship of
Christ is the "value" of Christ for Christians, and
what goes beyond the bounds of this conception is not
pertinent to the Christian faith. The community of

¹J.& R. - pp.414-5.
²Ibid - p.452.
³Ibid - p.387 (footnote)
⁴See ibid - p.387.
the faithful "depends entirely for its origin on the fact
that the Son of God is its Lord to whom it renders obedience." ¹

"Whatever in the Epistles (of the New Testament) goes
beyond this practical significance of the attribute of
"Kurios" as applied to Christ and give His relation
toward the world a wider scope than His present Lordship
over it, belongs to the sphere of special gnosis, that
is of intellectual cognition which creates problems
rather than solves them." ²

This emphasis upon the Lordship of Christ causes
Ritschl to modify the classic division of the functions
or offices of Christ as Prophet, Priest and King.
Ritschl tends to subordinate the prophetic and priestly
under the kingly offices as more suitably expressing His
Lordship.

"Derselbe Umfang des Berufsgehorsams Christi, der sein
Leben ausfuellt und in seinem Tode zur Vollendung Kommt,
will unter den zwei entgegengesetzten Gesichtspunkten
des koeniglichen Prophetenthums und des Koeniglichen
Priesterthums, der Vertretung Gottes fuer die Menschen
und der Vertretung der Menschen (als seiner Gemeinde)
vorn Gott begriffen." ³

As priest-king Christ fulfilled His religious function:
as prophet-king he fulfilled His moral function. He
brings man to God - therefore He is priest. He represents
God to man - therefore He is prophet." ⁴

This resolution of the old problem of the two natures
of Christ into a distinction of function has much to
commend it. The traditional theology, which began with
a distinction between the Divine and the human nature,
by very predication of such a distinction, separated the
two and forbade a union of the two in one personality.
Almost inevitably any attempt to reconcile the two
contraries in one person led to an explanation of one
in terms of the other - and this road leads to the morass
of heresy.

Ritschl abandoned the unprofitable investigation and
took his starting point in the actual work of Christ where
the Divine and the human were manifestly together. He
declared that God's end purpose is realised in the Christian
community (and indeed, to deny this is to deny the perfection
and ultimateness of Christianity), and he argued that the
work of Jesus in founding this community was therefore
a true revelation of the loving will of God at the same

¹ J. & R. - p. 281.
² ibid - p. 401.
³ Unterricht - sec. 44.
⁴ see J. & R. - pp. 476 & 482-3.
time as it was a moral vocation consciously assumed by Christ Himself. Consequently in this work of Christ we see the secret of His Divinity. He was a Divine organ in that He realised God's end purpose. He was a moral being in that He took up the task as His conscious vocation.

The criticism of Professor Orr that Ritschl leaves us in doubt whether the mission of Christ is to be regarded as religious or ethical, does not do justice to Ritschl's view; for upon the assumption that the religious and moral are equated in God's end purpose, then Christ, as a revelation of this purpose must represent both. By the very nature of the case He must embody the "religious supremacy over the world" which is the destination of members of His Kingdom, and at the same time be the realisation of "the ethical end of God in His Kingdom". The claim that these two functions are mutually exclusive could be based only upon a superficial insight into Ritschl's views. It may be, as A. M. Garvie says, that Ritschl's method allows the moral somewhat to obscure the religious, but this is a matter of emphasis, not of principle - an emphasis which Ritschl made because, on the one hand, to a personal prejudice against all emotional or mystical elements in faith, and on the other hand, to a reaction against the excessive emphasis placed on the other side by traditional theology.

III. The Subjective or Practical Basis of Revelation.

In His Christology, Ritschl explains the nature of Christ according to His functions. He was Christ in that He revealed God. The secret of His Divinity is explicable only in terms of His activity in making manifest the will and purpose of God. He insisted that:

"the religious estimate of Christ, which finds expression under definite conditions in the predicate of His Godhead must approve itself in the connection between Christ's visible conduct and His religious convictions and ethical motives; it does not stand in any direct relation to the presumable endowment of His person with inborn qualities or powers; for not in the latter but in the former does He exert an influence upon us." 2

1 op. cit - pp.126-7.
This is to express the meaning of the revelation in Christ in terms of its practical significance. The revelation in Christ is primarily a revelation to us and for us. Its authenticity is validated by its effectiveness in the justification and reconciliation of sinners to God. Only from the viewpoint of its effectiveness or its worth for us can the revelation in Christ be appreciated.

"Alle auessere Offenbarung kann nur in dieser inneren Offenbarung oder Vergewisserung dem Menschen kund werden." Consequently all the action, works, and teachings of Christ are to be explained in reference to their significance for us.

In support of this Ritschl is happy to recall Luther's greater Catechism in which the great reformer emphasises this practical reference. "It is as my redeemer that Christ is my Lord." And in the second article of the creed Luther describes the redemption in Christ.

"How much it cost Him, what He spent and dared to win us, and bring us under His Lordship, that is that He became man and suffered and died, etc. - - All this in order that He might become my Lord." From this Ritschl believes that he is only following in the footsteps of the great reformer when he seeks for the Divinity of Christ in what He has done for the salvation of mankind in the Christian community. Furthermore, Christ's relation to God and His post-resurrection exaltation must also be understood in this practical reference.

"If the Godhead of Christ or His lordship over the world in His present state of exaltation is to be a postulate of the Christian faith, an integral part of the Christian view of the world, then it must be demonstrated to us in Christ's influence upon ourselves." Accordingly, faith is the indispensable corollary of revelation. This is true of all revelation even in the most primitive forms of religion. But Ritschl was not concerned with sub-christian revelation. When he speaks of faith he means the faith of a Christian, and when he speaks of revelation he means the revelation in Christ. If the purpose in Christ's revelation was to found the Christian community then only from the point of view of the Christian community can this revelation be understood. To understand the Divinity of Christ and His redeeming activity one must first

1. Wendland - op. cit. - p.79.
place himself within the Christian community.

"No one can appreciate Christ except from a religious appreciation no more than they can appreciate Mozart without understanding music."

Consequently, we recognise Christ as the true revelation of God in that we behold in Him the power which reveals God to us, and in that we know in Him alone resides the power which can bring us into reconciliation with God.

"What Christ is for us must verify itself in the transferring of His worth to us. The recognition of Jesus as the Christ has for us no meaning unless through Him we know ourselves raised to kingship or dominion over the world and to priesthood or undisturbed communion with God." 1.

"The nature of God and the Divine, we can only know in its essence by determining its value for our salvation." 5.

The implication of such statements is that Christ is God in that He has for me the "value" of God. Apart from and further than this "value" I am not, as a Christian, concerned in investigating.

This raises a real and important issue. Does Ritschl maintain that Christ is divine in that He has a religious value for my salvation or does he maintain that Christ has a religious value for my salvation because He is divine? Does revelation presuppose faith or does faith presuppose revelation? Professor Orr 4 interprets Ritschl as advocating the former; while Professor Garvie insists that Ritschl, in such disparaging interpretations, is merely maintaining the religious value of Christ in reference to practical end. 5.

Certainly Ritschl is by no means clear on this point, and certainly he could be quoted from either side. It must be confessed that there is an undoubted trend in Ritschl's thought to place the judgment of value first and see revelation only in terms of it. In this matter Fabricius observed a development between the first and last edition of Ritschl's great work.

In IA (first edition) erscheint es als die Regel, dass man durch den bewussten Glauben an Christus zur religioesen und sittlichen Selbstbeherrschung befuehrt, als die Ausnahme dass man durch Selbstzucht dem Versoehnungs­glauben entgegengefuehrt wird. In 2=3A. gilt es umgekehrt als die Regel dass man zunaehest in der UBung des Vertrauens und der Demut gegen die Menschen begriffen ist und erst nachtraeglich die Offenbarung

The point which Ritschl was anxious to maintain was that revelation must be understood and comprehended within the sphere of value - for value is the sphere of religious knowledge. Toward this end his logic may be briefly summarised. Having established the revelation in Christ as the only, final, and ultimate basis and standard of the Christian religion, he maintains that from the side of the subject this revelation is comprehended in faith. Faith is the necessary correlate of revelation. Now this may be conceded. But from this point Ritschl tends to interpret revelation in terms of faith and make faith, as it were, the container and receptacle of revelation. Revelation, in the process, loses its objective references and Christ becomes a "value". Thus Ritschl is able to conclude - "if Christ by what He has done for my salvation is my Lord and if by trusting for my salvation to the power of what He has done for me I honour Him as my God then that is a value judgment of a direct kind".

Revelation and the judgment of value are thus more or less equated. Revelation, which was originally an historical fact embodied in the ethical vocation of Christ, here is considered in reference to His redeeming power over sinners. That both references are essential is of course evident. But Ritschl seems to neglect or forget the historical and objective references of revelation and to consider only its "for me" aspects. From this standpoint the revelation in Christ can be no greater nor broader in its significance than the "value of God" that Christ has for me.

The practical consequence of this attitude of Ritschl's is that he has no room in his Christology for any doctrine which refuses to submit to this "value for me" interpretation. The pre-existence of Christ, His post-resurrection exaltation, and the reality of the Holy Spirit are for him of doubtful value in Christian theology.

1 op. cit - pp. 99-100.
2 J. & R. - p. 298.
In this respect there is a remarkable change of expression between the first and last editions of his great work. In the first edition he rather naively disclaims for theology any interest in such metaphysical problems. But his later view is much more guarded on this point. Again we refer to Fabricius.

"Bemerkenswert sind nur folgende Abweichungen: IA. (p. 356-8) 'das Attribut der Praeexistenz ist kein brauchbares Merkmal der Gottheit Christi. Denn der Praeexistenz waere uns nicht offenbar, sondern verborgen'. Ausserdem ist hier der 'religioese Werte der Gottheit Christi' zu vermissen, 'weil derselbe sich in einer Moeglichkeit der Nachbildung durch uns bewahren muesste, die Praeexistenz Christi aber nur den uneuberwindlichen Abstand desselben von uns darstellt'. Ferner ist hier die 'Einsicht zu vermissen dass die Erkenntnis der Dinge immer darauf gegrundet ist, dass sie auf uns wirken, und dass zur goettlichen Offenbarung gehoert was uns eine Weltanschauung im ganzen und die entsprechende Selbstbeurteilung, namlich die Gewissheit des Heiles hervorruft.' Die Praeexistenz beruht auf 'schlechter Erkenntnistheorie' und 'falscher Metaphysik'. Endlich wurde die Vorstellung von zeitlicher Ewigkeit Christus ebenso wenig wie Gott von der Welt unterscheiden. 'Denn wir koennen niemals die Welt als nicht seien setzen; niemals einen Anfang derselben spuren.'

"Dieser Abschnitt ist in 2=3A. ausgefallen. Es lassen sich aber einige Zusatze in den naechsten Paragraphen mit ihm in Vergleich stellen: 'Die ethische Beurteilung Christi nach seinem Berufe sieht seine religioese Anerkennung als - IA. - Offenbarung - 2=3A. Offenbarers - I=2=3A. Gottes nach sich.'

"Am Schluss: I=2=3A. Wie Christus zur sittlich-religioesen Persoenlichkeit weren Konnte, das ist kein 'Gegenstand der theologischen Forschung' und die Ueberlieferung daruber ist undeutlich und widerspruchsvoll."

Many passages from the later edition could be quoted to indicate this more circumspect and less revolutionary attitude toward these metaphysical doctrines. Again and again he makes it clear that he is not denying the pre-existence of Christ or His post-resurrection exaltation, but he merely insists that such concerns are not the matter of theological study. 2

Ritschl's rather original exegesis of Col.I:1-20, and II Cor. 4:4, are suggestive in that they indicate the
RELIGION AS REVELATION.

general trend of his thought in this connection. He claims that the expressions which describe Christ as first born of all creation etc. must be interpreted not in a temporal sense but in a logical sense. That is, Christ's "lordship over the world is one of supremacy and super-excellence not of priority or pre-existence". - - "Christ is He who is preferred, who belongs to God in contrast with creation as a whole which is not the image and direct revelation of God." 1

Evidently Ritschl considers the doctrines of the pre-existence, post-resurrection exaltation and the Holy Spirit as metaphysical propositions which may certainly be valid in their own sphere - but theology, as a practical science, is not concerned with them. Ritschl's intention is quite definitely to explain the Christian revelation independently of them. He did not regard these doctrines as necessary in a system of theology. His purpose was to build up his theology upon a practical basis - upon a value basis. The limits and bounds of his theology could then not be broader than the region of the value judgment.

Unfortunately, for the satisfactoriness and consistency of his viewpoint, Ritschl never made clear and definite what he meant by value judgments. Consequently when the value standard is actually applied to the formation of a theological position his ambiguity in defining value involves him in numerous contradictions. If Ritschl means that our estimate of the value of Christ is something which is quite different and distinct from our recognition of His factual or historical existence, and His historical-moral purpose as revealed in His vocational work, then he is involving himself in an endless series of contradictions for his whole exposition of the person and work of Christ laid emphasis upon the historical and moral nature of revelation. On the other hand, if Ritschl maintains the relatedness of all judgments, scientific, moral and religious, within the field of value then he will be required to show the relation which they bear to each other and will be required to prove the supremacy - not the isolation - of the religious value judgment. In other words, he would be required to reconsider his entire treatment of metaphysics.

