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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1979
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| Title: | Theories of team agency |
| Authors: | Gold, Natalie Sugden, Robert |
| Issue Date: | 2007 |
| Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
| Abstract: | In decision theory, it is almost universally presupposed that agency is
invested in individuals: each person acts on her own preferences and
beliefs. A person’s preferences may take account of the effects of her actions
on other people; she may, for example, be altruistic or have an aversion
to inequality. Still, these are her preferences, and she chooses what she
most prefers. Opposing this orthodoxy is a small body of literature which
allows teams of individuals to count as agents, and which seeks to identify
distinctive modes of team reasoning that are used by individuals as members
of teams. This idea has been around for some time, having been proposed in
different forms by David Hodgson (1967), Donald Regan (1980), Margaret
Gilbert (1989), Susan Hurley (1989), Robert Sugden (1993, 2003), Martin
Hollis (1998) and Michael Bacharach (1999, 2006). Closely related, but
less directly concerned with decision theory, is the literature of collective
intentions, exemplified by the work of Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller
(1988), John Searle (1990) and Michael Bratman (1993). These ideas have
yet to capture the attention of mainstream decision theory.
There seems to be a suspicion either that team reasoning is a particular case
of individual reasoning, distinguished only by the particular assumptions
it makes about preferences, or that it is not reasoning in the true sense
of the word. The main contribution of the present paper is to represent
team reasoning explicitly, as a mode of reasoning in which propositions
are manipulated according to well-defined rules—an approach that has
previously been used by Natalie Gold and Christian List (2004). Our basic
building block is the concept of a schema of practical reasoning, in which
conclusions about what actions should be taken are inferred from explicit premises about the decision environment and about what agents are seeking
to achieve. We use this theoretical framework to compare team reasoning
with the individual reasoning of standard decision theory, and to compare
various theories of team agency and collective intentionality. |
| Description: | To appear in "Rationality and Commitment" Feb 2008
http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/EthicsMoralPhilosophy/?view=usa&ci=9780199287260 |
| Keywords: | Moral philosophy |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1979 |
| ISBN: | ISBN13: 9780199287260 |
| Appears in Collections: | Philosophy research publications
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