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http://hdl.handle.net/1842/2092
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| Title: | Utilitarianism and prioritarianism II |
| Authors: | McCarthy, David |
| Issue Date: | Nov-2007 |
| Abstract: | The priority view has become very popular in moral philosophy, but there is a serious question about how
it should be formalized. The most natural formalization leads to ex post prioritarianism, which results from adding
expected utility theory to the main ideas of the priority view. But ex post prioritarianism entails a claim which is
too implausible for it to be a serious competitor to utilitarianism. In fact, ex post prioritarianism was probably
never a genuine alternative to utilitarianism in the first place. By contrast, ex ante prioritarianism is defensible. But
its motivation is very different from the usual rationales offered for the priority view. Given the untenability of ex
post prioritarianism, it is more natural for most friends of the priority view to revert to utilitarianism. |
| Keywords: | philosophy moral philosophy |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/1842/2092 |
| Appears in Collections: | Philosophy research publications
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