It is from the viewpoint of this ambiguity that Ritschl's theology has been most severely criticised, - and rightly so. While his Christology is based on a recognition of the

historical revelation in Christ and while the worth of this revelation is directly related to the ethical vocation of Christ, there does exist in his theology an undeniable tendency to consider the meaning of Christ for us as a value which is independent of any historical fact for its proof and its application in Christian theology.

It cannot be denied that this emphasis upon the religious redeeming power of Christ, as a reaction against an emphasis upon His metaphysical significance, is a healthy one. But Ritschl does more than emphasise the practical value of Christ - he is basing his theology upon it to the exclusion of all metaphysical considerations. That Christ has a pre- and supra-temporal relation to God: that He came in a particular period in the development of human history; that He grew into manhood and engaged Himself with an historical vocation, Ritschl does not deny, to be sure. But his theological position is that the religious character of these facts lies in their value - their "for me" significance. The Divinity of Christ becomes interpreted in terms of His saving power; His historical vocation in terms of his activity in founding the Christian community; His exaltation in terms of His spiritual lordship over the world. As the doctrines of the pre-existence of Christ and the presence of the Holy Ghost do not fit into these practical requirements, then they become insignificant for Ritschl, and furthermore, in as much as they do not come within the sphere of direct value judgments, they do not fall within the sphere of Christian belief.

The consequences of this interpretation of Christian dogmatics need only be indicated. The nature of Christ is expressed in terms of will; His Being in terms of His activity. Christ, instead of being He who saves, becomes identified with the saving process. His personality is, for all practical purposes, lost sight of.

One may be willing to grant to Ritschl that the saving grace of Christ does not refer us directly to some idea of His pre-existence. I may experience the reviving power of His love without a theory of His eternal relation to God. Similarly I may experience the fruits of His activity in founding the Christian community with no conception of His present status at the right hand of God. But at the same time, unless I also believe that the person of Christ, as a Divine figure, stands behind, as it were, His saving activity, then the activity itself loses its Divine character as a revelation of God - and consequently loses its value for me.
Ritschl's Christology reveals the same weakness as did his doctrine of God. He insisted upon a description of the nature of God in terms of His loving will, and failed to see that if the "objective" or metaphysical description was one sided and defective, so also must be the subjective or practical, in as much as they are both but collateral sides of the same thing. Similarly, in describing the revelation in Christ he was successful in showing that revelation cannot be understood apart from faith so he proceeded to define it in terms of faith. Faith and revelation, which he had shown to be correlates, he tends to identify. He failed to see, as he failed to see in his exposition of the attributes of God, that if the objective reference cannot be understood apart from the practical, neither can the practical be understood apart from the objective.

IV. The Christian Community and the Kingdom of God.

In developing all his important theses in theology, we have seen that Ritschl constantly fell into subjectivism. His epistemological premise that "we know God in His effects" when applied to his doctrine of the nature of God tended to lose sight of God in His "effects", i.e. His actions in relation to the Christian community. His theological premise that "religious knowledge takes its course in value judgments" throws the emphasis upon the particular judgment in which the religious truth becomes valuable for us. His final premise that "we know God only by revelation" when applied to his Christology, likewise tends to represent Christ as One who has the value of God for us rather than One who has some fundamental and peculiar relation to God.

But there is another side to the matter. His epistemological premise may run to "appearances" but Ritschl insists that it is not in appearances, qua appearances, that our knowledge of God rests, but rather on the appearances which come to us as members of the Christian community. His theological premise may interpret religious doctrine in terms of its value for me" but he maintains, at the same time, that the value of religious doctrine is inseparable from the faith sustained by and maintained in the community of the faithful. His final premise may subordinate the nature of Christ to value categories, but he still insists that this concept can come only to those who, as members of the community of Christ, have identified their life's purpose with the end purpose of God. The concept of the Christian community stands, in his theology,
as the safeguard of the objective validity of Christian doctrine. And that which guarantees the validity of the Christian community is that it is the work of Christ in carrying out God's end purpose in ushering in the Kingdom of God.

He introduces his conception of the Christian community by distinguishing between man as natural and man as spiritual. Man as a natural being cannot be considered as the object of God's love, for by the definition of love God can love only persons in whom He can associate His own purposes and ends.

"The human race, in virtue of its attribute of multiplicity is involved in the conditions under which the genera and species of all organic creatures exist. Qua multiplicity therefore, the human race is akin to nature and not akin to God. In order to prove its kinship with God it would be necessary to conceive the human race as a unity, inspite of its natural multiplicity, as a unity which is other than its natural generic unity."¹

This unity is comprehensible only in terms of some idea which will unite the actions of men with the end purposes of God in creation.

"The conception we are in search of is given in the idea of the Christian community which makes the Kingdom of God its task. - - - It is an essential characteristic of the Kingdom of God that, as the final end which is being realised in the world and as the supreme good of created spirits, it transcends the world just as God Himself is super-mundane. - - - Consequently the unity of the human race thus reached is so far akin to the unity of the Divine will that in it may be seen the object of Divine love."²

In his little book "Ueber Gewissen" Ritschl struggles with the subjectivistic implications of his theology, and as this struggle provides a good illustration of the problem, it might be well to consider his position in relation to conscience.

Conscience, per se, he insists, cannot claim to speak with authority for such authority cannot come outside the Christian community. Hence he has no scruple in describing conscience as a natural phenomenon. The

¹ J. & R. - p.280.
² ibid - p.280 - 1.
function of conscience bears out this estimation. In intruding itself into a course of action to approve or to disapprove, it resembles the entrance into thought of a novel idea or a long sought but hitherto unrecalled idea, and in this sense it must be recognised as nothing but a knowledge judgment.\(^1\) But much more important for his general viewpoint is his repudiation of conscience as a guide in moral considerations. If conscience were accepted as a criterion then conscienceless rogues might consistently identify themselves with the Christian community.\(^2\) Consequently -

\[\text{das Gewissen ist eine erworbenesittliche Funktion,}
\text{und das gute oder rügendes Gewissen ein zweifelhaftes}
\text{Gut ist.}\]^3

In no respects can it be accepted as a competent guide. However it may have some value. It may point out an unhealthy condition of the judgment. It may indicate a sickness, but it cannot cure; its precision is lamed by evil habits; its hold of truth can be made ineffective and worthless by sophistic reasoning and unrighteousness; and a good conscience may be irreparably destroyed in unrestrained obduracy.\(^4\) Consequently, the source of conscience must be sought in the environment in which it develops.

The activity of conscience in setting a moral law for conduct generally is also subject to the same weaknesses and limitations. Its authority can never be broader than the habits and education which has fostered its development. To claim a general validity for the laws of conscience would be an unwarranted and selfish presumption equivalent to a tyrannical imposition of our will on others.\(^5\)

Ritschl then goes on to explain the development of conscience as a product of education and environment. Conscience, he says, is a virtue which is the immediate product of conscientious action. That is, it must be referred directly to the moral will which operates in actions.\(^6\) Now as the will operates within the particular vocation in which the individual finds himself, conscience is thus the presupposed inclination which orders the individual actions and decisions in harmony with the special calling in which man serves the general good and expects his life satisfaction.\(^7\)

\(^1\) pp. 6-7. \(^2\) pp. 13-14. \(^3\) p. 16. \(^4\) p. 17. \(^5\) p. 22.
Furthermore, as conscientious activity within our vocation represents our activity within the Kingdom of God, then the conclusion of the whole matter is that conscience - that is our general moral sense of right and wrong - must be explained in reference to our moral end in the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom of God (or at least our vocation within it) must be conceived as the criterion for the development and the functioning of conscience and not vice versa.

This treatment of the problem of conscience is typical of the general methodology of Ritschl, in which he refers all the phenomena of faith and spiritual life to this final standard - the Kingdom of God. It would be almost impossible to overestimate the importance which his conception of the Kingdom of God plays in his theology. Wegener, in his survey of "Ritschl's Idee des Reiches Gottes" affirms that - "should it appear that one of the adherents of his theology does not assign its full value to the idea of the Kingdom in his system, then he has ceased to be a follower of Ritschl and has no claim to belong to his school".¹ G. Halliday in "Facts and Values", says - "it (the idea of the Kingdom of God) is the unity, the central fact which has contact with God, man, and the world and holds these orders of being together".² Professor Garvie speaks of it as his "regulative idea" and Professor Mozley says it is a Procrustean bed into which everything is made to fit.

However, it is very doubtful whether Ritschl himself would have agreed that he had given such a central emphasis to the idea of the Kingdom of God. There can be little doubt that the objective reference which it gave to his doctrines induced him to depend more and more upon it whenever he found himself slipping into subjectivism. But to make it the central and regulative idea of his theology would be to recognise one principle and one all-inclusive idea for the explanation of the world, morality and religion. It would be a meeting place for all three and be at the same time the norm in theology. This Ritschl could never accept, for he insisted upon the separation of religion from both morality and natural events. Consequently it would be unfair to estimate his idea of the Kingdom of God upon the basis of inferences drawn from his theology without first seeking to understand what Ritschl intended to convey by the conception.

Ritschl maintained that the idea of the Kingdom of God was a definitely moral conception. The Kingdom of God, he viewed, as the universal moral union of men, of which the distinguishing mark is reciprocal action from the motive of love. The validity or worth-whileness of this union or community is guaranteed by the fact that its realisation is the expression of God's end purpose in creation, revealed in Christ Jesus, its Founder. 1

This separation of the moral and religious functions is a peculiarity of Ritschl's theology. Christianity, he said resembled not a circle described from a single point but rather an ellipse which is determined by two foci. 2 These two foci are reconciliation and the Kingdom of God - the religious and the moral. The religious function culminates in freedom over the world, and in the feeling of eternal life which is the practical result of justification. On the other hand, man is, in his moral relations, a member of the Kingdom of God. The two spheres are kept separate, and Ritschl insists that the moral is not to be subordinated to the religious. In no respect can morality be said to be the fruit of piety, in spite of all that James has to say on the subject.

This emphasis upon the moral nature of the Kingdom of God forced Ritschl to seek some practical expression in social life for the religious impulses of each member of the Christian community. He found a solution of this in his idea of the Christian church.

In order to preserve the true articulation of the Christian view of the world, it is necessary clearly to distinguish between viewing the followers of Christ first under the conception of the Kingdom of God and secondly under the conception of the worshipping community or the church. This distinction depends on the difference which exists between moral and devotional actions in spite of the fact that in Christianity moral action likewise can claim the value of service to God. 3 Those who believe in Christ, therefore constitute a church in so far as they express in prayer their faith in God the Father, or present themselves to God as men who, through Christ, are well pleasing to Him. The same believers in Christ constitute the Kingdom of God in so far as, forgetting the distinctions of sex, rank, or nationality they act reciprocally from love and thus call into existence that fellowship of moral dispositions and moral blessing which extends through all possible gradations to the limits of the human race. 4

In Ritschl's theology the church and the Kingdom of God replaces the traditional distinction between the church visible and the church invisible. His terminology has the advantage that it permits him to empty the idea of the Kingdom of God of any religious content it may bear and transfer it to the church, retaining only the moral for the Kingdom of God. Thus within the Christian community man fulfills a religious function in the church and a moral function in the Kingdom of God.

If Ritschl's intention is definitely to distinguish between the church as the visible community, and the Kingdom of God as the "invisible" or moral community, it is obvious that his difficulty of maintaining the separation of the moral, the natural and the religious is thereby increased, for in as much as he identifies the church with a particular temporal organisation he is associating and bringing together a religious and a historically natural conception; and if he identifies the Kingdom of God with the church invisible, he ipso facto, separates it from a large sphere of practical morality.

As a matter of fact it is extremely difficult to see what the real basis for the distinction of the two can be and what Ritschl actually means by the church as distinct from the Kingdom of God. They are both historical magnitudes as embodied in the Christian community (and here the comparison with the church visible and the church invisible does not apply) they both look back to the person of Christ as their founder; and in actual life they are inseparable. The only distinction seems to be that of function - the distinction of the religious and the moral. However it it may be shown, as we shall endeavour to show, that the Christian community viewed as the Kingdom of God, has also religious aspects and must have them, then it will follow that the distinction which Ritschl made between the church and the Kingdom of God will be proven inadequate.

