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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/1842/4753
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Files in This Item:
| File |
Description |
Size | Format |
Thesis.zip | File not available for download | 15.77 MB | Unknown | | | OShea2010.pdf | PhD thesis | 3.77 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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| Title: | Verification and validation of security protocol implementations |
| Authors: | O’Shea, Nicholas |
| Supervisor(s): | Gilmore, Stephen Stark, Ian |
| Issue Date: | 2010 |
| Publisher: | The University of Edinburgh |
| Abstract: | Security protocols are important and widely used because they enable secure communication
to take place over insecure networks. Over the years numerous formal methods
have been developed to assist protocol designers by analysing models of these
protocols to determine their security properties. Beyond the design stage however, developers
rarely employ formal methods when implementing security protocols. This
may result in implementation flaws often leading to security breaches.
This dissertation contributes to the study of security protocol analysis by advancing
the emerging field of implementation analysis. Two tools are presented which together
translate between Java and the LySa process calculus. Elyjah translates Java implementations
into formal models in LySa. In contrast, Hajyle generates Java implementations
from LySa models. These tools and the accompanying LySa verification tool perform
rapid static analysis and have been integrated into the Eclipse Development Environment.
The speed of the static analysis allows these tools to be used at compile-time
without disrupting a developer’s workflow. This allows us to position this work in the
domain of practical software tools supporting working developers.
As many of these developers may be unfamiliar with modelling security protocols a
suite of tools for the LySa process calculus is also provided. These tools are designed to
make LySa models easier to understand and manipulate. Additional tools are provided
for performance modelling of security protocols. These allow both the designer and
the implementor to predict and analyse the overall time taken for a protocol run to
complete.
Elyjah was among the very first tools to provide a method of translating between
implementation and formal model, and the first to use either Java for the implementation
language or LySa for the modelling language. To the best of our knowledge,
the combination of Elyjah and Hajyle represents the first and so far only system which
provides translation from both code to model and back again. |
| Keywords: | security protocols security protocol analysis implementation analysis Elyjah Hajyle LySa |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/1842/4753 |
| Appears in Collections: | Informatics thesis and dissertation collection
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