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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1391
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| Title: | Modularity, Relativism, and Neural Constructivism |
| Authors: | Toribio, Josefa |
| Issue Date: | 2002 |
| Citation: | Toribio, J., “Modularity, Relativism, and Neural Constructivism”. Cognitive Science Quarterly. Vol. 2 (1) 2002, pp. 93-106. |
| Publisher: | Hermes Science Publications |
| Abstract: | Fodor (1983) claims that the modularity of mind (the relatively encapsulated,
insulated, special-purpose nature of the psychological mechanisms
of perception) helps undermine relativism in various forms. I
shall show first, that the modular vision of mind provides insufficient
support for the rejection of (most forms of) relativism, and second, that
an alternative (‘neural constructivist’) model may, in fact, provide a
better empirical response to the relativist challenge. |
| Keywords: | philosophy
encapsulation
modularity
neural-constructivism
perception
plasticity
relativism |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1391 |
| Appears in Collections: | Philosophy research publications
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