But first, it would be well to be clear on the meaning of the two terms which Ritschl uses so freely in his theology: the Kingdom of God and the Christian community. In his consideration of the nature of the church one would be disposed to say that the Christian community is the general term which admits the twofold division - the Kingdom of God and the church - the moral and the religious. However, Ritschl does not maintain this distinction. Throughout his theology he appears to use the two terms more or less interchangeably. But, generally speaking, the distinction which seems to underly the general ambiguity is that the
Kingdom of God refers to the teleological nature and end of the community of believers. The term Christian community refers rather to the moral-spiritual-historical organisation of believing souls, which owes its inception and organisation to the vocational activity of Christ. That is the unity of Christians represents actually the Christian community and potentially the Kingdom of God. But in as much as the community founded by Christ is at the same time that it is the community of believers also the final and complete revelation of God's end purpose, then it makes any distinction rather hard to sustain. But if a distinction may be made it could be made on the ground that the revelation in Christ, viewed in reference to its final goal is the Kingdom of God and viewed in reference to the actual historical fellowship is the Christian community. The latter term is generally the more inclusive. But this is as far as one can go in interpreting Ritschl's definitions. Whether the term Christian community contains all the implications of the Kingdom of God, plus the implications contained in the conception of the church, or whether the Kingdom of God transcends the sphere of the Christian community, one must decide for himself. The point to be remembered is that the distinction between the two terms is vague and thus, no great importance should be put on the use of one rather than the other in any connection.

Ritschl maintains that the Kingdom of God, as the moral union of men, is related to the moral vocation of Christ even as justification and reconciliation are related to His religious function. Christ stands to the Kingdom of God as Founder.

"Ich habe ausgeführt, dass die Behauptung der Persönlichkeit Gottes nur mit dem Inhalt der Liebe und in der Abwendung dieses Willens auf das Reich Gottes, beziehungsweise auf den ewig geliebten Sohn Gottes die Weltanschauung der christlichen Gemeinde vollständig begründet."¹

Jesus Himself saw in the Kingdom of God the moral end of the fellowship He had founded and furthermore He understood by it "not the common exercise of worship but the organisation of humanity through action inspired by love" and "any conception of Christianity which did not include this particular aspect would be imperfect and therefore incorrect"².

That is, the relation of the moral vocation of Christ to the Kingdom of God is precisely that the moral vocation of Christ was the founding of the Kingdom of God. Thus, just as it is possible to regard the life of Jesus from the viewpoint of His religious and His moral activity, so the

RELIGION AS REVELATION.

life of the Founder of the Christian community can be considered with respect to His redemptive activity or with respect to His activity in setting up the Kingdom of God. Christianity is "based on the life of its Author as redeemer and as founder of the Kingdom of God." 1

However, if this distinction is more closely examined its validity becomes doubtful. When more closely looked into his conception of the Kingdom of God is seen to contain elements that must be described as distinctly religious. Indeed, we have already pointed out that Ritschl maintained that redemption itself comes to the individuals in virtue of, not their natural origin, but as members of God's Kingdom. Throughout his theology he consistently maintains the correlation of redemption with membership in the Kingdom of God.

"If justification and reconciliation of sinners are the leading features of the Christian religion they can be correctly examined and explained in the case of the individual only when, at the same time, we take note of his place in the Christian community." 2

"Everything that falls within the domain of redemption through Christ must be referred to the supreme end of blessedness in the Kingdom of God if it is to be understood as a necessary element in the Christian view." 3

"Authentic and complete knowledge of Jesus' religious significance depends then on one's reckoning oneself part of the community which He founded." 4

Professor Garvie demonstrates this point very clearly. "When he (Ritschl) comes to define the conception of justification he distinguishes it from the idea of the Kingdom of God only at once to deny the distinction and to assert that the two sets of ideas are of the same kind, for human activity is included in divine grace and divine grace implies human activity. As the conception of justification expresses the one aspect - the divine grace - and the idea of the Kingdom of God expresses the other aspect - the human activity - of the one spiritual process, both are of the same kind." 5

Professor Garvie goes on to show the logical development in Ritschl's thought whereby these two ideas are brought together. "First of all the one doctrine is subordinated to the other; next the two doctrines are co-ordinated; and thirdly they are declared to be practically identical, and finally when we turn to his small "Instruction in the Christian Religion" we find -- the idea of the Kingdom of God has become without qualification,

1 ibid - p.13.
2 ibid - p.28.
3 ibid - p.25.
4 ibid - p.2.
5 note that in these quotations the concepts "Kingdom of God" and "Christian community" are used quite interchangeably.
6 op.cit - p.243.
the regulative principle of his theology.\textsuperscript{1}.

That this conclusion gives us a different insight into Ritschl's Christology is evident, for if objectively, redemption is to be considered under the concept of the Kingdom of God then subjectively, the redemptive activity of Christ must also be subordinated to His moral vocation. Thus the criticism that Ritschl subordinated the religious function of Christ to the moral is substantiated providing it be proven also that the Kingdom of God is a purely moral conception. That Ritschl maintained that it is, cannot be denied, but in so far as he considers redemption as coming within it then it appears that its moral nature has been extended to include religious elements.

However, the primary emphasis in the idea of the Kingdom of God is undoubtedly moral. It has a clear historical dependence upon the moral vocation of Christ. The Kingdom of God is pictured in the gospels as coming into existence like the growing of grain, as due to the regular course of events and the activity of men in pursuit of their moral calling.\textsuperscript{2} And furthermore, our membership in the Kingdom ipso facto, binds us to a moral vocation which, though it cannot be identical with that of Jesus, is similar to it in that it commands us to act from the same motives which characterised His actions.

For Ritschl this moral duty with respect to the Kingdom of God consists in each doing his or her duty in the sphere of life in which he or she is situated: "you in your small corner and I in mine".

"Each individual acts morally when he fulfils the universal law of his special vocation in his conduct of life."\textsuperscript{3} He maintains that one would not and should not introduce moral considerations into practical action which does not bear upon the actual vocational life of the individual. That is, our moral duty as a citizen is to be a loyal citizen of the state and the same with respect to whatever phase of life which is concerned.

"For the individual at least the moral law and moral freedom must be considered in relation to vocational activity."\textsuperscript{*}

That this vocational reference in morality has much to commend it is evident. It brings morality down from the vague and ambiguous realm of universal principles to the practical functions of every day life. However, it is well to point out, as Ritschl, neglects to do, that the vocation

\textsuperscript{1} op.cit - p.244.
\textsuperscript{2} See Unterricht - sec. 5c.
\textsuperscript{3} J. & R. - p.666.
\textsuperscript{*} ibid - p.667.
by itself is not a sufficient standard of morality, even though we include under the conception of vocation all the particular forms of activity which characterise life - profession, family, social relations, etc. Ritschl's view smacks of a convenient Prussian state philosophy to exact obedience and loyalty from the people. It makes one think of Paul's much criticised dictum, "Slaves obey your masters". It provides no redress for the position of the "slaves" themselves, and suggests no standard for the judgment of the value of the vocation itself. Indeed, in modern life when life is so complex and vocations are so manifold, the most important need is not so much a justification for our activity within our vocation but rather a justification of our vocation itself. Sometimes more is demanded of the individual than that he be contented and satisfied with his lot in life.

However, Ritschl is far from ignorant of the necessity of a final standard for the judging of vocation themselves. Indeed, the idea of the Kingdom of God is just this extra-vocational reference and standard. To it vocational activity must be subordinated. It is the final goal and end of all moral striving. "The Kingdom of God - -constitutes the highest destiny of man." Thus, in what appears as almost a contradiction of the foregoing he declares.

"Moral fellowship as such, neutralises national distinction for its springs from the subjective motive of love, which differs from that natural hereditary friendliness of fellowcountrymen to one another which is as a rule an accompaniment of civil society. Moral fellowship viewed in these two characteristics of possessing the widest possible extension and being animated by the most comprehensive motive, can only be conceived as the Kingdom of God. Moral law is the system which embraces those disposition, intentions, and actions which necessarily follow from the all-comprehensive end of the Kingdom of God from the subjective motive of universal love." 

"For the Kingdom of God which Christ established, is meant a community resting not on legal rights but on loving conduct." 

The truth that Ritschl is endeavouring to bring out is that the "for the Kingdom of God" reference in all moral action, is the primary one. Or to express the same idea subjectively, the "for love's sake" is the ultimate standard in all conduct. We are to seek first the Kingdom of God - then as members of this Kingdom, our place in the Christian

\[ \text{J. & R. - p.252.} \]
\[ \text{ibid - p.433.} \]
community, in respect to our daily vocational activity, is seen in its proper perspective. But the ultimate criterion must not be confused with any particular vocation. It is the Kingdom of God. And when it is remembered that this Kingdom is the result of Christ's vocational activity in revealing the end-purpose of God for the world, then the final standard for action must be ultimately referred to the revelation in Christ. This fact and this conclusion is of the utmost importance in reference to the problem of value, for it makes the Kingdom of God the beginning and the end of moral striving, and the principle upon which this Kingdom rests - universal love - the ultimate criterion of action. To express the same idea in other words, the ultimate standard of value is the revelation in Christ as embodied in the Kingdom of God.

This reference of morality to the Kingdom of God and the reference of the Kingdom of God to the revelation in Christ cannot rest even here for the final basis of moral life. In as much as Christ, in His moral vocation in founding the Kingdom, was carrying out the Divine will, and in as much as the Kingdom He founded represents the full and complete revelation of God's end-purpose, then the nature and will of God with respect to the world becomes the final standard of value. That is, the ultimate validity of our moral values is guaranteed to us, not by our vocation, not by the community of Christians, not even by the revelation in Christ, but rather by the nature and will of God Himself. Our actions are moral because they participate in God's purpose for creation. The Divine reference in moral action is the primary and the ultimate one. The other reference points proceed from it. Ritschl gives expression to this idea in saying -

"in order to know the world as a totality, and in order to become a totality in or over it, by the help of God, man needs the idea of the Oneness of God and of the consumation of the world in an end which is for man both knowable and realisable." (that is, the Kingdom of God) 1.


But the idea of the Kingdom of God so interpreted is certainly not a purely moral idea - it is primarily religious. The moral significance is secondary and arises from the

fact that the Kingdom of God is a revelation of God's end-
purpose for man and the world. If this religious reference
be not recognised than the moral becomes meaningless.

This conclusion has carried us far beyond the subjective
predicament of Ritschl's earlier attempt to define the meaning
of value. The fact of the matter is that Ritschl was a
theologian and not a philosopher. In his attempts to define
his terms philosophically he was almost always unfortunate,
but in his theological expositions his insight usually
carried him far beyond the limitations set by his philosop-
hal thoughts. Consequently it is in the actual develop-
ment of his theology that his true contributions to the
problem of value must be sought and not in his philosophical
treatments of the matter.

Here Ritschl has presented us with a valuable and fruit-
suggestion as the the objective reference point in value.
That it contradicts and denies many of his former statements
goes without saying, but in as much as it is an integral
part of his final theological position there is ample reason
for affirming that it is the conclusion to which his theology
carries him.

One illustration will make this point clear. Ritschl,
we have seen, defined the Kingdom as the community founded
by Christ, and characterised from the subjective side by
the motive of love. And he further defines love as the
identification of our own end with that of the loved one.
So far so good. But there is no suggestion here as to
what end of the loved one is to be identified with the will
of the one who loves. If Ritschl argues (as he would argue)
that it is his end as a member of the Kingdom of God, he
is but arguing in a circle, unless at the same time, he give
to the idea of the Kingdom of God a value distinct from the
ends of members in it. That is, to escape from the circle
he must relate the Kingdom first to the Divine self-end.
But to do this is to recognise a religious basis for moral
action which carries the standard of value to the nature and
will of God. Consequently, the primary and ultimate refer-
ence in moral action is its religious significance for God and
to the end-purpose of God. This religious significance we
have before pointed out as indispensable and necessary
but it is here seen to be primary and ultimate.

Indeed, in his exposition of the nature of the Kingdom
of God, Ritschl repeatedly recognises, consciously or un-
consciously, its religious nature and basis. That the
Kingdom of God has an objective and idea reference beyond the subjective valuation of it he recognises in identifying it with the "sumnum bonum".

"It is that union of men in which all goods are appropriated in their proper subordination to the highest good."\(^1\)

On page thirty of his great work he definitely admits - "the Kingdom of God likewise is a directly religious conception. This is clear when we consider the phrase as it stood originally - sovereignty of God. For this combination of words distinctly expresses an operation of God directed toward men. - - The Kingdom of God is the sumnum bonum which God realises for men."\(^2\)

That this "for God" reference is the ultimate and primary one, his logic forces him to confess.

"In Christianity the religious motive of ethical action lies here, that the Kingdom of God, which it is our task to realise, represents also the highest good which God destines for us as our supra-mundane goal."\(^3\)

"If God is conceived in general as love in order to explain the Kingdom of God as the final end of the world and therefore the world itself, then from the significance which the Kingdom has for God there follows the content of the moral law and its absolute stringency for the members of the Kingdom."\(^4\)

These admissions break down completely the separation which Ritschl made between religion and ethics. He sought to establish the independence of religion by declaring its isolation - but he has suggested a truer basis of independence - that of prior and superior value.

In the same way the barrier which Ritschl erected between religious and world knowledge suffers the same fate. If the Kingdom of God is to include our vocational activity it is intimately concerned with the material welfare of its members. The Kingdom of God as actually in existence, is intimately bound up and related to a certain world order.

