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    <dc:date>2013-06-13T01:08:25Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/1842/6566">
    <title>Exclusion and Informality: The Praetorian Politics of Land Management in Cairo, Egypt</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1842/6566</link>
    <description>Title: Exclusion and Informality: The Praetorian Politics of Land Management in Cairo, Egypt
Authors: Dorman, W.J.
Abstract: Since the late 1970s, Western aid agencies, including the US Agency for International Development (AID) and the World Bank, sought to assist the Egyptian government in planning its capital, Cairo. The aim was to foster an administratively competent Egyptian state able to respond, for example, to informal urbanization of the city's agricultural periphery by channelling the city's growth into planned and serviced desert sites. However, these initiatives were almost entirely unsuccessful. Egyptian officials rejected engagement with the informal urbanization process. The projects became enmeshed in bureaucratic struggles over control of valuable state desert land. This article examines these failed planning exercises, first, in order to assess what they indicate about Egypt's authoritarian dispensation of power, in place since 1952 but challenged in the February 2011 overthrow of President Husni Mubarak. It concludes that project failure is diagnostic of the regime's exclusionary nature and the presence of autonomous centres of power such as the Egyptian military. Secondly, the article looks at how this political order shaped Cairo's largely uncontrolled growth by constraining the Egyptian state's capacity to manage it. Thus, urban planning in Cairo reveals how authoritarian power relations have been inscribed upon Egyptian social space.</description>
    <dc:date>2013-02-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <title>The Euro-Outsiders</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1842/3071</link>
    <description>Title: The Euro-Outsiders
Authors: Howarth, D.
Abstract: This concluding article reviews the lessons drawn from the respective case studies of the special issue and returns to the central assumptions of the politics of asymmetry outlined in the Introduction by Miles. A comparative overview of the applicability of the five forms of asymmetry to the euro-outsiders leads to the conclusion that they provide a useful heuristic device to structure future analysis of the debate on EMU membership that will resurface periodically in these countries.</description>
    <dc:date>2005-03-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <title>The Stability Pact and the Construction of European Economic Governance: Introduction</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1842/3070</link>
    <description>Title: The Stability Pact and the Construction of European Economic Governance: Introduction
Authors: Howarth, D.</description>
    <dc:date>2004-10-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <title>The European Central Bank: The Bank that rules Europe?</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1842/3069</link>
    <description>Title: The European Central Bank: The Bank that rules Europe?
Authors: Howarth, D.
Abstract: The power of the European Central Bank (ECB) is rooted in its independence established in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This power is reinforced though the bank’s monetary policy credibility—achieved through meeting its price stability mandate, whilst resisting political pressures to manipulate monetary policy to other ends. This credibility contributes to the ideational power of the ECB which is rooted in widespread support for price stability, one of the core objectives of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The ECB’s relative power, as one of the two leading central banks in the world, is determined by the relative size of the Euro Area economy and the growing importance of the euro as an international reserve currency. The ECB is the leading face of the Euro Area abroad and a new and important presence in several international economic fora. The ECB is responsible for coordinating the policy making of Eurosystem NCBs in a range of areas and NCB discussions on inflation forecasts. However, there are clear limits to the ECB’s power. It controls neither exchange-rate policy nor prudential supervision. Limits have been placed upon its international role. The ECB must work with governments to build support for low inflationary policies and maintain political support EMU. It must also share many core central banking operations with Eurosystem national central banks (NCBs). This chapter explores the confines of European Central Bank power.</description>
    <dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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