Judgement Internalism and Supererogation

Abstract

A curious feature of the literature on motivational judgement internalism is the absence of a discussion of which moral judgements are expected to motivate and how. This dissertation aims to address this issue by investigating what account an internalist can give of judgements of supererogation. This investigation will proceed in three stages. First I will investigate the difference between judging that something is a moral obligation and judging that it is supererogatory. I will argue that, unlike judgements of obligation, there is no reliable connection between judgements of supererogation and motivation. Next I will look at what account a judgement internalist can give of the necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation that is compatible with existence of moral judgements that we do not expect people to be motivated by. I will argue that an all things considered reasons internalism is able to give such an account but cannot explain the motivational power of judgements of supererogation. I will then argue that positing an internal connection between judgements of supererogation and feelings of admiration allows for an internalist account that is capable of explaining the ability of judgements of supererogation to motivate.