"Grace, in short, much as Ritschl may dislike the idea, presupposes nature - the second creation presupposes the first, and man's relations, duties and responsibilities as springing from his rational and moral endowment and his place and functions in society must be taken into account if any adequate conception of God's end for or even in His Kingdom is to be framed. We cannot therefore, separate the Kingdom of God as a religious idea from relations to this natural background, or afford to dispise

\(^1\) J. & R. - pp. 334-5.
\(^2\) Ibid - pp. 205.
\(^3\) Ibid - pp. 205-6.
\(^4\) Ibid - pp. 319-20.
the help which a philosophical analysis of man's nature and powers, undertaken from a Christian standpoint, brings to the elucidation of the latter." ¹

Indeed there are many trends in Ritschl's own theological thoughts, which indicate that he is not so hostile to the natural world and world knowledge as he has been made to appear. In the realm of knowledge he is hostile to any approach of one to the other, yet in practical life he admits a close connection in that he regards the true fulfillment of our vocational work as not merely ethically valuable, but as a direct co-operation with the will and purposes of God.

"Im Gebiete des Erkenntnis: kultur feindlich; im Gebiete des praktischen Handelns kultur freundlich, das ist die signatur der Theologie Ritschl's." ²

In explaining the practical relation of the individual to the Kingdom of God, we have seen that he associated membership with a specific vocational calling. And this vocational activity he defines in terms of historical-natural existence - professional ties, family ties, social relations, etc. He even admits that the "apparatus by which the individual life and all commerce in things spiritual is carried on presupposes for its permanent existence the whole immeasurable system of the world, mechanical, chemical, organic." ³ Consequently, any religious view of the world must recognise that -

"the whole universe therefore considered as the precondition of the moral Kingdom of created spirits is throughout God's creation for this end." ⁴

"Every religious society as such must take up an attitude either positive or negative toward the world in which it exists and every religion on closer examination if found to exist in the striving after goods or a summum bonum which either belongs to the world or can be understood only in contrast with it. - - - For the central point (of religion) is always this, that the religious community as situated in the world, endeavours to obtain certain goods in the world or above the world, through the Divine Being because of His authority over it." ⁵

What is more, this connection of religion with the natural world is not merely within the sphere of moral striving. In tracing the development of religion as a

¹ Orr - op. cit. - p.120.
² Wendland - op. cit. - p.32.
⁴ Ibid - p.280.
⁵ Ibid - p.29.
historic process, Ritschl is led to accept the objective and historic union of the religious and the natural. A certain stage of religious development is fundamentally bound up with a certain state of cultural life. In reference to the Christian faith he declares that - "strictly speaking, it is only the world historical nations of the west -- which have arrived at an idea of the natural and moral unity of the human race sufficient to enable them to embrace the practically thoroughgoing Christian idea of the unity of the race." 1.

And again, in reference to the spread of Christianity over the world it must be noted that this - "is only possible in the measure in which nations enter through their own efforts into the circle of culture of the world historical nations" 2.

This conception of the relation of Christianity to history and historical development, may be criticised as unduly limiting Christianity to a particular culture which we have been accustomed to consider Christian and ignoring the possibility of a quite different civilization upon the basis of the Christian gospel. If Ritschl had written in our present decade it is probable that he would not have been so dogmatic on this point. However, the point of the argument for the subject we are discussing is that Christianity must be related to a certain world order and this world order must be explained in terms of natural events and processes. Ritschl himself admits it frequently. The independence of faith from the natural world order certainly cannot be an independence of separation. The independence of religion must be that of prior and superior validity.

Ritschl is far from denying this. The very essence of Christianity, as a value conception, is that it raises us above the world and permits us to view natural processes as a means to spiritual ends. However, Ritschl constantly tends to limit this quality of supremacy to the realm of the subject and denies that there can be an objective confirmation or recognition of it. In such a light as this he would probably suggest that we interpret such statements of his as this:

"The final end of God in the world is the ground from which it is possible to explain the creation and government of the world in general and the interrelations between nature and created spirits".3

But we have indicated in our criticism of value judgments

1 ibid - p.137.
2 ibid - p.137.
3 ibid - p.326.
that this subjective union in faith is, by the very nature of the case, impossible and unthinkable unless it rests upon an objective reality. That is, unless the nature of the universe is such that it sustains the supremacy of the spiritual over the natural it would be unthinkable that we could believe in a subjective validation of this state of affairs. And if this is the case then it would be strange indeed if the natural world were completely devoid of all indications of such a relation, and it would be impossible to think that nature would refuse to give any confirmation to this spiritual interpretation.

The necessity of thinking the religious, moral, and natural factors as necessarily bound together and related in the conception of the Kingdom of God is illustrated in Ritschl's treatment of the doctrine of sin. Sin, he affirms, is intelligible only from the standpoint of the Christian community. "We should pay no attention to this purpose of Jesus (to pardon sin) nor should we seek to discover its value and its meaning did we not reckon ourselves part of the religious community which first attested through the writings of the New Testament, its possession of the forgiveness of sins as affected by Christ." Sin is thus fundamentally a religious conception. "It is opposition to religious trust." However, it has definite moral implications in that it involves a conscious deviation from the Divine law. Furthermore in as much as it is a repudiation of our vocational obligations, it has specific "natural" consequences. The problem of sin, may thus be studied from each of these aspects.

As religious, sin is "Opposition to religious trust". The principal thing in Christian perfection is reverence and trust in God, the opposite of both must be affirmed as the leading characteristic of sin. "A given action in opposition to human society and the law of the state is wrong and a crime. But the same action is sin when it springs from indifference toward God as the Benefactor and Governor of human life. By bringing out this aspect we stamp sin as a religious idea, as a characteristic value notion."  

Later, in showing the graduations in the idea of sin he says that sins are morally determined.

2. Ibid - p. 4.
"Sin is rather in all instances opposition to the good; that conception being defined in the ethical sense, so that the least deviation from the good or even the simple omission of the good already forms opposition thereto; for the good must be unconditionally and completely realised by the will at every moment." ¹

And guilt, he says, in the moral sense expresses - "the disturbance of the proper reciprocal relation between moral law and freedom, which follows from the law transgressing abuse of freedom. -- Guilt is thus the permanent contradiction between the objective and the subjective factor of the moral will." ²

Sin is thus a moral concept in that it is the disturbance "of the ideal relation of the will to its final end".³

But the practical activity of the will is confined to its particular vocational duties and consequently the activities of the moral will presuppose and require a definite and tangible natural environment. The concept of sin, in the same manner can not be considered apart from a world-temporal environment. Indeed it is the essence of sin, as alienation from God that it directs itself to an ungodly or sensuous or naturalistic end.

Sin has thus clear religious, moral and world-natural implications and its treatment involves a reference to all three spheres. But when we remember that Ritschl insists that "we have to comprehend the fact of sin from the standpoint of the reconciled community" ⁴ then it seems obvious that the religious community as Christian provides no ground for the isolation of religious from moral and world determinations.

The criticism which we have consistently sustained in our exposition of Ritschl's doctrine of the Kingdom of God, is that the content of the conception as applied to his theological position is much broader and more inclusive than Ritschl consciously recognised. Without actually intending to do so he made the idea of the Kingdom of God the final reference point for all his theological doctrines. It is the sine qua non of his doctrine of God and of his Christology. It is the manifest sphere of moral striving and guarantees the worth of worldly circumstance. All the activities that characterise men as natural-moral-spiritual beings may be considered from the standpoint of the Kingdom of God.

² ibid - p.57.
³ ibid - p.59.
⁴ ibid - p.327.
At this point it is of interest to raise the question: what is the relation of this idea of the Kingdom of God to his three initial premises; namely, that religious knowledge is bound up with "appearances"; that religious knowledge takes its course in value judgments; and that we know God only by revelation.

Obviously, the idea of the Kingdom of God could not be called an "appearance", that is a work of God given immediately at a certain time and given once and for all. To claim as much would be to rob the conception of the Kingdom of its moral qualities and would deny its progressive realisation through the moral-vocational strivings of men. Equally certain is it that the idea of the Kingdom cannot be termed a value judgment in the sense in which Ritschl defines the term. To claim as much would be to make our subjective judgment the arbiter and determiner of the final reference point in theology. Finally, it would not meet the requirements of the case to describe the Kingdom of God as given to us by revelation unless one were willing also to ascribe the sphere of moral striving and the Christian Weltanschauung generally to this concept. In other words, the idea of the Kingdom of God is too extensive in its meaning and its significance to be subordinate to any of Ritschl's theological premises. It is something which stands above his presuppositions and doctrines and which he calls into use to meet the needs and deficiencies of each. The idea is religious in that it defines the attitude of human beings to the will of God. It is moral in that it sets the standard of moral conduct, - the identification of our will with the end-purpose of God. And it has natural implications in that it indicates the relation of our world-temporal life to a final end purpose.

The question which yet faces us is the satisfactoriness of this conception as a final reference point in theology. This question refers us back to the relation of Ritschl's idea of the Kingdom of God to revelation in Christ. The answer to this question is that Ritschl practically identified the two. Ritschl viewed the revelation in Christ - religious and moral - ultimately in terms of the concept of the Kingdom of God. His three initial philosophical-theological premises drop out of the picture at this point. All that is left as the origin, guide, and end of his theology is the revelation in Christ which is embodied in the community which He founded looking toward the Kingdom of God.

It would not be fair to be too hasty in a criticism of this position. Providing that Ritschl keeps clear
in his exposition that the Kingdom of God is at all times dependent upon the revelation in Christ, it may be accepted as a valid theological method. It has the great merit that it defines the revelation and activities of Jesus in terms of a "way of life" and not in terms of intellectual belief alone. Also by embodying the revelation in the idea of the Kingdom of God Ritschl succeeds in interpreting this revelation in terms of a Christian Weltanschauung, and in this intention Ritschl deserves commendation; for what the world needs and what the problem of value needs is a clear and definite conception of a Christian Weltanschauung.

However, such a conclusion certainly does not flow clearly and freely from the intention of Ritschl's expositions. As a matter of fact Ritschl did not sustain the dependence of the idea of the Kingdom of God upon the revelation in Christ. This we have pointed out above. Just as he lost the personality of God in His loving will, so did he lose the revelation in intention and consequence of this revelation - the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom of God, instead of being defined in relation to the revelation in Christ, becomes itself the reference point upon which revelation is explained. The revelation in Christ, which should have validated the idea of the Kingdom becomes a subordinate concept. The idea of the Kingdom of God therefore assumed very much the character of one of the metaphysical ideas which Ritschl so condemned. It is built up from experience and then set over against experience and finally made the reference point for the explanation of particular phenomena.

The conclusion which we have reached is just this. It cannot be regarded as a legitimate procedure to make the idea of the Kingdom of God a regulative principle in theological exposition unless the idea is kept in a true dependence upon the revelation in Christ as the objective reference. The natural, the moral, and the religious cannot be kept separate and all come together in the Christian world outlook represented by the idea of the Kingdom of God. But the important point to be kept in mind is that it is not because the idea of the Kingdom involves these three functions that it is valid (that is, the three functions of natural, moral and religious) but rather it is valid because it is guaranteed by the revelation of God in Christ and its threefold nature springs from this fact. It may be possible to explain

Christian doctrine in relation to the idea of the Kingdom if at the same time it is held in mind that the Kingdom but Christ as the Founder of the Kingdom is the final reference point in theology.

The conclusion of the whole matter is that religious, moral, and world knowledge cannot be separated into exclusive and independent spheres, and that it is therefore a vain quest for theology to seek validity for religious knowledge by cutting itself off from other forms of knowing. This is the criticism which we have insistently pointed out in our exposition of Ritschl's theological position, and in reference to his three premises we have indicated how his stand on this point involved him in contradictions and an inadequate treatment of fundamental Christian doctrines.

Upon the basis of his epistemological premise that we recognise the thing in its appearances, Ritschl endeavoured to shut theology off from dependence upon philosophy and world knowledge. Philosophy, he declared, sought to transcend appearances and reach the "thing" which lay at the basis of appearance. Concerning this "thing-per-se" Ritschl said theology had no interest. For theology at any rate it was an "Unding". Appearances are quite enough - indeed are just the thing theology wants upon which to build an empirical theology. However when he attempted to present a positive theological position based upon appearances the weakness of his viewpoint became evident. He was able to give theology the validity and objectivity it demands only by contradicting his initial predications and giving to theology the validity and objectivity of a general world outlook. Thus he was able to give his doctrine of God full justice by recognising that appearances are valid only as the appearances of some "thing", (that is, he recognised this transcending of appearances in so far as he succeeded in giving validity and transcendence to the personality of God.) The distinction which he drew between theology and world knowledge broke down when applied to positive doctrines.

Similarly, no distinction between religious and world knowledge can be made within the sphere of value. Value, to be valid, implies more than a "valuable for me" reference. It implies as immediate an objective reference as natural knowledge. Thus neither within the realm of epistemology nor upon a distinction between world knowledge and value, can a line be drawn between religious and world knowledge.
Indeed, this becomes conclusively evident when religious knowledge is considered in relation to revelation. In the revelation in Christ the historical and the religious are seen together in Him who is the Founder of our faith. And finally, within the fellowship of Christians which He founded and on which all matters of faith are dependent, Ritschl recognises the concurrence of religious, moral, and natural elements.

However, Ritschl's exposition has done more than reveal the weaknesses of his premises. It has also suggested, by the very inadequacy of his premises to cover the facts of Christianity, some of the conditions which must govern an attempt to relate the two spheres of knowledge.

In treating the relation of religious to world knowledge upon his epistemological premise, he definitely brings natural knowledge under the all-supreme religious outlook, even though he confessed this supremacy to be confined to the realm of faith so far as we could know. World and religious knowledge cannot be ultimately antagonistic or separate but the religious Weltanschauung (even though it be confined to the realm of faith) tells us that the former must recognise the supremacy of the latter as representing the end toward which the world serves as a means. And furthermore, he, at one point, admitted that this supremacy of the religious Weltanschauung is not altogether hidden from natural knowledge.

In his discussion of value the nature of the problem at issue and course along which thought must proceed toward a solution, becomes evident. The conclusion which we arrived at here was just the conclusion which we reached in our initial estimation of the nature, and limits, and requirements of the problem of value. Value and reality must be related not only in the subject but also in the world. That is, the world must be explained in such a way as to recognise the objective validity of religious values. Furthermore, as religious values sustain and express the end-purpose of God in creation then the world must be explained in such a way as to recognise the prior nature of religious values, not only in the field of faith but in the actual existential world. Only upon this basis is it possible to present a Weltanschauung from any point of view.

Ritschl, of course, recognises the supremacy of the religious Weltanschauung as a necessary proposition of faith.
Indeed, it seems impossible to present a religious Weltanschauung which would not claim as much. But Ritschl generally tended to confine this viewpoint to the realm of faith alone. However, our analysis of the concept of value has shown that such a conception cannot be valid in the subjective sphere without being valid in the objective as well. In other words, the world must admit of interpretation in such a way as to validate the claim of religion. The problem which now confronts us is to suggest such an interpretation. This, as we have stated in the introduction is the real problem of value.

This interpretation of the world requires an exposition of natural knowledge in such a way as will make explicable its relation to value. What do we mean by objective validity? What is scientific knowledge? What is the basis of its distinction from "value" knowledge? What is the basis of its claim to validity? In what respect is this validity different from that claimed by value? Finally, what is the relation of all knowledge to a religious Weltanschauung? These are the questions which now concern us.
CHAPTER VI.

SCIENCE, REALITY, AND RELIGION.

The philosophic mechanism of the last century, based upon the remarkable success of scientific investigation, presumed to enclose the whole universe, from stones to stars and from men to monkeys, in a single all-embracing unity comprehended, determined and ruled by the same principles - the universal laws of nature. This whole monistic, mechanistic conception of the universe was developed within a period of time of scarcely more than four hundred years. Before the time of Copernicus - indeed before the time of Galileo - universal laws and mechanistic interpretations as we understand them, were a language foreign to men's thinkings. Yet when the rise of mechanism is traced, there seems to be a kind of inevitableness about it. It is difficult to imagine science taking any other course than the one it has taken. And assuming the course it has taken and its remarkable success in practically all its branches, then the only wonder is that the mechanics of the structure did not earlier appear as a direct challenge to the religious outlook. To appreciate this contradiction in outlook evidenced in the juxtaposition of the mechanistic and religious Weltanschauungen it is almost necessary to trace, in sketch form, the development of mechanism.

I. The Development of Mechanism.

The course along which scientific knowledge proceeded from the renaissance till the dawn of the present century is characterised by three phases. The first arose from an attempt to visualise the universe in terms of mechanical laws of motion. The second developed along with a revival of the concept of the atom as the final ontological ultimate. The third was the combination of the first two phases in the concept of the electron as a kind of dynamic ontological unit.

The first of these phases had its origin in the new attitude toward the world consequent upon the astronomical discoveries of the sixteenth century. Copernicus (1473-1543) shifted the frame of reference for all the planetary movements from the earth to the sphere of the fixed stars. Instead of being the center of the universe, the earth became but one among the planets. A new orientation was given to men's thoughts, which resulted in a more humble attitude toward the universe and man's place in it, but a more presumptuous attitude toward the dominion of the human knowledge. Tycho Brahe (1446-1501) worked out the planetary motions and passed on his findings to Kepler (1571-1630)
who began a systematic interpretation of planetary motion in terms of mathematics. This astronomic development reached a full fruition in Gallileo (1546-1642) who might well be called the father of modern science, in that he proceeded according to the experimental method which has been the fruitful source of subsequent scientific enterprise. He was the first true empiricist. However more important than this astronomic findings was Gallileo's application of this empirical method to terrestrial dynamics. He was not interested in why things took place and why change occurred. His interest was in the action itself and this action he endeavoured to translate into mathematical formulae and laws.

Subsequently, this impulse initiated into the field of dynamics by Gallileo, was transmitted to all branches of science. In medicine, for example, it started a revival of the study of anatomy and physiology from Paracelsus (1490-1541) through Franciscus Sylvius (1614-1677) and Versalius (1515-1564) to William Harvey (1578-1657). This medical trend is significant in that it marked a tendency to consider living bodies, as like the universe in general, subject to experiment and investigation.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) epitomised this tendency and laid the philosophic foundation of modern science. He made no striking contribution to natural knowledge and many of his philosophic conclusions were over-ambitious and inadequate, yet he laid a firm logical basis for the new methods and ideas of science and prepared the framework of subsequent scientific discoveries.

Descartes (1596-1650) first made clear the mechanistic implications of this scientific attitude and showed that the mathematical interpretation could recognise only a thoroughgoing mechanistic principle in operation in the universe. To him the universe was material and ethically indifferent. God was shoved back into the vague realm of First Cause.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) carried this mechanical attitude of the physical sciences into the field of physiology and psychology and showed the true implications of the mechanical approach. However, it was not till Newton (1642-1727) attempted his physical synthesis that the opposition between science and religion became definite. Science, when carried to a synthesis, was seen to present a rival claim to that of religion in the interpretation of the world. However it must
be granted that Newton himself did not wish or mean to bring about this cleavage of world knowledge from religion. He saw in all his discoveries but renewed proofs of the argument from design, and to him the music of the spheres rang praises of a Creator's sustaining hand.

In Germany and especially in France, the brutal conclusions of this mechanistic principle were applied. Human activity, human life, and human mind, were ruthlessly deprived of their sanctity and reduced to the level of all mechanical processes. Johannes Mueller with his "Handbuck der Physiologie" (1833) and E.H. Weber were the leaders of this trend of thought in Germany. In France psychological mechanism was still further developed. The old arguments used by La Mettrie in his "L'Homme Machine" (1748) were revived and developed with the added weight of the new physics, physiology and psychology behind them. This trend of thought might well be said to have reached its climax in Voegt's famous expression that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile.

Scientific knowledge appeared to have discredited the teleological and the ontological arguments, but the cosmological argument still lingered. The why of creation was still a riddle. Then Charles Darwin offered a fruitful solution of this problem in his principle of natural selection. This was all that was needed to overthrow the old theology and Ernst Haeckel could triumphantly assert -

"we are now agreed in a monistic conception of nature that regards the whole universe, including man, as a wonderful unity, governed by unalterable and eternal laws.

- - - I have endeavoured to show that - - the admission of the all-powerful rule of the same principle of evolution throughout the universe compels us to formulate a single supreme law, the all embracing law of Substance, or the united laws of the constancy of matter and the conservation of energy".

The omnipotent principle of mechanism which presumed to translate all movement into a mathematical formula, conceived in terms of universal laws, demanded as a corollary of its dynamic interpretation of nature some conception of matter. That is, a thoroughgoing mechanistic philosophy of the universe requires more than a statement of the laws of motion - it requires an interpretation of the existential realities in the universe according to some concept which will correspond to the laws that appear to govern their movements. In other words, it is required to connect, in some way, movement and that which moves - motion and mass. Furthermore, mass, as mechanically
conceived, cannot be regarded as a causa sui, or an initiating principle in any respect. Its function is merely to preserve and to pass on the impulse given it. By itself it is passive. The fundamental principles of mechanism are the conservation of energy and the conservation of matter.

Such a conception of mass the mechanical philosophers found in a revival of Democritus' atomism, which had hitherto lain dormant in philosophy, unable to recover from the shrewd blow dealt it by Aristotle. The renaissance brought a revival of atomism. Galileo regarded it favourably; Gassendi restated it in terms of Epicurus and Leucretius; Boyle and Newton used it in their chemical and physical speculations; and with the dawn of the nineteenth century it had been quite restored as an important principle of explanation. It was soon regarded as the inevitable explanation of physical properties, such as the existence of solid, liquid, and gaseous states of matter and of the definite facts of chemical composition.

Upon such a foundation thought became not only mechanistic, it became materialistic. Matter — dead, senseless, inert matter — was regarded as the sole ultimate reality of the universe. Life, thought and consciousness could be nothing but by-products of matter. Matter was the beginning and the end of all things — there was nothing before it, there was nothing above it, and there could be nothing beyond it. Religion and ethics seemed to be fighting a forlorn and losing battle against the onward march of scientific mechanism. It was assumed, that at least the universe had been explained — the human mind had mastered the secrets of nature. Little was left to be done but fill in some of the gaps left in the scheme. Certainly nothing startlingly new need be expected. Such was the position of scientific philosophy at the dawn of the revolutionary developments at the close of the last century.

II. The Present Position of Science.

The triumph of materialism carried the seeds of its own destruction in that it brought the focus of attention upon this "matter" which had been made the ultimate element in nature. Questions began to arise as to the possibility of atoms acting upon each other from a distance, and as to the principles of cohesion when they were together. Also the
fact that they would rebound when they collided showed that they were not the ultimate units but were capable of contracting and expanding. The new age in physics began with the discovery of X-rays involving the discovery of ultra-atomic corpuscles. The atom could no longer be regarded as the ultimate unit: X-rays could penetrate metals and wood. The atom was divisible into smaller units which in the process of division lost all the qualities that characterised the substance of which they were the unit. Hence the atom could be regarded as nought but the lowest point to which a substance could be reduced and still retain the character of that substance.

The unit which appeared to underlie the sensible manifestations discernible in the atom, was termed the "electron". However the electron, by its very definition forbade it being regarded as the final stopping place in the quest for the ontologically ultimate. The electron was but the negatively electrified corpuscle common to all elements. It was but the negative or passive part of the ultimate entity. To complete the requirements of the concepts of mass and energy a positive complement had to be postulated and discovered.

But it was now obvious that to press the search for the ontological ultimate further back would extend the search into a realm in which the triumphant science of the last century would, quite decidedly, not feel at home. Mechanism and mechanistic science were in their natural element when they could speak in terms of inert, lifeless material atoms. A fixed unit of mass plus a definite velocity transmitted, transmittable and constant, was all science wanted. Physics did not want to find a source of energy. It would have preferred accepting a general "First Cause" as a starting point, because by the admission of it in the beginning, it could be automatically dropped once the impetus it gave had begun its operations. Physics did not want to find activity in the ontological unit. It would have preferred stopping with the atom and regarding mass as dead and inert, as merely a via of motion and a unit to which motion could be referred for practical explanation.

The electron was disconcerting. It was not a passive via of energy; rather it was or implied an active center of energy. The problem involved in the "cause" for action could no longer be shoved into the inscrutable and barren realm of First Cause. It became crucial in every event. From whence does the energy of the electron come? Whither does it go? What is the via of transmission? These old questions were all opened again. Science became less sure
of itself. "Triumphant" materialism was left "in the air" there was no "matter" on which to rest. Mechanism in general received a severe jolt. In astronomical generalisations it might still demonstrate the ubiquity of inexorable universal law, but in the structure of the smallest ontological unit it had to begin all over again showing the suzerainty of its mechanical laws. The microcosm became just as important a subject of interest for philosophy as the macrocosm. The crucial question was, would these electrons, when further analysed, provide a more certain foundation for mechanism (that is, would they prove to be little universes in themselves amenable to the exactions of natural law) or would they prove recalcitrant to natural law?.

In 1911 experiments on the scattering of "A" rays when they strike matter led Professor Rutherford to the conclusion that, since the forces exerted by negative electrons were obviously too small to explain this deviation from their course and scattering of these aforementioned rays, another agent must be postulated. He further showed that the phenomenon would be explained if the atom be supposed to be a kind of miniature planetary system with a center in a positively charged minute nucleus (proton) about which negative electrons revolve. Furthermore, since the normal atom is electrically neutral, this positively charged nucleus (proton) must balance the complexity of negatively charged electrons in the atom, and since the mass of the electron is small compared with that of the atom, nearly all the mass must be concentrated in the nucleus (proton).

Thus the source of energy must be sought in the atom which is yet by itself normally neutral. Each atom seems more or less, a complete system, independent in itself. Consequently the laws or principles - or lack of laws or principles - which govern its activity become the test case for the suzerainty of mechanical law. If mechanism, in the popular sense, prevails in the activity of the atom, then philosophic mechanism has won the battle, temporarily at least. If not, it fails and fails fundamentally and irretrievably as a philosophy of the universe.

The atom is normally neutral, but in activity it gives off units of energy or "quanta". The significant thing about this emission of energy is that it is neither continuous nor always equal. A long train of waves is emitted then there is an intermission. The atom has to be prodded by some kind of stimulation before it emits again. But this emission or quanta cannot be regarded in the old mechanical sense as related to the nature and violence of the stimulation. The quanta of energy is directly associated
with some internal change in the atom itself, and not with
the nature or violence of the external stimulus. In 1910
Max Planck gave first formulation to the famous Quantum
Theory, to explain the action of the atom. Its consequences
have been far reaching. According to this theory, the
quanta of energy are neither steady ethereal waves nor
continuous undulations, but seem to consist of a stream of
minute gushes of energy which may almost be regarded as
corpuscular atoms like those described by Newton. However,
there is this important difference: the quantum as now com­
prehended, seems to defy explanation in terms of extension
in time. It is non-material. It is so large it can cover
a hundred inch mirror (as is the case when the light of
a star falls on the Wilson observatory telescope) and it
is so small that it can enter into an atom to cause it to
explode. One is reminded of childhood's definition of a
shadow:"it sometimes shoots up taller than an india rubber
ball, and sometimes gets so little that there's none of it
at all".

Yet this quantum when it is emitted has a definite and
fixed quality. It is the same no matter from what atom or
kind of atom it comes." . Its energy may vary and its time
may vary but considering the quantum (termed "h") as a
multiple of energy and duration, it is always constant.
It is a kind of atom. But this quantum radiation defies
explanation in terms of the parent atom. That is, it
cannot be found there as a definable quality until the
actual act of emission has occurred. "h" can never be found
in the constitution of the atom. It appears as a discernible
unit only when energy is being dissipated. It has no
coherence in space. In other words, it defies mechanical
explanation both with regard to its spacio-temporal nature
and with regard to its origin or cause.

If the atom is normally neutral except at the time of
emission, then a change must take place in the atom to
balance the "h" or multiple of "h" which has been emitted.
Niels Bohr has shown that the only possible change is the
transfer of an electron from one orbit to another. The
assumption being that the energy of the atom always equals
"h" or some multiple of it. If an electron jumps down from
one of the higher orbits to an orbit of less energy there
will be a certain amount of surplus energy to be gotten
rid of. This "lump" of energy must be "h" or some multiple
of it. It becomes clear then, that as the origin of "h"
lies in the change of the electron's orbit, and as this
change of orbit cannot be shown to be mechanically equatable
with the "h" quantity, then mechanical explanation breaks
down at this point. The Quantum Theory thus stands in
contradiction to the classical laws. However, Bohr, in his "Principle of Correspondence", shows that in a large group number of cases the average approximates the classical laws.

With regard to the claims of mechanism, the most significant implication of the Quantum Theory is the "Principle of Indeterminacy" in the activity of the atom. This, as the name suggests, repudiates determinism or the application of the classic laws of mechanism to the action of the ultimate ontological entity. Mechanism demands for explanation two qualities - mass or position and velocity. It cannot explain one without reference to the other. But in the activity of the atom, position appears to preclude a cognisance of velocity and vice versa.

"A particle may have position or it may have velocity but it cannot in any exact sense have both."1

If we try to calculate the position of an electron its velocity becomes incalculable, and if we wish to determine its velocity its position becomes indeterminate. This can be seen if we consider the position and velocity of a particular electron. Unless it is interacting with something and producing effects no knowledge is possible, in as much as the inactive atom is inscrutable. Only on those occasions when it is interacting with something and producing effects can we have any sensible awareness of it. But in any action the complete quantum "h" is always involved, which in so far as it cannot be related mechanically with a foregoing "cause" breaks down the mechanical sequence, and furthermore, the emission of this quantum, by the alteration it effects upon the atom, makes the information of change out of date before it can be observed. In other words, there does not seem any ground for believing it possible to predict just where and when a change in the atom will take place. And what is more, the implication is that no such prediction is possible because there is nothing in the nature of the atom to justify prediction. Indeterminism lies in the final character of the ontologically ultimate.

"The old laws of science about which so much was said, prove to be either truisms inserted by ourselves into our model of nature or statements of probability. The most a man of science can do even in that part of his subject which deals with large scale or statistical phenomena, is to bet long odds on his predictions being verified, while he cannot foretell the action of a single atom or quanta. Accepting the well known laws as expressions of probable tendencies, they are found to be concerned not with individual molecules or atoms or electrons, but with statistical averages only. If we heat a gas through one degree we may know by how much the average energy of a large number of molecules will be increased. But the energy of any one

1 Eddington - The Nature of the Physical World - p.270.
molecule depends upon chance collisions, which at present are incalculable. - - We may know how many electrons will emit a quantum of energy at a given temperature but not when any one electron will fall into a new orbit and therefore radiate. It is possible that at a future time a new theory of mechanics may be developed and some individual molecules, atoms and electrons become determinate. But as yet there is no sign of such a theory. Indeed, present tendencies point the other way. The principle of indeterminacy seems to introduce a new kind of incalculability into nature. - - The indication is that in the last analysis scientific determinism breaks down."

"There seems to be an ultimate impossibility of exact knowledge, fundamental and indeterminate, behind which we cannot go. It looks as though the final limits of human knowledge were near." 2.

Professor Eddington would go even further. "Science, in seeking to subordinate the whole universe to rigid laws, has been aiming at a false ideal. The future of science must be content to admit a mixture of the knowable and the unknowable. This means a denial of determinism, because the data required for prediction of the future will include the unknowable elements of the past. I think it was Heisenberg who said, 'The question whether, from a complete knowledge of the past we can predict the future, does not arise, because a complete knowledge of the past involves a self-contradiction'." 3.

It may seem that this humble attitude of modern science is over-drawn. It may appear to some as a reaction - a healthy reaction - from the presumptuous claims of scientific philosophy of the last century, but it may look to be unduly pessimistic to say that the limits of human knowledge are reached or that indeterminacy is ultimate. Such sweeping claims have been made before, and yet advance has been made. To be sure, if science has nothing further to say in the matter it may be that ethics or religion could carry on the investigation.

However, whatever trust is placed in the "Principle of Indeterminacy" as ultimate, it seems evident, at any rate, that modern science offers no support for a thoroughgoing mechanistic interpretation of nature, much less of life. And what is more, the present findings and present tendencies of modern science point to a repudiation and denial of such claims.

"In a completely objective survey of the situation, the outstanding fact would seem to be that mechanics has already 'shot its' bolt and failed dismally on both the scientific and philosophic side." 4.

There is something more that may be added to reinforce this new attitude of science. Not only has scientific mechanism failed to survive the analysis of the atom, but in the macrocosm itself - in the sphere of the sun, and the moon and the stars which was acknowledged as its citadel - its pretensions are not so unquestioned. Mechanism demands finality in all things. Laws must be fixed. Phenomena must be predictable. It speaks in terms of absolutes. It may recognise that no particular law can claim absolute finality - but it does insist that the universe does lend itself to interpretation in terms of absolute laws. But the modern theory of Relativity, if it says nothing else, says at least that we must get over this childish way of speaking in absolutes - in the realm of knowledge there is nothing absolute, neither ether, nor space nor time nor any scientifically knowable reference point. Relativity is the only absolute. The theory of relativity, when its logical implications are developed, means more than that human observations are necessarily anthropocentric or geo-centric. It means more than the admission that we cannot get to the absolute reckoning or observation point. It casts a doubt on the existence of an absolute point of reference and intimates that there is no such point.

The conclusion is, that nature had defied the attempts of men to fit it into a rigid frame of mechanical laws. The attempt to fit the sun and the moon, sticks and stones and worms and beetles and human beings into a single monistic system, interpreted in terms of "universal laws", has not been successful. Not only have human beings eludes the all-enveloping net, but even the sticks and stones and the moon and the stars have protested against this attempt to circumscribe their liberties.

"In the stately and sonorous diction of a bygone age, Bishop Berkeley summed up his philosophy in the words, 'All the choir of heaven and furniture of earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any substance without the mind -- the mind. So long as they are not actually perceived by me or do not exist in my mind or in that of any other spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit'. Modern science seems to lead by a very different road to a not altogether dissimilar conclusion." 1

It would seem that the hard and objective character of natural knowledge which, at first glance, seemed to give it an advantage over valueful knowledge, is not nearly so evident upon a closer study. If religion, morality, and the normative sciences generally, appear to suffer from an

inadequate foundation in value, it appears that also, the
postulates underlying the physical sciences rest upon
just as naively accepted or as doubtful foundations. This
point deserves closer consideration, for if it may be shown
that natural knowledge and appreciative or value knowledge
are, so to speak, in the same boat, then the common require­
ments of each may lead us to discover what the nature of this
boat is and what it is which propels it along.

III. What is a Fact.

The raw datum of natural knowledge enjoys an impressive
standing in our consciousness by claiming to be a "fact" -
that is, something "given". In chapter I, it has been shown
that the distinction between fact and value (as the basis for
the distinction made in popular imagination, between the
"natural" and the moral-religious) can not be logically
sustained upon an analysis of the concept of value. It
remains to be shown now what status this distinction has
from the standpoint of natural knowledge and science.

Common parlance would probably define a fact as an
element of knowledge which is immediately and objectively
obvious. An incident occurs: an event happens - that is
a fact. My pencil is in my hand - that is a fact. This
object before me is a piece of paper - that is a fact.
A fact is anything which occurs or is, and in its occurrence
or "isness" is not dependent upon an apperceptive or
appreciative relationship. But obviously, this definition
of fact is as foreign to the conceptions of modern science
(that is, critical science) as it is to the requirements
of the problem of value. If naive or Berkelian Idealism
has outlived its day so also has naive Realism.

A scientific conception of fact is much different from
that which vulgar opinion presumes. Science speaks of
"events" and "objects", but in so far as science lays no
claims to presumptuous metaphysical prerogatives, it forbears
declaring these events and objects to be facts in the popular
sense. All scientific data are hypothetically imperative,
dependent upon the subsisting hypothesis or principle of
selection.

For example, an eclipse of the sun is an event. In it
several objects are involved - the sun, and the moon, and
the earth. In the consideration of this event itself, the
sun, moon and earth (or rather that portion of the earth's
surface in which the particular relation of sun and moon
partakes of the character of an eclipse) as objects, are
assumed to be factual elements in the event naively accepted
for the purpose of explaining the "event". Each of these objects may itself, as the object of apprehension, become an event. An event, as A.N. Whitehead says, is a "constant of externality" or in other words, the thing we apprehend. The event may be described simply as a cross-section of nature, seen at a particular time from a particular viewpoint. An event may become an object by having a definite "duration" associated with it. Thus both events and objects are kinds of viewpoints which are assumed toward nature. They imply intelligent apperception - that is principles of cognition whose validity cannot be considered as intrinsically different from the principles associated with recognition of value.

"I am quite willing to admit - that there is no recognition of objects without intellectual accompaniments of comparison and judgment. - - - You cannot cling to the idea that we have two sets of experiences of nature, one primary qualities which belong to the objects perceived, and the one of secondary qualities which are the products of mental excitement. All we know of nature is in the same boat to sink or swim together."

J. Royce has expressed this same idea more clearly.

"Every concrete act of knowledge in our conscious life includes a more or less deliberate abstraction from the background of recognised reality which we conceive as the world, for the sake of clear attention to certain special objects of our present acknowledgement. The likeness and difference which we observe in facts are not merely thrust upon us without our consent or connivance. They are the objects of our attentive interest, and obviously vary with this interest."

This reference to a conscious interest or to a consciously framed hypothesis, is just as marked in the most exact of sciences - that is the mathematical sciences.

"In the so called "four dimensional" world of the relativity theory, the past and future lie, as it were, mapped out along with the near and distant. Each event is there in its proper relation to surrounding events; but events never seem to undergo what has been described as the 'formality of taking place'. (that is, this form of knowledge does not concern itself with physical, factual objects) Here is what Professor Weyl says about it: 'It is a four-dimensional continuum, which is neither time nor space. Only the consciousness which passes on in one portion of this world experiences the detached piece which comes to meet it and passes behind it as history, that is a process which goes forward in time and takes place in space; here you see again the absolute necessity of a reference to

consciousness. In a world without consciousness there is no meaning to this flux: the world is simply spread passively in its four dimensions with the events connected by relations to which we can give numerical measure, but it is by their values for consciousness that we become differentially certain of these relations as "beings" and others as "becomings"; certain relations as passive, and others as dynamic. That dynamic quality by which nature is not merely something which exists but is something which becomes, is not in the physical scheme and must be introduced into actuality by filling the skeleton frame of physics with things with over and above their physical definitions, have a value for consciousness, i.e. spiritual value."

To express the whole matter in a sentence: any attempt to represent reality in knowledge is, apart from a justification of the mode of procedure as an act of consciousness, as empty and as abstract as Plato's Ideas taken in their worst interpretation. All particularisation is an act of consciousness. And if the "particulars" of experience are to receive valid authority, it can only be by a justification of the act of consciousness by which they have been conceived. The particulars of experience are valid if, and only if, the act of consciousness in which they appear is a valid act. To justify the world represented in knowledge is to justify consciousness as a valid agent in comprehending reality. This is the matter which concerned Plato in his thinking and we may not boast ourselves that it is now out of date. The particular things of experience, as factual realities, are not very different from the particular things of experience as value realities.

IV. What are Laws of Science.

As has been indicated in chapter I. and explained in greater detail in the chapter dealing with Ritschl's identification of value and religious knowledge, a spiritual interpretation of nature requires and demands the breakdown of rigid natural determinism. If values and spiritual life generally are to be acceded a place other than an inexplicable and inconsequential epiphenomenon in the natural order - if they are to be acceded a place in the ontological constitution of reality - then the popular pretensions of natural law must be modified. These pretensions have been modified, as has been shown above. Then what do we mean by law?

'Eddington. - Science, Religion, And Reality. - p.212.'
Professor Eddington has divided the laws of physics, with which we are most concerned, into three classes - the identical, the statistical, and the transcendental.

"The identical laws include the great laws of physics which are commonly quoted as typical instances of natural law - the law of gravitation, the law of conservation of energy, the laws of electric and magnetic forces, and the conservation of electric charge. These are seen to be identities when we refer to the cycle so as to understand the constitution of the entities obeying them; so unless we have misunderstood this constitution, violation of these laws is inconceivable. They do not in any way limit the actual basal structure of the world and are not laws of governance. To quote again from Professor Weyl, 'The freedom of action in the world is no more restricted by the rigorous laws of physics than it is by the laws of Euclidean geometry according to the usual view.' You have unfettered freedom to draw anything you like on a flat sheet of paper; all the same you cannot draw a circle whose circumference is six times its diameter. But you would not complain that, because of this inability to do impossible things, your freedom is imperfect. The laws of Euclidean geometry are not felt to be a restriction upon the freedom of the artist; similarly the law of gravitation, when the nature of that which obeys it is understood, cannot be regarded as a limitation of freedom."

"The mind has by its selective power fitted the processes of nature into a frame of law of a pattern largely of its own choosing; and in the discovery of this system of law the mind may be regarded as regaining from nature that which the mind has put into nature." 1

"For example, the law of conservation is a truism for the things which satisfy it; but its prominence in the scheme of law of the physical world is due to the mind having demanded permanence. We might have built things which do not satisfy this law. In fact we do build one very important thing, "action" which is not permanent; in respect to action physics has taken the bit into its teeth and has insisted on recognising this as an important thing - indeed as the most fundamental thing of all, although the mind has not thought it worthy of a place in the familiar world and has not vivified it by any mental image or conception." 2

Laws in this sense are but summaries of observed phenomena in the sphere of comprehended reality. When applied to particular phenomena they partake of the same nature as a concept in any judgment of the understanding, such as

2. The Nature of the Physical World. - p.244.
3. ibid - p.251.
"This is a pencil". That is, they involve the fitting of a percept or a particular event into a concept or universal category, or, in the case of a law, a hypothesis. The triumph of a particular hypothesis in the field of its jurisdiction results in the translation of the hypothesis into a theory and eventually into a law; and the process is of the same nature as the establishment of a particular concept over the perceptual data in the formation of such a simple judgment as the above. In either case this recognition of the "universal" nature of the hypothesis as "law" or the "trueness" of the concept as a valid object of judgment, proceeds from the pragmatic impulse to find something which "works" - which satisfies the requirements presented by the particular experience, set of experiences or observations, or set of observations. In other words, we comprehend nature in terms of laws because that is a necessity of life. To live in the world we have to comprehend it, and understand it in some fashion. "Divine or you will be devoured" as Fouillé has said. Our conception of a law as also of an individual judgment in a particular simple instance, proceeds from this same impulse to comprehend the state of things in which we find ourselves. Our laws of nature are in some measure laws of our own thinking as well as laws of ontological reality.

"Laws contain elements that are needful for our minds in order that they may trace order or reason in our perceptions; and they can never be independent of the processes by which they have been established nor be other than laws as to what our minds make of the ontal."¹

To express the whole matter in a word: laws of nature, as commonly understood, are certain hypothetical frames or forms which are set up to contain a certain specific subject matter. If they contain the subject matter passably well, then well and good: if not, then they are modified and remoulded to suit. But that there may be another type of subject matter could not be denied, or that if a different selection of subject matter were made, a new type of frame would be required is manifestly possible. The choice of subject matter made at the outset determines the nature of the structure. The principle of selection plays the all-important part in the formation of laws of this type.

The second class of law mentioned by Eddington - the statistical laws, are more important and more significant

with respect to the problem of value. They include the
laws of gases and thermo-dynamics, and are the laws of crowds
independent of individuals. They express "tendencies" toward
certain ends upon the part of individuals, and naturally in
groups, these "tendencies" become generalised into almost
certain predictions. However, such laws do not interfere
with individual liberty any more than an insurance company's
mortality table determines the span of life of a particular
person. But they are important in that, unlike the laws of
identity, which are in a sense man-made principles of
classification, these laws pertain to the nature of reality
itself. Their jurisdiction is in the realm of the ontological.
To express the matter simply; individual freedom, if it be
recognised, must be acceded a place within the jurisdiction
of these laws. When we "make up our minds" we affect
statistical laws, and if enough individuals make up their
minds together they alter or determine statistical laws.

Above these statistical laws, Professor Eddington
introduces "transcendental laws", which he declares are true
and final laws of ontological reality. These laws pertain
to the action of the atom and its remarkable transformations
in the quantum ejeculation. Here, Professor Eddington says,
we strike rock bottom - we come up against the ontologically
ultimate. But here also, to change the metaphor, we come into
a blind alley - a cul-de-sac; for, as has been pointed out
above, the nature of the atom seems to forbid "legalistic"
description. The probabilities seem to be that statistical
laws are the most ultimate laws we can comprehend. Within
the sphere of statistical laws there is sufficient room for
the prediction which is the very life blood of scientific
research. To be sure, one cannot predict the action of a
single electron, but one may predict the action of a certain
complexity of electrons upon the basis of statistical averages.
Thus in the realm of astronomical speculation, where prediction
has its citadel, the number of units involved becomes so
tremendous that prediction closely approaches upon certainty.
Professor Eddington's laws of "Identity" upon this basis,
could establish themselves as valid categories in the
explanation of the universe in that they are pragmatic
postulates built upon the basis of statistical averages.

There is another type of transcendental law which
Professor Eddington introduces which, in as much as it
points to a final destiny for the world, has a direct
bearing upon a religious outlook. This is the second
law of thermo-dynamics - the law of entropy - the law of
the dissipation of energy. The claims of this law are
important, not because of their immediate or direct bearing
upon religion, but rather as they present a kind of test case of the right and ability of a scientific conclusion to legislate or govern in the determination of final ends and consummations. Here is the test case between science and value. Can knowledge, apart from value categories, declare an absolute, or as Professor Eddington expresses it, a transcendental law? The entire concept of evolution is here involved - and more generally the concept of progress.

V. Evolution and Progress, and Science.

Evolution, generally understood, means the "emergence" of something "new", in the course of world change. That is, it is distinct from mere "change". Furthermore, the "new", by its very nature must remain inexplicable from a mechanical or naturalistic analysis of preceding conditions. To deny this would automatically involve one in some theory similar to Aristotle's theory of entelechies - evolution would be but the realisation of becoming into being - an unfolding of what was already present. And this premise, as naturalism has foreseen, involves one in a kind of vitalism or panpsychism.

Evolution is now admittedly, the emergence of the "new" - and this evolution becomes progress when the "new" emergent is recognised as "better" or "higher". Evolution and progress are inseparable terms. There is no point in saying that things evolve (that is, implying more than a mechanical change) unless we mean by the word "evolve" something that is not expressed in the word "change". In order to distinguish evolution from change the idea of progress must be introduced and furthermore, progress is unintelligible apart from some idea of a "better" or a "higher".

For example, we have such an explanation of evolution and progress as is expressed in Herbert Spencer's phrase, "the survival of the fittest". But obviously, the expression but begs the question, What is the fittest? If it be argued that the fittest is what best suits the existing conditions then no standard for the determination of evolution exists but the survival itself. Whatever is is best. We have no reason for saying that man is "higher" than his simian ancestors except that he lives. To introduce another standard is to reject the premise. If a virulent germ were to destroy all human life tomorrow, this principle would have to recognise this as another step in the course of evolution. The germ would be "higher" than the man. No distinction between evolution and degeneration is possible upon this basis. Morality and ethics is stultified.
Similarly such naturalistic explanations of evolution as "increased complexity", "greater homogeneity", "increased use of the law of cause and effect", etc. all so obviously beg the question that they scarcely need be discussed. In this regard, at any rate, the battle against Herbert Spencer's conception of cosmic evolution must be conceded as conclusively won, and further discussion appears to be but a recapitulation of the obvious.

A recognition of progress in natural or biological evolution involves the concept of value according to which progress has a meaning. And the value category, be it naturally, biologically, ethically or religiously conceived, cannot be intelligible unless it be regarded as the end or purpose of the emergent factors in evolution. If we are to comprehend evolution we must comprehend it in terms of a terminus ad quem. "The idea of progress -- implies an anticipation of the future of a denouement, the meaning of which vacillates between the idea of an ever-increasing purpose and the idea of a limit toward which we tend -- a limit imposed without, and one which would not be attainable except by becoming a point of arrest in the sense of termination." 1

The conclusion seems to be unavoidable; if evolution in the universe is comprehensible only in terms of an end or purpose, then if the universe is to be regarded as a comprehensible universe, the universe itself must provide a justification and a basis for this demand of our reason. In other words, an end or purpose must reside in the course of evolution itself. Lloyd Morgan goes so far as to admit that we can but acknowledge the rise of new or emergent qualities or meanings with "natural piety".

A concept of evolution and progress or evolutionary progress, involves two things. One is a recognition of a value category as the basis of comprehension, and the other is a recognition that the category or standard of explanation is indigenous to the nature of evolution itself. Evolution is not only comprehended as purposive -- but it is comprehended as purposive because it is purposive. Consequently science, when it speaks of transcendental or absolute laws, must recognise that in doing so it is introducing matter which can scarcely be said to be scientific in the accepted sense of the word. Professor Eddington himself recognises this in terming the second law of thermo-dynamics as an "incongruous mixture of theology and statistics". 2

1 Urban, - op.cit. - p.390.
The second law of thermo-dynamics may justifiably state that energy everywhere in the universe, so far as observation indicates, appears to be dissipating itself faster than being created. But it cannot justifiably state, as a scientific conclusion, that the destiny of the world is in a direction determined by this dissipation. It is interesting to note that many scientists doubt the absolute nature of the law of entropy. Professor Millikan flatly opposes it, while Professors Whetham and Jeans are not at all sure in the matter.

Physics, indeed, has nothing to say about the direction of change, or progress or degeneration. Physics, as such, cannot say which is up and which is down, which is front and which is back in the universal change. As Professor Eddington concludes:

'We trust to some inner sense of fitness when we orient the physical world with the future on top and likewise we must trust to some inner monitor when we orient the spiritual world with the good on top.'

However, before dealing more specifically with the relation of the spheres of science and value, it might be well to present in summary form the position of science today. In this regard one could not do better than quote Professor Eddington's own summary.

"I. The symbolic nature of the titles of physics is generally recognised; and the scheme of physics is now formulated in such a way as to make it almost self-evident that it is a partial aspect of something.

2. Strict causality is abandoned in the material world. Our ideas of the controlling laws are in process of reconstruction and it is not possible to predict what kind of form they will ultimately take; but all the indications are that strict causality has dropped out permanently. This relieves the former necessity of supposing that mind is subject to deterministic law or alternatively that it can suspend deterministic law in the material world.

3. Recognising that the physical world is entirely abstract and without actuality apart from its linkage to consciousness, we restore consciousness to the fundamental position instead of representing it as an inessential complication occasionally found in the midst of organic nature at a late stage of evolutionary history."
4. The sanction for correlating a "real" physical world to certain feelings of which we are conscious does not seem to differ in any essential respect from the sanction for correlating a spiritual domain to another side of our personality.

VI. Science and Value.

The most significant point which emerges from this consideration of the position of modern science is that it dis countenances, from the standpoint of science itself, that naive distinction between fact and value which, from the viewpoint of value, has already been shown to be inadequate. In other words, the distinction between value knowledge and natural knowledge can never rest solely upon a distinction between knowledge in which an active consciousness plays a part and knowledge in which the consciousness is but an idle spectator. What is known is seen to be in either case, a product in which the act of observation or the intention or purpose in observation, plays a necessary part. In the sphere of value or in the sphere of natural knowledge there is only one approach to the understanding of basic reality, and that is through our direct conscious processes.

"The supposed approach through the physical world leads only into a cycle of physics where we run round and round like a kitten chasing its tail and never reach the world stuff at all. - - - Probably it would never have occurred to us (as a serious hypothesis) that the world could be based on anything else, (than a mind stuff) had we not been under the impression that there is a rival stuff with a more comfortable kind of concrete reality - something too inert and stupid to be capable of forging an illusion. The rival turns out to be a schedule of pointer readings; and though a world of symbolic character can well be constructed from it, this is mere shelving of the inquiry into the nature of the world of experience."

To be sure, this does not reduce all the world of experience to value in the sense that what we see and know is dependent upon the purpose or intention of the particular observer. Philosophy has made some progress since Protagoras. Plato has not laboured in vain. It is one thing to say that the world is unknowable apart from an act of consciousness and quite another to say that the world we know is

a product of conscious attention and intention. This distinction is very subtle and yet very real, and because of ignoring this distinction more than one philosophy has involved itself in confusion.

The distinction, to express the matter in simple terms, is just this. There is some intrinsic affinity between the world we know and our conscious processes. The world is a rational world - the universe is a rational universe. Now this being granted, the next step in estimating the nature of the real can be taken in either of two directions. On the one hand, it can be argued that, because the world is a rational world, unknowable apart from consciousness, therefore in the individual consciousness are to be found the standards and the categories for its apprehension. Now, so far so good: Kant has not laboured in vain. Undoubtedly the standards of knowledge must be found in individual consciousness - there is no other place to seek for them. But this point of view is dangerous as many post-kantian philosophies have given witness. From this premise the assumption so easily follows that if, in the individual consciousness are to be found the categories for the knowing of the world, then the reference point in the determination of the world that is known (that is, the real world) is the individual consciousness. In other words, because the standards by which we understand reality are found in consciousness, then the assumption so easily is made that reality is determinable within the processes of consciousness.

The insidious error in the view becomes apparent when we follow the argument in the other direction. Granting again that the universe is non-comprehensible apart from consciousness, then the conclusion follows that consciousness is forged, in some respect at least, in the mould that framed the universe. We "know" because there is a fundamental harmony between the operations of our own consciousness and the nature of reality. The reference point in the determination of reality is thus not in the individual consciousness as the other argument presumed, but rather in the universe which is partly "conscious" to us and in us.

This distinction is more important than a prima facie reading of it would suggest. From the first point of view the universe becomes but the transcendental synthesis of the apperception puffed up like a soap bubble until it appears to contain within its form all the data of experience. From the viewpoint of the second, the universe is seen to
be a reality which, because it permits of intelligent or conscious contact by the individual consciousness, has a nature not foreign to that of the individual consciousness. From the first point of view, the universe is the "absolute" of the apperceptive processes. From the other, the apperceptive processes are regarded as homogeneous in the universe.

The confusion which led to the equating of value and natural knowledge, in a system of thought such as Ritschl's, rests upon this same error. There is a sense, as has been recognised and shown by scientists themselves in which scientific knowledge is value knowledge. The intention of the observer and the categories of apperception determine the results. And upon this admission it seems easy to declare that there is no distinction between natural and value knowledge either in method or in result. They have both the same authority behind them, viz. the forms of the apperception.

But is there not here involved a confusion in the use of the word value. Value knowledge, as popularly understood, is that which affects or concerns the weal or woe of the persons interested. Natural knowledge is knowledge which sees things as non-deferential and indifferent to the weal or woe of the persons concerned. Obviously, when Professor Addington terms the reality observed by science a "spiritual value" he means more than popular usage of the term value implies. He means that the universe portrays and indicates to our consciousness that in its essence it is not foreign to the nature of our own consciousness. That is, it is a universe, not made up of inert, stupid particles of matter, obeying universal laws, but rather it is an active, dynamic, animate universe suggesting to us a purpose at its heart as real and as vital as the purpose which gives reality to our apperceptive processes, and furthermore, it is only upon a recognition of this that the universe becomes scientifically intelligible to us. Value when used thus becomes just as objective, just as independent of individual points of view as any scientific law.

Here we meet again the same problem which persisted in presenting itself throughout our consideration of Albrecht Ritschl's thinkings, - the relation of value and world knowledge. All knowledge is value knowledge, he declared at one time, - scientific, moral, and religious - in as much as the conscious processes of apperception play a part in each. But then he went on to describe value in terms of the weal or woe of the person concerned, and it was obvious even to him that there was much in scientific knowledge
which does not fit into the definition of value described in these terms. He made the same mistake so common in philosophy the mistake which we have pointed out above, - because value has an unquestionable "for me" or "to me" reference then he presumed that the secret of value could be found by examining this "for me" or "to me" reference. But, as we have already shown, the value is valuable to me or for me (as an object of knowledge) because it has a reference beyond me. The universal reference is prior and only because it is prior can the value have its full significance for the individual. Furthermore, the value has its "for me" reference because the individual concerned has a relation which might be termed homogeneous to the universe in which he resides.¹

This same ambiguity in the use of the term "value" has confused all treatment of the problem. We have suggested that by a distinction between "value" and "valuable" a point of distinction may be made between these two connotations of the term. Value is that which has meaning in an intelligible universe conceived teleologically. Valuable is that which has meaning for the practical requirements of the apperceptive consciousness. Now it may be conceded that an intelligible universe conceived teleologically might be equated (from the point of view of knowledge) with the fully expanded (that is, absolutely expanded) form of the apperceptive consciousness. But the significant point is that the apperceptive consciousness owes its expansion to the intelligible nature of the universe conceived teleologically and not vice versa. In general philosophy a loose equating of the a priori forms of apperception and the nature of the real may be provisionally acceptable, but from the standpoint of value the situation is critical and demands immediate resolution. Is the universe purposive because comprehended as such, or comprehended as such because purposive? The requirements of the problem of value demand the latter. And we have seen, by a survey of the position of science, that natural knowledge also, permits, if it does not demand the latter.

VII. What is Reality.

Reality, as ontologically imagined, must be conceived (to use Professor Eddington's phrase) as "some kind of mind stuff", - non-material, non-inert, but spiritual and active. It is something of which we must say that it has an essential affinity with the nature of individual conscious minds.

¹. We are here speaking of value in the sense in which it is defined and distinguished from "valuable" in the next paragraph.
Conscious minds are made in its image. From the Universal Mind has come the breath of life. Our minds are what they are because of their origin in, and their affinity to, the Universal Mind of the universe.

"If the unity of man's consciousness is not an illusion, there must be some corresponding unity in the relations of the mind-stuff which is behind the pointer readings (of science). Applying our measures of relation structure, we shall build matter and fields of force obeying identically the principle of field laws; the atoms will individually be in no way different from those which are without the unity in the background. But it seems plausible that when we consider their collective behaviour we shall have to take account of the broader unifying trends in the mind stuff and not expect the statistical results to agree with those appropriate to structures of haphazard origin." 1.

"In the case of nature, as in the case of a particular portion of nature known as our fellow men, we are dealing with phenomenal signs of a vast conscious process. When you deal with nature you deal with a vast realm of finite consciousness of which your own is at once a part and an example." 2.

The relations and contacts between man and reality, between the particular individual consciousness and the ontologically ultimate consciousness, which make up what we call in general, knowledge, must be conceived neither as a kind of picking and choosing by the individual consciousness in the realm of a passive nature, nor as the impression on the individual consciousness of a rigid and inexorable legalistic universe of hard facts. Rather, knowledge must be considered as the consequence of the meeting of two active minds - the human and the Ultimate or Divine - which in its essence is not different in kind from the relationship of two human minds. If one may reverently introduce the comparison; the relation between man and his world is not different from the relation which exists between the religious consciousness of a believing Christian and the personality of his living Christ. This comparison is more than an analogy - it is a sample and an example. It, itself, gives expression in a particular sphere of knowledge to that which pertains to knowledge in general. The risen Christ is to the religious consciousness what the ontologically Ultimate is to the general individual consciousness. Both involve individual selection

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or interest, both involve an external or absolute world or Mind, and both involve an historical or natural setting. And furthermore, this relationship of the religious sphere is an integral part of the general relationship which prevails in the sphere of knowledge in general. That is, our religious knowledge is an integral part of our knowledge of the world.

It may seem that in putting the matter thus the discussion is brought from the pure realm of philosophic terminology to the vulgar sphere of human emotions. But from this position we will not retreat, for this is our contention, that personality (including that side of its nature relating to feelings and emotions) contains the key which opens the door to the ontologically real - because the ontologically real must be conceived in terms of personality. Let us then repeat with emphasis: all knowledge is value knowledge in that it demands reference to mind and to purpose. Value takes us to the heart of the real - to the mind of God.

"The idea of the summum bonum and of an imperishable goal lies in the nature of value as such; and further, it is true that if we will at all, we must of necessity will according to these principles; then a world in which the opposite of these principles were true, in which there were no finality in the sense of an increasing purpose, no finality in the sense of an imperishable goal, would be an intolerable world, and to this extent wholly unintelligible." ¹

However, any attempt to give expression to this contact of the individual or finite consciousness and the infinite or ultimate Mind, in terms of the weal or woe of the person or persons concerned or in terms of the requirements of current and historical discourse and forms of thought, yield on the one hand "valuable" knowledge, and on the other hand natural and scientific knowledge. In other words, when we ask ourselves when "I" come into the picture and how does the world concern my particular self, then we enter the sphere of the valuable. And when we attempt to measure and weigh and compute the constituents of the world we live in, we find ourselves within the sphere of natural knowledge. As Sant has suggested, knowledge is made up of our experience or contact with reality, viewed through particular kinds of coloured glasses.

Ritschl's error now becomes clear. His confusion of

¹ Urban. - op.cit. - p.343
thought between "value" and valuable led him to consider that the latter term included all that was in the former. The result was that he tried to interpret and explain the data of the religious consciousness in terms of their "for me" or "to me" reference. The error involved is not only in neglecting an important part of the subject matter, but in that the whole theological structure built upon this inadequate basis becomes confused.

Similarly, the error of the materialistic and mechanistic philosophy of the last century is now clear also. It was presumptuous. It not only refused to recognize an important subject matter, but also in consequence of this neglect, the structure which it erected on its own subject matter was defective and inadequate.

However, within their own sphere, each of these types of knowledge - valuable and natural - seems to possess a kind of ultimateness that conveys the impression of finality. There seems no possibility of interpreting scientific knowledge in terms of valuable knowledge or vice versa. Obviously any such attempt would repudiate the essential character of each. Within the realm of the valuable itself this same distinction holds between the current distinctions of the good, the beautiful and the true. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other stultifies the claims of either or both. The same thing holds in the realm of natural knowledge, when an attempt to explain biology in terms of physics, or chemistry in terms of astronomy but confuses the position of each. The point is, that the categories upon which the structure of knowledge is built becomes fixed and immovable once the structure rests upon them. They have the appearance of finality and it is probable that it is this appearance which led to the fanciful and extravagant claims both of the Romanticists and the Natural scientists of the last century.

The fundamental matter which all types of knowledge share in common is that each helps toward the understanding of reality. Within its own sphere each type of knowledge presents a true picture - a picture not of the complete and ultimate Creation, but of that part of it comprehended and comprehensible from that particular point of view. From the standpoint of the individual consciousness (whether it be with regard to its understanding of the world in terms of its own weal and woe - valuable knowledge -, or whether it be with regard to its categorical comprehension of the world - natural knowledge) no reconciliation seems possible.
Natural knowledge may point toward an ultimate Creator and an absolute Mind, but it cannot say whether this Being is good or bad, god or devil. Valuable knowledge may speak of this Being in moral terms but it cannot guarantee its reality apart from a "valuable for me" reference. From the standpoint of each, each presents a viewpoint mutually excluding the other. Each definitely and finally limits itself to a partial intercourse - a limited contact - with the Ultimate, and consequently neither valuable knowledge nor natural knowledge can claim adequately to present or represent the ontologically Ultimate.

What then can lay claim to present and represent the ontologically Ultimate - the Supreme Mind? The answer is, that it is that activity of the consciousness (shall we call it intuition) which has as its special and primary concern, not the nature of the physical world as such, and not the individual's weal and woe as such, but precisely the nature of this Being who stands at the point of synthesis of all knowledge. As has been said in concluding the treatment of the requirements of religious knowledge, the supremacy of the religious Weltanschauung must be recognised in every sphere of knowledge. If it is ultimate in religion it must be ultimate where ever knowledge pretends to a contact with reality. 1.

Furthermore, this supremacy is not merely a matter of faith. That is, it is more than a pious hope. If it is valid within the sphere of faith it is valid in every sphere and could not be valid as a postulate of faith unless it had a prior and an a priori objective reality. Religion demands that the world admit of interpretation in such a way as to validate this claim.

The consideration of the position of modern scientific knowledge has indicated that, to say the least, natural knowledge does not and cannot present a rival claim. And more than this, natural knowledge points to, if it does not require, a Supreme Mind. THE VALUES OF RELIGION ARE THE ULTIMATE VALUES FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF THE UNIVERSE.

J.S. Haldane in a recent interview reported in the British Weekly, gives clear statement to this. His statement may be quoted in conclusion. "(Modern Science) "shows that in the ultimate analysis the universe can be nothing less than the progressive manifestation of God. Nothing but God's existence can

1 see pp. 109-10.
impart objective reality to what appears to us imperfectly, first in physical then in biological and finally in psychological interpretation. --- Religion, as the realisation of this puts heart and courage into the pursuit of what is right, true and beautiful. It also helps us face every apparent ill with a stout heart. Religion is just the realisation that not only is God present within us, but also in all things around us, both in space and in time. In religion evolution receives a spiritual interpretation as God's progressive manifestation."

1March 3rd., 1932.
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ALBRECHT RITSCHL, HIS FOLLOWERS AND CRITICS.

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